SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-2267-19

ESTATE OF EDGAR C. 

GEIGER, III, by the Administratix

JANICE E. GEIGER and JANICE 

E. GEIGER, Individually,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON

UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL, 

DR. VINETTE COELHO-D'COSTA,

DR. EDWARD FEIN,

DR. JOSEPH S. HANNA,

DR. LESLEY RABACH,

DR. SUMANA NARAYANAN,

DR. SHAZIA AMAN, 

KATHERINE BARON, R.N.,

ARLENE HENRY, R.N., 

A. RODEL, R.N.,

Defendants,

and

DR. PAVELA SAHA, 

DR. KUSUM PUNJABI,

DR. CHRISTIAN MCDONOUGH,

DR. ALIRAZA DINANI, 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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A-2267-19

Defendants-Respondents.

____________________________

Argued April 13, 2021 – Decided July 20, 2021

Before Judges Gilson and Gummer.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Middlesex County, Docket No. L-4067-15.

Randi S. Greenberg argued the cause for appellants and

(Shamy & Shamy LLC, attorneys; George Shamy, of 

counsel and on the brief).

Michael J. Lunga argued the cause for respondents Dr. 

Pavela Saha, Dr. Christian McDonough and Dr. Aliraza 

Dinani (Michael J. Lunga LLC, attorneys; Michael J.

Lunga, on the brief).

Russell J. Malta argued the cause for respondent Dr. 

Kusum Panjabi (Orlovsky, Moody, Schaaff, Conlon & 

Gabrysiak LLC, attorneys; Paul F. Schaaff, Jr., of 

counsel, Russell J. Malta, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

In this medical-malpractice case, instead of serving a tort-claim notice on 

Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey – the State entity that actually 

employed four defendant doctors – plaintiffs served notices on New Jersey's 

Department of Treasury and Robert Wood Johnson University Hospital

(RWJUH). Arguing they substantially complied with the notice requirements of 

the New Jersey Tort Claims Act, N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 to -12-3 (TCA), plaintiffs 
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appeal orders dismissing their complaint with prejudice as to the four doctors

for failure to file timely tort-claims notices. Unpersuaded, we affirm.

Because the case comes to us as a result of defendants' motions to dismiss, 

we assume as true all facts alleged by plaintiffs and give them "the benefit of all 

inferences that may be drawn from those facts." Feinberg v. N.J. Dep't of Env'l 

Prot., 137 N.J. 126, 129 (1994). Decedent Edgar C. Geiger, III, was admitted to 

RWJUH on July 12, 2013. According to plaintiffs Estate of Edgar C. Geiger, 

III, and Janice E. Geiger, defendants' negligence caused his death on July 22, 

2013. 

In a letter dated October 7, 2013, addressed to "Dept. of Treasury[,] 

Bureau of Risk Management" and copied to RWJUH, plaintiffs' counsel stated 

he had been retained to represent Edgar Geiger for injuries sustained on July 12, 

2013, and enclosed a claim notice, stating "[e]mployees" of RWJUH had 

"deviated from accepted standards of care in the care and treatment of the 

[decedent] resulting in his demise" and identifying RWJUH and "all employees, 

nurses, doctors and treating individuals whose names appear in the hospital 
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records" as the state agency and state employees who caused the alleged 

injuries.

1

 

The Department of the Treasury responded in a December 13, 2013 letter, 

advising plaintiffs' counsel "your notice indicates quite clearly that the claim is 

against a local public entity and does not involve the State of New Jersey or any 

of its agencies."

On July 10, 2015, plaintiffs filed a complaint, naming as defendants, 

among others, RWJUH and doctors Pavela Saha, Kusum Punjabi, Christian 

McDonough, and Aliraza Dinani. In her answer, which was filed on October 

19, 2015, Punjabi claimed entitlement to "the rights and privileges afforded by" 

the TCA, pleaded "all defenses to which University of Medicine and Dentistry

[UMDNJ] is entitled . . . pursuant to the [TCA],"

2

and asserted plaintiffs had 

1

 In their brief, plaintiffs assert counsel sent the letter before obtaining copies 

of the decedent's medical records, which were received "sometime in October 

2013." Plaintiffs concede those medical records contained "consent forms 

executed by [the decedent] when he presented for treatment," which 

"mention[ed] . . . the individual defendants' affiliation with Rutgers/UMDNJ."

2

 In her appellate brief, Punjabi states she was employed by Rutgers at the time 

of the alleged negligence and notes the motion judge and parties "sometimes 

referred to [her] employer as UMDNJ, no doubt because the reorganization of 

UMDNJ into Rutgers . . . occurred just before the alleged negligent conduct in 

this case." In their appellate brief defendants Saha, McDonough, and Dinani 

describe UMDNJ as Rutgers's "predecessor" and reference the "reorganization 
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"failed to file the requisite Tort Claims Notice" pursuant to the TCA. In its 

answer, which was filed on October 22, 2015, RWJUH asserted it is "a private 

not-for-profit corporation."

In a letter dated October 23, 2015, counsel for defendants Saha, 

McDonough, and Dinani advised plaintiffs' counsel those defendants were 

"Rutgers employees." In their answers, which Saha filed on November 9, 2015,

and McDonough and Dinani filed on November 23, 2015, Saha, McDonough, 

and Dinani asserted they were employed by "Rutgers, The State University of 

New Jersey (formerly [UMDNJ]). . . an agency of the State of New Jersey" and 

pleaded "every defense" pursuant to the TCA, including "every defense . . . by 

virtue of [plaintiffs'] failure to comply with the notice provisions" of the TCA. 

They also made a demand for "a Notice of Claim pursuant to Title 59." 

Ninety-one days after McDonough and Dinani filed their answer in which 

they stated they were employed by Rutgers, defendants Saha, McDonough, and 

Dinani moved to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint with prejudice for failure "to file 

a timely Notice of Claim" pursuant to the TCA, arguing the ninety-day time 

period under the TCA for the filing of a notice of claim had passed, whether 

of UMDMJ into Rutgers." See N.J.S.A. 18A:64M-2(r) (discussing legislation 

regarding transfer of certain UMDNJ schools to Rutgers).
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using as the accrual date the date of defense counsel's letter (October 23, 2015), 

the date Saha filed her answer (November 9, 2015), or the date McDonough and 

Dinani filed their answer (November 23, 2015). Defendant Punjabi also moved

to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint with prejudice for "failure to timely file a Notice 

of Tort Claim," using the date she filed an answer (October 19, 2015) as the 

accrual date.

3

 

Plaintiffs opposed defendants' motions and on March 31, 2016, crossmoved "to permit plaintiffs' filing of a late notice of claim," arguing their 

October 7, 2013 notices to the Treasury Department and RWJUH substantially 

complied with the requirements of the TCA and were sufficient to put the State 

on notice of plaintiffs' claims and, alternatively, exceptional circumstances 

justified their late claim notice. Defendants opposed plaintiffs' motion, asserting 

plaintiffs had not demonstrated extraordinary circumstances. 

3

 In deciding whether plaintiffs substantially complied with the notice 

requirements of the TCA, we need not opine as to whether the dates defendants 

filed their answers constituted accrual dates for plaintiffs' claims. We note, 

though, even with the information provided in the answers regarding defendants' 

affiliation with Rutgers, plaintiffs took no action to serve notice on Rutgers.
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On April 15, 2016, Judge Jamie D. Happas rendered an oral decision, 

granting defendants' motions and denying plaintiffs' motion.

4

Judge Happas

found plaintiffs' October 7, 2013 notices were timely but were "insufficient to 

constitute a proper notice, as they were not sent to the appropriate entity." Judge 

Happas held plaintiffs were "required to serve UMDNJ, the local public entity 

employing the defendants, rather than the State of New Jersey." She found "[a]t 

the time of receipt of the denial letter from the State, plaintiff could have sought 

relief from the [c]ourt under N.J.S.A. 59:8-9 seeking permission to serve the late 

notice on the appropriate local public entity," but "plaintiff did not take 

advantage of that option." She concluded plaintiffs' claims failed under N.J.S.A. 

59:8-8 because plaintiffs' actions were "insufficient to put the appropriate local 

entity on notice." She also held plaintiffs' October 7, 2013 notices did not 

"substantially comply" with the requirements of the TCA because "the notices 

were sent to the wrong entity and did not identify the appropriate person or 

entities involved," thereby depriving the correct entity of the opportunity to 

4

 In our April 27, 2020 orders, we denied defendants' motions to dismiss 

plaintiffs' appeal of the order denying plaintiffs' motion because "[p]laintiff has 

represented he is not appealing from the denial by the trial court of his motion 

for leave to file a late notice of claim under the [TCA], but only from the aspect 

of the trial court's determination that the notice of claim plaintiff did timely file 

was inadequate." 
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"investigate or review plaintiff[s'] claim [or] the ability to correct their 

practices." Judge Happas issued orders granting defendants' motions and 

dismissing the complaint against them with prejudice. Plaintiffs appeal those 

orders, arguing their notices to the Department of Treasury and RWJUH

substantially complied with the notice requirements of the TCA. 

Plaintiffs do not dispute Rutgers employed the defendant doctors; do not 

contend they served a tort-claims notice on Rutgers, UMDNJ, or the defendant 

doctors; and do not appeal the motion judge's denial of their motion for leave to 

file a late notice. Thus, the only issue before us is whether plaintiffs' service on 

the Department of Treasury and RWJUH constituted substantial compliance 

with the notice requirements of the TCA. Because only that question of law 

remains, we review the motion judge's decision de novo. See Jones v. Morey's 

Pier, Inc., 230 N.J. 142, 153 (2017).

The TCA governs when public entities and their employees are liable for 

their torts, Nieves v. Adolf, 241 N.J. 567, 574-75 (2020), and "imposes strict 

requirements upon litigants seeking to file claims against public entities," 

McDade v. Siazon, 208 N.J. 463, 468 (2011). Rutgers is a public entity to which 

the TCA applies. See Fine v. Rutgers, State Univ. of N.J., 163 N.J. 464, 468

(2000). 
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To proceed with a tort claim against a public entity or its employees, a 

plaintiff must file a notice of claim with the public entity allegedly involved in 

the tort within ninety days of the cause of action's accrual. O'Donnell v. N.J.

Tpk. Auth., 236 N.J. 335, 345 (2019); see also N.J.S.A. 59:8-8. The purpose of 

the notice is to allow the public entity to review and investigate the claim, afford 

it the opportunity to settle the claim, allow it to correct the conditions or 

practices that gave rise to the claim, and give it advance notice of its potential 

liability. Velez v. City of Jersey City, 180 N.J. 284, 290 (2004). Accordingly, 

the notice of claim must "be filed directly with the specific local entity at issue." 

McDade, 208 N.J. at 476; see also N.J.S.A. 59:8-7 ("[a] claim for injury or 

damages arising under this act against a local public entity shall be filed with 

that entity"). The failure to file "within ninety days under normal conditions, or 

within one year under extraordinary circumstances" bars the plaintiff's claim. 

Ben Elazar v. Macrietta Cleaners, Inc., 230 N.J. 123, 133 (2017); see also

N.J.S.A. 59:8-8(a). 

To prevent technical defects from barring legitimate claims, courts have 

applied the equitable doctrine of "substantial compliance." D.D. v. Univ. of 

Med. & Dentistry of N.J., 213 N.J. 130, 159-60 (2013); Lebron v. Sanchez, 407 

N.J. Super. 204, 215-16 (App. Div. 2009). "[S]ubstantial compliance means that 
10 A-2267-19

the notice has been given in a way, which though technically defective, 

substantially satisfies the purposes for which notices of claims are required." 

Lebron, 407 N.J. Super. at 216 (quoting Lameiro v. W. N.Y. Bd. of Educ., 136 

N.J. Super. 585, 588 (Law Div. 1975)). Substantial compliance is an equitable 

doctrine used "to avoid the harsh consequences that flow from technically 

inadequate actions that nonetheless meet a statute's underlying purpose." Galik 

v. Clara Maass Med. Ctr., 167 N.J. 341, 352 (2001). Parties seeking to apply 

the substantial-compliance doctrine must demonstrate they took "a series of 

steps . . . to comply with the statute involved," Id. at 353 (quoting Bernstein v. 

Bd. of Trs. of the Tchrs.' Pension and Annuity Fund, 151 N.J. Super. 71, 76-77

(App. Div. 1977)), and "those steps achieved the statute's purpose, as for 

example, providing notice," Cnty. of Hudson v. State Dept. of Corr., 208 N.J. 1,

22 (2011). Substantial compliance applies only if the other party is not 

prejudiced, ibid., and there is "a reasonable explanation why there was not a 

strict compliance with the statute," Bernstein, 151 N.J. Super. at 77. 

Application of the substantial-compliance doctrine in the tort-claims 

context "has been limited carefully to those situations in which the notice, 

although both timely and in writing, had technical deficiencies that did not 

deprive the public entity of the effective notice contemplated by the statute." 
11 A-2267-19

D.D., 213 N.J. at 159; see e.g., Lebron, 407 N.J. Super. at 217-19 (holding notice 

that did not assert expressly a negligent-supervision theory of liability 

substantially complied given that it identified the plaintiff and her attorney, 

described and identified the date of the incident, listed the injuries incurred, and 

demanded damages); Henderson v. Herman, 373 N.J. Super. 625, 633 (App. Div. 

2004) (finding notice of claim against police dispatch and emergency transport 

personnel substantially complied even though plaintiff failed to include names 

of specific dispatchers).

This case isn't about "technical deficiencies that did not deprive the public 

entity of the effective notice," D.D., 213 N.J. at 159, or about "the sufficiency 

of detail" provided in a notice of claim, Lebron, 407 N.J. Super. at 209. It is 

about a failure to provide any notice to the public entity at issue, directly 

defeating the purpose of the TCA's notice requirements. 

Contrary to plaintiffs' argument, service on the Treasury Department is 

not the equivalent of service on Rutgers. In enacting the TCA, the Legislature 

expressly "required that the notice of claim be filed directly with the specific 

local entity at issue." McDade, 208 N.J. at 476. N.J.S.A. 59:8-7 provides:

A claim for damage or injury arising under this act 

against the State shall be filed either with (1) the 

Attorney General or (2) the department or agency 

involved in the alleged wrongful act or omission. A 
12 A-2267-19

claim for injury or damages arising under this act 

against a local public entity shall be filed with that 

entity.

To accept plaintiffs' argument, we would have to ignore that language –

something we cannot do. We "must presume that every word in a statute has 

meaning," In re Att'y Gen.'s "Directive on Exit Polling: Media & Non-Partisan 

Pub. Int. Grps.", 200 N.J. 283, 297-98 (2009), and we "give effect to every 

word," Med. Soc'y of N.J. v. N.J. Dep't of Law & Pub. Safety, 120 N.J. 18, 26 

(1990). 

Plaintiffs' claims arise from the alleged negligence of employees of a local 

public entity,5 Rutgers, which plaintiffs never served. Even if plaintiffs were 

making a claim directly against the State, they would have had to serve a notice 

of claim on either the Attorney General or the "department or agency involved 

in the alleged wrongful act," which they also failed to do. See N.J.S.A. 59:8-7.

Instead, they served the Department of Treasury, which had nothing to do with 

the alleged negligence at issue, and RWJUH, which is not a public entity and 

did not employ the defendant doctors. 

5

 N.J.S.A. 59:1-3 provides "'State' shall mean the State and any office, 

department, division, bureau, board, commission or agency of the State, but shall 

not include any such entity which is statutorily authorized to sue and be sued." 

N.J.S.A. 59:8-2 provides "[f]or purposes of this chapter 'local public entity' 

means a public entity other than the State."
13 A-2267-19

Plaintiffs recognized the necessity of filing a tort-claim notice within 

ninety days of the decedent's death. They simply served the wrong entities and 

never took steps to ensure they had served the correct entity, even though (1) 

they knew of the individual defendants' affiliations with Rutgers from the 

consent forms they had received in October 2013 and the answers defendants 

had filed in October and November 2015 and (2) they knew RWJUH was not a 

state entity from the Department of Treasury's December 13, 2013 letter and the 

answer RWJUH had filed in October 2015. By failing to serve Rutgers –

initially and even after they knew it employed the defendant doctors – plaintiffs 

deprived Rutgers of its statutory right to notice. See D.D., 213 N.J. at 159.

Judge Happas correctly determined that plaintiffs had not actually or 

substantially complied with the notice requirements of the TCA and properly 

dismissed their claims as to these defendants. 

Affirmed.