alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Consulting Agreement for Betsy Z. Cohen



  
 Exhibit 10.8

 RAIT Financial Trust 
 Cira Centre 
 2929 Arch Street, 17th Floor 

Philadelphia, PA 19104 
 November 4, 2010 
 Betsy Z. Cohen 
 c/o RAIT Financial Trust 
 Cira Centre 

2929 Arch Street, 17th Floor 

Philadelphia, PA 19104 
  

					
	Re:	  	 Consulting Agreement
	  	

 Dear Betsy: 
 The purpose of this letter is to memorialize our mutual understanding as to the consulting services that you have agreed to perform for RAIT Financial Trust (“RAIT”) following your
ceasing to be an employee of RAIT as a result of your retirement as Chairman of the Board of Trustees of RAIT (the “Board”) and as a member of the Board, which retirement is to become effective on December 31, 2010. Specifically, for
the period from January 1, 2011 through March 31, 2011 (the “Consulting Period”), you agree to be a consultant for RAIT and perform consulting services for RAIT, which consulting services require you to consult with the
executive officers, as well as the Board, with respect to such matters as may be reasonably requested by RAIT (collectively, the “Consulting Services”). 
 In consideration for these Consulting Services, during the Consulting Period, RAIT will reimburse you for all of your reasonable travel and other expenses incurred by you in connection with the
performance of the Consulting Services in accordance with RAIT’s expense reimbursement policies and provide you with office space and appropriate secretarial support. However, as a consultant, you will not be an employee of RAIT and will not be
entitled to participate in or receive any benefit or right as a RAIT employee under any RAIT employee benefit plan or pension plan. In addition, you are responsible for all income taxes, employment taxes and workers’ compensation insurance
associated with the compensation you receive pursuant to this letter agreement and you agree that RAIT will not withhold or pay any of the foregoing in connection with your services to RAIT. 







  
 If the foregoing
correctly sets forth your understanding of our agreement relating to the matters set forth in this letter agreement, please so indicate by signing below. 

 

	
	 Sincerely,

	
	 /S/    SCOTT F.
SCHAEFFER

	 Scott F. Schaeffer

	 Chief Executive Officer and President



 ACCEPTED AND AGREED TO: 
  

	
	 /S/    BETSY Z.
COHEN

	 Betsy Z. Cohen
69–008 

110TH CONGRESS REPORT " ! HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 1st Session 110–440 

PROVIDING FOR CONSIDERATION OF THE CONFERENCE REPORT TO ACCOMPANY THE BILL (H.R. 1429) TO REAUTHORIZE THE HEAD START ACT, 

TO IMPROVE PROGRAM QUALITY, TO EXPAND ACCESS, AND FOR OTHER 

PURPOSES 

NOVEMBER 9, 2007.—Referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be printed 

Ms. CASTOR, from the Committee on Rules, 

submitted the following 

R E P O R T 

[To accompany H. Res. 813] 

The Committee on Rules, having had under consideration House 

Resolution 813, by a nonrecord vote, report the same to the House 

with the recommendation that the resolution be adopted. 

SUMMARY OF PROVISIONS OF THE RESOLUTION

The resolution waives all points of order against the conference 

report on H.R. 1429, the Improving Head Start for School Readiness Act of 2007 and against its consideration. The rule provides 

that the conference report shall be considered as read. 

EXPLANATION OF WAIVERS

The waiver of all points of order against the conference report 

and against its consideration includes a waiver of clause 8 of rule 

XXII (requiring a three-day layover of conference reports and the 

accompanying joint explanatory statement). Although the rule 

waives all points of order against the conference report and against 

its consideration, the conference report does not violate either 

clause 9 or 10 of rule XXI. 

Æ 

mstockstill on PROD1PC66 with HEARING
#### In the Matter of Donna Self et al., Appellants, v County of Nassau, Respondent.

In a proceeding pursuant to section 50-e of the General Municipal Law for leave to serve a late notice of claim *nunc pro tunc,*petitioners appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County, dated July 12, 1976, which denied their application. Order affirmed, with $50 costs and disbursements. The application was properly denied. The accident giving rise to the alleged claim against the County of Nassau occurred in May, 1972. No notice of claim was ever served by petitioners and no suit against the county was commenced by them. The instant application for leave to serve a late notice of claim was not made until June, 1976. It was obviously motivated by an April, 1976 jury verdict against the county in another action arising out of the same multi-car accident. Petitioners have not established any viable claim of estoppel against the county. Even assuming that the police accident report was misleading in failing to indicate that the investigating officer had arrived at the scene seconds before the collision and the position of his vehicle at the time (the officer has consistently claimed that he stopped his vehicle at the curb upon his arrival), petitioners’ counsel has failed to demonstrate reasonable diligence in his investigation. We agree that certainly by October, 1974, when a motion was made in Nassau County to consolidate all of the actions then pending in this matter, counsel knew or should have known of the possible "involvement” of the county. His failure to seek leave to file a late claim at that point constitutes laches. Moreover, it appears that the instant applica*964tion is absolutely time-barred since the time limited for the commencement of an action has long since expired (see General Municipal Law, § 50-e, subd 5; § 50-i). Cohalan, J. P., Damiani, Rabin and Titone, JJ., concur.
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SEMHAL SIRAJ,

Plaintiff,

v.

BAYER HEALTHCARE, LLC,

Defendant.

___________________________________/

No. C-09-0233 SI (EMC)

ORDER EXCUSING ATTENDANCE AT

SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE

By letter dated March 8, 2010, Plaintiff SEMHAL SIRAJ, through counsel Kenneth C.

Absalom , Nevin & Absalom, requested to be excused from personally appearing at the settlement

conference scheduled for March 15, 2010. No opposition was filed by any party.

Upon consideration of the request, the Court finds good cause for excusing personal

attendance. Therefore, it is hereby ordered that Plaintiff SEMHAL SIRAJ be available by telephone

from 1:30 p.m. Pacific Time until further notice on March 15, 2010.

If the Court concludes that the absence of Plaintiff SEMHAL SIRAJ is impeding the

settlement conference, the Court may continue the settlement conference and may order personal

attendance by each party including Plaintiff SEMHAL SIRAJ.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 11, 2010 _______________________________

EDWARD M. CHEN

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 3:09-cv-00233-SI Document 68 Filed 03/11/10 Page 1 of 1
#### Amsterdam Urban Renewal Agency, Appellant, v Ellis L. Jacobson et al., as Testamentary Trustees of Trust for the Estate of Samuel Jacobson, Deceased, Appellants, and Firestone Tire & Rubber Company, Respondent, et al., Defendants.

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court at Special Term, entered July 8, 1977 in Montgomery County, which granted respondent’s motion for permission to file a supplemental appraisal report. The underlying controversy herein centers upon the condemnation of a certain premises owned by appellants Ellis L. Jacobson, Henry S. Jacobson and Samuel Seigal and partially leased by respondent Firestone Tire & Rubber Company (hereinafter, Firestone). Following a trial before three commissioners, it was determined by said commissioners that the subject property had a full value of $143,102.96, all of which was awarded to the owners. Firestone, which as a tenant was awarded no damages, subsequently moved at Special Term for an order rejecting and setting aside the commissioners’ report, as did the owners, and the court granted these motions because of irregularities and errors in law and remanded the matter for a rehearing before the same commissioners *(Amsterdam Urban Renewal Agency v Jacobson,*85 Misc 2d 869). Thereafter, Firestone made application, pursuant to rule 839.3 of the special rules of practice of this court (22 NYCRR 839.3), for permission to file a supplemental appraisal for the consideration of the commissioners, and its request was granted in the order which is challenged on this appeal. We hold that the order appealed from must be reversed. Pursuant to 22 NYCRR 839.3 cited above, permission to file an amended or supplemental appraisal may be granted "upon good cause shown” and where, as here, the trial of the issue has begun, said permission may not be granted "except in extraordinary circumstances”. In the present instance, the record is barren of any evidence of good cause or extraordinary circumstances which would justify permitting Firestone to file a supplemental appraisal. While it concededly developed at the first trial that the initial report submitted by Firestone’s appraiser was inexpertly and inadequately prepared so as to limit the proof which Firestone could offer at the trial, this factor alone clearly does not provide a sufficient basis for Special Term’s grant of Firestone’s application (cf. *Binghamton Urban Renewal Agency v Levene,*34 AD2d 241; see, also, *Laken Realty Corp. v State of New York,*37 AD2d 885). In so ruling, we would point out that our *1093holding herein does not leave Firestone without a remedy. As Special Term stated in setting aside the initial award, upon the rehearing the commissioners may consider the evidence of the other appraisers and additional factors, such as the terms and conditions of the lease involved, in determining the amount of Firestone’s damages *(Amsterdam Urban Renewal Agency v Jacobson, supra;*see, also, *Irv-Ceil Realty Corp. v State of New York,*43 AD2d 775). Order reversed, on the law and the facts, without costs. Mahoney, P. J., Sweeney, Kane, Main and Larkin, JJ., concur.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-6652

CHRISTIAN ISRAEL LAVANDERA-HERNANDEZ,

 Petitioner – Appellant,

v.

DUANE TERRELL, Superintendent; ROBERT C. LEWIS, Director of 

Prisons; THEODIS BECK, Secretary,

 Respondents - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle 

District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Thomas D. Schroeder, 

District Judge. (1:12-cv-00553-TDS-LPA)

Submitted: August 29, 2013 Decided: September 4, 2013

Before DUNCAN, AGEE, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Christian Israel Lavandera-Hernandez, Appellant Pro Se. Clarence 

Joe DelForge, III, NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 

Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Christian Israel Lavandera-Hernandez seeks to appeal 

the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254 (2006) petition. The order is not appealable unless a 

circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 

28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (2006). A certificate of 

appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of 

the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) 

(2006). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a 

prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that 

reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s 

assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. 

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see Miller-El v. 

Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003). When the district court 

denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must 

demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is 

debatable, and that the petition states a debatable claim of the 

denial of a constitutional right. Slack, 529 U.S. at 484-85. 

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude 

that Lavandera-Hernandez has not made the requisite showing. 

Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability, deny leave 

to proceed in forma pauperis, and dismiss the appeal. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 
3

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ESCO MARINE INC,

Plaintiff,

 v.

SS PACIFIC STAR,

Defendant. /

No. C 08-05575 SI

SECOND

PRETRIAL PREPARATION ORDER

It is hereby ORDERED pursuant to F.R.C.P. and the Local Rules of this Court:

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO ADD INDIVIDUAL OWNERS AS DEFENDANTS: March 19, 2010, at

9:00 a.m. (File: 2/26/10, Opposition: 3/5/10, Reply: 3/12/10)

PRETRIAL CONFERENCE DATE: May 18, 2010 at 3:30 PM.

JURY TRIAL DATE: June 1, 2010 at 8:30 AM., Courtroom 10, 19th floor.

TRIAL LENGTH is estimated to be days.

SPECIAL DISCOVERY AND PRETRIAL PROVISIONS:

Naughton and Choi’s depositions shall proceed on a date convenient to Mr. Ronnenberg between

2/15/10 and 2/25/10.

The pretrial conference SHALL be attended by trial counsel prepared to discuss all aspects of the case,

including settlement. Parties SHALL conform to the attached instructions. Plaintiff is ORDERED to

serve a copy of this order on any party subsequently joined in this action.

Dated: 

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

Case 3:08-cv-05575-SI Document 43 Filed 01/29/10 Page 1 of 1
### §290cc–23. Requirement of matching funds

#### (a) In general

The Secretary may not make payments under section 290cc–21 of this title unless, with respect to the costs of providing services pursuant to section 290cc–22 of this title, the State involved agrees to make available, directly or through donations from public or private entities, non-Federal contributions toward such costs in an amount that is not less than $1 for each $3 of Federal funds provided in such payments.

#### (b) Determination of amount

Non-Federal contributions required in subsection (a) may be in cash or in kind, fairly evaluated, including plant, equipment, or services. Amounts provided by the Federal Government, or services assisted or subsidized to any significant extent by the Federal Government, shall not be included in determining the amount of such non-Federal contributions.

#### (c) Limitation regarding grants by States

The Secretary may not make payments under section 290cc–21 of this title unless the State involved agrees that the State will not require the entities to which grants are provided pursuant to section 290cc–22(a) of this title to provide non-Federal contributions in excess of the non-Federal contributions described in subsection (a).

(July 1, 1944, ch. 373, title V, §523, as added Pub. L. 100–77, title VI, §611(3), July 22, 1987, 101 Stat. 517; amended Pub. L. 101–645, title V, §511, Nov. 29, 1990, 104 Stat. 4728.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Prior Provisions

A prior section 523 of act July 1, 1944, was renumbered section 544 by section 611(2) of Pub. L. 100–77 and is classified to section 290dd–3 of this title.

#### Amendments

1990—Pub. L. 101–645 amended section generally, substituting present provisions for provisions which related to: in subsec. (a), general requirements; and in subsec. (b), determination of amount of non-Federal contribution.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

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<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR THE QUARTER ENDED JUNE 30, 1997 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS
ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
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<PERIOD-START>                             APR-01-1997
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<CASH>                                           7,151
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   27,163
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<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                33,576
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#### § 146.11 Scope of subpart.

This subpart contains the standards that HUD will use to determine whether an age distinction, or a factor other than age that may have a disproportionate effect on persons of different ages, is prohibited.
I 

109TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 2796 

To expand the use of DNA for the identification and prosecution of sex 

offenders, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JUNE 8, 2005 

Mr. GREEN of Wisconsin introduced the following bill; which was referred to 

the Committee on the Judiciary 

A BILL 

To expand the use of DNA for the identification and 

prosecution of sex offenders, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘DNA Fingerprinting 

5 Act of 2005’’. 

6 SEC. 2. EXPANDING USE OF DNA TO IDENTIFY AND PROS7 ECUTE SEX OFFENDERS. 

8 (a) EXPANSION OF NATIONAL DNA INDEX SYS9 TEM.—Section 210304 of the DNA Identification Act of 

10 1994 (42 U.S.C. 14132) is amended— 
2 

•HR 2796 IH 

1 (1) in subsection (a)(1)(C), by striking ‘‘, pro2 vided’’ and all that follows through ‘‘System’’; and 

3 (2) by striking subsections (d) and (e). 

4 (b) DNA SAMPLE COLLECTION FROM PERSONS AR5 RESTED OR DETAINED UNDER FEDERAL AUTHORITY.— 

6 (1) IN GENERAL.—Section 3 of the DNA Anal7 ysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000 (42 U.S.C. 

8 14135a) is amended— 

9 (A) in subsection (a)— 

10 (i) in paragraph (1), by striking ‘‘The 

11 Director’’ and inserting the following: 

12 ‘‘(A) The Attorney General may, as pro13 vided by the Attorney General by regulation, 

14 collect DNA samples from individuals who are 

15 arrested or detained under the authority of the 

16 United States. The Attorney General may dele17 gate this function within the Department of 

18 Justice as provided in section 510 of title 28, 

19 United States Code, and may also authorize 

20 and direct any other agency of the United 

21 States that arrests or detains individuals or su22 pervises individuals facing charges to carry out 

23 any function and exercise any power of the At24 torney General under this section. 

25 ‘‘(B) The Director’’; and 
3 

•HR 2796 IH 

1 (ii) in paragraphs (3) and (4), by 

2 striking ‘‘Director of the Bureau of Pris3 ons’’ each place it appears and inserting 

4 ‘‘Attorney General, the Director of the Bu5 reau of Prisons,’’; and 

6 (B) in subsection (b), by striking ‘‘Director 

7 of the Bureau of Prisons’’ and inserting ‘‘Attor8 ney General, the Director of the Bureau of 

9 Prisons,’’. 

10 (2) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—Subsections 

11 (b) and (c)(1)(A) of section 3142 of title 18, United 

12 States Code, are each amended by inserting ‘‘and 

13 subject to the condition that the person cooperate in 

14 the collection of a DNA sample from the person if 

15 the collection of such a sample is authorized pursu16 ant to section 3 of the DNA Analysis Backlog Elimi17 nation Act of 2000 (42 U.S.C. 14135a)’’ after ‘‘pe18 riod of release’’. 

19 (c) TOLLING OF STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN SEX20 UAL ABUSE CASES.—Section 3297 of title 18, United 

21 States Code, is amended by striking ‘‘except for a felony 

22 offense under chapter 109A,’’. 

Æ
### §3508. Omitted

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Codification

Section, which authorized the Secretary to make transfers of motor vehicles between bureaus and offices without transfer of funds, was from section 202 of the Department of Labor, and Health, Education, and Welfare Appropriation Act, 1976 (Pub. L. 94–206, title II, Jan. 28, 1976, 90 Stat. 20), and was not repeated in subsequent appropriation acts.

Similar provisions were contained in the following prior appropriation acts:

Dec. 7, 1974, Pub. L. 93–517, title II, §202, 88 Stat. 1647.

Dec. 18, 1973, Pub. L. 93–192, title II, §202, 87 Stat. 760.

Aug. 10, 1971, Pub. L. 92–80, title II, §202, 85 Stat. 298.

Jan. 11, 1971, Pub. L. 91–667, title II, §202, 84 Stat. 2015.

Mar. 5, 1970, Pub. L. 91–204, title II, §202, 84 Stat. 43.

Oct. 11, 1968, Pub. L. 90–557, title II, §202, 82 Stat. 991.

Nov. 8, 1967, Pub. L. 90–132, title II, §202, 81 Stat. 407.

Nov. 7, 1966, Pub. L. 89–787, title II, §202, 80 Stat. 1400.

Aug. 31, 1965, Pub. L. 89–156, title II, §202, 79 Stat. 608.

Sept. 19, 1964, Pub. L. 88–605, title II, §202, 78 Stat. 979.

Oct. 11, 1963, Pub. L. 88–136, title II, §202, 77 Stat. 244.

Aug. 14, 1962, Pub. L. 87–582, title II, §202, 76 Stat. 379.

Sept. 22, 1961, Pub. L. 87–290, title II, §203, 75 Stat. 608.

Sept. 2, 1960, Pub. L. 86–703, title II, §203, 74 Stat. 773.

Aug. 14, 1959, Pub. L. 86–158, title II, §205, 73 Stat. 355.

Aug. 1, 1958, Pub. L. 85–580, title II, §206, 72 Stat. 473.

June 29, 1957, Pub. L. 85–67, title II, §207, 71 Stat. 224.

June 29, 1956, ch. 477, title II, §207, 70 Stat. 436.

Aug. 1, 1955, ch. 437, title II, §206, 69 Stat. 410.

July 2, 1954, ch. 457, title II, §206, 68 Stat. 445.

July 31, 1953, ch. 296, title II, §206, 67 Stat. 257.

Section was formerly classified to section 623a of former Title 5, Executive Departments and Government Officers and Employees, prior to the general revision and enactment of Title 5, Government Organization and Employees, by Pub. L. 89–554, §1, Sept. 1, 1966, 80 Stat. 378.