2 0 -3599

M oll v. Telesector Resources Group, Inc.

1 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 2 F OR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 3 - - - - - - 4 August Term, 2021 5 (Argued: January 18, 20 22 Decided: February 28, 2024) 6 Docket No. 20-3599 7

_ _ _______________________________________________________ 8 CINDY L. MOLL, 9 Plaintiff-Counter-Defendant-Appellant , 10 - v. - 11 T E L E S E C T O R R E S O U R C E SG R O U P

, I N C . , d / b / aV e r i z o n

S e r v i c e s G r o u p, 12 a / k/a Verizon New York Inc., 13 Defendant-Counter-Claimant-Appellee

. * 14

_

_ _______________________________________________________ 15 B efore: KEARSE, WALKER, and SULLIVAN, Circuit Judges

. 16 Appeal from so much of a final judgment of the United States District Court 17 for the Western District of New York, W illiam M. Skretny, Judge, as dismissed plaintif f ' s

* T he Clerk of Court is instructed to am end the official caption to conformwith the above.1 a c t i o n a g a i n s t h e rf o r m e r e m p l o y e r, p r i n c i p a l l ya l l e g i n gg e n d e r -b a s e d d i s c r i m i n a t i o n i n t h e 2 t erms and conditions of her employment, including hostile work environment, retaliatory 3 t ransfer of her job site to a city some 160 miles aw a y, a nd dis criminatory or retaliatory 4 t ermination of her employment, all in violation of Title V II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 5 4 2 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq ., and New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exe c . La w § 2 90 et 6 se q . ; a nd a lleging that plaintiff was paid less than her male co-workers for substantially 7 s i m i l a r

w o r k , in v i o l a t i o n

o f T i t l e V I Ian d t

h e E q u a l P a y A c t , 2 9 U . S . C . § 2 0 6 e t

s e q . F o l l o w in g 8 p roceedings a fte r a remand from this Court in Moll v. Telesector Resources Group, Inc. , 760 9 F . 3 d 1 9 8 ( 2 d C i r . 2 0 1 4 ) , th e d i s t r i c t c o u r t g r a n t e d s u m m a r y jud g m e n t d i smi ssi n gth e a ct i o n , 10 r uling pr incipally that plaintiff failed t o p oint to evidence sufficient to establish (a) an 11 obj e c t i v e l yh o s t i l e w o r ke n v i r o n m e n t , ( b ) a na d v er s e emp l o y men ta ct i o n , o rd i s c r i m i n a t o ry 12 o r retaliatory intent, in the job site transfer, or (c) a clear causal c onne c tion between her 13 g e n d e ro rh e rp r o t e c t e d a c t i v i tya n d t h e t e r m i n a t i o n o f

h e r e m p l o y m e nt

; t h e c o u r t d i s m i s s e d 14 the claims o f gender-based unequal pay on the gr ound that the pay differences were not 15 b a s e d o n

g e n d e r . S e e Mo l l v . T

e l es e c t o r R es o u r ces G ro u p

, I n c . , N o . 0 4

- C V

- 8 0 5 , 2 0 2 0 W L 5 5 9 3 8 4 5 16 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 202 0). 17 O n a p p e a l, p l a i n t i f f

c o n t e n d s p r i n c i p a l l y th a t th e c o u r t

e r r e d i n c o n c l u d i n ga s 18 a ma t t ero f l a w th a tth er e was no adverse emp l o y men ta ct i o no r cl ea r r et a l i a t o r y mo t i v e i n 19 h er job s ite transfer; and that the court's conclusions that her proffered evidence was

- 2 -1 i nsufficient to show, inter alia , (A) an ob j ec tiv e ly h ostile work environment, and (B) 2 circumstances g iv ing rise to an inference of (1) retaliation i n the job site transfer, (2) 3 d is c rim ina tion or retaliation in the termination of her employment, a nd (3) unequal pay, 4 failed to view the record in th e light most favorable to he r. We conclude that the record, 5 v iewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff in connection with the motion for summary 6 j ud g men ta g a i n st h er, p r esen t s g enui n e i ssues o f ma t er i a lf a c t t o b e t r i e d a s t o th e c l a i m s o f 7 h o s t i l e w o r k

e nv i r o n m e nt

, r e t a l i a t o r yt r a n s fe r

, a n d d i s c r i m i n a t o r yo rr e t a l i a t o r yt e r m i n a t i o n 8 o f

e m p l o y m e nt

; a n d t h a t s u ch i s s u e s a l s o e x i s t

w i t h r e s p e c t t op l a in ti ff ' s E q

u a lP a yA c t

c l a i m 9 a s to one of her i dentified com pa r ators. W e v acate the judgment to the extent that it 10 d i s m i s s e d t

h e s e c l a i m s an d r e m an d fo r t r i a l

. O t h e r a s p e c t s o f

t h e f in a lj u d gm e nt

a r e a ffi r m e d 11 o r remain undisturbed. 12 Affirmed in part; vacated and remanded in part. 13 JOSEPHINE A. GRECO, Buffalo, New York ( Greco 14 T r a pp, Buffalo, New Y ork, o n the brief), for Plaintiff15 Counter-Defendant-Appellant

. 16 J A M E S S . U RB A N , P i t t sbu r gh , P e nn s y l v a n i a ( J o n e s D a y, 17 Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, on the brief), for Defendant18 Counter-Claimant-Appellee

.

- 3 -1 K EARSE, Circuit Judge : 2 P l a i n t i ff C i n d yL . M o l la p p e a l s fr o ms om u ch o f af in a l j u d gm e nt

o f t h e Un i t e d 3 S tates District Court for the Western District of Ne w Yor k, W illiam M. Skretny, Judge , as 4 d ismissed her action against her former employer defendant Telesector Resources Group, 5 I n c. , d /

b/ a V er i z o nS er v i c es Gr o up , a ni n d i r ect subsidia r y o f V er i z o nCo mmun i ca t i o n s I n c. 6 ( c o l l e c t i v e l y" V e r i z o n " o r " V e r i z o n B u s in e s s " o r" t

h e C o m p a ny " ) , p r i n c i p a l l y a l l e g i n g g e n d e r 7 based discrimination in the terms and conditions of h er employment, hostile work 8 environment, r etaliatory transfer of her job site to a city some 160 mile s a w a y, a n d 9 d iscriminatory or retaliatory termination o f h e r emp l o y men t , a l l i nv i o l a t i o n o f Title VII of 10 t

he C i v i lRi g

ht sA c t o f 1 9 6 4 , 4 2 U . S . C . § 2 0 0 0 e e t s e q . ( " T i tl e V I I " ) , an d N e wY o r k S t a te Hu m an 11 Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. L a w § 290 et seq . ("NYSHRL"); and alleging that she was paid less 12 th a nsev eral of her male co-workers for substantially similar work, inv i o l a t i o no f Ti t l e V I I 13 and the Equal Pay Act, 2 9 U.S.C. § 206 et seq . (or "EPA"). Following proceedings af te r a 14 r e m a n d fr o m t hi s C o u r t , s e e Mo l l v . T

e l es e c t o r R es o u r c e s G ro u p, I n c . , 7 6 0 F . 3 d 1 9 8 ( 2 d C i r . 2 0 1 4 ) 15 (" Moll III "), the district court granted Verizon's motion for sum m a r y j udgment, ruling 16 p rinc ipa lly that Moll failed to point to evidence sufficient to establish (a) an objectively 17 h ostile work environment, (b) an adverse employment action, or discriminatory o r 18 r e t a l i a t o r yi n t e n t , i n t h e j ob s i t e t r a n s fe r

, o r( c ) a c l e a rc a u s a l c o nn e c t i o n b e tw e e n h e rg e n d e r 19 o r her protected activity a nd the termination of he r e mployment; the court dismissed the

- 4 -1 c l a i m s o f g e n d e r -b a s e d u n equa l p a y o n th e g r o un d th a tth e p a y d i ffer en ces w e r e n o t b a s e d 2 o n gender. 3 On a ppeal, Moll contends pr inc ipally that the court erred in concluding as a 4 m a t t e ro f

l a wt h a t t h e r e w a s n o a d v e r s e e m p l o y m e nt a c t i o n o r c l e a rr e t a l i a t o r ym o t i v e i n h e r 5 j ob s i t e t r a n s fe r ; a n d t h a t t h e c o u r t ' s c o n c l u s i o n s t

h a t h e rp r o ff e r e d e v i d e n c e w a s i n s u ffi c i e n t 6 t o s h o w, i n t e r

a l i a, ( A ) a n

ob j e c t i v e l yh o s t i l e w o r k

e nv i r o nm e nt

, an d ( B ) c i r cu m s t an c e s g i v in g 7 r ise to an inference of (1 ) r et a l i a t i o n i n th e job si t e t r a n sfer , (2 ) d i scrimination or retaliation 8 i nth e t er mi n a t i o n o f h e re m p l o y m e n t

, a n d ( 3 ) un equa l p a y, fa i l ed t o v i ew t h e r eco r d i nth e 9 l i gh t

m o s t f a v o r ab l e t o h e r . W e c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e r e c o r d , v i e w e d i n

t h e l i gh t m o s t f a v o r a b l e 10 t o M o l l i n

c o nn e c t i o n

w i th th e m o t i o n

f o rs u m m a r yj u d g m e n t a g a i n s t h e r , p r e s e n t s g e nu i n e 11 is s u e s of material fact to be tried a s to the claims of hostile work environment, retaliator y 12 t ransfer, and discriminatory or retaliatory termination of h er employment; a nd that such 13 issues also exist with respect to Moll's Equal Pay Act claim as to one of her identif ie d 14 c o m p a r a t o r s. W e thus v a ca t e th e jud g men tt o th e ex t en tth a t i tsumma r i l y d i s m i s s e d th e s e 15 claims and remand for trial. Other aspects o f the final judgment are a ffirmed or remain 16 undisturbed.

- 5 -1 I. BACKGROUND

2 M o l l , wh o w a s e m p l o y e d b y V e r i z o n ( o r i t s p r e d e c e s s o r

o r c o m p o n e nt

e nti ti e s ) 3 fr o m 1 9 9 0 u n t i l h e rt e r m i n a t i o n i n 2 0 0 7 , b e g a n , a s a h i gh

s ch o o lg r a d u a t e , i n

th e C o m p a ny ' s 4 B u ff a l o, N e w Y o r k , o ffi c e i n a c l e r i c a lp o s i ti o n . Sh e e a rn e d an A s s o c i a te ' s D e g r e e i n

B u s i n e s s 5 i n 1999 and a B achelor's Degree in Business in 2006. In 19 9 7, she had been promoted to a 6 sales-related role in the Company's enterprise solutions group, whose mission was to sell 7 V erizon products a nd services to institutional customers, including businesses, 8 g overnmental entities, he a lthc are facilities, and schools. Moll's position (called "Systems 9 Analyst" until Verizon r evised its titles in 1999) was "Sales Engineer" (or "SE"). 10 The primary function of an SE was to assist a group's sales representative, 11 ti tl e d a " C o r p o r a t e A c c o u n t M a n a g e r " ( o r" C A M " ) , i n s e l l i n gV e r i z o n p r o d u c t s t o c l i e n t s ; t h e 12 e n t e r p r i se so l ut i o n s g r o u p (o r " E S G" ) a l so i n cl u d ed " p r o j e c t m a n a g e r s , " p o s i t i o n s th a twer e 13 coordinate with SEs. S Es and p roject managers r eported to S E Managers. SEs were 14 g enerally responsible for designing a n d p r i ci n gV er i z o n t el eco mmun i ca t i o n s sy st ems, a n d 15 for presenting d esign proposals. They were divided into four levels and given numerical 16 d esignations of I, II, III, or IV, w ith SE I being the lowest and S E IV being the highest; the 17 l evels w e re intended to signify distinctions in technical expertise within certain assigned 18 p roduct specialties. However, each SE was expected t o have expertise in a "bucket" of

- 6 -1 V erizon products. Moll was originally an SE I and was promoted in 2003 to SE II; her 2 specialty was "traditional telephone" and voice products. 3 Moll continued to r epor t to Verizon's B uffalo office, where she worked 4 a l o n g s i d e th r e e o th e r s : A nn e B y r n e, a S y s t ems An a l y st r e t i t l e d a n

S E I, w h o w a s p r o m o t e d 5 t o SE II in 2001 and to SE III in 2003; and Tho ma s S p en cera n d Da n i el I r v i n g, ea ch a Senior 6 S y st ems An a l y s tr e t i t l e d a n S E I I . B y r n e i n

e a r l y2 0 0 4 c o m men ced a Ti t l e V I I a ct i o nth a t , t o 7 a n

e x t e n t , p a r a l l e l e d th e p r e s e n t

a c t i o n . S e e, e . g . , B y r n ev . T e l e s e c t o r R e s o u r c e s G r o u p, In c . , 3 3 9 8 F . App'x 13 (2d Cir. 2009). Spencer remained an SE II until he left the group in early 2004. 9 I rving became an SE Manager in 2001. 10 Moll c om menced this action i n October 2004, asserting claims principally of 11 g ender discrimination in the terms, conditions, and privileges of em ploym e nt, including 12 sexual harassment by Irving, a hostile work environment, d enial of promotion by I rving 13 a ft e rh e b e c a m e h e rs u p e r v i s o r, a n d r e t a l i a t i o n f o rh e rc o m p l a i nt s o f s u ch d i s c r i m i n a t i o n

, a l l 14 in

v i o l a t i o n

o f T i t l e V I I an d s t a t e l a w ; a n d a s s e r ti n g t h a t s h e w a s d e n i e d c o m p e n s a t i o n e q u a l 15 t ot

h a t p a i d t o S p e n c e r

an d o t h e r m a l e c o - w o r k e r s f o rs ub s t an t i a l l y s i m i l a rw o r k

, i n v i o l a ti o n 16 o f Title VII and the EPA. She filed an a mended complaint in 2008, adding claims that she 17 was subjected to n ew a cts of discrimination and retaliation, firs t in 2004 by Verizon's 18 t ransferring her job site from Buff a lo, w he r e she and her family lived, to Syracuse, New

- 7 -1 Y o r k, so me 160 mi l es a wa y, a n d th e ni n 2 0 0 7by V er i z o n 's t er mi n a t i o no f h eremp l o y men t , 2 supposedly as part of a reduction in force. 3 The d etails of Moll's factual allegations and the path of this litigation are 4 d e s c r ib e d i n

o p i n i o n s o f

t h e d i s t r i c t

c o u r t a n d t h i s C o u r t , f a m i l i a r i tyw i t

h w h i c h i s a s s u m e d

. 5 S ee Moll v. Telesector R esources Group, Inc. , No. 04-CV-805, 2005 WL 2405999, at *7, *12 6 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2 005) (" Moll I ") ( gr a nting i n part Verizon's motion p ursuant to Fed. R. 7 Civ. P. 12(b)(6) to dismiss M o l l 's h o st i l e-wo r k -env i r o n ment claims as time-barred), vacated 8 b y Moll III

, 760 F.3d at 204; Moll v. Telesector Resources Group, Inc. , No. 04-CV-805, 2012 W L 9 1 9 350 8 7

, a t*3 2 (W . D. N . Y . M a y 2 9 , 2 0 1 2 , amen d edM a y 3 0 , 2012) (" Moll II " ) (granting in part 10 V erizon's motion for summary judgment, d ismissing a ll remaining claims (except one for 11 d iscriminatory delay in p romotion, which was thereafter settled)), vacated b y M o l l II I , 760 12 F .3d at 206; see also id

. a t 204 (vacating district court's denial of Moll' s m otion to compel 13 V erizon to produce certain documents). 14 Following the remand by Moll III , Moll filed a second amende d c om plaint, 15 which differed from her amended complaint principa lly by alleging hostile work 16 e n v i r o n men ta s sep a r a t e cl a i ms r a th erth a n a s a s p ec t s o f

h e rg e n e r a l g e n d e rd i s c r i mi n a t i o n 17 c l a i ms. An d fo l l o wi n ga d d i t i o n a l d i sco v er y, V er i z o na g a i n m o v e d f o r summa r y jud g men t 18 d ismis sing Moll's claims. The district court record described in Parts II.B. through II.E. 19 below--as developed before and after Moll III--includes d eclarations and deposition

- 8 -1 t estimony by Moll a nd two of Moll's female co-workers who h ad also brought a ctions 2 a l leging discrimination, h o stile work environment, s e xu al harassment, and retaliation, as 3 w e l l a s d e c l a r a t i o n s o rd e p o s i ti o n t e s t i m o nyo f

s e v e r a lV e r i z o n

m a n a g e r s a n d B u ff a l o -b a s e d 4 V erizon employees. 5 I n a D e c i s i o n a n d O r d e rr e p o r t e d a t M o l lv . T e l e s e c t o r R e s o u r c e s G ro u p, I

n c . , N o . 6 0 4

- C V

- 8 0 5 , 2 0 2 0 W L 5 5 9 3 8 4 5 ( W . D . N . Y . S e p t . 1 8 , 2 0 2 0 ) ( " M o l l I V " ) , th e d i s t r i c t

c o u r t g r a n t e d 7 Ve rizon's renewed summary judgment motion in its entirety. As described more fu lly in 8 P a r t I I . B . bel o w, th e co ur t f o u n d th a t

M o l l h a d f a i l e d t o p r e s e n t a p r i m a f a c i e c a s e o f h o st i l e 9 work environment, c onc lu ding that she had failed to adduce sufficient evidence of an 10 e nv i r o n m e n t

t h a t ar e a s o n a

b l e p e r s o n

w o u l d h a v e f o u n d t o b e h o s t i l e o rab u s i v e . Th e c o u r t 11 f o un d th a t

M o l l h a d a l s o f a i l e d t o p r e s e n t a p r i m a f a c i e c a se o f d i s cr i mi n a t i o no r r et a l i a t i o n 12 i n her job site transfer to Syracuse, principally because Verizon's p l an was to transfer men 13 a s w e l la s w o m e n , an d ru l e d t

h a t t h er e l o c a ti o n

o r d e r w a s n o t an a d v e r s ee m p l o y m e nt

a c ti o n 14 both because Moll was giv e n the options, instead of accepting the transfer, of changing 15 d epartments or accepting a severance p a ck a g e, a n d beca use sh e r ep o r t ed t o S y racuse only 16 i nfrequently and was on d isability leave for part of the period in question. In addition, 17 d iscounting contrary evidence given by Christopher Gaglione, the manager of Moll's SE 18 g roup at the t i me of the transfer order, the dis tr ict court stated that there was no clear

- 9 -1 evidence that the t r a ns f e r plan was devised or i mplemented with discriminatory o r 2 r etaliatory intent. See Part II.C. below. 3 T h e M o l l I V c o u r t a l s o c o n c l u d e d th a t

M o l lf a i l e d t o p r e s e nt

ap r i m af a c i e c a s e 4 o f

g e n d e rd i s c r i m i n a t i o n

o rr e t a l i a t i o n

i n th e t e r mi n a t i o n

o f h e re m p l o y m e n t . A s d e s c r ib e d 5 i n Part II.D. below, it found that the circumstances did not g ive rise t o an inference of 6 dis c r i mination, chiefly because in Verizon's reduction of force the ratio of terminate d 7 e m p l o y ees wa s t w o ma l es t o ev er y fe m a l e . T h e c o u r t f u r th e ra d o p t e d V e r i z o n ' s c o n t e n t i o n 8 that M oll's claims of retaliatory termination w e r e "belie[d]" by her manager's assigning 9 V erizon's most lucrative client account to her. 10 F i n a l l y , t h e c o u r t f o u n d t h a t M o l lh a d n o t

a d d u c e d s u ff

i c i e nt e v i d e n c e t o s h o w 11 a genuine issue of fact to be tried as t o h er Title VII claims of gende r discrimination o r 12 r e t a l i a t i o n

i n h e rt r e a tm e nt

w i t h r e g a r d t o s u c h

o th e rm a t t e r s a s c l i e n t

e n t e r t a i nm e n t

t i c k e t s, 13 v a c a t i o n

p r i v i l e g e s , c r e d i t

f o rs a l e s t o V e r i z o n

c l i e nt s , p e r f o r m a n c e r a n k i n g s , a n d d i s c i p l i n e . 14 I t

f o u n d th a t d i s p a r i ti e s i n p a y r e s u l t e d f r o mf a c t o r s o th e rth a n g e n d e r . S e e P a r t

I I . E . b e l o w . 15 H a v i n gfo un d th a tV er i z o nw a s e n t i t l e d t o s u m m a r yj u d g m e n t d i s m i s s i n ga l l 16 o f Moll's Title VII claims, the court rul ed th a tM o l l 's cl a i ms o f discrimination or retaliation 17 under the NYSHRL, which were governed by the same principles, were dismissed for the 18 s a me reasons as her claims under Title VII. Having disposed of Moll's claims, andh a v i n g

- 10 -1 d i s m i s s e d c o u n t e r c l a i m s a s s e r t e d b yV e r i z o n - - ad e c i s i o n t h a t V e r i z o n h a s n o t a p p e a l e d

- - th e 2 court entered final judgment. This appeal by Moll followed. 3 In reviewing Moll I V ' s gr a nt o f summary judgment, we are mindful that the 4 court refer r ed fr equ en t l y t o i t s fi n d i n g s a n d co n cl usions in Moll II , and generally found no 5 r eason to change th e r esults it had reached in Moll II . Accordingly, we take both opinions 6 i nto account as appropriate.

7 II. DISCUSSION

8 On a p p e a l , M o l l ' s ch a l l e n g e s t ot

he j u d gm e nt

a d d r e s sfo u r

c a te g o r i e s o f

c l a i m s : 9 ( 1 ) h o s t i l e w o r k e nv i r o n m e n t

, ( 2 ) r e t a l i a t o r yj ob s i t e t r a n s fe r , ( 3 ) d i s c r i m in a t o ryo rr e t a l i a t o ry 10 t er mi n a t i o no f h er e mp l o y men t , a n d (4 ) d enial of equal pay. She co n t en d s p r i n ci p a l l y th a t 11 the court erred in concluding as a matter of la w tha t there was no adverse employment 12 a ction or clear r etaliator y m otiv e in he r job site transfer; and that as to each of the above 13 categories of claims the court's conclusions that her proffered evidence was insufficient to 14 show a genuine issue of material fact to be tried failed to view the record i n the light most 15 favorable to her. 16 While Moll' s notic e of appeal indicates that i t encompasses all of Moll IV 's 17 d ismissals of her claims, h er briefs on appeal present challenges only with respect to the

- 11 -1 above four categories. She has not argued for reinstatement of her claim that the job site 2 tr an s fe r

w a s d i s c r i m i n a t o r y . A n d a l t h o u gh h e r c l a i mo f d e ni a lo f c o m p e n s a ti o n

e q u a lt ot h a t 3 o f

h e rm a l e c o - w o r k e r s i nv o ke s b o t h T i tl e V I I an d t h e E P A, s h eh a s n o t

a r gu e d t h a t t h e c o u r t 4 erred in r ejecting her claims of discrimination in o ther facets of her employment, such as 5 p e r m i s s i o n

t o w o r kf r o m h o m e , d i sci p l i n e, p er f o r m a n c e e v a l u a t i o n s , a l l o c a t i o n o f c r e d i t f o r 6 sales, and access to custom er ne tworking opportunities such as tickets or invitations to 7 sports events. Accordingly, we regard claims as to those other a spects as ha v ing been 8 ab andoned; the record a s to those aspects will thus be considered only as they may b e 9 r elevant to the above four claim categories that are argued in Moll's brief. 10 For the reasons that follow, we conclude that in light o f the r ecord in the 11 d i s t r i c t

c o u r t , w i th a l l r e a s o n ab l e i n f e r e n c e s d r a w n i n M o l l ' s f a v o r, s u m m a r yj u d g m e n t w a s 12 i nappropriately granted as to each of the first three categories and in part as to the fourth.

13 A. Summary Judgment Principles 14 W e r e v i e w d en o v o a d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s g r a n t o f s u m m a r yj u d g m e n t

, a p p l y i n gth e 15 same standards that gov ernth e d i st r i ct co ur t 's co n si d e r a t ion of the motion. "A motion for 16 summary judgment may properly be g ranted--and the gr a nt o f summary judgment may 17 p r o p e r l y be a ffi r med --o n l y wh er e th ere is no genuine issue of ma t er i a l fa c tt o be t r i ed , a n d 18 the facts as to which there is no such issue warrant the entry o f judgment for the m ov ing

- 12 -1 pa r ty as a matter of law." K aytor v. Electric Boat Corp. , 609 F.3d 537, 545 (2d Cir. 2 0 1 0 ) 2 (" Kaytor "); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The court's role with respect to such a motion is not to 3 r e s o l v e d i sp ut ed quest i o n s o f fa ct " but so l el y t o d et er m i n e wh eth er, a s t o a ny ma t e r i a l f a c t , 4 th er e i s a g enui n e i s sue t o be t r i ed

. " F itzge rald v . Hen d erson , 2 5 1 F . 3 d 3 4 5 , 3 6 0 ( 2 d Ci r . 2 0 0 1 ) 5 ( " F itzgerald " ), c ert. d en i ed , 5 3 6 U. S . 9 2 2 (2 0 0 2 ); s e e A n d e rs o n v . L i b e r t yL o b b y , In c . , 4 7 7 U. S . 2 4 2 , 6 2 5 5 (1986) (" Liberty Lobby "). 7 In d e t e r m inin g

wh e t h e r g e n u in e i s s u e s o f f a c t e x i s t

, " ' t h e d i s t r i c t

c o u r t m a yn o t 8 p roperly consider th e record in piecemeal fashion, trusting i nnocent explanations f or 9 in d i v i d u a ls tr a n d s o f e v i d e n c e . ' " D a v i s - G a re t tv . U r b a n O u t f i t t e rs, I n c . , 9 2 1 F . 3 d 3 0 , 4 5 ( 2 d C i r . 10 2 0 19) (" Davis-Garett " ) (q uo t i n g K ay tor , 609 F.3d at 545). Rather, the court must "review the 11 r e c o r d ' t a k e n

a sawh o l e . ' " R e e v es v . S a n de r s o n P l u m b i ng P ro d u c t s, I n c . , 5 3 0 U . S . 1 3 3 , 1 5 0 ( 2 0 0 0 ) 12 (quot i n g Matsu sh ita E l ec tric In dustrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)). In 13 so doing, it "'must draw all reasonable inference s in favor of the nonmoving party,' . . . even 14 though contrary inferences might reasonably be drawn." Kaytor, 609 F.3d at 545 (quoting 15 R eeves , 530 U.S. at 150 (emphasis in Kaytor ) (other internal quotation marks omitted)). 16 Moreover, the court "' may not make credibility determinat i o ns or weigh the 17 evidence,'" Kayt o r, 60 9 F. 3 d at 545 (quoting Reeves , 5 30 U.S. at 1 50 (emphasis in Kaytor )); 18 " '[c]r e d ibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate 19 in fe r e n c e s fr o mt h e f a c t s a r e j u r yf

u n c t i o n s , n o t

t h o s eo f aj u d g e, ' " D a v is - G a re t t

, 9 2 1 F . 3 d a t

4 6

- 13 -1 (quoting Reeves , 530 U.S. at 150); see , e.g. , Moll III , 760 F.3d a t 2 06 ("because the assessment 2 o f a witness's credibility is a function reserved for the jury," the summar y judgment court 3 " ma y n o td i scr ed i t " d ep o si t i o nt estimony that is favorable to the party opposing summary 4 j ud g men t(i n t er n a l quo t a t i o n ma r k s o m i t t ed )). I n d eed , i nr ul i n go na mo t i o nfo r summa r y 5 j u d gm e n t

, t h e c o u r t " ' m u s t d i s r e

g a r da l l e v i d e n c ef

a v o r a b l et o t h e m o v i n g

p a r t yt h a tt h ej u r

yi s n o t 6 required to believe .'" Kaytor, 609 F.3d at 545 (quoting Re ev e s , 5 3 0 U.S. at 151 (intermediate 7 quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in K aytor )). 8 T o b e s u r e , " r e l i a n c e u p o n c o n c l u s o r ys t a t e m e n t s o rm e r e a l l e g a t i o n s " w i l l n o t 9 suffice to defeat summary judgment. Davis v . New Yo r k , 3 1 6 F.3d 93, 100 (2d Cir. 2 002). 10 S ummary j udgment as t o a specific claim is p roper when "after a dequate time for 11 d i s c o v e r y [ , ] . . . t h e n o n m o v i n g

p a r tyh a s f a i l e d t o m a k e a s u ffi c i e n t s h o w i n go n

a n e s s e n t i a l 12 element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of p roof. " Ce l o t e x Corp. v. 13 C atrett , 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). But if "' the a dm is sib le materials i n the r ecord make it 14 a r

g u a b l eth a t

th e c l a i m h a s m e r i t

, ' " th e n " [ s ] u m m a r yj u d g m e n t d i s m i s s i n g

ac l a i m " c a n

n o t b e 15 g ranted. Davis-Garett , 921 F.3d at 45 (quoting Kaytor, 609 F.3d at 545 (emphasis ours)). 16 F i n a l l y, " a nex t r a mea sur e o f caution i s mer i t ed " befo r e g r a n t i n go r a ffi r mi n g 17 " summary judgment in a discrimination action because direct evidence of discriminatory 18 i ntent is rare." Holtz v. Rockefeller & Co., Inc . , 2 5 8 F . 3 d 6 2 , 6 9 (2 d Ci r . 2 0 0 1 ), abrogated in part 19 on o th er g r o unds by Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc. , 557 U.S. 1 67 (2009). Thus, the court

- 14 -1 must scrutinize affidavits a n d depositions caref u lly f or circumstantial evidence that, if 2 c r ed i t ed by th e fa c t fi n d e r, co ul d r ea so n abl yb e i n t er p r et ed a s sh o wi n gd i scr i mi n a t i o n . S ee, 3 e.g. , Gallo v. Prudential Residential Services, LP , 22 F.3d 1219, 1224 (2d Cir. 1994). 4 In sum, "summary judgment i s proper only w hen, with all permissible 5 i n fer en ces a n d cr ed ibi l i ty questions resolved in favor o f th e p a r ty a g a i n st wh o m jud g men t 6 i s sought, 'ther e can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict.'" K aytor, 609 F.3d 7 a t 546 (quoting Liberty Lobby , 477 U.S. at 250). Where "there are genuine issues of ma t er i a l 8 fact" that "'may reasonably b e r e s olved in favor of either party,'" "[s]ummary judgment 9 should be denied." Davis-Garett , 921 F.3d at 45 (quoting Liberty Lobby , 477 U.S. at 250).

10 B . The Hostile Work Environment Claims 11 Title VII prohibits em ployers from "discriminat[ing] against any individual 12 with respect to his [or her] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, 13 b e c a u s e o f

, " i n t e r a l i a, " s u c h

i n d i v i d u a l ' s . . . s e x . " 4 2 U . S . C . § 2 0 0 0 e - 2 ( a ) ( 1 ) . Th i s " p r o h i b i t i o n 14 o f

s e xd i s c r i m i n a t i o n

e x t e n d s t o s e x u a l h a r a s s m e n t , " w h i ch e n c o m p a s s e s " c o n d u c t

[ t h a t ] h a s 15 the purpose or effect of

. . . creating an intimida ting[ or ] hostile" work environment. 16 P etrosino v. Bell Atlantic, 385 F.3d 210, 220-21 (2d Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks 17 o mitted). Title VII "does not set fo r tha g e n eral civility code for the American workplace," 18 B u rling ton North e rn & S an ta Fe Ry . Co . v . W h i t e, 5 4 8 U . S . 5 3 , 6 8 ( 2 0 0 6 ) ( " B u r l i ng t o n N o r t h e r n " )

- 15 -1 (inte r nal quotation marks omitted); but "[w]hen [a] workplace is permeated with 2 'discriminatory intimidation, r i d i cul e, a n d i n sul t ' . . . th a t i s ' su ffic i en tlysev ere or p ervasive to 3 a l t e r

t h ec o n d i t i o n s o

f th e v i c t i m ' s e m p l oy m e n t

a n d c re a te a n a b u s i v ew o rk i ng

e n v i ro n m e n t

, ' . . . T i t l e 4 V I I i s v i o l a t e d , " H a r r i s v . F o rk l i

f tS y s t e m s , In c . , 5 1 0 U . S . 1 7 , 2 1 ( 1 9 9 3 ) (q

uo t i n g Meritor S av in g s 5 B ank, FSB v. Vinson , 477 U.S. 57, 65, 67 (1986) (emphasis ours)). 6 T o p r o v e a h o s t i l e w o r ke n v i r o n men ti n v i o l a t i o no f Ti t l e V I I, a p l a i n t i ff m u s t 7 establish both objective and subjective elements. The misconduct shown must ha v e been 8 " s e v e r e o rp e r v a si v e en o ught o cr ea t e a no bjecti v el y h o st i l e o r abusi v e wo r ken v i r o n m e n t , " 9 t h a t i s , " a n e nv i r o n m e n t

t h a t a r e a s o n ab l e p e r s o n

w o u l d fi n d h o s t i l e o ra b u s i v e . " H

a r r i s , 5 1 0 10 U.S. at 21. And the victim must have "subjectively pe r ce ive[d] the environment to be 11 abusive." Id

. Whether a p articular environment is objectively "'hostile' or 'abusive' can be 12 d etermined only by looking at all the circumstances." Id

. at 23 (emphasis a dded). Such 13 " circumstances . . . may include" but are not limited to 14 th e fr equen cyo f th e discriminatory conduct; its severity; wh eth eri ti s 15 physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offens iv e utterance; 16 a nd whether it unreasonably interferes with a n employee's w or k 17 performance. 18 I

d

. " [ N ] o s i n g l e f a c t o ri s r e qu i r e d

. " I d

. A n d " [ t ] h e r e i s n e i th e ra th r e s h o l d m a g i c numbero f 19 h a r a s s in g

in c i d e nt st

h a t g i v e s r i s e, w i t

h o u t m o r e , t o l i a

b i l i ty a s am a tte r

o f l a w , n o r an u m b e r 20 o f

i n c i d e n t s b e l o w w h i ch

ap l a in t i ff

f a i l s a s am a t t e ro f

l a w t o s t a t e a c l a i m . " H o w l eyv . T

o w n 21 of Stratford , 21 7 F.3d 141, 154 (2d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks o mitted). The - 16 -1 a ssessment " i s not, and by its nature cannot be, a mathematically precise t est." Harris , 510 2 U.S. at 22. 3 " B e c a u s e th e a n a l y s i s o f s e v e r i tya n d p e r v a s i v e n e s s l o o k s t o th e t o t a l i ty o f th e 4 c i r c u m s t a n c e s , th e c r u c i a li n q u i r yf o c u s e s o n t h e n a t u reo f t h ew o rk p l a c ee n v i ro n m e n ta s a w h o l e 5 . . . . " K

ay tor , 6 0 9 F . 3 d a t5 4 7(e m p h a s i s i n K a y t o r ( i n t e rn a l qu o t a t i o n

m a r k s o m i t t e d ) ). " S ex 6 b a sed h o st i l e wo r k en vironmen tcl a i ms ma y be sup p o r t ed b y fa ci a l l y sex -n eut r a l i n ci d en t s 7 a n d 'sex ua l l yo ffen si v e ' a ct s ma y be fa ci a l l ys e x - n e u t r a l

. S e e A l f an o v . C ostello, 2 9 4 F . 3 d 3 6 5 , 8 37 5 ( 2 d C ir. 2 002)." Moll III , 760 F.3d at 200 ("The district court [in Moll I ] erred when it 9 r efused to consider all a llegations in the Complaint in their totality, including those that 10 were not sexually offensive in nature."). And "a p laintif f who herself experiences 11 d i scr i mi n a t o r y h a r a ssment need not be the target of other instances of hostility in order for th ose 12 i n c i d e n t s t o s u p p o r th e r c l a i m . " K

a y t o r , 6 0 9 F . 3 d a t

5 4 7 ( e m p h a s i s i n K

a y t o r ( i n t e r n a l qu o t a t i o n 13 marks omitted)); see generally Raniola v. Bratton , 2 4 3 F.3d 610, 617 & n .6 (2d Cir. 2001) (a 14 " hostile environmen ti s n o tl i mi t ed t o . . . sex ua l beh a v i o r t a r geted at the complainant," "as 15 l ong as there is evidence suggesting that the objection abl e wo r k p l a ce beh a v i o r i s ba sed o n 16 the sex of the target" (internal quotation marks omitted)). 17 In M ol l I V , the district court granted summary judgment dismissing Moll's 18 h o s t i l e w o r ke n v i r o n m e n t c l a i m s f o rf a i l u r e t o p r o ff e re n o u gh e v i d e n c e t o e s t ab l i s h

a p r i m a 19 f a c i e c a s e . W h i l e r u l i n gth a t M o l l h a d s u ffi c i e n t l y" r a i s e [ d ] i s s u e s o f f a c t a s t o h e rs ubj e c t i v e

- 17 -1 belief that her work environment was hostile and that Verizon Business was responsible 2 through imputation," the court found that Moll "ha[d] not estab lis he d the existence of 3 m a t e r i a li s s u e o f f a c t o f t h e o b je c t i v e b a s is fo r h o s ti l e w o rk

e nv i r o nm e nt

g i v e n t h e n u m b e r an d 4 fr e qu e n c yo f

i n c i d e n t s [ s h e ] p r e s e n t e d

. " M o l l I V , 2 0 2 0 W L 5 5 9 3 8 4 5 , a t

* 1 6 ( e m p h a s i s a d d e d ) . 5 Accordingly, as to Moll's hostile wo r ken v i r o n men tcl a i ms, th e o n l y i ssue on 6 th is appeal is whether her proffered evidence sufficed to reveal a genui n e i ssue t o be t r i e d 7 a s t o whether a reasonable person in Moll's position would have found her working 8 e nv i r o n m e n t

h o s t i l e o ra

b u s i v e . V i e w i n g

t h e r e c o r d i n

t h e l i gh t m o s t f a v o r a b l e t oM o l l

, w i t h 9 a l l credibility questio n s a n d p er mi ssibl e i n fer en ces r eso l v ed i n h erfa v o r, we co n cl ud e that 10 summary judgment wa s inappropriate.

11 1 . The District Court's View of the Evidence 12 I n Moll IV , th e d i st r i ct

co u r td i sc u s s e d m a nyo f th e i n st a n ces, st a t emen t s, a n d 13 a ctions in the Verizon Business workplace in 1998-2003 that Moll view e d a s ha r assing, 14 a

b u s i v e , a n d hu m i l i a t i n g . I n th e M o l l I V d i s c u s s i o n

, w e c o u n t

s o m e 1 7 s u c h d e s c r i p t i o n s b y 15 t

h e c o u r t , s e e 2 0 2 0 W L 5 5 9 3 8 4 5 , a t * 1 4

- * 1 5, a l t h o u g h s o m e i n d i v i d u a ld e s c r i p t i o n s e n c o m p a s s 16 a n d/or compress multiple statements or actions. We summarize them as follows. 17 [1] In December 1998, "a male co-worker stated to another female co18 worker that she was wor king from home because he heard 'bedsprings 19 creaking'";

- 18 -1 [2 ] i n 1 9 9 9 , I r v i n gr e p e a t e d l y c a l l e d M o l l w h i l e s h e w a s o n a mul t i p l e2 d ay training trip, asking that she come to his hotel room; 3 [ 3 ] in J anu a r y2 0 0 0 , M o l l " w a s d e n i e d [ h o c k e yt i c k e t s ] b y[ S E M an a g e r ] 4 M i ch a e lM c G o w a n c l a i m i n g t h a t b e c a u s e [ M o l l ] w a s p r e gn a n t . . . s h e w a s t o o 5 t ir e d"; in 2003, Irving acquired hockey tickets for entertaining clients, for 6 w h i c h

h e c o u l d b e r e i mbur sed byV er i z o n , a n d h e o ffer ed th em o n l y t o ma l e , 7 n ot to female, SEs; 8 [ 4 ] i n 2 0 0 1 , p r o

j e c t m a n a g e rM i ch a e lF i n

n e g a n c a l l e d M o l la n d a n o t

h e r 9 female co-worker "hottie[s]"; 10 [5] I rving asked Moll whether she had an affair with a nother 11 co-worker; 12 [6] M oll was in conversations where male employees commented on 13 the age and attractiveness of female employees; 14 [7 ] a fema l e co -wo r k ert o l d M o l l th a t a " m a l e c o w o r k e ra s k e d t o co me 15 t o h e rh o t e lr o o m d u r i n ga s a l e s m e e t i n g( r e m i n i s c e n t o f [ ) ] " I r v in g ' s r e q

u e s t o f 16 M oll; 17 [8] another male co-worker c om mented on the a ppearance of Moll's 18 co- w or ker Sara DeLena, analogizing her to a "Bond g i rl"; one of DeLena' s 19 managers told her she should start exerc is ing, implying that DeLena was 20 o verweight; 21 [ 9 ] i n A p r i lo r M ay o f 2 0 0 1 , I r v in g

l e ft an o te o n M o l l ' s d e s k

s a y i n g t h a t 22 h e thought about her while he was in the shower; 23 [10] in June 2001, Ir v ing began to r equire Moll to communicate with 24 h im only in person, not by other mean s, a r equi r emen t h e d i d n o ti mpose on 25 male SEs; 26 [ 1 1 ] in J an u a ry 2 0 0 2, I r v in g

a s k e d M o l l

" t oc o m e b a c k

t ow o rk w i t h hi m 27 a t night," when they would be "alone in the office";

- 19 -1 [12] in February or March 2002, when Moll was talking with a group 2 o f

c o - w o r k e r s , I r v in g

w a l k e d u p t o afe m a l e w o r k e r , l o o k e d a t

h e r b r e a s t s , a n d 3 said "hooters"; 4 [13] i n May 2002, Irving de nied Moll permission to work from home 5 from then on, so that Irv ing could continue to see her; 6 [14] in October 2002, Irving followed Moll to a business lunch, and 7 when he was ask ed why (g i v en th a to th e r employees were not accompanied 8 o n similar occasions), Irving stated that he wanted to "develop" Moll; 9 [15] d uring a 2003 equ a l employment opportunity office t raining 10 p rogram on d i scrimination, retaliation, and harassm e nt a ttended by Irving, 11 I r v i n g

l a u gh e d a n d m o ck e d th e v i gn e t t e s p r e s e n t e d ; M o l l th e n c o m p l a i n e d o f 12 I rving's behavior and itemized instances of harassment and discrimination; 13 [16] in 2003, F innegan and ne w father David Jager were heard 14 d iscussing that Jager could not ha v e s e x w ith his wife; F innegan was giving 15 o ut his work and fax number as "25-PENIS"; 16 [17 ] in 2 0 0 5, Moll sought psychological treatment due to the 17 d iscrimination and harassment she suffered.

18 2 . Other Evidence or Details Not Mentioned in Moll IV 19 In a ddition to the court's description of the record as to Moll's complaints 20 about I rving and o thers at Verizon, her depositions and declaration--along with sworn 21 s t a t emen t s fr o m M o l l 's co -wo r k erS E Ann e B y r n e a n d f r o m S a r aD e L e n a, w h o h a d b e co me 22 aC o r p o r a t e A c c o u n t M a n a g e r

i n 1 9 9 6, o ne y e a r

b e fo r e M o l l

b e c a m e an

S E

- - p r o v i d e d f

u r t h e r 23 d et a i l s a s t o th e a p p r o x i m a t e t i m i n g , e x t e n t , a n d n a tu r e o f so me o f th e i n c i d en t s r efer r ed t o 24 by the court in Moll IV , including: - 20 -1 # In or about 1998 "through 1999," Irv ing made comments to Moll in 2 t

h e w o r k p l a c e , i n

w h i ch h e s a i d s h e " l o o k [ e d ] an d s m e l l [ e d ] g r e a t t o d a y " ; M o l l 3 w a s m a r r i e d , a s I r v i n g kn e w ; a n d I r v i n g

t o o w a s m a r r i e d ; M o l l " w a s o ffe n d e d 4 b y th ese co mmen t s, wh i ch wer e hu mi l i a t i n ga n d m a d e [ h e r ] un co m f o r t abl e" ; 5 # o n e o f th e sev er a l n o t es I r v i n gl e ft o n M o l l ' s d e s k c o m p l a i n e d ab o u t 6 " being inte r u pte d [ s ic ] when we a re t alking," a nd said "I know the 2 3rd was 7 unplanned & I was definitely thinking about the poss ib ilities!! You look & 8 smell great today... Call me?" (emphasis in original); 9 # in t h e 1 9 9 9 m u l ti

- d a y

tr a in in g tr i p m e nti o n e d in Mo l lI V , I r v in g c a l l e d 10 M o l li n h e r h o t e lr o o mm u l t i p l e t i m e s b e tw e e n 9 : 3 0 a n d 1 1 : 3 0 p . m . , a s k i n g h e r 11 t o come to his room; he had continued to c all a fter she had refused and had 12 a sked him to stop calling; after more than five such ca lls , s he took the 13 t elephone off the hook; 14 # Irvi n g a sk ed M o l l " wh eth e r[sh e] h a d a ny th i n gg o i n g[o n ] with Mr. 15 M cGowan [her then-SE Manager] or another male co-worker"; 16 # Irving "stated that [Moll] had the keys to Mr. McGowan's house, 17 suggesting that [she] m ust be having an affair with" McGowan; 18 # upon Moll's return to work after maternity l eave , F innegan called 19 M oll and CAM Sara DeLena "hottie[s]," and he thereafter repeatedly called 20 M o l l a " h o t t i e" " wh en h e wo ul d se e [ h e r ] e v e r ym o n th o rtw o d u r i n gth e t i m e 21 [they] worked together, which was through 2003 or 2004"; 22 # a lthough th e district court note d Verizon's contention that Irving's 23 sexual p ursuit of Moll had ceased in the Fall of 1 9 99 when Moll's pregnant 24 state became a ppare nt, it w as i n 2 001, after Moll returned from maternity 25 l e a v e, t

h a t I r v in g - - wh o b y

t he n w a s M o l l ' s s u p e r v i s o r - - l e ft hi sn o te o n

h e r d e s k 26 saying that he thought a bout her while he was in the shower; 27 # i n 2 0 0 3 , w h e n

F i nn e g a n

a n d J a g e rd i s c u s s e d J a g e r ' s i n ab i l i tyt o h a v e 28 s e x w i t h h i s w i f e f o rs i x w e e k s a ft e r th e b i r th o f th e b ab y, th e yd i d s o n e a rth e 29 d e s k s o f B y rn e an d M o l l

, b o t h o f wh o m h e a r d F in

n e g an s a y t h a t " an y gu y wh o 30 h a d t o g o th a t l o n gw i t h o u t s e x w o u l d b e i n

a n ' u p r i gh t a n d l o c k e d p o s i t i o n ' " ;

- 21 -1 # a l t h o u g h M o l lan d B y rn e c o m p l a in e d t oV e r i z on ' se q u a l e m p l o y m e nt 2 o pportunity of fice ("HR") about, inter alia , Irving's laughing at and mocking 3 the April 2003 HR tr a ining session on discrimination, retaliation, and 4 h arassment, in response Verizon did nothing; 5 # soon after that HR training session, Finnegan telephoned SE II 6 S p e n c e r a t w o r k , a s k in g t o r e c e i v e a f a xa t h i s V e r i z o n

f a xnu mb e r

, a n d s t a t in g 7 that his number was 25-PENIS; Spence r , whos e desk--like those of Moll and 8 B yrne, was in a cubicle--announced Finnegan's number to the p eople sitting 9 n e a r

b y ; h e th e n

i m m e d i a t e l yw e n t

t o M o l l ' s d e s k

a n d t o l d h e rth a tF i nn e g a n ' s 10 V erizon fax number was 25-PENIS; 11 # S pencer testified that he viewed Finne ga n' s fax number as "minor 12 c o mp a r ed t o o th erth i n g s th a twer e a l wa y s sa i d every day"; he t est i fi ed , " l i k e 13 I said, the o ffice atmosphere, that one statement . . . was n othing compared to 14 w hat went on " (emphasis added). 15 I n a d d i t i o nt o th ese d et a i l s, th e d i strict co ur ti n Moll IV l a r g e l y i g n o r e d E S G's 16 workplace c onditions for women as a whole, as it made scant mention of the sexual 17 h a r a s s m e nt

d e s c r i b e d b yS a r a D e L e n a( wh o, l i k e M o l la n d B y rn e , h a d fi l e d h e r o wn T i tl e V I I 18 a ct i o n ). F r o m 1 9 9 5 t o 2 0 0 2 , DeL ena's manager was McGowan, and DeL en a co mp l a i n ed t o 19 hi m f r e q

u e n t l y . T h e e v i d e n c e a s t o D e L e n a - - w h o i s u s u a l l yth e fe m a l e " c o - w o r k e r " r e fe r r e d 20 t o by the district court in Moll IV --reveals a working environment repeatedly punctuated 21 with sexual comments, innuendo, a nd s tatements or treatment d emeaning to women, 22 i ncluding the following: 23 # CAM Timothy Mitte n, at a charity event for which Verizon had 24 p urchased a table at which Verizon clients were sitting, referred to CAM 25 DeLena as "his secretary";

- 22 -1 # b e g in n i n g i n o ra b o u t 1 9 9 7 , F i n n e g an wh ow a s fi r s t

aC A Ma n d l a t e r 2 a project manager in the group, "regu larly" made sexually o ffensive 3 comments, and comme nts about DeLena's appearance; 4 # i na wo r k m eet i n gi no r abo ut 1 9 9 7 , a t t en d ed byDeLen a , F i nn eg a n , 5 M cGo wa n , a n d a n o th er, F i nn e g a n d e s c r i b e d a c e r t a i ni n d i v i d ua l a s so stup i d 6 that he could "'screw up a wet dream'"; 7 # i n t h e s a m e m e e t i n g

, i n ad i s c u s s i o n

ab o u t h i r i n g afe m a l e , F i n

n e g a n 8 stated that her hiring w ould depend on what she looked like; 9 # a ft erth a t meet i n gD e L e n a c o m p l a i n ed t o M cGo wa na n d a sk ed h i m 10 t o get Finnegan to "clean up his act"; 11 # in a 1998 conference call, w ith numerous CAMs participating, 12 F i nn e g a n a s k e d D e L e n a w h e th e rs h e w a s a t h o m e , s t a t i n g

th a t h e c o u l d " h e a r 13 the bedsprings creaking"; DeLena thereafter complained to McGowan and 14 a s k e d i f h e h a d s p o k e n

t o F i n n e g an; M c G o w a n

s a i d h e h a d a n d t

h a t h e w o u l d 15 d o so again; 16 # i n 2000, DeLena went to a meeting in McGowan's o ffice; when she 17 entered, Finnegan was there and t old DeLena she looked good; McGowan 18 a sked if h er dress was new, because it even smelled new; and F innegan told 19 h er, "come sit on my lap"; 20 # D e L e n a p r o m p tly t u rn e d an d w a l ke d o u t

; s hel a te r c o m p l a ine da g a in 21 t o McGowa n , wh o sa i d h e h a d sp o k en t o F i nn e g a ni n

th e past and would do 22 so again; 23 # thereafter, Finnegan's comments did not cease but rather 24 " ac c e le r a ted"; he referred to DeLena as a "hottie" two or three times a week; 25 s h e a s k e d h i mt o st o p , but h e just l a ugh e d a n d p e r s i s t e d , a n d h e c o n t i nu e d t o 26 comment on her appear ance, her dress, and her hair; 27 # DeL en a a g a i ncomplained to McGowan, who sa i d h e wo u l d t a l kt o 28 F innegan;

- 23 -1 # i n o r around 2000, when Finnegan and M cGowan were disc us s ing 2 the new President of Verizon's Sales Division--a woman- - Finnegan 3 c o m m e n t e d t h a t s h e w a s n o t

" t o o b a d l o o k i n g " ; M c G o w a n r e s p o n d e d t

h a t s h e 4 " had a l o to f m i l es o nh er " ; wh en a female co-worker who was present asked 5 wh a t

t h a t w a s s u p p o s e d t o m e an , F in n e g an o r M c G o w an

r e p l i e d b y

s a y in g t h e 6 woman was old; 7 # in November 2000, DeLena was stuck in the of fice because of a 8 severe snow storm; later that week Finnegan told her he was only sorry that 9 she was in the office alone without him; 10 # i n D e c e mb e r2 0 0 0 , a t

th e C o m p a nyC h r i s t ma s p a r ty, D e L e n a w a s i n 11 t

h e b u f fe t l inen e x t t o F in n e g an an d M c G o w an

, an d F in n e g an t o l d D e L e n at

h a t 12 h e had asked the restaur a n tt o k eep th e wh i p p ed cr ea m fo r h er to take home 13 so she could have a "hot time with" her husband; 14 # D e L e n a p r o m p t l ytu rn e d a n d l o o k e d a t M c G o w a n

, b u t h e r e m a i n e d 15 silent; 16 # around Christmas in 2000, Moll was i n a v an with members of the 17 B uffalo office ent er p r i se so l utions group for an outing to a casino, and when 18 DeLena entered, Finnegan said "now we have two old bags in the van"; 19 # in or about January 2001, when D e Le na w a s to depart for a sales 20 k ickoff meeting at a resort, Finnegan came to her o ffice and a sked if she had 21 ar o o m a l o n e a t th e r e s o r t; w h e n

s h e s a i d s h e d i d , h e t o l d h erh e wa s g o i n gt o 22 come knocking a t her door in the middle of the night; DeLena promptly 23 walked out of her office ; 24 # i n addition, pr ior to that meeting, Finnegan had said, "how are we 25 g oing to get Sara in the hot tub? Hopefully without a suit"; 26 # d ur i n gth e return trip from that meeting, Finnegan sa i d t o DeL en a , 27 " I h o p e y o u un d er st a n d wh a t Im e a n w h e n Im a k e c o m m e n t s abo ut h o w y o u 28 l ook, your body i s so . . ."; DeLena interrupte d him a n d told him t o stop 29 making comments about her body, her l ooks, and he r a p pearance; she later 30 complained again to Mc Gowan, who told her he would take care of it;

- 24 -1 # McGowan himself regularly made comments a b ou t women's 2 a ppearances; he also said women would be more appealing if they smelled 3 l ike bacon and eggs, or vanilla; 4 # McGowan regul a r l y a sk ed DeL en a abo ut th e appearance of certain 5 o f

h e r fr i e n d s ; a s t o o n e , h e a s k e d " whyd o e s s h e m a k e h e r s e l f s o u n a t t r a c ti v e " ; 6 o na n o th e r o cca si o nh e a sk ed " why o l d erwo men wo u l d h a v e p l a s t i c s ur g er y 7 when it obviously wouldn't make a difference in their attractiveness"; 8 # M c G o w an a l s o r e gu l a r ly

c l a i m e dt oh a v ea

c o u s in wh ow a s r e a l ly

hi s 9 s i s t e r, s t a t i n g t h a t h i s p a r e n t s h a d g i v e n h e ra w a y b e c a u s e t

h e y d i d n ' t

w a n t t o 10 h ave any girls; 11 # David Winley, who joined the enterprise solutions group as a 12 Technical Support Specialist i n Apr il 2 002, regularly made comments with 13 r espect to DeLena's appearance, referring to her as a "Bond woman"; 14 # Winley also regularly referred t o De Le na's perfume a nd said "oh, 15 O p i u m, d o n ' t d o t h a t t o m e, " an d o n c e s a i d " Ic a n ' t s i t n e x t t o y o u, Id o n ' t

w a n t 16 t o get in trouble"; 17 # i n May 2001, DeLena began treating with a psychiatris t b e c ause of 18 the continual and severe emotional stress she was experiencing at w ork; in 19 M ay

2 0 0 2, s he w a s p l a c e d o n d i s a b i l i t y l e a v e , w hi ch

l a s te d m o r et

h an am o nt h ; 20 # i n2 0 0 2 , wh en DeL en a wa s meeti n gwi th a c l i e n t a n d K ev i n

Dea n , a 21 r ecently hired SE, the client a s ke d w hether Dean worked for DeLena; Dean 22 r esponded, "I don't work for her, and she'll be working for me before I work 23 for her." 24 ( S e eA ffi d a v i t

o f S a r aD e L e n ad a t e d N o v e mb e r2 2 , 2 0 0 5 , ¶ ¶ 7 2 , 8 6 , 1 0 4

- 1 2 7; s e ea l s o A ff i d a v i t 25 o f

A nn e M . B y rn e d a t e d J u n e 1 2 , 2 0 0 6 ( " B y rn e A ff

. " ) , ¶ ¶ 1 1 , 1 4, 4 4, 5 0

- 5 6 , 5 9

- 6 1 , 6 4

- 6 5 , 6 7

- 72 , 26 7 6 -77 (describing the office a tm os phere a s oppressive t o women, r eferring to many of the 27 above events, as well as to h er own compla ints o f gender discrimination, of retaliation by 28 I r v in g

f o rh e r c o m p l a i n t s , a n d o f

t h e l a c ko f

a nyr e m e d i a l a c t i o n

b yV e r i z o n ) . ) M o l ll i k e w i s e - 25 -1 w a s a w a r e o f th e s e e v e n t s a n d f o u n d th e m d e m e a n i n ga n d hu m i l i a t i n g . ( S e eD e c l a r a t i o n o f 2 Cindy L. Moll dated September 22, 2017 ("Moll Decl."), ¶¶ 11, 58, 65, 70, 73-77.) 3 As indicated, many of the s e xu a lly offensive comments were made by 4 members o f the enterprise solutions group in the presence of their managers--principally 5 M cGowan or Irving--and the managers did nothing t o admonish the speakers, or even to 6 s u g g e s t

t h a t t h e i rb e h a v i o r w a s n o t

a c c e p t a b l e . D e L e n ar e p e a te d ly c o m p l a in e d t oM c G o w an 7 about Finnegan; and while M cGowan repeatedly said he had spoken a nd/or would speak 8 t o Finnegan, McGowan's utter silence when Finne gan made offensive or demeaning 9 s t a t e m e nt s o r

p r o p o s i t i o n s i n

M c G o w an ' s p r e s e n c e s u g g e s t st h a t M c G o w an h a d d o n e an d /o r 10 would do nothing to criticize such behavior. 11 It is perhaps unsurprising that DeLena's complaints did n ot r e s u lt in relief 12 from the numerous sexual comments and i nnuendo, give n tha t McGowan himself--and 13 some o ther SE Managers--made deme a ning comments or apparently relished such 14 c o mmen t s byo th er s. M cGo wa n , i n1 9 9 9 wh en B y rne became an SE I, told M o l l th a tB y r n e 15 w o u l d a c tu a l ly h a v e b e e n

m a d e an S E I I" i f s h e h a d o n l ys m i l e d m o r e . " A n d w h e n M o l la n d 16 D e L e n aw e r e s t a n d i n g i n a n o p e n a r e a o f th e o ffi c e i n F e b r u a r yo r M a r c h 2 0 0 2 w i t h ag r o u p 17 o f other workers, i t was then-SE Manager Irving who walked up to DeLena, looked at her 18 bre a sts, and said " hooters"; and another manager from the Company's Albany office who 19 was present just said, "you said hooters, I can't believe you said that," and laughed.

- 26 -1 I n s u m , M o l lp r o ffe r e d e v i d e n c e t h a t o v e r tly s e x u a l o r s e x i s t c o m m e n t s, s e x u a l 2 i nnuendos, and gender-b ased disparagements were regularly directed at women in 3 Verizon's enterprise solutions group or made about women in g eneral--such state m e nts 4 being made i n the woman's o wn office, or near a woman's des k, or t o a woman in a 5 m a n a g er 's o ffi ce, o rab o u t a w o m a n

a m i d p e r s o n s i n

a ca sua l g a th er i n gi n a co mmo no ffi ce 6 ar e a , or in c onference calls or meetings a mong co-workers, o r in a v an h eading for a staff 7 o uting, or i n a buffet line a t a n of f ic e party, or in meetings with clients. She proffered 8 e v i d e n c e t

h a t m o s t m a n a g e r s d i d n o t

h i n g t o d i s c o u r a g e t

h a t ob j e c t i o n a b l e c o n d u c t - - an d t

h a t 9 s o m e ma n a g e r s p a r t i ci p a t ed i nsuch co n d uct . Perh a p s m o s t t r o ub l i n g, a s d i scussedabo v e, 10 M o l l p o i n t e d t o e v i d e n c e th a t I r v i n g - - w h o a s h e rc o -wo r k erh a d h a r a s s e d h e rw i th s e x u a l l y 11 c o n

n o t a t i v e c o m m e n t s a n d r e q u e s t s t o c o m e t o h i s h o t e lr o o m - - a ft e rb e c o m in g h e rm a n a g e r

, 12 l e ft

h e r a n o t e sa y i n gth a t

h e " th o ugh tabo ut [h er ] wh en h e wa s i n

th e s h o w e r . " A n d a s h e r 13 m an a g e r

, h e in s i s t e d t

h a t s hec o m m u ni c a te w i t

h hi mo nlyi n

p e r s o n , d e m an d e d t

h a t s h e s t a y 14 a t the office alone with h i m late at night, a nd followed he r to client lunches against her 15 w i s h e s b e c a u s e h e w a n t e d t o " d e v e l o p " h e r . I r v i n ga t t e n d e d a n H R a w a r e n e s s p r e s e n t a t i o n 16 a twhich he simply laughed throughout

. Al th o ughMoll complained to HR about Irving's 17 d emonstration of contempt for the HR tr a ining p resentation, Verizon did nothing in 18 r esponse.

- 27 -1 Th e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ru l e d t h a t t h e i n c i d e n t s t

h a t M o l le x p e r i e n c e d o rkn e w a b o u t 2 were "puerile" and " offensive , " b u t found that they were n ot "humiliating" and "did not 3 u n r e a s o n a

b lyi n t e r fe r e w i t

h P l a i n t i ff ' s w o r k

. " Mo l lI V , 2 0 2 0 W L 5 5 9 3 8 4 5 , a t

* 1 5 . V i e w i n g

t h e 4 e v i d e n c e a s a w h o l e i n th e l i g h tmo st

fa v o r abl e t o M o l l, w e c a nn o t a g r e e th a t

n o r e a s o n ab l e 5 p erson could find the working environment hostile and abusiv e , or that no reasonable 6 p erson could find that th at e nv ir onment adversely affected h er ability t o concentrate on 7 s i m p l yp e r fo r mi n gh erjo b w e l l

. R a t i o n a l j u r o r s m a yd i s a g r e e a s t o w h e th e rth e s e i n c i d e n t s 8 w o u l d n e g a t i v e l ya l t e rth e w o r k i n gco n d i t i o n s o f a r ea so n abl e emp l o y e e ; but " th e p o t e n t i a l 9 f o r . . . d i sa g r eementr e n d e r s s u m m a r yj u d g m e n t i n a p p r o p r i a t e . " F i tzg e r a l d , 2 5 1 F . 3 d a t3 6 0 10 (internal quotation mar ks omitted).

11 C. The Claim of Retaliatory Transfer to Syracuse 12 I n S e p t e mber2 0 0 3 , M o l l fi l e d a c h a r g e a g a i n s t V e r i z o n w i th th e U n i t e d S t a t e s 13 E qu a l E m p l o y m e n t O p p o r t u n i tyC o m m i s s i o n

( " E E O C " ) , c o m p l a i n i n go f s e x d i s c r i m i n a t i o n

, 14 i ncluding sex ua l h a r a ssment, a hostile work environment, and retaliation for complaining 15 a

b o u t t h e d i s c r i m in a t o r yw o r k i n g c o n d i t i o n s . I n

O c t ob e r 2 0 0 4, M o l lc o m m e n c e d t h e p r e s e nt 16 a ction, which was served on Verizon in November.

- 28 -1 1 . Verizon's Transfer of Buffalo SEs to Syracuse 2 B y th e F a l l of 2004, th e sa l es en g i n eerg r o up sup p o r t i n gCAM s i nth e B u ffa l o 3 o f fi c e c o n s i s t e d o f S E s M o l l a n d B y r n e , n e w l yh i r e d S E M i ch a e l C h a s e , a n d p r o j e c t m a n a g e r 4 F i n

n e g a n . Th e i r

m an a g e r

w a s G a g l i o n e, wh oh a d c a u s e d V e r i z o n ' s H R t o m a k e t

h e T i t l e V I I 5 a wareness v ideo pre s e ntation in April 2003. Gaglione was stationed in Syracuse a nd also 6 managed SEs in Verizon's S yracuse office; Gaglione was su pervised by then-Branch Sales 7 Engineering Manager Robert Dixon. In December 2004, Dixon and Gaglione, with the 8 V erizon H R Manager on th e t elephone, met with Moll, Byrne, Chase, and Finnegan a n d 9 i nformed them that "all o f [their] jobs were being m oved to Syracuse," which is some 160 10 miles from Buffalo (Moll Decl. ¶¶ 104-105). Dixon des cr ib e d the move as part of "a new 11 model," under which certain SEs would "be l ocated in the same offic e a s their managers." 12 (Deposition of Cindy L. Moll, November 13, 2006 ("Moll 2006 Dep."), at 250.) 13 Moll, Byrne, Chase, and Finnegan wer e i n fo r med th a t i f they chose not to go 14 t o t

h e S y r a c u s e o ffi c e - - w h i ch w a s ab o u t a tw o - a n d

- a - h a l f

- h o u r d r i v e fr o mB u ff a l o - - t h e y h a d 15 the options of looking for another job within Verizon or taking a severance package a n d 16 b e i n gt a k e n

o ff th e p a y r o l l n o l a t e rth a n F eb r u a r y2 0 0 5 . M o l l a n d B y r n e i m m e d i a t e l ya s k e d 17 for more informa t i o n abo ut th e sev erance option; but they were told that the details of the 18 s e v e r a n c e p a c k a g e w o u l d n o t b e m a d e a v a i l ab l e t o th e m u n t i l th e ya g r e e d t o a c c e p t i t . ( S e e, 19 e . g . , B y rn e A ff

. ¶ 9 2 ( " W e w e r e g i v e n th r e e ch o i c e s : t o r e p o r t t ot h a t o ffi c e , t o fi n d an e wj ob ,

- 29 -1 o r take an early retirement," but "the y w ou ld not provide us with any of the details

. . . so 2 that we could determine the financial ramifications."); id

. ¶ 9 4 ("They said the y w ou ld not 3 p r o v i d e t

h a t in fo r m a ti o n

u nti l Ia g r e e d t

h a t Iw o u l d t a k et

h a t o p ti o n . " ) . ) M o l l a n d B y rn e a l s o 4 s o u gh t

i n f o r m a t i o n

fr o mt h e C o m p a ny ' s i n t e r n a l w e b s i t e, w hi ch s t a t e d t h a t i n a n e m p l o y e e 5 buy-out plan, Verizon "retaine d the discretion to change the terms and conditions," 6 i n cl ud i n g" r e l ea se" provisions. Thus unable to learn the terms or amount of the severance 7 " offer," warned that even if d isclosed the terms could be cha nge d at the whim of Verizon, 8 a n d w a r yo f

" r e l e a s e " p r o v i s i o n s ' p o t e n t i a l e ff e c t o n th e i r p en d i n g l a w s u i t s a g a i n s t V e r i z o n , 9 M oll and Byrne found the severance option unreasonable. 10 Finnegan, within a few da ys after the December meeting, t old Gaglione that 11 he h ad found a nother Verizon job. Byrne eventually also found a new position within 12 Ve r izon. As described i n Part II.C.5. below, Moll was unable to find a new position a t 13 V e r i z o ni n th e sh o r tt i me a l l o wed

. Thus, M o l l a n d Ch a se wer e th e o n l yB u ffa l o emp l o y e e s 14 whose job sites were ac tually transferred to Syracuse. 15 Moll sought dispensation to wo r kfr o m h o me, p o i n t i n gout that she had two 16 y oung children, that her husband worked in Buffalo, that she was enrolled in week-night 17 courses at a Buffalo college, where she was p ursuing a B a chelor's degree, and that she 18 a s s i s t e d i n t

h e c a r e o f

h e r w i d o w e d a n d h a n d i c a p p e d m o th e ri n B u ff a l o , w h o r e l i e d o n

M o l l 19 f o rt r a n s p o r t a t i o n t o m e d i c a l a p p o i n t m e n t s . G a g l i o n e--a ft er d i scussin gM o l l 's r equest w i th

- 30 -1 Dixon and Dixon's supe rvisor, Regional Sales Director Mark VanHoesen--wa s r equi red to 2 de ny Moll's request. ( See Deposition of Christopher T. Gaglione, December 13, 200 6 3 ("Gaglione 2006 Dep."), at 378; Declaration of Christopher T. Gaglione dated November 4, 4 2 0 11 ("Gaglione 2011 Decl."), ¶ 26.) 5 Thus, in Fe b ruary 2005, Moll was formally assigned t o work in the Syracuse 6 o ffice. Gaglione informed Moll and Chase that they should b e in S yracuse on days they 7 w e r e n o t

m e e t in g w i t h ac l i e n t , b u t h e p r o v i d e d s o m e fl e x i b i l i ty . H e t o l d t

h e m t h a t o n ad a y 8 w h e n th e yh a d a n a p p o i n t m e n t

w i t h a c u s t o m e ri n

B u ff a l o , th e yw o u l d n o t n e e d t o c o m e t o 9 S yracuse and could work at home or in the Buffalo office for the rest of the day. Gaglione 10 t estified that Moll was a "rule follower"; and Moll testifie d tha t s he h ad as many 11 a p p o i n t men t s i nB uffa l o a s p o ssible, and when she did not have such an a p p o i n t men t , sh e 12 was in Syracuse. 13 However, Dixon and VanHoesen eventually be c a me aware that Moll was 14 sometimes in Buffalo, and they made i t clear to Gaglione that they dis a ppr oved of his 15 flexible approach. Thus, i n a July 2005 email directed t o Moll and Chase--b ut not to any 16 o ther Syracuse-based SEs--Dixon stated: 17 It is the expectation that you report to work in Syracuse unless 18 there is a compelling reason not to do so. If you ha v e a m e e ting in 19 Buffalo in the morning, you are expected to be in Syracuse in the 20 afternoon. If there is a meeting in Buffalo in the afternoon, you a re 21 expected to be in Syracuse in the morning. . . .

- 31 -1 P l e a s e c o n f i r mv i ae - m a i lt

h a t y o u a r e a d h e r i n g

t o t h e s e p o l i c i e s . 2 (Robert Dixon email to Cindy Moll and M ichael C ha s e da ted July 5, 2005.) Soon after 3 r eceiving this email, Chase left Veriz on. Moll stayed on, and Dixon t elephoned her 4 p eriodically to make sure that she was in the Syracuse office. 5 In August 2 005, after Chase had left, M o l l r eceived fu rther stringent orders. 6 S he was informed by Gaglione that she "was required t o be a t [ her] desk i n Syracuse [for] 7 a m inimum of

. . . 3 days per week, 8 hours a day," t otaling at least "24 hours per wee k. " 8 (Moll Decl. ¶ 118.) Gaglione stated that he was instructed to impose this order by Dixon, 9 a n d that this requirement was imposed on no other S E. ( See Deposition of Christopher T. 10 Gaglione, May 10, 2017("Gaglione 2017 Dep."), at 103; Gaglione 2011 Decl. ¶ 30.) 11 Because of the stress she was exper ie nc ing at Verizon as a result of her 12 p e r cei v ed mi st r ea t m en t , M o l l h a d begunt r ea t i n gwi tha p sy c h i a t r i st , D r . M a r i a N i ck o l o v a , 13 in

J un e 2 0 0 4 . I n

A u g u s t 2 0 0 5 , t h e r e v i s e d c o m m a n d t

h a t M o l ls p e n d a t

l e a s t t hr e e e i g ht- h o u r 14 d ays a week in S yracuse , on top of Dixon's monitoring and other work-related pressures, 15 c a u s e d t

h e s t r e s s an danx i e t

y o f M o l l ' s j ob t o b e o v e r wh e l m in g . D r . N i c k o l o v a r e q u i r e d M o l l 16 t ot a k e ad i s a

b i l i t y l e a v e . A s h e r

ti m e a w a yfr o m w o r k

p r o g r e s s e d , M o l lb e g an t os e e as l o w

, 17 but hopeful, lessening of her anxiety. 18 Verizon's loc ation of its Buffalo-centric SEs in Syracuse lasted only about a 19 y e a r . D u r i n g

M o l l ' s l e a v e o f

a b s e n c e , V e r i z o n

c o m p l e t e d am e r g e r

w i t h t e l e c o m m u n i c a ti o n s

- 32 -1 p r o v i d e r M C I . M C Iw a s p u z z l e d b yt h e p l a c e m e n t

i n S y r a c u s e o f

S E s w h o a s s i s t e d B u ff a l o 2 b a s e d C A M s a n d B u ff a l o -b a s e d c l i e n t s , a n d th e j o b s i t e o f B u ff a l o - c e n t r i cS E s w a s p r o m p t l y 3 r e t

u rn e d t oB u ff a l o . ( S e e

G a g l i o n e 2 0 1 7

D e p . 2 3 ( " M C I

g o t inv o l v e d a n d t

h e y w e r e l i k e, ' H e y

, 4 w hya r e B u ff a l o S E s r e p o r t i n g t o S y r a cuse?' Theymo v ed i t r i g h tba ck

. " ). ) Ga g l i o n e wo ul d 5 r emain the SE Manager in Syracuse; someone else would manage the SEs in Buffalo. In 6 Fe b ruary 2006, Gaglione called Moll to inform her that as a r esult of the merger, her duty 7 s t a t i o n

w a s t r a n s f e r r e d b a c kt o th e B u ffa l o a r e a . S h e wa s n o l o n g er wi th i nth e V a n H o es e n 8 Dixon line of supervision, and she was no longer required to report to Syracuse. 9 M o l l t o l d h erp sy ch i a t r i s t th a t s h e w a s g r ea t l y r el i e v e d t o l ea r nth a th e r wo r k 10 l ocation h ad changed, and Dr. Nickolova cleared he r to r e sume work in March 2006. In 11 2 0 04, Moll had asked to be allowed to work in Verizon's office in Amher s t, Ne w Yor k, a 12 B u ff a l os ub u r

b , b e c au s e i t

w a s n e a r e r

t oh e r h o m ean d w o u l d p r o v i d e fr e ep a rkin g; G a g l i o n e 13 h ad denied her request. I n his February 2006 call, Gaglione told Moll s he could return to 14 work either at h er original B uffalo location or in the Amherst office. Learning that Dixon 15 a n d Irving would be working in Amherst, Moll chose the Buffalo office. 16 M o l lr e tu rn e d t o w o r k i n B u ff a l o i n

M a r c h 2 0 0 6 . H e rn e wm a n a g e rw a s M a r k 17 W i t t e , w h o h a d co me t o V er i z o nfr o m M C I . As d i scussedi nPa r tI I . D. bel o w, M o l l ' s r e tu r n 18 t o work was short-lived because in e a rly 2007, Verizon implemented a r eduction in force, 19 a n d Moll was one of the employees terminated.

- 33 -1 2 . Verizon's First Motion for Summary Judgment 2 In 2 0 0 8, M o l la m e n d e d h e r c o m p l a int

in t hi s a c t i o n

t o a d d a l l e g a ti o n s t

h a t b o t h 3 h er 2007 termination a nd h er 2004 job site transfer to S yr a c us e were the result of gender 4 d iscrimina tion or retaliation. Following a period of discovery, Verizon moved in 2011 for 5 summary judgment dis missing all of Moll's claims. 6 With respect to Moll' s c la im s that her job site transfer to Syracuse was 7 discriminatory or retaliatory, Verizon a rgued that it could n ot be found to ha v e 8 d i s c r i m i n a t e d o n th e b a s i s o f

s e x b e c a use t

h e d eci si o nh a d bee n

t o t r a n s f e r tw o w o m e n a n d 9 t wo men; they were treated equally. Arguing that the tr a nsfer was also not retaliatory, 10 V erizon submitted deposition testimony given by Gaglione in 2 006 that the transfer h ad 11 b een

a " busi n e ss p l a n

, " a n d th a t" th e wh o l e purpose of being in Syracuse, a cco r d i n gt o M r . 12 D i x o n

, wa s th a tev er ybo d y wa s g o i n gt o be t h e r e t o g e th er . " (Ga g l i o n e 2 0 0 6 Dep . 2 8 1 , 2 9 0 . ) 13 I n o p p o si t i o nt o V er i z on's 2011 request fo r d i s mi ssa l o f h ercl a i m th a th e r jo b 14 s i t e t r a n s f e rw a s d i s c r i m i n a t o r y o rr e t a l i a t o ry

, M o l ls ub m i t t e d a d e c l a r a ti o n fr o m G a g l i o n e - - 15 who by then was no longer employed by Ve r iz on. ( See Gaglione 2011 Decl. ¶ 1.) In this 16 d eclaration, Gaglione, who h ad participated in relevant 2004 meetings with D ixon a n d 17 V anHoesen, stated that the goal of the decision to t ransfer the four Buffalo job s ite s to 18 S yr a c us e ha d in fact been to retaliate against Moll and B yrne for their complaints of

- 34 -1 d i s c r i m i n a t i o n a n d r e t a l i a t i o n , a n d t o m a k e th e i rj ob s s o o n e r o u s th a t th e yw o u l d l e a v e E S G 2 entirely. Gaglione state d : 3 12. T h e v ariou s c o mp lain ts of discrimination and retaliation by both 4 Ms . M o l l a n dMs . B y r n ew e r ec o n s i d e r e d t o b ev e r yd i s r u p t i v et o t h eb u s i n e s s 5 o p e ra t i o n s b yt h e m an a g e m e nt

o f t h e fo r m e r

E n t e r p r i s e S o l u t i o n s G r o u p 6 of Ve r iz on, (ESG), which was the group in which we worked. These 7 were considered especially d i sruptive by the management of ESG, including 8 Mark VanHoesen and Robert Dixon

. 9 13. In late 2004, I attended m ee tings with Mr. VanHoesen and 10 Mr. Dixon in which Mr. Dixon propose d transferring all of the SEs and 11 Project Managers in the Buffalo office of ESG to the S yracuse office o f ESG . 12 It was agreed that we would offer them the opportunity to w or k in 13 S y r a cu s e, f in d an e wj ob w i t

hin V e r i z o n , o ra c c e p t

a s e v e r a n c e p a c k a g e . 14 14. Th e p rimary factor for this decision was an effort to retaliate 15 agains t b ot h Ms. Moll and Ms. Byrne for their c ontinuing complaints of 16 discrimination and retaliation

. Mr. Dixon and Mr. VanHoesen wa nt e d t o 17 ma k e l i f e as difficult as possible for Ms. Moll and Ms. Byrne and stated that 18 they believed this action would force them to leave ESG. 19 1 5 . W e k n ewth a t

b o th Ms . Mo l la n d

Ms . B y r n eh a d

t i e s t o th e B u f f a l o 20 area a n d bel i ev ed th a t , byforc i n gth em to eith er m o v e t o S y rac u s e or trav el 21 th e re on a daily basis, we could forc e th em to leav e th e E S G byfin d in ga n ew 22 position within Verizon or accept the severance package

. 23 16. We ju s tif ied this transfer with the pretext that all SEs and 24 Project Managers (which was a coordina t e po s ition to SEs) should work 25 together

. Since I was the Sales Engineer Manager and was l ocated in 26 Syracuse, the decision was made to force them to travel to Syracuse. 27 1 7 . It w as also dec id edth at th e S E s a n d P ro j e c tM a n ag e rs w o u l d be 28 required to report to the Syracuse office; they w ould not be permitted to 29 work at home

. Mr. Dixon, in particula r , wa s adamant that the SEs would 30 have to p hysically report to Syracuse when they wer e no t meeting with 31 c u s t o m e r s . Thi s d e c i s i o n

w o u l d a ffe c t

fo u r p e o p l e : M s . M o l l, M s . B y rn e, - 35 -1 Michael Chase, and Michael Finnegan. All were SEs, except for Mr. 2 Finnegan, who was a Project Manager. 3 (Gaglione 2011 Decl. ¶¶ 12-17 (emphases added).) 4 Gaglione stated that despite there being "some logic" in p lacing all SEs a n d 5 p roject managers in a single l ocation, that logic was m yopic . D ixon's plan moved the SEs 6 an d p r o

j e c t m a n a g e r

t o S y r a cu s e ; b u t

t h e j ob o f t h e s e e m p l o y e e s w a s t o a s s i s t t h e C A M s a n d 7 t he C A M s ' c l i e nt s . Th e C A M s w e r e i n B u ff a l o - - a s w e r e m o s t

o f t he i r c l i e nt s - - an d n o n e o f t

h e 8 CAMs were to be move d. 9 Thus, we w ere splitting up the SEs from the CAMs that t h e y supported

. 10 F ur thermore, we had numer o us cl i en t s i nB uffa l o fo rwh o m th ese S E s 11 provided support. Thus, these SEs would l os e hours every day traveling 12 betwe e n Buf falo and Syracuse to meet with the clients and CAMs to whom 13 t hey provided support . This w as an unproductive use of their t i m e a nd 14 undercut any business justification for this decision

. 15 ( I

d

. ¶ 1 8 ( e m p h a s e s a d d e d ) . ) G a g l i o n e a l s o n o t e d th a t " th i s wo ul d b e th e o n l yE S G o f fi c e i n 16 w h i ch

CAM S a n d S E s d i d n o two r k t o g eth eri n th e same p hy si ca l l o ca t i o n . " ( Id

. ; see also id

. 17 ¶ 23 ("I ha d r eser v a t i o n s ab o ut th e busin ess mer i t s o f this plan"; "I regret that I failed to do 18 m o r et o c o m p l a in a b o u t t h e r e t a l i a t o ry

n a t u r e o f t h e p l an . A t

t h a t ti m e, h o w e v e r

, Iw a s m o r e 19 concerned about losing my job.").)

- 36 -1 3 . Title VII Antiretaliation Principles 2 Title V II prohibits an employer from "discriminat[ing] against" an employee 3 " b e c a u s e h e [ o r

s h e ] h a s , " i n t e r

a l i a, " o p p o s e d an

y p r a c ti c e " t

h a t T i tl e V I Ifo r

b i d s o r" h a s m a d e 4 a ch a r g e . . . o r

p a r ti c i p a t e d i n

a nym an

n e ri n a n i nv e s t i g a t i o n

, p r o c e e d in g

, o r h e a r in g u n d e r " 5 Title VII. 4 2 U .S.C. § 2000e-3(a). The purpose of this "antiretaliation p rovision" is to 6 " p r e v e n t [ ] " e m p l o y e r sfr o minte r fe r in g " w i t h an e m p l o y e e ' s e ff o r t s t os e c u r e o ra d v a n c e [ t h e ] 7 e n fo r c e m e n t " o f T i t l e V I I ' s b a s i cp r o t e c t i o n s a g a i n s t d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . B u r l i ng t o n N o r t h e r n , 5 4 8 8 U.S. at 63. 9 To present a prima facie case of r e taliation under this provision, a plaintiff 10 must show that (1) "she participated in an activity protected by Title V II," (2) this 11 " p a r t i ci p a t i o nwa s kn o wn t o h eremp l o y er, " (3 ) th e emp l o y er" subjected h ert o a ma t er i a l l y 12 a d verse" action thereafter, and (4) a "causal connection" existed between the "protected 13 a ctivity" and the adverse a c tion. Kaytor, 609 F.3d at 552. With respect to the third 14 r equirement, the Supreme Court made clear in Burlington Northern that the antiretaliation 15 provision applies t o "employer actions that would have been materially adverse to a 16 r easonable employee," regardless of whether the action itself was "workplace-related o r 17 employmen t -r e l a t ed

. " 5 4 8 U. S. at 57, 67. An action qualifies as "materially adverse" if it is 18 " h a r mfult o th e p o i n t th a t [ i t ] c o u l dw e l l d i s s u a d ea r e a s o n a b l ew o rke r f rom makin

gor su p p orting

- 37 -1 a c h arg eof d iscrimination ." Id . at 57 (emphasis a d d ed ). Th i s st a n d a r d i s p l a i n l ya no bjecti v e 2 o ne, but Burlington Northern emphasized that 3 [c]ontext matters . The r e al social impact o f workplace behavior often 4 d e p e n d s o n ac o n s t e l l a t i o n o f

s u r r o u n d in g

c i r c u m s t a n c e s , e x p e c t a t i o n s, 5 a n d r e l a t i o n s h i p s w h i ch a r e n o t f u l l yc a p tu r e d b ya s i m p l e r e c i t a t i o n o f 6 th e w o r d s u s e d o rth e p hy s i c a l a c t s p e r f o r m e d

. . . . A s ch e d u l e ch a ngei n 7 an emp loy ee's w ork s c h e d u le may make little d ifferen c eto man yw orkers, bu t 8 may matter enormously to a y o ung mother with school-age children

. . . . 9 [ A n d ] a n a c t t h a t w o u l d b e i m m a t e r i a l i n s o m e s i tu a t i o n s i s m a t e r i a l i n 10 others. 11 I

d

. a t 6 9 ( i n t e rn a l q

u o t a t i o n m a r k s o m i t t e d ) ( e m p h a s e s o u r s ) ; s e e , e . g . , H i ck s v . B a i n es , 5 9 3 F . 3 d 12 1 5 9, 165 (2d Cir. 2010). 13 T h e fi n a l e l e m e n t o f a p r i m a f a c i e r et a l i a t i o n c a s e , r e qu i r i n gp r o o f

o f a " c a u s a l 14 r e l a t i o n s h i p " b e tw e e n t h e p r o t e c t e d a c t i v i tya n d t h e a d v e r s e a c t i o n

, c a n b e e s t a b l i s h e d e i t

h e r 15 ( 1 ) " d i r e c t l y, th r o u gh e v i d e n c e o f

r e t a l i a t o r y a n i m u s " t o w a r d th e p l a i n t i ff , o r( 2 ) " i n d i r e c t l y, " 16 t

h r o u g h " c i r c u m s t a n t i a le v i d e n c e . " Hi ck s , 5 9 3 F . 3 d a t

1 7 0 ( inte rn a lq

u o t a ti o n m a r k s o m i tte d ) . 17 Su c h circumstantial evidence may i nclude "[c]lose temporal proximity" between the 18 p l a inti ff ' s p r o t e c t e d a c t i v i tya n d t h e a d v e r s e a c t i o n t a k e n a g a i n s t h e r . K ay t o r , 6 0 9 F . 3 da t 5 5 2 .

19 4 . The Retaliatory-Transfer-Claim Decisions in Moll II and III 20 The district court initially, in r uling o n Veriz on' s 2 0 1 1 motion for summary 21 j ud g men t

, fo un d th a tM o l l h a d " met th e fi r s tt wo el ement s i n e s t abl i sh i n ga p rima fac ieca se 22 o f r et a l i a t i o n," Moll II , 2 0 1 2 W L 1 9 3 5 0 8 7

, a t*2 0 , but

h a d fa i l ed wi thr esp ect t o th e th i r d a n d - 38 -1 f o ur th

. As t o th e th i r d , th e co ur tfo un d th a tM o l l h a d n o tsh o wn a ny a d v er se emp l o y men t 2 action because she had not shown any o f the typical adverse actions such as loss or 3 d iminution i n her position, responsibilities, or compensation. And i t ruled that, as Moll 4 " r e gu l a r l yw o r k e d fr o mh o m e d u r i n g th e fi r s t s i xm o n th s o f

h e ra s s i g

nm e n t i n S y r a cu s e a n d 5 w a s o n

d i s a b i l i tyl e a v e f o ra n o th e rs e v e n m o nt h s a n d d i d n o t

r e p o r t t o S y r a c u s e d u r i n g

t h a t 6 t ime, she was not negatively impacted by the transfer." Id

. 7 As t o th e fourth element, the court found a la c k of any causal connection 8 b e tw e e n

th e e m p l o y m e n t

a c t i o n a n d M o l l 's Ti t l e V I I co mp l a i n t s. I tr ul e d th a t M o l l w a s n o t 9 c o m p e l l e d t o a c c e p t t h e j ob s i t e r e l o c a t i o n

, b e c a u s e s h e " w a s p r e s e nte d w i t h s e v e r a lo p ti o n s " ; 10 and "in lieu of accepting a severance package or transferring to a different job within the 11 company and r emaining in Buffalo," she "chose to relocate" to Syracuse "knowing that the 12 r eporting location would be distant from her home in Buffalo." Id

. T he court found that 13 V erizon could n ot h ave inte nde d its of fered choices to be onerous, so a s to dissuade a 14 r easonable employee from engaging in protected conduct, because Moll " only made it 15 kn o wn

th a tth e r el o cation would be a hardship after she h a d a g r eed t o t a k e th e p o si t i o n i n 16 S yracuse." Id

. 17 T h e c o u r t c o n c l u d e d th a t

" [ t ] h e t r a n s fe r

, u n d e rt h e s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , c a nn o t b e 18 s a i d t o b e t

h et y p eo f a c ti v i t

y t h a t m i gh t w e l ld i s s u a d e a r e a s o n a b l e e m p l o y e efr o me n g a g in g 19 i n

p r o t e c t e d c o n d u c t

, b u t r a t h e ra n u n d e s i r a b l e c o n s e q

u e n c e r e s u l t i n g

fr o mP l a i n t i ff ' s ch o i c e

- 39 -1 to r e m a in in her current position." Id .; see id

. at *21 ("Plaintiff h as not shown tha t the 2 r estructuring plan was linked to her discrimination complaints.") 3 The Moll II co ur tn o t ed Ga g l i o n e's st a t ement in his 2011 declaration that "the 4 p r i m a r y f a c t o rf o r h e r Sy r a cu s e t r an s fe ra n d V e r i z o n ' s r e f u s a l t o a l l o wP l a i n t i ff

t o w o r k fr o m 5 h o m e " h a d b e e n " a n e ff o r t

t o r e t a l i a t e a g a i n st

h erfo rh e r E E O C a ct i v i ty . " Id

. a t* 2 2 . B u t th e 6 c o ur tco n cl ud ed th a t i t" must d isregard Gaglione's stat emen t , . . . beca use i t co n t r a d i ct s h i s 7 p rior deposition testimony" which indicated that the transfe r d ecision resulted only from 8 l egitimate, non-discriminatory business concerns. Id

. 9 In Moll III , this Court, inter alia , reversed an order of the district court that 10 d enied certain of Moll's d i scovery requests; a nd as a r esult we als o v ac a te d the grant of 11 s u m m a ry

j u d gm e nt

d i s m i s s in g

h e r d i s c r i m in a ti o n

an d r e t a l i a ti o n

c l a i m s . S e e7 6 0 F . 3 da t 2 0 4 . 12 I n so doing, we did n ot foreclose a new decision granting summary judgment in favor of 13 V e r i z o n

" [ i ] f , f o l l o w i n g

d i s c o v e r y

, M o l l[ w e r e ] u n a

b l e t oe s t a

b l i s h a g e n u ine i s s u e o f

m a te r i a l 14 fact suggesting Verizon discriminated or r e ta lia te d against her." Id

. And we were 15 constrained to note--les t an avoidable error be repeated on remand-- 16 th a tth e d i st r i c t co ur ter r ed wh en i tco n cl ud e d th a t i t " m ust d i sr eg a r d " 17 Christopher Gaglione's sworn statement that Moll's tr a nsfer was 18 motivate d by retaliatory intent because it contradicted his prior 19 deposition t estimony. Moll [II] , 2012 W L 1 9 3 50 87, at *22. The district 20 court was not required to disregard Gaglione's testimony.

- 40 -1 Moll II I , 760 F .3d at 2 04-05. Although "[t]he 'sham i ssue of fact' doctrine prohibits a party 2 from defeating summary judgment simply by submitting an affidav it that contradicts the 3 p a r ty 's p r e v i o us swo r n t est i mo ny, " id

. a t2 0 5 (emp h a si s i n Moll III (o th eri n t e r n a l qu o t a t i o n 4 marks omitted)), we pointed out that 5 Gaglione was not a party to the action, nor did he have a familial o r 6 other close relationship with the plaintiff that suggests Moll could 7 influence Gaglione's testimony. Moreover, there i s nothing in the 8 record to suggest that Gaglione s u b mitted the declaration solely to 9 create a genuine issue of fact. The refore the district court was not 10 required to disregard Gaglione's second sworn statement. 11 I

d

. (emp h a si s i n

o r i g i n a l ). F u r th e r, n o t i n gth a t w e w e r e n o t

e v e n c o n v i n ced th a tGa g l i o n e's 12 2 0 11 declaration was inescapably and u ne q u ivocally contrary to h is earlier deposition 13 t estimony--seeing "a readily apparent, plausible explanation for any i nconsistency in his 14 t e st i m o ny " --we v i ewed " th e v er a ci ty o f th e wi tn ess i nth ese ci r c umst a n c e s [ a s ] p r e s e n t [ i n g ] 15 a quintessential question of fact for the fact-finder." Id

. at 206.

16 5 . The Moll IV Dismissal of the Retaliatory Transfer Claim 17 F o l l o w i n gth e Moll III r ema n d , V er i z o np r o d uced a d d i t i o n a l d o cumen t s; a n d 18 more depositions were conducted by both sides, including fur th erd ep o si t i o n s by Verizon 19 of Moll and Gaglione. In 2017, Verizon served its second motion for summar y j u dgm e nt 20 seeking the dismissal of all of Moll's claims.

- 41 -1 On the remand from Moll III , the district court i n Moll IV conclu de d tha t the 2 r ecord, as expanded or recons ide r e d on remand, did "not change the result found by this 3 Court in 2012." Moll IV , 2 02 0 W L 5 5 93845, a t *19 (citing Moll II , 2012 WL 1935087, at *20). 4 The district court also a pparently viewed its job on remand as limited to a single issue. 5 I t s t a t e d t h a t t h e " i s s u e o f f a c t " r a i s e d b yG a g l i o n e ' s d e s c r i p t i o n o f " t h e c a [ u s ] a l 6 r elationship" between M oll' s c om plaints of Title VII violations a nd "her transfer to the 7 S yracuse office" was "the o n e i ssue t h e S eco n d Circuit explicitly remanded for this Court's 8 r eco n si d er a t i o n . " Moll IV , 2 0 2 0 W L 5 5 9 3 8 4 5 , a t*1 7 . B u tth e d i st r i ct co ur t fo u n d th a t

" [t ]h i s 9 G a g l i o n e t e s t i m o n i a lf a c t i s s u e t h a t i n p a r t l e d t o th e r e m a n d , . . . n e e d n o t b e r e s o l v e d o rb e 10 found t o be a ba si s t o d eny summa r y jud g ment." Id

. at *18. Reiterating rationales from its 11 d e c i s i o n

i n M o l l I I , a n d e n d o r s in g

t h e c o n c l u s i o n

t h a t t h e r e l o c a t i o n

o f M o l l ' sj ob s i te t o ac i ty 12 1 6 0 miles away was a "trivial" matter, Moll II , 2012 WL 1935087, at *29, the Moll IV court 13 concluded that because Moll 14 never appeared in the Syracuse of f ice (either by teleworking o r 15 scheduling appointment[s] exclusiv ely in Buffalo and l ater going on 16 d i s a b i l i tyl e a v e, fi n d i n g s n o t c h a l l e n g e d b yth e S e c o n d C i r c u i t . . . ) a n d 17 Plaintiff was given three choices when the transfer was o rdered (either 18 g o t o S y r a cuse, wo r ka ta d i ffer en t jo b wi thV er i z o ni nB uffa l o , o r t a k e 19 a sever a nc e p ackage,

. . .) the order t o transfer to an office she never 20 appeared in wa s a tr i v i a l harm,

. . . not a material adversity that a 21 reasonable employee would have [felt] dissuaded them from acting. 22 Moll IV

, 2020 WL 5593845, at *16 (emphases added).

- 42 -1 Moll IV a l s o en d o r sed Moll II 's v i ews that Moll's acceptance of the transfer to 2 S yracuse was a voluntary choice because she was gi v e n a lternative "options," and that the 3 t r a n s f e rw a s n o t a n a d v e r s e e m p l o y m e n t

a c t i o n beca u se sh e wo r k ed fr o m h erh o me fo r th e 4 fi r s t s i x m o n th s a n d w a s o n d i s ab i l i tyf o rth e l a s t

s e v e n , s e e M o l l I

I , 2 0 1 2 W L 1 9 3 5 0 8 7

, a t * 2 0 . 5 Thus, the Moll IV court stated that Moll "fails to estab lis h that she suffered an adverse 6 employment action from" the "tr a ns fer to Syracuse" because " she was (a) g i ven the choice 7 o f whether to transfer, change departments, or accept a severance package," "or (b) was 8 g i v e n

fl e x ib i l i tyb y G a g l i o n e i na ctua l a p p e a r a n c e s i n S y r a c u s e . " M o l l I V

, 2 0 2 0 W L 5 5 9 3 8 4 5 , 9 a t*18. 10 T h e M o l l I V c o u r t e n t i r e l yd i s c o u n t e d th e e v i d e n c e th a t a nyfl e x ib i l i tyi n i t i a l l y 11 g r ant e d b y

G a g l i o n e w a sd i r e c tly

c o u n t e r m a n d e d b yt

h e h a r s h r e q u i r e m e n t s D i x o n

i m p o s e d 12 in

J u ly 2 0 0 5 t h a t M o l lb e p h

y s i c a l l y p r e s e n t

i n S y r a c u s e - - e v e n

f o r ah a l f d a y i f

s h e h a d a h a l f

13 d a ya p p o i n t m e n t i n B uffa l o --a n d i nAugust th a t sh e must

be p r es e n t

i n S y r a c u s e a t

l e a s t 2 4 14 h ours a week, leading to Moll's going on disability leave. The court stated 15 e a ch d a yfr o mA u gu s t 2 9 , 2 0 0 5 , wh e n p l a c e d o n d i s a

b i l i tyu n t i ls h e w a s 16 reassigned to Bu f f alo in February 2006 and later returned from 17 disability is a pe riod when she d i d not h ave an adverse employment 18 a c t i o n b e c a u s e s h e w a s e ffe c t i v e l yn o t e m p l o y e d ( d e s p i t et h e s o u r c eo f t h e 19 disability ). 20 Id . (emphasis added).

- 43 -1 Finally, the court stated that because Verizon's insistence on frequent 2 a t tendance in Syr a c use was directed at "both [Moll] and Chase," it was " not clear that the 3 t ransfer was retaliatory or directed to Plaintiff merely because of her gender." Id . at *19. 4 We h a ve s e v e ral difficulties with the district court's decision in Moll IV , as it 5 b o t

h m i s c o n s t r u e d o u rd e c i s i o n i n M o l l I I I a n d f a i l e d t o a p p l yc e r t a i n T i t l e V I Ia n d s u m m a ry 6 j u d gm e nt

p r in c i p l e s . T o b e g in

w i t h , o u r M o l lI

I I o p i n i o n d o e s n o t s u p p o r t t h e d i s t r i c t

c o u r t ' s 7 suggestion that its refusal to consider Gaglione's 2011 declaration was to be the only issue 8 o n remand. In addressing the district court's granting of summary judgment, we ruled: 9 t h e d i s t r i c tc o u r ta b u s e di t s d i s c re t i o n w h e n i td e n i e dM o l l ' s m o t i o n t o c o m p e l 10 d o c u m e n ts r e l a t e d t o V e r i z o n ' s R e d u c t i o n i n F o r c e e v e n t s a n d , t

h e r e f o r e, 11 [we] o r d erth e d i st r i ct co ur tt o co m p el p r o d uct ion of such d o cument s. 12 Accordingl y , we V ACATE the judgment of the district court insofar as it 13 granted in part Verizon's motion for summary judgment

. 14 M o l l I

I I , 7 6 0 F . 3 d a t

2 0 0 ( e m p h a s e s a d d e d ) ; s e ea l s o i d

. a t 2 0 4 ( " B e c a u s e w e r e v e r s e th e d i s t r i c t 15 court's order denying Moll's motion to compe l, we v acate the summary judgment."). We 16 p r o ceed ed t o men t i o nGa g l i o n e's 2 0 1 1 d eclaration because th e d i st r i ct co ur th a d a l so er r e d 17 i n r efusing to consider i t; and since the case was being re ma nded for further proceedings, 18 i t would have been inefficient not to caution against a repetition of that error. 19 N o rd o e s o u r Mo l l I I I d e c i s i o n s u p p o r t t h e d i s tr i c t

c o u r t ' s s u g g e s ti o n

i n M o l l I V 20 t

h a t th i s C o u r t

a p p r o v e d o f

" fi n d i n g s " i n Moll II

th a t beca use M o l l i n i t i a l l yd i d n o t g o t o th e 21 Syr a c u se office and thereafter was "on disability leave," the Syracuse transfer was not a

- 44 -1 materially adverse employment action but rather was "trivial," Moll IV , 202 0 W L 5593845, 2 a t

* 1 6 ( d i s cu s s in g Mo l l I

I ) . Ou r o p ini o n d i dn o t

p u r p o r t t o d e te r m in ewh e t

h e r g e n u in e i s s u e s 3 o f material fact were revealed in the recor d a s it the n existed before us--much less to 4 a n ticipate whethe r or not the record would be sufficient to show such issues after new 5 p roceedings following our r emand. We le f t the a ssessment of the eventual record to be 6 p erformed, in the first instance, by the district court. 7 A s t o t h em e r i t so f

t he Mo l lIV

d e c i s i o n , w e h a v ed i ff

i cu l ti e s w i t

h i t s a s s e s s m e nt 8 o f th e r eco rd and its view of what can constitute an adverse employment action. Fi r st , we 9 d i s a g r e e w i th

i t s d e c i s i o n

th a t th e t r a n s f e ro f

M o l l ' s j o b s i t e t o S y r a c u s e c o u l d n o t h a v e b e e n 10 v iewed as an adverse employment action on the theory tha t Moll w as not compelled to 11 a c c e p t

th a t t r a n s f e rb e c a u s e sh e wa s o ffer e d o th ero p t i o n s th a tth e d i st r i ct co ur ta p p a r en t l y 12 found viable. 13 In finding that Moll's going to Syracuse was a voluntary " choice" a mong 14 s e v e r a l" o p ti o n s, " t he c o u r t d i d n o t

t a k e t h e r e c o r d i n

t h e l i gh t m o s t f a v o r a b l e t o M o l l

. Th e r e 15 i s no dispute that, if she d id not wish t o a ccept the tr a ns f e r , s he was presented with two 16 a l t er n a t i v es: (1 ) fi n d a n o th erjo b a t V er i z o n , o r(2) ta k e a sev er a n c e p a c k a g e. B ut Ga g l i o n e 17 t estified that the first option pr ovided an unrealistically short time t o g et another position 18 w i th i n V er i zon. He said, "it was nice to say you can either mo v e; y o u ca ng et a jo b; o r y o u 19 c an t a k e ap a c k a g e . B u t t h e t r u t h i s i t [ w a s ] h a r d i n as h o r t p e r i o d o f

ti m e t of in d an o t h e r j ob

- 45 -1 . . . within [the] company," and "everyone" knew it. (Gaglione 2017 Dep. 7 6 . ) Gaglione 2 s t a t ed th a th e thus had surreptitiously given Finnegan and Chase, the two males, ad v a n ce 3 warning of th e transfer plan because they w ere " collateral damage" from the decision to 4 r etaliate against Moll and Byrne. (Gaglione 2011 Decl. ¶ 20.) 5 According to Moll, she and the o thers were informed of the transfer plan on 6 D e c e mb e r3 , 2 0 0 4, a n d " w e r e t o l d th a t [ th e y ] h a d u n t i l 2 / 1 1 / 0 5 t o d e c i d e a m o n g s t [ t h e ] t h r e e 7 o ptions how . . . to proceed." (Moll's flexible work arrangement request dated January 11, 8 2 0 0 5 . ) H o wev er, o n Ja nua r y 1 0 , a mo n thbefo r e th a to r i g i n a l d e a d l i n e , s h e a n d B y r n e wer e 9 i nformed that if they did n o tcommit to continue working "by close of business on 1/11/05 10 . . . a reduction in force package would be issued" and th ei r abi l i ty t o r et a i n their positions 11 w a s n o tg ua r a n t eed : "a requisition would be opened to refill our jobs in Syracuse, " a n d " i f 12 av i abl e ca n d i d a t e ca me fo r wa r d a n d a n o ffer w a s o nth e t abl e, we wo ul d n o l o n g e rh a v e a 13 job." ( Id .) Thus, not only was Moll given an unrealistic a lly short job-search time at the 14 o ut set; but the original period was thereafter abruptly shortened by a mon th , a n d sh e wa s 15 r equired to make a decision the next day. 16 The second " option," the severance p ackage, was unrealistic as a matter of 17 substance. To begin with, Verizon would not disclose a ny details u nle s s a nd until Moll 18 a g r eed to accept the package in adv a nc e . In a ddition, a ccording to the Verizon i nternal 19 website, Verizon would be free to change the te r m s . Acceptance o f such an "offer" would

- 46 -1 l ea v e th e emp l o y ee a tth e mercy of the empl o y er - -a n d h er e, a n emp l o y er wh o wa s a l r ea d y 2 believed to have engage d in prohibited discrimination and retaliation. 3 Fur the r , the district court's characterization o f Dixon as "believ[ing]" that he 4 h a d " ' as o l i d b u s i n ess r e a s o n ' " f o r " r e a s s i gn i n gs t a ff ( i n c l u d i n g[ M o l l ] ) " t o S y r a c u s e , M o l l I V , 5 2 0 2 0W L 5 5 9 3 8 4 5, a t * 1 7 ( q u o tin g G a g l i o n e 2 0 1 7

D e p . 2 0 ) , n e i t

h e rt a k e s t

h e r e c o r d in

t h e l i g ht 6 m o s t

f a v o r ab l e t o M o l ln o ra c c u r a t e l yr e fl e c t s th e th r u s t o f G a g l i o n e ' s d e p o s i t i o n

t e s t i m o ny . 7 Gaglione testified that "the purpose of developing the plan fr o m [Di x on's] standpoint was 8 t o g et

th em t o l ea v e. " (Gaglione 2017 Dep

. 7 6 ; seeGa g l i o n e 2 0 1 1 Decl

. ¶ 1 4 (" Mr. Dix on an d 9 M r. Van Hoesen wa n t ed to make life as difficult as possible for M s. M o l l a n d M s. B y r n e a n d 10 stated that they believed this action wo ul d force them to leave ESG." (emphases added)).) The 11 " ch o i ce" o ffer ed byDi x o nwa s a v i r tua l H obson's Choice, since he so ugh t t o p ush M o l l o ut 12 the door. 13 In sum, there were not several r ealistic "options" among which Moll could 14 c h o o s e. Th r ee p o ssibi l i t i es wer e p r e s e n t e d , tw o o f w h i c ha r a t i o n a l jur o r wo ul d be en t i t l e d 15 t o v i ew a s mi r a g es t h a t wer e t emp o r a l l yo rs ub s t a n t i v e l yu n a c c e p t a b l e . Th e a l t er n a t i v es t o 16 a ccepting the transfer to Syracuse were not reasonable options. 17 Nor c ould the district court properly rule as a matter of law that the sole 18 concrete option offered to Moll b y Ve r izon, i.e. , to accept the transfer to Syracuse, was not 19 a n adverse employment action. Although the M o l l II opinion referred to Burlington

- 47 -1 N

o r t h e r n ' s o b s e r v a t i o n

th a t , i ni d en t i fy i n gma t er i a l l y a d v er se emp l o y men ta ct i o n s, " c o n t e x t 2 matters," Moll II , 2012 WL 1935087, at *20 (internal quotation marks omitted), the c ou r t 3 p roceeded throughout either to ignore the p rinciple or to ignor e the actual context. For 4 exa m ple, Moll II found that Verizon could not have intended to impose a reta lia tor y 5 h ardship on Moll by moving her job site to Syracuse because, the court found, Moll " only 6 made it known that the relocation would be a hardship aft er she had agreed to take the 7 p osition in Syracuse." Moll II , 2 012 WL 1935087, at *20 ( em pha s es added) (apparently 8 r e fe r r in g

t o M o l l ' s l i s t i n g

o f h e rB u ff a l o t i e s w i t

h r e g a r d t oh e r

y o u n g chi l d r e n , h e r h u sb an d ' s 9 work, her mother's health ne e ds , a nd her evening college classes). B ut most, if not all, of 10 t

h e s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s w e r e w e l lkn o w n t o V e r i z o n : J u s t

afe w y e a r s e a r l i e r, M o l l h a d b e e n o n 11 m a te rni t

y l e a v e fr o m V e r i z o n

; M o l l ' sh u sb an d w o r k e d f o rV e r i z o n ; a n d M o l l ' s c o l l e g e c l a s s e s 12 were being p aid for by V erizon. Gaglione, speaking of his meetings w ith D ixon a n d 13 V a n H o e s e n

, t e s t i fi e d " w e a l lkn e w[ M o l la n d B y rn e ] w o u l d n o t m o v e t o S y r a c u s e . T h a t w a s 14 n o t

a p o s s i b i l i t y . " ( G a g l i o n e 2 0 1 7

D e p . 7 6 ; s e e

, e . g . , B y rn e A ff

. ¶ ¶ 8 6

- 8 7 ( a y e a re a r l i e r, B y r n e 15 h a d i n t e r v i e w e d w i th G a g l i o n e f o ra n

S E I V p o s i t i o n

t h a t w a s p o s t e d f o rth e S y r a c u s e o f fi c e 16 a n d had made clear that she wanted t o p er f o r m th at job by telecommuting and would not 17 m o v e t o S y r a cuse); Decl a r a t i o no f Ch r i st o p h erT. Ga g l i o n e d ated April 26, 2006 (" Ga g l i o n e 18 2 0 06 Decl."), ¶ 11 (same); Gaglione 2011 Decl. ¶ 15 ("We knew that both Ms. Moll and Ms. 19 B yrne had ties to the Buffalo area and believed that, by forcing them to either move to Syracuse

- 48 -1 o r

t ra v e l t h e reo n a d a i ly b a s i s, w ec o u l df o r cet h e m t o l e a v e t h eE S Gb y f i n d i ng an e wp o s i t i o n w i t h i n 2 Verizon or accept the seve rance package ." (emphasis added)).) 3 N o r d i d th e c o u r t i n M o l l I I o r I V a d e qu a t el y a p p r a i s e th e S y r a c u s e t r a n s f e ri n 4 th e co n t ex to f th e a d d i t i o n a l t i me demands imposed--either i nl i gh t o f th e d i st a n ce i ni t sel f 5 o r i n

l i g h to f th e d i st a nce combined wi thth e st r i n g e n t" p hy s i ca l l y r ep o r t [i n g ] t o S y r a c use" 6 r equirements about which "Di x o n , i np a r t i cul a r, wa s a d a ma n t " (Ga g l ione 2011 Decl. ¶ 17). 7 These i ncluded the order that Moll be present in Syracuse at l east three days a week, each 8 d ay for a minimum of eight hours. Neither the Moll II nor the M oll IV

d eci si o nmen t ioned 9 the distance between Buf fa lo and Syracuse--some 1 6 0 miles (Gaglione estimated perhaps 10 " 1 8 0 m i l e s " ( G a g l i o n e 2 0 1 7 D e p . 2 0 ) )

- - o rt

h e e s t i m a t e d ti m e fo r

t h e r o u n d t r i p - - f

i v e h o u r s ( s e e 11 M oll 2006 Dep. 269). Dixon's minima meant that Moll was required to make at least three 12 tr i p s t o Sy r a cu s e e a ch w e e k , t h u s d e m an d in g

o f h e r am ini m u m o f

an e x tr a 1 5 h o u r so f

t r a v e l 13 t ime a week, amounting to more than 60 hours a month. And given a round-trip distance 14 o f approximately 320 miles, M oll would have been driving nearly 1 ,000 miles a week, 15 i ncurring the extra time--and expense--in driving more than 4,000 miles a month. 16 And these were the minima if Moll went to Syracuse on only three days. As 17 D i x o nh a d ordered that Moll be in Syracuse for half days if in the other half o f th e d a y sh e 18 w a s r e q

u i r e d t o b e i n

B u ff a l o , t

h a t o r d e r i n c o mb i n a t i o n

w i t h t h e r e q u i r e m e n t o f t h r e e e i gh t 19 h ou r days in th e Syracuse office meant that in any week in which Moll h a d a half-day

- 49 -1 a p p o intm e nt in B u f f a l o s h e w o u l d b e r e q

u i r e d t o g o t o S y r a c u s e o n a f o u r t h d a y - - afi v e - h o u r 2 r ound trip i no r d ert o sp en d fo urh o ur s i n th e S y r a c use o ffice. The district court could not 3 pr operly r ule that these demands were, as a matter of law, "trivial," Moll IV , 2020 W L 4 5 5 93845, at *16; Moll II , 2012 WL 1935087, at *29. 5 N o r d i d th e f a c t th a t M o l l d i d n o t o ft en a c tua l l yg o t o S y r a cuse meanth a t th e 6 Dixon order that she d o so was, a s a m a tter of law, not a n adverse employment action. 7 W

h e t h e r t h e e m p l o y e e h a s r e s i s t e d c o m p ly in g w i t h t h e e m p l o y e r ' s d e c i s i o n

i s n o t t h e p r o p e r 8 foc u s . The test of whether a decision is a materially adverse employment decision is 9 wh e t

h e ri t s n a tu r e i s s u ch

t h a t i t w o u l d l i k e l y, i n th e r e l e v a n t c o n t e x t , d i s s u a d e a r e a s o n a

b l e 10 e m p l o y e e fr o m c o m p l a inin g a b o u t d i s c r i m in a t i o n . Ar a ti o n a lj u r o rc o u l d fi n d , i n t h e c o n t e x t 11 p resented here, that the prospect of being required to spend more than 60 extr a hours 12 d riving a total of more than 4,000 extra miles every month, just t o get to and from her job, 13 " co u l d wel l d i ssua d e a r ea so n abl e" emp l o y ee - -wh o wa s a mo th e r wi th y o un gch i l d r en a n d 14 o th err e sp o nsibilities--"from making or suppor t i n ga ch a r g e o f d i scr i mi n a t i o n . " B u rling t on 15 Northern , 548 U.S. at 57. 16 The district court also ruled that Moll was not subjec te d to an adverse 17 e m p l o y m e n t

a c t i o n o n

" [ a ny ] d a yf r o m A u gu s t 2 9 , 2 0 0 5 , w h e n

p l a c e d o n d i s ab i l i tyu n t i ls h e 18 w a s r e a s s i gn e d t o B u ff a l o i n F e b r u a r y2 0 0 6 a n d l a t e rr e tu r n e d f r o m d i s ab i l i ty. . . ( d e s p i t et h e 19 source of the disability )." Moll IV , 2020 WL 5 5 9 3845, a t *18 (emphasis added). The court's

- 50 -1 p arenthetical evidently refers to Moll' s assertion that the v ery source of her d isability was 2 t h e s t r e s s c a u s e d b yth e m u l t i f a c e t e d s e xd i s c r i m i n a t i o n t o w h i c h

s h e w a s s ub

j e c t e d i n E S G , 3 i ncluding receiving l ess pay than males doing comparable work, being subjected to an 4 environment that was hostile and demeaning to women, and--added to a ll of that--being 5 v e n g e f

u l l yr e q u i r e d t o c o m m u t e t o a c i ty1 6 0 m i l e sa w a y , w i t h a tte n d an c e c o n d i ti o n s c o s tin g 6 h e r, i n t e r

a l i a , m o r e th a n

6 0 ex t r a h o ur s o f d r i v i n gp er mo n th

. H o w ev e r, e v e n i f M o l l n e v e r 7 consistently made the commute, the evidence presents a triable i ssue a s to whether the 8 1 6 0-mile lateral transfer and the stringent a tte ndance requirements were "harmful to the 9 p o i n t

th a t th e y c o u l d w e l ld i s s u a d e a r e a s o n ab l e w o r k e r " w i th M o l l ' s f a m i l yr e s p o n s ib i l i t i e s 10 " fr o m m a k i n go rs u p p o r t i n ga c h a r g e o f d i s c r i m i n a t i o n

, " B u r l i n g t o n N

o r t h e r n , 5 4 8 U . S . a t5 7 . 11 F i n a l l y, we n o t e th a t th e Moll IV co ur tst a t ed M o l l h a d fa i l ed t o sh o w th a t th e 12 S yracuse transfer plan was linked to her discrimination complaints b e c ause, inter alia , the 13 fact that Verizon's stringent requirements for SEs' presence in Syracuse w e re directed at 14 " both [Moll] a nd Chase" made it "not clear tha t the transfer was retaliatory or directed to 15 Plaintiff merely because of her gender." Id . at *19. But that motivation need not be "clear" 16 a t

t h e s u m m a r yj u d g m e n t

s t a g e ; i t n e e d o n l yb e a r gu ab l e . D a v i s - G a r e t t , 9 2 1 F . 3 d a t

4 5 . A n d 17 the inquiry into motivation "'cannot be short-circuited by the mere fact'" that an employer 18 sought "'immunity from Title VII liability b y ta king care to [mistreat] an occasional male 19 worker, though his pref erred targets wer e fema l e,'" K aytor, 609 F.3d at 549 (quoting B rown

- 51 -1 v . Henderson , 257 F.3d 246, 254 (2d Cir. 2 001)), or--as Gaglione put it--inf lic ting "c ollateral 2 d amage" on a noncomplaining employee while reta l i a t i n ga g a i n st o n e wh o complained of 3 Title VII violations. 4 In sum, we conclude that the record, viewed in the light most f a v or a b le to 5 M oll, with all permissible inferences and credibility assessments determined in her favor, 6 r eveals genuine issues as to all of the elements of Moll's claim that Verizon's decision to 7 t ransfer her job site to Syracuse violated Title VII's prohibition against retaliation.

8 D. The Claims of Discrimination and Retaliation in Termination 9 O n h e rr e tu r n

t o V er i z o n ' s B uffa l o o ffi c e i n M a r c h 2 0 0 6 , M o l l b e g a n

r e p o r t i n g 10 t o a n ew S E M a n a g er, M a r k W i t t e, a fo r meremp l o y ee o f M CI . ( S eeM o l l D e c l

. ¶ ¶ 1 2 8

- 1 2 9 . ) 11 At first, Moll felt that her job was progressing well with Witte as he r s u pe rvisor. ( See id

. 12 ¶ 1 3 0 . ) In

A p r i l2 0 0 6, wh e n

D i x o n a n d S E G r e g

S h e l t o n w e r e h a v in g

t r o ub l e r e s o l v in g

i s s u e s 13 w i t

h ap r o j e c t fo r V e r i z o n ' s m o s t

l u c r a t i v e c l i e nt - - M & TB a nk

- - t h e C A M o n t h ea c c o u nt

a s k e d 14 M oll to assist. Moll was able to solv e the problems. Witte's comments in her mid-year 15 p erformance r e vie w stated th at the CAM "for M&T [was] very pleased with [Moll's] 16 p erformance" and that her "positive contribution on handling the M&T Bank account . . . 17 o pened the door for closing new business."

- 52 -1 In September 2006, however, Witte told Moll that she would have to report 2 more frequently to the Amherst o ffice. As that was the office in which Dixon and Ir v ing 3 w o r k ed , M o l l i mmed i a t el y beg a nt o cr y a n d t o suffer s y m p t o m s o f st r ess a n d a n x i ety . ( S ee 4 M oll Decl. ¶ 130.) She told W itte about her pending lawsuit that a lleged harassing, 5 d iscriminatory, and retaliatory conduct by Dixon and/or I rving; she said she did not want 6 t o b e i n

c l o s e p h y s i c a lp r o x i m i tyt o t

h e m . ( S e e i d

. ¶ 1 3 1 . ) M o l li m p l o r e d W i t te t o r e c o n s i d e r 7 this move; he refused. 8 Moll also complained to Witte that, since she returned to work, Dixon--who 9 h a d b e c o m e R e g i o n a lS a l e sM an a g e r - - h a d n o t a s s i g n e d an y C A M s t ow o r k

w i t h h e r a s e i t h e r 10 a primary or backup SE o n any client account. ( See id

. ¶ 132.) Moll believed that Dixon' s 11 d ecisions placed her at an extreme disadvantage compared to all the other SEs, who were 12 male. ( See id .) 13 Als o in Se ptember 2006, around the time Witte r equired Moll to work in the 14 s a m e o ffi c e a s D i x o n a n d I r v i n g

, h e r e q u i r e d h e rt o a d d 1 0 n e wa c c o u n t s t oh e rp o r tf o l i o " b y 15 t

h e e n d o f

th e y e a r . " (M o l l

. Decl

. ¶ 1 3 3 . ) S h e h a d n ev erbefo r e been r equi r ed t o so l i c i t

n e w 16 a c c o u n t s ; th a twa s a d uty o f th e CAM s a n d n o tth e S E s. ( S ee id

. ; see alsoG a g l i o n e 2 0 1 1 D e c l

. 17 ¶ 3 6 ("I was never given any instruction by my supervisor (who was also Mr . W itte's 18 supervisor)" to require that my SEs "add t en new accounts"; "SEs were never expe c ted to 19 g enerate new accounts.").)

- 53 -1 In early 2 007, Verizon notified Witte tha t there would be a Companywide 2 r eduction in force (or "RIF") in which he would be required to eliminate one SE I position. 3 ( S eeDecl a r a t i o no f M a r kW i t t e d a t ed August 22, 2017 ("Witte Decl."), ¶ 15.) Witt e t e st i fi e d 4 that he w a s ne v er given any criteria to apply in d eciding whose position to eliminate; nor 5 d id he recall having received any doc u m e nts f rom Verizon to prepare for the RIF. ( See 6 Deposition of Mark Witte, March 1, 2017 ("Witte Dep."), at 259.) In contr a s t , Gaglione, for 7 the same RIF, had been instructed to use standard "objective criteria, including a nnual 8 a p praisals," to "rank and rate" his SEs. (Gaglione 2011 Decl. ¶ 37.) 9 At that time, Moll was the only female SE managed by Witte. The other SEs 10 i n her reporting structure were Shelton, Gregg Mar a glia no, Tom Elks, and Kyle McMinn. 11 O n F e b r u a r y9 , 2 0 0 7 , W i t t e i n f o r m e d M o l l o f th e R I F a n d t o l d h e rth a t h e re m p l o y m e n t

w a s 12 g o i n gt o be t er mi n a t ed

. ( S e e Dep o s i t i o no f Ci n d yL . M o l l , M a y 2 4, 2 0 1 7 (" M o l l 2 0 1 7Dep . " ), 13 a t16-17; Moll Decl. ¶ 135.) 14 In the RIF, Verizon laid off approxim a tely 156 employees nationwide, 15 i n c l u d i n gM o l l

. W i t t e d i d n o tg i v e M o l l a r e a s o n w hys h e w a s c h o s e n

f o rt e r m i n a t i o n . ( S e e 16 M o l l D e c l

. ¶ 1 3 6 . ) B u t " a ft e rth e [ R I F ] , " " W i t t e e x p r e s s e d t o [ G a g l i o n e ] th a t h e w a s p r o u d t o 17 be able to terminate Ms . Moll." (Gaglione 2011 Decl. ¶ 38.) 18 In her amended complaint, filed in 2008, Moll alleged, inter alia , that she 19 p o ssessedth e r equi si te skills for her position, and that the termination of her employmen t

- 54 -1 w a s ba sed o nsex d i s c r i mi n a tion i nv i o l a t i o no f Ti t l e V I I, a n d r et a l i a t i o n fo rh erco mp l a i n t s 2 about such discrimination. I n the ensuing discovery period, W itte testified that he h ad 3 s el ect ed M o l l " [b]a s ed o n[ h i s ] o bj e c t i v e s a n d wh a tth e busin ess n e e d ed

. " (W i t t e Dep . 2 5 9 . ) 4 I n a declaration, he a sserted that Moll l acked the skills to work with products integral to 5 V e r i z o n ' s b u s i n e s s i n t h e w a k e o f

t h e M C Im e r g e r

, an d t h a t h e r "j ob p e r fo r m a n c e a n d r e s u l t s 6 t railed those of the other [SEs] in [his] group." (Witte Decl. ¶¶ 16-17.)

7 1 . The Moll II and Moll IV Rejections of the Termination Claims 8 In Moll II , a May 30, 2012 Decision and Order, the district cour t dis missed 9 M oll's Ti t l e V I I cl a i ms th a th ert er mi n a t i o nwa s ba sed o nd i scr i mi n a t i o na n d / o r r et a l iation. 10 I t stated that 11 [t]o make out a prima facie case of d isc r imination, Plaintiff must show 12 th a t ( 1 ) s h e i s a m e mber o f a p r o t ect e d cl a ss, (2 ) sh e i s qua l i fi e d f o rh e r 13 position, (3) she s u f f e r e d a n adverse employment action, and (4) the 14 circumstances of the adverse action give rise to a n i nference of 15 d i s cr i mi n a t i o n . . . . The burden Plaintiff carries at th e p rima fac iest a g e 16 of summary judgment is minimal. 17 Moll II

, 2012 WL 1 93 50 8 7, at *17. The court noted that to p resent a p rima facie case of 18 Title VII retaliation, 19 P l a i n t i ff m u s t s h o w th a t

( 1 ) s h e w a s e n g a g e d i n a p r o t e c te d a c t i v i ty

, ( 2 ) 20 V e r i z o n w a s a w a r e o f h e rp a r t i c i p a t i o n i n th i s a c t i v i ty, ( 3 ) V e r i z o n t o o k 21 an action against her that was s o m a terially adverse a r easonable 22 e m ployee would have been dissuaded from engaging in protected 23 activity, and (4) there i s a causal relationship between the protected - 55 -1 activity and the adverse action--that is, a retaliatory motive played a 2 part in the action. 3 Id . at *18. The court no t ed th a t , i nth e absen ce o f direct evidence of retaliatory motivation, 4 that motivation may be inferable where the adverse a c tion oc c u rs in close proximity after 5 the protected activity. See id

. 6 A s to Moll's discrimination claim, the district court stated in Moll II tha t 7 " [w]ithin Mark Witte ' s gr oup, Plaintiff was selected because h er skill set was 8 u n so p h i st i ca t ed , l a r g el y fo cused o nt r a d i t i o n a l t elephone services, and her ca p abi l i t i es, jo b 9 p e r fo r ma n ce , a n d r e s u l t s t r a i l e d th o s e o f th e o th e rS a l es E n g i n eer s i nh e r g r o up . " Id

. a t*1 5 . 10 The court also stated that even 11 [ a ] s s u m i n g P l a i n t i ff m e t h e r d em i n i m [ i ] s b u r d e n , V e r i z o n h a s p r o v i d e d 12 a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for her ter m ination. Further, 13 according to V erizon, Plaintiff was selected for termination because 14 [Witte] perceived her skill set to be the least sophistic a ted of those in 15 her work group, and her c a pa b ilities and job performance trailed 16 behind her peers. 17 Id

. at *24. The Moll IV court likewise saw i n Verizon's RIF no evidenc e of gender 18 d iscrimination. It stated that 19 Verizon Business globally l a id off more men than women . [Moll]'s 20 supervisor, Witte, first laid her off and months later (whe n further 21 layoffs were requi r ed ) laidoff a male worker . Witte selected those to be 22 reduced in force on his own criteria and not on the advice of o thers. 23 Witte said he selected [Moll] f or la yoff

. . . because she was not 24 knowledgeable of MCI technologies

. . . . 25 Moll IV

, 2020 WL 5593845, at *24 (emphases added). - 56 -1 A s t o M o l l ' s c l a i m th a t th e t e r m i n a ti o n

o f h e re m p l o y m e n t w a s r e t a l i a t o ry , t h e 2 M oll II

co ur th a d f o u n d th a t

M o l l f a i l e d t o s h o wa p r i m a f a c i e ca s e beca use sh e a d d uced n o 3 evidence of a causal relationship between h er termina tion and her complaints of Title VII 4 v iolations. "S he doe s not provide any direct evidence of a causal relationship, and her 5 t ermination took place three y ears after the commencement of her l awsuit a nd four years 6 a ft e r

h e r ini ti a lch a r g e o f

d i s c r i m in a ti o n w i t

h t h e E E O C, w h i ch

i s t o o l o n g

o f ap e r i o d o f

t i m e 7 to s how temporal proximity." Moll II , 2012 WL 1935087, at *24. The court also found tha t 8 a l though Moll contended that Verizon's proffered reasons were pr ete xts for unlawful 9 r e t a l i a t i o n

, s h e h a d p o inte d t o n o a d m i s s i b l e e v i d e n c e o t

h e rt h a n h e r o w n a ffi d a v i t - - h e ro w n 10 s ub

j e c t i v e b e l i e f

- - t o s h o w

t h e a d e q u a cy o f h e r s k i l l s an dp e r fo r m an c e, whi ch w a s in s u ffi c i e n t 11 t o show pretext. See id

. The court thus concluded that Verizon wa s entitled to summary 12 judgment dismissing Moll's claim that her termination was retaliatory. 13 Following o ur Moll III remand, the district court in Moll IV noted tha t this 14 Court had reject ed th e Moll II r ul i n gth at Moll failed to raise a genuine issue to be tried " as 15 t o th e p retex tu al n atu re of n o n d isc rimin atory reason s f o r t h er e d u c t i o n i n f

o r c e, " M o l l I V

, 2 0 2 0 W L 16 5 5 93845, at *25 (citing Moll III , 760 F.3d a t 2 0 4 ( e m pha sis added)). H owever, the Moll IV 17 court found tha t summary judgment dismissing both termination claims nevertheless 18 r emained warranted for lack of a prima facie case.

- 57 -1 As t o M o l l 's cl a i m th a th er termination was discriminatory, the Moll IV co u r t 2 fo u n d t

h a t h e re v i d e n c e f a i l e d t o s h o w" c i r cu m s t an c e s " s u ff i c i e n t t o " g i v e r i s e t o a n

i n fe r e n c e 3 o f d i scr i m i n a t i o n . " 2 0 2 0 W L 5 5 9 3 8 4 5 , a t * 2 4 . I t f o u n d th a t

i n th e R I F , V e r i z o n

" g l ob a l l y l a i d 4 o ff more men than women"; a nd it found that "months later (when further layoffs were 5 r equired) [Witte] laid off a male worker," Steve Medve. Id

. These raw-number rationales 6 a r e questionable. 7 As to the simplistic point that Verizon l aid off more men than women, our 8 a t tention ha s not been called to evidence showing that the number o f women laid off by 9 V erizon in the early 2007 RIF was n ot d i sproportiona te to the percentage of women in its 10 workforce. Indeed, the spreadsheet that Verizon pr odu c e d in post-remand discovery-- 11 r e f e r r e d t o b yth e d i s t r i c t c o u r t i n M o l l I V

- - a p p e a r s t o r e l a t e o n l yt o th e S e p t e mb e r2 0 0 7 R I F , 12 n ot the early 2007 RIF in which Moll was fired; and that spreadsheet "has the names (save 13 M e d v e ' s ) r e d a c t e d a n d n o g e n d e r i d e n t i fi c a t i o n , " 2 0 2 0 W L 5 5 9 3 8 4 5 , a t

* 2 4 . A n d t

h e f a c t t h a t 14 W itte t erminated a male SE (Medve) a few m onths a fter terminating Moll may be of no 15 significance a t all: Moll had been the only female SE Witte was m a na ging, and neither 16 V erizon nor the court points to evidence that there were any women left for Witte to 17 eliminate. 18 A s t o th e c l a i m th a t h e rt e r m i n a t i o n

w a s r e t a l i a t o r y

, th e c o u r t

f o u n d th a t

M o l l 19 failed t o show any evidence of a c ausal relationship between her complaints of gender

- 58 -1 d i s c r i m in a ti o n an d h e r t e r m in a ti o n . Mo l lI V

, 2 0 2 0 W L 5 5 9 3 8 4 5 , a t

* 2 4 . I t a p p a r e n t l yc r e d i t e d 2 b o thW i t t e's st a t e men tth a t h e ch o se M o l l t o be t er mi n a t ed i n th e RI F beca u s e h erex p er t i se 3 w a s i n

t r a d i t i o n a lv o i c e c o m m u ni c a ti o n , an d V e r i z o n ' s c o nte nti o n t h a t an y p o s s i b l e infe r e n c e 4 o f retaliation w a s "belie[d]" by Witte's assigning M oll to the account of Verizon's most 5 l ucrative customer. Id

. 6 For the reasons that follow , w e c onc lude that the court in Moll IV did not 7 a d here to the summary judgment principles that a court, in ruling on such a m otion, is 8 r equi r ed t o co n si d er th e r eco r d a s a wh o l e, i s r equi r e d t o v i ew t h a t r e c o r d i nth e l i gh tmo st 9 f a v o r ab l e t o th e p a r tya g a i n s t w h o m jud g men ta s a ma t t ero f l a w i s so ugh t

, a n d i s r e qu i r e d 10 t o disregard all evidence favorable t o the moving party tha t a j ury would be entitled to 11 d isbelieve.

12 2 . The Record Viewed in the Light Most Favorable to Moll 13 When Witte informed Moll that she was b e ing terminated, he gave her no 14 e x p l an a t i o n

a s t o w hys h e w a s s e l e c t e d f o rth e R I F . I n h i s d e p o s i t i o n

a n d d e c l a r a t i o n

, W i t t e 15 a t t r ibut ed h i s d eci s i o n t o " [ h i s] objecti v es a n d wh a tth e busin ess n eed ed

. " (W i t t e Dep . 2 5 9 ; 16 s e e

W i tt e D e c l

. ¶ 1 6 . ) W i t t e a s s e r t e d t h a t M o l ll a c k e d t

h e s k i l l t o w o r k

w i t h p r o d u c t s inte g r a l 17 t o Verizon's business in the wake of the MCI merger, and that her job performance t r ailed 18 behind that of her peers . ( See Witte Decl. ¶¶ 16-17.)

- 59 -1 M o l l i n h erd ecl a r a t i o na s ser t ed th a t sh e i nfa ct

d i d p o s s e s s m a nyo f

th e s k i l l s 2 that Witte claims t o h ave desired. ( See Moll D e c l. ¶ 1 3 8. ) And Witte's a ssertions that she 3 l a c k e d t

h o s e s k i l l s d o n o t

a p p e a r t ob e s u p p o r te d b y

e i t h e r f i r s t- h an d k

n o w l e d g e o r

an y t hin g 4 h e h a d l e a rne d fr o mc l i e nt s o r an y o n e wh o h a d s u p e r v i s e d M o l l i n t h e p a s t . W i t t e c o n c e d e d 5 in

hi s d e p o s i ti o n

t h a t h e d i d n o t

k n o wt h e " f u l le x t e n t " o f

M o l l ' s t r a i n in g

i n p e r tin e nt

p r o d u c t 6 a r eas, and he was not sure that she lacked the expertise t o work with supposedly relevant 7 t echnologie s . ( W itte Dep. 260-61.) Witte had n ot attended any of Moll's customer 8 p r e s e n t a t i o n s . ( S e e i d

. a t 2 3 8 ( h e " a t t e n d e d c u s t o m e rm e e t in g s o n o c c a s i o n , " b u t w h e n a s k e d 9 why he d id not attend any of Moll's meetings he responded, "I ju s t didn't attend any.").) 10 W i t t e a l so n ev ersat d o wn wi thM o l l t o ex p l o r e wh a tsh e co ul d o r co ul d n o td o ( see, e. g . , id

. 11 a t 260-61; M oll Decl. ¶ 138); and he made no inquiries o f her prior supervis or s ( see , e.g. , 12 G a g l i o n e 2 0 1 1 D e c l

. ¶ 3 8 ( " M r . W i t t e , w h o h a d w o r k e d w i th M s . M o l l f o rl e s s t

h a n o n e y e a r , 13 n ev e r s ou ght any input from me regarding Ms. Moll's abilities, even though I h ad 14 s u p e r v i s e d h e r s i n c e 2 0 0 3 u n t i lh e rt r a n s fe rb a c k t o B u ff a l o f r o m S y r a c u s e . I f h e h a d s o u gh t 15 my input, I would have given Ms. Moll a relatively high rating.").) 16 N o r c o u l d W i t t e p o i n t t o a nyd o c u m e n t o n

w h i ch h e h a d r el i e d i n

m a k i n gh i s 17 d e c i s i o n . ( S e e

, e . g . , W i t t e D e p . 2 9 6 . ) T h e s o l e d o c u m e n th e p r o d uced, a " Per s o nn e l G r a d i n g 18 S he e t" c om pa ring SEs, r anked Moll the lowest, g i ving h er a "B minus" in "team" and in 19 " r el a t i o n s h i p s "

- - n e i t h e ro f w h i c h h e c o u l d e x p l a i n . A s t o " t e a m, " W i t t e c o n c e d ed th a t i nth e

- 60 -1 A p r i l 2 0 0 6 M & Tp r o j e c t ( a " g i a n t t e l e p h o ny m e s s " ( i d

. a t

3 1 4 ) ) , " M o l lw a s d o i n g

a l lt h i s w o r k 2 h e l p i n go th e r s w h e n s h e d i d n ' t

e v e n h a v e a . . . co r p o r a t e a cco un t ma n a g era s s i gn e d t o h e r, 3 s h e w o u l d h a v e b e e n . . . d o i n g

m o r e o f at e a m e ff o r t

b e c a u s e s h e [ w a s ] h e l p i n g e v e ry b o d y , " 4 a n d that is " what a te a m pla ye r does" ( id

. at 248). And Witte conceded that he saw no 5 p robl em i nM o l l 's r el a t i o n sh i p wi thth e M&T CAM Marquis--and that in the M&T project, 6 M oll was helping "[Dixon] w ho doe s n' t even, quote, unquote, l ike her." ( Id

. at 248-49.) 7 W hen asked, "[s]o why would she get a B minus in relationships," Witte said " I don't know 8 w hy I scored it that way ," and " I can't say it's accurate ." ( Id . at 249-50 (emphases added).) 9 T w o o f t h e M o l l I V

c o u r t ' s f in d in g s - - a p p a r e ntly

a c c e p tin g

p r o ffe r e d r e a s o n s f o r 10 r a ti o n a l i z i n g

W i t t e ' s t r e a tm e nt

o f M o l l

- - a p p e a r

t ob e a t o d d s w i t

h e a ch o t h e r; an d e a ch

s e e m s 11 t o us, in light of the r ecord as a whole, t o raise more questions than i t answers. First, the 12 court appears to have credited Witte's "state[ment] that he eliminated [Moll's] position 13 b eca use h ersk i l l s fo cused o nt r a d i t i o n a l t e l ep h o n e s e r v i c e s r a th erth a n th e n ex t -g en er a t i o n 14 M CI products and servic es . " M o l l I V , 2020 WL 5593845, at *24 (internal quotation marks 15 o m i tt e d ) . S e c o n d , t h e c o u r t f o u n d t h a t " W i t t eh a da s s i

g n e d P l a i n t i f f t o th e p res t i g i o u s a n d h i gh es t 16 r ev en u eM&T

B an k ac c ou n t, " s t a t i n gth a t" [h ] a d th er e been r e t a l i a t i o n

, W i t t e wo ul d n o t

h a v e 17 a s s i gn e d [ M o l l ] t o V e r i z o n ' s m o s t v a l u a b l e a c c o u n t . " I

d

. ( e m p h a s i s a d d e d ) . W e a d d r e s s fi r s t 18 the assignment finding, which presents a procedural conundrum. We conclude that the 19 tru t

h o f t h e m a tt e r

c o n c e rnin g

M o l l ' s a s s i g

nm e nt t ot

he M & TB ank

a c c o u nt i s ag e n u in e i s s u e

- 61 -1 t o be resolved by the jury. So, too, is the significance of that fact in de te r m ining Verizon's 2 r easons for terminating Moll's employment.

3 a. Whether Moll Was Assigned to the M&T Account 4 Th e c o u r t ' s a c c e p t an c e o f V e r i z o n ' s c o nte nti o n

i s r e fl e c t e d i n

i t s c o n c l u s i o n

t h a t 5 M oll "has not established any direct evidence of a causal relationship" between her 6 te r m ination and her complaints of d iscrimination or retaliation, because " [h]ad there b e en 7 retaliation, Witte would not have assigned Plaintiff to Verizon's most valuable account ." Moll IV , 8 2 0 2 0 W L 5 5 9 3 8 4 5 , a t * 2 4 ( e m p h a s i s a d d e d ) . V e r i z o n ' s a s s i g nm e n t c o n t e n t i o n

w a s a d v a n c e d 9 in

i t s S t a t e m e n t

o f M a t e r i a l F a c t s s ub m i t t e d i n s u p p o r t o f i t s m o t i o n

f o rs u m m a r yj u d g m e n t , 10 a s follows: 11 248. Ms. Moll admits that Mr. Witte a ssigned Ms. Moll to "one 12 o f th e h i gh e s t

r e v e nu e a n d p r e s t i g i o u s a c c o u n t s i n t h e o ffi c e " w h i l e s h e 13 reported to him. See Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 85-87 (Tab 9). 14 Th e c i t a t i o n a n d qu o t a t i o n a r e a c c u r a t e . I n th e s e c o n d a m e n d e d c o m p l a i n t ( o r" S A C " ) , M o l l 15 a l l e g e d, i n t e r

a l i a, t h a t a ft e rs h e p r o v i d e d s e r v i c e s t o M & TB a n k( " M & T " ) i n A p r i l 2 0 0 6 , M o l l 16 was informed that M&T was "so ple a s ed" with her work that it "requested that she be 17 a ssi g n ed o na ful l -t i me ba si s t o th e a cco un t , " a n d " [ u]p o ni n fo r ma t i o na n d bel i ef" th e CAM 18 o nth e M &T a cco un t" co n v e y ed th a ti n f o r m a t i o n t o P l a i n t i ff ' s m a n a g e r, M a r k W i t t e. " (S AC 19 ¶ 86.) The SAC then alleged as follows:

- 62 -1 87. Thereafter, Plaintiff was assigned full-t ime to the M&T Bank 2 account . 3 ( Id . ¶ 87 (emphasis added).) 4 In the ensuing discovery a nd m otion practice proceedings, however, Moll 5 a r gued that in April 2 006 she was not assigned to the M&T account b y W itte ; r ather, she 6 a sserted that she had bee n drafted into service by Dennis Marquis, the CAM forM &T, fo r 7 a p a r t i cul a r M &T p r o ject , o nwh i ch

i ssues h a d a r i sen

th a t S E S h e l t o n

( w h o w a s a s si g n ed t o 8 t h e a c c o u n t ) a n d D i x o n

h a d b e e n

u n ab l e t o r e s o l v e . M o l l w a s ab l e t o so l v e th o se p r o b l e m s . 9 S he also asserts that she was not, after her return from disability leave, assigne d to any 1 0 C AM . S h e contends that her allegations of retaliatory animus find support in the fact that 11 s h e wa s thus un d er ut i l i z ed , a n d th e fa ct , a d mi t t ed i n th e 2 0 1 7 d ep o si t i on of Witte, that sh e 12 w a s n o tth er e a ft e r a ssi g n ed ful l t i m e t o th e M &T a cco u n td esp ite M&T's request . ( S ee, e. g . , 13 M oll Decl. ¶ 137; Witte Dep. 312-14.) 14 V e r i z o n c o n t e n d s th a t

th e c o u r t ' s fi n d i n gth a t M o l l w a s i nfa ct a s s i gn e d t o th e 15 M &T account was required because the allegation in Moll' s S A C that she was so assigned 16 constitutes a judicial admission by which Moll is bound thr ou ghou t the course of the 17 p roceeding. Verizon a r gu e s tha t Moll is not entitled to claim or attempt to prove that she 18 was not in fact assigned to the M&T account. 19 O r d i n a r i l y, we wo ul d a g r e e . I t i s e s t ab l i s h e d th a t

a p a r ty ' s a s s e r t i o n

o f f a c t i n 20 ap l e a d i n gi s a j u d i c i a l a d m i s s i o n b y wh i ch

s h e n o r m a l l yi s b o u n d th r o u gh o u t th e c o u r s e o f - 63 -1 the proceeding. See , e.g. , B ellefonte Re Insurance Co . v . Ar g onaut Insurance Co. , 757 F.2d 523, 2 5 2 8 (2d Cir. 1985). An allegation made only in a pleading that has been withdrawn o r 3 superseded is not a judicial admission, although it would, if offered against the pleader, 4 qualify as a party admission within the meaning of Rule 8 0 1 (d)(2) of the Federal Rules of 5 E vidence. S ee , e.g. , United States v. GAF Corp. , 928 F.2d 1253, 1259 (2d Cir. 1991). 6 B u t a d e fe n d a n t ' s a n s w e rt o a c o m p l a i n t i s a l s o a p l e a d i n g . Th e F e d e r a lRu l e s 7 o f

C i v i lP r o c e d u r e d e t a i l th e s e v e r a l w a y s i n w h i c h a d e f e n d a n t

c a n p r o p e r l ya d m i t

o rd e ny 8 a l lo r

p a r t s o f a c o m p l a i n t ' s a l l e g a t i o n s , s e eF e d

. R . C i v . P . 8 ( b ) ( 1 )

- ( 6 ) ; t h e t h e o ryb e h i n d t

h e s e 9 specifications "is that a d efendant's pleading should apprise the opponent of those 1 0 a l l e g a t i o n s i n

t h e c o m p l a i nt

t h a t s t a n d a d m i t t e d a n d w i l l n o t b e i n i s s u e a t

t r i a l a n dt h o s et h a t 11 are contested and wil l r e q uire proof ," 5 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1261 12 ( 2 0 2 1 ) ( e m p h a s i s a d d e d ) . T hu s , " [ a ] p a r tyth a ti n t en d s i ng o o d fa i th t o d e nyo n l yp a r t

o f a n 13 a l legation must admit the part that is true and deny the rest." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b)(4). 14 In t hi sc a s eV e r i z o n

, in i t s an s w e r

t ot h e a l l e g a ti o n s in

S A C ¶ ¶ 8 6 an d8 7

, s t a te d 15 a s follows: 16 86. Defendant admits that Plaintiff was supporting the M&T 17 Bank Account during April 2006. Defendant denies th e r e m a i ning 18 allegations set forth in Paragraph 86 of the Second Amended Complaint

. 19 8 7 . D e f e n d a n td e n i e s t h ea l l e

g a t i o n s c o n t a i n e di n P a r ag r a p h 8 7o f t h e 20 Second Amended Complaint

.

- 64 -1 (Verizon Answer t o Moll's S econd A m e nde d Complaint ("Verizon Answer") ¶¶ 86-87 2 (emphases added).) Therefore, according to V er izon's answer to SAC ¶ 8 7, after Moll 3 p rovided services to M&T in April 2006, she was not "assigned full-time to the M&T Bank 4 a c c o u n t . " Th a t

t o o w a saj u d i c i a la d m i s s i o n , n o tw i t h s t a n d i n g

w h i ch , V e r i z o n h a s p r o c e e d e d 5 t o argue--in, a nd in s u ppor t of, its motion for summary judgment--that Witte did in fact 6 a ssign Moll to the M&T a ccount. 7 Obviously, if the issue of whether Moll was or was n ot assigned full time to 8 t h e M & Ta c c o u n t

a s M & T r e qu e s t e d i s m a t e r i a l t o th e a d j u d i c a t i o n

o f a nyo f h ercl a i m s , th e 9 n ormal rule that a facta d v a n ced bya p a r ty i n h i s p l ea d i n gi s co n cl u si v e against that party 10 c a nn o t

b e a p p l i ed i nth i s ca s e. N o r a t i o n a l jud g men t ca n be ba sed o nth e p r o p o si t i o n t h a t a 11 g i v e n

f a c t s i m u l t a n e o u s l yb o t

h d i d a n d d i d n o t

e x i s t . Th e s o l u t i o n

h e r e l i e s i n

t h e p r i n c i p l e s 12 th a t th e co ur th a s d i scr et i o nt o " a v o i d th e co n seq uence of conclusi v en ess o f a na d mi ssi o n , " 13 9 Wigmore, Evidence § 259 0 (2023), and that "[p]leadings must be construed so as to do 14 justice," Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 (e). 15 We note that Moll's pleading--alleging that after she w as called in to fix the 16 M &T problem, a "giant telephony mess" (Witte D e p. 314) that had baffled Dixon a n d 17 S h el t o n

, sh e wa s a s si gn e d t o th e M &T a cco unt full time--was filed nearly two yea r s befo r e 18 she o btained discovery from Witte. The Ve r iz o n Answer was a lso filed nearly two years 19 b efo r e W i t t e g a v e h i s d e p o s i t i o n; b u t V e r i z o np r esuma b l y h a d k n o wl ed g e a s t o wh eth ero r

- 65 -1 n o t i t s a g e nt h a d a s s i g

n e d M o l lt o i t sm o s t

lu c r a t i v e c u s t o m e r

, w i t h o u t t a k in g h i s d e p o s i ti o n . 2 And we think it n o t eworthy that in its Statement of Material Facts in support of summary 3 judgment, by which time Witte's deposition had been taken, the only citation Ve rizon 4 p rovided to support its assertion that W itte did assign Moll to the M&T account after her 5 April 2006 positive contributions to the M& T project was the allegation in Moll's SAC. 6 V e r i z o n

d i d n o t p o i n t t o a ny o f i t s o wn d o cument s t o sh o w s u c h a n a s s i gn m e n t . N o r d i d i t 7 cite Witte's deposition. 8 W i t t e, i nh i s d ep o si t i o n , a p p e a r s t o a dmi t k eyp a r t s o f M o l l 's co n t en t i o na s t o 9 M & T ' s r e qu e s t

th a t V e r i z o n a s si g nh ert o i t s a cco un t ful l t i me; b u t h e a l s o a p p e a r s t o t e s t i f y 10 that he did not grant that request. He testified in part as follows: 11 Q. . . . . Is it normal for you to get a r e q uest from a client to have a 12 specifi c SE on their account, a large client back then, your first year? Is 13 that normal? . . . . How many that year asked you for a specific SE? 14 A. I don't think many made a distinction, if any

. 15 Q. Well, you just told me M and T did

. 16 A. Right

. 17 Q. And you were in jeopardy of losing the accou nt a nd they 18 asked for a person and you didn't grant it? What did y ou tell [M&T's 19 telecommunications director] ? 20 A. I don't think I told him anything directly

. 21 Q. You just ignored him?

- 66 -1 A. I th i n kw e h a d a r el a t i o n sh i p th er e wh er e h e kn ew wh a twe 2 were doing and what was going on. 3 Q. Did you respond to his request, yes or no? 4 A. T here was no--I don't believe there was any def i nitive yes other 5 than she would work on the account

. . . . 6 Q . L e t ' s g o b a c k t o aq u e s t i o n . D i d acu s t o m e r , al a r g e cu s t o m e r 7 ask you specifically? Did Mr. Ma r q ui s e v e r t ell you that

. . . the 8 telec ommu n ic ation s d irec tor to M and T Bank[] was so impressed with Miss 9 Moll's work that he asked Mr. Marqu is to have her permanently assigned to 10 that account ? 11 A. I believe he said that

. 12 Q. Okay. And then what, if anything, did you do? 13 A. Cindy was assigned to work on the account at that time. 14 Q. So she b e c a m e the SE on the account, i s that what you're 15 telling me? 16 A. S h e beca me a n S E th a two r k ed o n th e a cco unt. There's n o -- 17 . . . . 18 Q. So you decided

. . . t o disregard the reques t of one of the 19 la rgest clients that you had, right, that you're trying to d o a big de a l 20 with, you just ignored him? 21 . . . . 22 Is that what you're telling me, you ignored him? 23 A. I felt like he was getting enough support. 24 . . . . - 67 -1 Q. . . . . Did you do anything? 2 A. I didn't do anything with regard to what you're asking. 3 (Witte Dep. 311-14 (emphases added).) 4 Q. Do you usually not grant client requests? 5 A. If it can be accommodated, we try to. 6 Q . W h yd i d n ' ty o u d o i tf

o r h e r ? . . . . W

h a t w a s t h eb u s i n e s s r e a s o n 7 not to do that ? 8 A. I'm not sure. . . . I don't understand your question. 9 ( Id . at 311 (emphases added).) 10 If, a s Moll asserts, she was at tha t time not a ssigned to any CAM and could 11 h ave been a s s igned full time to M&T as it requested, a rational juror could find it difficult 12 t o d i s c e rn

a l e g i ti m a t e b u s in e s sr a ti o n a l e fo r W i tt e ' s d e ni a l o f M & T ' s r e q

u e s t . I t i s e v e n m o r e 13 d i ffi cul tfo r us t o co n cl ud e th a tjustice would be done in th i s ca se bya l l o wi n gei th erp a r ty, 14 h aving pleaded a given fact presumably i n good faith, to pr e c lu de the o ther side from 15 a d opting that factual proposition. 16 Accordingly, in this case, i n which eac h s ide has retreated from its factual 17 p l ea d i n gt o en d o r s e t h e o p p o s i t e p r o p o s i t i o n , w e th i n ki ta p p r o p r i a t e th a t n ei th erp l ea d i n g 18 s h o u l d b e v i e w e d a s c o n c l u s i v e a g a i n s t t h e p l e a d e r ; r a th e r, a s a m a t t e r o f j u d i c i a l d i s c r e ti o n

, 19 ea c h is deemed to have been superseded. But each p leaded assertion may be treated as a

- 68 -1 p a r ty a d m i ssi o nfo r e v i d e n t i a r y p ur p o ses. Th e t r utho f th e ma t t err ema i n s a g enui n e i ssue 2 o f fact to be determined by the jury.

3 b. Witte's Stated Reason for Moll's RIF Termination 4 The specific reason advanced by Witte for selecting Moll to be terminated in 5 the RIF--that M oll's specia lty w a s t raditional voice communication--also seems puzzling. 6 M & Tw a s V e r i z o n ' s m o s t l u c r a ti v e cu s t o m e r

, an d " al a r g e p i e c eo f

t h e b u s i n e s s " t

h a t V e r i z o n 7 d id with M& T w a s "tr a ditional" voice communication (Witte Dep. 240). In the Spring of 8 2 0 06, Moll had been a b le to solve M&T's problem; and M&T had been so pleased that it 9 a sked Verizon to assign Moll to its account permanently. 10 A rational ju ror could well infer that the fact that M oll's main expertise was 11 v oice communication--given the f a c t tha t she h ad been the only o ne able to clear the 12 o bstacles to the M&T project--was not the r e a l r e a s on she was chosen for termination. 13 M &T's request for Moll's full-time assignment meant that h er expertis e was a valuable 14 c o m m o d i ty . A s k e d ab o u t th e i m p o r t o f h i s e v a l u a t i o n

o f M o l li n

S e p t e mb e r2 0 0 6 , j u s t

afe w 15 months before announc ing that she would be terminated, Witte testified as follows: 16 Q. . . . [W]here you said that her positive contr ib ution on 17 handling the M and T Bank account has o pened the door for closing 18 new business. What doe s that mean, open the door for closing new 19 business? 20 A. That means it creates a positive business relationship. - 69 -1 Q. More money to come in the door, right? 2 A. Yes. 3 ( I

d

. a t 2 3 7 . ) Ar a t i o n a lj u r o rc o u l d l o o kf o ra n d , i m p o r t a n t l y, c o u l d fi n d i n o t h e re v i d e n c e a n 4 explanation that suppor ts Moll's claims of discriminatory or retaliatory motivation.

5 c. Witte's Choice To Terminate Moll Rather Than Sh elton 6 A t th e s u m m a r yj u d g m e n t s t a g e , a p l a i n t i ff c a n m e e t t h e " m i n i m a l " b u r d e n

t o 7 show circumstances sufficient to raise an inference of discrim ina tion by showing that her 8 employer "treated [her] less favorably tha n a similarly situated employee outside [her] 9 p r o t e c t e d g r o u p . " G ra h a m v . L o ng I s l a n dR . R . , 2 3 0 F . 3 d 3 4, 3 8

- 3 9 ( 2 d C i r . 2 0 0 0 ) . Wh e t h e r t h a t 10 p e r s o n

i s " s i m i l a r ly

s i t u a te d " i s af a c t

q u e s ti o n n o r m a l ly

l e ft t ot h e j u ry . I

d

. H e r e, M o l lr a i s e d 11 s uch

a t r i abl e i ssue o f

fa ct byp o i n t i n gt o Gr e g S h el t o n , h erma l e c o w o r k e rw i tha p p a r e n t l y 12 s i m i l a r

q u a l i f i c a t i o n s w h o w a s n o t

l e t g o i n t h e RI F . A c c o r d in g

t oM o l l ' s t e s t i m o ny

, b o t h s h e 13 a n d Shelton shared the same skillset of traditional voice, l ong distance, and telephone 14 services. ( See Moll Decl. ¶ 137; Moll 2017 Dep. 117-18.) And at his deposition Witte was 15 unable to explain how S h elton was better qualified--or differently situated--than Moll. 16 When W itte w a s asked what Shelton was "most knowledgeable of," Witte 17 b eg a nbyt a l k i n gabo u t S h el t o n 's " I L E C b a c k g r o u n d " b efo r e M o l l 's co u n selqui ck l y p o i n t e d 18 o u t

t h a t W i t t e h a d a l r e a d ys a i d M o l lw a s m o s t kn o w l e d g e a

b l e a b o u t I L E C . ( W i t t e D e p . 2 72 )

- 70 -1 A ft e rW i t t e w a s a g a i n p r e s s e d t o s p e c i f yS h e l t o n ' s b e s t a t t r i

b u t e , W i tt e p r o v i d e d o n lyv a gu e 2 r esponses. H e fi r st st a t ed , wi th o ut

el abo r a t i o n

, th a tS h el t o n wa s " a mi x o f a l l ser v i ces." Id

. 3 W itte then pivoted to talking about various other areas--like "the da ta side and the IP a n d 4 the VPN str uctur es, " i nwhich Moll was not "strong"--but without saying that Shelton was 5 p roficient there either. Id

. 6 In contrast, there was specific evidence from which a jury could reasonably 7 i n ferth a t S h el t o nwa s n o tbet t erqua l i fi e d th a n M o l l

-- t o w i t

, th e e v e n t s co n cern i n gV er i z o n 8 k ey client M&T's "giant telephony mess" (Witte Dep. 314). The "mess" involved problems 9 o n which Shelton had been working a nd had been unable to solve. Moll was called in to 10 a d d r e s st

hep r ob l e m s, an d s h e s o l v e d t h e m . Th u s, whi l e W i tte a s s e r te d t h a t h e s e l e c t e d M o l l 11 fo rt e r m i n a ti o n i n t h e R I F b e c au s e " h e r

c a p a b i l i ti e s , j ob p e r f o r m a n c e a n d r e s u l t s t r a i l e d t h o s e 12 o f the other sales engineers i n [Witte's] group" (Witte Decl. ¶¶ 16

- 1 7 ), the r ecord contains 13 concrete evidence that Moll had been able to solve p roblems for an important client that 14 were beyond Shelton's c apability. 15 I n d e e d , f o l l o w i n gh e rs u c c e s s , M & Ta s k e d V e r i z o n t oa s s i gn

M o l l t o th e M & T 16 a ccount full time. Witte was asked, " How about Mr. Shelton, did [the M&T 17 t e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n s d i r e c t o r ] s ay h e w ante d M r . She l t o n

t ob e t h e o ne o n

hi s a c c o u nt ? " W i t t e 18 said, "I don't think so." (Witte Dep. 315. ) Ye t Witte declined to assign Moll to the M&T 19 a c c o u n t

a s i t r e q u e s t e d ; a n d h e d e s i gn a t e d M o l l f o rt e r m i n a t i o n w h i l e S h e l t o n

w a s r e t a i n e d

.

- 71 -1 A j u ryc o u l d r e a s o n a b l yfi n d th a t

W i t t e ' s c l a i m th a t

S h e l t o n ' s s k i l l s w e r e m o r e 2 v a l uab l e t o Verizon than Moll's was not cred ibl e , a n d , i nl i g h to f o th ert est i mo ny byW i t t e, 3 that Moll's termination was retaliation for her complaints of sex discrimination.

4 d. Witte and Dixon 5 As d escr ib ed i nPa r t I I . C. ab o v e, th e r eco r d co n t a i n s e v i d en ce t h a tDi x o n h a d 6 d evised the plan to send the Buffalo-based S Es to Syrac u s e in a n effort to retaliate against 7 M o l l a n d B y r n e fo r co mp l a i n i n go f Ti t l e V I Iv i o l a t i o n s; a n d h e ex p e c t ed th a tth e r el o ca t i o n , 8 a n d his " adamant" requirements that Moll b e physically present in Syracuse most days of 9 th e week some 160 miles from her home, would cause h ert o l ea v e E S G o r V er i z o n . W h en 10 S E M a n a g e r W i t t e m a d e h i s d e c i s i o n n o t t o a s s i gn

M o l l t o th e M & T a c c o u nt , a n d p r o c e e d e d 11 t o select Moll as the SE whose job would be eliminated in the RIF, Dix o nwa s h i s Reg i onal 12 S a l e s M a n a g e r . W i t t e t e s t i fi e d th a t h i s o wn jo b a s m a n a g e ro f S E s w a s , " [ i ] n s o m e w a y s , " t o 13 " d e a l w i th

M r . D i x o n

a n d ke ep M r . Dix on h ap p y . " (W i t t e Dep . 2 6 7 ( e m p h a s i s a d d e d ) . ) W i t t e 14 said h e could " try to do things differently," but Dixon "play[ed] a role i n how things g[o]t 15 d one." ( Id .) 16 Witte kne w that Moll had a pending lawsuit that involved claims of 17 misconduct by Dixon. A nd although Witt e sa i d h e co ul d n o t r eca ll whether he and Dixon 18 h a d d i s c u s s e d M o l l ' s s u i t , h e t e s t i fi e d th a t h e " s e n s [ ed ] th e an imosity " " from Mr. Dix on to Miss

- 72 -1 Moll ." (Witte Dep. 233, 234-35 (emphases a dded).) As to whether Dixon wanted him to 2 choose Moll as the pers on to be terminated in the RIF, Witte testified as follows: 3 Q. Anyone ever tell you Mr. Dixon wanted Miss Moll gone? 4 A. Not gone. Not those terms

. I just was a ware of the lawsuits. 5 ( Id . at 299 (emphasis added).) 6 Whatever "terms" Witte m a y have heard from Dixon, there i s clear evidence 7 t h a t D i x o n i n f a c t w an t e d M o l l" g o n e " b e c a u s e o f " t h e l a w s u i t s, " a s s e t

o u t in t h ed e c l a r a ti o n s 8 an d d e p o s i t i o n

t e s t i m o nyo f

G a g l i o n e d e s c r i

b e d in P a r t I I . C . a

b o v e . F o r e x a m p l e, in

hi s 2 0 1 1 9 d e c l a r a t i o n - - q

u o t e d m o r e e x t e n s i v e l yi n P a r t I I . C . 2 . - - G a g l i o n e d e s c r i b e d a t t e n d i n gm e e t i n g s 10 i nwh i ch

" M r . Di x o n p r o p o sed " th e t r a n sfer o f th e B uffa l o S E s t o S y r a cuse, 1 6 0 m i l e s a wa y, 11 " primar[il]y

. . . []as an effort to retaliate against both Ms. Moll and Ms. Byrne f o r t heir 12 c ontinuing complaints of discrimination and retaliation ." (Gaglione 2011 De c l. ¶ ¶ 13-14 13 ( emp h a ses a d d ed ). ) Ga g l i o n e st a t ed , in ter alia, that " Mr. Dixon and Mr. V a n H o esen w an ted 14 t o m a kel i

f ea s d i f f i c u l ta s p o s s i b l ef

o r Ms . M o l l a n d M s . B y rn e " ( i d

. ¶ 1 4 ( e m p h a s e s a d d e d ) ) th e y 15 kn e w o f

M o l l 's " t i es t o th e B uffa l o a r ea " ( id

. ¶ 1 5 ); th ey" a l l kn ew [M o l l ] wo u l d n o tmo v e t o 16 S yracuse" (Gaglione 2017 Dep. 76); and " Mr. Dixon and Mr. VanHoesen . . . stated that they 17 be lieved this action would force [Moll] to leave ESG " (Gaglione 2011 Decl. ¶ 1 4 ( e m pha s e s 18 a d ded)). Thereafter, to further increase the pr e s s ure on Moll, Dixon required Gaglione to 19 o rder her t o "be at [her] desk in Syracuse [for ] a m inim u m o f

. . . 3 days per week, 8 hours

- 73 -1 a day" (Moll Decl. ¶ 1 18), a r equirement imposed on "[n]o other SE" (Gaglione 2 0 1 1 D e c l. 2 ¶ 3 0). In a d d ition, whenever Moll had a morning or afternoon m e e ting w ith a client in 3 B uffalo, she was required to be in the Syracuse office for the other half of the day. 4 Moll did n o tl ea v e E S G; a ft er Di x o n 's effo r t s " t o make [her] life as difficult as 5 p o ssibl e, " M o l l t o o ka d i sabi l i ty l ea ve of absence for stress. When Moll returned from th a t 6 l eave--to work at E S G in Buffalo, because during her l eave, Verizon had r etransferred its 7 B uffalo SEs to Bu ffalo--her manager was Witte. Gaglione described Witte's treatment of 8 M o l la s d i s r e g a r d i n g h e r a b i l i ti e s, in s t ru c tin g

h e r t og e n e r a te n e wcu s t o m e r s ( ar e s p o n s i b i l i ty 9 that SEs had never b e en giv e n before), imposing on her performance targets that were 10 unrealistic, and terminating her without ever seeking an evaluation of her work from 11 Gaglione, who h ad supervised her since 2003 and would have given h er a r e la tiv e ly high 12 r ating. (Gaglione 2011 Decl. ¶¶ 36, 38.) 13 While the dis trict court concluded that Moll's termination could not be 14 a t t r i

b u t e d t o T i tl e V I I

- p r o hi

b i t e d r e t a l i a t i o n

b e c a u s e i t

" o c c u r r [ e d ] t

h r e e y e a r s a ft e r[ t

h e 2 0 0 4 ] 15 commencement of this a ction," Moll IV , 2 0 2 0 W L 5593845, at *24, that conclusion ignored 16 evidence that could suppor t a fi n d i n go f ca usa tion. Based on the record as a whole, a jury 17 could reasonably find that Verizon managers had engaged in a years-long c a m pa ign of 18 r et a l i a t i o n

a g a i n st M o l l th a tc u l m i n a t e d i n W i t t e ' s d e c i s i o n t o d esi g n a t e h erfo r t er mi n a t i o n 19 i n

th e R I F . M o l l fi l e d th e p r e s e n t a c t i o n i n O c t o b e r 2 0 0 4 . D i x o n ' s p l a n t o h a v e M o l la n d th e

- 74 -1 o ther B uffalo S Es transferred to Syracuse in order to retaliate a g ainst Moll and Byrne was 2 p roposed and launched in "late 2004" (Gaglione 2011 Decl. ¶¶ 13-14). 3 A l th o u gh W i t t e h a d co me t o V er i z o ni nth e 2 0 0 5 M CI mer g er, a n d h en c e h a d 4 n ot been involved in Dixon's earlier efforts to drive Moll from ESG, he became aware of 5 M oll's lawsuit in S e pte m b e r 2006 ( see, e.g. , W i tte Dep. 218 (shortly after giving Moll a 6 g l o w i n gr e v i e w o n S e p t e mb e r1 3 , 2 0 0 6 , W i t t e h a d a m e e t i n g w i th h e ri n w h i c h s h e t o l d h i m 7 a b o u t h e rl a w s u i t

, a n d h e " w a s p r ob a

b l ym a d e a w a r e o f

s tu ff a t t h a t p o i n t " ) ) . W i t t e t e s t i fi e d 8 t h a t h e" w a s a w a r eo f

t h e l a w s u i t

a t t h e e n d " o f " S e p t e mb e r - i s h " ( i d

. a t 2 3 3 ) an d a fte r

l e a rnin g 9 o f the lawsuit, he "sens[ed]" Dixon's "animosity" toward Moll ( id . at 234-35). 10 W i t t e kn e w th a t D i x o n " d [ i d ] n ' t . . . l i k e M o l l " (W i t t e Dep . 2 4 8

- 4 9 ) ; h e t e s t i fi e d 11 t

h a t h eb e l i e v e d t

h a t p a r t o f h i s j ob a t

V e r i z o n w a s t o " k e e p . . . D i x o n h a p p y " ( i d

. a t

2 6 7 ) ; an d 12 a ft e rt

h e R I F , W i t t e s a i d h e w a s " p r o u d " t o h a v e t e r m i n a t e d M o l l( G a g l i o n e 2 0 1 1 D e c l

. ¶ 3 8 ) . 13 A l t h o u g h W i tted e ni e dh a v in g

e x p r e s s e d s u ch

p r i d e ( s e e W i tteD e p . 2 3 5 ) , a j u ry 14 n e e d n o t

fi n d h i s d e n i a l c r e d ib l e . W i t h r e s p e c t t o V e r i z o n ' s m o t i o n

f o rs u m m a r yj u d g m e n t , 15 therefore, the court was required to disregard that denial. 16 In s u m , in a d d i ti o n t o t h e l a c k o f

a nya p p a r e n t

b u s i n e s s r e a s o n

fo r te r m in a tin g 17 M oll i nstead of g ranting the request of Verizon's most lucrativ e c ustomer that she be 18 a s s i gn e d t o i t s a c c o u n t f u l l t i m e , th e a d m i s s i

b l e e v i d e n c e i n

t h i s c a s e , t a k e n

i n th e l i gh t

m o s t 19 favorable to Moll, inclu d es

- 75 -1 < Witte's statement that Verizon gave him no objective criteria by 2 which to decide which S E to terminate, 3 < Witte's selection of Moll for the RIF termination with apparent 4 d isre ga r d for the glowing midyear review h e had given her l ess than six 5 months earlier, 6 < Witte's claim to have based his decision on Moll's lac k of r elevant 7 skills, 8 < W i tt e ' s c l a i mt o h a v e b e l i e v e d t h a t M o l ll a c k e dr e l e v ant

s k i l l s, d e s p i te 9 hi sh a v in g m a d e n o a tte m p t t od e te r m i n e w h a t s k i l l s s h e h a d b yob s e r v i n g h e r 10 i n action, or by interviewing her, or by inquiring of her prior managers, and 11 < W i tt e ' s c l a i mt oh a v e v i e w e d M o l l ' s s k i l l s a s l a c k i n g r e l e v an c e d e s p i te 12 the f act that h er product specialty was "a large piece of the business" that 13 V er i z o nco n d u ct e d w i th i t s h i g h e s tr ev enue cl i en t --a nd in spite of the cl i en t 's 14 express request for her full-time services, which would hav e m e a nt "[m]ore 15 money to come in the door." 16 A rational factfinder attempting to identify a more plausible reason for Witte's decision to 17 t erminate Moll would also be entitled to take into account the evidence that 18 < Witte knew of Dixon's animosity toward Moll, 19 < as witne s s e d b y G a g lione, there had been a pattern of adverse 20 employment decisions by Moll's managers, d esigned to cause her to leave 21 E SG, in retaliation for her complaints of sex discrimination and retaliation, 22 < Di x o nh i mself had orchestrated the failed 2004-2005 attemp t s t o r i d 23 E S G o r V er i z o no f M o l l byt r a nsferr i n gh erjo b si t e t o S y r a cuse an d i mp o si n g 24 the onerous attendance requirements, 25 < W i t t e's v i ew was that part o f h i s jo b wa s t o " k eep . . . Di x o nh a p p y, " 26 a nd

- 76 -1 < W i t t e , a ft e rth e R I F , s t a t e d th a t h e w a s " p r o u d " o f

h a v i n gt e r m i n a t e d 2 M oll. 3 W e c o n c l u d e th a t th e r e c o r d w a s s u ff

i c i e n t t o s h o wc i r c u m s t a n c e s fr o mw h i ch 4 a rational juror could infer that the termination of Moll' s employment was motivated by 5 g ender discrimination or by retaliation for her complaints of such discrimination.

6 E . The Unequal Pay Claims 7 M o l l ' s c l a i m s o f u n e q u a lp a yf o c u s e d o n

th e c o m p a r i s o n

b e tw e e n h e rV e r i z o n 8 s a l a r ya n d t

h e s a l a r i e s V e r i z o n

p a i d t o t h r e e m a l e s w h o w e r e S E s d u r i n g p a r t s o f h e r t e nu r e 9 a s an SE. Thomas S pencer, who had pr eviously been employed in a different Verizon 10 d ivision, joined the enterprise solutions group in 1997 shortly before Moll; he joined as a 11 S en i o r S y st ems An a l y st , th e p o si t i o n th a t

wo ul d be r et i t l ed S E I I . D a v i d W i n l e ya n d K ev i n 12 De a n w e r e hired for the g roup i n the Spring of 2002 from outside of Verizon; originally 13 called "Senior Specialists--Technology Solutions," the ir titles were soon changed to SE IV. 14 A l lf o u ro f

t h e s e s a l e s e n g in e e r s w e r e s u p e r v i s e d b y S E M an a g e rI r v i n g

t h r o u gh 2 0 0 2 ; I r v i n g 15 was succeeded by Gaglione. 16 When Moll was promoted to sales engineer in 1997, her SE I base salary was 17 $ 4 7

, 4 0 0 . S p e n c e r ' s b a s e s a l a r ya s a n S E I I h a db e e n s e t

a t $ 6 1 , 3 0 0 . B y

2 0 0 2, M o l l ' s b a s e s a l a ry 18 was $54,400, and Spenc er's was $72,800. An d i nth a ty ea r, Dea nwa s h i r ed a t a base salary 19 o f $88,000, and Winley was hired at a base sala r y of $9 0 , 0 00. Throughout the periods in - 77 -1 which Winley, Dean, or Spencer overlapped with Moll at ESG, their compe ns a tion, after 2 r aises for a ll, was h igher than Moll's by at least $ 13 , 900 to $35,600. Moll claimed that 3 V e r i z o n ' s p a y i n g h e rl e s s t

h a n i t p a i d W i nl e y

, D e an , o r S p e n c e r

, wh e n a l lo f t h e mp e r f o r m e d 4 substantially similar work, violated the EPA and Title VII. 5 Verizon moved for summary judgment dism is sing these claims "whether 6 a s s e r t e d u n d e rt h e E q u a lP a yA c t

o r o t h e r w i s e , " a r gu i n g th a t

M o l l " c a nn o t d e m o n s t r a t e th a t 7 she performed equal work on jobs requiring equal skill, e ff or t, and responsibility in 8 c o mp a r i so nt o m a l e s a n d , i n a l l e v e n t s , V e r i z o n

c a n p o i n t t o g e n d e r - n e u t r a l r e a s o n s fo r a ny 9 p u r p o r t ed p a y d i sp a r i ty . " (V er i z o nN o t i ce o f M o t i o n f o rS u m m a r y J u d g men ta t2 (i n t er n a l 10 quo t a t i o nma r k s o mi t t ed ). ) I tco n t en d ed principally that its empl o y men to f W i n l e y, Dea n , 11 a n d Spencer at salaries higher than it paid Moll did not violate the Eq u a l P ay Act because 12 th o se men h a d k eysk i l l s th a td i ffer ed fr o m M o ll's, or because Veri z o nco ul d n o th i r e th em 13 without meeting their r espective monetary demands. 14 The district court, wi th o ut men t i o n i n gTi t l e V I I, g r a n t ed summa r y jud g ment 15 d ismissing the c la im s of unequal pay. It found that, although Moll presented sufficient 16 evidence to establish a prima facie case of EPA violation, Verizon had established that the 17 s a l a r yd i s p a r i t i e s w e r e b a s e d o n f a c t o r s o t

h e rt h a n s e x . S e e M o l l I V

, 2 0 2 0 W L 5 5 9 3 8 4 5 , a t

* 2 5 . 18 M oll challenges this conclusion.

- 78 -1 M o l la l s o c o n t e n d s th a t t h e c o u r t e r r e d i n f a i l i n g t o a d d r e s s h e r c l a i m s t

h a t t h e 2 d isparities between h er salary and those of Winley, Dean, and Spencer violated Title VII. 3 V erizon argue s that the district court correctly dismissed the EPA claims; and it contends 4 that Moll has waived her claims of unequal pay violations of Title VII because she did not 5 p resent any argument for those claims i no p p o si t i o nt o th e mo t i o nfo r summa r y jud g ment 6 ( see Verizon brief on appeal at 54). 7 " [W ] h en a co un sel ed p a r ty moves for summary judgmen t , a p a r t i a l r esp o n se 8 [ by th e n o n-movant] arguing that summary judgment should be denied as t o so me cl a i ms 9 w h i l e n o t men t i o n i n go th e r s m a yb e d e e m e d a n ab a n d o n m e n t o f th e u n m e n t i o n e d c l a i ms. " 10 K

ovaco v. Rockbestos-Surprenant Cable Corp. , 834 F.3d 1 2 8, 143 (2d Cir. 2016) (internal 11 q

u o t a ti o n m a r k s o m i t t e d ) ( fi n d i n g h o s t i l e - w o r k

- e nv i r o nm e n t c l a i m s ab a n d o n e d b e c a u s e t h e 12 n o n - m o v a n t

fi l e d a b r i e f

th a t" fa i l ed t o sup p o r to r ev e n a d d r ess" th o s e c l a i m s ) . I n r e s p o n s e 13 t o Ve r iz on's motion for summary judgment, M oll's memorandum defending her claims 14 b a s e d o n

u n e q u a lp ay d i s cu s s e d o nly

t h e E P A, n o t

T i tl eV I I . ( S e e M o l l

M e m o r an d u mo f

L a w 15 i n

O p p o s i t i o n

t o V e r i z o n ' s M o t i o n

f o rS u m m a r yJ u d g m e n t a t 3 4 -3 5 . ) An d i nh e rr e p l yb r i e f 16 t o th i s C o u r t

, w h i l e M o l l a r gu e s th a t h e rc l a i m s th a t

th e u n e qu a l p a yv i o l a t e d T i t l e V I Iw e r e 17 a sserted in her complaint ( see Moll reply brief on appe al at 25-26 (citing sections of the 18 d i s t r i c t

c o u r t r e c o r d c o n t a i n i n g

p a r t s o f th e s e c o n d a m e n d e d c o m p l a i n t ) ) , s h e d o e s n o t p o i n t 19 t o any part of her memorandum to the district court in opposition to summary judgment

- 79 -1 th a t a r gued fo r p r eser v a t i o no f h ercl a i ms th at the lower sa l a r i es V e r i z o n p a i d h erv i o l a t e d 2 Title VII. 3 In l ight of M oll's submissions, we agree with Verizon that, a s Moll failed to 4 a r gu e in t

h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t

a g a i n s t s u m m a ryj u d g m e n t

d i s m i s s in g

h e r c l a i m s t h a t t h e u n e q u a l 5 p ay violated Title VII, she ab a ndoned those claims and cannot now r esurrect them on 6 a p peal. 7 W i t h r e s p e c t t o M o l l ' s c l a i m s u n d e rt h e E P A, w e s e e n o e r r o r in t h e i r d i s m i s s a l 8 t o th e e x t e n t

th a t M o l l ' s p r o p o s e d c o m p a r a t o r s wer e W i n l eya n d D e a n . W e s e e i s s u e s t o b e 9 t ried, however, with respect to Moll's equal pay claim to the exte nt tha t it compared her 10 salary to Spencer's.

11 1 . The EPA 12 The E qual Pay Act, designed "to le gis la te out o f existence a long-held, but 13 o u t m o d e d s o c i e t a l v i e w th a t a m a n s h o u l d b e p a i d m o r e t

h a n aw o m a n

f o rth e s a m e w o r k

, " 14 B elfi v . P ren d erg ast , 1 9 1 F . 3 d 1 2 9 , 1 3 5 (2d Cir. 1999) (" B elfi " ), p r o v i d es, i np er t i n en tp a r t , th a t 15 " [n]o employer" engaged in interstate or foreign commerce 16 s h a l l d i s c r i m i n a t e . . . b e tw e e n e m p l o y e e s o n th e b a s i s o f

s e xb y p a y i n g 17 wages to employees

. . . at a rate le s s tha n the rate at which he pays 18 wa g es t o employees of the opposite sex . . . for equalwo r ko n jo bs th e 19 performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, 20 and which are performed under similar working conditions, except

- 80 -1 where such payment is made pursuant to . . . (iv) a differential based on any 2 other factor other than sex

. 3 2 9 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (emphases added). To establish a p rima facie case of discrimination 4 under this section, the plaintiff must show that 5 "[1] the employer pays different wages to employees of the opposite 6 s e x ; [ 2 ] t h e e m p l o y e e s p e r f o r me q u a lw o r k o n j ob s r e q u i r in g e q u a ls k i l l , 7 effo r t , a n d r es p o n s ib i l i ty ; a n d [ 3 ] th e jobs a r e p er fo r med un d ersi mi l a r 8 working conditions." 9 B e l

f i , 1 9 1 F . 3 d a t

1 3 5 ( q u o tin g T o m k av . S e i l e r Co r

p . , 6 6 F . 3 d 1 2 9 5 , 1 3 1 0 ( 2 d C i r . 1 9 9 5 ) ( " T o m ka " ) , 10 a b r og a t e do n o t h e r g r o u n d s b y B u r l i n g t o n In d u s t r i e s, In c . v . E llerth, 5 2 4 U. S . 74 2 ( 1 9 9 8 ) ) ; s e e, e . g . , 11 C orning Glass Works v. B ren n an , 4 1 7U. S . 1 8 8 , 1 9 5 (1 9 74 ). " Th e E qua l Pay Act creates a type 12 o f strict liability," because "no inte nt to dis c r iminate need be shown.

. . . [A] prima facie 13 showing gives rise to a presumption of discrimination." B elfi, 191 F. 3 d a t 1 36 (internal 14 quotation marks omitted); see , e.g. , Ryduchowski v . The Port Authority of Ne w Yo r k & New 15 Jersey, 2 03 F.3d 135, 1 4 2 (2d Cir.) (" Ryduchowsk i ") ( "the EPA does not require a plaintiff to 16 establish an employer's discriminatory intent"), cert. denied , 530 U.S. 1276 (2000). 17 Once a plaintiff ma ke s ou t a prima facie case, however, the employer has 18 a v a i l a

b l e s e v e r a ls t a t

u t o r ya ffi r m a t i v e d e fe n s e s - - in c l u d i n g t h e d e fe n s e a d v a n c e d b yV e r i z o n , 19 t

h a t th e c o m p l a i n e d

- o f

d i ff e r e n t i a l i n

p a yw a s " b a s e d o n " a " f a c t o r o t h e r th a n s e x, " 2 9 U . S . C . 20 §2 0 6 ( d ) ( 1 ) ( i v ) . Th e b u r d e n o f p e r s u a s i o n

a s t o t h e p r o ffe r e d d e fe n s ei so n t he e m p l o y e r . S e e 21 T

o m ka , 6 6 F . 3 d a t

1 3 1 0 . A n d th e e m p l o y e rm u s t p r o v e th a t

th e a s s e r t e d f a c t o ri s " r e l a t e d " t o

- 81 -1 the performance of the job in question. A ldrich v. Randolph Central School District , 963 F.2d 2 5 2 0, 5 2 7

( 2 d C i r . ) ( " A l d r i ch " ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , 5 0 6 U . S . 9 6 5 ( 1 9 9 2 ) . F o r e x a m p l e, " [ w ] hi l e [ am a l e ' s ] 3 exp er i ence m a y v ery well explain the [pay] discrepancy, [the employer] has the burden of 4 p e r sua si o n to sho w bo thth a ti tba sed [th e ma l e's] hi g h ersa l a r y o nth i s fa c t o r a n d th a t [h is] 5 e xp e r i e n c ei s a j o b

- re l a t e d q u a l i f i c a t i o n . " T

o m k a, 6 6 F . 3 d a t

1 3 1 2 ( e m p h a s e sa d d e d ) . W i t h o u t t hi s 6 " job-relatedness requirement, " the "factor-other-than-sex defense would provide a gaping 7 l o o p h o l e i n th e [ E P A ] " th r o u gh w h i c h m a nyp o s th o c ex c uses fo r d i scr i mi n a t i o n" wo ul d be 8 sanctioned." Aldrich , 963 F.2d at 525. 9 F i n a l l y, " [ o ] n c e th e e m p l o y e r p r o v e s t h a t t h e w a g e d i s p a r i tyi s j u s t i fi e d b yo n e 10 o f

th e E PA's fo ura ffi r m a t i v e d e f e n s e s , ' th e p l a i n t i ff m a yc o u n t e r th e e m p l o y e r ' s a f fi r m a t i v e 11 d e f e n s e b yp r o d u c i n ge v i d e n c e th a t th e r e a s o n s th e d e f e n d a n t s e e k s t o a d v a n c e a r e a c tu a l l y 12 a p retext for sex discrimination.'" R yduchowski, 203 F.3d at 142 ( q u oting Be l fi , 191 F.3d 13 a t136); see , e.g. , Aldrich , 963 F.2d at 526.

14 2 . Moll's Claimed Comparators 15 Application of the above principles here leads us t o a potentially different 16 o u t c o m e fo r

M o l l ' s E P Ac l a i mw i t

h r e s p e c t t o S p e n c e r

t h an w i t h r e s p e c t t oW inl e y

an d D e an .

- 82 -1 a. Winley and Dean 2 There is no question as to the c ircumstances that led to Verizon's hiring of 3 W inley and Dean. I n mid-2000, Verizon merged with telecommunications p rovider GTE, 4 which added new products that Verizon could offer, especially to corporate customers. 5 These included voice and data "customer p remises equipment" ( or "C P E"). In order to 6 m a r k e t

th e s e p r o d u c t s , V e r i z o n n e e d e d p e r s o nn e l w h o h a d e x p e r t i s e i n th e n ewl y a cqui r e d 7 t e ch

n o l o g i e s . A t

t h a t t i m e , M o l l" d i d n ' t

h a v e a ny e x p e r i e n c e " i n " s e l l i n gv o i c e a n d d a t aC P E 8 p roducts." (Moll 2006 Dep. 69.) 9 In ea r ly 2002, Verizon advertised two Buffalo-based job openings listed as 10 " S en i o r S p eci a l i st --Tech n o l o g y S o l ut i o n s , " o n e t o focus on voice CPE and th e o th ero nd a t a 11 CPE. The job descriptions called for, inter alia , a "Bachelor's d egree or e q u iv a lent 12 experience," "technical knowledge," and--labele d "Highly Desired"--"[e]xperience in 13 engineering and selling voic e , da ta and IP services in the enterprise market," a n d 14 " [ e ] x p e r i e n c e i n v a l u e s e l l i n go f c u s t o m e rp r e m i s e e q

u i p m e n t f o r v o i c e s w i t ch i n g

, d e s i gn i n g 15 an d s e l l i n g

N o r t e lE nt e r p r i s e V o i c e S w i t chin g p r o d u c t s . " ( V e r i z o n j ob p o s ti n g

d a t e d J a nu a ry 16 2 2 , 2 0 0 2 ; see B y r n e Aff. ¶ 2 7 . ) I no r d ert o entice the d e s i r ed i n d i v i d u a l s t o l ea v e co mp a n i es 17 that were more entrenched in these products, Verizon typically of f e r e d a base salary of 18 $ 9 0,000. The salary range listed in these postings was $54,000-$132,000.

- 83 -1 In the S pr ing of 2002, Verizon hired Winley and Dean, both of whom h ad 2 p r e v i o u s l yw o r k e d f o rN o r t e l

. W i n l e yw a s h i r e d f o rt h e v o i c e C P E p o s i t i o n

, a t ab a s e s a l a ry 3 o f

$ 9 0 , 0 0 0 . V er i z o nh i r ed D e a n f o rth e d a t a C P E p o s i t i o n; h i s b a s e p a yi n 2 0 0 2 w a s $ 8 8 , 0 0 0 . 4 Both Winley and Dean were SE IVs. But mere titles have little s w a y in EP A 5 an a ly s i s . S e e

, e . g . , T o m ka, 6 6 F . 3 d a t

1 3 1 0 . A n d h e r e , G a g l i o n e s t a t e d t h a t t h e E S G " n

u m e r i c a l 6 d e s i gn a t i o n s " S E I t o S E I V" w e r e m e a n t t o s i gn i f ya d i s t i n c t i o n

i n t e c hn i c a l e x p e r t i s e w i th i n 7 certain assigned produc t specialties," but that 8 these designations meant little in practice because some pr odu c t 9 spe c ia lties did not require a depth of technical knowledge. All of the 10 SE's were expected to be able to assist CAM's in de s ig ni ng 11 telecommunications systems for customers and prospective customers

. 12 (Gaglione 2011 Decl. ¶ 11 (emphasis added).) However, while "the r e wa s no distinction" 13 a m o n g W inl e y , S p e n c e r , an d M o l l

( i d

. ) a n d D e a n

( s e eG a g l i o n e 2 0 1 7

D e p . 6 7

- 6 8 ) a s t o" t

he [ i r ] 14 l e v e l o f

s k i l l s, e ff o r t

a n d r e s p o n s i

b i l i ty , " s o m e S E s " h a d g re a t e r k n o w l e d geo f p a r t i c u l a r

p ro d u c t s , 15 s u ch

a s d a t as y s t e m s , o rv o i c e s y s t e m s , o rte l e p h o ni cs y s te m s , . . . b a s e di n p a r t o n s u b j e c ta re a s 16 th a t [V er i z o n ] a sk e d ea ch t o co n cen t r a t e o n " (Gaglione 2011 Decl. ¶ 11 (emp h a ses a d d ed )). 17 Thus, a s Moll described the work of the sales engineers in 2002, it was 18 " segmented by product": 19 [Moll] was responsible for the "specialty bucket" consisting o f core 20 voice (or local usage) p roducts, Ms. Byrne was responsible for optical 21 services products, Mr. Spencer was responsib le for fast p acket (data 22 s e r v i c e s ) , M r . W i n l e yw a s r e s p o n s ib l e f o rv o i c e C P E a n d M r . D e a n w a s 23 responsible for data CPE. - 84 -1 (Moll Counterstatement of Facts ¶ 1 06.) Acc ordingly, given the different levels of 2 kn o wl ed g e i n

r e l a t i o n t o p a r t i c u l a rp r o d u c t s , G a g l i o n e t e s t i fi ed th a tth er e wer e " th i n g s th a t 3 . . . K ev i nD e a n [ ] w a s a p p r o p r i a t e t o be a s si gn e d t o th a t , sa y, To m S p en cerwo ul d n o t h a v e 4 been appropriate to ass ign [to]" because 5 Dean was very knowledgeable in the area o f TCPI P i n t er n et wo rking, 6 and Tom Spencer was not. So if so m eth i n gwa s r el a t e d t o , y o u kn o w, 7 that protocol s ta c k,

. . . I wouldn't assign Tom to i t, but it wouldn't 8 mean that Tom's not a great SE, you know? Bu t he's just--his area of 9 expertise falls in other areas like voice, traditional . . . . telephony. 10 (Gaglione 2017 Dep. 68.) And for the same r e a s ons, there were projects "that [Gaglione] 11 w o u l d a ssign Kevin Dean to that [he] would not have assigned Cindy Moll to." ( Id

. a t6 9 . ) 12 I n l i g h to f V e rizon's a cqui si t i o n o f CPE v o i ce a n d d a t a p r o d uct s i ni t s mer g er 13 with GTE, its n eed for staff experienced in those new products, and Moll's admission that 14 s h e h a d n o ex p er i e n ce i nsel l i n gv o i ce a n d d a t a CPE p r o d ucts, no r a t i o n a l jur o r co ul d i n fer 15 that Veriz on, in hiring Winley or Dean to sell those products, paid them more than Moll 16 based on gender. 17 A s i t tu rn e d o u t

, n e i t h e r W in l e y n o rD e a n

r e m a i n e d a t

V e r i z o n l o n g . W i n l e y ' s 18 p erformance was widely criticized, and he had difficulty meeting his Verizon sales 19 o bjecti v es. ( S ee, e. g . , Dep o si t i o no f Ch r i st o p h erT. Ga g l i o n e , N o v ember2 9 , 2 0 0 5 ( " G a g l i o n e 20 20 0 5 D e p."), at 32-40, 213 (Gaglione "talked with Winley

. . . on . . . five or six occasions, 21 r egarding his perceived lack of performance and [his increasingly]

. . . ob vious lack of

. . .

- 85 -1 c a p a

b i l i t i e s " ) . ) W i n l e ys o o n

a c c e p t e d G a g l i o n e ' s r e c o m m e n d a t i o n t h a t h e a g r e e t o a V e r i z o n 2 buyout plan; Winley left Verizon in late 2003. ( See id

. at 221.) Dean, who also was not 3 meeting his Verizon sales objectives, voluntarily left Verizon in May 2004 and returned to 4 N ortel. ( S ee , e.g. , Moll Counterstatement of Facts ¶¶ 72, 173.) 5 M o l l e m p h a s i z e s t h e d e fi c i e n t

p e r f o r m a n c e s o f

W i n l e ya n d D e a n - - i n

th e w o r k 6 t h e yw er e h i r e d fo r --i nh era t t emp tt o sh o w th a ta l l fo uro f th e S E s p e r f o r m e d s ub s t a n t i a l l y 7 s i mi l a r wo r ka n d th a tsh e s h o u l d n o t h a v e b e e n

p a i d l e s s th a n th e m e n . W i th th e b e n e fi t

o f 8 hi n d s i gh t

, t h e s e tw o m e n

p e rh a p s s h o u l d n o t

h a v e b e e n

h i r e d

. B u t

t h e f a c t t h a t t h e yd i d n o t 9 l i v e up t o V er i z o n 's ex p ect a t i o n s a s t o th e i rp e r f o r m a n c e a n d / o rc a p ab i l i t i es i s n o tev i d e n ce 10 that the work for which they were hired was substantiv ely comparable to that performed 11 b y M o l l, o rth a t M o l l w a s qu a l i fi e d t o p e r f o r m i t , o rth a t V e r i z o n p a i d th em m o r e th a n

M o l l 12 because of gender. W e see n o error in the district court's r ejection of Moll's EPA claim 13 i nsofar as her comparators were Winley and Dean.

14 b. Spencer 15 W e fi n d th e r eco r d l e s s c l ea r wi thr esp ect t o M o l l 's E PA cl a i m a s t o p r o p o sed 16 comparator Spencer. S pencer differed from Winley and Dean i n a number of ways. He 17 j o i n ed E S G a tth e S E I I l ev el i n1 9 9 7 , p r i o rt o M o l l 's p r o mo t i o nt o th e S E I l ev e l i nth a ty ea r . 18 S p e n c e rr e m a in e d a n S E I Iu n t i lh e l e ft

E S G i n e a r l y2 0 0 4 t ow o r k

i n a n o t h e ra r e ao f

V e r i z o n .

- 86 -1 As indicated in the previous section, Gaglione testified that Spencer did not have the CPE 2 capabilities tha t Ve rizon believed Winley a nd Dean possessed; Gaglione could not give 3 S pencer the same projects that would be given to Winley or Dean. 4 Nor was Spencer in 1997 someone Verizon had to hire away f r om another 5 c o m p a ny ; h e w a s a l r e a d ya V e r i z o n e m p l o y e e . H e h a d s p e n t t h e p r i o r1 0 y e a r s a s a" m a r k e t 6 a d m i n i s t r a t o r " i n a d i ff e r e n t

V e r i z o n d e p a r tm e n t

( D e p o s i t i o n

o f Th o m a s S p e n c e r

, D e c e mb e r 7 2 1 , 2005 ("Spencer 2005 Dep. ") , a t 14). Just prior to his being hired for E SG, his salary was 8 $ 5 8, 8 0 0 , a n d h es t a t e d t h a t h e in fo r m e d t

h e n- S E M an a g e r M c G o w an t h a t h e w o u l d n o t m o v e 9 t o ESG unless he received a raise ( see Declaration of Thomas S pencer d a ted June 29, 2006 10 ( " S p e n c e rD e c l

. " ) , ¶ 5 ) . H e w a s g i v e n a b o u t a4 . 3 % r a i s e o f $ 2 , 5 0 0 a n d w a s t hu s p a i d $ 6 1 , 3 0 0 11 t o b e a n

S E I I ; M o l l ' s b a s e s a l a r ya s a n S E I th a t y e a rw a s $ 4 7

, 4 0 0 . W h e n

S p e n c e rl e ft

E S G i n 12 2 0 04, h is base salary was $76,200. By then Moll too was an SE II; b ut her base salary was 13 $ 5 9,400-- i.e. , less than Spencer's when he began in 1997. 14 V e r i z o n p o int s o u t

t h a t M o l l w a s p r o m o te d t o S E Ifr o ma c l e r i c a lp o s i ti o n , an d 15 i t c o n t e n d s t

h a t t h e s a l a r yi t

p a i d S p e n c e r

w a s j u s t i f

i a b l yh i gh e rt

h a n t h e s a l a r yi t

w a s t o p a y 16 M oll because Spence r w a s a "long-time Verizon manager" in a different division, referred 17 t o as "COG Group." (Verizon Statement o f Material Facts ¶ 13; see also (Verizon brief on 18 a p p e a l a t

6 0 ) ( s t a t i n gth a t

S p e n cer" h a d a d e c a d e o f m a n a g e m e n t

w o r k " ) . ) W h i l e th e r e c o r d 19 s h o w s t

h a t S p e n c e r ' s s a l a r yi n

C O G w a s a l r e a d y

w e l la b o v e wh a t

M o l l ' s w o u l db e a s an

S E I ,

- 87 -1 w e a r e n o t p e r s u a d e d t

h a t t h e r e c o r d a s a w h o l e s u p p o r t s V e r i z o n ' s c o n t e n t i o n th a t S p e n c e r 2 was not a valid compar ator for Moll's equal pay claim as a matter of law. 3 First, S pencer's own testimony in his 2005 deposition appears to contradic t 4 V erizon's characterization of his COG job as that o f a "m a na ge r . " Although the title was 5 " Market Administrator"--and Spencer in his declaration referred to i t as "my former 6 management job" (Spencer Decl. ¶ 4 )-

- he testified that his job was to provide Verizon 7 s a l esmen

wi th "technical support" (Spencer 2005 Dep. 14). H e sa i d , " [t ]h eywo ul d co me t o 8 m e fo r

q u e s ti o n s o r

p r o b l e m s . " ( I

d

. a t 1 5 . ) B u t

S p e n c e rt e s t i fi e d t

h a t n o o n e r e p o r t e d d i r e c tly 9 t o h i m; a n d h e was not aware of any organization ch a r ti n wh i ch h e wo ul d be l i st ed abo v e 10 o ther i ndividuals. He te s tified that he was not authorized to hire, or fire, or evaluate, o r 11 pr om ote a nyone. He was not authorized t o, and did not perform, employee performanc e 12 r e v i e w s . Th o s e a p p r a i s a l s w e r e d o n e b yS p e n c e r ' s o w n s u p e r v i s o r ; a n d whi l e S p e n c e r c o u l d 13 m a k e r eco mmen d a t i o n s, h e did not recall ever being a sk ed fo r h i s v i ews. ( S e e id

. a t1 5 -1 6 . ) 14 N o t hin g in t he r e c o r d m a te r i a l s s u p p l i e d o n t h i s a p p e a la p p e a r s t os u p p o r t t h e 15 v i e w th a t

S p e n c e rw a s h i r e d a w a yf r o maj ob i n w hi ch h e h a d m a n a g e m e n t

d u t i e s . I n d e e d , 16 Spencer viewed the S E II job--which itself was supportive of the CAMs, rather tha n 17 managerial--as "a prom o tion" (Spencer Decl. ¶ 6). 18 I t i s l e s s c l e a r

wh e t h e r S p e n c e r ' s w o rk

a s an S E I Iw a s s u

b s t anti a l ly

c o m p a r a b l e 19 t o the work performed by M oll. Moll claims tha t the w ork of a ll the SEs was comparable,

- 88 -1 but she described her main area of expertis e as traditional voice communication, while 2 d escribing Spencer's as "fast packet" "data services," explained as "[f]rame r elay services, 3 d ata services" (Moll 2006 Dep. 145). However, Gaglione , in distinguishing Spencer's data 4 s p e c i a l ty f r o m th e s p e c i a l t i e s o f W i n l e ya n d D e a n

, t e s t i fi e d th a t

S p e n c e r ' s " a r e ao f

e x p e r ti s e " 5 i n cl ud ed " a r e a s l i k e v o i ce, t r a d i t i o n a l

. . . . t e l e p h o ny " ( G a g l i o n e 2 0 1 7 D e p . 6 8 ) , th e a r e ath a t 6 was Moll's specialty. 7 Spencer himself has shed no d irect light on h is comparability to Moll. The 8 S p e n c e rd e c l a r a t i o n i n t h e p r e s e n t

r e c o r d w a s o n e t

h a t h e f u rn i s h e d i n

t h e a c t i o n b r o u gh t b y 9 B yrne; and it indicates that S pencer's specialties w e r e ne v e r the same as Byrne's. ( See 10 S p en cerDecl

. ¶¶ 8 -9 . ) B u t S p e n c e rd i d n o t m e n t i o n M o l l e i th e ri nth a td e cl a r a t i o no r i nh i s 11 2 0 05 deposition; and so far a s we are aware, h e has not furnished a ny de c la r a tion in the 12 p r esen t

a ct i o n . W h i l e Spencer gave a deposition in this case, the o n l yex c er p t s i n cl ud ed i n 13 the record on appeal describe his testimony about hearing--and t elling the people s e ate d 14 n ear him about--Finnegan's Verizon fax number, which Spence r c ons idered " minor 15 c o m p a r e d t o o t h e rt h i n g s th a t

w e r e a l w a y s s a i d e v e r yd a y " ( D e p o s i t i o n o f T h o m a s S p e n c e r, 16 N ovember 21, 2 006, at 2 4 ) . We have n ot been pointed t o evidence indicating that Spencer 17 d id not have the same voice telephony specialty as Moll. 18 M o r eo v e r, e v en i f S p en cer ' s p r ev i o us ex p er i en ce co ul d ex p l a i nth e d i ffer e n ce 19 betwee n his and Moll's salaries in 1997 when their employment in ESG began, that factor

- 89 -1 would not explain why the salary gap persisted. Differences in education a nd e xperience 2 a t

t h e t i m e o f

hi r in g a r el i k e ly t o m a tte r l e s s a s t h e e m p l o y e e s s p e n d y e a r s o n t h e j ob , l e a d i n g 3 t o l e s s o f

ad i s p a r i tyb e tw e e n

s a l a r i e s . S e eg e n e r a l l y Ki ng v . A c o s t aS a l e s &M a rke t i ng , I n c . , 6 7 8 4 F . 3 d 4 7 0 , 4 7 3

- 75 ( 7 th C i r . 2 0 1 2 ) . Th a td i d n o to ccurh e r e. W h e n S p e n c e rl e ft

E S G i n 2 0 0 4 h e 5 was still an SE II, and M oll had been promote d to SE II. Yet, the difference between their 6 salaries after both had bee n in ES G f or those seven years had n ot shrunk but in fact h ad 7 i ncreased. In 1997, Spencer's salary exceeded Moll's by $13,900; in 2004, Spencer's salary 8 exceeded Moll's by $16,800. Although Verizon argues that "no s ta tutory or judicial 9 a u th o r i ty " r equ i r ed i t" t o cl o se a ny g a p mo r e qui ck l y " (V er i z o nb r i e f o n a p p e a l a t

6 0 ) , i t h a s 10 o ffered no reason " other than sex," 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1), for the persistence and growth of 11 the Moll-Spencer pay gap. 12 I n sum, esp ecially giv en

th e ev i d en ce un d er mi n i n gV er i z o n 's co n t en t i o nth a t 13 S pencer h ad previously be en a "manager," there are factual issues to be resolved as to 14 whether Spencer was comparable to Moll for purposes of the Equal Pay Act.

15 F . Moll's State-Law Claims 16 Af te r d ismissing Moll's Title VII claims, the district court noted that her 17 N Y S H RL c l a i m s w e r e g o v e r n e d b y th e s a m e p r i n c i p l e s a n d d i s m i s s e d th e m a s w e l l

. T o th e

- 90 -1 e x t e n t

t h a t w e v a c a t e t

h e d i s m i s s a lo f

t h e T i t l e V I Ic l a i m s, w e a l s o v a c a t e t h e d i s m i s s a lo f

h e r 2 p arallel NYSHRL claims.

3 CONCLUSION

4 W e h a v e c o n s i d e r e d a l lo f t h e p a r t i e s ' a r gu m e n t s i n s u p p o r t o f t h e i rr e s p e c t i v e 5 p ositions on this a ppeal and, except as indicated above, h ave found them to b e w ithout 6 merit. The judgment dismissing Moll's complaint is a ffirmed e xc e pt to the extent that it 7 d ismissed her cla ims under Title VII and the NYSHRL for hostile work environment, 8 r e t a l i a t o r y t r a n sfero f h erjo b si t e t o S y r a c use, a n d d i s c r i m i n a t o r y o rr e t a l i a t o r yt e r m i n a t i o n 9 o f

h e re m p l o y m e n t; w e a l s o v a c a t e s om u ch o f t h e j u d g m e n t

a s d i s m i s s e d h e r

E q u a lP a yA c t 10 claim insofar as i t identified S pencer as a comparator. As to these s p ecified claims, we 11 v acate the judgment and remand for trial. 12 Costs to plaintiff.

- 91 -