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MASSACRE AT CAMP ASHRAF:

IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND 

INVESTIGATIONS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JULY 7, 2011

Serial No. 112–52

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

RON PAUL, Texas 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

BILL JOHNSON, Ohio 

DAVID RIVERA, Florida 

MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York 

RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina 

VACANT 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

DENNIS CARDOZA, California 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut 

FREDERICA WILSON, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

YLEEM D.S. POBLETE, Staff Director 

RICHARD J. KESSLER, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS

DANA ROHRABACHER, California, Chairman 

MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania 

RON PAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

DAVID RIVERA, Florida 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

KAREN BASS, California 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Michael Mukasey (former Attorney General of the United 

States) ................................................................................................................... 8

Colonel Wes Martin, USA (retired) (former Base Commander of Camp 

Ashraf) .................................................................................................................. 15

Gary Morsch, M.D. (former Commander of Forward Operation Base Ashraf) ... 20

Mr. Ray Takeyh, senior fellow for Middle Eastern Studies, Council on Foreign 

Relations ............................................................................................................... 28

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Michael Mukasey: Prepared statement ....................................... 11

Colonel Wes Martin, USA (retired): Prepared statement .................................... 17

Gary Morsch, M.D.: Prepared statement ............................................................... 22

Mr. Ray Takeyh: Prepared statement .................................................................... 30

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 54

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 55

Colonel Wes Martin, USA (retired): Material submitted for the record ............. 56

Gary Morsch, M.D.: Material submitted for the record ........................................ 57

(1)

MASSACRE AT CAMP ASHRAF:

IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY 

THURSDAY, JULY 7, 2011

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:22 p.m., in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Dana Rohrabacher 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I call this hearing of the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee 

to order. 

I will be having opening remarks. We will then have short opening remarks from members of the committee, and then we will go 

to our panel of witnesses. 

I am Congressman Dana Rohrabacher. I welcome you to this 

hearing. 

As we move from the briefing on the April attack, it should be 

noted that Camp Ashraf has for more than 20 years been the home 

of 3,400 members of the Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MEK), a key opposition group working against the radical Islamic Iranian dictatorship. 

Re that, the 3,400 residents of Camp Ashraf are declared enemies 

of the Mullah dictatorship in Iran, which is a very significant fact 

to keep in mind when paying attention to try to figure out what 

is going on. 

Camp Ashraf residents were promised protection under the 

Fourth Geneva Convention by senior U.S. commanders in the aftermath of the liberation of Iraq as we kicked out Saddam Hussein. 

Sovereignty was turned over to the Baghdad government in 2004 

and, with it, the transfer of responsibility for Camp Ashraf. 

When our congressional delegation discussed the situation with 

Iraq’s Prime Minister Maliki in Baghdad last month, his authority 

to govern and the sovereignty of the people of Iraq over their territory was not an issue. We in no way quarreled with that. How the 

Iraqi Government exercises its authority, however, is a matter of 

grave concern. The use of excessive force—murder, massacres, and 

other such tactics is illegitimate on the face of it. 

What happened on April 8 was an excessive use of force. It was 

an illegitimate use of power on its face. Using troops and armored 

vehicles against unarmed civilians conjures up memories of 

Tiananmen Square in Communist China, not the kind of democratic rule that Americans have fought so long and hard, that we 

have dedicated such of our own blood and treasure to try to create 

2

a more democratic society. It certainly isn’t reflected in what happened at Camp Ashraf on April 8. 

The wholesale murder of unarmed refugees simply cannot be ignored. 

After the attack, the State Department asserted that the ‘‘crisis 

and loss of life was initiated by the Government of Iraq and the 

Iraqi military.’’ But what about before the attack? Was the U.S. 

Embassy or the commander of U.S. forces in Iraq notified of the 

Iraqi military build-up outside the camp or of their intentions? Was 

the Iraqi Government contacted? Did they contact us? If so, what 

was the response? What response did we give them? And what was 

the Iraqi response if we questioned them? Why was a United 

States unit, deployed at Camp Ashraf, ordered away just hours before the attack? 

We would like to ask the State Department these questions. We 

would like them to have had a witness here, an official that could 

have talked to us about this and been on the record in answering 

these important questions. But we were told that no one was available to testify today at this hearing. How convenient. 

This stonewalling can only go so far before it becomes a coverup. And, yes, illegalities not just of the Iraqi military who murdered civilians, who committed a massacre, but of the acquiescence 

by the United States and the United States officials in this crime 

are part of the story. Covering up wrongdoing is itself illegal. 

A second issue of concern is whether the Maliki government 

acted in concert with the Iranian dictatorship. Prime Minister 

Maliki’s political party is based on support from the Shiite community of Iraq; and, of course, the Shiite community of Iraq has, in 

some kind, a mutual relationship with the Shiite Mullah dictatorship in Tehran. Maliki’s majority in the Parliament depends on the 

political block that is controlled by Mr. Al-Sadr, an open agent of 

Tehran and whose Mahdi militia has often clashed with U.S. 

forces. 

Is the Camp Ashraf massacre a signal of even a larger problem? 

Is this something that has resulted in the fact that we are seeing 

a willingness on the part of the Government of Iraq, of Prime Minister Maliki and his majority, to do the bidding of the Mullah dictatorship next door? 

Well, if something like that is happening and this is the reason 

why Iraqi military forces felt compelled to go into Camp Ashraf and 

massacre its residents, maybe this calls into question the entire 

purpose of America’s involvement in Iraq to begin with. Has America spent its blood and treasure only to allow a government to come 

to power in Baghdad that is a puppet of the Iranian Mullah dictatorship? 

In 1997, Iran and the State Department persuaded the Clinton 

administration to put the MEK on the foreign terrorist organization list. This naive gesture was supposed to improve relations, but 

we know that relations did not improve with Tehran because 

Tehran continued to support violence and terrorism across the region and crush dissidents at home and develop nuclear weapons. 

So certainly putting the people of Camp Ashraf on the terrorist 

list certainly didn’t do any good, even if it was dishonest in its intent to begin with. The MEK, however, remains on the terrorist 

3

list, even though it is clear the Mullahs didn’t start coming around 

and becoming more, how you say, acceptable in their behavior. 

The United Kingdom and the European Union have removed the 

MEK from the terrorist list. So we should quit playing games and 

also remove the MEK from the terrorist list before it results in another massacre, which is one thing that needs to be answered: Did 

the fact that the United States Government maintain the MEK on 

a terrorist list in any way contribute to the string of decisions that 

led to the massacre of 34 innocent people as well as the wounding 

of hundreds more? 

Now we have much to learn today. What really happened on 

April 8th? Can we continue to protect Camp Ashraf? What is the 

solution? Should the residents be relocated to safe areas outside of 

Iraq? What is the solution? 

That is an interesting question for us to talk about today as well. 

I would be interested in hearing suggestions from the panel that 

we are about to hear from. 

And one last point before we turn it over to Congressman 

Carnahan for his opening statement. 

I believe I read in a paper that 34 people were killed just a day 

or two ago from bombs that went off in Iraq. And it is very easy 

to think that those 34 people—well, people are still being killed. 

Why are we concerned about Camp Ashraf when you have other 

people being killed in these terrorist attacks? 

Well, let me note, it is not equal when a terrorist plants a bomb 

and kills innocent people. It is not equal to when a government, exercising its sovereign authority, decides in a willful way to massacre people and kill them, even though the numbers are the same. 

A government is expected to be responsible and to act legally and 

lawfully. A terrorist group, you will expect them to be the dregs of 

society and of the Earth. 

Let us hope that the Maliki government understands that there 

is a difference between terrorist activities which are unacceptable 

and the activities of this government which are totally inconsistent 

with law and civilization. So for government troops to be openly 

killing people, as we just saw, is unacceptable anywhere in the civilized world, and that is a lot different than a terrorist attack. So 

we have a moral obligation today as people to call people to task 

and to find out exactly what happened. 

Mr. Carnahan, do you have an opening statement? 

Mr. CARNAHAN. Yes, I do; and I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this hearing today and for shining a bright light on this 

issue, also for leading our delegation recently to Iraq to meet with 

Prime Minister Maliki and officials there as well as our own U.S. 

Government officials to really help get to the bottom of this issue. 

Thank you. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. 

I would ask Congressman Poe to take over the chair. I have been 

called to the floor. I have an amendment on the floor that I have 

to take care of. I will be returning very shortly as soon as we do 

business. 

Mr. Poe, could you take over the chair? And I am sure you have 

an opening statement as well. 

4

Mr. CARNAHAN. Thank you again, Mr. Chairman; and I also want 

to recognize my colleague, Mr. Poe from Texas, who is also in our 

delegation, for his commitment on this issue as well. 

In light of recent events, our trip to Iraq and the scheduled departure of U.S. military this December, this hearing is especially 

timely for us to assess not only the humanitarian situation at 

Camp Ashraf but also to consider the broader issues of U.S.-Iraq 

policy. 

I would also like to note that several Missourians are here today, 

including Mrs. Azam Shahriary—we are happy to have you here—

whose son is currently at Camp Ashraf. I want to thank you all for 

being here and for your insight on these issues. 

The history of MEK and Camp Ashraf is one that dates back several decades. During our trip to Iraq last month, we met with numerous people regarding the slaughter at Camp Ashraf on April 8. 

Not surprisingly, we heard a lot of different and conflicting stories. 

What is not in dispute is that over 30 Camp Ashraf residents were 

killed, over 300 wounded by Iraqi security forces. 

These killings have been widely condemned, and I concur. In the 

week following the killings, the U.N. High Commissioner for 

Human Rights called for ‘‘a full, independent, and transparent inquiry’’ and further added ‘‘any person found responsible for the use 

of excessive force should be prosecuted.’’ Again, I concur. A full, 

fair, and independent investigation will provide for the best means 

of finding a final determination of what happened and will allow 

anyone found responsible to be brought to justice and help prevent 

future attacks. I look forward to hearing the insights of the witnesses here today regarding the human rights abuses but also how 

we protect from future abuses. 

In 2003, the residents of Camp Ashraf had protected status 

under the Geneva Convention; and pursuant to the statuses of 

forces agreement between the U.S. and Iraqi Governments, jurisdiction of the camp has been under Iraqi jurisdiction since 2009. 

With the draw-down of U.S. forces in Iraq, I believe that the U.N. 

or another independent body be given access to the camp to assess 

the humanitarian situation there. 

I would also like to have the panel address the issues with regard to relocation of the residents. Is that an option or is it not? 

And also to look at the broader implications to U.S. policy as we 

shift from military to a State Department-led effort, focusing on diplomacy and development. 

With that, I am going to submit the balance of my opening for 

the record so we can shift our time for the witnesses. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. POE [presiding]. I appreciate the ranking member’s comments. 

Likewise, I was with Chairman Rohrabacher and the ranking 

member on our trip to Iraq on June 11. We did visit with Maliki, 

discussed many issues with him, and one of those issues was we 

wanted to go to Camp Ashraf and get the residents’ side of what 

happened to them and the camp in April. 

After almost 2 hours of talking and a lot of talk—as the statement has sometimes been said, when all is said and done, more is 

said than done—we were not allowed to go to Camp Ashraf. He 

5

was adamant about that, and we respected his decision since he 

was in charge of the nation. 

But my question then and now is still the same: Why not? What 

did Maliki have to hide? If he was right about his position—and 

he articulated his position I thought quite well—why couldn’t he be 

open-minded enough to let us get the viewpoint from the residents 

that live in Camp Ashraf? And he denied us that access to those 

people. So, it seems to me, he had plenty to hide, is the reason we 

weren’t allowed to go to Camp Ashraf and hear from the residents. 

When the Iraqi soldiers stormed Camp Ashraf on April 8, fired 

at the residents, and ran them over with American Humvees, 36 

were killed, including women and children. It was a human rights 

atrocity. And the U.S., with thousands of troops still fighting for 

peace in Iraq, has done little more than issue just a statement, has 

not conducted its own investigation, hasn’t asked the U.N. to investigate, and there is no point in the Iraqi Government investigating 

the attack because they are the ones who ordered the attack. They 

certainly are going to find no fault with the action of their own 

military. 

A week after the attack, a letter with 18 Members of the House 

to Secretary Clinton and Secretary Gates asked them to shed some 

light on this violent attack. It is now July. To date, there is blissful 

silence from the administration and have given us no answer for 

this inhumane attack of Iraq on the people of Iraq. I guess they are 

too busy bombing Libya in the name of humanity to get back with 

us. 

Instead, the administration has proposed a new relocation plan 

for the camp. They want to move the camp to some other location 

within Iraq. This is the same plan the Iranians themselves proposed years ago. 

We have heard how dangerous this would be to the residents of 

the camp. In May, I sent a letter to Secretary Clinton opposing this 

misguided plan. Camp Ashraf is recognized around the world as a 

refuge for those who oppose the Iranian regime; and if we move it 

within Iraq, they will lose that public recognition, while leaving 

residents under the same control of the army. 

There is something directly under our control that we can do, 

and that is we can take the MEK off the foreign terrorist organization list. One of the obstacles in moving Camp Ashraf to a peaceful 

third country is that they are still designated as terrorists by the 

United States. 

I have introduced bipartisan legislation, H.Res. 60, that urges 

the Secretary of State to take the MEK off the foreign terrorist organization list. I have seen and been in all the classified briefings 

that I know of regarding the MEK, and I am not convinced that 

they should remain on the list. 

The State Department has not made their case to keep them on 

the list. Therefore, they should be removed. The MEK should not 

be used as a political tool to appease any dictators in the world. 

Eighty-three of my colleagues agree with me. 

As a Nation, we promised to protect these Iranian individuals. 

No matter what we think of the MEK, we should all agree that no 

group, especially one that has given up terrorism and given up all 

6

of its weapons, deserves to have its human rights trampled on by 

Iraq or Iran or anyone else. 

We have given Iraq a democracy and freedom. It is time they 

start acting like they deserve it and provide safety for Camp 

Ashraf residents and the MEK. 

And I will yield to the gentleman, Mr. Filner, for his opening 

statement. 

Mr. FILNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would like a unanimous consent agreement that I be allowed 

to officially sit here as a member of the committee. 

Mr. POE. Without objection. 

Mr. FILNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I appreciate your courage and activism on this issue, also. 

I was reading the testimony, Mr. Chairman, of our panelists in 

advance, just to be prepared. I noticed one of the panelists spends 

his whole time discrediting or trying to discredit the MEK, almost 

as if to justify the massacre that occurred at Camp Ashraf. I wish 

he had spent as much time undermining the regime of Iran. We 

would be better off. 

I don’t know about you, Mr. Chairman, but I have tried to look 

at the resistance going on inside Iran—and the MEK, and its leader, has come up with, it seems to me, the one legitimate policy that 

is best for us as Americans. They call it the ‘‘third way.’’ That 

means we do not invade Iran, but we do not appease the existing 

Mullahs. We get out of the way and let the internal resistance do 

what it can and should and wants to. The listing of the MEK as 

a terrorist organization is getting in the way. So we ought to delist. 

And there are lots of reasons, as you pointed out, why we should. 

I was recently at a rally in Paris and Judge Mukasey was 

there—where the first Homeland Security secretary unequivocally 

said that the MEK is not a terrorist organization. Nothing crossed 

his desk as the Secretary of Homeland Security that indicated that 

in the years that he was in that position. So I think we ought to 

look seriously at this. And, besides, it is not even an issue. It 

should be for us whether, whatever the ideology is—and we can 

talk about that. There was a massacre. We should have prevented 

it. We have a legal obligation to have prevented it. We should have 

done it. We should do it in the future. I can’t worry about ideology 

when there are human rights violations going on, although I think 

it is a, if I may say, a red herring. 

So I appreciate your efforts, Mr. Rohrabacher’s efforts, Mr. 

Carnahan’s efforts to make America more aware of this. This is 

going to hit us, Mr. Poe—I think you know—as the American pullout occurs of Iraq, after all our treasure of money and men and 

women who have died and been injured there, do we want the Iranians to take over? And yet that is a potential. Ashraf is a symbol 

of what I think we need to prevent. After all this intervention in 

Iraq in the decade, the Iranians come in. The MEK favors a nonnuclear, democratic, secular regime. I think that is something we 

can all agree to. I look forward to the testimony. 

Thank you, Mr. Poe. 

Mr. POE. Does the gentlelady from Texas have a brief opening 

statement? 

7

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and 

thank you for your courtesy. 

Let me acknowledge the witnesses, and I get a special opportunity to acknowledge General Mukasey. We were together before, 

and I didn’t have the opportunity to do so. 

I do want to acknowledge as well, Mr. Chairman, receiving a letter to my letter that I had written regarding the involvement of the 

United States in this effort to resolve this terrible crisis, and I do 

think it should be acknowledged. And that is a letter from Joseph 

McManus, who wrote on behalf of the State Department of the 

United States interests. 

So let me just say that nowhere should we tolerate the heinousness of the attack on the residents of Camp Ashraf; and no matter 

how deep the friendship is or the recovering history of Iraq, it 

should not be tolerated. And, as well, we should not allow Iran to 

dominate and to violently infuse into the response to Camp Ashraf 

actions that they would carry out themselves. And if the actions 

were carried out by the military in Iraq, they are as culpable as 

those who have either instructed or created the atmosphere. 

So I hope, as we find a solution, that it will be a solution where 

we demand of the head of Government of Iraq to cease and desist 

and to collaborate and cooperate a safe passage for those in the 

camp, medical care. And the extreme violation of human rights, 

civil rights should be completely denounced. 

But, more importantly, the world organizations, including the 

United Nations, should immediately denounce this behavior; and 

Iraq should pay a penalty in the world forum for the treatment not 

only of those in Camp Ashraf but the many citizens of their own 

who are in diverse backgrounds. 

So I thank you for holding this hearing, Mr. Chairman. It is frustrating to come back time after time with continuous violence and 

no response by Iraq. 

And I hope if the Ambassador of Iraq—I don’t see that person as 

a witness on this august body—but if the Ambassador of Iraq can 

hear my voice, he needs to come to Congress. He owes this Congress an apology. He owes this country an explanation as to why 

he is, in essence, violating the civil rights of a minority group in 

his country when we fought and shed blood so that Iraqis might 

live free. He owes both an apology to the people in Camp Ashraf, 

to the people of Iraq who will suffer as well because they are diverse, and he owes an apology and explanation to the world family 

and particularly the United States of America for the treasure that 

we lost, attempting to provide democracy there. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. POE. I will introduce the panel members. 

I do want to introduce and recognize the numerous families of 

residents who are in Camp Ashraf who are here. There are a lot 

from my home State of Texas. I am glad to have those individuals 

here. 

Michael Mukasey served as Attorney General of the United 

States from 2007 to 2009. Prior to joining the George Bush administration, he had served for 18 years as a Federal judge. He was 

appointed to the U.S. District Court by Ronald Reagan in 1988, 

served there until 2006, and is a graduate of Columbia University 

8

and Yale Law School. He worked as an Assistant United States Attorney in New York from 1972 through 1996, serving as chief of the 

district’s official corruption unit from ’75 through ’76. 

Judge, we welcome you today. 

Retired Army Colonel Wes Martin is our second panelist. He retired from active duty in 2010. In combat, he served as the senior 

antiterrorism force protection officer for all coalition forces in Iraq 

during Operation Iraqi Freedom I and II, as J–3 operations officer 

for Task Force 134, which was detention operations, and as commander of Forward Operation Base Ashraf. He then served three 

tours in the Pentagon. He holds two master’s degrees and is currently a member of the technical staff at the Department of Energy 

Sandia National Laboratories. 

Our third panelist is Dr. Gary Morsch. He is the founder and 

president of Heart to Heart International, a global humanitarian 

organization. Dr. Morsch continues to practice family and emergency medicine and does it through Docs Who Care, a medical 

staffing company he founded. Dr. Morsch is a member of Army Reserve with the rank of colonel and has been deployed to Kosovo and 

to Germany as well as to Iraq where he ran a hospital at Camp 

Ashraf. 

Dr. Ray Takeyh is a Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies at 

the Council on Foreign Relations, adjunct professor for the Center 

for Peace and Security Studies at Georgetown University. He has 

a Ph.D. From Oxford University and has served as special advisor 

for the Gulf and Southwest Asia at the U.S. Department of State. 

He is also the author of the Guardians of the Revolution, Iran’s approach to the world, which was published in 2009 by Oxford University Press. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for being here today. 

Judge Mukasey, we will hear from you first. There is a 5-minute 

time limit on each of your comments. So if you want to go longer 

than that, you can submit it to the record. 

So, first, Judge Mukasey. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE MICHAEL MUKASEY 

(FORMER ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES) 

Mr. MUKASEY. Thank you. 

I want to thank the chairman, Ranking Member Carnahan, 

Judge Poe, Representative Filner, and Representative Jackson Lee 

for allowing me to testify at this important hearing on the events 

in Camp Ashraf in April of this year that involved the murder of 

some 36 innocents by Iraqi forces using weapons and vehicles that 

were actually supplied to them by the United States. 

I have submitted seven pages of written testimony, making several recommendations of what I would hope this committee would 

do and could do to try to determine how this massacre came to be 

and what can be done to prevent conditions at Ashraf from deteriorating even further, and I thank the subcommittee for making 

those a part of the record. But I know that the chair of this committee and others have had direct experience with the Iraqi Government insofar as Ashraf is concerned and know a great deal 

more about that subject than I do. So I want to focus my oral testimony today on what the United States has done in the past, some 

9

of which has helped but some of which has hurt, and what it can 

do in the future to prevent people from being murdered. 

Because, make no mistake about it, what we are talking about 

here literally is a matter of life and death. Back in 2003 when the 

multinational force went into Iraq, the residents of Ashraf surrendered the weapons they could have used to defend themselves and 

put themselves in the hands of the multinational force and principally the hands of American forces. They received a written guarantee from an American general that I attached to my written testimony that they would be treated as protected persons under the 

Fourth Geneva Convention. 

In 2009, General Petraeus signed off on the Iraqi Government’s 

assumption of control over the entirety of the country, including 

the vicinity of Ashraf, only after he got written and oral assurances 

that the people living in Ashraf would be protected by Iraqi forces. 

And, as we know, those assurances have been violated repeatedly, 

with the results that we have seen here today. 

I should mention that at both times, both in July 2009 and in 

April 2011, when these attacks took place, our Secretary of Defense 

was in country. It would be hard to imagine a more calculated slap 

at this country than that. 

And when you think about the terrible price that we have paid 

to liberate Iraq, the lengths to which we have gone to oppose the 

Iranian Government, when you think of the opposition to the Iranian Government in the Gulf and elsewhere and the strategic defeat that Iran suffered when it overreached in Bahrain, you wonder 

what has made Iran and Iraq so bold as to act in this way. 

Well, I would suggest to you that what enables them and what 

emboldens them is, as the chairman suggested, that the United 

States and particularly the State Department has kept the MEK 

on a list of foreign terrorist organizations, something the European 

Union and the U.K. have long since stopped doing, and thereby legitimized the behavior of both Iraq and Iran. 

The State Department seems infected with the idea that it must 

not do anything that might displease the Iranians, even when 

doing so in fact would give the United States more leverage against 

the Iranians, not less. So we have the spectacle last week of the 

United States diplomat, our Ambassador to Iraq, saying in one 

breath that Iran is, in fact, sending IEDs into Iraq that are used 

to kill Americans but saying in the next breath that MEK members 

should agree to disband in order to facilitate the resettlement of 

the residents of Ashraf. In other words, he is saying that a principled, organized group that defines itself in large measure by opposition to the tyrannical regime in Iran should cease to be a group 

and should give up its identity in the ridiculous hope that when the 

Iranians and the Iraqis can pick them off one at a time that they 

will somehow be safer and not less safe when that happens. 

The MEK, as many of you know, went to court to get this unjustified designation removed. The DC Circuit Court of Appeals 

told the State Department that they had not presented evidence 

that MEK has committed violence in the last 10 years or has the 

ability or the inclination to do so now, and it directed the State Department in September 2010 to review and to reconsider that designation. That was almost a year ago, and all the State DepartVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:59 Sep 01, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\OI\070711\67306 HFA PsN: SHIRL
10

ment has done in that time is to come forward with documents that 

do not deal with any issue relevant to the designation and to ask 

MEK questions which it has answered that are not relevant to the 

designation. 

It is long since time for the State Department to stop this policy 

of delay which simply emboldens murderers. I urge the committee 

to hold a hearing at which the State Department is required to justify its policy or to change it and at which this committee inquires 

also into what our Government is doing to enforce the Leahy 

amendment that bars both military and civilian aid from this country to military units like the Iraqi units that murdered Ashraf residents. If you ask tough questions, perhaps we will get answers that 

we and the residents of Ashraf can live with. 

I thank you very much for your attention and for hearing me. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Mukasey follows:]

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Mr. POE. Thank you Judge Mukasey. 

Colonel Martin. 

STATEMENT OF COLONEL WES MARTIN, USA (RETIRED) 

(FORMER BASE COMMANDER OF CAMP ASHRAF) 

Colonel MARTIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, ranking member, for 

this opportunity to speak before the committee. 

Mr. Chairman, I would also like to introduce the Courting Disaster. It is the rebuttal to the RAND report on the MEK, sir. 

Mr. POE. Without objection. 

Colonel MARTIN. Thank you, sir. 

As the first antiterrorism officer for all of Iraq, the operations officer for Task Force 134, detention operations, and the base commander for Ashraf——

Mr. FILNER. Colonel, can you just speak more directly into the 

mic? 

Mr. POE. And talk a little slower, if you would. Some of us are 

from the South. We talk slower. 

Colonel MARTIN. Hopefully, I will make, for the ranking member, 

my northeast Missouri State education put to good use. 

As the antiterrorism force protection officer for all of Iraq and as 

the J–3 for detention operations and the base commander of Camp 

Ashraf, I would like to make one point up front. The MEK is not 

a terrorist organization. 

In 2003, as the United States finalized its invasion plans, the 

Iranian Government set to work how to quietly take over as much 

of Iraq as possible. Today, the Iranian influence expanded itself 

over the southern provinces throughout Baghdad and into Diyala 

province where Camp Ashraf and the MEK is now located. 

Iran’s growing influence in the region is in keeping with Ayatollah Khomeini’s statement: The road to Jerusalem is through 

Karbala. As the Maliki and Ahmadinijad governments grow closer, 

the situation of the MEK becomes more critical, as evidenced in the 

filmed footage of July 2009 and April 2011. In these videos, we observe Maliki’s forces using U.S.-supplied vehicles and equipment to 

run down and shoot defenseless people. We witnessed the courage 

of the residents of Ashraf. Despite knowing they may be the next 

to die, they rush to the rescue of their fallen comrades. Courage 

under fire is a remarkable trait. Killing unarmed people is murder. 

Yet the U.S. State Department has done nothing of substance to 

address these attacks or the entire Ashraf situation. 

As for the State Department, the action officer provided to handle Camp Ashraf issues during my tenure was a never-ending story 

of embarrassment and prejudice. Her visits were disastrous. Her 

continual rumors and misinformation resulted in my frequent unannounced and unfounded inspections into MEK compounds. Despite warnings to all of us from the commanding general of Task 

Force 134 not to provide the untrustworthy Iraqi National Security 

Advisor Rubaie information, she continued to do so. In turn Rubaie 

would pass it on to the Iranian Government. Within a couple of 

weeks I would then receive the information from the MEK. Upon 

my return to the Pentagon I assisted State Department officials addressing the MEK issue. This included providing a translated letter 

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national Relations, stating MEK did not attack the Kurds. Mr. 

Zebari subsequently confirmed the letter to be true, yet several 

months later when the annual report on terrorism was released by 

the State Department the accusation for attacking the Kurds remained. Upon my questioning the same State Department officials 

about this, I was informed they don’t communicate with people who 

put out the annual report. 

One perpetual rumor worthy of specific address concerns members of the MEK being held against their will. I was able to validate through specific occurrences anyone wishing to leave has that 

choice. 

The real benefactor of the fall of the Mujahedin will be 

Ahmadinejad and the ruling religious fundamentalists. The fundamentalists of the Iranian Government has always wanted the 

MEK to be turned over to them. If it happens, executions will be 

conducted to remind Iranian citizens of what happens to people 

who oppose the government to break the spirit of anyone considering resistance and to show the world what happens to those who 

trust their lives to the United States. 

The MEK surrendered to the United States military without firing a shot, turned over all their weapons, accepted consolidation at 

Camp Ashraf, renounced terrorism, accepted protected person status under the 4th Geneva Convention, provided the free world with 

crucial intelligence to include Iran’s development of a nuclear 

weapons program and fulfilled every limitation and requirement 

placed on them. Yet when the United States could no longer figure 

out what do with the MEK, the protected person status was revoked and the organization was turned over to the Iraqi Government. There are protocols and expectations to surrender. The MEK 

has fulfilled their end, the United States comes up very short. The 

price of that is now being paid by the residents of Camp Ashraf. 

Thank you, sir. 

[The prepared statement of Colonel Martin follows:]

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Mr. POE. Thank you. Dr. Gary Morsch, 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF GARY MORSCH, M.D. (FORMER COMMANDER 

OF FORWARD OPERATION BASE ASHRAF) 

Dr. MORSCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and ranking member 

and members of the subcommittee. Mr. Chairman, before I begin 

my——

Mr. POE. Is your microphone on? 

Dr. MORSCH. Yes, it is on now. Thank you for this opportunity, 

Mr. Chairman. 

Before I begin my remarks with your permission I would like to 

submit for the record a letter from General James Gardner, Commanding General of MMNF–I to MEK Secretary General, dated 

February 16th, 2006. 

Mr. POE. Without objection, it will be part of the record. 

Dr. MORSCH. I would like to also submit a statement by the U.S. 

Central Commander on the full disarmament of the MEK. This 

statement was released in 2003. 

Mr. POE. Without objection, it will also be part of the record. 

Dr. MORSCH. Lastly, I would like to provide the written submission of Mr. Stephen Schneebaum, an international human rights 

law scholar, who has written on the rights of the residents of 

Ashraf and attached to this written submission are two legal opinions which he has also prepared on the subject. 

Mr. POE. Without objection, it is admitted. 

Dr. MORSCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I have submitted a fairly extensive prepared statement that outlines my observations. These observations are based on my direct 

role as the lead physician assigned to Camp Ashraf in early 2004 

where I lived and worked with the residents of Ashraf on a 24/7 

basis. 

I arrived in Iraq knowing nothing about the MEK and left Ashraf 

with a great knowledge and insight into the organization, as great 

a knowledge or insight I believe as any other American or more so. 

Let me just say I know the MEK. 

Based on my observations I would like to express three simple 

conclusions, which I believe are indisputable. Number one, the 

MEK and Ashraf are not terrorists. In fact they are allies, friends 

and collaborators in our mission in Iraq and the Middle East. During my time in Ashraf they provided intelligence and recon so that 

our convoys knew where IEDs had been placed and could then 

avoid them. Even more importantly, the MEK worked with local 

and regional populations to advocate for their cooperation with the 

American mission. 

The MEK even organized town hall like meetings with area 

sheikhs, participating in roundtable discussions about democracy in 

Iraq. Does this sound like the activities of a terrorist organization? 

If so, I guess we could use a few more friendly terrorist organizations like this group. Of course they are not terrorists. The European Union does not consider them terrorists, the French don’t, the 

United Kingdom don’t. The U.S. is the only significant country that 

keeps them on the terrorist list. This must change and change immediately. 

21

Number two, when our military forces entered Iraq in 2003 meetings were held between the MEK and U.S. Officials. The MEK 

agreed to give up all their weapons, and arms, and to fully cooperate with and support the mission and goals of the U.S. In return 

for their giving up their weapons of self defense, the U.S. promised 

to protect them. In fact, following an extensive investigation into 

all aspects of the MEK, including lengthy interviews of every resident of Ashraf, each resident of Ashraf was given a signed document guaranteeing their safety as protected persons under the 4th 

Geneva Convention, with the United States promising to ensure 

that protection. 

Ladies and gentlemen, the people of Ashraf have more than 

upheld their side of this agreement. We have not. U.S. forces have 

stood by, sometimes literally filming the assaults as they were happening without intervening. To date 47 members of Ashraf have 

been killed along with hundreds more wounded. Today the City of 

Ashraf is a city under siege, and unless something is done quickly 

and dramatically Ashraf will fall and thousands more will be killed 

in a great genocide. 

Number three, finally I have a specific recommendation on what 

the U.S. should do to keep its word and carry out the terms of the 

agreement that we made. Someone must take the responsibility for 

protecting Ashraf and must take this responsibility away from the 

Iraqis. Under the obvious influence of Iran, Iran and Iraq intend 

to exterminate the MEK. The status quo is not acceptable. We 

must intervene. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Morsch follows:]

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Mr. POE. Thank you very much. Dr. Takeyh. 

STATEMENT OF MR. RAY TAKEYH, SENIOR FELLOW FOR MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

Mr. TAKEYH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for inviting me. It is a 

privilege to be here with my copanelists. I have submitted testimony for the record. I will just highlight certain aspects of it. 

Mujahedin-e-Khalq, the MEK, was founded in early 1960s in 

Iran at a time of proliferation of various opposition groups again 

the Shah. It distinguished itself by the discursive nature of ideology that sought to mix a number of incompatible dogmas. From 

Shia Islam they appropriated symbols of martyrdom, from Marxism 

the notion of historic development of stages, from Lenin they embraced the importance of a vanguard party committed to mobilization of masses, and from Third World revolutionaries they took the 

primacy of gorilla warfare and violence as indispensable agents of 

political change. 

The core of MEK ideology historically has always been anti-imperialism, which has often been defined as opposition to United 

States interests. They oppose the Shah’s regime partly because of 

this close association with the United States. It is this impulse that 

propelled MEK in the 1970s toward embracing an entire spectrum 

of anti-American forces ranging from the Vietcong to PLO. 

Given this mission of liberating the working class and expunging 

the influence of predatory capitalism, the United States has traditionally been identified as a source of exploitation and abuse in 

MEK literature. Violence has been the hallmark of MEK’s strategy 

for assuming power. Through much of its past the party exalted violence as a historic expression of dissent. 

One of the central precepts of the party is that a dedicated vanguard challenging the authority of the state can spark a mass revolution by bravely confronting that state. Once the masses observe 

that the state is vulnerable to violence then they will shed their inhibition and join the protest for sparking the revolution. Thus, the 

most suitable means of effecting political change has always been 

to some extent including violence. 

Although MEK victims have been mostly Iranians, there have 

been Americans and American installations also victims of MEK violence. In the early seventies the MEK Communique Number 3 

stressed that violence against the United States was permissible 

given America’s suppression of legitimate revolutionary movements 

such as those in Palestine. The first such attack came in May 1972 

on the occasion of President Richard Nixon’s visit to Iran. To derail 

that visit, MEK bombed a U.S. Information Office and targeted an 

American company such as General Motors and Pan American Airways. That same year the party attempted to assassinate General 

Harold Price, the Chief of U.S. Military Mission in Iran. Although 

General Price escaped his assassins, the MEK did tragically succeed in murdering Colonel Lewis Hawkins, the Deputy Chief of 

Mission, outside his home. 

It must be stressed that thought the 1970s, the MEK did have 

support within Iran, particularly among the intelligentsia and the 

working class. This message of resistance and this record of resisting the Shah did attract substantial support. 

29

The turning point for MEK’s internal fortunes in Iran seems to 

have been 1981, when the Islamic regime engaged in one the most 

brutal acts of repression, executing vast numbers of opposition 

members, including many MEK cadre. It is at that time that the 

organization’s political infrastructure in Iran was largely subdued. 

However, a decision made by MEK personnel also ensured that the 

party would not reclaim its place of influence in Iran. 

As MEK went into exile its willingness to side with Saddam’s 

Iraq against Iran in the Iran-Iraq war disturbed its already diminished cadre. 

During their 1983 meeting between Mr. Rajavi and Tariq Aziz, 

an alliance was forged. The MEK personnel fought along side of the 

Iraqis and were used in some of the most daring missions of the 

war. Given the highly nationalistic nature of the Iranian population, such act was viewed as a betrayal of homeland and not necessarily a legitimate act of opposition against an abhorrent regime. 

The MEK would go on to assist Saddam’s regime, they were employed by him in the repression of the Sunni uprising—Shia uprising, I’m sorry, in 1991. Given that the Shia community is having 

a leading role in Iraq, that is indeed a disturbing legacy. 

The question then becomes what to do with MEK members in 

Camp Ashraf. It would be wrong, it would be immoral to forcefully 

repatriate inhabitants of the camp back to Iran. Given that the Islamic Republic lacks even the basic rudiments of impartial justice, 

they are likely to be met with certain death. 

Nonetheless, the international community under the auspices of 

United Nations Refugee Committee has an obligation to the members of the MEK currently at Camp Ashraf to ensure their safety 

and their security. The MEK cadre cannot be repatriated back to 

Iran, they cannot be returned to Iran, and they seem to have a difficulty staying in Iraq. It becomes a question for the international 

community and the United Nations to find a safe haven for the remaining members of the MEK currently in Camp Ashraf. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Takeyh follows:]

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Mr. ROHRABACHER [presiding]. Thank you very much. This happens when you are a Member of Congress and you may be preparing for something for weeks and weeks and it happens at the 

exact same time you have something on the floor, a bill on the 

floor, that is your amendment on the floor, it happens to come together at exactly the same time. I think that that is God’s way of 

just teaching us not to take everything for granted and to be grateful for the time when we do have together here. 

I am going to actually ask Mr. Filner, he was not a member of 

this committee, if he would like to have a few minutes of questions 

as I organize my thoughts. Mr. Filner has been very active and involved in this issue. Then I will turn to Mr. Rivera. 

Mr. FILNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And again thank you for 

your incredible personal interventions in these things. It really 

makes a difference in the world. 

What struck me from the testimony is those who have had such 

personal contact with Ashraf based on their own information, their 

own investigations, their own witnessing, their own talking to the 

people have come to the conclusion that we do not have a terrorist 

organization. I don’t see any of us worried about all of these folks 

here, by the way, these violent people that are about to overthrow 

us, to have come to a conclusion that these are our allies. So I 

thank you for having the courage to do that. 

I was struck by, as I said earlier, by Dr. Takeyh’s—is that the 

right pronunciation, sir, Takeyh? 

Mr. TAKEYH. Yes. 

Mr. FILNER. Testimony. Do you think there should have been a 

massacre given the horrible ideology of the MEK? 

Mr. TAKEYH. No. 

Mr. FILNER. Because you don’t say that anywhere. 

Mr. TAKEYH. I said report of violence of Ashraf members. 

Mr. FILNER. The last so-called terrorist thing you indicated in 

your written statement is 1972. Let’s say that is 39 years ago, I 

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of a terrorist organization. By the way, have you ever met this cult 

leader that you talk about here? 

Mr. TAKEYH. No. 

Mr. FILNER. I have on several occasions. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I noticed that stare in your eyes after. 

Mr. FILNER. I know, I have been brainwashed. I have met a lot 

of world leaders, I will tell you, I have not met someone I can say 

is as intelligent, as humorous, as humane, as concerned with other 

people around her and as humble as Ms. Rajavi. I mean, I just 

don’t understand. 

In fact, when I last met with her it was raining in Paris and I 

said to her, ‘‘You are a cult leader, can’t you stop this rain here?’’ 

She proceeded then to tell me that as the most powerful Member 

of Congress, I should be able to stop the rain. But clearly I never 

saw a cult leader act like that, by the way. She is a political leader, 

a very humane and humble person, a very intelligent person that 

obviously has the support. I don’t know what group could have 

gathered 100,000 people in one place to hear a former Attorney 

General speak to them, a former Secretary of Homeland Security, 

former Chief of Staff of President Bush, a couple of Congress Members. 

It strikes me that if our view of the world is that Iran is one of 

the most troubling, to say the least, actors on the planet and they 

are heading toward an atomic bomb and they are heading toward 

maybe a takeover of Iraq, at least in political terms, we should be 

doing everything we can to stop that, barring the use right now of 

American forces. Yet you want to discredit one of resistance groups. 

You say how unimportant they are. Well, if they are so unimportant, why worry about them? 

We should be helping everybody, seems to me. The MEK has 

shown with its leadership and very structured program for the 

United States it is in our interest, it seems to me, to adopt that 

program and with its ability to organize vast demonstrations, and 

I think these gentleman here would concur that they gave us very 

important intelligence on the Iranian nuclear capabilities and 

progress. It seems to me, I mean I don’t care what religion they 

are, what ideology they have, they could even be Republicans as far 

as I am concerned, these are our friends, these are our friends and 

we should——

Mr. POE. Some of them are Republicans. 

Mr. FILNER. We should be getting out of their way and delist 

them and just let them do what they can. If they are so unimportant and so lacking of support so that will be proved in history, but 

why are we helping the Iranian regime by not helping the MEK? 

And that is just the way it is. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, thank you very much. 

Mr. FILNER. Dr. Takeyh, I don’t know if you want to respond. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. We are going to give you time to answer that. 

Mr. FILNER. Before you throw your credentials, I am a Ph.D. 

Also. 

Mr. TAKEYH. That disqualifies us both. I do think we should assist the opposition movements within Iran in order to deal with the 

regime whose characterizations I don’t dispute. There is an opposition movement against Iran. It is called the Green Movement. It 

35

features dissident clerks, it features liberal elements, it features intelligentsia, it features middle class elements, and the groups that 

you are supporting, Congressman, has limited if not any support in 

Iran. That is just a fact. 

Mr. FILNER. So what——

Mr. TAKEYH. And it has——

Mr. FILNER. I don’t agree, but even if you are right, so what? 

What does that mean we shouldn’t help them because they have 

zero? So they will be proved and if there is an overthrow of the 

Mullahs we will see who comes out as the thing, so what? 

Mr. TAKEYH. I think we share concern of Iranian human rights. 

Mr. FILNER. I am not asking for millions of dollars, I am just saying delist them. 

Mr. TAKEYH. You can have a hearing on a delisting. What I can 

say to you is this is an organization with a very discursive ideology, 

and with very peculiarities and also violence. 

Mr. FILNER. So what? 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I would suggest that we let the witness answer the question. 

Mr. FILNER. So irrelevant. 

Mr. TAKEYH. I think the Congressman and I just simply disagree 

on this. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right. Well, thank you very much. As I 

get my notes together let us turn to Judge Poe and we will make 

sure. 

Mr. POE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to follow up on Mr. 

Filner’s comments about Iran. They are the problem, Iran is the 

problem, they are the world’s problem. And we got a group of Iranian citizens that are in Camp Ashraf that the Iranian Government does not like, wants them to go away, disappear from the 

Earth if they had their way. Why is that? Probably because they 

oppose the regime in Iran. And I actually agree with you, Mr. Filner, that we should encourage groups that oppose the Iranian regime because the best hope for the world is a peaceful regime 

change in Iran and the Iranians have to do it, wherever they are 

in the world. So I just don’t know why our State Department is so 

hardheaded about delisting them from the MEK but they are. 

So we need to intervene and get them off the MEK list. 

Dr. Mukasey, or Judge Mukasey, which I prefer to call you that 

if that is okay. 

Mr. FILNER. He likes General. 

Mr. POE. Judge Mukasey, the camp if it is moved somewhere else 

in Iraq, what do you think will happen to the residents? 

Mr. MUKASEY. That can’t possibly—nothing good is the short answer. It is not in any way a threat to Iran where it is. Certainly 

nobody from the camp has lobbed anything into Iran nor have any 

of the incursions against the camp from come from Iran. They have 

come from Iraq. So moving them within Iraq isn’t going to solve 

any problems. The only thing it will do is take them out of sight 

and thereby allow the Iraqi Government at the behest of the Iranians to finish them off. That would be a disaster. 

Mr. POE. What is the relationship right now with Maliki and 

Ahmadinejad? 

36

Mr. MUKASEY. It appears to be a close relationship. The Iranians 

call the shots and Maliki acts in accordance with what serves their 

interest. 

Mr. POE. Colonel, let me ask you this question since you were 

there. Are there MEK terrorists today? 

Colonel MARTIN. The MEK are not terrorists today. And if I may 

continue, sir, in May 1972 the MEK leadership was rolled up and 

Rajavi and many others ended up in prison just prior to that, and 

then there was a split within the MEK to a Communist Mujahedin 

Marxist regime and what we see now is the MEK and it stayed 

that way. 

The killings of Colonel Schaeffer, Colonel Turner and Lieutenant 

Colonel Hawkins were accomplished in June and July 1975, and 

the Shah’s own police interrogated the killers, and they said they 

were part of the Marxist MEK. 

When Rajavi was released from prison, he was able to bring the 

MEK back together outside of the prisons, and that is the organization you see today. It is not the MEK that was doing those executions. They are not terrorists today, and whatever activities they 

did in the past, if we were to hold that against them, then we 

should have had nothing to do with Menachem Begin or Anwar 

Sadat. 

Mr. POE. The United States is getting ready to leave Iraq. So 

what happens when we leave? 

Colonel MARTIN. When we leave? 

Mr. POE. To the camp. 

Colonel MARTIN. When we leave, the camp will be annihilated. 

Mr. POE. My last question is open to the panel. So what do we 

do? What do we do? The United States Government, Congress, 

what should we do? 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I think that is such a good question. We will 

have each witness give a 1-minute answer. 

Colonel MARTIN. My recommendation, sir, is get them delisted 

immediately. We get them out of camp as soon as possible, certainly before the end of the year. I am willing to get on the plane 

and go over and help load them up if that is what it takes. When 

I was working with the State Department, we tried to get Homeland Security to see can they come to the United States. No, because they are a terrorist organization. Well, we delist them. Well, 

they were once a terrorist organization even though it was an erroneous delisting. We need to get them out of there. 

Mr. POE. Judge. 

Mr. MUKASEY. I agree and if it takes, in order to get around 

Homeland Security objections, a special bill I am sure that that is 

something that is not beyond the power of this body. To get some 

members, I am not suggesting that all of the residents of Ashraf 

be settled here. But certainly if we take the lead, taking some folks 

in, then we can persuade other countries to do likewise, but the 

first step is delisting. If they are still listed as a terrorist organization, it becomes impossible to move them anyplace else. Delisting 

is for certain the first and essential step. 

Mr. POE. Dr. Morsch. 

Dr. MORSCH. Delisting MEK must happen first. We must recommit to fulfilling our promise that we made to the people of Ashraf. 

37

You know, I appreciate what Mr. Takeyh has said. We are talking 

about decades ago. Even if we want to debate this, the U.K. has 

already debated it, the European Union, they have already concluded the debate. There are 3,400 human beings in Ashraf and 

there will be a genocide unless we intervene and do something. I 

think the United States Government needs to take responsibility 

for the solemn promise it made and to fulfill it. Whether it is 

through the U.S. military forces, UNAMI, somehow we have to 

keep our word in this world. 

Mr. POE. Dr. Takeyh. 

Mr. TAKEYH. As I mentioned in my testimony, Congressman, I 

think the U.N. Refugee Commission should hold the responsibility 

for them. If sizable members of the Camp Ashraf are actually passport holders or residents of other countries, Canada, France or 

something, I believe under international law those countries are 

obligated to take back their citizens. United States would be obligated to do so for those citizens abroad in jeopardy, and the remaining of them the United Nations should look for a safe haven 

for them. 

I do agree that they cannot be repatriated to Iran certainly, and 

the situation in Iraq does seem precarious. 

Mr. POE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Sherman, you are not a member of the 

subcommittee. We do have members of the subcommittee here. We 

will recognize your contribution and the right to ask questions as 

soon as the final subcommittee member, Mr. Rivera, has his time. 

Mr. Rivera. 

Mr. RIVERA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I understand from all 

the testimony and all the information and the history that certainly the Iraqi Government as it is currently constituted does not 

seem to want the MEK in their country, and I certainly understand 

that under no circumstances can they be sent back to Iran. I also 

certainly understand the physical integrity of the residents of the 

camp must be protected. 

Given all of these different circumstances, I guess my first question is what does the MEK, based on all of your knowledge—I will 

start with the judge—what does MEK want their fate to be, given 

all the constraints? 

Mr. MUKASEY. I think they simply want to be able to function. 

Mr. RIVERA. Where? 

Mr. MUKASEY. Wherever they can, both within Iran. 

Mr. RIVERA. Within Iran? 

Mr. MUKASEY. Yes—no, I don’t mean sending the Ashraf residents back, but they want to have connection to people in Iran with 

whom they have contact so that they can effect regime change, but 

they can’t function in that fashion as long as they continue to be 

listed as a terrorist organization. 

Mr. RIVERA. In terms of physical residence, I will go to the Colonel, what do they want their fate to be? 

Colonel MARTIN. The first thing would be to continue to operate 

in the Ashraf area unimpeded. However, Madam Parsai has specifically told Lieutenant General Gardner and myself, if you want us 

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other country where they know they can be secure and they can 

be protected. They are willing to leave. 

Mr. RIVERA. Well, if that is the case, does anyone—does the 

United States have a plan toward that end to settle them to have 

them leave or does anyone have a plan? 

Colonel MARTIN. The United States I know for a fact has no plan. 

And we have seen and it was mentioned this morning—this afternoon, the State Department does not respond to the calls of Congress, they are not responding to the findings of the judicial 

branch. And if I may be so bold, as an American warrior I carry 

a copy of the Constitution with me. The first branch our Founding 

Fathers put down was the legislative because it was the most important and it represented the will of the people, and then came 

the executive to carry out that will, and then came the judicial to 

make sure it was being done right. We have a sub-element of the 

executive branch ignoring both the legislative and the judicial 

branch. 

Mr. RIVERA. And Dr. Takeyh, maybe you are best qualified to answer this, what is Iraq’s plan? 

Mr. TAKEYH. I am not quite sure if Iraq has a plan to deal with 

them. I think the Iraqi regime seems to be in control of ill-disciplined forces who may not be able to control the physical integrity 

of the camp, as you suggest. This is why I suggest one of the ways 

we could go about this is to interview individual camp members to 

see where they go, if they have nationalities in Europe and others. 

Mr. RIVERA. If we would ask Maliki right now what is your plan, 

what would he respond? 

Mr. TAKEYH. I am not quite sure if he has one. I think it is a 

problem that neither Iraqis knows what to do, because it endangers 

their relationship with Iran, it complicates their relationship with 

the United States, and it also complicates Maliki’s own relationship 

with the Shia community given the fact MEK has been implicated 

in violence against Iraqi Shias during Saddam’s tenure. 

Mr. RIVERA. Does anyone have a plan, European Union, Arab 

League, anyone have a plan? 

Mr. MUKASEY. Not that I am aware of. A particular plan as to 

the residents of Ashraf, not that I am aware of. 

Mr. TAKEYH. Congressman, the United Nations does have experience in dealing with displaced refugees and they may not have a 

specific plan for residents of Camp Ashraf, but they do have experience with individuals. 

Mr. RIVERA. What can the United Nations do to implement their 

plan? How can they enforce it? 

Mr. TAKEYH. Well, for one thing the camp can come under the 

authority of the United Nations where they would be essentially in 

control of——

Mr. RIVERA. Would Maliki permit that? 

Mr. TAKEYH. Well, that is something that United Nations and 

Maliki would negotiate with each other. The other thing they can 

do is look for safe havens for them, which they have more experience in doing. The United Nations does run refugee camps in a 

vast number of countries. 

39

Mr. RIVERA. Safe havens also imply that those countries provide 

assent to the camp residents going into—have any countries expressed any interest? 

Mr. TAKEYH. Some of them who are dual nationals would have 

to be taken back from their countries, if they are nationals of Canada——

Mr. RIVERA. Have any countries expressed interest in taking 

back——

Mr. TAKEYH. The dual nationals is a question of law, they have 

to be taken back by their original——

Mr. RIVERA. But has any country publicly expressed interest?

Mr. TAKEYH. I think some European countries have. 

Mr. RIVERA. Such as? 

Mr. TAKEYH. Sweden and so forth. 

Mr. RIVERA. Sweden? 

Mr. TAKEYH. Yeah. 

Mr. RIVERA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. The chairman will when everyone else has 

had their time questioning, I will begin my questioning. I will now 

recognize Mr. Brad Sherman, who has also been very active on this 

issue but not necessarily on this subcommittee. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I thank the chairman for his patience. Practical 

question or two to Mr. Attorney General. If someone happens to 

have a visa to go to Sweden, are they allowed to leave Camp 

Ashraf and go there? 

Mr. MUKASEY. As far as I am aware, they are. 

Mr. SHERMAN. And would the residents of Camp Ashraf be safe 

anywhere in Iraq, say in a Sunni part of that country, or is it critical that we get them out? I see the Colonel with an answer. 

Colonel MARTIN. I will gladly answer that question. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Not to mention obviously any moving of them 

would be dangerous and would have to be carried out, I think, by 

U.S. forces, but if they arrived in some other part of Iraq would 

they be any safer than they are now? 

Colonel MARTIN. I agree with the young lady that was in the 

video in the very front, they could not be safe. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Either there has to be U.S. or U.N. protection of 

Camp Ashraf or, much better, the people have got to be outside of 

both Iran and Iraq? 

Colonel MARTIN. That is correct. And if I may add to this, we had 

approximately 195 defectors that was being protected at the American camp. Working with Barzani, we were able to get them released into Kurdistan and their fate was a very terrible one, and 

they ended coming up and asking for financial help from the MEK 

so that they could try to move on with their lives. 

So the answer as proven by evidence of that happening to the defectors is nowhere in Iraq is safe. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Dr. Takeyh, you seem to be the only person here 

who thinks it might be okay for the MEK to stay on the terrorist 

list. Are you aware of any terrorist action attributed to the MEK 

after the last terrorist action attributed to the IRA? 

Mr. TAKEYH. In terms of in Iraq itself there is allegations of 

MEK being part of Saddam’s regime against Shia residents before 

40

their disarmament, throughout the tenure of Saddam. Those are 

the allegations. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Are those acts classified as acts of terrorism by 

the State Department and are there any specific acts that are attributed? 

Mr. TAKEYH. Well, there is certainly the contention of the Iraqi 

Government that the MEK membership during Saddam Hussein’s 

era was acting as his praetorian guard. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Well, what about the praetorian guard of Saddam 

Hussein and his other—I mean is everyone who served in the Iraqi 

Army considered a terrorist by the United States? 

Mr. TAKEYH. I am not suggesting that, Congressman. I am just 

suggesting that they were used in specific campaigns, and particularly against the Shia population in the south in 1991. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Okay. Now the MEK was designated in 1997 but 

every act of terrorism that you have described in your statement, 

at least when I was in this room, were a long time before then. 

Were they designated in 1997 because that was part of an olive 

branch to Tehran or because the State Department finally got 

around to looking at the actions taken in the 1980s and 1970s? 

Mr. TAKEYH. I wasn’t in the State Department in 1997 when the 

designation took place. I am not quite certain of the reasoning to 

do so at that time. I am sure there are representatives of the State 

Department at that time or subsequently can respond to your question. 

Mr. SHERMAN. What I have been told is again and again that the 

MEK is on that list as an olive branch to Tehran. It is not working 

out real well. 

Colonel, do you have any insight as to why action was taken of 

all times in 1997, decades after the most offensive actions taken by 

the MEK? 

Colonel MARTIN. Sometimes when you have enemies you have to 

compliment them for a great skill. Iran beautifully portrayed itself 

as going to a more moderate government that was going to open 

up to the West. There is nothing more moderate because the Supreme Council would not have allowed, we saw what happened in 

2009 when they did have a chance for a moderate President. So 

they presented themselves as moderate and in turn we gave them 

the olive branch that you mentioned. Then when it was convenient 

for Tehran, then next thing you know Ahmadinejad is now in 

power. 

Mr. SHERMAN. So we twisted our semi-judicial or administrative 

determination for political reasons and in this case for the wrong 

political reasons? 

Mr. MUKASEY. I totally agree. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Does anyone else on the panel have a comment? 

I yield back. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. We have Mr. 

Carnahan with us and you may proceed, Mr. Carnahan. 

Mr. CARNAHAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to the 

panel. I apologize for missing some of your testimony. I had to step 

out for just a minute. I wanted to come back and start with Dr. 

Takeyh. And given that the PMOI MEK received safe harbor under 

Saddam Hussein and helped Iraq fight against Iran during the 

41

Iran-Iraq war in the eighties how does this group hold enough legitimacy in Iran to be a viable opposition to the current regime, 

particularly considering the nature of the culture? Could you talk 

about that? 

Mr. TAKEYH. I don’t think it is a credible opposition movement 

within Iran as perceived by credible Iranian opposition movements, 

such as the Green Movement representative, which has forsworn 

any relationship with MEK and have denounced it at every turn. 

I mean you see that in a secular opposition in Iran and its umbrella organization that comes under the auspices of the Green 

Movement. 

Mr. CARNAHAN. We have limited means of engaging the Iranian 

people now. How would U.S. support for the MEK affect the Iranian popular opinion in the U.S. and, more broadly, how are there 

better ways that we could engage with the Iranian people and the 

Iranian opposition? 

Mr. TAKEYH. I think the task at hand is how does the United 

States enable, empower the Green Movement in its attempt to create a democratic society in Iran and try to liberalize the Iranian 

Government and in due course displace the radical regime that is 

in power. That is the key challenge we have today. We have a lot 

of experience with that and are in a Cold War with our assistance 

to solidarity in Poland, with our assistance to other Eastern European opposition movements and their efforts against Communist 

governments in the Eastern Bloc. I think some of those lessons can 

be used to assist the indigenous, viable, legitimate opposition within Iran, which comes under the auspices of the Green Movement. 

Mr. CARNAHAN. Thank you, and I just wanted to open this up for 

the rest of the panel to address the issue of the practicality of relocation as an option. Can that work, does that work and what are 

your thoughts on that? Let me start with General Mukasey and we 

will go down the line. 

Mr. MUKASEY. I think if people are going to be killed where they 

are, then relocation is the only practical alternative, to respond directly to your question. Also to comment on something that Dr. 

Takeyh just said, there is as far as I know no, zero, no example 

of any situation in which help to a dissident group in a totalitarian 

country was successful. Poland was not a totalitarian country at 

the time we helped solidarity. That was—you try to help an organization that is in a totalitarian country, there is only one way to get 

rid of a totalitarian government, and that is to overthrow it. 

Mr. CARNAHAN. Thank you, Colonel. 

Colonel MARTIN. The Mujahedin needs to be moved completely 

out of Iraq and not to Iran. 

Mr. CARNAHAN. What else would that look like in your opinion? 

Colonel MARTIN. It would give the appearance that we are bringing them under an umbrella and keeping them operational as an 

organization, but the reality of it, they certainly would not be a 

military force because the average age is now over 40 years old. 

They are a very valuable intelligence resource, and that could be 

used in the future, but if we would bring them in and pretend that 

we are training them up, it is just not feasible. 

Mr. CARNAHAN. And Mr. Morsch, Dr. Morsch, sorry. 

42

Dr. MORSCH. Ashraf is probably the safest place for them right 

now. They are very close to Balad, Camp Anaconda, which is one 

of the largest U.S. Bases in Iraq. They are very close to Baghdad, 

relatively close to Baghdad. It is an area that is very scrutinized. 

So to move them anywhere else within Iraq it would certainly be 

less safe and more dangerous. 

Mr. CARNAHAN. Thank you all very much. I yield back. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Ms. Sheila Jackson Lee is not a member of 

this subcommittee, I believe, but she has interest in this particular 

issue and, as I say, as chairman I will be the last person to ask 

questions today, but I think I have several important questions to 

ask. So you may proceed, Ms. Jackson Lee. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman, again in your absence I thank 

you for your kindness and indulgence and also allow me to recognize both you and the ranking member on your astuteness on 

issues in dealing with human rights and fairness and simple practicality on questions that seem to be unanswerable but seem to be 

common sense. I guess the question is how do you allow persons 

to be murdered and the guns used against those persons being 

funded by the United States of America. It continues to baffle me. 

Before I came into the room, and as I acknowledge again Mr. 

Carnahan and my colleague Mr. Filner, we have both experienced 

over the years enough indictment for our concern about the individuals who are in a membership by the name of MEK, but more importantly the brutality against several human beings. It amazes 

me that again blood has been shed, treasure of the United States 

has died in Iraq so that Iraqis might live free, might have the 

blessings of democracy and choice of that democracy. And yet we 

are covered with the blood of others at the hands of, as we have 

come to understand the allegations, of Iraqi soldiers. 

Judge Mukasey, help me with—you have 7 pages that I will read 

more extensively. Would you help me with laws that you say that 

we are not enforcing? Give me those tools. You said we are not enforcing certain laws that we need to do. Would you repeat those 

again for me, please? 

Mr. MUKASEY. I think what is often described in shorthand as 

the Leahy amendment, which is actually two statutory provisions, 

one of which relates to use of foreign aid, the second of which relates to use of military aid, and bars the use of such aid when it 

goes to military organizations that have committed human rights 

violations unless there is a finding in the case of military, unless 

there is a finding by the Secretary of Defense of overriding necessity. I don’t know of any such finding here. So the lay Leahy 

amendment is, it seems to me, right on the nose. I think Senator 

Leahy was the author of that amendment. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I have not looked at your bio, I can’t say in 

certainty whether you were in the military or not in the military, 

but I know you have been both an outstanding jurist and the Attorney General. Would you suggest that the actions of this past incident counted for—do you believe it is well documented that the violence was perpetrated by soldiers that were in Iraqi uniforms or 

Iraqis with guns that resulted in the deaths of the 30-plus individuals? 

43

Mr. MUKASEY. There is no doubt of it. We have identified, as I 

understand it, the precise units that participated in this operation. 

So that is relatively easy to come by. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Dr. Morsch, can you document or suggest any 

reason why tanks and commandos and guns were approaching that 

camp? Was there any national security reason? 

Dr. MORSCH. No reason other than I believe the Maliki I government is planning to exterminate the people of Ashraf and this is 

part of a long series of actions that are probably going to occur 

until they are ultimately victorious. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Does that sound like to you a conspiracy with 

Iran, a country who has potential nuclear capacity, threatening the 

world, and the leader of Iraq is now in cahoots to attack individuals who cannot defend themselves, or at least defend themselves 

against tanks. 

Dr. MORSCH. Congresswoman, I arrived in Iraq in January 2004, 

shortly after the Iraq war began. And so from my first days on the 

ground I saw the influence of Iran within Iraq because Ashraf is 

close to that border. It has been there ever since, it is growing, it 

is obvious, it is intentional, and in fact in 2004 I made the comment to some of my fellow officers Iran—we are basically going to 

come in here and take out Saddam, create a power vacuum and 

create a greater Tehran right here in Iraq. It is happening right 

before our eyes. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me just conclude, Mr. Chairman, I see the 

lights. Thank you very much. 

Let me conclude by saying my outrage cannot be expressed and 

again I ask our Government, which I have great respect for, to immediately denounce and ask for a ceasing of the collaboration between the Iraqi Government of which we are funding and Iran, 

which has become the world’s enemy to destroy and kill innocent 

persons and whatever laws that we have, Chairman Rohrabacher, 

that we can use, the Leahy amendment, should be implemented 

immediately. 

I yield back. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Ms. Jackson Lee, and 

to all of our other members who have participated today. I again 

apologize that earlier I had to leave. I did actually go from here 

straight to the floor to deal with an amendment that would defund 

our friends in Pakistan which has something to do with some of the 

issues we are discussing today, and so is vitally important. However, I am very pleased we were able it get the questioning in from 

those of us here able to spend the entire time with us. Let me just 

ask you a few questions here. 

Dr. Morsch, you were in Camp Ashraf in what year? 

Dr. MORSCH. 2004. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. 2004. Now in 2004, correct me if I am wrong, 

the FBI actually went to Camp Ashraf and interviewed all of the 

residents of Camp Ashraf to find out if any of them were indeed 

terrorists; is that correct? 

Dr. MORSCH. Yes, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Are you aware of what the FBI determined 

by their questioning of all of—each and every one of the people 

there at Camp Ashraf? 

44

Dr. MORSCH. Yes, sir. I was there during the entire investigation 

phase and from the beginning to the end all 34 or at that time 

maybe a few more were interrogated. I did not see the official report of the FBI but I talked to the agents and interviewers on a 

daily basis as they came back from spending the day in these interviews. And they expressed tremendous frustration that they had 

come to Ashraf with particular people they thought they were going 

to be able to take back to the U.S. To prosecute for various nefarious criminal or terrorist activities. And day by day they were not 

able to find any evidence on any illegal criminal or terrorist activities and finally left empty handed, as they said, and were quite disappointed. 

Mr. FILNER. Mr. Chairman, I just want to ask——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Excuse me, I have the floor now. 

Mr. FILNER. I want to make sure he meant 3,400. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I will be happy to let you do this after my 

questions. 

Mr. FILNER. I just wanted a question of fact. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you, Mr. Filner. 

To the point that was just made, Dr. Takeyh, have you seen this 

FBI record? 

Mr. TAKEYH. I have not. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And you question that the FBI was conducting a proper investigation? 

Mr. TAKEYH. I have no insight into the investigation. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. And when you have expressed your 

concern about the MEK since 19-—well 2004, so that’s 6 years, you 

have been expressing concern that the MEK might, you know, be 

worthy of designating a terrorist organization but you have not 

bothered to go and find the FBI report that went in and investigated that specifically. 

Mr. TAKEYH. I am not sure if that FBI report is actually for public consumption, nor have I been intensely engaged in the MEK 

terrorism debate, as you suggest, in the past 6 years. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So you are not sure whether the FBI report 

is for public consumption? 

Mr. TAKEYH. Congressman, I simply cannot comment on a report 

I haven’t seen. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I understand, but I guess what the question 

is you are a Ph.D.? 

Mr. TAKEYH. Uh-huh. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. When these people are talking, as you might 

say, a credible witness on issues, especially when someone has a 

scholarly background, a Ph.D., that you would expect they would 

go to all sources, especially ones that were directly related to investigating a specific charge, but you did not go to——

Mr. TAKEYH. I don’t think——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. You didn’t try to seek out the FBI report? 

Mr. TAKEYH. I don’t think that FBI report was publicly available. 

I believe it is under classification. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. The operative words I think which means 

you did not. 

Mr. TAKEYH. I would be happy to look at the report. 

45

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Usually if one was to be someone to argue a 

case they would at least take the time to see if something was 

available or not. Dr.——

Mr. TAKEYH. Ordinarily, Congressman, FBI reports of this nature are not available and my colleague has himself said he hasn’t 

seen the report. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay, well, I am not sure whether the FBI 

report is available or if the conclusion was available. My guess is 

that at the very least the conclusion that the FBI made was made 

available and that has——

Mr. TAKEYH. I am not sure if that is correct. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Is it your understanding that the FBI concluded, that is your testimony today, that the charge that these 

people were still a terrorist organization was debunked; is that correct? 

Dr. MORSCH. Yes, sir. That was the point of the investigation and 

again they didn’t find anything. This is my unofficial discussion 

with numerous members of the OGA personnel who were there on 

site for the several months of the investigation. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. When you are suggesting that all 3,400 people there were questioned by the FBI. 

Dr. MORSCH. All of them questioned by the FBI and or other representatives that had arrived, perhaps 100 outside personnel, a 

very efficient, organized interrogation process. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Now, let me just note that I have been involved politically since I was in my teens and I have seen different 

organizations evolve into different things and my understanding of 

the MEK is that it had a Marxist beginning and that there were 

questions about—that I would have about an organization that was 

involved in the type of activity that was at the same time espousing some sort of Marxist ideology. Apparently that was a long time 

ago and there seems to be a lot of evidence that MEK evolved out 

of that position. I did not get involved in this issue for a long time 

because many people in Iran, many of the Iranian exiled community still remembered the MEK as an organization that was involved in assassinating members of the Shah’s government. By the 

way, not to say that the Shah was not a dictatorship as well and 

when people are struggling for democracy against a dictatorship 

usually you have to use force, but that still would not necessarily 

say that what the MEK was doing was acceptable because I understand they were targeting unarmed officials who worked for the 

Shah and worked for his administration. 

Is there some reason, Mr. Takeyh, that we have to believe that 

the MEK is still after all of these years and all of these individuals 

have been involved with them that that they are still involved in 

some sort of terrorist operation? 

Mr. TAKEYH. The MEK use of violence did not stop with its opposition to the Shah’s regime. It continued in the aftermath and has 

continued throughout the aftermath of past 30 years, and it has 

continued against Iranian civilians within Iran and Iraqis within 

Iraq once they relocated there. So it is a long history of violence. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Let me just note for you. This is a territory 

that is filled with violence, whether you are talking about the Shah 

or you are talking about the Mullah regime, you are talking about 

46

incredible violence. I wouldn’t be surprised if there was any organization that existed that wasn’t in some way involved with the use 

of force at least to protect themselves. 

Mr. TAKEYH. Oh, I disagree with that. Within Iran there are 

many opposition movements such as the Green Movement that explicitly rejects violence for civil disobedience and protest and demonstrations. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Or like the American Revolution where we—

oh, wait a minute, we did use violence there, didn’t we? Let me 

suggest that I would ask our friends in the audience not to applaud, or to be fair to all of our witnesses. 

You have got a lot of courage, thank you for being here, I appreciate your being here today, knowing that you are going to get 

some very poignant questions. 

So your suggestion is the MEK today has been branded as unacceptable by the leaders of the Green Movement in Iran. 

Mr. TAKEYH. Yes, that is right. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Is that the case? Does anyone know about 

that detail? Agree? Disagree? 

Colonel MARTIN. I am not sure if it is going to be in agreement 

or disagreement. But I remember in 2009, when all the riots and 

everything were going on, the MEK was very, very quiet, and they 

were not involved in any of those activities. So to say they have 

been accepted by the Green Movement, I don’t believe so. I do believe the National Council of the Resistance of Iran, Maryam 

Rajavi’s other organization, is very much accepting of it. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Let us note that the Green Movement has, I 

believe—and please correct me if I am wrong—has dissociated itself 

from violence as a means of achieving its goals. 

But also let us note that just because some—that does not mean 

that an opposition group to a despicable dictatorial regime that 

uses torture and violence against its people, that anyone who 

chooses to resist it in a violent fashion doesn’t make them right or 

wrong. We are not going to get the Mullahs to give up power simply by proving that they are thugs, by letting them beat people up 

and suppress people at will. 

In fact, I will have to admit one of the things that attracts me 

to this movement is that it is willing to fight for the rights of the 

people of Iran against a very oppressive regime that is willing to 

kill people to stay in power. 

But if the Green Movement has not accepted that and that the 

use of force has been something that the MEK is willing to do and 

it separates it from the Green Movement, let us accept that. That 

has been a reality. That doesn’t necessarily make it the right position of the United States to back just pacifists in the world. Backing people who fight against tyranny is also something the United 

States could be doing. 

Colonel, you seemed like you are anxious to say something. 

Colonel MARTIN. I thank you, sir. 

One point that needs to be pointed out, in the membership of the 

MEK inside Camp Ashraf there are only two people that were involved in the organization in the early 1970s, and I am holding 

their names for their own safety. One was in prison with Rajavi, 

47

and the other one I know personally, and he is a good friend. I can 

honestly say neither one of those two people were involved. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, it is very difficult for me, after seeing 

the video that we had, which is very clear evidence of a massacre 

of unarmed people, to then in some way focus attention on perhaps 

somewhere they might have people in their organization that believe in violence in order to overthrow the Mullah regime in Iran. 

And that is something that in some way should turn us off toward 

that organization. 

About the massacre, how do we feel about whether this terrorist 

designation, which it seems impossible for the United States, as 

compared to all of our European allies, to get rid of this designation, did it play a significant role in the decision of whoever it was 

to commit this massacre? Is there any reason for us to believe that 

if they were not designated a terrorist organization that the person 

who ordered them to go in with those troops and shoot down unarmed civilians might not have issued that order? 

Colonel? 

Colonel MARTIN. I will lead out on that one, sir. 

I think yes. Because the State Department has been basically 

moving at the pace of a startled snail. And when you see the 

Maliki government doing things wrong—and to include the attack 

2 years ago—and our State Department and our Government does 

nothing about it but we keep them on the terrorist list, claiming 

they are a bunch of bad people, we are giving justification. And 

then when the attack is over, we also do nothing about it. 

We remember the pictures of pictures of Abu Ghraib. This, Abu 

Ghraib, was minor compared to what happened at Camp Ashraf. 

It was very hideous, and it was very wrong. But all of a sudden 

our whole Nation was enflamed, and the world was enflamed, and 

it was a recruiting tool for the al Qaeda. But then we see blatant 

murder and then we look the other way. That just encourages 

more. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. The point is very well made, Colonel. 

I think that there are consequences to political designations, and 

consequences in the actions of the people who order them and the 

people who are decision makers in other countries, which leads us 

to Prime Minister Maliki. Does this slaughter that we have seen 

of the people in Camp Ashraf indicate that the government now of 

Prime Minister Maliki is perhaps in a subservient position to the 

Iranian Mullah regime? 

Colonel MARTIN. If I may again, sir, I see him subservient to 

three different elements. One is the Iranian regime, two is Hakim, 

and three is Muqtada al-Sadr. 

And we saw this even in the execution of Saddam. Muqtada alSadr was the one who said to his followers, Saddam will not live 

to see the light of a new year. And then suddenly Task Force 134 

gets a call from Maliki himself saying, I want Saddam turned over 

tomorrow. And you remember the spectacle of that. 

Maliki is taking orders from three different elements. And, as 

you recall, Allawi won the election but Maliki would not follow the 

constitution and work with Allawi. And, as a result, Allawi won the 

election but he lost the government. 

48

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well the Mullah regime obviously—let me 

just say, Dr. Takeyh, you have suggested that actually the MEK 

is not a major force in this part of the world, that in Iraq they are 

not considered to be an important player——

Mr. TAKEYH. In Iraq? 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Excuse me. In Iran. They are not a major 

part of the resistance or the opposition. Why would the Mullah regime be so concerned about them if they weren’t a player? 

Mr. TAKEYH. Oh, the paranoid politics of the Islamic Republic are 

beyond my comprehension. They are concerned about every expression of dissent. That is what totalitarian governments are like. 

They try to squash any form of dissent. But in terms of array of 

forces that could displace their current regime, I don’t think MEK 

would play a role in that. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I am not sure what role MEK will play. I am 

not sure what their position is in terms of the people of Iran and 

the Green Movement, et cetera, as well as the Mullahs. But it does 

seem to be clear that Maliki, the Prime Minister of Iraq, thought 

that he was doing a favor for his buddies in Tehran in committing 

this massacre. 

Let’s go to a little bit about the relocation and such. Are all of 

you suggesting then that relocation in the United States is what 

you think will probably be the end result of this? 

Mr. TAKEYH. I suggest in my testimony it should come under the 

auspices of the United Nations Refugee Commission. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right. But the United Nations is located in 

New York, I think. 

Mr. TAKEYH. Well, it has offices all over the place. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Maybe we could house them in the U.N. in 

New York. Yes. 

Dr. MORSCH. Mr. Chairman, I think that the United States 

should be prepared to take all or the majority of them. But I do 

think that many other countries, as we are seeing in Europe, who 

are unilaterally taking actions in Libya and other places that they 

think are in the best interests on the world stage, I believe there 

is tremendous momentum, critical mass building. And I believe if 

the United States would take a lead—or the U.N.—I believe we 

would find a host of countries that would be willing to take the 

members of Ashraf. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Colonel Martin certainly has made that 

point, that we have got citizens from various countries there. And 

the witness that we had at our briefing prior to the hearing today 

was a young lady from Canada. And maybe, Doctor, you could let 

me know, how many people there at Camp Ashraf would you suggest have such ties? What percentage of that 3,400 have ties to 

elsewhere? 

Dr. MORSCH. While I was there, I did not consider whether they 

were citizens or whether they had Green Cards or visas. But I was 

impressed with the number of people who had received graduate 

and postgraduate degrees in developed countries, in Europe and in 

the United States and Canada. I mean, many, many, many hundreds of the residents were very well educated, spoke very good 

English, and obviously had ties with the West. 

49

If you would poll the people behind me, my guess is half of them 

have family members today in Ashraf. And as I have traveled the 

world and met Iranians from throughout the world, there are a lot 

of families that are following their loved ones in Ashraf, and I have 

to assume there is some type of legal status tied to that. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Do the other two witnesses agree with this 

assessment? Maybe half the people in Camp Ashraf have families 

that could in some way take care of them if they are forced out of 

Ashraf? 

Colonel MARTIN. I would have to agree, sir. 

I would have to make one point to an earlier comment. If we put 

them in the United Nations building, we would have to take them 

out once a year when Ahmadinijad comes for his annual rant. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thanks. 

Mr. MUKASEY. I should point out that the strong statements from 

the European Parliament introduced actually a European plan to 

first provide security at Ashraf via UNAMI, a United Nations entity, with the help of the U.S. military and then, at the same time, 

with the EU and the U.S. to resettle residents in Europe and the 

U.S. But that when the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, Ambassador Jeffrey, says that he supports the idea of resettling these folks within 

Iraq, that is not helpful. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, let’s just note that my observation—

personal observation is that the people involved in this movement 

are highly educated people and highly motivated and have a great 

sense of unity. And while the United States has been in Iraq—

which I will close with a closing statement about the wisdom of us 

going into Iraq in the first place, considering what this incident is 

telling us about the Iraqi Government—but as long as we were 

there, we could make promises, and we did make promises to the 

people of Camp Ashraf. And the people of Camp Ashraf kept their 

word to us, and they gave us intelligence information and disarmed 

and were as sincere in their pledges to us as we were to them. 

However, the reality is the United States is leaving Iraq within 

2 years. I believe the American presence in Iraq will be probably 

nothing. I mean, we will probably not have combat troops in Iraq. 

That means we will no longer be able to protect these individuals 

with the promise of protection from the United States. I would 

hope that we can work together to try to make sure that these individuals have an alternative that gives them safety and will not—

but let me tell you what is unfortunate about this is that the closing of Camp Ashraf—and I disagree with you, Dr. Takeyh, on 

this—and that is, I think the Mullah regime does see the MEK and 

does know they are there. That is why this massacre took place. 

And I think that disbanding Camp Ashraf and just scurrying away, 

retreating from the border of Iran, will be viewed by the Mullahs 

not as—oh, look how sincere the Americans are being—but will be 

looked at as a retreat. And, basically, it will encourage the dictatorship and the Mullahs to even have a tougher grip on their own people because of the fact that we now are taking 3,400 souls who are 

standing against their dictatorship and we are disbanding them 

and we are demobilizing them. 

50

And that is unfortunate. That is an unfortunate reality. But the 

reality is, is that we can no longer protect them once we are out 

of the country. 

But I think that we should be proud as when we were there in 

Iraq that we didn’t send the wrong message to the Mullahs that 

we were cowards and that we didn’t believe that only pacifists can 

bring down the Mullah regime. It won’t be just pacifism. It will be 

people with courage and people who stand up, people who have 

their own motives, whether they have their own religious group or 

their own social group. 

There were groups of patriots during the American Revolution 

that brought down the British control of America. And they all 

weren’t just of one mind. Some of them, in fact, were religious fanatics. Some were Christian cults that lived in the United States 

who supported us. And that is our history. But they had their 

rights, and they were willing to fight for them. 

So let me just leave with one last thought, and I want to give 

you a chance to express a last thought, and then I want to express 

maybe 1 minute worth of thought. 

Mr. Carnahan. 

Mr. CARNAHAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, again, I just want to personally say to the chairman for his 

work on this issue, his leadership, and leading our delegation 

there, demanding answers to tough questions, both from the Maliki 

government but also from our own Government in terms of how we 

go forward, bring people to justice, and find out how we can go forward to find a safe haven for the people there. So, again, thank you 

and thank you to the witnesses who are bringing your expertise to 

bear here today. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right. And I will finish with this. 

Number one, there will be a list of questions offered to the State 

Department concerning the massacre at Camp Ashraf, including 

when they knew about what and who gave orders for our military 

to leave, et cetera, et cetera, and I detail some of those questions. 

There will be official lists of questions from this committee to the 

State Department. And we will expect an answer. If we do not get 

an answer, I will proceed with making sure that we have a followup hearing until those questions are answered. 

And, finally, let me just leave with this thought: The invasion 

and the liberation, you might say, of Iraq was something that I 

supported. I mean, I trusted President Bush that he knew what he 

was doing, that he had a good grip on how to make sure that we 

got that job done, and that it was necessary, that it was absolutely 

necessary for us to go into that country with heavy armored divisions in such a big way. 

I was wrong. I was wrong. I was wrong to put my trust in his 

judgment. I worked for the President of the United States, and I 

assumed that he had a similar responsible position toward the 

American people and sending the American military, as did the 

President who I worked for, which was Ronald Reagan. And that 

was not the case. 

The United States has paid a dear price, probably $1 trillion of 

wealth, which may have been one of the major factors in kicking 

us into this horrible economic crisis that we are on the edge of 

51

today, as well as thousands and thousands of our young people 

dead and many tens of thousands more who lost parts of their bodies or their faces were blown off or they now live in misery because 

their home lives are destroyed. And that is the price we Americans 

have paid. 

And Americans don’t mind fighting for freedom. Americans don’t. 

That is our job. We come from every race, every religion, and every 

ethnic group. So we can show the world there is a better way. 

But the ingratitude that I have found in our visit to Iraq was 

overwhelming. The people of Iraq—at least those in their government, the government of Prime Minister Maliki—showed absolutely no gratitude and in fact were contemptuous of the price that 

the Americans have paid to dislodge the Saddam Hussein dictatorship. 

Let us note that Saddam Hussein murdered hundreds of thousands of his people, many more than have been killed in that 7-

year, 8-year period since Americans dislodged Saddam Hussein. 

And many of the people being killed in Iraq are being killed by 

their fellow Iraqis. And here we just jumped in there and have paid 

such a heavy price. 

Well, we Americans think it is okay as long as—you know, as I 

say, we have got a place in the world. We have got to show the 

world there is a better way where people can get along and not explode car bombs off because they worship God in a different way. 

And that is what we are all about. 

I think that the members of the MEK that I have met here in 

the United States exemplify a commitment to freedom. And no 

matter how activists or what their organization did in the past, 

they are committed to freedom and democracy today. And certainly 

the slaughter there at that camp, we should have taken more caution and more care to see that that did not happen. And I think 

we all believe that. 

So, with that said, when we make decisions in the future about 

what countries we are going to commit to and what we are going 

to jump into in a big way, we are going to have a lot of second 

thoughts about that. Americans are going to have a lot of second 

thoughts about that. In the meantime, we are going to do our best 

to live to what our traditions and our values are all about as a people. 

I want to thank each and every one of you. Doctor, you were courageous to come here knowing that you were going to get the hardest questions. But I want to thank our other witnesses as well, because you have all contributed to a better understanding of this 

issue that has led to this horrible massacre. Let’s just make sure 

that no more of these people who are friends of freedom are murdered by the Mullah regime and Tehran or by their stooges who 

now control the Government of Iraq. 

Thank you very much. This hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 5:20 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

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MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY COLONEL WES MARTIN, USA (RETIRED) 

(FORMER BASE COMMANDER OF CAMP ASHRAF)

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MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY GARY MORSCH, M.D. (FORMER

COMMANDER OF FORWARD OPERATION BASE ASHRAF)


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[NOTE: Additional papers by Mr. Schneebaum, submitted for the record by Dr. 

Morsch, are not reprinted here but are available in committee records.]

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