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37–168 PDF 2007

S. HRG. 110–127

PROCESS PATENTS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

MAY 1, 2007

Serial No. J–110–31

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary

(

(II)

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont, Chairman 

EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts 

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware 

HERB KOHL, Wisconsin 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island 

ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania 

ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah 

CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Iowa 

JON KYL, Arizona 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina 

JOHN CORNYN, Texas 

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

BRUCE A. COHEN, Chief Counsel and Staff Director 

MICHAEL O’NEILL, Republican Chief Counsel and Staff Director 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

STATEMENTS OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS 

Page

Feinstein, Hon. Dianne, a U.S. Senator from the State from California, prepared statement ................................................................................................... 59

Leahy, Hon. Patrick J., a U.S. Senator from the State of Vermont .................... 1

prepared statement .......................................................................................... 82

Specter, Hon. Arlen, a U.S. Senator from the State of Pennsylvania ................. 2

WITNESSES 

Cotropia, Christopher A., Professor of Law, University of Richmond School 

of Law, Richmond, Virginia ................................................................................. 8

Herrington, Wayne W., Assistant General Counsel, U.S. International Trade 

Commission, Washington, D.C. ........................................................................... 3

Kirk, Michael K., Executive Director, American Intellectual Property Law 

Association, Arlington, Virginia .......................................................................... 6

Thomas, John R., Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, 

Washington, D.C. ................................................................................................. 5

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 

Responses of Christopher Cotropia to questions submitted by Senators Specter and Whitehouse .............................................................................................. 17

Responses of Wayne Herrington to questions submitted by Senators Specter .. 24

Responses of Michael Kirk to questions submitted by Senators Specter and 

Whitehouse ........................................................................................................... 28

Responses of John R. Thomas to questions submitted by Senators Specter 

and Whitehouse .................................................................................................... 34

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD 

American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, William Samuel, Director, Department of Legislation, Washington, D.C., letter 38

Cotropia, Christopher A., Professor of Law, University of Richmond School 

of Law, Richmond, Virginia, statement .............................................................. 40

Department of Commerce, John J. Sullivan, General Counsel, Washington, 

D.C., letter ............................................................................................................ 48

Herrington, Wayne W., Assistant General Counsel, U.S. International Trade 

Commission, Washington, D.C., statement ........................................................ 65

Kantor, Mickey and Theodore B. Olson, Hoffman-LaRoche Inc., Washington, 

D.C., article ........................................................................................................... 69

Kirk, Michael K., Executive Director, American Intellectual Property Law 

Association, Arlington, Virginia, statement ....................................................... 71

Thomas, John R., Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, 

Washington, D.C., statement .............................................................................. 84

United Steelworkers, Leo W. Gerard, International President, Pittsburgh, 

Pennsylvania, letter ............................................................................................. 89

(1)

PROCESS PATENTS 

TUESDAY, MAY 1, 2007

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, Washington, D.C. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:43 p.m., in room 

SD–226, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Patrick J. Leahy, 

Chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Leahy, Cardin, Whitehouse, Specter, Graham, 

and Coburn. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. PATRICK J. LEAHY, A U.S. 

SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF VERMONT 

Chairman LEAHY. I would like to apologize to the four of you, 

and especially to Senator Specter and Senator Coburn, for being 

late. I have actually been in the Agriculture Committee, which was 

running somewhat behind, and everything has been running behind today with the funeral of our good friend, Jack Valenti. Senator Specter and I were both at that earlier today. 

I joined with Senator Hatch and other Senators, and with Chairman Berman and Representative Smith from the House Judiciary 

Committee, just a few weeks ago to introduce sweeping bipartisan, 

bicameral patent reform legislation. We are trying to update our 

patent laws to provide help to patent seekers and patent holders. 

The Supreme Court is also more engaged in patent law decisions 

than it has been in decades. It has decided three important cases 

already this term. In two decisions released just yesterday, the Supreme Court ventured, first, into the fundamental issue of the 

standard for ‘‘obviousness’’ that would prevent patentability and, 

second, spoke to the extraterritorial effect of U.S. patent laws. 

We have heard a great deal about another issue involving U.S. 

patents and overseas manufacturing—the issues surrounding products produced overseas using processes patented in the United 

States. One of those issues is the importation of these products. So 

we will turn today about what defenses should be available to a 

party accused of importing products manufactured abroad by infringing a U.S. process patent, the so-called 271(g) question. 

Sometimes litigation brings important issues to our attention. It 

should always be the case that we do not intend to interfere with 

that litigation. We are well aware that private parties are interested, and we will proceed carefully today. 

Prior to Congress’ amending the patent laws in 1988, a company 

holding a U.S. process patent could sue for infringement of that 

patent only if the infringement took place within the United States. 

2

If it took place overseas, they only had the International Trade 

Commission. In 1988, we amended that law. 

The ITC has held that our 271(g) defenses are not available in 

ITC exclusion proceedings because the plain language of the statute, confirmed by its history, applies them only to patent infringement claims being considered in Federal court pursuant to the 

1988 amendment. So we will decide whether this distinction should 

remain. 

I have heard from those who argue that the defenses were never 

intended to be limited to infringement claims, and the law should 

be changed to harmonize ITC and district court litigation. Others 

argue that the purpose of an ITC exclusion proceeding and district 

court patent infringement litigation are simply different. But if we 

permit products to enter the United States that were made abroad 

by a process patented here—where the creation of the product 

would itself be an act of infringement if it occurred here—well, 

then, we are doing nothing less than offshoring infringement and 

outsourcing jobs. 

This may seem like is a very narrow legal issue, but the policy 

can have a very wide reach, and I think we should be fully informed. So I am looking forward to the witnesses today. But before 

we begin, of course, I yield to Senator Specter. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Leahy appears as a submission for the record.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. ARLEN SPECTER, A U.S. SENATOR FROM 

THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA 

Senator SPECTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This is a very important hearing focusing on a very narrow issue, as you have stated, whether the defenses ought to be available in the International 

Trade Commission contrasted with the Federal court. And this is 

part of a broader picture of patent reform where we are deeply involved at the present time, and there is a great deal of thought 

being given to the whole field, and especially to this specific issue. 

I regret that I cannot stay. We are in the midst of a whole series 

of meetings on immigration reform. We are trying to craft a bill to 

come before the Senate in the last 2 weeks of this month if we are 

to have any chance to deal with immigration this year, because 

once we pass Memorial Day, we get involved in the appropriations 

process. So there have been very heavy efforts on that, and there 

had previously been scheduled a meeting at 3 o’clock today, which 

I am hosting. But my staff is here, and my cerebrum will be here. 

My cerebellum is going to Hart 711. And the third part of my 

brain, medulla oblongata, is unoccupied at the moment. 

[Laughter.] 

Chairman LEAHY. Can I borrow it? 

Senator SPECTER. So it is a rest period for part of me. But as I 

say, my staff will be here, and I will be watching the proceedings 

very closely. 

I have talked to the combatants. This is a Herculean struggle, 

and we will listen carefully and try to come to a sound legislative 

judgment. We will try to change our spots and do it rationally. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you. If you are going to immigration, 

you are going to another Herculean battle, and I wish you well. 

3

Senator SPECTER. Well, the only regret I have about going to immigration is that I am not taking Coburn and Leahy with me. 

Thank you. 

Chairman LEAHY. Gentlemen, would you please stand and raise 

your right hand? Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you 

will give in this matter will be the truth, the whole truth, and 

nothing but the truth, so help you God? 

Mr. HERRINGTON. I do. 

Mr. THOMAS. I do. 

Mr. KIRK. I do. 

Mr. COTROPIA. I do. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you. Our first witness will be Wayne 

Herrington, who is Assistant General Counsel at the United States 

International Trade Commission. After he got his law degree from 

Columbia University, he clerked for Judge Giles S. Rich of the U.S. 

Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. I knew Judge Rich. Mr. 

Herrington then held jobs both with the Government and in the 

private sector. He is co-author of the book ‘‘Intellectual Property 

Rights and United States International Law.’’

We will begin with you, Mr. Herrington. 

STATEMENT OF WAYNE W. HERRINGTON, ASSISTANT GENERAL COUNSEL, U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION, 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Mr. HERRINGTON. Thank you. Good afternoon, Chairman Leahy, 

Ranking Member Specter, and members of the Committee. The 

Commission appreciates the opportunity to appear before this Committee to discuss its administration of Section 337 of the Tariff Act 

of 1930 and process patents. 

The Commission is an independent, nonpartisan, quasi-judicial 

agency. It administers a wide variety of trade-related statutes, including Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930. Section 337 prohibits 

unfair practices in the import trade, including imports which infringe intellectual property rights. In fact, the overwhelming majority of our cases under Section 337 involve allegations of patent or 

trademark infringement, with allegations of patent infringement 

predominating. We conduct our Section 337 proceedings under the 

adjudicative provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, with 

an administrative law judge making an initial determination and 

the Commission making the final determination. If the Commission 

finds a violation of Section 337, it may issue an order excluding the 

infringing products from entry into the United States. It may also 

issue cease and desist orders to infringing firms and persons prohibiting them from selling infringing goods already located in the 

United States. 

The subject of this hearing is the law applicable to the unauthorized importation and sale of products made abroad by a process 

covered by the claims of a United States patent. The Commission 

has had statutory authority to address such unauthorized importation since 1940, when Congress enacted what used to be known as 

Section 337a. Section 337a was eventually incorporated in Section 

337 itself as Section 337(a)(1)(B)(ii) as a result of the amendments 

to Section 337 in the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 

1988. 

4

The current version of that provision provides that the importation, sale for importation, or sale within the United States after importation of a product will be a violation of Section 337 if it is 

‘‘made, produced, processed, or mined under, or by means of, a 

process covered by the claims of a valid and enforceable United 

States patent.’’

The U.S. district courts did not obtain statutory authority under 

the patent law to address the unauthorized importation and sale 

of products made abroad by a patented process until 1988, when 

35 U.S.C. 271(g) was added to the patent law by the Process Patent 

Amendments Act. Besides providing for infringement, Section 

271(g) provides that ‘‘[a] product which is made by a patented process will, for purposes of this title, not be considered to be so made 

after—(1) it is materially changed by subsequent processes; or (2) 

it becomes a trivial and nonessential component of another product.’’

In 2002, in the Abrasives case, the Commission affirmed an order 

of one of its administrative law judges that the defenses to infringement contained in 35 U.S.C. 271(g)—that is, 271(g)(1) and 

(g)(2)—were not available in a case based on the Commission’s 

process patent provision. Specifically, the Commission found that 

Section 9006(c) of the Process Patent Amendments Act made it 

clear that the defenses of Section 271(g)(1) and (2) would not apply 

to Section 337 cases. As an additional reason, the Commission 

found that Section 271(g) explicitly restricted its application to 

cases under Title 35. Section 337 is under Title 19. 

The accused infringer in the Abrasives case, Kinik, Co., appealed 

the Commission’s final determination to the Federal Circuit, arguing numerous points, including that the Commission erred in holding that Kinik could not rely on the defenses in 271(g)(1) and (2). 

On appeal, the Federal Circuit agreed with the Commission’s interpretation of the statutory provisions and the legislative history 

with respect to the inapplicability of those defenses. The case is 

Kinik Company v. International Trade Commission, a 2004 decision 

of the Federal Circuit. However, the court reversed the Commission’s finding of infringement on an entirely unrelated basis because it disagreed with the Commission’s claim construction. 

The foregoing is a summary of the Commission’s practice and the 

development of the law. The Commission would be pleased to provide technical advice on legislative language the Committee may be 

considering. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Herrington appears as a submission for the record.] 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you very much. 

Our next witness is John R. Thomas, a professor of law at my 

alma mater, Georgetown, where he teaches classes on patent law 

and intellectual property and world trade. He recently received a 

grant from the MacArthur Foundation—congratulations—in order 

to continue working as a visiting scholar at the Congressional Research Service. Professor Thomas is an author of several books on 

intellectual property law and patent law and pharmaceutical patent law. 

5

And I will also take this moment to do some housekeeping and 

put a statement from Senator Feinstein and a letter from the AFL–

CIO in the record at this place. 

Go ahead, Professor Thomas. 

STATEMENT OF JOHN R. THOMAS, PROFESSOR OF LAW, 

GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER, WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Mr. THOMAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Leahy, Ranking Member Specter, and other members 

of the Committee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you 

today. I testify here on my own behalf, and my views are not necessarily those of any institution with which I am associated. 

The issue of process patent enforcement is complex. Yet in the 

view of many observers, the question of process patent enforcement 

reduces to an elemental proposition of a just system of laws: that 

like cases should be decided alike, regardless of the forum in which 

the case is heard. 

Competing views certainly exist, and I will rely upon Mr. Kirk 

to articulate them effectively, but let me focus my testimony instead on the concerns that have arisen with respect to the Kinik

case and its consequences. 

The Kinik opinion has attracted criticism for several reasons. 

First, its holding is purely dicta. It is hastily considered and not 

necessarily the result of the dispute before the court. 

Second, the Federal Circuit arguably misinterpreted language 

from the statute and legislative history that it read to say that the 

limitations in 271(g) do not apply to the ITC. But a sensible and 

alternative reading of that language is merely that 271(g) does not 

affect wholly domestic situations involving process patents, and 

that the ITC is not usurped by the availability of a similar remedy 

in the trial courts. 

Finally, the Federal Circuit did not account for the strong presumption against extraterritorial application of U.S. laws. Mr. 

Leahy, you referenced the Microsoft v. AT&T case that came out 

yesterday. There the Supreme Court emphasized that the presumption that U.S. law governs domestically but does not rule the world 

applies with particular force to patent law. The court further explained that this presumption is not defeated even with respect to 

provisions like 271(g) that have some extraterritorial effect. In 

those cases, the presumption remains instructive as to the extent 

of the statutory exemption. Application of this presumption suggests that the 271(g) defenses should apply not just to the district 

courts, but also to the ITC. 

Now, regardless of whether the Federal Circuit got it right in 

Kinik, there are a number of concerns that its outcome has raised. 

First, Congress intended the two exemptions of the Process Patent Amendments Act to balance the traditional competing objectives of patent law, and one of them is to encourage the labors that 

lead to innovation, but the other is to disseminate the fruits of 

those labors to members of the public. The ‘‘materially changed’’ 

and ‘‘nonessential component’’ limitations both balance the interests of patent proprietors, on one hand, with follow-on innovators, 

and they also recognize the territorial limitations of the patent instrument. These congressional intentions, this balance, simply canVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:09 Aug 24, 2007 Jkt 037168 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\37168.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
6

not be achieved if, at whim, the patent holders can simply go to 

another forum and bypass them. 

Second, our current fragmented enforcement policy may limit the 

access of U.S. consumers to innovative products that bear a tangential relationship to the patented process. The two exemptions in 

271(g) evidence a Congressional intent not to provide patent holders in the United States with an extraterritorial proprietary interest on products too distant from the marketplace value of the patented process. Again, that goal cannot be achieved if a plaintiff on 

its whim can simply bypass the forum in which they apply. 

Finally, the remedial disparity between the district courts and 

the ITC potentially favors domestic industry over foreign firms. Because the availability of exclusion orders is premised upon the existence of a domestic industry, U.S.-based firms are favored over 

importers. Although the analysis of whether this regime is effectively a violation of our WTO agreements which bind us is a complex issue, but the perceived favoritism of U.S. industry over foreign firms may send a conflicting message. 

Also issued yesterday was the U.S. Trade Representative’s report 

about intellectual property rights in foreign firms, the special 301 

report, and the USTR faulted no fewer than 43 of our trading partners for violations or lapses, perceived lapses in intellectual property policy. The U.S. may be subject to similar criticism so long as 

it maintains a regime of substantive patent law that favors domestic industry over foreign firms. 

Thank you very much for the opportunity to present this testimony, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to any questions that you or 

your colleagues may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Thomas appears as a submission 

for the record.] 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you, Professor, and thank you for keeping within our time limitations. 

Mr. Kirk has been the Executive Director of the American Intellectual Property Law Association since 1995—is that correct? He 

previously held a number of positions at the Patent and Trademark 

Office, including most recently Deputy Commissioner. He has had 

extensive experience in patent law in the international context. 

During his tenure at the Patent and Trademark Office, Mr. Kirk 

represented the United States in several international treaty obligations, including GATT and WIPO and OECD. And to try to keep 

some continuity here, he is also a graduate of the Georgetown University Law Center. 

What year did you graduate? 

Mr. KIRK. I graduated in 1965. 

Chairman LEAHY. Mr. Kirk knows why I am grinning. I graduated in 1964. 

[Laughter.] 

Chairman LEAHY. Go ahead, Mr. Kirk. 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL K. KIRK, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, 

AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW ASSOCIATION, 

ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 

Mr. KIRK. Thank you, Chairman Leahy, members of the Committee. I am pleased to be here today to offer the views of the 

7

American Intellectual Property Law Association on whether the defenses to infringement in Section 271(g) should be made applicable 

to Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930. I will not go through the 

details that have already been covered by you, Mr. Chairman, and 

by Mr. Herrington and Professor Thomas, but let me say that there 

are significant differences between a Section 337 proceeding in the 

ITC and an action for patent infringement in a Federal court that 

make Section 271(g) exceptions inappropriate for Section 337. 

The ITC must find that a patentee is actively engaged in exploiting the patent in the United States. The product must have been 

made by a process covered by a valid and enforceable patent. The 

remedy is limited to a prospective exclusion order, no monetary 

damages. The ITC must also consider the public interest, health 

and welfare, and competitive conditions in the United States before 

issuing an exclusion order, and the Section 337 determination is 

subject to Presidential review before becoming final. 

In contrast, the district court in a patent infringement action 

only considers whether the patent is valid, enforceable, and infringed, and both damages and injunctive relief are available. 

By adding 271(g) to the patent law, Congress intended to provide 

additional remedies in Federal court for process patent owners. 

Congress explicitly stated that it did not intend to undermine any 

existing remedies available to patent owners in Section 337 proceedings. The Senate report reinforces this point. As we heard from 

Mr. Herrington, this intent was confirmed by the ITC and the Federal Circuit in Kinik v. International Trade Commission. We think 

the Federal Circuit got it right. Congress closed the process patent 

loophole with passage of 271(g) and was careful not to create a second one. We believe this decision was correct. 

The proposed amendment to Section 271(g) would be detrimental 

to U.S. manufacturers. It would put domestic firms at a competitive disadvantage relative to their foreign competitors. A domestic 

manufacturer has no defense to a charge of infringing a process 

patent under Section 271(a) on the ground that the product will 

later be materially changed or become a trivial and nonessential 

component of another product. 

Its foreign competitors do not face this problem. The practice outside the United States of a process protected by a United States 

patent is not an infringement of the U.S. patent. There is no Section 271(a) action that can be brought against a foreign company 

for such activity outside the United States. 

If the proposed amendment were adopted, a company in China 

could transform an intermediate compound—produced according to 

a patented process—into a chemically different final product and 

import it with impunity into the United States. Or a company in 

South Korea might employ a patented method for forming conductive lines on semiconductor wafers as an initial step in manufacturing integrated circuits for use in cell phones that could be imported into the United States, perhaps under either of the two defenses. Protecting American intellectual property against foreign 

usurpation is already difficult; the amendment would make it more 

so. 

Moreover, the amendment would create a perverse incentive to 

offshore domestic manufacturing and jobs, as you alluded to, Mr. 

8

Chairman. It could provide an incentive for domestic manufacturers to practice patented manufacturing processes offshore in order 

to take advantage of the defenses in 271(g), in the same manner 

as their foreign competitors could, were this amendment to be 

adopted. Existing pressures already exist to offshore American jobs 

to take advantage of low labor costs in other countries. Aiding their 

exodus by weakening protection for U.S. process patents would 

seem unwise. 

For these reasons, AIPLA opposes any amendment to Section 

271(g) to create new defenses that would only benefit foreign manufacturers conducting unfair trade practices. Section 337 should 

not be amended in a manner that would benefit foreign manufacturers at the expense of patent owners, manufacturers, and workers in this country. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would be pleased to answer any 

questions you might have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kirk appears as a submission for 

the record.] 

Chairman LEAHY. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Kirk. 

Christopher Cotropia is an associate professor of law at the University of Richmond School of Law, and a member of the school’s 

Intellectual Property Institute. He attended law school at the University of Texas Law School. He clerked for Judge Alvin Schall of 

the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. We have two people who clerked for the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 

He teaches intellectual property law, patent law, copyright law, 

cyberlaw, and property. 

Please go ahead. 

STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER A. COTROPIA, PROFESSOR OF 

LAW, UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND SCHOOL OF LAW, RICHMOND, VIRGINIA 

Mr. COTROPIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank the Committee and the Chairman for the opportunity to testify before the 

Committee today on the extraterritorial enforcement of a United 

States process patent. I appear today on my own behalf, as a concerned observer of the patent system. 

As has been mentioned before, the issue before the Committee 

today is very narrow and incredibly complex. I hope to cut through 

some of this complexity with my testimony today and provide a fair 

and balanced presentation of the issues that 271(g) exceptions and 

their inapplicability to the ITC present. 

To put it succinctly, there are three issues that are presented by 

the inapplicability of these exceptions to the ITC: the first is inconsistency of judgments; the second are these international trade 

issues; and, third, the possible hindrance of the policies behind the 

exceptions. 

One of the other things I would like the Committee to consider 

is exactly how this issue sits within the context of the broader patent reform that is facing us currently today. 

As has been previously mentioned, the Kinik decision presents 

the possibility, although yet not applied, that the exceptions to 

271(g) would only apply in district court cases as opposed to cases 

9

before the ITC. I would like to proceed with my testimony just talking about these three issues that I think it presents. 

First, inconsistency of judgments. Professor Thomas presents this 

as one of the potential concerns, the idea being that for the same 

patent and the same claims someone would not win in the district 

court proceedings because the exceptions would be applicable. But 

then at the ITC, with the same patent and the same claims, I could 

prevail because the exceptions do not apply. This is a potential concern. 

There are, however, reasons to not label these judgments as ‘‘inconsistent.’’ In some ways, we could be looking at apples and oranges here. If Congress purposely created separate and different 

types of enforcement mechanisms, then in some ways there is no 

reason to compare these as equals. This same argument can actually be made at even a higher level. There are different purposes 

that these two tribunals try to effectuate. United States district 

courts are tasked with enforcing the patent laws of Title 35, while 

the ITC is actually tasked with enforcing our trade-related laws 

and protecting domestic industries. 

The second potential concern is the international concerns, and 

this is more specifically the concern that not allowing these exceptions to apply in the ITC realm would cause us to be in 

incompliance with TRIPs, particularly Article III of TRIPS, which 

requires us to not provide someone of foreign origin with less favorable protections than a domestic counterpart. You could see how 

this could play out. A foreign importer would be subject to in some 

ways the heightened standards at the ITC, would not be able to 

avail themselves of those defenses, and, thus, might be found liable 

at the ITC, while a domestic counterpart in district court would be 

able to avail themselves of these exceptions. And, thus, we would 

have a less favorable application to a foreign company. 

The problem here with this type of analysis is that we have to 

look at the totality of the circumstances to determine whether it is 

less favorable. And as has already been mentioned by Mr. Kirk, 

there are certain differences between the two jurisdictions, and in 

some ways district court proceedings can be more onerous because 

of the monetary relief that is there, and there are some advantages 

to foreign companies in the ITC. One in particular that was adopted with these amendments is 35 U.S.C. 295, which only applies in 

district court settings and creates a presumption of infringement in 

that context, but does not create a presumption of infringement in 

the ITC context. 

The third area of concern is to see whether this might actually 

hinder the policy concerns behind Section 271(g). In some ways, I 

think that this is the most important issue, and we really need to 

consider how much we want to limit the enforcement of process 

patents outside the United States. To put it another way, how 

strong do we want process patents to be? 

Professor Thomas presents a good argument why this might actually upset the balances in this type of situation, but on the flip 

side, there could be good arguments to be made that we are just 

extending the natural protection that you get in the United States 

to extraterritorial regions. We do not care traditionally under process patents what product was made by the patent or the value the 

10

process presented to that patent. And, thus, we could be simply extending this in the ITC realm to those things that are done abroad. 

My final point—and in some ways this is not directly relevant to 

the 271(g) issue—is that I really think the Committee and Congress should consider this issue in the context of broader patent reform. To get 271(g), the first go-around, it took many years. It also 

took a bitter battle between industries and much congressional testimony. In some ways, I would like the Committee to take a look 

at this, an issue that has not actually been applied, and think 

about it in the broader context, and also think about it being a 

moving part in the patent reform that has in some ways a higher 

impact and greater range, that is currently before the Committee 

and Congress, both the House and the Senate. 

Thank you very much, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Cotropia appears as a submission for the record.] 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you, Professor. 

Mr. Herrington, let me refer to Mr. Cotropia’s testimony. 

Senator GRAHAM. Mr. Chairman, pardon me. I am going to have 

to leave. Could I submit for the record an article by Mr. Kantor and 

Mr. Olson reflecting my views? And I apologize to—

Chairman LEAHY. No, it is quite all right. In fact, we will keep 

the record open for any Senator, we will keep it open for at least 

24 hours if any Senator wants to—

Senator GRAHAM. I will take you up on that. This is a very important issue for me in South Carolina, and I appreciate your having this hearing. 

Chairman LEAHY. I understand. 

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you very much. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you, and I appreciate your coming here. 

I know you spent a lot of time on this. 

Mr. Herrington, in Professor Cotropia’s testimony, he explores 

whether you apply the 271(g) defenses—if you apply them in the 

district court but not at the ITC, would that really result in inconsistent decisions? He speaks of the different institutional goals of 

patent infringement litigation in ITC proceedings. I think I am correctly stating it. 

Mr. COTROPIA. That is correct, Chairman. 

Chairman LEAHY. Now, can you elaborate, Mr. Herrington, on 

how the purposes of ITC exclusion proceedings and the remedies 

available there are distinct from district court patent infringement 

litigation? 

Mr. HERRINGTON. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I can tell you that with respect to the distinctions and similarities, as I mentioned earlier, we 

adjudicate under the adjudicative provisions of the Administrative 

Procedure Act. There is an administrative law judge and then potential review by the Commission. 

The proceedings before the administrative law judge are very 

much like a bench trial in a United States district court. There is 

discovery very similar to the type of discovery that you could get 

in a district court proceeding. The response times tend to be shorter. The rules of evidence that we apply are the ABA Rules of Evidence, reliable, probative, substantial evidence. We do not directly 

apply the Federal Rules of Evidence, but we can look to them for 

11

some guidance. There is not a jury, of course. It is just the administrative law judge and ultimately the Commission. We do not award 

damages. 

There are three parties to a Commission 337 proceeding: one is 

the complainant; one is the respondent, the accused infringer; and 

the other is the Commission investigative attorney. We have an office at the Commission called the Office of Unfair Import Investigations, and they provide an attorney who acts as a party in every 

one of our Section 337 investigations at the Commission level, and 

the purpose of that attorney is to make sure the record is complete 

and to address public interest concerns. 

Of course, our jurisdiction is limited to imports. We do have a domestic industry requirement. Our appeals, appeals from our determinations, are to the Federal Circuit, which is the same court, of 

course, that hears all appeals from patent cases in district courts. 

Chairman LEAHY. Well—oh, go ahead. 

Mr. HERRINGTON. I hope I—

Chairman LEAHY. It is such a complex hearing. I may do a followup question on this, but I wanted to go to Professor Thomas for 

a moment because he had stated several reasons why Congress 

should change the law so that 271(g) defenses apply in ITC proceedings as well as in patent infringement cases in district court. 

And the defenses assumed the process used to manufacture the 

product abroad was a process that, if it was used in the U.S., it 

would violate a U.S. process patent and, thus, be patent infringement. 

The 271(g) defenses simply excuse that action for patent infringement cases where the manufacturing occurred abroad, if the foreign product is sufficiently different than the original product. If 

you are going to apply the defenses to ITC proceedings, would we 

not be encouraging companies to produce these products abroad instead of doing them here in the U.S.? 

Mr. THOMAS. Well, Mr. Chairman, being just a lawyer and, gee, 

not only that, just a law professor, these sorts of economic calculations can be difficult to make. But what I would observe—

Chairman LEAHY. I am just a small-town lawyer who lives on a 

dirt road in Middlesex, Vermont, so I mean, what the heck. 

Mr. THOMAS. Well, we will give you credit for your choice of law 

school, at a minimum, sir. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. THOMAS. What I would observe is that simply this situation 

is complex. For example, when I go to places like South Carolina, 

I see large Japanese automakers with large plants by the side of 

Route 95. Many foreign firms have substantial manufacturing in 

the United States, and many of them, I am sure, want to import 

component parts for their products that they make in the United 

States from abroad. Would they cease these activities if they cannot actually import products from abroad because they can be accused of patent infringement in the ITC, but not the district 

courts? 

So it seems to me this account of offshoring in a world with multinationals and distributed manufacturing facilities is a complex 

one. I am not sure the story is as straightforward that they will 

simply be saying this is going to promote offshoring. 

12

Chairman LEAHY. Mr. Kirk and Professor Cotropia, do you want 

to add anything to that? 

Mr. KIRK. Chairman Leahy, I come from the perspective that I 

am not terribly concerned about the difficulties faced by a foreign 

company, that practices a process that was created and patented 

in the United States by an American company, which would like 

to avail itself of the defenses in 271(g) to import that product into 

the United States. It deprives the patent holder of the revenue it 

rightly deserves, and it makes a mockery, I believe, of the situation. 

The article that Senator Graham asked be put into the record 

states in part ‘‘There is no real harm done to the holder of a process patent if someone produces and imports a significantly different 

product into the United States. On the other hand, real damage to 

the economy and to innovation could ensue if these limitations 

were not built in the law.’’

I am sorry, sir, but I do not believe a foreign copyist is an innovator. I think they are a copyist, and I do not believe they should 

be entitled to these defenses. 

Chairman LEAHY. I gather that is the way you felt. 

Professor Cotropia? 

Mr. COTROPIA. The only point I would add to this discussion is 

that maybe the focus needs to be on the actual incentives of the 

creation of the process in the first place. In some senses, that is 

where patent law is trying to target, not a kind of post hoc after 

the fact taking up of value. So the question becomes whether someone innovating a process needs to have this added protection for its 

extraterritorial use or not, and clearly Congress thought that it 

would not be that much harm on the incentive to take that away 

from them at the district court level. 

The question then becomes if we take away that at the ITC level, 

does that erode too much of the incentive that is there, and I think 

that is the balancing question that Congress is faced with here. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you. 

Senator Coburn? 

Senator COBURN. Just a couple of questions. 

It is your opinion, Professor Thomas, that 271(g) right now favors 

domestic industry. 

Mr. THOMAS. It is my opinion that the inapplicability of 271(g) 

defenses to ITC actions favors domestic industry. 

Senator COBURN. And the purpose for favoring the domestic industry was what? 

Mr. THOMAS. I believe the purpose speaks for itself. In 1930, the 

statute was passed to favor domestic industry over foreign competitors. 

Senator COBURN. OK. Well, let me go a little further. You all 

have called in the question of economics and trade and everything 

else. Tell me, when we look at ITC, where is the legitimacy for a 

drug manufacturer in this country who may have patent rights in 

Europe, but then is told what price they will be paid for their drug? 

If you have intellectual property but yet you have a price control 

on that otherwise—I guess the thing I am challenging a little bit 

is how worried we are about our trading partners when, in fact, we 

are the ones getting the short end of the deal in intellectual propVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:09 Aug 24, 2007 Jkt 037168 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\37168.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
13

erty throughout the world. That is my view. It may be slanted. It 

certainly is going on in the Far East and in the Near East, where 

we lack any capability to enforce our intellectual property. 

I hear you and the other professor come and say we should be 

worried about it. I think there is a cogent argument to be made to 

say we should not disadvantage somebody under ITC, that we are 

using two standards. But maybe that is a good standard given the 

world where it is today rather than taking the presumption that 

we are worried about trade in the future. 

You know, I find that very strange that that figures in to what 

you all are trying to testify today. We ought to be talking about 

what are the effects of 271 and what are the effects of the ITC 

process under it, and let trade fall where it will. If we have true 

intellectual property, we ought to protect it, and we ought to protect it equally. And trade agreements or not, either that patent 

means something in this country or it does not. 

I know I am not a lawyer, so I am setting this down kind of as 

a doctor: Where are the symptoms here and where is the disease? 

The disease is if somebody has a patent on a process and it is their 

patent, they ought to have adequate protection for that, whether 

they are trying to do that overseas or they are trying to do it here, 

especially if they have conquered the patent law overseas. 

So help me out. Where does the trade come into this versus the 

inapplicability of the two sets of performance standards, one under 

the ITC and one under 271(g)? 

Mr. THOMAS. Certainly, sir. First, my sense is that medical pricing bears a tangential relationship to this issue, but I think it is 

important to remember that the United States is a member of a 

community of states. We were one of the founding members of the 

World Trade Organization. As part of that agreement, other member States of the WTO have pledged to dramatically upgrade their 

intellectual property regimes. When you start speaking about European States, patents on pharmaceuticals are well available there, 

and there are established enforcement systems, and pharmaceutical companies that are based in the United States quite frequently obtain patents covering processes in those jurisdictions. 

Those patents remain ready for enforcement at any time by a U.S. 

firm. In addition—

Senator COBURN. OK. Let me interrupt you just for a second, if 

I can. Those patents are enforced as long as the pharmaceutical 

company will agree to sell at the price at which the European country says they are going to pay for it under the threat of ‘‘We will 

allow production of this drug if you do not do that.’’

Now, tell me in law how that patent is protected when it is, in 

fact, hung out to dry under the threat of having no patent protection? I mean, that is what we see. Am I incorrect in that? Is that 

not why we have prices of pharmaceuticals one-half the price they 

are in this country all across Europe because a fixed price is demanded? 

Mr. THOMAS. Well, Mr. Coburn, while I do not claim to have an 

extraordinary amount of expertise in pharmaceutical pricing under 

the various laws of Europe, I am not familiar with any regime that 

denies patent protection to drug companies that do not sell at a 

particular price. Perhaps they exist. I am certainly not aware of 

14

any European patent law that, in fact, stipulates pricing for particular products as a condition to obtain patent protection. 

Senator COBURN. It is not a stated threat. It is an implied threat. 

Mr. THOMAS. OK. Well, I am not aware of the express or implied 

limitations, so your knowledge may exceed my own. I am certainly 

not aware of it. Certainly many jurisdictions do use an average 

pricing regime, just as the United States Government uses an average wholesale price for its own Federal employee pricing system. 

So I think we cannot point fingers too quickly at prices of medicines that we regulate certainly for Federal employees, and we certainly regulate prices of other products. 

I think ultimately, just going back again, we have entered into 

an international agreement that stipulates, among other things, 

that our firms can obtain intellectual property rights and enforce 

them on a nondiscriminatory basis in those countries, and as part 

of that deal, we have also agreed to apply national treatment and 

most-favored-nation to our trading partners. And I think as part of 

that deal, regardless of whether you feel others are scalawags or 

others are not living up to their bargain, it is important for the 

United States to set an example and follow the terms of the agreement, in my opinion. 

Thank you. 

Senator COBURN. Thank you. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you. 

Senator Cardin? 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I have two questions. The first is how we can make the remedy 

under the ITC more effective. I appreciate, Mr. Herrington, the 

work that is done at the Commission, but I know it can take a long 

time. It can be very expensive, and enforcement through denying 

entry into the United States is not always effective. So I would be 

interested in how we could improve the system so that those that 

violate our intellectual property laws, that the domestic producers 

have a more effective remedy through the ITC. 

Second, Professor Thomas, I think you have sort of provoked my 

interest. I must confess I do not know the entire history behind the 

defenses in 271(g), and I am certain they were hard fought and 

very controversial. But maybe you are convincing me that we 

should repeal those two exemptions with the district court matters, 

knowing full well that the dollar amounts that are awarded there 

would take into consideration what would be included in those defenses anyway. 

So why not just, if you are so concerned about our international 

requirements, consider changing the defenses that are available for 

those who have violated the patent laws of this country but have 

the defenses because of the change in status or the minor impact 

on the product? 

Mr. HERRINGTON. Senator Cardin, with respect to the first question you addressed, I had not given that a lot of thought before 

coming to this hearing. You may know that our caseload has been 

increasing. It has been increasing very substantially. We are still 

able to cope with that caseload, and we are taking steps to ensure 

that we have the appropriate personnel and facilities to make sure 

that that continues to happen. 

15

I am not sure that I can comment any further on the question. 

Senator CARDIN. Well, it may be that some of the procedures or 

some of the requirements—we found that in some of the ITC areas 

that I have been involved with on steel and countervailing duties, 

et cetera, that some of the laws that you operate under make it difficult to comply and some of the court rulings have made it difficult 

to enforce our laws. 

I happen to agree with Senator Coburn. I want to make our intellectual property rights enforceable and I want to make our rules 

enforceable. So I do not have a lot of sympathy for those who violate them. 

Mr. HERRINGTON. Well, we will certainly give that some thought 

and, mention anything that we think is appropriate. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you. 

Professor Thomas, I am looking forward to your reply. 

Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Cardin, I hope you have the same sympathy for 

witnesses before this Committee. Certainly I agree with you to the 

extent that symmetry of laws between the ITC and district 

courts—

Senator CARDIN. So you support repealing those? 

Mr. THOMAS. Well, I think let me offer a few observations on that 

point. I am not that familiar with European medical pricing. I am 

more familiar with European patent laws, and many of them had 

a provision that essentially inspired 271(g). They called for products that were directly -and I am transliterating, but directly the 

result of the process. 

Senator CARDIN. You are suggesting that we pattern our trade 

laws after Europe? 

Mr. THOMAS. We already have, Mr. Cardin. We—

Senator CARDIN. Certainly that is not true in agriculture. 

Mr. THOMAS. Well, the Process Patent Amendments Act certainly 

was—

Senator CARDIN. Certainly it is not true in the Doha Round 

where we are getting into all types of problems with Europe. 

Mr. THOMAS. All I am suggesting is—in fact, will tell you directly 

is that the legislative history of the Process Patent Amendments 

Act accounted for European laws that used words like ‘‘directly the 

product of the process,’’ and I think this was an attempt to articulate a bit further—

Senator CARDIN. So when the European laws favor our foreign 

competitors, we should use those laws, but not the other ones? I 

am not—

Mr. THOMAS. Well, if you will allow me to continue, Mr. Cardin, 

if I may. 

Senator CARDIN. Sure. 

Mr. THOMAS. One thing to remember is that when the product 

of the process is subject to a number of modifications or is only tangential to the product, there tends to be some disconnect or at least 

some separation between the process and the product. And so the 

notion is perhaps these individuals are not the copyists of which 

you speak. Perhaps they have done some follow-on innovation 

themselves to move further. 

I would also state that—

16

Senator CARDIN. Then that wouldn’t violate the law. They 

wouldn’t violate the—they would have a defense there. 

Mr. THOMAS. Well, they might violate the process patent in the 

jurisdiction from which that product is exported. 

Senator CARDIN. Then they have violated our law. 

Mr. THOMAS. Not necessarily under 271(g) in the district courts. 

Let me also observe that these situations arise because there is 

no product patent in the United States. If there is a product patent 

in the United States, that patent proprietor could enforce the product patent directly. And the reason these cases come up is because 

there is only a process patent in the United States. And why is 

there only a process and not a product patent? Usually because 

patent policy says that there ought not to be, because it is a naturally occurring substance or because the product is already known, 

and so the only innovation that is done is a new way of making 

it or using it. 

So those policy reasons are well established in the patent law, 

and they are not by accident. They balance between innovation and 

access. And so when we say, well, we ought to have expanded protection for sort of a form of patent protection that is regarded as 

weak, that is sort of at times left to someone who cannot get a fullfledged product patent, we should at least pause, respectfully, I 

think, before we expand it. 

Thank you, Mr. Cardin. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEAHY. Senator Cardin, if you have more, feel free. 

Senator CARDIN. No, Mr. Chairman. I think I got the answer I 

expected. I would just come back to the point, if there are additional suggestions that any of the panelists might have, we would 

certainly appreciate it, because I do think we want our laws enforced. 

Thank you. 

Chairman LEAHY. In fact, I will keep the record open. There are 

a couple of points that I would like to explore further. For one 

thing, take a look at your testimony when you look at it. If you 

want to add to it, and we will note it as an addition, but we are 

keeping it open for that. We are not trying to play ‘‘gotcha’’ here. 

This is too important an issue. It is a highly complex issue, as you 

know. You have each spent more time on this than most of us 

have. But it is a very, very worrisome issue. 

After I get a chance to read more thoroughly the two cases from 

yesterday in the Supreme Court, I may followup with some questions based on that. Some of the cases in the Supreme Court—I 

mean, it is very easy to read a case about chasing a fleeing suspect. 

The press and everybody else can usually pick up on that, and as 

a former prosecutor, I read it with interest. But on these, they get 

a little bit—they do not make for exciting bedtime reading. Perhaps 

for the four of you they do. They do not for me. But, fortunately, 

they do for Susan Davies and other brilliant people on the staff. 

But I may followup based on that, if you do not have any objection. 

So we will stand in recess. 

[Whereupon, at 3:34 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 

[Questions and answers and submissions for the record follow.]

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