TUT ont. meontt

FBI Headquarters sent a lead to the Denver Field Office requesting that 1t investigate this

connection. On September 19, 2002 agents of the Denver Field Office responded, stati

they had completed their initial investigetion,

g thal

According to the FBI’s Denver Office, ASPCOL 1s the umbrelia corporation that
manages the affairs of the Colorado residence of Prince Bandar, the Saudi ambassador to the
United States. The facility is protected by Scimitar Security. Agents of thc Denver Field Office

noted that neither ASPCOL nor Scimitar Security is listed in the phone bock or is easily

locatable. In addition, the Colorado Secretary of State’s office hus ne record ef ASPCOL. The
Denver office did not attempt to make any local inquiries about ASPCOL, as they believed that

any inguir

’s employees. Due

es regarding ASPCOL would be quickly known by Prince Band:
to the sensitivity of this matter, they decided to hold their investigation of ASPCOL in abeyance

until they received additional guidance from FBI Headquarters,

According to the FBI, the phone nunber of an individual named ig of
Melean, Virginia was found within the effects of Abu Zubaida. (IJ is reportedly 2
bodyguard at the Saudi Embassy in Washington, DC, The FBI now suspects that he may be a
GR. 2 « Seprernber 17, 2002 docur
opening an investigation on {J due to the size and value of his residence and his suspicious
activity in approaching U.S. Intelligence Community personnel. I: alse eppears tha
as been in contact with [iii which is located at
SS. i=: McLean, Virginie. The FBL has identified this address as the address of
Fnince Bandar. According to the FBI, BIJ is officially a driver for the Saudi E:
SR wibcr was also linked to ASPCOL, Prince Baudat’s umbrella company located in
Colorado.

nt, the FBI notes that the But

atl 1S

bassy.

It should be noted that the FBI’s November 18, 2002 response states that “CIA traces
have revealed no direct (emphasis added) links between numbers found in Zubaida’s phone book

and numbers in the United States.”"



ee

Daring the post-September 11 investigation, the FBI discovered that al-Bayoumi had far
more extensive ties to the Saudi Government than previously realized. In fact, according to an
October 14, 2002 FBI document, al-Bayoumi has “exiensive ties to the Saudi Govermment.” The

connections identified by the FBI are:

* Al-Bayoumi had been an accountant at the Saudi Civil Aviation Administration from

1976 to 1993, when he relocated to the United States;

* According to the FBI, al-Bayoumi was in frequent contact with the Emir et the Saud:

Ministry of Defense, responsible for air traffic control,

* The FBI has also located records, indicating that al-Bayoumi received $20,000 from

the Saudi Ministry of Finance at one point;

+ When al-Bayoumi applied to schools in the United States in 1998, he had a lette>
from the Saudi Embassy, which stated that he was getting a full scholarship Som the
Government of Saudi Arabia; and

+ While in San Diego, sI-Bayoumi was receiving money from the Saudi Ministry of
Defense through a Saudi company called “Ercan.” (EE of thet company
infortned the FBI after September 11, 2001 that, although 21-Beyoumi only showed
up at the company on one occasion, he received a monthly salary and allowances,
GRRE st tcc that, at first, he attempted to refuse to pay al-Bayoumi 2 monthiy
salary, but be was told that his company would lose their contract if he did not pay
him. (RE) informed the HRI that at the time, he atiributed this to Saudi
corruption.

Al-Bayoumi also had frequent contact with Saudi establishments in the United States. In

areview of telephone toll records, the FBI leamed that al-Bayoumi called Saudi Goverment
establishments in the United States almost 100 times between January and May of 2000.

According to the FBI, sl-Bayoumi was in contact with at least three individuals at the Saudi

ore



According to the FBI, Abdullah Bin Ladin has a number of connections to terrorist
organizations. He is the President und Director of the World Arab Muslim Youth Association
(WAMY) and the Institute of Islamic and Arabic Sciences in America. Both organizations are
local branches of non-govemumental organizations (NGOs) based in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia
According to the FBI, there is reason to believe that WAMY

‘closely associated with the
funding and financing of international terrorist activities and in the past has provided logistical
support to individuals wishing to fight in the Afghan War.” in 1998, the CIA published a paper
characterizing WAMY es a NGO that provides funding, logistical support and training with
possible connections to the Arab Afghans network, Hamas, Algenan extremists, and Philippine
militants. ?

Also of potential interest, at least in retrospect, is the 1999 incident involving Mohammed
al-Qudhaegin and Hamdan al-Shalawi. Al-Qudhaecin and al-Shalawi were flying from Phoenix
to Washington, DC to attend a party at the Saudi Embassy. After they boarded the plane in
Phoenix, they began asking the flight attendants technical questions about the flight that the
I-Qudhacein asked where the

bathroom was; one of the flight attendants pointed him to the back of the plane. Nevertheless,

flight atendants found suspicious. When the plane was in fligl

al-Qudhaeein went to the front of the plane and attempted on two occasions to enter the cockpit.
‘The plane made an emergency landing and the FBI investigated the incident, but decided not to

pursue @ prosecution. At the time, al-Qudhaccin and al-Shalawi claimed that the Saudi Einbassy
paid for their airplane

cts.

After the FBI discovered that an individual in Phocnix who was the subject of a
counterterrorism investigation was driving al-Shalawi's car, the Bureau opened 2
counterterrorism investigation on al-Shalawi. In November 2000, the FBI received reporting
from (REM that l-Shelawi had trained at the terrorist camps in Afghanistan and had
received explosives training to perform “Khobar Towers”-type allacks, Aer the September 11,
2001 attacks, the Phoenix Field Office attached even potentially greater significance to that 1999
incident. A Phoenix FBI communication explained the theory behind this: “Phoenix FBI now

? According to thie FBI's November 18, 2002 response, although several officials in WAMY support!
other terrorist groups, the intelligence is insufficient to show whether the organization as a w)wole and its senicr
leadership suppurt terrorism.



eT Gn el

S. Reet. No. 107- 107TM Conaress, 2p Session H. Rept. No. 107-

JOINT INQUIRY INTO
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ACTIVITIES
BEFORE AND AFTER THE TERRORIST ATTACKS OF

SEPTEMBER 11, 2001

REPORT
OF THE
U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
AND
U.S. HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE

TOGETHER WITH ADDITIONAL VIEWS

DECEMBER 2002



The U.S. Government also located another Virginia number at an Usama Bin Ladin
safehouse in Pakistan. The number is subscribed to by an individual named is
ED © 2 io.crvicwed by the FET in June

2002. He could not explain why his number ended up at a safehouse in Pakistan,

but stated thar

he regularly provides services to a couple who are personal assistants to Prince Bandar This

couple's dnver is an individual named i, who is assigned to the Saudi
Embassy in Washington, DC. According oI reguicrly calicd ay

business and frequently travels back and forth to Pakistan

Other Saudi Government Officials in the United States Who May Have Been in Contact
with the September 11 Hijackers

Among the individuals who may have i-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar

was Shaykh al-Thumairy. According to thelfmcmorandum reviewed by the Joint Inquiry

N associates of 1

Steff, “initial indicatior

xe that al-Thumairy may have had a physical or financial connection to

al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar, but we are still looking at this possibility." Al-Thumairy is an

accredited diplomat at the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles and is also considered one of the
“imams” at the King Fahad Mosque in Culver City, Califoni, iy

According to FBI documents, the King Fahad mosque was built in 1998 from funding
from the Saudi Arabian Crown Prince Abdulaziz. The mosque is attended by members of the
Saudj Consulate in Los Angeles and is widely known for its anti-Western views, FBI

documents indicate that Mohdhar Abdullah drove al-Hazt

i and al-Mihdhar to the King Fahad

Mosque, before al-Mihdhar retumed to Saudi Arabia.

Several individuals on the East Coast whom the hijackers may have met may also had

connections to the Saudi Government. After the terrorist attacks, the FBI discovered that, during

September 2001, an individual named Saleh al-Hussayen stayed at the same hntel in Herndon,

Virginia where al-Hazmni was staying at the time. According to FBI docum

s al-Hussayen is

apparently a “Saudi Interior Ministry employee/official." He claimed not to know the hijackers,



November 18, 2002 response, the al-Haramaia Islamic Foundation (HIF) has clear ties to the
Saudi Government, and intelligence reporting suggests it is providing financial and logistical
support to al-Qa'ids. In 1993, HIF established its U.S.-besed office in Ashland, Oregon, and that
office has since received approximately $700,000 from the parent offices in Saudi Arabia. The
FBI has a pending investigation of HIF and the activities of the Portland HIF Office. As
discussed above, the FBI has located correspondence between al-Bayoumi and the HIF. From
the documents, it is clear that HIF was interested in appointing the imam of the mosque in Cajon,

Californiz, that al-Bayoumi managed
The Treasury General Counsel testified about his agency"s concern about the foundation:

MR. AUFHAUSER: Second, and this is important point, it also rises out of Rick's
testimony, on al-Haramain, the two branch offices that we took 2 public and joint action
against, al-Haramain zeally does represent a significant issue for the PCC and for terrorist
financing and for the United States policy. It is, of course, the largest, I think the largest
Islamic charity in the world. Its name is synonymous with charity in the Islamic world.
Its direct overseers are members of the Royal Family; significant contributors ate
members of the Royal Family. We don't have # great deal of intelligence on the
headquarters, about whether they are knowingly assisting people in al-Qu'ida and others;
but in significant branch offices yet to be designated and under current investigation, we
have ample evidence that large cash amounts are being couriered to those branch offices,
that large wire transfers of money are being sent tu those offices, that a great dea! of the
moncy is being dissipated through misspending, unaccounted for, and finally, that those
offices have significant contacts with extremists, Islamic extre:nists.

CIA officials recently testified that they are making progress on their investigations of al-
Heramain:

‘A year ago we had a lot of reponing suggesting branch offices were tied to al-
Qa'ida...Over the last year we developed a lot of intelligence and law enforcement
information and we prepared a paper bout a month, six weeks ago which assembled all
of that... That paper gave us the first clear indication that the head of the central office is
complicit ia supporting terrorism, and it élso raised questions about Prince Nayef.

investigations, also hus clos:

jes to a member of the Saudi royal family. (EER no longer

resides in the United States, but is still the subject of an FBI investigation. The FBI opened an

———————————————— 436



TUr scUnD eon

The FBI has also discovered some more termous connections between Saudi Government
personnel and the hijackers during the course of the PENTI'BOM investigation. For example,
according to the FBI, an individual named Faliad Abdullah Salch Bakala was close friends with

September 11 hijackers Ahmed al-Ghamdi and Hamza al-Ghamdi. Baksla previous!

y “worked
as a pilot for the Saudi Royal family, flying Usama Bin Ladin between Afghanistan and Saudi
Asabja during UBL's exile.” In addition, an FBI so’

¢ stated after September 1} that he/she
was 50% sure that al-Mihdhar was a visitor at an apartment in McLs

Virginia that was
occupied in July and August 2001 by Hamad Alotaibi of the Ssudi Embassy Military Division,
FBI documents also note thet September
address

er Saeed Alghamdi may have also vis

Connections Between Saudi Government Officials in the United States and Other Possible
Terrorist Operatives

The Joint Inquiry also reviewed information in FBI files, suggesting other possible

connections between Saudi Government officials and terrorist operatives.

For example, according to F8I docuracats, there is evidence that hijackers Marwan al-

Shehhi and Mohammed Atta were in contact with Mohammed Rafique Quadir Hanunani, th

subject of an FBI counterterrorism investigation since 1999 and associate of Abdulla

Bin Ladin, who is referred to in FBI documents as Usama Bin Ladin’s half brother. Abdu
Bin Ladin, who is he United States

e claims to work for

subject of several FBI investigations, is currently i

in Washington, DC as an administrative officer. Abdullah Bin Ladin
has financed Quudir’s company and is listed by Quadir as the emergency contact for Quadir's

children. They are in fre

it email and phone contact as well,



+ The FBI is aware of contact between the hijackers and a close friend of Bassnan’s,
Khaled al-Kayed, a commercial airline pilot and certified flight instructor liv
San Diego. Al-Ka:

2000, 21 Mihdhar and al-

ed adinitted to the FBI that in May

Hazmi contacted him about leaming to fly Boeing jet airer

FBI documents speculate that Osama Bassnan
RF Th: FETs Noveriber 18, 2002 response contends that this was
an early investigative theory based on asset reporting which the FBI hes not been able to

corroborate.

However, there is also additional information possibly tying Bassnen (ay

GER =: 1992, white he was living in Washington, DC, Bassnan listed his employment as
the Saudi Arabian Education Mission. FBI documents state that

Bassnan also has other ties to the Saudi Government. Bassnan's wife received 2 monthly

from Princess Haifa. In a recent search of Bessnan’s residence,

the FBI located copies of

ashiers checks totaling $74,000, during the period Fobrua:

These checks were payable to Bassnan's wife and were drawn on the Riggs Bank account of
Prince Bandar's wife. The FBI has determined that there has been a standing order on Princess

Haifa’s account since January 1999 to si

$2000 a month to Bas pan's wife

was allegedly receiving the funding for “nursing services,” but, according to the fj docurnent,

there is no evidence that Bassnan's wife provided nursing s

On at least one occasion, Bassnan received a check directly from Prince Banda

account. According to the FBI, on May 14, 1998, Bassnan cashed a check from Bandar in the
1 of $15,000. Bassnan’s wi ly from Bandar. She

also received at least on:

also received one additional check from Bandar's wife, which she c
$10,000.

ashed on

anuary S, 1998, for



ine eRe

Colorado, and manages the affairs of the Colorado residence of the Saudi Ambassador
Bandar. The FBI noted that ASPCOL has an unlisted telephone number. A November
18, 2002 FBI response to the Joint Inquiry states that “CLA traces have revealed no direct
Unks between aumbers found in Zubaida’s phone book and numbers in the United

Sta

tes.”

» According to sn FBI document, the telephone number of a bodyguard at the Saudi

Embassy in Washington, DC, who some have dleged zy be : a
(EY © 8120 found in. Abu Zubaida’s poccersions; and

+ According to an FBI agent in Phoenix, the FBI suspects Mohammed al-Qudhacein of

being IR 1-ouchaccin was involved in s 1999 incident zdoard

an America West flight,

which the FBI's Phoenix office now suspects may have been a

“ary run" to test airline security. Dusing the flight, el-Qudhaeein and his associate asked

the Might attendants a variety of suspicious questions; 2l-Qudhaecin thea attempted to

enter the cockpit on two occssions. Al-Qudhacein and his associate were fying to

Washington, D.C. to attend a party at the Saudi Embassy, and both claimed ¢

their
tickets were paid for by the Scudi Embassy. During the course of its investigations, the
FBI has discovered that both al-Qudhaeein and the other individual involved in this

incident had connections to terrorism.

Finally, the Committees are particularly concerned about the serious nature of allegations
contained in # CLA memorandum fonnd by the Joint Inquiry Staff in the files of the FBI's San
Diego Field Office That memorandum, which discusses alleged financial connections between
the September 11 hijackers, Saudi Government officials, and members of the Saudi Royal

Family, was drafted by a CIA office: a,

information from FBI files. The CLA officer sent it to the CTC to determine whether CIA had

relying primarily on

additional information. He also provided 2 copy to the FBI agent responsible for the
investigation of one of the individuals discussed in the memorandum. Despite the clear national

um in an mdividval

implications of the CIA memorandum, the FBI agent included the memor

case file and did not forward it to FBI Headquarters. FBI Headquarters, therefore, was unaware

———
TOR SECC | a rg 5-057 eel



invest significant energy in cultiveting what Abu Zubaydah called good relationships
with Saudis of all standing.. He said bin Ladin is very pleased when Saudis in the
military, those successful in business and those close to the royal family to lend active
support to his cause. He said bin Ladin actively seeks out such relationships

Other CLA and FBI officials echoed these remarks in recent Congressional testimony.

==:

What we find troubling about the cases that we learned about from FBI, hoth
Angeles cases and some of the cases that the Washington Field Office has looked at, in
which you're seeing Saudi money going to people, is that it fits sort ofa pattern that
we've seen in terms of direct payments from the Saudis, the Saudi Government's
longstanding support for very fundamentalist Wahabi and Salafi charities and movements
around the world, which ina sense you see the money is going to fundamentalists and
you would be very surprised if some of it doesn’t bleed over into terronst

¢ had a lot of suspicions before September 11 which we documented in a
rent papers, and again it’s a lot of smoke and the issues that come up are
who knows about the payments, on whose behalf are the payments being made, are 0
being made on behalf of the central government or are they being made by a local official
oraperson, De the people who are making the payments know what's happening to the
money? If they do know what's happening, why are they making the payments? Is ita
form of blackmail? Do they recognize the terrorist support? There's the issue of are they
regulating themselycs as well as are they doing the due diligence that they ought to.

FBI Executive Assistant Director Pasquale D' Amuro testified

same hearing:

To date I can’t sit here and tell you that those ties go back, that we can prove that the
Saudi royal family is sponsoring terrorism. But there's enough smoke that we are
conducting several investigations to try to determine what other information is out there.

What is clear is that the FBI did not treat the Saudis us a counterterrorism

SN #021 92105 to Septernber 11, 2001.

442



SN °251£504 on “his issue on October 9,

On the issue of al-Qa'ida and Saudi intelligence, that gocs back to our efforts to interact
with the Saudi to get them to help us on investigating al-Qa'ida. ..for the most part it was
a very troubled relationship where the Saudis were not providing us quickly or very
vigorously with response to it. Sometimes they did, many times they didn't. lt was just
very slaw in coming.

Both FBI and CLA personnel cited an individual named Madani al-Tayyib as a specific
case in which the Saudis were uncooperative. The CLA and the FBI bad been pressuring the
Saudis for yeats for permission to talk to al-Tayyib. According to the former head of ALEC
Station, ai-Tayyib managed all of Bin Ladin’s finances when Bin Ladin was in Sudan, and any
expense over $1,000 had to be approved by al-Tayvib. Al-Tayyib moved to London in 1996 to
work with Khalid al-Fawwaz, another important al-Qa'ida figure who has since been arrested. In
the summer of 1996, al-Tayyab returned to Saudi Arabia. The Saudis continuously refused the
EDI's and the C1A's requests to talk ‘o al-Tayyib, stating, in the words of an FBI agent, that al-
Tayyib was “just a poor man who lost his leg. He doesn't know anything.”

‘The former chief of Alec Station also cited the example of Mohammed Jamal Khalifa.
Khalifa is Bin Ladin's brother-in-law and an important figure in al-Qa'ida. The U.S.
Government arrested Khalifa in the United States in 1994, Khalifa had becn sentenced to death
in absentia by the Jordanian Government for his role in a bombing in Jordan. As a result, the
US. agreed to extradite him to Jordan. The Jordanians then retimed him to Saudi Arabia. In the
opinion of the CLA officer, the Saudis “bought off" the Jordanians for the return of Khalifa.
According to the CIA officer, whca Khalifa subsequently arrived in Saudi Arabia, he was met by
at least one important government official. Khalifa naw works for a Riyadh-hased NGO and
travels and operates frecly.

The General Counsel of the U.S. Treasury Department testified at the July 23, 2002
hearing about the lack of Saudi cooperation with the U.S.:

i

—rersrer:T i Co 439



OSC

September 11, 2001, the FBI received “no reporting from any ‘member of the Intelligence
Conununity” that there was 2 EB presence in the United States.

According to vanous FBI documents and at least one CA memorandum, some of the
September 11 hijackers, while in the United States, apparently had contacts with individuals who
may be connected to the Saudi Government. While the Joint Inquir

uncovered this matenal
during the course of its review of FBI and C1A documents, it did not attempt to investigaic and
assess the accuracy and significance of this information independently, recognizing that such a
lask would be beyonce the scope ot this Joint Inquiry. Instead, the Joint inquiry referred a
detailed compilation of information uncovered by the Inquiry in documents and interviews to the
FBI and CIA for further investigation by the Intelligence Community and, if appropriate, law
enforcement agencies. A brief summary of the available information regarding some of these

individuals is illustrative for purposes of this report

* Omer al-Bayoumi, The FBI has received numerous reports from individuals in the
Muslim community, dating back to 1999, alleging that al-Bayoumi may be a Sundi
intelligence officer. FBI files suggest that al-Bayoumi provided substantial assistance to
lujackers Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi after they urrived in San Diego in
February 2000. Al-Bayoumi met the hijackers at a public place shortly after his meeting

with an individual at the Saudi consulate and there are indications in the files that his
encounter with the hijackers may not have been accidental. During this same timeframe,
al-Bayoumi had extensive contact with Sandi Goverment establisiunents in the United
States and received financial support from a Saudi company affiliated with the Saudi
Ministry of Defense. According to FBI files, RRR at the company said that al-
Bayoumi received a monthly salary even though he had been there on only one eccasion.
‘This support increased substantially in April 2000, two months after the hijackers arrived
in San Diego, decreased slightly in December 2000, and stayed at that same level until
August 2001. ‘That company reportedly had ties to Usame Bin Ladin and al-Qa'ide. In
addition, the FB] determined that al-Bayoumi was in contact with several individuals
under FBI investigation and with the Holy Land Foundation, which has been under

investigation as 2 fundraising front for Hamas;

—erer nn 416



Tr a

PART FOUR—¥INDING, DISCUSSION AND NARRATIVE REGARDING CERTAIN
SENSITIVE NATIONAL SECURITY MATTERS

20. Finding: While in the United States, some of the September 11 hijackers were in

contact with, and received support or assistance from, individuals who may be covuected to
the Saudi Government. There is information, primarily from FBI sources, that at least two
of those individuals were alleged by some to be Saudi intelligence officers. The Joint
Inquiry’s review confirmed that the Intelligence Community also has information, muck of
which has yet to be independently verified, indicating that individuals associated with the
Saudi Government in the United States may have other ties to al-Qu’ida and other terrorist
groups. The FBI and CIA bave informed the Joint Inquiry that, since the September 11
attacks, they are treating the Saudi issue seriously, but both still have only a limited
understanding of the Saudi Government's ties to terrorist elements. In their testimony,
neither CIA nor FBI wituesses were able to identify definitively the extent of Saudi support
for terrorist activity globally or within the United States and the extent to which such
support, if it exists, is knowing or inadvertent in nature, The FBI's Washington Field
Office created a squad devoted to [iii iia
Ee ae
he
at Jeast in part due to the Joint Inquiry’s focus on this issue, did the FBI and CIA establish
a working group to address the Saudi issue. In the view of the Joint Inquiry, this gap in
U.S. intelligence coverage is unacceptable, given the magnitude and immediacy of the
potential risk to U.S. national security, The Intelligence Conununity needs to address this

area of coucern as aggressively and as quickly as possible.

Discussion: One reason for the limited understanding is that it was only afier Septernber

11 that the U.S. Government began to aggressively investigate this issuc, Prior to September

11", the FBI apparently did not focus investigative resources on i

MR S26) nationals in the United States due to Saudi Arabia's status as an Amer

“ally.” A representative ofthe F5] MMII csfied that, prior to

Ee 41S
oe



In the October 9, 2002 hearing FBI Executive Assistant Director D’Amuro commented
on this funding:

} believe that we do have money going from Bandar’s wife, $2,000 2 month up to about
$64,000. What the money was for is what we don’t know.”

|. She gives money to 2
lot of different groups and people fom around the world. We've been able to uncover a
number of these...but meybe if we can discover that she gives to 20 different radical
groups, well, gee, maybe there's a pattern here.

‘The FBI has also developed additional information clearly indicating that Bassnan is an
extremist and supporter of Usama Bin Ladin. In 1993, the FBI became aware that Bassnan had
hosted a party for the Blind Shaykh at his house in Washington, DC in October 1992. Bassnea
has made many laudatory remarks to FBI assets about Bin Ladin, referring to Bin Ladin as the

official Khalifate and the ruler of the Islamic world. According to an FBI asset, Bassnan spoke
of Bin Ladin “as ifhe were a god.” Bassnan also stated to an FRI asset that he heard that the

U.S. Government had stopped approving visas for foreign students. He considered su

measures to be insufficient as there are already enough Muslims in the United States to destroy
the United States and make it an Islamic state within tea to fifleen years. According to FBI
documents, Bassnan also knew Bin Ladin's family in Saudi Arabia and speaks on his mobile

telephone with members of the family who are living in the United States.
Phone Numbers Linking Abu Zubsida to 2 Company ia the United States and a Saudi
Diplomat in Washington

On March 28, 2002 U.S. and coalition forces retrieved the telephone book of Abu

Zudaida, whom the U.S. Government has identified as a senior al-Qa’ide oper

coordinator According to an FBI document, “a review of toll records has linked several of the
nurobers found in Zubaida’s phonebook with U.S. phone numbers.” One of the numbers is

unlisted and subscribed to by the ASPCOL Comoration in Aspen, Colorado. On July 15, 2002,

Tor snenr



© Saleh al-Hussayen, In September 2001, Saleh al-Hussayen, reportedly a Saudi Interior
Ministry official, stayed at the same hotel in Hemdon, Virginia where al-Hazmi was
staying. While al-Hussayen claimed after September 11 not to know the hijackers, FBI
agents believed he was being deceptive. He was able to depart the United States despite

FBI efforts to locate and re-interview him; and

© Abdullah Bin Ladin, Abdullah Bin Ladin claims to work for the Saudi Embassy in
Washington, D.C. as an administrative officer. [Hc is identified by the BI as Usama Bin
Ladin’s half brother. He is a close friend of Moharnmed Quadir-Hanmnani, a possible
associate of Mohammed Atta and Marwan al-Shehhi prior to September 11, 2001.

The Joint Inquiry also found other indications that individuals commected to the Sauci

Goverment have ties to terrorist networks, including:

+ The CLA and FBI have identified the Ibn Tamiyah Mosque in Culver City as a site of
extremist-related activity. Several subjects of FBI investigations prior to September 11
had close connections to the mosque and are believed to have laundered money through
this mosque to non-profit organizations overseas affiliated with Usema Bin Ladin. In an
interview, an FDI agent said he belicved that Saudi Government money was being

laundered through the mosque;

+ Another Saudi

tional with close ties to the Saudi Royal Family, MM, is che
subject of FBI counterterrorism investigations and reportedly was checking security at
the United States’ southwest border in 1999 and discussing the possibility of infiltrating
individuals into the United States;

* According to FB! documents, several of the phone numbers found in the phone hook of
Abu Zubsida, a senior al-Qa'ida operative captured in Pakistan in March 2002, could be
linked, at least indirectly, to telephone numbers in the United States. One of those U.S.

numbers is subscribed to by the ASPCOL Corporation, which is located in Aspen,



ST

believes both men were spi

ically attempting to test the sec

ity procedures of America West

Airlines in preparation for and in furtherance of UBL/AI Quede operations.”
In testimony before the Joint Inquiry, the agent who drafted the “Phoenix EC” stated:

Ina post 9/11 world, 1 went back and looked at that as possibly being some sort of dry
run. It is currently under investigation.

After September 11, 2001, al-Quctinaccin a

In interviews, a Phoenix FBT agent stated that Phoenix aT
believed that «!-Quéhseein ight be IIR. His prof

al-Bayoumi and Bassnan. He is in the United States as a student and does not have a vis

is similar to that of

means of income.

He is in frequent contact with Saudi Government establishments in the Uni
States and appears to be very involved in the affairs of the local Saudi community. He runs a
“Saudi Club" in Phoenix, and assists Seudi students in the area. The FBI has also developed
information that al-Qudhaeein was receiving money from the Saudi Government but, as of
August 2002, had not obtained the relevant bank records for review. The FBI's Phoenix Field

¢al-Quahaeein and others may be [I a

Office hus speculated th

There are other indications in FBI files thet elements of the Saudi Goverament may have

provided support to terrorist networks. For example, the FBI had identified +

mm Tamiyah
Mosque in Culver City as a site of extremist-related activity both before and after September 11
Several subjects of San Diego investigation prior to September 11 had close connections to the
mosque, Based on interviews and review of FBI files, San Diego FBI agents believed at the time
that these subjects were laundering money through this mosque first to Somali non-profit

organizations and then to other entities affiliated with Usama Bin Ladin.

—re ee

G



DAG 004 11-3,

Congress of the United States
‘Warhingin, B.C.

January 29, 2003

The Honorable George J. Tenet
Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, DC 20505

Dear Director Tanet:

As you know, the final report of the Joint inquiry into the events of September 11
has been submitted to the Intelligence Community for declassification review, We look

forward to early release of the public report so that efforts at reforms can be.
accelerated.

Having been privileged to lead this bipartisan, bicameral investigation last year,
we ate committed to working in the current Congress to help secure implementation of
its recommendations. In furtherance of that goal, we are writing to the President and
heads of departments and agencies about portions of the Joint Inquiry's
recommendations that may be of particular concem to them.

Our first recommendation calls for establishment of a Director of National
Intelligence, or DNI, who in addition to being the Prasident’s principal intelligence
adviser ‘shall have the full range of management, budgetary and personnel
responsibilities needed to make the U.S. Intelligence Community operate as a coherent
whole." To help promote both strong leadership of the entire intelligence Community
leadership and an effective CIA, the Joint Inquiry also recommended that Congress
provide that the DNI not simultaneously serve as director of the CIA or any other
agency. in considering this recommendation, the Congress wil certainly, we believe,

benefit from learning of your-views about the strengthening of the role of head of the
Intelligence Community.

A number of the recommendations thal follow address proposed tasks of the
Director of National Intelligence, but as that reform will require study and deliberation,
for the Immediate future those further recommendations are directed to the Director of
Centra! Intelligence as the present statutory head of the intelligence Community.

The Joint Inquiry found that prior to September 11 neither the U.S. Govemment
a8 @ whole nor the Intelligence Community had a comprehensive counterterrorist
‘strategy. One of cur recommendations calls on the National Security Council, In
conjunction with key agency and department heads, to prepare such a strategy for the
President's approval. The recommendation states that the strategy should be



hearings that, prior to September 11", the FRI received “no reporting from any member of the

munity” that there is 2 II presence

Intelligence C

in the United States.

It should be clear that this Joint Inquiry hes made no final determinations as to the

reliability or sufficiency of the information regarding these issucs thet we found contained in FBI
und CLA documents. It was not the task of this Joint Inquiry to conduct the kind of extensive
investigation that would be required to determined the true significance of any such alleged

connections to the Sandi Governm:

On the one hand, it is possible that these lands of

connections cuuld sugest, 2s indicated in 2 MM detcd ruly 2, 2002,

“incontrovertible evidence thst there is support for these terrorists within the Saudi

Government.” On the other hand, it is also possible that further inves

gotion of these alley

could reveal legitimate, and innocent, explanations for these associations.

Given the serious national security implications of this information, however, the
leadership of the Joint Inquiry is referring the staff's compilation of relevant information to both
the FBI and the CIA for investigative review and appropriate investigative and intelligence

action,

Possible Connections Between the September 11 Hijackers and Saudi Government Officials
in the United States

In reviewing FBI documents and the CLA memorandum, the Joint Inquiry Staff has

examined information suggesting that:

« One individual who provided assistance to Nawaf al.

jacmi and Khalid ai-Mihdhar may

be connecied to the Saudi Government. A second int

dual who may have been in

contact with al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar also has tics to the Saudi Govermmen

including

connections to the Saudi Ambassador to the United States. There is reporting in FBI files
that persons have alleged that both of these individuals may be Saudi intelligence

officers;



—PoT Sich i

of statements in the memorandum until the Joint Inquiry brought the memorandum’s

implication othe Bureau's etc

Possible Saudi Government Connections to Terrorists and Terrorist Groups

While in the United States, some of the September 11 hijackers were in contact with, and
received support or assistance from, individuals who may be connected to the Saudi
Goverument. There is information, fiou: FBI suusces, thut at least two of thuse individuals were
alleged to be Saudi intelligence officers. The Joint Inquiry’s review confirmed that the
Intelligence Community also has informatio:

auch of which remains speculativ

and yet to be

independently verified, indicating that Saudi Goverament officials in the United States may have

other ties to al-Qa’ida and other terrorist groups.

The Committees are particularly concemed about the serious nature of allegations
contained in a CLA memorandum found within the files of the FBI's San Dicyo Field Office
That memorandum, which discusses alleged financial connections between the September 11

hijackers, Saudi Government officials, and members of the Saudi Royal Family, was drafted by a

CIA officer (ES relying primarily on information from FBI files

In their testimony before the Joint Inquiry, neither the CIA nor the FBI was able to
definitively identify for these Committees the extent of Saudi support for terrorist activity
globally or within the United States and the extent to which such suppor, if it exists, is
intentional or innocent in nature. Both the FBI and CIA have indicated to the Committees that

they are now aggressively pursuing Saudi-related terrorism issues.

Prior to September 11", the FBI apparently did not focus investigative
a es
the United States due to Saudi Arabia's status as an American “ally” is
GN. 4 representative of the FBI's IY tcstified in closed



TOF SS CRE | ay OST

However, both the FBI and the CIA st

ave only a limited vaderstanding of the Saudi

Government's ties to terro:

elements. In the October 9, 2002 closed hearing, Director Mueller

stated:

If Lhave one preliminary note of caution, it is that at this point there are more questions
than answers, and I would caution against jumping to conclusions before we know a lot
more,

A document located by the Joint Inquiry Staff confirms that the FBI's Washington Field
Office is still in the early stages of focusing on these investigations. In an August 15, 2002,
communication, a field office agent stated that‘ RE aa

EE ee SE

that same document, the Washington Field Office asked [iS

a ee ae ee

ony that th understanding of this issue is limited as well.

owledged in his

With regard to the specific question of have we seen the Saudi intelligence services
supporting terror groups, I think the record is not clear at all on that.

Both the FBI and CIA recognized the possibility that individuals connected to the Saudi

Government may be providing support to terrorists.

So there is certainly « good, good chance that there are sympathizers or extremists,
sympathizers possibly for al-Qa’ida within the security services.

I 2150 010 th

Abu Zubzydah said he’s confident that al-Qa’ida must have contact certainly with Saudis
in the United States and that al-Qa'ida and Usama Hin Ladin are particularly—they

ROE ORNS a 281) aa



and-2 a ceatagle es. The
signation of a man narned Julaydin, who is notori
of this; and his designation will be public within the next 10 days. They came forward
to us 2 weeks ago and said, okay, we think we should go forward with the designation
and a freeze order against Mr. Julaydin. We asked, what do you have on him? Because
they certainly know what we have on him, because we shared it as we tried to convince
ther: that they ought to join us. The answer back was, nothing new.

rst is, aficr some pretiod, the S

MR. BEREUTER: Do you believe that?

MR. AUFHAUSER: No, ] think that taxes credulity, or there is another motive we are not

being told.

Status of the U.S. Intelligence Community’s Investigations into Connections Between
‘Terrorism and Saudi Government Officials

Both the FBI and the CLA have informed the Committees they are treating the Sau

issue seriously. According to the November 18, 2002 FBI response, the FBI and CIA have

established a working group to look into the Saudi issue. ‘The FBI formed a squad at t

Washington Field Office INS to investigate this issue 2

Sp ne



Osama Bassnan. Bassnan may have been in contact with al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi

during their time in San Diego. Bassnan was a close associate of al-Bayoumi and Omar

Bakarbashat, another one of the hijackers’ close associates. He also lived across the
street from the hijackers, and made a comment to an FBI asset that he dic more than al-
Bayoumi did for the hijackers. According to an FBI document, Basnan told another
individual that he met al-Hazmi through al-Bayoumi and Ister that he met two of the
hijackers through al-Bayoumi. He also told the asset that al-Bayoumi wes arrested
‘because he knew al-Hazmi and el-Mihdhur very

The document goes on to state that

Bassnan and al-Bayoumi have been “close to each other for

jong time.” Bessnan has

many ties to the Saudi Govemment, including past employment by the Saudi Arabian

Education Mission, referred to in FBI documents 25 a
.e F21 else received reports fiom
individuals in the Muslim community alleging that Bassnan might be a Saudi intelligence
officer. According to a CIA memo, Bassnan reportedly received funding and possibly a

fake passport from Saudi Govemment officials, He and his wife have received financial

support from the Saudi Ambassador to the United States and his wife A CIA report aise

indicates that Bassnar traveled to Houston in 2002 and met with an individual who
MMMM The report states thar during that trip a member of the Saudi Royal Family

provided Bassnan with a signific:

nt amount of cash. FBI information int

es that
Bassnan is an extremist and supporter of Usama Bin Ladin, and has been connected to the

Eritrean Islamic Jihad and the Blind Shaykh;

Shaykh al-Thumairy. According to FBI documents and a CIA memorendum, al-ITazmi
and al-Mihdhar may have been in contact with Shaykh

humairy, an accredited

diplomat at the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles and one of th

amis” at the King
Fehad mosque in Culver City, California. Also uecording to FEY documents, the mosque
was built in 1998 from funding provided by Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Abdulaziz.
The mosque is reportedly attended by members of the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles

and is widely recognized for its anti-

festem views;

coerce Src: 417



but agents in the FBI's Washington Field Office believed he was being deceptive. The interview
was terminated when al-Hussayen either passed aut or feigned a seizure requiring medical

treatment. He was released from

the hospital several days later and managed to depart the

United States despite law enforcement efforts to locate and re-interview him.

Salch al-Hussayen is the uncle of Sami Omar al-Hussayen. Sami al-Hussaye:

connected to the Islamic Assembly of North America (LANA) and is the subject of an FBI
counterterrorism investigation. The FBI has also discovered that Saleh al-Hussayen is a major

conwibutor to the LANA, a non-profit organization based in Mich is dedicated to the

spread of Islam worldwide. According to the FBI, the LANA‘s mission is actually to spread

Islamic fundamentalism and Salafist doctrine throughout the United States and the world at

large, The LANA solicits funds from wealthy Saudi benefactors, extremist islamic Shaykhs, and
suspect non-governmental organizations. According to FBI documents, IANA has solicited

money from Prince Bandar, but the documents are unclear as to whether Bandar actually

contributed money to this organization.

FBI documents also indicate that several Saudi Naval officers were in contact with the

September 11 hijackers. FB] documents state that the San Dicgo Field Office opened a

counterterrorism investigation on an individual named Osama Nooh, a Saudi Naval oflicer, due

to his association with Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mih

In addition, Lafi al-Hasbi,

another Saudi Naval officer, was in telephonic contact with flight 77.hijackers Khalid al-Mihdhar

and Nawaf al-Hazmi on nine occasions from March 1!, 2000 to March 27, 2000.

The Jacksonville FBI Field Office is conducting an investigation to determine whether

Salch Ahmed Bedaiwi, 2 Saudi Naval officer within its territory was in contact with any of the

recererer: 431



Tt iiVT[_”’ =<

investigation of {EE en employee of Saudi Arabian Airlines, in 1999 after receiving
information {iE thet Sin Ladin lieutenant Abu Zubaida had been
in contact with a telephone number associated with (REIN in Portland. In Mey 2001, two
individuals were arrested in Bahrain and later admitted they were on their way to blow up U.S
facilities in Saudi Arabia. of them had a passport that had been issued to one of
(>= FBI's Phoenix Field Office also received source reporting in 1999 that [EA
was checking security at the Southwest border and discussing the possibility of inf

ting

individuals into the United States.

The FBI has developed information that IMJ has close ties with oue of the Saudi
princes and accompanies him on many trips, including travel to the United States. According to
the FBI, SEY wos recently interrogated at the detention facility at
Guantanamo Bay. He informed the FBI that MJ got the job at Saudi Arabien Airlines through
his contacts. He said that {J did not eam much money in this:job, but that he “had another
source of income through 2 Saudi prince” named Khalid al-Bandar. According to
GR performed miscellancous tasks for the Prince, such as handling real estate mutters
and assisting the Prince's grandmother. {J traveled many places with the Prince, including
(ERE 012e the cryptic comment
that nobody “knew everything about” Although his name was on the S)
Department's watchlist, SENS was apparently able to circumvent
and the Immigration and Naturalization Service because he was travel

Europe, and often to the United Arab Emir

the Customs Service

ing with the Saudi prince.

The FBI only leamed of the trip after the fact. Agents in the FBI's Portland Field Off
expressed their concern that (IJ and others were using their status as Saudi Arabian
Airlines employees as @ cover to enable them to transport weapons in and out of the United

States.
Lack of Saudi Cooperation in Counterterrorism Investigations

In testimony and interviews, a nuraber of FBI agents and CIA offic:

5 complained to the
Joint Inquiry aboot a lack of Saudi cooperation in terrorism investigations both before and after

the September 11 attacks. For example, @ veteran New York FBI agent stated that, from his

TS iL 437



The Honorable George J. Tenet
January 29, 2003
Page 4

that you might have for legislative or administrative action to improve the Nation's
counterterrorist capabilities.

= Y)

Bob Graham Porter Gi —~
Chairman, Senate Intelligence Chairman, House Intelligence
Committee, 107" Congrass Committee, 107° and 108”
Congresses

eR) (\ OY 2 re
Richard Shelby Nancy Pelosi

Vice Chairman, Senate Intelligence Ranking Minority Member, House
Committee, 107" Congress Intelligence Committee, 107" Congress

and Member ex officio (as Minority
Leader), 108" Congrass

Enclosure: As stated



mbassy in Washington, DC; two individuals at the Saudi Arabian Cultural Mission in
on, DC, and three individuals at the

ni i hey

the Saudi Consulate in London.

di Consulate in Los Angeles. In a search of

50 di d that he had the phone number f

‘Two former San Diego

s addressed the issue of whether al-Bayoumi was an

cer at the October 9, 2002 closed hearing. The former case agent who handled

[Al-Bayoumi] acted like a Saudi intelligence officer, in my opinion, And if he was
involved with the hijackers, which it looks like he was, if he signed leases, i he provided
some sort of financing or payment of some sort, then | would say that there’s a clear
possibility that there might be a connection between Saudi intelligence and U

A former

Assistant Special Agent in Charge in San Diego testified that the FBI received

“numerous, { would say half'a dozen" reports from individuals who be!

rd that al-Bayoumi

was a Saudi intelligence officer. The FBI's Novernber 18TM response is inconsistent as to whether

the FBI cu

response, the FBI notes that al-Bayoun

3 “there is no evidence” to conclude that al-

September 11", but the response also

Bayoumi is a Saudi intelligence officer.

The

FBI had received reporting from a

iable source well prior to September 11, 2001
indicating that al-Rayoumi might be a Saudi intelligence officer. Al-Bayoumni »
h

Ss KO

ve access to large amounts of mor

y from Saudi Arabia, despite the fact that he did not app

to hold 2 yeb, On one occasion prior to September 11, the FBI re

erved in watson that al

Bayoum had received $400,000 trom Saudi Arabia to help fund a new mosque mn Sum Diego.

The FBT conducted 2 counterterrorisin investigation on al

youmi in 1998 and 1999, but closed

the investigation at thet point.

oe)
ie



whi

wife of Prince Bandar, 1

that only Osama Bassnan’s wife received money directly from Prince Bandar’s wi

¢ living in San Diego, was receiving $1200 a month from P=in

Ee ee po

‘Thfcmorandum dated July 2, 2002, ineorre:

y noted that al-Bayout

wife,

s Haifa Hint Sultan, the

¢ Saudi Ambassador to the United States. The Fis] has now confirmed

, but that al-

Bayoumi's wife attempted to deposit three of the checks from Prince Bandar’s wife, which were

payable to Bassnan’s wife, into her own accounts

may have also been in contact with al

The Joint Inquiry also found, in TBI files, information suggesting that Osama Bass

{ihdhar and al-Hazmi, including:

+ Bassnan was a very close associate of Omar al-Bayoumi’s and was in telephone

contact with ai-Bayoumi several umes a day while they were both in San Diego.

Bassnan also has close ties to 2 number of other individuals connected to the

cluding Omar Bakarbashat, discussed below,

who is referred to in FBI

hijackers, in

documents as Bassnan's brother-in-law;

‘cording to an October 16, 2001 FBI document, Bassnan informed an asset that he

had met Nawaf al-Hazmi through al-Bayoumi. He went on te say that he met two of

the nineteen hijackers through Omar al-Bayeumi. According to the FBI doc!

also told the asset thit al-Bayoumi was arrested because he knew al-Hazmi and al-

ent, he

Mikdhar very well, The document

have been “close to each other for a long ime.”

«  Bassnan lived in the apartment complex in San Diego across the s1

and al-Mihdher;

ks suggesting

=
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a
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=
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&
a
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o



The Honorable George J. Tenet
January 29, 2003
Page 3

States, recognizing the need to enhance national security while fully protecting civil
liberties.”

The Committees expressed their strong conviction that “the Intelligence
Community's employees remain its greatest resource." They recommend that the head
of the Intelligence Community “should require that measures be Implemented to greatly
enhance the recruitment and development of a workforce with the intelligence skills and
expertise needed for success in counterterrorist efforts.” Several particular actions are
set forth in the recommendation. One is that Intelligence Community agencies should
expand and Improve counterterrorism training, including about information sharing
among law enfarcement and intelligence personnel, the use of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act, and watchlisting. The recommendation includes steps to improve
Intelligence Community language capabilities and the utilization of the skills and
experience of retired personnel. It calls on the Intelligence Community to “enhance
recruitment of a more ethnically and culturally diverse workforce.”

A further personnel recommendation proposes, in part, that Congress enact
legistation, modeled on the landmark Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986, to help instill the concept of “jointness” throughout the
Intelligence Community and ensure that its components will work more closely together
than has been the case. The mechanisms identified in the recommendation include
‘such things as joint tours for intelligence and law enforcement personnel as well as
incentives for joint servica throughout the Intelligence Community. In developing these
ideas, Congress would benefit from the Administration's detailed proposals.

The Joint Inquiry identified several important objectives conceming classified
information, including expanding access by federal agencies outside the Intelligence
Community, by state and local authorities, and by the American public. To this end, we
recommended that the Director of Central Intelligence, in consultation with the heads of
key components of the intelligence Community, including the Atorney General, should
report to the Intelligence Committees on “proposals for a new and more realistic
approach to the processes and structures that have governed the designation of
sensitive and classified information.” The report should also address “proposals to

protect against the use of the classification process as a shield to protect agency self-
interest.”

The Congress and the Nation as a whole will be grateful for your attention and
response to these and other matters identified in the course of the Joint Inquiry.
Further, we are confident that the Congress will benefit from other recommendations



In approximately 1998, the FB] became aware of millions of dollars in wire transfers
from the Somali community in San Diego to Al Barakast Trading Company und other businesses
affiliated with Usama Bin Ladin. At the time, the funding appeared to be originating from the
local Somali community in the form of donations to vatious Somali non-profits. [fowever, the
FBI now believes that the some of the funding actually originated from Saudi Arabia and that
both the Ibn Tamiyah Mosque in Los Angeles and the Islamic Center of San Diego were
involved in laundering the money.

According to the forme: FBI agent in San Dicgo who was involved in this investigation,
this scheme may allow the Saudi Government to provide al-Qa'ida with funding through covert
or indirect means. In his October 9, 2002 testimony the former agent commented on the possible
money laundering:

My guess Saudi-it’s connected somehow with the Saudis. And knowing that probably
‘70-80 percent of the population of Saudi Arabia support Usama Bin Ladin, it might be an
indication.

‘There are also indications of Saudi governmental support for terrorist activity through
charitable organizations. The Saudi-based Umm al-Qura Istamic Charitable Foundation (UQ) is
an Isiainic non-governmental organization linked to terrorist support activities. According toa
May 2002 Defense Intelligence Terrorism Summary, the UQ's activities in support of terrorism
include: suspicious money transfers, document forgery, providing jobs to wanted terrorist
suspects, and financing travel for youths to attend jihad taining. The Defense communication
notes that since September 2001, UQ couriers have transported over $330,000 in cash, most of
which they received from Saudi Embassies in the For Bast. In January 2002, UQ administrator
Yassir El-Sayid Mohammed traveled to Thailand to pick up approximately $200,000 from the
Saudi Embassy in Bangkok. In early November 2001, the persona! assistant to the UQ
administrator traveled to Kuala Lumpur for a meeting at the Saudi Arabian Embassy. He
retumed with tens of thousands of dollars, according to the Department of Defense.

CIA, Treasury, and FBI officials have all expressed their concern about the al-Haramain
Foundation’s ties to both the Saudi Government and terrorist activity. According to the FBI's



The Honorable George J. Tenet
January 29, 2003
Page 2

“government wide,” apply both “home and abroad,” and include “the growing terrorism
threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and associated
technologies.” The recommendation asks that this strategy identify and fully engage the
Intelligence as well as foreign policy, economic, military and law enforcement elements
that are “critical to a comprehensive blueprint for success in the war against terrorism.”
The Director of Central intelligence's full participation in this overall process will be
essential, as will the DCI's development of the Intelligence Cammunity component of
the full strategy. The Joint Inquiry recommended that the Intelligence Community's
component of the overall strategy include a number of important items, among them
development of human sources to penetrate terrorist organizations and networks.

To provide to the Congress and Executive Branch policymakers intelligence
estimates on terrorism, the Joint Inquiry has recommended establishment on the
National Intelligence Council of the position of National Intelligence Officer for
Terrorism. The recommendation suggests that the person holding this position also
assist the Intelligence Community in developing a program for strategic analysis.

Another recommendation addresses the need for Congress and the
Administration to ensure development within the Department of Homeland Security of
an effective all-source terrorism information fusion center, as mandated by the
Homeland Security Act of 2002. The success of that fusion center will depend, as the
recommendation states, on the center's “full and timely access to all counterterrorism-
felated intelligence information, including ‘raw’ supporting data as needed.” Your action
to ensure full cooperation between the entire Intelligence Community (including, of
course, the CIA) and the Department of Homeland Security will be fundamental to the
‘success of this vital reform. We applaud the President's announcement of the
establishment of a new Terrorist Threat Integration Center, which we understand will be
located under the Director of Central Intelligence. The important challenge, we believe,
is to assure the full and harmonious implementation of both the information fusion
requirement of the Homeland Security Act and the center that the President announced.

The recommendations include a list of significant reforms that the Intelligence
Committees believe are essential for strengthening the FBI's domestic intelligence
capability. In regard to these critically needed reforms, the Joint Inquiry has
recommended that Congress should direct that the head of the Intelligence Community,
together with the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security, should
report to Congress on the FBI's progress. The report should include “the specific
manner in which a new domestic Intelligence service could be established in the United



Michael Rolince, the former head of the International Terrorism Operations Section at

FBI testified:

The answer to your question is pre-9/11 there were not any significant preliminary
inquiry or full investigations, with relatively few exceptions, conducted by the FBI
looking at Saudi [RENN or support to tervorism...I'm not going to stand
here, Ms. Hill, and tell you in any way, shape or form

‘The former Assistant Special Agent in Charge in San Diego confirmed this in his

testiznony:

Basic
were not a country identified by the Stats Department us a state sponsor of terrorism.

And the theme or the common modus operandi that we saw in San Diego was that if there
were MEM there, their primary objective was to monitor dissidents in the
interest of protecting the royal family. So they were not viewed as an inimical threat to
national secunty,

In the October 9, acknowledged that he became

aware of some of the facts regarding the Saudi issue only as a result of the investigative work of

Mueller

2 closed hearing, Director

the Joint Inquiry Staff:

the staff probed end, as a result of the

at had not come to light

jot probed. ‘That's what
ng brought out facts that

I’m saying the sequence of events here, I
probing, some facts came to light here and to me, franily,
before, and perhaps would not have come to light the stat
T'm telling you. So I'm agreeing with you that the staff probi
may not have come to this Committee.”

Senator Dewine: But what you're aiso saying, though, is that that probing then brought

facts to your attention.

Director Mueller: Yes.



point of view, the Saudis have been useless and obstructionist for years. In this agent's opinion,
the Saudis will only act when it is in their self-interest.

When a high-level {ij officer was asked how the September 1! attacks might have been
prevented, he cited greater Saudi cooperation, pointing to an example from the summer of 2001,
when the U.S. Government requested Saudi assistance, with no success. In May 2001, the U.S.
Government became aware that an individual in Saudi Arabia wes in contuct with Abu Zubsida
and was most likely aware of an upcoming al-Qa'ida operation. The U.S. Governmen: pressured
tac Ssudi Govomment to locate him. The Saudis informed the U.S. Government tha: they
required additional information to do so. The U.S Government agency that had originally
leaned of this individual's knowledge refused to provide the Saudis with additional information
because it would reveal sources and methods. The National Security Council also tied to
pressure the Saudis, but the Saudis would nol cooperate without (he additional information.

According to some FBI personnel, this type of response is typical from the Saudis. For
example, one FBI agent described one investigation after September 11 in which he provided the
Saudi Government with copies of the subjects’ Saudi passports. The Saudi Government
maintamed that they had no record of the subjects.

According to the former Chief of Alec Station, the unit in the DCI's Counterterrorist
Center established in 1996 to focus specifically on Usama Bin Ladir, it was clear from about
1996 that the Saudi Government would not cooperate with the United States on matters relating,
to Usama Bin Ladin. There is a May 1996 memo from the DCI's Counterterrorist Center
[MBB stating that the Saudis had stopped providing background informution or other assistanee on
Bin Ladin because Bin Ladin had “too much information about official Saudi dealings with
Islamic extremists in the 1980s for Riyadh to deliver him into U.S. hands.” In a June 1997
memo to the DCL, Alec Station reemphasized the lack of Saudi cooperation and stated that there
was little prospect of future cooperation regarding Bin Ladin. The former Chief of Alec Station
thought that the U.S. Goverament’s hope of eventually obtaining Saudi cooperation was
‘unrealistic because Saudi assistance to the U.S. Goverment on this matter was contrary to Saudi

national interests.

a
AUF SOC 8 SY SE 438



cmb

+ The September 11 hijackers may have been in contact with other Saudi Goverment

ials in the United States pnor to the September 11 attacks; and
* Saudi Government officials in the United States may have ties te Usama Bin Ladin’s
terrorist network.
Omar al-Bayoumi and Osama Bassnan
Two individuals known to the FBI prior to September 1, 2001 - Omar al-Bayoumi and

Osama Bassnan ~ may have provided assistance or support to al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar while the
two hijacke:

jo-be were living in San Diego. While the documentary evidence that al-Bayoumi
provided assistance to al-[lazmi and al-Mihdhar is solid, the files contain only limited evidence

that Osama Bassnan had contacts with the two individuals.

Wher 2l-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar moved to San Diego, al-Bayoumt provided them with
considerable assistance. Before the hijackers moved in with the long-time FBI informant, they
stayed at al-Bayoumi’s apartracnt for several days until ai-Bayoumi was able to find them an

apartment. Al-Bayoumi then co-signed their lease and may have paid their

month's rent and
sceurity deposit.’ After al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar moved into their own apartment, al-Bayourni
xed Modhar Abdullah,
dividual from the Islamic Center of San Diego (ICSD), to help them get accliznated to

threw a party to welcome them to the San Diego community He also ta

anothi

the United States. Abdullah served as their translator, helped them get drivers’ li

es, and

assisted them in oeating Aig sos,

‘The FBI notes, un its November 18, 2002 response that “financial records indicate
amount as the casi check into al-Rayoumi's bank account on the same day, wi gues

reimbursed him.” FBI November 18 Response, 3. However, another FDI docurnens, dated October 14,200
appears to reach a slightly different conclusion This document states that “a review of Khalid Al-Mibdhar a:
Nawaf Al-Hazmi's banik records indicate there is no bank documentation thet supports the reimbursement of [the
reat money}, or any monies to Omer Al-Bayoumi fom al-Hazmi or Al-Midkar.”



Since September 11, 2001 FI investigation revealed that al-Bayoumi has some tics to

terrorist elements. Pasquale J. D’Amuro, the Executive Assistant Director for Counterterrorism

end Counterintelligence testified in the October 9, 2002 hearing that

{w]e've been talking with the {J Government about collection on an individual
named BEBE who has ties to al-Qa'ida, who has ties to Bayoumi

In addition, the FBI reported the results of their search of al-Bayour

Ss,

“after an exhaustive translations of Bayoumi’s documents, it is clear that in Bayoumi’s

conespondence he is providing guidance to young Muslims and some of his writings can be
interpreted as jihadist.”

According to information acquired by the FBI after September 11, 2001, al-Bayourni also
noted on one of his school applications that he worked for a company called “DallalvAveo.””
According ta the FBI, Erean is 2 San Diego subcontractor of Dallah/Avco. According to a
separate [Hocument, Dallat

Traus Arab, which is a subsidiary of Al Barakaat Invesunent and Development Company. Aveo

and Avco are under the same umbrella company, Aveo Dallah

Dallah reportedly holds the contracts for cleaning and maintenance at the three major airports in

Saudi Arabia. The | documen aes I

the company has links to Usama Bin Ladin. FRI Headquay
between Dallah/Avco and Al Barakant in February 2001, but the San Diego Field Office

informed of the affiliation

apparently never got this information.

According to FBI documents, al-Bayoumi’s pay mcreased during th

time that al-Hazmi
and al-Mibdhar were in the United States. According to a recent [fnalysis of ties between

the terronst attacks and elements of the Saudi

jovernment, before al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar
arrived in the U.S., a!-Bayoumi generally received approximately $465 per month in
“allowances.” According to the {J document, in March 2009, « month after al-Hazmi and al-

Mihdhar arrived in San Diego, his “allowances” jnmped to over $3700 # month and stayed

constant until December 2000, when al-Hezmi lefi San Diego. Al-Bayoumi's allowances
then decreased to approximately $3,200 a month and stayed ai that rate until al-Bayoumi left the

United States in August 2001, approximately one month before the September 11° attacks.

—rorsrers Ti

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