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United States District Court

Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v.

STEVEN ADAMS,

Defendant.

Case No. 09-cr-00783-MMC-1 

Case No. 01-cr-00251-MMC-1

ORDER GRANTING GOVERNMENT'S 

MOTIONS TO STAY PETITIONS; 

SETTING BRIEFING SCHEDULE

Before the Court are two motions, filed July 1, 2016, by the government, in, 

respectively, Criminal Case No. 09-783 and Criminal Case No. 01-251, both titled “Motion 

to Stay Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255” and identical in content. Defendant Steven 

Adams has filed opposition, to which the government has replied. Having read and 

considered the papers filed in support of and in opposition to the motions, the Court rules 

as follows.

By indictment filed July 30, 2009, defendant was charged in Case No. 09-783 with 

three counts of felony bank robbery and one count of felony attempted bank robbery. He 

pleaded guilty to all four charges, and the Court thereafter imposed a prison term of 151 

months. In his § 2255 motion, defendant asserts that his applicable sentencing range 

under the United States Sentencing Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.”) was 151 to 188 months, and 

that he was found to be a “career offender,” due to the fact that defendant’s instant 

offense of bank robbery was a “crime of violence” that he committed when he was at 

least eighteen years of age and after he previously had been convicted of second degree 

robbery and bank robbery. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a) (providing defendant is “a career 

offender” if “defendant was at least eighteen years old at the time defendant committed 

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the instant offense,” that the instant offense is “a crime of violence,” and “the defendant 

has at least two prior felony convictions of . . . a crime of violence”).

In Case No. 01-251, based on the same conduct, the Court imposed a 24-month 

prison term for defendant’s violation of his supervised release, said term to be served 

consecutively to the above-referenced 151-month term. In his § 2255 motion, defendant 

asserts that the applicable sentencing range under the U.S.S.G. was 33 to 41 months, 

and that his violation was classified as “Grade A” pursuant to a finding that the offense for 

which he was sentenced in Case No. 09-783 was a felony “crime of violence.” See

U.S.S.G. § 7B1.1(a)(1) (providing for “three grades of . . . supervised release violations”; 

further providing violation is “Grade A” if underlying “conduct constitut[es] . . . a federal, 

state, or local offense punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year that . . . 

is a crime of violence”). 

On May 20, 2016, defendant filed the above-referenced two motions for relief 

under § 2255, in which he argues he was denied due process at sentencing and should 

be resentenced. Specifically, defendant challenges as unconstitutional the “residual 

clause” (see Def.’s Mot. at 6:2-3) set forth below in italics, found in the following guideline 

defining the term “crime of violence”:

The term “crime of violence” means any offense under federal or state law, 

punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that –

(1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threated use of physical force 

against the person of another, or

(2) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or 

otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury 

to another.

See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a) (emphasis added). The term “crime of violence,” in turn, is, as 

noted above, found in both the guideline defining “career offender” and the guideline 

classifying supervised release violations. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a); § 7B1.1(a)(1). 

Defendant contends both sentences were “imposed under the residual clause” 

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(see Def.’s Mot. at 17:14), and that said clause is unconstitutional given the Supreme 

Court’s reasoning in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), in which the 

Supreme Court found unconstitutional the “residual clause” contained in a section of the 

Armed Career Criminal Act defining the term “violent felony.” See 18 U.S.C. § 

924(e)(2)(B). Additionally, defendant, again citing Johnson, argues that, although 

robbery is listed as an example of a “crime of violence” in the commentary to U.S.S.G. § 

4B1.2(a), the commentary cannot expand the scope of the guideline term.

In its motions to stay, the government points out that the very issues presented by 

defendant’s § 2255 motion are presently pending before the United States Supreme 

Court. Specifically, on June 27, 2016, the Supreme Court granted a petition for a writ of 

certiorari in Beckles v. United States, which petition presents the following three issues: 

(1) “[w]hether Johnson applies retroactively to collateral cases challenging federal 

sentences enhanced under the residual clause in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2)”; (2) “[w]hether 

Johnson’s constitutional holding applies to the residual clause in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2), 

thereby rendering challenges to sentences enhanced under it cognizable on collateral 

review”; and (3) “[w]hether mere possession of a sawed-off shotgun, an offense listed as 

a ‘crime of violence’ only in the commentary to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2, remains a ‘crime of 

violence’ after Johnson.” See Beckles v. United States, 2016 WL 1029080 (June 27, 

2016).

The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] trial court may, with propriety, find it is efficient 

for its own docket and the fairest outcome for the parties to enter a stay of an action 

before it, pending resolution of independent proceedings which bear upon the case.” See

Levya v. Certified Grocers of California, Ltd., 593 F.2d 857, 863 (9th Cir. 1979). Here, 

resolution of Beckles will do more than “bear upon the case”; indeed, the outcome would 

appear determinative of defendant’s § 2255 motion, barring any argument the 

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government might make in response thereto independent of the residual clause. 

The Ninth Circuit nonetheless has cautioned that a stay should not be granted 

“unless it appears likely the other proceedings will be concluded within a reasonable time 

in relation to the urgency of the claims presented to the court.” See id. at 864. The Ninth 

Circuit has held, for example, that a stay should not be granted if the delay will be 

“indefinite” or “potentially lengthy.” See Yong v. INS, 208 F.3d 1116, 1120 (9th Cir. 2000) 

(reversing order staying proceedings on petition for writ of habeas corpus, where period 

of stay was “potentially for years”). Here, however, the anticipated length of the stay is 

neither indefinite nor potentially lengthy, as the Supreme Court has scheduled the 

Beckles case for argument in its October 2016 term, which begins in less than three 

months.1 Indeed, as the government points out, the Ninth Circuit itself has recently 

stayed two cases pending before it, each of which presents the issue of whether the 

holding in Johnson applies to defendants seeking collateral review based on a theory that 

the residual clause in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 is unconstitutional. See Gardner v. United 

States, Case No. 15-72559, slip op. at 1 (9th Cir. June 27, 2016); Jacob v. United States, 

Case No. 15-73302, slip op. at 1 (9th Cir. June 27, 2016).

The Court next considers whether imposition of a stay would unfairly prejudice 

defendant. See Yong, 208 F.3d at 1121. Defendant asserts that, if his motion is 

successful, his “corrected guideline range . . . [will be] more than five years below the 

Career Offender range,” and, further, that the Court should consider a variance below 

said range “based on post-conviction rehabilitation.” (See Def.’s Mot. at 7:23-27.) The 

 

1 Defendant points out that, given its present eight-member composition, the 

Supreme Court could render a 4-4 decision, thereby failing to issue a precedential 

decision in Beckles. Any such possibility appears remote, however, given that Justice 

Kagan has recused herself from the matter. See Beckles, 2016 WL 1029080, at *1.

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Court, however, finds defendant would not be prejudiced by a stay, as it does not appear 

that, at this time, he is able to overcome the obstacle presented by the one-year statute 

of limitations in § 2255. In particular, where, as here, a defendant moves for collateral 

review based on a change in the law, he may do so within a year of the “date on which 

the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court” and only if that right is 

“made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3). 

In this instance, as the Ninth Circuit has observed, “[i]t is an open question . . . whether 

[U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)’s] residual clause remains valid in light of Johnson,” see United 

States v. Willis, 795 F.3d 986, 996 (9th Cir. 2015), and, as discussed above, the 

Supreme Court has yet to determine that unsettled issue. Moreover, as the very 

existence of the right is unsettled, it is apparent that no such right has been found 

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.

Accordingly, the government’s motions to stay are hereby GRANTED.

In light of said ruling, the Court hereby sets the following briefing schedule on 

defendant’s § 2255 motions:

1. No later than 30 days after issuance of the Supreme Court’s decision in 

Beckles, the government shall file its oppositions or other response to defendant’s § 2255 

motions.

2. No later than 21 days after the government files its oppositions or responses, 

defendant shall file his replies.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 28, 2016

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

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