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57–608PDF 2010

ASSESSING THE MERIDA INITIATIVE:

A REPORT FROM THE GOVERNMENT

ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (GAO)

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JULY 21, 2010

Serial No. 111–109

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California, Chairman 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BILL DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

MICHAEL E. MCMAHON, New York 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

JOHN S. TANNER, Tennessee 

GENE GREEN, Texas 

LYNN WOOLSEY, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

BARBARA LEE, California 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

MIKE ROSS, Arkansas 

BRAD MILLER, North Carolina 

DAVID SCOTT, Georgia 

JIM COSTA, California 

KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

RON KLEIN, Florida 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

RON PAUL, Texas 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

BOB INGLIS, South Carolina 

GUS BILIRAKIS, Florida 

RICHARD J. KESSLER, Staff Director 

YLEEM POBLETE, Republican Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York, Chairman 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GENE GREEN, Texas 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

ENI F. H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

JOHN S. TANNER, Tennessee 

BARBARA LEE, California 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

RON KLEIN, Florida 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

RON PAUL, Texas 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

GUS BILIRAKIS, Florida 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESS 

Mr. Jess T. Ford, Director, International Affairs and Trade Team, United 

States Government Accountability Office (GAO) ............................................... 10

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Eliot L. Engel, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of New York, and Chairman, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere: 

Prepared statement .............................................................................................. 3

Mr. Jess T. Ford: Prepared statement ................................................................... 13

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 36

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 37

The Honorable Connie Mack, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Florida: Prepared statement ........................................................................... 38

The Honorable Christopher H. Smith, a Representative in Congress from 

the State of New Jersey: Prepared statement ................................................... 39

Written responses from Mr. Jess T. Ford to questions submitted for the 

record by the Honorable Eliot L. Engel .............................................................. 40

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ASSESSING THE MERIDA INITIATIVE: A REPORT FROM THE GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (GAO) 

WEDNESDAY, JULY 21, 2010

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:45 p.m., in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Eliot L. Engel (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. ENGEL. The subcommittee will come to order. 

Our hearing today is ‘‘Assessing the Merida Initiative: A Report 

from the Government Accountability Office,’’ or the GAO. 

On Sunday, 18 people were murdered in cold blood at a party in 

northern Mexico. This came just 3 days after a car bomb killed several people in Ciudad Juarez. And it came a week after the Ninth 

U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals ordered immigration judges to seriously consider granting asylum to Guatemalan women who fear 

they will be murdered in a country where more than 3,800 women 

have been killed since 2000. 

Nobody can bring back the lives of the many people tragically 

killed through drug-related and other violence in Mexico and Central America. But if we are to avoid future tragedies of this magnitude, we must redouble our efforts to support a holistic security 

strategy. 

Such a strategy must confront drug cartels head-on while also investing in drug and violence prevention and treatment programs, 

both in Latin America and here at home. One such effort that I 

have championed here in Congress is the Merida Initiative. 

Today, the Government Accountability Office is releasing a report that I commissioned, along with Ranking Member Mack, on 

the Merida Initiative and the Central American piece of Merida, 

which is now known as the Central America Regional Security Initiative, or CARSI. 

Let me start with the good news from the report. 

In December, the GAO issued an interim report on the slow 

speed of Merida assistance to Mexico and Central America. Since 

then, the GAO reports that the Obama administration has picked 

up the pace in getting essential equipment and training to our 

partners in these countries. 

I commend President Obama and Secretary Clinton for cutting 

through our Government’s red tape to get the Merida Initiative 

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moving. In the coming months, we must continue to expedite our 

assistance to Mexico and Central America. 

On a more disappointing note, however, today’s report notes that, 

nearly 3 years and $1.6 billion after the announcement of the 

Merida Initiative, our counternarcotics assistance to Mexico and 

Central America lacks fundamental measurements of success. 

Specifically, the GAO found that the State Department’s performance measures, and I quote from the report, ‘‘do not provide 

measurable targets and do not measure outcomes.’’ As the GAO report notes, and I quote again, ‘‘Without targets to strive toward, 

State cannot determine if it is meeting expectations under the 

Merida Initiative.’’

Now, I just want to say this, and I want to say it very emphatically: Our long history of counternarcotics spending in the Western 

Hemisphere demands that we had better define our goals. 

You all have heard me express my concerns in this subcommittee 

about coordination of the Merida Initiative. The GAO report notes 

that tracking Merida funds is difficult, as each of the three State 

Department bureaus managing these funds has a different method. 

It is really incredible to me that there is still no consolidated database for tracking these funds. If the State Department cannot track 

its own funding, then how can we in Congress exercise appropriate 

oversight? We can and must do better than this. 

I have long called for a coordinator at the State Department for 

our security programs in the Americas, and this is just another 

reason why we need it. I have had this discussion with Secretary 

Clinton, and she was favorable. I hope we can move forward and 

get a coordinator for our security programs in the Americas. This 

would help us in Merida funding; it would help us understand 

what is happening with the funding. It is ridiculous to keep calling 

the State Department and, each time, getting a different person to 

find out what is really going on with Merida. 

With regard to the Central America Regional Security Initiative, 

or CARSI, I was stunned to learn that the narcotics affairs section 

at the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City serves as the account manager 

for funds destined for Central America. I cannot understand why 

this extra layer of bureaucracy is needed. 

And, finally, unlike Mexico, in Central America there is no formal coordination mechanism in place between U.S. agencies and 

their host-government counterparts working on CARSI implementation. This cannot continue and must be improved. 

I would like to thank the Government Accountability Office for 

its excellent report. In addition to Mr. Ford, who is testifying here 

today, I greatly appreciate the contributions from Juan Gobel, 

Marc Castellano, Marisela Perez, Erin Saunders Rath, and Judith 

Williams. 

Thank you. 

And I now call on Mr. McCaul for his opening statement. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Engel follows:]

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Mr. MCCAUL. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for 

holding this hearing on a foreign policy issue that I consider to be 

one of the most important facing the United States and Mexico. 

I remember years ago traveling down to Mexico City with—I see 

Congressman Cuellar just arrived. We visited with newly elected 

President Calderon, talked to him. He said security was his number-one issue. And he said, ‘‘But I need your help,’’ and, in a very 

bold way, asked for military assistance from the United States. 

And I say that was bold for a Mexican President to be able to make 

that ask. I am glad to say that we met that request by President 

Calderon, and we began the Merida Initiative. 

Since that visit, though, about 25,000 people have died in Mexico 

at the hands of the drug cartels. In recent weeks, we have seen 

that violence escalate, the U.S. Consular Office in Juarez being 

under attack, under siege; Nuevo Laredo; and this past week, as 

the chairman referenced, a car bomb, in a sort of Iraq-Afghanistan 

style, went off in Juarez, just south of the border from El Paso, 

Texas, my home State. 

Their expanding expertise reinforces the belief that the cartels 

are actively working with terrorist organizations. And it is crucial 

that the United States stand strong in its commitment to dismantle the drug trafficking organizations and, in doing so, that we 

uphold our commitments to the President of Mexico, as he aggressively attacks the drug trafficking networks. 

He does not take this lightly, nor do I. We all know how violent 

the situation is and how dangerous it is for the Mexican administration to be cracking down on these very dangerous elements that 

are exporting drugs into this country, and violence. 

The last hearing we held on this topic highlighted the slow manner in which the U.S. assistance is reaching the programs established under the Merida Initiative. I appreciate the GAO coming 

here to testify, to report on possible improvement in this area, as 

well as better coordination between U.S. agencies supporting the 

Merida Initiative and with our Mexican counterparts in securing 

our southern border against illicit activity. 

This coordination between the United States and Mexico needs 

to be institutionalized as a standard of our bilateral relationship to 

guarantee that progress cannot be undone. We need to strengthen 

security of our borders, enforce the laws we have on the books, and 

utilize the funds we have appropriated for the Merida Initiative to 

address this violence and illegal activity. 

And as we hear from the GAO’s witness on the recommendations 

for better performance metrics in the Merida Initiative, I will also 

be looking to hear how our current strategy will address the balloon effect of the drug trade. 

I must express my disappointment, as well, to the chairman that, 

since this initiative has begun, only 46 percent of the funds have 

been obligated and only 9 percent of those funds have been expended. I understand that this takes time. I understand that it 

takes time to build helicopters and military hardware. But I hope, 

Mr. Chairman, for the sake of our two countries, that we can expedite this very important initiative. 

And, with that, I yield back. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. McCaul, for an excellent statement. 

6

And I want to also add my voice to my admiration for Mexican 

President Felipe Calderon, who I think has done a really excellent 

job in confronting the drug cartels and letting them know that violence and drug dealing is unacceptable, and we are not going to 

just look the other way and pretend it doesn’t exist. 

So, with that, I call on Mr. Sires for an opening statement. 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding today’s hearing. 

Mr. Ford, nice to see you again. 

Mr. Ford, I remain extremely concerned about the escalating violence within Mexico and the precipitating violence against American citizens in and around our own borders. The revised strategy 

of the Merida Initiative has the potential to improve programs already on the way and to decrease crime and violence. However, my 

colleagues and I on this subcommittee have heard numerous testimonies accounting the historical slow distribution of the Merida assistance. And I fear that, while this new strategy may provide the 

positive changes we need to decrease violence, without changes in 

the distribution of assistance this new strategy may not reach its 

full potential. It is estimated that of $1.6 billion in Merida Initiative funds intended to actively support projects in Mexico and Central America, 

only about 46 percent of the funds have been obligated, and only 

9 percent have been expended. In recent months, we have seen 

some equipment assistance and training provided, but there still 

remains a much larger portion of assistance that has yet to be allocated, making it extremely difficult to fully understand the results 

the Merida Initiative could provide in both countries. We must continue to find ways that the Merida assistance can be allocated in 

the most efficient and responsible fashion. 

We must also continue to work with the Mexican agencies so 

that we may better understand their needs and ensure improvements are made within their agencies in order to guarantee transparent allocation of funding. It has come to my attention that the 

narco groups have circumvented the Mexican Government’s authority across agencies. And we must ensure that the new Merida 

strategy aims to reduce this phenomenon and decreases bloodshed 

in both countries. 

Again, thank you, Chairman Engel, for holding this hearing. And 

I look forward to Mr. Ford’s testimony. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Sires. 

Ms. Lee? 

Ms. LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much for 

this hearing. 

And I want to welcome Mr. Ford to this committee. And I want 

to thank you and your team at GAO for your efforts in putting together this very thorough report. 

Today’s hearing is really very timely, as we work to address the 

vicious spread of illicit drug use and narcotrafficking in the United 

States and Mexico, which continues, and increasing so, to devastate 

families and communities at home and abroad. This report makes 

it obvious that we need better monitoring and evaluation of our 

counternarcotics assistance programs, which, as many of us know, 

is true of our foreign aid programs more generally. 

7

However, I have been critical, myself personally, from the start 

of the initiative, in that it has focused overwhelmingly on military 

aid and supply-side counter-drug efforts. If we continue to operate 

in a vacuum and ignore the root causes of drug trafficking and related violence, then we will continue to see our counternarcotics efforts fail. We need to begin to shift amounts of our foreign counterdrug assistance dollars away from military and supply-side policing 

efforts toward judicial reforms, institution-building, human rights, 

and at-risk youth programs. 

Also, I am a member of the Appropriations Subcommittee on 

State and Foreign Ops, and I requested that at least two-thirds of 

our ESF and our INCLE funding in the Fiscal Year 2011 approps 

bill go toward good governance, rule of law, and human rights activities. 

Also, we need to aggressively and holistically address drug use 

here in our own country at home and the societal harm that drugs 

continue to cause. I support the bill that Chairman Engel has introduced, the Western Hemisphere Drug Policy Commission Act, 

which passed the House in December. And it would create a commission to evaluate not only our supply-side counter-drug strategies but best practices around the world for demand-side policies, 

as well. 

Finally, let me just say, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Ford, I think we 

need to aggressively combat illicit arms trafficking from our own 

country, which any expert in the region will tell you is contributing 

significantly to the spiraling violence that we are witnessing today. 

I wish we could reinstate the assault weapons ban. 

Thank you very much. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Ms. Lee. And I agree with you about the 

illicit gun trafficking. That is something that we have to deal with. 

Mr. Green? 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing 

today. 

I want to thank Director Ford for the GAO report and for appearing before our committee today. 

Almost daily, my hometown newspaper, the Houston Chronicle, 

publishes stories on the violence taking place across the border in 

Mexico. I am sure many of you have learned of the senseless killing 

of 17 people this past weekend in Torreon, Coahuila, a Mexican 

state that borders the Rio Grande River. Media records indicate 

that the killings are believed to be connected to the growing rivalry 

between two of Mexico’s largest drug trafficking organizations, the 

Gulf Cartel and the Zetas. 

Last month, Rodolfo Torre Cantu, the leading candidate in the 

governor’s race in the Mexican state of Tamaulipas, which also borders Texas, was assassinated. It has been reported that the murder 

of Dr. Torre Cantu was also connected to the drug war and the rivalry between the Gulf Cartel and the Zetas. 

I am sure everyone is well aware of the murders of Lesley Ann 

Enriquez, a staff member at the U.S. Consulate in Ciudad Juarez; 

her husband, Arthur Redelfs, an El Paso sheriff’s deputy; and 

Jorge Alberto Salcido, the husband of a Mexican employee at the 

consulate, this past March. These murders are also believed to be 

linked to drug trafficking organizations. 

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The Congressional Research Service has reported that, in 2008, 

5,100 people were killed in drug-trafficking-related violence in 

Mexico. In 2009, that number grew to 6,500. Understandably, people in our district and throughout the Southwest are very concerned about this violence and its potential to spill over into the 

United States. 

Almost 3 years ago, the United States and Mexico agreed on the 

Merida Initiative to stem the tide against organizations like the 

Sinaloa and Gulf cartels, which are responsible for bringing hundreds of tons of cocaine and heroin into this country and for eroding civil society in Mexico. Similar drug trafficking organizations 

are producing similar results in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras. 

This Congress and the American people are expecting results, 

and we cannot afford to allow damaging effects of the illicit drug 

trade and its related violence to continue. We cannot allow further 

delays in Congress’s efforts to provide support to our neighbors. We 

cannot wait for months at a time to go by, due to a slow negotiation 

between agencies. 

This is one of the paramount security concerns of this country 

and our people. We need results, and we need tools and performance measures, and we need targets to strive toward. This is necessary if we want to know if we are even winning this war or if 

we need to examine this matter further and redouble our efforts. 

And, again, Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

And, again, Director Ford, thank you for being here. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Green. 

It is now my pleasure to call on Mr. Cuellar, who is not a member of the committee but has done a lot of work with me on these 

issues. And he chairs the Committee on Homeland Security’s Border, Maritime, and Global Counterterrorism Subcommittee. And we 

held a joint hearing, this subcommittee and his subcommittee. 

So, welcome, Mr. Cuellar. And you may make an opening statement. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate 

the leadership that you have taken on the Merida Initiative. And, 

of course, thank the ranking member from Texas, also, and the 

members of the committee for allowing me to be here. 

Mr. Chairman, I think one of the things we have to keep in 

mind—and, as you know, I am from Laredo, Texas. I live on the 

border. My brother is the sheriff down there on the border itself. 

He has been doing narcotics with the State for about 27 years before that. So I am very familiar with what is happening in Mexico. 

The bottom line is, Mr. Chairman, I think one of the things—and 

yesterday I was on a panel with the Mexican Ambassador, and I 

know he doesn’t like it when I say this, but I think Mexico is where 

Colombia was in the 1980s, 1990s, whether we say no or yes to 

that. But the situation is, one thing we learned from there is that 

this is going to be a long-term battle. It is not going to happen 

overnight, where we are going to win this. 

And this is why these performance measures are so important, 

setting the goals, making sure that we address the goals so we 

know whether we are winning or not. Because it is going to take 

a long time. 

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I know we have some friends from SEDENA coming in tomorrow 

to talk to us, and we will be talking to them. And I understand 

what Ms. Lee is saying that, I think the first part of Merida was 

on the military, but now we have to go into what we call institution-building, the capacity-building, making sure the judiciary system works well, making sure that the prisons, the prosecutorial 

system, and, of course, professionalizing the police. 

If you look at a prosecutor on this side, that prosecutor will have 

about at least a 95 percent chance of prosecuting somebody. In 

Mexico, if you look at it, if they get caught—if they get caught—

and put in the legal system, the prosecutor has less than a 2 percent chance. 

So, therefore, in order to build up the institutions, it is going to 

take time. It is going to take time. And as we build the police force 

and as we start looking at the prosecutorial system and, of course, 

the judiciary and the prison system, all of this is going to take 

time. 

And I think this GAO report is important because we need to 

know what are the—not the big goals of the Merida Initiative is, 

but what are the goals that we want to measure, and what measures are we going to be using to measure those goals. 

Otherwise, we won’t be able to—you know, we can talk about 

measuring activity. How much money have we spent? Nine percent. 

How much has been obligated? Forty-something percent. I understand, like Mr. McCaul and the chairman said, you know, it takes 

time to buy helicopters, it takes time to do all this, but eventually 

we are measuring activity—that is, buying the equipment. 

But I think what is important is, are we winning down there? 

Because if they win down there, if they are successful, and for us 

on the border, we live on the border, we have our families there, 

we drink the water, breathe the air down on the border, we want 

to make sure that that violence doesn’t spill over. 

So, again, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you and your committee for the leadership that you are taking on this Merida Initiative. Thank you. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you very much, Mr. Cuellar. We are happy to 

have you with us today. 

I am now pleased to introduce our distinguished witness today, 

Mr. Jess Ford. Jess is the director for international affairs and 

trade at the Government Accountability Office (GAO) where he has 

worked since 1973. He joined GAO in 1973 and has worked extensively in international affairs, the national security affairs area, 

concerning trade, foreign assistance, and foreign policy issues. He 

has managed GAO audits of the Agency for International Development, the State Department, and the Department of Defense. 

In January 1994, Mr. Ford was selected into GAO’s Senior Executive Service and is currently director, International Affairs and 

Trade. He has directed the completion of numerous studies on U.S. 

National security issues, foreign assistance, counternarcotics, border security, and foreign affairs management activities, and has 

testified before Congress over 40 times on these topics. 

So, Mr. Ford, welcome to the subcommittee. We are all ears. Obviously, the GAO had an important role to play in this report, and 

we are very anxious to hear from you. 

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STATEMENT OF MR. JESS T. FORD, DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND TRADE TEAM, UNITED STATES 

GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (GAO) 

Mr. FORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee. I am pleased to be here today to discuss U.S. support 

to Mexico and Central America on the Merida Initiative. 

As you mentioned, crime and violence in Mexico and Central 

America has continued to increase in recent years and poses a 

threat not only to those areas but also to the United States, particularly along the U.S.-Mexican border. 

To address this growing narcotics and crime issue, in October 

2007 the United States and Mexico launched the Merida Initiative, 

a $1.6 billion effort aimed at supporting law enforcement. The Department of State manages the Merida Initiative and, in cooperation with several other U.S. agencies, is responsible for its implementation. 

My remarks today are based on our report, which is released 

today, entitled, ‘‘Merida Initiative: The United States Has Provided 

Counternarcotics and Anticrime Support but Needs Better Performance Measures.’’

I plan to focus on three topics: First, the status of the Merida 

program implementation; secondly, coordinating mechanisms that 

are in place for the Merida program; and, third, what the State Department strategy for implementation is for the Merida program. 

In brief, Mr. Chairman, we found that, while the United States 

has provided assistance, better performance measures are needed 

to improve the management and accountability of the Merida Initiative. 

The United States has delivered various forms of equipment and 

training under the Merida Initiative. As was mentioned by several 

members, as of March 31st of this year, 46 percent of Fiscal Year 

2008 and 2010 moneys have been obligated for this program, and 

approximately 9 percent has been expended. This is an improvement from what we reported back in December of last year. 

In Mexico, the United States has delivered items including five 

Bell helicopters, biometric equipment, immigration computer equipment, software, laboratory equipment, and canines. In addition, the 

United States has assisted in the training of over 4,000 Federal police recruits in Mexico, has established a law enforcement academy 

in Mexico. And, in Central America, it has delivered some forms of 

equipment, vehicles, and training designed to address the crime 

and gang problem in those locations. 

While the pace of delivery has been slowed by a number of implementation challenges, it has increased, as I mentioned, in the last 

6 months. Deliveries of equipment and training have been delayed 

by challenges associated with insufficient numbers of staff to administer the program, negotiations on interagency and bilateral 

agreements, delays in the procurement processes for some forms of 

equipment, some changes in local governments which slowed the 

delivery of equipment, and funding availability. U.S. agencies are 

working to address these challenges, particularly the Embassy in 

Mexico City and in Central America locations, who are attempting 

to expedite the delivery of assistance. 

11

The State Department has primary responsibility for coordinating the Merida Initiative, which has diverse program components that are being implemented by a wide range of U.S. agencies 

under the leadership of the State Department. Although State has 

not comprehensively documented its coordinating structure for 

Merida, we were able to identify several of the mechanisms they 

put in place to coordinate the program. 

At the highest policy level, the National Security Council is, of 

course, the primary agency for coordinating policy-level efforts with 

Merida. Within the State Department, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for North America and Western Hemisphere Affairs is the 

principal Merida coordinator. However, other State Department offices, such as the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement and other bureaus within the State Department, also 

have focal points who are involved in the implementation of the 

Merida Initiative. 

Similarly, at the Embassy level, there are several coordinating 

mechanisms that have been put in place, both internally, to coordinate all of the agency efforts at the Embassy level, and a bilateral 

coordinating mechanism with the Mexican Government, which we 

had an opportunity to participate in during our visit there back in 

March. 

At this point, there is no formal coordinating mechanism for the 

Central American aspect of the Merida program. And we are waiting to see how the administration will announce the strategy under 

CARSI and what type of mechanisms they may put in place to coordinate the program once that gets under way. 

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I want to talk about the lack of performance measures for the program. 

Earlier this year, the United States and Mexico announced a new 

strategy predicated on four goals: First, to disrupt criminal groups; 

secondly, to reform rule of law and respect for human rights; third, 

to create a 21st-century border; and, fourth, to develop strong and 

resilient communities. 

While the State Department has developed some performance 

metrics for the delivery of assistance, we found that no performance metrics have been established for any of these four goals to 

date. For example, the State Department’s strategic documents do 

not include performance measures to indicate progress toward 

achieving any of these goals or timelines for all future deliveries 

and completion of Merida program moneys. 

Our prior work has shown that including these types of elements 

is important because it helps decision-makers determine whether 

or not the program is being successful and whether or not adjustments may need to be made if things are not working in accordance 

with what the expectations of our Government are. 

In general, State Department’s performance measures do not 

align with the existing goals, do not establish targets to measure 

against, and do not discuss what the outcomes are that are expected under the programs. To address this issue, we add in a recommendation in our report that the State Department establish 

these goals. And they have told us they are in the process of attempting to do this. 

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Finally, on the issues of timelines, we found that the State Department has developed some timelines on deliveries of equipment 

and training, but they do not have, at this point, a comprehensive 

set of timelines for the delivery of equipment or training for the entire program. 

Again, we recommended in our report that they establish such 

timelines, again, so you have a better understanding of when 

things will be delivered, what the schedule looks like, and, if they 

are going to make adjustments, you will be in a position to understand what the adjustments are. Again, the State Department in 

their comments to us on our report indicated that they planned to 

address this issue and establish better timelines for the delivery of 

both equipment and training. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I am going to conclude and try to answer any questions that you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Ford follows:]

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Mr. ENGEL. Thank you very much, Mr. Ford. 

Let me start with this. In your report, you argue that the State 

Department’s performance metrics for the Merida Initiative do not 

provide measurable targets and do not measure outcomes. 

Can you give us examples of what specific targets and outcomes 

you think should be measured by the State Department in evaluating Merida? In other words, how should we define success? 

Mr. FORD. Okay, I think that is an excellent question. Let me 

start with the basics first. 

We haven’t seen any statements of how they are going to measure success under these new four objectives that they just established with the Mexican Government. So I can only notionally answer this in terms of what would be the kind of metrics one might 

look for. I can’t tell you that these are the ones being considered 

by the administration at this point. So I need to make that clear. 

I mean, we have worked in the counter-drug area for years at 

GAO, and there are areas where one could reasonably see potential 

goals and objectives that can be measured to try to judge the success of a program. 

So, in the case of Plan Colombia, the goal was established to try 

to reduce the level of cultivation of coca plants in that country and 

the potential for production of cocaine over a specified period of 

time. Specifically, it called for a 50 percent reduction over 6-year 

period. 

We wrote a report on that in 2008, and we found part of the 

goals were achieved in the area of poppy cultivation, and that the 

goals for coca cultivation were not achieved, although there were 

reductions. The most recent data issued by the ONDCP indicates 

that, as of 2008, there has, in fact, been a greater reduction in the 

amount of cocaine that can be produced. 

Those metrics are available. There are numbers you can measure 

against them, and you can track the progress on a year-to-year 

basis. Now, that is just a notional example based on the Colombia 

program, and I am not suggesting that that would be one you 

would apply here in Mexico. 

But the important point here is, you want to establish a goal. 

You want to establish a benchmark you are going to measure 

against. You want to establish a way of tracking that, a target that 

you want to establish. And that helps one determine whether or 

not you are moving the ball forward and whether you are seeing 

progress. So that is notionally how we see how you might be able 

to determine whether this program is moving forward or not. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. 

In the report, you say that tracking Merida funds is difficult because each of the three State Department bureaus managing 

Merida funds has a different method for tracking. And you note 

that the State Department currently has no consolidated database 

for these funds. I mentioned that in my opening remarks. 

If the State Department can’t even keep track of its own funding, 

how can Members of Congress exercise oversight of the Merida Initiative? This is obviously a serious problem. How serious do you 

think it is? Does it go beyond Merida and impact on our other foreign assistance programs? And, if so, what needs to be done to fix 

this? 

24

Mr. FORD. Okay, let me start by saying, yes, in fact, it is a challenge for the State Department to provide, particularly, real-time 

information on the current status of funding obligations, expenditures, and also a delivery schedule on equipment that is going to 

be provided over a specified period of time. 

With regard to the funding part of this issue, the State Department’s accounting system is not set up based on a concept of programs. It is set up based on a concept of the funding accounts that 

the Congress appropriates the money under. So, for example, Congress provides money under the Economic Support Fund concept. 

They provide money under the INCLE concept, which is counternarcotics money that goes to INL. They provide money under other 

budget accounts. And that is the way the State Department’s accounting system tends to track money, in terms of obligations and 

expenditures. 

What they do not do—and I can certainly say this for Merida, 

and I can’t say conclusively for other programs, although I have 

reason to believe it is true, as well—is that for programmatic programs that Congress puts out, they don’t have a readily available 

system to track, at a program level, what obligations and expenditures are. And that is what the problem is with the Merida program. 

As we mentioned in our report, you have three different bureaus 

in the State Department tracking money that Congress has provided. Part of it is FMF money, part of it is the INCLE money, and 

part of it is the ESF money that Congress has given under this 

program. They have three different bureaus tracking it. They don’t 

all have the same process in place. They are trying to put in place 

a spreadsheet, for lack of a better term, that will enable them to 

get this information on a more real-time basis so that they can give 

you answers to the questions when you call them and say, ‘‘Where 

do we stand as of today?’’

I brought an example. This is not a funding example, but this is 

a spreadsheet that State Department created for the delivery of 

their equipment to Mexico. And it is fairly detailed. It gives you a 

good idea of what they have already delivered and what they plan 

to deliver. But it is not comprehensive, and it is something that 

they just put together based on a spreadsheet. It is not based on 

any system they have in place. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you very much. 

Mr. McCaul? 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, Mr. Ford, thank you for your testimony. 

This is not all good news. There is no performance metrics, or 

none have been developed, for any of the four goals stated? Is that 

your testimony? 

Mr. FORD. That is my testimony, but I want to add something, 

if I might. 

The original goals established under the Merida program in 2008 

are different than the ones we have now. There are some similarities. Those goals were more directly related to law enforcement 

issues, interdicting drugs, supporting law enforcement. 

At that time, the State Department did, in fact, begin to develop 

some performance metrics based on those goals. Now, we critique 

25

some of those in our report. We said the goals that they put in 

place, some of them were fine; others, they didn’t have benchmarks, they didn’t know what the starting point was. Some of them 

didn’t have targets, so you didn’t know—they had a good goal, but 

they didn’t know what the target was, how far along do we need 

to be before we achieve something. So we critiqued that in our report. 

Unfortunately, what the State Department has done is, they developed those on the old goals, and they haven’t yet developed any 

for the new goals. So that is why we are in an awkward situation, 

where we know they have tried to do this when they started the 

program, but now they are evolving into something new and we 

haven’t seen it. 

Mr. MCCAUL. And there are three different bureaus tracking the 

funding, according to your testimony? 

Mr. FORD. Yes. 

Mr. MCCAUL. How do you propose to fix that? 

And I say that because we appropriated this money in Fiscal 

Year 2008, $1.32 billion. Only 46 has been obligated; only 9 percent 

has been expended. In the current budget request for 2011, we 

have an additional $480 million. And yet we can’t seem to move 

this thing forward. 

Mr. FORD. Okay, you know, I am not the administration, so I am 

going to try to give you my perspective based on our work. 

Mr. MCCAUL. I appreciate that. 

Mr. FORD. I think in the beginning of the program there were a 

lot of organizational issues that needed to be dealt with. We didn’t 

have many staff to administer the program in Mexico, for example. 

The NAS down there, I think we had about 15 people, and now 

they are up to about 50. So part of it was you just didn’t have 

enough people to administer the program. 

Then another problem was, we needed to sign letters of agreement with the Government of Mexico, which authorizes the exchange of the equipment based on certain laws and everything that 

have to be met in our Government and in their government. For 

the last two letters of agreement, it took an inordinate amount of 

time for them to finalize them. 

The first time they did this, it was our understanding that it was 

because the two governments had not had a major program expansion like this, and it was just a case of both governments understanding the terminologies and what everybody had to do. And that 

kind of explained why there was a delay the first go-around. 

The second go-around, I can’t explain why there were delays. But 

we know that the second letter of agreement, which was just 

signed in May, which obligated another $200-some-odd million, 

that agreement took several months. And we don’t know the reason 

why that took as long as it did. 

And then you have the issues related to procuring major pieces 

of equipment and how long it takes. Like Black Hawk helicopters, 

you know, it takes 18 months or more——

Mr. MCCAUL. Can I ask you about that? I mean, we just can’t 

afford to delay anymore. There is a crisis going on on the border 

and in Mexico. 

26

And, you know, the helicopter issue is just one example. When 

we talk to the manufacturers, they say, ‘‘Sure, we can build them.’’ 

But there is a delay, as you testified to, in the procurement process. What can we do to expedite that? 

Mr. FORD. I am not sure for the big-ticket items like the Black 

Hawks. It is not clear to me what can actually be—they have to 

follow the procurement rules that are specified by DOD and by law. 

I don’t have an answer for how they can more quickly acquire 

them. 

I do know the State Department attempted to finance, I think, 

three of the Black Hawk helicopters without going through the 

FMF process that DOD manages, and that their goal was to acquire those Black Hawk helicopters, three of them I believe, more 

quickly than they could if they went through the FMF process. 

Mr. MCCAUL. My time is running out, but I just wanted to end 

on this question. There has been some reference to Colombia. How 

would you compare—now, Plan Colombia actually eventually was 

a successful model. Are there lessons learned that we can take 

from what we did in Colombia to what is happening now in Mexico? 

Mr. FORD. Well, I believe, based on our work there, that—I am 

going to sort of mirror what Congressman Cuellar said. I think 

that we need to accept the fact that it takes a while for these 

things to turn around. 

The beginning years of Plan Colombia, we had a lot of the same 

sorts of problems that we are now talking about in Mexico. We had 

problems with getting the equipment down there on a timely basis. 

We had problems in being able to train the Colombian police and 

the Colombian military to use the equipment once we got it to 

them. We had problems with negotiating agreements with the Colombian Government to ensure that human rights were going to be 

honored as we increased our security assistance down there. 

There were a lot of what I would characterize as early planning 

and implementation challenges in Plan Colombia. And if you had 

measured that program in the first 2 or 3 years of its existence, 

some of the things that I am reporting now probably would have—

you know, that is what happened then. 

Eventually, we were able to turn that around, because we did develop institutional capacity down there, not only with the security 

forces but also with their judiciary and some of the civil side. And 

that led to more successes, you know, in terms of stabilizing that 

country. 

So I am not saying that is a model, but I will say that I believe 

patience is needed if we are going to try to change the dynamic in 

Mexico in a manner that will reduce violence and lessen the threat 

to our border. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you. 

Mr. ENGEL. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. Sires? 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you for your testimony, Mr. Ford. 

The shift away from military assistance toward a greater assistance for civilian police training, do you see this improving our ability to spend the money the right way, or do you think it is going 

27

to be a hindrance, the shift away from the fact that it is not as concentrated on the military? 

Mr. FORD. Well, that is hard to argue, at this point. I mean, let 

me say it this way: I think anything we do to improve the law enforcement capability in Mexico is going to be a plus. Spending resources on that and ensuring that we get what we pay for and that 

the Mexican Government follows through with building that capacity, I see that as a value to what we want to achieve there. 

I can’t really comment on whether or not a shift from the military to law enforcement is a good thing or a bad thing. I just think 

that supporting the law enforcement community down there is important, and if we are going to do that, we just need to make sure 

that we do it effectively. 

Mr. SIRES. And you said we haven’t spent any money on the rest 

of the other countries? There is moneys in there for some of the 

other Central American countries. Has any money been spent? 

Mr. FORD. Yeah. It is in our report. I am going to refer to that. 

Again, this is as of March 31st of this year. For the Merida aspects of Central America, we had obligated about $65 million, 

which is about 25 percent of the amount that has been allocated 

by Congress. And they expended approximately $20 million, which 

is, oh, maybe 8 percent. That is where we are as of March. 

Mr. SIRES. Are we encountering the same problems there also? 

Mr. FORD. We are encountering—yeah. Yes. The answer is, yes, 

we are, the same problems in terms of coming up with delivery 

schedules that allow us to get the programs up and running. We 

are running into the same issue. 

The difference is, in Central America, we are not spending a lot 

of money on hardware, like helicopters and things like that. A lot 

of the money is for technical assistance and training for law enforcement in those countries. 

Mr. SIRES. On that spreadsheet that you showed before, are 

there fixed dates when certain things should be achieved or anything like that? 

Mr. FORD. With regard to items that are pending, they report it 

three different ways. They have some by month, by October 2010. 

They have some by 2010 or 2011. And they have a couple of cases 

when they have a specific date. 

Mr. SIRES. That is just reporting, but it is not a goal? 

Mr. FORD. No, this is their planned schedule for delivery. 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I don’t have any more 

questions. 

Mr. ENGEL. Okay, thank you, Mr. Sires. 

Mr. Green? 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Director Ford, President Calderon’s government has expanded its 

cooperation with the United States to a level unprecedented in our 

bilateral relations historically. And there appears to be more information-sharing and true partnership with Mexico in the fight 

against drug trafficking. 

Can you characterize the existing level of cooperation with Mexico? And I don’t know if you have a historical perspective. Do these 

changes extend across the breadth of the working relationships 

28

with the various ministries in Mexico, or is it just certain ones that 

we have better luck with? 

Mr. FORD. Well, first of all, let me comment sort of broadly, since 

we issued a report in 2007 on the counternarcotics program in 

Mexico, which was pre-Merida, and the level of our effort at that 

time was much smaller than it is today. 

I can say, based on all of our meetings in Mexico, meeting with 

not only U.S. officials, including all of our law enforcement components, of course the Ambassador and other people associated with 

dealing with all different ministries in the Government of Mexico, 

almost uniformly we heard positive feedback in terms of the level 

of cooperation that we are getting from the Mexican Government 

in general. 

Now, of course, like any other place, there are some agencies 

within the Mexican Government that are a little more reticent than 

others in terms of working with us. But, overall, we heard very 

positive comments from virtually everybody we talked to down 

there. 

Mr. GREEN. I know it is interesting, having traveled to Mexico 

it seems like my whole life, that joke about, ‘‘We are from the government, here to help you.’’ If you go down to Mexico and say, ‘‘We 

are here from the United States and we are here to help you,’’ it 

is a problem, although I have noticed in the last 2 years there has 

been so much more cooperation. And I think President Calderon’s 

leadership has been there for that. 

In the GAO report, it shares that negotiating agreements between beneficiary governments in reaching understanding with the 

U.S. agency on implementation logistics can be time-consuming. 

From your research, is there a more effective way for these negotiations to shorten that time? And is it on us or is it on the Republic 

of Mexico? 

Mr. FORD. I would say it is a little bit of both. Some of it is us. 

We just don’t do a good job of—well, part of it is just setting good 

expectations. When we were down there in March, we talked to 

several Mexican Government officials who sort of felt like they 

were instantaneously going to get them equipment, or the U.S. 

Government said we were going to send them brand-new armored 

cars, and they would be there within a month or so, not realizing 

that it takes time for these things to happen. So part of it is basically setting good expectations with our partner. 

And then, in terms of the actual implementation, clearly, on our 

side there were delays, for lots of different reasons, some of which 

I articulated earlier. And then, I think on the other side, on the 

Mexican side, in some cases they weren’t 100 percent always clear 

about what exactly they wanted or what they really needed. 

And what they are doing at the Embassy to address this issue 

is they have established a formal working group with Mexican officials and U.S. officials. They are going to work together so these 

day-to-day problems can be resolved. Hopefully, that will help expedite the delivery of the assistance. 

Mr. GREEN. Okay. And I know the three bureaus have tracked 

the funds in the State Department—and you have discussed that. 

Is it possible for any of these agencies on the U.S. side to be 

29

merged, so we can see maybe fewer decision-makers and more decisions being made? 

Mr. FORD. Yeah, I think that—well, first of all, let me say this: 

The State Department recognizes they have this problem, that they 

cannot readily track the moneys, that they have sort of a fragmented approach. They have indicated to us they are going to try 

to address that, or they are in the process of trying to address it, 

by coming up with a more streamlined system. We haven’t yet seen 

that, so I can’t really comment on it, in terms of whether I think 

that is going to fix the problem. 

But the fact that they recognize that they need to put something 

together that will provide more real-time information to Congress 

on what is really going on I think is a step forward. The real key 

is, can they really implement something that will allow you all to 

get information on everything that is going on? Right now, it is 

fragmented. 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

My frustration, I guess, is that this has been going on, and I 

know it was a President Bush initiative, but I would hope we 

would see much more quicker response on the United States’s part, 

because this problem is in Mr. Cuellar’s district, in my district, and 

it will be in New York, and of course Mr. McCaul’s district in central Texas. And if we don’t help our neighbors in Mexico, it will 

surely be in our backyard. 

Mr. ENGEL. Well, thank you. I certainly agree. And we will keep 

exploring this. Thank you, Mr. Green. 

We have been joined by Ms. Giffords of Arizona. And I am going 

to give her an extra minute so she can incorporate her opening 

statement into her questions. 

So, Ms. Giffords, you have 6 minutes. 

Ms. GIFFORDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, Mr. Ford, thank you for joining us today. 

It is interesting, when you look back from the first conversations 

we had a couple of years ago under the former administration 

about the Merida plan, and we had a lot of questions and a lot of 

skepticism. And the challenge for us is how we support the 

Calderon administration, which is really doing some very heavy 

lifting in a very, very difficult situation, but also having the ability 

to go to back to our constituents and our taxpayers, those of us who 

actually live on the border, and explain and justify to them this extraordinary amount of money that we are, of course, sending to 

Mexico. 

I come from the worst part of the district, so if I sound a little 

angry, it is because I am. I represent half of the Tucson sector, 

which, by far—about 10 years ago, we had over 700,000 apprehensions. And last year we were down to 242,000 apprehensions, but 

over 1.2 million pounds of marijuana was actually seized in my sector. 

And when people say that the border is more secure now than 

it has ever been, I beg them to come down and actually talk directly to my constituents, to the ranchers out in Cochise County, 

to the Krentz family, who had a family member that was murdered 

on his own land, and explain how much safer it is, when their 

30

property values have absolutely plummeted and they don’t feel 

safe. 

So the challenges we have—and I was fortunate to have the 

chairman of the Homeland Security Committee with us a couple of 

weeks ago down for a border tour and for a chance to spend time 

with the ranchers and to do a rancher town hall meeting, for the 

chairman to hear directly about what is working and what is not 

working. And, with that, we had the sector chief of the border patrol alongside. 

And so, my questions—and, again, I know we are talking about 

different programs; we are talking about north side of the border 

and south side of the border. But the reality is, it is all one big 

area when it comes to drugs that are moving up northward and we 

have cash and arms going in the other direction. And if we are 

going to get operational control of the border, we are going to have 

to think bilateral. 

And so my question to you is, what sort of coordination is going 

on with the expenditure of the Merida money and the plans with 

the sector chiefs, particularly in the worst areas of the border? 

Mr. FORD. Okay, that is a very good question. Here is my challenge in answering that. We know that there are a lot of efforts between our Government and Mexico on the border being undertaken 

primarily with DHS, ATF, the law enforcement community, State 

and local government. Many of those activities, as far as we know, 

are not really connected to the Merida program in terms of the assistance that we are providing to Mexico. 

There are some programs that are directly related to the border, 

such as providing communication equipment. For example, the Department of Defense is providing communication equipment to 

their counterparts. ATF is running their gun-runner program, 

which is on the border. ICE has their gun program and their antismuggling programs. 

A lot of those efforts, to our knowledge, are not directly associated with the Merida program. So I can’t answer your question holistically in terms of what our Government is doing on the border. 

I know there are lots of things going on. We didn’t study in detail 

many of those other programs for this particular job that I am reporting on. 

But to the extent we had information about what we are providing to the Mexican counterparts—like, the customs service, we 

are giving them equipment; we are providing canine units to prevent smuggling—that should work for both sides of the border, 

there are a number of things we are financing with the Merida 

money. 

But it is only part of, I think, your broader question, which is, 

what is the government as a whole doing to protect the border? 

And I don’t know enough about how to answer that for the whole 

government. But I will say, for the Merida program, there are programs designed to help address the border specifically, not just the 

broader going after the drug traffickers. 

Ms. GIFFORDS. Mr. Chairman and Mr. Ford, you know, when you 

are actually on the front line and you have spend a lot of time with 

the law enforcement agents and the border patrol and the people 

31

that live there, you know, it becomes pretty—and then you look at 

the numbers, and the numbers just speak for themselves. 

You know, the Tucson sector has more than all of the other areas 

combined, when it comes to seizures of narcotics. So, there is potential on all sorts of coming in from the Canadian border or on the 

coasts, but the reality is it is coming through Arizona right now in 

huge, huge numbers. 

So with the deployment of the National Guard that is going to 

start in a couple of weeks, we are spending a lot of money on bringing the Guard in. We have a huge supplemental we are waiting to 

have the Senate pass through with $700 million, as well, that is 

going to go toward increased Border Patrol and ICE agents and, 

you know, a huge increase of resources. 

But if the coordination isn’t taking place—and I beg people to 

come down, drive along the border, and see if you see one Mexican 

vehicle patrolling—one. I mean, of all of the time that I have been 

in Congress and all the time I spend out there, I have never seen 

one vehicle on the other side of the border—not one camera, not 

one radar system, not one balloon, not any type of surveillance. 

So, you know, the numbers speak for themselves. You know, we 

are spending a lot of money, and I am not saying it is a waste. I 

am just saying that we know where the drugs are coming in, because we can just estimate by the seizures that we have. Yet, here 

we are spending money. We have DOD money, we have Department of State money, we have DHS money, we have a lot of money 

flowing. But when you talk to my sector chief that is on the front 

lines, he is not being asked, you know, ‘‘Should we put the resources south of Douglas or south of Nogales?’’ No one is talking 

to him. 

And that is where I just—I don’t get it. I don’t know how we can 

sit here and, with straight faces, talk about why this is a good program if that just on-the-ground coordination is not taking place. 

Mr. FORD. You know, I don’t know what to say. I mean, again, 

part of the reason we think that they need to develop these metrics 

we talked about is so that you can get an answer to that question. 

Right now, I don’t see any way how the administration can answer 

that because they don’t have a way of saying whether or not the 

border effectiveness, from the Mexican side, is being improved because of our money. There is no way for us to know that, at this 

point. 

Ms. GIFFORDS. And, Mr. Chairman, you know, I would love to 

work with you and others to figure this out. Because, obviously, 

this is an extraordinary sum of money that we are spending to secure the border and to try to reduce the amount of drugs that are 

smuggled in. But if we don’t have the metrics and if we don’t have 

a coordinated plan, then I would argue that we need to rethink 

this. 

Mr. ENGEL. Well, let me just say, Ms. Giffords, I would be delighted to work with you. As you well know, I have a Tucson connection, with my son graduating from the university there. And I 

am hoping that your constituents do know that you are doing an 

excellent job fighting for these things. And I do hope we can have 

that hearing in Tucson or around Tucson before the end of the 

year. So I look forward to working with you on that. 

32

As you can tell, we have been called for a vote, but we have been 

joined by Mr. Meeks of New York, who says he has one quick question before we adjourn. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And my question is not exactly like the gentlelady from Arizona’s, but it is similar in regards to coordination. We know that 

when we initially started talking about Plan Colombia, we had to 

work out some things, and I think, finally, we have it working. 

But coordination is the key to success. And I know that we have 

initiatives now in Central America and initiatives in the Caribbean. And some argued against the Merida money initially because 

they say what happens is you close it off at one end and the drugs 

will come through another end. 

So I am wondering whether or not you are also looking at the 

coordination between Central America and the Caribbean, so that 

it is not that, you know, one end going one way, then it goes someplace else, all still coming into the United States. And where it is 

Arizona that may have the key problem today, but it could be Florida tomorrow. 

Is there any coordination between the Merida Initiative and the 

Caribbean and Central America? That is my question. 

Mr. FORD. Okay. The short answer is I don’t know, because the 

CARSI program that has been announced, the administration 

hasn’t put its strategy out yet for that, so we don’t know exactly 

what we are trying to do there. We don’t know who is going to exactly administer the program. 

The Caribbean Basin Security Initiative, which I presume is 

linked to that, same thing: We don’t quite know what the strategy 

is and what the implementing pieces of that are going to be. 

The Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy that was promulgated by the Office of National Drug Control Policy, which involves many U.S. agencies on the border designed to stop the flow 

of arms, bulk cash, and other things, we are not quite sure who is 

responsible for coordinating that, along with these other initiatives. 

So my answer to that is, I think it is important that Congress 

ask the administration how they plan to coordinate all of these security initiatives. There may be a notional idea of how they plan 

on doing it, but we haven’t seen it. And so I don’t know how to answer that. 

If you are asking me, do you think we have a coordination mechanism in place, I don’t know that, at this stage. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, you know, I was and am a big supporter of 

Merida, but we have to make sure that we know how the money 

is being spent and that it is being coordinated so that we know 

that we are getting the best bang for our buck. Otherwise, we need 

to rethink what we are doing, because if it is not doing anything, 

we don’t need to just throw money away. 

So I would join Ms. Giffords in that vein, in saying, if we are 

doing it and we are doing it right, I am all for it, let’s do it. But 

if not, then we need to rethink what we are doing. 

Mr. ENGEL. Well, thank you, Mr. Meeks. 

Mr. Ford, I want to thank you for your very excellent testimony. 

I actually agree with everything you have said, as I have agreed 

33

with everything that has been said up here. I think we are all in 

sync on this and we realize how important it is, in terms of making 

sure that Mexico gets the help it needs but making sure that, when 

we send the help, it is being used properly. And I think we all have 

a stake in that. So I want to thank you for testifying. 

I want to thank Mr. McCaul for ably filling in for Mr. Mack 

today. And Mr. McCaul, of course, is always a very valued member 

of this subcommittee, as well. 

So, again, Mr. Ford, we look forward to continuing this discussion with you. 

And the subcommittee hearing is now adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:44 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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A P P E N D I X 

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[NOTE: The GAO Report to Congressional Requesters, ‘‘ME ́ RIDA INITIATIVE, The 

United States Has Provided Counternarcotics and Anticrime Support but Needs 

Better Performance Measures,’’ was submitted for the record but is not reprinted 

here. It is available in committee records or may be accessed via the Internet at: 

http://www.hcfa.house.gov/111/GAO072110.pdf.]

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