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FLIGHT 253: LEARNING LESSONS FROM AN 

AVERTED TRAGEDY 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

JANUARY 27, 2010 

Serial No. 111–51 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi, Chairman 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

JANE HARMAN, California 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

HENRY CUELLAR, Texas 

CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania 

YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York 

LAURA RICHARDSON, California 

ANN KIRKPATRICK, Arizona 

BEN RAY LUJA ́ N, New Mexico 

WILLIAM L. OWENS, New York 

BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey 

EMANUEL CLEAVER, Missouri 

AL GREEN, Texas 

JAMES A. HIMES, Connecticut 

MARY JO KILROY, Ohio 

ERIC J.J. MASSA, New York 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

PETER T. KING, New York 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

PETE OLSON, Texas 

ANH ‘‘JOSEPH’’ CAO, Louisiana 

STEVE AUSTRIA, Ohio 

I. LANIER AVANT, Staff Director 

ROSALINE COHEN, Chief Counsel 

MICHAEL TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

ROBERT O’CONNOR, Minority Staff Director 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security .. 1 

The Honorable Peter T. King, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of New York, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland Security ........ 2 

The Honorable Laura Richardson, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of California: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 5 

WITNESSES

Ms. Jane Holl Lute, Deputy Secretary, Department of Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 24 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 26 

Mr. Patrick F. Kennedy, Under Secretary, Management, Department of State: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 31 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 33 

Mr. Michael E. Leiter, Director, National Counterterrorism Center: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 36 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 38 

FOR THE RECORD

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security: 

Statement Submitted by Eileen R. Larence, Director, Homeland Security 

and Justice Issues, and Stephen M. Lord, Director, Homeland Security 

and Justice Issues, Government Accountability Office ................................. 6 

Statement Submitted by the American Civil Liberties Union ......................... 17 

APPENDIX

Questions Submitted by Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee for Jane Holl Lute, 

Deputy Secretary, Department of Homeland Security ..................................... 81 

Questions Submitted by Chairman Bennie G. Thompson for Michael E. 

Leiter, Director, National Counterterrorism Center ......................................... 84 

Questions Submitted by Honorable Christopher P. Carney for Michael E. 

Leiter, Director, National Counterterrorism Center ......................................... 84 

(1) 

FLIGHT 253: LEARNING LESSONS FROM AN 

AVERTED TRAGEDY 

Wednesday, January 27, 2010 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, 

WASHINGTON, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:03 a.m., in Room 311, 

Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Bennie G. Thompson [Chairman of the committee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Thompson, Harman, DeFazio, Jackson 

Lee, Carney, Clarke, Richardson, Kirkpatrick, Luja ́n, Owens, Pascrell, Cleaver, Green, Himes, Kilroy, Titus, King, Souder, Lungren, 

Rogers, McCaul, Dent, Bilirakis, Broun, Miller, Olson, and Austria. 

Chairman THOMPSON [presiding]. The Committee on Homeland 

Security will come to order. The committee is meeting today to receive testimony on ‘‘Flight 253: Learning Lessons from an Averted 

Tragedy.’’ 

Good morning. I would like to thank our witnesses for being here 

today. Today’s hearing will examine the circumstances surrounding 

the attempted Christmas day bombing of Northwest Flight 253. 

This committee will examine what happened, why it happened, and 

what this Nation can do to make sure it does not happen again. 

We all know the facts. Abdulmutallab boarded Northwest Flight 

253 in Amsterdam bound for Detroit. As the plane entered Detroit’s 

airspace, he removed chemicals concealed in his clothing and mixed 

them together with the intention of causing an explosion. Thankfully, he failed. Courageous passengers and crew subdued and restrained him until the plane landed, and he was taken into custody. 

Since September 11, this Nation has spent billions of dollars to 

fix the aviation security system, yet 9 years later it is clear that 

the safeguards put in place during the last administration did not 

prevent another terrorist from boarding a plane and trying to do 

harm to Americans. 

This single failed terrorist act has brought those unsolved security vulnerabilities into sharp focus. Security weaknesses in the 

process of gaining legal admission to this country, gaps in the collection and dissemination of information, a confusing plethora of 

lists used to identify dangerous individuals, stovepipes that impede 

the progress of information analysis and sharing, and inconsistencies in the use of screening technology all combine to create the 

situation faced by the passengers on Flight 253. 

The 9/11 Commission identified many of these problems, and 

while the previous administration engaged in much movement to 
2 

solve these problems, it appears that movement and progress are 

not the same. Within 2 weeks of this incident, President Obama 

issued his preliminary report. The President’s report found incoherent, systematic weaknesses, and human errors were the root cause 

of the intelligence failures that led to this incident. 

To any reasonable observer, one fact was certain. The system did 

not work. In fact, the President ordered a series of corrective actions, a clear and unflinching assessment followed by quick action 

designed to address this long-known vulnerability must be commended. 

But it is important for all of us to realize that we will not address our problems with terrorism in a blink of an eye with a single technology. This Nation must begin to adopt a layered approach 

to achieve a secure environment. We must not begin our security 

assessment at the airport gate. 

I want to thank our witnesses, and I look forward to their testimony. 

The Chairman now recognizes the Ranking Member of the full 

committee, the gentleman from New York, Mr. King, for an opening statement. 

Mr. KING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Like you, I want to thank 

the witnesses for their testimony here today. 

I think this is an especially critical hearing. Everyone knows 

mistakes are made. Mistakes do happen. I think what concerns us 

and what should concern us as we go forward is how those mistakes are addressed and what is being done to protect our Nation 

in the future and to protect those types of mistakes from happening 

again. 

Mr. Chairman, one of the concerns I have is what appears to me 

an uncoordinated response from the intelligence community. I say 

that not just based on what we have learned over the past month, 

but also from watching the Senate hearings last week, from looking 

at the testimony, listening to what former Congressman Hamilton 

had to say yesterday. 

I say that is I still can’t determine who is in charge, who makes 

the decisions. If we go back to the 2006 event, the liquid explosives 

from London, clearly, the Department of Homeland Security was in 

charge. It was Secretary Chertoff who was out front. It was Kip 

Hawley, head of TSA, who was out in front. 

This time there was really no one in front. Secretary Napolitano 

made several appearances. Mr. Brennan made several appearances. But it appears that there was no one who was coordinating 

this from beginning to end. There was no one who was going to be 

out in front. 

I am concerned what the role—I asked Deputy Secretary Lute 

just during her testimony what DHS sees as its role as being, and 

I know in your statement, I have heard Secretary Napolitano say 

this, that the Department is a consumer of intelligence. I thought 

when the Department was created, we expected more of an affirmative role by the Department, again, as what did occur, I thought, 

in the last several years of the previous administration. 

I am not making this a political issue, but if this administration 

is deciding to change emphasis, then I think we should know that, 

as to who is going to be the main coordinator here. 
3 

Also, I think it is important for the President to come forward 

and to establish some order in the intelligence community. I saw 

Lee Hamilton said yesterday, ‘‘I do not believe the President yet 

has a firm grasp of the intelligence community.’’ 

All of us are aware that in the past 6 or 8 months, there has 

been an open dispute between Admiral Blair and Director Panetta. 

That has not been resolved, and if it is resolved, it is resolved at 

the margins. That feud, if you will, is still there. 

We find out that the main decisions, some of the key decisions 

that were made on December 25 were not made by anyone in the 

intelligence community, but apparently by the Justice Department, 

and then after that it appears the main player was the White 

House itself, John Brennan, neither of whom is part of the intelligence community. 

If we are going to have an effective response and effective defense set up, I believe that the professionals in the intelligence field 

should have more to say. The departments and agencies that have 

been created for that purpose should be in the forefront. 

So the whole issue of the Miranda warning—currently, no one— 

no one here today, nor Director Blair nor Director Panetta were 

consulted when that decision was made. It was made by the Justice 

Department, apparently. 

Similarly, let me add on that, when it comes to the Justice Department being involved, it was the attorney general, who we have 

learned, and some of us have known it for a while, but it has now 

become public, when he made the decision to bring the 9/11 trials 

to New York, he never consulted with one person, not one person 

in New York—police commissioner, anyone of the State police, anyone of the U.S. Marshals. 

No one was consulted about the security implications of that, 

which appears to be what was repeated on Christmas day when the 

Justice Department made this decision without getting any input 

from anyone else in the intelligence community. 

Let me also make a point here, and I want to make this very 

clearly. I hope this will be a bipartisan point. I am outraged by the 

lack of information we have gotten from this administration since 

Christmas day. The previous administration—I will ask the Chairman to vouch for me on this—again, using the liquid explosive incident in London, from the night before and for every day and every 

hour after that, we received any information we asked for, that we 

requested. It was given to us. We were told what was classified, 

what was not to be made public. 

In this case on Christmas night, the White House—and I have 

heard this from a number of people—told other agencies and departments not to give information out. We could not get anything. 

Whatever we got was on our own. We were not given any information. I believe John Brennan has set up an iron curtain of secrecy 

in the White House and wants to control the intelligence community. He wants to control the information. 

I ask the Chairman, again, to back me on this, and he can disagree if he wishes. I don’t know one item in the last—when I was 

Chairman or he was Chairman or either of us was Ranking Member, one bit of information that was given to us that was ever 
4 

leaked out if it was classified. We never got one complaint from the 

Department of Homeland Security or from NCTC or CIA or anyone. 

But now going back to September, but especially this Christmas 

day, I believe that the White House is trying to control intelligence, 

is trying to control counterterrorism, and it is doing it in a way 

which is highly restricting the powers of the departments here involved and is cutting off the Congress from the information we 

have to have. 

We have constituents, we have responsibilities. This cannot be 

something where the White House gets all the information, massages it, manages it, and then puts out the facts later on. So I am 

putting that at the foot of John Brennan. 

I am putting it also at the foot of Attorney General Holder the 

fact that decisions are being made by him almost unilaterally that 

should be made by the professionals in the field, certainly in consultation with people who can agree or disagree on these decisions. 

But to have them unilaterally made by someone who is outside 

what I believe is the intelligence world is wrong. I think the President should address that. 

I also believe that as far as Congress, we have a different role 

of that information. We have time and time again have had to 

bring resolutions frequently to get information. On this in particular, I know that an iron curtain came down on Christmas night. 

That was wrong. 

It doesn’t matter who is in power, whether Republican or Democrat, we need information as Members of Congress to get the job 

done. We are not getting it done, and I fault this administration. 

It is disgraceful and outrageous, and I put that at John Brennan. 

I yield back. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you very much. 

Ranking Member King is partially correct in terms of the committee’s need to know with respect to any of this. I absolutely support his premise that this committee has a function. It cannot function without information in real time. That information should not 

be gleaned from the news media, but it should be gleaned from the 

proper source. It should not be screened. 

But I would also say that the Secretary Lute, Deputy Secretary 

Lute, did contact me the night of Christmas on this event, and I 

think she probably reached out to you. But now, I am not aware 

of anybody else who tried to get in touch with us. 

Mr. KING. Deputy Secretary Lute reached out to me, discussed 

what was going to be done as far as the future, as far as airline 

precautions, but nothing about the facts of this case. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Okay, well—— 

Mr. KING. We were told by other agencies they could not give us 

any information. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Well, no question the committee has the 

right to know, and others have a responsibility to provide it, and 

we will pursue that also. 

Other Members of the committee are reminded that under committee rules, opening statements may be submitted for the record. 

[The statement of Hon. Richardson follows:] 
5 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HONORABLE LAURA RICHARDSON

JANUARY 27, 2010 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for convening this very important hearing today focusing on the circumstances surrounding the attempted terrorist bombing of Northwest 

Flight 253 on December 25, 2009. It is important for the House to get answers regarding the events of that day. I thank our distinguished panel of witnesses for appearing before us today to share with us the lessons learned from this averted tragedy. 

Like millions of Americans, I am a frequent air traveler, which makes the events 

of December 25 particularly personal to us all. While air travel still ranks as one 

of the safest ways to travel, this is an industry where a single incident can become 

an enormous tragedy. Beyond the lives lost and the damage to our economy, both 

the air travel industry and the Nation suffers as the public loses confidence in the 

integrity of our homeland security system. 

It is disturbing to think what could have happened without the brave actions of 

the passengers aboard Flight 253. Those passengers are heroes and we cannot 

thank them enough for what they did. But what the committee is focusing on today 

is what should have happened, what systems should have worked, before we 

reached that point. 

There are several questions to be explored today: (1) Why our intelligence agencies did not connect the dots regarding the suspect, (2) the efficiency of our visa and 

watch lists systems, (3) the expanding nature of al-Quaeda, and (4) what technology 

we use, or should be using, that would have prevented the events of December 25. 

Also, I think we need to address why all the Members of this committee were not 

notified and briefed in a timely fashion. 

In the days and hours immediately after Christmas day, Members of this committee were not briefed by the administration or TSA. As Members of the committee 

tasked with jurisdiction over the agencies responsible for security, that cannot be 

allowed to happen again. I look forward to working with the Chairman, my colleagues, and the administration to ensure that timely and meaningful consultation 

and information sharing takes place. 

I look forward to the testimony of our distinguished panel of witnesses. We need 

to know exactly what went wrong and what we can do to prevent these repeated 

mistakes from happening again. 

Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for convening this hearing. I yield back the balance of my time. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Before I welcome our witnesses, I want to 

indicate that Secretary Napolitano was invited to this hearing. We 

were told that she would be out of the country. I now understand 

she is no longer out of the country, but she is not here, so maybe 

Deputy Secretary Lute, you can pull us in on where the Secretary 

is. 

Our first witness is Dr. Jane Holl Lute, the Deputy Secretary for 

the Department of Homeland Security. Dr. Lute has been before 

the committee a number of times and has been very straightforward in her presentations, and we appreciate that. 

Our second witness is Mr. Patrick Kennedy, Under Secretary of 

Management at the Department of State. Our final witness is Mr. 

Michael Leiter, Director of the National Counterterrorism Center. 

Without objection, the witnesses’ full statement and a statement 

provided by GAO and a statement by the ACLU will be inserted 

into the record. I now ask each witness to summarize their statement for 5 minutes, beginning with Deputy Secretary Lute. 

[The statements of the Government Accountability Office and the 

American Civil Liberties Union follow:] 
6 

STATEMENT OF EILEEN R. LARENCE, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY AND JUSTICE

ISSUES, AND STEPHEN M. LORD, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY AND JUSTICE

ISSUES, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

JANUARY 27, 2010 

GAO HIGHLIGHTS

Highlights of GAO–10–401T, a statement for the record to the Committee on 

Homeland Security, House of Representatives. 

Why GAO Did This Study 

The December 25, 2009, attempted bombing of Flight 253 raised questions about 

the Federal Government’s ability to protect the homeland and secure the commercial aviation system. This statement focuses on the Government’s efforts to use the 

terrorist watch list to screen individuals and determine if they pose a threat, and 

how failures in this process contributed to the December 25 attempted attack. This 

statement also addresses the Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) 

planned deployment of technologies for enhanced explosive detection and the challenges associated with this deployment. GAO’s comments are based on products 

issued from September 2006 through October 2009 and selected updates in January 

2010. For these updates, GAO reviewed Government reports related to the December 25 attempted attack and obtained information from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and TSA on use of the watch list and new technologies for 

screening airline passengers. 

What GAO Recommends 

GAO is not making new recommendations, but has made recommendations in 

prior reports to DHS, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the White 

House Homeland Security Council to enhance the use of the watch list and to TSA 

related to checkpoint technologies. The agencies generally agreed and are making 

some progress, but full implementation is needed. 

HOMELAND SECURITY.—BETTER USE OF TERRORIST WATCH LIST INFORMATION AND IMPROVEMENTS IN DEPLOYMENT OF PASSENGER CHECKPOINT TECHNOLOGIES COULD

FURTHER STRENGTHEN SECURITY

What GAO Found 

The intelligence community uses standards of reasonableness to evaluate individuals for nomination to the consolidated terrorist watch list. In making these determinations, agencies are to consider information from all available sources. However, 

for the December 25 subject, the intelligence community did not effectively complete 

these steps and link available information to the subject before the incident. Therefore, agencies did not nominate the individual to the watch list or any of the subset 

lists that are used during agency screening processes, such as the ‘‘No-Fly’’ list. 

Weighing and responding to the potential impacts that changes to the nomination 

criteria would have on the traveling public will be an important consideration in determining what changes may be needed. Also, screening agencies stated that they 

do not check against all records in the watch list, partly because screening against 

certain records may not be needed to support a respective agency’s mission or may 

not be possible because of the requirements of computer programs used to check individuals against watch list records. In October 2007, GAO reported that not checking against all records may pose a security risk and recommended that DHS and 

the FBI assess potential vulnerabilities, but they have not completed these assessments. TSA is implementing an advanced airline passenger prescreening program— 

known as Secure Flight—that could potentially result in the Federal Government 

checking passengers against the entire watch list under certain security conditions. 

Further, the Government lacks an up-to-date strategy and implementation plan— 

supported by a clearly defined leadership or governance structure—which are needed to enhance the effectiveness of terrorist-related screening and ensure accountability for the process. In the 2007 report, GAO recommended that the Homeland 

Security Council ensure that a governance structure exists that has the requisite 

authority over the watch list process. The council did not comment on this recommendation. 

As GAO reported in October 2009, since TSA’s creation, 10 passenger screening 

technologies have been in various phases of research, development, procurement, 

and deployment, including the Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT)—formerly 

known as the Whole Body Imager. TSA expects to have installed almost 200 AITs 

in airports by the end of calendar year 2010 and plans to install a total of 878 units 
7 

1GAO, Terrorist Watchlist Screening: Opportunities Exist to Enhance Management Oversight, 

Reduce Vulnerabilities in Agency Screening Processes, and Expand Use of the List, GAO–08–110 

(Washington, DC: Oct. 11, 2007). 2See GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO–09–271 (Washington, DC: January 2009), for 

our most recent update. 3See, for example, GAO, Information Sharing: The Federal Government Needs to Establish 

Policies and Processes for Sharing Terrorism-Related and Sensitive but Unclassified Information, 

GAO–06–385 (Washington, DC: Mar. 17, 2006); Information Sharing Environment: Definition of 

the Results to Be Achieved in Improving Terrorism-Related Information Sharing Is Needed to 

Guide Implementation and Assess Progress, GAO–08–492 (Washington, DC: June 25, 2008); and 

Information Sharing: Federal Agencies Are Sharing Border and Terrorism Information with 

Local and Tribal Law Enforcement Agencies, but Additional Efforts Are Needed, GAO–10–41 

(Washington, DC: Dec. 18, 2009). 4We have three on-going reviews of terrorism-related information sharing that are being conducted based on separate requests from your committee, the House Committee on Oversight and 

Continued 

by the end of fiscal year 2014. In October 2009, GAO reported that TSA had not 

yet conducted an assessment of the technology’s vulnerabilities to determine the extent to which a terrorist could employ tactics that would evade detection by the AIT. 

Thus, it is unclear whether the AIT or other technologies would have detected the 

weapon used in the December 25 attempted attack. GAO’s report also noted the 

problems TSA experienced in deploying another checkpoint technology that had not 

been tested in the operational environment. Since GAO’s October report, TSA stated 

that it has completed the testing as of the end of 2009. We are currently verifying 

that all functional requirements of the AIT were tested in an operational environment. Completing these steps should better position TSA to ensure that moving 

ahead with a costly deployment of AIT machines will enhance passenger checkpoint 

security. 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the committee: We are pleased to submit this 

statement on the progress Federal agencies have made and the challenges they face 

in key areas of terrorism information sharing and the deployment of checkpoint 

technologies. The December 25, 2009, attempted bombing of Flight 253 has led to 

increased scrutiny of how the Government creates and uses the consolidated terrorist screening database (the watch list) to screen individuals and determine if they 

pose a security threat, and highlighted the importance of detecting improvised explosive devices and other prohibited items on passengers before they board a commercial aircraft. The White House’s initial review of these events exposed gaps in 

how intelligence agencies collected, shared, and analyzed terrorism-related information to determine if the subject—Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab—posed enough of a 

threat to warrant placing him on the watch list, which could have altered the course 

of events that day. To enhance its ability to detect explosive devices and other prohibited items on passengers, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is 

evaluating the use of Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT)—formerly called the 

Whole Body Imager—as an improvement over current screening capabilities. 

In October 2007, we released a report on the results of our review—conducted at 

your request—of how the watch list is created and maintained, and how Federal, 

State, and local security partners use the list to screen individuals for potential 

threats to the homeland.1 As a result of that review, we identified potential 

vulnerabilities, including ones created because agencies were not screening against 

all records in the watch list. We made a number of recommendations aimed at addressing these potential vulnerabilities and helping to enhance the effectiveness of 

the watch list process, which the agencies have not yet fully addressed. These recommendations—which we discuss later in this statement—are still important to address and can inform on-going reviews of the December 25 attempted terrorist attack. 

Also, in January 2005, we designated information sharing for homeland security 

a high-risk area because the Government faced formidable challenges in analyzing 

and disseminating this information in a timely, accurate, and useful manner.2 Since 

then, we have been monitoring and making recommendations to improve the Government’s efforts to share terrorism-related information, not only among Federal 

agencies but also with their State, local, Tribal, and private sector security partners.3 Addressing this high-risk area is important to help remove barriers that lead 

to agencies maintaining information in stove-piped systems, and to hold them accountable to the Congress and the public for ensuring terrorism information is 

shared, is used, and makes a difference. We are continuing to review Federal agencies’ efforts to share terrorism-related information and expect to report the results 

of this work later this year.4
8 

Government Reform, and the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. 5GAO, Aviation Security: DHS and TSA Have Researched, Developed, and Begun Deploying 

Passenger Checkpoint Screening Technologies, but Continue to Face Challenges, GAO–10–128 

(Washington, DC: Oct. 7, 2009). 6See GAO, Terrorist Watch List Screening: Efforts to Help Reduce Adverse Effects on the Public, GAO–06–1031 (Washington, DC: Sept. 29, 2006); GAO–08–110; Aviation Security: TSA Has 

Completed Key Activities Associated with Implementing Secure Flight, but Additional Actions Are 

Needed to Mitigate Risks, GAO–09–292 (Washington, DC: May 13, 2009); and GAO–10–128. 

In addition, in October 2009, we released a report on TSA’s efforts to deploy 

checkpoint technologies and the challenges the agency faces in these efforts.5 We 

made eight recommendations related to the research, development, and deployment 

of these technologies. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) agreed with our 

recommendations and identified actions planned or under way to implement them. 

While DHS is taking steps to address our recommendations related to conducting 

risk assessments, the actions DHS reported that TSA had taken or plans to take 

do not fully address the intent of the majority of our recommendations. 

This statement for the record discusses: (1) The Government’s efforts to use the 

terrorist watch list to screen individuals and determine if they pose a threat, as well 

as how aspects of this process contributed to the December 25 attempted terrorist 

attack and (2) TSA’s planned deployment of the AIT for enhanced explosive detection and the challenges associated with this deployment. 

This statement is based on products GAO issued from September 2006 through 

October 2009.6 In conducting our prior work, we reviewed documentation obtained 

from and interviewed officials at the various departments and agencies with responsibilities for compiling and using watch list records. We also reviewed documentation and obtained information on current checkpoint screening technologies being 

researched, developed, and deployed. Our previously published reports contain additional details on the scope and methodology for those reviews. In addition, this 

statement contains selected updates conducted in December 2009 and January 2010. 

For the updates, GAO reviewed Government reports and other information related 

to the December 25 attempted attack, obtained information from DHS and TSA on 

the use of watch list records and new technologies for screening airline passengers, 

and interviewed a senior TSA official. We conducted our updated work in December 

2009 and January 2010 in accordance with generally accepted Government auditing 

standards. 

IN SUMMARY

Because the subject of the December 25 attempted terrorist attack was not nominated for inclusion on the Government’s consolidated terrorist screening database, 

Federal agencies responsible for screening activities missed several opportunities to 

identify him and possibly take action. We have previously reported on a number of 

issues related to the compilation and use of watch list records, such as the potential 

security risk posed by not checking against all records on the watch list. We also 

identified the need for an up-to-date strategy and implementation plan—one that 

describes the scope, governance, outcomes, milestones, and metrics, among other 

things—for managing the watch list process across the Federal Government. Such 

a strategy and plan, supported by a clearly defined leadership or governance structure, can be helpful in removing cultural, technological, and other barriers—such as 

those problems that the December 25 attempted terrorist attack exposed—that inhibit the effective use of watch list information. 

With regard to the deployment of technology to detect explosives on passengers, 

TSA expects to have installed almost 200 AITs in airports by the end of calendar 

year 2010, and plans to procure and install a total of 878 units by the end of fiscal 

year 2014. While recently providing GAO with updated information to our October 

2009 report, TSA stated that operational testing for the AIT was completed as of 

the end of calendar year 2009. We are in the process of verifying that TSA tested 

all of the AIT functional requirements in an operational environment. Moreover, we 

previously reported that TSA had not yet conducted an assessment of the technology’s vulnerabilities to determine the extent to which a terrorist could employ 

tactics that would evade detection by the AIT. While we recognize that the AIT 

could provide an enhanced detection capability, completing these steps should better 

position TSA to have the information necessary to ensure that moving ahead with 

a costly deployment of AIT machines will enhance passenger checkpoint security. 
9 

7 By law, NCTC, which is within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, serves as 

the primary organization in the U.S. Government for analyzing and integrating all intelligence 

pertaining to terrorism and counterterrorism, except for intelligence pertaining exclusively to domestic terrorists and domestic counterterrorism. See 50 U.S.C. §404o(d)(1). 8See GAO–08–110 for additional details on the compilation and use of terrorist watch list 

records. 9Sterile areas are generally located within the terminal where passengers are provided access 

to boarding aircraft, and access is controlled in accordance with TSA requirements. 10 A nonselectee passenger who alarms the walk-through metal detector on the first pass is 

offered a second pass. If the passenger declines the second pass, the passenger must proceed 

to additional screening. If the nonselectee passenger accepts the second pass and the machine 

does not alarm, the passenger may generally proceed without further screening. 

BACKGROUND

Terrorist Watch List Process 

The Terrorist Screening Center (TSC)—administered by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)—is responsible for maintaining the U.S. Government’s consolidated watch list and providing it to Federal agencies as well as State, local, and 

selected foreign partners for their use in screening individuals. TSC receives the 

vast majority of its watch list nominations and information from the National 

Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), which compiles information on known or suspected international terrorists from Executive branch departments and agencies.7 In 

addition, the FBI provides TSC with information on known or suspected domestic 

terrorists who operate primarily within the United States. To support agency 

screening processes, TSC first determines if each nomination contains specific minimum derogatory information for inclusion in its terrorist screening database. TSC 

then sends applicable records from the terrorist watch list to screening agency systems for use in efforts to deter or detect the movements of known or suspected terrorists. For instance, applicable TSC records are provided to TSA for use in 

prescreening airline passengers; to a U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) system for use in screening travelers entering the United States; to a Department of 

State system for use in screening visa applicants; and to an FBI system for use by 

State and local law enforcement agencies pursuant to arrests, detentions, and other 

criminal justice purposes.8

Airline Passenger Screening Using Checkpoint Screening Technology 

Passenger screening is a process by which screeners inspect individuals and their 

property to deter and prevent an act of violence or air piracy, such as the carrying 

of any unauthorized explosive, incendiary, weapon, or other prohibited item on 

board an aircraft or into a sterile area.9 Screeners inspect individuals for prohibited 

items at designated screening locations. TSA developed standard operating procedures for screening passengers at airport checkpoints. Primary screening is conducted on all airline passengers before they enter the sterile area of an airport and 

involves passengers walking through a metal detector and carry-on items being subjected to X-ray screening. Passengers who alarm the walkthrough metal detector or 

are designated as selectees—that is, passengers selected for additional screening— 

must then undergo secondary screening, as well as passengers whose carry-on items 

have been identified by the X-ray machine as potentially containing prohibited 

items.10 Secondary screening involves additional means for screening passengers, 

such as by hand-wand; physical pat-down; or, at certain airport locations, an explosives trace portal (ETP), which is used to detect traces of explosives on passengers 

by using puffs of air to dislodge particles from their bodies and clothing into an analyzer. Selectees’ carry-on items are also physically searched or screened for explosives, such as by using explosives trace detection machines. 

ASSESSING POTENTIAL VULNERABILITIES RELATED TO NOT SCREENING AGAINST ALL

WATCH LIST RECORDS AND ENSURING CLEAR LINES OF AUTHORITY OVER THE WATCH

LIST PROCESS WOULD PROVIDE FOR ITS MORE EFFECTIVE USE

Agencies Rely Upon Standards of Reasonableness in Assessing Individuals for Nomination to TSC’s Watch List, but Did Not Connect Available Information on Mr. 

Abdulmutallab to Determine Whether a Reasonable Suspicion Existed 

Federal agencies—particularly NCTC and the FBI—submit to TSC nominations 

of individuals to be included on the consolidated watch list. For example, NCTC receives terrorist-related information from Executive branch departments and agencies, such as the Department of State, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the FBI, 

and catalogs this information in its Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment 

database, commonly known as the TIDE database. This database serves as the U.S. 

Government’s central classified database with information on known or suspected 
10 

11 As discussed later in this statement, agencies generally do not use the full terrorist watch 

list to screen individuals. Rather, they generally use subsets of the full list based on each agency’s mission and other factors. 12The White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD–6, Subject: Integration 

and Use of Screening Information (Washington, DC, Sept. 16, 2003). 13The White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD–24, Subject: Biometrics 

for Identification and Screening to Enhance National Security (Washington, DC, June 5, 2008). 14The White House, Summary of the White House Review of the December 25, 2009, Attempted 

Terrorist Attack (Washington, DC, Jan. 7, 2010). 15The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, as amended, defines the Information Sharing Environment as ‘‘an approach that facilitates the sharing of terrorism and 

homeland security information, which may include any method determined necessary and appropriate for carrying out [section 1016].’’ See Pub. L. No. 108–458, § 1016(a)(2), 118 Stat. 3638, 

3665 (codified as amended at 6 U.S.C. § 485(a)(3)). See also Homeland Security Act of 2002, 6 

U.S.C. § 482 (requiring the establishment of procedures for the sharing of homeland security information, as defined by this section). 

international terrorists. According to NCTC, agencies submit watch list nomination 

reports to the center, but are not required to specify individual screening systems 

that they believe should receive the watch list record, such as the No-Fly list of individuals who are to be denied boarding an aircraft.11 NCTC is to presume that agency nominations are valid unless it has other information in its possession to rebut 

that position. 

To decide if a person poses enough of a threat to be placed on the watch list, agencies are to follow Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 6, which states 

that the watch list is to contain information about individuals ‘‘known or appropriately suspected to be or have been engaged in conduct constituting, in preparation for, in aid of, or related to terrorism.’’12 HSPD–24 definitively established the 

‘‘reasonable suspicion’’ standard for watchlisting by providing that agencies are to 

make available to other agencies all biometric information associated with ‘‘persons 

for whom there is an articulable and reasonable basis for suspicion that they pose 

a threat to national security.’’13 NCTC is to consider information from all available 

sources and databases to determine if there is a reasonable suspicion of links to terrorism that warrants a nomination, which can involve some level of subjectivity. 

The guidance on determining reasonable suspicion, which TSC most recently updated in February 2009, contains specific examples of the types of terrorism-related 

conduct that may make an individual appropriate for inclusion on the watch list. 

The White House’s review of the December 25 attempted terrorist attack noted 

that Mr. Abdulmutallab’s father met with U.S. Embassy officers in Abuja, Nigeria, 

to discuss his concerns that his son may have come under the influence of unidentified extremists and had planned to travel to Yemen.14 However, according to NCTC, 

the information in the State Department’s nomination report did not meet the criteria for watchlisting in TSC’s consolidated terrorist screening database per the 

Government’s established and approved nomination standards. NCTC also noted 

that the State Department cable nominating Mr. Abdulmutallab had no indication 

that the father was the source of the information. According to the White House review of the December 25 attempted attack, the U.S. Government had sufficient information to have uncovered and potentially disrupted the attack—including by 

placing Mr. Abdulmutallab on the No-Fly list—but analysts within the intelligence 

community failed to connect the dots that could have identified and warned of the 

specific threat. 

After receiving the results of the White House’s review of the December 25 attempted attack, the President called for members of the intelligence community to 

undertake a number of corrective actions—such as clarifying intelligence agency 

roles, responsibilities, and accountabilities to document, share, and analyze all 

sources of intelligence and threat threads related to terrorism, and accelerating information technology enhancements that will help with information correlation and 

analysis. The House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform has asked us, 

among other things, to assess Government efforts to revise the watch list process, 

including actions taken related to the December 25 attempted attack. 

As part of our monitoring of high-risk issues, we also have on-going work—at the 

request of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs— 

that is assessing agency efforts to create the Information Sharing Environment, 

which is intended to break down barriers to sharing terrorism-related information, 

especially across Federal agencies.15 Our work is designed to help ensure that Federal agencies have a road map that defines roles, responsibilities, actions, and time 

frames for removing barriers, as well as a system to hold agencies accountable to 

the Congress and the public for making progress on these efforts. Among other 

things, this road map can be helpful in removing cultural, technological, and other 
11 

16Of all of the screening databases that accept watch list records, only the No-Fly and Selectee lists require certain nomination criteria or inclusion standards that are narrower than 

the ‘‘known or appropriately suspected’’ standard of HSPD–6. The most recent guidance related 

to the No-Fly and Selectee list criteria was issued in February 2009. 17The Homeland Security Council originally was established in 2001 by Executive Order and 

subsequently codified into law by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 for the purpose of more 

effectively coordinating the policies and functions of the Federal Government relating to homeland security. See Exec. Order No. 13,228; Pub. L. No. 107–296, tit. IX, 116 Stat. 2135, 2258– 

59 (codified at 6 U.S.C. §§ 491–496). On May 26, 2009, the President announced the full integration of White House staff supporting National security and homeland security into a new ‘‘NaContinued 

barriers that lead to agencies maintaining information in stove-piped systems so 

that it is not easily accessible, similar to those problems that the December 25 attempted attack exposed. We expect to issue the results of this work later this year. 

By Not Placing Mr. Abdulmutallab on the Consolidated Watch List or Its Subsets, 

the Government Missed Opportunities to Use These Counterterrorism Tools 

Following the December 25 attempted terrorist attack, questions were raised as 

to what could have happened if Mr. Abdulmutallab had been on TSC’s consolidated 

terrorist screening database. We created several scenarios to help explain how the 

watch list process is intended to work and what opportunities agencies could have 

had to identify him if he was on the watch list. For example, according to TSC, if 

a record from the terrorist screening database is sent to the State Department’s system and the individual in that record holds a valid visa, TSC would compare the 

identifying information in the watch list record against identifying information in 

the visa and forward positive matches to the State Department for possible visa revocation. If an individual’s visa is revoked, under existing procedures, this information is to be entered into the database CBP uses to screen airline passengers prior 

to their boarding, which we describe below. According to CBP, when the individual 

checks in for a flight, the on-site CBP Immigration Advisory Program officers already would have been apprised of the visa revocation by CBP and they would have 

checked the person’s travel documents to verify that the individual was a match to 

the visa revocation record. Once the positive match was established, the officers 

would have recommended that he not be allowed to board the flight. 

Under another scenario, if an individual is on TSC’s terrorist screening database, 

existing processes provide CBP with the opportunity to identify the subject of a 

watch list record as part of the checks CBP is to conduct to see if airline passengers 

are eligible to be admitted into the country. Specifically, for international flights departing to or from the United States (but not for domestic flights), CBP is to receive 

information on passengers obtained, for example, when their travel document is 

swiped. CBP is to check this passenger information against a number of databases 

to see if there are any persons who have immigration violations, criminal histories, 

or any other reason for being denied entry to the country, in accordance with the 

agency’s mission. According to CBP, when it identifies a U.S.-bound passenger who 

is on the watch list, it coordinates with other Federal agencies to evaluate the totality of available information to see what action is appropriate. In foreign airports 

where there is a CBP Immigration Advisory Program presence, the information on 

a watchlisted subject is forwarded by CBP to program officers on-site. The officers 

would then intercept the subject prior to boarding the aircraft and confirm that the 

individual is watchlisted, and when appropriate based on the derogatory information, request that the passenger be denied boarding. 

In a third scenario, if an individual is on the watch list and is also placed on the 

No-Fly or Selectee list, when the person checks in for a flight, the individual’s identifying information is to be checked against these lists. Individuals matched to the 

No-Fly list are to be denied boarding. If the individual is matched to the Selectee 

list, the person is to be subject to further screening, which could include physical 

screening, such as a pat-down. The criteria in general that are used to place someone on either of these two lists include the following: • Persons who are deemed to be a threat to civil aviation or National security and 

should be precluded from boarding an aircraft are put on the No-Fly list. • Persons who are deemed to be a threat to civil aviation or National security but 

do not meet the criteria of the No-Fly list are placed on the Selectee list and 

are to receive additional security screening prior to being permitted to board an 

aircraft.16

The White House Homeland Security Council devised these more stringent sets 

of criteria for the No-Fly and Selectee lists in part because these lists are not intended as investigative or information-gathering tools or tracking mechanisms, and 

TSA is a screening but not an intelligence agency.17 Rather, the lists are intended 
12 

tional Security Staff’’ supporting all White House policy-making activities relating to international, transnational, and homeland security matters. The Homeland Security Council was 

maintained as the principle venue for interagency deliberations on issues that affect the security 

of the homeland, such as terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, natural disasters, and pandemic influenza. 18GAO–06–1031. 19GAO–08–110. 20GAO–09–292. 

to help ensure the safe transport of passengers and facilitate the flow of commerce. 

However, the White House’s review of the December 25 attempted terrorist attack 

raised questions about the effectiveness of the criteria, and the President tasked the 

FBI and TSC with developing recommendations for any needed changes to the nominations guidance and criteria. 

Weighing and responding to the potential impacts that changes to the nominations guidance and criteria could have on the traveling public and the airlines will 

be important considerations in developing such recommendations. In September 

2006, we reported that tens of thousands of individuals who had similar names to 

persons on the watch list were being misidentified and subjected to additional 

screening, and in some cases delayed so long as to miss their flights.18 We also reported that resolving these misidentifications can take time and, therefore, affect air 

carriers and commerce. If changes in criteria result in more individuals being added 

to the lists, this could also increase the number of individuals who are misidentified, 

exacerbating these negative effects. In addition, we explained that individuals who 

believe that they have been inappropriately matched to the watch list can petition 

the Government for action and the relevant agencies must conduct research and 

work to resolve these issues. If more people are misidentified, more people may trigger this redress process, increasing the need for resources. Finally, any changes to 

the criteria or process would have to ensure that watch list records are used in a 

manner that safeguards legal rights, including freedoms, civil liberties, and information privacy guaranteed by Federal law. 

Agencies Do Not Screen Individuals Against All Records in the Watch List, Which 

Creates Potential Security Vulnerabilities; GAO Continues to Recommend That 

Agencies Assess and Address These Gaps 

In reacting to the December 25 attempted terrorist attack, determining whether 

there were potential vulnerabilities related to the use of watch list records when 

screening—not only individuals who fly into the country but also, for example, those 

who cross land borders—are important considerations. Screening agencies whose 

missions most frequently and directly involve interactions with travelers generally 

do not check against all records in the consolidated terrorist watch list. In our October 2007 report, we noted that this is because screening against certain records may 

not be needed to support a respective agency’s mission or may not be possible because of computer system limitations, among other things.19

For example, CBP’s mission is to determine if any traveler is eligible to enter the 

country or is to be denied entry because of immigration or criminal violations. As 

such, CBP’s computer system accepts all records from the consolidated watch list 

database that have either a first name or a last name and one other identifier, such 

as a date of birth. Therefore, TSC sends CBP the greatest number of records from 

the consolidated watch list database for its screening. In contrast, one of the State 

Department’s missions is to approve requests for visas. Since only non-U.S. citizens 

and nonlawful permanent residents apply for visas, TSC does not send the department records on citizens or lawful permanent residents for screening visa applicants. 

Also, the FBI database that State and local law enforcement agencies use for their 

missions in checking individuals for criminal histories, for example, also receives a 

smaller portion of the watch list. According to the FBI, its computer system requires 

a full first name, last name, and other identifier, typically a date of birth. The FBI 

noted that this is because having these identifiers helps to reduce the number of 

times an individual is misidentified as being someone on the list, and the computer 

system would not be effective in making matches without this information. Finally, 

the No-Fly and Selectee lists collectively contain the lowest percentage of watch list 

records because the remaining ones either do not meet the nominating criteria, as 

described above, or do not meet system requirements—that is, include full names 

and dates of birth, which TSA stated are required to minimize misidentifications. 

TSA is implementing a new screening program that the agency states will have 

the capability to screen an individual against the entire watch list.20 Under this program, called Secure Flight, TSA will assume from air carriers the responsibility of 
13 

21Pub. L. No. 108–458, 4012(a), 118 Stat. 3638, 3714–15 (codified at 49 U.S.C. 

§ 44903(j)(2)(C)). 

22See 73 Fed. Reg. 64,018 (Oct. 28, 2008) (codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 1560). 23GAO–08–110. 24The identification of critical infrastructure components that are not using watch list records 

for screening is considered Sensitive Security Information that cannot be disclosed in a public 

statement. 25The White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD–11, Subject: Comprehensive Terrorist-Related Screening Procedures (Washington, DC, Aug. 27, 2004). 

comparing passenger information against the No-Fly and Selectee lists.21 According 

to the program’s final rule, in general, Secure Flight is to compare passenger information only to the No-Fly and Selectee lists.22 The supplementary information accompanying the rule notes that this will be satisfactory to counter the security 

threat during normal security circumstances. However, the rule provides that TSA 

may use the larger set of watch list records when warranted by security considerations, such as if TSA learns that flights on a particular route may pose increased 

risks. TSA emphasized that use of the full terrorist screening database is not routine. Rather, TSA noted that its use is limited to circumstances in which there is 

information concerning an increased risk to transportation security, and the decision 

to use the full watch list database will be based on circumstances at the time. According to TSA, as of January 2010, the agency was developing administrative procedures for utilizing the full watch list when warranted. 

In late January 2009, TSA began to assume from airlines the watch list matching 

function for a limited number of domestic flights, and has since phased in additional 

flights and airlines. TSA expects to assume the watch list matching function for all 

domestic and international flights departing to and from the United States by December 2010. It is important to note that under the Secure Flight program, TSA 

requires airlines to provide the agency with each passenger’s full name and date of 

birth to facilitate the watch list matching process, which should reduce the number 

of individuals who are misidentified as the subject of a watch list record. We continue to monitor the Secure Flight program at the Congress’s request. 

In our October 2007 watch list report, we recommended that the FBI and DHS 

assess the extent to which security risks exist by not screening against certain 

watch list records and what actions, if any, should be taken in response.23 The agencies generally agreed with our recommendations but noted that the risks related to 

not screening against all watch list records needs to be balanced with the impact 

of screening against all records, especially those records without a full name and 

other identifiers. For example, more individuals could be misidentified, law enforcement would be put in the position of detaining more individuals until their identities could be resolved, and administrative costs could increase, without knowing 

what measurable increase in security is achieved. While we acknowledge these 

tradeoffs and potential impacts, we maintain that assessing whether vulnerabilities 

exist by not screening against all watch list records—and if there are ways to limit 

impacts—is critical and could be a relevant component of the Government’s on-going 

review of the watch list process. Therefore, we believe that our recommendation continues to have merit. 

Identifying Additional Screening Opportunities and Determining Whether There Are 

Clear Lines of Authority for and Accountability Over the Watch List Process 

Would Help Ensure Its Effective Use 

As we reported in October 2007, the Federal Government has made progress in 

using the consolidated terrorist watch list for screening purposes, but has additional 

opportunities to use the list. For example, DHS uses the list to screen employees 

in some critical infrastructure components of the private sector, including certain individuals who have access to vital areas of nuclear power plants or transport hazardous materials. However, many critical infrastructure components are not using 

watch list records, and DHS has not finalized guidelines to support such private sector screening, as HSPD–6 mandated and we previously recommended.24

In that same report, we noted that HSPD–11 tasked the Secretary of Homeland 

Security with coordinating across other Federal departments to develop: (1) A strategy for a comprehensive and coordinated watchlisting and screening approach and 

(2) a prioritized implementation and investment plan that describes the scope, governance, principles, outcomes, milestones, training objectives, metrics, costs, and 

schedule of necessary activities.25 We reported that without such a strategy, the 

Government could not provide accountability and a basis for monitoring to ensure 

that: (1) The intended goals for, and expected results of, terrorist screening are 

being achieved and (2) use of the watch list is consistent with privacy and civil lib-
14 

26DHS established the Screening Coordination Office in July 2006 to enhance security measures by integrating the Department’s terrorist-and immigration-related screening efforts, creating unified screening standards and policies, and developing a single redress process for travelers. 

erties. We recommended that DHS develop a current interagency strategy and related plans. 

According to DHS’s Screening Coordination Office, during the fall of 2007, the office led an interagency effort to provide the President with an updated report, entitled, HSPD–11, An Updated Strategy for Comprehensive Terrorist-Related Screening 

Procedures.26 The office noted that the report was formally submitted to the Executive Office of the President through the Homeland Security Council and reviewed 

by the President on January 25, 2008. Further, the office noted that it also provided 

a sensitive version of the report to the Congress in October 2008. DHS provided us 

an excerpt of that report to review, stating that it did not have the authority to 

share excerpts provided by other agencies, and we were unable to obtain a copy of 

the full report. The information we reviewed only discussed DHS’s own efforts for 

coordinating watch list screening across the Department. Therefore, we were not 

able to determine whether the HSPD–11 report submitted to the President addressed all of the components called for in the directive or what action, if any, was 

taken as a result. We maintain that a comprehensive strategy, as well as related 

implementation and investment plans, as called for by HSPD–11, continue to be important to ensure effective Government-wide use of the watch list process. 

In addition, in our October 2007 report, we noted that establishing an effective 

governance structure as part of this strategic approach is particularly vital since numerous agencies and components are involved in the development, maintenance, 

and use of the watch list process, both within and outside of the Federal Government. Also, establishing a governance structure with clearly-defined responsibility 

and authority would help to ensure that agency efforts are coordinated, and that 

the Federal Government has the means to monitor and analyze the outcomes of 

such efforts and to address common problems efficiently and effectively. We determined at the time that no such structure was in place and that no existing entity 

clearly had the requisite authority for addressing interagency issues. We recommended that the Homeland Security Council ensure that a governance structure 

was in place, but the council did not comment on our recommendation. 

At the time of our report, TSC stated that it had a governance board in place, 

comprised of senior-level agency representatives from numerous departments and 

agencies. However, we also noted that the board provided guidance concerning 

issues within TSC’s mission and authority. We also stated that while this governance board could be suited to assume more of a leadership role, its authority at that 

time was limited to TSC-specific issues, and it would need additional authority to 

provide effective coordination of terrorist-related screening activities and interagency issues Government-wide. In January 2010, the FBI stated that TSC has a 

Policy Board in place, with representatives from relevant departments and agencies, 

that reviews and provides input to the Government’s watch list policy. The FBI also 

stated that the policies developed are then sent to the National Security Council 

Deputies Committee (formerly the Homeland Security Council) for ratification. The 

FBI noted that this process was used for making the most recent additions and 

changes to watch list standards and criteria. We have not yet been able to determine, however, whether the Policy Board has the jurisdiction and authority to resolve issues beyond TSC’s purview, such as issues within the intelligence community and in regard to the nominations process, similar to the types of interagency 

issues the December 25 attempted attack identified. We maintain that a governance 

structure with the authority for and accountability over the entire watch list process, from nominations through screening, and across the Government is important. 

On January 7, 2010, the President tasked the National Security Staff with initiating an interagency review of the watch list process—including the business processes, procedures, and criteria—and the interoperability and sufficiency of supporting information technology systems. This review offers the Government an opportunity to develop an updated strategy, related plans, and governance structure 

that would provide accountability to the administration, the Congress, and the 

American public that the watch list process is effective at helping to secure the 

homeland. 
15 

27GAO–10–128. 28 According to TSA, this description of the millimeter wave technology applies only to the machine manufactured by L3 and does not apply to other millimeter wave technologies that TSA 

is evaluating, such as the Smiths millimeter wave AIT. 29 Research and development of the AIT technology is continuing, specifically, to develop passive terahertz (THz) and active gigahertz (GHz) technologies to improve detection performance 

and reduce operational costs of commercially available systems. 30 According to TSA, some of the 300 AIT units to be procured in fiscal year 2010 will begin 

to be deployed to airports in the latter half of fiscal year 2010. 31TSA classifies the commercial airports in the United States into one of five security risk 

categories (X, I, II, III, and IV). In general, category X airports have the largest number of passenger boardings, and category IV airports have the smallest. Categories X, I, II, and III airports account for more than 90 percent of the Nation’s air traffic. 

RECENT WORK HIGHLIGHTS THE IMPORTANCE OF CONDUCTING VULNERABILITY ASSESS- MENTS AND OPERATIONAL TESTING PRIOR TO DEPLOYMENT OF NEW CHECKPOINT

TECHNOLOGIES

While TSA Has Not Yet Deployed Any New Checkpoint Technologies Nationwide, It 

Plans to Have Installed Almost 200 AITs by the End of 2010 

As we reported in October 2009, in an effort to improve the capability to detect 

explosives at aviation passenger checkpoints, TSA has 10 passenger screening technologies in various phases of research, development, procurement, and deployment, 

including the AIT (formerly Whole Body Imager).27 TSA is evaluating the AIT as 

an improvement over current screening capabilities of the metal detector and patdowns specifically to identify nonmetallic threat objects and liquids. The AITs 

produce an image of a passenger’s body that a screener interprets. The image identifies objects, or anomalies, on the outside of the physical body but does not reveal 

items beneath the surface of the skin, such as implants. TSA plans to procure two 

types of AIT units: One type uses millimeter wave and the other type uses 

backscatter X-ray technology. Millimeter wave technology beams millimeter wave 

radio frequency energy over the body’s surface at high speed from two antennas simultaneously as they rotate around the body.28 The energy reflected back from the 

body or other objects on the body is used to construct a three-dimensional image. 

Millimeter wave technology produces an image that resembles a fuzzy photo negative. Backscatter X-ray technology uses a low-level X-ray to create a two-sided image 

of the person. Backscatter technology produces an image that resembles a chalk 

etching.29

As we reported in October 2009, TSA has not yet deployed any new technologies 

Nation-wide. However, as of December 31, 2009, according to a senior TSA official, 

the agency has deployed 40 of the millimeter wave AITs, and has procured 150 

backscatter X-ray units in fiscal year 2009 and estimates that these units will be 

installed at airports by the end of calendar year 2010. In addition, TSA plans to 

procure an additional 300 AIT units in fiscal year 2010, some of which will be purchased with funds from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009.30

TSA plans to procure and deploy a total of 878 units at all category X through category IV airports.31 Full operating capability is expected in fiscal year 2014. TSA 

officials stated that the cost of the AIT is about $130,000 to $170,000 per unit, excluding installation costs. In addition, the estimated training costs are $50,000 per 

unit. 

While TSA stated that the AIT will enhance its explosives detection capability, 

because the AIT presents a full body image of a person during the screening process, 

concerns have been expressed that the image is an invasion of privacy. According 

to TSA, to protect passenger privacy and ensure anonymity, strict privacy safeguards are built into the procedures for use of the AIT. For example, the officer who 

assists the passenger never sees the image that the technology produces, and the 

officer who views the image is remotely located in a secure resolution room and 

never sees the passenger. Officers evaluating images are not permitted to take cameras, cell phones, or photo-enabled devices into the resolution room. To further protect passengers’ privacy, ways have been introduced to blur the passengers’ images. 

The millimeter wave technology blurs all facial features, and the backscatter X-ray 

technology has an algorithm applied to the entire image to protect privacy. Further, 

TSA has stated that the AIT’s capability to store, print, transmit, or save the image 

will be disabled at the factory before the machines are delivered to airports, and 

each image is automatically deleted from the system after it is cleared by the remotely located security officer. Once the remotely located officer determines that 

threat items are not present, that officer communicates wirelessly to the officer assisting the passenger. The passenger may then continue through the security process. Potential threat items are resolved through a direct physical pat-down before 
16 

32TSA stated that it continues to evaluate possible display options that include a ‘‘stick figure’’ or ‘‘cartoonlike’’ form to provide greater privacy protection to the individual being screened 

while still allowing the unit operator or automated detection algorithms to detect possible 

threats. 33GAO–10–128. 34Operational testing refers to testing in an operational environment in order to verify that 

new systems are operationally effective, supportable, and suitable. 35GAO, Best Practices: Using a Knowledge-Based Approach to Improve Weapon Acquisition, 

GAO–04–386SP (Washington, DC: January 2004). 36TSA deployed the ETPs from January to June 2006. Since June 2006, TSA removed all but 

9 ETPs from airports because of maintenance issues. 

the passenger is cleared to enter the sterile area.32 In addition to privacy concerns, 

the AITs are large machines, and adding them to the checkpoint areas will require 

additional space, especially since the operators are segregated from the checkpoint 

to help ensure passenger privacy. 

TSA Reports That It Is Taking Steps to Operationally Test AITs but Has Not Conducted Vulnerability Assessments 

We previously reported on several challenges TSA faces related to the research, 

development, and deployment of passenger checkpoint screening technologies and 

made a number of recommendations to improve this process.33 Two of these recommendations are particularly relevant today, as TSA moves forward with plans to 

install a total of 878 additional AITs—completing operational testing of technologies 

in airports prior to using them in day-to-day operations and assessing whether technologies such as the AIT are vulnerable to terrorist countermeasures, such as hiding 

threat items on various parts of the body to evade detection. 

First, in October 2009, we reported that TSA had relied on technologies in dayto-day airport operations that had not been proven to meet their functional requirements through operational testing and evaluation, contrary to TSA’s acquisition 

guidance and a knowledge-based acquisition approach. We also reported that TSA 

had not operationally tested the AITs at the time of our review, and we recommended that TSA operationally test and evaluate technologies prior to deploying 

them.34 In commenting on our report, TSA agreed with this recommendation. A senior TSA official stated that although TSA does not yet have a written policy requiring operational testing prior to deployment, TSA is now including in its contracts 

with vendors that checkpoint screening machines are required to successfully complete laboratory tests as well as operational tests. The test results are then incorporated in the source selection plan. The official also stated that the test results are 

now required at key decision points by DHS’s Investment Review Board. While recently providing GAO with updated information to our October 2009 report, TSA 

stated that operational testing for the AIT was completed as of the end of calendar 

year 2009. We are in the process of verifying that TSA has tested all of the AIT’s 

functional requirements in an operational environment. 

Deploying technologies that have not successfully completed operational testing 

and evaluation can lead to cost overruns and underperformance. TSA’s procurement 

guidance provides that testing should be conducted in an operational environment 

to validate that the system meets all functional requirements before deployment. In 

addition, our reviews have shown that leading commercial firms follow a knowledgebased approach to major acquisitions and do not proceed with large investments unless the product’s design demonstrates its ability to meet functional requirements 

and be stable.35 The developer must show that the product can be manufactured 

within cost, schedule, and quality targets and is reliable before production begins 

and the system is used in day-to-day operations. 

TSA’s experience with the ETPs, which the agency uses for secondary screening, 

demonstrates the importance of testing and evaluation in an operational environment. The ETP detects traces of explosives on a passenger by using puffs of air to 

dislodge particles from the passenger’s body and clothing that the machine analyzes 

for traces of explosives. TSA procured 207 ETPs and in 2006 deployed 101 ETPs 

to 36 airports, the first deployment of a checkpoint technology initiated by the agency.36 TSA deployed the ETPs even though agency officials were aware that tests 

conducted during 2004 and 2005 on earlier ETP models suggested that they did not 

demonstrate reliable performance. Furthermore, the ETP models that were subsequently deployed were not first tested to prove their effective performance in an 

operational environment, contrary to TSA’s acquisition guidance, which recommends 

such testing. As a result, TSA procured and deployed ETPs without assurance that 

they would perform as intended in an operational environment. TSA officials stated 

that they deployed the machines without resolving these issues to respond quickly 

to the threat of suicide bombers. In June 2006, TSA halted further deployment of 
17 

37See GAO, Transportation Security: TSA Has Developed a Risk-Based Covert Testing Program, but Could Better Mitigate Aviation Security Vulnerabilities Identified Through Covert 

Tests, GAO–08–958 (Washington, DC: Aug. 8, 2008). 

the ETP because of performance, maintenance, and installation issues. According to 

a senior TSA official, as of December 31, 2009, all but 9 ETPs have been withdrawn 

from airports and 18 ETPs remain in inventory. TSA estimates that the 9 remaining 

ETPs will be removed from airports by the end of calendar year 2010. In the future, 

using validated technologies would enhance TSA’s efforts to improve checkpoint security. Furthermore, retaining existing screening procedures until the effectiveness 

of future technologies has been validated could provide assurances that use of checkpoint technologies improves aviation security. 

Second, as we reported in October 2009, TSA does not know whether its explosives detection technologies, such as the AITs, are susceptible to terrorist tactics. 

Although TSA has obtained information on vulnerabilities at the screening checkpoint, the agency has not assessed vulnerabilities—that is, weaknesses in the system that terrorists could exploit in order to carry out an attack—related to passenger screening technologies, such as AITs, that are currently deployed. According 

to TSA’s threat assessment, terrorists have various techniques for concealing explosives on their persons, as was evident in Mr. Abdulmutallab’s attempted attack on 

December 25, where he concealed an explosive in his underwear. However, TSA has 

not assessed whether these and other tactics that terrorists could use to evade detection by screening technologies, such as AIT, increase the likelihood that the 

screening equipment would not detect the hidden weapons or explosives. Thus, without an assessment of the vulnerabilities of checkpoint technologies, it is unclear 

whether the AIT or other technologies would have been able to detect the weapon 

Mr. Abdulmutallab used in his attempted attack. TSA is in the process of developing 

a risk assessment for the airport checkpoints, but the agency has not yet completed 

this effort or clarified the extent to which this effort addresses any specific 

vulnerabilities in checkpoint technology. 

TSA officials stated that to identify vulnerabilities at airport checkpoints, the 

agency analyzes information such as the results from its covert testing program. 

TSA conducts National and local covert tests, whereby individuals attempt to enter 

the secure area of an airport through the passenger checkpoint with prohibited 

items in their carry-on bags or hidden on their persons. However, TSA’s covert testing programs do not systematically test passenger and baggage screening technologies Nation-wide to ensure that they identify the threat objects and materials 

the technologies are designed to detect, nor do the covert testing programs identify 

vulnerabilities related to these technologies. We reported in August 2008 that while 

TSA’s local covert testing program attempts to identify test failures that may be 

caused by screening equipment not working properly or caused by screeners and the 

screening procedures they follow, the agency’s National testing program does not attribute a specific cause of a test failure.37 We recommended, among other things, 

that TSA require the documentation of specific causes of all National covert testing 

failures, including documenting failures related to equipment, in the covert testing 

database to help TSA better identify areas for improvement. TSA concurred with 

this recommendation and stated that the agency will expand the covert testing database to document test failures related to screening equipment. 

In our 2009 report, we also recommended that the Assistant Secretary for TSA, 

among other actions, conduct a complete risk assessment—including threat, vulnerability, and consequence assessment—for the passenger screening program and incorporate the results into TSA’s program strategy, as appropriate. TSA and DHS 

concurred with our recommendation, but have not completed these risk assessments 

or provided documentation to show how they have addressed the concerns raised in 

our 2009 report regarding the susceptibility of the technology to terrorist tactics. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes our statement for the record. 

STATEMENT OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION

JANUARY 27, 2010 

Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member King, and Members of the committee: The 

American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) has more than half a million members, 

countless additional activists and supporters, and 53 affiliates Nation-wide. We are 

one of the Nation’s oldest and largest organizations advocating in support of individual rights in the courts and before the Executive and Legislative branches of 

Government. In particular, throughout our history, we have been one of the Nation’s 
18 

1 Harriet Baskas, Air security: Protection at privacy’s expense? Msnbc.com, January 14, 2010. 

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/34846903/ns/travel-tips/. 2Paul Giblin and Eric Lipton, New Airport X-Rays Scan Bodies, Not Just Bags, New York 

Times, February 24, 2007. 3The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Terrorist Watchlist Nomination Practices, Justice Department, Office of the Inspector General, Audit Report 09–25, May 2009, pg 3. http:// 

www.justice.gov/oig/reports/FBI/a0925/final.pdf. 4 Id at 70. 

pre-eminent advocates in support of privacy and equality. We write today to express 

our strong concern over the three substantive policy changes that are being considered in the wake of the attempted terror attack on Christmas day: the wider deployment of whole body imaging (WBI) devices, the expanded use of terror watch lists 

and increased screening of individuals from fourteen so-called nations of interest. 

The ACLU believes that each of these changes greatly infringe on civil liberties and 

face serious questions regarding their efficacy in protecting airline travelers. 

The President has already identified a failure of intelligence as the chief cause 

of the inability to detect the attempted terror attack on Christmas day. As such, 

the Government’s response must be directed to that end. These invasive and unjust 

airline security techniques represent a dangerous diversion of resources from the 

real problem. This diversion of resources promises serious harm to American’s privacy and civil liberties while failing to deliver significant safety improvements. 

I. INTRODUCTION

WBI uses millimeter wave or X-ray technology to produce graphic images of passengers’ bodies, essentially taking a naked picture of air passengers as they pass 

through security checkpoints. This technology is currently deployed at 19 airports 

and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) recently announced the roll-out 

of 300 more machines by year end.1 While initially described as a secondary screening mechanism, DHS is now stating that WBI will be used for primary screening 

of passengers.2

Another way of screening passengers is through terror watch lists. The terror 

watch lists are a series of lists of names of individuals suspected of planning or executing terrorist attacks. The master list is maintained by the Terrorist Screening 

Center (TSC) and contains more than one million names.3 Subsets of this list include the No-Fly list (barring individuals from air travel) and the Automatic Selectee list (requiring a secondary screening). The names on this list and the criteria 

for placement on these lists are secret.4 There is no process allowing individuals to 

challenge their placement on a list or seek removal from a list. 

Finally, individuals who were born in, are citizens of, or are traveling from fourteen nations will receive additional scrutiny under a policy announced by the U.S. 

Government after the attempted terror attack. As of January 19, 2010 these nations 

are Afghanistan, Algeria, Cuba, Iran, Lebanon, Libya, Iraq, Nigeria, Pakistan, 

Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen. 

The ACLU believes that Congress should apply the following two principles in 

evaluating any airline security measure: 

• Efficacy. New security technologies must be genuinely effective, rather than creating a false sense of security. The wisdom supporting this principle is obvious: 

Funds to increase aviation security are limited, and any technique or technology 

must work and be substantially better than other alternatives to deserve some 

of the limited funds available. It therefore follows that before Congress invests 

in technologies or employs new screening methods, it must demand evidence 

and testing from neutral parties that these techniques have a likelihood of success. 

• Impact on Civil Liberties. The degree to which a proposed measure invades privacy should be weighed in the evaluation of any technology. If there are multiple effective techniques for safeguarding air travel, the least intrusive technology or technique should always trump the more invasive technology. 

II. SCREENING TECHNIQUES AND TECHNOLOGIES MUST BE EFFECTIVE, OR THEY SHOULD

NOT BE UTILIZED OR FUNDED

The wider deployment of whole body imaging (WBI) devices, expanded use of terror watch lists and increased screening of individuals from fourteen so-called nations of interest each face significant questions regarding their efficacy in protecting 

air travelers and combating terrorism. 
19 

5 Jane Merrick, Are planned airport scanners just a scam? The Independent, January 3, 2010. 6 Id. 

7 Id. 

8Sheila MacVicar, Al Qaeda Bombers Learn from Drug Smugglers, CBSnews.com, September 

28, 2009 9http://www.tsa.gov/whatlweldo/screening/securitylcheckpoints.shtm. 10DOJ OIG Audit Report 09–25, pg 3. http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/FBI/a0925/ 

final.pdf. 11 Virginia Fusion Center, 2009 Virginia Terrorism Threat Assessment, March 2009, pg 27. 

Whole Body Imaging 

There are no magic solutions or technologies for protecting air travelers. Ben Wallace, a current member of the British parliament who advised a research team at 

QinetiQ, a manufacturer of body screening devices, has stated that their testing 

demonstrated that these screening devices would not have discovered a bomb of the 

type used on Christmas day, as they failed to detect low density materials like powders, liquids and thin plastics.5 A current QinetiQ product manager admitted that 

even their newest body scan technology probably would not have detected the underwear bomb.6 The British press has also reported that the British Department for 

Transport (DfT) and the British Home Office have already tested the scanners and 

were not convinced they would work comprehensively against terrorist threats to 

aviation.7

In addition we know that al-Qaeda has already discovered a way to work around 

this technology. In September a suicide bomber stowed a full pound of high explosives and a detonator inside his rectum, and attempted to assassinate a Saudi 

prince by blowing himself up.8 While the attack only slightly wounded the prince, 

it fully defeated an array of security measures including metal detectors and palace 

security. The bomber spent 30 hours in the close company of the prince’s own secret 

service agents—all without anyone suspecting a thing. WBI devices—which do not 

penetrate the body—would not have detected this device. 

The practical obstacles to effective deployment of body scanners are also considerable. In the United States alone, 43,000 TSA officers staff numerous security gates 

at over 450 airports and over 2 million passengers a day.9 To avoid being an ineffective ‘‘Maginot line,’’ these $170,000 machines will need to be put in place at all gates 

in all airports; otherwise a terrorist could just use an airport gate that does not 

have them. Scanner operators struggle constantly with boredom and inattention 

when tasked with the monotonous job of scanning thousands of harmless individuals 

when day after day, year after year, no terrorists come through their gate. In addition to the expense of buying, installing, and maintaining these machines, additional personnel will have to be hired to run them (unless they are shifted from 

other security functions, which will degrade those functions). 

The efficacy of WBI devices must be weighed against not only their impact on civil 

liberties (discussed further below) but also their impact on the U.S. ability to implement other security measures. Every dollar spent on these technologies is a dollar 

that is not spent on intelligence analysis or other law enforcement activity. The 

President has already acknowledged that it was deficiencies in those areas—not 

aviation screening—that allowed Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab to board an airplane. 

Watch Lists 

The events leading up to the attempted Christmas attack are a telling indictment 

of the entire watch list system. In spite of damning information, including the direct 

plea of Abdulmutallab’s father, and other intelligence gathered about terrorist activity in Yemen, Abdulmutallab was not placed into the main Terrorist Screening 

Database. We believe that fact can be directly attributed to the bloated and 

overbroad nature of the list—now at more than a million names.10 The size of the 

list creates numerous false positives, wastes resources, and hides the real threats 

to aviation security. As we discuss below it also sweeps up many innocent Americans—falsely labeling them terrorists and providing them with no mechanism for 

removing themselves from the list. 

These problems are not hypothetical. They have real consequences for law enforcement and safety. An April 2009 report from the Virginia Fusion Center states 

‘‘According to 2008 Terrorism Screening Center ground encounter data, al-Qa’ida 

was one of the three most frequently encountered groups in Virginia. In 2007, at 

least 414 encounters between suspected al-Qa’ida members and law enforcement or 

government officials were documented in the Commonwealth. Although the vast majority of encounters involved automatic database checks for air travel, a number of 

subjects were encountered by law enforcement officers.’’11
20 

12The report does not state that any of these individuals were arrested. 13DOJ OIG Audit Report 09–25, pg iv–v. http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/FBI/a0925/ 

final.pdf. 14 Review of the Terrorist Screening Center (Redacted for Public Release), Justice Department, 

Office of the Inspector General, Audit Report 05–27, June 2005; Review of the Terrorist Screening Center’s Efforts to Support the Secure Flight Program (Redacted for Public Release), Justice 

Department, Office of the Inspector General, Audit Report 05–34, August 2005; Follow-Up Audit 

of the Terrorist Screening Center (Redacted for Public Release), Justice Department, Office of the 

Inspector General, Audit Report 07–41, September 2007; The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s 

Terrorist Watchlist Nomination Practices, Justice Department, Office of the Inspector General, 

Audit Report 09–25, May 2009; DHS Challenges in Consolidating Terrorist Watch List Information, Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, OIG–04–31, August 2004; 

Terrorist Watch Lists Should Be Consolidated to Promote Better Integration and Sharing, GAO 

Report to Congressional Requesters, GAO–03–322, April 2003; Congressional Memo Regarding 

Technical Flaws in the Terrorist Watch List, House Committee on Science and Technology, August 2008. 

Every time a law enforcement officer encounters someone on the terrorist watch 

list (as determined by a check of the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) 

database) they contact the TSC. So in essence Virginia law enforcement is reporting 

that there are more than 400 al-Qaeda terrorists in Virginia in a given year. This 

is difficult to believe.12 In reality most, if not all, of these stops are false positives, 

mistakes regarding individuals who should not be on the list. These false positives 

can only distract law enforcement from real dangers. 

A 2009 report by the Department of Justice Inspector General found similarly 

troubling results. From the summary: 

‘‘We found that the FBI failed to nominate many subjects in the terrorism investigations that we sampled, did not nominate many others in a timely fashion, and did 

not update or remove watch list records as required. Specifically, in 32 of the 216 

(15 percent) terrorism investigations we reviewed, 35 subjects of these investigations were not nominated to the consolidated terrorist watch list, contrary to FBI 

policy. We also found that 78 percent of the initial watch list nominations we reviewed were not processed in established FBI timeframes. 

‘‘Additionally, in 67 percent of the cases that we reviewed in which a watch list 

record modification was necessary, we determined that the FBI case agent primarily 

assigned to the case failed to modify the watch list record when new identifying information was obtained during the course of the investigation, as required by FBI 

policy. Further, in 8 percent of the closed cases we reviewed, we found that the FBI 

failed to remove subjects from the watch list as required by FBI policy. Finally, in 

72 percent of the closed cases reviewed, the FBI failed to remove the subject in a 

timely manner.’’13

This is only the latest in a long string of Government reports describing the failure of the terror watch lists.14 In order to be an effective tool against terrorism 

these lists must shrink dramatically with names limited to only those for whom 

there is credible evidence of terrorist ties or activities. 

Aviation Screening on the Basis of Nationality 

Numerous security experts have already decried the use of race and national origin as an aviation screening technique. 

Noted security expert Bruce Schneier stated recently: 

‘‘[A]utomatic profiling based on name, nationality, method of ticket purchase, and 

so on . . . makes us all less safe. The problem with automatic profiling is that it 

doesn’t work. 

‘‘Terrorists can figure out how to beat any profiling system. 

‘‘Terrorists don’t fit a profile and cannot be plucked out of crowds by computers. 

They’re European, Asian, African, Hispanic, and Middle Eastern, male and female, 

young and old. Umar Farouk Abdul Mutallab was Nigerian. Richard Reid, the shoe 

bomber, was British with a Jamaican father. Germaine Lindsay, one of the 7/7 London bombers, was Afro-Caribbean. Dirty bomb suspect Jose Padilla was HispanicAmerican. The 2002 Bali terrorists were Indonesian. Timothy McVeigh was a white 

American. So was the Unabomber. The Chechen terrorists who blew up two Russian 

planes in 2004 were female. Palestinian terrorists routinely recruit ‘‘clean’’ suicide 

bombers, and have used unsuspecting Westerners as bomb carriers. 

‘‘Without an accurate profile, the system can be statistically demonstrated to be no 

more effective than random screening. 
21 

15http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/01/04/will-profiling-make-a-difference/. 16 Id. 17Katherine Walsh, Behavior Pattern Recognition and Why Racial Profiling Doesn’t Work, 

CSO Online, (Feb. 1, 2006), at http://www.csoonline.com/article/220787/ 

BehaviorlPatternlRecognitionlandlWhylRaciallProfilinglDoesnltlWork. 

‘‘And, even worse, profiling creates two paths through security: one with less scrutiny and one with more. And once you do that, you invite the terrorists to take the 

path with less scrutiny. That is, a terrorist group can safely probe any profiling system and figure out how to beat the profile. And once they do, they’re going to get 

through airport security with the minimum level of screening every time.’’15

Schneier is not alone in this assessment. Philip Baum is the managing director 

of an aviation security company: 

‘‘Effective profiling is based on the analysis of the appearance and behavior of a passenger and an inspection of the traveler’s itinerary and passport; it does not and 

should not be based on race, religion, nationality or color of skin . . . 

‘‘Equally, the decision to focus on nationals of certain countries is flawed and backward. Perhaps I, as a British citizen, should be screened more intensely given that 

Richard Reid (a.k.a. ‘‘the Shoebomber’’) was a U.K. passport holder and my guess 

is there are plenty more radicalized Muslims carrying similar passports. Has America forgotten the likes of Timothy McVeigh? It only takes one bad egg and they exist 

in every country of the world.16

Former Israeli airport security director Rafi Ron: 

‘‘My experience at Ben Gurion Airport in Tel Aviv has led me to the conclusion that 

racial profiling is not effective. The major attacks at Ben Gurion Airport were carried out by Japanese terrorists in 1972 and Germans in the 1980s. [They] did not 

belong to any expected ethnic group. Richard Reid [known as the shoe bomber] did 

not fit a racial profile. Professionally as well as legally, I oppose the idea of racial 

profiling.’’17

This should be the end of the discussions. Policies that don’t work have no place 

in aviation security. When they are actively harmful—wasting resources and making us less safe—they should be stopped as quickly as possible. 

III. THE IMPACT ON PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES MUST BE WEIGHED IN ANY

ASSESSMENT OF AVIATION SECURITY TECHNIQUES

Each of the three aviation security provisions discussed in these remarks represents a direct attack on fundamental American values. As such they raise serious 

civil liberties concerns. 

Whole Body Imaging 

WBI technology involves a striking and direct invasion of privacy. It produces 

strikingly graphic images of passengers’ bodies, essentially taking a naked picture 

of air passengers as they pass through security checkpoints. It is a virtual strip 

search that reveals not only our private body parts, but also intimate medical details like colostomy bags. Many people who wear adult diapers feel they will be humiliated. That degree of examination amounts to a significant assault on the essential dignity of passengers. Some people do not mind being viewed naked but many 

do and they have a right to have their integrity honored. 

This technology should not be used as part of a routine screening procedure, but 

only when the facts and circumstances suggest that it is the most effective method 

for a particular individual. And such technology may be used in place of an intrusive 

search, such as a strip search—when there is reasonable suspicion sufficient to support such a search. 

TSA is also touting privacy safeguards including blurring of faces, the non-retention of images, and the viewing of images only by screeners in a separate room. 

Scanners with such protections are certainly better than those without; however, we 

are still skeptical of their suggested safeguards such as obscuring faces and not retaining images. 

Obscuring faces is just a software fix that can be undone as easily as it is applied. 

And obscuring faces does not hide the fact that rest of the body will be vividly displayed. A policy of not retaining images is a protection that would certainly be a 

vital step for such a potentially invasive system, but it is hard to see how this would 

be achieved in practice. TSA would almost certainly have to create exceptions—for 

collecting evidence of a crime or for evaluation of the system (such as in the event 
22 

18 John Solomon, Bureaucracy Impedes Bomb Detection Work, Washington Post, Aug. 12, 2006, 

at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/08/12/ 

AR2006081200269.html. 19 Jeanne Meserve, Name on government watch list threatens pilot’s career, CNN.com, August 

22, 2008, http://www.cnn.com/2008/US/08/22/pilot.watch.list/index.html?iref=newssearch. 20For details on these individuals and many other please see: http://www.aclu.org/ 

technology-and-liberty/unlikelysuspects. 21Lizette Alvarez, Meet Mikey, 8: U.S. Has Him on Watch List, New York Times, January 

13, 2010. 22 Effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program, 

Department of Homeland Security, Office of the Inspector General OIG 09–10, September 2009. 

http://www.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/mgmtrpts/OIG-09-103rlSep09.pdf. 

of another attack) for example—and it is a short step from there to these images 

appearing on the internet. 

Intrusive technologies are often introduced very gingerly with all manner of safeguards and protections, but once the technology is accepted the protections are 

stripped away. There are substantial reasons for skepticism regarding TSA promised protections for WBI devices. In order for these protections to be credible Congress must enshrine them in law. 

Finally, the TSA should invest in developing other detection systems that are less 

invasive, less costly, and less damaging to privacy. For example, ‘‘trace portal detection’’ particle detectors hold the promise of detecting explosives while posing little 

challenge to flyers’ privacy. A 2002 Homeland Security report urged the ‘‘immediate 

deployment’’ of relatively inexpensive explosive trace detectors in European airports, 

as did a 2005 report to Congress, yet according to a 2006 Associated Press article, 

these efforts ‘‘were frustrated inside Homeland Security by ‘bureaucratic games’, a 

lack of strategic goals and months-long delays in distributing money Congress had 

already approved.’’18 Bureaucratic delay and mismanagement should not be allowed 

to thwart the development of more effective explosive detection technologies that do 

not have the negative privacy impact of WBI devices. 

Watch Lists 

The creation of terrorist watch lists—literally labeling individuals as a terrorist— 

has enormous civil liberties impact. It means on-going and repetitive harassment at 

all airports—foreign and domestic, constant extra screening, searches and invasive 

questions. For the many innocent individuals on the lists this is humiliating and 

infuriating. 

For some it is worse. Individuals on the No-Fly list are denied a fundamental 

right, the right to travel and move about the country freely. Others are threatened 

with the loss of their job. Erich Sherfen, commercial airline pilot and Gulf War veteran, has been threatened with termination from his job as a pilot because his name 

appears on a Government watch list, which prevents him from entering the cockpit.19 Sherfen is not the only innocent person placed on a terror watch list. Other 

individuals who are either on a list or mistaken for those on the list include a 

former Assistant Attorney General, many individuals with the name Robert Johnson, the late Senator Edward Kennedy and even Nelson Mandela.20

The most recent case—revealed just last week—is that of Mikey Hicks, an 8-yearold boy who has been on the Selectee list seemingly since birth. According to Hicks’ 

family their travel tribulations that began when Mikey was an infant. When he was 

2 years old, the kid was patted down at airport security. He’s now, by all accounts, 

an unassuming bespectacled Boy Scout who has been stopped every time he flies 

with his family.21

In addition, to stops at the airport watch list information is also placed in the National Criminal Information Center database. That means law enforcement routinely run names against the watch lists for matters as mundane as traffic stops. 

It’s clear that innocent individuals may be harassed even if they don’t attempt to 

fly. 

Nor is there any due process for removing individuals from the list—there is simply no process for challenging the Government’s contention that you are a terrorist. 

Even people who are mistaken for those on the list face challenges. A September 

2009 report by the Inspector General of the Department of Homeland Security found 

that the process for clearing innocent travelers from the list is a complete mess.22

In light of the significant and on-going harm to innocent Americans as well as 

the harm to our National security caused by the diversion of security resources 

these watch lists must be substantial reduced in size and fundamental due process 

protections imposed. Innocent travelers must be able to remove themselves from the 

list both for their sake and the sake of National security. 
23 

23See for example, Hearing of the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, Violent Islamist Extremism: The European Experience, (June 27, 2007), particularly the 

testimony of Lidewijde Ongering and Marc Sageman, available at: http://hsgac.senate.gov/ 

public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Hearing&HearinglID=9c8ef805-75c8-48c2- 

810dd778af31cca6. 24 National Counterterrorism Center Conference Report, Towards a Domestic 

Counterradicalization Strategy, (August 2008) 25 Briefing by Homeland Security Secretary Napolitano, Assistant to the President for 

Counterterrorism and Homeland Security Brennan, and Press Secretary Gibbs, 1/7/10, at: 

http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/briefing-homeland-security-secretary-napolitano-assistant-president-counterterroris[sic]. 26 Jake Tapper and Sunlen Miller, Obama: Intelligence Community Failed to ‘‘Connect the 

Dots’’ in a ‘‘Potentially Disastrous Way’’, ABCNews.com, January 05, 2010. http:// 

blogs.abcnews.com/politicalpunch/2010/01/obamaintelligence-community-failed-to-connect-thedots-in-a-potentially-disastrous-way.html. 

Aviation Screening on the Basis of Nationality 

This history of the civil rights movement in the 20th and 21st Century is a long, 

compelling rejection of the idea that individuals should be treated differently on the 

basis of their race or nation of origin. Because of that, the administration’s decision 

to subject the citizens of fourteen nations flying to the United States to intensified 

screening is deeply troubling. Long-standing constitutional principles require that 

no administrative searches, either by technique or technology, be applied in a discriminatory matter. The ACLU opposes the categorical use of profiles based on race, 

religion, ethnicity, or country of origin. This practice is nothing less than racial 

profiling. Such profiling is ineffective and counter to American values. 

But the harm that profiling on the basis of national origin does to civil liberties 

is not an abstraction—it also has direct impact on American security interests. 

These harmful policies have a direct impact on the Muslim and Arab communities. 

The Senate Homeland Security and Government Affairs committee has heard testimony from several witnesses who cited the growth of Islamophobia and the polarization of the Muslim community as risk factors that could raise the potential for extremist violence.23 Unfairly focusing suspicion on a vulnerable community tends to 

create the very alienation and danger that we need to avoid. 

Indeed a recent United Kingdom analysis based on hundreds of case studies of 

individuals involved in terrorism reportedly identified ‘‘facing marginalization and 

racism’’ as a key vulnerability that could tend to make an individual receptive to 

extremist ideology.24 The conclusion supporting tolerance of diversity and protection 

of civil liberties was echoed in a National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) paper 

published in August 2008. In exploring why there was less violent homegrown extremism in the United States than the United Kingdom, the authors cited the diversity 

of American communities and the greater protection of civil rights as key factors. 

At the January 7, 2009 White House briefing regarding the security failures surrounding the Christmas attack, DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano raised a question 

about ‘‘counterradicalization.’’25 She asked, ‘‘How do we communicate better American values and so forth, in this country but also around the globe?’’ Of course the 

Secretary should know American values are communicated through U.S. Government policies, which is why adopting openly discriminatory policies can be so damaging and counterproductive to our National interests. 

IV. CONCLUSION

Ultimately security is never absolute and never will be. It is not wise security policy to spend heavily to protect against one particular type of plot, when the number 

of terrorist ideas that can be hatched—not only against airlines, but also against 

other targets—is limitless. The President has identified a failure ‘‘connect the dots’’ 

by intelligence analysts as the main reason that Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab was 

able to board a flight to the United States.26 We must not lose sight of that reality. 

Limited security dollars should be invested where they will do the most good and 

have the best chance of thwarting attacks. That means investing them in developing 

competent intelligence and law enforcement agencies that will identify specific individuals who represent a danger to air travel and arrest them or deny them a visa. 

Invasive screening mechanisms, enlarging already bloated watch lists, targeting 

on the basis of national origin—none of these approaches go to the heart of what 

went wrong on Christmas day. Instead they are a dangerous sideshow—one that 

harms our civil liberties and ultimately makes us less safe. 
24 

STATEMENT OF JANE HOLL LUTE, DEPUTY SECRETARY, 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Ms. LUTE. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member King, 

Members of the committee. Thank you for this opportunity to testify on the attempted attack on December 25. 

Secretary Napolitano, Mr. Chairman, as you noted, was scheduled to be out of the country. In view of that, although her plans 

have changed, we have been in touch with your staff that I would 

be here to testify for the Department. 

As President Obama made clear immediately following the attack, at the Department of Homeland Security and across the Federal Government, we are determined to find and fix the 

vulnerabilities that led to this breach. 

Protecting the United States against terrorism calls upon the expertise and authority of multiple agencies and many partners. In 

addition to the men and women of the Department of Homeland 

Security, this includes the efforts of the departments of State, Defense, Justice, FBI, NCTC, and the broader intelligence community. 

It also importantly includes our State and local law enforcement 

agencies and our international partners and allies around the 

world. 

I am very pleased this morning to be joined by my colleagues 

from the Department of State and the National Counterterrorism 

Center. 

As this committee is well aware of, Mr. Chairman, boarding the 

plane means fulfilling three basic requirements. The individual 

must retain proper documentation, including a passport, visa, or 

other travel authorization, a ticket, and boarding pass. He or she 

must pass through the checkpoint screening to ensure that they 

are not concealing a dangerous weapon or other dangerous material on their person or in their baggage. 

Finally, the individual must be cleared through a pre-flight 

screening process that seeks to determine if that individual poses 

a threat to the homeland security and thus should be denied permission to fly. 

Within this set of requirements, let me briefly describe the specific role the Department of Homeland Security plays. First, to conduct pre-flight screening, the Department is one of the principal 

consumers of intelligence gathered by other agencies, including the 

terrorist watch list, which includes the No-Fly list. DHS checks 

passengers against these lists to keep potential terrorists from 

boarding flights and to identify travelers who should undergo additional screening. 

Second, within the United States, DHS performs the physical 

screening at domestic airport checkpoints and provides further inflight security measures in order to prevent smuggling of weapons 

or other dangerous materials on airplanes. 

Third, outside of the United States, the Department works with 

foreign governments and airlines to advise them on the required 

security measures for flights bound for the United States and on 

which passengers may prove a threat. TSA nor any other part of 

the Department, however, does not screen people or baggage at 

international airports. 
25 

Let me say emphatically, as the President of the United States 

has said and as the Secretary of Homeland Security has said, that 

with regard to the attempted attack on December 25, Omar Farouk 

Abdulmutallab should never have been allowed to board a U.S.- 

bound airplane with explosives. As Secretary Napolitano has detailed in recent weeks, DHS has implemented numerous steps and 

is working closely with our Federal partners to fix the 

vulnerabilities that led to the attempted attack. 

As a consumer or a terrorist watch list information, the Department works closely with the FBI, with the Office of the Director of 

National Intelligence and NCTC to improve our ability to connect 

and assimilate intelligence. We are also taking steps to strengthen 

standards for international aviation screening and bolstering international partnerships to guard against a similar type of attack. 

But to be clear, Abdulmutallab was not on the No-Fly list and 

hence, did not come to our attention prior to his boarding the flight 

in Amsterdam. His presence on this list would have flagged him to 

be prevented from boarding. He was not either on the Selectee list, 

which would have flagged him for secondary screening. Furthermore, the physical screenings that were performed by foreign authorities at the airports in Nigeria and the Netherlands failed to 

detect the explosive on his person. 

Immediately following the attempted attack, the Department 

took steps to secure incoming and future flights. We directed the 

FAA to alert all 128 flights inbound to the United States from Europe of the situation. We increased security measures at domestic 

airports. We implemented an enhanced screening for all international flights coming into the United States, and we reached out 

to State and local law enforcement, air carriers, international partners, and relevant agencies to provide information they needed on 

the ground to take appropriate measures. 

In January 3, Secretary Napolitano dispatched me and my colleagues in the Department to meet with international leadership 

on the crisis in aviation security that was illustrated through the 

events of 12/25. We met with senior officials from 11 countries, plus 

the European Union, to discuss ways to strengthen aviation security, and we are determined to follow through on these contacts. I 

can report, as questioned, Mr. Chairman, on the results of those 

discussions. 

The Secretary has herself been in touch with international colleagues to identify ways to strengthen the international aviation 

security standards and procedures. 

As the Secretary said last week, and as the President has said, 

there are no 100 percent guarantees against another terrorist attempt to take down a plane or attack us in some other fashion. But 

what we can give you, Mr. Chairman, is the 100 percent commitment of the Secretary, myself, Department leadership, and the 

hundreds of thousands of men and women who work in homeland 

security to do everything we can to minimize the risk of terrorist 

attack. 

Thank you again for this opportunity, Mr. Chairman, to appear 

before this committee. I look forward to your questions. 

[The statement of Ms. Lute follows:] 
26 

1The 35 countries in the Visa Waiver Program are: Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, 

Brunei, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, 

Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, San Marino, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South 

Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom (for the United Kingdom, only citizens with an unrestricted right of permanent abode in the United Kingdom are eligible for VWP 

travel authorizations). 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JANE HOLL LUTE

JANUARY 27, 2010 

Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member King, and Members of the committee: 

Thank you for this opportunity to testify on the attempted terrorist attack on Northwest Flight 253. 

The attempted attack on December 25 was a powerful illustration that terrorists 

will go to great lengths to defeat the security measures that have been put in place 

since September 11, 2001. This administration is determined to thwart those plans 

and disrupt, dismantle, and defeat terrorist networks by employing multiple layers 

of defense that work in concert with one another to secure our country. This is an 

effort that involves not just DHS, but many other Federal agencies and the international community as well. 

As our part in this effort, DHS is a consumer of the U.S. Government’s consolidated terrorist watch list, which we use to help keep potential terrorists off flights 

within, over, or bound for the United States, and to identify travelers that require 

additional screening. We work with foreign governments, Interpol, and air carriers 

to strengthen global air travel security by advising them on security measures, and 

on which passengers may prove a threat. We also work with air carriers and airport 

authorities to perform physical screening at TSA checkpoints and to provide security 

measures in flight. 

Immediately following the December 25 attack, DHS took swift action at airports 

across the country and around the world. These steps included enhancing screening 

for individuals flying to the United States; increasing the presence of law enforcement and explosives detection canine teams at airports, and of air marshals in 

flight; and directing the FAA to notify the 128 flights already in-bound from Europe 

about the situation. Nonetheless, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab should never have 

been able to board a U.S.-bound plane with the explosive PETN on his person. As 

President Obama has made clear, this administration is determined to find and fix 

the vulnerabilities in our systems that allowed this breach to occur. 

Agencies across the Federal Government have worked quickly to address what 

went wrong in the Abdulmutallab case. The effort to solve these problems is well 

underway, with cooperation among DHS, the Department of State, the Department 

of Justice, the intelligence community, and our international allies, among others. 

As a consumer of terrorist watch list information, the Department of Homeland Security welcomes the opportunity to contribute to the dialogue on improving the Federal Government’s ability to connect and assimilate intelligence. We are also focused 

on improving aviation screening and expanding our international partnerships to 

guard against a similar type of attack occurring again. To those ends, today I want 

to describe the role that DHS currently performs in aviation security, how DHS responded in the immediate aftermath of the attempted attack on December 25, and 

how we are moving forward to further bolster aviation security. 

DHS’ ROLE IN MULTIPLE LAYERS OF DEFENSE

Since 9/11, the U.S. Government has employed multiple layers of defense across 

several departments to secure the aviation sector and ensure the safety of the traveling public. Different Federal agencies bear different responsibilities, while other 

countries and the private sector—especially the air carriers themselves—also have 

important roles to play. 

DHS oversees several programs to prevent individuals with terrorist ties from 

boarding flights that are headed to, within, or traveling over the United States or, 

in appropriate cases, to identify them for additional screening. Specifically, DHS 

uses information held in the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB), a resource managed by the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), as well as other information provided 

through the intelligence community, to screen individuals; operates the travel authorization program for people who are traveling to the United States under the 

Visa Waiver Program (VWP);1 and works with foreign governments, international, 

and regional organizations, and airlines to design and implement improved security 

standards worldwide. This includes routine checks against Interpol databases on 
27 

2 Exceptions would be citizens of countries under other visa waiver authority such as the 

Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative or the separate visa waiver program for Guam and the 

Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, or those granted individual waivers of the visa 

requirement under the immigration laws. 

wanted persons and lost or stolen passports on all international travelers arriving 

in the United States. The Department also performs checkpoint screenings at airports in the United States. 

To provide a sense of the scale of our operations, every day, U.S. Customs and 

Border Protection (CBP) processes 1.2 million travelers seeking to enter the United 

States by land, air, or sea; the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) 

screens 1.8 million travelers at domestic airports; and DHS receives advanced passenger information from carriers operating in 245 international airports that are the 

last point of departure for flights to the United States, accounting for about 1,600 

to 1,800 flights per day. Ensuring that DHS employees and all relevant Federal officials are armed with intelligence and information is critical to the success of these 

efforts. 

Safeguards for Visas and Travel 

One of the first layers of defense in securing air travel consists of safeguards to 

prevent dangerous people from obtaining visas, travel authorizations, and boarding 

passes. To apply for entry to the United States prior to boarding flights bound for 

the United States or arriving at a U.S. port of entry, most foreign nationals need 

visas—issued by a U.S. embassy or consulate—or, if traveling under a Visa Waiver 

Program country, travel authorizations issued through the Electronic System for 

Travel Authorization (ESTA).2

Issuing visas is the responsibility of the Department of State. At embassies and 

consulates where it is operational, the Visa Security Program positions personnel 

of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to assist State Department 

personnel in identifying visa applicants who may present a security threat. For individuals traveling under the VWP, DHS operates ESTA, a web-based system through 

which individuals must apply for travel authorization prior to traveling to the 

United States. These systems examine an individual’s information to assess whether 

he or she could pose a risk to the United States or its citizens, including possible 

links to terrorism. Without presenting a valid authorization to travel to the United 

States at the airport of departure, a foreign national is not able to board a U.S.- 

bound flight. 

The Department also works with other Federal agencies and our foreign partners 

to try to prevent possible terrorists from obtaining boarding passes. These include 

the application of the No-Fly List and the implementation of Secure Flight program, 

which I explain below. 

Pre-departure screening 

As another layer of defense, DHS conducts pre-departure passenger screening in 

partnership with the airline industry and foreign governments in order to prevent 

known or suspected terrorists from boarding a plane bound for the United States 

or, as appropriate, to identify them for additional screening. DHS uses TSDB data, 

managed by the Terrorist Screening Center that is administered by the FBI, to determine who may board, who requires further screening and investigation, who 

should not be admitted, or who should be referred to appropriate law enforcement 

personnel. 

Specifically, to help make these determinations, DHS uses the No-Fly List and the 

Selectee List, two important subsets within the TSDB. Individuals on the No-Fly 

List should not receive a boarding pass for a flight to, from, over, or within the 

United States. Individuals on the Selectee List must go through additional security 

measures, including a full-body pat-down and a full physical examination of personal effects. 

Through the Secure Flight Program, the Department is making an important 

change to the process of matching passenger identities against the No-Fly List and 

Selectee List, and fulfilling an important recommendation of the 9/11 Commission. 

Previously, responsibility for checking passenger manifests against these lists rested 

with the air carriers themselves. Under the Secure Flight program, DHS began to 

transfer this responsibility to TSA in 2009, and the transition is targeted for completion by the end of this year. In addition to creating a more consistent matching 

process for all domestic and international travel to the United States and strengthening the effectiveness of redress in preventing misidentifications, Secure Flight will 

flag potential watch list matches and immediately trigger law enforcement notification and coordination. 
28 

As an additional layer of security, DHS also uses the Passenger Name Record 

(PNR), the Advanced Passenger Information System (APIS), and the Immigration 

Advisory Program (IAP) to assess a passenger’s level of risk and, when necessary, 

flag them for further inspection. PNR data, obtained from the airline reservations 

systems, contains various elements, which may include optional information on 

itinerary, co-travelers, changes to the reservation, and payment information. PNR 

data is evaluated against ‘‘targeting rules’’ that are based on law enforcement data, 

intelligence and past case experience. APIS data, which carriers are required to provide to DHS at least 30 minutes before a flight, contains important identifying information that may not be included in PNR data, including verified identity and travel 

document information such as a traveler’s date of birth, citizenship, and travel document number. DHS screens APIS information on international flights to or from the 

United States against the TSDB, as well as against criminal history information, 

records of lost or stolen passports, and prior immigration or customs violations. 

APIS is also connected to Interpol’s lost and stolen passport database for routine 

queries on all inbound international travelers. 

Another layer in the screening process is the Immigration Advisory Program 

(IAP). The CBP officers stationed overseas under the IAP program at nine airports 

in seven countries receive referrals from CBP screening against the TSDB, of which 

the No-Fly list is a subset. IAP officers can make ‘‘no board’’ recommendations to 

carriers and host governments regarding passengers bound for the United States 

who may constitute security risks, but do not have the authority to arrest, detain, 

or prevent passengers from boarding planes. 

Checkpoint Screenings and In-Flight Security 

The third layer of defense for air travel in which DHS plays a role is the screening of passengers and their baggage. TSA screens passengers and baggage at airports in the United States, but not in other countries. When a traveler at a foreign 

airport is physically screened, that screening is conducted by the foreign government, air carriers, or the respective airport authority. 

Domestically, TSA employs a layered approach to security, which includes measures both seen and unseen by travelers. The 48,000 Transportation Security Officers 

at hundreds of airports across the country screen passengers and their baggage 

using advanced technology X-ray systems, walk-through metal detectors, explosive 

trace detection equipment, trained canines, vapor trace machines that detect liquid 

explosives, Advanced Imaging Technology, full-body pat-downs, explosives detection 

systems, Bomb Appraisal Officers, and Behavior Detection Officers—both at the 

checkpoint and throughout the airport. Through programs such as the Aviation Direct Access Screening Program, TSA also uses random and unpredictable measures 

to enhance security throughout the airport perimeter and in limited access areas of 

airports. The $1 billion in Recovery Act funds provided to TSA for checkpoint and 

checked baggage screening technology have enabled TSA to greatly accelerate deployment of these critical tools to keep passengers safe. 

In an effort to enhance international screening standards, TSA conducts security 

assessments in accordance with security standards established by the International 

Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) at more than 300 foreign airports, which include 

foreign airports from which flights operate directly to the United States and all airports from which U.S. air carriers operate. If an airport does not meet these standards, TSA works with the host government to rectify the deficiencies and raise airport security to an acceptable level. Ultimately, it is the foreign government that 

must work to address these security issues. 

In long-term circumstances of non-compliance with international standards, TSA 

may recommend suspension of flight service from these airports to the United 

States. In addition, TSA inspects all U.S. and foreign air carriers that fly to the 

United States from each airport to ensure compliance with TSA standards and directives. Should air carrier security deficiencies exist, TSA works with the air carrier to raise compliance to an acceptable level. If an airport is located within one 

of the 35 VWP countries, DHS conducts additional audits and inspections as part 

of the statutorily mandated VWP designation and review process. 

In terms of in-flight security, Federal Air Marshals (FAM) are deployed on highrisk domestic and international flights where international partners allow FAMs to 

enter their country on U.S.-flagged carriers. Thousands more volunteer pilots serve 

as armed, deputized Federal Flight Deck Officers. Additionally, armed law enforcement officers from Federal, State, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies that 

have a need to fly armed provide a force multiplier on many flights. 
29 

DHS RESPONSE TO THE ATTEMPTED DECEMBER 25 ATTACK

The facts of the December 25 attempted bombing are well established and were 

relayed in the report on the incident that the President released on January 7, 

2010. On December 16, 2009, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, a Nigerian national, 

purchased a round-trip ticket from Lagos, Nigeria to Detroit. Abdulmutallab went 

through physical security screening conducted by foreign airport personnel at 

Murtala Muhammed International Airport in Lagos on December 24 prior to boarding a flight to Amsterdam Airport Schiphol. This physical screening included an Xray of his carry-on luggage and his passing through a walk-through metal detector. 

Abdulmutallab went through additional physical screening, conducted by Dutch authorities, when transiting through Amsterdam to Northwest Flight 253 to Detroit, 

and presented a valid U.S. visa. Abdulmutallab was not on the No-Fly or Selectee 

Lists. Accordingly, the carrier was not alerted to prevent him from boarding the 

flight or additional physical screening, nor did the IAP officer advise Dutch authorities of any concerns. 

As with all passengers traveling on that flight, and similar to all other international flights arriving in the United States, CBP evaluated Abdulmutallab’s information while the flight was en route to conduct a preliminary assessment of his admissibility and to determine whether there were requirements for additional inspection. During this assessment, CBP noted that there was a record that had been received from the Department of State, which indicated possible extremist ties. It did 

not indicate that he had been found to be a threat, or that his visa had been revoked. CBP officers in Detroit were prepared to meet Abdulmutallab upon his arrival for further interview and inspection. The attack on board the flight failed in 

no small part due to the brave actions of the crew and passengers aboard the plane. 

Immediate DHS Response 

Following the first reports of an attempted terrorist attack on Northwest Flight 

253 on December 25, DHS immediately put in place additional security measures. 

TSA directed the Federal Aviation Administration to apprise 128 U.S.-bound international flights from Europe of the attempted attack and to ask them to maintain 

heightened vigilance on their flights. Increased security measures were put in place 

at domestic airports, including additional explosive detection canine teams, State 

and local law enforcement, expanded presence of Behavior Detection Officers, and 

enhanced screening. That evening, DHS issued a security directive for all international flights to the United States, which mandated enhanced screening prior to 

departure and additional security measures during flight. 

From the first hours following the attempted attack, Secretary Napolitano worked 

closely with the President, senior Department leadership, and agencies across the 

Federal Government. Secretary Napolitano and I communicated with international 

partners and Members of Congress. The Secretary also engaged in dialogue with 

State and local leadership, the aviation industry, and with National security experts 

on counterterrorism and aviation security. The results of these communications culminated in two reports to the President: one on New Year’s Eve and the second on 

January 2, 2010. 

One of our most important conclusions was that it is now clearer than ever that 

air travel security is an international responsibility. Indeed, passengers from 17 

countries were aboard Flight 253. Accordingly, DHS has embarked upon an aggressive international program designed to raise international standards for airports 

and air safety. On January 3, 2010, Secretary Napolitano dispatched me and Assistant Secretary for Policy David Heyman to Africa, Asia, Europe, the Middle East, 

Australia, and South America to meet with international leadership on aviation security. In total, we met with senior officials from 11 countries, plus the European 

Union in order to discuss new ways to bolster collective tactics for improving global 

aviation security. Last week, Secretary Napolitano travelled to Spain to meet with 

her European Union counterparts in the first of a series of global meetings intended 

to bring about broad consensus on new, stronger, and more consistent international 

aviation security standards and procedures. 

In addition to these efforts, the Department has been in close contact with Congress, our international partners, the aviation industry and State and local officials 

across the country since the afternoon of the attempted attack. On December 25, 

the Department issued a joint bulletin with the FBI to State and local law enforcement throughout the Nation; conducted calls with major airlines and the Air Transport Association; distributed the FBI-DHS joint bulletin to all Homeland Security 

Advisors, regional fusion center directors and Major City Homeland Security Points 

of Contact in the country; and notified foreign air carriers with flights to and from 

the United States of the additional security requirements. DHS has maintained 
30 

close contact with all of these partners since the attempted attack, and will continue 

to do so. 

On January 3, TSA issued a new Security Directive, effective on January 4, mandating enhanced passenger screening. 

STEPS FORWARD TO IMPROVE AVIATION SECURITY

While these immediate steps helped strengthen our security posture to face current threats to our country, as President Obama has made clear, we need to take 

additional actions to address the systemic vulnerabilities highlighted by this failed 

attack. On January 7, Secretary Napolitano was joined by Assistant to the President 

for Counterterrorism and Homeland Security John Brennan to announce five recommendations DHS made to the President as a result of the security reviews ordered by President Obama. At the President’s direction, DHS will pursue these five 

objectives to enhance the protection of air travel from acts of terrorism. 

First, DHS will work with our interagency partners to re-evaluate and modify the 

criteria and process used to create terrorist watch list, including adjusting the process by which names are added to the No-Fly and Selectee Lists. The Department’s 

ability to prevent terrorists from boarding flights to the United States depends upon 

these lists and the criteria used to create them. As an entity that is primarily a 

consumer of this intelligence and the operator of programs that rely on these lists, 

the Department will work closely with our partners in the intelligence community 

to make clear the kind of information DHS needs from the watch list system. 

Second, DHS will establish a partnership on aviation security with the Department of Energy and its National Laboratories in order to use their expertise to bolster our security. This new partnership will work to develop new and more effective 

technologies that deter and disrupt known threats, as well as anticipate and protect 

against new ways that terrorists could seek to board an aircraft with dangerous materials. 

Third, DHS will accelerate deployment of Advanced Imaging Technology to provide capabilities to identify materials such as those used in the attempted December 

25 attack, and we will encourage foreign aviation security authorities to do the 

same. TSA currently has 40 machines deployed at nineteen airports throughout the 

United States, and plans to deploy at least 450 additional units in 2010. DHS will 

also seek to increase our assets in the area of explosives-trained canines, explosives 

detection equipment, and other security personnel. 

Fourth, DHS will strengthen the presence and capacity of aviation law enforcement. As an interim measure, we will deploy law enforcement officers from across 

DHS to serve as Federal Air Marshals to increase security aboard U.S.-flag carriers’ 

international flights. At the same time, we will maintain the current tempo of operations to support high-risk domestic flights, as we look to longer-term solutions to 

enhance the training and workforce of the Federal Air Marshal Service. 

Fifth, as mentioned earlier, DHS will work with international partners to 

strengthen international security measures and standards for aviation security. 

Much of our success in ensuring that terrorists do not board flights to the United 

States is dependent on what happens in foreign airports and the commitments of 

our foreign partners to enhance security—not just for Americans, but also for their 

nationals traveling to this country. 

In all of these action areas to bolster aviation security, we are moving forward 

with a dedication to safeguard the privacy and rights of travelers. 

CONCLUSION

President Obama has made clear that we will be unrelenting in using every element of our National power in our efforts around the world to disrupt, dismantle, 

and defeat al-Qaeda and other violent extremists. 

While we address the circumstances behind this specific incident, we must also 

recognize the evolving threats posed by terrorists, and take action to ensure that 

our defenses continue to evolve in order to defeat them. We live in a world of everchanging risks, and we must move as aggressively as possible both to find and fix 

security flaws and anticipate future vulnerabilities in all sectors. President Obama 

has clearly communicated the urgency of this task, and the American people rightfully expect swift action. DHS and our Federal partners are moving quickly to provide just that. 

As Secretary Napolitano said last week, there is no 100 percent guarantee that 

we can prevent a terrorist from trying to take down a plane or attack us in some 

other fashion. That is not the nature of the world we live in, nor of the threats that 

we face. What we can give you, however, is the 100 percent commitment of the Sec-
31 

retary, myself, DHS leadership, and the entire DHS enterprise to do everything we 

can to minimize the risk of terrorist attacks. 

Chairman Thompson, Representative King, and Members of the committee: 

Thank you for this opportunity to testify. I am happy to answer any questions you 

may have. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you for your testimony, Dr. Lute. 

I now recognize Under Secretary Kennedy to summarize his 

statement for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF PATRICK F. KENNEDY, UNDER SECRETARY, 

MANAGEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. KENNEDY. Thank you, sir. Chairman Thompson, Ranking 

Member King, distinguished Members of the committee, thank you 

for the opportunity to appear before you today. 

After the attempted bombing of Flight 253, Secretary Clinton 

stated, ‘‘We are all looking hard at what did happen in order to improve our procedures, to avoid human errors, mistakes, oversights 

of any kind, and we are going to be working hard with the rest of 

the administration to improve every aspect of our effort.’’ 

This introspective review and the concurrent interagency review 

are on-going. We appreciate this committee’s interest and support 

as we continue this review process, noting in particular the recent 

committee staff visit to our consular facility in London. We recognize the gravity of the threat we face, and we consider ourselves 

the first line of defense in our National security efforts. We acknowledge that processes need to be improved, and here are the 

steps we have already taken. 

The State Department misspelled Umar Farouk Abdullah’s name 

in our Visas Viper report. As a result, we did not have that information about his current U.S. visa in that report. To prevent that 

from occurring again, we instituted new procedures to ensure comprehensive visa information is included in all our Visas Viper reporting. This will highlight the visa application and issuance material also available already in the data that we have shared with 

our National security partners. 

We are also reevaluating the procedures and criteria used to revoke visas. The State Department has broad and flexible authority 

to revoke visas. Since 2001, we have revoked over 51,000 visas for 

a variety of reasons, including over 1,700 suspected links to terror. 

New watchlisting information coming from the intelligence and 

law enforcement community is continually checked every day 

against the database of previously issued visas. We can and do revoke visas and circumstances where an immediate threat is recognized. We can and do revoke visas to the point of people seeking 

to board aircraft, preventing their boarding in coordination with 

the FBI’s National Targeting Center. We revoke visas under these 

circumstances almost daily. We are standardizing procedures for 

triggering revocations from the field and are adding revocation recommendations to the Visas Viper report. 

At the same time, expeditious coordination with our National security partners is not to be underestimated. There have been numerous cases where a State Department unilateral and uncoordinated revocation would have disrupted important investigations 

that were under way by one of our National security partners. 
32 

The individual involved was under active investigation, and our 

revocation action would have disclosed the United States Government’s interest in that individual and ended our National security 

colleague’s ability to pursue the case and identify terrorist plans 

and co-conspirators. 

We will continue to closely coordinate visa revocation processes 

with our intelligence and law enforcement partners, while also constantly making enhancements to the security and integrity of the 

visa process. Information sharing and coordinated action are foundations of the border security systems put in place since 9/11, and 

they remain sound principles. 

The State Department has close and productive relationships 

with our interagency partners, particularly with the Department of 

Homeland Security, which has statutory authority for visa policy. 

The State Department brings unique assets and capabilities to this 

partnership. Our global presence, international expertise, and highly trained personnel provide us singular advantages in supporting 

the visa function throughout the world. 

We developed and implemented intensive screening processes requiring personal interviews and supported by a sophisticated global 

information network. This front line of border security has visa offices in virtually every country of the world and are staffed by 

highly trained, multilingual, culturally aware personnel of the 

State Department. 

We support them with the latest technology and access to enhanced screening tools and information systems. We are introducing a new generation of visa software to more efficiently manage our growing mission and the increasing amounts of data we 

handle. We are pioneers in the use of biometrics, a leader in the 

field of facial recognition, and we are expanding into the field of 

iris screening. We have and will continue to automate processes to 

reduce the possibility of human error. 

The State Department makes all visa information available to 

other agencies, giving them immediate access to over 13 years of 

data. We introduced on-line visa applications in 2009, which expanded our data collection tenfold and provide new information 

readily available for analysis by the State Department and by other 

agencies. This system is being rolled out worldwide in a few 

months. 

We embrace a layered approach to border security screening, 

which results in multiple agencies having an opportunity to review 

information and requires separate reviews at both the visa application and admission stage. No visa—no visa—is issued without it 

being run through security checks against our partners’ databases. 

We screen applicants’ fingerprints against U.S. databases, and we 

run our facial recognition software against the photo array provided by the intelligence community. 

At the same time we believe that U.S. interests in legitimate 

trade, travel, and educational exchanges are not in opposition to 

border security. In fact, the United States must strive to meet both 

goals to guarantee our long-term security. 

Again, the multi-agency team effort to which each agency brings 

its particular strengths and expertise results in a robust and secure process, a process based on broadly shared information. We re-
33 

main fully committed to correcting mistakes and remedying deficiencies that inhibit the full and timely sharing of information. 

We fully recognize that we are not perfect in our reporting in 

connection with this case. However, we are working and will continue to work not only to address shortcomings, but to continually 

enhance our border security screening capabilities and the contributions we make to this interagency effort. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to your 

questions. 

[The statement of Mr. Kennedy follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF PATRICK F. KENNEDY

JANUARY 27, 2010 

Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member King and distinguished Members of the 

committee, thank you for the opportunity to address you today. As a result of the 

attempted terrorist attack on Flight 253, the President ordered corrective steps to 

address systemic failures in procedures we use to protect the people of the United 

States. Secretary Clinton reiterated this direction when she stated, ‘‘we all are looking hard at what did happen in order to improve our procedures to avoid human 

errors, mistakes, oversights of any kind. We in the State Department are fully committed to accepting our responsibility for the mistakes that were made, and we’re 

going to be working hard with the rest of the Administration to improve every aspect of our efforts.’’ Therefore, the Department of State now is working on reviewing 

visa issuance and revocation criteria and determining how technological enhancements can facilitate and strengthen visa-related business processes. 

Our immediate attention is on addressing the deficiencies identified following the 

attempted attack on Flight 253. At the same time we continue to plan for the future, incorporating new technology, increasing data sharing and enhancing operational cooperation with partner agencies. We have a record of quickly adapting and 

improving our procedures to respond to security imperatives. We have a highly 

trained global team working daily to protect our borders and fulfill the overseas border security mission and other critical tasks ranging from crisis management to protection of American interests abroad. Within the Department we have a dynamic 

partnership between the Bureau of Consular Affairs and the Bureau of Diplomatic 

Security that adds a valuable law enforcement and investigative component to our 

capabilities. We will use these strengths to address the continuing security threats. 

In the case of Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, on the day following his father’s November 19 visit to the Embassy, we sent a cable to the Washington intelligence and 

law enforcement community through proper channels (the Visas Viper system) that 

‘‘Information at post suggests [that Farouk] may be involved in Yemeni-based extremists.’’ At the same time, the Consular Section entered Abdulmutallab into the 

Consular Lookout and Support System database known as CLASS. In sending the 

Visas Viper cable and checking State Department records to determine whether 

Abdulmutallab had a visa, Embassy officials misspelled his name, but entered it correctly into CLASS. As a result of the misspelling in the cable, information about 

previous visas issued to him and the fact that he currently held a valid U.S. visa 

was not included in the cable. At the same time the CLASS entry resulted in a lookout using the correct spelling that was shared automatically with the primary lookout system used by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and accessible to 

other agencies. 

We have taken immediate action to improve the procedures and content requirements for Visas Viper cable reporting that will call attention to the visa application 

and issuance material that is already in the data that we share with our National 

security partners. All officers have been instructed to include complete information 

about all previous and current U.S. visa(s). This guidance includes specific methods 

to comprehensively and intensively search the database of visa records so that all 

pertinent information is obtained. 

In addition to this change in current procedures to search visa records, we immediately began working to refine the capability of our current systems. When dealing 

with applications for visas, we employ strong, sophisticated name searching algorithms to ensure matches between names of visa applicants and any derogatory information contained in the 27 million records found in CLASS. This strong searching capability has been central to our procedures since automated lookout system 

checks were mandated following the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. We will use 
34 

our significant experience with search mechanisms for derogatory information to improve the systems for checking our visa issuance records. 

The Department of State has been matching new threat information with our 

records of existing visas since 2002. We have long recognized this function as critical 

to the way we manage our records and processes. This system of continual vetting 

has evolved as post-9/11 reforms were instituted and is now performed by the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC). All records added to the Terrorist Screening Database are checked against the Department’s Consolidated Consular Database (CCD) 

to determine if there are matching visa records. Matches are sent electronically from 

the TSC to the Department of State to flag cases for visa revocation. In almost all 

such cases, visas are revoked. In addition, we have widely disseminated our data 

to other agencies that may wish to learn whether a subject of interest has a U.S. 

visa. Cases for revocation consideration are forwarded to us by DHS/Customs and 

Border Protection’s (CBP) National Targeting Center (NTC) and other entities. Almost every day, we receive requests to review and, if warranted, revoke visas for 

potential travelers for whom new derogatory information has been discovered since 

the visa was issued. Our Operations Center is staffed 24 hours per day/7 days per 

week to work these issues. Many of these requests are urgent because the person 

is about to board a plane. The State Department then uses its authority to prudentially revoke the visa. 

Since the Presidentially-ordered Security Review, there have been changes in the 

thresholds for adding individuals to the Terrorist Screening Database, No-Fly, and 

Selectee lists. The number of revocations has increased substantially as a result. 

This revocation work is processed electronically in the Department. As soon as information is established to support a revocation, an entry showing the visa revocation 

is added electronically to the Department of State’s lookout system and shared in 

real time with the DHS lookout systems used for border screening. 

In addition to these changes, the Department is reviewing the procedures and criteria used in the field to revoke visas and will issue new instructions to our officers. 

Revocation recommendations will be added as an element of reporting through the 

Visas Viper channel. We will be reiterating our guidance on use of the broad discretionary authority of visa officers to deny visas on security and other grounds. Instruction in appropriate use of this authority has been a fundamental part of officer 

training for several years. 

The State Department has broad and flexible authority to revoke visas and we 

use that authority widely to protect our borders. Since 2001, we have revoked 

51,000 visas for a variety of reasons, including over 1,700 for suspected links to terrorism. We have been actively using this authority as we perform internal scrubs 

of our data with watch list information provided by partner agencies. For example, 

we are re-examining information in our CLASS database on individuals with potential connections to terrorist activity or support for such activity. We are reviewing 

all previous Visas Viper submissions as well as cases that other agencies are bringing to our attention from the No-Fly and Selectee lists, as well as other sources. 

In these reviews, we have identified cases for revocation and we have also confirmed 

that substantial numbers of individuals in these classes hold no visas and of those 

few who did, many were revoked prior to the current review. We recognize the gravity of the threat we face and are working intensely with our colleagues from other 

agencies to ensure that when the U.S. Government obtains information that a person may pose a threat to our security, that person does not hold a visa. 

We will use revocation authority prior to interagency consultation in circumstances where we believe there is an immediate threat. Revocation is an important tool in our border security arsenal. At the same time, expeditious coordination 

with our National security partners is not to be underestimated. There have been 

numerous cases where our unilateral and uncoordinated revocation would have disrupted important investigations that were underway by one of our National security 

partners. They had the individual under investigation and our revocation action 

would have disclosed the U.S. Government’s interest in the individual and ended 

our colleagues’ ability to quietly pursue the case and identify terrorists’ plans and 

co-conspirators. 

In addition to revocation efforts, consular officers refused 1,885,017 visas in fiscal 

year 2009. We now are renewing guidance to our officers on their discretionary authority to refuse visas under section 214(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act 

with specific reference to cases that raise security concerns. No visa is issued without it being run through security checks against our partners’ data. And we screen 

applicants’ fingerprints against U.S. databases as well. 

The Department has a close and productive partnership with DHS, which has authority for visa policy. Over the past 7 years both agencies significantly increased 

resources, improved procedures, and upgraded systems devoted to supporting the 
35 

visa function. DHS receives all of the information collected by the Department of 

State during the visa process. DHS has broad access to our entire CCD, containing 

136 million records related to both immigrant and nonimmigrant visas and covering 

visa actions of the last 13 years. Special extracts of data are supplied to elements 

within DHS, including the Visa Security Units of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). These extracts have been tailored to the specific requirements of 

those units. We are working closely with ICE Visa Security Units established 

abroad and with domestic elements of DHS, such as CBP’s National Targeting Center. 

We gave DHS access to U.S. passport records, used by CBP to confirm the identity 

of citizens returning to the United States. We developed new card-type travel documents that work with the automated systems CBP installed at the U.S. land borders. We are collecting more information electronically and earlier in the process. 

Expanded data collection done in advance of travel will give DHS and partner agencies richer information and more time for analysis. 

We make all of our visa information available to other involved agencies, and we 

specifically designed our systems to facilitate comprehensive data sharing. We give 

other agencies immediate access to over 13 years of visa data, and they use this 

access extensively. In November 2009, more than 16,000 employees of DHS, the Department of Defense (DOD), the FBI and Commerce made 920,000 queries on visa 

records. We embrace a layered approach to border security screening and are fully 

supportive of the DHS Visa Security Program. 

The Department of State is at the forefront of interagency cooperation and data 

sharing to improve border security, and we embarked on initiatives that will position us to meet future challenges while taking into consideration our partner agencies and their specific needs and requirements. We are implementing a new generation of visa processing systems that will further integrate information gathered from 

domestic and overseas activities. We are restructuring our information technology 

architecture to accommodate the unprecedented scale of information we collect and 

to keep us agile and adaptable in an age of intensive and growing requirements for 

data and data sharing. 

We proactively expanded biometric screening programs and spared no effort to integrate this expansion into existing overseas facilities. In partnership with DHS and 

the FBI, we established the largest biometric screening process on the globe. We 

were a pioneer in the use of facial recognition techniques and remain a leader in 

operational use of this technology. In 2009 we expanded use of facial recognition 

from a selected segment of visa applications to all visa applications. We now are expanding our use of this technology beyond visa records. We are testing use of iris 

recognition technology in visa screening, making use of both identity and derogatory 

information collected by DOD. These efforts require intense on-going cooperation 

from other agencies. We successfully forged and continue to foster partnerships that 

recognize the need to supply accurate and speedy screening in a 24/7 global environment. As we implement process and policy changes, we are always striving to add 

value in both border security and in operational results. Both dimensions are important in supporting the visa process. 

The Department of State is an integral player on the border security team. We 

are the first line of defense. Our global presence, foreign policy mission, and personnel structure give us singular advantages in executing the visa function throughout the world. Our authorities and responsibilities enable us to provide a global perspective to the visa process and its impact on U.S. National interests. The issuance 

and refusal of visas has a direct impact on foreign relations. Visa policy quickly can 

become a significant bilateral problem that harms U.S. interests if handled without 

consideration of foreign policy impacts. The conduct of U.S. visa policy has a direct 

and significant impact on the treatment of U.S. citizens abroad. The Department of 

State is in a position to anticipate and weigh those possibilities. 

We developed and implemented intensive screening processes requiring personal 

interviews, employing analytic interview techniques, incorporating multiple biometric checks, all built around a sophisticated global information technology network. 

This frontline of border security has visa offices present in virtually every country 

of the world. They are staffed by highly trained and multi-lingual personnel of the 

Department of State. These officials are dedicated to a career of worldwide service 

and provide the cultural awareness, knowledge, and objectivity to ensure that the 

visa function remains the frontline of border security. 

In addition, we have 145 officers and 540 locally employed staff devoted specifically to fraud prevention and document security, including fraud prevention officers 

at overseas posts. We have a large Fraud Prevention Programs office in Washington, 

DC that works very closely with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, and we have 

fraud screening operations using sophisticated database checks at both the Ken-
36 

tucky Consular Center and the National Visa Center in Portsmouth, New Hampshire. Their role in flagging applications and applicants who lack credibility, who 

present fraudulent documents, or who give us false information adds a valuable dimension to our visa process. 

The Bureau of Diplomatic Security adds an important law enforcement element 

to the Department’s visa procedures. There are now 50 Assistant Regional Security 

Officer Investigators abroad specifically devoted to maintaining the integrity of the 

process. They are complemented by officers working domestically on both visa and 

passport matters. These Diplomatic Security officers staff a unit within the Bureau 

of Consular Affairs that monitors overseas visa activities to detect risks and 

vulnerabilities. These highly trained law enforcement professionals add another dimension to our border security efforts. 

The multi-agency team effort on border security, based upon broadly shared information, provides a solid foundation. At the same time we remain fully committed 

to correcting mistakes and remedying deficiencies that inhibit the full and timely 

sharing of information. We have and we will continue to automate processes to reduce the possibility of human error. We fully recognize that we were not perfect in 

our reporting in connection with the attempted terrorist attack on Flight 253. We 

are working and will continue to work not only to address that mistake but to continually enhance our border security screening capabilities and the contributions we 

make to the interagency effort. 

We believe that U.S. interests in legitimate travel, trade promotion, and educational exchange are not in conflict with our border security agenda and, in fact, 

further that agenda in the long term. Our long-term interests are served by continuing the flow of commerce and ideas that are the foundations of prosperity and 

security. Acquainting people with American culture and perspectives remains the 

surest way to reduce misperceptions about the United States. Fostering academic 

and professional exchange keeps our universities and research institutions at the 

forefront of scientific and technological change. We believe the United States must 

meet both goals to guarantee our long-term security. 

We are facing an evolving threat. The tools we use to address this threat must 

be sophisticated and agile. Information obtained from these tools must be comprehensive and accurate. Our criteria for taking action must be clear and coordinated. The team we use for this mission must be the best. The Department of State 

has spent years developing the tools and personnel needed to properly execute the 

visa function overseas and remains fully committed to continuing to fulfill its essential role on the border security team. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you for your testimony. 

I now recognize Director Leiter to summarize his statement for 

5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL E. LEITER, DIRECTOR, NATIONAL 

COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER 

Mr. LEITER. Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member King, Members of the committee, thank you for holding this hearing on the 

events of Christmas day. 

Let me start with the most crystal-clear assertion I can make. 

Omar Farouk Abdulmutallab should not have boarded that plane 

bound for the United States on Christmas day. The counterterrorism system failed, and I along with other leaders have told the 

President—I tell you, I am telling the American people—we are determined to do better. 

I have also pledged to the President, along with the DNI, a fresh 

and penetrating look at the human and technical factors that we 

think contributed to this failure and try to determine ways that we 

can improve our performance. The President has tasked me with 

two specific responsibilities—one, a methodology of pursuing followup actions for all threats and threads as we detect them, and second, a dedicated capability at NCTC to enhance watch list records. 
37 

In addition, I am, of course, working with the DNI, with Leon 

Panetta, with Bob Mueller and other members of the IC to work 

on intelligence community-specific improvements. 

I would like to briefly summarize the events of Christmas day 

from our perspective and what went wrong. I want to start by debunking something that has become conventional wisdom, that this 

is a failure just like 9/11. As the President has said, this was not, 

like 2001, a failure to collect or share intelligence. Rather, it was 

a failure to connect, integrate, and understand the intelligence. 

Now, one is not necessarily a lead to the more tragic consequences than the other, but the differences in those failures obviously lead to a different set of reforms that might be necessary. 

Although the National Counterterrorism Center and the intelligence community have long warned, going back to 2008, 2009, 

about the threat posed by al-Qaeda in Yemen, we did not correlate 

the specific information that would have kept Abdulmutallab off 

that flight. 

We did highlight the growing threat of al-Qaeda in Yemen. We 

also focused on targets in Yemen, but in the fall of 2009 we increased the need to talk about the possibility of al-Qaeda from 

Yemen targeting the United States. We also in fact analyzed the 

information that al-Qaeda was working with an individual who, 

only again after the fact, did we know to be Abdulmutallab. 

Finally, the intelligence community also warned repeatedly of the 

type of explosive device that was ultimately used by Abdulmutallab 

and the ways in which that device could be used to undermine U.S. 

aviation screening. But again, despite having identified these overall streams, we failed to make the last final connection, what I 

would refer to as the last tactical mile here, linking 

Abdulmutallab’s identity to the plot that was in train. 

We indeed had the information that came from his father that 

he was concerned about his son going to Yemen, coming under the 

influence of religious extremists, and that he was not going to return home. We also had streams of information from other intelligence channels that provide the pieces of the story. We had a partial name, an indicator of a Nigerian, but there was no single piece 

of intelligence that brought that together, nor did we at NCTC or 

elsewhere in the intelligence community do that in our analysis. 

As a result, although Mr. Abdulmutallab was identified with respect to terrorists and placed in the Terrorist Identities Datamart 

Environment, he was not watchlisted based on the information that 

was associated with him, nor was the placed on the No-Fly or Selectee list. 

Had all the information the United States had available at the 

time that link together, his name would have been watchlisted and 

thus on the visa screening list and the border inspection list. 

Whether he would have been placed on the No-Fly and Selectee 

list, based on the existing standards, would have been determined 

by the strength of our analytic judgment. As I have already said, 

I believe, one of the clear lessons we have learned is a need to reexamine the standards for inclusion on these various watch lists. 

Finally, and I hope I have made clear I have no desire to try to 

make excuses for what we did not do, because there are things that 

we didn’t do well and we didn’t do right. I do want to give you at 
38 

least a bit of context about the context in which this failure occurred. 

Every day the National Counterterrorism Center receives literally thousands of pieces of intelligence related to CT—more than 

5,000 a day; well over 5,000. We review well over 5,000 names each 

day. Each day more than 350 individuals are actually placed on the 

watch list. 

Now, in hindsight we can say with a high degree of confidence 

that Abdulmutallab was plotting with AQAP. Although we obviously have to do better, we have to recognize that in my view there 

is no single silver bullet, and that is especially true as this terror 

threat we face becomes more multi-dimensional and more dispersed 

away from traditional areas of promoting terrorism. 

So while watchlisting and intelligence are critical tools in this 

fight, I would echo the Chairman’s statement of the need for a layered approach to counterterrorism, which includes technology, 

international screening and cooperation and the like. 

Now, very quickly, I would like to outline the ways in which we 

are improving the system already. As I have noted, the President 

has assigned to the interagency to review the standards for inclusion on the watch lists, including the No-Fly Selectee list. This has 

been done. 

In addition, we have immediately moved additional resources to 

focusing on Yemen and other al-Qaeda affiliates that we believe 

pose a threat to U.S. homeland security. 

Third, we are trying to move away from a names-based system 

of pursuing these threats, ensuring that our analysts have the time 

and resources to pursue the small tidbits of information so they can 

in fact associate that with individuals and ensure proper 

watchlisting. 

Finally, as I also noted at the outset, under the President’s direction we are expanding and deepening our allocation of responsibility for specific follow-up actions for a wide range of threats, not 

just those that appear to be high-priority threats in the beginning. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I very much look forward to working 

with this committee and fielding your questions as we work on this 

together. 

[The statement of Mr. Leiter follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MICHAEL E. LEITER

27 JANUARY 2010 

Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member King, and Members of the Committee on 

Homeland Security: Thank you for your invitation to appear before the committee 

to discuss the events leading up to the attempted terrorist attack on Christmas day 

and the improvements the National Counterterrorism Center and the intelligence 

community have underway to fix deficiencies. 

It is my privilege to be accompanied by Jane Holl Lute, Deputy Secretary of 

Homeland Security and Patrick Kennedy, Under Secretary of State for Management. 

The attempted terrorist attack on Christmas day did not succeed, but, as one of 

several recent attacks against the United States inspired by jihadist ideology or directed by al-Qaeda and its affiliates, it reminds us that our mission to protect Americans is unending. 

Let’s start with this clear assertion: Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab should not have 

stepped on that plane. The counterterrorism system failed and we told the President 

we are determined to do better. 
39 

Within the intelligence community we had strategic intelligence that al-Qaeda in 

the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) had the intention of taking action against the United 

States prior to the failed attack on December 25, but, we did not direct more resources against AQAP, nor insist that the watchlisting criteria be adjusted prior to 

the event. In addition, the intelligence community analysts who were working hard 

on immediate threats to Americans in Yemen did not understand the fragments of 

intelligence on what turned out later to be Mr. Abdulmutallab, so they did not push 

him onto the terrorist watch list. 

We are taking a fresh and penetrating look at strengthening both human and 

technical performance and do what we have to do in all areas. Director of National 

Intelligence Blair and I have specifically been tasked by the President to improve 

and manage work in four areas: 

• Immediately reaffirm and clarify roles and responsibilities of the counterterrorism analytic components of the IC in synchronizing, correlating, and analyzing all sources of intelligence related to terrorism. 

• Accelerate information technology enhancements, to include knowledge discovery, database integration, cross-database searches, and the ability to correlate biographic information with terrorism-related intelligence. 

• Take further steps to enhance the rigor and raise the standard of tradecraft of 

intelligence analysis, especially analysis designed to uncover and prevent terrorist plots. 

• Ensure resources are properly aligned with issues highlighted in strategic warning analysis. 

Additionally, NCTC has been tasked by the President to do the following: 

• Establish and resource appropriately a process to prioritize and to pursue thoroughly and exhaustively terrorism threat threads, to include the identification 

of appropriate follow-up action by the intelligence, law enforcement, and homeland security communities. 

• Establish a dedicated capability responsible for enhancing record information on 

possible terrorist in the Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment for 

watchlisting purposes. 

THE EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE CHRISTMAS DAY ATTACK

I will now briefly discuss some of the details of the bombing attempt and what 

we missed. As the President has said, this was not—like in 2001—a failure to collect 

or share intelligence; rather it was a failure to connect, integrate, and understand 

the intelligence we had. 

Although NCTC and the intelligence community had long warned of the threat 

posed by al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, we did not correlate the specific information that would have been required to help keep Abdulmutallab off that Northwest Airlines flight. 

More specifically, the intelligence community highlighted the growing threat to 

U.S. and Western interests in the region posed by AQAP, whose precursor elements 

attacked our embassy in Sana’a in 2008. Our analysis focused on AQAP’s plans to 

strike U.S. targets in Yemen, but it also noted—increasingly in the fall of 2009— 

the possibility of targeting the United States. We had analyzed the information that 

this group was working with an individual who we now know was the individual 

involved in the Christmas attack. 

In addition, the intelligence community warned repeatedly of the type of explosive 

device used by Abdulmutallab and the ways in which it might prove a challenge to 

screening. Of course, at the Amsterdam airport, Abdulmutallab was subjected to the 

same screening as other passengers—he passed through a metal detector, which 

didn’t detect the explosives that were sewn into his clothes. 

As I have noted, despite our successes in identifying the overall themes that described the plot we failed to make the final connections—the ‘‘last tactical mile’’— 

linking Abdulmutallab’s identity to the plot. We had the information that came from 

his father that he was concerned about his son going to Yemen, coming under the 

influence of unknown religious extremists, and that he was not going to return 

home. We also had other streams of information coming from intelligence channels 

that provided pieces of the story. We had a partial name, an indication of a Nigerian, but there was nothing that brought it all together—nor did we do so in our 

analysis. 

As a result, although Mr. Abdulmutallab was identified as a known or suspected 

terrorist and entered into the Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE)— 

and this information was in turn widely available throughout the intelligence community—the derogatory information associated with him did not meet the existing 

policy standards—those first adopted in the summer of 2008 and ultimately promul-
40 

gated in February 2009—for him to be ‘‘watchlisted,’’ let alone placed on the NoFly List or Selectee lists. 

Had all of the information the United States had available, fragmentary and otherwise, been linked together, his name would have undoubtedly been entered on the 

Terrorist Screening Database which is exported to the Department of State and the 

Department of Homeland Security. Whether he would have been placed on either 

the No-Fly or Selectee list—again based on the existing standards—would have 

been determined by the strength of the analytic judgment. One of the clear lessons 

the U.S. Government has learned and which the intelligence community will support is the need to modify the standards for inclusion on such lists. 

In hindsight, the intelligence we had can be assessed with a high degree of confidence to describe Mr. Abdulmutallab as a likely operative of AQAP. But without 

making excuses for what we did not do, I think it critical that we at least note the 

context in which this failure occurred: Each day NCTC receives literally thousands 

of pieces of intelligence information from around the world, reviews literally thousands of different names, and places more than 350 people a day on the watch list— 

virtually all based on far more damning information than that associated with Mr. 

Abdulutallab prior to Christmas day. Although we must and will do better, we must 

also recognize that not all of the pieces rise above the noise level. 

The men and women of the National Counterterrorism Center and the intelligence 

community are committed to fighting terrorism at home and abroad and will seek 

every opportunity to better our analytical tradecraft, more aggressively pursue those 

that plan and perpetrate acts of terrorism, and effectively enhance the criteria used 

to keep known or suspected terrorists out of the United States. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you very much. 

I thank all the witnesses for their testimony. 

I remind each Member that he or she will have 5 minutes to 

question the panel. I will now recognize myself for questions. 

To each one of the panelists, since this occurrence on December 

25, has any personnel action or disciplinary action taken place in 

your Department relative to this incident? 

Ms. LUTE. In the Department of Homeland Security, Mr. Chairman, the personnel actions that have been taken have related to 

intensified training, intensified deployment, but there have been no 

disciplinary actions that have taken place. 

Chairman THOMPSON. So there are no disciplinary—— 

Mr. KENNEDY. No disciplinary actions, sir. 

Mr. LEITER. We are currently reviewing all the personnel. We 

have made no final decisions. 

Chairman THOMPSON. If you will, at whatever point you complete 

that review, would you provide the committee that which the law 

allows so we can review it? 

Mr. LEITER. Absolutely, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman THOMPSON. So my understanding is, even though this 

was an unfortunate situation, nobody has been disciplined. We understand the President took responsibility, and that is good, but 

the question in the minds of a lot of us is, is that good enough? 

Now, my next question to each one of you is if that situation occurred today, would it be any different? 

Mr. KENNEDY. On the State Department, it would be different, 

Mr. Chairman. We had a process that had been worked out with 

the interagency community, and we have discovered that we did 

not have sufficient checkmarks in. There was no requirement in 

our previous rule grid when we reported on the Visas Viper, meaning somebody coming into an American embassy and saying we 

have concerns about a third party. 

We reported that immediately, but we did not have in that process a checkmark that this individual had a U.S. visa. I cannot tell 
41 

you why that wasn’t included. I can tell you probably because we 

had already passed to the law enforcement intelligence community 

the list of everyone who gets a visa on a daily basis. 

We have now added that to our process, so any person who 

comes in the embassy and makes a report of terrorist concern, not 

only to report that individual in our Visas Viper message to the 

community, but we add then this person has a United States visa, 

and we have also enhanced the name-checking capability in that 

system to make sure that if there is a misspelling—— 

Chairman THOMPSON. Okay. So, all right, so he has a visa. So 

what does that do? 

Mr. KENNEDY. What? 

Chairman THOMPSON. In the process. Does it revoke the visa? 

Does it—— 

Mr. KENNEDY. As I mentioned in my statement, Mr. Chairman, 

if we unilaterally revoked a visa, and there was the case recently 

up, we have a request from a law enforcement agency to not revoke 

the visa. We came across information. We said, ‘‘This is a dangerous person.’’ We were ready to revoke the visa. We then went 

to the community and said, ‘‘Should we revoke this visa?’’ 

One of the members—and we would be glad to give you that in 

private—said, ‘‘Please, do not revoke this visa. We have eyes on 

this person. We are following this person who has the visa for the 

purpose of trying to roll up an entire network, not just stop one 

person.’’ 

So we will revoke the visa of any individual who is a threat to 

the United States, but we do take one preliminary step. We ask our 

law enforcement and intelligence community partners, ‘‘Do you 

have eyes on this person and do you want us to let this person proceed under your surveillance so that you may potentially break a 

larger plot?’’ 

Chairman THOMPSON. I think that the point that I am trying to 

get at is is this just another box you are checking, or is there some 

security value to adding that box to the list? 

Mr. KENNEDY. Yes. The intelligence and law enforcement community tell us that they believe in certain cases that there is a 

higher value of them following this person so they can find his or 

her co-conspirators and roll up an entire plot against the United 

States, rather than simply knock out one soldier in that effort. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Mr. Leiter. 

Mr. LEITER. I would offer four ways in which I think the process 

would work differently today, Mr. Chairman. First, actually beginning in July 2008, right after Mr. Abdulmutallab obtained his visa, 

NCTC began working with State Department in reviewing visa applications in a new and more advanced way. 

The way in which we now review that visa, and I can’t go into 

it in the open session, would have detected a connection with Mr. 

Abdulmutallab, which would have stamped an automatic warning 

to State Department, DHS, FBI and other intelligence community 

components. So first of all, he might not have even gotten the visa 

in the first place. 

Second, anyone who has a visa that goes on the watch list, the 

default is if that visa is revoked, they also become a no-fly to en-
42 

sure that if someone shows up with the visa, if there is some confusion there, they are also a no-fly. That is the second step. 

Third, we have dedicated teams that don’t have any responsibility for producing intelligence, but simply for following up on 

these small leads. I believe those teams would increase the likelihood we would tap. 

Fourth, we have, as an interagency way, reviewed already the 

standards for placement on No-Fly. Although those standards have 

not yet been formally adjusted, they are being interpreted in a 

manner which allows us to more broadly apply those practically. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you. 

I yield to the Ranking Member for questions. 

Mr. KING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I guess this would go to Mr. Leiter and Deputy Secretary Lute. 

The President first spoke to the Nation on this on Monday, December 28, I believe. It was 3 days after the event. During that time 

I assume most of this information was available to the intelligence 

community, whoever was briefing the President. Yet when he spoke 

that day, 3 days after, he referred to Abdulmutallab as an isolated 

extremist. 

Do you know who was responsible for clearing that statement, 

when obviously he was not an isolated extremist? He was part of 

al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. We had this series of information on him. Now, the President seemed to correct that the next 

day. Why did the President go forward and use that term? Who is 

responsible for briefing him? Who is responsible for clearing that 

statement? 

Mr. LEITER. Congressman, I frankly can’t speak to the White 

House interactions and who prepared that for the President and 

who briefed him on that. I simply don’t know. I would say that on 

the night, on Christmas night, we advised the White House. I think 

the White House, we said that we believe this was an attempted 

terrorist attack. 

I will also add that during this entire look back, an on-going investigation, as you know, different pieces of information have come 

forward, which have made it more and more clear, I think, each 

day of his connections to al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. 

Mr. KING. Secretary Lute. 

Ms. LUTE. Congressman, I would echo what Director Leiter has 

said. I was equally not involved in the deliberations within the 

White House to inform the President. 

I can also say, as Director Leiter has said, that from the moment 

we became aware of this incident, there was an extremely intensive 

effort to identify as many facts about this individual as we possibly 

could, including reaching out to international partners who held 

some elements of information. That work was intensive over those 

several—— 

Mr. KING. Because this interrupts my time, I want to interrupt. 

Again, I am just concerned why 3 days later, with all this information available, the President said ‘‘isolated extremist.’’ Was it John 

Brennan who briefed him? Was it Leon Panetta? 

I mean it would seem to me that in a situation like this, there 

should be one point person, who goes in and tells the President, 

who coordinates everything. Who is that coordinator? Do you know? 
43 

Who would have allowed him to say ‘‘isolated extremist’’ when he 

was not isolated? 

Mr. LEITER. Congressman, I know that the National Counterterrorism Center and others were providing intelligence to the White 

House on an on-going basis. I simply don’t know how those statements were produced. 

Mr. KING. Okay. 

Secretary Lute and Mr. Leiter, would, you know, either yourselves or anyone in the intelligence community who would now say 

that Abdulmutallab should be un-Mirandized at this stage? Because, obviously, Director Blair seems to believe it was a mistake 

to have him put into the criminal justice system. At this stage, is 

anyone willing to recommend he be taken out of the criminal justice system and put into the military tribunal system? 

Ms. LUTE. Congressman, what I can say from the Department of 

Homeland Security’s perspective and in hindsight—there is a lot of 

hindsight going on—we are focused on those aspects of this for 

which the Department had key responsibility. The decisions regarding the Mirandizing of Abdulmutallab are appropriately directed to the Justice Department. 

Mr. KING. Okay. My understanding was the Secretary of Homeland Security is a member of the President’s task force on interrogation, and that supported the creation of the HIG. I am wondering 

does the Department have a position of whether or not at this 

stage, not doing Monday morning quarterbacking, right now as of 

Wednesday, January 27, do you believe that you should be taken 

out of the criminal justice system and put into the military tribunal 

system? 

Ms. LUTE. Congressman, I am not party of all of the conversations that have gone in this individual. I am not prepared—— 

Mr. KING. Director Leiter. 

Mr. LEITER. Congressman, I think it is critically important that 

we try to get in as much information from him as we can. I think 

now, several weeks after the arrest and Mirandizing, it is not at 

all clear to me, and I am not close enough to know whether or not 

it would be productive or counterproductive, given the current FBI 

investigation, to do that. 

Mr. KING. Secretary Lute, it has been reported in the press that 

CBP was waiting in Detroit to question the terrorist when he came 

off the plane. If that is true, wouldn’t that have been sufficient information to contact the Netherlands and at least ask them to do 

a secondary inspection? 

Ms. LUTE. Congressman, what CBP had was consistent with our 

long-standing practice of examining issues related to admissibility, 

and—— 

Mr. KING. Okay, but looking at it now—we are going toward the 

future again—I am not trying to Monday morning quarterback, but 

looking toward the future, having that information, if there is 

enough information to question a person coming off, is it that difficult to ask another government to give him a secondary inspection? 

Ms. LUTE. We in fact have changed our practice. 

Mr. KING. We have. Okay. 

Ms. LUTE. That kind of information will be pushed forward. 
44 

Mr. KING. Let me ask Director Leiter and Secretary Lute: People 

have said the system failed, but what really was the system failure? Wasn’t it judgments that failed? Obviously, we always have to 

adapt the system. But it seems to me the system provided enough 

information that, if it were properly interpreted, this would not 

have happened. Did the system actually fail, or are we talking 

about judgment mistakes? 

Again, I am not trying to Monday morning quarterback. But I 

think rather than just say the system failed, one person accepts the 

responsibility, shouldn’t we be—as the Chairman seemed to be indicating, and I agree—looking for individuals who did make judgment mistakes? 

Mr. LEITER. Congressman, I think there are potentially some instances where there was a protocol to be followed, and someone 

didn’t follow the protocol. That is one category of failure. 

The second category of failing is did you connect these two pieces 

of data? I frankly think that that second category is a lot harder 

to identify and clearly say you made a mistake. We want analysts 

to do that. But whether or not they actually could, and piece that 

all together, given the resources, the workload they are facing, I 

think it is much more difficult to say that that was a clear failure. 

I believe the phrase ‘‘systemic failure’’ was meant to suggest that 

there are a series of failings in different pieces of the system, not 

that the entire system itself is broken. 

Mr. KING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you very much. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from California for 5 

minutes. Ms. Harman. 

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would like to welcome our witnesses, but comment on the absence of Secretary Napolitano. This is the committee with primary 

jurisdiction over the Department of Homeland Security. She is the 

Secretary of Homeland Security. She is in Washington, DC. 

She was invited to testify at this very important hearing, and she 

should have been here, Deputy Secretary Lute. I understand that 

you were prepared and you had accepted our invitation, but I am 

very personally disappointed that she isn’t here. 

I also want to note for the record that I was briefed following the 

Christmas bomb plot within a few days. I was first in my district, 

and then I was on a family vacation, but Secretary Napolitano did 

call me after she spoke to the Chairman. I am quite aware that she 

had first spoken to him. I also exchanged e-mails and had numerous calls with Mr. Leiter, who was first in Washington, DC, during 

the event and then subsequently on a short family vacation himself. I know he was hard at work. 

Mr. KING. Would you just yield for 2 seconds? Just to say nobody 

on this side received those briefings, which I think is wrong. It has 

always been bipartisan. 

Ms. HARMAN. I agree with you, Mr. King, that there should be 

bipartisan briefings. You know that I agree with that. 

I also want to note that in recent years there have been many 

intelligence community successes. The Zazi plot, the Headley plot 

and others are examples of success, and there had been many intelligence community sacrifices, particularly the loss recently of seven 
45 

CIA personnel at the Forward Operating Base Chapman in Afghanistan. Obviously, all of us know this and want to salute again 

today the hard-working women and men of the intelligence community. 

But despite all those successes and the risks that they take, the 

Christmas day problem does represent a failure. Two of you, Mr. 

Kennedy and Mr. Leiter, have stepped up and taken responsibility, 

as has Mr. Brennan, and I applaud you for doing that. I applaud 

the fact that you have all pledged that you would do better. 

Doing better is not optional. A hundred percent security can 

never be achieved, but surely we can do better. At least to me, listening to all of this and based on my long experience with the Intelligence Reform Act and other efforts to try to better, I think that 

doing better is not about laundry lists. It is about leadership. 

Only through leadership will our system of layered security become more agile and responsive. Let us understand that the enemy 

that is seeking to harm us is agile and responsive. Whatever it is 

that we now decide to do, they will try to figure out a way to get 

around it. So our system of collection, analysis, visa approval, 

watchlisting and other things should get better. But only through 

strong leadership will that better system stay agile and responsive. 

Let me just add one thing as the tag end. This I commend the 

Department of Homeland Security for doing very well, and that is 

preparing, not scaring the public. There is a new tone. I applaud 

that. Let us remember that the successful layer of security on 

Christmas day was a prepared public on that airplane. 

So, finally, let me make one other point. There is testimony submitted for the record of this hearing by the ACLU, and I have read 

that testimony, and I think it is extremely thoughtful. It reminds 

me that one piece of unfinished business since the Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 is the formation of a privacy and civil liberties 

commission that was supposed to oversee new practices to keep our 

country safer. 

I wrote a letter to the President in October with Senator Susan 

Collins of Maine, and the White House has never responded to our 

letter. Insofar as I know, nothing has been done. I think that this 

is unfortunate and will prevent us from assuring the public that we 

are enacting better practices consistent with our Constitution. 

But my one question, because time is running out, is to each of 

you. What are you personally going to do to assert leadership in 

the near- and medium-term to make certain that the people under 

your supervision remain agile and responsive against an evolving 

threat by a learning organization? 

Ms. LUTE. Congresswoman, perhaps I will begin. You and I know 

each other well. I take very seriously the responsibilities of leadership, and I underscore responsibility. I personally traveled to 12 

countries in 12 days with colleagues from the Department of Homeland Security to bring a message of leadership from the United 

States to our international partners with whom we have to work 

very closely to raise the standard of aviation security. 

I personally spoke with the IAB officer on the ground in Amsterdam to understand from his perspective what more can we do to 

change the system and to improve our ability to prevent a future 

event as occurred on Christmas day. 
46 

The Secretary equally has personally made aviation security a 

cornerstone event of our efforts going forward in this, along with 

other parts of the Department, who take very seriously its leadership role to help create a homeland where the American way of life 

can thrive. This is something we take extremely seriously. 

Mr. KENNEDY. Ma’am, the Secretary of State is incredibly involved in this, and she has charged me, and I think that I would 

offer in the brief time I have two points, but there are others. 

The first, we need to continually increase our software capability 

to take disjointed pieces of material and bring them to get together. 

The second thing we need to do is and I have to make sure that 

is happening, and I think that we also have to make sure that we 

remain and improve our lash-up with the National security and the 

law enforcement community, because we are on the frontline. 

But while we are on the frontlines, if we don’t have the backstopping that is the best that we can lash up, then we would fail again. 

That is my pledge to make sure those happen. 

Mr. LEITER. Congresswoman, I have spent a tremendous amount 

of time since December 25 with my workforce, my analysts, my 

watch listers, my watch standards, and made clear to them many 

things. One, I have to enable them to be able to do the job. If they 

need something, they have to come to me, so I am making sure 

that lines of communication are more open than ever. 

So one of the things I first said to them is I want to know from 

every one of them how do we do our job better. I did an open email to my entire organization. I probably got 200 responses of 

what they think needs to be done. 

The second thing I said to them in a way relates back to what 

the Chairman asked. I told all of them you have to ask yourself 

whether or not you can keep doing it, because this is high pressure. 

It is high stakes. You are going to get beat up in the public realm. 

You have to make sure that you can commit yourself 100 percent 

to this every single day. There is no embarrassment if they can’t. 

We have to make sure that we have a well-honed team that really 

stays on this. 

Finally, the last thing I would say I am doing—I am not generally noted to be an especially patient person, but whatever patience I have shown in the past in terms of trying to negotiate or 

massage interagency agreement to obtain data or to provide cooperation, frankly, I am done with it. I am going to ask once politely, and after that I am bringing to the White House and Director Blair and saying this has to be done. If it can’t be done, I can’t 

guarantee you the security that I think you and the American people deserve. 

Could I add one thing, Mr. Chairman? I just want to note on the 

record I endorse wholeheartedly the information that this committee needs to make a decision. You have my commitment from 

NCTC—I hope we have illustrated that in the past—to provide you 

that completely and on a nonpartisan basis the information you 

need to do your oversight correctly. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you. 

The gentleman from Indiana for 5 minutes, Mr. Souder. 

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
47 

First, Mr. Kennedy, I would appreciate for the record if you 

would—you said since 2001 you revoked 51,000 visas and 1,700 for 

suspected links to terrorism—could you give us a by-year number 

of visas revoked and number for suspected terrorism? 

But, secondly, I know my friend from New York kept making a 

point about Monday morning quarterbacking. As a Hoosier, when 

you have Peyton Manning as your quarterback, you don’t have to 

do Monday morning quarterbacking. That is important here, because it is the person in charge, and the people in charge. When 

they fail is when we do Monday morning quarterbacking. 

It is not the agent who didn’t have the information who messed 

up here, that as you see these people at the airports as you go 

around the world, there were signals from the top to back off of 

profiling, don’t focus as much, agents not focusing as much on capturing people as moving them through, not putting things together. 

I have some basic questions that we learned before, and I was 

very disturbed at some of the briefing. My understanding is in public record that we didn’t know he paid cash, because we don’t collect the information on cash, because 20 percent or some percentage of people who do foreign travel pay by cash and that that 

wasn’t in his—we didn’t know he paid cash. That is public record. 

Is that true? 

Mr. LEITER. I think it is true that we did not know he paid cash. 

One note, I would say, Mr. Souder. I think you are right. Roughly 

20 percent of global passengers pay cash. That proportion, from the 

region he came from in Africa, is vastly higher, so frankly, a cash 

payment for a ticket from where he bought his ticket really would 

not raise any suspicion. 

Mr. SOUDER. We also didn’t know that the British had him on 

a no-fly list. Is that correct? That is publicly reported. 

Mr. LEITER. The British did not have him on a counterterrorism 

no-fly list. The British had—— 

Mr. SOUDER. But they had him on a no-fly list. 

Mr. LEITER. He did not have a visa—— 

Mr. SOUDER. He didn’t have a visa, so he couldn’t fly. 

Mr. LEITER [continuing]. For criminal purposes. 

Mr. SOUDER. So the question is, and this is what I would ask 

you, in any type of basic tracking or intelligence, in narcotics and 

that type of thing, you build a system. When a business is trying 

to figure out risk of something, they build a system. 

The cash would not be relevant in normal, but the cash becomes 

relevant if the father said this, and you knew you were watching 

something from there, and you are tracking a ticket. Then all of a 

sudden the cash is relevant. The fact that he didn’t have a visa was 

not relevant, because it wasn’t relevant to terrorism. But the fact 

that he was a liar on his visa form suddenly becomes relevant, once 

you know that the father called, and he bought cash in that. 

In other words there is a point system. My understanding is you 

don’t have a point system. Is that true? 

Mr. LEITER. Congressman—— 

Mr. SOUDER. In other words there is no way to pyramid the information. 
48 

Mr. LEITER. Congressman, I don’t think that is quite true, but I 

don’t want to quibble with your point, because I think you are exactly right. Those individually—— 

Mr. SOUDER. Irrelevant things, yes. 

Mr. LEITER [continuing]. Inoffensive bits of data add up to a larger picture. I will say that over the past several years, as we have 

tried to ‘‘accumulate data’’ so all of that data can be shared and 

analyzed together, one of the consistent challenges we have faced 

at the National Counterterrorism Center is these bits of data that 

aren’t terrorism information, but could add to that picture. 

That has been one of the most significant obstacles we have faced 

in making sure all that information can be effectively analyzed. 

Mr. SOUDER. But would you not agree that there are things 

where you are building a broad picture, and there are things that 

are specifically relevant to getting on an airplane? In other words 

I know early on until they somewhat improved the system, that 

one time going through the Washington airport, six of the seven 

people in secondary where members of Congress. Why? We got out 

early. We bought e-tickets. We paid cash. 

That those are logical things you watch for in an airplane, and 

they build that, but you might not need them in your full terrorism 

bank. Do you have any ability to separate when you are getting on 

an airplane, when you are getting at something else from kind of 

this general pool? Otherwise, you will have so much information 

that will be indecipherable. 

Mr. LEITER. On that, Congressman, I would really defer to Deputy Secretary Lute on their screening—— 

Mr. SOUDER. Then let me tie a question with that, that we 

worked hard in the very original bill to make sure that Homeland 

Security was going to be at as many posts where they were doing 

visas and as many posts at airports. You had 50 deployments. Are 

you asking for more? 

In other words the whole point of port security in airports is not 

to kind of arrest them after they have blown everything up. It is 

to get it before it gets here. Are you asking and requesting more 

overseas deployments? Are you going to get this kind of information where they can say, okay, this is airplane specific, this is harbor specific, as opposed to just general? 

There may be something—for example, somebody’s shipping orders. That may be relevant in a port, but not relevant to the total 

counterterrorism center. 

Ms. LUTE. Congressman, on each of these lines we are doing 

more. As you know, the Department of Homeland Security has no 

authority abroad. But we do have programs where we have people 

deployed for precisely this purpose. These are limited programs. 

We have expanded them as Congress has given us the resources to 

do so. We will expand them again. We have expanded them in the 

wake of this episode. 

Mr. Chairman, if I could just make one thing very clear about 

the Secretary’s leadership and your presence today, as you know, 

she had planned—there was international travel that conflicted 

with this hearing today. I was offered in part because I went 

abroad immediately at her direction with my colleagues to raise 

some of the issues that you are raising about the kind of informa-
49 

tion that we are collecting, about the kind of technology that we 

can deploy, about the weaknesses that exist in the system and how 

we can work collectively to raise that bar. 

Mr. Chairman, with your staff it was coordinated and agreed 

that that I would appear for that reason. 

Mr. SOUDER. With all due respect, it isn’t true that you have no 

authority abroad. You have the right to reject their entry into the 

United States. 

Ms. LUTE. Absolutely right, Congressman. There is no question. 

We do—we can—— 

Mr. SOUDER. A container doesn’t have to come in. A person 

doesn’t have to come in. We have that authority. 

Ms. LUTE. That is correct. But to your point about additional information, we have made that change in Homeland Security, taking information that previously under our pre-existing protocols 

was related to admissibility and not putting it in the service of 

making flying determinations. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you. 

Time has expired. 

The Chair now recognizes Mr. DiFazio for 5 minutes. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ms. Lute, you know, we wouldn’t have any imaging technology 

capability today if it hadn’t been for Kip Hawley. You know, I have 

been a fan of this since I was first exposed to it about 8 years ago. 

I kept bumping up against that ‘‘Oh, my God, we are going to see 

people’s skin or bodies or images’’ or whatever. 

Kip Hawley, you know, after a number of failed administrators, 

really focused on this. He pushed it through. I kept saying, ‘‘Isn’t 

it just the way you get software? It doesn’t have to be your body. 

It can—’’ and Kip finally got that done. 

So the point I am making here is we need a TSA administrator. 

I am going to ask this question, which I asked Ms. Napolitano last 

spring. Can’t you just get it out of the way and allow the people 

in the TSA to unionize? It will not impinge, unlike some wacko Republicans think, on National security. Just get that out of the way 

so that won’t be the thing that stalls the new TSA administrator. 

She said she wanted to wait for an administrator to get it done. 

You can’t wait. She needs to make the decision, get it done, give 

them those rights and get that off the table, and then the next administrator can just deal with security issues and their history and 

background, and not this specious issue. That is just a message I 

wish you would deliver to her, because she said here, you know, to 

me quite some time ago she was wanting to move this forward, but 

she wanted to wait for the administrator. Can’t wait. Get it done. 

Point No. 2, you know, the imaging technology is good. It may 

or may not have worked in this case, but it has to be mated with 

something that does vapor detection. Are we full out there working 

on vapor detection or trace detection? You know, I mean dogs are 

great, but, you know, we need, you know, maybe, you know, either 

we need a heck of a lot of dogs or, you know, we need some technology that is more dependable than those puffer machines. 

Ms. LUTE. You are absolutely right, Congressman. This technology does represent an improvement in our overall capabilities, 

but it is only one part of a layered system. Other technology has 
50 

to be brought to bear as well, as well as improved processes, improved information gathering across the board. 

We are working very closely and have established a high-level 

working group with the Department of Energy and the National 

labs to look precisely not only at are we using existing technology 

to best effect, but what are the promising new technologies that we 

can then add to these multiple layers to ensure the best safety and 

defense possible? 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Okay. 

To anybody, are all—I hate these stupid names; I don’t know, the 

Terrorist Identities Datamart entire and, you know, whatever, 

TIDE? Are all the people on the TIDE list now selectees? I don’t 

see why they wouldn’t be. It is an insignificant number of daily 

passengers compared to the number of people who fly daily. It 

would not be in an imposition. Are they now also selectees? 

Mr. LEITER. Congressman, they are not, although I must say I 

very much appreciate your sentiment. Frankly, from my perspective as the director of NCTC, it is no skin off of my back if they 

all were. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. There are 500,000 of them. They are worldwide. 

There are 3 million-something people fly a day. You know, I mean 

it would add significantly to the burden. Does Homeland Security 

object to this? 

Ms. LUTE. Homeland Security has no objection to that, to any 

measures that enhance the security of the traveling public. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Do you think that would enhance security, that 

anybody who is on the TIDE list is a selectee? 

Ms. LUTE. Rather than going—— 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Yes or no. I am running out of time. 

Ms. LUTE. If any—it takes—— 

Mr. DEFAZIO. You don’t know. 

Ms. LUTE [continuing]. It takes layers of defenses— 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Okay. All right. So you are sort of no. 

Mr. LEITER[continuing]. Respectfully. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Yes, yes. 

Mr. LEITER. Again, I respect your views, and I am happy to do 

it, but the pressure on NCTC, on DHS over the past 8 years has 

never been in that direction. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. All right. 

Mr. LEITER. It has always been in the exact opposite direction. 

So I just want to recognize this is a very changed—— 

Mr. DEFAZIO. I understand, but, you know, Congress acted, and 

we pushed, and we have in place now an appeal system. So if 

somebody is on that list, like John Lewis from Georgia, our colleague, or, you know, former Senator Kennedy, others who get on 

the list, you know, there is an appeals process. You can get off the 

list. 

But why not err on the side of caution? Anybody on that list becomes a selectee. They at least get that slightly higher level of 

screening. They have some interaction with a, you know, with an 

officer, you know. I just think that to me, and again, it would be 

a very, very, very infinitesimal percentage addition to the daily 

workload. 

Mr. LEITER. Congressman, I agree in many ways—— 
51 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Okay. 

Mr. LEITER [continuing]. But would note it would be about a 40 

or 50 times increase in the number of selectees we have today. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Yes, but I don’t think so on a daily basis. It is 

500,000 people on the list. How many of them fly on a daily basis, 

you know, when there are 3 million people a day flying? I mean 

I just don’t think it would be. 

Mr. LEITER. But we currently have 14,000 on the Selectee that 

would increase them 40 to 50—— 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Yes, but I know it would increase the list that 

much, but in terms of daily workload, it would be nowhere near 

that. 

One other quick question to State. You talked about you have the 

authority to immediately revoke a visa. You know, but you want 

to communicate. Then you said, but if it was urgent, you would act. 

Have you ever had a recommendation the other way to you, that 

you revoke a visa that you didn’t revoke? 

Okay. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you. 

Thank you very much. We have been told that some votes will 

happen, and I have been fairly lenient with time. But in the interest of giving every Member an opportunity to ask questions, we 

will strictly adhere to the time. 

The gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Rogers, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

As everybody on this committee knows, for many years I have 

been a vigorous advocate of canines’ use and remain that way, and 

I want to talk mostly about that. 

Before I do, I want to visit the subject that my colleague from 

Oregon brought up about the administrator who was proposed. The 

administration didn’t propose him until September. I mean they 

had been in office 8 months, so if this was such a priority with the 

administration, he should have been proposed earlier. 

Secondly, you did raise the issue that I care about. That is canine use. Right after this Christmas day bombing, Secretary 

Napolitano in her remarks—White House press conference—listed 

three or four items that the Department was going to turn to to 

enhance our security layer system, and one of them was enhanced 

canine use. 

I sent her a letter since then, expressing again, as I have in this 

hearing and in other venues, my concern that we aren’t utilizing 

that asset enough. I know for a fact that TSA only uses 750 canines. These are very inexpensive, very effective means of technology. 

You have stated in your statement, the written statement, in two 

different places that you have increased your use of canine detection dogs, explosive dogs, in our transportation hubs. Can you tell 

me where and how many and what your plan is on that asset? 

Ms. LUTE. In this open setting, Congressman, I am not going to 

detail any of the specific security measures that we have taken, but 

we believe that canines are an important part of the multi-layered 

defenses that we have been talking about. We look to use them to 
52 

the greatest extent possible. We know their value. We are convinced of it, and we are going to expand our use. 

Mr. ROGERS. Okay. But you haven’t significantly expanded them 

since the Christmas day bombing. 

Ms. LUTE. But we have in fact expanded them. But the details 

of that in this setting I am not prepared to explain. 

Mr. ROGERS. That is fine. I do want to get back with you in a 

more private setting, but I want to address a new technology. 

Currently, the Amtrak, the Capitol Police and the Federal Protective Service all use a new type of canine explosive detection dog 

called a vapor wake dog. What it is is when somebody walks by, 

the dog detects the vapors in their wake. We all leave a wake when 

we walk by. Explosives in particular leave the smell, the odor, 

there for 15 minutes in that wake. So when it comes to transportation hubs like airports, bus stations, subways, whatever, the dog 

doesn’t have to smell the person directly. It can just step by when 

the person walks by. 

All these entities use it, but TSA does not use it. The Capitol Police, as I said, uses it. The Secret Service is now looking at it. They 

are going to probably start using it. Why has TSA been so reluctant to use that technology? 

Ms. LUTE. Congressman, we focus on layered defense, as we have 

been discussing here this morning, and we are examining all aspects of layers, including the increased use of canines. As I mentioned, the Secretary has made very clear her determination that 

we look at promising new technologies, techniques, canines, leave 

no stone unturned to increase the security of the traveling public. 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, they are used extensively in Europe. One of 

the things I was hoping that Secretary Napolitano would do during 

her trip to Europe—and I thought about it when she announced 

it—was I am hoping that as a part of the agreements that we 

worked out with our allies around the world, that for planes that 

are destined to the United States, that we can at a minimum deploy dogs, canines to those airports to be at the gate of any plane 

that is leaving for the United States to make sure that at least 

those passengers are screened with that layer of security that we 

have some control over. 

If they want to let people get on the planes going elsewhere, that 

is their business, but if it is coming to this country, I want to make 

sure they are screened with every tool that we have got in our toolbox. A frustration that I have got is we are spending billions a year 

on bells and whistles, and we have a very simple technology that 

works, and we aren’t using it anywhere close to the level that we 

should be using it. So I would ask you if you are going to make 

this a priority is to go forward and in the near future. 

Ms. LUTE. Yes, sir. As the Secretary did make clear to her European colleagues when they met together on this issue at her request, there are number of measures that need to be taken. This 

is not a business-as-usual environment that we are in, and it takes 

the collaboration of all of us to be able to assure the traveling public that we are doing ever we can to keep them safe, including 

measures such as you have outlined. 

Mr. ROGERS. Great. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
53 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you very much. 

The Chairman now recognizes Representative Cleaver for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CLEAVER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ms. Lute, you addressed this already to some degree, and I am 

not sure how much you can discuss this issue here publicly, but 

you had mentioned that you and the Secretary had traveled abroad 

in hopes of working out some cooperative agreements with our allies in this fight against terror. 

One of the questions that maybe you can answer here, and I 

would be interested in hearing, you know, some of the more detailed information in the right setting, proper setting, but is there 

any willingness abroad to support what we are trying to do in 

terms of aviation safety for other countries to contribute financially 

to enhance technological measures, I mean? Or are we the only 

Western nation that is engaged in spending a lot of money in trying to increase the technology or create more sophisticated technology? 

Ms. LUTE. Congressman, this was an extremely intensive trip. 

My many years in the Army prepared me well for the conditions 

under which we were traveling. 

The dialogue with our international partners could not have been 

more supportive. They recognize almost universally that this is not 

a U.S. problem. This is not a Dutch problem. This is not a Nigerian 

problem. This is an international problem that the responsible governments of the world must come together to address. Again, they 

all agree that in the area of information gathering and sharing, we 

need to do better, and we can. 

In the area of technology, we are not deploying existing technologies to best effect, and there are new and promising technologies. We are not the only ones with an investment in technology and reliance. It is one of the multiple layers of defense that 

we have in place. 

Equally, there is a recognition that this global system, as we saw 

on Christmas day, with an access to any part of this system, you 

potentially have access to the entire system, so we all need to come 

together, and they recognize those responsibilities. The Secretary is 

leading a series of regional dialogues leading to a major conference 

on this issue so that concrete actions can be taken in the information sharing, technology, and system strengthening. 

Mr. CLEAVER. I have no other questions, Mr. Chairman. Thank 

you. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you very much. 

The Chairman now recognizes Mr. McCaul for 5 minutes. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

This was clearly a failure in intelligence. I think all the witnesses have agreed to that. The President of the United States has 

as well. It is more than a failure to connect the dots, as we talk 

about so much. It is a failure to identify dots or specific threat information coming in and acting upon it appropriately. 

We had the Christmas bomber’s father going to the embassy, 

warning us about his son. The State Department issued a cable 

that basically stated that and sent it to law enforcement, and I as-
54 

sume to the NCTC, stating that information had posted just that 

Farouk may be involved in Yemeni-based extremists. 

I think Members of Congress and the American people don’t understand why with that type of information and Director Leiter 

with specific intelligence coming in through the IC, the intelligence 

community, why that wasn’t linked together, No. 1, and why it 

wasn’t acted upon to ensure that this man never got on this airplane in the first place. 

I think we agree that this visa should have been revoked immediately, given the information. I can’t get into the classified information that you are privy to, but it was specific. What happened 

here? 

Mr. LEITER. Congressman, some action was taken, but as you 

have identified, as I have talked, we would say it was obviously not 

sufficient, which was his name was entered into the Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment, but that didn’t have automatic repercussions in terms of screening, visa revocation, or stopping him 

from boarding the plane. 

The other intelligence simply wasn’t identified and associated 

with this individual. I can tell you that there was concern on the 

intelligence community’s part about potential attack by al-Qaeda in 

Yemen, and we were concerned even about the timing of that. 

What we didn’t connect was the individual’s name or where that 

attack would occur. That was our failure. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Was that because it was misspelled—the name was 

misspelled? I mean to me, you know, if you type my name into 

Google, for instance, M-C-C-A-U-L, they will say, did you mean MC-C-A-L-L. and so do you not have a similar type of capability? 

Mr. LEITER. Actually, the misspelling did not affect NCTC in any 

way. It did affect, as I understand it, and I will defer to Under Secretary Kennedy on this, from our perspective when his name was 

sent in, we actually put the spelling in both ways. The technology 

we use, it wouldn’t have made a difference. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Did you not have the cable that the State Department sent? 

Mr. LEITER. We did, and we inserted the spelling based on a 

number of things. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Yet you made the decision not to revoke the visa, 

given that information? 

Mr. LEITER. I don’t have the authority to revoke a visa. That is 

an authority—— 

Mr. MCCAUL. Right. Can’t you call Secretary Kennedy and say, 

‘‘You know, I think we have got a problem here. We ought to think 

about revoking this visa.’’ 

Mr. LEITER. The intelligence community can, frankly. That normally doesn’t occur, if the nomination itself comes from the State 

Department, because—— 

Mr. MCCAUL. Well, I think there needs to be a lot better coordination going on here between these two entities. 

Mr. Kennedy, why, given the information that you had, why 

wasn’t the visa revoked? 

Mr. KENNEDY. Sir, as I mentioned earlier, when we get any information, when anyone appears at an American embassy and say 

that they have doubts about someone, we immediately generate 
55 

what is called a Visas Viper message. We send that to the entire 

law enforcement and intelligence—— 

Mr. MCCAUL. My time is running out. I understand the process, 

but you had this information, and you didn’t revoke the visa. 

Mr. KENNEDY. Because—— 

Mr. MCCAUL. I mean the cable I just read—— 

Mr. KENNEDY. Right. 

Mr. MCCAUL [continuing]. Makes it pretty clear that this man is 

associated with extremists in Yemen. You didn’t revoke his visa. 

Mr. KENNEDY. What it was, sir, his father said he was associated 

with this, and so we then asked the intelligence and law enforcement community if they had any other information. I don’t want 

to take much of your time. I would be glad to visit with you afterwards. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Well, I think the father is a very credible source. 

This isn’t some anonymous person coming in saying this. 

Mr. KENNEDY. We have people coming in, sir, to American embassies every day, attacking their relatives. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Well, let me just—my time—this was a failure 

extraordinaire, and I sure hope it never happens again. 

Deputy Secretary Lute, the last of my remaining time, they have 

identified a vulnerability in our system. I am very concerned about 

future flights now. The system didn’t work. The screening—you 

know, they are always a simple genius, you know. They use chemical explosives, which would be detected through X-ray, but not 

through the magnetometer. 

I know we are focusing on the 16 countries of interest in terms 

of pat-downs and more enhanced screening, but I am concerned 

about still the majority of the airports out there where we are still 

vulnerable. They could still use this technique and get chemical explosives through the magnetometer. What is the Department of 

Homeland Security doing about that? 

Ms. LUTE. Congressman, we are not just focused on those 16 

places that you have identified. We are focused on aviation security 

globally and the traveling public, to ensure their safety. 

People have talked about silver bullets. We don’t look for silver 

bullets in Homeland Security. We know it takes a layer, multiple 

measures of layers, not just by us, but by our international partners, and it takes constant vigilance. 

We have made some adjustments internally now to take the information that we get, push it forward where we have teams on the 

ground or to authorities in airlines where we don’t have specific 

teams. We are looking to expand our teams as well. This is not a 

business-as-usual response. No one will be satisfied—— 

Mr. MCCAUL. But my point is there are still many airports vulnerable to the same technique deployed by this terrorist. 

Chairman THOMPSON. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Carney, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CARNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I have to echo the sentiments of a number of our colleagues 

today, who I am very dismayed that the Secretary herself is in 

here. I mean it is probably fair to ask where the hell is Secretary 

Napolitano for this hearing, to be quite honest. 
56 

I understand, Deputy Secretary Lute, that you are prepared and 

that is great, but she was invited. She needs to be here to address 

something of this magnitude. My first question is why was her first 

response to the public that the system worked? 

Ms. LUTE. Congressman, if I could, and I clarified before, the 

Secretary had international travel that was originally conflicted. 

We coordinated with the Chairman’s office. She has been in regular 

talks with the Chairman, other Members of this committee. She 

dispatched me with my colleagues around the world to work aggressively with international partners, part of the reason my appearance here was coordinated and agreed. 

What the Secretary has made clear in her initial response, she 

was responding to in the environment of what are we doing to address this concern now? How are responding to the information 

that we would have to ensure that there are no other flights that 

are subjected to any danger or that pose any threat to the American public? 

Mr. CARNEY. I want to shift gears slightly here. You and I, last 

time we spoke, I believe, was New Year’s Eve. That is right. How 

is the QHSR coming? Are we further down the road? Are we going 

to see it soon? Frankly, does the QHSR lay out a sort of chain of 

command that would obviate some of the issues we are talking 

about today? 

Ms. LUTE. We did speak late New Year’s Eve, in fact. The QHSR 

from our perspective is concluded. It is with the White House right 

now, ensuring final interagency coordination prior to release. As I 

mentioned to you, we are on schedule that I discussed with you. 

We look for the QHSR, together with the bottom-up review of the 

Department and a number of other measures that we are taking 

internally to clarify roles and responsibilities in what is a significant enterprise for this country—that is, homeland security. 

We believe that the QHSR lays this out in a clear fashion, the 

roles and responsibilities of other Members, other parts of the Federal Government, State, local, law enforcement. It is an enterprise 

to ensure that this homeland is a place where the American values, 

aspirations, and way of life can thrive. 

Mr. CARNEY. Okay. Thanks. Just one more question, and you 

didn’t answer my second question, my first comment. Do you know 

why the Secretary said the system worked in her first reaction? 

Ms. LUTE. Congressman, as she has made clear, she was responding to a series of questions that were also related to what are 

you doing in response to this information? What are we doing now 

to ensure that the traveling public is safe—planes in the air, airlines? What information are we pushing out? 

Mr. CARNEY. Thank you. 

Mr. Leiter, I just have a couple of moments left. By the way, sir, 

I respect you enormously and what you bring to the table, and I 

really want to know from your perspective, was there a single point 

of failure, a double point of failure, multiple points of failure in the 

Christmas day attack? 

Mr. LEITER. Multiple. 

Mr. CARNEY. Multiple. 

Mr. LEITER. Yes. 

I am trying to save you time, Congressman. 
57 

Mr. CARNEY. We will have a chance at some more questions, Mr. 

Chairman? 

Chairman THOMPSON. Well, we can, or we can submit them for 

the record and get a response. 

Mr. CARNEY. Okay. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Multiple probably could go a long time. 

Mr. LEITER. Congressman, if you would like me to expand, I always can, but I was—— 

Mr. CARNEY. Well, no, no, as the Chairman of the Oversight Investigation Subcommittee, I think maybe we will have you come in 

and chat with us a little bit. I will appreciate that. 

No more questions, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you very much. 

I don’t want the committee to be misled. I have talked with the 

Secretary 2 days ago. We did not talk about her non-attendance or 

attendance at this hearing. Staff did communicate based on a directive we received that the Secretary would not be here, and we 

worked on Deputy Secretary Lute’s presence. 

That changed. At a minimum, based on that change, somebody 

could have communicated back to the committee one way or the 

other that we told you we weren’t going to be here, we are here 

now, but we still can’t come because of some other things. That is 

the courtesy I think the committee still deserves, and it does not 

require comment. 

The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Dent. 

Mr. DENT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Leiter, based on your testimony, your written testimony and 

also your testimony that you gave last week before the Senate, it 

appears you believe that the Federal Government did in fact collect 

the dots, but did not recognize the linkages between those pieces 

of information. Is that a fair assessment of your statement, your 

position? 

Mr. LEITER. Yes, definitely. 

Mr. DENT. Isn’t it true that the NCTC is designed to be a major, 

if not the premier intelligence fusion and analysis center? 

Mr. LEITER. We have the statutory responsibility to be the primary analytic center for counterterrorism, and we along with the 

CIA have primary responsibility on it. 

Mr. DENT. Thank you. 

I also understand that the Intel Authorization Act of 2010 that 

passed the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, but 

was not considered on the House floor, included sharp decreases in 

staffing levels for the Office of Director of National Intelligence. 

Isn’t it true that your staffing at the National Counterterrorism 

Center is included in those DNI staffing levels and could have been 

very negatively impacted? 

Mr. LEITER. Congressman, that is correct. As Director Blair 

noted, I believe, last week, my discussions with him in December 

were about how I was going to absorb cuts of up to 20 percent of 

my personnel areas to include analytic and watchlisting personnel. 

Mr. DENT. So then do you have enough analysts to connect these 

dots? 

Mr. LEITER. Well, believe me, it is a very, very small silver lining 

and not a silver lining I really wanted, but those initial cuts have 
58 

now been canceled for us. We have been working with the DNI and 

the—— 

Mr. DENT. So you do have enough analysts? 

Mr. LEITER. No. I have already discussed with the DNI, and he 

has discussed with the Office of Management and Budget the need 

for additional analysts and individuals to work on watchlisting. So 

we enhanced those watchlisting records, so the right people are on 

the No-Fly list, the Selectee list. Right now I don’t have enough 

people to do that. 

Mr. DENT. So you are saying, then, additional analysts, and not 

fewer analysts, as HPSI proposed, that would help you accomplish 

your intelligence fusion mission? 

Mr. LEITER. Yes, but I do want to make clear I don’t look at this 

as this great opportunity to grow. 

Mr. DENT. I understand. 

Mr. LEITER. I look at it as the realization that we can’t do the 

mission as expected, and we weren’t doing as well as we did because of the assets we didn’t have and the assets we were potentially losing. 

Mr. DENT. Thank you, sir. 

To Deputy Secretary Lute, I understand that while at the 

Schiphol Airport in Amsterdam, they have these full body imagers, 

as you know. They were not used at the checkpoints for the flights 

bound for the United States on Christmas day. In fact, within the 

United States we have only 40 of these machines at about 19 airports. 

While I know that you can not guarantee protection, particularly 

when you are relying on human interpretation of an image, do you 

believe that the whole body imager would have had a better chance 

of detecting or identifying Abdulmutallab’s explosive device than 

the current technologies employed at airports? 

Ms. LUTE. Congressman, we believe it represents an improvement over our current capabilities, but again, it is only part of a 

layered system. 

Mr. DENT. Understood. In order to address privacy concerns, 

some of the local vendors have developed these so-called auto detection software for their whole body imaging equipment with the goal 

of getting the TSA image observer out of the process. This auto detection technology, I am told, is currently being tested over in 

Schiphol and in Amsterdam. 

Is the TSA, the Transportation Security Lab, or the S&T director 

examining this auto detection technology? If so, when can we expect to see some preliminary results? 

Ms. LUTE. We are examining all aspects of advanced imaging 

technology, whole body imaging. We are aware of some of the technologies that exist out there, and we are also engaging in dialogue 

with our international partners like the Dutch to see what they 

have, what they are using. We believe this is an enhancement. 

We take the privacy concerns very seriously. There are a number 

of measures in place with respect to whole body imaging now, the 

dislocation of the observer, the non-retention of image. But we believe that this is an area where we don’t want to settle for just existing technology, but also want to explore most promising new. 
59 

But we also don’t want this to take forever. We want to put tools 

in the hands of screeners now to enhance security. 

Mr. DENT. Good. Then I hope you will certainly communicate 

with our friends in the Senate that stripped the amendment that 

was placed in the TSA authorization by the House that would restrict the use of these whole body imagers. 

Finally, there appears to be a debate on which advanced technology system is better—backscatter radiation or the millimeter 

wave technology. Have you done an analysis on the health and 

safety of both of those types of systems? Did you identify any risks 

in multiple daily exposures? 

Ms. LUTE. So, Congressman, I am aware that there are differences. I am not a scientist. Our science and technology folks, together with the Department of Energy and the National labs, are 

working with TSA on this and other technologies as part of a layered defense. 

Mr. DENT. Could somebody report back to us? Could somebody 

send a report back to us, which is the better technology? 

Ms. LUTE. Yes. 

Mr. DENT. Thank you. 

I yield back. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you. 

We will get the gentleman’s question answered by the Department. Be happy to. 

The gentlelady from Ohio for 5 minutes, Ms. Kilroy. 

Turn your microphone on. 

Ms. KILROY [continuing]. The responsibility for failing within 

their respective organization. I think coming before this committee 

is part of that acknowledgment of responsibility and the oversight 

that it ruled as given to this body and to the United States Congress. 

I think it is critically important that once we acknowledge the errors, that we also provide a plan or hear from you your plan to fix, 

to correct the problem, to make sure that people aren’t becoming 

complacent in the years since 9/11 and protect the flying public. I 

thank those of you who made very clear statements in your testimony, as you did, Director Leiter, about that level of responsibility. 

The more I hear about the Christmas bomber, the more I am 

amazed at how he got on the plane. That continues today to really 

stun me, that given the level of information, granted in different 

parts of the system, that there was sufficient information that, at 

least to me, it seems that he should not have been allowed onto 

that plane. 

I keep learning things through hearings, through briefings, and 

through public news reports, that news reporters managed to get 

some information that had not been shared with the committee in 

prior briefings. But there was sufficient information, apparently, 

for him to be tagged for questioning when he got off the plane. I 

don’t understand, I guess, why the Customs and Border Protection 

was the agency that was charged with questioning him when he 

got off the plane. 

Ms. LUTE. Congresswoman, that is we have standing protocols 

that have been in place in this case since 2006 related to admissibility issue questions. The Customs and Border Protection persons 
60 

were prepared on the basis of that information to question him 

when he arrived. 

We have changed that process. We now take that kind of information and push it forward to a pre-boarding opportunity that individuals be questioned before they get on planes, precisely because 

we recognize now that there is important information that can help 

us understand whether or not an individual poses a threat to aviation security, and so we have changed that process. 

Ms. KILROY. Well, I appreciate that things have moved forward 

and people will be getting questioned ahead of the process. 

But when you have this incident that has occurred—and thank 

God that actions were taken that all passengers and crew were 

able to get off that plane safely—but once you have this person, 

who has attempted this atrocious act, when and who, what agency 

should be involved in taking custody of that person? Who is trained 

to interrogate a terrorist? Who has ultimate authority in the chain 

of command in this type of situation? 

Ms. LUTE. I can only speak to the part about the information 

that we had regarding admissibility. No one is satisfied that this 

individual got on this plane with this material. It should never 

have happened, and we have to do everything we can so it doesn’t 

happen again. 

We are taking the information we have about admissibility. He 

was at no time identified as a No-Fly or Selectee, which would 

have triggered certain actions prior to his boarding. 

Ms. KILROY. I understand that, but he took actions on the plane. 

Everybody on the plane was aware of that. People on the ground 

were aware of that. So are Customs and Border Patrol agents 

trained in the science of interrogating a terrorist that has been 

taken into custody? 

Ms. LUTE. He was handed over to the Department of Justice and 

the FBI. 

Ms. KILROY. So the reports that I read that Customs and Border 

Protection interrogated him for an hour before he was turned over 

to the FBI—you are saying that would be incorrect, then? 

Ms. LUTE. No. Customs and Border Protection had him upon 

presentation for entry, and he was handed over to law enforcement 

officials. 

Mr. LEITER. Congresswoman, if I—I got it. 

Ms. KILROY. Yes. 

Mr. LEITER. He was initially arrested by the Customs and Border 

Protection officers, who were there at the airport. Immediately 

upon being removed from the aircraft, he was immediately turned 

over to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 

Ms. KILROY. I also want to endorse the line of questioning that 

Congressman Rogers led with respect to the use of canines, because 

I think that they have amazing abilities to detect, and they are 

very observant of body language as well as their use of different 

senses. 

With respect to the changes in the visa process, have there been 

any changes in the length of visas that are going to be offered, allowed to people so they could come to this country? 

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. Chairman, should I answer the question? 

Chairman THOMPSON. The gentleman will answer the question. 
61 

Mr. KENNEDY. I will be glad to see the Congresswoman and come 

visit with her and discuss that or submit an answer for the record, 

whichever you prefer, sir. I am prepared now. 

Chairman THOMPSON. You can answer the question now. 

Mr. KENNEDY. Ma’am, it really doesn’t matter whether a visa has 

a validity of 1 day or 1 year. If information comes to us on the day 

after a visa issue or 30 days after or 90 days after, if the intelligence or law enforcement community comes to us and said, ‘‘You 

cleared this person, because there was no record when you cleared 

them. We now have something new on this person. That is, he or 

she is a danger to National security,’’ we revoke the visa that day. 

Ms. KILROY. Thank you. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you. 

The gentleman from Georgia for 5 minutes, Mr. Broun. 

Mr. BROUN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, during 

your opening statement you seemed to blame the Bush administration on this instance on Christmas day. To me there is a whole lot 

more going on here than just blaming President Bush and his administration, because I think this administration has a lot to 

blame, too. 

Deputy Secretary Lute, I assume that you are just a good soldier 

and carrying out the orders that you were given by your chain of 

command. You mentioned attempted attack, and they have actually—before your testimony, you just talked about that during your 

discussion about the Secretary not being here. 

I am incensed, frankly, that she is not here. Even the foreign 

visit was to brief people in Europe, and she ought to be here briefing these people in this committee who have responsibility to ensure the safety of the American public. 

Also, the Secretary said that the system worked, which is hogwash. The Chairman asked if there was any disciplinary action 

being taken, and all of you all said no. Frankly, I am incensed by 

that, and I think the President of the United States should ask for 

the resignation of Secretary Napolitano and get somebody there 

who is not in la-la land. Frankly, I think she is in la-la land. 

I don’t know who else in your Department is, but whoever he is, 

they need to go, because the safety of the American people absolutely is critical on having good leadership at the top. I don’t think 

we have that here in this country. 

So I am incensed. I think other Members of this committee are 

incensed that the Secretary won’t take her time to come here and 

face this committee. I hope the President will take disciplinary action and get rid of her and get rid of anybody else in your-all’s Department who are in denial, frankly, about the seriousness of this. 

In the United States Marine Corps, I was taught to know your 

enemy. I have heard testimony from some other of the members of 

this panel. They seem to get it. But I don’t think the Department 

of Homeland Security, and I am not sure the President and his administration, get it. 

We are facing not a war on terror. We are facing a war against 

a group of fascists in this country who hate this Nation, hate everything we stand for, including the freedom, including the freedom 

we give to women, and they want to destroy this Nation. We must 

as a Nation start facing the fact that these are Islamic fascist ter-
62 

rorists, who want to use that tactic in a war. Terrorism is only a 

tactic. We are not fighting terrorism. We need to stop talking about 

that. 

To me the failure here is political correctness gone amok. There 

are many Members of this committee, principally on the other side, 

who don’t want profiling. We just had a hearing about the undocumented attendees to a State dinner. We have got a lot of undocumented attendees in this Nation that the State Department allows 

to come into this country, and some that are documented. 

We need to change the whole philosophy of how we are trying to 

protect this Nation. I don’t think we are doing a proper job. Frankly, I am incensed. I hope the President will start paying attention 

to what is going on here and will stop this inane thought of not 

profiling people that are entities that we know hate our Nation and 

will do what is necessary to protect the American public and keep 

this Nation safe. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Will the gentleman yield? 

Mr. BROUN. No, I won’t. 

Mr. PASCRELL. You won’t yield? 

Mr. BROUN. No, I won’t. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Okay. 

Mr. BROUN. Because I have got just a minute left, and so I 

want—— 

Mr. PASCRELL. I will just say it later, so it doesn’t matter. 

Mr. BROUN. But it is absolutely critical that this administration 

take serious our enemy. America needs to know its enemy. It is 

radical—it is a bunch of radical folks all over the world, who want 

to destroy it. They are going to continue to attack us. 

Whole body imaging is not going to prevent, and even the canines are not going to prevent, bombings. There is no way unless 

we search every body cavity on every person who wants to come 

into this Nation. 

But we know one of the big, glaring, flashing dots is radical 

Islam. We have got to start focusing upon that. There is absolutely 

no question about that. Our people are going to die. Those who are 

worshiping at the altar of political correctness are going to—that 

worshiping at the altar of political correctness and not profiling our 

enemies is going to result in killing American citizens. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. My time is up. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you very much. 

The gentleman’s time has expired. 

We have two votes scheduled, and we expect to return in about 

25 minutes. The committee stands in recess. 

[Recess.] 

Chairman THOMPSON. We would like to reconvene the recessed 

meeting. 

We now will begin questioning with the gentlelady from Nevada, 

Ms. Titus. 

Ms. TITUS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I do have a 

couple of questions. I would like to start with Mr. Leiter. 

On several points in your written testimony, maybe not so much 

in your oral testimony, you note that the intelligence community 

possessed strategic intelligence regarding al-Qaeda in the Arabian 

Peninsula, and you note that they had—and I put this in quotes— 
63 

‘‘had the intention of taking action against the U.S. prior to the 

failed attack on December 25, but we did not direct more resources 

against them nor insist that the watch list criteria be adjusted 

prior to the event.’’ 

You also note that the NCTC and intelligence community had 

long warned of the threat posed by this group in the Arabian Peninsula. But it appears that despite your intelligence on this and 

your concern about it expressed here, that the necessary steps 

weren’t taken to prevent this. 

So I want to ask you who was receiving your reports about this 

intelligence? Why do you think they didn’t respond to it in the appropriate way? 

Mr. LEITER. Congresswoman, I think everything you said is correct in terms of encapsulating my statement. All of the intelligence 

we write goes to a broad array of consumers ranging from the 

President to the members of the Cabinet, deputy secretaries and 

the like. 

I wouldn’t say, though, that nothing was done. It is that the 

things that were done turned out not to have been ones that 

stopped this threat. There was forceful action taken on a number 

of fronts to try to disrupt various threats from al-Qaeda in Yemen. 

What it didn’t do is detect this thread or stop this particular individual. 

Now, steps were taken. Why do I think that we didn’t shift 

enough focus onto this individual? I do think that al-Qaeda in the 

Arabian Peninsula, although we saw a desire and a possibility to 

strike the homeland, I don’t think we fully realized the speed with 

which they had moved and actually put that desire into action. 

Ms. TITUS. Well, I would ask you going forward, which is the important thing, do you think we are putting enough resources and 

enough attention on this growing threat in the Arabian Peninsula? 

Mr. LEITER. I think we have begun to move those resources. I 

still don’t believe we have all the resources we need. I would also 

add that I remain particularly concerned, as I have testified before 

this committee and others previously, I remain particularly concerned not just about Yemen, but also in Somalia and the flow of 

Americans of largely Somali descent to Somalia. I think that poses 

a similar threat. Although Yemen is the subject of today’s hearing, 

we have to remain very, very focused again on Somalia and, of 

course, on Afghanistan and Pakistan. 

Ms. TITUS. Do you feel like the people who are higher up, all this 

group that you report to, are taking your warnings seriously? 

Mr. LEITER. I think without a doubt. I believe the President’s immediate direction on shipping resources, Director Blair’s intervention here to make sure we have the resources, and the rest of the 

intelligence community, I think we have. 

Ms. TITUS. Well, we need to. There is no question about that. 

Mr. LEITER. I agree with you wholeheartedly. 

Ms. TITUS. Just one other quick question for Ms. Lute. I would 

ask you—now, we have put so much focus on the international 

flights, because this incident was an international flight, but we 

can’t forget that 9/11 involved domestic flight. We are not ignoring 

them or letting them go by the wayside as we now suddenly focus 

on Schiphol, are we? 
64 

Ms. LUTE. Absolutely right, Congresswoman. We are not neglecting any part of the aviation security systems, nor are we neglecting 

our land and sea borders, as we have this particular focus on air. 

We have a number of measures in place across the board to enhance our vigilance, increase our information gathering and sharing, as we have been discussing, working with technology in this 

multi-layer defense domestically as well as internationally. 

Ms. TITUS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you very much. 

The gentlelady from Michigan, Mrs. Miller, for 5 minutes. 

Mrs. MILLER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

You know, there have been lots of questions from my colleagues 

about the process and the failures of our protocol, et cetera. Many 

people have commented about the absence of Secretary Napolitano, 

and I would associate myself with those remarks. 

However, I will also say that it is stunning to me that Attorney 

General Holder or nobody from the Department of Justice is here 

to talk to this committee and to testify to this committee. I would 

respectfully request that at some point he does testify before this 

committee. 

Our responsibility is to have oversight, and I want to focus, I 

think, on what has happened since the attempted act of war, because that is what it was. It wasn’t a criminal act. It was an act 

of war by a terrorist, an enemy combatant. I was stunned that this 

terrorist was not turned over to the military. 

Again, I am just incredibly dismayed no one from the DOJ is 

here. Yet, it was they, under the direction of Attorney General 

Holder, that made this decision to turn this terrorist over to the 

FBI, and not as an enemy combatant. He made the decision. I believe that the attorney general is creating a culture at the Department of Justice that fosters an ideology of approaching this war on 

terror like a simple police action. 

I will cite a couple examples of why I say that, because I do believe it is dangerous to our security, and I am very concerned about 

it. We know, for instance, that before becoming the attorney general, Eric Holder and his law firm represented accused terrorists 

that were in the custody of the military, and he urged their release 

to the civilian justice system. That includes Jose Padilla. They 

were very proud about giving free pro bono legal service to 17 Yemeni and one Pakistani, who currently are at Gitmo. 

We know that he and President Obama have placed many of 

these attorneys in high-ranking positions at the Justice Department—again, attorneys that provided free, top-flight legal assistance to enemy detainees. 

I mean my husband’s an attorney. I know a lot of attorneys. You 

might have pro bono work for a child abuse case, domestic violence 

case. This is what they decided they wanted to give free legal advice to: Enemy detainees. 

We also know that the attorney general has stonewalled Senator 

Grassley, who is attempting to discover who these high-ranking 

Justice officials are and what their role is in making these decisions. 

We know that the attorney general has been a huge advocate to 

close Gitmo and to bring these detainees to the United States. We 
65 

know that the attorney general has made the decision to bring 

KSM and others implicated in the 9/11 conspiracy to New York 

City for trial without consulting any security officials in New York 

or other high-ranking officials in the military or intelligence communities. 

Our Ranking Member mentioned that he had not consulted 

them—actually, I think it was on the Jim Lehrer Show, where he 

said he consulted his wife and his brother before he made that decision. So I have concern with that. 

We also know that in this instance the attorney general did not 

share, in the instance of the Christmas day bomber, that he did not 

share the intelligence gleaned from the Christmas day bomber with 

the military or intelligence officials before giving the Miranda 

rights to this terrorist. 

I know the President has said that no one is accountable, or that 

no one will be held accountable, no single person, but I believe that 

President Obama must hold Attorney General Eric Holder responsible for the loss of additional intelligence that would have been 

gained to protect our citizens from future attack. 

He has been rather flippant, I would say, in saying that he is not 

afraid of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed being given a platform to spout 

his anti-American rants in our justice system. He says we have 

nothing to fear from giving terrorists constitutional rights and access to our court. I disagree. 

I am the only Member of this committee from the Detroit area, 

and this incident may have faded in the front of many papers, 

newspapers, and media across our Nation, but I will tell you in Detroit we are looking every single day at this terrorist, this enemy 

combatant, an act of war against America, who was treated at the 

University of Michigan Burn Center, which is probably the best 

burn center in the entire world, and not only given one free courtappointed, taxpayer-funded attorney, he has three—three—attorneys. 

We are looking every day at what is happening at the Federal 

building in the city of Detroit, all of the expense that is being taken 

on by the Detroit Police Department at a time they can’t afford 

that kind of expense, and other security officials, just to make sure 

that we have no incident there. 

The first thing this guy hears when he gets off the airplane is, 

‘‘You have the right to remain silent.’’ Here is your great justice 

system that we are having here in America. It makes me crazy. 

In the absence of anyone from the Department of Justice, let me 

just ask Director Leiter. Do you think that Attorney General Eric 

Holder’s decision to Mirandize this guy denied us the opportunity 

to garner very valuable information? Do you think that if we got 

a terrorist in Afghanistan or Yemen or in theater and we only interrogated him for 50 minutes, that that would be adequate? 

Mr. LEITER. Congresswoman, I will try to answer, of course. I 

mean I am not from the Department of Justice. One thing I do 

want to correct, though. I don’t believe it is correct that the information that was garnered during those initial 50 minutes of interrogation was not shared with the intelligence community or with 

the Department of Defense. I say that, because I was on the video 

teleconference that evening, and—— 
66 

Mrs. MILLER. If you could, just a moment. I recognize he did 

share the information, but he did not share the information that 

he was going to Mirandize this, and that was my point. Nobody 

was asked about that. That was Attorney General Eric Holder’s decision, apparently. 

Mr. LEITER. I apologize, Congresswoman. I understood. I just did 

want to make clear that the information that they garnered was 

immediately shared with the intelligence community. It was put to 

action. I think there was information that was garnered from that 

initial 50 minutes of interrogation that has been quite valuable. 

Mrs. MILLER. Well, my time has expired, so I would just simply 

say that, Mr. Chairman, we are facing a new type of enemy who 

doesn’t consider the battlefield to be just in Yemen or in theater. 

The battlefield that day was Seat 19A on that Northwest flight, 

and these are enemy combatants. I think it is dangerous for America to treat them as civil criminals. Thank you. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you very much. 

For the record, as you know, the Minority has an opportunity to 

request a witness, and it could have very well been the Minority’s 

option to request Attorney General Holder for this hearing, and 

they did not. 

The Chairman recognizes the gentlelady from New York, Ms. 

Clarke, for 5 minutes. 

Ms. CLARKE. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me just say that as a New Yorker, I know that it is possible 

that we have under previous administrations tried individuals who 

seek to do us harm—terrorists, if you will—in civilian courts and 

been very successful there. So, you know, I think that this is an 

issue we can go back and forth with. 

But I think that we have to also make sure that in doing so we 

don’t manifest through our conversations just the outcomes that we 

are seeking to prevent. That is encouraging others, by labeling 

enemy combatants, to become enemy combatants. 

I think that we have the power and an expertise in our Nation 

to address all of these concerns, and that is why we are here today 

to encourage one another to use those talents and expertise to do 

what needs to be done to protect the American people. Certainly, 

as we review our failures and our mistakes, we learn from them 

to strengthen ourselves as a Nation, to do what has to be done to 

protect the American people. 

So having said that, my concern has to do with our ability to 

manage these databases. I have felt all along since, really, hearing 

from constituents in my constituency that they have had a very 

hard time getting off these lists, that we were building a quagmire. 

I say that, because at a certain point the list becomes the proverbial trying to find the needle in a haystack, when you are not purging it, when you are not moving people through the cleared list. 

So I am just concerned that as we build out this data infrastructure to be able to find individuals, to communicate in real-time 

about individuals that we may have on one list, but may not be on 

another, that the time that it takes to scan, to data input, because 

it is my understanding that particularly in the TIDE database, 

that there are people with similar names in addition to the actual 
67 

name. I am sure once you sort of plug in a name, you are going 

to get a list of names. 

I want to raise the question with each of you about how we refine our capacity through data maintenance and gathering to be 

able to do that type of ID in real-time. The GAO has found that 

agencies involved in screening international visitors to the United 

States do not screen individuals against all records in the watch 

list. 

Can we say that the system has become too cumbersome for accuracy of screening to become more difficult over time? I would like 

to get that response from each of you. 

Ms. LUTE. Congresswoman, perhaps I will begin, and then Director Leiter may want to add to it. 

There is an enormous amount of data being gathered. It is one 

of the tools that we use for aviation screening, and we use it for 

other purposes as well. We are constantly refining our processes to 

ensure that we have the accurate information of an individual that 

is in these databases. 

One of the issues that I raised in my conversations with international colleagues, and the Secretary certainly emphasized as 

well, is creating a standard for passenger name records so that we 

have as much information as we possibly can about individuals. 

Are they who they say they are, and are they fulfilling the intent 

they declare? 

We do and have created a sort of one-stop for de-confliction when 

people find themselves on a database erroneously. It is called the 

Travelers Redress Information Program. It is not yet a perfect system, and we acknowledge that, but we are working very hard to 

address it. 

Mr. LEITER. Congresswoman, believe me, I am very sympathetic 

to your concerns, because I have the responsibility to get through 

all of this data and make sure it is clean. We want it as clean a 

system as we could have. I will note a couple of things. 

First, I think it is important to note that United States persons 

make up a very small percentage of our high database, very small 

percentage. In fact, you can only be in our database if you are the 

subject of an active FBI investigation. Within 24 hours of that investigation being closed, you are purged. I think we have a very 

good record for meeting that standard. So I think that is point No. 

1. 

Point No. 2, are there simply better ways of doing this? There 

undoubtedly are. Any names-based screening system has inherent 

weaknesses. It requires not just a name, but you also want additional data about that person if you can, whether it is a birth date 

or a passport number. 

The next step, really, is moving towards greater integration of 

biometrics. Under Secretary Kennedy has already noted some of 

those advances that we have made. I think both at the initial 

screening when someone is getting on an aircraft, but certainly 

when they are getting a visa, when they arrive at a port of entry, 

the integrated use of biometrics, which is there already, is extremely helpful. 
68 

It has to be expanded. There is a significant resource tail, and 

there is also a significant civil liberties concern that have to be addressed as we do this. But we know that is the right way to go. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you very much. 

The Chairman now recognizes for 5 minutes, Mr. Olson. 

Mr. OLSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Before I get started on my line of questioning, I would like to 

identify myself with my colleague from Michigan’s remark on the 

decision to use the criminal justice system of our country instead 

of the military justice system to prosecute this individual. 

Very briefly, what I have understood is when he was brought off 

that aircraft after he had tried to kill all the people aboard that 

plane, he was taken into custody, was taken to the hospital for 

medical treatment. 

Two FBI agents began asking questions. He was giving them actionable intelligence for at least 50 minutes, intelligence that saves 

lives. Those agents that were asking those questions—there is an 

exception to the Miranda rights that if you believe there is imminent information that is going to save lives—there is another bomb 

on an aircraft or, as we saw unfortunately on September 11, there 

are other aircraft in the air with bombers like Mr. Abdulmutallab 

on it—then they have discretion to ask questions. Again, for 50 

minutes, by reports, they got actionable intelligence information. 

Five hours later, another group, a ‘‘clean team,’’ showed up. The 

first thing they did was read him his Miranda rights. No surprise, 

he hasn’t talked since then. We will never know what information 

we have lost and what risks and what damage we may put to our 

country by not interrogating him fully and getting all the information he had to learn about what al-Qaeda’s doing in Yemen. 

I would like to change tactics here, change the tone of my—I 

want to talk a little bit about—you know, one thing that I believe 

is the most information we can have and the quicker we get it, the 

earlier in the whole process, the better chance we have to thwart 

it. 

As we know Mr. Abdulmuttalab, it seems to be that he got, at 

least from the information I have had, that his radicalization, his 

radicalization happened while he was going to school in Great Britain in England. The British intelligence states he is—Islamic student organization in their fight against extremism. 

Abdullahmatal—I am sorry—Abdulmutallab was the fourth president of an organization like that in Great Britain to be charged 

with a terrorism-related offense. 

My question is is extremism on college campuses something that 

the intelligence community is focused on, both abroad and here at 

home? 

Mr. LEITER. Congressman, I would be happy to talk about this 

more in a closed hearing. I will say we have worked very closely 

with the British as they look at their groups. We have consistently 

seen connections between terrorists threatening the United States 

and terrorist activity in the United Kingdom. 

One of the things we have done as a response to this is reinvigorate that information sharing to make sure that we have full visibility into whether or not it is the schools or the garage mosques 
69 

or simply the splinter groups. I agree with you. We have to make 

sure this information is shared very quickly. 

Mr. OLSON. Have we seen anything here domestically akin to 

what is going on in Great Britain? 

Mr. LEITER. Congressman, we have never seen within the United 

States nearly the scale, scope, depth of radicalization that we have 

seen in the United Kingdom. We have pockets of it, and we are 

concerned with it. I wouldn’t associate it with any single environment within the United States. 

Mr. OLSON. Thanks for that. 

One more question. Maybe I appreciate if it is two sentences 

across the line in the classification system. But one individual I am 

concerned about, and I hope I pronounced this right, is Sheikh 

Anwar al-Awlaki, who had contact, we know, with Mr. 

Abdulmuttalab, probably in Yemen, probably as part of the, you 

know, the organization that helped him get trained and certainly 

can keep him indoctrinated. 

Also concerned as a Member from Texas. Apparently, there were 

e-mail contacts between him and Captain Hasan who, as you know, 

killed 13 soldiers at Fort Hood. I am just concerned. Do you know 

of any other? He is using 21st century technology—videos, teleconferencing technology, particularly, you know, of sending that 

signal to England and Great Britain again. I know I am harping 

on them, but is there any evidence that he has been doing that 

home here in our country? 

Mr. LEITER. Congressman, I really can. I can’t go into great 

depth here. I will tell you that the intelligence community has been 

concerned with the activities of Anwar al-Awlaki for some time. He 

was initially investigated in association with the events of 9/11, 

when he was an imam in San Diego, later in Northern Virginia. 

I can tell you that even well before Major Hasan, but certainly 

after the events of Fort Hood, NCTC, the FBI and other agencies 

have been very, very focused on Awlaki, but also other individuals 

like Awlaki, who are savvy to Western ways, Western technology, 

modern technology, and their ability to reach into our border 

through this technology. 

Mr. OLSON. I see that I have run out of time. Thank you very 

much. Stay on him. Thanks. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you very much. 

The gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Pascrell. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Chairman, thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, many of us have stressed one thing as Members 

of this committee. If there is one thing we have stressed, it is that 

the bureaucracy itself is as great a threat to our National security 

as anything else. You heard the bureaucracy today, part of it. 

Let me just point out that Congress is not exempt from this criticism. Indeed, this is at least the fourth of different full committees 

to hold a hearing on the attempted attack of December 25. This 

strikes me as entirely counterproductive to what we are trying to 

accomplish. 

It seems crystal clear to me that the events of December 25 were 

allowed to occur, because once again we have failed to connect 

things in the information that we already had, we already knew 
70 

about. Once again, our intelligence agencies failed to communicate 

with each other. This is a human error, not an electronic error. 

We spend a lot of time talking about the state-of-the-art of these 

machines that are in airports and aren’t in airports. We have not 

told the American people the truth. Many binary explosives are not 

detectable at this point. 

We established a Director of National Intelligence, the DNI, to 

serve as the head of the intelligence community. It consists of 16 

different agencies spread throughout the Federal Government—16. 

Each of these intelligence agencies have different standards for 

their personnel—each of them. 9/11 9 years ago—they still have 

different standards. 

I would conclude that you are not going to get the proper relationship amongst these agencies until you have basic standards. In 

fact, the agency within all of the 16 that has the toughest standards is the CIA. I would begin there. 

But we established that position of Director of National Intelligence to finally provide some leadership and guidance over the intelligence community so that we could finally close the gaps in this 

information sharing. Clearly, we are not there yet. 

What troubles me most about this incident was that we allowed 

this individual to receive a visa in the first place to enter the 

United States. I think of all those families who have tried to get 

united and were denied a visa, because they thought if they came 

to the United States, that they wouldn’t go back. Many of those 

cases were adjudicated correctly. Many of them were not. 

We never took steps to revoke his visa before he entered a foreign airport to travel. We already had negative information on this 

individual. Not only had the State Department spoken to his father, but we knew that he traveled to Yemen. For young men to 

travel from Nigeria to Yemen with no known legitimate purpose— 

that should raise a number of red flags. 

Mr. Leiter, Director Leiter of the National Counterterrorism Center, is often described as the arm of our intelligence community 

that is responsible for—I hate the phrase, and probably you do, 

too—connecting the dots on intelligence gathering. Do you agree 

that is your primary role and responsibility? If so, doesn’t that hold 

you primarily responsible for the failure to connect the dots on the 

intelligence we already had on this individual? 

Mr. LEITER. Absolutely. I said several times, Congressman, 

NCTC is the primary analytic organization. It was our responsibility to do this. We didn’t do that. There was another organization 

that also had responsibility under the DNI’s standards. That didn’t 

occur there either. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Do you wonder why some of us have concluded 

that maybe we have added an extra layer of bureaucracy to the intelligence apparatus that is slowing us down to get to the goal line? 

Do you wonder why we think that at times? Or do you think that 

the DNI is absolutely necessary to stop those who wish to bring 

harm to our families, to our neighborhoods, and to our borders? 

What are your thoughts? I know you work for them. What are your 

thoughts? 

Mr. LEITER. Congressman, I think the DNI is a useful construct 

to advance intelligence reform. I do not think that the DNI in this 
71 

case, this construct or the layers, was the problem. I mean I think 

many of the weaknesses you have identified are fair weaknesses. 

I just don’t think they were the issue that caused this failure here 

today. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Do you have the authority you need to work with 

intelligence across our Federal departments and agencies? Do you 

have the authority to do that? 

Mr. LEITER. Congressman, it is not easy for an—— 

Mr. PASCRELL. I am not saying it is easy. Believe me, I am not, 

Mr. Leiter. But my question is very specific. 

Mr. LEITER. I do not, nor do I believe the DNI, as currently constructed, has all of the authority necessary to move all of the information in a way that will maximize the likelihood of detecting 

these plots. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Mr. Chairman, I hope that—and I know you were 

listening, and the Ranking Member, to the last answer. The gentleman has been forthright. I thank him for his service to his country. We have created—my conclusion, not their conclusion—a monster. We will never get the safety of the American citizens as we 

build these levels of bureaucracy that do not get to the heart of the 

issue. 

I would ask you to go back—— 

I would ask you to go back, Ms. Lute—— 

I would ask you to go back, Mr. Kennedy—to look at this bureaucracy as being the systemic problem. This is human error, but 

maybe it is human error precipitated by the fact that we have created a bureaucratic nightmare so that no one is held accountable. 

That is why you create bureaucracies, you know. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you very much. 

The gentleman’s time has expired, but we always recognize his 

leadership. 

Mr. Leiter, In light of your question, we are going to ask you to 

provide us what authority you think you need in order for you to 

do your job in a manner you deem necessary. 

Mr. LEITER. Mr. Chairman, I am happy to do that, and I would 

work with the DNI. I would add that although I say that, I don’t 

have any particular authorities right now that would quickly ensure that every bit of this data is shared with every other component of the intelligence community. 

Chairman THOMPSON. I understand, but you just said in response to the gentleman from New Jersey’s question that you don’t 

have it. 

Mr. LEITER. Mr. Chairman, I am happy to go back, and we will 

come back with recommendations to you. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you very much. 

The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Green, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I thank the witnesses for appearing today. 

I believe, as has been indicated, this was a failure of intelligence, 

but I would like to make sure that I state that it was not a failure 

of all intelligence personnel. I say this, because we have many people who risk their lives on a daily basis. Some, by the way, lose 
72 

their lives, as was evidenced by the recent event that we need not 

go into. 

Their families—they see these hearings. I don’t want their families to assume that I have concluded that all intelligence officers 

are failures, because I want them to have the morale necessary to 

do a very difficult job under circumstances that are extremely complicated, and sometimes almost impossible, if not impossible. 

I believe that the structural integrity of a plane at 3,000 feet 

traveling at 500 miles per hour is of paramount importance. It is 

as important as anything that we deal with. Because the structural 

integrity of that plane is so important, I want a system that will 

reveal and allow us to capture the Omar Farouk Abdulmutallab. 

But I also want a system that will capture the Abdulmutallab 

who doesn’t pay cash, the Abdulmutallab who doesn’t ask for Seat 

19A, the Abdulmutallab whose father doesn’t turn them in. I want 

a system that will capture the Abdulmutallab whose religion I am 

not aware of. 

If we focus only on connecting the dots that could have been connected to the exclusion of designing a system that will allow us to 

capture the Abdulmutallabs who are not obvious, who are not intuitively obvious to the most casual observer, if you will, it would be 

a mistake. 

We must have a system that will reveal the Abdulmutallab who 

is Anglo-Saxon and has blond hair, because this beast that we have 

to deal with continually metamorphoses. It becomes something else 

somewhere else. If we only assume that it will be tomorrow what 

it is today, we will make today’s mistake, and it will impact tomorrow. 

So the system that I am looking for is one that will allow us to 

understand, in my opinion, that the last line of defense is the airport. That is the last line of defense. The American people don’t 

ask us to do the impossible. They do demand, however, that we do 

all that we can—that we do all that we can. 

At some point the excuse that we didn’t do all that we could is 

not going to be enough for the American people. So we have got a 

duty at these airports to do all that we can. We owe it to the intelligence officers who risk their lives every day to make sure that we 

do all that we can at the airports, our last line of defense. 

A quick question, if I may. Did we know the religion of Richard 

Reid prior to December 2001? 

Mr. LEITER. I don’t believe so. I don’t think we knew anything—— 

Mr. GREEN. I think that that answer suffices. The reason I asked 

is because if we focus on religion and then some other adjectives, 

we are missing a point here. I want to capture the culprit whose 

religion may not be the religion du jour for our purposes. This is 

serious business, and it goes beyond the ability to simply identify 

that which is superficial, the superficial social analyst who can 

come in after the fact and connect all of the dots and see how clearly we could have saved the day, had we connected the dots. 

So I suppose I had more of a statement than questions for you, 

because I just absolutely believe that we must not allow ourselves 

to be trapped by religion and by ethnicity and place of origin. It 

is bigger than that. 
73 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back the balance of my time. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you very much. 

The gentleman’s time has expired. 

The gentleman from California for 5 minutes, Mr. Lungren. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate 

the time. I am sorry I couldn’t be here during all of this, but I am 

divided between three different committees, and we just voted to 

impeach a Federal judge. I think it is only eight times in history 

we have done that, so I had to be there for that vote. 

Yes, I hope we are not prisoners of wrong impressions either. But 

I also hope we are not prisoners of PC. We are in a war declared 

on us by radical jihad, radical Islam. That happens to be a fact. We 

didn’t pick the war. They picked the war. I haven’t seen too many 

Irish Catholic nuns blow themselves up. 

Sometimes we do stupid things like having my 6-month-old 

granddaughter a couple of years ago taken out for a secondary 

search when they searched her diaper. That kind of stupidity hurts 

us, I think, even though we do it to make sure that we have some 

egalitarian approach to this. 

Mr. Kennedy, let me ask you something. That is if the State Department had the information about Abdulmutallab from his father 

prior to issuing a visa, would we have issued a visa? 

Mr. KENNEDY. Sir, if we had the information the father had presented before—— 

Mr. LUNGREN. Yes, that is my question. 

Mr. KENNEDY. Yes, sir. What we would have done is we would 

have not issued the visa. We would have sent in to the intelligence 

and law enforcement communities a security and advisory opinion, 

ask them what additional information they had, and then made the 

decision on the basis of what additional information they provided 

as well. 

Mr. LUNGREN. So if that is the case, why wouldn’t we move to 

revoke the visa if we have that information? 

Mr. KENNEDY. Because we sent the request in to the Visas Viper, 

sir, went into the intelligence and law enforcement community and 

ask them if they had any additional information on Mr. Mutallab. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Does someone have a constitutional right to come 

to the United States? 

Mr. KENNEDY. No, sir. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Does someone have some sort of international 

right to come to the United States? 

Mr. KENNEDY. Absolutely not. 

Mr. LUNGREN. A visa is a discretionary action by the United 

States, right? 

Mr. KENNEDY. Absolutely, sir. 

Mr. LUNGREN. The granting of a visa. So why would you even 

hesitate about not granting someone a visa if he had that information from the father such as was given by Mr. Abdulmutallab’s father? 

Mr. KENNEDY. Two reasons, sir. First is context. We turn down 

almost two million—1.9 million visas a year. So we do not—— 

Mr. LUNGREN. Okay. I don’t care about the other. I am asking 

you about this specific case. That is why I am asking. 
74 

Mr. KENNEDY. No, because, sir, there are people who come into 

embassies every day, every month, family members, disgruntled 

business partners, and others who say that so-and-so might be a 

terrorist. So we have been very carefully analyzing that. We consult with our partners. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Okay. I understand that. Let me ask you this, 

then. So do we have a lot of fathers who have experience such as 

Mr. Abdulmutallab’s father did, who turn their sons in with that 

kind of information? 

Mr. KENNEDY. There have been family members. 

Mr. LUNGREN. So there are a lot of them. 

Mr. KENNEDY. There have been family members who—— 

Mr. LUNGREN. You know, I appreciate it. I don’t like people getting cute with me. This is very serious business. 

Mr. KENNEDY. Absolutely. 

Mr. LUNGREN. The American people are asking us. I was just 

home. People are saying, ‘‘How in God’s name can you screw up 

like this?’’ We have spent billions of dollars trying to do it, and we 

say, ‘‘Well, you know, a father comes in like this with this guy’s 

pedigree. He says that about it. Yes, we got a lot of them.’’ I would 

argue that you don’t get a lot of them, and I would argue that you 

ought to be a little more serious about this then doing that. 

Mr. KENNEDY. Sir, I am—— 

Mr. LUNGREN. Now, you know, it is easy to be a second, you 

know, on Monday morning quarterback, but when you tell me that, 

it bothers me a great deal. 

Mr. KENNEDY. If I could just finish my sentence. 

Mr. LUNGREN. You can finish your sentence, but we are in a serious question here about people who want to kill us, and you talk 

to me. It sounds like the State Department is doing things the way 

they used to do it. 

Mr. KENNEDY. No, sir. The second part of my sentence, sir, is 

that we are reviewing all of our procedures. We regard ourselves 

as the first line of defense, and we have every intention. We are 

committed to—— 

Mr. LUNGREN. Well, you weren’t the first line of defense here, 

were you? 

Mr. KENNEDY. I believe we were, sir. 

Mr. LUNGREN. This is amazing. I am sorry. It is amazing to me. 

So you don’t—it didn’t work the way it should, though, did it? 

Mr. KENNEDY. Absolutely not. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Okay. 

Mr. KENNEDY. I said that in my testimony, sir. 

Mr. LUNGREN. So you are reviewing the procedures and criteria. 

So what would do differently now, if you got this information? Or 

would you do anything differently, except make sure it went up the 

line? 

Mr. KENNEDY. If he had been a visa applicant, we would have 

coded that information. We would have sent the inquiry to Washington. We would have asked other people in the intelligence community what—— 

Mr. LUNGREN. Okay. So he wasn’t a visa applicant. He already 

had a visa. 

Mr. KENNEDY. Right. 
75 

Mr. LUNGREN. So what change would take place now, if you are 

confronted with the same information, not applying for a visa, but 

he has a visa. This information is brought to you at one of the embassies. 

Mr. KENNEDY. I would think, as you suggested, sir, we would do 

all more in-depth review to make sure that the information being 

presented to us was valid. Then if it was valid, we would move to 

revoke the visa immediately. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Okay. I would just like you to bring one little bit 

of information back to the State Department. I have an adult 

daughter who was visiting Gambia the week after Christmas. She 

thought it might be important for her to go to the embassy to indicate that she was there—American citizen there. 

She was told the person that would take that information was 

sick, and the person who was—or, excuse me, was on vacation— 

and the person who was supposed to take that person’s place was 

sick. Therefore, she could come back in a week to tell them that 

she was there. She was leaving in a week. 

I just want to tell you she didn’t pull anything about being my 

daughter or anything else. I just happen to think that kind of a response to a simple American citizen going to a country saying, ‘‘You 

know, you might want to know I am here in case anything happens’’—not that she thought anything was going to happen in that 

country, but that was the response she got. 

Mr. KENNEDY. That was totally inappropriate and wrong, and I 

will look into that, sir. We encourage, we request, we have web 

sites to encourage any American traveler to record their—— 

Mr. LUNGREN. That is what she did. She was told to come back 

after she had left. 

Mr. KENNEDY. That was an error, and we will look into it. Why? 

That is not our procedure. 

Chairman THOMPSON. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

The gentlelady from Texas for 5 minutes, Ms. Jackson Lee. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

To the witnesses, let me thank you. 

I think all of us echo the fact that we know that there are men 

and women on the front line, and we appreciate their service. We 

also appreciate the leadership of the President of the United States 

as the Commander-in-Chief. He should be able to expect the highest level of performance of his staff, of his Executive staff, that he 

should also expect the Congress is a collaborator with him in team 

homeland security. 

Unfortunately, I think that there were enormous challenges and 

missteps that did not equate to the team working together and 

playing on the playing field together. I frankly believe that part of 

it is, of course, some of the missteps of the United States Congress, 

some of the inability of the executive to listen to the Congress. 

My subcommittee, the Subcommittee on Transportation Security 

and Infrastructure Protection, looked into the question of watch 

lists. We actually made comments about the burdensome method 

of that watch list, of how heavy laden it was, how inaccurate it 

was, to the extent that we had 8-year-olds, so we had an 8-yearold as a witness. Another 8-year-old had been interviewed. It is a 

simple task to look at that watch list and provide the intelligence 
76 

and the staffing to make it a watch list that is credible of the 

name. 

The other broken part of the system is the responsibility still, as 

I understand it, on airline personnel as people come to counters 

and their names—they go to the back and check their names—civilians looking at issues that happen to deal with homeland security 

issues. 

We have a problem and a crisis that needs to be fixed. A part 

of it is that we must acknowledge that we will not have people 

bearing flags running down airports and saying, ‘‘I am a terrorist.’’ 

Individual operators and actors, franchising of terrorism, seems to 

be the call of the day, and then taking credit for it one way or the 

other. We know now that Osama bin Laden has taken credit for 

the December 25 action. 

Many of us, who are not inside the Department, were aware that 

there was activity going on around the holiday. We know that that 

is the modus operandi of terrorists. Go when a country is focusing 

on something else. So my questions go to this whole question of 

interrelatedness. 

Quickly to Secretary Kennedy, are your consul offices—do they 

have a direct connection to the watch list effort of Deputy Secretary 

Lute and the counterterrorism efforts of Director Leiter so that the 

Nigerian consulate person would have had that direct connection? 

Chairman THOMPSON. Please use your microphone. 

Mr. KENNEDY. My apologies. 

We get daily and—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Can they call back and contact a human 

being? 

Chairman THOMPSON. Madam, well, just, I don’t think he finished it. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I understand, but my question is can they— 

I hear what he is going to say. The question is—— 

Chairman THOMPSON. Now, I didn’t hear what he was going to 

say. Just let him answer. You have got plenty of time. I am going 

to be very nice. 

Go ahead, Mr. Kennedy. 

Mr. KENNEDY. The law enforcement and Homeland Security and 

intelligence communities provide us with information every day on 

new threats. We load that into our database, and that information 

is available to every embassy and consulate throughout the world. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Does the consular general have the authority 

or the ability, or the individual who dealt with the father of the alleged perpetrator in the incident at December 25, to be able to call 

back on the telephone, on a cable, on an e-mail, or whatever is secure, to ask questions out of the Deputy Secretary Lute area or the 

counterterrorism area? 

Mr. KENNEDY. What they do is they call the visa office at the 

State Department, which is our central repository and which is in 

daily contact via all the secure means with both as the National 

Counterterrorism Center, the Department of Homeland Security, 

the FBI’s Terrorist Screening Center. Yes, ma’am. We are in contact with daily. That is one of the major improvements since 9/11. 

We are all lashed up as partners—— 
77 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. But if you are in contact, what does that 

mean? Does that mean that the person who engaged with the father of the alleged perpetrator had the ability to get on the phone 

and call and get a quick answer of the person who answered the 

phone in Washington, DC? I am suspicious. There is an individual 

here talking about activity of an individual that has a visa. 

Was there a direct link for there to be a response by checking 

live intelligence by way of a direct call to the counterterrorism or 

direct call to the watch list? Those are in two different areas. 

Mr. KENNEDY. Yes, sir. He was not on the watch list. He was not 

on the Selectee list. The State Department, when the father came 

in, talked to an embassy officer, who then immediately reported to 

the consular section that this is the information that was received, 

and that information was immediately sent to Washington. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Have you made changes to ensure that information that would describe someone as suspicious can be responded to quickly? Because frankly I believe that all that the father said was enough information for a well-trained official, whether they are State Department or not, that we are living in a different climate and maybe I should do something about it? Have you 

had a re-training of your staff around the country—around the 

world, rather? 

Mr. KENNEDY. Yes, ma’am. We have sent out revised and updated instructions, and we emphasize that we have added additional information to the immediate report that is sent in—it is 

called Visas Viper—that notifies the Homeland Security and intelligence and law enforcement communities that the State Department has come into piece of information that may well be important, and here it is. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Deputy Secretary Lute, if I might, on the 

watch list, which has been one of the major complaints and a burdensome list that is both, I believe, inaccurate. In many instances 

it plays into my colleague’s comments about profiling for the basis 

of religion and otherwise, which does nothing to fight the war on 

terror. 

My question is the distinction between the watch list and the NoFly list. In this instance this person should have definitely been on 

the No-Fly list, and so my question is what is the strategy for a 

comprehensive and coordinated watchlisting and screening approach into a prioritized implementation and investment plan that 

describes the scope, governance principles, outcomes, milestones, 

training objectives, metrics, cost and schedule of necessary activities as relates to the watch list to be able to move to the No-Fly 

list? 

If I may also raise to Director Leiter so I can have these questions out, which I think is very important. I hope that when we are 

on notice that an incident is occurring, all hands will be on deck, 

similar to making sure that embassy personnel, who we have great 

respect for, are at their desks at appropriate times, because all 

times of the schedule, if you will, the calendar, people are coming 

and going. I hope if there is a terrorist act, we have all hands on 

deck on this information. 

Director Leiter, and I would say my question is there has been 

a lot of discussion about the failure. This was not a failure to con-
78 

nect the dots, but to analyze what we had. It has been said that 

the intelligence community, to build a more robust analytical capability, specifically what steps are being taken to accommodate this 

goal in training, system design and technological changes, but more 

importantly, on the human intelligence and behavioral assessment, 

which, if you had done that on the gentleman’s actions, he would 

have been on the No-Fly list. 

Deputy Secretary Lute. 

Ms. LUTE. Yes, ma’am. Thank you. As you know, the Department 

of Homeland Security does not own or control the watchlisting. 

Abdulmutallab was neither No-Fly nor Selectee. 

But we are working very closely with our colleagues throughout 

the interagency to identify the kinds of information that is necessary for us to take steps related to ensuring aviation security. 

In fact, in the wake of this incident, we will take information 

such as Under Secretary Kennedy was talking about and put that 

in the hand of our immigration advisory professionals that are stationed abroad in nine locations so that they can engage in additional questioning and examination of persons who come on that 

list. That is an important step in the direction of increased security, and we are looking at others as well. 

You also mentioned the frustration with the ensuring the accuracy of the list. We share that frustration. It is important that we 

do have lists on which we rely for ensuring the safety of the traveling public, that these be accurate lists. We are working very intensively to establish an easy way for people to de-conflict information when it is erroneous and to ensure that those lists are the accurate, important tool that we need them to be. 

But we also know that we are facing a determined adversary, 

who is looking to use people who are unknown to any system. In 

this regard we need to evaluate their activities, travel patterns, 

and other activities which can tip us off that this person may be 

dangerous, certainly is worth additional screening and questioning, 

and working intensively with our interagency colleagues to get better systems in place for those contingencies. 

Mr. LEITER. Congresswoman, thank you for the question. I think 

you are exactly right, that we have to improve the ability of these 

analysts to understand the characteristics of this information as 

they are coming in so they get a true feel for when a father walks 

in, why is the father walking in? Why this report? 

We are doing a number of things on this front. Most importantly, 

we are creating specific teams that are not bound to writing daily 

intelligence. When they get that bit from the father and dive into 

it and connect that intelligence in a way, that you do have all the 

information necessary to make that determination about whether 

someone should be or should not be on the No-Fly list. 

So you also do not get people on the No-Fly list that you don’t 

want on the No-Fly list, because the only way you are going to get 

the bad guys off the plane is to also ensure that the good guys can 

get on the plane. Otherwise, the system just becomes unwieldy. 

So we have already begun additional training. The Director of 

National Intelligence is studying how we can advance that training 

more. We are creating teams to pursue these to ensure that they 
79 

have the time and they have the resources to track down these free 

pieces of information and put them together. 

Mr. KENNEDY. Congresswoman, you also asked is the State Department on duty in addition to the embassy people you mentioned. 

We have somebody responsible that is in our operation centers 7 

days a week, 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. If a question comes 

in from an embassy—it may be in a different time zone—or comes 

in from our partners in the National security community, that officer knows who to reach out to to get the right information they 

need immediately. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman, may I just say a point on the 

record? 

I thank the witnesses. 

The one point that I heard Deputy Secretary Lute say is that 

Homeland Security does not have ownership of the watch list. I 

think it speaks to, again, the work we have to do and have been 

doing to get the synergism so that we have some mutually interrelatedness on trying to help all of these persons and that we can 

get an understanding everybody has ownership of the watch list, 

the No-Fly list. 

We have got to find a way to weave in our security so that there 

are no gaps, not putting the fault on these public servants, but 

there has to be a cleaning up of the cracks in the system that will 

allow this kind of breach to happen. It has to be a combination, Mr. 

Chairman, of the Executive working with us as team homeland security, and no distinction between Republicans and Democrats, 

team homeland security. 

I hope in that spirit that we will have the appointee necessary 

for the running of the Homeland Security Department to move as 

quickly as possible to be appointed and confirmed on the behalf of 

the American people. I look forward to working with them. 

I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for yielding. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you very much. 

I want to thank the witnesses for their valuable testimony and 

the Members for their questions. 

Mr. Kennedy, if you would provide the committee with the instructions you referenced Chairwoman Jackson Lee that have been 

implemented since the December 25 incident with respect to training and other information. Now, if that is classified, just let us 

know, we will still govern ourselves accordingly. 

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. Chairman, I will be pleased to get that to you, 

sir. Thank you. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you. 

Mr. Leiter, you said you want to make sure that good guys get 

on the plane. There is a good guy here who is a Member of Congress that has an awful difficult time getting on planes. He is Congressman John Lewis in Georgia. 

Deputy Secretary Lute, can you look into that and figure out a 

way how he can not be flagged for secondary screening and other 

things, because he is in fact John Lewis? Now, there is another 

John Lewis out there. We still ought to have a system to figure out 

how to handle this. 

Ms. LUTE. Yes, sir, we should. I am on it. 
80 

Chairman THOMPSON. Okay. Thank you very much. I am sure he 

would appreciate it. 

Mr. LEITER. Mr. Chairman. Can I make one note on that front? 

Chairman THOMPSON. Yes. 

Mr. LEITER. Not knowing the facts of Congressman Lewis’ case 

and certainly not accusing him of being a known or suspected terrorist, I do want to flag for the committee—I think it is important 

to understand—that a desire to have more people on the watch list 

will inevitably lead to more false positives. We have to accept that, 

I believe, as a cost. 

There is nothing we can do technologically or with the human to 

eliminate those false positives from occurring—again, not speaking 

directly to the Congressman’s case, but accepting that this will be 

a byproduct of ensuring that some bad people don’t get on the 

plane. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Well, and I understand, but that is going 

forward. This has been from day 1. So we are not even to the next 

generation. But, obviously, we assume the inconvenience that adding to the list will bring, but these are different times. 

Mr. Kennedy, last question. Can you provide the committee with 

either, if you know right now or at a later date, how many people 

we actually have working in the visa office in your shop here in 

Washington? 

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. Chairman, let me get that for the record. I 

can get within a swag, but I will submit that for the record, sir. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you very much. 

Mr. KING. Thank you for the testimony. Thank you for their service. I yield back. 

Thank you, Chairman, for the hearing. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you. 

Before concluding, I remind the witnesses that the Members of 

the committee may have additional questions for you, and we ask 

that you respond expeditiously in writing to those questions. 

Hearing no further business, the committee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 1:21 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 
(81) 

A P P E N D I X 

QUESTIONS FROM HONORABLE SHEILA JACKSON LEE OF TEXAS FOR JANE HOLL LUTE, 

DEPUTY SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Question 1. In response to a recommendation by the 9/11 Commission about improving passenger pre-screening, the Secure Flight program is being implemented 

so that TSA will be assuming the duty, which now rests with the air carriers, of 

checking passengers against the No-Fly and Selectee databases. I understand TSA 

is first implementing Secure Flight domestically, but with there being a significant 

threat concerning international in-bound flights, how will the Department conduct 

watch list passenger pre-screening for in-bound flights to the United States? How 

will this be incorporated with existing CBP programs like the Advanced Passenger 

Information System? 

Answer. DHS is implementing Secure Flight through a phased process. The 

Transportation Security Administration (TSA) anticipates that Secure Flight deployments for domestic aircraft operators will be completed in spring 2010. TSA has also 

initiated Secure Flight deployments for foreign aircraft operators and expects to assume watch list matching for all flights, international and domestic, by the end of 

calendar year 2010. 

All aircraft operators, both foreign and domestic, who have not transitioned to Secure Flight are responsible for conducting watch list screening of their passengers 

against the No-Fly and Selectee lists. 

Currently, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) screens travelers arriving 

into or departing from the United States against the Terrorist Screening Database 

(TSDB, the U.S. Government’s Terrorist Watch List), including No-Fly and Selectee 

records. All commercial and private aircraft operators with flights arriving into or 

departing from the United States are required to transmit passenger manifest information through the Advance Passenger Information System (APIS) to U.S. Customs 

and Border Protection (CBP). APIS is used for terrorist watchlist screening, law enforcement analytical work, passenger facilitation, and departure monitoring. As part 

of program alignment, on February 19, 2008, CBP started screening all APIS manifest submissions against the No-Fly and Selectee watch lists with the screening results being provided to the TSA Office of Intelligence (TSA–OI) for resolution. CBP 

has been working closely with TSA and the airline industry to align the APIS program with TSA Secure Flight watchlist screening. When TSA’s Secure Flight Program is fully implemented, the No-Fly and Selectee screening will transition from 

the APIS system to Secure Flight. CBP will continue to process APIS manifest information for its law enforcement and traveler facilitation mission. 

Question 2. Ms. Lute, It is my understanding that ‘‘Puffer Machines’’ or Explosive 

Trace Portal Machines worked great when they were tested in the lab testing but 

during field testing they had a high breakdown rate caused by dust and dirt entering the machines. I have been told by TSA that there are currently 9 machines currently in the field, but TSA has no intention to field any more because of the breakdown rate. Is any effort being made to revise or improve this technology? 

Answer. At this time there are only two deployed Explosive Trace Portals (ETP), 

one at Gulfport-Biloxi International Airport and one at Phoenix Sky Harbor International Airport, and both are slotted for removal this year. As we deploy Advanced 

Imaging Technology (AIT) at an airport we remove obsolete equipment at the same 

time. This minimizes disruption of the airport operations and increases resource and 

cost efficiencies. 

While the ETP devices previously purchased by Transportation Security Administration (TSA) experienced operational performance issues that hindered their effectiveness in the field, TSA and the Department of Homeland Security Science and 

Technology Directorate continue to evaluate a variety of trace detection technologies. 
82 

Question 3. Ms. Lute, it is my understanding that every checkpoint in the United 

States has portable Explosive Trace Technology devices. I realize it is not practical 

to test every person in every airport with this device because of time limitations, 

but can TSA increase the amount of passengers randomly selected for the explosive 

trace technology swab test? Has TSA taken any steps to increase their use? 

Answer. To restate your question more accurately, every checkpoint in the United 

States has tabletop Explosive Trace Technology devices. Explosive Trace Detection 

(ETD) technology is a critical tool in our ability to stay ahead of evolving threats 

to aviation security. In fact, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has 

recently expanded the random use of ETD technology at airports Nation-wide as an 

additional layer of security. Since it will be used on a random basis, passengers 

should not expect to see the same thing at every airport or each time they travel. 

TSA will continue to evaluate the numbers of passengers screened and work to 

maximize the effectiveness of ETD screening as commensurate with resource levels 

and airport operations. 

Question 4. Ms. Lute, it is my understanding that a pilot program that was recently completed by TSA called ‘‘e-Logbook’’ would allow TSA to instantly be able 

to know if a FAM or LEO flying armed is on-board an aircraft. I have been informed 

this pilot program was a success however, it is my understanding that no funding 

has been requested yet for this program to go up Nation-wide. I would like to know 

what the current status is and what plan does TSA have to role out this program 

Nation-wide? 

Answer. The Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS) has a dedicated system in place 

to continually track, in real time, Federal Air Marshal (FAM) presence on domestic 

and international flights. 

With regard to the Electronic Logbook (e-Logbook) pilot program, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is seeking to establish an automated process 

for providing situational awareness for other armed law enforcement officers (LEOs) 

on-board any given aircraft. The e-Logbook pilot program was tested in Washington 

(Reagan National Airport, Dulles International) and San Francisco and TSA is currently considering a Nation-wide implementation. In the interim, TSA’s Transportation Security Operations Center (TSOC) currently tracks State and local armed 

LEOs on commercial aircraft through a National Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (NLETS) solution implemented last year. Although functional, the 

NLETS solution relies on manual processes and is limited to State and local LEOs. 

Also, on February 1, 2010, TSA began a pilot implementation of an enhanced credential verification procedure for Federal Law Enforcement personnel flying while 

armed. 

The enhanced identification procedures require each Federal LEO flying armed in 

accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 1544.219 and respective agency policy, to be in possession of a Unique Federal Agency Number (UFAN). The UFAN is an agency-specific 

alpha-numeric number TSA issues to Federal agencies/entities upon request. The 

UFAN is known only to TSA and the respective agency/entity. Each agency/entity 

must ensure its eligible law enforcement personnel are aware of this number to be 

used in conjunction with the LEOs badge, credential, a secondary form of Government-issued identification, and airline-issued LEO flying armed paperwork. The 

UFAN number is an additional form of verification and will be requested of the LEO 

at the LEO checkpoint prior to entry into the boarding area. 

Question 5. Ms. Lute, it has come to my intention that some flights have both 

FAMS agents and LEO’s flying armed, while other flights have neither. Is the Department taking any steps to create a scheduling system to maximize the use of 

FAMS with LEO’s flying armed? 

Answer. The Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS) provides mission coverage to 

the Nation’s civil aviation system using a concept of operations (CONOPs) that is 

essentially a threat-based matrix prioritizing scheduled flight coverage well in advance of the flight date. FAMS, on the other hand, can be made available to cover 

emergent threats when necessary. In order to perform the FAMS’ mission, all Federal Air Marshals (FAM) undergo intensive specialized training far exceeding requirements for law enforcement officers (LEOs) flying armed. 

With regard to the matter of other armed LEOs, the FAMS has determined that 

flight schedules from other agencies (Federal, State, and local) are flexible by nature, often booked within days of the flight date (allowing virtually no advance 

FAMS planning) and are not sufficiently reliable to ensure daily coverage of flights. 

Overburdening airlines and TSA’s Mission Operation Center with additional last 

moment cancellations/bookings to ensure proper coverage of high priority flights presents operational and logistical challenges best overcome by the FAMS making its 

own schedule independent of other LEOs traveling on flights. 
83 

Question 6. Ms. Lute, does the Department plan to hire more FAMS agents? If 

so, how many? 

Answer. The President’s fiscal year 2011 budget request does seek to increase the 

Federal Air Marshal Service funded staffing level. Specifically, the budget request 

seeks to hire 499 additional FAMS personnel in fiscal year 2011. 

Question 7. I have recently become aware of ‘‘event-driven’’ as compared to ‘‘person-driven’’ software. As I understand it, ‘‘event-driven’’ software is very efficient 

and can instantly capture and process extremely large volumes of information. I understand that electronic signals generated by events serve as input into specialized 

event-driven software. I am told that based on its processing rules with predetermined expectations and constraints, it can intelligently process the information to 

constantly revaluate individuals’ risk profiles, connect the intelligence-revealing 

dots, and automatically and immediately communicate the derived intelligence or 

alerts to all the appropriate people that need to know, or need to take action. 

I am told that this event-driven software has been successfully used for years in 

extremely complex manufacturing environments such as Aerospace and Defense, as 

well as many other challenging industries. The processing of travel and security 

‘‘events’’ is apparently no different and I understand that the software can be deployed very quickly. It appears there is a possibility that with this software the 

‘‘events’’ leading up to the Christmas day bomber incident would have set off the 

alarms for everyone, even if the bomber was not on any watch list. How long do 

you estimate it will take before the American people can be protected by comprehensive ‘‘event-driven’’ software? 

Answer. DHS is aware that event-driven systems have proven useful in such 

large-scale applications as manufacturing, financial and investment management, 

aircraft and spaceflight, and project management. Common to all these applications 

is some on-going process, workflow, or lifecycle. For example, a production line; an 

investment policy based on a series of price or monetary changes; a series of engine 

thrust, altitude, heading, weather, and fuel (and many other) measurements, which 

describe the health of an aircraft; or a development cycle for a software design. The 

‘‘event’’ refers to a point along the process, workflow, or lifecycle, where an automated decision is made by the system to proceed or to take one of several alternatives. Using our manufacturing or aircraft and spaceflight examples, this could 

be deciding to insert a new throttle assembly because the old one was ineffective 

or setting a series of thrusters or making altitude adjustments on the Space Shuttle 

to ensure a safe re-entry trajectory. For event-driven systems to function, at least 

three elements are necessary. These are: (1) A constrained set of rules that determine how decisions are made, (2) access to all the data or databases that are necessary to make a decision, and (3) sensors to detect an event or measurements that 

are continuously made along the process or lifecycle. 

In the context of the attempted attack on December 25, 2009, for an individual 

and an explosive material, a set of rules does exist for deciding what happens if one 

or the other is detected, therefore the first element for an event-driven system is 

present and functioning. The second element, access to all data, was incomplete. In 

the case of the individual, while he used his real identity (e.g., he did not try to 

use a false passport or another name), DHS screening systems lacked any data indicating that he presented an imminent threat. In particular, he was not on the U.S. 

Government’s terrorist watch list. 

Similarly, while DHS had sufficient information to know that the particular substance could be explosive, our foreign partners did not have systems or processes 

in place to detect it. 

In summary, an event-driven system applied to the attempted attack on December 25 would not have functioned because the individual was not watchlisted and 

because the screening equipment was not sensitive enough to detect the explosive 

material. Had the individual been watchlisted or had the equipment been sensitive 

enough to detect the explosive materials, an event-driven system would not have 

been necessary as the existing information-based and physical screening processes 

would have prevented him from boarding the aircraft. DHS is working with our 

counterparts within the U.S. Government and our foreign partners to close these 

vulnerabilities. 

Event-driven systems could prove useful for some homeland security applications. 

However, should the Department identify event-driven systems as a practical technology solution for air passenger screening, it will take time to integrate into the 

existing enterprise. 

Question 8. The findings of the administration’s report released Jan 7, 2010, included: ‘‘The information that was available to analysts, as is usually the case, was 

fragmented and embedded in a large volume of other data’’, and that ‘‘NCTC and 

CIA personnel who are responsible for watchlisting did not search all available data-
84 

bases to uncover additional derogatory information that could have been correlated 

with Mr. Abdulmutallab’’. 

My understanding is that most of the analysis is currently a process of manual 

searches of the various databases. 

Could this goal be achieved with automation, through the use of clever technology 

that can process large volumes of information efficiently and if so, are you currently 

looking at putting such technology in place? 

Answer. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is investigating ways to 

improve searches across the large number of databases in the Department. Even before 25 December, in response to terrorist activity, the Department established a 

DHS Threat Task Force (DTTF) and provided access to 47 databases to a single colocated team in order to conduct name traces. While this is a step forward and has 

yielded actionable insights, the greater need is the ability to search across databases 

at the same time, combining search results. Rather than search each database individually, a federated search would allow us to more quickly make analytic connections. 

A cross-database search capability could enable DHS to conduct searches on individual names, submit lists of names for search, and set up alerts which are tripped 

when new information on individuals of interest arrives. Various statistical and 

probabilistic algorithms could be used to prioritize the search results based on context and frequency. 

DHS is exploring options for a federated search capability. While federating 

searches across multiple databases is technically feasible, it is challenging when 

dealing with numerous datasets of different eras and structures, and it must also 

be done in a manner consistent with DHS information use policies including implementation of the Fair Information Practice Principles. In advance of creating this 

capability, moreover, the Department will also develop applicable System of Records 

Notices (SORN) and Privacy Impact Assessments (PIA) to ensure that we use the 

databases in a manner consistent with what we have publicly stated about them. 

The Department will continue to work through these issues to make available for 

search the kinds of sensitive U.S. persons data that are currently not easily shared 

with the intelligence community in a manner that protects privacy, civil rights and 

civil liberties, and ensuring DHS can achieve its mission to detect threats to the 

homeland. 

Question 9. Does our technology today enable us to assess every single passenger’s 

risk profile, considering all contributing factors, in order to determine his/her specific risk level at any given point in time, and to immediately communicate an elevated risk to the security agencies for extra screening or follow up? If not, are you 

aware of a technology that could accomplish this? 

Answer. For international flights, in addition to screening against the No-Fly and 

Selectee lists that are part of the Terrorist Screening Database, DHS uses a decisions support tool that compares traveler information against intelligence and other 

enforcement data by incorporating risk-based targeting scenarios and assessments. 

The primary purpose is to target, identify, and prevent terrorists and terrorists’ 

weapons from entering the country. All individuals entering the country by commercial air and sea carriers are run through this system. Based on results of the targeting systems, DHS will determine appropriate next steps, which include denying 

boarding, additional screening before departure or upon arrival, denying admission 

to the United States, or arrest upon arrival. 

QUESTIONS FROM CHAIRMAN BENNIE G. THOMPSON OF MISSISSIPPI FOR MICHAEL E. 

LEITER, DIRECTOR, NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER

Question 1. What disciplinary or other personnel action has your agency taken in 

response to the events leading up to the failed attack on Flight 253? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 2. Does NCTC have the authority it needs to fulfill its mission to the 

American people? Specify any additional authorities needed to operate effectively. 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 3. Under what circumstances are names removed from the TIDE database? Describe relevant procedures and the time intervals associated with these procedures. 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

QUESTION FROM HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY OF PENNSYLVANIA FOR

MICHAEL E. LEITER, DIRECTOR, NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER

Question. Mr. Leiter, at the hearing when asked about how many points of failure 

occurred within our intelligence and homeland security systems, ‘‘Was there a single 
85 

point of failure, a double point of failure or multiple points of failure?’’, you answered ‘‘Multiple’’. Please list these failures and rank them in terms of severity and 

what needs to be done to fix them. 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

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