alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
### §7265. Regional Energy Advisory Boards

#### (a) Establishment; membership

The Governors of the various States may establish Regional Energy Advisory Boards for their regions with such membership as they may determine.

#### (b) Observers

Representatives of the Secretary, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of the Interior, the Chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality, the Commandant of the Coast Guard and the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency shall be entitled to participate as observers in the deliberations of any Board established pursuant to subsection (a) of this section. The Federal Cochairman of the Appalachian Regional Commission or any regional commission under title V of the Public Works and Economic Development Act [42 U.S.C. 3181 et seq.] shall be entitled to participate as an observer in the deliberations of any such Board which contains one or more States which are members of such Commission.

#### (c) Recommendations of Board

Each Board established pursuant to subsection (a) may make such recommendations as it determines to be appropriate to programs of the Department having a direct effect on the region.

#### (d) Notice of reasons not to adopt recommendations

If any Regional Advisory Board makes specific recommendations pursuant to subsection (c), the Secretary shall, if such recommendations are not adopted in the implementation of the program, notify the Board in writing of his reasons for not adopting such recommendations.

(Pub. L. 95–91, title VI, §655, Aug. 4, 1977, 91 Stat. 602.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### References in Text

The Public Works and Economic Development Act, referred to in subsec. (b), is Pub. L. 89–136, Aug. 26, 1965, 79 Stat. 552. Title V of the Public Works and Economic Development Act was classified generally to subchapter V (§3181 et seq.) of chapter 38 of this title prior to repeal by Pub. L. 97–35, title XVIII, §1821(a)(8), Aug. 13, 1981, 95 Stat. 766. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Short Title note set out under section 3121 of this title and Tables.

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Transfer of Functions

For transfer of authorities, functions, personnel, and assets of the Coast Guard, including the authorities and functions of the Secretary of Transportation relating thereto, to the Department of Homeland Security, and for treatment of related references, see sections 468(b), 551(d), 552(d), and 557 of Title 6, Domestic Security, and the Department of Homeland Security Reorganization Plan of November 25, 2002, as modified, set out as a note under section 542 of Title 6.
1

The Honorable Donovan W. Frank, United States District Judge for the

District of Minnesota, adopting the report and recommendations of the Honorable

Jonathan G. Lebedoff, United States Magistrate Judge for the District of Minnesota.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-2601

___________

Dana Thompson, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* District of Minnesota.

T. C. Outlaw, Warden, FCI Waseca, *

* [UNPUBLISHED]

Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: July 7, 2005

Filed: July 15, 2005

___________

Before MELLOY, McMILLIAN, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Federal inmate Dana Thompson appeals the district court’s1

 dismissal of his 28

U.S.C. § 2241 petition. Following our de novo review, see United States v. Lurie,

207 F.3d 1075, 1076 (8th Cir. 2000), we agree with the district court that the federal

Bureau of Prisons (BOP) properly concluded that Thompson was ineligible for early

release based on his robbery conviction, and that he could not pursue his
-2-

Administrative Procedure Act-based claim because he failed to exhaust relevant

administrative remedies. See Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 230, 242-44 (2001) (holding

that 28 C.F.R. § 550.58 is reasonable interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)(B) both

in taking account of preconviction conduct and in making categorical exclusions);

United States v. Chappel, 208 F.3d 1069, 1069 (8th Cir. 2000) (per curiam)

(affirming district court’s dismissal--for failure to exhaust administrative remedies--of

inmate’s § 2241 petition seeking an order addressing right to pretrial credit against

federal sentence); Zachar v. Tippy, 202 F.3d 1039, 1044 (8th Cir. 2000) (upholding

denial of early release to inmate who completed Residential Drug Abuse Program

because his earlier conviction in California for aggravated assault, which was listed

in § 550.58, met the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting definition); 28 C.F.R.

§ 550.58(a)(1)(iv) (as exercise of discretion vested in director of BOP, inmates who

have prior felony or misdemeanor conviction for, inter alia, robbery are not eligible

for early release).

Accordingly, we affirm under 8th Cir. Rule 47B.

______________________________
Comment Info: =================

General Comment:June 15, 2010 email sent to FAA Rotorcraft Directorate (Sharon Miles, ASW-111) writhdrawing (canceling) Petition for Exemption.
§ 103.200 Investigations. ( a ) Upon the filing of a complaint under § 103.40, the Assistant Secretary will initiate an investigation. The purposes of an investigation are: ( 1 ) To obtain information concerning the events or transactions that relate to the alleged discriminatory housing practice identified in the complaint.
( 2 ) To document policies or practices of the respondent involved in the alleged discriminatory housing practice raised in the complaint.
( 3 ) To develop factual data necessary for the General Counsel to make a determination under § 103.400 whether reasonable cause exists to believe that a discriminatory housing practice has occurred or is about to occur, and for the Assistant Secretary to make a determination under § 103.400 that no reasonable cause exists to believe that a discriminatory housing practice has occurred or is about to occur, and to take other actions provided under this part.
( b ) Upon the written direction of the Assistant Secretary, HUD may initate an investigation of housing practices to determine whether a complaint should be filed under subpart B of this part. Such investigations will be conducted in accordance with the procedures described under this subpart.
[54 FR 3292, Jan. 23, 1989, as amended at 55 FR 53293, Dec. 28, 1990, 57 FR 39116, Aug. 28, 1992]
#### In the Matter of Felicia Vasquez-Williams, Respondent, v Vincent Williams, Appellant.

[821 NYS2d 226]

In a custody proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 6, the father appeals from an order of the Family Court, Suffolk County (MacKenzie, J.), dated August 24, 2005, which, after a hearing, inter alia, granted the mother’s petition to modify the custody provisions of the parties’ judgment of divorce and awarded her sole custody of the subject children.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

A parent seeking a change in custody must make an initial *860evidentiary showing sufficient to warrant a hearing (see *McNally v McNally,*28 AD3d 526 [2006]; *Smoczkiewicz v Smoczkiewicz,*2 AD3d 705 [2003]; *Corigliano v Corigliano,*297 AD2d 328, 329 [2002]; *Teuschler v Teuschler,*242 AD2d 289 [1997]). Contrary to the father’s contention, the mother’s allegations that he imposed excessive and inappropriate discipline on the subject children, including corporal punishment, was sufficient to warrant a hearing.

“A change of custody should be made only if the totality of the circumstances warrants a modification” *(Corigliano v Corigliano, supra*at 329; *see Friederwitzer v Friederwitzer,*55 NY2d 89, 95-96 [1982]). On this record, we discern no basis to disturb the Family Court’s determination, made after a hearing and in camera interviews with the subject children *(see Matter of Lincoln v Lincoln,*24 NY2d 270, 272 [1969]), that it was in their best interests to award custody to the mother *(see Eschbach v Eschbach,*56 NY2d 167, 171 [1982]; *Friederwitzer v Friederwitzer, supra*at 93-95).

The father’s remaining contentions are without merit. Florio, J.P., Goldstein, Mastro and Fisher, JJ., concur.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

AARON L. STRIBLING, AKA Aaron Lamont Stribling,

Plaintiff

- Appellant,

v.

E. WILSON, Correctional Officer in individual and official capacity,

Defendant

- Appellee. No. 18

- 16504

D.C. No.

1:17

- cv

- 01275

- AWI

- BAM

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California Anthony W. Ishii, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted May 21, 2019 **

Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, FRIEDLAND and BENNETT, Circuit Judges.

California state prisoner Aaron L. Stribling, AKA Aaron Lamont Stribling,

appeals pro se from the di strict court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983

action alleging that he was wrongfully deprived of personal property. We have

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

MAY 23 2019

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLER K

U.S. COURT OF APPEAL S2

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Belanus v. Clark , 796

F.3d 1021, 1024 (9th Cir. 2015) ( dismissa l under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A ); Watison v.

Carter , 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9 th Cir. 2012) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii))

. We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Stribling’s Fourteenth Amendment due

process claim because Stribling fa iled to allege facts sufficient to show that a

meaningful post

- deprivation remedy was unavailable to him

. See Hudson v.

Palmer , 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984) (holding an unauthorized intentional deprivation

of property by a state employee does not constitute a violation of the procedural

protections of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if a

meaningful post

- deprivation remedy is available); Barnett v. Centoni , 31 F.3d 813,

816

- 17 (9 th Cir. 1994) (“California [l]aw provides an adequate post

- depri vation

remedy for any property deprivations.” ).

To the extent that Stribling alleged that the deprivation of his property

violated the Fourth and Eighth Amendments, the district court properly dismissed

these claims because Stribling failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible

claim. See Ash croft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (to avoid dismissal, “a

complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim

to relief that is plausible on its face” (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted)); see also Taylor v. Knapp , 871 F.2d 803, 806 (9 th Cir. 1989) (Fourth3

Amendment does not protect an inmate from the seizure or conversion of his

property).

AFFIRMED.
§ 146.37 Investigation. ( a ) *Investigation and settlement following mediation.* ( 1 ) HUD shall investigate complaints that are unresolved after mediation or are reopened because of an alleged violation of a mediation agreement.
( 2 ) In the investigation of complaints filed under this part, HUD will establish facts through such methods as discussion with the complainant and recipient and the review of documents in the possession of either party. HUD may also seek the assistance of any applicable State agency. Where possible, HUD will settle the complaint on terms that are mutually agreeable to the parties.
( 3 ) Settlements shall be in writing and signed by the parties and by an authorized HUD official.
( 4 ) A settlement shall not affect the initiation or continuation of any other enforcement effort of HUD, including compliance reviews or investigation of other complaints involving the recipient.
( 5 ) A settlement reached under this paragraph (a) of this section is an agreement to resolve an alleged violation of the Act to the satisfaction of the parties involved, and does not constitute a finding of discrimination against the recipient.
( b ) *Failure of settlement.* If HUD cannot resolve the complaint through settlement, it may make a formal determination that the Act or this part has been violated and begin enforcement procedures, as provided in § 146.39. HUD shall inform the recipient and complainant in writing that the matter cannot be resolved through settlement.
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

JUDGMENT

No. 04-18-00080-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF A.J.M. and A.R.P., Children

From the 131st Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2017-PA-00429

Honorable Stephani A. Walsh, Judge Presiding

BEFORE CHIEF JUSTICE MARION, JUSTICE ANGELINI, AND JUSTICE BARNARD

In accordance with this court’s opinion of this date, this appeal is DISMISSED FOR 

WANT OF PROSECUTION. Costs of this appeal are taxed against appellant. 

SIGNED May 30, 2018.

_________________________________

Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice
##### 



EXHIBIT 32.1 
 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED
PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 In connection with the accompanying Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of
Lason, Inc. for the quarter ended March 31, 2004, each of the undersigned
hereby certifies pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to the best of my knowledge and
belief, that:  (1)
    
    such Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Lason, Inc. for the
quarter ended March 31, 2004, fully complies with the requirements of
Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and(2)
    
    the information contained in such Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q
of Lason, Inc. for the quarter ended March 31, 2004, fairly presents,
in all material respects, the financial condition and results of
operations of Lason, Inc. May 14, 2004
    /s/Ronald D. RisherRonald D. RisherChief Executive Officer May 14, 2004
    /s/Douglas S. KearneyDouglas S. KearneyChief Financial Officer
p.1 

OAR Box 1865 

Prepped by Charmelle Mathews 

Document Number: 

54) IV-E-42 

Docket Number: 

A-83-27 

Printed 12/3/2008 9:15:29 AM Sheet 54 of 105 
P.2 

/

u s " 

$ ift i \ UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 

I r&^-f 1 Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards 

t-ii&fc / Research Triangle Park, North Carolina 27711 

^H* * 

A-83-27 

SO NOV i387 IV-E-42 

Mr. J. R. Donnelly 

Chief Development Engineer 

Joy Technology, Incorporated 

404 East Huntington Drive 

Monrovia, California 91016 

Dear Mr. Donnelly: 

The purpose of this is to document our telephone conversation of 

November 25, 1987. Based on that conversation, it is my understanding 

that: 

1. Joy Technology is a leading manufacturer of spray dryer flue 

gas desulfurization (FGD) systems. 

2. Joy spray dryer FGD systems represent about 50 percent of 

domestic industrial boiler spray dryer FGD applications and about 75 to 

80 percent of the domestic utility boiler spray dryer FGD applications. 

3. The information, data, and conclusions presented in the following 

technical papers represent Joy's current view of spray dryer FGD system 

application and performance capabilities. 

a. "Industrial Spray Dryer FGD Experience," 1986 Industrial Power 

Conference, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, October 5-8, 1986; J.R. Donnelly, 

S.K. Hansen, and M.T. Quach; Joy Manufacturing Company, V/estern 

Precipitation Division; Los Angeles, California; and P.S. Farber; 

Argonne National Laboratory; Argonne, Illinois (Docket A-83-27; IV-J-40). 

b. "Spray Dryer Absorption Applications for High Sulfur Coal," 

J.R. Donnelly; Joy Manufacturing Company; Western Precipitation Division; 

Los Angeles, California; and K.S. Felsvang; A/S Niro Atomizer; Soeborg, 

Denmark, DK 2860. 

4. Joy Technology concludes that spray dryer FGD systems are 

capable of 90 percent SO? reduction on both high and low sulfur coal 

industrial boiler applications. 

5. Joy Technology has given, or will provide, guarantees of 

90 percent S0£ reduction for Joy spray dryer FGD systems on both low 

and high sulfur coal industrial boiler applications. 
P.3 

\ 

2 

Please confirm the contents of this memorandum. 

If I have misunderstood any of our discussion, please call me 

at (919) 541-5264. 

Sincerely, 

wodtto/4l. J/M»£h^ 

Walter H. Stevenson 

Environmental Engineer 

Standards Development Branch
§ 1006.315 Lease requirements. Except to the extent otherwise provided by or inconsistent with the laws of the State of Hawaii, in renting dwelling units in affordable housing assisted with NHHBG funds, the DHHL, owner, or manager must use leases that: ( a ) Do not contain unreasonable terms and conditions;
( b ) Require the DHHL, owner, or manager to maintain the housing in compliance with applicable local housing codes and quality standards;
( c ) Require the DHHL, owner, or manager to give adequate written notice of termination of the lease, which shall be the period of time required under applicable State or local law;
( d ) Specify that, with respect to any notice of eviction or termination, notwithstanding any State or local law, a resident shall be informed of the opportunity, before any hearing or trial, to examine any relevant documents, record, or regulations directly related to the eviction or termination;
( e ) Require that the DHHL, owner, or manager may not terminate the tenancy, during the term of the lease, except for serious or repeated violation of the terms and conditions of the lease, violation of applicable Federal, State, or local law, or for other good cause; and
( f ) Provide that the DHHL, owner, or manager may terminate the tenancy of a resident for any activity, engaged in by the resident, any member of the household of the resident, or any guest or other person under the control of the resident, that: ( 1 ) Threatens the health or safety of, or right to peaceful enjoyment of the premises by, other residents or employees of the DHHL, owner, or manager;
( 2 ) Threatens the health or safety of, or right to peaceful enjoyment of their premises by, persons residing in the immediate vicinity of the premises; or
( 3 ) Involves criminal activity (including drug-related criminal activity) on or off the premises.
### §6249b. Repealed. Pub. L. 106–469, title I, §103(22), Nov. 9, 2000, 114 Stat. 2033

Section, Pub. L. 94–163, title I, §173, as added Pub. L. 101–383, §6(a)(4), Sept. 15, 1990, 104 Stat. 731, related to contracts not requiring implementing legislation.
<PAGE>

                                                                  Exhibit 99(ii)

                                 Certifications

     I, Sharon Draper, Chief Accounting Officer of Tice Technology, Inc.,
certify that:

     1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of Tice Technology,
Inc.;

     2. Based on my knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain any untrue
statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make
the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements
were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this quarterly
report;

     3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this quarterly report, fairly present in all material
respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the
registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this quarterly report;

     4. The registrant's other certifying officers and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-14 and 15d-14) for the registrant and have:

          a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures to ensure that
material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated
subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly
during the period in which this quarterly report is being prepared;

          b) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls
and procedures as of a date within 90 days prior to the filing date of this
quarterly report (the "Evaluation Date"); and

          c) presented in this quarterly report our conclusions about the
effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures based on our evaluation
as of the Evaluation Date;

     5. The registrant's other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based
on our most recent evaluation, to the registrant's auditors and the audit
committee of registrant's board of directors (or persons performing the
equivalent functions):

          d) all significant deficiencies in the design or operation of internal
controls which could adversely affect the registrant's ability to record,
process, summarize and report financial data and have identified for the
registrant's auditors any material weaknesses in internal controls; and

          e) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or
other employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal
controls; and

     6. The registrant's other certifying officers and I have indicated in this
quarterly report whether or not there were significant changes in internal
controls or in other factors that could significantly affect internal controls
subsequent to the date of our most recent evaluation, including any corrective
actions with regard to significant deficiencies and material weaknesses.

Date:  February 6, 2003                  /s/ Sharon Draper
                                         ---------------------------------------
                                         Sharon Draper, Chief Accounting Officer
#### BAGNELL, Respondent, v. FEAGLES, Appellant.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.

February 15, 1905.)

Action by Robert Bagnell against Grace B. Feagles.

PER CURIAM.

Interlocutory judgment affirmed, with costs.

HOOKER, J., not sitting.
#### Antoinette Rosato et al., Respondents, v Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, Respondent, and Otis Elevator Co. Inc., Appellant.

[716 NYS2d 12]

—Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Charles Ramos, J.), entered April 10, 2000, which denied defendant Otis Elevator’s motion pursuant to CPLR 3216 to dismiss the complaint in this personal injury action for want of prosecution and granted plaintiffs’ cross motion to vacate the prior dismissal of the action under CPLR 3404 as abandoned and to permit the filing of a note of issue, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

The court properly exercised its discretion in concluding that the circumstances did not warrant dismissal for want of prosecution, even though plaintiffs failed to file a note of issue within 90 days of defendant Otis’s demand or to submit an affidavit outlining the meritorious nature of their case. We note that Otis served its 90-day demand only approximately 6 months after the end of a multi-year period of what even Otis does not dispute was active and extensive discovery. Moreover, about two months prior to filing the dismissal motion, Otis’s counsel had signed a stipulation, agreeing that all discovery was complete and that the matter was ready to be placed on the trial calendar. Finally, plaintiffs’ failure to submit an affidavit of merit is of little moment here, since there was an adequate showing that for a long period of time prior to the submission *44of the dismissal motion the action had been actively pursued *(Rogoff v Scheinberg,*22 AD2d 679). Otis’s complaint of prejudice is unsubstantiated.

Turning to plaintiffs’ cross motion for restoration under CPLR 3404, no one disputes that the parties were unaware that the case had been stricken from the calendar in May 1996. It does not appear, and Otis does not maintain, that the case had been marked off as the result of any default on the part of plaintiffs (in fact counsel had responded to court inquiries about the status of the case). Further, the IAS Court noted that the mark off apparently was the result of a clerical error.

Under these circumstances, plaintiffs’ failure to submit an affidavit of merit is not fatal to restoration *(see, Balducci v Jason,*133 AD2d 436, 437). Concur — Nardelli, J. P., Tom, Wallach, Andrias and Saxe, JJ.