alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
§ 309.9 Notice—written demand for payment. ( a ) Upon determination that a debt is owed to Peace Corps or the United States, Peace Corps shall promptly hand deliver or send by first-class mail (to the debtor's most current address in the records of Peace Corps) at least one written notice (e.g. Bill of Collection or demand letter) informing the debtor of the consequences of failing to pay or otherwise resolve a Peace Corps debt, subject to paragraph (c) of this section. Written demand under this subpart may be preceded by other appropriate actions under this part and or the FCCS, including but not limited to actions taken under the procedures applicable to administrative offset, including salary offset.
( b ) The written notice shall inform the debtor of: ( 1 ) The nature and amount of the debt, and the facts giving rise to the debt;
( 2 ) The date by which payment should be made to avoid the imposition of interest, penalties, and administrative costs, and the enforced collection actions described in § 309.5 of this part;
( 3 ) The applicable standards for imposing interest, penalties and administrative costs to delinquent debts;
( 4 ) Peace Corps' willingness to discuss alternative payment arrangements and how the debtor may enter into a written agreement to repay the debt under terms acceptable to Peace Corps;
( 5 ) The name, address, and telephone number of a contact person or office within Peace Corps;
( 6 ) Peace Corps' intention to enforce collection if the debtor fails to pay or otherwise resolve the debt, by taking one or more of the following actions: ( i ) Offset from Federal payments otherwise due to the debtor, including income tax refunds, salary, certain benefit payments, retirement, vendor payments, travel reimbursement and advances, and other Federal payments;
( ii ) Referral to private collection agency;
( iii ) Report to credit bureaus;
( iv ) Administrative wage garnishment;
( v ) Referral to Department of Justice for litigation action;
( vi ) Referral to Financial Management Service of the Department of the Treasury for collection;
( vii ) Other actions as permitted by the FCCS and applicable law.
( 7 ) How the debtor may inspect and copy records related to the debt;
( 8 ) The debtor's opportunity for an internal review of Peace Corps' determination that the debtor owes a debt or the amount of the debt;
( 9 ) The debtor's right, if any, to request waiver of collection of certain debts, as applicable;
( 10 ) Requirement that the debtor advise Peace Corps of any bankruptcy proceeding of the debtor.
( c ) Peace Corps may omit from a notice to a debtor one or more of the provisions contained in paragraphs (b) (6) through (10) of this section if Peace Corps determines that any provision is not legally required given the collection remedies to be applied to a particular debt, or which have already been provided by prior notice, applicable agreement, or contract.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

No. DA 22-0650

STATE OF MONTANA, 

Plaintiff and Appellee, 

v. 

AARON EUGENE MCLAUGHLIN,

Defendant and Appellant.

ORDER

Upon consideration of Appellant’s motion for extension of time, 

and good cause appearing,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant is granted an extension 

of time to and including July 24, 2023, within which to prepare, file, 

and serve Appellant’s opening brief on appeal.

Electronically signed by:

Mike McGrath

Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

June 16 2023

06/16/2023

Case Number: DA 22-0650
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Jerome Handy, Appellant.

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County, rendered March 26, 1976, convicting defendant, after jury trial, of murder in the second degree and sentencing him to an indeterminate term of 15 years to life, unanimously reversed, on the law, and the matter remanded for a new trial. It was error for the court to refuse to charge the jury on justification. The prosecution’s key witness was a 14-year-old girl who saw most, but not all, of the incident culminating in the fatal shooting. Her account that she saw defendant shoot Edwards while Edwards held .his hands, upraised, differed from an earlier version. On cross-examination she conceded that she had once told an investigator that she lost sight of Edwards as he backed up because her line of vision was blocked by a parked truck, that Edwards had reached into his back pocket, and that only after she lost sight of Edwards did defendant pull his gun. Moreover her testimony discloses an obvious confusion as to whether Edwards was advancing or backing up at the time he put his hand into his back pocket. When she last saw defendant and Edwards, before her vision was blocked, they were only 15 feet apart. It is clear that the witness did not know what gestures, if any, Edwards had made or what position he was in at the precise moment that defendant fired. In such a setting as was described a reasonable view of the evidence could support the inference that Edwards had made a threatening motion towards defendant which precipitated his firing of the gun. Defendant knew that Edwards just a short time earlier had argued with his brother during the course of which Edwards had pulled a knife. An autopsy revealed that Edwards had been a chronic alcoholic who was drunk at the time of his *974death. It is not implausible that Edwards, in a stupor, made a threatening motion towards defendant, either before or despite the latter’s display of the gun. Thus, a sufficient question of fact was raised as to what Edwards had done just prior to the shooting. It is not inconceivable that the jury could find that Edwards was "using or about to use unlawful deadly physical force” (Penal Law, § 35.15, subd 2). "In determining the requirements of the court’s charge to the jury * * * defendant is entitled to the 'most favorable view of the record’ [cases omitted]” *(People v Steele,*26 NY2d 526, 529). But the court’s refusal to charge justification removed the issue from any jury consideration. This was error and warrants a retrial. Concur—Lupiano, J. P., Fein, Sandler and Sullivan, JJ.
#### § 121.1 Purpose.

The purpose of this part is to enable the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development to carry out his or her responsibilities under the Fair Housing Act, Executive Order 11063, dated November 20, 1962, title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and section 562 of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1987. These authorities prohibit discrimination in housing and in programs receiving financial assistance from the Department of Housing and Urban Development, and they direct the Secretary to administer the Department's housing and urban development programs and activities in a manner affirmatively to further these policies and to collect certain data to assess the extent of compliance with these policies.
Exhibit 10.1






Exhibit 10.1




PRIDE INTERNATIONAL, INC.

2007 LONG-TERM INCENTIVE PLAN




(As Amended and Restated Effective March 16, 2010)



First Amendment



Pride International, Inc. (the “Company”) having previously established the Pride
International, Inc. 2007 Long-Term Incentive Plan, as amended and restated effective March 16, 2010
(the “Plan”), and having reserved the right under Section 14 thereof to amend the Plan, does hereby
amend the Plan, effective as of August 13, 2010, as follows:



1. Section 8(a)(i) of the Plan is hereby amended by inserting the following sentence
immediately after the fifth sentence of such section:




“Options shall have a minimum vesting period of three years; provided,
however, that (1) the Committee may provide for earlier vesting upon a
Change in Control or an Employee’s termination of employment, including by
reason of death, disability or retirement and (2) vesting may occur
incrementally over the three-year minimum vesting period.”



2. Section 8(a)(ii) of the Plan is hereby amended by inserting the following sentence
immediately after the fifth sentence of such section:




“SARs shall have a minimum vesting period of three years; provided, however,
that (1) the Committee may provide for earlier vesting upon a Change in
Control or an Employee’s termination of employment, including by reason of
death, disability or retirement and (2) vesting may occur incrementally over
the three-year minimum vesting period.”



	 	 	 	 	 
	 	PRIDE INTERNATIONAL, INC.

 	 
	 	By:  	/s/ Brady K. Long
 	 
	 	Name:  	Brady K. Long 	 
	 	Title:  	Vice President, General Counsel & Secretary 	 
	 



	 	 	 	 	 
	ATTEST:

 	 	 
	/s/ Lonnie D. Bane
 	 	 
	Name:  	Lonnie D. Bane 	 	 
	Title:  	Senior Vice President, Human Resources

& Administration
#### FRIEDMAN v. SCHULMAN et al.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Term.

March 21, 1905.)

Contracts—Assignment—Action by Assignee—Interest of Assignee—Defense.

In an action by the assignee of a claim under an assignment valid on its face, the fact that the assignor testified that he did not know the plaintiff personally,, and that he expected to receive the entire recovery if plaintiff succeeded, was no ground for a nonsuit

Appeal from City Court of New York.

Action by Abraham Friedman against Herman I. Schulman and others. From a judgment in favor of defendants, plaintiff appeals. Reversed.

Argued before SCOTT, O’GORMAN, and BLANCHARD, JJ.

M. Meyers, for appellant.

H. Kuntz, for respondents.

O’GORMAN, J.

The plaintiff, as assignee of one Govonor, sues for the breach by defendants of a written contract of employment made with said assignor. The assignment to the plaintiff is in writing, and duly executed and acknowledged. Upon the trial Govonor was called as a witness, and on cross-examination stated that he was a nonresident, that he did not know the plaintiff personally, and that he expected to get the entire recovery if plaintiff succeeded. Thereupon, upon motion of the défendant, the plaintiff was nonsuited upon the ground that the evidence did not prove that he 'was the owner of the claim. This ruling was erroneous. The plaintiff had a valid transfer as against his assignor, and held the legal title to the claim. The fact that the witness did not know his assignor was of no significance. As well might a deed be held to be invalid because the grantor had no previous acquaintance with the grantee. While the transaction as between the parties appears to have been merely colorable, yet that could constitute no defense on the ground that the assignee was not the real party in interest. Where an assignment is valid upon its face, a debtor will not be permitted to raise a question as to the consideration or the equities between the assignor and the assignee. Sheridan v. The Mayor, 68 N. Y. 30; Van Dyke v. Gardner, 22 Misc. Rep. 113, 49 N. Y. Supp. 328. The statements made by plaintiff’s assignor on his cross-examination were significant only so far as they affected his credibility.

Judgment reversed, and new trial ordered, with costs to the appellant to abide the event. All concur.
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TOM H. BROCK,

Plaintiff,

    v.

MICHAEL ASTRUE, Commissioner of theSocial Security,

Defendant.                                                                      /

No. C 08-04829 CRB

JUDGMENT

The Court, having granted Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, enters

judgment in favor of Defendant against Plaintiff.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 24, 2010                                                            CHARLES  R. BREYERUNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:08-cv-04829-CRB   Document 27   Filed 03/24/10   Page 1 of 1

    -       - Superintendent of Documents
      - 2018-03-11T21:49:54-0400
      - US GPO, Washington, DC 20401
      - Superintendent of Documents
      - GPO attests that this document has not been altered since it was disseminated by GPO
NO. C 09-00301 RS 

STANDBY ORDER OF DISMISSAL

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United 

States District 

Court

For the Northern District of California 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION 

 Ron E. Reynolds, 

 Plaintiffs, 

 v. 

 City and County of San Francisco, et al., 

 Defendants. 

____________________________________/ 

No. C 09-00301 RS 

STANDBY ORDER OF DISMISSAL 

 The Court has been informed that the above-entitled action has settled. Accordingly, the 

Court vacates all pretrial and trial dates. The parties are required to file a stipulation of dismissal by 

June 22, 2015. If a stipulation of dismissal is not filed by that date, the parties are ordered to 

appear on June 25, 2015 at 1:30 p.m. in Courtroom 3, 17th Floor of the San Francisco 

Courthouse and show cause why the case should not be dismissed. Failure to comply with this 

Order may result in dismissal of the case. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: February 18, 2015 

RICHARD SEEBORG 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

 

Case 3:09-cv-00301-RS Document 111 Filed 02/18/15 Page 1 of 1
§ 125.401 Private Enforcement Initiative. ( a ) The Private Enforcement Initiative provides funding on a single-year or multi-year basis, to investigate violations and obtain enforcement of the rights granted under the Fair Housing Act or State or local laws that provide rights and remedies for discriminatory housing practices that are substantially equivalent to the rights and remedies provided in the Fair Housing Act. Multi-year funding may be contingent upon annual performance reviews and annual appropriations.
( b ) Organizations that are eligible to receive assistance under the Private Enforcement Initiative are: ( 1 ) Qualified fair housing enforcement organizations.
( 2 ) Fair housing enforcement organizations with at least 1 year of experience in complaint intake, complaint investigation, testing for fair housing violations and enforcement of meritorious claims. For the purpose of meeting this 1 year qualification period, it is not necessary that the activities were conducted simultaneously, as long as each activity was conducted for 1 year. It is also not necessary for the activities to have been conducted for a continuous year. An organization may aggregate its experience in each activity over the 2-year period preceding its application to meet this 1 year qualification period requirement.
214 A.2d 381.

#### McGraw-Edison Company *vs.*Irving Friedenn.

NOVEMBER 15, 1965.

Present: Roberts, Paolino and Joslin, JJ.

Roberts, J.

This petition for certiorari was brought to review a ruling of the superior court ordering the petitioner here, as the .defendant in an action of assumpsit pending in that .court, to produce for examination by the plaintiff in that action a number of documents designated in a petition to compel the production of documents pursuant to G. L. 1956, §9-19-23.

We have examined the petition to compel production and the allegations contained therein relating to the relevancy and materiality of said documents to the issues raised in the assumpsit action, and we note also that testimonial evidence was not adduced on the question of relevancy of the .documents to such issues. From this examination we conclude that the allegations set out in the petition to compel production are insufficient to establish that relevancy or -materiality under the requirements therefor set out in our opinion in *Moretta*v. *Moretta,*100 R. I. 220, 213 A.2d 808.

*268*Higgins & Slattery, William C. Dorgan,*for petitioner.

*Winograd, Winograd & Marcus, Irving Winograd,*for respondent.

In that opinion we held that the allegations contained in the petition as to relevancy and -materiality were of a conclusory nature and were not supported by any factual allegations probative of the relevancy and materiality necessary to warrant the trial justice in the granting thereof. We are of the opinion that in the instant case, as in *Moretta*v. *Moretta, supra,*the allegations as to relevancy and materiality are conclusory also and that no adequate allegations of fact -in support thereof 'are contained in the petition to compel the production of documents. It is, therefore, our opinion that the order should be quashed without prejudice to the right of the plaintiff in the assumpsit action pending in the superior court again to invoke the statute and seek the relief therein provided pursuant to a petition filed in compliance with the requirements therefor stated in *Moretta*v. *Moretta, supra.*

The- petition for certiorari is -granted, the order requiring the production of documents is quashed without prejudice, and the records certified to this court from the superior court are ordered returned to that court with our decision endorsed thereon.
§ 100.301 Exemption. ( a ) The provisions regarding familial status in this part do not apply to housing which satisfies the requirements of §§ 100.302, 100.303 or § 100.304.
( b ) Nothing in this part limits the applicability of any reasonable local, State, or Federal restrictions regarding the maximum number of occupants permitted to occupy a dwelling.
§ 203.412 Payment for foreclosure alternative actions. Notwithstanding the conveyance, sale, or assignment requirements for payment of a claim elsewhere in this part, HUD may pay the mortgagee, in accordance with procedures prescribed by HUD, for the following foreclosure alternative actions, in such amounts as HUD determines: ( a ) Assumptions under § 203.512;
( b ) Special forbearance under §§ 203.471 and 203.614;
( c ) Recasting or modification of defaulted mortgages under § 203.616, where the mortgagee is not reimbursed under § 203.405(a);
( d ) Refinancing under § 203.43(c).
[61 FR 35019, July 3, 1996]
[Federal Register Volume 69, Number 246 (Thursday, December 23, 2004)]
[Notices]
[Page 76947]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 04-28064]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM


Formations of, Acquisitions by, and Mergers of Bank Holding 
Companies

    The companies listed in this notice have applied to the Board for 
approval, pursuant to the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 (12 U.S.C. 
1841 et seq.) (BHC Act), Regulation Y (12 CFR Part 225), and all other 
applicable statutes and regulations to become a bank holding company 
and/or to acquire the assets or the ownership of, control of, or the 
power to vote shares of a bank or bank holding company and all of the 
banks and nonbanking companies owned by the bank holding company, 
including the companies listed below.
    The applications listed below, as well as other related filings 
required by the Board, are available for immediate inspection at the 
Federal Reserve Bank indicated. The application also will be available 
for inspection at the offices of the Board of Governors. Interested 
persons may express their views in writing on the standards enumerated 
in the BHC Act (12 U.S.C. 1842(c)). If the proposal also involves the 
acquisition of a nonbanking company, the review also includes whether 
the acquisition of the nonbanking company complies with the standards 
in section 4 of the BHC Act (12 U.S.C. 1843). Unless otherwise noted, 
nonbanking activities will be conducted throughout the United States. 
Additional information on all bank holding companies may be obtained 
from the National Information Center website at www.ffiec.gov/nic/.
    Unless otherwise noted, comments regarding each of these 
applications must be received at the Reserve Bank indicated or the 
offices of the Board of Governors not later than January 18, 2005.
    A. Federal Reserve Bank of Boston (Richard Walker, Community 
Affairs Officer) 600 Atlantic Avenue, Boston, Massachusetts 02106-2204:
    1. The Royal Bank of Scotland Group plc, Edinburgh, Scotland and 
its subsidiaries, The Royal Bank of Scotland plc, Edinburgh, Scotland, 
RBSG International Holdings Ltd, Edinburgh, Scotland, and Citizens 
Financial Group, Inc., Providence, Rhode Island; to acquire 100 percent 
of the voting shares of Citizens Bank,National Association, Albany, New 
York, a de novo bank.
    B. Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas (W. Arthur Tribble, Vice 
President) 2200 North Pearl Street, Dallas, Texas 75201-2272:
    1. One World Holding, Inc., Dallas, Texas; to become a bank holding 
company by acquiring 100 percent of the voting shares of One World 
Bank, Dallas, Texas, a de novo bank.

    Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, December 17, 
2004.
Robert deV. Frierson,
Deputy Secretary of the Board.
[FR Doc. 04-28064 Filed 12-22-04; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6210-01-S
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