* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and col lateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### JUL 2 2003 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

SHARON DOWTY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. JO ANNE B. BARNHART, Commissioner of Social Security Administration,

Defendant-Appellee. No. 02-7103 (D.C. No. 01-CV-539-S) (E.D. Okla.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before BRISCOE , PORFILIO , and ANDERSON , Circuit Judges.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a dec ision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.-2-

Plaintiff Sharon Dowty appeals from a district court order affirming the Commissioner’s decision denying her application forsupplemental security income benefits. The Commissioner concluded that plaintif f was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act because, despite her limitations, she was able to perform a significant number of jobs that exist in the national economy. Because the Commissioner’s decision is supported bysubstantial evidence, we affirm. Plaintiff filed her application for benefits in 199 6, alleging inability to work since 1994 due to mental disorders. Her applicatio n was denied initially and on reconsideration. Following a hearing before an adm inistrative law judge (ALJ), the ALJ found that plaintiff was impaired by an anx iety disorder and a mood disorder, and that these impairments precluded her from doing her past relevant work. The ALJ further found that plaintiff retaine d the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform a wide range of medium wo rk, reduced by her inability to understand, remember, and carry out detailed or complex instructions, to tolerate more than superficial contact with the gen eral public, or to tolerate work that is stressful. Based on these findings and the testimony of the vo cational expert (VE) at the hearing, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff is capable of performing work that exists in significant numbers in the national econo my, including working as maid,-3-

janitor, mix hand, mail clerk, laundry presser, or newspaper worker. Thus, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff was not disabled at st ep five of the Commissioner’s five-step sequential process for determining disabi lity. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920; Williams v. Bowen , 844 F.2d 748, 750-52 (10th Cir. 1988) (discussingthe five-step process). Plaintiff contends the ALJ failed in his legal obli gation to give an individualized assessment of her ability to deal wi th stress. In a related issue, plaintiff also contends that the hypothetical quest ion posed by the ALJ to the VE was inadequate because it did not identify the spec ific nature of her stress. Plaintiff relies on Social Security Ruling (SSR) 85 -15, 1985 WL 56857, which instructs that “[t]he reaction to the demands of wo rk (stress) is highly individualized,” and that mentally impaired individ uals “may have difficulty meeting the requirements of even so-called ‘low-str ess’ jobs,” and that “[a]ny impairment-related limitations created by an indivi dual’s response to demands of work . . . must be reflected in the RFC assessment. ” 1985 WL 56857, at *6. She further relies on Lancellotta v. Secretary of Health & Human Services , 806 F.2d 284 (1st Cir. 1986), in which the court observed th at “stress is not a characteristic of a job, but instead reflects an individual’s subj ective response to a particular situation,” and, citing SSR 85-15, held that the Co mmissioner must make specific-4-

findings about the nature of a claimant’s stress, the circumstances that trigger it, and how those factors affect her ability to work. Id . at 285.
In Lancellotta , three physicians determined that the claimant was “totally incapacitated as a result of anxiety.” Id . There was evidence in the record indicating that the claimant in that case, who had suffered a head injury, experienced dizziness, ringing in his ears, severe anxiety, fatigue, stomach distress, shortness of breath, and ventricular irre gularity, feared going outside, and was incapable of driving. In contrast, no doctor f ound plaintiff to be disabled and no treating physician found her to be totally incap acitated by stress or anxiety. Unlike the claimant in Lancellotta , there is no evidence in the record demonstrating her stress and anxiety preclude her f rom all employment. Plaintiff’s former treating physician, Dr. Dean, pe rformed the only complete mental examination of plaintiff. He concluded thatplaintiff did suffer from a stress disorder, anxiety disorder, and depression, in particular near the anniversary of her boyfriend’s suicide, but that she was friend ly, alert, oriented, and appropriate during the examination, demonstrated no unusual behavior, and did not report having frank panic attacks, phobias, hysteri cal behavior, hallucinations, or delusional thinking. R. Vol. II, at 135-6. Dr. De an concluded that plaintiff is oriented to time, place, and person and is able to manage her own funds, shop, prepare meals, clean her home, do laundry, pay bill s, and manage her home-5-

without supervision. Id . at 137. He further concluded that she was able t o do simple arithmetic, and was able to relate to her family, friends, and neighbors. Id. Plaintiff testified at her hearing that because of her stress, she is unable to drive, does not like being around people, and needs help paying bills and going to the store. The ALJ noted, however, that her testim ony conflicted with her statements to Dr. Dean that she drove herself to th e examination and that she was able to shop, cook, clean, do laundry, and pay her bills, and conflicted with her disability application materials, in which she stat ed she was able to do light housekeeping and did not need help with her persona l needs or grooming. The ALJ found that plaintiff’s subjective complaints ab out her limitations were not fully credible, a finding plaintiff does not disput e on appeal. Plaintiff also directs this court to the report of Dr. Brixey, D.O., who stated that she has extreme limitations in the areas of attention, concentration, and social interaction. The ALJ did not fully credit this rep ort because Dr. Brixey is not a psychiatrist or similar specialist and gave only a conclusory report, without any supporting objective medical evidence to support hi s conclusions. Plaintiff does not challenge the ALJ’s assessment of Dr. Brixey’s report. We conclude that the ALJ’s findings with respect to plaintiff’s stress were specific and individualized and that his assessmentof her RFC included the individualized assessment of her stress required bySSR 85-15. He specifically-6-

found that she could not perform work which require s understanding, remembering and carrying out detailed or complex instructions, that required more than superficial contact with the public, or that is cat egorized as stressful. These limitations reflected plaintiff’s impairments to th e extent that the ALJ found them to be supported by evidence in the record. For the same reason, we conclude the hypothetical w hich the ALJ posed to the VE fairly summarized the limitations which were found to be credible and supported by the medical evidence. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Entered for the Court

Mary Beck Briscoe Circuit Judge