Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2188 | May 31, 2019 Page 1 of 7

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Elizabeth A. Bellin

Elkhart, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Evan M. Comer

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Jamie R. Green,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

May 31, 2019

Court of Appeals Case No.

18A-CR-2188

Appeal from the Elkhart Superior 

Court

The Honorable Kristine A. 

Osterday, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

20D01-1803-F5-49

May, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2188 | May 31, 2019 Page 2 of 7

[1] Jamie R. Green appeals his conviction of Level 5 felony domestic battery 

resulting in injury to a pregnant woman.

1

 Green raises one issue on appeal, 

which we restate as whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the 

victim’s prior out-of-court statements during the responding officer’s testimony 

and the victim’s direct examination. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] K.B. and Green began a romantic relationship in 2017. During their 

relationship, Green impregnated K.B, and K.B. notified Green of her 

pregnancy. K.B. and Green discussed topics related to the baby, including the 

baby’s gender, items that needed to be purchased for the baby, and pregnancyrelated doctor appointments.

[3] K.B. was at Green’s house during the early morning hours of January 10, 2018. 

While Green was asleep, a female sent several text messages to him asking for 

sexual favors. K.B. read the text messages, and she woke Green and asked him

about the text messages. Green then put his hand behind K.B’s neck and 

started “smashing” the side of her head with his elbow. (Tr. Vol. II at 91.) 

K.B. experienced extreme pain and fell to the floor. Green punched K.B. in the 

mouth and hit her right eye.

 

1 Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1.3(c).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2188 | May 31, 2019 Page 3 of 7

[4] After the assault, K.B. left Green’s house and called 911 on her way to a gas 

station. Officer Tyler Kruse responded to K.B.’s 911 call and met her at the gas 

station. He observed K.B. was crying, her lip was swollen with dried blood on 

it, the right side of her face was swollen and red, and her right ear and the area 

behind the ear were bright red. K.B. told Officer Kruse that she was 19 weeks 

pregnant, Green was the father, and Green had battered her. Officer Kruse 

recorded his interactions with K.B. using his bodycam.

[5] The State charged Green with Level 5 felony domestic battery resulting in 

injury to a pregnant woman and Class A misdemeanor domestic battery.2

 The 

court held a jury trial on July 24 and 25, 2018. Both Officer Kruse and K.B. 

testified at the trial. Officer Kruse testified:

[K.B.] told me that her boyfriend, Jamie Green, had received a 

text. She said that she opened the phone and saw the text was 

from another girl. She accused Jamie of cheating on her and 

then Jaime immediately hit her. She said Jamie hit her twice on 

the side of—in the side of the head with his elbow. She said 

Jamie continued to hit her. He grabbed her neck, punched her in 

her lip, mouth, and then finally Jamie grabbed her hair and hit 

her head on his knee and then she said she was able to get away. 

That’s when she drove away and called the police and met us at 

the gas station.

(Id. at 47.) K.B. testified on the second day of trial. During K.B.’s testimony, 

the State published to the jury portions of K.B.’s 911 call and Officer Kruse’s 

 

2 Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1.3(a).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2188 | May 31, 2019 Page 4 of 7

bodycam footage. The jury returned a verdict of guilty on both counts. The 

trial court merged the misdemeanor charge with the felony count, entered the 

felony conviction, and sentenced Green to five years in the Indiana Department 

of Correction, with one year suspended to probation. 

Discussion and Decision

[6] The decision to admit or exclude evidence rests within the sound discretion of 

the trial court, and we afford the trial court great deference on appeal. Norris v. 

State, 53 N.E.3d 512, 525 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). “An abuse of discretion occurs 

when the trial court’s decision is clearly erroneous and against the logic and 

effect of the facts and circumstances before it or it misinterprets the law.” Id. 

Similarly, the number of witnesses that may be called to prove a fact is within 

the trial court’s sound discretion. Id.

[7] A contemporaneous objection is required at the time evidence is introduced at 

trial in order to preserve the issue for appeal. Rhodes v. State, 996 N.E.2d 450, 

454 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). Green failed to contemporaneously object to

admission of the evidence he now contends was erroneously allowed. 

Therefore, we may reverse only upon a showing of fundamental error. Brown v. 

State, 929 N.E.2d 204, 207 (Ind. 2010), reh’g denied. “The fundamental error 

exception is extremely narrow, and [it] applies only when the error constitutes a 

blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is 

substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due 

process.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The claimed error must be so 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2188 | May 31, 2019 Page 5 of 7

egregious it renders a fair trial impossible or constitutes a blatant violation of 

basic and elementary principles of due process. Id.

[8] Green argues the trial court abused its discretion in allowing Officer Kruse to 

testify as to K.B.’s out-of-court statements and in admitting portions of K.B.’s 

call to 911 and Officer Kruse’s bodycam footage. Green contends these out-ofcourt statements improperly bolstered the victim’s credibility, amounting to 

drumbeat repetition making meaningful cross-examination impossible. We 

disagree.

[9] Green’s argument principally relies on two cases, Modesitt v. State, 578 N.E.2d 

649 (Ind. 1991), and Stone v. State, 536 N.E.2d 534 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989), trans. 

denied. In Modesitt, the defendant was charged with molesting an 11-year-old

girl. 578 N.E.2d at 650. The victim’s mother, a welfare caseworker, and a 

psychologist testified as to what the victim told each of them about the 

defendant’s conduct before the State called the victim to testify. Id. Our 

Indiana Supreme Court held that the drumbeat repetition of the victim’s 

statements by other witnesses before the victim was called to testify “precluded 

direct, immediate cross examination of the statements and constitutes error 

requiring reversal.” Id. at 652. 

[10] Similarly, in Stone, the defendant was charged with two counts of child 

molesting. 536 N.E.2d at 535. The victim, the victim’s sister, and four adults 

testified as to the victim’s report of what transpired between the defendant and 

the victim. Id. at 537. We determined the trial court abused its discretion in 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2188 | May 31, 2019 Page 6 of 7

allowing each witness to recount the victim’s version of events because the 

victim’s “credibility became increasingly unimpeachable as each adult added 

his or her personal eloquence, maturity, emotion, and professionalism to [the 

victim’s] out-of-court statements.” Id. at 540. 

[11] However, this case differs significantly from Modesitt and Stone. In both the 911 

call and the recording from Officer Kruse’s body cam, K.B. herself is the one 

recounting the same events to which she was testifying at trial. So, unlike Stone,

multiple witnesses are not using their “eloquence, maturity, emotion, and 

professionalism” to boost K.B.’s credibility. Id. K.B. is the only one speaking. 

Additionally, the State played the portions of K.B.’s 911 call and Officer 

Kruse’s bodycam footage during K.B.’s testimony, and Green cross-examined 

K.B. after this testimony. Thus, Green had the opportunity to immediately 

address K.B.’s statements and the exhibits. 

[12] Finally, Officer Kruse’s statement was, at most, harmlessly cumulative. We do 

not reverse when repetitive testimony is “brief, consistent with, and [does] not 

elaborate” upon the victim’s allegations. Surber v. State, 884 N.E.2d 856, 864 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied. The State asked Officer Kruse what K.B. 

told him, and Officer Kruse merely summarized her statement. His testimony 

was consistent with K.B.’s version of events as relayed in her 911 call, her 

statement captured on Officer’s Kruse’s bodycam, and her testimony. 

Therefore, we cannot say it was fundamental error to admit his statement. See 

Norris, 53 N.E.3d at 526 (holding it was not error for trial court to allow 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2188 | May 31, 2019 Page 7 of 7

testimony of two witnesses that merely provided an overview of the situation 

and a summary of the victim’s accusations).

Conclusion

[13] Green cross-examined K.B. immediately after portions of her 911 call and 

Officer Kruse’s bodycam footage were published to the jury. Additionally,

Officer Kruse’s brief summary of K.B.’s report to him and evidence of K.B. 

explaining what happened do not amount to impermissible drumbeat 

repetition. Accordingly, we affirm. 

Affirmed.

Baker, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.