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35–919 PDF 2007

THE SAFETY AND SECURITY OF

LIQUEFIED NATURAL GAS TERMINALS

(110–37)

FIELD HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

TRANSPORTATION AND 

INFRASTRUCTURE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

MAY 7, 2007 (Farmingville, NY)

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

(

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE 

JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota, Chairman 

NICK J. RAHALL, II, West Virginia 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

JERROLD NADLER, New York 

CORRINE BROWN, Florida 

BOB FILNER, California 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland 

ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California 

LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa 

TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania 

BRIAN BAIRD, Washington 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts 

JULIA CARSON, Indiana 

TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York 

MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

JOHN T. SALAZAR, Colorado 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois 

DORIS O. MATSUI, California 

NICK LAMPSON, Texas 

ZACHARY T. SPACE, Ohio 

MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii 

BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa 

JASON ALTMIRE, Pennsylvania 

TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota 

HEATH SHULER, North Carolina 

MICHAEL A. ACURI, New York 

HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona 

CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania 

JOHN J. HALL, New York 

STEVE KAGEN, Wisconsin 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

JERRY MCNERNEY, California 

VACANCY 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee 

WAYNE T. GILCHREST, Maryland 

VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan 

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio 

RICHARD H. BAKER, Louisiana 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

JERRY MORAN, Kansas 

GARY G. MILLER, California 

ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina 

HENRY E. BROWN, JR., South Carolina 

TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois 

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia 

JIM GERLACH, Pennsylvania 

MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida 

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania 

TED POE, Texas 

DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JOHN R. ‘RANDY’ KUHL, JR., New York 

LYNN A WESTMORELAND, Georgia 

CHARLES W. BOUSTANY, JR., Louisiana 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

THELMA D. DRAKE, Virginia 

MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma 

VERN BUCHANAN, Florida 

(II)

SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland, Chairman 

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

CORRINE BROWN, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

BRIAN BAIRD, Washington 

TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York 

VACANCY 

JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota 

(Ex Officio) 

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

WAYNE T. GILCHREST, Maryland 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

TED POE, Texas 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida 

(Ex Officio) 

(III)

(V)

CONTENTS Page

Summary of Subject Matter .................................................................................... vi 

TESTIMONY 

Boynton, Captain Peter, Captain of the Port—Long Island Sound, United 

States Coast Guard .............................................................................................. 19

Flynn, Steven E., Jeane J. Kirkpatrick Senior Fellow for National Security 

Studies, Council on Foreign Relations ............................................................... 36

Foley, Brian, Supervisor, Town of Brookhaven ..................................................... 6

Gaffigan, Mark, Acting Director of Natural Resources and Environment, Government Accountability Office ............................................................................. 19

Hritcko, Jr., John, Senior Vice President and Regional Project Director, 

Broadwater Energy, LLC .................................................................................... 36

Johnson, Bruce, Riverhead Town Fire Marshal, Wading River Fire Department ...................................................................................................................... 36

Levy, Steve, County Executive, Suffolk County .................................................... 6

McGintee, Bill, Supervisor, Town of East Hampton ............................................. 6

McCarrick, Kevin, Councilman, Town of Brookhaven .......................................... 6

O’Malley, Mark, Chief, Office of Ports and Facilities Activities, United States 

Coast Guard .......................................................................................................... 19

Robinson, Mark, Director, Office of Energy Projects, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ............................................................................................... 19

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY WITNESSES 

Flynn, Stephen E. .................................................................................................... 59

Foley, Brian X. ......................................................................................................... 67

Gaffigan, Mark ......................................................................................................... 70

Hritcko Jr., John ...................................................................................................... 81

Johnson, Bruce ......................................................................................................... 87

Levy, Steve ............................................................................................................... 92

McGintee, Bill .......................................................................................................... 97

McCarrick, Kevin T. ................................................................................................ 99

O’Malley, Mark ........................................................................................................ 103

Robinson, J. Mark .................................................................................................... 112

ADDITION TO THE RECORD 

Marc S. Alessi, New York State Assemblyman, written testimony ..................... 153

Marine Engineers’ Beneficial Association, William P. Doyle, Deputy General 

Counsel, written testimony ................................................................................. 155

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(1)

SAFETY AND SECURITY OF LIQUEFIED 

NATURAL GAS TERMINALS 

Monday, May 7, 2007

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND MARITIME

TRANSPORTATION, Farmingville, NY. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10 a.m., at the Town 

of Brookhaven Auditorium, One Independence Hill, Farmingville, 

New York, Hon. Tim Bishop presiding. 

Also Present: Representative DeLauro. 

Mr. BISHOP. The hearing will come to order. Good morning, all 

of you. Welcome to this field hearing on the Subcommittee on Coast 

Guard and Maritime Transportation. My name is Tim Bishop. I 

have the honor of the representing New York Congressional District One in Congress. I am joined this morning by Congresswoman 

DeLauro from Connecticut. 

I wish to apologize for Mr. Cummings who called early this 

morning to tell us that he’s quite ill and will not be able to be with 

us. And Representative LaTourette, the ranking member of the 

committee, learned late last week that he would be unable to attend this hearing as well. 

Before we begin I ask unanimous consent that Congresswoman 

DeLauro be allowed to join the subcommittee for today and participate in this hearing. Without objection, so ordered. 

I also ask that all members have five legislative days in which 

to revise and extend their remarks. Without objection, so ordered. 

I want to thank Chairman Cummings for agreeing to this field 

hearing. His leadership and commitment to the issues that we will 

be discussing today have been essential to this committee’s ability 

to perform its various responsibilities. I would also like to thank 

my distinguished colleague and friend from Connecticut, Congresswoman DeLauro, for coming over the Sound to participate in today’s hearing. 

I would also like to extend my gratitude to Brian Foley, the supervisor of the Town of Brookhaven, and his colleagues on the 

Brookhaven Town Board for serving as our hosts for today’s hearing. 

And I would also like to thank all of the panelists who will be 

participating in today’s hearing. 

For the record, I oppose the Broadwater proposal to place the liquefied natural gas terminal in the middle of Long Island Sound. 

The vast majority of those I represent in the first Congressional 

2

District of New York are opposed to the Broadwater proposal. Virtually every elected official in Suffolk County is opposed to 

Broadwater. 

Practically all of us, our opposition is rooted in two areas of concern; environmental impacts and safety and security. The environmental concerns are self-evident and have been well chronicled by 

the various government agencies, environmental groups, and academic studies. 

Among government agencies, serious concerns have been raised 

by the New York Department of Environmental Conservation, National Marine Fishery Service, United States Department of the Interior, United States Environmental Protection Agency, and the 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. 

However, environmental concerns are not the focus of this hearing. This hearing will focus on the multiple safety and security concerns presented by the Broadwater proposal as well as the cumulative impact to the approximately 40 other proposed LNG terminals nationwide. 

More specifically, this hearing will focus on the capacity of the 

United States Coast Guard to ensure the safe operation of the 

Floating Storing Regasification Unit and the delivery of LNG to 

FSRU, and to do so while still maintaining its core functions of 

homeland security, rescue and recovery, drug interdiction, border 

protections, among others. 

It is my hope that this hearing will provide much more information than is currently available on the safety and security challenges associated with dozens of new LNG terminals. 

What do we know thus far? 

We have the Coast Guard Waterways Suitability Report which 

states that Broadwater will not impair the waterway assuming 

that the Guard is provided the resources necessary to, quote, 

′′implement the measures that have been identified as being necessary to effectively manage the potential risk to navigation safety 

and maritime security associated with the Broadwater Energy proposal,′′ close quotes. 

However, with these requirements, there have been no estimates 

of cost. In fact, the Coast Guard has said it will not determine the 

true costs of protecting the facility until after the FERC approves 

the terminal. Thus, the scenario exists of one government agency 

giving the green light to a massive facility with enormous security 

implications prior to another government agency saying it has the 

resources required to secure it. 

What else do we know? 

A CRS report, using the existing Everett Terminal in Boston, 

conservatively estimates a security cost of $40,000 per tanker shipment of LNG, and this number would be combined with expected 

levels of delivery, will amount to annual security costs of $24 million in 2008 growing to $120 million in 2030. And this does not 

consider costs to local and State security agencies. Who will pay 

these costs? 

There is also the recent GAO report that raises more questions 

than it answers regarding the consequences of an accident or terrorist attack. This report highlights that we do not have adequate 

data regarding the consequences of catastrophic failure. While 

3

there is more information forthcoming from both the GAO and the 

Department of Energy, it is possible that the Broadwater project 

will be approved before all of this information comes to light. 

We also know that there are no U.S.-flagged vessels delivering 

LNG anywhere in the world. This means that the Coast Guard has 

no authority over crews, their training, or there experience as they 

would if the vessels were U.S. flagged and are operating at senior 

levels by U.S. merchant mariners. 

Thus we have a situation that these massive tankers, with four 

times the energy potential of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima, are 

crewed by people whose background, training, and expertise are 

completely unknown to the Coast Guard. 

We also know that Coast Guard resources are currently stretched 

thin. This committee is investigating the Deepwater fiasco which 

has taken significant other Coast Guard assets off line. We also 

know given this situation that a Coast Guard request for additional 

assets to the Congress could not possibly come at a worse time. 

The important role of an oversight committee is not simply the 

answers it receives but asking the right questions. The question 

today is not does Long Island need more natural gas? The answer 

to that is yes. My question is, is Broadwater the most efficient, 

safest way to bring more natural gas to Long Island? 

There are alternative solutions that would not require the same 

level of security or pose the same risks to the environment as 

Broadwater. 

In the context of this committee’s jurisdiction, the question we 

must ask is: At what price can the Coast Guard secure 

Broadwater? What resources will it require? What are the costs of 

those resources? Who is bearing those costs? What existing functions will suffer because the Coast Guard must shift resources to 

secure Broadwater? And how will the Coast Guard find the resources for 40 other LNG terminals? 

The responsibility of this subcommittee is to ask these tough 

questions, get answers, and make informed choices that are in the 

best interest of protecting our communities. 

I thank you and I look forward to hearing from our panelists. 

Congresswoman DeLauro, would you like to make an opening 

statement. 

Ms. DELAURO. Yes. 

Mr. BISHOP. Congresswoman DeLauro now has five minutes. 

Ms. DELAURO. Thank you and good morning to all. I’m delighted 

to be here and to be invited to be part of this effort and to be, if 

you will, accepted as an, on a nonpermanent basis, to be a part of 

this subcommittee. By the way, I would like to say that this is just 

a beautiful facility, Congressman Bishop, and I love the art work, 

and it’s a beautiful day and I came across the Sound this morning 

along with the Coast Guard and it was a beautiful, beautiful trip. 

I, too, would like to say a thank you to Chairman Cummings who 

isn’t here but I wanted to thank him for his work with the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation. He is 

from Baltimore where one LNG terminal already exists and another has been proposed. He understands the issues that surrounds 

these facilities and we all look forward to our continued conversations with him and drawing on his experiences. 

4

I want to thank, very, very sincerely, thank my colleague Congressman Tim Bishop. No one in the Congress is more commited 

to protecting the Long Island Sound than Tim Bishop. Congressman Bishop’s tireless efforts have shown his keen understanding of 

the Sound’s important role in our lives and understands that we 

must urgently come together to protect it. 

We have come together today to discuss an issue of local and national importance, the studying of LNG terminals. We will address 

the specific example of the Broadwater proposal in the middle of 

Long Island Sound, one example which has many implications for 

the entire country. The issues it raises include energy prices, our 

reliance on foreign energy, because LNG is indeed a foreign fuel, 

security, environmental hazards, Coast Guard resources, and the 

impact on local first responders. 

With 28 million people living within 50 miles of its shores, Long Island Sound contributes more than $5 billion annually to our 

economy. It is the life blood providing environmental, recreational, 

and economic opportunity for many of our communities. 

And as you may know, Long Island Sound is held to the citizens 

of Connecticut and New York under the Public Trust Doctrine. 

Over the years, both States have taken this responsibility seriously 

and acted to preserve and protect the Sound and its habitat for the 

benefit of its surrounding communities. 

I believe that this project violates that public trust. Its approval 

would most certainly set the precedent for further industrialization 

of the Sound, as we have seen over the last several years with the 

approval of many projects each larger than the last. 

Broadwater is just across the Connecticut New York border in 

the Sound. It would effect our State as much as it would effect New 

York. Yet Connecticut has no formal role in the decision to put this 

facility in the Sound. Connecticut should have a seat at this table 

with this process. If there are going to be tankers in Connecticut’s 

waters, Connecticut ought to have a say in this process. 

I believe that Connecticut has a unique role in this discussion 

and a unique perspective to offer the debate. If Broadwater became 

a reality, it would install a floating vessel roughly the size of the 

Queen Mary II. I’ve been on the Queen Mary II. It gives you some 

sense of the enormity of this project. 

Ten point two miles off the Connecticut coast, nine miles off the 

Long Island Coast. The proposal also calls for the installation of a 

25 five mile pipeline right in the middle of prime territory for both 

lobstering and fishing. This threat comes at a time when we have 

now just begun to see some signs of recovery in the lobstering industry. 

In addition, through a new permanent 1200 foot by 180 foot vessel in our waters, the Broadwater proposal would establish socalled exclusionary zones prohibiting any vessels from coming within a certain distance from both the facility itself and the delivery 

tankers. 

It would take the entire security zones surrounding a moving 

tanker 15 minutes to pass any given point, potentially causing 

major disruptions in maritime travel every time these tankers 

enter the Sound to deliver international shipments of liquefied natural gas two to three times a week. 

5

We have an obligation to address grave concerns about security, 

safety, and the strains this project would put on the Coast Guard. 

And I do not believe the successful case has been made which addresses those concerns. In fact, responsibility for enforcing these secure tanker zones would fall to a Coast Guard that is already 

stretched thin. 

Instead of managing our fisheries, conducting lifesaving operations, and monitoring port security, it will be diverting resources 

to these new LNG tankers which itself would pose a new security 

risk. 

I’m also concerned about its potential impact on our first responders. To be sure, the Broadwater facility is not technically in 

Connecticut waters so I have said and it would be the Coast 

Guard’s responsibility to respond to problems at the site, but the 

truth is, that Connecticut’s first responders will, of course, respond 

to any emergency in the Sound to offer any assistance possible. 

Tankers entering and leaving the Sound will be in Connecticut 

waters from time to time and should an emergency arise, our emergency personnel will respond. Yet, few departments, if any, have 

the resources or personnel to handle this kind of emergency. 

Between fiscal years 2005 and 2006, Connecticut’s homeland security first responders’ State grants were cut by 28 percent or four 

point three million dollars. They have yet not fully recovered. By 

putting increased pressure on our first responders, Broadwater 

would not help. 

And as my colleague, Mr. Bishop, has pointed out, the situation 

we have with the budgets today and the unlikelihood of these budgets and these grant programs increasing. Looking ahead, we need 

to ask the hard questions about this facility’s full impact on our regional and our national security. We are already forcing the Coast 

Guard and our local first responders to do more plus they are already dealing with the Groton Submarine Base, Millstone Nuclear, 

and international shipping traffic on a daily basis. 

We all understand the need for greater infrastructure and additional energy resources. On a national level, they play an integral 

role in our economic, environment, and foreign policy. On the local 

level they have direct impact on the cost of doing business and our 

quality of life. These are important questions; however, I do not believe this Broadwater facility provides the right answer. 

Finally, finally, finally, fishermen have worked these waters 

through generations. Thousands of residents and visitors spend 

their free time enjoying the quiet beauty of its water and its landscape every year. We know what it means to our community on so 

many levels because it has always been at the very heart of this 

region’s heritage. 

We have a responsibility to maintain that heritage, to step up as 

responsible stewards of our natural resources, keep our Coast 

Guard strong, support our first responders, and protect our community. Thank you. 

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you very much. Before we proceed with our 

first panel, let me do a couple of housekeeping details. First let me 

ask that everyone please turn off their cell phones or put them on 

silent or vibrate. And the second is that, much as I appreciate the 

applause, and Congresswoman DeLauro’s very kind comments 

6

about me, I would ask that we have no outbursts of any kind, either positive or negative. 

Let’s proceed to our testimony. Panel number one is comprised 

of four local elected officials. We have the Honorable Steve Levy, 

the County Executive of Suffolk County; the Honorable Brian 

Foley, Supervisor of the Town of Brookhaven; and our host, the 

Honorable Bill McGintee, Supervisor of the Town of East Hampton. 

We have the Honorable Kevin McCarrick, Councilman of the Town 

of Brookhaven and also our host. 

Your full statements will be submitted for the record. I would 

ask that you limit your testimony, your verbal testimony now, to 

five minutes each and let us begin with County Executive Levy. 

Mr. Levy. 

TESTIMONY OF STEVE LEVY, COUNTY EXECUTIVE, SUFFOLK 

COUNTY; BRIAN FOLEY, SUPERVISOR, TOWN OF 

BROOKHAVEN; BILL McGINTEE, SUPERVISOR, TOWN OF 

EAST HAMPTON; AND KEVIN McCARRICK, COUNCILMAN, 

TOWN OF BROOKHAVEN 

Mr. LEVY. Thank you. It’s truly an honor to be with you all. Welcome to our friends from outside of the Long Island area, Congresswoman DeLauro, counsel, and others from as far as Washington, 

D.C. I say first of all, Tim, the people on this panel are not—it’s 

not a very common thing for us to have our back to the audience. 

It’s a lot more comfortable sitting there looking out. This way if 

there’s any projectiles coming our way, we can duck. So I’m going 

to ask you to hang in with us. 

For those who aren’t—by the way, we do have some written testimony we’ll hand in. I would rather speak more off text especially 

to our friends from outside the Long Island area, and for the record 

so those from Washington reading this would get an understanding 

of what this town is all about here on Long Island, here in Suffolk 

County. 

We are number one in many ways. We are number one in population. We are the largest Suburban County in the entire State of 

New York, 1.4 million residents. We’re a suburban county, but in 

many ways still rural. In fact, we are still the number one county 

in the State of New York in terms of agriculture produced from a 

revenue standpoint. 

Our number one industry is tourism. None of the people would 

understand that or recognize that outside the area but they should 

be very aware of that fact and that’s why we prize our environment 

to such a great degree. 

We’re number one in aquaculture as well. Our Sound, our 

Peconic Bay, our Great South Bay have helped produce a tremendous industry for clammers, for the shellfishing industry. In fact, 

at one point 25 percent of the entire Nation’s scallop harvesting 

came from Suffolk County. It’s a $5 billion regional economy that 

is fostered from the Long Island Sound and that cannot be underscored enough. 

We’re also number one when it comes to preserving our open 

spaces. We are the envy of every county throughout the State and 

I would say the entire Nation. We preserve these open spaces because we believe in our environment. 

7

The history of Suffolk County cannot be written without also understanding how much and how vigorously we fought another Federal attempt to industrialize us in some essence, that was the 

Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant. 

Back in the late 60s a power plant was proposed here on the 

north shore of Suffolk County and this county rallied together its 

elected officials and its residents to a degree that no one ever felt—

everyone said we would not be able to fight, we would not be able 

to win. 

We did fight in that particular instance and we did win. In this 

particular instance, we are opposed to this Broadwater concept. 

We’re going to fight, and I think just like with Shoreham, we’re 

going to win. 

Let me tell you why I think we should be opposed to Broadwater. 

Number one, we don’t need it. There’s great—obviously, we are a 

large county and we’re always growing and we can’t say no to everything. I’m not a believer that you go out and you oppose every 

attempt for a windmill and every attempt for hydropower and 

every attempt for any kind of power plant that might be built in 

your particular community. 

In fact, over the last several years we’ve constructed over 11 new 

power plants in Suffolk County and Long Island and that’s a good 

thing. We need more power. But only 15 percent of the gas that 

will come into our Sound will inure to the benefit of Suffolk County. 

So here we are absorbing all the risk and getting very, very little 

benefit. Moreover, we have two—we have two pipelines that are in 

the pipeline, no pun intended, Iroquois and the Islander East. Once 

they are on line, we will have more than an ample supply of natural gas. Secondly, the security that would be involved and required to this is enormous. It will not only cost us a great deal of 

money, and by the way the proponents of Broadwater will say that 

they will pick up the tab. I will believe that when I see it. 

But nevertheless, it’s going to cost us a great deal of money, and 

it’s going to close the perimeter, not only around the Broadwater 

plant but for those 312 tankers that will come into the Sound on 

an everyday basis. 

I know I am out of time but I will go to the last reason that we 

should be opposing the Broadwater plant. It’s going to have a tremendous impact on our ecology. It’s going to suck in a tremendous 

amount of water and actually warm up the temperatures of our 

Long Island Sound and that could have a deleterious impact on the 

ecology. 

So basically to conclude, when it comes to Broadwater, we don’t 

need it, we don’t benefit by it, we can’t secure it, and it will impact 

the temperature of our Sound. For that reason, Ladies and Gentlemen, we thank you for having this hearing and we thank you for 

the opportunity to express our opposition as the people of Suffolk 

County, 1.4 million, who believe there is a better way. 

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you very much. 

Please, no outbursts. Please, no applause, no booing, no cat calls, 

thank you. 

We will now proceed to Supervisor Foley. Supervisor Foley, you 

are recognized for five minutes. 

8

Mr. FOLEY. Thank you, Congressman Bishop and Congresswoman Rose DeLauro. We thank you for taking the trip across the 

Sound. Certainly many ways Connecticut and Long Island have 

many common interests and certainly this is one of the most important. We also realize that the purpose of today’s testimony is to 

focus on safety and security issues which will be the substance of 

my remarks. 

I would like to thank the subcommittee for conducting a hearing 

at Brookhaven Town. For the record, my name is Brian Foley. I am 

the supervisor of the Town of Brookhaven. As supervisor and a 

member of the Town Board, I also represent close to half a million 

residents who live in our township. Today I wish to express the 

Town’s grave concerns with the safety and security issues surrounding the liquefied natural gas tankers and the LNG barge that 

Broadwater proposes for the Long Island Sound. 

The north shore of our Town has miles of precious coastline and 

acres of embayments, including fish habitats and wetlands feeding 

into the Long Island Sound, which has been declared by Congress 

to be an Estuary of National Significance. The residents of the 

Town of Brookhaven are very proud of our rich maritime heritage. 

Our concerns with the Broadwater proposal were heightened by 

the forthright admission in the United States Coast Guard Long Island Sound Waterways Suitability Report which I quote in pertinent part. 

Quote: ′′The Coast Guard does not have the resources required 

to implement the measures which are necessary to manage effectively the potential risks of navigation safety and maritime security.′′

The Coast Guard went on to note: ′′Local law enforcement agencies could potentially assist with some of the... Measures for managing potential risk. [We] Recognize that local governments do not 

have the necessary personnel, training, or equipment,′′ end quote. 

Now the Town presumably is one of the local agencies the Coast 

Guard would rely upon to assist with managing risk. I must tell 

you quite forthrightly as well that the Town does not have those 

resources. Frankly, the Town should not be expected to provide security for an international corporate venture. Further, the Town of 

Brookhaven’s taxpayers should not be expected to perform homeland security functions in the face of terrorist attacks. If the Coast 

Guard does not have the resources to protect us, the Broadwater 

project should be rejected for that reason alone. 

The Town’s safety concerns were further heightened upon release 

of the recent GAO Report which highlighted additional safety 

issues which have yet to be studied by the Department of Energy. 

The GAO report also emphasized the disagreement among experts 

with the conclusions reached in the Sandia Report. The Sandia Report, as you know, is the basis for the safety conclusions in 

Broadwater’s DEIS and the Coast Guard report. 

Of significant concern to the Town are the experts cited on the 

GAO report who disagreed with the Sandia Report’s conclusion 

that the distance of one mile protected human beings from burns 

resulting from an LNG fire. A significant portion of those experts, 

fully 25 percent of the experts contacted by the GAO believed that 

9

this one mile assumption is way too small a distance and that 

burns might very well occur at a greater distance. 

At a minimum, this issue should be studied, particularly since 

the Race, as it’s called, the entrance to the Long Island Sound and 

a prime area for fishermen and boaters from our Town, is only one 

and a half miles wide in some areas, way too close for comfort and 

something that we are very, very concerned about. 

Further, we understand the GAO is conducting further studies 

on the potential impact of fires on marine life and on the Coast 

Guard’s ability to provide security. These studies likely will not be 

completed until after the scheduled issuance of the Broadwater 

FEIS, a situation this committee should address. 

Finally, the subcommittee should note that the Broadwater DEIS 

suggests two general areas which Broadwater is considering for its 

onshore support and launching facilities. One of those areas is Port 

Jefferson. Nowhere in the DEIS or the Coast Guard report are the 

safety and security issues related to such a support facility analyzed or even discussed. 

In short, safety issues raised by LNG tankers and facilities have 

not been studied sufficiently to consider placement of the LNG 

barge in an Estuary of National Significance such as the Long Island Sound. We suggest that Congress act to prevent further action 

by FERC on the Broadwater application until the GAO studies are 

completed and until an analysis of the security and impacts of the 

potential Port Jefferson launching facility is concluded. 

Finally, we must emphasize that in no way should FERC or 

Broadwater expect local government to bear the burden of 

Broadwater’s security. Thank you very much. 

Mr. BISHOP. Mr. Foley, thank you very much. 

We will now proceed to Councilman McCarrick. Councilman 

McCarrick, you are recognized for five minutes. 

Mr. MCCARRICK. Thank you, Congressman Bishop and thank 

you, Congresswoman DeLauro for coming across the Long Island 

Sound that doesn’t separate us, it joins us together as you know. 

And there couldn’t be a more important issue. My name is Kevin 

McCarrick representing Council District 2 in Brookhaven. My district encompasses parts of at Terryville, Ridge and Coram as well 

as the shoreline hamlets of Miller Place, Mount Sinai, Rocky Point, 

Sound Beach and Shoreham. As the elected local representative for 

the hamlet of Wading River, I’m greatly concerned regarding the 

potential effects of locating an LNG barge facility off Shoreham/

Wading River in Long Island Sound. 

Anyone who doubts the sincere and overwhelming magnitude of 

public concern need not take my office or any other elected official’s 

word. They need not to consult leading environmental activists or 

science experts regarding the Broadwater proposal. Indeed, all anyone needs to do is recall the 1,000 plus residents of our northeastern communities who attended the FERC public hearing of 

January 11, 2007, some parking as far as a half a mile away just 

to attend. The FERC hearing I attended in Rancor was just as 

heavily attended and overwhelmingly in opposition to the proposal. 

We as a community from all walks of life and all occupations 

voice in near unanimous harmony a reverberant ′′no′′ to the 

Broadwater proposal. 

10

Among the many concerns was the real possibility of a terrorist 

incident at the site. Sadly, we live during a period in history where 

the very possibility of such an action is ever present. We live with 

the very real possibility of an attractive target drawing and increasing the likelihood of a terrorist action based on the very nature of the activity. A large floating LNG bomb is undeniably such 

an entity that by its very nature increases the likelihood of an attack. The World Trade Center stood as a beacon of our Nation’s 

economic might, its size attracted two attacks over the course of 

eight years, each causing harm culminating with the unthinkable 

catastrophic incident forever burned into the American psyche. 

We run the same type of risk by the very nature of this LNG proposal regardless of what anyone states. The reality of the terrorist 

mind needs to be confronted boldly. I have been active in considering these sets of facts. Official governmental publications support 

these concerns and we need to seriously consider them. My constituents and I would be impacted directly by the LNG barge, the 

tankers, and other related activities. 

We are deeply concerned with the statements in the Coast Guard 

Report released on September 21 of 2006 which candidly admits 

that the U.S. Coast Guard does not have the resources to provide 

security for the LNG barge, the tankers, or provide rescue service 

for the workers or tankers and barge. The local volunteer fire departments are not equipped to respond to the magnitude of possible 

incidents such as LNG fires or explosions. 

I attended the hearing conducted by the Suffolk County Legislature’s Committee on Energy and Environment last month where 

GAO staff answered questions from the committee and the public 

regarding its recent report on the public safety consequences of a 

terrorist attack on LNG tankers. 

The statements at the hearing underscored the fact that the potentially disastrous impact of an LNG accident, explosion, and fire 

have yet to be studied sufficiently. Most troubling is the fact that 

there is not scientific unanimity on the question of the distance one 

must be from an LNG fire in order to be protected from heat burn. 

Indeed, the Sandia Report—which is the foundation for the DEIS—

is being called into question as to the one mile estimate of the distance one must be in order to be protected from burns from an 

LNG fire. The range, according to some experts weighing into the 

GAO, may be further. 

Further, we learned for the first time at the Suffolk County Legislative hearing that the GAO is conducting additional studies as 

to the safety of the LNG facilities. Evidence of this is outlined in 

the GAO report of February of 2007 entitled Maritime Security 

Public Safety Consequences of a Terrorist Attack on a Tanker Carrying Liquefied Natural Gas. 

DOE recently funded a new study to be completed by the Sandia 

National Laboratories of 2008 that would conduct small and large 

scale LNG fire experiments to refine and validate existing models 

such as the one used by the Sandia National Laboratories in a 

2004 study to calculate the heat hazards of a LNG fire. 

Locally, our hospitals are under siege, grappling with questions 

of funding. There are very real possibilities that some maybe forced 

11

to curtail services or to close. If this becomes reality, will we be 

able the service anticipated victims? 

Proponents of the Broadwater proposal state we must have this 

source of LNG to serve the growing energy appetite for the region 

and this additional source in a competitive market will lower the 

price. If every home and business here on Long Island were to replace five incandescent light bulbs with compact fluorescent bulbs, 

we would save millions of dollars, clean our environment, and 

eliminate the safety and security questions we are addressing here 

today. But additionally, we drastically reduce our need of this imported fossil fuel here. 

If we consume less energy, we become less of a target market to 

sell and then maybe we won’t get proposals that require us to question our need to consider a project like this. We wouldn’t need 

hearings like this. That’s Broadwater’s inconvenient truth. On behalf of the people of the Second District, I thank you for this opportunity to address you. 

Mr. BISHOP. Mr. McCarrick, thank you. 

I now recognize Supervisor McGintee for five minutes. 

Mr. MCGINTEE. Thank you, Congressman and thank you for having this forum and allowing this panel to speak. Congresswoman 

DeLauro, welcome to this side of the Sound. It’s a pleasure to have 

you here. I’m kind of uncomfortable because where I come from, we 

prefer cat calls and noise from the audience. We’re kind of used to 

that. I would like to read my statement and then I have some of 

my own comments to follow. 

For the record, I am the Supervisor of East Hampton Town. The 

plan for a Broadwater liquefied natural gas terminal on the Long 

Island Sound will require transit through Montauk Channel and 

Point Judith Channel of large LNG carriers to supply the terminal. 

Broadwater expects six trips by these LNG carriers per week. One 

of the safety measures that the Coast Guard will impose on the 

carriers and barges is a security zone that will require other vessels to cease their activities and leave the area while the LNG carries are passing thorough local waters. 

The consequences of a catastrophic incident with one of these 

carriers is so serious that the Coast Guard requires a moving safety zone around them 6,000 yards long and 1,600 yards wide. That 

is 60 football fields long and 16 football fields wide moving with 

ships at 10 knots. Just off point for a moment, it takes 15 minutes 

for that zone to move from the end to the beginning which would 

be inconveniencing a lot of fishermen and a lot of recreational boaters in the eastern end of Long Island. 

Although the LNG carriers and the barge are not expected to 

enter East Hampton borders, except for the occasions on which 

they may travel off course, the project will cause a serious disruption to East Hampton commerce and our way of life. 

The Race, the most dangerous part of the route for the LNG carriers to navigate, is one of the most heavily used fishing spots on 

the East End. Vessels, particularly vessels from East Hampton, 

utilize that area almost every day weather permitting. East Hampton Town is home to over 2,800 boats of all types. All of these vessels have a potential to be impacted by this proposal. 

12

I will point out in the Coast Guard Report it says East Hampton’s commercial fleet consists, I believe, of eight to 10 boats and 

that they scallop and that is so far from correct. That should be 

changed. For example, fishing vessels make up a large component 

of the vessels that use the Race and include commercial fishing 

vessels such as lobster boats and trawlers as well as recreational 

and sports fishing vessels. 

It is estimated that the value of fish land in East Hampton is 

in the 10s of millions of dollars. The path of these fishing vessels 

in many instances intersects with the parallel of the LNG carrier 

routes. These fishing vessels create a significant security problem 

to the LNG carrier routes. 

Fishing vessels are not the only vessels to be affected by the 

LNG routes and safety zones. These areas are also intersected, for 

example, by private ferry vessels and recreational boaters. Commercial boaters are likely to become aware of the time periods during which they my no longer traverse certain waters, although it 

should be anticipated that certain individuals will refuse to recognize such limitations on their livelihoods, if anybody is aware of the 

independence of the fishermen in Montauk and in East Hampton, 

they will understand that they will not take lightly being locked 

out from their fishing grounds for any period of time. Recreational 

boaters may not be aware of such limitations and accidentally pass 

into forbidden zones. 

In this report the Coast Guard specifically states it currently 

does not have the resources required to implement the measures 

that have been identified as being necessary to manage the potential risk through navigation, safety, and maritime security associated with the Broadwater energy proposal. 

The Coast Guard states that it will rely upon local enforcement 

agencies such as East Hampton to assist in implementing some of 

the measures identified for managing potential risks in maritime 

security associated with the Broadwater energy project. 

Thus, much of the burden for providing security for the LNG carriers of the East End of Long Island would fall upon the Town of 

East Hampton and its Marine Patrol Unit. 

Specifically, the Broadwater proposal would require law enforcement from the Town of East Hampton to keep vessels out of the 

security zone, to warn, arrest, and impound fishing and other vessels obstructing the security zone, to aid and assist those with medical emergencies on the vessels, and to deal with law enforcement 

issues on the carriers. In addition, the Town would be required to 

assist with the clearing and assisting vessels and tankers in navigation mishaps in the shallow water off the Montauk Channel. 

Accidents or mishaps involving LNG carriers’ dangerous cargo in 

East Hampton Montauk area also could require Town Harbor Masters to close Montauk Inlet and would require local police to close 

onshore facilities, tourist attractions, and the docks at the Montauk 

Harbor area. The Town’s marine patrol fleet consists of two 18 foot 

marine patrol boats, one 32 foot work boat, and several 20 foot outboards. None of these boats is armed. 

The Town is not at all equipped to meet the security demands 

which would be required by Broadwater proposals. The Town taxVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:12 Nov 07, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00026 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\35919 HTRANS1 PsN: JASON
13

payers should not be forced to expand its military control unit for 

the benefit of a for-profit operation such as Broadwater. 

The Town of East Hampton is frequently called upon to assist 

the Coast Guard even with its current more limited duties. The 

Town has always worked cooperatively with the Coast Guard to assist it in security and safety measures in the waters off the East 

End. From the Town’s experiences, however, it appears the Coast 

Guard lacks the financial capital and financial resources to maintain even the current level of need in Montauk. In order to protect 

the safety and security of its citizens and visitors, the Town would 

need to be assured that the LNG carriers are safe, the safety zones 

are secure, and any impacts to its vital fishing industry and recreational boating are minimized. 

The Town of East Hampton should not be the entity of footing 

the bill to ensure the safety and security concerns. 

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you, Mr. McGintee. 

We’re out of time. We’re going to now to proceed to questions. I 

thank all of you for your testimony. I’m going to start and, Rosa, 

I will recognize myself for five minutes. 

I just really have two questions. I would like to put each question 

to each member of the panel and the first is for all of you: To what 

extent has your office been involved or had any say at all in the 

siting process for the Broadwater facility? Mr. Levy, I’ll start with 

you. 

Mr. LEVY. None. 

Mr. BISHOP. Mr. Foley. 

Mr. FOLEY. A verified none, sir. 

Mr. BISHOP. Mr. McCarrick. 

Mr. MCCARRICK. Same. 

Mr. BISHOP. Mr. McGintee. 

Mr. MCGINTEE. I would like to be able to answer differently, but 

none. 

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you. 

The second question, the Coast Guard Waterways Suitability Report suggests that there will be a mix of law enforcement that 

would be involved. There has been some suggestion from 

Broadwater that there will be private law enforcement and security 

provided. And so my question to each of you is: What is your reaction to the prospects of private security patrolling the waters off of 

Suffolk County that is not under the jurisdiction of either the local 

authorities or the Coast Guard. 

Mr. McGintee, as a law enforcement officer, I’ll start with you. 

Mr. MCGINTEE. I have an enormous problem with it. When you 

look at this document, and I did spend 25 years in law enforcement, when you plan for security, you plan for your operation. You 

don’t plan for reliance upon other agencies for an ongoing security 

program. It is clear that the Coast Guard indicates that they can’t 

handle this. 

I want to go on the record. It has nothing to do with the Coast 

Guard’s abilities. We have worked closely with them. They are an 

extremely well trained and talented agency. The problem is is that 

they don’t have the staffing currently. And my experience—now I 

don’t want anybody that works for the Federal Government to take 

offense at this—but I doubt very much the funding is going to be 

14

available for the Coast Guard to handle the security in terms of increased training, increased equipment, and increased staff. 

And currently with the Broadwater prospectus, they’re going to 

provide 25 percent, allegedly, needs to Long Island and the greater 

metropolitan area. To me, that leaves 75 percent gap in the energy 

needs. And I believe once you open the door, there will be many, 

many people knocking on that door to fill the 75 percent gap. 

If the Coast Guard can’t handle the job with a business that’s 

supplying 25 percent of the need, I can’t imagine who is going to 

handle security if this expands beyond Broadwater. 

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you. 

Mr. Levy. 

Mr. LEVY. Thank you. The Coast Guard Report itself said quote, 

′′Currently the agencies that could potentially provide assistance do 

not have the necessary personnel, training, or equipment.′′ That 

speaks volumes. 

Furthermore, if there were this scenario developing whereby the 

entity itself, Broadwater, was going to be hiring security to provide 

security in our Long Island Sound, it’s a little bit of the fox guarding the chicken coop. That security firm is going to be answerable 

only to the entity that pays it and that would be Broadwater itself. 

It’s so absurd to think that we would ever have our Suffolk 

County fire, rescue, and emergency services units farmed out. New 

York City anti-terrorist squad would never be farmed out. We don’t 

want security in our Long Island Sound being farmed out. 

Mr. BISHOP. Mr. Foley. 

Mr. FOLEY. Certainly the public safety issues confronting the 

Town of Brookhaven, we have a full plate as it is now with public 

safety issues in our Township. The record should clearly reflect in 

the East End towns they have their own police department, in 

Brookhaven Towns and the towns west, it’s the Suffolk County Police Department that has the key role in providing fire, rescue, 

emergency services, and police duties. 

So we would be of assistance to the police department in a number of matters and the same holds true with fire and rescue. However, in this particular case, even though we are a township of 

close to half a million people, to expect us to provide any services 

out into the Long Island Sound would really greatly impact not 

only our treasury but also the staffing that we have now, which for 

the most part particularly in the public safety area, one of things 

that we had inherited with this new administration, the Public 

Safety Department in our Township is basically comprised of parttimers. 

That is something that, given the size of our township is troubling enough on the land itself. Now, to take that same organization and apply it to an international venture that is on the Long 

Island Sound, I think makes it even much more problematic. 

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you very much. 

Mr. McCarrick. 

Mr. MCCARRICK. To me are some of the comments of our supervisor, on top of that we have spending out one of our largest bond 

acts in the history of purchasing a required property in Brookhaven 

Town which would be part of what our security force will be maintaining. 

15

We have a part-time security force here, and, in fact, all of the 

maritime rescue services provided on the north shore by completely 

volunteer fire departments, which by the nature of being a volunteer fire department, only has a limited ability to help. So I see this 

as being quite a dilemma for Brookhaven Town and the residents 

being that we are somewhat short. 

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you very much. My time has expired. 

Mr. FOLEY. There’s one additional comment I can give with the 

permission of the chair and to underscore what Councilman 

McCarrick had mentioned earlier, showing how local, State, and 

Federal issues have really come into play here. The State right now 

is entertaining ideas of reducing support for local community hospitals. 

So at a time when we’re having an increase of population in our 

Township, an increase in population in our county, at the same 

time there are those decision makers at the State level through the 

Berger Commission Report, looking to reduce the amount of services that the different hospitals can provide. 

Some of those hospitals are on the North Shore of Brookhaven 

Town. You have a holistic decision making process here. It is very 

problematic to try to place this LNG plant in this particular location for the reasons that they had outlined but also for the additional reasons that when it comes to local community hospitals, 

which is where, God forbid, if any accident would occur, is where 

those foreign forces would go to. 

We’re looking at the spectre of having reduced services to some 

of those community hospitals that would serve the North Shore of 

Long Island. So, it’s very problematic for both those reasons. 

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you very much. 

I now recognize Congresswoman DeLauro for five minutes. 

Ms. DELAURO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and thank all of you 

for your testimony. It’s very enlightening. Let me just pursue a 

couple of pieces of the security issues just for a second and then 

I’ll move to a couple of other parts. 

Has any Federal agency explained to you how they will ensure 

that the security resources are in place before the facility is approved for construction? 

Let’s go down the line. 

Mr. LEVY. I would say to the contrary, they have admitted that 

right now they don’t have the ability to do so. 

Mr. FOLEY. To the Town of Brookhaven, no, they haven’t. 

Mr. MCCARRICK. Absolutely not. 

Mr. MCGINTEE. They have not contacted the Town of East 

Hampton regarding that matter. 

Ms. DELAURO. Do any of your local law enforcement agencies 

currently provide on water patrol services now? 

Mr. MCGINTEE. We do. We have a Marine division that patrols 

the inner harbors and outside. 

Mr. FOLEY. We have some, through the aviation transportation 

department, some personnel who patrol some of our local waterways through the Port Jeff Harbors and the like. Again, in a very 

limited fashion. 

Ms. DELAURO. Very limited, right. 

16

Mr. MCCARRICK. Actually, in Brookhaven Town, they are not 

prepared for response to emergencies where there are situations 

where people are injured. That falls onto the Suffolk County Police 

and local volunteer fire departments. 

Mr. LEVY. Our Suffolk County Police Department does have a 

marine bureau but it has never contemplated anything of this matter. 

Ms. DELAURO. Let me just quickly tick off the budget that was 

proposed to the Congress in terms of this area that you’re talking 

and the level of expense that you would have to bear and don’t 

know what those numbers are yet. 

Let me run those quickly and then I have a couple of other quick 

questions. State and local grants drastically cut 63 percent from 

2.7 billion to 1.9 billion. State homeland security grants cut $338 

million. A decrease of $112 million for the law enforcement terrorism prevention. The urban area security initiative, the UASI, 

cut $170 million. Firefighters assistance grants cut by $362 million. 

I can tell you about the State of Connecticut. We have the law 

enforcement terrorist prevention program in the ’08 budget was 

eliminated, eliminated in the administration’s budget. Overall the 

2003-2006 where we had $81 million dedicated to these areas, 

homeland security grants slashed 52 percent. 

The list goes on and on and on about the cuts in dealing with 

local law enforcement and their ability to be able to handle any 

kind of homeland security threats. Albeit, there has been money for 

border security, but no money in terms of being able to defend 

homeland security. 

Let me just ask these couple of questions to you: What kinds of 

support would be helpful to communities, I’m going to say Connecticut, but much like your own, in terms of assisting those who 

would negatively be impacted by the LNG terminal and a weekly 

tanker traffic? Let me give you an idea. 

Should it be mandatory for Broadwater to establish and maintain an environmental benefit fund, a commercial fisherman’s fund, 

a community benefits fund, and a safety and security fund and 

make payments in lieu of taxes, and I’m going to talk about Connecticut towns? 

I would ask you all if you would briefly give me your sense of 

that kind of an effort and about the tax issue. 

Mr. LEVY. Well, ironically, if a company trying to put a big coal 

plant on the mainland wanted to do so, it would have to go through 

permit processes, et cetera, pay taxes, do the whole bit. By simply 

going a few miles offshore, all of the sudden this entity is saying 

we don’t have to play by those rules, we don’t have to pay taxes. 

Now they’re saying they’ll put money into the local area, we don’t 

know much or whether that would ever materialize. 

So certainly that would help. But that’s not what we’re looking 

for. We’re looking to preserve the integrity of the Sound. What can 

be done to really put the nail into the coffin of Broadwater? Finally, one of the things presently holding back our flow of natural 

gas through the Iroquois pipeline and Islander East are some lawsuits generated by the Attorney General in Connecticut. 

Any help that your good auspices, Congressman DeLauro, could 

have in placing some pressure on the Attorney General to ease up 

17

to allow this flow of this natural gas to come from New England 

and upland down to Long Island, would be of very great help to our 

economy would obviate the need for Broadwater all together. 

Mr. FOLEY. Just to answer the question very briefly regarding 

funds as a potential way to mitigate, the way we look at it is that 

once you lose the commercial fishing grounds and once you lose 

those recreational grounds, particularly the commercial fishing 

grounds, you’re losing a way of life that’s been applied in these waterways for generations; 100, 200 years. 

So in some respect, it’s not just a rhetorical point, it goes to the 

heart of the matter that no amount of funding could be a suitable 

substitute for a loss of a way of life that’s been part of our shoreline as well as the shoreline of Connecticut for centuries and for 

generations. 

Mr. MCGINTEE. I actually have a proposal that could save 

Broadwater a lot of money; if they just don’t do it, they do have 

to worry about funding anything. I think if this project were to 

move forward, then it would be essential that a large sum of money 

be put into a environmental protection fund for the project. 

To me it doesn’t matter how much money they put in towards 

security, it can’t be done. I do not have the resources. I cannot expand my marine divisions to the point where they are out there at 

night, they are out there during the day securing these vessels. 

One of the things that is missing in this report that I have concerns about, and again we’re here to testify about security, the 

devil is in the detail. 

No one explains to me what the Coast Guard would do if a fishing vessel challenged the zone. No one has explained to me what 

would happen to a recreational boater that decided to cut behind 

the two mile area. Are these ships going to be armed? Are there 

shots across the bow? 

And what happens to the security breakdown if the Coast Guard 

vessels have to leave and secure that individual and then they 

breach their own security zone around the tanker? None of these 

questions have been answered. So to me, no amount of money on 

a security end is going to resolve these issues. 

Ms. DELAURO. Mr. Chairman, if I might for a second because I 

believe I owe Mr. Levy a comment about Islander East because I’m 

nothing but up front about where we are and where we are in Connecticut. I’m obviously opposed to Broadwater and in the case of 

Broadwater, we’re talking about 22 percent of the gas will serve 

the State of Connecticut. And that maybe as much or that maybe 

less in terms of Islander East. 

So, for the record, I am opposed to Islander East and have been 

strong in my community about that. I understand your concerns 

about it but I would be less than honest if I just let that go and 

let that slide here. I do believe there are other ways in which we 

can deal with that issue but I don’t view that one as one of them 

and though we do agree in opposition on Broadwater. Thank you 

very much. 

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you very much, Congresswoman. I’m going to 

exercise the prerogative of the chair and I don’t get to say that all 

that often, and ask one additional question of Supervisor McGintee. 

You’ve made clear the importance of both commercial fishing and 

18

recreational boating to the economy, not just of East Hampton but 

for all of the eastern half of Long Island if not more. 

In your opinion, what will be the impact to those two sectors of 

our economy, recreational boating and commercial fishing, caused 

by the increase of traffic of LNG vessels bordering our coast? 

Mr. MCGINTEE. I think it will have a profound impact on the 

commercial fishing industry and the recreational fishing industry. 

I did bring a chart here which had the ex-captain of the Boatman’s 

Association and we do have a commercial fisherman on our board 

who is actually a member of the county commercial fisheries commission and they’ve indicated that this would be a great financial 

loss, particularly in the areas of the Race and the lobster industry 

and funds to take care of the lobsterman who may have lost pots 

or cannot get out there at the appropriate tides. 

It doesn’t do any good—it does good for the lobsterman—but for 

lobsters that don’t make it to market reflect an increase in price 

to everybody and that includes the entire fishing industry. 

On the recreational end of it, I think the impact is going to be 

more on a tourism and the people that come to spend money in my 

town and the Town of Southampton, if they are constantly being 

cut off or they have concerns about either being arrested or detained if they happen to make a mistake of crossing over one of 

these zones, quite often they’re not even going to be aware of 

what’s going on, I think it’s going to have a profound impact on the 

boating community as well as the fishing community. 

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you very much. I will now excuse the first 

panel with our thanks. Thank you very much. 

The subcommittee will take a brief recess and will reconvene in 

about five minutes. Thank you very much. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. BISHOP. This subcommittee will now reconvene. We will now 

move to the panel number two. For panel number two, we are 

joined by Captain Mark O’Malley, who is the Chief of the Office of 

Ports and Facilities Activities for the United States Coast Guard; 

Captain Peter Boynton, who is the Captain of the Port for Long Island Sound, United States Coast Guard; Mr. Mark Robinson, who 

is the director of the Office of Energy Projects for the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission; and Mr. Mark Gaffigan, who is the 

Acting Director of Natural Resources and Environment for the Government Accountability Office. 

As was the case with the first panel, your written statements 

will be submitted for the record in their entirety. We would ask at 

this time that you limit your verbal testimony to five minutes and 

we will start with Captain O’Malley. Captain O’Malley, you are recognized for five minutes. 

19

TESTIMONY OF MARK O’MALLEY, CHIEF, OFFICE OF PORTS 

AND FACILITIES ACTIVITIES, UNITED STATES COAST 

GUARD; CAPTAIN PETER BOYNTON, CAPTAIN OF THE 

PORT—LONG ISLAND SOUND, UNITED STATES COAST 

GUARD; MARK ROBINSON, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF ENERGY 

PROJECTS, FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION; 

MARK GAFFIGAN, ACTING DIRECTOR OF NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Captain O’MALLEY. Thank you, Mr. Bishop. Good morning, Ms. 

DeLauro. I am Captain Mark O’Malley Chief, Office of Port and 

Facility Activities at U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters. It is my 

pleasure to appear before you today to discuss the Coast Guard’s 

role in providing for the safety and security of Liquefied Natural 

Gas vessels and facilities. 

LNG vessels have had an enviable safety record over the last 45 

years. Since the inception of LNG shipping in 1959, there have 

been over 40,000 LNG shipments around the world without a serious accident at sea or in port. LNG vessels and those transporting 

liquefied hazardous gasses are built and inspected to the highest 

engineering and safety standards established by the International 

Code of Construction and Equipment of Ships Carrying Liquefied 

Gasses in Bulk. 

Today there are over 200 vessels operating worldwide and they 

are expertly manned by some of the most highly trained officers 

and merchant seamen. In response to the terrorist attacks of 2001, 

the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 was enacted and 

required robust maritime security regime for both vessels and facilities. These security requirements closely paralleled the Internal 

Ship and Port Facility Security Code. 

Under ISPS, vessels must develop and implement a threat scalable security plan that, among other things, establishes access control measures, security measures for cargo handling and delivery of 

ships stores, surveillance and monitoring, security communications, 

and incident procedures and training and drill requirements. 

Additionally, like all deep draft vessels in the United States, 

LNG vessel operators must provide the Coast Guard with a 96-

hour advance notice of arrival and including information on the 

vessel’s last ports of call, true identities, and cargo information. 

This information is vetted to detect any concerns or anomalies. 

The Coast Guard conducts pre-entry security warnings of LNG 

vessels to ensure it is under the control of proper authorities during a seaport transit. In order to protect a vessel carrying LNG and 

other especially hazardous cargos from external attack, these vessels are escorted by Coast Guard vessels throughout key port 

areas. 

These efforts are often augmented by other Government agencies 

and the facilities operators’ private security forces who conduct additional activities such as waterway patrols and surveillance. 

The combined effort of Federal, State, local, and private assets 

contribute to the overall local LNG port risk mitigation plan. The 

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission has siting authority for 

shoreside LNG terminals. The Coast Guard is a cooperating agency 

20

for the preparation of first environmental impact statements associated with siting of the facility. 

The local captain of the port must conduct an assessment regarding the suitability of the waterway for the proposed vessel’s transits ensuring that full consideration is given to the safety and security of the port, the facility and the vessels transporting the LNG. 

The process involves an area maritime security committee and a 

harbor safety committee. It includes identification of the mitigation 

measures to responsibly manage the safety and security risks that 

are identified in the suitability assessment. 

The assessment also includes an analysis of an optimum mix of 

Federal, State, and local resources in addition to private security 

forces needed in implementing necessary risk mitigation measures. 

The Coast Guard continues to analyze resource application needed 

in light of the potential growth of the LNG industry in the U.S. 

This new work maybe accommodated through reallocation of existing resources, expanding the use of other government agencies 

to conduct security operations, or the use of political resources. All 

of these options are under consideration. It is important to note 

that there are other hazardous cargos the Coast Guard regulates 

and ensures the safety and security. 

Our prevention and protection strategies must be aimed at ensuring the highest risk situations receive the highest level of protection. GAO recently concluded two reports; one examined the current security practices for vessels carrying LNG and other petroleum commodities. The Coast Guard had extensive interaction with 

the GAO in the drafting of this report. 

The second report is a comprehensive review of existing LNG 

consequence studies. The Department of Energy was the principle 

Federal agency interacting with GAO. The Coast Guard had minimal input into this study. However, we do agree that additional 

studies are needed to further examine the potential consequences 

of an LNG contingency. Thank you for giving me this opportunity 

to discuss the Coast Guard’s role in LNG security. I’ll be happy to 

answer any questions that you may have. 

Mr. BISHOP. Captain O’Malley, thank you for your testimony. 

Captain Boynton, a pleasure to see you again. You are now recognized for five minutes. 

Captain BOYNTON. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Congresswoman DeLauro. My name is Captain Peter Boynton. I’m the Commander of Coast Guard Sector Long Island Sound. I’m responsible 

for all Coast Guard operations in Connecticut, on Long Island, in 

Long Island Sound, and 200 miles out to sea, including search and 

rescue, port security, port safety, and environmental protection. 

I supervise 16 field units in Connecticut and on Long Island with 

490 active duty and civilian men and women, 200 reservists, and 

1,800 volunteer Coast Guard auxiliaries. If I could just comment 

for a moment as your Captain of the Port, I want to say how much 

I’ve enjoyed working with both you, Congressman Bishop and Congresswoman DeLauro, and how much I appreciate leadership from 

both of you working Coast Guard issues during the last three years 

while I have served as your Captain of the Port. I am truly grateful 

for your leadership on Coast Guard issues. 

21

Beginning in the spring of 2005, Coast Guard Sector Long Island 

Sound has been evaluating the Broadwater LNG proposal for Long 

Island Sound. The Coast Guard role is not to approve or deny this 

project. That is the role of FERC as the lead Federal agency. The 

Coast Guard role has been to determine the suitability of the waterway with respect to just two issues; navigation safety and port 

security. 

When we began this process I gave my staff two rules. The first 

is that the Coast Guard would neither support nor oppose this 

project but instead would focus on doing an objective analysis of 

the risks. Second, that we would not as your Coast Guard do this 

process behind closed doors. Instead, that we would involve experts 

and users in our assessment of safety and security. 

That assessment took well over a year and involved over 50 experts and users from both Long Island and Connecticut helping us 

on two committees; one for safety, the other for security. 

The security committee examined 26 potential attack scenarios 

including sabotage, hijacking, stand off attacks, aerial attacks, surface attacks, subsurface attacks. The security committee included 

20 participants outside of the Coast Guard and a partial list would 

include the U.S. Navy, the FBI, the Transportation Security Administration, Customs and Border Protection, the New York and 

Connecticut Offices of Homeland Security, the National Guard, the 

Nassau County Police, Suffolk County was represented on this 

committee by the Suffolk County Fire, Rescue, and Emergency 

Services personnel, Riverhead Police, New Haven Fire Department, 

Cross Sound and Port Jeff Ferry among others. 

The second committee, the safety committee, examined 25 potential safety scenarios including collisions, groundings, and ollisions. 

The safety committee included 30 participants from outside the 

Coast Guard including Towing and Shipping Operators, Department of Environmental Protection, Boating Advisory Council, Lobster and Shellfish Association representatives, Riverhead Fire marshal, New York State Police, Key Span, U.S. Power Squadron, National Party Boat Owners’ Association, harbor masters, and others. 

In other words, in following my rule number two when we examined safety and security, we include representatives ranging from 

the FBI to representatives of fishermen. With those two committees, we identified potential risks to safety and security. 

We then asked both of those committees to help us to go back 

over those lists of potential risks and help us evaluate whether or 

not those risks could be mitigated; for example, mitigated with 

things like security zones which the Coast Guard has in operation 

today even without Broadwater, not only at locations around the 

country but even here in Long Island Sound where we have security zones escorting armed Coast Guard boats that very successfully and safely escort U.S. Navy and nuclear submarines through 

areas where there are recreational boaters. 

In the process, I attended dozens and dozens of meetings, some 

of which I was the only government employee present. I received 

2400 letters. I read each one of those letters. I reported this yearlong collaborative effort to the Waterways Suitability Report or 

WSR which was completed in September of 2006. 

22

Before I released this to the public and FERC, I sent this report 

up the Coast Guard chain for their concurrence with my findings 

and my statement of necessary resources. 

Key findings include that Long Island Sound is a mixed used waterway. The impact of LNG tanker arrivals, that the off shore location nine miles from land is a significant advantage from safety 

and security in reducing potential consequences because of the distance from any population centers, that none of the hazard zones 

from the facility would reach land, and neither hazard zone one nor 

two would reach land from any point on the tanker route, and that 

hazard zone three could reach land at some locations. 

We concluded there were risks to safety and security and that 

those risks could be mitigated, at a cost. As a result of these findings, the preliminary conclusion of the WSR was that Long Island 

Sound could be suitable for the transport of LNG from the perspective of safety and security if, and these things are linked, suitable 

if the risks were to be mitigated, and mitigating those risks carry 

costs. 

Thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today. 

Mr. BISHOP. Captain Boynton, thank you very much. 

Mr. Robinson, you are now recognized for five minutes. 

Mr. ROBINSON. Thank you. I am Mark Robinson. I am the Director of the Office of Energy Projects at FERC. We are responsible 

for the siting of natural gas pipelines, natural gas storage facilities, 

electric transmission lines, about 2500 hydroelectric projects, their 

siting, their safety, their security. 

More significantly for this audience today, the authorization, the 

construction, and the operation of LNG terminals. 

I would like to touch upon three points today in our discussion: 

how our siting process incorporates safety and security measures; 

just briefly, tanker safety and more of that will be discussed by the 

Coast Guard; and then Broadwater. 

First, siting. The point that I need to make here is that siting 

is a cumulative process. We don’t just site, it’s one decision at a 

time. The first step is a pre-authorization process. That’s what 

we’re in right now with Broadwater. During the pre-authorization 

process, we have the initial engineering, we have the initial safety 

features that will be employed, we have mitigation measures that 

might be addressed. 

We do that in a very open and public forum. We have some of 

listings of this project and thousands of comments, all of which we 

look at and address. 

The pre-authorization process often culminates with the Commission deciding whether or not the project should be authorized. In 

the case they do decide it’s in the public interest, the one criteria 

that they look at above all others is can it conclude that the project 

will operate safely, then they will authorize that project. 

But that’s just the first step. After the authorization we go into 

a reconstruction mode of authorization and here one of the more 

significant aspects of that reconstruction period is something that 

was required of us by the Energy Policy Act of 2005. We have to 

develop what’s called an emergency response plan during that period; after authorization, before construction. By law we have to do 

this. 

23

To determine exactly what the specifics are and who will be 

doing what to ensure the safety and security of this facility, not 

only do we have a plan developed during that period but we also 

have a cost sharing mechanism to put into place, which identifies 

exactly who is going to pay for what. 

No construction can occur until that cost sharing plan is filed 

with the Commission and I have to authorize it, I have to approve 

it, and allow construction to begin. If it’s not adequate, if the costs 

aren’t identified as to how the safety zone will be ensured, one cannot construct. 

Let’s assume we go through that process and we do, in fact, authorize construction of the project. The second phase is siting. Then 

we start a pre-operation process which includes the fabrication of 

materials, the assurance that everything is constructed exactly as 

proposed, or if it’s modified in some way, it’s at least as safe as 

originally proposed. 

And only after all of those criteria have been met, once again the 

authorization holder comes back to the Commission and demonstrates to us that they have constructed the project adequately 

and that they receive an authorization to operate. So safety is in 

every one of those phases, is in the primary interest of the Commission and the other agencies that we deal with throughout the 

entire process, and the public involved. 

On tanker safety, just real quickly I want to mention. The one 

aspect of this that I think we need to make sure everybody understands, is we’ve been operating LNG tankers around the world for 

almost 50 years now. There has never been a lost LNG cargo in 

that 50 years. 

You have an LNG tanker coming into Tokyo Harbor, one of the 

busier harbors, more populated harbors in the world every 23 

hours. They’ve been doing that for decades. LNG ships are constructed in a fashion and have demonstrated they can withstand 

rigorous activity and deliver LNG safely and they’ve done it for 

decades. 

Moving onto Broadwater in particular. We received that application in June of ’06 but that was after 14 months of a pre-filing 

process. If you add it all together so far we have spent about 26 

months now reviewing this project. There is no rush to judgement 

on the Broadwater project. 

There has been much identified and much learned about this 

project and some conclusions reached, all of which are now in the 

phase of a draft environmental impact statement being challenged 

and reexamined with new information coming in here. 

Ultimately, we will issue a final environmental impact statement 

that will address every single comment that we received on our 

analysis from critics and proponents alike. Believe me, we get comments about our analysis from both critics and proponents. 

Ultimately, we will answer those and put out an FEIS and only 

at that time will the Commission be in a posture to take action on 

Broadwater and determine whether or not they believe it’s in the 

public interest. 

Ultimately, our objective with the commission is to ensure a contingency rising level of safety and security of these facilities so that 

24

LNG can continue to supply natural gasses to this country and 

move forward. Thank you very much. 

Mr. BISHOP. Mr. Robinson, thank you. 

Mr. Gaffigan, you’re now recognized for five minutes. 

Mr. GAFFIGAN. Thank you, Mr. Bishop, Ms. DeLauro. Good morning. I’m Mark Gaffigan, Acting Director of Energy Issues with 

GAO’s Natural Resources and Environment Team. I’m pleased to 

be with you this morning discuss GAO’s work on the potential public safety consequences of a terrorist attack on an LNG tanker. 

As you well know, the Nation’s demand for energy is increasing. 

This includes increasing demand for natural gas. In general the 

U.S. has largely met its natural gas demand from domestic sources 

with about 15 percent of its supply imported by pipeline from Canada and only three percent imported from other countries via LNG 

tankers. 

However, this largely North American market is starting to turn 

more towards sources of natural gas from the rest of the world that 

must be liquefied and condensed to be carried by LNG tankers to 

the U.S. Thus, there is increasing interest in expanding the Nation’s LNG import capacity with proposed new facilities like the 

Broadwater facility off of Long Island. 

The proposed new facilities along with increased awareness of 

terrorist attacks after 9/11 has drawn attention and raised questions about the potential of terrorist attacks on LNG tankers and 

the consequences. The Congress asked GAO, its independent investigative arm, to examine the safety consequences of LNG spills. 

Our recent report attempted to identify where there was consensus among experts and where questions still remained about 

LNG tanker risks. My message today, based on our work that examined multiple LNG studies and consulted a panel of 19 experts 

emphasizes three points: 

One, the most likely public safety impact of LNG spill is the heat 

impact of a fire. 

Two, there are uncertainties associated with the heat impact of 

fires that could be clarified by further research. 

Finally, the U.S. Department of Energy has recently funded research to address large scale LNG fires that addresses some but 

not all of the research priorities identified by experts. 

There is broad consensus that the heat impact of fire is the 

greatest safety concern. While there are other potential hazards 

from LNG spills, they are considered to be much less likely to occur 

or affect public safety. Most notably, experts believe explosions are 

not likely to occur in the wake of an LNG spill unless LNG vapors 

are in confined spaces. 

The experts also reached a consensus that freeze burns and asphyxiation do not pose a hazard to the public. Uncertainty about 

the heat impact of an LNG fire was illustrated by different conclusions about the distance at which 30 seconds of exposure to heat 

can burn people. 

The distances ranged from about a third of a mile and a mile and 

a quarter in the studies that we examined. The uncertainty stems 

from numerous model assumptions that have to be made because 

there are no large scale LNG spills from actual events. 

25

Experts we consulted with recommended several research priorities to address these uncertainties which included large scale fire 

experiments, and the potential for the cascading failure of multiple 

tanks within an LNG tanker that could impact the fire size, duration, and hazard ranges. 

DOE has recently funded research to address large scale spill 

testing on water and large scale fire testing. However, other research areas such as the potential for cascading failure of multiple 

tanks within an LNG tanker are an not yet part of the funded research. 

However, DOE has agreed with our recommendations to consider 

research priorities identified by the experts in our report and is 

considering further research to clarify and better define potential 

public safety consequences of an LNG spill. 

As the Nation looks to expand its ability to import LNG, understanding the risks and resolving the uncertainties associated with 

LNG tankers will become increasingly important to regulators and 

the public so that informed decisions can be made about siting new 

terminals and protecting public safety as LNG tankers serve both 

existing and new terminals. This concludes my opening remarks. I 

have submitted a written statement for the record and I welcome 

any questions you might have. Thank you. 

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you very much. 

I thank all of you for your testimony. 

Mr. Robinson, I’m going to start with you, if I may. 

Mr. Robinson, Broadwater has repeatedly made the point that 

construction of the facility bringing it on line will save an average 

of $300 per household. They cite that number in data that they 

submitted to the FERC as part of the so called resource report. 

Very quickly, does that number or any number having to do with 

potential economic impact to families on Long Island or Connecticut or the New York metropolitan area, does that have any 

role at all in the FERC siting issue? 

Mr. ROBINSON. No. The number that you’re talking about has not 

been filed with FERC. There is information in resource report number five that Broadwater cites, the information they used to calculate that number. But there’s been no filing with FERC that reports a $300 benefit and to my recollection we’ve never had that 

type of filing in any LNG case made with us. And quite frankly, 

it probably wouldn’t have much effect if it was filed. 

Mr. BISHOP. If it saved zero or if it saved $3,000 per family does 

it or does it not enter into your calculation. 

Mr. ROBINSON. It does not right now. I’ll tell you, if it was filed, 

it would not have an effect on the Commission’s decision making 

process on LNG terminals and we’ve looked at a number of variables since 2002 goes primarily, primarily first and foremost, to 

how we can conclude that the project would be safe or not, everything else is immaterial, including the need for gas. 

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you very much. Let me go to Captain Boynton. 

Captain Boynton, pleasure to work with you. You and I have had 

a lot of opportunity to interact and I’ve always found you to be an 

absolutely first rate professional and I thank you for that. 

26

To waterways suitability report prepared by the Coast Guard, I 

believe you were the primary author of that, lists several additional 

resources that are quote, ′′necessary to implement the risk management measures required by the Coast Guard,′′ closed quote. Our office queried the Coast Guard as to how much those resources would 

cost and here’s the response we got have it was not from you, it 

was from someone else in the Coast Guard. 

Quote, ′′While the resources identified are indeed a potential solution, further review in the broader context across Coast Guard 

sectors districts and the Coast Guard’s Atlantic area may well result in a different mix of personnel and platforms to meet this 

need. If a terminal is approved, the Coast Guard will weigh these 

responsibilities along with statutory responsibilities to our other 

mission areas and determine the best resource allegation to mitigate risk across all 11 of our mission areas.′′

The Coast Guard goes onto say if a terminal is not yet approved, 

the Coast Guard has not requested new resources or begun the 

process to reallocate resources and it cannot provide a detailed estimate of future resources. 

Now, I have to say that that response gives me great pause because it suggests that the Coast Guard will only undertake the 

task of specifically estimating cost and specifically assessing the 

impact of those costs, whether they be dollar cost or reallocation of 

resource cost, only after the project has been approved. Am I reading this correctly? 

Captain BOYNTON. I think part of the answer I’m going to have 

to refer to my colleague from headquarters because as your Captain of the Port, I don’t handle budget issues, those are done in 

Washington. I can comment on two aspects of what I think you’re 

asking, if you like. 

Mr. BISHOP. Please. 

Captain BOYNTON. The first is the need for resources, how did we 

come up with the number of resources that we put in the WSR? 

And essentially it was a three part assessment. First, what’s the 

safety assessment, where are the risks, and what has to be done 

to mitigate it. And second, what are the security risks and what 

has to be done to mitigate them. And third, what is the Coast 

Guard policy in terms of how we mitigate them? 

We have policy documents. It’s a classified document. I can’t give 

you the details in this session. I think you’re probably familiar with 

that. It’s like a strategy document; here’s how you go about protecting things. 

Now, if the safety assessment were to change, that could effect 

the number of resources, the same with the security assessment or 

that policy document changed. And as we learn more in post 9/11, 

it’s very likely that documents like that would be updated, we’ll get 

better at how we do things and we might even get more efficient 

at it. 

So, if those three variables change, the amount of resources 

change in terms of where we get the resources from. As your local 

sector commander, I can tell you that currently I don’t have those 

resources available. It’s conceivable they might be available in the 

future. 

27

Now, there’s a second source and the second source is it could be 

resources available from else where in the Coast Guard and every 

day we surge resources from one place to another, sometimes temporarily like Katrina and other times permanently. 

Another source for resources could be our deployable units like 

our MSSTs. We deploy them to do things like escort ships. The last 

resource could be going through the president’s budget process. For 

that I’ll ask my colleague if you would like him to comment. 

Mr. BISHOP. Captain O’Malley. 

Captain O’MALLEY. Thank you both. 

Captain Boynton, despite the fact that he is local and not headquarters, did an exceptional job giving a headquarters response. All 

of the things he said are right on the money, sir. The fact that they 

are not locked in for Broadwater is a simple fact that, as you are 

well aware, 40 applications being processed currently. 

We anticipate that somewhere between eight and 12 will be approved. So as you can imagine, if you were to set up a template 

of resources for all 40 applications, then it would create a tremendous resource base that we would have to work from. So we are 

holding off on the assigning resources until we have approved applications. 

The other aspect of this as Mr. Robinson mentioned is that before 

construction takes place, there has to be a cautionary plan and an 

emergency response plan put together and that will certainly factor 

into it. 

Mr. BISHOP. Let me just make sure I understand. We’re in the 

pre-application phase. Assuming that the application is approved, 

the Coast Guard, will then sharpen its pencil and will then look at 

the recommendations that Captain Boynton’s report has made and 

will determine what fulfilling those recommendations will cost, correct? 

Captain O’MALLEY. Correct. 

Mr. BISHOP. Let’s assume that the Coast Guard comes up with 

a cost. That cost becomes part of the annual budget request to the 

Congress and the Congress says, you know what, we’ve got a lot 

of other serious problems here. We’ve got a $25 billion de-border 

acquisition program that hasn’t gone so well. We just took eight 

cutters off line. Our first priority is to fix those eight cutters, replace those, we can’t fund needs. Does the FERC then not move to 

the construction phase, Mr. Robinson. 

Mr. ROBINSON. Yes, I’m sorry, I thought you were addressing 

that to the Captain. I think I got the majority of the question. The 

Commission, in working with the Coast Guard, is never going to 

allow tankers to come in, and I’m not sure this is my part or a 

project to be constructed or a project to operate unless we know the 

mitigation measures, the security measures are the same measures 

that we have required are back in place and operational. 

Generically, I would say that we would just not allow that to 

occur. The safety of this facility is paramount. I have stopped an 

operation of LNG terminals at this time when things are going 

wrong. I’ve stopped tankers from coming in when a barrel was not 

in place. We would do that. 

Mr. BISHOP. Let me move to a related issue and this is for both 

Captain Boynton and Captain O’Malley. You make reference, CapVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:12 Nov 07, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00041 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\35919 HTRANS1 PsN: JASON
28

tain O’Malley, to the fact that there are 40 some applications pending, all of which will have some level of impact on the Coast Guard, 

whether it’s additional resources or reallocation of existing resources. 

Would it make more sense from the Coast Guard’s perspective if 

we had a national policy for the siting of terminals and that we 

identify the five or 10 or 15 most strategically located areas where 

these terminals would make the most sense, be operated at the 

most efficient level, and that we made in effect holistic decisions 

about what our future energy needs are as opposed to making decisions seriotically, if you look at Broadwater and then you look at 

one other and then look at another. 

I’ll put that question first to Captain O’Malley have then to Mr. 

Robinson. 

Captain O’MALLEY. That is a point that we’ve had discussions 

about certainly. The Coast Guard is not in a position as Captain 

Boynton articulated early on to either oppose or support a facility. 

So we research and look at each of these objectively. Now, that 

question really is far better answered by FERC. 

Mr. BISHOP. It may well be but from the Coast Guard’s perspective, if you are going to be charged with protecting these facilities, 

just from the narrow perspective of the Coast Guard, would it 

make more sense if we had a national siting policy where we made 

decisions looking at energy needs across the country and looking at 

the Coast Guard’s ability to support those needs. 

Captain O’MALLEY. The simple answer to that is yes, sir. 

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Robinson. 

Mr. ROBINSON. Well—if I’ve answered the question—if you look 

at what’s going on worldwide with LNG siting, you see different 

models in different places. The model that you’re talking about, 

there is in fact a Poei (phonetic) Channel. If you look at a map of 

the coastline of China, the government has dictated about evenly 

spaced terminals going down the coastline. 

Here, to this site at least, the siting process at work, is that the 

market ultimately makes the decision which LNG terminal will be 

constructed because that will provide the most economic source of 

natural gas, with the caveat that the government makes sure that 

whatever facility is built can be ensured in terms of safety and security. That’s the model we’re working under. So far five LNG terminals in this country have been effectively sited. 

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you Mr. Robinson, and Mr. Gaffigan—and 

Rosa thank you for indulging my——

Ms. DELAURO. That’s okay. 

Mr. BISHOP. Today we’ve talked about the maritime security report that you’ve just issued, I would like to ask a question that references an earlier report, January ’05 GAO report that was entitled 

Coast Guard Station Readiness Improving but Resource Challenges 

and management concerns remain. I will quote from that report: 

′′The Coast Guard does not have an adequate plan in place for addressing the main readiness needs for the Coast Guard’s strategic 

plans for these stations has not been updated to reflect increased 

security responsibilities and the agency lacks specific planned actions and milestones. 

29

Moreover, the Coast Guard has yet to develop measurable goals 

that will allow the agency and others to track the stations’ 

progress.′′

That report as I said was January of ’05. To your knowledge has 

the GAO undertaken a more recent report to address those issues. 

Mr. GAFFIGAN. We continue to work on Coast Guard issues and 

this resource challenge is something that continues with the Coast 

Guard. We recently testified on the Safe Port Act on the question 

of resources. The question of resources has been raised today. It’s 

out there and I think it’s a fair question to ask and I think it’s a 

question, related to Broadwater, it’s a question to resolve now. 

The Coast Guard is struggling to meet resources not only for 

Broadwater, not only for LNG facilities, but for all its responsibilities that have increased after 9/11. 

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you very much. Congresswoman DeLauro. 

Ms. DELAURO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I, too, 

want to express my thanks to Captain Boynton for your great work 

as head of the Port. And it’s been a pleasure working with you and 

i’m delighted that you’re going to continue to be a Connecticut resident soon, wonderful. 

I think it’s important if we’re talking about—what are the areas 

that when we talk about what the security needs are, I think it’s—

let’s tick those off lest people think that it’s one or two items that 

would be easily dealt with and paid for. See if I have this right. 

The resources which represent significant increase in funding include 187 or 110 coastal control boat 41 foot. 10 rescue boats or 

UTBs, that’s the next generation of small boats. Security boarding 

teams consisting of one boarding officer, seven boarding team members. 10 to 12 boat crews consisting of 40 to 48 personnel. Two marine inspectors, crew facility inspectors, four logistic support personnel. Is that——

Captain BOYNTON. Exactly correct. 

Ms. DELAURO. I think for the record it’s important to note that 

we’re not talking about a person here, a boat there. This is a significant commitment of resources in order—no protect the communities, you know, to protect the carrier, et cetera. I don’t understand. Let me just ask this of both Captain Boynton and Captain 

O’Malley. 

To what extent now do you depend on local communities to do 

the jobs that you—I’m just going to tick off a couple of questions—

to what extent do you depend on them now? You also have a very 

serious issue that my colleague mentioned of the Coast Guard 

being behind schedule in the Deepwater plan to modernize the fleet 

which is going to take some resources. 

We’ve addressed the issue of—we’re putting the cart before the 

horse here, friends. No one in my community buys a pig in a poke. 

I’m not suggesting that this is what this is, but if the costs are 

going—we’re going to know about the cost after the fact and then 

we’re going to figure out how we’re going to the pay for after the 

fact, it’s a little bit of problem for us to deal with. I know my city 

of New Haven would have significant problems with that. 

You tell me what it’s going to cost we’ll determine along with our 

counsel. If not the fact that we can’t handle it. 

30

In fact, what level of experience do you have with them now? 

What is your broad mandate of dealing—what are the responsibilities you currently have in terms of commanding a port here and 

what resources does that take at the moment? Let me just start 

with those if you can answer that. 

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you. Captain Boynton, if I could just make 

an announcement. Please, work with me here. Please let’s not have 

outbursts of any type. 

Ms. DELAURO. The last question is what else are you charged 

with protecting? 

Captain BOYNTON. Yes, ma’am. I got it. I think out of the four 

questions I can answer one, three, and four and then problems 

with Deepwater, I’m going to ask my colleague from headquarters 

to comment on. 

Captain O’MALLEY. Thank you. 

Captain BOYNTON. You’re welcome. 

To what extent do we depend on State and local partners? Congresswoman, I’ve been in the Coast Guard from Maine to Puerto 

Rico. And the partnerships we have on Long Island and Connecticut are among the best I have seen anywhere. Suffolk County, 

Nassau County have the wherewithal of States and it’s rare that 

we have a case for search and rescue, for port security, for marine 

environmental protection when Suffolk and Nassau are not on the 

scene with us. They are fantastic partners. 

In Connecticut, the New Haven Fire Department, Police Department, Bridgeport Marine Control, Waterford Marine Patrol State 

DEP—let me just give one example. Last summer——

Ms. DELAURO. I’m going to just interrupt you for a second because the report said that the resources does not have enough resources in the Long Island Sound sector to conduct other missions 

and to provide the security necessary to protect Broadwater. Those 

are not my words. Those are the words of the report. Given the 

good nature and the fortitude of these communities, we’re still looking at a lack of resources as I understand it. 

Captain BOYNTON. Yes, ma’am. I was giving examples of common 

partnership without Broadwater, how strong it is, and the fact that 

we rely on these partnerships with or without Broadwater. The 

Coast Guard brings certain expertise that local, State, and, county 

agencies don’t have and local, State, and, county agencies bring expertise that the Coast Guard doesn’t have. 

For example, that deep local knowledge, that ability to be able 

to tell, well, wait a minute, something doesn’t look right here given 

this locale. Some of my boat crews were born in Nebraska. Some 

of them worked most of their lives in San Diego. They don’t have 

that local knowledge that the State, county, and locals have. So do 

we need to work together like a quilt? We do need to and we currently do. 

One of your other questions, ma’am, the cart before the horse in 

terms of resources and localities. I thought I heard some outrage 

today about the Coast Guard having identified that resources 

would be needed. Whether Coast Guard or State, county, local, it 

was clear to us as we did this 12 month study that there would 

be costs. And my view, right or wrong, was that it was responsible 

public policy to make sure people knew even when I did not have 

31

the ability to assign a dollar value, that it was responsible public 

policy to say there will be costs. 

Now I have not and will not commit State, county, or local agencies to those costs but I do want to send a flag that says there 

could be costs. 

Ms. DELAURO. No. We very, very much appreciate the delineation of what those costs are and I think we’re of the view that we 

need to have—and I suppose we could bring Mr. Robinson into this 

effort as well—if we find that the lack of the security resources is 

not sufficient, to put the project on hold, how is FERC going to—

what are you going to do? Are you going to move forward? I think 

that question my colleague made mention, do you move forward 

when we don’t know how we’re going to take care of the security 

issues here and pay for those issues. 

And I ticked off in the earlier panel, Federal Government, anybody who has read the newspapers, I’ve ticked off for you what was 

proposed by the president’s budget. We will make up some of that, 

we will address that in a budget that comes out of the Congress 

but we’re not going to be able to make it up in the amount after 

dollars that we’re talking about here to make people whole in order 

to be able to secure this carrier. So you’ll go forward with or without the money for the resources in place? 

Mr. ROBINSON. I’ll restate, nothing will go forward unless we can 

ensure that safety measures are in place, and let me give you one 

example of how this works. The Elba Island project down in South 

Carolina, it was worked out between the Coast Guard, the operator 

of the project, and the local Port Authority during consideration of 

conditions necessary to protect that facility included the purchase 

of two extremely large tractor tugs with fire fighting capabilities, 

purchased by the LNG operative. 

Those tugs are not only available for the LNG tankers but are 

also available for other operations and fire fighting capabilities 

which was not available prior to the LNG terminal coming into 

place. In fact, just not too long ago there was a house fire that was 

inaccessible by the fire trucks. The tug went down the river and 

drowned the house to put the fire out using that equipment to help 

the local community. 

Ms. DELAURO. I just want to interrupt you for a second because 

I do sit on the appropriations committee. Let me ask the Coast 

Guard—I know there are two questions still pending here, I 

haven’t lost track. 

Is there any U.S. Coast Guard analysis for anticipated need for 

the LNG security and over the next 10 or 15 years we understand 

that there’s going to be an anticipated growth of the industry. 

Captain O’MALLEY. Thank you. There are—there has been significant discussion regarding resources and costs et cetera for upcoming needs for LNG. Before we get into that too in depth, I do 

want to mention in the past two months we have begun a multipronged examination of how we go about our business. 

For instance, in February we had members of all the ports involved in the LNG and perspective LNG ports gather to examine 

how we conduct business with regard to LNG. Just last week we 

had our experts from around the country meet to discuss how we 

32

provide our security for not only LNG but all certain dangerous 

cargoes and other law enforcement issues. 

Two weeks ago we had all the representatives from area maritime security meet together to discuss how we can better develop 

partnerships within our port communities sharing the information, 

sharing threat analysis, et cetera. 

Ms. DELAURO. With all due respect, Captain O’Malley, truly, is 

there, yes or no, does the Coast Guard today have an analysis of 

anticipated needs for LNG security given 40 pending applications, 

all that we’ve been talking about? 

Captain O’MALLEY. Well, I’m sorry, I was getting to that, ma’am. 

What we’re doing is these are all interwoven into how we deliver 

our security toward not only LNG facilities but all chemical facilities and other law enforcement needs. What we do is——

Ms. DELAURO. They can’t hear you. 

Captain O’MALLEY. Our local cabinet reports are asked to look at 

all risks and hazards within it responsibility. That is then fed up 

through the chain of command to us. In that mix, Captain Boynton 

mentioned, there are significant partnerships. Every Port that has 

LNG, Boston, Baltimore, and the superb example of Elba Island 

have excellent partnerships with State and local agencies as well 

as the facility. 

The Coast Guard is very—we respond, you see it every day, 

Katrina was a prime example, 9/11 was a prime example. Since 9/

11 we have purchased 120 boats that Captain Boynton talked 

about. Not only the boats, associated crew that goes with it. We 

have established 13 maritime safety and security teams around the 

country. These teams are deployed to our ports when we hear the 

needs. 

We are very responsive and very nimble. And that four pronged 

approach that I talked about, Ma’am, is going to bring together 

how we are going to deliver security for LNG not only involved in 

Broadwater but across the country. It’s a very comprehensive, very 

inclusive review of all our partnerships and fellow agencies and 

county effort. And when we progress forward this will certainly be 

refined to the point where we can take a much harder deliberate 

look at how the resources are cleaner. 

Ms. DELAURO. Mr. Chairman, my time has gone way over but I 

just would say this; I have very great and deep respect for the 

Coast Guard. I think you’re doing an amazing job. I also believe 

that the resources are limited and as I understand it, LNG security 

is not even a specific employment category within the Coast 

Guard’s abstract of Operations System. But I’m going to—this is 

not about—I am just saying, I think you do an incredible job with 

the resources you have. My point particularly is that given the 

scope of what we’re talking about here, you do not currently have 

the resources in order to accommodate what needs to be in terms 

of security. I’m sorry, Chairman. 

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you very much, Congresswoman DeLauro. 

Let me first associate myself with your remarks both with respect 

to the work that the Coast Guard does which I think is first rate 

and with respect to concerns that I share with respect to the Coast 

Guard’s ability to be able to staff up and have the resources necVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:12 Nov 07, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00046 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\35919 HTRANS1 PsN: JASON
33

essary to undertake this new challenge. Again I’m going to exercise 

the right of the chair and ask a couple more questions. 

Captain O’Malley, the Cove Point Facility in Maryland, my understanding is that the original security arrangement was that the 

Coast Guard would provide security for that facility. My further 

understanding as of June of this year the security of that facility 

will be transferred to local law enforcement; is that correct? 

Captain O’MALLEY. It is correct with regard to security at the facility when there is a vessel moored, yes. 

Mr. BISHOP. Just tell me what happened. Tell me why it was 

that the Coast Guard thought that they could originally undertake 

it and why it is now the case that they recognize that they either 

cannot or should not. 

Captain O’MALLEY. It is simply a matter of the partnerships that 

we talked about earlier. The local facilities were able to provide 

that security when asked and that is—that’s what has transpired. 

Mr. BISHOP. Mr. Robinson, from the perspective of the FERC, 

you have said repeatedly both this morning and in your written 

testimony that the number one consideration that the FERC has 

in assessing applications is safety and security. Does the kind of security arrangement that is now being put into place at Cove Point 

that, as I understand it, will be the kind of security arrangement 

that will be put in place with Broadwater, do you consider that to 

be the ideal security arrangement or would you prefer to see some 

other form of arrangement. 

Mr. ROBINSON. The security arrangements that are going to be 

put into place with Broadwater if authorized to construct and operate, we don’t know the details of that yet. That would occur, by 

law, after the authorization occurs and before construction. 

But about your fundamental question, I think each project and 

what happens with each project develops as the local communities 

become more involved, they’re trained, they become more aware of 

what these projects are about, there is a tendency for them to take 

on the first calls from when it first is constructed or operated. So 

I don’t see any problem with that. I have great confidence in the 

partnerships that exist for security measures across the country. 

That’s the way it works not just for LNG but for all of the terminals. 

Mr. BISHOP. But the Coast Guard is a specially trained, highly 

skilled, arm of our Government, Department of Homeland Security. 

Would it not be—does it not just make sense that it would be preferable for the Coast Guard to undertake primary security responsibility for the kind of facility that we are contemplating with 

Broadwater. 

Mr. ROBINSON. I think, again, each project dictates what the security measures should be and they should accommodate based 

upon the resources and their expertise. The Coast Guard certainly 

has that expertise and at their discretion, if they find that one of 

the partners can substitute, I have confidence in that——

Mr. BISHOP. In fairness and this is not to aggrandize the role of 

the Coast Guard, can you articulate for me a substitute security arrangement that would rise to the level of expertise that the Coast 

Guard already possesses. 

Mr. ROBINSON. I’m not exactly sure I can answer that question. 

34

Mr. BISHOP. If the Coast Guard is not going to do it, someone 

else will do it, correct. 

Mr. ROBINSON. I don’t think that’s correct at all. The Coast 

Guard will do it working in partnership with other entities, other 

law enforcement agencies, they will, on individual projects, determine who is best suited to handle aspects of security. And that’s 

the security plan that will be in place. That’s the security plan that 

we will monitor and make sure is effective. 

Mr. BISHOP. Captain Boynton, do you want to make a comment? 

Captain BOYNTON. Yes, sir. I just want to comment that waterside security at the tanker site is more, does not equal the security. 

The waterside security alongside of the tanker is the end zone for 

the security. But if this is done right, there should be a whole series of layers that extend beyond the dock. Typically the Coast 

Guard has better expertise than our partners to be further away 

from shore, not in the end zone, but in the yard lines that extend 

out. 

I’m not the Captain of the Port for Cove Point, I don’t want to 

speculate, but it could be that this allows the Coast Guard a platform that’s more capable to more often be patrolling further offshore which is part of the security regime for the moored tanker. 

That security regime for the moored tanker in theory extends all 

the way to the foreign port where it picked up its cargo. And there 

are certain tasks the Coast Guard is uniquely suited for. When we 

find a partner that can help us with tasks that they are also suited 

for, we can reallocate to where we must be and no one else can do. 

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you. Two more questions. My understanding 

is that the FSRU is going to be constructed else where and then 

towed to the mooring location; is that correct? 

Captain BOYNTON. Yes, sir. 

Mr. BISHOP. And when it’s being towed there, is it a vessel? 

Captain BOYNTON. Congressman, I can tell you that we are treating it in a regulatory manner once it’s moored as a facility with 

vessel like characteristics. 

Mr. BISHOP. Tell me what that means. 

Captain BOYNTON. I can, sir. If we treated this under the regs 

as a ship, it could end up being a foreign-flagged barge, and we did 

not want that. 

Mr. BISHOP. But tell me why it isn’t a ship. Tell me why it isn’t 

a vessel. Just, for example, my understanding is that the gambling 

boats in the Gulf States are permanently moored but they are 

treated as vessels; is that correct? 

Captain BOYNTON. I don’t have any of those in my zone so I 

shouldn’t comment. I’m just not familiar. 

Mr. BISHOP. I think I’m right. Tell me why this isn’t a vessel. 

Captain BOYNTON. This is not a vessel because we prefer it not 

being subject to possibly being foreign flagged. 

Mr. BISHOP. The Coast Guard is making a judgment call here, 

correct? 

Captain BOYNTON. We’re making a judgment call. And under the 

regulations we can treat this as a facility with vessel like characteristics. 

35

Mr. BISHOP. While it’s moving, while it’s in transit from 

whereever it is going to be fabricated to the port location, at that 

time is it a vessel. 

Captain BOYNTON. I would have to respond for the record, because I want to be sure to give you the absolute facts and I can’t 

right now. 

[Subsequent to the hearing, Captain Boynton submitted the following: The Broadwater unit was analyzed by the Coast Guard 

under the principles announced by the Supreme Court in Stewart 

V. Dutra Construction Co. Inc. and determined not to be a vessel 

under 1 U.S.C. section 3; once it is permanently attached on its 

mooring post, it is not used or capable of being used as a means 

of transportation on the water.] 

Mr. BISHOP. Counsel, you have a couple more questions. 

Ms. DELAURO. Just a quick follow-up. I had another question for 

Mr. Gaffigan, but where is the vessel being constructed? 

Captain BOYNTON. I would have to defer to either FERC or 

Broadwater for that. 

Ms. DELAURO. Can anybody tell us where this or any of these 

other vessels are being constructed? Are they being constructed in 

the United States? 

Mr. ROBINSON. It’s unlikely it is being constructed in the United 

States. 

Ms. DELAURO. Unlikely it is being constructed in the United 

States. 

Mr. ROBINSON. The vessel doesn’t exist. It has not been authorized. There’s no money being spent in that area and no contracts 

have been made with anyone. 

Ms. DELAURO. I understand that but the assumption is it will 

not be constructed in the United States? 

Mr. ROBINSON. That would be my assumption. You have someone 

on the next panel who should be able to answer that. 

Ms. DELAURO. I just wanted to ask Mr. Gaffigan about the assessment process which what I am concerned about was I believe 

the current assessment process preceding the siting of the onshore 

LNG terminal provides a sufficiently comprehensive review of the 

all the risks and issues associated with the proposed siting. 

Does the assessment process include sufficient assessment of the 

availability of Coast Guard resources to provide security around 

both the terminals and the tankers? Just a quick answer to those 

in terms of, you know, GAO’s review of the——

Mr. GAFFIGAN. Right. The work we have now is focused on the 

safety consequences. What I’ll tell you is that Captain O’Malley 

mentioned other work that we’re doing. So people aren’t confused 

about the different GAO efforts,, you know, there’s this report that 

came out in February ’07. There will be a classified version of this 

which talks to some issues with the LNG consequences. 

The other work that we are doing is a broader look at the energy 

commodity tankers and the security threat that’s posed, efforts to 

mitigate it, and the response capabilities. That report went to the 

same committees. It also is a sensitive report. We’re working with 

the Coast Guard to get a public version of that. 

Ms. DELAURO. So what you’re saying is that with regard to the 

LNG the terminal et cetera terminal et cetera, that what you can’t 

36

do is talk about whether or not there has been an assessment of 

the—sufficient assessment of the resources of the Coast Guard to 

whether or not they can provide security and that’s for security 

reasons that you can’t do that, that’s classified document; is that 

right? 

Mr. GAFFIGAN. We did not assess, you know, for example, a particular facility such as Broadwater in terms of whether resources 

were there or not. What we did look at was the resources that were 

brought to bear, this report which we’re looking on getting a public 

version out there, that talks to the resource challenges that are 

faced in response, who is going to be the first responder, all of the 

issues that are being raised today. 

Ms. DELAURO. When is that due? 

Mr. GAFFIGAN. We’re trying to work with the Coast Guard to try 

to take out the sensitive information so that it could be a public 

document. My best guess is in the next couple of months we should 

be able to have something out. 

Ms. DELAURO. Thank you. 

Thank you Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you very much. We will now excuse panel 

two with our thanks and appreciation. I know you all came a good 

long way to be here and your testimony was very, very helpful. 

Thank you all very, very much. And we will move to panel three. 

Thank you. We’re not going to recess, folks. We’re just going to go 

right to panel three in a moment. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. BISHOP. We will now reconvene with the third panel. Our 

third panel is comprised of Mr. John Hritcko who is the senior vice 

president and regional project director for Broadwater Energy, 

LLC; Mr. Bruce Johnson, the Riverhead Town Fire Marshal and 

Wading River Fire Department in New York; and Dr. Steven E. 

Flynn, the Jeane J. Kirkpatrick Senior Fellow for National Security 

Studies, Council on Foreign Relations. 

As has been the case with our other two panels, your full statements will be submitted for the record we ask that you limit your 

verbal testimony at this time to five minutes and we will begin 

with Mr. Hritcko. 

Mr. Hritcko, thank you very much. 

TESTIMONY OF JOHN HRITCKO, JR., SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT 

AND REGIONAL PROJECT DIRECTOR, BROADWATER ENERGY, LLC; BRUCE JOHNSON, RIVERHEAD TOWN FIRE MARSHAL, WADING RIVER FIRE DEPARTMENT; AND STEVEN E. 

FLYNN, JEANE J. KIRKPATRICK SENIOR FELLOW FOR NATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

Mr. HRITCKO. Thank you, Congressman Bishop, and thank you, 

Congresswoman DeLauro, for this opportunity to appear in front of 

the subcommittee on behalf of Broadwater LLC. 

My name is John Hritcko, Jr., and I am senior vice president and 

Regional Project Director for Broadwater LNG LLC. Broadwater is 

a joint venture comprised of subsidiaries of the Shell Oil Company 

and TransCanada Corporation. 

37

Broadwater proposes a project that would bring a new source of 

reliable, long-term, competitively priced natural gas supply to the 

Long Island, New York City, and Connecticut markets will be commonly referred to as the region. Broadwater has undertaken an extensive regulatory review process at both Federal and State levels 

led by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, or FERC, designated as the lead agency. 

As part of that review, a Draft Environmental Impact Statement, 

a DEIS, was released by FERC late last year. Incorporated into the 

DEIS was the Coast Guard’s assessment of safety and security 

issues related to determining the suitability of Long Island Sound 

for the Broadwater project called the Waterway Suitability Report. 

My prepared statement, previously submitted for the record, 

summarizes the detailed application submitted by Broadwater to 

FERC with emphasis upon the need for the proposed facilities, 

highlighting the measures to be incorporated into the project to 

maintain safety and security of the operations and facility, and reiterates Broadwater’s commitment to safety and security without 

burdening the local population. 

This region faces enormous challenges with regard to energy. 

The cost of energy in general and particularly the cost of natural 

gas is the highest of the lower 48 States in this Region. This Region experiences dramatic upward price swings during periods of 

peak demand, on the coldest winter days when heating needs are 

the greatest and during the summer when electricity for cooling are 

the greatest. 

Broadwater is a supply-side proposal seeking to deliver a large, 

new, diversified supply of natural gas directly into the region. This 

would be accomplished by siting, constructing, and operating an 

LNG marine import and regasification terminal in the Long Island 

Sound, nine miles from Long Island shoreline, which is to be connected to the existing natural gas pipeline serving this region. 

Natural gas would be transported and delivered to the 

Broadwater terminal as a liquid by specially designed ocean going 

vessels all called LNG carriers. The LNG would be transferred 

from the carriers to Broadwater and slowly warmed back into the 

gas and delivered into the pipeline over a number of days. 

The siting of the facility was determined based upon a comprehensive and interactive process that evaluated potential terminal designs and sites throughout the entire Long Island region, 

including both onshore and offshore locations. This siting process 

evaluated potential sites against a wide range of environmental 

and socioeconomic criteria. The process and analysis is fully detailed in Broadwater’s application filed with FERC. 

The economic benefits of having one Bcf per day of natural gas 

delivered directly into the region by Broadwater are extremely compelling. Broadwater estimates that the wholesale energy savings to 

the region would total nearly $10 billion over the life of the project 

or approximately $300 to $400 per year in direct and indirect cost 

savings for the average home in the region. 

Beyond the economic benefits, Broadwater would provide a substantial amount of natural gas that could greatly assist in helping 

New York and Connecticut meet its clean air requirements as well 

38

as climate change goals under the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative. 

The safety and security of the adjacent communities and other 

users of the Sound and the facility is of the highest priority to 

Broadwater. Key aspects of Broadwater’s safety controls and security measures are detailed in the FERC application. Incorporated 

within the design of the facility is a layered approach to safety and 

security. 

The FSRU will be designed to withstand severe weather conditions and natural catastrophes. Although Broadwater terminal may 

be among the first FSRUs in operation, it does not rely on new 

technologies. As such, Broadwater has been able to develop safety 

and security measures that are proven in the industry today. 

Broadwater will meet the requirements outlined by FERC and 

the Coast Guard and I would like to assure this Subcommittee and 

the public that we have already made provisions within our preliminary budget estimates of these requirements to ensure the burden for protecting the facility and responding in the event of an 

emergency is carried by the project itself. 

For example; it has been stated that Broadwater will provide the 

necessary fire fighting tugs as well as security personnel to protect 

the facility. The project recognizes that local first responders and 

communities do not have the capabilities to respond to an incident 

at the facility nor would we call upon the shoreline communities. 

At a minimum, however, we would expect to establish communication plans and protocols with the appropriate agencies or departments so that necessary coordination and interoperability between Broadwater and various parties is established. Broadwater 

is also committed to ensuring that these parties are involved, to 

the extent that they are willing, in the development of the Emergency Response Plan and security procedures. 

In closing, I would like to emphasize Broadwater’s commitment 

to the stakeholder engagement. Since announcing the project in 

November 2004, the project has strived to reach out to as many 

Long Island and Connecticut groups and individuals as possible. 

We have taken much of the feedback and incorporated it into the 

development of the project so that the benefits of the facility are 

maximized and the impacts are avoided or minimized. 

We will continue to meet with interested groups and individuals 

who have seen a growing level of understanding about the project 

and its role in addressing the region’s energy and environmental 

challenges. Thank you. 

Mr. BISHOP. Mr. Hritcko, thank you very much. 

Mr. Johnson, you’re recognized for five minutes. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Good afternoon. Thank you, Congressman Bishop 

and Congresswoman DeLauro. It’s a pleasure to be here before this 

Congressional hearing today. You have my written comments and 

there are a few things that I would like to highlight during my testimony this afternoon. As part of my qualifications, I’ve had the 

honor and ability to serve as a volunteer fire fighter here on Long 

Island over the last 25 years, and that’s unique because our fire 

services to our communities have been provided by volunteers who 

do an outstanding job and they are truly unpaid professionals. 

39

And it’s important to note that this group has continued to partner not only within our own associations mutually but now with 

other partners like the Coast Guard particularly following the 

events of 9/11 through the development of national response plans 

and our training of as NIMs (phonetic) and we’re going to continue 

to develop those partnerships. 

It’s also important to understand that Long Island, and I believe 

to some extent Connecticut, we have a multiple number of emergency response agencies that we need to unite, whether it’s for the 

review of the Broadwater project or just about to coordinate our response activities here in Suffolk County on Long Island with our 

partners across the Sound. 

We’re a home rule State. That means that each of the municipalities are a taxing entity and they have their own authority within their individual fire districts, so coordinating those efforts is 

going to be a significant task. But none is less a very important 

task as we move forward particularly if we need to develop an 

emergency response plan for the Broadwater project. 

It’s also important to note that it is not unusual and certainly 

is not unprecedented here right in Suffolk County that volunteers 

are working closely with paid professional fire departments such as 

that that protects the Islip Airport, protects the Brookhaven National Labs facility or Plum Island. And those groups are part of 

our mutual aid agreements and we work regularly with them for 

fires and Hazmat emergencies. 

It’s also important to emphasize that as the Coast Guard position, my position as emergency responder and Fire marshal for the 

Town of Riverhead is to take a position neither in support nor opposition to this project, but to be an impartial judge and to look at 

the risks and to look at the mitigation strategies and determine, 

if we can, come up with mitigation strategies to make this facility 

safe and then to report those to the appropriate agencies for final 

decision. 

There are a number of stake holders, as I mentioned, that are 

going to be involved in this process, not just through Suffolk County but we have local, county, and State officials here in New York 

as well as our counterparts in Connecticut and possibly Rhode Island need to be united as we work towards the review of this process and we look at developing an emergency response plan that 

may be appropriate for the facility. 

And that process certainly needs to involve not only these multiple responders, the Coast Guard and FERC, and also Broadwater 

because they have the lot of technical engineering expertise that’s 

associated with this project and they will provide the resources 

that will be necessary for the work of this group. 

I think it’s important that we take the time, and the time is 

probably now, to begin identifying all of these stake holders and 

bringing them together under the direction of the Coast Guard to 

continue the work that was done during Broadwater’s assessment 

and the security and safety analysis that the Coast Guard and 

Captain Boynton’s spoke of earlier. 

This is really the first time that a lot of us first responders got 

to meet our counterparts from Connecticut and begin looking at 

what capabilities we have, what strengths and resources, and start 

40

to build a network that we can build upon for energy response in 

the Long Island Sound. 

That process needs to continue but it’s essential that we bring 

the right people to the table. And one of the things that I think 

is really critical is that we have to really work really hard to get 

the participation of both local, county, and State responders that 

will come to the table that will probably work for as long as 18 to 

24 months to make that review and that emergency response plan 

a good, working, well thought out document. 

Part of what we know right now from some of the other testimony of the reports, there are things that we know about LNG 

transport, there is a lot that we need to confirm, and there’s some 

other studies that may need to occur. And I think for first responders, this is something new for us. 

We have learned how to deal with a lot of other hazards that are 

associated in our response areas here in Suffolk County, things 

that have become part of our area. We have obtained training and 

we’re able to respond to those emergencies. 

But we’re going to need training and we’re going to need access 

to expertise in the LNG area for us to participate and really understand the hazards, the risks, and the appropriate mitigation strategies when we talk about fire incidents, when we talk about 

Hazmat, or other incidents not related to security that could be associated with this project. 

I hope that through this review process, we’ll be provided the opportunity to do so and that any cost associated with that will be 

borne by the applicant, and that’s not unusual for anything that we 

look at in our municipal jobs, when we review commercial projects, 

that we have certain expertise that may be provided to us at the 

cost of the applicant. 

I see my time is almost up but, again, I think the planning process is really the key. The time that goes into that is going to be 

as important, if not more important, than the finished document 

because that is going to unite the first responders here in Suffolk 

County with our counterparts across the Sound and is going to prepare us for any sort of emergency, or better prepare us for any sort 

of emergency, whether it’s associated with the Broadwater project 

or anything else that we may have been called upon to do. 

So I hope that this congressional hearing today will lead us to 

that next process and it will allow us the opportunity to work together as first responders to come up with appropriate strategies 

and deliver a report that will hopefully answer some of the questions that we have not been able to answer today about safety, 

about what assets we have locally, and certainly the cost of those 

potential assets. Those are all the things I think will come after we 

have completed our work and the analysis necessary for the emergency response plan. 

I thank you for the opportunity today and I will be certainly be 

available for any questions you may have. 

Mr. BISHOP. Mr. Johnson, thank you. 

Dr. Flynn, you are recognized for five minutes. 

Mr. FLYNN. Thank you. Chairman Bishop, Congresswoman 

DeLauro from my home State of Connecticut, it’s an honor to appear before you to discuss the security issues that are associated 

41

with the growth of the LNG industry within the United States. 

Given the obvious location of this field hearing today, and the interest it has generated with so many of the people gathered here, 

I will also offer my assessment of the security risks associated with 

the Broadwater Energy proposal for Long Island Sound. 

Since 9/11, I’ve testified on 18 occasions before Congress on the 

issues associated with homeland security, generally, and port maritime security specifically. Most recently on March 19, 2007, I testified to the potential security risks associated with the chemical and 

petrochemical industry within the United States. 

In that testimony, I made the case that many of these facilities 

represent the military equivalent of a poorly guarded arsenal of 

weapons of mass destruction. Deadly chemicals are often stored in 

large quantities in densely populated areas, for instance, near some 

very important infrastructures such as water treatment plants, 

bridges, energy facilities, and transportation hubs. 

I suggested it was perplexing that a Nation that has expended 

so much blood and treasure searching for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq would allow what could be their equivalent to sit largely overlooked on the United States’s soil. I also pointed that it is 

prudent to recall that on September 11, 2001 Al Quaeda did not 

import weapons of mass destruction, they used four domestic airliners as them. 

Like many students of terrorism, I believe that Al Quaeda or one 

of its growing number of radical jihadist imitators will attempt to 

carry out a major terrorist attack on the United States within the 

next five years. At the top of the list of likely targets is the chemical and energy industries. I make this case in part because this 

is what’s happening in Iraq and Saudi Arabia and the middle east. 

The skills are being refined, they are being shared in Jihadist 

internet chat rooms, and the number of people engaged in terror 

has grown since 9/11. 

While the safety and security risks associated with the chemical 

and petrochemical industries are real, it is also a risk we must roll 

up our sleeves and strive to effectively manage. 

For a long time energy was cheap, reliable, and its source was 

largely invisible to the vast majority of Americans. Those days are 

gone. Energy will cost more. It will be more susceptible to disruption by both natural and man-made sources, and the sources for 

producing it cannot be kept out of sight and out of mind. As a society, we will have to have an adult-like conversation about how we 

manage the risks associated with our continued reliance on the energy sector. 

Let me be clear, there are important security issues associated 

with the LNG industry as there are with the operation of oil and 

gas refineries, power plants, and the transportation and storage of 

hazardous chemicals associated with the energy sector. Most recently I’ve written of the danger to Boston should the LNG tanker 

be attacked by two small boats manned by suicide attackers armed 

with the latest generation of Improvised Explosive Devices. 

Given the number of people living and working on Boston’s waterfront and the difficulty of quickly evacuating such a congested 

area, the immediate loss of life is likely to be 10,000 or more. There 

42

would be a large number of subsequent fatalities due to inadequate 

capacity at hospitals to treat all the burn victims. 

This is a frightening scenario, but it’s not one to be used to suggest that LNG always poses an unacceptable risk to the public. 

Rather, it highlights that the location of an LNG facility and the 

transit route of the LNG tankers that dock at that facility is the 

critical ingredient in assessing the safety and security risk. 

There is no explosion or mushroom cloud associated with an LNG 

fire. Because it is stored at such an incredibly cold temperature, it 

is difficult to ignite liquefied natural gas. It must first spill out of 

the hull and turn into vapor. Once the gas does ignite, it burns 

very hot but the range of the fire would be contained to under onehalf mile. Also, unlike a crude oil spill, once an LNG fire burns 

itself out, there is no natural gas left over to contaminate the maritime environment. 

My recommendation for preventing the hypothetical scenario I 

outlined for the Boston Harbor is to construct a replacement LNG 

facility on a more remote location in the harbor’s entrance or to 

place it further offshore. If an LNG tanker did not need to transit 

within one mile of a densely populated area, it makes a far less attractive target for a suicide attack by terrorists. This is because, 

while the fire would be spectacular to watch, the consequences 

would not. 

This brings me to the Broadwater facility proposal. The proposed 

location of the facility is 10.2 miles from Connecticut and 9.2 miles 

from New York. And the small number of transits per week made 

by the tankers arriving through the Race at the eastern end of the 

Long Island Sound would not put the potential burn-radius in contact with any population center. 

It short, a successful attack on this facility or on the tankers 

traveling to this facility would not endanger the general public. As 

such, it can offer no real appeal to terrorists who are intent on 

causing mass U.S. Casualties. 

However, there is a different kind of security risk associated with 

the proposed Broadwater facility and for other LNG facilities located offshore or in remote locations. That risk is that these facilities are likely to make attractive economic targets. This will particularly be the case in the northeast and other regions as they become more dependent on natural gas for the generation of electricity. By 2010 close to 50 percent of New England’s electricity will 

be generated by natural gas. 

Should the Broadwater facility be constructed as designed, it will 

provide nearly one-third of all the daily natural gas needs from 

Connecticut to Long Island. Accordingly, an attack on unprotected 

LNG facilities could lead to long-term black outs or brown-outs. 

This applies as well to other critical facilities within or adjacent to 

America’s waterways. 

One potentially positive result of the surge in public interest surrounding the safety and security of new LNG facilities and shipments is that it provides an opportunity to point out the extent to 

which Americans are becoming increasingly dependent on energy 

infrastructure that must operate within a maritime and coastal environment. 

43

Quite simply, in the post 9/11 world the United States can no 

longer rely on the relative safety of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans 

when it comes to protecting what is valuable and vulnerable within 

and alongside the U.S. Harbors and waterways. 

In the post 9/11 security environment, we must put in place on 

America’s waterways the means to conduct something akin to community policing. This would represent a sharp departure from the 

current posture that relies on providing nominal resources to the 

U.S. Coast Guard and only token State and local harbor patrols. 

The Coast Guard is simply overwhelmed with its current missions 

and is unable to provide stepped up capabilities. Locals don’t have 

the resources in place to do this as well. So what is required is a 

national capacity to maintain a regular cop on the beat presence 

in waterways proximate to critical infrastructure. We should move 

to a patrol presence, though not an episodic one. 

As I have examined the report for Broadwater, I think that Captain Ford is right, this is a manageable risk, but I would add that 

we need to move to a place where, and I also agree with him, that 

it’s a natural risk in the context of additional measures to mitigate 

that risk. 

Frankly the major findings of the Coast Guard’s Report on 

Broadwater could be extrapolated to the issue of locating LNG facilities nationwide. First, there’s no serious risk to public safety as 

long as the facility and the vessels that transit them are at least 

one mile away from a population center. Second, the security risk 

connected with terrorists potentially attacking these facilities is a 

manageable one as long as there is enough patrol assets available 

to routinely monitor the maritime environment in proximity to 

these and other critical assets. 

Managing the risk will require a new commitment in resources 

at the Federal, State, and local levels. I made the recommendation 

that the Federal Government undertake a maritime version of the 

Department of Justice’s COPS program and bolster the capacity of 

State and local law enforcement agencies to hire additional assets 

to support an ongoing presence to safeguard the safety and security 

of America’s waterways. 

The bottom line is this Nation has spent every day since we got 

into Iraq $250 million a day for four years plus dealing with the 

hazard beyond our shores. Yet we seem unable and unwilling to 

commit the ample resources necessary to deal with the ongoing 

risks to vital assets within our maritime environment. That kind 

of approach in dealing with the security threat we face today is unacceptable. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to your questions. 

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you, Dr. Flynn. 

I have my first question for you, Dr. Flynn. In your written testimony you compare the size of the Coast Guard to the NYPD. We 

all know that the scope of the territory the NYPD is responsible 

for patrolling is microscopic in comparison with the scope of the 

territory the Coast Guard is responsible for patrolling. 

And if I could quote from your testimony, you say the Coast 

Guard, quote,′′is in no position to provide anything more than an 

episodic patrol presence even in the busiest of waterways such as 

the Long Island Sound or the Port of New York and New Jersey.′′

44

Now, given your extensive knowledge of the Coast Guard, your 

service in the Coast Guard, given your knowledge of their current 

abilities and the requirements to adequately protect critical maritime infrastructure as well as their numerous other responsibilities, what are your thoughts on why it is that the Coast Guard has 

not yet projected a cost for securing this facility? 

Mr. FLYNN. Well, I think the challenge is overall that we have 

these critical maritime infrastructures on harbors and waterways 

and the kind of redesign the Coast Guard would have to embrace, 

is a particular emphasis on small boat operations and essentially 

more patrol assets on an on going basis. This again is moving from 

the fire house kind of capabilities the Coast Guard currently has 

to get specific intelligence after which the Coast Guard moves, that 

maybe confronts a threat of armed forces and otherwise. 

Otherwise, in case of an incident they can respond to, it’s very 

difficult to maintain an on going presence with 40,000 people 

spread across three million miles of patrol area and 95,000 thousand miles of coastline. So you’re talking about a fundamental reengineering of the Coast Guard to build a sort of community policing approach to manage the waterfront. 

This is happening in a time when its offshore assets are literally 

falling apart. And so its primary mission is then to try to keep 

problems evolving before they get onshore out there in that environment. They’re barely able to do that. And then there’s this new 

need here for active presence to deal with this growth of critical 

maritime assets within the maritime system. 

There’s nobody talking about plussing up any serious resources 

beyond the rate of inflation. So you just can’t get there from here. 

And the Coast Guard, I think, has looked at what to do via the 

coastline. It’s relying primarily on this notion of a sort of strategic 

depth in the hopes of being able to stop the threat along with a 

combination of new regulatory regimes and local help and other 

stuff that we can wade our way through this. 

Mr. BISHOP. Let me ask the same question I asked Captain 

Boynton and Mr. Robinson from FERC; and that is, would it not 

make more sense for there to be a national policy with respect to 

these siting issues of LNG facilities? We have 40 applications. My 

understanding is that the current process is we’re going to go 

through each one individually, assess each one on its own merits, 

and then determine whether or not the Coast Guard can adequately provide protective services for them. 

Would it not make more sense to deal with these 40 applications 

in some cohesive way so that they’re able to make informed judgements about our ability to service them and secure them in a 

macro sense as opposed to this, as I say, stereotypical decision; decision one, then decision two, and then decision three? 

Mr. FLYNN. Absolutely. This is nuts the way we’re doing this. 

Mr. BISHOP. Don’t sugarcoat it. 

Mr. FLYNN. Essentially, it’s like going around the Country with 

a bunch of straws and spitballs and try to toss them around and 

hope something will stick. This is not the way this country should 

be dealing with reality. And we will need LNG, because of diminishing production of natural gas locally and rising population—you 

45

know we’re going to add another 100 million people to this country 

in the next 25 years. 

We can’t rely on this ad hoc process that we’re using now to get 

what we need. What I particularly worry about as I look at this 

natural gas need, the liquefied natural gas, is virtually all the facilities are going to end up down the Gulf Coast because that’s 

going to be sort of the easiest place locally to put these things. That 

means we’re going to go from 100 year storms to 10 year storms 

by 2050 given the climate change. And we’re going to increase the 

dependency of the utility sector on the use of natural gas. 

So literally the lights are going to go out in big portions of the 

country. We have to have an adult-like conversation about where 

to locate these, not just simply for the purpose of the economics, 

but as a nation our vulnerability itself goes up as we import more 

of this natural gas and become more dependent upon it, but we 

concentrate in such a narrow geographic area. We’ve got to change 

this process. 

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Hritcko, I wanted to ask—I want to focus in on the issue of 

the potential savings that Broadwater continues to talk about three 

to $400 per family saving for families on Long Island. Now, presumably that number derives from some calculation of cost of obtaining the, again, the energy, the cost of operating, the cost of getting it there, the cost of operating efforts are huge; all of the different costs that will allow you to calculate what you are going to 

charge which will then allow you to calculate what families will 

save. 

My questions is rooted in the fact that it doesn’t seem as if we 

have a clue as to what it’s going to cost. I mean, we know that the 

Coast Guard has not made any assessment with respect to what 

it is going to cost. 

We know that the Energy Policy Act mandates the cost share 

with local municipalities with respect to protection and securing 

services. But we also know that there has been no definitive discussion, no concrete discussion with any of the local government agencies with respect to what they’re going to need to bring to the table, 

what the costs will be, to what extent you would reimburse those 

costs. 

So in the absence of—or in presence of all of those unknowns, 

how is it that you can put out there a number that, at least gives 

people reason to say that there’s a cost benefit here and that the 

benefits outweighs the cost when we don’t really know how real or 

illusory that benefit is. 

So with that as a very lengthy question, how do you get to that 

number and how can those of us reasonable people that are trying 

to assess this, how can we put any with reliability on that number? 

Mr. HRITCKO. Well, to respond to your question and, Congressman, I’m sure you’re aware it’s a multiple tiered question at best. 

Mr. BISHOP. Yes. 

Mr. HRITCKO. Let me say that the price of natural gas here in 

the United States is set by an open market. And what we’re looking at here is an analysis of what would happen if we bring in a 

large new supply of natural gas directly into this region that needs 

46

it so badly and it is so constrained in terms of infrastructure as to 

how it’s going to obtain its supply in the future. 

You mentioned a lot of things about what it’s going to cost 

Broadwater, what it’s going to cost. That doesn’t get to the point 

of what the impact would be here in the market place if you have 

this gas delivered. That gets to the point of what would the price 

be to suppliers or to the operators of the facility. 

What we look at and what we presented in the application was 

the analysis of the U.S. market, and more particularly this regional 

market, of what economic impact would be entailed by bringing in 

this large supply of gas. That turned out to be, as I stated in my 

testimony, as is stated in the FERC application, approximately $10 

billion over the lifetime of the project. 

Well, we put that in the application and so many people came 

back to us and said, well, that doesn’t really mean anything. What 

does that mean to me? That’s sort of like talking about the national 

debt. They asked us to break that down further. So we went back 

and we took that number, based on economic analysis of the market, this $10 billion savings, and we determined that it would be 

a savings to the region of $680 million a year. 

And then the economists went further in using their econometric 

modeling and government statistics on energy use, the price of energy, and they broke that down further into a number that now appears as the 300 to $400 per year annual average savings for both 

direct and indirect cost. 

Now what I have to point out is that that number reflects both 

customers who use natural gas and electricity. A majority of this 

natural gas is going to be used to generate electricity. So even people who do not have natural gas in their homes will actually realize 

a savings because of the lower cost of electricity. 

So that is sort of the long-winded response to a portion of your 

question, but I hope that responds. 

Mr. BISHOP. Yes. And I’m not trying to ask you to do something 

that—I’m not very good at predicting the future, I’m going to assume not too many people in here are or we would be playing the 

lottery. So, what level of certainty can you assign to that number? 

Because it just seems to me, I’m not an expert by any means in 

terms of how the energy market works and in terms of pricing, but 

it seems to me that if you have a set of costs that you’re estimating, one component of which is your operational cost which assumes—which includes security and that number is going to 

change. 

That number is going to be significantly higher than you’re anticipating, then the cost of delivering the energy is going to go up; 

therefore, you’re going to charge for more for that energy. So, I 

guess my question is can you or can you not tell us with any reasonable degree of certainty that the average Long Island family is 

going to save three or $400? 

Mr. HRITCKO. I think maybe the best response to our degree or 

level of certainty, Congressman, is the fact that we believe that the 

market is in such need of this gas and that this would be a longterm solution for this region that we are willing to invest a billion 

dollars in this facility to serve this region long-term. 

47

Mr. BISHOP. Is there any calculation of the cost to the taxpayer 

of the additional services that would be needed to be undertaken 

like the Coast Guard, by the Town of Riverhead, by Suffolk County, 

by the Town of Brookhaven, any of the localities along the shoreline of Connecticut, a calculation of what the cost to the taxpayer 

will be? 

Mr. HRITCKO. While I understand your desire to get to the figure, 

the situation that we’re in right now is that we’re at the beginning 

of the process of talking to emergency first responders on both 

sides of the Sound, not only on Long Island but also Connecticut 

and Rhode Island, folks like Mr. Johnson here who is the fire marshal for Riverhead and others like him. 

We will not only seek to determine what assets and capabilities 

are currently here but also what’s going to be needed and then develop an emergency response and security plan based upon that. 

That’s a long process. That’s going to take us quite some time and 

we’re in the early stage of the process. For me to speculate at this 

point wouldn’t be prudent. 

Mr. BISHOP. I guess my concern, my skepticism is that a positive 

number is being put out there at the beginning stages of this process but what might possibly be a negative number, that is to say 

the cost to the taxpayers for additional Coast Guard resources, the 

cost to the taxpayer for additional Town of Riverhead resources, 

that number remains an unknown until we’re much deeper into the 

process and I have some concern about that. 

Mr. HRITCKO. Let me clarify one point. That gets back to the 

original question. You seem to imply that the cost would somehow 

be reflected in the price. In fact, as I stated earlier, the price of 

natural gas is set by the open market. The price is what the price 

is, it’s not something that Broadwater or the suppliers will be able 

to dictate. The cost will be determined whether or not we either we 

make a profit or we don’t——

Mr. BISHOP. In other words, let me put this in terms I understand. To the extent that the cost associated with operating the 

Broadwater facilities, securing the Broadwater facilities, cautionary 

subjects—to the extent that that number is larger than you’re currently thinking it might be, the impact of that will be on the profit 

margin of Broadwater and not on the price of the energy that goes 

to the homes on Long Island? 

Mr. HRITCKO. Exactly. We have to decide whether or not we 

would go forward with this project if the cost became so large that 

it makes this project unviable. We don’t believe that it’s not viable. 

We think that those costs are in fact workable. 

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you very much. 

Congresswoman DeLauro. 

Ms. DELAURO. Thank you very much. Let me just—Dr. Flynn, I 

didn’t allow Captain Boynton to answer the question about what 

else is the Coast Guard is charged with protecting, what their 

scope of mission is, which is very broad and they do an excellent, 

excellent job. But the mission is the area of responsibility, Long Island Sound, Coastal Connecticut, North Shore of Long Island, 

South Shore of Long Island, three deep water ports; New London, 

New Haven, Bridgeport offshore, facilities located in Riverhead and 

Northport, search and rescue, ports, waterways, coastal security, 

48

aids to navigation, domestic acts and operation, environmental protection, living marine resources, marine safety, maritime law enforcement, illegal drug missions, MTSA regulated facilities, security zones during Naval unit escorts, maritime security presence, 

shoreside waterside security patrols, port infrastructure located 

within the sector the but not limited to, Millstone Nuclear Power 

Plant, U.S. Naval substations New London, Cross Sound Ferry, 

Bridgeport Port Jefferson Ferry, Electric Boat, U.S. Naval substations, securing zones at New London Naval Base. It goes on further here, just to tell you home heating oil reserve in New Haven, 

pipeline supplies, Department of Defense Connecticut and other 

States, coordinate the Department of Agriculture, the Department 

of Homeland Security, Water Security measures for Plum Island 

and——

Anyway, it is extensive and as I say they that do an unbelievable 

job. Now you have mentioned in your testimony that you believe 

that we ought to try to have new commitments in resources on the 

Federal, State, and local levels and undertake a community-oriented police services program, a COPS program. 

I might just add to you for your information here that the COPS 

program was eliminated inside the most recent past, eliminated 

though worked well. So in terms of thinking about how you expand 

operation from what we’re doing now and try to put a new system 

in place, Federal resources let alone State and local are almost 

nonexistent. Now I anticipate you will address some of those needs 

but not to the extent that you’re talking about. 

Now, the question is, do you think that you’ve got a safe and secure arrangement for local law enforcement currently to assume 

some of responsibility for providing security for these tankers at 

these terminals, local, your sense of local law enforcement in terms 

of this effort? 

Could the Coast Guard or local law enforcement realistically 

intercept a boat attack? Do you believe that the security zones created around the LNG tankers are adequate and that the Coast 

Guard is adequately armed and equipped to enforce these zones? 

Mr. FLYNN. The answer is no, there are not adequate resources 

here in the Long Island Sound to deal with the general challenge 

of implementing an on going layered security approach to this potential threat. The biggest opportunity to deal with a small boat attack on a ship is not the actual operation of the attack. 

You’re talking about a 20- to 30-second response time that you’re 

asking somebody in a small boat in a patrol craft to say this person 

is not a knuckle head but is actually somebody who is intent on 

a suicide attack on a ship. And then they have to be able to shoot 

at a moving target from something also moving. That’s a very difficult thing to do. 

The time that we find to intercept this is during—the bad guys 

would not just show up, get on a plane, come here, get on a Zodiac 

and decide to charge out and go after a tanker. They do surveillance and they do dry runs. With a suicide attack you get one bite 

at the apple, that’s it. That’s the time when you are best suited 

both to put in place a deterrent. 

When they go out there and patrol and see there is a presence 

and that the risk of failure goes up. But also, the detection goes 

49

up when you’re there. I worry about the current approach that the 

Coast Guard is taking because of the resources it has. All it allows 

us to do is an episodic patrol built around guesswork. 

We basically—they surge up for the evolution of an LNG shipment, a ship coming in, a tanker coming in, off-load, and then almost collapse with total exhaustion afterwards because it’s all the 

resources they have. And so basically the presence goes down in 

many cases. Now that is being made up in places like Boston Harbor, by locals who are helping out and some investment is coming 

at a cost. 

The fundamental issue here is as a Nation we’re simply not appreciating the fact that we are incredibly dependent on maritime 

environment for our way of life and our quality of life. And today 

we’ve been getting by on the cheap. The Coast Guard is the size 

of the NYPD and it’s responsible not just for the Continental U.S., 

but Hawaii and Alaska. It’s also operating in the Persian Gulf right 

now providing safety patrols as a part of our war effort over there. 

This is a very spread thin outfit. My last real job was as the Captain of the buoy tender here on the Long Island Sound from Block 

Island to East River, so I know these waters well. There isn’t a lot 

of presence out here. It’s a difficult area to patrol particularly in 

the middle of the Sound. It’s a doable issue in terms of managed 

risk if we’re willing to commit to the resources. Right now we have 

not done that and we don’t have the capacity, I think, to manage, 

not just the LNG issue but the broader issue of a lot of critical infrastructure, there’s a lot of waterways that remain a factor as a 

potential target for terrorist attack. 

Again, this seems crazy to me to spend the amount of resources we are. This year we will spend over $660 billion on our National 

security and intelligence apparatus to confront threats beyond our 

borders but we can’t seem to marshal hardly any effort here to 

safeguard the critical assets here at home. It just seems entirely 

backwards to me that we’re still operating this way. 

Ms. DELAURO. Thank you for your thoughtful approach to this 

issue. Mr. Hritcko, in its proposal Broadwater has stated that they 

will employ a private security company to patrol the FSRU task 

force meetings, public hearings that deal with concerns about the 

use of private security companies specifically. There are no provisions in current Connecticut statutes allowing for private security 

forces to be used in open waters. 

In fact, Connecticut does not provide any enforcement or arrest 

powers to either State or local law enforcement officials on open 

waters. Who, what agency or government entity has the right to 

bestow its powers on a private security force? Is there a licensing 

involved? What should be required of armed patrol boats and the 

employees of such companies? Do Connecticut and New York need 

to develop reciprocity language as far as enforcement or arrest 

powers are concerned? There are no clear boundaries on the open 

water. 

Mr. HRITCKO. Let me start by stating that we have not made the 

determination as yet as to whether we would in fact employ private 

security. This is one of issues that we’re discussing with first responders in both sides of the Sound. We may have to employ private security for that purpose. However, that’s part and parcel of 

50

the discussions that we’re now having with the first responders on 

both sides of the Sound 

Ms. DELAURO. One second. You said that Broadwater will have 

its own 24 hour a day security protecting the facility when it’s built 

as well as a staff of first responders, some of the secure staff maybe 

hired from an agency. That was from the Suffolk Life Newspaper 

on April 27. 

Mr. HRITCKO. Maybe, maybe, maybe. That’s the key thing. We’re 

in discussions right now with first responders for both sides of the 

Long Island Sound to discuss that matter and to develop those 

plans. In the Coast Guard’s WSR, they indicated there’s a number 

of ways in which we can ensure the safety and security of this facility. And our discussions are to be with these various agencies in 

order to define how in fact we will proceed forward. So for us to 

discuss, to say that that will in fact be the case, I cannot say that 

definitively right now. 

But what I can say is some of the issues that you raised in fact 

are legitimate issues. But I would also point to the fact that private 

security firms have been part of security operations for a number 

of facilities not only in New York State but in Connecticut and the 

nuclear plant. It’s also in occurrence in other parts of the United 

States including the Ports in Florida where cruise ships leave the 

harbors as well as other facilities, the LNG facilities here in the 

United States. 

So it’s not a new or innovative type of response. It’s something 

that we considered in terms of development of our emergency response. 

Ms. DELAURO. I’m just saying that Connecticut does not provide 

an enforcement authority or arrest powers to either State or local 

law enforcement on the open water. One of the other things I think 

that you said with regard to security that well, quote, ′′we will not 

burden the taxpayers with the cost of security for this facility.′′ Is 

that something you can state on the record as true? 

Mr. HRITCKO. We have said it before and I’ll say it again, it is 

true, yes, in fact that is true. This is no different from anywhere 

else that companies like Shell and TransCanada and other energy 

companies operate. We operated in the Gulf of Mexico for years and 

from the Texas shoreline to Louisiana, to the Mississippi shoreline 

where you have extensive offshore operations. 

We do not call on we do no burden those States with the extensive security and emergency operations. We have to provide it ourselves. Likewise in the North Sea, we have to provide that ourselves. Throughout the world—this is not something new. This isn’t 

something that’s unique for us. We do this every day and this is 

one of the a challenges of developing a project of this nature. 

Ms. DELAURO. I would say with regard to Connecticut as I understand it, and I, please correct me if this is incorrect, plan for 

law enforcement agencies, you have not addressed Connecticut at 

all yet a tanker travels through Connecticut waters and if tragically something happens there, it would be our local responders 

who would respond. 

As far as I know there have not been any conversations with regard to Connecticut and tankers traveling through Connecticut. I 

just pointed out that the Coast Guard does have the ability the 

51

stop ships without probable cause but local law does not at the moment. So that would require a different set of authorities. 

Mr. HRITCKO. Your first statement that we have not considered 

Connecticut is wrong. We have spent a great deal of time in Connecticut. The WSR addresses the issue of the routes traversing 

Long Island Sound the tankers would make. In fact, we have already begun engaging Connecticut first responders on a number of 

different levels with regard to the emergency response and safety 

and security plans for Broadwater. 

In fact, they point out to us that they see benefits in the future 

if Broadwater were operational had the assets out there. I should 

just point out to you, Congresswoman, as you are well aware that 

the second largest port in New England is there in New Haven 

Harbor. 

Ms. DELAURO. You don’t have to tell me. 

Mr. HRITCKO. You have ships coming in from all over the world, 

not only petroleum products but other cargoes that need to be protected but at the same time, there is not the single fire fighting tug 

in Long Island Sound or in the Port of New Haven. If you stop to 

think about the future of Long Island Sound with the Broadwater 

facility here, with the assets that we would bring to the table, it 

would help the Long Island Sound under a mutual aide packet that 

would be developed within the emergency response plan. We could 

now offer some cover for marine type of activities. 

Ms. DELAURO. We pay a very high price for that Mr. Hritcko, 

and I will tell you that the Federal Government in its recent budget cut out fire fighting assistance and grants which would allow 

municipalities like New Haven and others to get the kind of equipment they need to do the job that they need. The introduction of 

this Broadwater facility would create an unbearable burden on locations within our State and within the State of New York. 

I would dare to say to you at this moment that the difficulties 

and the inability with regard to resources to address these efforts 

certainly, I mean, outweigh at the moment, the benefits of what 

you are talking about. And I don’t believe there’s a public official 

in the State of Connecticut, a public official in the State of New 

York and community groups and individuals, who believe that this 

will inure to the best, to continued safety of both of our States. 

Don’t get me started on that. 

Mr. HRITCKO. I would comment——

Mr. FLYNN. One thing I would like to add and I think it is important to keep in context and that is the LNG tanker is not a particularly soft target. It’s very difficult because of the way it is designed 

for a small boat to be able to successfully breech an internal tank. 

The amount of explosive required, that scenario would be very difficult. I think what’s important to keep in balance here is that 

there are so many other soft targets in the maritime community of 

which there are inadequate resources. So it’s hard for me to say 

LNG by definition raises the risk up tremendously. 

It’s brought focus on an issue that all communities face and I 

share your concerns and outrage that we’re not able to marshal 

Federal resources to provide better preparedness to get the States 

involved, but overall attacking a tanker in the middle of the Sound 

is a difficult thing to do and its consequence on populations won’t 

52

be there. If I’m an adversary, I’m going after the heart of New 

Haven, and bigger population because it would cause a bigger disruption of that harbor. I guess part of the issue——

Ms. DELAURO. I think as I said it is very balanced testimony and 

I much appreciate the balanced view. I would just say in interpreting what you’re saying, we had a total inability, if you want to 

talk about a Nation in all levels of government that could not respond or privately individuals that could not respond, it’s the national disaster of hurricanes. 

You take a look at Katrina. There was—this didn’t come from 

outside. This came from within. And the government at all levels 

failed the people on the Gulf Coast and are continuing in my view 

to fail them in terms of their ability to try to pick up and to move 

on. 

What we’re trying to do here is to be preemptive and try to take 

a look at what is necessary in order to meet a need. And so far I 

don’t believe we have the review that the resources are there in 

order to be able to handle this and other venues. 

Mr. HRITCKO. Congresswoman, I appreciate your position on this. 

I’m not here to debate on how we got to where we are. This is the 

type of debate that we need to have around how we’re going to 

meet our needs in the future and also recognize all of the aspects 

of this facility. I’m just simply stating to you what I’ve been told 

by some of the emergency first responders who are charged with 

ensuring safety and security of our ports, harbors, and people and 

we have to recognize that there, in fact, some upsides to having 

those facilities in the Sound. 

Ms. DELAURO. Mr. Chairman, if I might, the question I asked of 

the last panel; where will the vessel be constructed? 

Mr. HRITCKO. Likely in an Asian shipyard because those are 

the—Korea or Japan because those are a shipyards that are currently constructing LNG carriers. Most of the LNG carriers are 

specialized vessels and require specialized equipment. This is simply an LNG carrier without propulsion. So the United States is 

good at building nuclear submarines and other specialties ships. 

They don’t build any LNG carriers at the time so I would say it’s 

highly unlikely we will see the LNG carrier built here. 

Ms. DELAURO. Will there be U.S. crews, or are the tankers foreign flagged; will there be U.S. crews on these ships? 

Mr. HRITCKO. With regard—Broadwater will own and operate the 

terminal itself so we don’t have a position or an understanding specifically of what the tankers will have. There may be a variety. We 

expect, looking at the international fleet which is a number somewhere in the order of 100, 185 LNG carriers at the current level 

that they would probably be a combination. 

Ms. DELAURO. A combination of foreign flagged——

Mr. HRITCKO. Foreign flagged, a combination of crews. We’re 

looking at an international trade with multiple parties both developing the LNG——

Ms. DELAURO. I’m told there are no U.S.-flagged——

Mr. HRITCKO. That’s right. There are no U.S.-flagged vessels. 

Mr. FLYNN. I think it’s important to keep in mind here there are 

only just under 300 U.S.-flagged vessels of greater than 1,000 tons. 

So there is not a whole lot out there period. So it would with very 

53

unlikely under current market forces that this would be a U.S.-

flagged vessel. 

Mr. BISHOP. My understanding is there are no U.S.-flagged vessels of 200 vessels currently importing LNG, none of them which 

are U.S.-flagged vessels. My understanding further is that there 

are approximately 100 vessels that are expected to be constructed 

over the next several months—several years, pardon me—and none 

of them will be U.S.-flagged vessels. It will be all foreign flagged 

vessels. 

They will be crewed in large part by non-U.S. national crews and 

therefore not subject to the jurisdiction or to the oversight of the 

Coast Guard in the same way that Merchant Marines of the United 

States would be subject. And I think that’s one of the concerns that 

I have is that these tankers are going to be transiting within a 

mile or mile and a half of both the New York coast and some cases 

the Connecticut coast and we don’t know a thing about who is on 

them. 

And my further understanding is that because LNG, the need for 

LNG is growing, that there is a crew shortage and that certain carriers are ocean crewed from other carriers. Thus we have crews on 

boats with which they are not familiar and these are highly sophisticated and highly complex boats, all of which seems to be—gives 

rise to enormous concern about the safety and the way in which 

the LNG would get to the terminal. Can you comment on that, Mr. 

Hritcko. 

Mr. HRITCKO. Yes. Congressman, I am afraid your information is 

not correct about security and safety of crews. In fact, it doesn’t 

matter whether it is a U.S. crew or a foreign national crew, they 

are subject to security reviews both international and U.S. security 

reviews by the Coast Guard. 

There is a 96 hour requirement to report who is on board, what 

the vessel is carrying, when it’s going to arrive. There’s extensive 

review of the vessel before it leaves it ports of origin before proceeding to the United States so there is the tremendous amount of 

security on that vessel. 

Mr. BISHOP. Let me interrupt you. Is the international review, 

does it rise to the same level the same standard as the United 

States’ review. 

Mr. HRITCKO. The international parties have all signed onto the 

same standards that the United States——

Mr. BISHOP. Do you have the same level of confidence or is it reasonable for us to have the same level of confidence in the international review that we would have for a domestic boat. 

Mr. HRITCKO. Clearly there’s some parties that are more stringent on their requirements than others, but we have had no incident with LNG throughout the history of LNG of having a problem 

with the crews or ships. And we have come from all parts of the 

world including Algeria. I point out in Algeria was our largest supplier of LNG in Boston Harbor for many years and we’ve never had 

a problem. So if history is a prelude to what we are seeing in the 

future, we have had extensive and very good operating history on 

that. 

The other point that I would point out to you, yes, we are in fact 

in a growing business. There is a large number of carriers that are 

54

going to be needed in the future. Your numbers are approximately 

correct. We’re doubling the size of the LNG fleet that we just had 

in effect over the last 10 years. So there will be a tremendous need 

for crews. However, crews have to be competent, they have to be 

experienced, and they have to be cost effective for these vessels to 

be operating. And those are key elements so we will have to look 

at all avenues of being able to double the size of that fleet and have 

competent and effective crews on board these vessels. 

Ms. DELAURO. Mr. Chair, just I think that it would interesting 

to know that I understand Shell Oil will build 28 ships, none of 

them will be U.S.-flagged. You mentioned Algeria, not in connection with Boston, but in January 2004 Algeria. . . Explosion. . . 

Massive vapor cloud, fire, explosion and fires destroyed a portion 

of the LNG tanker, caused death injury. . . . Outside the plant outside of the plant’s boundaries. 

Mr. FLYNN. If I may, Mr. Chairman. The reality is we have a 

global industry here in the Merchant Marine, and the real challenge is are we setting adequate standards throughout that industry to assure that whoever is coming through, whether from Des 

Moines or from Dubai or wherever, that, in fact, that there’s adequate security for that vessel. I think there has been some improvement since 9/11. Of the industry and crews that I worry 

about, LNG falls low in that area because of, one, you have to double the size of the crews normally available for a vessel of similar 

size. The level of qualification is so high that the ability to run an 

internal conspiracy within that ship would be very difficult without 

being noticed. 

And also it becomes like a milk run, it’s the same vessel, it’s the 

same process, and it’s much easier therefore to vet. So some of the 

other safeguards in place, the issue of foreign crew and of course 

within U.S. waters, Block Island Sound here, it will be highly 

boarded it will be met and escort, so we’ll know exactly what’s coming when it’s coming. 

I’ve made the pitch that what we should do though is have point 

of origin inspections. We should have a government agent at the 

loading point and ideally even ride out with the LNG to the sea 

buoy so you have confidence what it’s vetted is what’s leaving. 

Then you know by ongoing tracking what gets here and you don’t 

have to worry so much about the in between, you track the vessel 

all the way over. 

But I would like to see like we do with containers these point of 

origin controls, to these hazardous cargoes a similar approach and 

then you can basically improve the confidence vetting improves, 

vetting the vessel. 

And clearly while it’s being loaded would be an ideal time to do 

that. That’s a resource issue, having resources to be given to people. Given the hazards involved, I think it’s worth making that investment. 

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you very much. I just have one more question. From Mr. Johnson we’ve heard an awful lot about relying on 

local resources, we heard about cost sharing, just tell me, Wading 

River Fire Department, all volunteer, what do you need to do? 

What needs to believe added in terms of personnel in terms of 

equipment, to respond to a fire a mile and a half offshore, nine 

55

point two miles offshore, just walk us through what your thought 

process would be and what additional resources you would have to 

have in order to have any hope of reasonably responding in such 

an emergency. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, as I said earlier, I think one of the challenges that we have is we need to be become better educated as 

emergency first responders to exactly what this hazard is and to 

becoming more familiar with all of the body of knowledge that’s out 

there. This is certainly something that’s new. 

However, we’re used to dealing with our own hazards. If we have 

structure fire, if we have a vehicle fire, if we have a rescue close 

to shore, we trained for that, we’re comfortable, we’re competent in 

that. This is something that is very new and very foreign. 

So, yes, there are definitely going to be assets but we are not as 

far along in our understanding of this process for example as the 

Coast Guard is. So I don’t feel that we can develop a list of assets 

yet. There are certainly going to be things that are going to be 

needed. As Captain Boynton said, I think my role now is to point 

out that there are going to be additional assets and not only physical assets, possibly personnel, certainly additional training. 

Even as we go through the process of looking at appropriate mitigation strategies and understanding the components of an emergency response plan, the officers, the chiefs, and commissioners 

that are part of the local response force need to get up to speed in 

terms of the body of knowledge that’s out there. So I have to beg 

off on the question just a little bit and say that there will be additional assets that will be necessary, there will be additional personnel that need to be trained but exactly what extent, I don’t 

think it’s fair to give you an estimate on the record to that. 

I think one other point, while we look at our partnerships and 

I know the Coast Guard is too, that anybody in this area is concerned with security, I don’t think that it’s appropriate that we 

give every local first responder all the assets and the personnel and 

the training that would be necessary to handle an event. We have 

resources on the coast of Suffolk County. We have resources in 

Connecticut. We have Coast Guard resources. We have police assets, do we think about those in terms of security, they’re certainly 

available for rescue and you might be able to equip them for fire 

fighting. 

So I think that we can better utilize our resources as we go 

through this process of appropriate mitigation strategy and our response plan. So that we’re not duplicating, because resources are 

obviously extremely tight. I think we want to be able to take again 

the strengths we have on both coasts of both States to make sure 

we are as well equipped as possible but would do so as economically or financially responsible as we can. 

Mr. BISHOP. One other question. Mr. Hritcko, the two projects recently licensed off of Massachusetts, both 12 plus miles offshore, 

very little local opposition, and that there was both Coast Guard—

they were licensed both by the Coast Guard and the Maritime Administration. Why not put Broadwater 12 plus miles offshore? Why 

this location and why not an alternate location that would be safer 

perhaps and have less concerns with respect to interference with 

commercial fishing, recreational boating, whatever it is, and cerVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:12 Nov 07, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00069 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\35919 HTRANS1 PsN: JASON
56

tainly using Massachusetts as a model, less local opposition, so 

why not move in that direction? 

Mr. HRITCKO. We did an extensive, very extensive alternatives 

analysis as I point in my testimony and is contained in the FERC 

application, both, as I said before, onshore and offshore locations 

both Long Island Sound and else where. What drove our decision 

was essentially three things; reliability of that supply, the ability 

to move the gas to the market to meet the market’s needs, and 

safety and security. 

We had defined the best location in order to meet these three key 

areas, so that we could provide plentiful, affordable, reliable supply 

to this region. This location on the Long Island Sound did just that. 

That is why the——

Mr. BISHOP. Let me interrupt. Are you suggesting that the Massachusetts facilities failed that test? 

Mr. HRITCKO. No, not at all. Massachusetts facilities we looked 

at the characteristics of the market in that particular area and 

those proposals were acceptable and you had said very little opposition. I beg to differ. But if you look at the record there was a tremendous amount of opposition because they had a lot of activity 

particularly in the locations they had because of fishing and other 

areas out there. But the fact of the matter is you have to look at 

these on an individual basis at each location. 

We looked at this region to serve the New York Long Island Connecticut market region specifically and we found that after our extensive review that this location would be the best location to serve 

this region. 

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you. 

Congresswoman DeLauro. 

Ms. DELAURO. Just to make a comment and I have a final question for Mr. Hritcko. Dr. Flynn, I, too, understand the increase of, 

you know, globalization and what that means in terms of vetting 

crews, et cetera. A totally different example that maybe, I hope I’m 

not comparing apples to oranges. I chair the Subcommittee on Agriculture, the Appropriations Committee, and that committee has jurisdiction over the Food and Drug Administration. 

I think most recently we have seen, and this is an area of real 

globalization, we are looking at continued volume of imported food 

into the United States. 

Quite frankly we do not have, we’re now looking at equivalent 

standards in terms of products et cetera that’s coming into the 

United States. We see yesterday’s New York Times that we have 

product coming in terms of drugs killing 88 people in I think, I’m 

not sure if it was Haiti—Panama, in any case I understand that 

we are in a global economy, global world but I think it goes to your 

point that unless we are willing to deal with technology and the 

resources that allow us to monitor the process of what is happening 

with what’s coming into the United States, whether it’s a or whether it’s a product, that it’s not going to put at risk the safety here. 

We’re not shutting down our borders. We want to have our borders open. But we certainly want to protect it and the incidents I 

am dealing with, we want to protect the public health with regard 

to food and drugs. We want to deal with protecting—with crew or 

anyone else—where there are standards that are internationally 

57

reviewed and reviewed so that we know that the people are being 

trained here and the people that are being trained at Broadwater 

have the same kind of training so that we’re putting everyone not 

at risk but we’re ensuring their safeguard and I watch it fail on 

one side, failing miserably on one side so it’s of concern. 

Mr. FLYNN. I couldn’t agree with you more that globalization 

needs sustainable paths to figure out how we manage these risks 

within that context. The good news on the maritime story is—well, 

it’s sort of good news bad news. From my perspective, I wish we 

had this conversation in the late 1950s and ’60s about the 

globalization of the maritime industry, from a merchant mariner’s 

standpoint I wish we had that conversation here. We didn’t. 

The good news side of that is for 50 years we have been developing an international regime that deals with this risk that doesn’t 

exist within the food sector. So there is a baseline to build a advanced standard that’s fairly rigorous, not nearly where I want it 

to be but it’s much further along. 

I often point to these other sectors looking at models in the Maritime realm that can be drawn with a lot more teeth in them, a lot 

more explicit——

Ms. DELAURO. I want to see ships coming into our ports as well 

where we know what the cargo is and we have a way of dealing 

with that and we have not been able to deal with that in the last 

several years. 

Final question for me, Mr. Hritcko, the floating storage unit with 

regard to hurricanes, and help us in this regard. What size hurricane could it withstand? You looked at the offshore terminals in 

the gulf and they failed in Katrina and Rita. Can you describe by 

the design of Broadwater, is it more likely to survive a Katrina or 

Rita like storm? 

Mr. HRITCKO. This facility is designed to withstand a category 

five hurricane. A Katrina type of hurricane. We know from looking 

at the records and we know from meteorological data and whatnot 

that the occurrence of a category five is virtually impossible in this 

area. As a matter of fact, the storm of record that everyone points 

to is the 1938 hurricane and that was the equivalent to a category 

three. 

So this facility could withstand the ’38 hurricane and much more 

beyond that. I think from our analysis and from what our engineers have said, that we would have much larger problems elsewhere if Broadwater were hit by a larger storm of that nature. 

Ms. DELAURO. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you very much. I am going to excercise the 

Chair’s prerogative to have the final word. And that is it seems 

that there’s only one known, and that known is that we will become increasingly reliant upon LNG as an energy source. And virtually everything else is unknown. We don’t know how much it is 

going to cost for the Coast Guard to secure this facility. We don’t 

know if the Coast Guard has the resources. We don’t know at what 

cost to the other functions the Coast Guard has to undertake that 

securing this facility will take. We don’t know what demands will 

be placed on local government. We don’t know what those will cost. 

We don’t know to what extent their ability to step up to the plate 

58

in terms of providing security or response. And will it effect their—

their ability to do their core functions. We don’t know with any degree of certainty, respectfully, Mr. Hritcko, whether or not this 

$300 number is a number that we can rely upon. We don’t even 

know what gas is going to cost tomorrow. 

So it seems to me, as I said, we have one known. We have a 

great many unknowns. And in my own view, that there be unknowns, the absence of answers, and the risks that’s involved suggest that at this time it’s not prudent to move forward on this 

project. 

But with that, let me thank our panelists for their testimony. I 

know you also came a great distance some of you to be here. It was 

very important testimony and I thank all of you for coming. The 

hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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