IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA

STATE OF ARIZONA,

Appellee,

v.

RODNEY CHRISTOPHER JONES,

Appellant.

No. CR-18-0370-PR

Filed May 28, 2019

Appeal from the Superior Court in Yavapai County 

The Honorable Tina R. Ainley, Judge

No. P1300CR201400328

REVERSED

Opinion of the Court of Appeals, Division One

245 Ariz. 46 (App. 2018)

VACATED

COUNSEL:

Sheila Polk, Yavapai County Attorney, Dennis M. McGrane, Chief Deputy 

County Attorney, Benjamin D. Kreutzberg (argued), Deputy County 

Attorney, Prescott, Attorneys for State of Arizona

Robert A. Mandel (argued), Taylor C. Young, Mandel Young PLC, Phoenix; 

and Lee Stein, Anna H. Finn, Mitchell Stein Carey Chapman, PC, Phoenix,

Attorneys for Rodney Christopher Jones

Sarah L. Mayhew, Tucson, Attorney for Amicus Curiae Arizona Attorneys 

for Criminal Justice; and Thomas W. Dean, Phoenix, Attorney for Amicus 

Curiae National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws

Eric M. Fraser, Osborn Maledon, P.A., Phoenix, Attorneys for Amicus 

Curiae Arizona Dispensaries Association
STATE V. JONES

Opinion of the Court

2

Gary Michael Smith, Smith Saks, PLC, Phoenix, Attorney for Amicus 

Curiae Will Humble

Gaye L. Gould, Janet E. Jackim, Philip R. Rudd, Sacks Tierney P.A., 

Scottsdale, Attorneys for Amici Curiae Physicians

Sharon A. Urias, Greenspoon Marder LLP, Scottsdale; and John H. Pelzer, 

Greenspoon Marder LLP, Ft. Lauderdale, FL, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae 

MPX Bioceutical Corporation

Jared G. Keenan, Kathleen E. Brody, American Civil Liberties Union 

Foundation of Arizona, Phoenix; and Emma A. Andersson, American Civil 

Liberties Union, New York, NY, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Qualifying 

Patients and Caregivers

Elizabeth Burton Ortiz, Arizona Prosecuting Attorneys’ Advisory Council, 

Phoenix, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Arizona Prosecuting Attorneys’

Advisory Council

Alex Lane, Lane, Hupp, Crowley, PLC, Phoenix, Attorneys for Amici 

Curiae Jennifer Welton and Alex Lane

Kathi Mann Sandweiss, Lawrence E. Wilk, Thomas S. Moring, Jaburg & 

Wilk, P.C., Phoenix, Attorneys for Receiver for Green Hills Patient Center, 

Inc. 

VICE CHIEF JUSTICE BRUTINEL authored the opinion of the Court, in 

which CHIEF JUSTICE BALES and JUSTICES TIMMER, BOLICK, GOULD, 

LOPEZ, and PELANDER (RETIRED) joined.

VICE CHIEF JUSTICE BRUTINEL, opinion of the Court:

¶1 Rodney Christopher Jones appeals his convictions and 

sentences arising from his possession of hashish, a form of cannabis resin, 

A.R.S. §§ 13-3401(4)(a), -3408(A)(1), arguing that the Arizona Medical 

Marijuana Act (“AMMA”) immunizes his conduct. AMMA defines 

marijuana as including “all parts of any plant of the genus cannabis 

whether growing or not.” A.R.S. § 36-2801(8). Consistent with this 

language, we hold that AMMA’s definition of marijuana includes both its 

dried-leaf/flower form and extracted resin, including hashish.
STATE V. JONES

Opinion of the Court

3

I.

¶2 In March 2013, Jones—a registered qualifying patient under 

AMMA—was found in possession of a jar containing 1.43 grams, or 0.050 

ounces, of hashish. Jones was charged with possession of cannabis and 

possession of drug paraphernalia (the jar). As defined by Arizona’s

criminal code, cannabis is a narcotic drug, § 13-3401(20)(w), consisting of

“[t]he resin extracted from any part of a plant of the genus cannabis, and 

every compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture or preparation of 

such plant, its seeds or its resin,” § 13-3401(4)(a).

¶3 Jones moved to dismiss the charges, arguing his use was 

allowed under AMMA. Relying on State v. Bollander, 110 Ariz. 84 (1973), 

the State argued that AMMA does not displace the criminal code 

distinctions between cannabis, § 13-3401(4)(a), and marijuana, 

§ 13-3401(19), and that AMMA only provides a defense for the use of 

marijuana from which the resin has not been extracted. Agreeing with the 

State, the trial court denied Jones’s motion. After a bench trial, Jones was 

convicted as charged and sentenced to concurrent 2.5-year prison terms.

¶4 The court of appeals affirmed Jones’s convictions in a divided 

opinion, holding that AMMA did not immunize his possession of cannabis. 

State v. Jones, 245 Ariz. 46, 49–50 ¶¶ 9–15 (App. 2018). We granted review 

to determine whether AMMA immunizes cannabis, a recurring issue of 

statewide importance. We have jurisdiction under article 6, section 5(3) of 

the Arizona Constitution.

II.

¶5 “We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo.” 

Reed-Kaliher v. Hoggatt, 237 Ariz. 119, 122 ¶ 6 (2015). Because AMMA was 

passed by voter initiative, our primary objective “is to give effect to the 

intent of the electorate.” Id. (quoting State v. Gomez, 212 Ariz. 55, 57 ¶ 11 

(2006)). The most reliable indicator of that intent is the language of the 

statute, and if it is clear and unambiguous, we apply its plain meaning and 

the inquiry ends. State v. Burbey, 243 Ariz. 145, 147 ¶ 7 (2017).

¶6 Passed in 2010, “AMMA permits those who meet statutory 

conditions to use medical marijuana.” Reed-Kaliher, 237 Ariz. at 122 ¶ 7. 

AMMA does so by “broadly immuniz[ing] qualified patients” for their 
STATE V. JONES

Opinion of the Court

4

medical marijuana use and by “carving out only narrow exceptions from

its otherwise sweeping grant of immunity.” Id. ¶ 8 (citing A.R.S. 

§ 36-2811(B)). Specifically, AMMA provides protection “[f]or the registered 

qualifying patient’s medical use of marijuana pursuant to this chapter, [so 

long as] the registered qualifying patient does not possess more than the 

allowable amount of marijuana.” § 36-2811(B)(1). AMMA defines 

“marijuana” to mean “all parts of any plant of the genus cannabis whether 

growing or not, and the seeds of such plant.” § 36-2801(8).

¶7 The court of appeals’ majority determined that voters only 

intended to immunize the use of marijuana as defined by the criminal code, 

meaning the dried leaves or flowers of the cannabis plant, but not the use 

of cannabis, the resin extracted from the marijuana plant. Jones, 245 Ariz. 

at 49 ¶ 9 (“[B]y not specifically including extracted resin within its 

description of immunized marijuana, AMMA adopts the preexisting law 

distinguishing between cannabis and marijuana.” (internal quotation

marks omitted)); see also § 13-3401(19) (defining “marijuana” to mean “all 

parts of any plant of the genus cannabis, from which the resin has not been 

extracted”); cf. Bollander, 110 Ariz. at 87 (concluding “that the legislature has 

recognized hashish and marijuana as two distinct forms of cannabis”). We 

disagree.

¶8 We start with the statutory language. Because AMMA 

specifically defines “marijuana,” we apply the statutory definition and look 

to neither the criminal code nor common understanding. See Enloe v. Baker, 

94 Ariz. 295, 298 (1963). Indeed, AMMA’s definition of “marijuana” stands 

on its own: it neither cross-references nor incorporates the criminal code 

definition. Cf. State v. Pirello, 282 P.3d 662, 663–65 ¶¶ 11–18 (Mont. 2012)

(recognizing that the Montana Medical Marijuana Act cross-references and 

incorporates the criminal code distinction between marijuana and hashish).

¶9 AMMA defines “marijuana” as “all parts of [the] plant.” 

§ 36-2801(8). The word “all,” one of the most comprehensive words in the 

English language, means exactly that. See Flood Control Dist. of Maricopa Cty. 

v. Gaines, 202 Ariz. 248, 252 ¶ 9 (App. 2002). “Part” means “an essential 

portion or integral element,” or, as relevant here, “one of the constituent

elements of a plant or animal body.” Part, Merriam-Webster, 

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/part (last visited May 20, 

2019). Taken together, “all parts” refers to all constituent elements of the 
STATE V. JONES

Opinion of the Court

5

marijuana plant, and the fact the resin must first be extracted from the plant 

reflects that it is part of the plant.

¶10 The State nevertheless argues AMMA does not apply to resin 

or its extracts. Again, we disagree. Section 36-2811(B)(1) immunizes the 

patient’s “medical use” of marijuana, defined to mean “the acquisition, 

possession, cultivation, manufacture, use, administration, delivery, transfer 

or transportation of marijuana or paraphernalia relating to the 

administration of marijuana to treat or alleviate a registered qualifying 

patient’s debilitating medical condition.” § 36-2801(9) (emphasis added). 

AMMA does not define “manufacture” but it commonly means “to make 

into a product suitable for use.” Manufacture, Merriam-Webster, 

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/manufacture (last visited 

May 20, 2019); see also § 13-3401(17) (defining “manufacture” in the criminal 

code as to “produce, prepare, propagate, compound, mix or process, 

directly or indirectly, by extraction from substances of natural origin or 

independently by means of chemical synthesis, or by a combination of 

extraction and chemical synthesis” (emphasis added)). AMMA anticipates 

not only that dispensaries will produce marijuana in edible form, see

§ 36-2801(15) (defining “usable marijuana” to include mixtures or 

preparations, to be “prepared for consumption as food or drink”), but also

that patients will “consume[ marijuana] by a method other than smoking,” 

see A.R.S. § 36-2805(A)(3). Taken together, these statutes indicate AMMA’s 

intent to allow the manufacture and preparation of parts of the marijuana 

plant for medical use, including extracting the resin.

¶11 We are likewise unpersuaded by the State’s argument that 

§§ 36-2811(B)(1) and 36-2801(1), (15) limit marijuana use to dried flowers. 

Section 36-2811(B)(1) provides that a registered qualifying patient may not 

possess more “than the allowable amount of marijuana.” Section 36-2801(1) 

provides that the allowable amount of marijuana is two-and-one-half 

ounces of “usable marijuana,” which § 36-2801(15) defines as “the dried 

flowers of the marijuana plant, and any mixture or preparation thereof, but 

does not include the seeds, stalks and roots of the plant and does not 

include the weight of any non-marijuana ingredients combined with 

marijuana and prepared for consumption as food or drink.” The State 

argues that by conjunction these provisions limit marijuana use to “dried 

flowers.” See People v. Carruthers, 837 N.W.2d 16, 21–24 (Mich. Ct. App. 

2013) (giving controlling weight to the Michigan Medical Mari[j]uana Act’s 

definition of “usable mari[j]uana,” meaning “dried leaves and flowers of 
STATE V. JONES

Opinion of the Court

6

the mari[j]uana plant,” and concluding it does not include “all parts” of the 

cannabis plant or its resin).

¶12 But § 36-2811(B)(1) protects “the registered qualifying 

patient’s medical use of marijuana,” not just the use of the dried flowers of the 

marijuana plant. (Emphasis added.) Section 36-2801(8) provides the 

definition of marijuana, and nothing in § 36-2801(1) or (15) alters its 

meaning. Rather, by its own language, the limitation in § 36-2801(1) and 

(15) pertains only to the amount of marijuana the patient can legally possess, 

not the type or form of marijuana one may possess and use. See Amount, 

Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/

amount (last visited May 20, 2019) (defining “amount” to mean “the total 

number or quantity”). Accordingly, we decline to follow Carruthers.

1

¶13 Section 36-2806.02 supports this view. First, it authorizes 

dispensaries to dispense “marijuana”: it includes no reference or limitation 

to “usable marijuana.” § 36-2806.02(A)–(B). We decline to adopt an 

interpretation that presents contradictory definitions and allows the 

dispensary to dispense “marijuana”—all parts of the plant—but only 

allows the patient to receive “usable marijuana”—the dried flowers of the 

plant. See Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation 

of Legal Texts 180 (2012) (“The provisions of a text should be interpreted in 

a way that renders them compatible, not contradictory.”). Second, in 

dispensing marijuana, the dispensary is required to list “[h]ow much 

marijuana is being dispensed,” § 36-2806.02(B)(1), and to determine 

whether the amount to be dispensed would cause patients to exceed their 

two-and-one-half-ounce limit, § 36-2806.02(A)(3). Section 36-2806.02 thus 

supports our interpretation that the limitation refers to the quantity of 

marijuana that may be dispensed, not its type or form.

¶14 The State contends that such a reading will result in the 

allowance of two-and-one-half ounces of cannabis, equivalent to far more 

than two-and-one-half ounces of dried flowers and leaves. We disagree. In 

defining what AMMA protects, § 36-2801(8) defines marijuana broadly. See 

supra ¶¶ 9–12; see also § 36-2811(B) (immunizing the “qualifying patient’s 

medical use of marijuana”). In defining how much marijuana may be 

 

1 Post-Carruthers, the Michigan Medical Mari[j]uana Act’s definition of 

“usable mari[j]uana” was amended to include “resin” and “extract.” See 

Mich. Comp. Laws § 333.26423(n).
STATE V. JONES

Opinion of the Court

7

possessed, however, § 36-2801(1) and (15) define the weight more narrowly. 

See § 36-2811(B) (limiting patients’ marijuana possession to the “allowable 

amount of marijuana”). Section 36-2801(1) provides that the “allowable 

amount of marijuana” is “[t]wo-and-one-half ounces of usable marijuana,” 

which subsection (15) defines as “the dried flowers of the marijuana plant, 

and any mixture or preparation thereof.” AMMA’s weight limitation is 

based on “two-and-one-half ounces” of “the dried flowers of the marijuana 

plant,” regardless of the weight of the product manufactured from those 

flowers.

¶15 As stated above, AMMA extends to manufactured marijuana 

products using extracted resin. See supra ¶ 10. Under § 36-2801(15), these

products are “mixture[s] or preparation[s]” of the dried flowers of the 

marijuana plant. We therefore read § 36-2801(1) and (15) to mean 

qualifying patients are allowed two-and-one-half ounces of dried flowers, 

or mixtures or preparations made from two-and-one-half ounces of dried 

flowers.2

¶16 A plain reading of the relevant provisions compels our

conclusion that AMMA protects the use of “marijuana,” including resin, so 

long as the patient does not exceed the allowable amount and otherwise 

complies with the statutory requirements. Consideration of AMMA’s 

purpose and ballot materials support this plain reading. See Ruiz v. Hull, 

191 Ariz. 441, 450 ¶ 36 (1998) (stating that we may consider ballot materials

in construing initiatives).

¶17 AMMA appeared on the 2010 ballot as Proposition 203. The 

accompanying ballot materials stated Proposition 203’s purpose was to 

“protect patients with debilitating medical conditions . . . from arrest and

prosecution” for their “medical use of marijuana.” Ariz. Sec’y of State, 2010 

Publicity Pamphlet 73 (2010), https://apps.azsos.gov/election/

2010/info/PubPamphlet/english/e-book.pdf. Proposition 203 was 

intended to allow the use of marijuana in connection with a wide array of 

debilitating medical conditions, including “cancer, glaucoma, . . . 

amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, Crohn’s disease, [and] agitation of 

Alzheimer’s disease,” including “relief [from] nausea, vomiting and other 

 

2 We express no opinion on how much resin may be extracted from, or how 

much “mixture” may be obtained from, two-and-one-half ounces of dried 

flowers.
STATE V. JONES

Opinion of the Court

8

side effects of drugs” used to treat debilitating conditions. Id. It is 

implausible that voters intended to allow patients with these conditions to 

use marijuana only if they could consume it in dried-leaf/flower form. 

Such an interpretation would preclude the use of marijuana as an option 

for those for whom smoking or consuming those parts of the marijuana 

plants would be ineffective or impossible. Consistent with voter intent, our 

interpretation enables patients to use medical marijuana to treat their 

debilitating medical conditions, in whatever form best suits them, so long 

as they do not possess more than the allowable amount.

¶18 Separately, the State argues AMMA is preempted by the 

Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, which is 

comprised of two components, the Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”), 21 

U.S.C. §§ 801–971, and the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”), 21 

U.S.C. §§ 301–399i. But the State did not raise this argument before the 

court of appeals or in its petition for review to this Court. Though the State 

urges us to nevertheless consider the issue because it is one of statewide 

importance, see, e.g., Barrio v. San Manuel Div. Hosp. for Magma Copper Co., 

143 Ariz. 101, 104 (1984), we previously rejected a preemption challenge 

based on the CSA in Reed-Kaliher, 237 Ariz. at 123–25 ¶¶ 18–24, and the State 

offers no persuasive reason to revisit that decision. As to the FDCA, the 

State’s preemption argument is undeveloped, and we thus decline to 

consider it. See Hawkins v. Allstate Ins. Co., 152 Ariz. 490, 503 (1987) (stating 

the Court may hear issues though they were not properly raised but 

declining to exercise that power).

III.

¶19 We hold that the definition of marijuana in § 36-2801(8) 

includes resin, and by extension hashish, and that § 36-2811(B)(1) 

immunizes the use of such marijuana consistent with AMMA. We reverse

the trial court’s ruling denying Jones’s motion to dismiss, vacate the court 

of appeals’ opinion, and vacate Jones’s convictions and sentences.