SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

522 

CAF 16-00507 

PRESENT: CENTRA, J.P., PERADOTTO, LINDLEY, CURRAN, AND SCUDDER, JJ. 

 

IN THE MATTER OF NATAYLIA C.B. AND 

SABASTION C.B. 

------------------------------------------- MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ONONDAGA COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 

AND FAMILY SERVICES, PETITIONER-RESPONDENT; 

 

CHRISTOPHER B., RESPONDENT-APPELLANT. 

(APPEAL NO. 1.) 

FRANK H. HISCOCK LEGAL AID SOCIETY, SYRACUSE (DANIELLE K. BLACKABY OF

COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT-APPELLANT. 

ROBERT A. DURR, COUNTY ATTORNEY, SYRACUSE (MAGGIE SEIKALY OF COUNSEL),

FOR PETITIONER-RESPONDENT. 

ARLENE BRADSHAW, ATTORNEY FOR THE CHILDREN, SYRACUSE. 

 

Appeal from an order of the Family Court, Onondaga County

(Michael L. Hanuszczak, J.), entered March 2, 2016 in a proceeding

pursuant to Social Services Law § 384-b. The order, among other

things, terminated respondent’s parental rights to the subject

children. 

It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is

unanimously affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: In appeal No. 1, respondent father appeals from an

order that, inter alia, terminated his parental rights with respect to

the subject children on the ground of permanent neglect. In appeal

No. 2, the father appeals from an order denying in part the father’s

motion to settle the record on appeal in appeal No. 1. Contrary to

the father’s contention in appeal No. 2, we conclude that Family Court

did not abuse its discretion in settling the record (see Kalbfliesh v

McCann, 129 AD3d 1671, 1672, lv denied 26 NY3d 907). 

With respect to the order in appeal No. 1, the father failed to

preserve for our review his contention that the petition is

“jurisdictionally defective because it failed to set forth the

requisite diligent efforts of petitioner to encourage and strengthen

the parental relationship” (Matter of Abraham C., 55 AD3d 1442, 1442-

1443, lv denied 12 NY3d 701). In any event, the petition

“sufficiently specified the agency’s efforts,” which included

arranging visitation with the children, consulting with the father

about developing a service plan, and reviewing his progress (Matter of
-2- 522 

CAF 16-00507 

Ana M.G. [Rosealba H.], 74 AD3d 419, 419; see Abraham C., 55 AD3d at

1443).

Contrary to the father’s contention, his admission that he failed

to plan adequately for the children’s long-term care was sufficient to

establish permanent neglect (see generally Matter of Jason H. [Lisa

K.], 118 AD3d 1066, 1067; Matter of Adam L. [Marie L.-K.], 97 AD3d

581, 582), inasmuch as “[t]he failure of an incarcerated parent to

provide any realistic and feasible alternative to having the

child[ren] remain in foster care until the parent’s release from

prison . . . supports a finding of permanent neglect” (Matter of Alex

C., Jr. [Alex C., Sr.], 114 AD3d 1149, 1150, lv denied 23 NY3d 901

[internal quotation marks omitted]). Furthermore, “in view of the

father’s admissions of permanent neglect, the court was not required

to determine whether petitioner exercised diligent efforts to

strengthen and encourage the parental relationship” (Matter of

Shadazia W., 52 AD3d 1330, 1331, lv denied 11 NY3d 706).

We reject the father’s further contention that he was denied

effective assistance of counsel. Counsel cannot be deemed ineffective

“ ‘merely because the attorney counseled [the father] to admit the

allegations in the petition’ ” (Matter of Michael W., 266 AD2d 884,

884-885; see Matter of Leo UU., 288 AD2d 711, 713, lv denied 97 NY2d

609), and it is clear from the record “that [the father’s] decision to

admit to the allegations of permanent neglect was a matter of

strategy” (Matter of Yusef P., 298 AD2d 968, 969; see Matter of

Brandon B. [Scott B.], 93 AD3d 1212, 1213, lv denied 19 NY3d 805).

Finally, we reject the father’s contention that the court should

have entered a suspended judgment rather than terminating his parental

rights. In light of “the positive living situation” of the children

while residing with their foster parents, “the absence of a more

significant relationship” between the children and the father, “and

the uncertainty surrounding both when [the father] would be released

from prison and where he would reside,” the court properly determined

that further delay was not in the best interests of the children and

that termination of the father’s parental rights was warranted (Matter

of Jazmyne II. [Frank MM.], 144 AD3d 1459, 1461, lv denied ___ NY3d

___ [Mar. 23, 2017]; see Matter of Bayley W. [Patrick K.], 146 AD3d

1097, 1101).

Entered: May 5, 2017 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court