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AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION OVERSIGHT

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL 

ORGANIZATIONS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND OVERSIGHT

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

MAY 20, 2010

Serial No. 111–96

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California, Chairman 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BILL DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

MICHAEL E. MCMAHON, New York 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

JOHN S. TANNER, Tennessee 

GENE GREEN, Texas 

LYNN WOOLSEY, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

BARBARA LEE, California 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

MIKE ROSS, Arkansas 

BRAD MILLER, North Carolina 

DAVID SCOTT, Georgia 

JIM COSTA, California 

KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

RON KLEIN, Florida 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

RON PAUL, Texas 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

BOB INGLIS, South Carolina 

GUS BILIRAKIS, Florida 

RICHARD J. KESSLER, Staff Director 

YLEEM POBLETE, Republican Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS,

HUMAN RIGHTS AND OVERSIGHT

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri, Chairman 

BILL DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

VACANT 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

RON PAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

JERRY HALDEMAN, Subcommittee Staff Director 

PAUL BERKOWITZ, Republican Professional Staff Member 

MARIANA MAGUIRE, Staff Associate 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESS 

Major General Arnold Fields (USMC-Retired), Inspector General, Office of 

the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction ....................... 7

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Russ Carnahan, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Missouri, and Chairman, Subcommittee on International Organizations, 

Human Rights and Oversight: Prepared statement .......................................... 4

Major General Arnold Fields (USMC-Retired): Prepared statement .................. 10

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 42

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 43

(1)

AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION OVERSIGHT 

THURSDAY, MAY 20, 2010

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS,

HUMAN RIGHTS AND OVERSIGHT,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:31 a.m. in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Russ Carnahan (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. CARNAHAN. Good morning. I want to call the Subcommittee 

on International Organizations, Human Rights and Oversight to 

order this morning. 

I want to get started. We do have a time constraint this morning, 

as the joint session is going to convene at 11 o’clock. And so we 

want to jump right into the hearing this morning. 

But before we get started, I would like to recognize some distinguished visitors who are joining us. A delegation from the Standing 

Committee on Defense from Pakistan is with us this morning. If 

you would please stand, and let us acknowledge our guests. Welcome. 

[Applause.] 

Mr. CARNAHAN. They are in Washington this week as guests of 

the House Democracy Partnership. Welcome. 

On Tuesday morning we marked a solemn occasion when a car 

bomb intercepted a U.S. convoy, and five U.S. soldiers died. The 

toll of America’s dead in Afghanistan passed 1,000. With 1,000 

Americans dead and thousands more wounded, we must redouble 

our efforts to effectively utilize our resources, and build up Afghan 

forces so that our brave American troops can ultimately come 

home. 

From May 1 to May 3 I traveled to Kabul, Kandahar, and 

Islamabad as part of the House Foreign Affairs Committee trip to 

review security and reconstruction efforts underway in Afghanistan 

and Pakistan. Our delegation met with General McChrystal. I also 

met with Afghan President Karzai, along with American troops 

who are working hand-in-hand with the Afghan people to rebuild 

their nation after years of Taliban control. 

While I was away we were threatened on U.S. soil once again. 

The Times Square bomb plot reminded us all of the urgency and 

importance of our success in Afghanistan and Pakistan. We must 

do everything in our power at home and abroad to keep our citizens 

safe. 

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On February 24 I convened my first hearing as chair of this subcommittee. The title: ‘‘Hard Lessons Learned in Iraq, and Benchmarks for Future Reconstruction Efforts,’’ with Special Inspector 

General for Iraq Reconstruction Stewart Bowen. 

Mr. Bowen conveyed a series of hard lessons to this committee. 

He estimated that $4 billion in waste had occurred during the Iraq 

program because of weak planning, repeated shifts in program direction, and poor management oversight. He went on and highlighted a lack of contract oversight to protect our tax dollars. 

In one striking example, a $2.5 billion police training contract, 

the largest ever in State Department’s history, was being managed 

by only three contract officer representatives. 

Mr. Bowen described an ‘‘adhocracy,’’ with blurred chains of command between DOD, State, and USAID. He emphasized the lack 

of an institutional structure in human resources to effectively perform stabilization and reconstruction operations. 

Today I want to ask Major General Arnold Fields, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, a simple question that 

has profound implications for protecting our citizens and safeguarding our tax dollars: Have we learned lessons? And if so, as 

we say in Missouri, show me. 

Last December President Obama announced that 30,000 additional troops will be sent to Afghanistan. To accompany the troop 

increase, the State Department announced that it will immediately 

triple the number of civilian experts and advisors. 

President Obama’s new funding request would bring U.S. support for the reconstruction of Afghanistan to $71 billion, far surpassing what the United States provided to rebuild Europe after 

World War II, and significantly more than what was spent in Iraq 

over the last 8 years. We need to ensure that these civilian resources are being spent effectively, and that waste, fraud, and 

abuse are being rooted out. 

The Government Accountability Office estimates that as of 2010, 

approximately 107,000 contractors support U.S. and allied efforts 

in Afghanistan. Last month, General McChrystal questioned our 

reliance on private contractors. And he said, ‘‘I actually think we 

would be better to reduce the number of contractors involved. I 

think it doesn’t save money. We have created in ourselves a dependency on contractors that I think is greater than it ought to be.’’ 

We need to reduce our dependence on private contractors, and ensure there is adequate oversight and contract management in place 

so that tax dollars are not wasted. 

In order to protect taxpayer resources, we must also strengthen 

efforts to combat corruption. A recent U.N. survey estimates that 

Afghans paid $2.5 billion in bribes to government officials and 

members of the police force in 2009. In 2009, Afghanistan was 

ranked 179th out of 180 nations on Transparency International’s 

Corruption Perceptions Index, a step down from 117 out of 159 in 

2005. 

These are alarming numbers. The U.S. and other donors have 

pledged to increase the proportion of development aid delivered to 

the Afghan Government to 50 percent in the next 2 years. 

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If we are going to work in partnership with the Afghan Government, we must ensure they are a reliable partner that will seriously address corruption issues. 

While we fight waste and corruption, we must also build Afghanistan’s capacity to provide for its own security and training in 

equipping the Afghan National Security Forces. Current requirements call for the Afghan National Army to grow from 103,000, as 

of June 2009, to 171,000 by October 2011. 

The Afghan National Police will be boosted from 94,000 to 

134,000. We must ensure we are measuring not just the number 

of troops and police being trained, but the effectiveness in protecting Afghan civilians. 

We must also develop Afghan’s economy. According to the U.N., 

about 80 percent of Afghanistan’s population live in rural areas. 

We must do more to promote alternative development, build the Afghan agricultural sector, and reduce the production of opium. 

Missouri National Guard Agricultural Development teams, from 

my home state, have been deployed to the Nangarhar Province. 

Their work is being received well, pairing with civilians. Their 

background in farming has been critical, working with Afghan 

farmers to teach them sustainable farming practices and techniques. 

As we train the Afghan National Security Forces and develop the 

Afghan economy, we must also focus on women, who make up 60 

percent of the Afghanistan population. Under the Taliban’s rule in 

Afghanistan, women were subjected to harsh inequalities, and were 

excluded from all forms of public life. 

Last week I moderated a roundtable with female ministers from 

the Afghan Government to discuss how the United States and Afghanistan can work together to empower women politically, economically, and socially. 

I look forward to hearing the testimony today on all of these critical areas from Major General Fields. We have a responsibility to 

our men and women in uniform, to the taxpayers of this country 

to make sure that we have a strict accounting on how resources are 

being spent. We cannot waste resources that our troops need to 

keep themselves safe and get the job done. 

I want to now recognize our ranking member, Representative 

Rohrabacher, for his opening statement. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Carnahan follows:]

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Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Yesterday I had 

the great honor to meet with our Inspector General, Major General 

Fields, and I was deeply moved by his dedication and understanding the magnitude of the challenge that he faces, which you 

just outlined very well. 

I do not see how we can expect any human being to meet this 

challenge alone, even as a great leader as a Marine Major General. 

He has demonstrated his leadership. This has got to be a team effort, or we will fail. 

We have failed in the past. We have failed in the past. And I remember as a young person, when I was 19 years old—and again, 

I was not in the military, but I found myself in Vietnam, and found 

myself confronting enormous corruption, beyond my imagination as 

a 19-year-old. And the sight of the gore of war and this corruption 

was quite, left a lasting imprint on me. And I left that country 

thinking that all those young men that I saw, who were wounded 

and dying, that their lives may have been spent in vain. But it was 

not because they were not fighting the battle, but because we were 

unable to control an out-of-control situation. 

I went home, and my father, I talked to my father about it. My 

father was a Marine, as General Fields. He wasn’t quite your, you 

weren’t quite his commanding officer, because I think he was out 

by the time you got in. 

But I told him about it. I told him that I thought that the chaotic 

situation and the incredible corruption that I saw would prevent us 

from prevailing. And he had some very wise words for me. 

He just said look, Dana, what do you think it looked like when 

I flew the first DC–3 into the Pusan Perimeter in Korea. And what 

do you think it was like in World War II and Korea? There is chaos 

in war; war comes with chaos. And those people, like the General, 

who have taken it upon themselves to try to bring some order to 

a situation in which people are losing their lives in great numbers, 

and bombs are going off, and no one knows if they are going to live 

to the next day, and sometimes their morals then are obliterated 

along with their bodies, it is an incredible job. But it is one that 

we need to succeed in. 

And we need—American people will lose faith in rebuilding Afghanistan if they believe that all this money that we are committing, or large chunks of it, are being siphoned off. And, just as we 

lost faith in the war in Vietnam and eventually lost that war, we 

could lose this conflict, as well. 

Let me note, our enemy, then, is not necessarily religious fanaticism, but the corruption of the human soul. And this is a great 

challenge, and a great challenge in this context. 

I am very honored that we have a man of integrity trying to 

tackle this. But General, you can’t do it on your own. We are here 

to learn from you today about some of the successes, but also perhaps some of the things we must overcome in order to succeed. 

And I appreciate your leadership, Mr. Chairman. You take this 

issue very seriously; one can tell that by your opening statement. 

And so let us get on with the hearing, and see if we can come to 

some conclusions that will do some good. 

Mr. CARNAHAN. Thank you. And now we would like to turn to today’s witness, Major General Arnold Fields. He is the special inVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:46 Jul 06, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\IOHRO\052010\56558 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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spector general for Afghanistan reconstruction, a position he has 

held since July 2008. He is responsible for ensuring effective oversight of funds appropriated for the reconstruction of Afghanistan. 

Previously General Fields served as deputy director of the Africa 

Center for Strategic Studies at the Department of Defense, and as 

chief of staff at the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office in the 

U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, where he assisted in coordinating over 

$18 billion of U.S. appropriated funds for Iraq reconstruction. 

Major General Fields retired from the U.S. Marine Corps in January 2004, after 34 years of active military service. His decorations 

include the Distinguished Service Medal and the Defense Superior 

Service Medal. 

General Fields holds a master of arts degree in human resources 

management from Pepperdine University. He is also a graduate of 

the Army War College, the Marine Corps Command and Staff College, and the Marine Corps Amphibious Warfare School. 

Again, welcome. We are honored to have you here, and very 

much appreciate your many years of service. 

STATEMENT OF MAJOR GENERAL ARNOLD FIELDS (USMC–RETIRED), INSPECTOR GENERAL, OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION 

Mr. FIELDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Rohrabacher, and the members of the committee. Thank you very much 

for inviting me to discuss SIGIR’s oversight mission, and the issues 

we have identified that must be addressed to improve the implementation of what is poised to become the largest overseas reconstruction effort in American history. 

In February of this year the President submitted a budget re- quest that, if approved, will add about $20 billion to the $51 billion 

Congress has appropriated for the reconstruction of Afghanistan 

since 2002. SIGIR was stood up to bring focused oversight to this 

money. And we are doing so by providing a broad range of oversight to the reconstruction activities that are funded through, and 

implemented by, multiple agencies. 

Over the last 12 months, SIGIR has produced 23 reports. We 

have seven reports that are currently in their final stages, and another 10 audits that are underway. Our work has identified several 

issues that hamper the reconstruction effort in Afghanistan. Let 

me talk about a few of them. 

Reviews of infrastructure contracts have found serious construction problems, due in part to a lack of quality control. Agencies continue to suffer from a shortage of qualified contracting officials, and 

U.S. agencies lack a full picture of reconstruction projects in Afghanistan. 

I am particularly concerned about three issues that our auditors 

have identified over the last year: Inadequate planning, inadequate 

sustainability, and inadequate accountability. A couple of examples. SIGIR audits found obsolete planning documents in the energy and security sectors. We issued two audit reports of U.S.-funded construction contracts to build Afghanistan National Army garrisons. The United States has invested more than $25 billion, nearly half of all reconstruction dollars appropriated to date, to train 

and equip the Afghanistan security forces. 

8

U.S. military officials were unable to provide us with an updated 

master plan for the facilities to house and train the forces representing the Afghanistan security sector. 

And a bit about metrics. As part of the planning process, implementing agencies must establish reliable metrics to measure 

progress. SIGIR has been conducting an audit of the capability 

milestones, or CM ratings system, the primary metric used to monitor development progress of fielded Afghanistan security forces 

and units. 

The ability to accurately measure the abilities of the Afghan 

Army and Police is absolutely critical to the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan. Our audit will, it is yet to be released, describe weaknesses that have affected the reliability of the rating system. And 

certainly we will make recommendations. 

This audit has had an impact already, given the outbrief that we 

have already provided to General McChrystal, as well as to certain 

Members of Congress. It has caused the Defense Department to acknowledge limitations of the rating system. 

The International Security Assistance Force, or ISAF, Joint Command is replacing the rating system with a new unit, a new units 

level assessment system. 

One of the most serious development challenges anywhere is creating sustainable programs. Our audits in the energy and security 

sectors have found that the Afghan Government does not have the 

financial resources to operate and maintain new infrastructure. 

Therefore, the United States has funded operations and maintenance contracts for the next several years. 

While this solves a short-term problem, it does not address the 

long-term issue of sustainability. 

Under the new strategy, the international community, in partnership with the Afghan Government, is committed to increasing 

both the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police 

forces. An important question will be how these forces can be sustained over time. 

The United States and international donor community are planning to provide more development funding through Afghan institutions. SIGIR certainly supports giving Afghans a greater say in 

how money is spent. But we also believe it is vital that Afghans 

be held accountable for U.S. funds channeled through the Afghan 

institutions. 

Therefore, SIGIR has begun assessing, one, what the United 

States and other donors are doing to build the capacity of Afghanistan institutions to deter corruption and strengthen the rule of law. 

And the extent to which various national and local institutions 

have the systems in place to exert internal control, and demonstrate accountability for donor funds. 

This work is having an impact. For example, the international 

community and the Afghan Government have taken steps to implement many of SIGIR’s, our organization’s, recommendations to 

strengthen the principal Afghanistan agency responsible for combating corruption. SIGIR is reviewing the salary support that the 

U.S. Government is providing for Afghan civil servants. 

We have also begun an assessment of the Afghanistan National 

Solidarity Program, which has received more than $900 million in 

9

donor assistance to fund small infrastructure programs. SIGIR’s 

legislation gives it a special responsibility to provide independent 

and objective assessments of every aspect of the reconstruction effort to Congress and to the Secretaries of State and Defense. 

Last month SIGIR began a review of the implementation of the 

inter-agency civilian surge. This audit seeks to identify the number 

and types of personnel provided to implement the civilian surge. It 

will also evaluate the extent to which civilians in the field are 

being effectively utilized to achieve strategic goals. 

Now a bit about SIGIR. We are steadily building our staff, and 

are prepared to provide the expanded oversight necessary to detect 

and deter waste, fraud, and abuse of the increasing U.S. funding 

for this reconstruction effort. 

We currently have 79 employees, and plan to reach our goal of 

132 during Fiscal Year 2011. We are in negotiations with the U.S. 

Embassy to increase the number of auditors and investigators 

present at the Embassy. Currently we have 20 full-time, for a year, 

investigators and auditors, with a small support staff, located at 

the Embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan. 

The United States, together with the international community, is 

committed to a strategy that will put Afghans in control of their 

future. The President is asking for a nearly 40 percent increase in 

U.S. funding. 

However, the success of this strategy depends not only on how 

the United States implements its reconstruction program; it also 

depends on the actions of the Afghan Government. Afghanistan 

must do its part to make sure that the human and financial resources provided for its reconstruction are not wasted. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Fields follows:]

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Mr. CARNAHAN. Thank you. I want to recognize myself for 5 minutes. And I guess I want to start with a look back. 

No special IG was created for Afghanistan until 2008. That was 

$38 billion and 7 years into the program. And given the massive 

level of waste, fraud, and abuse, and incredible levels of corruption 

in Afghanistan, I guess, can you assess the time before the special 

IG got up and running in terms of evaluating that time period? 

And then, of course, we want to talk about from that time forward. But can you assess that time before the Inspector General’s 

Office got up and running? 

Mr. FIELDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First I will say that it 

was a mistake; that we took too long to stand up this office of Special Inspector General. 

I applaud, however, my counterpart, SIGIR, under the current 

leadership of Mr. Stuart Bowen, who largely, almost from the start, 

was stood up to provide the same oversight over Iraq spending that 

my office is providing for Afghanistan. So it took us almost 8 years 

into this very expensive and very serious and pivotal operation in 

Afghanistan to bring about the organization that I am currently 

privileged to represent. 

So we are going back, however, commensurate with our legislation and we are looking at what did, in fact, in retrospect, took 

place between 2002 and actually the point at which we stood our 

office up. 

In so doing, we are conducting forensic investigations to determine who may have wasted, frauded, or abused the American taxpayer dollar during this period during which this office was not 

stood up. 

Meanwhile, the offices of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and USAID were, in 

fact, expected to provide the oversight in the absence of such an organization as a Special Inspector General for Afghanistan. 

Mr. CARNAHAN. Thank you. And I guess to drill down more specifically, have you evaluated that time period, looking back, in 

terms of the amount of money that was wasted? I guess, is number 

one. 

And number two, if you could address some of the criminal prosecutions for fraud that were mentioned in your report. 

Mr. FIELDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We are, by way of the forensic effort, going back and determining the extent to which funds 

were wasted during the period in advance of this office having been 

stood up. We don’t have figures, sir, at this time to provide to this 

subcommittee. But we will determine that over time. 

Initial indications are, though, that we have wasted money. I am 

not prepared today to put a figure on it, in the millions or billions, 

but I would hazard, sir, that it is in the millions, and perhaps even 

in the billions, that we have wasted and/or frauded the American 

taxpayer out of money during the period between 2002 and 2008. 

Mr. CARNAHAN. In the process to come to a more precise number 

on that, tell me what that process is, and when you think we could 

get some better numbers. 

Mr. FIELDS. Yes, sir. We are, as I mentioned, conducting the 

forensics. This essentially means we are boring down into various 

27

documents and procedures and spending that took place over about 

an 8-year period. 

We will review the contractual arrangements of folks involved in 

that spending for that period of time. And as a result of that, we 

hope that we will be able to determine if there was, in fact, waste, 

fraud and abuse, and indeed, who was——

Mr. CARNAHAN. Excuse me for interrupting. Just really quickly, 

because my time is about to expire, if you could briefly mention the 

criminal prosecutions and some of the monies that have been recovered. 

Mr. FIELDS. Yes, sir. Thus far, we have been a part of the joint 

community responsible for finding criminal activity. And as part of 

that mechanism, which is ongoing, and of which we are members, 

we have at least sent two folks to jail, or been a part of the process 

that in fact has resulted in two Afghanistan-Americans having 

been sent to jail. As a part of that, we have identified about $2 million associated with their activity. 

Mr. CARNAHAN. I am going to have to cut you off there. I am 

sorry, but my time is up, and I am going to yield 5 minutes to Mr. 

Rohrabacher. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you. Well, as I mentioned in my opening statement, you face quite a challenge. And your testimony 

today has only underscored that point. 

In looking back, it is a little breathtaking to understand that 

when we rushed into Iraq, how unprepared we were to handle the 

specific things that needed to be done in order for us to succeed. 

And here we are still in Iraq. 

And then to understand, as it appears now from what you are 

saying and what we have heard, and what our gut told us at the 

time, was that going into Iraq took our focus away from Afghanistan. And so for all of those years, we have not been doing the job 

we needed to do there, either. 

So one area of where we were not able to competently do what 

is necessary to be done, actually the magnitude of that challenge 

drew away from what we could do in Afghanistan. Let me note that 

in the 1990s, I was somewhat of a lone voice here, talking about 

Afghanistan. 

As you know, I spent time in Afghanistan with the Mujahideen 

when they were fighting the Russians. And also that I spent considerable time and effort during the Reagan White House years, 

when I worked in Reagan’s White House, to make sure that we 

were supporting people who were fighting the Soviet Empire, as 

the strategy to eliminate that. 

Well, the Afghans, more than anyone else, they gave us a victory 

in the Cold War. And a victory in the Cold War simply meant that 

the Soviet Communism disappeared from the planet. And I realized, because I had spent time in Afghanistan, how much we owed 

to the Afghan people. And they bore the brunt of that effort. And 

yet, we abandoned them. After the Soviet Union dissolved, we 

abandoned them, and did not help them rebuild their country, as 

we should have. And they ended up with these radical forces at 

play. 

28

And then with 9/11, and I might add during the time period of 

the 1990s, I was here calling for us to make sure that we did right 

by them, and that it would hurt us if we did not. And here, it did. 

But here again, what happened? After 9/11, with 200 American 

soldiers on the ground, and several, perhaps 20,000, 30,000 members of the Northern Alliance, we drove the Taliban and al Qaeda 

out of Afghanistan. And at one point, when they had been driven 

out, 90 percent of the people in the country were positive toward 

us. 

Again, it was our, it was, the ball was in our court. And again, 

we dropped the ball. And your testimony today is just underscoring 

that. 

That does not mean that we should not move forward now, and 

see what we can do, to the best of our ability, as a team, to try 

to see if we can, number one, repay that debt to the Afghan people. 

And by doing so, undercut this religious fanaticism on the part of 

Islamic extremists that have targeted the United States. 

General, I am going to read your report. I have not read it yet. 

Let me just ask, when you talk about corruption, are we talking 

about Americans or Afghans who are basically responsible for the 

corruption level we are talking about? 

Mr. FIELDS. Thank you, sir. When we look at corruption, we are 

looking at the whole enchilada. We are looking at both sides, the 

American side as well as the Afghan side. 

Currently, given that most of the money, probably as much as 80 

percent of it, that we have invested or are investing in Afghanistan 

is not channeled through the Government of Afghanistan, it is 

channeled through the implementing agencies of the United States; 

principally, the Department of Defense and the Department of 

State. And then from there to various contractors and other entities who help to make use of this money for the purposes for which 

it was, in fact, appropriated. 

So the work of our audit, as well as our investigations, considers 

both sides. With some degree of emphasis, of course, on the U.S. 

side and what we are doing to properly prevent waste, fraud, and 

abuse. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman, I think this subject actually 

deserves a lot more time than we are going to be able to give it 

today. And I would suggest to you that we bring the General back 

some time soon, after we have studied your reports, and be able 

to—there are some areas that I would really like to get into very 

deeply here. And we do not have the time to do it today. 

There is a major address before Congress, before the President 

of Mexico, I believe, that we are going to. And it would seem to me 

that we should—for example, I would like to ask the General’s 

analysis of whether the military teams, the PRTs, whether that is 

the way that we should focus on delivering aid, and what we have 

found are the effectiveness of those teams, as compared to the contractors at the local level. 

And there are a number of questions specifically like that, that 

need to be addressed. And I would hope that we can bring him 

back. 

Mr. CARNAHAN. I concur. And our point today is I think to give 

us an overview of the work that the Inspector General is doing. 

29

And certainly I expect there is going to be a number of specific 

issues we are going to want to dig into. So I look forward to working with you on that. 

Now I want to recognize Mr. Ellison for 5 minutes. 

Mr. ELLISON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, General, for being here and sharing your illuminating insights about 

these issues we are facing here in reconstruction of Afghanistan. 

Last month General McChrystal questioned our reliance on private contractors in Afghanistan. In fact, he is quoted to have said 

the following. This is him. ‘‘I actually think we would be better to 

reduce the number of contractors involved.’’ He went on to say, ‘‘I 

think it doesn’t save money.’’ And then he further elaborated by 

saying, ‘‘We have created in ourselves a dependency on contractors 

that I think is greater than it ought to be.’’

According to the GAO, in early 2010 there was approximately 

107,000 contractors supporting the United States and allied efforts 

in Afghanistan. 

I guess my question is, do you share General McChrystal’s concerns expressed in these quotes? Or how do you react to them? 

Mr. FIELDS. Thank you very much, sir. I think what General 

McChrystal is saying is generally true, from the standpoint of our 

dependence on the contracting community. 

But we also have been engaged with contractors for quite some 

time. This is not the first time, in a conflict, in the interest of the 

strategic direction of the United States, that we have had such a 

dependence on contractors. We did it during World War II, Korea, 

certainly Vietnam, and now Afghanistan. And of course, in Iraq, as 

well. 

But I do feel, and agree with General McChrystal, that we have 

come to depend too much on contractors. But there is a liability to 

this. 

We either build the resources that are now being provided by the 

contracting community within the defense mechanism and structure, or we continue to depend upon contractors. 

Mr. ELLISON. Could I follow up on that, general? 

Mr. FIELDS. Absolutely, sir. 

Mr. ELLISON. Well, I mean, we are paying these contractors quite 

a bit of money. So if the U.S. military developed capacity to perform these same functions internally, isn’t it likely that we could 

do it cheaper? 

Mr. FIELDS. I would say, sir, that some aspects of what we are 

currently doing could be done cheaper if the resources were, in fact, 

a part of the uniform defense establishment. But I am not inclined 

to say that that would necessarily, in the long run, be in the best 

interest of the American taxpayer. 

I do feel, though, that we could perhaps reduce our dependency 

on contractors by taking more full advantage of resources that we 

could have within the more conventional establishment of the U.S. 

military environment. 

Mr. ELLISON. But General, if we are spending, say, $1 to hire a 

contractor to do any given task, and if that task is necessary to be 

done; and given some of the concerns we have had about the expense of contractors and the difficulty of imposing accountability; 

30

I mean, the dollar to the contractor and a dollar spent internally 

is the same dollar, isn’t it? 

I mean, isn’t it conceivable that we could do better by—I mean, 

where would we not do better if we were to do, to build capacity 

internally? Because we are spending the same money anyway, either way. 

Mr. FIELDS. Well, let me say, sir, that the resources that the contracting community brings to a very complex environment, such as 

Afghanistan, is good. I do not wish to characterize all contractors 

as out to take advantage of the American taxpayer. 

Yes, they are businesses; and certainly there is a profit margin 

that they seek to find. But having done this work now for the past 

coming up on 2 years, I have considerable respect for the contracting community. They are operating in a very dangerous environment, and folks are not necessarily lining up to go to the edge 

of the battlefield, if you will, such as our contractors. Even folks 

that I would wish to hire into my organization, with the intent to 

spend quite a bit of time in dangerous places in corners of Afghanistan, it is difficult for me, as well. 

There are contractors being killed on the battlefield out there. 

And so it is very complex. 

Mr. ELLISON. General, certainly we want to thank any, all the 

contractors for their meritorious service. But this is not really a 

question of are contractors good people or are they bad people. It 

is a question of how do we get the most out of our dollars spent 

as American taxpayers, and might we do these things more costeffectively internally? And might we also have a better ability to 

demand accountability if they are done internally? So those are the 

points. 

And I just want to agree with you that people who have gone 

over and serve as contractors have done good work, and certainly 

we don’t want to denigrate their work. But I think some of these 

issues remain important. And I thank you for your testimony 

today. 

Mr. FIELDS. Thank you very much, sir. 

Mr. CARNAHAN. I want to thank the gentleman. And while we 

still have additional time, I think we are just going to do a second 

round of questions. 

And I want to follow up where I left off. We really didn’t get time 

to get your full answer, I think, in terms of the look back, before 

the Special Inspector General’s Office was stood up. 

Again, give me a description of the process that is in place to 

evaluate that, and a timeframe when you think we will have some 

better answers. Because as we evaluate these additional investments going forward, that is the kind of information that we need. 

Mr. FIELDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am pleased to have 

with me at the table today, and in the room, two of my principal 

staff: My assistant inspector general and acting deputy inspector 

general for audits, Mr. John Brummet. He is a career member, or 

former career member of the Government Accountability Office, 

GAO. 

And I also have with me the assistant inspector general for investigations, a career member of the Federal Bureau of Investigations, Mr. Ray DiNunzio. 

31

I would like to respectfully ask if Mr. John Brummet will roll in 

on that question of looking back, particularly with emphasis on the 

forensic work that he and his auditors are doing at this time. 

Mr. CARNAHAN. I recognize him to do so. And again, if you could 

give us a description of the process and the timeline, again as we 

look at these substantial new investments going forward. I think 

that is a very critical part of understanding what we have done in 

the past. 

Mr. BRUMMET. Yes, Mr. Chairman. It is very hard to look back. 

It would have been much easier if we had been set up a long time 

ago. When we look back, it is hard to find the documentation. It 

is hard to find the people responsible for the various programs because of the length of tour in Afghanistan. So looking back is a difficult thing. 

What we are trying to do is gather transaction data from all the 

reconstruction programs, and use some data-mining techniques to 

identify potential anomalies, like duplicate payments, or instances 

where the person that approved the payment is the same person 

that received the payment, to get suspect transactions. And then, 

through audit and through investigations, try to track those down. 

But it is a difficult process. And getting precision in terms of the 

amount of wasted or funds subject to fraud will be a very, very difficult task. 

Mr. CARNAHAN. I think that I cannot even imagine how difficult 

that would be. But having all of us acknowledge that it is difficult, 

you know, when do you think we could have—again, I know we are 

not going to get precision on this. But when do you think we could 

get some even ballpark ideas on where that stands, looking back? 

Mr. BRUMMET. I would think that over the course of the next 6 

months, as we complete another 10 to 12 audit reports, we will be 

in a much better position to make estimates along the lines that 

Mr. Bowen was able to make after he had spent 5 years of doing 

audits. And I think the figure on our estimate of waste will be considerable. 

Mr. CARNAHAN. Well, that will be very important, again, going 

forward. Now I want to flip to the present. And in your report you 

talk about the new funding that has been requested; three fourths 

of this new budget request is going for training the Afghan National Army and Police. 

And I think everyone, from our military leaders on the ground 

to people here on the Hill, believe that the success on the ground 

is critical, that military and police in Afghanistan be stood up. But 

it is also critical to being able to get our troops home. 

And so I would like you to address the police training, military 

training aspect. And in particular, you mentioned the Afghanistan 

Contract and Audit Office and problems there with their having insufficient independence, authority, and qualified staff to actually do 

their job. 

If we are spending these large amounts of money on something 

when clearly there is a consensus that this is something that has 

to be done, and done well, we need to be able to track how that 

is going. And again, part of that is money, as you mentioned, but 

I would also like you to address the capability milestone rating sysVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:46 Jul 06, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00035 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\IOHRO\052010\56558 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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tem, which can really talk about the effectiveness, and when you 

expect that report to be prepared. 

Because again, I think going forward, for considering these new 

budget requests, that is going to be critical. 

Mr. FIELDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me address the capability milestones report. That, to answer part of your question, sir, 

we hope to have completed that report and released it publicly by 

this June. So next month that report should be posted on our Web 

site and briefed, as appropriate to the leadership here in the Congress. 

That report will identify some serious issues. The most serious 

is that we have been using for years now this capability milestone, 

or CM, ratings process to determine where it was, where it is that 

the Afghanistan Security Forces stand, particularly and specifically 

Afghanistan National Army, as well as the Afghanistan National 

Police, and their ability to do what they are being stood up to do, 

and for which the American taxpayer has thus far essentially spent 

about $27 billion, with another $14.2 billion to come as a part of 

the President’s most recent request for additional funds to train the 

security apparatus of Afghanistan. 

We found flaws in this CM rating or capability milestone rating 

scheme. As I mentioned in my opening statement, this flaw or 

these flaws have been recognized by the most senior leadership of 

our military forces and trainers in Afghanistan, and they are taking corrective action to remedy this. 

But I am amazed that really, over the period that we have been 

spending so much money training and equipping this force, that we 

have just come to realize that we had an inadequate system of 

measuring their progress. 

In terms of the CAO, that is the Control and Audit Office, very 

similar to our Government Accountability Office here in the United 

States, and the High Office of Oversight, or the HOO. Those are 

two mechanisms within the Government of Afghanistan designed 

to fight corruption. 

We believe, of course, that in order to be successful, both in 

terms of standing up the security forces, we have to have good systems, institutions in place in Afghanistan. The CAO and the HOO 

are very significant in that regard. 

Our audit recently released both for the CAO and the HOO suggest that those offices are currently inadequate to do that for which 

they have been put in place. And the Embassy in Kabul is working 

with the Government of Afghanistan, as well as with other representatives of the international community, to remedy this. 

And I want to point out that President Karzai has taken some 

action himself to help remedy this, by decreeing that this office, 

specifically the High Office of Oversight, be provided more independence, so that it can really do its work. 

Mr. CARNAHAN. Thank you. Now I want to yield 5 minutes to Mr. 

Rohrabacher. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And 

again, I think we are going to have to, in the weeks ahead, we 

might have to have the General back. In the months ahead we 

might have to have the General back. And I am very happy that 

you are there, General. 

33

If we are going to talk about contractors, I just thought I would 

go on the record, because it seems to be a lot of focus on contractors 

here, a lot of people want to vilify contractors because of a natural 

inclination to suggest that, well, if there is a problem, we are going 

to blame it on somebody. We don’t want to blame it on the uniformed military people; we will blame it on the contractors. 

I think they, by and large, the contractors have done a good job. 

But we must make sure that they are not corrupt, and they are not 

going there and just exploiting a situation for profit. 

But let me just say that there are people who deserve our 

thanks, and deserve to be honored, among these contractors. 

Blackwater, for example, has been a contractor that has been 

vilified. And I would say the vilification of Blackwater and contractors like Blackwater is a black mark on a lot of people in this town. 

Blackwater has lost a lot of men in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

Just several months ago, when a CIA post was blown up, and we 

said that we lost, it was reported that six CIA operatives were lost 

in that explosion. Well, in fact, there weren’t eight operatives lost; 

there were six Blackwater contractors who were lost, along with 

two CIA operatives. And that didn’t happen to get reported. 

And they have done a good job. Blackwater has done a terrific 

job. Yet we see that organization targeted to try to find any little 

thing that they have done, to try to bring them down. That is outrageous, and I think the American people need to know the sacrifices that these, almost all the Blackwater people are former Special Forces, and I might add Marines, who are retired, and who are 

now using their expertise to try to accomplish our goals. 

So I think the vilification of the contractors is misplaced, and 

something that we should really think about. And these people, 

most of them, most of them deserve our praise. 

Now, why do we use contractors? Just to note, if a contractor can 

cook food for our troops, it is actually more cost-effective to have 

a cook, who is not in uniform and is not a military person, to be 

there cooking for our troops and providing food services for our 

troops. Because it costs us $1 million per person, and per uniformed military personnel in that combat area, it is costing $1 million a year. 

Well, it shouldn’t cost us $1 million a year in order to provide 

a cook. But perhaps putting someone, someone who is willing to go 

into harm’s way, and our soldiers and Marines, that is the type of 

expenditure that we have to have. 

General, I want to get back to—okay, there is my defense of the 

contractors. I think it is necessary. I think that they are being 

abused, and people should be ashamed that they are abusing some 

of these heroic people, like Blackwater, who have done great jobs 

for us. 

Now, with that said, I would like to go back to this initial question about comparing when the military itself is able to involve 

itself in economy-building operations, versus having aid, USAID 

and other agencies, and contractors coming in to do that job. 

I am just requesting you now—I don’t want you to do this off the 

top of your head—I would like you to prepare a report for this committee comparing the effectiveness and letting us know the effectiveness of the PRTs, which are military units, in Afghanistan, as 

34

compared to perhaps the way, the operation of non, of contractors 

and other elements of our Government, in terms of building up 

local economy, and the success they have had. 

So I am going to ask you to do that for this committee. And it 

wouldn’t have to be an extensive report, but just a general analysis 

of how that is working. 

And I see that my time is up now, Mr. Chairman. I hope that 

if we have time for another round, I do have a couple more questions. Thank you. 

Mr. CARNAHAN. Thank you. And I wanted to, in my next round 

of questions, get into, again looking forward with some of the activities you mentioned. Of course, the Donor Conference in London. 

We have the upcoming peace jirga on the 29th of this month, and 

the Kabul conference in July. 

Can you address for the committee some of your expectations 

from those conferences? And in particular, the importance of having really a broad-base involvement of men and women in those 

conferences, and how that is going to improve the effectiveness of 

what we are able to do on the ground? 

Mr. FIELDS. Sir, I applaud the fact that these conferences are, in 

fact, taking place. Much of the work that will be done at these 

forthcoming conferences really is really borne out of the 28 January 

conference hosted in London in support of the reconstruction efforts 

in Afghanistan. 

There were certain decisions made at that conference, and now 

the international community is coming together to assist the Government of Afghanistan in making sure that those recommendations agreed upon are, in fact, put in place. 

In terms of the involvement of women, I don’t anticipate that the 

level of involvement of women will be at the level at which I think 

the American people would be pleased to see. We can reflect on 

audit work that we have done, which I think is an example of what 

I am trying to say here, regarding women in Afghanistan. We conducted an audit associated with the recent elections, and while not 

completely disenfranchised, nonetheless, the women did not fare 

well in terms of the basic rights for voting, and expectations as 

would otherwise be expected among the male population of Afghanistan. 

We are also conducting an audit to determine what has happened to about three quarters of a billion dollars, Mr. Chairman, 

that this Congress has made available for women and girls in Afghanistan during the course of the past several years. We are looking to find if there is evidence that the money was, first of all, used 

for the purposes for which it was made available; and to what extent has it helped to advance women and girls in Afghanistan. 

The extent to which that money, perhaps, and other donor contributions have been effective will certainly be reflected in the extent to which women participate, to any influential level, in these 

forthcoming conferences. 

Mr. CARNAHAN. Let me ask about the development of the agricultural sector. During our visits a few weeks ago, it was one of the 

things that was highlighted, that 80 percent of the country is rural 

and agriculturally driven. They have great opportunities in develVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:46 Jul 06, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00038 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\IOHRO\052010\56558 HFA PsN: SHIRL
35

oping pomegranates, fruits, nuts, grapes, and that that is going to 

be critical to their economic growth. 

We heard some good success stories about the way some of our 

civilian teams were partnering with farmers. Also that the farm income in the areas that we visited, in Kandahar, had tripled in the 

last year. So there is some good progress being made. 

Can you talk about your evaluation of how the agricultural sector 

is developing? And in particular, as was mentioned by Mr. Rohrabacher, about the success of some of the PRTs? But also, the National Guard Agricultural Development Teams. 

Mr. FIELDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The agriculture sector is 

a very important part of the strategy that the United States, in 

conjunction with the international community, is implementing in 

Afghanistan. And you may know, sir, and the committee members 

may know that it consists basically of two principal elements, one 

of which is to help shore up the Ministry of Agriculture in Afghanistan. And the other component is to shore up agriculture itself 

among the 34 provinces so that they help to encourage or expand 

job opportunities which our Government feels is important to helping to bring this reconstruction effort and this conflict to closure. 

We are poised to do some work in this area. And I would like 

to ask Mr. Brummet if he would comment on that, sir. 

Mr. CARNAHAN. I recognize you to do so. 

Mr. BRUMMET. We have not done any audit work on the ag sector. However, I do have a team that has been in Jalalabad in 

Nangarhar Province, and they met with the Agricultural Development Team there. And we will be going in I believe next month to 

do work at the provincial level. 

I would say that looking at the ag sector, in a comprehensive 

way, is something that needs to be done because we have USAID 

spending a lot of money. We have the U.S. military with the Agricultural Development Team spending a lot of money. We have 

USDA, Department of Agriculture, with about 40 advisors, 

throughout the country. And we have the State Department that 

is working on counter-drug activities, which involve things like alternative crops and that type of thing. 

What we found, looking at other sectors—namely, the energy sector—is it is very, very difficult, when you have so many U.S. agencies involved, and also the international donor community, to have 

a coordinated effort. And what we found in the energy sector was 

lack of coordination, lack of planning, lack of common standards. 

And I suspect we might find some of the same problems in looking 

at the agriculture sector. 

So we will be starting that work probably within 6 to 8 weeks. 

And we will have a report out on the ag sector I hope by the end 

of the year. 

Mr. CARNAHAN. Thank you. Mr. Rohrabacher. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Amazing we are talking about this 8 years 

into the war. It is unbelievable. 

Let me just note, Mr. Chairman, that quite often people will take 

a look at projects, and suggest that there might be waste involved 

in it because they are unsuccessful. 

The lack of success in this particular situation, as in other overseas conflicts, is usually not traced back just to corruption, and not 

36

just to waste, but to a flawed strategy. And you cannot have a 

strategy or a policy that is fundamentally in conflict with the tradition or culture of the country that you are in, and expect that it 

will succeed. 

And it may look like waste or fraud from a distance. For example, when we are talking about creating the, standing up the Army 

of Afghanistan, and standing up the National Police in Afghanistan. 

Now, correct me if I am wrong, General, you may know about 

this, but there has been a huge desertion rate among the people 

that we have already trained. Now, what does that reflect? Does 

it reflect waste? It doesn’t reflect waste. 

What it reflects is the fact that Afghanistan has the most decentralized tribal and provincial and ethnic culture of any other country in the world. And trying to create an Afghanistan that is controlled or dominated by Kabul, and governed by Kabul, the capitol 

city, isn’t going to happen. It isn’t going to happen. It is totally contrary to their whole tradition. 

There has never been an Afghanistan that was dominated by the 

capitol cities. Zahirshah, the King, there for 40 years, basically 

didn’t rule the country. He simply was the godfather or the father 

figure of the country. But the governance was going down at the 

tribal level, at the village level, at the family level, at the provincial level. And as we try to create this image of a modern country 

which has a central army, we will not succeed. And it may look like 

waste, but it isn’t. 

And let me just note, the great State Department planners who 

forced the current constitution on Afghanistan, after the Taliban 

were driven out, created and developed a constitution that is the 

most centralized-power constitution of any country that I know of. 

Mr. Chairman, the constitution in Afghanistan does not have the 

power to the people, so to speak. I mean, down at the village level. 

In fact, the police are the National Police Force. Does that sound 

like it is consistent with a decentralized society? A national police 

force? That may be good in France, but it is not good in Afghanistan. And if you appoint the heads of police from Kabul, you are 

asking for corruption. All right? 

So we have a flawed policy that looks like corruption, but it is 

a flawed policy. We aren’t going to have—and the provincial leaders, I believe, are appointed by Kabul, under their constitution. 

How is that going to succeed in a country that prides itself on ethnic lines and in tribal lines, and has a decentralized culture? It 

won’t work. 

So General, you have got your job cut out for you. And I would 

hope that we can, as we discuss the waste that is going on, that 

we can try to delineate where that fraud and that waste is that is 

actual fraud and waste, but not just the result of a flawed policy. 

You, General, are not going to be able to correct the flawed policy. You are going to be able to point out to us and to everybody 

else how things aren’t working, or there is corruption involved. And 

we are going to pay a lot of attention to that. 

But Mr. Chairman, we need to realize that there are some fundamental structures that have been put in place that will not work. 

And I think that, as a result also of a lack of attention, as you have 

37

already brought out in this hearing, Mr. Chairman, the lack of attention to exactly what was going on in Afghanistan. And I believe 

that the incompetence level of what we have been trying to do in 

Iraq and Afghanistan is a major issue. But especially in Afghanistan, the basic policy and foundation that we have been working 

with is something that also needs to be looked at, and needs to be 

corrected if we can. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. General, I am looking forward to your report. 

When I was, over the years as I visited Afghanistan, I have noted 

the good work of the various PRT groups that are not totally military, but at least the military officers I think are playing the dominant role in the PRTs. So I am looking forward to that report from 

you. 

And with that said, I guess I didn’t ask a question. General, my 

question is, what do you think about that? 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. FIELDS. Thank you, sir. We comment on policy issues when 

requested. And as we see a policy issue having an impact on our 

principal work, providing oversight of that 51, and to be more 

exact, $51.5 billion that the U.S. taxpayer has already invested in 

Afghanistan. 

The issues that you mentioned, sir, are certainly issues that need 

to be addressed. And I am confident that, in this Congress and 

within the administration, those matters will be sufficiently addressed. And wherever it is that our work, in terms of providing 

the oversight, crosses those issues, then we will certainly provide 

our advice and counsel as we see them from our vantage point. 

In reference to the PRTs, sir, and their impact, I am pleased to 

say that I have thus far visited about half of the PRTs, representing about 15 countries, rather, 15 provinces of Afghanistan. 

I have yet to find a PRT commander who is inadequate or incompetent. I have been impressed by the leadership, both on the U.S. 

side, as well as on the internationally led PRT side. 

What we have found, though, is that the PRTs have been insufficiently staffed, not so much by the uniform military, but the institutions, Federal institutions of our Government. Department of Agriculture, Department of State, USAID have not, in the past, consistently provided the personnel resources and expertise that was, 

were determined on the front end of the PRT arrangement. 

I am pleased to say, though, I have now been able to see some 

evidence that the institutions are providing a better response. We 

are not there yet. A part of that response is, in fact, the civilian 

surge, or civilian uplift, as we say. 

We are conducting an audit of the civilian uplift to determine if, 

in fact, the policy under which the civilian uplift and surge have 

been implemented measures up to the effect that we expect that instrument of support to reconstruction should have. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you, General, I appreciate that. And 

if you can provide some specifics in writing to me on the PRTs that 

you just stated. See, I happen to believe that is where the progress 

is going to come from. Because PRTs go right down to the local 

level, and you have direct interaction, and you have a disbursement of funds by a military officer, rather than contractors or nonVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:46 Jul 06, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00041 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\IOHRO\052010\56558 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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military officers. Or at least a military officer overseeing it in that 

local area. 

So I am very interested in that. And thank you for that answer. 

I am looking forward to, as I say, working with you in the years 

ahead, or months ahead at least. 

Mr. FIELDS. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. CARNAHAN. Thank you. And I just wanted to close up with 

a couple of questions, one really following up on the corruption discussion that you had, and also about staffing. 

The survey that was put out earlier this year by the U.N. said 

that 60 percent of Afghans thought that corruption was their biggest concern. That one Afghan out of every two had to pay at least 

one kickback to a public official. The average bribe was $160, and 

that the one quarter of the, this was one quarter of the country’s 

GDP, they paid out over $2.5 billion in bribes in the last 12 

months. That is equivalent to the revenue accrued by the poppy 

trade, of about $2.8 billion. 

So the magnitude of this is staggering. And, you know, your job 

is staggering, in terms of trying to get a handle on that and assess 

that. But, you know, your job I think is to shine a light on the 

problems there, to arm us with information, to help make the best 

policy and funding decisions we can from where we sit. And we absolutely want and need you to succeed. 

And so I guess I would like you to comment on addressing the 

corruption issue that seems endemic, and also address the staffing 

levels for the Inspector General’s Office, efforts to be sure that we 

are not duplicating what other agencies are doing. 

But the bottom-line question: Do you have the staffing and resources you need to provide the information that Congress was 

looking for going forward? 

Mr. FIELDS. Thank you, sir. Let me say that the Congress has 

been forthcoming in providing resources for my office. 

While on the front end of the stand-up of this SIGIR office, we 

did not have really a penny. When I was appointed on the 22nd, 

when I was sworn in on the 22nd of July in 2008, this organization 

had absolutely no money. 

But by October/November of that same year, Congress did make 

available $2 million in one instance, in another, $5 million, followed up by another $9 million. So we essentially worked for 1 year 

building this organization from scratch with about $16 million. 

But I am pleased to say that for this year, as well as for year 

2011, we have about $35 million to build this organization to 132, 

primarily of investigators and auditors, about a third of whom will 

be stationed in Afghanistan. So we are poised to, I think, conduct 

the work that we have been designed to do. 

We are being asked to do more than we really have a capability. 

We have been asked to participate in the provincial oversight issue 

or mechanism of the Government of Afghanistan. To this extent we 

have made a request for an additional $14 million to help in that 

regard. That would increase by almost twice the current number of 

auditors that we have. 

We don’t know whether or not this measure will find its way 

completely through the Congress, but I do bring that to your attention as a measure of funding for which we have made a request. 

39

And we would certainly put to good use, were the Congress to find 

that it should be appropriated on behalf of SIGIR. 

In terms of corruption, I honestly will tell this Congress that I 

don’t believe that in advance of year 2009, that we paid very much 

attention to the, an anti-corruption program in Afghanistan as a 

part of our reconstruction effort. But I am pleased to say that over 

the last year, and especially in the past 6 months, after seeing considerable activity in that regard, I am inclined to say that some of 

that activity has been generated by the very audits that SIGIR has 

conducted. Specifically, the audit of the Control and Audit Office, 

as well as the audit of the High Office of Oversight. 

So the Embassy is working with the Government of Afghanistan, 

the international community is working with the Government of 

Afghanistan, both in providing expertise, as well as monetary resources, to raise this country up from 179 or so in terms of where 

it stands on the hierarchy, if you will, of anti-corruption, or corruption, to something much, much better than that. 

I am very disappointed, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Rohrabacher, that after we have spent essentially $50 billion, we 

still have a country that is almost at the bottom of the list in terms 

of corruption. 

Mr. CARNAHAN. Thank you. And we have just a few minutes left, 

and I am going to yield to Mr. Ellison for the last questions. 

Mr. ELLISON. General, I just have a very brief, and even simple, 

question, and even a simplistic question. But I would just like to 

ask you your views on, as we approach this issue of addressing corruption, what are some of the key things you think that the United 

States Government could do to help? I mean some of the key things 

to really promote a greater environment of transparency and accountability on behalf of our Afghan partners? 

Mr. FIELDS. Thank you for your question, sir. What is it that the 

United States can do? I think we are already doing a lot. But I am 

disappointed to say that in terms of our financial investment in Afghanistan in shoring up the institutions of Afghanistan, where I 

think much of the future of fighting anti-corruption begins. 

We must have strong institutions. We must have systems and 

controls in place at the highest level of any government, particularly the one about which we are concerned at this point in time, 

and that is Afghanistan. We must have those mechanisms at the 

top of the government. 

We are working with the Control and Audit Office, and with the 

High Office of Oversight. We have spent $27 billion associated with 

the Afghanistan Security Forces. All of these mechanisms I feel 

come together to I think, sir, answer your question as to where are 

we helping to take Afghanistan when it comes to fighting this corruption that exists in their institutions and among their populace. 

Mr. CARNAHAN. Thank you, Inspector General. And we are going 

to have to wrap up. And Mr. Rohrabacher, you had a quick closing? 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. That is it. 

Mr. CARNAHAN. Okay. Thank you. We will certainly follow up. 

We appreciate your service. We want you to succeed in what you 

are doing, so that we can make the best decisions possible. Thank 

you very much. 

Mr. FIELDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

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[Whereupon, at 10:54 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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