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41–809 PDF 2007

TIBET: SPECIAL FOCUS FOR 2007

REPRINTED

FROM THE

2007 ANNUAL REPORT

OF THE

CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE 

COMMISSION ON CHINA

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

OCTOBER 10, 2007

Printed for the use of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.cecc.gov 

CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA 

LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS

House Senate

SANDER LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman 

MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio 

MICHAEL M. HONDA, California 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey

BYRON DORGAN, North Dakota, Co-Chairman 

MAX BAUCUS, Montana 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California 

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio 

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas 

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska 

GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon 

MEL MARTINEZ, Florida

EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS

PAULA DOBRIANSKY, Department of State 

CHRISTOPHER R. HILL, Department of State 

HOWARD M. RADZELY, Department of Labor

DOUGLAS GROB, Staff Director 

MURRAY SCOT TANNER, Deputy Staff Director

(II) 

(1)

Tibet: Special Focus for 2007

FINDINGS

• No progress in the dialogue between China and the Dalai 

Lama or his representatives is evident. After the Dalai Lama’s 

Special Envoy returned to India after the sixth round of dialogue, he issued the briefest and least optimistic statement to 

date. Chinese officials showed no sign that they recognize the 

potential benefits of inviting the Dalai Lama to visit China so 

that they can meet with him directly. 

• Chinese government enforcement of Party policy on religion 

resulted in an increased level of repression of the freedom of 

religion for Tibetan Buddhists during the past year. The Communist Party intensified its long-running anti-Dalai Lama 

campaign. Tibetan Buddhism in the Tibet Autonomous Region 

(TAR) is coming under increased pressure as recent legal 

measures expand and deepen government control over Buddhist monasteries, nunneries, monks, nuns, and reincarnated 

lamas. The Chinese government issued legal measures that if 

fully implemented will establish government control over the 

process of identifying and educating reincarnated Tibetan Buddhist teachers throughout China. 

• Chinese authorities continue to detain and imprison Tibetans for peaceful expression and non-violent action, charging 

them with crimes such as ‘‘splittism,’’ and claiming that their 

behavior ‘‘endangers state security.’’ The Commission’s Political Prisoner Database listed 100 known cases of current Tibetan political detention or imprisonment as of September 

2007, a figure that is likely to be lower than the actual number 

of Tibetan political prisoners. Based on sentence information 

available for 64 of the current prisoners, the average sentence 

length is 11 years and 2 months. Tibetan Buddhist monks and 

nuns make up a separate set of 64 of the known currently detained or imprisoned Tibetan political prisoners as of September 2007, according to data available in the Commission’s 

Political Prisoner Database. Based on data available for 42 currently imprisoned Tibetan monks and nuns, their average sentence length is 10 years and 4 months. (It is a coincidence that 

the number of monks and nuns, and the number of prisoners 

for whom the Commission has sentence information available, 

are both 64). 

• In its first year of operation, the Qinghai-Tibet railway carried 1.5 million passengers into the TAR, of whom hundreds of 

thousands are likely to be ethnic Han and other non-Tibetans 

seeking jobs and economic opportunities. The government is establishing greater control over the Tibetan rural population by 

implementing programs that will bring to an end the tradiVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:44 Apr 18, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00003 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 U:\DOCS\41809.TXT DEIDRE
2

tional lifestyle of the Tibetan nomadic herder by settling them 

in fixed communities, and reconstructing or relocating farm

villages. 

INTRODUCTION

The human rights environment that the Communist Party and 

Chinese government enforce in the Tibetan areas of China has not 

improved over the past five years, and has deteriorated since 2005. 

No progress in the dialogue between China and the Dalai Lama or 

his representatives is evident. Implementation of China’s Regional 

Ethnic Autonomy Law is weak and prevents Tibetans from realizing the law’s guarantee that ethnic minorities have the ‘‘right to 

administer their internal affairs.’’ The Communist Party tolerates 

religious activity only within strict limits imposed by China’s constitutional, legal, and policy framework. Legal measures issued in 

2006 and 2007 impose unprecedented government control on Tibetan Buddhist activity. Party campaigns that seek to discredit the 

Dalai Lama as a religious leader, to portray him and those who 

support him as threats to China’s state security, and to prevent Tibetans from expressing their religious devotion to him have intensified since 2005. 

The government and Party prioritize economic development over 

cultural protection, eroding the Tibetan culture and language. 

Changes in Chinese laws and regulations that address ethnic autonomy issues and that have been enacted since 2000, when the 

government implemented the Great Western Development program, tend to decrease the protection of ethnic minority language 

and culture. The Qinghai-Tibet railway began service in July 2006 

and has carried thousands of passengers to Lhasa each day, leading to crowded conditions in the city and increased pressure on the 

Tibetan culture. In recent years, governments in some Tibetan 

areas have accelerated the implementation of programs that require nomadic Tibetan herders to settle in fixed communities. The 

Chinese government applies the Constitution and law in a manner 

that restricts and represses the exercise of human rights by Tibetans, and that uses the law to punish peaceful expression and action 

by Tibetans deemed as threats to state security. The government 

made no progress in the past year toward improving the right of 

Tibetans in China to exercise their constitutionally guaranteed 

freedoms of religion, expression, and assembly. Such restrictions 

are inconsistent with the Chinese government’s obligations under 

international human rights standards. 

STATUS OF DISCUSSION BETWEEN CHINA AND THE DALAI LAMA

Commission Recommendations, U.S. Policy, and the Report on Tibet 

Negotiations 

Commission Annual Reports in 2002, 2004, 2005, and 2006 included recommendations in support of the dialogue between the 

Chinese government and the Dalai Lama or his representatives. 

The Commission has observed no evidence of substantive progress 

in that dialogue toward fair and equitable decisions about policies 

that could help to protect Tibetans and their religion, language, 

and culture, even though a session of dialogue took place each year 

3

beginning in 2002, and even though a basis for such protections exists under China’s Constitution and law.1 In response to the lack 

of progress over the years, the Commission strengthened recommendations in successive annual reports.2 The 2006 Annual Report called for efforts to persuade the Chinese government to invite 

the Dalai Lama to visit China so that he could seek to build trust 

through direct contact with the Chinese leadership.3 In 2007, Chinese officials continued to allow the potential mutual benefits of 

the dialogue process—a more secure future for Tibetan culture and 

heritage, and improved stability and ethnic harmony in China—to 

remain unrealized. 

The U.S. Congress will award the Congressional Gold Medal to 

the Dalai Lama on October 17.4 The congressional act providing for 

the award finds that the Dalai Lama ‘‘is the unrivaled spiritual 

and cultural leader of the Tibetan people, and has used his leadership to promote democracy, freedom, and peace for the Tibetan people through a negotiated settlement of the Tibet issue, based on

autonomy within the People’s Republic of China.’’ 5

U.S. government policy recognizes the Tibet Autonomous Region 

(TAR) and Tibetan autonomous prefectures and counties6 in other 

provinces to be a part of China.7 The Department of State’s 2007 

Report on Tibet Negotiations articulates U.S. Tibet policy:

Encouraging substantive dialogue between Beijing and the 

Dalai Lama is an important objective of this Administration. The United States encourages China and the Dalai 

Lama to hold direct and substantive discussions aimed at 

resolution of differences at an early date, without preconditions. The Administration believes that dialogue between China and the Dalai Lama or his representatives 

will alleviate tensions in Tibetan areas and contribute to 

the overall stability of China.8

The Report on Tibet Negotiations observes that the Dalai Lama 

‘‘represents the views of the vast majority of Tibetans,’’ and that 

‘‘his moral authority helps to unite the Tibetan community inside 

and outside of China.’’ 9 The report cautions that ‘‘the lack of resolution of these problems leads to greater tensions inside China and 

will be a stumbling block to fuller political and economic engagement with the United States and other nations.’’ The report rejects 

the notion that the Dalai Lama is seeking Tibetan independence:

[T]he Dalai Lama has expressly disclaimed any intention 

to seek sovereignty or independence for Tibet and has stated that he only seeks for China to preserve Tibetan culture, spirituality, and environment.10

The President and other senior U.S. officials have pressed Chinese leaders to move forward in the dialogue process, according to 

the Report on Tibet Negotiations. In April and November 2006, 

President Bush urged President Hu Jintao to continue the dialogue 

and hold direct discussions with the Dalai Lama.11 Secretary of 

State Condoleezza Rice called on Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing to 

engage in direct talks with the Dalai Lama when they met at the 

UN General Assembly in September 2006.12 When Secretary Rice 

traveled to China in October 2006, she reiterated the request for 

direct dialogue between Chinese officials and the Dalai Lama.13

4

Under Secretary of State for Democracy and Global Affairs Paula 

Dobriansky, who has served since 2001 as the Special Coordinator 

for Tibetan Issues and as a CECC Commissioner,14 traveled to Beijing in August 2006 and raised ‘‘the need for concrete progress’’ 

during meetings with officials including Executive Vice Foreign 

Minister Dai Bingguo and Assistant Foreign Minister Cui Tiankai, 

according to the Report on Tibet Negotiations.15 Deputy Secretary 

of State John Negroponte raised the same issues during a February 

2007 visit to China.16

Dalai Lama’s Envoys’ Fifth Visit to China; Discussions with the 

Party’s UFWD 

The Dalai Lama’s envoys visited China for the fifth time17 from 

June 29 to July 5, 2007, to engage in their sixth round of dialogue 

with Chinese officials.18 The trip culminated with the briefest19

and least optimistic statement issued after any of the previous 

rounds of dialogue. Special Envoy Lodi Gyari20 reported that he 

and Envoy Kelsang Gyaltsen engaged in three ‘‘sessions of discussion’’ in Shanghai and Nanjing, the capital of Zhejiang province, 

over a one and one-half day period.21 The statement provided no 

details about the topics the envoys discussed in meetings, or about 

their activities and location during the remainder of their visit. Unlike previous statements, the Special Envoy’s statement did not 

close with an expression of ‘‘appreciation’’ to Chinese officials and 

hosts, perhaps signaling an increased level of frustration. 

Gyari’s statement acknowledged that the dialogue process had 

reached a ‘‘critical stage,’’ and that ‘‘[b]oth sides expressed in strong 

terms their divergent positions and views on a number of issues.’’ 

Referring to the lack of progress, Gyari said, ‘‘We conveyed our serious concerns in the strongest possible manner on the overall Tibetan issue and made some concrete proposals for implementation 

if our dialogue process is to go forward.’’ 22 The statement provided 

no details about the proposals that the envoys hope Chinese officials will implement. 

In China, the envoys met with the Communist Party’s United 

Front Work Department (UFWD) Deputy Head Zhu Weiqun and 

UFWD Seventh Bureau Director Sithar (or Sita).23 The UFWD 

oversees the implementation of Party policy toward China’s eight 

‘‘democratic’’ political parties, ethnic and religious groups, intellectuals, and entrepreneurs, among other functions. The UFWD established the Seventh Bureau in 2005 and appointed Sithar as Director, 

according to a September 2006 Singtao Daily report.24 The Tibetan 

affairs portfolio moved from the Second Bureau, which handles ethnic and religious affairs, to the new Seventh Bureau. Sithar previously served as a deputy director of the Second Bureau.25

The creation of the UFWD Seventh Bureau may signal that the 

Party leadership has attached increased importance to Tibetan 

issues, such as the ongoing dialogue with the Dalai Lama’s representatives. The mission of the Seventh Bureau, according to the 

Singtao Daily report, is ‘‘to cooperate with relevant parties in 

struggling against secessionism by enemies, both local and foreign, 

such as the Dalai Lama clique, and to liaise with overseas Tibetans.’’ 26 The report notes that Party leaders are concerned

5

principally about the ‘‘development of the Tibet independence 

movement in the ‘post-Dalai Lama era’.’’ 27

UFWD officials with whom the Dalai Lama’s envoys meet also 

hold additional posts in governmental, advisory, and NGO spheres 

that increase and extend their influence on the future of Tibetan 

culture, religion, and language. Liu Yandong, whom the envoys met 

during trips to China in 2003 and 2004,28 is head of the UFWD, 

Vice Chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, and the Honorary President of China Association for Preservation and Development of Tibetan Culture (CAPDTC), a

Chinese NGO founded in June 2004 that describes its legal status 

as ‘‘independent.’’ 29 Zhu is a member of the CCP Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, a senior official of the State Council 

Information Office,30 a cabinet-level part of the Chinese government, and the Vice President of CAPDTC.31 Sithar is CAPDTC’s 

Vice Chairman.32

A Tibetan Vision of Autonomy: The Special Envoy Provides More 

Detail 

In 2006 and 2007, the Dalai Lama, Special Envoy Lodi Gyari, 

and the elected head of the Tibetan government-in-exile, Samdhong 

Rinpoche, increased their efforts to advocate their vision of Tibetan 

autonomy under Chinese sovereignty, and to provide more detailed 

statements about their proposed formula. In his annual March 10, 

2007, statement,33 the Dalai Lama asserted, ‘‘The most important 

reason behind my proposal to have genuine national regional

autonomy for all Tibetans is to achieve genuine equality and unity 

between the Tibetans and Chinese by eliminating big Han chauvinism and local nationalism.’’ 34 In testimony before the U.S. 

House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee on March 13, 

2007, Gyari stated, ‘‘In treating the Tibetan people with respect 

and dignity through genuine autonomy, the Chinese leadership has 

the opportunity to create a truly multi-ethnic, harmonious nation 

without a tremendous cost in human suffering.’’ 35 Samdhong 

Rinpoche told a gathering of advocacy groups in Brussels in May 

2007, ‘‘We are simply asking for the sincere implementation of the 

national regional autonomy provisions enshrined in the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, which is further spelt out 

in the autonomy law.’’ 36

The basis of the Tibetan negotiating position continues to be the 

Dalai Lama’s Middle Way Approach,37 which renounces Tibetan 

independence in exchange for genuine autonomy. An outcome of 

the dialogue process that would fulfill Tibetan wishes in a manner 

consistent with the Middle Way Approach would require the Chinese government’s agreement to:

• The inclusion under the agreement of all the areas in China 

that many Tibetans regard as ‘‘the three traditional provinces 

of Tibet,’’ or about one-quarter of China;38

• The unification of that area under one genuinely autonomous 

administration; and 

• The empowerment of the residents of the resulting administrative area to elect a government through a democratic process.

6

Gyari identified the Chinese response to the Tibetan demands 

that ‘‘the entire Tibetan people need to live under a single administrative entity,’’ and that Tibetans practice ‘‘genuine autonomy,’’ as 

the principal area of disagreement in a November 2006 address at 

the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C.39 His prepared 

statement40 and responses to questions41 were more detailed than 

remarks Gyari made after the previous rounds of dialogue. The 

Dalai Lama emphasized his commitment to the same principles in 

March 2006, saying in his March 10 speech, ‘‘I have only one

demand: self-rule and genuine autonomy for all Tibetans, i.e., the 

Tibetan nationality in its entirety.’’ 42 Samdhong Rinpoche underscored the importance Tibetans place on including all Tibetans in 

a reconfigured Tibet when he addressed advocacy groups in May: 

‘‘[A]ll Tibetans must be administered by a single autonomous selfgovernment.’’ 43

Like many Tibetans, Gyari refers to all of the territory in China 

where Tibetans live as ‘‘Tibet.’’ ‘‘[I]t is a reality that the landmass 

inhabited by Tibetans constitutes roughly one-fourth44 the territory 

of [China],’’ he said in his Brookings statement.45 The Chinese government ‘‘has already designated almost all Tibetan areas as Tibet 

autonomous entities. . . . Thus, our positions on what constitutes 

Tibet are really not so divergent.’’ 46 The land area that Tibetans 

claim as Tibet is about 100,000 square miles larger than the total 

area of the TAR and the Tibetan autonomous prefectures and counties designated by China.47 Aside from pockets of long-term Tibetan settlement in Qinghai province,48 most of the area that

Tibetans claim beyond the existing Tibetan autonomous areas is 

made up of autonomous prefectures and counties allocated to other 

ethnic groups.49 Ten counties in that area have populations that 

are between 5 and 25 percent Tibetan, according to official 2000 

census data.50 The precise portion of the approximately 100,000 

square mile area that Tibetans claim as Tibet, and where the Tibetan population is less than 5 percent,51 is unknown because a 

map that indicates the boundary of Tibet with respect to current 

Chinese administrative geographic divisions at the prefectural and 

county levels is not available. 

Gyari addressed the critics of proposed administrative unification 

of land where Tibetans live, saying, ‘‘Having the Tibetan people 

under a single administrative entity should not be seen as an effort 

to create a ‘greater’ Tibet, nor is it a cover for a separatist plot.’’ 52

Tibetans ‘‘yearn to be under one administrative entity so that their 

way of life, tradition, and religion can be more effectively and 

peacefully maintained,’’ he said, and pointed out that the Chinese 

government ‘‘has redrawn internal boundaries when it suited its 

needs.’’ 53 Gyari’s prepared statement cites as an example the abolition in 1955 of Xikang province upon the completion of the division 

of its territory between Sichuan province and what later became 

the TAR.54

Establishing a unified Tibetan autonomous administrative area 

such as the Special Envoy described would involve all of the TAR, 

all or most of Qinghai province, approximately half of Sichuan 

province, parts of Gansu and Yunnan provinces, and according to 

some maps, a small part of Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region.55

Under China’s Constitution, establishing or changing units of adVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:44 Apr 18, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 U:\DOCS\41809.TXT DEIDRE
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ministrative geography would require approval by the National 

People’s Congress (NPC) or the State Council, or both.56

The Dalai Lama and Lodi Gyari provided more detailed statements than previously about their expectations of ‘‘genuine autonomy,’’ which can be compared to the prevailing situation under the 

Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law (REAL).57 Although the REAL declares in its Preamble that the practice of autonomy conveys the 

state’s ‘‘full respect for and guarantee of ethnic minorities’ right to 

administer their internal affairs,’’ 58 the Dalai Lama explained in 

his March 10, 2007, statement the manner in which he believes the 

REAL has failed ethnic groups like Tibetans:

The problem is that [regional ethnic autonomy] is not implemented fully, and thus fails to serve its express purpose 

of preserving and protecting the distinct identity, culture 

and language of the minority nationalities. What happens 

on the ground is that large populations from the majority 

nationalities have spread in these minority regions. Therefore, the minority nationalities, instead of being able to 

preserve their own identity, culture and language, have no 

choice but to depend on the language and customs of the 

majority nationality in their day-to-day lives.59

Gyari’s statement to the Brookings Institution implied that a solution to the autonomy issue would have to reach beyond the 

REAL’s status quo, and perhaps be innovative. He discussed the 

Tibetan need for autonomy in the context of the higher level of 

rights that Hong Kong and Macao enjoy under their status as special administrative regions (SARs).60 Gyari said that the Tibetans 

have not proposed to their Chinese interlocutors any specific autonomy formula or administrative title, such as an SAR, and stressed, 

‘‘[W]e place more importance on discussing the substance than on 

the label.’’ 61 Samdhong Rinpoche maintained that a solution is 

available within the existing constitutional and legal environment: 

‘‘The PRC leadership can very easily grant whatever we are asking 

for, if they have the political will. They need not have to amend 

their constitution nor make a major shift in their policies.’’ 62

The Tibetan Vision of Autonomy Versus China’s Constitution and 

Law 

The outlook for what the Tibetans call ‘‘genuine autonomy’’ under 

the current implementation of the REAL is poor. Communist Party 

control over China’s legislative, governmental, policymaking, and 

implementation process, as well as contradictory provisions in Chinese laws and regulations, undercut the practice of regional ethnic 

autonomy in China. As a result, the functional level of autonomy 

that Chinese laws and regulations provide to local Tibetan autonomous governments to ‘‘administer their internal affairs,’’ 63 to protect their culture, language, and religion, and to manage policy

implementation on issues such as economic development and the 

environment, is negligible. 

Recent laws, regulations, and local implementing measures

consistently prioritize the central government’s interests above protecting the right of ethnic autonomous governments to exercise selfgovernment.64 The same legal issues that minimize the level of 

8

local autonomy for Tibetans serve to diminish the prospects for 

substantive progress in dialogue between Chinese officials and the 

Dalai Lama and his envoys. The following examples of how China’s 

application of law adversely affects Tibetan autonomy are indicative, not comprehensive. [See Section II—Ethnic Minority Rights 

for more information on the REAL.] 

The REAL Provides Subordination, Not Self-government 

Article 7 of the REAL counteracts the Preamble’s guarantee that 

ethnic autonomous governments have the right to ‘‘administer their 

own affairs’’ by directing that, ‘‘Institutions of self-government in 

ethnic autonomous areas shall place the interests of the state as 

a whole above all else and actively fulfill all tasks assigned by state 

institutions at higher levels.’’ 

The REAL Provides a Basis To Divide Tibetan Areas, Not To Unify 

Them 

Tibetan leaders, including Lodi Gyari and Samdhong Rinpoche, 

have described their vision in the past year that China’s Constitution and law, including the REAL, can support the unification of 

Tibetan autonomous areas.65 The Constitution and REAL do not 

state explicitly whether or not contiguous areas where the same 

ethnic group lives are entitled to be included in the same ethnic 

autonomous area. In fact, Article 12 of the REAL provides the Chinese government a basis in law for division by allowing the establishment of ethnic autonomous areas to take into consideration factors such as ‘‘historical background’’ and ‘‘the relationship among 

the various nationalities.’’ 66 Because the National People’s Congress (NPC) and State Council have the constitutional authority to 

approve the establishment of autonomous regions, prefectures, and 

counties, and to alter their geographic divisions,67 it is Beijing’s 

view of history and ethnic relations that guides decisions to apply 

the REAL in a manner that unites—or divides—ethnic groups. 

Conflict of Law Limits Rights Provided by the Constitution and 

REAL 

The Constitution and REAL state that ethnic autonomous

congresses have the power to enact autonomy or self-governing regulations ‘‘in the light of the political, economic, and cultural characteristics’’ of the relevant ethnic group(s).68 But the Legislation Law 

reserves to the State Council the power to issue regulations when 

the NPC specifically authorizes the State Council to do so, thereby 

intruding upon the right of ethnic autonomous congresses to issue 

regulations.69 These provisions in the Legislation Law explicitly 

create a conflict of law with respect to rights provided by the Constitution and the REAL. The Legislation Law authorizes an autonomous people’s congress to enact an ‘‘autonomous decree or a special 

decree’’ that must be approved by the standing committee of the 

next higher level people’s congress.70

The Legislation Law Bars Autonomous Governments From Altering 

Laws and Regulations That Concern Autonomy 

The REAL includes a provision allowing an ethnic autonomous 

government to apply to a higher-level state agency to alter or cancel 

9

the implementation of a ‘‘resolution, decision, order, or instruction’’ 

if it does not ‘‘suit the actual conditions in an ethnic autonomous 

area.’’ 71 The Legislation Law, however, bars ethnic autonomous 

governments from enacting any variance to any law or regulation 

that is ‘‘dedicated to matters concerning ethnic autonomous 

areas.’’ 72

Special Administrative Regions Offer More Flexibility 

The Chinese Constitution provides a method to create a political 

and administrative solution to challenges that the principal body of 

Chinese law cannot resolve. Article 31 empowers the state to establish a ‘‘special administrative region’’ (SAR) that can satisfy a particular need ‘‘when necessary,’’ and authorizes the NPC to enact a 

law that institutes a ‘‘system’’ (of governance and administration) 

‘‘in the light of the specific conditions.’’ 73 Hong Kong and Macao 

are the only SARs created by the NPC to date. Chinese officials reject the notion that a Tibetan solution could be developed by establishing a special administrative region,74 but their arguments use 

as proof the dissimilarity of the pre-reunification political and economic systems of Hong Kong and Macao (not reunited with China, 

democratic government, capitalist economy) compared with the current political and economic system in the Tibetan autonomous 

areas of China (Chinese administration, non-democratic government, socialist economy). The language in Article 31, however, 

states no prerequisites of any kind and allows the state to create 

the solution that it needs. 

RELIGIOUS FREEDOM FOR TIBETAN BUDDHISTS

Commission Recommendations and China’s Record 

Commission Annual Reports from 2002 to 2006 included recommendations calling for the Chinese leadership to ‘‘promote the 

concept of religious tolerance,’’ 75 to ‘‘meet with religious figures 

from around the world to discuss the positive impact on national 

development of free religious belief and religious tolerance,’’ 76 and 

to take measures to develop the freedom of religion in China including respecting ‘‘the right of Tibetan Buddhists to freely express 

their religious devotion to the Dalai Lama.’’ 77

The Commission cannot report improvement in the overall level 

of freedom of religion for Tibetan Buddhists at any time during the 

past five years, and in the past year the environment for Tibetan 

Buddhism has become significantly more repressive. The Party led 

an intensified anti-Dalai Lama campaign78 and an expanding program of patriotic education,79 and two sets of new legal measures 

imposing stricter and more detailed controls on Tibetan Buddhist 

institutions and religious activity took effect.80 In the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), the government began on January 1, 2007, to 

implement new legal measures issued in September 2006 that regulate fundamental aspects of Tibetan Buddhism in a stricter and 

more detailed manner than previous measures.81 The State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA) issued legal measures in July 

2007 that empower the government and Party to gradually reshape 

Tibetan Buddhism by controlling the religion’s most important and 

10

unusual feature—lineages of reincarnated Buddhist teachers that 

Tibetan Buddhists believe can span centuries.82

Although the Party tolerates religious activity only within the 

strict limits imposed by China’s constitutional, legal, and policy 

framework, and the government further restricts those limits at 

will, Chinese authorities tolerate selected Tibetan Buddhist practices and expressions of religious belief,83 and the intensity of religious repression against Tibetans varies across regions.84

[See Section II—Freedom of Religion for more information on 

Party and government control of religion.] 

TAR Party Chief Intensifies Anti-Dalai Lama Campaign, Patriotic 

Education 

Tibetan Buddhism is at the core of Tibetan culture and self-identity, and for most Tibetans the Dalai Lama is at the core of Tibetan 

Buddhism. Seeking to strengthen control over Tibetan Buddhism 

and to end the Dalai Lama’s influence over Tibetans, the Communist Party intensified a long-running campaign during the past 

year to discredit the Dalai Lama as a religious leader, to portray 

him and those who support him as threats to China’s state security, and to prevent Tibetans from expressing their religious devotion to him. 

TAR Party Secretary Zhang Qingli took on the role of a high-profile representative of the anti-Dalai Lama campaign in late 2005, 

when the Party’s Central Committee transferred him to the TAR 

from the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region.85 In an August 2006 

interview with a Western magazine, Zhang attacked the Dalai 

Lama’s Buddhist credentials, accusing him of being a ‘‘false religious leader’’ who has led Tibetans astray and done ‘‘many bad 

things . . . that contradict the role of a religious leader’’ since he 

fled into exile in 1959.86 Zhang urged the Party to ‘‘clearly distinguish between proper religious activities and the use of religion to 

engage in separatist activities,’’ an expression that can refer to 

peaceful expressions of religious devotion to the Dalai Lama. Zhang 

described the Party’s conflict with the Dalai Lama and the ‘‘Western hostile forces’’ 87 that support him as ‘‘long term, sharp, and 

complex,’’ and ‘‘even quite intense at times.’’ 88

Zhang rallied hundreds of Party members at a May 2007 meeting 

in Lhasa, the capital of the TAR, telling them, ‘‘From beginning to 

end . . . we must deepen patriotic education at temples, comprehensively expose and denounce the Dalai Lama clique’s political 

reactionary nature and religious hypocrisy.’’ 89 Patriotic education 

(‘‘love the country, love religion’’)90 is an open-ended campaign to 

bring to an end the Dalai Lama’s religious authority among Tibetans, and that requires Tibetan Buddhists to accept patriotism

toward China as a part of Tibetan Buddhism. Patriotic education 

sessions require monks and nuns to pass examinations on political 

texts, agree that Tibet is historically a part of China, accept the legitimacy of the Panchen Lama installed by the Chinese government, and denounce the Dalai Lama.’’ 91 Monitoring organizations 

confirmed in 2007 that officials are increasing patriotic education 

activity in monasteries and nunneries.92 In one case, the abbot of 

a monastery in Qinghai province was forced to step down in May 

after he refused to sign a denunciation of the Dalai Lama.93

11

In May 2006, Zhang called on TAR Party and government officials to intensify restructuring and ‘‘rectification’’ of Democratic 

Management Committees (DMCs),94 and to ‘‘[e]nsure that leadership powers at monasteries are in the hands of religious personages who love the country and love religion.’’ 95 DMCs,96 located 

within each monastery and nunnery, are the Party’s direct interface with monks and nuns, and are charged by the Party and government to implement policies on religion and ensure that monks 

and nuns obey government regulations on religious practice. 

An official poster reportedly displayed in a Tibetan Buddhist 

monastery in Sichuan province listed the DMC’s main functions, 

including to ‘‘[u]phold the leadership of the Chinese Communist 

Party, love the county and love religion, and progress in unity’’ and 

to ensure that ‘‘[n]o activities may be carried out under the direction of forces outside the country.’’ 97 The same document instructs 

the DMC on its ‘‘professional responsibilities,’’ such as, ‘‘To collectively educate the monastery’s monks and religious believers to 

abide by the country’s Constitution, laws, and all policies, to ensure 

the normal progression of religious activities, to protect the monastery’s legal rights and interests, to resolutely oppose splittist activities, and to protect the unification of the motherland.’’ 98 The 

poster specified the subordinate relationship of the monastery to 

external, non-religious agencies: ‘‘The monastery should accept the 

administrative management of local village-level organizations, and 

accept the leadership of the Buddhist association.’’ A 1991 set of 

TAR measures regulating religious affairs described a Buddhist association as ‘‘a bridge for the Party and government to unite and 

educate personages from religious circles and the believing 

masses.’’ 99

TAR Measures Extend Party Control Over Tibetan Buddhism 

In January 2007, Zhang Qingli wrote in an issue of Seeking 

Truth that the TAR government must implement the national-level 

Regulation on Religious Affairs (RRA)100 in a manner that will ‘‘ensure that the Constitution and laws enter the temple doors, the 

management system, and the minds of monks and nuns.’’ 101 There 

are more than 1,700 monasteries and nunneries in the TAR, and 

approximately 46,000 monks and nuns, according to official staterun media reports.102 As Zhang called on the Party to achieve comprehensive implementation of its policy on ‘‘freedom of religious

belief,’’ which he said aims to ‘‘actively guide religion to adapt to 

socialist society,’’ 103 the TAR Implementing Measures for the Regulation on Religious Affairs (TAR 2006 Measures) were coming into 

effect.104

The TAR 2006 Measures state a general formula for the relationship between the state and religion: ‘‘All levels of the people’s government shall actively guide religious organizations, venues for

religious activities, and religious personnel in a love of the country 

and of religion, in protecting the country and benefiting the people, 

in uniting and moving forward, and in guiding the mutual adaptation of religion and socialism.’’ The national-level RRA, effective in 

March 2005, does not contain such language.105

The TAR 2006 Measures impose stricter and more detailed controls on TAR religious activity,106 which is mainly Tibetan BudVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:44 Apr 18, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 U:\DOCS\41809.TXT DEIDRE
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dhist,107 than the RRA or the 1991 TAR Temporary Measures on 

the Management of Religious Affairs108 (TAR 1991 Measures) that 

the TAR 2006 Measures replaced. The most forward-looking area 

of state intrusion into Tibetan Buddhist freedom of religion, and 

the most consequential to the future of the religion, is in the process of identifying, seating, and providing religious training to

reincarnated Tibetan Buddhist lamas. The TAR 2006 measures 

provide five articles on the matter,109 compared to one each in the 

RRA110 and the TAR 1991 Measures.111 The RRA article includes 

language that seeks to compel Tibetan compliance with a 17th century Qing dynasty edict directing Tibetan religious leaders to identify reincarnations by drawing a name from an urn in the presence 

of an imperial Chinese official.112 The TAR 1991 Measures ban the 

involvement in the identification process of ‘‘foreign forces,’’ a

reference to the traditional role of the Dalai Lama and other highranking Tibetan lamas now living in exile. [See the following subsection for information on national measures regulating Tibetan

reincarnation issued in July 2007 and effective in September.] 

The TAR 2006 Measures establish additional Party and government controls,113 beyond those contained in the RRA or the TAR 

1991 Measures, over the identification and education of reincarnated Tibetan Buddhist lamas in the TAR.

• No organization or individual in the TAR may attempt to 

identify a reincarnated lama without approval from the TAR 

government.114

• No one from the TAR may travel to another province to attempt to identify a reincarnated lama (or vice versa) until the 

TAR Buddhist association (‘‘religious organization’’) consults 

with the provincial-level Buddhist association in the other 

province (or vice versa), and the TAR Buddhist association reports the matter to the TAR government.115

• DMCs must plan and implement milestones in the institutional advancement of reincarnated lamas, such as the formal 

seating of a reincarnated lama at a monastery, formally ordaining a reincarnated lama as a monk, and promoting a reincarnated lama to advanced levels of Buddhist study. Local 

government must supervise such events.116

• DMCs must draft, and reincarnated lamas must submit to, 

‘‘practical measures for strengthening the development, education, and management’’ of reincarnated lamas.117

• DMCs must report to the local government the names of a 

reincarnated lama’s religious and cultural teacher(s) after the 

DMC has proposed candidates to the local Buddhist association 

and the association consents.118

The TAR 2006 Measures impose new requirements119 that eliminate freedom of movement for monks and nuns in the TAR if they 

travel for the purpose of teaching, studying, or practicing religion.120 Monks and nuns living in TAR monasteries and nunneries 

may not travel anywhere in the TAR for the purpose of practicing 

religion121 without carrying with them their ‘‘religious personnel 

identification [card]’’ and an unspecified form of ‘‘proof’’ provided by 

the county-level government where they live, and reporting ‘‘for the 

record’’ to the county-level government where they wish to practice 

religion.122 Monks and nuns in the TAR may not travel to another 

13

TAR prefecture to study religion without first obtaining approval 

from the local government in the destination prefecture, and reporting the approval to the local government in the prefecture of 

origin.123 The TAR 1991 Measures, in comparison, stated no requirements of monks and nuns who traveled between monasteries 

and nunneries in the TAR in order to practice or study religion. 

The TAR 1991 Measures contained one article addressing travel 

that required monks and nuns traveling from the TAR to another 

province for advanced Buddhist study or teaching Buddhism (or 

vice versa) to first obtain consent from the governments of the TAR 

and the other province.124

Buddhist associations, monasteries, nunneries, monks, and nuns 

that violate provisions of the TAR 2006 Measures can face criminal 

or civil penalties under Chinese law, or expulsion from a monastery 

or nunnery.125 Authorities can, for example, initiate punishments 

for ‘‘illegal activities such as those that harm national security or 

public security,’’ a catch-all phrase that can include expressions of 

religious devotion to the Dalai Lama, or for sharing, viewing, and 

listening to any type of recorded media about him. The TAR 2006 

Measures introduce an explicit ban on disseminating and viewing 

‘‘books, pictures, and materials that disrupt ethnic unity or endanger national security,’’ and a ban on requests by ‘‘religious followers’’ for monks and nuns ‘‘to recite from banned religious 

texts.’’ 126 Another punitive measure with potentially broad impact 

empowers local governments to order a ‘‘religious organization’’ to 

‘‘disqualify’’ as a registered religious professional a monk or nun 

who, in ‘‘serious circumstances,’’ does not fulfill regulatory requirements on travel.127

A local government’s use of regulations on religious affairs to

enforce the demolition in May 2007 of a large, nearly completed 

statue of a ninth century Buddhist teacher, Padmasambhava (Guru 

Rinpoche),128 at the oldest Tibetan monastery, Samye,129 shows 

how the law can control religious practice, rather than protect religious freedom. Photographs available in one report appear to show 

that the 30-foot tall statue was constructed within the monastery’s 

grounds.130 People’s Armed Police (PAP) arrived at Samye, located 

in Shannan (Lhoka) prefecture in the TAR, and demolished the 

statue during the Buddhist holy month of Saga Dawa, according to 

an unofficial report.131 Private donors from Guangzhou city in 

Guangdong province paid 800,000 yuan to have the statue constructed.132

The RRA and TAR 2006 Measures introduce provisions prohibiting any group or individual not part of a state-authorized religious organization or venue for religious activity from building such 

a statue.133 Both sets of provisions mandate the demolition of a religious statue that is erected without official approval, but the TAR 

2006 Measures only address the matter if the statue is built outside monastery grounds.134 Because the statue was built on 

Samye’s grounds by individuals who were not authorized members 

of an officially recognized religious institution, the local government could have invoked RRA provisions as a legal pretext to destroy the statue. In fact, an official Chinese media report provided 

a rough translation of a Samye DMC notice confirming the role of 

the RRA as well as the Law on Protection of Cultural Relics.135

14

The State Administration for Religious Affairs, the Ministry of 

Construction, and the China National Tourism Administration 

jointly issued a ‘‘Notice of Illegally Building [an] Open[-air] Statue 

of Buddha,’’ according to the DMC notice.136 Lodi Gyari, the Dalai 

Lama’s Special Envoy, decried the statue’s destruction, saying, 

‘‘This divisive and sacrilegious act by an atheist state has caused 

deep anguish among Tibetans in the region.’’ 137

The total number of monasteries, nunneries, monks, and nuns 

that the TAR government tolerates could come under increased 

pressure, based on Zhang Qingli’s statements in Seeking Truth. He 

described a ‘‘bottom line’’ for the number of locations for ‘‘religious 

activity’’ (monasteries and nunneries) and of ‘‘full time religious 

persons’’ (monks and nuns), and warned that, ‘‘[H]aving satisfied 

the needs of the believer masses, there can be no indiscriminate 

building and recruiting.’’ 138 Zhang’s comment could presage government action to assert more aggressively its role in limiting the 

size of the Tibetan Buddhist monastic establishment—which the 

TAR Party newspaper said in 1996 exceeded the number that the 

Party planned in 1986, and created a negative impact on Tibetan 

social and economic development.139

National Government Measures Take Control of Tibetan Buddhist 

Reincarnation 

The State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA) issued a 

set of national measures in July 2007 (effective on September 1) 

that, if fully implemented, will establish government control over 

the process of identifying and training reincarnated Tibetan Buddhist teachers throughout China.140 Unlike the TAR 2006 Measures, the ‘‘Measures on the Management of the Reincarnation of 

Living Buddhas in Tibetan Buddhism’’ 141 (MMR) apply to the significant concentrations of Tibetan Buddhists in Qinghai, Gansu, 

Sichuan, and Yunnan provinces, as well as to the TAR. The total 

number of Tibetan Buddhist monasteries and nunneries in the 

TAR and the four provinces probably exceeds 3,300, based on official information, and the total number of monks and nuns may exceed 115,000 by several thousand.142 Each monastery hopes to 

have a reincarnated teacher in residence, although some monasteries have none and other monasteries have more than one. 

Based on official but incomplete information, the Commission estimates that the total number of reincarnated teachers in the Tibetan areas of China probably exceeds 1,000, and could reach or 

surpass 2,000.143

The MMR will ‘‘institutionalize management on reincarnation of 

living Buddhas,’’ according to a SARA statement,144 and strengthen 

the subordination of traditional Tibetan Buddhist practices to 

Party policy: ‘‘The selection of reincarnates must preserve national 

unity and solidarity of all ethnic groups and the selection process 

cannot be influenced by any group or individual from outside the 

country.’’ The MMR could result in greater isolation between Tibetan Buddhist communities living in China and important Tibetan Buddhist teachers living in exile, especially the Dalai Lama, 

by using each instance of recognizing a reincarnated Tibetan teacher as an opportunity for the government to reinforce the barrier beVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:44 Apr 18, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 U:\DOCS\41809.TXT DEIDRE
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tween Tibetan Buddhism in China and Tibetan Buddhists living in 

other countries. 

As elderly Tibetan Buddhist reincarnated teachers pass away, 

government enforcement of the MMR may prevent Tibetans from 

searching for and recognizing subsequent reincarnations, resulting 

in a decreasing number of reincarnated teachers. Article 3 requires 

that ‘‘[a] majority of local religious believers and the monastery 

[Democratic Management Committee] must request the reincarnation’’ before the search for a reincarnation may take place.145

DMCs are less likely to pursue a request for a reincarnation if local 

officials oppose it, and local authorities are well-positioned to 

hinder or discourage a majority of ‘‘religious believers’’ from

expressing their desire to maintain a reincarnation in a local

monastery. Article 4 disallows the recognition and seating of reincarnations within urban districts established by higher-level governments if the urban district government issues a local decree 

banning further reincarnations.146 The Chengguan district under 

Lhasa municipality is currently the only urban district within the 

Tibetan autonomous areas of China.147 If the Chengguan district 

government issues such a decree, it could affect two of the largest 

and most influential Tibetan monasteries, Drepung and Sera,148

and the two oldest Tibetan Buddhist temples, Jokhang and 

Ramoche. 

The MMR establishes unprecedented government control149 over 

the principal stages of identifying and educating reincarnated Tibetan teachers, including:

• Determining whether or not a reincarnated teacher who 

passes away may be reincarnated, and whether a monastery is 

entitled to seek to have a reincarnated teacher in residence.150

• Conducting a search for a reincarnation.151

• Recognizing a reincarnation and obtaining government approval of the recognition.152

• Seating (installing) a reincarnation in a monastery.153

• Providing education and religious training for a reincarnation.154

The measures provide for punishment of individuals or offices 

that are responsible for a failure to comply with the measures, or 

that conduct activities pertaining to reincarnation without government authorization.155

In August 2007, senior officials, including Liu Yandong, Head of 

the Communist Party United Front Work Department (UFWD), 

and Ye Xiaowen, Director of SARA, convened a national seminar 

in Beijing on ‘‘Tibetan Buddhism work,’’ and stressed that in the 

matter of seating Tibetan Buddhist reincarnated teachers, ‘‘our 

own come first,’’ according to a Singtao Daily report.156 The phrase 

underscores Party resolve to ensure that successful candidates for 

positions as reincarnated teachers will from now on fulfill the Party’s political expectations, and that the Dalai Lama and other senior Tibetan Buddhist teachers living in exile will have no influence 

on the process.157 Officials at the seminar emphasized that the 

MMR must be implemented fully throughout the Tibetan areas of 

China and in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, where many 

Mongols believe in Tibetan Buddhism. At an August 17–18 UFWD 

work forum in Lhasa, Director of the TAR UFWD, Lobsang 

16

Gyaltsen (Luosang Jiangcun), relayed the national guidelines to regional officials, and Zhang Yijiong, Deputy Secretary of the TAR 

Party Committee, called on attendees to ‘‘thoroughly implement the 

policy of the [Party] on religious work’’ and ‘‘energetically unite the 

religious and patriotic forces.’’ 158

Number of Imprisoned Monks and Nuns Declines as Repression of 

Religion Increases 

Tibetan Buddhist monks and nuns constituted 11 of the 13 

known political detentions of Tibetans by Chinese authorities in 

2006, compared to 21 of the 24 known such detentions in 2005, and 

8 of the 15 such detentions in 2004,159 based on data available in 

the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database (PPD)160 as of September 2007. The increased proportion of monks and nuns that 

make up the total number of known political detentions evident in 

2005 has not changed in 2006, and is likely to reflect monastic resentment against the intensified patriotic education campaign. The 

total number of known detentions of monks and nuns, however, 

has declined in comparison with 2005. The unusual shift of political 

detention of monks and nuns away from Sichuan province in 

2005,161 when none were reported, was short lived. Nine of the 13 

known political detentions of Tibetan monks and nuns in 2006 took 

place in Sichuan province; the rest occurred in the TAR. 

The extent to which the apparent decline in political detention of 

monks and nuns in 2006 reflects actual circumstances, or incomplete information, or both, is unknown. It is possible that the Party 

and government’s increased repression of Tibetan Buddhism since 

2005 (especially of aspects of the religion that involve the Dalai 

Lama) has produced the result that the government desires: a more 

subdued monastic community. Fewer monks and nuns may be risking behavior that could result in punishments such as imprisonment or expulsion from a monastery or nunnery (a prospect that 

may increase under the TAR 2006 Measures). At the same time, 

it is likely that the actual number of detained monks and nuns is 

higher than PPD data indicates.162 Reports of detention of 

unnamed persons,163 or of persons who are reported as missing,164

are not listed along with reports of detention that include detailed 

information. Irrespective of the actual number of recent detentions, 

the high proportion of monks and nuns among them, and recent 

statements by monks and nuns describing their frustration with 

government management of Tibetan Buddhism,165 suggests that 

the level of monastic resentment against Chinese religious policies 

remains high. Repressive policies can result in a decline of behavior 

that triggers punishment, but a high level of frustration suggests 

that the potential for a resurgence of political protest exists. 

Tibetan monks and nuns make up about 64 of the 100 known 

currently detained or imprisoned Tibetan political prisoners, according to PPD data current in September 2007. Twenty-eight of 

the monks and nuns were detained or imprisoned in the TAR, 24 

in Sichuan province, 7 in Qinghai province, and 4 in Gansu province. Based on data available for 42 currently imprisoned Tibetan 

monks and nuns, their average sentence length is 10 years and 4 

months. 

17

No Progress on Access to (or Freedom for) the Panchen Lama 

The Chinese government continues to refuse to allow access by 

an international organization, such as the International Red Cross, 

to Gedun Choekyi Nyima, the boy the Dalai Lama recognized as 

the Panchen Lama in May 1995.166 Chinese officials continue to 

hold him in incommunicado custody along with his parents at an 

unknown location. Gedun Choekyi Nyima turned 18 years of age in 

April 2007, and in May he completed his 12th year in custody. Chinese officials claim that Gedun Choekyi Nyima is leading a ‘‘normal, happy life and receiving a good cultural education.’’ 167 After 

the Dalai Lama announced his recognition of Gedun Choekyi 

Nyima, Chinese officials took the then six-year-old boy and his parents into custody. The State Council declared the Dalai Lama’s announcement ‘‘illegal and invalid’’ 168 and installed Gyaltsen 

Norbu,169 whose appointment continues to stir widespread resentment among Tibetans. Chinese authorities may punish or imprison 

Tibetans who possess photographs of Gedun Choekyi Nyima or

information about him. 

Incidents of Repression of Freedom of Religion in Tibetan Secular 

Society 

Chinese government repression of freedom of religion is not limited to the Tibetan Buddhist monastic community, and adversely 

affects secular Tibetan society. Most Tibetans are not monks or 

nuns—they are farmers, herders, workers, traders, business operators, professionals, students, teachers, and government staff. In the 

TAR about 98 percent of Tibetans live in secular society.170 Official 

repression of Tibetan Buddhist activity by secular Tibetans principally targets the Dalai Lama, Tibetan religious devotion to him, 

and aspects of Tibetan Buddhism closely linked to him, especially 

certain ceremonies and observances associated with the Gelug tradition of Tibetan Buddhism.171 Tibetans who follow other traditions 

of Tibetan Buddhism, such as the Kargyu, Sakya, and Nyingma 

traditions, especially in Tibetan areas outside the TAR, may experience less interference from authorities.172

Chinese authorities routinely seek to prevent Tibetans from participating in religious observances that they suspect signify Tibetan 

devotion to the Dalai Lama. For example, the Lhasa Evening News 

published a Lhasa Party Committee notice on December 12, 2006, 

that forbids government employees, workers in government-run 

businesses, and school students to participate in a Tibetan Buddhist observance, Gaden Ngachoe, that would take place three days 

later.173 The notice warned, ‘‘Everyone must conscientiously respect the government and Party committee’s demand.’’ Tibetans 

traditionally light butter lamps to mark the occasion. 

The Lhasa Party Committee in May 2007 forbade Tibetan school 

children in some Lhasa neighborhoods from participating in

Tibetan Buddhism’s most holy day, Saga Dawa,174 or wearing ‘‘amulet threads’’ (blessing strings) received at Buddhist sites.175 Beginning in the late 1980s, when Tibetans staged a series of public

protests against Chinese policies, the Lhasa government has attempted to prevent Tibetans employed in the government sector 

and Tibetan students from participating in Saga Dawa.176 The proVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:44 Apr 18, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 U:\DOCS\41809.TXT DEIDRE
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hibition continued in 2006, when the government threatened to fire 

government employees who defied the ban, according to a U.S. Department of State report.177

Tibetans living in the Lhasa area, as well as throughout the TAR 

and in Tibetan autonomous areas of Qinghai, Gansu, and Sichuan 

provinces, openly celebrated the Dalai Lama’s July 6 birthday in 

2007,178 despite government characterization of such celebration as 

‘‘illegal’’ 179 and effective enforcement of a ban in previous years.180

Some Tibetans reportedly believed that the turnout in 2007 represented Tibetan celebration of the Dalai Lama’s receipt of the 

Congressional Gold Medal, scheduled for October 2007.181

TIBETAN CULTURE UNDER CHINESE DEVELOPMENT POLICY AND

PRACTICE

Commission Reports and Recommendations: Tibetan Culture in a 

Developing West 

CECC Annual Reports issued since 2002 document that Chinese 

government development policy and implementation, especially of 

the Great Western Development (GWD) program,182 increase pressure on the Tibetan language and culture, and erode the Tibetan 

people’s ability to preserve their heritage and self-identity. 

• The 2002 Annual Report observed that GWD ‘‘has the most 

profound implications for western China of any official policy 

formulation to emerge in the post-Deng era.’’ 183 The report 

identified the Qinghai-Tibet railway, then in its second year of 

construction,184 as the project causing the greatest alarm for 

Tibetans. An expert told the Commission, ‘‘The new railway to 

Tibet will only intensify existing migratory trends, exacerbate 

ethnic income disparities, and further marginalize Tibetans in 

traditional economic pursuits.’’ 185

• In 2003, the Annual Report stated, ‘‘The majority of Tibetans, 

who live in rural areas, benefit little from central government 

investment in the Tibetan economy. Most of this investment 

supports large-scale construction and government-run enterprises in which Han control is predominant.’’ 186 Tibetans must 

have access to significantly improved educational resources if 

they are to adapt successfully to their new environment, and 

if their culture is to survive, then the Tibetan language must 

play an important role in their education, the report said.187

• In 2004, the Annual Report noted that ‘‘existing policy initiatives are gaining momentum, especially the Great Western

Development program, formulated to accelerate economic development in China’s western provinces and speed their integration into the political and social mainstream.’’ 188 The report 

warned that government policies ‘‘promote strict adherence to 

a national identity defined in Beijing [and] discourage Tibetan 

aspirations to maintain their distinctive culture and religion.’’ 189

• The 2005 Annual Report showed that Chinese government 

statistics on educational achievement demonstrate that few Tibetans are prepared to compete for employment and business 

opportunities in the Han-dominated economic environment developing around them.190 Urban Tibetans reached senior midVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:44 Apr 18, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 U:\DOCS\41809.TXT DEIDRE
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dle school at 19 times the rate of rural Tibetans, the report 

said, but rural Tibetans are the largest and least prepared category of Tibetans competing for opportunities created by government economic development programs.191

• The release of the 2006 Annual Report followed the start of 

operation of the Qinghai-Tibet railway. The report noted ‘‘increasing Tibetan concerns about the railway’s potential effects 

on the Tibetan culture and environment,’’ 192 and explained 

why Chinese law, government and Party policies, and official 

statements increase Tibetan concerns that programs such as 

GWD and projects such as the Qinghai-Tibet railway will lead 

to large increases in Han migration.193

The Commission responded to the concerns and needs of Tibetans in China by recommending increased funding for U.S. NGOs 

to develop programs that ‘‘improve the health, education, and

economic conditions of ethnic Tibetans.’’ A Commission recommendation in 2003 stressed that such programs should ‘‘create 

direct, sustainable benefits for Tibetans without encouraging an influx of non-Tibetans into these areas.’’ 194

GWD Era Laws and Regulations Tend To Pressure, Not Protect, 

Tibetan Culture 

Changes in Chinese laws and regulations that address ethnic autonomy issues and that have been enacted during the period of 

GWD tend to decrease the protection of ethnic minority language 

and culture. The stated purpose of GWD is to ‘‘accelerate economic 

and social development of the western region and the minority nationality regions in particular.’’ 195 TAR Party Secretary Zhang 

Qingli asserted that as the result of such policies, ‘‘Tibet is in [the] 

best period of development and stability in its history.’’ 196 President and Party General Secretary Hu Jintao, who served as the 

TAR Party Secretary from 1988–1992,197 affirmed support for 

GWD and the importance of ‘‘the issue of coordinated regional development’’ when he met TAR delegates to the NPC in March 

2007.198 Laws and regulations such as the following have resulted 

in a trend of increasing cultural, linguistic, and economic pressure 

on ethnic minorities. 

The National People’s Congress (NPC) amended the 1984 Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law (REAL)199 in 2001, bringing the law 

into conformity with more recent trends in Party policy. Amendments added extensive language guiding issues that include economic development, natural resource exploitation, infrastructure 

construction, financial and fiscal management, recruiting cadres, 

professionals, and workers from other parts of China to ‘‘Go West,’’ 

establishing cooperative development projects between other parts 

of China and the GWD area, and improving the education system 

for ethnic minorities.200 [See Section II—Ethnic Minority Rights for 

more information on the REAL.] 

The amended REAL increased state support for ethnic minority 

education but lessened the state’s commitment to the constitutionally protected task of preserving and using ethnic minority languages.201 The 1984 REAL required the state to set up ‘‘institutes 

of nationalities and, . . . nationality oriented classes and preVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:44 Apr 18, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 U:\DOCS\41809.TXT DEIDRE
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paratory classes which only enroll students from minority nationalities.’’ 202 The amended REAL requires such institutes to ‘‘enroll 

only or mostly students from ethnic minorities,’’ 203 potentially reducing the level of use of ethnic languages within such institutes. 

Another result is that ethnic minorities must compete academically 

with Han who enroll in ethnic minority institutes, and compete 

with them for jobs after graduation.204 The 1984 REAL authorized 

the state to introduce for ethnic minorities ‘‘[p]referred enrollment 

and preferred assignment of jobs,’’ 205 a form of assistance that can 

help Tibetans and other minorities to compete for employment in 

an emerging market economy that attracts an increasing number 

of Han who have better educations.206 The amended REAL, however, removed the language that authorized the preferential treatment for ethnic minorities.207

The Provisions of the State Council for Implementing the 

REAL,208 issued in May 2005, promote a key GWD strategy:209 encouraging professionals, experts, and workers in China’s populous 

areas to ‘‘Go West’’ along with their families to ‘‘develop and pioneer in ethnic autonomous areas.’’ 210 The amended REAL itself 

provides the basis for establishing implementing provisions that 

provide incentives for population movement into autonomous areas 

where Tibetans and other ethnic groups live by authorizing local 

autonomous governments to provide ‘‘preferential treatment and 

encouragement’’ to ‘‘specialized personnel joining in the various 

kinds of construction in these areas.’’ 211 Minister Li Dezhu of the 

State Ethnic Affairs Commission (SEAC) warned in 2000 that implementation of the GWD and the resulting westward population 

flow could cause ‘‘possible trouble’’ in ethnic relations. He wrote in 

Seeking Truth that ‘‘some changes in the proportions of the nationalities’’ would take place and that ‘‘conflicts and clashes’’ could 

occur between ethnic groups.212

The State Council Legislative Affairs Office is reportedly preparing a draft law for submission to the NPC that ‘‘aims to create 

a favorable legal environment and support for a smooth implementation’’ of GWD, according to a March 2006 statement by Wang 

Jinxiang, the Vice Minister of the National Development and Reform Commission and the Deputy Director of the State Council Office of the Leading Group for Western Region Development.213

Wang said that the Legislative Affairs Office was working on the 

14th version of the draft and that he believed completion of the 

draft was ‘‘imminent.’’ No updated information is available about 

the progress of the bill. 

Protection for the Tibetan language has also decreased under autonomy regulations enacted during the GWD period. In 2002, the 

TAR People’s Congress revised the 1987 TAR Regulations on the 

Study, Use, and Development of the Tibetan Language,214 ending 

the precedence of the Tibetan language by authorizing the use of 

‘‘either or both’’ of Mandarin and Tibetan languages in most areas 

of government work.215 A 1998 government White Paper stated, 

‘‘Guaranteeing the study and use of the Tibetan language is an important aspect of safeguarding the Tibetan people’s right to autonomy and exercising their right to participate in the administration 

of state and local affairs.’’ 216 The then-current regulation ‘‘clearly 

specifies that both Tibetan and Chinese should be used in the Tibet 

21

Autonomous Region, with precedence given to the Tibetan language,’’ according to the White Paper. 

Qinghai-Tibet Railway Carries 1.5 Million Passengers Into the TAR 

in First Year 

The Qinghai-Tibet railway, officially designated a key GWD 

project,217 ‘‘transported 1.5 million passengers into Tibet’’ during 

its first year of operation (ending on June 30, 2007), according to 

a July report.218 The government issued no public reports of major 

incidents or accidents linked to the railway’s operation during the 

year. Advocacy organizations have expressed publicly219 what Tibetans in China say privately, that the railway will facilitate a 

surge of non-Tibetans into Tibetan autonomous areas, altering the 

demographic and economic structure of the region, and further increasing pressure on Tibetan culture and on Tibetans as they compete for jobs and other economic benefits.220 Jampa Phuntsog 

(Xiangba Pingcuo), Chairman of the TAR government, claimed in 

June 2007 that such a threat does not exist, and that Tibetans in 

the TAR would not face assimilation into Chinese culture (‘‘Han 

culture’’).221

State-run media reports about the Qinghai-Tibet railway generally apply the terms ‘‘passenger’’ and ‘‘tourist’’ interchangeably to 

persons traveling to the TAR, and provide little information about 

how many passengers arrive in the TAR for purposes other than 

tourism. For example, the July report of ‘‘1.5 million passengers’’ 

describes them as ‘‘nearly half of the total tourist arrivals in the 

region.’’ 222 At that rate of arrival, nearly 4,100 passengers arrived 

in the TAR each day. That figure accords closely with a May 2006 

statement by the China Tibet Tourism Bureau (before railway operations began) that the railway would ‘‘transport an additional 

4,000 tourists to Tibet each day.’’ 223 The July report’s portrayal of 

the 1.5 million passengers as ‘‘tourists’’ making up nearly half the 

total tourist arrivals is also consistent with information in other official reports: there were a total of 3.6 million tourist arrivals in 

2006 and the first six months of 2007.224

The Commission is aware of one official Chinese media report 

that less than half of the Lhasa-bound Qinghai-Tibet railway passengers were tourists during the height of the tourist season after 

the railway began service. Midway into September 2006, the railway’s third month of operation, Jin Shixun, the Director of the 

TAR Committee of Development and Reform, provided information 

about the occupational categories of passengers—60 percent were 

business persons, students, transient workers, traders, and individuals visiting relatives; 40 percent were tourists.225 Jin’s remark 

was based on 270,000 passengers over a period of approximately 75 

days, or about 3,600 passengers per day. If a similar proportion 

prevailed throughout the remainder of the first year of operation, 

then approximately 900,000 of the 1.5 million passengers could 

have been non-tourists, and hundreds of thousands of them could 

have been non-Tibetan business persons, workers, and traders who 

intended to remain for a period in the TAR. An October 2005 report by China’s state-run media also acknowledged that the railway will ‘‘attract tourists, traders, and ethnic Chinese settlers’’ to 

the region.226

22

A Tibetan resident of Lhasa told a radio call-in show in July 

2007 that ‘‘Tibetans in Lhasa have been overwhelmed by the frightful explosion of the Chinese population in the city.’’ 227 The caller 

said that ‘‘wherever you go, you get the impression of overcrowding.’’ Tibetans ‘‘[witness] Chinese tourists becoming permanent residents,’’ she said, and reported that ‘‘Chinese migrants 

were moving fast into formerly Tibetan neighborhoods and businesses.’’ Another Tibetan caller from Lhasa said ‘‘there is deep 

skepticism about the aim and whose purpose [the railway] is serving,’’ and asserted that ‘‘the Tibetans are certainly not the direct 

beneficiaries.’’ The first caller acknowledged that Tibetan traders 

are doing more business, but she said those benefits are ‘‘insignificant if you take the whole picture of Chinese benefits in terms of 

business and employment into account.’’ 228 An NGO reported in 

early August that Chinese fleeing flooded areas of the country were 

‘‘pouring into Tibet’’ on the Qinghai-Tibet railway, and that thousands of unemployed migrants roamed Lhasa looking for work.229

The ‘‘unprecedented movement of Chinese migrants to Lhasa,’’ 

which started in July, ‘‘has put pressure on the local Tibetans and 

their day-to-day livelihood,’’ according to the report. 

Inadequate information provided by the Chinese government 

about passengers traveling on the Qinghai-Tibet railway hampers 

objective assessment of the railway’s alleged role in accelerating 

the influx of non-Tibetan residents into the region. Existing examples of the establishment of rail links to remote regions in China 

indicate that significant changes to the proportions of ethnic groups 

occur over time. Rail links were built into what is now the Inner 

Mongolia Autonomous Region (IMAR) before the PRC was established;230 a railway reached Urumqi, the capital of the Xinjiang 

Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR), in 1962; the railway arrived 

in Kashgar, in the western XUAR, in 1999.231 Based on official 

2000 census data, the ratio of Han to Mongol in the IMAR is 4.6 

Han to 1 Mongol. In the XUAR the ratio of Han to Uighur is 0.9 

Han to 1 Uighur. The ratio of Han to Tibetans in the TAR stood 

at 0.07 Han to 1 Tibetan in 2000, according to census data.232 Tibetans are concerned that the Qinghai-Tibet railway will facilitate 

changes in Tibetan areas of China similar to those in the IMAR 

and XUAR. 

Rebuilding the Tibetan Countryside: Allegations of Forced 

Settlement, Re-housing 

Another Party-led program linked to GWD and the anti-Dalai 

Lama campaign aims to end a way of life that is iconic among Tibetans and that has survived for centuries: nomadic herding.233 A 

government program gathered momentum last year that aims to 

build a ‘‘beautiful, new socialist countryside’’ 234 and requires nomads to give up their traditional lifestyle and grazing lands to live 

in fixed settlements, or find other work. Similar programs affecting 

herders in Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan, and Yunnan provinces are underway.235 A TAR government program underway is moving Tibetan farmers into new housing in reorganized communities. TAR 

Party Secretary Zhang Qingli said that such steps would result in 

a ‘‘harmonious society.’’ 236 Party General Secretary Hu Jintao237

advised TAR delegates, including Zhang, attending the NPC in 

23

March 2007 that ‘‘maintaining social harmony and stability is the 

premise’’ for economic and social development in the TAR.238

Zhang Qingli said in the January 2007 issue of Seeking Truth 

that the Party’s determination to restructure Tibetan farming and 

grazing communities is not only to promote economic development, 

but also to counteract the Dalai Lama’s influence.239 Zhang said 

that to do so is essential for ‘‘continuing to carry out major development of west China’’ (e.g., GWD), and pointed out that 80 percent 

of the TAR population are farmers and herders. ‘‘[Farmers and 

herders ‘living and working in peace and contentment’] is the fundamental condition for us in holding the initiative in the struggle 

against the Dalai clique,’’ Zhang said.240 He listed Party objectives 

including to construct permanent housing for nomadic herders, improve farmers’ housing, relocate farmers’ housing to achieve poverty relief, and ensure that 80 percent of TAR farmers and herders 

are in ‘‘safe and suitable’’ housing within five years. Zhang called 

on the Party to support measures to ‘‘actively organize’’ Tibetan 

farmers and herders to move to towns or urban areas to find employment, set up businesses, or seek training in other skills.241

The Chinese government has implemented policies since 2000 

(the year that GWD was implemented) to confiscate herders’ land, 

erect fencing, and resettle herders, and has intensified the policies 

in some areas since 2003, Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported in 

June 2007.242 Guolou (Golog) and Yushu Tibetan Autonomous Prefectures (TAPs) in Qinghai province are the areas most severely affected by implementation.243 The report acknowledges that China 

faces environmental crises, and that Chinese officials have explained that removing herds from traditional pastures will benefit 

the environment,244 but the report asserts that ‘‘there are grounds 

for disputing both who is responsible for those crises and the consequent actions taken by the government in the name of protection 

in Tibetan areas.’’ 245

The resettlement program has subjected herders to compulsory 

or forced resettlement, compulsory livestock reduction, bans on 

grazing, compulsory change of land use, and evictions to make way 

for public works schemes, the HRW report asserts.246 Chinese

authorities failed to consult adequately with the affected herders, 

provide them with adequate compensation, or allow them adequate 

options for complaint, thereby failing to fulfill requirements under 

the Chinese Constitution, according to the report.247 ‘‘Claims of 

nonpayment are endemic, and there are also allegations of corruption and discrimination in the compensation process,’’ according to 

HRW.248

The number of Tibetans affected by forced resettlement is unknown but it ‘‘clearly runs into the tens, if not hundreds, of thousands,’’ according to the HRW report.249 The Commission’s 2006 

Annual Report reported that TAR authorities relocated 48,000 

herders and settled them in fixed communities in the period 2001–

2004,250 that a government program in Qinghai province to settle 

herders (including Tibetans) placed about 10,000 families in fixed 

communities by 2005,251 and that a Gansu province program started in the late 1990s to settle herders in Tibetan autonomous areas 

settled 7,000 families by 2004 and is expected to be complete in 

2009.252

24

TAR government Chairman Jampa Phuntsog stated in June 2007 

that ‘‘no forced resettlement has been done’’ in the TAR, and he 

provided details about some cases of relocation.253 He acknowledged that the TAR government had ‘‘displaced some 7,000 people 

who lived at the source of the Yangtze River’’ in Changdu 

(Chamdo) prefecture and resettled them in Linzhi (Kongpo) prefecture. He claimed that the government had ‘‘respected the will of 

the people’’ in doing so. In addition, the TAR was seeking to move 

dozens of herding families out of the Hol Xil Natural Reserve, but 

not all of them had agreed to leave. ‘‘We are still trying to persuade 

them to move, and they will only be relocated when they agree to,’’ 

Jampa Phuntsog said.254

The TAR government launched a program in 2006, concurrent 

with the region’s 11th Five-Year Plan, to move Tibetan farmers 

and herders into new housing.255 In the first year of operation, the 

program moved 56,000 households with 290,000 members into new 

houses.256 Zhang Qingli personally led the effort, according to 

state-run media, and when the program concludes in 2010, it will 

have moved 220,000 families into new homes.257 Based on an average household size of 5.2 persons (suggested by the preceding data), 

the total number of Tibetans moved into new housing by 2010 

could be approximately 1.14 million—more than half of the total 

number of Tibetan rural residents in the TAR at the time of the 

2000 census.258

Reports by advocacy groups and official Chinese media organizations on whether or not Tibetan participation in the housing program is voluntary, and the consequences of the financial burden on 

Tibetan farmers and herders, differ sharply. Zhang Qingli said in 

March 2007 that county- and prefecture-level governments offer 

each household a subsidy to defray 10,000–25,000 yuan (US$1,300–

US$3,300) of the estimated 60,000 yuan (US$8,000) cost of a house, 

with Tibetan householders paying the rest.259 Construction is on a 

‘‘strictly volunteer basis,’’ Zhang claimed.260 HRW reported in December 2006 that the program requires villagers, ‘‘particularly 

those who live next to main roads,’’ to rebuild their homes ‘‘in accordance with strict official specifications within two to three 

years.’’ 261 The government does not subsidize the cost of the house, 

according to HRW, but lends Tibetans between 20 and 25 percent 

of the cost to householders.262

Tibetan farmers and nomads, whose 2,435 yuan average per capita income in 2006 places them among China’s poorest citizens,263

generally do not have savings or other capital resources equal to 

several years of income, so they face difficulty in paying for the 

government-mandated housing. ‘‘Nearly all must therefore supplement these funds with considerable bank loans,’’ HRW said. Even 

relatively wealthy households have been ‘‘forced into debt,’’ and 

borrowers who default on loans forfeit the right to occupy the 

house, according to the report.264 None of the Tibetans interviewed 

by HRW reported that they had a right to challenge the program 

or refuse to participate in it. Some Tibetans described incidents in 

which local authorities demolished Tibetan homes after residents 

refused to participate in the program, or who said that they could 

not participate because they could not borrow enough money to pay 

for a new home. According to a June 2007 foreign media report, the 

25

relocated villages are ‘‘cookie-cutter’’ in style, and even though 

farmers did not appear to be happy, they were ‘‘reluctant to complain.’’ 265

Local government officials in a village in Dingri county, located 

in Rikaze (Shigatse) prefecture in the TAR, threatened to punish 

households that failed to build a new home, according to a May 

2007 Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy (TCHRD) 

report.266 Officials told the villagers that they should improve their 

village before the 2008 Olympics so that it will be more attractive 

to tourists. The government offered to contribute 10,000 yuan toward houses that must cost a minimum of 20,000 yuan, but villagers in the area are so poor that only 4 of the 34 households built 

houses.267 Three of the four households had to secure a bank loan 

in order to match the government’s 10,000 yuan contribution. ‘‘The 

new houses do not reflect the better living standards of Tibetan 

people, they are not happy in the new houses built upon debts, 

[and] they are more worried than ever about how to repay the 

loans to banks,’’ TCHRD’s source said.268

PUNISHING PEACEFUL TIBETAN EXPRESSION UNDER CHINA’S

CONSTITUTION AND LAW

Commission Reports, China’s Record on Tibetan Rights 

Commission Annual Reports issued since 2002 document that the 

Chinese government applies the Constitution and law in a manner 

that restricts and represses the exercise of human rights by Tibetans, and that uses the law to punish peaceful expression and action 

by Tibetans as threats to state security. The Chinese government, 

and governments in the TAR and other provinces where Tibetans 

live, made no progress in the past year toward improving the right 

of Tibetans in China to exercise their constitutionally guaranteed 

freedoms of religion, expression, and assembly. Such restrictions 

are inconsistent with the Chinese government’s obligations under 

international human rights standards.269 Instead, Communist 

Party political campaigns promote atheism and strengthen government efforts to discourage Tibetan aspirations to foster their 

unique culture and heritage. [See Section II—Freedom of Religion.]

• The 2002 Annual Report observed that the Chinese government seeks to maintain unity and stability270 by ‘‘constraining 

Tibetan political, cultural, educational, and religious life,’’ and 

that human rights and the rule of law in Tibetan areas of 

China are configured to serve government and Party interests.271

• In 2003, the Annual Report noted that friction remains between Tibetan aspirations to maintain their distinctive culture 

and religion and Chinese policies favoring atheism and emphasizing the primacy of national identity. China represses peaceful expression that it considers ‘‘splittist,’’ or that it deems to 

be ‘‘detrimental to the security, honor, and interests of the 

motherland.’’ 272

• The 2004 Annual Report observed that China represses or 

punishes peaceful expression by Tibetans that authorities 

deem to ‘‘endanger state security’’ even if the expression is 

non-violent and poses no threat to the state. An official in BeiVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:44 Apr 18, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 U:\DOCS\41809.TXT DEIDRE
26

jing told Commission staff in September 2003, ‘‘There is not a 

distinct line between violent and non-violent. . . . A non-violent action can result in eventual violence.’’

• The 2005 Annual Report noted the downward trend in the 

number of known Tibetan political prisoners, and suggested, 

‘‘Tibetans are avoiding the risks of direct criticism or protest 

against Chinese policies and are turning to education, arts, 

and religion for ways to express and protect their culture and 

heritage.’’ But as incidents of protest declined, Chinese authorities watched for other signs of Tibetan resentment or nationalism. 

• In 2006, the Annual Report provided additional information 

on how Tibetans appear to be avoiding the risks of direct

protest against government policies and turning to other methods of cultural expression. After the Dalai Lama told Tibetans 

in India, ‘‘Neither use, sell, or buy wild animals, their products 

or derivatives,’’ Tibetans in China staged public events in 

which they burned rare furs stripped from traditional Tibetan 

garments.273

Political Imprisonment of Tibetans: Peaceful Expression and NonViolent Action as Threats to State Security 

Chinese authorities continue to detain and imprison Tibetans for 

peaceful expression and non-violent action, charging them with 

crimes such as ‘‘splittism,’’ 274 and claiming that their behavior ‘‘endangers state security.’’ 275 [See Section II—Rights of Criminal Suspect and Defendants—Law in Action: Abuses of Criminal Law and 

Procedure.] Expression or action that is linked to the Dalai Lama 

is especially likely to result in such charges. Chinese officials have 

punished Tibetans, such as Jigme Gyatso, a former monk imprisoned in 1996 who is serving an 18-year sentence276 for printing 

leaflets, distributing posters, and later shouting pro-Dalai Lama 

slogans in prison, and Choeying Khedrub, a monk serving a life 

sentence since 2000 for printing leaflets, for peaceful expressions 

and non-violent actions that officials believe could undermine Party 

rule. Two Tibetans sentenced along with Choeying Khedrub, monk 

Yeshe Tenzin and builder Tsering Lhagon, are serving sentences of 

10 and 15 years respectively on the same charges. 

Possessing photographs or copies of religious teachings of the 

Dalai Lama can result in imprisonment for endangering state security (by ‘‘inciting splittism’’) for up to five years, especially if a Tibetan carries such material across the international border into the 

TAR, an official of the Rikaze (Shigatse) Prefecture Intermediate 

People’s Court, located in the TAR, confirmed in 2005.277 ‘‘Any document that relates to Tibetan independence, Dalai Lama photos, or 

any other documents or literature containing reactionary themes or 

subjects are punishable,’’ he said. In February 2007, the Rikaze 

court sentenced a Tibetan man, Penpa, to three years’ imprisonment after police searched his home and confiscated audio recordings of the Dalai Lama conducting a Buddhist teaching in India.278

Local authorities became suspicious of Penpa when they learned 

that he was saving sheep from the slaughterhouse as a religious 

offering dedicated to the Dalai Lama’s long life.279

27

Public security officials detained a total of nine Tibetans in Ganzi 

(Kardze) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (TAP), Sichuan province, 

none of whom authorities accused of violent activity, between 

March and August 2006, according to reports issued between June 

and September.280 Officials detained six of the Tibetans for alleged 

roles in printing and distributing pro-independence leaflets in late 

May: Kayo Doga (a layman in his late-50s, previously sentenced to 

three years of reeducation through labor in 2002 for his role in arranging a prayer ceremony for the Dalai Lama’s long life); Yiga 

(Kayo Doga’s daughter, a former nun); nuns Sonam Lhamo, Sonam 

Choezom (or Sonam Choetso), and Jampa Yangzom (or Jampa 

Yangtso); and Yiga, a female middle-school student. According to 

an unofficial source, a Ganzi county court issued a notice that all 

six detainees, including the minor, Yiwang, would face trial and 

that formal arrest had taken place.281

In separate incidents reported by unofficial sources involving the 

seventh and eighth Ganzi detentions, officials detained monk 

Namkha Gyaltsen of Gepheling Monastery in March 2006 for allegedly painting pro-independence slogans on government buildings 

(or putting up pro-independence posters), and monk Lobsang 

Palden, also of Gepheling, on August 15 after authorities searched 

his room and found ‘‘incriminating documents’’ including photos of 

the Dalai Lama.282 Namkha Gyaltsen allegedly confessed and may 

face a sentence of seven to eight years, and officials formally arrested Lobsang Palden on September 6 on charges of inciting 

splittism. In the ninth reported Ganzi detention, public security officials searched the living quarters of Jinpa, the abbot of Taglung 

Monastery, located in Seda (Serthar) county in Ganzi TAP, in

August 2006, according to an unofficial report.283 The officials reportedly found nothing that they considered to be illegal, but they 

detained Jinpa nonetheless, possibly in connection with pro-independence posters that appeared in the monastery a year earlier. 

Public security officials based at Sera Monastery in Lhasa detained monk Gyaltsen Namdrag in May 2006 on suspicion that he 

distributed pro-independence pamphlets, according to an unofficial 

report.284 The Lhasa Intermediate People’s Court sentenced him in 

October to five years’ imprisonment on charges of endangering 

state security (probably ‘‘inciting splittism’’). Gyaltsen Namdrag is 

reportedly serving his sentence at Qushui Prison, according to the 

report. 

The Lhasa Intermediate People’s Court sentenced tailor Sonam 

Gyalpo to 12 years’ imprisonment for espionage on June 9, 2006,285

following a search of his Lhasa home in August 2005 by state security officials who discovered photos and videotapes of the Dalai 

Lama and printed matter, according to an unofficial report.286

Sonam Gyalpo allegedly made contact with the Tibetan government-in-exile in the 1990s and engaged in pro-independence activity in the TAR, according to official Chinese information reported 

by Dui Hua Dialogue in April 2007.287 Sonam Gyalpo was 1 of 

about 10 Tibetans detained before the 40th anniversary of the TAR 

on September 1, 2005, according to another unofficial report.288 He 

was reportedly imprisoned twice previously for a total of nearly 

four years as punishment for political activity,289 and is serving his 

current sentence in Qushui Prison.290

28

Official Chinese information confirmed the detention of Lhasa 

school teacher Drolma Kyab in March 2005, his conviction on 

charges of espionage and illegally crossing the border, and his sentence of 10 years and 6 months’ imprisonment after he authored 

a manuscript touching on sensitive political subjects.291 The unpublished book contained 57 chapters on subjects such as ‘‘democracy, sovereignty of Tibet, Tibet under [C]ommunism, colonialism, 

[and] religion,’’ according to an unofficial report.292 Drolma Kyab 

had started a second work that focused on Tibetan geography and 

that touched on topics including the number and location of military camps in ‘‘Chinese occupied Tibet.’’ 293 He smuggled a letter 

appealing to the United Nations for help out of Qushui Prison,294

where he is serving his sentence.295 Drolma Kyab wrote in the letter, ‘‘They think that what I wrote about nature and geography 

was also connected to Tibetan independence. . . . [T]his is the 

main reason of my conviction, but according to Chinese law, the 

book alone would not justify such a sentence. So they announced 

that I am guilty of the crime of espionage.’’ 296

The Gannan Intermediate People’s Court in Gansu province sentenced nun Choekyi Drolma to three years’ imprisonment in December 2005 for ‘‘inciting splittism,’’ according to official Chinese 

information that became available in November 2006.297 She is 

serving her sentence in the Gansu Women’s Prison. Choekyi 

Drolma was among five Tibetan monks and nuns detained in 2005 

in Xiahe (Sangchu), in Gannan (Kanlho) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (TAP) in Gansu. Public security officials detained her along 

with nuns Tamdrin Tsomo and Yonten Drolma of Gedun 

Tengyeling Nunnery, and monks Dargyal Gyatso and Jamyang 

Samdrub of Labrang Tashikhyil Monastery, on May 22, 2005, on 

suspicion that they circulated and displayed letter-sized posters 

that were critical of the Chinese government. The official information mentioned only Choekyi Drolma, but it is likely that the court 

tried and sentenced the five monks and nuns together since they 

allegedly acted together. Dargyal Gyatso and Tamdrin Tsomo are 

believed to be serving 3-year sentences; Jamyang Samdrub and 

Yonten Drolma are believed to have been released after completing 

18-month sentences.298

Jamphel Gyatso and Tashi Gyaltsen, two of a group of five 

monks of Dragkar Traldzong Monastery reportedly detained in 

Qinghai province in January 2005 and sentenced in February for 

publishing a poem in the monastery newsletter, are reportedly 

serving their three-year sentences at a brick kiln near Xining, the 

capital of Qinghai.299 The other three monks, Lobsang Dargyal, 

Tsesum Samten, and Tsultrim Phelgyal, completed two-year and 

six-month sentences in July 2007 and are presumed to be released. 

Security officials considered the poem to be politically sensitive and 

ordered the monks to serve terms of reeducation through labor. 

No new developments were reported in the past year in the cases 

of prisoners Bangri Chogtrul or Tenzin Deleg, reincarnated Tibetan 

lamas convicted in separate cases. Both men had contact with the 

Dalai Lama in India in the years prior to their detentions. Bangri 

Chogtrul (Jigme Tenzin Nyima), who lived as a householder in 

Lhasa and managed a children’s home along with his wife, was 

convicted of inciting splittism and sentenced to life imprisonment 

29

in a closed court in Lhasa in September 2000.300 The Lhasa Intermediate People’s Court commuted his sentence to 19 years of fixed 

term imprisonment in July 2003, and reduced the sentence by 1 

year in November 2005.301 Tenzin Deleg (A’an Zhaxi) was convicted 

in a closed court in Sichuan province in November 2002 of conspiring to cause explosions and inciting splittism.302 Authorities 

claim that the case involves state secrets and refuse to disclose details of evidence that establishes a direct link between Tenzin 

Deleg and the alleged criminal acts. The Commission and Human 

Rights Watch have published reports on the case, which has stirred 

international controversy for its procedural violations and lack of 

transparency.303 The provincial high court commuted Tenzin 

Deleg’s reprieved death sentence to life imprisonment in January 

2005. Chinese officials acknowledge that he suffers from coronary 

heart disease and high blood pressure.304

In an incident linked to a protest against Tenzin Deleg’s imprisonment, public security officials in Litang county, Ganzi TAP, detained Tibetan nomad Ronggyal Adrag (Runggye Adak) on August 

1, 2007, at a horse-racing festival after he climbed onto a stage 

where officials were scheduled to speak and, according to one report,305 shouted slogans calling for the Dalai Lama’s return to 

Tibet, the release of Gedun Choekyi Nyima (the Panchen Lama 

identified by the Dalai Lama), and Tibetan independence. According to other reports,306 he called for the Dalai Lama’s return, freedom of religion, and the releases of the Panchen Lama and Tenzin 

Deleg. Ronggyal Adrag’s statements may have been provoked by a 

petition drive conducted by Chinese officials who visited local monasteries in the weeks before the festival and told monks to sign a 

petition stating that they do not want the Dalai Lama to return to 

Tibet.307 In an unusually swift and public response, China’s staterun media acknowledged on August 3 that police detained 

Ronggyal Adrag for ‘‘inciting separation of the nationalities,’’ and 

that more than 200 Tibetans had gathered the same day outside 

the detention center to call for his release.308 All of the Tibetans 

left the area of the detention center by the following day, according 

to the official report. A week later, on August 8, People’s Armed Police forces used tear gas and stun grenades to disperse Tibetans 

who gathered peacefully near the horse-racing grounds to call for 

Ronggyal Adrag’s release, according to an unofficial report.309 Authorities detained three of Ronggyal Adrag’s nephews on August 

21, including monk Adrug Lopoe of Lithang Monastery, whom police deemed to be a ‘‘splittist’’ influence behind the public demands 

for Ronggyal Adrag’s release.310 Officials released Adrug Lopoe’s 

two brothers soon after they took him into detention.311

Another incident of Tibetan expression of the wish for the Dalai 

Lama to return to Tibet resulted in the detention of seven 14- and 

15-year old middle school students in Xiahe county, Gannan TAP, 

according to an NGO report.312 On or about September 7, 2007, 

local public security officials detained about 40 students from a

village middle school after some of the students allegedly wrote slogans on walls calling for the Dalai Lama’s return and Tibetan freedom.313 Police released all but seven of the students within 48 

hours, and transferred seven boys to the Xiahe county seat, where 

authorities refused to provide any information to the children’s 

30

families or confirm that they were in police custody.314 The report 

named five of the boys: Chopa Kyab (age 14), Drolma Kyab (14), 

Tsekhu (14), and two 15-year-olds each named Lhamo Tseten.315

Police reportedly beat one of the seven boys upon detention, resulting in profuse bleeding, and refused to allow the boy’s family to 

take him for medical care. 

Chinese authorities carried out 13 known detentions of Tibetans 

in 2006, a decrease compared to the 24 such detentions in 2005 and 

15 such detentions in 2004, according to information available in 

the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database (PPD) as of September 2007. Of the known political detentions in 2006, nine took 

place in Sichuan province and four in the TAR. The PPD listed 100 

known cases of current Tibetan political detention or imprisonment, a figure that is likely to be lower than the actual number 

of Tibetan political prisoners. Reports of Tibetan political imprisonment often do not reach monitoring groups until at least one or two 

years after the detentions occur. Forty-nine of the Tibetans are believed to be detained or imprisoned in the TAR, 30 in Sichuan 

province, 9 in Qinghai province, and 9 in Gansu province. The location where Chinese authorities are holding the Panchen Lama and 

his parents is unknown. Based on sentence information available 

for 61 of the current prisoners, the average sentence length is 11 

years and 7 months. 

The number of known cases of current Tibetan political detention 

or imprisonment reported in the current Annual Report is approximately half the number that the Commission reported in the 2002 

Annual Report.316 The downward trend in the number of known 

Tibetan political prisoners may reflect incomplete information, as 

well as fewer Tibetans risking imprisonment as punishment for 

peaceful expression and non-violent action in opposition to Chinese 

policies. Instead, Tibetans may be turning to other methods of expressing their culture and self-identity. 

Monk Ngawang Phuljung of Drepung Monastery, the longest 

serving Tibetan who remains imprisoned for counterrevolutionary 

crimes, received a 6-month reduction to his 19-year sentence in 

September 2005 and is due for release from Qushui Prison on October 18, 2007, according to an October 2006 report based on official 

Chinese information.317 After his detention in April 1989, the 

Lhasa Intermediate People’s Court sentenced him along with nine 

other Drepung monks at a public rally in November. Ngawang 

Phuljung’s crimes included ‘‘forming a counterrevolutionary organization,’’ ‘‘spreading counterrevolutionary propaganda,’’ ‘‘passing

information to the enemy,’’ and ‘‘crossing the border illegally and 

spying,’’ according to a 1994 UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (UNWGAD) report that quoted an official Chinese response 

about the case.318 The UNWGAD report declared Ngawang 

Phuljung’s detention arbitrary, and stated that the alleged espionage and betrayal of state secrets ‘‘consisted in fact in the exposure 

of cases of violations of human rights including their disclosure 

abroad.’’

31

The Commission’s Executive Branch members have participated 

in and supported the work of the Commission, including the preparation of the 2007 Annual Report. The views and recommendations 

expressed in this report, however, do not necessarily reflect the views 

of individual Executive Branch members or the Administration. 

(33)

Endnotes

1PRC Constitution, art. 36 (‘‘enjoy freedom of religious belief’’), art. 116 (‘‘enact autonomy regulations and specific regulations in the light of the political, economic, and cultural characteristics of the nationality or nationalities’’), art. 119 (‘‘independently administer educational, scientific, cultural, public health, and physical culture affairs’’), art. 121 (‘‘employ the spoken and 

written language or languages in common use’’). Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law, enacted 31 

May 84, amended 28 February 01, art. 11 (‘‘guarantee the freedom of religious belief’’), art. 19 

(‘‘enact self-governing regulations and separate regulations in the light of the political, economic, 

and cultural characteristics’’), art. 21 (‘‘use the language or languages commonly used in the locality;. . . the language of the nationality exercising regional autonomy may be used as the main 

language’’), art. 36 (‘‘decide on educational plans’’), art. 37 (‘‘independently develop education for 

the nationalities’’), art. 38 (‘‘develop literature, art, the press, publishing, radio broadcasting, the 

film industry, television, and other cultural undertakings’’). Regulation on Religious Affairs, 

issued 30 November 04, art. 2 (‘‘Citizens enjoy freedom of religious belief.’’).] 2 CECC, 2004 Annual Report, 5 October 04, sec. I. The 2004 recommendation stressed more 

specifically the objectives of dialogue: ‘‘The future of Tibetans and their religion, language, and 

culture depends on fair and equitable decisions about future policies that can only be achieved 

through dialogue. The Dalai Lama is essential to such a dialogue. The President and the Congress should continue to urge the Chinese government to engage in substantive discussions with 

the Dalai Lama or his representatives.’’ CECC, 2005 Annual Report, 11 October 05, sec. I. The 

2005 recommendation called for direct contact between the Dalai Lama and the Chinese leadership: ‘‘To help the parties build on visits and dialogue held in 2003, 2004, and 2005, the President and the Congress should urge the Chinese government to move the current dialogue toward deeper, substantive discussions with the Dalai Lama or his representatives, and encourage 

direct contact between the Dalai Lama and the Chinese leadership.’’ 3 CECC, 2006 Annual Report, 20 September 06, 17–18. 

4 H. Con. Res. 196, ‘‘Authorizing the use of the Rotunda and grounds of the Capitol for a ceremony to award the Congressional Gold Medal to Tenzin Gyatso, the Fourteenth Dalai Lama,’’ 

4 September 07. According to the House Concurrent Resolution, the award ceremony will take 

place in the Capitol Rotunda on October 17, and the Capitol grounds will be available for a public event. The Resolution names the International Campaign for Tibet as the sponsor of the public event. 5S. 2784, Fourteenth Dalai Lama Congressional Gold Medal Act, The Library of Congress 

(Online), enacted 27 September 06; International Campaign for Tibet (ICT) (Online), ‘‘US Congress Passes Bill to Award the Dalai Lama the Congressional Gold Medal: Bill Cosponsored by 

387 Members of U.S. House and Senate,’’ 13 September 06. ICT notes that the Fourteenth Dalai 

Lama Congressional Gold Medal Act was introduced as S.2782 by Senators Dianne Feinstein 

and Craig Thomas, and as H.R.4562 by Representatives Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, and Tom Lantos. 6Steven Marshall and Susette Cooke, Tibet Outside the TAR: Control, Exploitation and Assimilation: Development With Chinese Characteristics (Washington D.C.: self-published CD–

ROM, 1997), Table 7. The 13 Tibetan autonomous areas include the provincial-level Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), with an area of 1.2 million square kilometers (463,320 square miles), 

as well as 10 Tibetan autonomous prefectures (TAP) and two Tibetan autonomous counties 

(TAC) located in Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan, and Yunnan provinces. Qinghai province: Yushu 

TAP, 197,791 square kilometers (76,367 square miles); Guoluo (Golog) TAP, 78,444 square kilometers (30,287 square miles); Huangnan (Malho) TAP, 17,901 square kilometers (6,912 square 

miles); Hainan (Tsolho) TAP, 41,634 square kilometers (16,075 square miles); Haibei (Tsojang) 

TAP, 52,000 square kilometers (20,077 square miles); Haixi (Tsonub) Mongol and Tibetan AP, 

325,787 square kilometers (125,786 square miles). Gansu province: Gannan (Kanlho) TAP, 

45,000 square kilometers (17,374 square miles); Tianzhu (Pari) TAC, 7,150 square kilometers 

(2,761 square miles). Sichuan province: Ganzi (Kardze) TAP, 153,870 square kilometers (59,409 

square miles); Aba (Ngaba) Tibetan and Qiang AP, 86,639 square kilometers (33,451 square 

miles); Muli (Mili) TAC, 11,413 square kilometers (4,407 square miles). Yunnan province: Diqing 

(Dechen) TAP, 23,870 square kilometers (9,216 square miles). The Table provides areas in 

square kilometers; conversion to square miles uses the formula provided on the Web site of the 

U.S. Geological Survey (USGS): one square kilometer = 0.3861 square mile. Based on data in 

the Table, the 10 TAPs and 2 TACs have a total area of approximately 1.04 million square kilometers (402,000 square miles). The TAR and the Tibetan autonomous prefectures and counties 

are contiguous and total approximately 2.24 million square kilometers (865,000 square miles). 

Xining city and Haidong prefecture, located in Qinghai province, have a total area of 20,919 

square kilometers (8,077 square miles) and are not Tibetan autonomous areas. 7Office of the Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues, U.S. Department of State, Report on 

Tibet Negotiations, 11 July 2007. The Report is mandated by Section 611 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, 2003. 8 Ibid. 

9 Ibid. 

34

10 Ibid. 11 Ibid. President Bush raised the issue of dialogue and direct discussion between the Dalai 

Lama and Chinese officials when he met President Hu in Washington in April 2006 and at the 

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC) in Vietnam the following November. 12 Ibid. 13 Ibid. 14Paula Dobriansky was sworn in as Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs on May 1, 

2001. She was appointed Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues on May 17, 2001. She was appointed CECC Commissioner in July 2001. 15 U.S. Department of State, Report on Tibet Negotiations. 16 Ibid. 17 ‘‘Dalai Lama’s Envoy: China Talks Deal With Substantive Issues, Encounter Obstacle,’’ 

CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, April 2006, 3. The envoys visited China 

on September 9–27, 2002; May 25–June 8, 2003; September 12–29, 2004, and February 15–23, 

2006. The fourth round of dialogue took place at the Chinese Embassy in Bern, Switzerland on 

June 30–July 1, 2005. 18Tibetan Government-in-Exile, ‘‘Statement by Special Envoy of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, 

Lodi Gyari, head of the Tibetan delegation, following the sixth round of discussions with the 

Chinese leadership,’’ 7 July 07. 19Word count of main text of Special Envoy statements following sessions of dialogue: 2002, 

770 words; 2003, 831 words; 2004, 454 words; 2005, 514 words; 2006, 303 words; 2007, 235 

words. 20 International Campaign for Tibet (Online), ‘‘ICT’s Mission,’’ last visited 15 July 07. In addition to serving as the Dalai Lama’s Special Envoy, Lodi Gyari is the Executive Chairman of 

the International Campaign for Tibet (ICT). International Campaign for Tibet (Online), ‘‘ICT’s 

Mission,’’ last visited 15 July 07. ICT ‘‘promotes self-determination for the Tibetan people 

through negotiations between the Chinese government and the Dalai Lama.’’ 21Tibetan Government-in-Exile, ‘‘Statement by Special Envoy of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, 

Lodi Gyari, head of the Tibetan delegation, following the sixth round of discussions with the 

Chinese leadership,’’ 7 July 07. 22 Ibid. 23 Ibid. 24 ‘‘Communist Party Adds Tibetan Affairs Bureau to the United Front Work Department,’’ 

CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, October 2006, 8. 25 Ibid. 26 Ibid. 27 Ibid. 28Tibetan Government-in-Exile (Online), ‘‘Statement by Special Envoy Lodi Gyari, Head of the 

Delegation Sent by His Holiness the Dalai Lama to China,’’ 11 June 03; Tibetan Governmentin-Exile (Online), ‘‘Statement by Special Envoy Kasur Lodi Gyari, Head of the Delegation to 

China,’’ 13 October 04. 29 ‘‘Forum on Tibetan Cultural Preservation Upholds Party Development Policy,’’ CECC China 

Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, November 2006, 12–13. 30 ‘‘Talks With Chinese Officials in Switzerland Were Concrete and Substantive, Says Tibetan 

Special Envoy,’’ CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, August 2005, 2–3. 31 ‘‘Forum on Tibetan Cultural Preservation Upholds Party Development Policy,’’ CECC China 

Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, November 2006, 12–13. 32 Ibid. 33The Dalai Lama has made a statement on the anniversary of the 1959 Lhasa uprising on 

March 10 of every year that he has lived in exile, beginning in 1960. 34Tibetan Government-in-Exile (Online),’’The Statement of His Holiness the Dalai Lama on 

the Forty-Eighth Anniversary of the Tibetan National Uprising Day,’’ 10 March 2007. PRC Constitution, Preamble. Samdhong Rinpoche’s remark refers to a statement in the Preamble, ‘‘In 

the struggle to safeguard the unity of the nationalities, it is necessary to combat big-nation 

chauvinism, mainly Han chauvinism, and also necessary to combat local-national chauvinism.’’ 

China’s system of ethnic autonomy is an attempt to resolve the divergent interests of a dominant and potentially overbearing ethnic group (Han) and nationalistic ethnic minorities (such 

as Tibetans, Uighurs, and Mongols). 35Testimony of Lodi G. Gyari, Special Envoy of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, at the House 

Foreign Affairs Committee Hearing on the Status of Tibet Negotiations, U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs (Online), 13 March 07. 36Tibetan Government-in-Exile (Online), ‘‘We Are Not Asking for ‘High’ or ‘Low’ Degree of Autonomy: Kalon Tripa,’’ 12 May 07. 37Tibetan Government-in-Exile (Online), ‘‘The Middle-Way Approach: A Framework for Resolving the Issue of Tibet,’’ last visited 13 July 07. The explanation of the Middle-Way Approach 

lists eight ‘‘important components.’’ The first three are: (1) Without seeking independence for 

Tibet, the Central Tibetan Administration strives for the creation of a political entity comprising 

the three traditional provinces of Tibet; (2) Such an entity should enjoy a status of genuine national regional autonomy; (3) This autonomy should be governed by the popularly-elected legislature and executive through a democratic process. 38Tibetan Government-in-Exile (Online), ‘‘Tibet at a Glance,’’ last visited 14 July 07. ‘‘Land 

Size: 2.5 million square kilometers, which includes U-Tsang, Kham and Amdo provinces [the 

three traditional provinces of Tibet]. ‘Tibet Autonomous Region,’ consisting of U-Tsang and a 

small portion of Kham, consists of 1.2 million square kilometers.’’ A People’s Daily Web page 

states that the area of China is 9.6 million square kilometers. 39 ‘‘Dalai Lama’s Special Envoy Describes Status of Discussions With Chinese Government,’’ 

CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, December 2006, 6–7. 

35

40 ‘‘Seeking Unity Through Equality: The Current Status of Discussions Between His Holiness 

the Dalai Lama and the Government of the People’s Republic of China,’’ Prepared Statement 

of Lodi Gyaltsen Gyari, Special Envoy of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, The Brookings Institution (Online), 14 November 2006. 41Question and Answer Session with Lodi Gyaltsen Gyari, Special Envoy of His Holiness the 

Dalai Lama, on the Current State of Discussions Between the Dalai Lama and the Government 

of the People’s Republic of China, The Brookings Institution (Online), 14 November 2006. 42Tibetan Government-in-Exile (Online), ‘‘Statement of His Holiness the Dalai Lama on the 

Forty-Seventh Anniversary of the Tibetan National Uprising Day.’’ 43Tibetan Government-in-Exile (Online), ‘‘We Are Not Asking for ‘High’ or ‘Low’ Degree of Autonomy: Kalon Tripa,’’ 12 May 07. 44 International Campaign for Tibet, Tibet at a Glance. The ICT Web page describes Tibet as 

an ‘‘occupied’’ country of 2.5 million square kilometers (965,000 square miles) with Lhasa as its 

capital. 45 ‘‘Dalai Lama’s Special Envoy Describes Status of Discussions With Chinese Government,’’ 

CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, December 2006, 6–7. ‘‘Seeking Unity 

Through Equality,’’ Prepared Statement of Lodi Gyaltsen Gyari. 46 ‘‘Seeking Unity Through Equality,’’ Prepared Statement of Lodi Gyaltsen Gyari. 47 ‘‘Dalai Lama’s Special Envoy Describes Status of Discussions With Chinese Government,’’ 

CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, December 2006, 6–7. Steven Marshall 

and Susette Cooke, Tibet Outside the TAR, Table 7. The total area of the TAR and Tibetan autonomous prefectures and counties is approximately 2.24 million square kilometers (865,000 

square miles). The area that Tibetans claim as Tibet, 2.5 million square kilometers, is approximately 965,000 square miles. 48Tabulation on Nationalities of 2000 Population Census of China, Department of Population, 

Social, Science and Technology Statistics, National Bureau of Statistics, and Department of Economic Development, State Ethnic Affairs Commission (Beijing: Ethnic Publishing House, September 2003), Table 10–4. The only prefectural-level areas of Qinghai province that are not a 

Tibetan autonomous prefecture or a Mongol and Tibetan autonomous prefecture are Xining municipality and Haidong prefecture. According to official 2000 census information, the total population of Xining and Haidong was about 3.24 million. Of that population, about 224,000 persons 

(6.9 percent) were Tibetans. 49The territory that Tibetans claim outside the existing Tibetan autonomous areas contain 

parts of autonomous prefectures or counties named to reflect ethnic groups including the Hui, 

Salar, and Tu in Qinghai province; the Kazak, Mongol, Yugur, Hui, Dongxiang, and Bao’an in 

Gansu province; the Yi in Sichuan province; the Naxi, Lisu, Nu, Bai, and Pumi in Yunnan province; and, according to some maps, the Mongol in Xinjiang. Substantial Han Chinese populations 

are also included, some established for centuries. 50Tabulation on Nationalities of 2000 Population Census of China, Table 10–4. According to 

official data, no county-level area outside the existing Tibetan autonomous areas has a Tibetan 

population higher than 25 percent. Three counties outside the existing Tibetan autonomous 

areas have a Tibetan population between 20 and 25 percent: Xunhua Salar Autonomous County 

(24.7 percent), Hualong Hui Autonomous County (21.5 percent), and Su’nan Yugur Autonomous 

County (24.4 percent) in Gansu province. One county outside the existing Tibetan autonomous 

areas has a Tibetan population between 10 and 20 percent: Huangyuan county (10.4 percent) 

in Qinghai province. Six counties outside the existing Tibetan autonomous areas have a Tibetan 

population between 5 and 10 percent: Huangzhong county (8.5 percent), Datong Hui Autonomous County (6.6 percent), Ledu county (6.4 percent), and Huzhu Tu Autonomous County (6.0 

percent) in Qinghai province; and Shimian county (9.8 percent) and Baoxing county (8.7 percent) 

in Sichuan province. 51 Ibid. Substantial areas and populations of the territory that Tibetans claim outside the existing Tibetan autonomous areas contain Tibetan populations of 5 percent or less, including part 

or all of: Xining municipality in Qinghai province; Jiuquan, Zhangye, and Wuwei municipalities, 

and Linxia Hui Autonomous Prefecture in Gansu province; Liangshan Yi Autonomous Prefecture in Sichuan province; and Lijiang Naxi Autonomous Prefecture and Nujiang Lisu Autonomous Prefecture in Yunnan province. 52 ‘‘Seeking Unity Through Equality,’’ Prepared Statement of Lodi Gyaltsen Gyari. 53 Ibid. 54Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Online), ‘‘The Tibetan ethnic minority,’’ 15 November 00. ‘‘In 

1929, the Kuomintang government set up a commission for Mongolian and Tibetan affairs in 

Nanjing and established Qinghai province. In 1939, Xikang province was set up.’’ (The article 

also shows that the Guomindang established Qinghai province in 1929. Today, Qinghai is occupied principally by Tibetan autonomous prefectures established by the PRC government.) People’s Daily (Online), ‘‘Panda’s Hometown Lures Tourists, Investors With Wonders,’’ 23 August 

01. ‘‘Ya’an boasts a history of over 2,000 years and was once the capital of Xikang province 

which was abolished in 1955.’’ 55 International Campaign for Tibet, Tibet at a Glance. A map on the Web site shows the Tibetan boundary as a solid line. Portions of Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan, and Yunnan provinces that 

are inside the Tibet boundary are shown as dashed lines. Tibetan Government-in-Exile (Online), 

Map of Tibet, last visited 14 July 07. The relatively straight contour between the western and 

northern tips of the Tibet map shows that a portion of Bayinguoleng Mongol Autonomous Prefecture is included within Tibet. 56PRC Constitution, art. 62(12). The National People’s Congress exercises the function and 

power to ‘‘approve the establishment of provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities directly under the Central Government.’’ PRC Constitution, art. 89(15). The State Council exercises the function and power to ‘‘approve the geographic division of provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities directly under the Central Government, and to approve the establishVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:44 Apr 18, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 U:\DOCS\41809.TXT DEIDRE
36

ment and geographic division of autonomous prefectures, counties, autonomous counties, and cities.’’ 57PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law [hereinafter REAL], enacted 31 May 84, amended 28 

February 01. 58 REAL, Preamble. 59Tibetan Government-in-Exile (Online),’’ The Statement of His Holiness the Dalai Lama on 

the Forty-Eighth Anniversary of the Tibetan National Uprising Day. 60PRC Constitution, art. 31. ‘‘The state may establish special administrative regions when 

necessary. The systems to be instituted in special administrative regions shall be prescribed by 

law enacted by the National People’s Congress in the light of the specific conditions.’’ 61 Ibid. 62Tibetan Government-in-Exile, ‘‘We are not asking for ‘high’ or ‘low’ degree of autonomy.’’ 63 REAL, Preamble. 64The REAL (amended 28 February 01) and State Council Regulations on the Implementation 

of the REAL (issued 11 May 05) promote increased emphasis on economic development, and reinforce the government’s Great Western Development program. The Regulation on Religious Affairs (RRA) (issued 30 November 04) elaborates the state’s legal control over the publication and 

dissemination of religious literature, the identification of high-ranking reincarnated Tibetan 

Buddhist lamas, state supervision over who teaches and studies religious subjects. The TAR Implementing Measures for the Regulation on Religious Affairs (issued 19 September 06) are more 

detailed and intrusive than the RRA in establishing control over the function of Tibetan Buddhism. The TAR Regulations on the Study, Use, and Development of the Tibetan Language (revised May 22, 2002) drop the requirement that state government agencies use both Mandarin 

and Tibetan, and instead allow them to decide to use either one. 65Question and Answer Session with Lodi Gyaltsen Gyari, The Brookings Institution. Responding to a question about the ‘‘unification of all ethnic Tibetans,’’ Gyari said that China accepts that ‘‘the Tibetan people are one people,’’ so the Tibetans are asking that they ‘‘be able 

to live within one single administration.’’ Gyari asserted, ‘‘I am utterly convinced from every 

point of view, what we ask is legitimate, what we ask is according to the Chinese Constitution, 

Chinese laws.’’ Tibetan Government-in-Exile, ‘‘We are not asking for ‘high’ or ‘low’ degree of autonomy.’’ Samdhong Rinpoche told a conference, ‘‘Our two desires are that the constitutional provisions of national regional autonomy must be implemented . . ., [so that] all Tibetans must 

be administered by a single autonomous self-government. . . . We are simply asking for the sincere implementation of the national regional autonomy provisions enshrined in the Constitution 

of the People’s Republic of China, which is further spelt out in the autonomy law.’’ 66 REAL, art. 12. ‘‘Autonomous areas may be established where one or more minority nationalities live in concentrated communities, in the light of local conditions such as the relationship 

among the various nationalities and the level of economic development, and with due consideration for historical background.’’ 67PRC Constitution, art. 62(12), 89(15). 68 Ibid., art. 116. ‘‘People’s congresses of national autonomous areas have the power to enact 

autonomy regulations and specific regulations in the light of the political, economic and cultural 

characteristics of the nationality or nationalities in the areas concerned. . . .’’ REAL, art. 19. 

‘‘The people’s congresses of ethnic autonomous areas shall have the power to enact self-governing regulations and separate regulations in the light of the political, economic, and cultural 

characteristics of the nationality or nationalities in the areas concerned. . . .’’ 69PRC Legislation Law, enacted 15 March 00, art. 9. ‘‘In the event that no national law has 

been enacted in respect of a matter enumerated in Article 8 hereof, the [NPC] and the Standing 

Committee thereof have the power to make a decision to enable the State Council to enact administrative regulations in respect of part of the matters concerned for the time being, except 

where the matter relates to crime and criminal sanctions, the deprivation of a citizen’s political 

rights, compulsory measure and penalty restricting the personal freedom of a citizen, and the 

judicial system.’’ 70 Ibid., art. 66. 71 REAL, art. 20. ‘‘If a resolution, decision, order, or instruction of a state agency at a higher 

level does not suit the actual conditions in an ethnic autonomous area, an autonomous agency 

of the area may report for the approval of that higher level state agency to either implement 

it with certain alterations or cease implementing it altogether. . . .’’ 72PRC Legislation Law, art. 66. ‘‘. . . An autonomous decree or special decree may vary the 

provisions of a law or administrative regulation, provided that any such variance may not violate the basic principles thereof, and no variance is allowed in respect of any provision of the 

Constitution or the Law on Ethnic Area Autonomy and provisions of any other law or administrative regulations which are dedicated to matters concerning ethnic autonomous areas.’’ 73PRC Constitution, art. 31. 74State Council Information Office, ‘‘White Paper on Regional Ethnic Autonomy in Tibet,’’ 

Xinhua (Online), 23 May 04. ‘‘The situation in Tibet is entirely different from that in Hong Kong 

and Macao. The Hong Kong and Macao issue was a product of imperialist aggression against 

China; it was an issue of China’s resumption of exercise of its sovereignty. Since ancient times 

Tibet has been an inseparable part of Chinese territory, where the Central Government has always exercised effective sovereign jurisdiction over the region.’’ ‘‘Yedor: On the ‘Middle Way’ of 

the Dalai Lama,’’ China Tibet Information Center (Online), 18 July 06. ‘‘It is known to all that 

the ‘‘one country, two systems’’ refers to the fact that the mainland follows the socialist system 

while Hong Kong and Macao continue to follow the capitalist system they had followed before. 

However, no capitalist system existed in Tibetan history; . . .’’ 75 CECC, Annual Report 2002, 12 October 02, Sec. 1. 76 CECC, Annual Report 2004, 5 October 04, Sec. 1. 77 CECC, Annual Report 2006, 20 September 06, Sec. 1. 

37

78Zhang Qingli, ‘‘Grasp the Two Major Affairs of Development and Stability, Promote the 

Building of a Harmonious Tibet,’’ Seeking Truth, 16 January 07 (Open Source Center, 18 January 07); Tenzing Sonam, ‘‘Roadblock on the Middle Path,’’ Himal Magazine (Online), December 

2006. ‘‘Why, then, when the Tibetans are officially doing everything possible to create what the 

Kashag’s Prime Minister, Samdhong Rinpoche, calls a ‘conducive atmosphere,’ are the Chinese 

stepping up their campaign to vilify the Dalai Lama, and denouncing his overtures to find accommodation?’’ 79 ‘‘China Vows to Tighten Security in Tibet,’’ Reuters, reprinted in Phayul (Online), 21 May 

07. TAR Party Secretary Zhang Qingli told a group of Party members, ‘‘From beginning to end 

. . . we must deepen patriotic education at temples, comprehensively expose and denounce the 

Dalai Lama clique’s political reactionary nature and religious hypocrisy;’’ ‘‘Tibetan Abbot Forced 

To Step Down,’’ Radio Free Asia (Online), 30 May 07. A Tibetan Buddhist abbot in Gande county, Guolou Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Qinghai province, said that officials were stepping 

up patriotic education in the county. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices—2006, China (includes Tibet, 

Hong Kong, and Macau), 8 March 06. ‘‘Numerous credible sources reported that political education sessions intensified in Lhasa beginning in April 2005.’’ 80Tibet Autonomous Region Implementing Measures for the ‘‘Regulation on Religious Affairs’’ 

[hereinafter TAR 2006 Measures], issued by the Standing Committee of the Tibet Autonomous 

Region People’s Government on September 19, 2006. The TAR 2006 Measures became effective 

on January 1, 2007. 81 Ibid. The Measures contain 56 articles (6,221 Chinese characters). Tibet Autonomous Region 

Temporary Measures on the Management of Religious Affairs [hereinafter TAR 1991 Measures], 

issued by the Standing Committee of the Tibet Autonomous Region People’s Government on December 9, 1991. The measures contain 30 articles (3,355 Chinese characters). 82State Administration for Religious Affairs, Measures on the Management of the Reincarnation of Living Buddhas in Tibetan Buddhism [Zangchuan fojiao huofo zhuanshi guanli banfa] 

[hereinafter MMR], issued 13 July 07. 83 Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, International 

Religious Freedom Report—2006, China (includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau), 15 September 

06. ‘‘Although authorities permitted many traditional religious practices and public manifestations of belief, they promptly and forcibly suppressed any activities, which they viewed as vehicles for political dissent. This included religious activities that officials perceived as supporting 

the Dalai Lama or Tibetan independence.’’ 84 CECC Staff Interviews. The Kargyu, Sakya, and Nyingma traditions, especially in Tibetan 

areas outside the TAR, may experience less interference from authorities. 85 ‘‘Zhang Qingli becomes new Party chief of Tibet,’’ Xinhua (Online), 29 May 07; ‘‘Xinjiang 

Communist Party Official Promoted to Acting Secretary of the Tibet Autonomous Region,’’ CECC 

China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, January 2006, 19. The Party Central Committee 

appointed Zhang Qingli to the post of acting TAR Party Secretary in November 2005, and Secretary on May 29, 2006. Zhang previously served in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region 

as Deputy Party Secretary and commander of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps 

(XPCC). 86 ‘‘TAR Party Secretary Accuses the Dalai Lama of Being a ‘False Religious Leader,’ ’’ CECC 

China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, September 2006, 14. 87The Party and government use the term ‘‘Western hostile forces’’ to include governments, 

NGOs, advocacy groups, media organizations, and individuals who criticize Chinese policies, actions, and records with respect to issues such as human rights, and who work to encourage or 

facilitate change in such areas. 88Zhang Qingli, ‘‘Grasp the Two Major Affairs of Development and Stability.’’ 89 ‘‘China Vows to Tighten Security in Tibet,’’ Reuters. 90 ‘‘Monk Dies Following Dispute With Patriotic Education Instructors,’’ CECC China Human 

Rights and Rule of Law Update, December 2005, 10. ‘‘A Reader for Advocating Science and 

Technology and Doing Away With Superstitions’’ (translated by International Campaign for 

Tibet in When the Sky Fell to Earth: The New Crackdown on Buddhism in Tibet, 2004). The 

manual asks, ‘‘Why do we conduct patriotic education among monks and nuns in the monasteries?,’’ and provides the answer: ‘‘Conducting patriotic education among the monks and nuns 

in the monasteries is an important aspect of strengthening the management of religious affairs 

by the government. . . . Dalai’s bloc has never stopped penetrating and engaging in splittist 

activities in our region under the support of international antagonistic forces. . . . The monks 

and nuns should be religious professionals who love the country, love religion, obey the discipline, and abide by the law.’’ 91 ‘‘Lhasa Area Monks and Nuns Face a New Round of ‘Patriotic Education’,’’ CECC China 

Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, November 2005, 10; Tibetan Centre for Human Rights 

and Democracy (Online), ‘‘China Recommences ‘Patriotic Education’ Campaign in Tibet’s Monastic Institutions,’’ 13 October 05. 92 International Campaign for Tibet (Online), ‘‘The Communist Party as Living Buddha: The 

Crisis Facing Tibetan Religion Under Chinese Control,’’ 26 April 2007, 5. Tibetan Centre for 

Human Rights and Democracy (Online), Annual Report 2006, March 2006, 39, 41–42. 93 ‘‘Tibetan Abbot Forced To Step Down,’’ Radio Free Asia. RFA reports that officials forced 

an abbot of a Tibetan Buddhist monastery in Gande (Gade) county, Guoluo (Golog) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture to step down in May after he refused to sign a statement denouncing the 

Dalai Lama. An official of the county Religious Affairs Bureau allegedly acknowledged that authorities were stepping up patriotic education. 94 ‘‘Zhang Qingli Delivers Major Address at Opening of Party Conference in Tibet [Xizang 

quanqu dangyuan lingdao ganbu dahui zhaokai Zhang Qingli fabiao zhongyao jianghua],’’ Tibet 

Daily, reprinted in Xinhua (Online), 16 May 06; ‘‘TAR Party Secretary Calls for Tighter Control 

38

of Tibetan Monasteries, Nunneries,’’ China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, July 2006, 

9. 95 International Campaign for Tibet, ‘‘The Communist Party as Living Buddha,’’ 37. ICT cites, 

Xinhua, ‘‘Zhang Qingli: Ensure Tibet’s Leap-over Style Development and Long Term Order and 

Security [Zhang Qingli: Quebao Xizang kuayueshi fazhan he changzhi jiuan], 18 May 06. 96 RRA, art. 17: ‘‘Venues for religious activities shall set up management organizations and 

practice democratic management. Members of the management organizations of venues for religious activities shall be selected through democratic consultations and reported as a matter of 

record to the registration management organs for the venues.’’ (In a Tibetan monastery or nunnery, a DMC is generally made up of monks or nuns selected from among themselves. Candidates are sometimes screened by local officials, according to some reports.) 97 International Campaign for Tibet, ‘‘The Communist Party as Living Buddha,’’ 39. 98 Ibid. 99Tibet Autonomous Region Temporary Measures on the Management of Religious Affairs 

[hereinafter TAR 1991 Measures], issued by the Standing Committee of the Tibet Autonomous 

Region People’s Government on December 9, 1991, art. 15. ‘‘The Buddhist Association is a mass 

organization of personages from religious circles and religious believers, and a bridge for the 

Party and government to unite and educate personages from religious circles and the believing 

masses. Its effectiveness shall be vigorously brought into play under the administrative leadership of the government’s religious affairs department.’’ 100 Regulation on Religious Affairs (RRA) [Zongjiao shiwu tiaoli], issued 30 November 04. 101Zhang Qingli, ‘‘Grasp the Two Major Affairs of Development and Stability.’’ 102 ‘‘Regional National Autonomy Is the Only Road for Tibet’s Development, Part One,’’ 

Xinhua, 24 April 07 (Open Source Center, 17 May 07). (Official TAR reports provided the figures 

of more than 1,700 monasteries and nunneries and 46,000 monks and nuns as early as 1996.) 103Zhang Qingli, ‘‘Grasp the Two Major Affairs of Development and Stability.’’ 104Tibet Autonomous Region Implementing Measures for the ‘‘Regulation on Religious Affairs’’ 

[hereinafter TAR 2006 Measures], issued by the Standing Committee of the Tibet Autonomous 

Region People’s Government on September 19, 2006. The measures became effective on January 

1, 2007. 105 RRA, translated on the Web site of China Elections and Governance. 106TAR 2006 Measures. Of the Measures 56 articles: 7 articles lay out the ‘‘general principles’’ 

for religious activity; 21 articles stipulate responsibilities and regulations for ‘‘religious organizations’’ (provincial-level, government-controlled Buddhist associations) and ‘‘venues for religious 

activities’’ (e.g. monasteries and nunneries), as well as on activity by monasteries and nunneries; 

17 articles regulate religious activity by ‘‘religious personnel’’ (e.g. monks and nuns); 10 articles 

stipulate punitive measures against persons or entities that violate the measures; 1 article repeals the 1991 Temporary Measures on the Management of Religious Affairs. 107State Council Information Office, ‘‘White Paper on Regional Ethnic Autonomy in Tibet,’’ 

Xinhua (Online), 23 May 04. ‘‘At present, there are over 1,700 venues for Tibetan Buddhist activities, with some 46,000 resident monks and nuns; four mosques and about 3,000 Muslims; 

and one Catholic church and over 700 believers in the [Tibet Autonomous Region].’’ 108TAR 1991 Measures, issued by the Standing Committee of the Tibet Autonomous Region 

People’s Government on December 9, 1991. 109TAR 2006 Measures, arts. 36–40. 110 RRA, art. 27. 111TAR 1991 Measures, art. 23. 112Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Online), ‘‘Did Tibet Become an Independent Country After the 

Revolution of 1911?,’’ 15 November 00. ‘‘In 1792 the Twenty-Nine Article Imperial Ordinance 

was issued. It stipulated in explicit terms for the reincarnation of the Living Buddhas in Tibet 

as well as the administrative, military, and foreign affairs.’’ (The edict sought to impose Qing 

control over religious, administrative, military, fiscal, commercial, and foreign affairs. The edict 

demanded that an Amban, the ‘‘Resident Official’’ representing the imperial court, would have 

equal status to the Dalai and Panchen Lamas, and function as the supervisor of the Tibetan 

administration.) 113 Although the TAR 2006 Measures are government-issued, the measures depend in part on 

Democratic Management Committees (DMCs) and Buddhist associations for effective application. The Party maintains regular contact with both organizations, and requires each of them 

to study and implement Party policies on religion. 114TAR 2006 Measures, art. 36. 115 Ibid., art. 37. 116 Ibid., art. 38. 117 Ibid., art. 39. 118 Ibid., art. 39. 119The RRA contains no precedent for restriction on travel by religious professionals such as 

Tibetan Buddhist monks and nuns. The TAR 1991 Measures contained no restrictions on intraprovincial travel by monks and nuns. The Commission does not have on file detailed information 

about local rules or practices that may have exceeded the level of restriction provided for by 

the TAR 1991 Measures or the RRA. 120TAR 2006 Measures, arts. 41–44. 121 ‘‘Practicing religion’’ is distinct from studying religion, which is more strictly regulated. 

Practicing religion may include activities such as conducting extended periods of prayer and ritual offering, or going on pilgrimage. Monks and nuns sometimes conduct extended periods of 

prayer and offering while living in seclusion, or in remote places in a rudimentary shelter. 122TAR 2006 Measures, art. 41. The requirement to report for the record to the local government’s religious affairs bureau could provide government officials a pretext to discourage, interfere in, or prevent monks and nuns from engaging in traditional Buddhist practices, especially 

living in seclusion or in remote places. 

39

123 Ibid., art. 43. 124TAR 1991 Measures, art. 9. 125TAR 2006 Measures, arts. 46–55. The articles use the term ‘‘disqualify,’’ not ‘‘expel.’’ ‘‘Disqualify’’ here means to disqualify someone from legally practicing religion as a religious professional. Revoking registration as a ‘‘religious professional’’ terminates a person’s legal status as 

a monk or nun, and the authorization to reside at a monastery or nunnery in order to study 

and practice religion. 126 Ibid., art. 34. The RRA and TAR 1991 Measures do not explicitly state such a ban. 127 Ibid., art. 53. 128Padmasambhava, or Guru Rinpoche, is regarded as one of the greatest teachers of Tibetan 

Buddhism and a central figure in the oldest tradition of Tibetan Buddhism, the Nyingma. 129Gyurme Dorje, Tibet Handbook, (Bath, England: Trade and Travel Handbooks, 1996), 235. 

Samye Monastery was probably constructed between 775 and 779, although other historical accounts provide different dates. 130 International Campaign for Tibet (Online), ‘‘Demolition of Giant Buddha Statue at Tibetan 

Monastery Confirmed by China,’’ 14 June 07. 131Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy (Online), ‘‘Colossal Guru Rinpoche’s 

Statue Demolished in Tibet: China’s New Religious Affairs Regulations for ‘TAR’ Entered Into 

Force,’’ 4 June 07. 132 Ibid. 133 RRA, art. 24, ‘‘No organizations or individuals other than religious bodies, monasteries, 

temples, mosques, and churches may build large-size outdoor religious statues.’’ TAR 2006 

Measures, art. 13, ‘‘No group or individual outside of religious organizations and venues for religious activities may build religious structures such as a large-scale open-air religious statue, or 

mani lhakhang [prayer (wheel) temple].’’ (The TAR 1991 Measures do not contain a precedent 

for Article 13 of the TAR 2006 Measures.) 134 RRA, art. 44, ‘‘Where, in violation of the provisions of these Regulations, anyone builds a 

large outdoor religious statue, the religious affairs department shall order it to discontinue the 

construction and to demolish the statue in a specified time limit; . . .’’ TAR 2006 Measures, art. 

48, ‘‘Where, in violation of provisions in Article 13 of these measures, a religious structure such 

as an outdoor religious statue, stupa, or mani lhakhang [prayer (wheel) temple] is built without 

authorization outside of a venue for religious activity, the people’s government religious affairs 

department at the county level or above orders redress, suspension of construction, and demolition within a specified time limit, in accordance with relevant laws and regulations.’’ 135 ‘‘Samye Moves Open-air Statue of Buddha,’’ China Tibet Information Center (Online), 9 

June 07. ‘‘Samye Monastery made bold to erect a copper statue of Buddha Padmasambhava in 

the open air donated by a related enterprise’s principal, which disobeyed the Law of the People’s 

Republic of China on Protection of Cultural Relics and the Notice of Illegally Building Open 

Statue of Buddha jointly issued by the State Administration for Religious Affairs of People’s Republic of China, Ministry of Construction of the People’s Republic of China, and China National 

Tourism Administration.’’ 136 Ibid. 137 International Campaign for Tibet, ‘‘Demolition of Giant Buddha Statue at Tibetan Monastery’’ 138Zhang Qingli, ‘‘Grasp the Two Major Affairs of Development and Stability.’’ 139Tibet Information Network (TIN), Background Briefing Papers: Documents and Statements 

from Tibet 1996–1997, 1998, 45. A November 4, 1996, article in the Tibet Daily said that the 

number of monasteries and nunneries in the TAR (1,787) was too high and that the Party 

planned in 1986 that only 229 monasteries would be reopened in the TAR. The article said that 

the number of monks and nuns (46,000 in early 1996) was high and created a negative impact 

on social and economic development. (The TIN summary of the article did not include any reference to a Party statement explicitly calling for a reduction in the number of monasteries, nunneries, monks, and nuns.) 140 ‘‘Reincarnation of Tibetan Living Buddhas Must Get Government Approval,’’ Xinhua, reprinted in People’s Daily (Online), 3 August 07. 141State Administration for Religious Affairs, Measures on the Management of the Reincarnation of Living Buddhas in Tibetan Buddhism [Zangchuan fojiao huofo zhuanshi guanli banfa] 

[hereinafter MMR], issued 13 July 07. 142State Council Information Office, ‘‘White Paper on Regional Ethnic Autonomy in Tibet,’’ 

Xinhua (Online), 23 May 04. There are approximately 1,700 monasteries and nunneries and 

46,000 monks and nuns in the TAR. CECC Staff Interviews, September 2003. According to a 

Chinese official, there are 655 Tibetan Buddhist monasteries and nunneries and approximately 

21,000 monks and nuns in Qinghai province. An official in Huangnan (Malho) TAP in eastern 

Qinghai province reported that there are 83 monasteries and nunneries, 3,656 monks and nuns, 

and 116 Tibetan Buddhist reincarnations in the prefecture. (Based on the Huangnan figures, 

the ratio of the number of monasteries and nunneries in Huangnan to the number of reincarnations is about 1.4 to 1. The ratio of monks and nuns to reincarnations in Huangnan is approximately 32 to 1.) CECC Staff Interview, April 2004. According to a Chinese official, in Gansu 

province there are 276 Tibetan Buddhist monasteries and nunneries, approximately 10,000 

monks and nuns, and 144 Tibetan Buddhist reincarnated teachers. (Based on these figures, the 

ratio of the number of monasteries and nunneries in Gansu to the number of reincarnations 

is approximately 1.9 to 1. The ratio of monks and nuns to reincarnations in Gansu is approximately 69 to 1.) Web site of the Sichuan Province Party Committee Policy Research Office, ‘‘Improve Capacity to Resolve Minority Issues, Make Efforts to Build a Harmonious Ganzi,’’ 10 August 05. There are 515 Tibetan Buddhist monasteries and nunneries and 37,916 monks and 

nuns in Ganzi (Kardze) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (TAP). (The data in these sources total 

3,146 Tibetan Buddhist monasteries and nunneries and approximately 115,000 monks and nuns, 

and do not include monasteries and nunneries in Aba (Ngaba) Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous 

40

Prefecture and Muli (Mili) Tibetan Autonomous County in Sichuan province, and Diqing 

(Dechen) TAP in Yunnan province.) 143 Based on an estimated 3,300 Tibetan monasteries and nunneries, and extrapolating an estimate by applying the ratio of monasteries to reincarnations in Gansu province (1.9 to 1) and 

Huangnan TAP (1.4 to 1), an estimated total number of reincarnations could be more than 1,700 

(based on the Gansu ratio) and more than 2,300 (based on the Huangnan ratio). The Gansu and 

Huangnan data samples are relatively small, however, and may not provide a reliable estimate. 

The Commission has very little information on the number of reincarnated teachers in the TAR; 

the proportion there may be lower than in some of the Tibetan areas of Sichuan and Qinghai 

provinces. 144 ‘‘Reincarnation of Tibetan Living Buddhas Must Get Government Approval,’’ Xinhua, reprinted in People’s Daily (Online), 3 August 07. 145MMR, art. 3. 146 Ibid., art. 4. 147 Xining city, the capital of Qinghai province, has four urban districts (Chengdong, Chengxi, 

Chengzhong, and Chengbei), but there are no Tibetan Buddhist monasteries within the city districts. 148The Commission does not have official information on the number of reincarnated Tibetan 

Buddhist teachers at Drepung and Sera Monasteries, but each monastery has several according 

to unofficial reports. 149 In comparison to the MMR, only Article 27 of the RRA addresses reincarnation (requiring 

government guidance and compliance with ‘‘historical conventions’’). Articles 36–40 of the TAR 

2006 Measures address reincarnation, but the measures apply only within the TAR and do not 

apply as many detailed requirements as the MMR. Only Article 23 of the TAR 1991 Measures 

refers to reincarnation (banning the involvement of ‘‘foreign forces’’ in confirming reincarnations). 150MMR, arts. 3–4. 151 Ibid., arts. 5–7. 152 Ibid., arts. 4, 7–9 153 Ibid., art. 10. 154 Ibid., art. 12. 155 Ibid., art. 11. 156 ‘ ‘‘Our Own Come First’ in the Reincarnation of Living Buddhas,’’ Singtao Daily, 23 August 

07 (Open Source Center, 13 September 07). The report does not state the date when the forum 

took place. 157 ‘ ‘‘Ibid. ‘‘The meeting stressed that the Tibetan areas must strictly carry out the Management Measures for the Reincarnation of ‘Living Buddhas’ in Tibetan Buddhism, that ‘our own 

comes first’ in the reincarnation of living Buddhas, and that we must be on guard against interference by the Dalai Lama clique in exile abroad with the support of international hostile 

forces.’’ 158 Ibid. 159The figures for 2004 and 2005, reported by the CECC 2006 Annual Report based on data 

available in the PPD as of August 2006, have not changed. 160The Commission’s Political Prisoner Database (PPD) is available Online at http://

ppd.cecc.gov. 161The CECC 2005 Annual Report referred to the period 2002–2004 saying, ‘‘About two-thirds 

of the Tibetan political prisoners detained from 2002 onward are in Sichuan province, according 

to the PPD. Half of them are monks.’’ 162 U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, ‘‘Annual Report of the Commission 

on International Religious Freedom,’’ 2 May 07, 123. ‘‘The Chinese government acknowledges 

that more than 100 Tibetan Buddhist monks and nuns are being held in prison.’’ The report 

does not provide a date for the Chinese statement or provide additional detail. 163Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, ‘‘China Recommences ‘Patriotic Education’ Campaign in Tibet’s Monastic Institutions.’’ For example, TCHRD reported that as many 

as eight Sera monastery monks reportedly detained the previous July remained unidentified. 

As of September 2007, additional information about the outcome of their detentions is not available. 164Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy (Online), ‘‘Human Rights Update, October 2006. For example, TCHRD reported that Sera Monastery monk Thubten Samten ‘‘disappeared’’ in May 2006 after he behaved in a defiant manner to members of a patriotic education work team when they warned him not to display prohibited material in his room. As of 

September 2007, information about whether or not police detained him is not available. 165See, for example, International Campaign for Tibet, ‘‘The Communist Party as Living Buddha: The Crisis Facing Tibetan Religion Under Chinese Control,’’ 26 April 2007, 29, 43, 55, 75. 166 U.S. Department of State, International Religious Freedom Report 2006, China. ‘‘The Government continued to refuse to allow access to Gendun Choekyi Nyima, . . . and his whereabouts were unknown. . . . All requests from the international community for access to the boy 

to confirm his well-being have been refused.’’ ‘‘UN Committee Recommends Independent Expert 

to Visit Boy Named As Panchen Lama,’’ CECC Virtual Academy (Online), 26 January 06. 167 UN Commission on Human Rights (Online), ‘‘Summary of Cases Transmitted to Governments and Replies Received, 27 March 06, 24–25. The Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief sent a request to the Chinese government for information about Gedun Choekyi 

Nyima on June 9, 2005. The Chinese government provided a response on September 7, 2005. 168 ‘‘It Is Both Illegal and Invalid for the Dalai Lama to Universally Identify the Reincarnated 

Soul Boy of the Panchen Lama,’’ People’s Daily, 1 December 95 (Open Source Center, 1 December 95). 169See CECC Annual Report 2006, Section V(d)—Freedom of Religion, for additional information about the Panchen Lama and Gyaltsen Norbu. 

41

170Tibet Information Network, Background Briefing Papers: Documents and Statements from 

Tibet 1996–1997, 1998, 45. A November 4, 1996, article in the Tibet Daily said that there were 

1,787 monasteries and nunneries in the TAR, and 46,000 monks and nuns. Tabulation on Nationalities of 2000 Population Census of China, Table 10–4. The Tibetan population of the TAR 

was 2,427,168 in 2000. (If the government enumeration of monks and nuns is accurate, then 

1.9 percent of the TAR Tibetan population are Tibetan Buddhist monks and nuns, and 98 percent are living in secular society.) 171The Gelug tradition, established in the late 14th century, is the largest of several traditions of Tibetan Buddhism that are currently practiced. The Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama 

are the most revered spiritual teachers of the Gelug. 172 CECC Staff Interviews. 173 International Campaign for Tibet (Online), ‘‘Tibetans Banned From Marking Traditional 

Buddhist Anniversary,’’ 9 January 07. ‘‘All members of the Communist Party, government employees, retired cadres and staff, cadres and workers of business and enterprise work units and 

people’s collectives, and the broad masses of young students are not permitted to participate in 

or observe celebrations of the Gaden Ngachoe Festival.’’ (Gaden Ngachoe observes the passing 

in 1419 of Tsongkhapa, the founder of the Gelug tradition of Tibetan Buddhism, of which the 

Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama are the most revered spiritual teachers. The observance takes 

place on the 25th day of the 11th lunar month on the Tibetan calendar, December 15 in 2006.) 174Saga Dawa falls on the 15th day (the full moon) of the 4th month of the Tibetan lunar 

calendar. The day commemorates both the enlightenment and passing away of the Buddha. 

Saga Dawa fell on June 11 in 2006, and on May 31 in 2007. 175Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy (Online), ‘‘China intensifies prohibition 

of religious activities in Tibet during the holy month of Saka Dawa,’’ 19 May 07. 176 CECC Staff Interviews. 177 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices—2006, China. 

‘‘Government officials reportedly ordered Tibetans working for the government to refrain from 

going to temples during the Saga Dawa festival in May or risk losing their jobs.’’ 178 ‘‘Dalai Lama’s Birthday celebrated by Tibetans across Tibet,’’ Phayul (Online), 5 July 07. 179 ‘‘Work Report of the Tibet Autonomous Regional Government,’’ Tibet Daily, 29 January 03 

(Open Source Center, 16 June 03). Legchog (Lieque), then-Chairman of the TAR government, 

said, ‘‘We carried out the work to confiscate and ban reactionary propaganda materials, cracked 

down on illegal exit to and entry from other countries, and checked ‘‘Trunglha Yarsol’’ [activities 

to mark the birthday of the Dalai Lama] and other illegal activities.’’ 180 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices—2006, China. The 

report refers to the Dalai Lama’s birthday in July 2006, saying, ‘‘The prohibition on celebrating 

the Dalai Lama’s birthday on July 6 continued.’’ 181 ‘‘Dalai Lama’s Birthday celebrated by Tibetans across Tibet,’’ Phayul. 182 ‘‘Grand Western Development Is a Vivacious Chapter in Implementation of ‘Three Represents’,’’ People’s Daily, 20 October 02 (Open Source Center, 20 October 02). ‘‘Since 1999, Comrade Jiang Zemin has frequently presided over meetings to specifically study the issue of implementing the strategy of great western development and has issued a series of important directives. In early 2000, the State Council founded a leading group for the development of the western region and presented the strategy of great western development.’’ State Council, ‘‘Some 

Opinions of the State Council on Continuing to Press Ahead with the Development of the Western Region,’’ Xinhua, 22 March 04 (Open Source Center, 29 March 04). ‘‘Practice provides ample 

evidence that the strategic decision by the CPC Central Committee and the State Council to 

develop the west is entirely correct and that all policy measures and key tasks pertaining to 

the development of the western region are entirely consistent with reality.’’ (The statement 

shows that the State Council considers implementation of GWD to be a matter of policy.) 183 CECC, 2002 Annual Report, 40. 184 ‘‘Qinghai-Tibet Railway Project to Start on June 29,’’ Xinhua (Online), 17 June 01. Railway 

construction was scheduled to begin on June 29, 2001. Completion would take six years. 185 CECC, 2002 Annual Report, 40. 186 CECC, 2003 Annual Report, 78. 187 Ibid., 81. 188 CECC, 2004 Annual Report, 97. 189 Ibid., 97–98. 190 CECC, 2005 Annual Report, 108 191 Ibid., 109. 192 CECC, 2006 Annual Report, 166. 193 Ibid., 168. 194 CECC, 2002 Annual Report, 41. ‘‘The Commission recommends that the Congress appropriate increased funding for NGOs to develop programs that improve the health, education, and 

economic conditions of ethnic Tibetans.’’ CECC, 2003 Annual Report, 4. ‘‘The Congress should 

increase funding for U.S. nongovernmental organizations (Ngos) to develop programs that improve the health, education, and economic conditions of ethnic Tibetans living in Tibetan areas 

of China, and create direct, sustainable benefits for Tibetans without encouraging an influx of 

non-Tibetans into these areas. 195Li Dezhu, ‘‘Large-Scale Development of Western China and China’s Nationality Problem,’’ 

Seeking Truth, 15 June 00 (Open Source Center, 15 June 00). Li Dezhu (Li Dek Su) addresses 

the social and ethnic implications of the program that Jiang Zemin launched in 1999. (The campaign is also known as Develop the West, and as Xibu da kaifa.) 196 ‘‘Zhang Qingli Addresses ‘First Plenum’ of Tibet Military District Party Committee,’’ Tibet 

Daily, 20 April 07 (Open Source Center, 8 May 07). 197 ‘‘Hu Jintao,’’ China Tibet Information Center (Online), visited 2 August 07. 

42

198 ‘‘Hu Jintao Takes Part in Deliberations by Delegation of Tibet Deputies,’’ Xinhua, 5 March 

07 (Open Source Center), 5 March 07. Hu met with TAR delegates including Zhang Qingli and 

Jampa Phuntsog. 199PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law [hereinafter REAL], enacted 31 May 84, amended 28 

February 01. 200See, for example, REAL, amended 28 February 01, arts. 54–72. 201PRC Constitution, art. 4. ‘‘The people of all nationalities have the freedom to use and develop their own spoken and written languages, and to preserve or reform their own ways and 

customs.’’ 202 REAL, enacted 31 May 84, art. 65. 203 REAL, amended 28 February 01, art. 71. 204 ‘‘Education, Employment Top Concerns for Tibetan Youth,’’ Radio Free Asia (Online), 13 

July 07; ‘‘Tibetans Stage Rare Public Protest in Lhasa,’’ Radio Free Asia (Online), 8 November 

06; Tibetan Government-in-Exile, ‘‘Abuse in Job Allocation in Tibet Drives Students to Streets,’’ 

6 December 06. ‘‘Tibetan University Graduates Stage Public Protest, Allege Job Discrimination,’’ 

CECC Virtual Academy (Online), 15 December 06. 205 REAL, enacted 31 May 84, art. 65. 206 CECC, 2006 Annual Report, 169, citing Ma Rong and Tanzen Lhundup, ‘‘Temporary Migrants in Lhasa in 2005,’’ Section IV(4.8), Table 14. Based on a survey published by Chinese 

academics Ma Rong and Tanzen Lhundup, the rate of illiteracy among Tibetan migrants (32.3 

percent) was almost 10 times higher than for Han migrants (3.3 percent), and Han migrants 

were better prepared to secure jobs that require skills learned in junior or senior middle school. 

Of the migrants surveyed, Han reached junior or senior middle school at about twice the rate 

of Tibetans: 53.7 percent of Han compared to 26 percent of Tibetans reached junior middle 

school, and 19.4 percent of Han compared to 9 percent of Tibetans reached senior middle school. 207 REAL, amended 28 February 01, art. 71. 208Provisions of the State Council for Implementing the Law on Regional Ethnic Autonomy 

of the People’s Republic of China [hereinafter REAL Implementing Provisions], issued 11 May 

05. 209 ‘‘PRC Western Development Official on 4 Key Aspects of New Preferential Policies,’’ China 

Daily, 23 October 00 (Open Source Center, 23 October 00). ‘‘Wang Chunzheng, deputy director 

of the State Council’s Western Development Office, said the policies focus on four key aspects; 

increasing capital input, improving the investment environment, attracting skilled personnel 

and boosting the development of science and technology. This is the first time that China has 

summarized the measures to be carried out in its ‘Go-West’ campaign, . . .’’ 210 REAL Implementing Measures, art. 29. ‘‘The State encourages and supports talents of all 

categories and classes to develop and pioneer in ethnic autonomous areas and local government 

shall offer preferential and convenient working and living conditions to them. Dependents and 

children of cadres of Han nationality or ethnic minorities who go to work in remote, tough, and 

frigid ethnic autonomous areas shall enjoy special treatment in employment and schooling.’’ 211 REAL, amended 28 February 01, art. 22. 212Li Dezhu, ‘‘Large-Scale Development of Western China and China’s Nationality Problem.’’ 213 ‘‘Law on Western Development in Pipeline,’’ China Daily (Online), 14 March 06. 214TAR Regulations on the Study, Use and Development of the Tibetan Language [hereinafter 

TAR Language Regulations], adopted July 9, 1987, by the Fifth Session of the Fourth TAR People’s Congress, and amended on May 22, 2002, by the Fifth Session of the Seventh TAR People’s 

Congress. 215TAR Language Regulations, arts. 3–5. Mandarin and Tibetan have ‘‘equal effect’’ when government agencies at any level in the TAR are ‘‘carrying out their duties.’’ Government and regional enterprise meetings may use either or both of the Tibetan and Mandarin languages. Official documents must be issued in both languages. Citizens of ethnic minorities are ‘‘assured of 

the right to use their native language to carry out legal proceedings.’’ 216State Council Information Office, White Paper on New Progress in Human Rights in the 

Tibet Autonomous Region, February 1998. 217 ‘‘Report on the Outline of The 10th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development by Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji at the Opening of the Fourth Session of the Ninth National People’s Congress at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing,’’ China Central Television, 

5 March 01 (Open Source Center, 5 March 01). Premier Zhu said, ‘‘During the Tenth Five-Year 

Plan period, we need to place emphasis on key projects for a good beginning to the program. 

. . . We must focus on a number of major projects of strategic significance, such as the transmission of natural gas and electricity from western to eastern regions and the planned QinghaiTibet Railway.’’ State Council Office of Western Region Development, ‘‘Implementation Opinions 

Concerning Policies and Measures Pertaining to the Development of the Western Region,’’ 

Xinhua, 20 December 01 (Open Source Center, 15 January 01). ‘‘Resources must be concentrated 

on the construction of a host of major projects that impact the development of the western region as a whole, such as the ‘‘West China-East China Gas Pipeline Project,’’ the ‘‘West ChinaEast China Power Transmission Project,’’ the Qinghai-Tibet Railway, major state highways, and 

the proper exploitation, conservation, and utilization of water resources.’’ 218 ‘‘Figures Related to Qinghai-Tibet Railway on its One Year Inauguration Anniversary,’’ 

Xinhua (Online), 01 July 07. 219Tibetan Center for Human Rights and Democracy (Online), Annual Report 2006, 02 March 

07, 5. ‘‘The railway facilitating a huge population influx, including Chinese settlers into Tibet, 

is bound to inevitably change Tibet physically and culturally causing further alienation of Tibetan identity.’’ 220 ‘‘Education, Employment Top Concerns for Tibetan Youth,’’ Radio Free Asia (Online), 13 

July 2007. The report does not refer to the Qinghai-Tibet railway or to an increase in the Chinese population. It cites the increasing importance of having fluency in Mandarin language in 

43

order to secure a good job. The other factor necessary for finding a job is ‘‘making the right connections.’’ 221 ‘‘Tibet Official: Tibet Not to be ‘‘Assimilated’’ by Han Amid Huge Investment,’’ Xinhua (Online), 20 June 07. Jampa Phuntsog supported his assertion by pointing out, ‘‘The customs and 

traditional festivals also remain unchanged after millions of tourists flock there following the 

central government’s large amount investment in the region.’’ 222 ‘‘Figures Related to Qinghai-Tibet Railway on its One Year Inauguration Anniversary,’’ 

Xinhua. ‘‘A year after its inauguration, the railway has transported 1.5 million passengers into 

Tibet, nearly half of the total tourists arrivals in the region.’’ 223 ‘‘Tibetan Railway to Transport 4,000 More Tourists Each Day,’’ China Tibet Information 

Center (Online), 22 May 06. 224 ‘‘Tibet Expects 6 Million Tourist Arrivals by 2010,’’ Xinhua, reprinted in People’s Daily 

(Online), 7 June 07. ‘‘The region hosted more than 2.5 million tourists last year, including 

154,800 from overseas.’’ ‘‘More Than 1.1 mln Tourists Visit Tibet in First Half Year,’’ Xinhua 

(Online), 11 July 07. ‘‘More than 1.1 million tourists traveled to Tibet in the first six months 

of the year, up 86.3 percent over the same period last year, according to the local tourism authority.’’ 225 ‘‘Qinghai-Tibet Railway Transports 270,000 Passengers,’’ Xinhua (Online), 14 September 

06. ‘‘About 40 percent of the passengers were tourists, 30 percent business people and the rest 

students, transient workers, traders and people visiting relatives in Tibet.’’ 226 ‘‘Tibet Rail Construction Completed,’’ China Daily (Online), 15 October 05. ‘‘The line is expected to attract tourists, traders and ethnic Chinese settlers who currently have to take either 

expensive flights to Lhasa or bone-shaking bus rides.’’ 227 ‘‘Callers Decry Impact of Tibet Railway,’’ Radio Free Asia (Online), 31 July 07. 228 Ibid. 229Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy (Online), ‘‘Tibetan People in Lhasa Reel 

Under Influx of Chinese Migrants,’’ 3 August 07. 230 John K. Fairbank and Roderick MacFarquhar, eds., The Cambridge History of China, Vol. 

14, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 368: ‘‘Map 7. Railway Construction between 

1949 and 1960.’’ The railroads linking Jining, Hohhot, and Baotou in Inner Mongolia were built 

before the PRC was founded. 231State Council Information Office, ‘‘White Paper on History and Development of Xinjiang,’’ 

Xinhua (Online), 26 May 03. 232Tabulation on Nationalities of 2000 Population Census of China, Department of Population, Social, Science and Technology Statistics, National Bureau of Statistics, and Department 

of Economic Development, State Ethnic Affairs Commission (Beijing: Ethnic Publishing House, 

September 2003) Table 10–1: total population of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region (IMAR) 

was 23,323,347, of whom 18,465,586 were Han; total population of the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR) was 18,459,511, of whom 7,489,919 were Han; total population of the Tibet 

Autonomous Region (TAR) was 2,616,329, of whom 158,570 were Han. Table 10–2: total Mongol 

population of the IMAR was 3,995,349. Table 10–5: total Uighur population of the XUAR was 

8,345,622. Table 10–4: total Tibetan population of the TAR was 2,427,168. In the IMAR, the 

ratio of Han to Mongol was approximately 4.6:1; in the XUAR, the ratio of Han to Uighur was 

approximately 0.9:1; in the TAR, the ratio of Han to Tibetan was approximately 0.07:1 233 Human Rights Watch (Online), ‘ ‘‘No One Has the Liberty to Refuse’—Tibetan Herders 

Forcibly Relocated in Gansu, Qinghai, Sichuan, and the Tibet Autonomous Region,’’ 11 June 07, 

3. A Tibetan herder from Maqin (Machen) county, Guoluo (Golog) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture in Qinghai province (November 2004): ‘‘They are destroying our Tibetan [herder] communities by not letting us live in our area and thus wiping out our livelihood completely, making 

it difficult for us to survive in this world, as we have been [herders] for generations. The Chinese are not letting us carry on our occupation and forcing us to live in Chinese-built towns, 

which will leave us with no livestock and we won’t be able to do any other work. . . .’’ 234Zhang Qingli, ‘‘Grasp the Two Major Affairs of Development and Stability, Promote the 

Building of a Harmonious Tibet,’’ Seeking Truth, 16 January 07 (Open Source Center, 18 January 07). 235 Human Rights Watch, ‘‘No One Has the Liberty to Refuse,’’ 3. According to the report, the 

current program to settle nomadic herders began in 2000 and has intensified in some areas 

since 2003. 236Zhang Qingli, ‘‘Grasp the Two Major Affairs of Development and Stability.’’ 237 Hu Jintao served as the TAR Communist Party Secretary from 1988–1992. 238 ‘‘Hu Jintao Takes Part in Deliberations by Delegation of Tibet Deputies,’’ Xinhua, 5 March 

07 (Open Source Center), 5 March 07. 239Zhang Qingli, ‘‘Grasp the Two Major Affairs of Development and Stability.’’ 240 Ibid. 241 Ibid. 242 Human Rights Watch, ‘‘No One Has the Liberty to Refuse,’’ 3. 243 Ibid., 27. 244 Ibid., 17–18. ‘‘The [policy] known as ‘revert pasture to grassland’ (tuimu huancao), was 

aimed at reversing degradation in pastoral regions by imposing total, temporary, or seasonal 

bans on grazing.’’ 245 Ibid., 45. ‘‘Tibetan herders had pursued their way of life for centuries without causing 

harm to the grassland; damage emerged only after the imposition of policies such as collectivization.’’ 246 Ibid., 26–38. 247 Ibid. The report provides as examples art. 13 (‘‘the right of citizens to own lawfully earned 

income, savings, houses and other lawful property’’); art. 41 (‘‘the right to criticize and make 

suggestions,’’ ‘‘the right to make to relevant state organs complaints and charges against, or exposures of, violation of the law or dereliction of duty’’); and art. 111 (‘‘committees for people’s 

44

mediation,’’ ‘‘mediate civil disputes,’’ ‘‘convey residents’ opinions and demands and make suggestions to the people’s government’’). 248 Ibid., 57. 249 Ibid., 43. 250 ‘‘More Nomadic Tibetan Herders Settle Down,’’ Xinhua (Online), 2 September 04; ‘‘Government Campaign to Settle Tibetan Nomads Moving Toward Completion,’’ CECC China Human 

Rights and Rule of Law Update, November 2005, 8. 251 Hamish McDonald, ‘‘China Anxious To Prove Settled Life is Better for Tibetan Nomads,’’ 

Sydney Morning Herald (Online), 5 October 05; ‘‘Government Campaign to Settle Tibetan Nomads Moving Toward Completion,’’ CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, November 2005, 8. 252 CECC Staff Interviews. The nomad families lived in Gannan (Kanlho) TAP and Tianzhu 

(Pari) Tibetan Autonomous County. ‘‘Government Campaign to Settle Tibetan Nomads Moving 

Toward Completion,’’ CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, November 2005, 8. 253 ‘‘Tibet Official Denies Forced Relocation of Herdsmen,’’ Xinhua (Online), 20 June 07. 254 Ibid. 255 ‘‘Zhang Qingli Addresses ‘First Plenum’ of Tibet Military District Party Committee,’’ Tibet 

Daily, 20 April 07 (Open Source Center, 8 May 07). ‘‘250,000 Tibetans move into new houses 

in 2006,’’ China Tibet Information Center (Online), 16 January 07. ‘‘The ‘‘Housing Project’’ which 

has been put into operation since 2006 aims at improving locals’ living condition and special 

attention has been put into the house renovation, nomads’ settle-down and moving because of 

endemic [local health problems].’’ 256 ‘‘Party Chief Brings Tibet New Homes,’’ China Daily, reprinted in People’s Daily (Online), 

15 March 07. 257 Ibid. 258Tabulation on Nationalities of 2000 Population Census of China. Table 1–2 shows 

2,427,168 Tibetans in the TAR. Table 1–2c shows that 2,058,011 of them are classified as 

‘‘rural.’’ 259 ‘‘250,000 Tibetans move into new houses in 2006,’’ China Tibet Information Center (Online), 16 January 07. The article states, ‘‘The ‘‘Housing Project’’ mostly reduces the cost of building houses for local Tibetans as the subsidy varying from 10,000 yuan to 25,000 yuan has been 

offered to locals.’’ 260 ‘‘Party Chief Brings Tibet New Homes,’’ China Daily. ‘‘It would cost a rural Tibetan about 

60,000 yuan to build a new house with a floor space of about 200 square meters. Part of that 

money could come from the autonomous region’s government. Farmers can apply to receive 

10,000 yuan; a herdsman can apply for 15,000 yuan; and a resident of a poverty-stricken area 

can seek up to 25,000 yuan.’’ 261 Human Rights Watch (Online), ‘‘Tibet: China Must End Rural Reconstruction Campaign,’’ 

20 December 06. 262 Ibid. ‘‘The cost of building a new house that meets the government’s standards is about 

US$5,000–US$6,000, though the government lends households only about US$1,200 for construction costs.’’ 263 ‘‘Tibet Population Tops 2.8 Million,’’ Xinhua (Online), 12 April 07. In the TAR in 2006, 

‘‘Farmers and herders posted a per capita net annual income of 2,435 yuan, . . .’’ ‘‘China’s GDP 

Grows 10.7% in 2006,’’ China Daily, reprinted in Xinhua, 25 January 07. In 2006, ‘‘Last year, 

rural residents in China had their per-capita income increase by 10.2 percent to 3,587 yuan.’’ 

(Based on these figures, the average rural income in the TAR is 68 percent of the national average.) 264 Human Rights Watch, ‘‘Tibet: China Must End Rural Reconstruction Campaign.’’ 265 ‘‘Tibet is Remade by Hand of Chinese Government by Force,’’ McClatchy Newspapers, 29 

July 07, reprinted in Phayul, 30 July 07. 266Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy (Online), Human Rights Update and Archives, ‘‘The Rural Reconstruction Campaign in Tibet Against the Will and Wishes of the Residents,’’ April 2007. 267 Ibid. 268 Ibid. 269See, e.g., the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by General 

Assembly resolution 217 A (III) of 10 December 48, arts. 2, 7, 18, 19, 20; International Covenant 

on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) adopted by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 

16 December 66, entry into force 23 March 76, arts. 2(1), 18, 19, 21, 22, 26, 27; International 

Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) adopted by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 3 January 76, art. 2(1, 2). 270 ‘‘China to Monitor Ethnic Relations,’’ Xinhua (Online), 29 March 07. The State Council announced a monitoring mechanism to deal with ‘‘emergencies resulting from ethnic issues.’’ The 

mechanism aims to ‘‘clamp down on ethnic separatism so as to safeguard ethnic unity, social 

stability, and national security.’’ (The report provides an update about government efforts to 

crack down on what it deems to be ethno-nationalism.) 271 CECC, 2002 Annual Report, 38. 272PRC Constitution, art. 54. 273 CECC, 2006 Annual Report, 170–71. 274PRC Criminal Law, art. 103 (‘‘organize, plot or carry out the scheme of splitting the State 

or undermining unity of the country;’’ ‘‘incites others to split the State or undermine unity of 

the country’’). The Commission’s Political Prisoner Database does not contain official charge information for many Tibetan cases, but official Chinese media reports, as well as unofficial reports, frequently provide information indicating a charge of splittism. 275 Ibid., art. 102–113. 

45

276Dui Hua Dialogue, ‘‘Official Responses Reveal Many Sentence Adjustments,’’ Fall 2006, 6; 

‘‘Officials Extend Tibetan’s Sentence for Shouting Pro-Dalai Lama Slogans in Prison,’’ CECC 

China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, December 2006, 17. 277 ‘‘Chinese Court Has Jailed More Than 20 ‘Reactionary’ Tibetans Since 1996,’’ Radio Free 

Asia (Online), 1 September 05; ‘‘Court Official Acknowledges Imprisoning Tibetans Who Carried 

Dalai Lama Photos Into the TAR,’’ CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, October 2005, 4–5. 278 ‘‘Tibetan Jailed for Three Years,’’ Radio Free Asia (Online), 9 March 07. (The RFA report 

did not provide information about the charges against Penpa. Charges arising from possessing 

material pertaining to the Dalai Lama are likely to be based on Article 103 of the Criminal Law 

(inciting splittism).) 279 Ibid. (The RFA report did not provide information about the charges against Penpa. 

Charges arising from possessing material pertaining to the Dalai Lama are likely to be based 

on Article 103 of the Criminal Law (inciting splittism).) 280 ‘‘Three Tibetan Women Arrested in Lhasa,’’ Phayul (Online), 15 June 06; ‘‘Chinese Authorities Detain Five Tibetans for Alleged Leafleting,’’ Radio Free Asia (Online), 16 June 06; ‘‘Tibetan 

Monk Faces Eight Years for Separatism,’’ Radio Free Asia (Online), 14 July 06; ‘‘China Detains 

Teenage Girl for Writing Pro-Independence Leaflets,’’ Radio Free Asia (Online), 18 August 06; 

‘‘China Detains Tibetan Abbot in Sichuan,’’ Radio Free Asia (Online), 7 September 06; ‘‘Another 

Tibetan Monk Arrested,’’ Radio Free Asia (Online), 19 September 06;; ‘‘Officials Detain Nine Tibetan Residents of Sichuan for Links to Leaflets, Posters,’’ CECC China Human Rights and Rule 

of Law Update, November 2006, 3–4. 281 ‘‘China Detains Teenage Girl for Writing Pro-Independence Leaflets,’’ Radio Free Asia. 282 ‘‘Tibetan Monk Faces Eight Years for Separatism,’’ Radio Free Asia; ‘‘Another Tibetan 

Monk Arrested,’’ Radio Free Asia. Namkha Gyaltsen was reportedly held in a detention center 

in Aba (Ngaba) Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture in Sichuan province, according to 

RFA, and Lobsang Palden is presumed to be detained in Ganzi TAP. 283 ‘‘China Detains Tibetan Abbot in Sichuan,’’ Radio Free Asia. 284Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy (Online), ‘‘Monk Sentenced to Five Years 

Term for Distributing Political Pamphlets,’’ 14 November 06. 285Dui Hua Dialogue, ‘‘Summary of Recent Prisoner Responses,’’ Spring 2007, 7. 286Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy (Online), ‘‘Former Tibetan Political Prisoner Served With 12 Years Prison Term,’’ 24 November 06. According to the TCHRD report, 

Sonam Gyalpo’s family appealed his case. No additional information is available about the appeal. 287Dui Hua Dialogue, ‘‘Summary of Recent Prisoner Responses.’’ 288TibetInfoNet (Online), ‘‘Detentions Before 40th Anniversary of TAR,’’ 9 September 2005. 289 Ibid. Sonam Gyalpo was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment in TAR Prison (Drapchi) 

after he supported a protest march by monks in Lhasa on September 27, 1987. He was held 

without charge for about one year in the TAR Police Detention Center (Sitru) after July 1993, 

when he returned to the TAR following an undocumented visit to India. Dui Hua Dialogue, 

‘‘Summary of Recent Prisoner Responses.’’ Dui Hua reports that, according to the official Chinese response, Sonam Gyalpo was sentenced to three years in prison in January 1989 for 

‘‘counterrevolutionary propaganda and incitement.’’ (It is not clear whether the three-year sentence began in 1987 or 1989.) 290Dui Hua Dialogue, ‘‘Summary of Recent Prisoner Responses.’’ 291 Ibid. 292Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy (Online), ‘‘Commentary Manuscript 

Lands Tibetan Youth Ten Years in Prison,’’ 25 July 06. 293 Ibid. 294 International Campaign for Tibet (Online), ‘‘Tibetan Scholar Sentenced to Ten Years in 

Prison After Writing Book on History and Culture,’’ 8 August 06. 295Dui Hua Dialogue, ‘‘Summary of Recent Prisoner Responses,’’ Spring 2007, 7. 296 International Campaign for Tibet, ‘‘Tibetan Scholar Sentenced to Ten Years.’’ ICT obtained 

a copy of the letter. 297 ‘‘Official Information Confirms Sentence for Tibetan Nun Who Put Up Posters,’’ CECC 

China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, December 2006, 17. 298Free Tibet Campaign (Online), ‘‘Four Monks and Nuns Arrested for Displaying Dalai Lama 

Poster,’’ 30 January 06; ‘‘Gansu Court Sentences Five Tibetan Monks and Nuns for Protest Posters,’’ CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, March 2006, 10–11; Radio Free Asia 

(Online), ‘‘China Arrests Tibetan Monks, Nuns for Dalai Lama Poster,’’ 20 December 05; Tibetan 

Centre for Human Rights and Democracy (Online), ‘‘Arrest of Tibetan Monks for Postings Calling for Freedom in Tibet,’’ 15 July 05; ‘‘Official Information Confirms Sentence for Tibetan Nun 

Who Put Up Posters,’’ CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, December 2006, 

17. 299 ‘‘Five Tibetan Monks Jailed in Western China,’’ Radio Free Asia (Online), 13 February 05; 

Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, Human Rights Update February 2005, 

‘‘Monks Imprisoned for Political Journal,’’ April 2005. 300 International Campaign for Tibet (Online), ‘‘Long Sentences for Tibetan Political Prisoners 

for ‘Splittist’ Offences,’’ 12 May 06. The ICT report contains a link to an ICT translation of the 

sentencing document. ‘‘Lhasa Court Commutes Life Sentence for Children’s Home Director to 

19 Years,’’ CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, April 2006, 16. The sentencing 

document lists evidence against Bangri Chogtrul that includes meeting the Dalai Lama, accepting a donation for the home from a foundation in India, and a business relationship with a Tibetan contractor who lowered a Chinese flag in Lhasa in 1999 and tried to blow himself up. 

Jigme Tenzin Nyima acknowledged meeting the Dalai Lama, accepting the contribution, and 

knowing the contractor, but he denied the charges against him and rejected the court’s portrayal 

of events. 

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301Dui Hua (Online), ‘‘Dui Hua Executive Director Attends Trials, Explores Judicial Openness, Clemency Granted to Tibetan Monk, Labor Activist,’’ 28 February 06. 302 ‘‘The Execution of Lobsang Dondrub and the Case Against Tenzin Deleg: The Law, the 

Courts, and the Debate on Legality,’’ Topic Paper of the Congressional-Executive Commission 

on China, February 2003; Human Rights Watch (Online), Trials of a Tibetan Monk: The Case 

of Tenzin Delek, 9 February 04. 303 Ibid. 304 ‘‘Tibetan Monk Involved in Terrorist Bombing Still in Prison,’’ Xinhua (Online), 31 December 04. 305Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy (Online), ‘‘A Tibetan Arrested in Lithang 

for Political Demonstration,’’ 2 August 07. 306 International Campaign for Tibet (Online), ‘‘Security Crackdown Feared Following Public 

Appeal by Tibetan for Return of Dalai Lama,’’ 2 August 07; ‘‘Scores of Tibetans Detained for 

Protesting at Festival,’’ Radio Free Asia (Online), 2 August 07. 307 International Campaign for Tibet (Online), ‘‘Official Petition on Dalai Lama May Have Provoked Lithang Action,’’ 10 August 07. According to an ICT source: ‘‘’It seems that most of the 

local population knew about this petition being circulated by officials, and it caused an increase 

in tension and anxiety. People in this area revere His Holiness the Dalai Lama, and Runggye 

Adak’s action could have been a response to this provocative move by officials. Local people may 

have somehow wanted to demonstrate that this petition is a lie, and did not represent the wishes of Tibetans in Lithang.’’ 308 ‘‘Villager Detained for Inciting Separation,’’ Xinhua, reprinted in China Daily (Online), 3 

August 07. 309 International Campaign for Tibet (Online), ‘‘New Images Confirm Dispersal of Tibetans by 

Armed Police After Lithang Protest: Runggye Adak’s Relatives Taken Into Custody,’’ 24 August 

07. 310Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy (Online), ‘‘The Chinese Authorities 

Transfer Adruk Lopoe to an Unknown Location, Arrest Another Tibetan Nomad,’’ 28 August 07; 

International Campaign for Tibet, ‘‘New Images Confirm Dispersal of Tibetans by Armed Police 

After Lithang Protest.’’ Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy (Online), ‘‘China Arrest Three Nephews of Ronggye A’drak in Lithang,’’ 22 August 07. 311Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy (Online), ‘‘The Chinese Authorities 

Transfer Adruk Lopoe to an Unknown Location, Arrest Another Tibetan Nomad,’’ 28 August 07. 312 Human Rights in China (Online), ‘‘Tibetan Schoolboys Detained as Crackdown Worsens,’’ 

20 September 07. 313 Ibid. The students allegedly wrote slogans on walls of the village police station, and elsewhere in the village. 314 Ibid. According to the report, authorities held the students at a village police station from 

September 7–9 and allowed families to access the children. 315 It is commonplace for multiple Tibetans in the same community to have identical names. 

Generally, Tibetan names do not include a family name. 316The number of known cases of current Tibetan political detention or imprisonment reported in CECC Annual Reports: 2002 Annual Report, 39, ‘‘less than 200,’’ based on a 2002 report by the Tibet Information Network (TIN); 2003 Annual Report, 79, ‘‘approximately 150,’’ 

based on a March 2003 TIN report; 2004 Annual Report, 101, ‘‘145 prisoners,’’ based on a February 2004 TIN report; 2005 Annual Report, 112, ‘‘120 current cases,’’ based on CECC Political 

Prisoner Database information current in June 2005; 2006 Annual Report, 171, ‘‘103 known 

cases of current Tibetan political detention or imprisonment,’’ based on PPD information current 

in August 2006. 317Dui Hua Dialogue, ‘‘Official Responses Reveal Many Sentence Adjustments.’’ 318 United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Decisions adopted by the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Decision No. 65/1993, 5 October 

94.

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