2024 UT App 114

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH, IN THE INTEREST OF K.B.,

A PERSON UNDER EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE.

M.B.,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF UTAH,

Appellee.

Per Curiam Opinion

No. 20240136-CA

Filed August 8, 2024

Second District Juvenile Court, Farmington Department

The Honorable Sharon S. Sipes

No. 1202076

Colleen K. Coeberg, Attorney for Appellant

Sean D. Reyes and John M. Peterson, Attorneys

for Appellee

Martha Pierce, Guardian ad Litem

Before JUDGES GREGORY K. ORME, MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN

FORSTER and AMY J. OLIVER.

PER CURIAM:

¶1 M.B. (Mother) appeals the termination of her parental 

rights in K.B. and K.B. (Children).

¶2 Mother asserts that the juvenile court’s determination that 

the Division of Child and Family Services (DCFS) made active 

efforts to provide services to Mother was clearly erroneous. 

Children are within the scope of the Indian Child Welfare Act 

(ICWA). See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901—1963. Under section 1912 of 
In re K.B

20240136-CA 2 2024 UT App 114

ICWA, before terminating the parental rights of a parent of an 

Indian child, the juvenile court must determine that “active efforts 

have been made to provide remedial services and rehabilitative 

programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family

and that these efforts have proved unsuccessful.” Id. § 1912(d). A 

juvenile court’s determination regarding the provision of services 

is “a mixed question of fact and law.” In re A.C., 2004 UT App 255, 

¶ 9, 97 P.3d 706 (quotation simplified). “[T]he determination of 

whether [the active efforts] standard has been met should be 

made on a case-by-case basis.” In re C.D., 2008 UT App 477, ¶ 35, 

200 P.3d 194. “Accordingly, the juvenile court is afforded some 

discretion on this issue.” Id. “We review the juvenile court's 

factual findings for clear error and its conclusions of law for 

correctness, affording the court some discretion in applying the 

law to the facts.” Id. (quotation simplified).

¶3 Mother does not challenge any of the findings of fact 

underlying the juvenile court’s determination that active efforts 

were made. Rather, she argues that the court’s determination that 

DCFS made active efforts to provide services to Mother was not 

supported by the evidence. She also contends that the court 

improperly relied on expert testimony from the Colorado River 

Indian Tribes’ (Tribe) ICWA expert (Tribe Representative). 

¶4 Mother first argues that the juvenile court improperly 

relied on Tribe Representative’s expert testimony. Tribe 

Representative testified that DCFS provided information 

regarding the case to Tribe, included Tribe Representative and 

Tribe counsel in regular meetings, accepted suggestions 

regarding the case, and provided appropriate services to Mother. 

Tribe Representative also stated that the services DCFS offered 

were essentially the same as Tribe would have provided. There 

were no other services identified from which Mother would have 

benefitted that were not offered. Tribe Representative opined that 

the services provided by DCFS constituted “active efforts.”
In re K.B

20240136-CA 3 2024 UT App 114

¶5 Mother asserts that the juvenile court “simply adopted the 

ICWA expert’s opinion regarding active efforts” when such 

expert testimony was not required. Although expert testimony 

regarding “active efforts” is not required, see In re P.F., 2017 UT 

App 159, ¶ 32, 405 P.3d 755 (quotation simplified), the court may 

consider expert testimony on the issue, see id. ¶ 33. No objection 

was made to Tribe Representative’s testimony. The court was 

entitled to consider the expert testimony as part of its analysis of 

whether DCFS made active efforts. See id. Furthermore, Mother’s 

assertion that the court “simply adopted” Tribe Representative’s 

opinion is incorrect. The court referred to the testimony as part of 

its analysis and found it to support the determination that DCFS 

made active efforts to provide remedial services.

¶6 Mother also argues that the juvenile court’s finding is not 

supported by the evidence. Although Mother faults the court’s 

analysis for not including “meticulous findings,” she does not 

challenge here any of the more than two hundred findings of fact 

regarding the proceedings, including many specifically regarding 

the services provided in an effort to prevent the breakup of the 

family. The court’s findings of fact included numerous findings 

regarding the services provided, follow up with Mother on issues, 

active communication with Tribe, Mother’s compliance with 

some provisions of the service plan, and Mother’s lack of 

compliance with other parts of the service plan. The findings 

support the juvenile court’s analysis of the efforts made. Mother 

implies that the summary of facts in the analysis constitute the 

whole of the findings, which is inaccurate.

¶7 Although the juvenile court made numerous findings of 

fact that support its determination that DCFS made active efforts 

to provide services, Mother contends that other evidence should 

be weighed against the determination of active efforts. A finding

of fact in parental termination proceedings will not be overturned 

unless it is against the clear weight of the evidence or the appellate 

court otherwise reaches a conviction that a mistake has been 
In re K.B

20240136-CA 4 2024 UT App 114

made. See In re S.Y., 2003 UT App 66, ¶ 11, 66 P.3d 601. The weight 

of the evidence in the record supports the juvenile court’s finding 

that DCFS made active efforts.

¶8 Mother argues that the DCFS caseworker (Caseworker)

should have done more in areas where Mother had not complied 

with the service plan. She contends that Caseworker should have 

consulted with Mother’s criminal attorney to assist with Mental 

Health Court. However, Caseworker testified that DCFS has no 

control over Mental Health Court or compliance in criminal 

matters that are beyond the scope of the underlying proceeding. 

Caseworker also testified that there may have been some question 

about Mother’s eligibility for Mental Health Court depending on 

the charges. Mother also asserts that Caseworker should have 

done more to get Mother to comply with a requirement to get a 

medication management assessment. Mother consistently 

declined to take medication, even after multiple discussions. 

Caseworker engaged in multiple discussions with Mother, but 

Caseworker also testified there is no mechanism to force a parent 

to take medication. Additionally, Caseworker followed up with 

Mother multiple times regarding releases and forms, but 

Caseworker testified she could not fill out forms for Mother. 

Overall, Mother resists responsibility for her own recalcitrance 

and seeks to attribute that responsibility to DCFS. But, the weight 

of the evidence, including the services provided by DCFS, 

Caseworker’s regular communication and follow up with Mother 

and Tribe, and expert testimony from Tribe Representative, 

supports the juvenile court’s finding that DCFS made active 

efforts to provide services to Mother.

¶9 Mother also asserts that the juvenile court improperly 

relied on hearsay to determine that Mother continued her criminal 

activity. Mother identifies an objection to particular testimony 

and challenges a specific finding of fact. However, the testimony 

and objection do not relate to the challenged finding.
In re K.B

20240136-CA 5 2024 UT App 114

¶10 Caseworker testified regarding Mother’s continued 

criminal activity. Caseworker testified that Mother had been 

arrested twice since Caseworker had come onto the case in 

September 2022. Mother had been jailed for each arrest. Those 

arrests were supported by the criminal court dockets admitted as 

exhibits without objection. Caseworker also testified that the

parents’ (Parents) relationship was frequently discussed at team 

meetings. Parents both reported that they were no longer 

together. Caseworker requested police reports to monitor Parents’ 

interactions with law enforcement. She received about fifteen 

reports from September 2022 to May 2023. Although Parents 

denied that they were together, Caseworker testified that several 

of the police reports involved both parents and were labeled as 

family disturbance or domestic violence interactions. Based on the 

police reports, Caseworker was concerned about Parents’ 

relationship and their honesty. No objection was made to this 

testimony.

¶11 Caseworker also testified that she had concerns regarding 

whether Mother had internalized the information from services in 

which she had participated. Caseworker explained her concern by 

referring to the police reports she had seen that indicated 

domestic violence issues. It is this testimony to which an objection 

was made. Mother’s counsel stated that the testimony was 

hearsay as to the content of the police reports. The court overruled 

the objection because the court determined that the testimony was 

not offered for the truth of matter of the content of the police 

reports. Rather, the testimony provided the rationale for 

Caseworker’s continued concerns about Mother.

¶12 On appeal, Mother asserts that the juvenile court used the 

challenged testimony as affirmative evidence of domestic 

violence. She specifically challenges finding of fact number ten: 

“On January 16, 2022, [Mother] was arrested after police 

responded to a report of domestic violence at [Parents’] 

apartment. [Mother] was released with a jail release no contact 
In re K.B

20240136-CA 6 2024 UT App 114

order from the district court. On January 17, 2022, [Mother] was 

arrested for violating that order.” However, the challenged 

testimony and police reports involve a time period well after 

January 2022. The challenged finding was not based on the 

identified testimony. Furthermore, there is no finding of fact that 

is specifically based on the identified testimony.1

¶13 To the extent that Mother contends the challenged finding 

of fact is unsupported because it is from an unproven petition, she 

is partially correct. The fact of Mother’s arrest in January 2022 and 

the resulting removal of Children are established through 

testimony. The details that the police responded to a report of 

domestic violence and that Mother subsequently was arrested 

again for violating a no contact order appear not to be 

independently supported in the record on appeal.

¶14 Mother contends that this unsupported finding of fact 

affected multiple grounds for termination. The juvenile court 

referred to the January 2022 arrest and domestic violence in a few, 

but not all, of the multiple grounds for termination found by the 

court. However, a finding of any single ground is sufficient to 

support the termination of parental rights. Utah Code § 80-4-

301(1) (providing “the juvenile court may terminate all parental 

1. Mother asserts that inadmissible hearsay led to the court’s 

finding regarding “inconsistencies between the parents’ reports 

of their no contact and numerous police reports of ongoing 

domestic violence between the parents.” This misstates the 

finding. The complete finding related to discussions at family 

team meetings: “At family team meetings, the relationship 

between the parents was discussed to address the inconsistencies 

between the parents’ reports of their no contact and numerous 

police reports of ongoing domestic violence between the parents.” 

As noted above, no objection was made to Caseworker’s 

testimony regarding the meetings and police reports obtained to 

monitor Parents’ relationship.
In re K.B

20240136-CA 7 2024 UT App 114

rights with respect to the parent if the juvenile court finds any one 

of the” listed grounds for termination). Because the juvenile court 

found grounds for termination that did not rely on the challenged 

finding, any reference to the challenged finding is harmless error. 

The independent grounds are sufficient to support the 

termination of Mother’s parental rights.

¶15 Accordingly, the termination of Mother’s parental rights is 

affirmed.