NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

R.L. WHITMER, Plaintiff/Appellant,

v.

HILTON CASITAS HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, Defendant/Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 23-0350

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CV2022-014709

The Honorable John Christian Rea, Judge (Retired)

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Meyer & Partners, PLLC, Phoenix

By Ross P. Meyer 

Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant

Carpenter Hazlewood Delgado & Bolen, LLP, Tempe 

By Edith I. Rudder

Counsel for Defendant/Appellee

FILED 1-30-2024
WHITMER v. HILTON CASITAS

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Daniel J. Kiley delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Judge Kent E. Cattani and Judge D. Steven Williams joined.

K I L E Y, Judge:

¶1 R.L. Whitmer filed a petition asking the superior court to hold 

Hilton Casitas Homeowners Association (“Hilton Casitas”) in contempt for 

failing to comply with a decision rendered in an administrative proceeding 

several years earlier. The court dismissed his claim for relief, and Whitmer 

appeals. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Hilton Casitas is the homeowners association for the

Scottsdale condominium community where Whitmer lives. Hilton Casitas

is subject to the Arizona Condominium Act. See A.R.S. §§ 33-1201 to -1270. 

¶3 In 2014, Whitmer filed a petition with the predecessor agency 

to the Arizona Department of Real Estate (the “Department”) alleging that 

Hilton Casitas had violated its statutory obligations regarding association 

budgets. Specifically, Whitmer alleged that Hilton Casitas incurred legal 

fees in 2013 and 2014 that exceeded budgeted amounts without receiving

authority from members to amend the budgets as required by A.R.S. 

§ 33-1243(D).

¶4 At an evidentiary hearing before the Office of Administrative 

Hearings (“OAH”), Hilton Casitas’ former board president admitted that 

Hilton Casitas incurred legal fees in 2014 that “substantially exceeded the 

amount of money that had been budgeted for legal fees” that year. She 

explained that Whitmer had filed two or three lawsuits against Hilton 

Casitas that required Hilton Casitas to incur attorney fees that had not been 

anticipated.

¶5 After the hearing, the administrative law judge (the “ALJ”)

issued a decision (the “2015 Decision”) concluding that Hilton Casitas 

violated A.R.S. § 33-1243(D) by “exceed[ing] the amount of money that had 

been budgeted for legal fees in 2014.” The ALJ did not impose a civil penalty 

against Hilton Casitas but ordered it to “fully comply with the applicable 

provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1243(D) in the future.”
WHITMER v. HILTON CASITAS

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¶6 Eight years later, in 2022, Whitmer petitioned the superior 

court to hold Hilton Casitas in contempt for violating the 2015 Decision. In 

his petition as amended, Whitmer alleged that Hilton Casitas had incurred 

legal expenses of $67,195.50 in 2021 and $46,591.60 in 2022, more than the 

amounts budgeted for those years. The amended petition further alleged 

that, by failing to amend its budget for either year, Hilton Casitas violated 

the 2015 Decision’s directive to “fully comply with the applicable

provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1243(D) in the future.” Whitmer asked the court to

find Hilton Casitas in contempt for violating the 2015 Decision, award him 

attorney fees, and order Hilton Casitas to “amend its future budgets within 

thirty (30) days of exceeding or knowing [it] will exceed its adopted 

budget’s authorized expenditures.”

¶7 Hilton Casitas moved to dismiss the amended petition for 

failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See Ariz. R. Civ. 

P. 12(b)(6). It argued that the ALJ exceeded his authority by issuing the 2015 

Decision because an administrative agency lacks authority to issue a 

“non-specific order” requiring a condominium association “to obey A.R.S. 

§ 33-1243(D) moving forward.” In the alternative, Hilton Casitas denied 

that it had violated Section 33-1243(D) and argued that, in any event, “[a]ny 

alleged overspend[ing]” for legal fees “in the 2021 and 2022 budgets” 

resulted from Whitmer’s own actions in “continuing to file” lawsuits 

against Hilton Casitas, “thereby causing the very problem of which he 

complains.”

¶8 Whitmer opposed the motion to dismiss, arguing that A.R.S. 

§ 32-2199.02(A) confers statutory authority on administrative law judges to 

“order any party” to a condominium dispute “to abide by the statute, 

condominium documents, community documents or contract provision at 

issue.” He also asserted that Hilton Casitas violated A.R.S. § 33-1243(D) by 

“overspend[ing] its adopted annual budget” in 2021 and 2022 without 

asking members to approve an amended budget.

¶9 After full briefing, the superior court issued a ruling stating 

that it did not interpret the 2015 Decision to require Hilton Casitas to 

comply with Section 33-1243(D) for the indefinite future. Citing evidence 

presented at the OAH hearing that the Hilton Casitas board “intended to 

meet soon to ratify the increased legal costs,” the court stated that it 

construed the 2015 Decision simply to mandate Hilton Casitas’ compliance 

with Section 33-1243(D) at its upcoming board meeting to amend the 2014 

budget. Accordingly, the court ruled, the 2015 Decision did not apply to 

Hilton Casitas’ actions in 2021 and 2022.
WHITMER v. HILTON CASITAS

Decision of the Court

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¶10 The court went on to hold that if the 2015 Decision were 

interpreted to impose an ongoing obligation on Hilton Casitas to comply 

with Section 33-1243(D) for the indefinite future, the decision would be “too 

vague to enforce by contempt.” The court concluded by dismissing 

Whitmer’s amended petition. After awarding attorney fees to Hilton 

Casitas, the court entered final judgment from which Whitmer has timely 

appealed. We have jurisdiction under A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1). 

DISCUSSION

¶11 Whitmer challenges the dismissal of his amended petition

under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). We review an order 

granting a motion to dismiss de novo. Mills v. Ariz. Bd. of Tech. Registration, 

253 Ariz. 415, 420, ¶ 10 (2022). We accept the facts alleged as true and 

determine whether those facts state a claim upon which relief can be 

granted. See Mirchandani v. BMO Harris Bank, N.A., 235 Ariz. 68, 70, ¶ 7 

(App. 2014); Ariz. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). We likewise review de novo the 

superior court’s interpretation of the 2015 Decision. See Holcomb v. Ariz. 

Dep’t of Real Estate, 247 Ariz. 439, 443, ¶ 9 (App. 2019) (“We review de novo 

any legal issues addressed by the [administrative] agency or the superior 

court.”); see also Abbott Lab’ys. v. TorPharm, Inc., 503 F.3d 1372, 1382 (Fed. 

Cir. 2007) (“As with any other legal instrument, interpretation of the terms 

of an injunction is a question of law we review de novo.”). 

¶12 Pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1243(D), 

Except as provided in the declaration, within thirty days after 

adoption of any proposed budget for the condominium, the 

board of directors shall provide a summary of the budget to 

all the unit owners. Unless the board of directors is expressly 

authorized in the declaration to adopt and amend budgets 

from time to time, any budget or amendment shall be ratified 

by the unit owners in accordance with the procedures set 

forth in this subsection. If ratification is required, the board of 

directors shall set a date for a meeting of the unit owners to 

consider ratification of the budget not fewer than fourteen or 

more than thirty days after mailing of the summary. Unless at 

that meeting a majority of all the unit owners or any larger 

vote specified in the declaration rejects the budget, the budget 

is ratified, whether or not a quorum is present. If the proposed 

budget is rejected, the periodic budget last ratified by the unit 

owners shall be continued until such time as the unit owners 
WHITMER v. HILTON CASITAS

Decision of the Court

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ratify a subsequent budget proposed by the board of 

directors.

¶13 The superior court dismissed Whitmer’s amended petition 

because it interpreted the 2015 Decision to impose no obligation on Hilton 

Casitas beyond compliance with Section 33-1243(D) at its upcoming 

meeting to amend the 2014 budget. The court also held, in the alternative, 

that to the extent the 2015 Decision’s directive purported to require future 

compliance with Section 33-1243(D) for an indefinite period, the directive

was unenforceable. Because we agree with the parties that the 2015 

Decision’s directive can be read to mandate ongoing compliance with the 

statute for the indefinite future, we address the superior court’s alternative 

holding that such a directive is unenforceable.

¶14 Whitmer asserts that the court erred in dismissing his 

amended petition for failure to state a claim for relief because, he contends, 

A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(A) authorized the ALJ to issue a “forward binding 

order” requiring Hilton Casitas to abide by Section 33-1243(D) on an 

ongoing basis. In response, Hilton Casitas argues the 2015 Decision’s 

injunction provision is insufficiently specific to be enforced by contempt.

¶15 Administrative law judges have authority to issue injunctions 

directing parties to condominium disputes to abide by the requirements of 

particular statutes and contract provisions. See A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(A) (“The 

administrative law judge may order any party to abide by the statute, 

condominium documents, community documents or contract provision at 

issue and may levy a civil penalty on the basis of each violation.”). The 

injunctions may be enforced through contempt proceedings in superior 

court. Whitmer v. Hilton Casitas Homeowners Ass’n, 245 Ariz. 77, 80-81, 

¶¶ 11-12 (App. 2018).

¶16 All injunctions must, inter alia, “describe in reasonable 

detail—and not by referring to the complaint or other document—the act 

or acts restrained or required.” Ariz. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(1). The requisite 

specificity will be found “only if the enjoined party can ascertain from the 

four corners of the order precisely what acts are forbidden or required.”

Havens v. James, 76 F.4th 103, 121 (2d Cir. 2023) (citation omitted).

¶17 The specificity required of injunctions serves “to prevent 

uncertainty and confusion on the part of those faced with injunctive 

orders,” Schmidt v. Lessard, 414 U.S. 473, 476 (1974), thereby “protect[ing]

the elementary due process requirement of notice,” Axia NetMedia Corp. v. 

Mass. Tech. Park Corp., 889 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2018) (cleaned up). As courts 
WHITMER v. HILTON CASITAS

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have long held, “basic fairness requires that those enjoined receive explicit 

notice of precisely what conduct is outlawed.” Schmidt, 414 U.S. at 476; see 

also Granny Goose Foods v. Bhd. of Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers Loc. No. 70, 

415 U.S. 423, 444 (1974) (“[O]ne basic principle built into [Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure] 65 is that those against whom an injunction is issued 

should receive fair and precisely drawn notice of what the injunction 

actually prohibits.”). To provide fair notice to the defendant of what he or 

she “is ordered to do or not to do,” an injunction “should be phrased in 

terms of objective actions, not legal conclusions.” John H. Harland Co. v. 

Clarke Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966, 985 (11th Cir. 1983) (citation omitted).

¶18 An injunction that lacks the required specificity, or otherwise 

“does not clearly describe prohibited or required conduct, . . . is not 

enforceable by contempt.” Gates v. Shinn, 98 F.3d 463, 468 (9th Cir. 1996); see 

also United States v. Askins & Miller Orthopaedics, P.A., 924 F.3d 1348, 1362 

(11th Cir. 2019) (noting that injunctions’ specificity requirement is 

“designed,” inter alia, “to avoid the possible founding of a contempt citation 

on a decree too vague to be understood”) (citation omitted). As the United 

States Supreme Court has recognized, “[t]he judicial contempt power is a 

potent weapon,” and “[w]hen it is founded upon a decree too vague to be 

understood, it can be a deadly one.” Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n, Loc. 1291 v. 

Phila. Marine Trade Ass’n, 389 U.S. 64, 76 (1967); see also Payne v. Travenol 

Lab’ys, Inc., 565 F.2d 895, 897 (5th Cir. 1978) (finding that the specificity 

requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d) is “a reflection of the 

seriousness of the consequences which may flow from a violation of an 

injunctive order”).

¶19 “[C]ourts are generally hesitant to order a defendant to obey 

a law in the future,” W. Valley View, Inc. v. Maricopa Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 216 

Ariz. 225, 228, ¶ 11 (App. 2007), and one reason for this reluctance is that 

injunctions that simply direct parties to comply with the law provide no 

specific guidance for future conduct. An injunction that “gives little more 

direction than a general command to obey the law” sets forth mere “legal 

conclusions” instead of the required “specific acts.” See Pardilla v. Vill. of 

Hoffman Ests., __ N.E.3d __, 2023 IL App (1st) 211580, ¶ 37 (Ill. App. Ct.

2023). Such an order does not provide “fair and precisely drawn notice of 

what the injunction actually prohibits,” leaving the defendant “to guess at 

what kind of conduct would be deemed” to be a violation. Calvin Klein 

Cosms. Corp. v. Parfums de Coeur, Ltd., 824 F.2d 665, 669 (8th Cir. 1987). 

So-called “obey-the-law” injunctions thus “run afoul” of the principle “that

an injunction state its terms specifically and describe in reasonable detail 

the act or acts restrained or required.” Bone v. Univ. of N.C. Health Care Sys., 

1:18-cv-994, 2023 WL 4144277, at *32 (M.D.N.C. June 22, 2023) (mem. 
WHITMER v. HILTON CASITAS

Decision of the Court

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decision) (cleaned up); cf. Osorio v. Ross, 1 CA-CV 20-0543, 2021 WL 2836431,

at *4, ¶ 18 (Ariz. App. July 8, 2021) (mem. decision) (affirming denial of 

claim for injunctive relief because plaintiff’s request that defendants be 

ordered to obey agency policies and procedures “amounts to little more 

than a broad demand to obey the law,” and “ordering such relief would 

have been improper”).

¶20 Because of their lack of specificity, “obey-the-law” injunctions

are generally unenforceable by contempt. See Hope v. Warden York Cnty.

Prison, 972 F.3d 310, 322 (3d Cir. 2020) (“Persons may not be placed at risk 

of contempt unless they have been given specific notice of the norm to 

which they must pattern their conduct.”) (citation omitted); Hughey v. JMS 

Dev. Corp., 78 F.3d 1523, 1531 (11th Cir. 1996) (“Broad, non-specific 

language that merely enjoins a party to obey the law . . . does not give the 

restrained party fair notice of what conduct will risk contempt.”) (citation 

omitted). And even courts that have approved of “obey-the-law” 

injunctions often require temporal limitations for such orders to avoid 

leaving defendants at perpetual risk of contempt for future statutory 

violations “no matter how remote in time” they may occur. E.E.O.C. v. 

AutoZone, Inc., 707 F.3d 824, 844 (7th Cir. 2013) (remanding injunction 

compelling compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act “with 

instructions to modify [it] to impose a reasonable time limit”); see also Rome 

v. Mandel, 405 P.3d 387, 401-02, ¶¶ 78-79 & n.10 (Colo. App. 2016) (reversing 

permanent injunction compelling compliance with state securities act and 

holding that, “[e]ven assuming that a court may enter such an [injunction] 

in some cases,” it must contain a “temporal limit,” explaining that “[t]he 

need for a temporal limit in an obey-the-law injunction derives from [its] 

suspect nature and our duty to scrutinize such an injunction with great 

care”).

¶21 The 2015 Decision does not identify any specific act that is 

mandated or prohibited. Instead, it merely directs Hilton Casitas to “fully 

comply with the applicable provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1243(D) in the future.” 

(Emphasis added.) The statute includes multiple provisions governing 

varied matters (including adopting and amending budgets, notice to unit 

owners, setting meetings, voting, and proceeding without a ratified 

budget), and the 2015 Decision does not indicate which are the “applicable 

provisions” with which Hilton Casitas is being ordered to “fully comply.”

Further, the 2015 Decision contains no temporal limitation, requiring 

compliance with Section 33-1243(D) for the indefinite “future.” An

unlimited “obey-the-law” injunction of this kind is too vague to be 

enforceable by contempt. See City of New York v. Mickalis Pawn Shop, LLC, 

645 F.3d 114, 144 (2d Cir. 2011) (holding “insufficiently specific,” and 
WHITMER v. HILTON CASITAS

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therefore unenforceable, injunctions purporting to direct defendants “to act 

in full conformity with applicable laws pertaining to firearms” without 

“specifying which laws are ‘applicable’”) (cleaned up); see also United States

v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 566 F.3d 1095, 1137 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (noting that,

because “basic fairness requires that those enjoined receive explicit notice 

of precisely what conduct is outlawed[,] . . . we have held injunctions to be 

too vague when they enjoin all violations of a statute in the abstract without 

any further specification”) (citation omitted).

¶22 Because the 2015 Decision’s injunction provision lacks the 

specificity required to be enforced by contempt, the court did not err by 

dismissing Whitmer’s amended petition for failure to state a claim.

CONCLUSION

¶23 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

¶24 Hilton Casitas requests an award of attorney fees under 

A.R.S. § 12-341.01 based on the parties’ contractual relationship. We grant 

Hilton Casitas’ request for reasonable attorney fees and taxable costs upon 

its compliance with ARCAP 21.