UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON

INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

REPORT ON

SAUDI ARABIA

MAY 2003
U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom

800 North Capitol Street, NW

Suite 790

Washington, DC 20002

202-523-3240

202-523-5020 (fax)

www.uscirf.gov
United States Commission on International Religious Freedom

Felice D. Gaer

Chair

Michael K. Young

Vice Chair

Firuz Kazemzadeh

Richard D. Land

Bishop William F. Murphy

Leila Nadya Sadat

Nina Shea

The Honorable Charles R. Stith

The Honorable Shirin Tahir-Kheli*

Joseph R. Crapa

Executive Director

* Effective March 24, 2003, Ambassador Shirin Tahir-Kheli was appointed Special Assistant to 

the President and Senior Director for Democracy, Human Rights and International Operations by 

National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice. This appointment necessitated Amb. Tahir-Kheli's 

resignation from the Commission.
STAFF OF THE U.S. COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

May 2003

Tad Stahnke, Deputy Director for Policy

David Dettoni, Deputy Director for Outreach

Christy Hines, Director of Government Affairs

Anne Johnson, Director of Communications

Carmelita Pratt, Director of Administration

Dwight N. Bashir, Policy Analyst

Patricia M. Carley, Senior Policy Analyst

Deborah DuCre, Receptionist

Scott Flipse, Policy Analyst

Allison B. Hollabaugh, Research Assistant

Susan Kemp, Communications Assistant

Caitlin Lacy, Intern

Jacqueline A. Mitchell, Executive Assistant

James W. Newton, Policy Analyst

Stephen R. Snow, Senior Policy Analyst

Eileen A. Sullivan, Deputy Director of Communications

John W. Tai, Policy Analyst
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

__________

UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

Washington, DC, May 1, 2003

The PRESIDENT

The White House

 DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: On behalf of the United States Commission on International 

Religious Freedom, I am transmitting to you the Commission’s Report on Saudi Arabia, 

prepared in compliance with section 202(a)(2) of the International Religious Freedom Act of 

1998, 22 U.S.C. 6401 et seq., P.L. 105-292, as amended by P.L. 106-55 and P.L. 107-228.

 We would welcome the opportunity to discuss with you this Report, and the policy 

recommendations that it contains. 

 Sincerely, 

 FELICE D. GAER

Chair 

Enclosure

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

__________

UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

Washington, DC, May 1, 2003

Hon. COLIN POWELL

Secretary of State

Department of State

 DEAR MR. SECRETARY: On behalf of the United States Commission on International 

Religious Freedom, I am transmitting to you the Commission’s Report on Saudi Arabia, 

prepared in compliance with section 202(a)(2) of the International Religious Freedom Act of 

1998, 22 U.S.C. 6401 et seq., P.L. 105-292, as amended by P.L. 106-55 and P.L. 107-228.

 We would welcome the opportunity to discuss with you this Report, and the policy 

recommendations that it contains. 

 Sincerely, 

FELICE D. GAER

Chair

Enclosure
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

__________

UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

Washington, DC, May 1, 2003

Hon. DENNIS HASTERT

Speaker of the House

U.S. House of Representatives

 DEAR MR. SPEAKER: On behalf of the United States Commission on International Religious 

Freedom, I am transmitting to you the Commission’s Report on Saudi Arabia, prepared in 

compliance with section 202(a)(2) of the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, 22 

U.S.C. 6401 et seq., P.L. 105-292, as amended by P.L. 106-55 and P.L. 107-228.

 We would welcome the opportunity to discuss with you this Report, and the policy 

recommendations that it contains. 

 Sincerely, 

FELICE D. GAER

Chair

Enclosure

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

__________

UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

Washington, DC, May 1, 2003

Hon. TED STEVENS

President Pro Tempore

U.S. Senate

 DEAR MR. STEVENS: On behalf of the United States Commission on International Religious 

Freedom, I am transmitting to you the Commission’s Report on Saudi Arabia, prepared in 

compliance with section 202(a)(2) of the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, 22 

U.S.C. 6401 et seq., P.L. 105-292, as amended by P.L. 106-55 and P.L. 107-228.

 We would welcome the opportunity to discuss with you this Report, and the policy 

recommendations that it contains. 

 Sincerely, 

FELICE D. GAER

Chair 

Enclosure
1

SAUDI ARABIA

A. Introduction

According to the State Department, freedom of religion does not exist in Saudi Arabia. 

Saudi Arabia is a uniquely repressive case where the government forcefully and almost 

completely limits the public practice or expression of religion to one interpretation: a narrow and 

puritanical version of Islam based on the Wahhabi doctrine. Consequently, those Saudis and 

foreign contract workers who do not adhere to the Saudi government’s interpretation of Islam are 

subject to severe religious freedom violations. Among the most serious abuses and forms of 

discrimination are: 

• Virtually complete prohibitions on establishing non-Wahhabi places of worship, the 

public expression of non-Wahhabi religion, the wearing of non-prescribed religious dress 

and symbols, and the presence of identifiable clerics of any religion other than the 

government’s interpretation of Islam;

• The harassment, detention, arrest, torture, and subsequent deportation by government 

authorities of Christian foreign workers for worshipping in private – with many forced to 

go to great lengths to conceal private religious practice in order to avoid these abuses;

• The detention, imprisonment, and, in some cases, torture of Shi’a clerics and religious 

scholars for their religious views, which differ from those of the government;

• The interpretation and enforcement of religious law in Saudi Arabia, which affects every 

aspect of women’s lives and results in serious violations of their human rights; and

• The offensive and discriminatory language found in Saudi government-sponsored school 

textbooks, sermons in mosques, and articles and commentary in the media about Jews, 

Christians, and non-Wahhabi streams of Islam.

Despite occasional disagreements over regional issues and a growing public debate on the 

direction of U.S.-Saudi relations following the attacks of September 11, 2001, official U.S. 

relations with Saudi Arabia remain close. The Commission, however, shares the State 

Department’s view that freedom of religion does not exist in Saudi Arabia, and notes that 

advancing human rights, including religious freedom, has not been a public feature of the 

bilateral relationship. Indeed, some have argued that the U.S. government has refrained from 

criticizing human rights practices in Saudi Arabia, and has even gone so far as to restrict the 

rights of Americans to do so. 

The Commission believes that U.S. efforts to encourage Saudi Arabia to comply with its 

international commitments to protect religious freedom should be strengthened significantly and 

made more transparent instead of being relegated to private discussions. As with other countries 

where serious human rights violations exist, the U.S. government should more frequently 

identify these problems and publicly acknowledge that they are significant issues in the bilateral 

relationship.
2

To that end, the Commission makes several specific recommendations for U.S. policy 

presented in Section G of this report. 

B. Demographic Information

Saudi Arabia has an estimated population of 23 million that includes between 6 and 7 

million foreign contract workers.1 The 16-17 million Saudi nationals are exclusively Arab and 

85-90 percent are Sunni Muslims. Shi’a Muslims, including Ismailis,2 are concentrated 

primarily in the Eastern Province and constitute 8-10 percent of Saudi nationals. Approximate 

numbers of foreign contract workers include: Indians (1.5 million), Bangladeshis (1 million), 

Egyptians (1 million), Pakistanis (900,000), Filipinos (800,000), Sri Lankans (300,000), 

Palestinians (250,000), Lebanese (150,000), Eritreans and Ethiopians (40,000), Americans 

(40,000), and British (27,000). Foreign workers in Saudi Arabia are primarily Muslims of 

diverse cultural and religious backgrounds. Among the non-Saudis, there is also a large 

community of Christians, including the Filipino population that is primarily Roman Catholic, as 

well as smaller communities of Hindus, Buddhists, Jews, and others.3

Foreign workers under contract with private Saudi employment agencies account for 

close to half of Saudi Arabia’s work force – and make up an even higher percentage in the 

private sector.4 They play an important role in the Saudi economy, particularly in the oil, 

banking, and service sectors. Employers must act as sponsors to allow foreign workers to remain 

in the country. Employers’ permission is required for foreign workers to travel within or to leave 

the country, and passports are routinely held by employers and occasionally confiscated by the 

government in order to control movement and, in some cases, reportedly to keep foreign workers 

in the country against their will.5

C. Religious Freedom Conditions

1. Prohibitions on Non-Wahhabi Public Religious Practice and Expression 

As a result of an alliance between 18th century Islamic reformer Muhammad ibn Abd alWahhab and tribal chief Muhammad bin Saud more than 250 years ago, the Saudi government 

today imposes and enforces, in collaboration with the religious establishment, an exclusivist 

religious ideology on all residents of Saudi Arabia.6 There are large communities of Muslims 

from a variety of different doctrinal schools of Islam residing in Saudi Arabia, among both 

Saudis and foreign workers from throughout the Muslim world. Moreover, estimates of nonMuslim foreign workers are as high as 2 million. Yet, the public manifestation and practice of 

religion in Saudi Arabia is limited to that prescribed by one interpretation and presentation of 

Islam: the Sunni branch of Islam as interpreted by Abd al-Wahhab within the Hanbali school of 

jurisprudence.7 

The virtual elimination of the public practice of any religion other than Wahhabi Islam is 

patently contrary to the guarantees set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 

other international human rights instruments for the “freedom, either alone or in community with 

others and in public or private, to manifest [religion].”8

The official prohibitions are far-reaching, and affect both Muslims and non-Muslims. No 

church, Hindu temple, synagogue, or other non-Muslim public place of worship may exist in 
3

Saudi Arabia. There are only a few Shi’a mosques in the entire country, and the display of 

distinctive Shi’a motifs inside these mosques is prohibited. Construction or expansion of Shi’a 

mosques requires government approval, and the Shi’a community refuses government offers to 

build mosques for them because of the prohibition on Shi’a motifs and other government 

controls over the operation of those mosques. Shi’a funeral shrines and hosainyas (religious 

community centers) are prohibited. Numerous Muslim religious landmarks, holy sites, and 

mosques have been demolished by the Saudi authorities over the years, because these sites are 

associated with votive offerings, praying at saints’ tombs and graves, and other prayer rituals 

that, from the Wahhabi point of view, are prohibited because they could lead to shirk

(polytheism; literally “association”). 

Saudi officials prohibit a number of Muslim practices that are common to Muslims 

around the world, including the public commemoration of the birth of the Prophet Muhammad. 

Wearing religious symbols or jewelry of any kind, whether Muslim or non-Muslim, is also 

prohibited. Saudi authorities permit the celebration of the Shi’a holiday of Ashura in Qatif, 

where Shi’a Muslims predominate, provided that the celebrants do not engage in public marches 

or assemblies. 

The government strictly prohibits the public teaching and spreading of Islam within Saudi 

Arabia by non-Wahhabi Muslims – including Sunni and Shi’a Muslims. Non-Muslim public 

religious persuasion is also prohibited.

Historically, relations between the Shi’a community and the Saudi religious 

establishment have been strained because “the Wahhabis consider the rituals of the Shi’a to be 

the epitome of shirk...especially the Ashura mourning celebrations, the passion play reenacting 

Husayn’s death at Karbala, and popular votive rituals carried out at shrines and graves.”9 

Members of the official religious establishment have reportedly issued fatwas (religious edicts) 

declaring the Shi’a to be outside the pale of Islam and authorizing the state to prevent them, 

including forcibly, from practicing certain aspects of their religion.

During its visit to Saudi Arabia in March 2001, a Commission delegation was informed 

by government officials that public worship by non-Muslims in Saudi Arabia is prohibited for 

several reasons. First, they claimed the existence of a hadith (saying of the Prophet Muhammad) 

to the effect that there cannot be two religions in the Arabian Peninsula. No other country on the 

Arabian Peninsula has a similar interpretation; none has a complete prohibition on non-Muslim 

places of worship.10 Second, officials claimed that, as the keepers of Islam’s two Holy Mosques 

– in Mecca and Medina – Saudi Arabia has a special responsibility to preserve the sanctity of the 

entire country and that to allow non-Muslim worship would incur opposition from Muslims all 

over the world. Despite this claim, there is no evidence that suggests that Muslims would object 

to non-Muslim places of worship in Saudi Arabia. Indeed, churches, synagogues, or other places 

of worship exist throughout the Muslim world. 

Saudi officials also asserted to the Commission that there are no Saudi non-Muslims; all 

non-Muslims are foreign contract workers who are required, including by employment contract, 

to abide by Saudi laws and customs. However, under international law, states must protect the 

fundamental rights, including religious freedom, of all individuals under their jurisdiction, 

whether citizens or foreign-born.11 Saudi officials also claimed that allowing public displays of 
4

non-Muslim religious practice would be seen as a “provocation” and would offend the 

sensibilities of Saudi Muslims. In the Commission’s view, this problem should be addressed by 

the government actively promoting tolerance. Instead, as discussed below, the Saudi education 

system, official media, and some official religious institutions reportedly promote intolerance of 

non-Muslims, as well as of Muslims who do not conform to the official Wahhabi interpretation 

of Islam.

A number of the justifications for restrictions on public religious practice in Saudi Arabia 

are, in the government’s view, grounded in religious doctrine. This assertion raises troubling 

issues, in that quite severe restrictions on the freedom of religion are justified by a government in 

terms of adherence to its interpretation of religious norms. Nevertheless, the Commission 

believes that religious beliefs standing alone cannot prevail as a justification for these 

government violations of the internationally guaranteed freedom to manifest religion as protected 

in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political 

Rights, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child.12

2. Prohibitions on Non-Wahhabi Religious Teaching

Saudi authorities do not permit the importation or dissemination of Shi’a religious 

literature and educational materials. All Shi’a books are banned.13 Since 1979, when the Grand 

Mosque in Mecca was taken over by Saudi extremists influenced by the Iranian revolution, the 

government has also restricted Saudi Shi’a scholars and pilgrims from going to Shi’a learning 

centers in Iran, though these restrictions have eased somewhat as result of the thaw in SaudiIranian relations in recent years. 

The government also prohibits non-Muslim clergy from entering the country to conduct 

religious services for foreign workers. This prohibition falls particularly hard on Catholics and 

Orthodox Christians who require the services of a priest in order to engage in collective worship. 

Customs officials regularly confiscate Bibles and other religious material when Christian foreign 

workers arrive at the airport from their home countries initially or return from a vacation.

3. Criminalization of Apostasy and Blasphemy

Apostasy, defined as the abandonment of one’s Muslim faith or changing from Islam to 

another faith, is an offense punishable by death. There have been several reported cases of 

executions of individuals found to be apostates in Saudi Arabia, though none in the last few 

years.

Nevertheless, the government continues to prosecute individuals charged with blasphemy 

– in some cases death sentences have been handed down – although the number of cases has 

decreased significantly in recent years.14 In January 2003, a Yemeni national, Hail al-Masri, was 

reportedly sentenced to death for “insulting the religion of his roommate.”15 Originally, a lower 

court in Jeddah sentenced the man to two years in prison and 600 lashes; however, a higher court 

rejected that ruling and subsequently sentenced him to death. His fate is unknown. A Shi’a 

Muslim, Mohsen al-Turki, is reportedly in hiding to avoid a blasphemy charge that could be also 

punishable by death.16 Some Christian foreign workers informed the Commission that the Saudi 

legal system encourages dishonest employers to resort to the threat of arrest on false charges 
5

such as blasphemy or slander in order to pressure workers to renounce their legal claims to 

severance pay and other benefits.17

4. Restrictions on Private Religious Practice

In recent years, the Saudi government has taken the position publicly on several 

occasions that all residents of Saudi Arabia – both Muslim and non-Muslim and including 

foreign workers – may worship freely in private.18 As discussed above, allowing members of 

some religious communities to worship only in private falls far short of international legal 

guarantees for the freedom of religion. Moreover, the freedom to worship privately in 

community with others is not, in fact, respected in Saudi Arabia, as numerous foreign Christians 

attending house church worship services have been detained without charge for months, beaten, 

imprisoned, and deported for engaging in such worship. In practice, for most foreign nonMuslims, Saudi restrictions on the freedom to engage in private communal worship is 

tantamount to a requirement to worship in secret.

Numerous American and other foreign workers in Saudi Arabia have told the 

Commission that what constitutes permitted private worship, as opposed to prohibited public 

worship, is often unclear. The guidelines that do exist are often not followed by either the 

Committee for the Propagation of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice (mutawaa) or the police. 

Saudi officials generally define “private” worship as that which takes place inside one’s own 

home or private quarters. Saudi Minister of Islamic Affairs Shaykh Saleh al-Shaykh outlined to 

the Commission three conditions for a “private” religious service: (1) that the venue does not 

become specialized for this purpose; (2) that public invitations are not sent out; and (3) that the 

service is not obvious to the public (i.e. parking, crowds, traffic).19 Religious services held on 

the premises of foreign embassies or the ARAMCO compound20 also fall within the category of 

“private” worship. However, the vast majority of foreigners living in Saudi Arabia are not able 

to enter the diplomatic quarter or the ARAMCO compound for worship services, and most 

embassies cannot accommodate large numbers of people.

Because the guidelines for private worship are vague, and because the police or mutawaa

have broken up services that appear to fall within the guidelines that do exist, many non-Muslim 

foreign workers worship together in secret for fear of government reprisal and arrest. 

Underground churches function in secrecy in private homes, but usually do not meet on Sundays

in order to avoid unwanted attention. Numerous foreign workers interviewed by the 

Commission spoke of the great effort required to organize private communal worship and avoid 

detection by the Saudi authorities. 

Saudi officials have raided private religious gatherings, leading to the arrest, detention, 

and deportation of foreign contract workers. For example, on July 18, 2001, Prabhu Isaac, an 

Indian national, was arrested after two sizeable farewell parties (350-400 guests each) were given 

in his honor at a wedding hall in a sparsely populated section of Jeddah. There were Christian 

elements to both events: Bible reading, prayer, hymn singing, and sermons. However, no Saudi 

nationals were invited, though one was apparently present, and there was no religious literature 

distributed or speeches made in Arabic. Mr. Isaac’s arrest was followed one week later by that 

of Eskinder Menghis, an Eritrean national who did not attend the gatherings but whose name 

appeared on the rental agreements for the wedding hall. Altogether, 14 Christians of various 
6

nationalities were detained and imprisoned in Jeddah between July and September 2001 in what 

appeared to be a crackdown on a loose network of private Christian “home fellowships.” 21 All 

were arrested and detained without charge. Several reported harsh prison conditions (and, in 

some cases, beatings) and being subjected to repeated interrogations.22 All were deported by 

March 2002 after, for some, more than six months in prison. None of the detainees was 

permitted to communicate with family, legal counsel, or consular officials. 

Dennis Moreno-Lacalle, a Filipino national among those detained, informed the 

Commission that after being arrested in August 2001, he was forced to sign a statement in 

Arabic, without access to an interpreter, lawyer, or consular official. Mr. Moreno-Lacalle 

reported that he was subsequently held in solitary confinement for 13 days, repeatedly urged to 

convert to Islam in order to be released, and witnessed first-hand the flogging of three Ethiopian 

Christians on January 28, 2002.23

According to the State Department, in April 2002, at least 26 Christians were detained by 

the Saudi police and the mutawaa in a series of raids on private homes where worship services 

were being held in a suburb of Riyadh. In May 2002, 11 Christians, primarily Ethiopian and 

Eritrean, were detained in Jeddah and Riyadh for allegedly engaging in “activities that violated 

restrictions against public worship.”24 By September, most had been deported and the rest were 

released without charge.25 

Treatment of foreign nationals in Saudi Arabia appears to vary based on one’s 

nationality, religion, sex, nature of work, and place of residence. Residents in Saudi Arabia have 

told the Commission that nationals from developing countries such as Filipinos, Indians, 

Bangladeshis, Sri Lankans, Africans, and other Asians, receive far worse treatment and 

experience greater restrictions than Americans or Europeans. In addition, those residing in 

special compounds – such as the diplomatic quarter and the ARAMCO compound – report 

having more freedom to practice their faith than those who do not.

5. Enforcement of a Narrow Set of Religious Principles

The Committee on the Rights of the Child, a UN treaty monitoring body with three of its 

10 members from Middle Eastern Muslim countries, concluded in February 2001 with regard to 

Saudi Arabia that: “Noting the universal values of equality and tolerance inherent in Islam, the 

Committee observes that narrow interpretations of Islamic texts by State authorities are impeding 

the enjoyment of many rights protected under the Convention.” The Committee recommended 

that Saudi Arabia “take all effective measures, enacting or rescinding legislation where 

necessary, to prevent and eliminate discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief....”26 

a. Abuses by the Mutawaa

Enforcement of religious conformity among the population at large is primarily the 

responsibility of the mutawaa. Formally known as the Committee for the Propagation of Virtue 

and the Prevention of Vice, the mutawaa is a security force of approximately 4,500 persons that 

monitors and enforces standards of public dress and behavior. The mutawaa is a government 

entity, and its chairman has the status of minister. 
7

Members of the mutawaa may admonish any individual or group whose public behavior 

they deem in violation of Islamic principles as defined by the government. They may enforce 

attendance of men at mosques, closure of stores and other businesses during prayer time, public 

abstinence from eating, drinking, and smoking – for Muslims and non-Muslims alike – during 

the fasting month of Ramadan, strict dress codes for both men and women regardless of religious 

affiliation, and strict segregation of the sexes. They have the legal authority to detain persons for 

up to 24 hours before transporting detainees to the police.

The mutawaa is intrusive. They arbitrarily raid private homes and exercise broadly 

defined, vague powers, including the ability to use physical force and detain individuals without 

due process. The State Department reported in its Annual Report on International Religious 

Freedom – 2002 that: “In certain areas, both the Mutawwa’in and religious vigilantes acting on 

their own harassed, assaulted, battered, arrested, and detained citizens and foreigners.” Several 

persons, both Saudi and non-Saudi, told the Commission that the mutawaa harass women for not 

complying with the dress code; detain men for appearing in public places with women who are 

not relatives; harass and detain female foreign workers arbitrarily; shear men’s hair if it is 

determined to violate imposed standards; detain without charge Saudis and non-Saudis for long 

periods of time; and whip and beat both Saudis and non-Saudis.27

In interviews with the Commission, several foreign workers reported that they had either 

themselves been harassed by the mutawaa or knew of people who had been harassed over the 

past several years. According to one interlocutor, many female foreign workers from developing 

countries fear leaving their homes because of the treatment they might receive from the 

mutawaa. Non-Muslim women reported being forced into mosques to pray, ordered to make 

sure headscarves cover the entire head, questioned on their way to work, and heckled. Other 

foreign workers expressed concern about “vigilantes” or volunteers who pose as mutawaa and 

cause additional problems, sometimes using excessive force. Some foreign workers stated that 

they fear complaining or reporting mistreatment by the mutawaa for fear of retaliation by their 

employers.

The UN Committee Against Torture released conclusions and recommendations in June 

2002 on the first Saudi report on its compliance with the Convention against Torture, which was 

ratified by Saudi Arabia in 1997.28 The Committee expressed concern over the vagueness of the 

legal provisions governing the powers of mutawaa “to proscribe conduct they identify as not 

conducive to public morality and safety.”29 Further, expressing concern that the activities of the 

mutawaa may violate the Convention, the Committee recommended that the mutawaa “exercise 

a clear and precise jurisdiction” without discrimination and in a manner regulated by law and 

subject to judicial review. 

b. Arrest and imprisonment of religious dissidents

Any individual who criticizes the government-imposed version of Islam or advocates a 

different interpretation of Islam faces possible arrest, detention, and imprisonment.30 The Saudi 

government continues to arrest and detain without charge prominent Shi’a clerics and religious 

scholars for their religious views. Several remain in prison and reportedly have been beaten or 

otherwise ill-treated. Several imams, both Sunni and Shi’a, who have spoken in opposition to 
8

government policies or against the official interpretation of Islam, have been harassed, arrested, 

and detained.31

In February 2002, the Saudi government released Shaykh Ali bin Ali al-Ghanim, a 

prominent Shi’a cleric, who was imprisoned in August 2000. He was never charged with any 

crime and was reportedly tortured in prison. According to the State Department, 16 Shi’a clerics 

remained in prison as of the end of December 2002.32

Saudi authorities occasionally have arrested and detained Ismaili clerics for allegedly 

practicing sorcery in Najran, a region in the southwest corner of Saudi Arabia. Historically, 

spurious charges of “sorcery” and “witchcraft” have been used by the Saudi authorities against 

non-Wahhabi Muslims. 

In April 2000 in Najran, after the mutawaa raided an Ismaili mosque, closed it down, and 

confiscated its religious literature, Ismailis confronted the security forces and serious unrest 

ensued. Ahmad bin Muhammad al-Khayat, an Ismaili cleric and, according to Saudi authorities, 

an illegal Yemeni immigrant, was arrested in the raid and charged with practicing sorcery while 

conducting a religion class for a small group of Ismailis at al-Mansura mosque.33 At a 

demonstration at the governor’s headquarters calling for the release of al-Khayat, Ismaili 

protesters fired guns and burned vehicles, killing at least one member of the security force and 

injuring others. Though there was no independent confirmation of the numbers killed, injured, or 

arrested in the days that followed, Ismaili leaders claimed that 40 Ismailis were killed and the 

Saudi government stated that five members of its security force were killed. Other reports 

indicated that two Ismailis were killed, several others were injured, and one member of the 

security force was killed. 

In February 2002, Amnesty International reported that three Ismaili tribal leaders were 

being held in “incommunicado detention, where they are at risk of torture or ill treatment.” 

Ismaili leader Sheikh Ahmed Turki al-Saab was arrested in Najran on January 15, 2002 because

he was quoted in a January 9, 2002 Wall Street Journal article claiming that Ismailis are 

discriminated against by Saudi officials. Two other Ismailis were also detained on February 4. 

Amnesty International, citing Western diplomats in Riyadh, said the three men were detained 

“because they had not obtained prior approval from authorities to talk to the foreign press.” The 

State Department reports that in April 2002, Sheikh Turki al-Saab was sentenced to flogging and 

seven years imprisonment. 

In December 2002, King Fahd commuted the death sentences of 17 Ismailis involved in 

the unrest in Najran and reduced the prison sentences of others. Also in December, the Saudi 

government released elderly Ismaili leader Haj Muhammad Al-Saadi, who had been held in the 

Al-Hair maximum security prison for nearly three years for his involvement in the Najran 

demonstration. Yet, in April 2003, a press report alleged that Saudi authorities recently had 

begun flogging dozens of Ismailis involved in the April 2000 Najran incident.34

c. Discrimination against Shi’a

In addition to restrictions on religious freedom, Saudi Shi’a face widespread 

discrimination. Members of the Shi’a community informed the Commission that they are 
9

regularly discriminated against in government employment, especially with respect to national 

security positions, such as in the military or the Ministry of the Interior. The government also 

discriminates against Shi’a in higher education through unofficial restrictions on the number of 

Shi’a admitted to universities.35 Members of the Shi’a community also report unequal access to 

healthcare. There have also been credible reports that Shi’a testimony in various court cases is

discounted or rendered inadmissible by judges. Thousands of Shi’a, including several clerics, 

reportedly have had their passports confiscated. Also, many Shi’a are banned from leaving the 

country.36

6. Violations of Women’s Equal Right to Religious Freedom

The way religious law is interpreted and enforced in Saudi Arabia affects every aspect of 

the lives of both Saudi and foreign women and results in serious violations of their human 

rights.37 Force is used to threaten or compel women to act in ways prescribed by the mutawaa

and by the government’s interpretation of Sharia. 

The discrimination that affects women’s rights has other far-reaching consequences. For 

example, women must adhere to a strict dress code when appearing in public. Women can only 

be admitted to a hospital for medical treatment upon consent of a male relative. While women 

formally own 20 percent of Saudi businesses, they must deputize a male relative to represent 

them in financial transactions. Religiously-based directives limit women’s right to choose 

employment because, for instance, women are excluded from studying for certain professions 

such as engineering, journalism, and architecture. Women have no freedom of movement within 

the country and need to receive written permission from a male relative to travel inside or outside 

the country.38 Further, women cannot drive motor vehicles and can only ride in a vehicle driven 

by a close male relative or an employee or they risk arrest by the mutawaa or police. They also 

may not accept jobs in rural areas if an adult male relative is not able to accompany them. Thus, 

the restriction of freedom of thought, conscience, religion, and belief in Saudi Arabia has a 

particularly severe impact on the lives of women.

All the limitations on women’s conduct in public renders them particularly vulnerable to 

physical coercion by Saudi officials. Moreover, it is very difficult for women to obtain judicial 

redress for abuses committed by the mutawaa or other government officials.

The mutawaa’s role in enforcing public morality as it pertains to women came under 

unusual scrutiny in 2002. In March of that year, 15 girls were killed and at least 50 injured in a 

fire that broke out at a school for girls in Mecca. Press reports, including from the Saudi Press 

Agency, accused the mutawaa of interfering with rescue workers and preventing girls from 

leaving the burning building because many of them were “not covered” according to the Saudi 

dress code for females. The chief of police in Mecca initially was quoted as saying that the 

mutawaa may have been responsible for “trying to interfere” with the girls’ escape. Interior 

Minister Prince Naif ordered a full investigation that subsequently cleared the mutawaa of any 

wrongdoing. Saudi and international media, human rights non-governmental organizations 

(NGOs), and Saudi citizens expressed outrage at the initial findings of the investigation, 

demanded a more complete and transparent investigation, and asked for the resignation of the 

head of the Presidency of Girls’ Education (PGE), Ali Al-Murshid.39 Two weeks after the 
10

tragedy, Al-Murshid was asked to take early retirement by Crown Prince Abdullah and the PGE 

was subsequently merged with the Education Ministry.

The Saudi justice system does not grant women the same legal status as men. For 

example, in the country’s courts, the official interpretation of Sharia provides that in some 

circumstances “testimony by a man is said to be equivalent to the testimony of two women.”40 

Muslim women cannot freely choose a spouse because they are prohibited from marrying nonMuslims. The same limitation does not apply to Muslim men, who can choose whether to marry 

Muslims, Christians, or Jews. Daughters receive only half the inheritance awarded to their 

brothers. Women “must demonstrate legally specified grounds for divorce, but men may divorce 

without giving cause.”41 In September 2001, the Saudi government announced that women 

could obtain identity cards, although they need permission of a close male relative to do so.

Domestic violence is not regarded as a crime under Saudi law, and spousal abuse is 

prevalent.42 The State Department reports that foreign domestic workers are subject to forced 

confinement, withholding of food, beatings and other physical abuse, including rape.43 In 

interviews with the Commission, foreign women employed as domestic servants stated that they 

are especially prone to abuse and are often forbidden to leave the house in which they work for 

the entire duration of their stay in Saudi Arabia.44 In one case, the Commission was told of a 

foreign domestic worker who had become pregnant after being raped by her employer. She was 

subsequently imprisoned because it is illegal for female foreign workers to become pregnant in 

Saudi Arabia if they are not married. 

7. No Legal Protections for Religious Freedom

Saudi Arabia does not have a formal written constitution. In 1992, King Fahd introduced 

the “Basic Law” that declared the Koran and the Sunna (tradition) of the Prophet Muhammad as 

the constitution of the country and Islamic law (Sharia) as the basis of governance. The Basic 

Law bans arbitrary arrest, harassment, and entry to individual homes without legal authority; 

however, the authorities regularly do not adhere even to these explicit legal guidelines. The 

Basic Law does not include any protections for freedom of religion or belief.

The central institution of the Saudi Arabian government is the monarchy. There are no 

political parties or national elections. The leading members of the royal family choose the king 

from among themselves with the subsequent approval of the ulema (Wahhabi religious 

leaders).45 The king’s powers are limited only by the principles that he must observe the Sharia 

and other Saudi traditions. In practice, he also must retain a consensus of the Saudi royal family, 

the ulema, and other important elements in Saudi society. There is no public accountability of 

government policy. Legislation is introduced by resolution of the Council of Ministers, ratified 

by royal decree, and must be compatible with the government’s interpretation of Sharia. In 

1993, the King appointed a 60-member consultative council, eventually increased to 120 in 2001, 

which has limited powers to question cabinet members and propose new laws.46

Justice is administered according to the Sharia by a system of religious courts whose 

judges are appointed by the king on the recommendation of the Supreme Judicial Council, 

composed of 12 senior jurists. The king acts as the highest court of appeal and has the power to 

pardon.47 According to the Basic Law, the independence of the judiciary is protected by law, 
11

with Sharia as its primary reference. Despite a diversity of Muslims in Saudi Arabia, as well as 

non-Muslim foreign workers, the government’s interpretation of Sharia is imposed on all 

residents. Therefore, justice is administered through only one court system and judges may 

discount the testimony of individuals who do not adhere to the Wahhabi version of Islam.

Hudud punishments prescribed under Sharia law for criminal offenses are carried out by 

the state.48 Offenses subject to hudud punishments are theft, robbery, illicit sexual relations, 

false accusation of illicit sexual relations, drinking of alcohol, and apostasy. Specific 

punishments include flogging, amputation of limbs, beheading, and death by stoning. In recent 

years, authorities have not carried out death by stoning sentences. However, the UN Committee 

Against Torture has expressed concern about “the sentencing to, and imposition of, corporal 

punishments by judicial and administrative authorities, including, in particular, flogging and 

amputation of limbs, that are not in conformity with the Convention [Against Torture].”49

The Ministry of Justice, established in 1970, administers the more than 300 Sharia courts 

in Saudi Arabia. The Minister of Justice is appointed by the king from among the country’s most 

senior ulema. The ulema have significant political influence and include religious scholars, 

judges, lawyers, seminary leaders, and prayer leaders.50 Secrecy and the lack of internationally 

recognized standards of due process have long been distinctive features of the Saudi justice 

system. At present, the Saudi legal system is undergoing some change, both structurally and 

procedurally. A new criminal procedure code went into effect in May 2002 explicitly detailing 

the rights of the accused, along with regulations as to its implementation. A new law on the legal 

profession has also been issued and the nationwide registration of lawyers is expected to be 

completed within five years.51 Despite these changes, compliance with international human 

rights standards continues to be a major challenge for Saudi Arabia. 

Reporting on his October 2002 visit to Saudi Arabia, the UN Special Rapporteur on the 

Independence of Judges and Lawyers expressed several concerns about the justice system. He 

concluded that there is a “substantial lack” of transparency in the judicial system; prolonged 

“incommunicado” detention; lack of due process; lack of access to lawyers by the accused; lack 

of equality under the law; reliance by authorities on public confessions of the accused as 

evidence in court; and lack of access of accused foreign nationals to consular assistance.52 The 

Special Rapporteur made several recommendations, including the reform of criminal procedure 

to bring it into conformance with international standards.

8. Intolerance in the Saudi Education System and Media

The Saudi education system indoctrinates all students in the government’s favored 

interpretation of Islam, regardless of the convictions of the children or their parents. Some 

experts report that the Saudi education system, in its present state, promotes intolerance in its 

curriculum and its textbooks. Islamic religious education is mandatory in public schools at all 

levels and all public school children receive religious instruction that conforms to the official 

version of Islam. Some estimate that as much as 30-50 percent of the secondary school 

curriculum is based on religious teachings.53 Saudi interlocutors assert that while in primary and 

secondary school, they were forced to learn the Wahhabi interpretation of Islam and were told 

repeatedly that no other form of Islam, or any other religion for that matter, had any validity or 

truth and that they should not associate with members of other religious groups. Such mandatory 
12

indoctrination violates the principle articulated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 

and other international instruments that religious instruction in the schools shall be only in 

accordance with the convictions of the parents and the best interests and evolving capacities of 

the child.

Independent studies conducted in recent months indicate that official government 

textbooks, published by the Saudi Ministry of Education, include offensive and discriminatory 

language and, in some cases, promote intolerance and hatred of other religious groups.54 Among 

the major findings of these studies of the Saudi public education system are: (1) Islam –

specifically the Wahhabi interpretation – is presented as the only true religion and all other 

religions are considered invalid and misguided, including other streams of Islam such as Shi’ism 

and Sufism; (2) Christians and Jews repeatedly are labeled as infidels and enemies of Islam who 

should not be befriended or emulated, and are referred to in eighth grade textbooks as “apes” and 

pigs”55; (3) Jews are repeatedly referred to as a “wicked nation,” characterized by bribery, 

deception, and betrayal, among other things; (4) those who abandon Islam for another religion 

deserve to be killed, or at least imprisoned, if found guilty; (5) rote learning is emphasized rather 

than the development of analytical skills; and (6) Saudi education policy and curriculum 

discriminate against girls. These findings raise concerns regarding the promotion of intolerance 

in the public school system, as well as mandatory education in one religious doctrine for all 

students.

In meetings during a Commission visit to Saudi Arabia in March 2001, Saudi officials 

justified government prohibitions on public manifestation of religion in part by claiming that the 

Saudi people would not tolerate, and may violently oppose, such public religious expression. As 

noted above, even if indeed this is an accurate perception of societal attitudes, the government 

has other obligations to promote tolerance. The Commission believes the remedy lies not in 

perpetuating these views by suppressing public religious practice, but in promoting 

understanding and religious tolerance, including in its education system. In its May 2001 report, 

the Commission called on the U.S. government to “encourage the Saudi government to promote 

religious tolerance and respect toward all religions in their education system.” The UN 

Committee on the Rights of the Child has recommended that the Saudi government “make every 

effort, including public education campaigns, to combat intolerance on the grounds of religion or 

other belief.”56 

Like the education system, intolerant and offensive messages are also found in other 

important elements of Saudi society such as mosques and the media, which is largely controlled 

by the government. There have been numerous reports that religious leaders use their sermons in 

mosques to deliver intolerant and discriminatory messages about Jews and Christians.57 Such 

examples include: “Christians and Jews are infidels...and enemies of Allah;” “O God, destroy 

the tyrant Jews;” “Muslims must educate their children to Jihad...and to hatred of the Jews;” and 

“Jews and Christians...are descendants of apes and pigs.”58

Anti-Semitic and anti-Western sentiment also remains prevalent in the governmentcontrolled media.59 Numerous articles and commentary in the Saudi press are openly antiJewish, offensive, and discriminatory: the “Zionist movement” is labeled as evil; blood libel 

accusations are made; hatred toward Jews is encouraged; Jews are said to be trying to take over 

the world; and the existence of the Holocaust is denied.60
13

D. Saudi Global Export of the Wahhabi Ideology 

The Commission is concerned about numerous credible reports that the Saudi 

government and members of the royal family directly and indirectly fund the global propagation 

of an exclusivist religious ideology, Wahhabism, which allegedly promotes hatred, intolerance, 

and other abuses of human rights, including violence. The concern is not about the propagation 

of Islam per se, but about allegations that the Saudi government’s version of Islam promotes 

abuses of human rights, including violent acts, against non-Muslims and disfavored Muslims. 

The concern is broader than the allegation that the Saudi government is supporting and financing 

terrorism, which has received substantial attention following the September 11, 2001 terrorist 

attacks in the United States.61

In the 1960s, the Saudi government began creating and financing Islamic organizations to 

promote its religious ideology abroad. In 1962, it established the Muslim World League, an 

organization that seeks to promote Islamic unity and to propagate the Wahhabi version of Islam 

to Muslims and non-Muslims. Subsequently, it created the World Association of Muslim Youth, 

which focuses on propagation among young people. The Saudi government also funds numerous 

relief organizations that provide humanitarian assistance, but which also have propagation as a 

component of their activities. One scholar suggests that “it is important to distinguish between 

assistance destined for humanitarian purposes and cases where funds have been diverted –

whether intentionally or not – to fund militant activities. It is also necessary to differentiate 

between schools that provide religious teachings with solely educational motives, and schools 

that use religion to incite hatred towards others and that have been used by some individuals or 

groupings for political aims. The dividing lines may often be blurred....”62

Many experts agree that an even more concerted effort was made by the Saudi 

government to increase funding and initiate a systematic campaign to propagate Wahhabism 

outside of Saudi Arabia after the brief takeover of the Grand Mosque in Mecca in 1979 by 

disgruntled Muslim extremists. These extremists felt that the Saudi government had become too 

close to the West. At the same time, the Saudi government viewed the 1979 Islamic revolution 

in Iran as a direct threat that would fuel opposition to the Saudi regime among the country’s 

minority Shi’a population. Many experts also believe that global propagation efforts were 

increased at this time in order to appease the Wahhabi religious establishment’s concern about 

increased modernization in Saudi Arabia and closer relations with the West, particularly the 

United States, thus deflecting domestic criticism of the ruling family. Another wave of 

aggressive propagation ensued in the late 1980s and early 1990s, which targeted countries of the 

former Soviet Union. Even after the September 11, 2001 attacks, the Saudi government’s “role 

in financing and supporting extremist interpretations of Islam across the Muslim world 

intensified.”63

Saudi Arabia is known to be the biggest funder of madaris – Islamic religious schools –

in Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Yemen, Africa, Central Asia, Eastern Europe (particularly 

Bosnia and Kosovo), Southeast Asia, North America, Chechnya, and Dagestan.64 Around the 

world, Saudi wealth and charities contributed to an explosive growth of madaris during the 

period of Afghan resistance to the Soviet invasion. During that war (1979-1989), a new kind of 

madrassa emerged in Pakistan and Afghanistan that was not so much concerned about 

scholarship as declaring war on infidels. Many of the Taliban, who went on to rule much of 
14

Afghanistan, were educated in Saudi-financed madaris in Pakistan.65 In the case of Pakistan, an 

expert who testified before the Commission concluded that “some of these schools run by 

particular religious groups provide ideological training and motivation to those who go on to 

fight in Afghanistan and Kashmir, and take part in violence targeting religious minorities in 

Pakistan....”66

Many allege that the kind of religious education propagated in Saudi-funded Islamic 

schools, mosques, and Islamic centers of learning throughout the world fuels hatred and 

intolerance, and even violence, against both Muslims and non-Muslims. Some Saudi 

government-funded textbooks used both in Saudi Arabia and also in North American Islamic 

schools and mosques have been found to encourage incitement to violence against nonMuslims.67 There have also been reports that some members of extremist and militant groups 

have been trained as clerics in Saudi Arabia; these groups promote intolerance of and even 

violence against others on the basis of religion.68 

Several former U.S. government officials and scholars have raised publicly the Saudi 

government’s role in exporting Wahhabism. In testimony before the House International 

Relations Committee on “The Future of U.S.-Saudi Relations” in May 2002, former CIA director 

James Woolsey stated that “Saudi-funded, Wahhabi-operated export of hatred for us reaches 

around the globe. It is well known that the religious schools of Pakistan that educated a large 

share of the Taliban and al Qaeda are Wahhabi.... The Wahhabi textbooks...teach that it is the 

obligation of all Muslims to consider all infidels the enemy.”69 In a 2002 article in Foreign 

Affairs, former Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Martin Indyk asserted that 

“the [Saudi] regime accordingly financed the export of Wahhabism through the building of 

hundreds of mosques and madrassas (religious schools) abroad. The activity was particularly 

intense in areas affected by the collapse of the Soviet Union – the Balkans, Central Asia, 

Afghanistan, and Pakistan – where the Saudis engaged in competition with Iranian mullahs for 

the hearts and minds of local Muslim populations.”70

One scholar has written: “Internationally, the Saudis, both government-sponsored 

organizations and wealthy individuals, have exported a puritanical and at times militant version 

of Wahhabi Islam to other countries and communities in the Muslim world and the West.”71 

Another scholar suggests that the Saudis “need to be encouraged to develop a more tolerant 

model of Islam, one more reconciled to modernity, as an alternative to the hatred and xenophobia 

now propagated through school and mosque.”72 A third expert has gone further: “The other way 

the Saudis have been accused of promoting terrorism abroad is by funding – through Saudisanctioned charities and international Muslim organizations – Muslim schools and institutions, 

from Pakistan to Europe to the United States, that have become recruiting stations and training 

grounds for terrorists. A comprehensive accounting of just what kinds of official Saudi support 

go to which schools, and where, is lacking, which has allowed all sorts of charges to be leveled 

against Riyadh.”73 Many have also alleged that numerous radical Islamic groups that have 

engaged in violence in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Indonesia, and Central Asia, among other places, 

“are partly the fruits of this export of Wahhabism.”74 According to one press report, in 

“Indonesia, this campaign [of Wahhabi exportation] included distributing leaflets condemning 

any deviation from Wahhabi teaching, building mosques and paying Indonesian students to 

attend the hard-line Al-Jamia Al-Islamia University in Medina –‘Wahhabi U.’.... It is no 
15

coincidence that most radical groups in Indonesia today have ideological affinities with 

Wahhabism.”75

Although numerous allegations of this type have been made, especially since September 

11, 2001, the precise role of the Saudi government or officials in the alleged activities is not 

known. The problem appears to be serious and such allegations warrant further investigation.

E. Post-September 11 Saudi Government Statements on Reform

The catastrophic events of September 11, 2001 cast an international spotlight on Saudi 

Arabia when it became clear that 15 of the 19 terrorist hijackers were Saudi nationals and that 

Saudi dissident cleric Osama bin Laden, said to be a proponent of Wahhabi ideology, was 

responsible for the attacks. Since September 11, the Saudi government has at times 

acknowledged and spoken publicly about certain aspects of its society that are in need of some 

kind of reform. Recent statements by the Saudi government reflect some sensitivity to 

international criticism, especially in the United States. They also reflect an ongoing debate 

among Saudi government officials, intellectuals, academics, and other leaders on the necessity of 

various reforms within Saudi Arabia. This debate in some respects predates September 2001, but 

has intensified and become more public since that time. Nevertheless, despite increased 

international scrutiny, domestic debate, and public statements by government officials on the 

need for reform, protection for religious freedom and other human rights has not been 

implemented in Saudi Arabia and the situation has not significantly improved.

In the weeks following the September 11 attacks, the Saudi government began a vigorous 

public relations initiative in the United States in an attempt to improve its image with the 

American people.76 Over the last 18 months, high-level Saudi government officials have made 

numerous public statements, focused not only on their country’s cooperation in the global 

campaign against terrorism, but also on other issues such as political and educational reform, 

religious extremism, and the treatment of foreign residents and contract workers. Yet, these 

statements have not resulted in specific actions by the Saudi government that have led to 

measurable improvements in the protection of human rights. Moreover, statements regarding 

educational reform have been contradictory.

Reacting to findings in the 2002 Arab Human Development Report (AHDR) prepared by 

regional experts for the United Nations Development Program, Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince 

Abdullah proposed large-scale reform in Arab countries in January 2003. The AHDR identified 

significant problems in the Arab world regarding a lack of political freedom, educational 

opportunity, economic transparency, and women’s ability to contribute to all aspects of society.77 

In proposing a new “Arab Charter,” Crown Prince Abdullah stated, “...that internal reform and 

enhanced political participation in the Arab states are essential steps for the building of Arab 

capabilities, and for providing the conditions for a comprehensive awakening and development 

of Arab human resources.”78 Furthermore, in that same month a group of more than 100 Saudi 

intellectuals and academics met and presented Crown Prince Abdullah with a proposed national 

reform document that “call[ed] for an independent judiciary, the creation of civil and human 

rights institutions, constitutional reforms, elections to a consultative council and freedom of 

expression.”79 In the weeks following, numerous “pro-reform” articles were published in 
16

national and local Saudi newspapers.80 However, as of this writing, specific actions have not 

been taken to enact changes outlined in the proposed national reform document.

There have been several official statements regarding educational reform, in part because 

of the asserted linkage between terrorism and the current Saudi education system. Following a 

government review of school textbooks in September 2002, Foreign Minister Prince Saud alFaisal stated: “Ten percent of what we found [in Saudi textbooks] was questionable. Five 

percent was actually abhorrent to us. So, we took a decision to change that, and we have 

changed.”81 Just a few months later, in January 2003, Saudi Education Minister Muhammad alRasheed, during a discussion with the Saudi Consultative Council, asserted that the “national 

school syllabus has ‘several defects’ and that [his] ministry is making every effort to address and 

eliminate them.”82 On February 4, 2003, the Saudi government released a statement 

summarizing its findings of an audit conducted on its educational system.83 It concluded that 

approximately “five percent of school textbooks and curriculum guides contained possibly 

offensive language” and that a program is underway to remove such materials from the schools. 

However, various Saudi government officials have also stated that there is no problem 

with the education system and that there will be no changes made, thus raising questions about 

the government’s commitment to educational reform. Defense Minister Prince Sultan, quoted in 

an October 26, 2002 interview, stated that: “We will never change our education policy....Our 

country has...above all religious curricula that must never be changed.”84 On October 22, 2002, 

Saudi Deputy Education Minister Khaled al-Awad commented on an understanding agreed to in 

meetings with U.S. government officials: “[The] Saudi curriculum is fine and does not encourage 

or boost terrorism and hatred of a member of another religion or faith.... These meetings yielded 

positive results, and since most of those present realized that the Saudi curricula were fine, they 

retracted these baseless accusations.”85 In December 2002, Interior Minister Prince Naif 

“denied that US officials have requested their Saudi counterparts to embark on changing 

educational curricula” and defended the educational system.86 

Senior Saudi government officials have also made statements that highlight the problem 

of religious intolerance and urge moderation and respect toward all elements of the Saudi 

population. In October 2002 and again in January 2003, Crown Prince Abdullah called on all 

Saudi citizens to “shun extremism and radicalism,” recognize that there should be no compulsion 

in religion, and practice moderation and tolerance based on Islamic principles.87 At an October 

2002 international conference of the Saudi government funded World Association of Muslim 

Youth, Crown Prince Abdullah again called for moderation in Islam and encouraged participants 

to engage in a dialogue among nations and to gain a better understanding of international law. 

According to the Saudi Press Agency, on November 3, 2002, Interior Minister Prince Naif 

publicly admonished the mutawaa to show more “leniency and respect toward people’s privacy 

and freedoms.”88 In a December 2002 interview in a Saudi-funded English language weekly 

news magazine, Prince Naif further stated that the mutawaa “needs to hire well qualified people 

and not people of limited qualifications who act recklessly....[W]orkers of the department should 

gently deal with the people and avoid harshness, especially with young people.”89 

According to the State Department and press reports, the Grand Mufti, the highest 

Islamic authority in Saudi Arabia, used several of his sermons in late 2002 to warn employers 

against abusing foreign workers and violating employment contracts. The head of the Council of 
17

Senior Ulema reportedly further warned that abuse of expatriate workers violates Islamic tenets. 

In February 2003, the Council issued a fatwa condemning and forbidding violent attacks against 

non-Muslims residing in Saudi Arabia.90

Although there have been calls for moderation, in March 2003, Defense Minister Prince 

Sultan made clear that there would be no change in the current policy of the government 

prohibiting churches in Saudi Arabia: “We are not against religions at all...but there are no 

churches — not in the past, the present or future.... Those who talked [about churches in Saudi 

Arabia] are church people and they are, unfortunately, fanatics.”

91 He also reaffirmed the 

government’s position that non-Muslims are free to worship privately in their homes.92

Regrettably, despite unprecedented debate, there has been no specific subsequent action 

that has fundamentally improved protection for human rights, including religious freedom, in 

Saudi Arabia. 

F. U.S. Policy

U.S.-Saudi relations have long been and continue to remain close, despite strain since the 

September 11 attacks. However, the fact that 15 of the 19 hijackers who perpetrated those 

attacks were Saudi nationals has raised questions about the Saudi government’s promotion of 

extremism and willingness to cooperate in the campaign against terrorism. A high-level 

delegation, led by Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal, arrived in Washington just days after 

September 11 to convey the “condolences of King Fahd and the Saudi people to President 

George W. Bush, the American people and victims of the terrorist attack.” 

Close consultations between the United States and Saudi Arabia continue on the 

campaign against terrorism and on security, economic, and development issues such as the 

Middle East peace process.93 In late February 2002, Crown Prince Abdullah outlined a peace 

initiative for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that for the first time promised complete 

normalization of relations by Saudi Arabia and other Arab states with Israel. The Bush 

Administration welcomed this proposal. The Crown Prince visited President Bush at his Texas 

ranch in April 2002 to discuss a variety of issues, including the Saudi peace initiative, the 

campaign against terrorism, and the future of U.S.-Saudi relations.

The continued availability of reliable sources of oil, particularly from Saudi Arabia, 

remains important to the United States. Saudi Arabia is often the leading source of oil imported 

to the United States, providing about 20 percent of total U.S. crude imports and 10 percent of 

U.S. consumption. The United States is Saudi Arabia’s largest trading partner, and Saudi Arabia 

is the largest U.S. export market in the Middle East.94 In addition to economic ties, a 

longstanding security relationship continues to be a central component of U.S.-Saudi relations. 

According to the Bush Administration, Saudi Arabia is an important partner in the campaign 

against terrorism, providing assistance in the military, diplomatic, and financial arenas. 

Following initial resistance to a U.S.-led war in Iraq, the Saudi government subsequently called 

for Saddam Hussein to step down and decreased its public opposition to the war, although it 

continued to refuse access to military bases and airspace. In late April 2003, just before this 

report went to print, the United States announced that it was withdrawing virtually all of its 

military personnel from Saudi Arabia over the course of the next several months.95
18

Despite public documentation of serious religious freedom and other human rights

violations in Saudi Arabia, the U.S. government has not, until very recently, articulated in public 

that failure to address these violations could have an impact on U.S.-Saudi relations. A former 

American diplomat who served in Saudi Arabia informed the Commission that until the 1990s, 

the U.S. government never raised human rights issues, including religious freedom, in bilateral 

meetings with the Saudi government. Religious freedom is reportedly now the subject of a few 

private conversations between U.S. and Saudi officials. The State Department stated in its 2002

Annual Report on International Religious Freedom that U.S. government officials have raised 

issues of religious freedom with Saudi officials and “sought reconfirmation” from the Saudi 

government of their policy to allow non-Muslims to worship privately. U.S. officials in Saudi 

Arabia have privately raised several specific cases of detention of individuals imprisoned on 

account of their religious activities. Some were released and others deported. 

However, what is still severely lacking in bilateral relations between the United States 

and Saudi Arabia, spanning several U.S. Administrations, is public condemnation by the U.S. 

government for repeated violations of human rights, including religious freedom, by the Saudi 

government. Over the past few years, there have been only a few public statements from U.S. 

government officials regarding the poor conditions of religious freedom. In October 2002, at the

release of the Annual Report on International Religious Freedom, Ambassador-at-Large for 

International Religious Freedom, John Hanford, said “in Saudi Arabia religious freedom, as we 

understand it and view it, does not exist,” and that designating Saudi Arabia as a “country of 

particular concern” for religious freedom violations under the International Religious Freedom 

Act of 1998 would be something that the State Department would “have to consider very 

seriously.”96 Previously, in March 2002, State Department spokesman Richard Boucher stated: 

“There is no religious freedom in Saudi Arabia. It's a country that, based on the guidelines in the 

law, came very close to the threshold of being listed [a country of particular concern].”97 Yet, to 

date, there have been no statements from the President, Secretary of State, Assistant Secretary 

for Human Rights, or Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs on Saudi Arabia’s poor record 

on human rights, including religious freedom.

In recent years, reports indicate that female American military officers stationed in Saudi 

Arabia were required to wear Muslim religious garb and to ride in the backseat of a vehicle 

accompanied by a man when off U.S. military compounds. The Pentagon recently changed its 

policy requiring female military officers to wear the abaya (religious garb which covers a 

woman from head to toe).

98 Other reports indicate that the U.S. government still does not allow 

American military personnel to wear religious jewelry or any outward expressions or symbols of 

their faith.99 U.S. personnel are also reportedly prevented from celebrating Christmas on 

American military bases and any worship services held for military personnel are limited to 

“counseling sessions.”100 In 1990, while visiting troops gathering to defend Saudi Arabia in the 

first Gulf War, President George H.W. Bush reportedly was forbidden to say Thanksgiving grace 

on Saudi soil and was therefore forced to do so aboard a U.S. ship in international waters.101 

Some U.S. Embassy personnel have reported that the embassy in the past has curbed 

Christian worship services for embassy employees to accommodate the mutawaa, who had 

begun to patrol inside the diplomatic quarter – where most foreign diplomats reside – and take 

down license plate numbers of attendees at embassy-sponsored services. According to the State 

Department, worship services are currently functioning. One former Foreign Service Officer 
19

claims that in the early-to mid-1990s, it was U.S. policy to respond to inquiring Americans that 

the U.S. consulate in Jeddah did not host Christian worship services.102 He also claims that 

Jewish-American Foreign Service Officers were excluded from being assigned to tours of duty in 

Saudi Arabia in the 1990s in response to objections by the Saudi government. 

Since September 11, 2001, leading members of Congress and the foreign policy 

community have raised, in unprecedented fashion, questions about the state of the U.S.-Saudi 

relationship. In October 2001, Senators John McCain and Joseph Lieberman charged the 

governments of Egypt and Saudi Arabia with being weak in their support for the U.S. campaign 

against terrorism. Secretary Powell responded by noting that both Egypt and Saudi Arabia had 

responded to every request relating to counter-terrorism that the United States had made of them. 

Yet, in congressional testimony, foreign policy journals, and in op-ed pages former 

policymakers, scholars, and foreign policy experts have continued to question the strength and 

direction of U.S.-Saudi relations and have encouraged reconsideration of U.S. policy. In July 

2002, a Rand Corporation consultant, in a presentation to the Defense Policy Board of the 

Pentagon, stated, among other things, that Saudi Arabia should be viewed as an adversary rather 

than an ally and that the “Saudis are active at every level of the terror chain, from planners to 

financiers, from cadre to foot-soldier, from ideologist to cheerleader.”103 When the contents of 

the presentation were leaked to the press, several senior administration officials immediately 

distanced the U.S. government from the position, although at least one member of the Board 

openly expressed agreement with at least parts of the presentation.104 Despite a vigorous debate 

on these issues outside of the government, the Administration has made no public show of 

reassessing its Saudi policy. 

In August 2002, more than 600 family members of the September 11 victims filed a $1 

trillion lawsuit against Saudi government officials and financial institutions, charging they 

financed Osama bin Laden and the al-Qaeda network that was responsible for the attacks on the 

World Trade Center and Pentagon. According to a press report, some plaintiffs in the case claim 

that the U.S. government is “pressuring them to pull out of the lawsuit in order to avoid 

damaging US-Saudi relations, threatening them with the prospect of being denied any money 

from the government’s own compensation scheme if they continue to pursue it.”105

In 2002, Congress focused more attention on Saudi Arabia than in several recent years 

combined. Through a series of hearings and several other activities, various aspects of U.S.-

Saudi relations were scrutinized. The Middle East and South Asia Subcommittee of the House 

International Relations Committee held a hearing on the future of U.S.-Saudi relations in May 

2002 at which numerous concerns were raised, including the Saudi government’s exportation of 

extremism globally, its funding of madaris that promote intolerance, particularly in South and 

Central Asia, and its treatment of women and religious minorities. The Congressional Human 

Rights Caucus held a Members’ briefing on the rights of women in Saudi Arabia in June 2002 –

at which Commission Chair Felice Gaer testified – and the House Government Reform 

Committee has held a series of hearings on cases of alleged child abduction. Several Members 

of Congress traveled to Saudi Arabia in September 2002 to raise the abduction issue with Saudi 

officials. According to the State Department, the Saudi government has subsequently set up a 

small inter-ministerial group to work on child custody cases. 
20

Also, in the last Congress, a resolution was introduced in the House in June 2002 

(H.Con.Res. 432) urging Saudi Arabia to review and reform its educational curriculum. In May 

2002, S.Res. 258 was introduced, urging Saudi Arabia to dissolve its “martyrs” fund, which 

provided millions of dollars to Palestinian families of suicide bombers, and “to refuse to support 

terrorism in any way.” No further action was taken on these legislative measures. In the 108th

Congress, a resolution was introduced in the Senate in March 2003 (S.Con.Res. 14), very similar 

to H.Con.Res. 432 but which went further by requesting that the U.S. Representative at 

UNESCO address educational reform in Saudi Arabia at the 2003 General Conference session 

and encourage UNESCO to examine the Saudi educational system and to “monitor the progress 

of the efforts to reform the curriculum.”

G. Commission Recommendations

The continued absence of religious freedom in Saudi Arabia requires a vigorous response 

by the U.S. government. To that end, the Commission makes the following recommendations.

I. Advocate Effective Guarantees of Religious Freedom and Necessary Action to 

Implement Those Guarantees

A core goal of U.S. engagement with Saudi Arabia should be the protection and 

implementation of the universal right to freedom of religion for all Saudi nationals and foreign 

residents. At a minimum, this should include guarantees and the implementation, in a 

constitution and through other mechanisms, of the following components of that right as 

specified in international instruments:

• the freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief, including the guarantee that no one 

shall be subject to coercion which would impair that freedom;

• the freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to 

manifest a religion or belief in worship, observance, practice, and teaching;

• equal protection of the law and the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of 

their human rights, including religious freedom; and

• the rights and duties of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to ensure the 

religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their convictions, as 

provided in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the UN Declaration on the 

Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or 

Belief, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child.106

1. The U.S. government should urge the Saudi Arabian government to take steps 

toward the implementation of the rights stated above. Initial measures that could 

immediately be implemented include the following:

1.a. genuinely safeguard the freedom to worship privately, as affirmed by 

Saudi government officials, of non-Muslims and of those Muslims who do not 

follow the government’s version of Islam. As requested by the relevant 
21

communities, this should include immediate permission for clergy to enter 

the country and perform private religious services;

1.b. permit non-Wahhabi places of worship, such as churches, to function 

openly in special compounds or zones for foreigners or in unadorned 

buildings designated for this purpose; 

1.c. allow foreign clerics openly to wear religious garb and foreign nationals 

to possess religious literature and openly wear or carry non-Muslim religious 

symbols;

1.d. entrust enforcement of the law to regular professionals in law 

enforcement agencies subject to judicial review and appropriate human 

rights norms, and dissolve the Committee for the Propagation of Virtue and 

the Prevention of Vice (mutawaa); 

1.e. establish a mechanism to review cases of persons detained under 

suspicion of or charged with religious, political, or security offenses 

and release those who have been imprisoned solely because of their 

religious beliefs or practices, such as those charged with apostasy, 

blasphemy, criticizing the government, and sorcery, as well as any 

others who have been unjustly detained or sentenced;

1.f. end state prosecution of apostasy, blasphemy, criticizing the 

government, and sorcery;

1.g. permit the establishment of independent non-governmental 

organizations to advance human rights and to promote tolerance, and 

create an independent human rights commission for those same 

purposes; and

1.h. ratify and fully comply with international human rights 

instruments and cooperate with UN human rights mechanisms; in 

particular, ratify and implement the protections of the International 

Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).

As stated above, on March 10, 2003 the Saudi Defense Minister reaffirmed the Saudi 

government’s policy that religious worship of non-Muslims in private is permissible. However, 

this policy is not reflected in practice. Saudi authorities continue to raid religious gatherings in 

private homes and arrest, detain, and deport foreign workers.

The right to freedom of religion will not exist in Saudi Arabia until everyone in the 

country is guaranteed the freedom to manifest his or her religion or belief “either alone or in 

community with others and in public or private.”107 A first step for the Saudi government to 

promote religious freedom is to clarify and safeguard the freedom to worship in private. The 

U.S. government should consistently press the Saudi government to do so. 
22

A second small step would be to allow non-Wahhabi places of worship. In each of the 

other Gulf states on the Arabian Peninsula, churches and Shi’a mosques are permitted to function 

without government interference, officially or unofficially. In Oman, both Christian and Hindu 

public worship is permitted. In Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), authorities have 

given de facto recognition to some Christian denominations and have permitted churches to be 

constructed and to operate in accordance with local customs.108 The Qatari government, which 

also follows the Wahhabi interpretation of Islam, “made a verbal commitment to allow the 

churches to operate without interference” in 1999.109 The UAE government issues land use 

permits for some Christian denominations to build and operate churches. Both Qatar and the 

UAE have gradually, over the years, become more tolerant and accepting of non-Muslims in 

their respective countries. The U.S. government should press the Saudi government to take steps 

to emulate such models of progressive tolerance. U.S. government officials already have 

indicated that encouraging “the Saudi government to furnish unadorned buildings for nonMuslim religions prohibited from practicing their faith” would be one practical way “for moving 

forward.”110 

As indicated in this report and in the findings of the UN Committee Against Torture, the 

mutawaa consistently abuse their authority and harass, detain for long periods, and beat both 

Saudis and non-Saudis. Based on repeated reports of abuse and clear violations of 

internationally recognized human rights, the U.S. government should press the Saudi government 

to dissolve the mutawaa.

As discussed above, there are individuals, both Saudi and non-Saudi, who have been 

charged by the Saudi government with religious, political, and security offenses based on 

religious belief or practice, such as those charged with apostasy, blasphemy, criticizing the 

government, or sorcery. The U.S. government should urge the Saudi government to cease such 

prosecutions and to establish a mechanism to review cases of those that have been charged 

wrongly and to release any persons who are detained because of religion or belief.

NGOs are not legally permitted to be established and operate in Saudi Arabia. The Saudi 

government has stated that any NGO critical of government policies would not be acceptable. 

The Commission received reports that in the fall of 2002, a Saudi national requested permission 

from the government to establish a human rights NGO. In January 2003, after repeated requests, 

the individual never heard back from the government and thus decided to begin functioning 

openly without government approval. To date, the Commission has not received any 

information on whether the government has interfered with its operation. The U.S. government 

should press the Saudi government to encourage openness and transparency in its political 

system and permit the establishment of independent NGOs to advance human rights and to 

promote tolerance.

Saudi Arabia has been an active member of the United Nations and has sought greater 

participation in the international community, including membership in the World Trade 

Organization. Yet, the Saudi government has repeatedly stated that it disagrees with 

“internationally accepted definitions of human rights and viewed its interpretation of Islamic law 

as the only necessary guide to protect human rights.”111 In recognition of the role that Saudi 

Arabia seeks to assume in international affairs, the U.S. government should urge the Saudi 

government to respect international norms by ratifying basic human rights treaties such as the 
23

ICCPR, and by implementing the human rights protections contained in the international treaties 

to which it is already a party. Saudi Arabia is a state party to the Convention Against Torture 

and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the Convention on the Rights 

of the Child and the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial 

Discrimination, and its human rights practices have been subject to scrutiny by the respective 

treaty bodies. In 2000, Saudi Arabia ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 

Discrimination Against Women, but has entered several significant reservations to the treaty and 

has yet to submit a report on its compliance with the convention. Saudi Arabia has not yet 

signed or ratified the ICCPR. On numerous occasions, Saudi officials have publicly and 

privately stated that they intend to do so.112

The Saudi government granted a visit of the UN Special Rapporteur on the Independence 

of Judges and Lawyers in October 2002, the first time it has extended an official invitation to a 

Special Rapporteur of the UN Commission on Human Rights. However, the Saudi government 

has yet to extend invitations to the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief or 

the Special Rapporteur Against Torture. The Saudi government also hosted a delegation from 

Human Rights Watch in January 2003.

In those instances when Saudi Arabia has cooperated with international human rights 

mechanisms, serious concerns have been identified and recommendations for addressing those 

concerns have been put forward. The conclusions and recommendations of the UN Committee 

Against Torture, the Committee on the Rights of the Child, and the UN Special Rapporteur on 

the Independence of Judges and Lawyers have been discussed above. The U.S. government 

should urge the Saudi government to cooperate with international human rights mechanisms and 

address the concerns and implement the recommendations of those bodies.

2. The U.S. government should urge the Saudi government (a) to exclude from all 

textbooks any language or images that promote enmity, intolerance, hatred, or 

violence toward any group of persons based on faith, gender, ethnicity, or 

nationality; and (b) to include in all school curricula, in school textbooks, and in 

teacher training the concepts of tolerance and respect for human rights, including 

religious freedom. Textbooks should be reviewed in light of the standards for 

education set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

As discussed above, Saudi officials have issued conflicting messages regarding the 

government’s willingness to address the problem of offensive and discriminatory language in 

government published textbooks. State Department Spokesman Richard Boucher recently stated 

that the U.S. government intends to work with the Saudi government to “eliminate language of 

intolerance...in school textbooks.”113 As of the date of this report, however, no specific 

initiatives have been announced. The U.S. government should work closely with the Saudi 

government on any efforts to address the issue in school curricula, textbooks, and teacher 

training, as well as request to review the audit that the Saudi government claims to have 

conducted in recent months on offensive language in textbooks.114

Article 26(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that “[Education] shall 

promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups, 

and shall further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace.”115 Criteria 
24

for reviewing textbooks and other educational materials have been developed by several 

international bodies, such as UNESCO.116

II. Address Global Propagation

3. The U.S. government should undertake a study to determine whether the Saudis 

are directly or indirectly funding efforts to propagate globally, including in the 

United States, a religious ideology that explicitly promotes hate, intolerance, and 

other human rights violations, and in some cases violence, toward members of other 

religious groups, both Muslim and non-Muslim. Congress should authorize and 

fund such a study. Findings of this study should be reported to Congress within six 

months after funds are appropriated. 

In conjunction with the above study, the U.S. government should request the Saudi 

government to provide an accounting of what kinds of Saudi support go to which 

religious schools, mosques, centers of learning, and other religious organizations 

globally. A list of such places in the United States should be specifically requested.

4. In its bilateral engagement with Saudi Arabia, the U.S. government should urge 

the Saudi government to cease any funding of efforts to propagate outside of Saudi 

Arabia any religious ideology that explicitly promotes hate, intolerance, and other 

human rights violations, including violence.

In its May 2002 annual report, the Commission urged the State Department to “pay close 

attention to activities undertaken by the Saudi government that have detrimental effects on the 

protection of religious freedom in countries outside of Saudi Arabia. It should report on such 

activities and take further action as appropriate.”117 There is no indication that the U.S. 

government has taken any action on this recommendation.

As detailed above, since the September 11 attacks, there has been a growing number of 

reports that funding coming from Saudi Arabia has been used to finance religious schools and 

other activities in several countries that are alleged to support Islamic militants and extremists 

throughout the world. The extent of the involvement of the government of Saudi Arabia in these 

funding activities is unclear, but some reports allege a direct involvement by organizations 

funded by the Saudi government or members of the Saudi royal family in some of these 

activities.118 The Commission has reported on several countries, such as Indonesia and Pakistan, 

where Islamic militant and extremist groups have committed severe violations of religious 

freedom against both Muslims and non-Muslims. 

The preponderance and seriousness of these reports strongly suggest that the U.S. 

government should investigate allegations that Saudi Arabia has provided funding for training or 

other support for groups that commit human rights abuses. The State Department should be 

required to submit a periodic public report to Congress on this issue, including information on 

any Saudi government cooperation or response. Given the dominance of the Saudi government 

by the royal family, which is heavily supported by state funds, the report should address the 

activities of government officials, members of the royal family, as well as organizations that 

receive funding from the government. The Saudi government has released two reports, 
25

“Initiatives and Actions in the Fight Against Terrorism,” and “Initiatives and Actions Taken by 

the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the Financial Area to Combat Terrorism,” in August and 

December 2002 respectively, on measures it has taken or plans to take to combat terrorism 

generally and suppress the financing of terrorism.119 However, it has not yet made any statement 

regarding the widespread accusations that it propagates its intolerant religious ideology globally. 

The Saudi government has a responsibility to monitor carefully the educational and other 

institutions it supports. The U.S. government should demand that Saudi funds not support any 

schools, mosques, or other activities that are directly or indirectly connected with the spread of 

hatred and intolerance or with discrimination or other violations of human rights, as well as 

violent attacks. 

The Commission is not recommending that the U.S. government conduct a study on the 

nature of the religion of Islam or the Saudi government’s favored interpretation of Islam. Rather, 

it proposes a study on the alleged activities of a government that may have a strong effect on the 

protection of religious freedom and the promotion of violence and terrorism worldwide. The 

U.S. government should be concerned when there are credible allegations that a foreign 

government, which itself is a severe violator of religious freedom and other human rights, is 

engaging in activities that have a detrimental effect on the protection of freedom of religion and 

belief and the obligation not to destroy the rights of others outside of that country. Furthermore, 

when the promotion of these activities is linked to violence targeting persons on account of their 

religion, a state may be violating its obligation to ensure that rights are guaranteed. 

III. Use U.S. Leverage to Encourage and Implement Reform

5. In its bilateral relations with Saudi Arabia and in multilateral settings, the 

U.S. government, both in public and in private, should raise concerns about 

violations of freedom of religion and related human rights. Congress should 

hold biannual hearings at which the State Department reports on what issues 

have been raised and what actions have been taken in light of the Saudi 

government’s response. 

Some U.S. government officials have indicated that the United States prefers a “behindthe-scenes approach” to raising religious freedom concerns with the Saudi government.120

 

However, despite private efforts by the U.S. government, religious freedom conditions in Saudi 

Arabia have not improved. The U.S. government should, therefore, also raise its concerns in 

public, both bilaterally and multilaterally. The State Department should report to Congress on 

the status of U.S. initiatives and programs in Saudi Arabia, including those outlined in 

recommendations 7 and 9 of this report, as well as progress on addressing the religious freedom 

concerns presented in recommendations 1 and 2. 

6. The U.S. government should designate Saudi Arabia a “country of 

particular concern” under the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 

(IRFA).

In September 2002, the Commission recommended for the third consecutive year that 

Saudi Arabia be designated a “country of particular concern” (CPC). The Commission firmly 

believes that, based on public sources of information and its own investigation, Saudi Arabia 
26

continues to engage in systematic, ongoing, and egregious violations of religious freedom, thus 

meeting the threshold for CPC designation. Indeed, how could a country where religious 

freedom does not exist fail to qualify for CPC designation?

Over the past three years, the State Department has asserted several reasons for not 

designating Saudi Arabia as a CPC. In September 2000, then Ambassador-at-Large for 

International Religious Freedom Robert Seiple, during an American Embassy TV network 

program, inexplicably stated that the State Department had “decided that there was not religious 

persecution in Saudi Arabia.” Ambassador Seiple went on to say that “if there had been 

[religious persecution] we would have been obliged by the legislation to designate the country as 

a ‘country of particular concern’ and look at a various list of sanctions that could be applied.”121 

In October 2001, following the release of the State Department’s 2001 Annual Report on 

International Religious Freedom, Department Spokesman Richard Boucher affirmed that 

because the religious freedom situation had not changed in Saudi Arabia that year, the decision 

on CPC designation “has not changed.” 

In October 2002, Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom 

John V. Hanford III suggested that designating Saudi Arabia as a CPC would be something the 

State Department would “have to consider very seriously.”122 Despite considerable debate on the 

issue and this Commission’s recommendation, in March 2003, the Secretary of State failed to 

designate Saudi Arabia.123 Shortly after the announcement, when asked why, State Department 

Spokesman Boucher said: “There is no religious freedom in Saudi Arabia. It’s a country that, 

based on the guidelines in the law, came very close to the threshold of being listed. However, it 

was the recommendation of all the experts involved in the government that we continue the same 

listings as last year and that we look for ways of working with the Saudi Government to try to 

take advantage of any opportunities there might be to improve the state of religious freedom in 

Saudi Arabia.”124 

The Department’s statement unfortunately, and without explanation, ignores the 

recommendation of this Commission, which is a governmental body of experts. IRFA requires 

that CPC designation review “shall take into account any findings or recommendations by the 

Commission with respect to the foreign country.”125 Moreover, CPC designation does not 

preclude the U.S. government from pursuing the most effective ways to improve religious 

freedom in Saudi Arabia. In fact, that is a requirement following CPC designation, as the 

Administration determines what actions to take in response.

The fluctuating reasons offered by the State Department suggest that neither the current 

nor the previous Administration has been able to articulate a clear policy on opposing religious 

freedom violations in Saudi Arabia.

7. The U.S. government should expand its efforts to support initiatives to 

advance human rights, including freedom of religion and belief, in Saudi 

Arabia through its (a) human rights assistance; (b) cultural, academic, visitor 

and other exchanges; (c) international broadcasting; and (d) other public 

diplomacy programs. 
27

Since very few initiatives to date have been aimed specifically at Saudi 

Arabia in these areas, the U.S. government should develop a country plan 

identifying and implementing activities concerning Saudi Arabia and report 

to Congress on the objectives and details of the plan. In particular:

7.a. the State Department should ensure that existing or proposed 

democracy, human rights, and other related programs directed 

toward the Middle East in general, such as the Middle East 

Partnership Initiative (MEPI) and the Middle East Democracy Fund 

(MEDF), include components specifically for Saudi Arabia; and

7.b. the U.S. government should take steps to overcome obstacles to 

broadcasting Radio Sawa throughout Saudi Arabia; Congress should 

ask the State Department to report on its progress in doing so. 

The Commission has been informed that at present there are no U.S.-funded democracy 

or human rights programs functioning in Saudi Arabia, unlike in most other countries in the 

Middle East where such programs exist. The State Department should develop a plan to use the 

existing tools of U.S. assistance and public diplomacy to promote the rule of law, build civil 

society, and advance human rights, including religious freedom, and tolerance in Saudi Arabia. 

The Department should share the plan with Congress, and periodically report on its 

implementation, as discussed in recommendation 5. The U.S. government should press the 

Saudi government to cooperate in these efforts.

In March 2002, President Bush announced that he had asked Secretary Powell to develop 

“a new initiative aimed at increasing both economic, and educational opportunities throughout 

the region [the Arab world].”126 In December 2002, Secretary Powell launched a new set of 

programs called the U.S. Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI). According to Assistant 

Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs William Burns, the goals of the initiative are “to 

promote key regional reform issues, such as broadening economic and educational opportunities, 

and expanding political participation, in a systematic way.”127 In addition to the current 

programs in countries such as Egypt, Bahrain, Yemen, and Morocco, the U.S. government 

should ensure that MEPI include specific programs that are created for and implemented in Saudi 

Arabia. The Middle East Democracy Fund (MEDF) currently has programs targeting the Arab 

world and some Gulf states, but not Saudi Arabia. The U.S. government should use MEPI and 

MEDF as a means to support and encourage the internal reform debate in Saudi Arabia, on the 

one hand, while pressing the Saudi government to implement reforms, on the other. 

The State Department itself has endorsed the feasibility of these efforts in March 2003 

congressional testimony. Assistant Secretary Burns indicated that MEPI could: (1) encourage 

efforts such as the national reform document signed by more than 100 societal leaders in Saudi 

Arabia; (2) help revamp the education system; (3) promote the rule of law; and (4) provide 

technical assistance to Saudi Arabia should Crown Prince Abdullah want to advance further his 

government’s initiative to join the World Trade Organization.128

Saudi Arabia is an exception to the otherwise broad availability of Radio Sawa in the 

Middle East. Radio Sawa is operated by the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), an 
28

agency of the U.S. government, and broadcasts music, news, and commentary in Arabic 

throughout the Middle East 24 hours a day. Radio Sawa is available through FM or medium 

wave broadcast in Jordan, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, and 

Iraq. It is also available through three satellite frequencies. 

Radio Sawa produces substantive programming that presents a view of America and the 

democratic process that is otherwise unavailable in the region. According to the BBG, its 

mission “is to promote freedom and democracy by encouraging open discussion and an exchange 

of views.” On January 24, 2003, Secretary of State Powell spoke on Radio Sawa to launch a 

weekly program called The Free Zone. This program examines a host of issues related to 

democracy and human rights, including religious freedom, women’s issues, press freedom, the 

role of civil society, and elections. In his radio address, Secretary Powell stated that: “Men and 

women have certain universal rights.... And we believe that democracy is the best way to allow 

[people] to have those rights...[Arab governments] must give their people a right to choose...a 

proper form of political system for those people and in line with their religion ...their culture 

[and] their beliefs.”129 This type of programming, along with other news reporting, can help 

raise public interest and awareness in Saudi Arabia of the value of advancing democracy, human 

rights, including freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief, as well as promoting 

religious tolerance. Kenneth Tomlinson, chairman of the BBG, has indicated that when the war 

in Iraq is over, Radio Sawa programming will focus on “building democracies in the Arab world, 

advancing human rights, and promoting religious diversity.”130

Radio Sawa is only available in the evenings to a small portion of the eastern and 

northern parts of Saudi Arabia through existing FM transmitters in Bahrain and Qatar and 

through medium wave transmitters from Rhodes and Cyprus. The Commission has been told 

that the Saudi government has refused to permit the construction or use of facilities to broadcast 

Radio Sawa throughout the country. On the principle of reciprocity, because the Saudi 

controlled media have unrestricted access to the U.S. market, the U.S. government should press 

the Saudi government and overcome the obstacles to broadcasting Radio Sawa throughout Saudi 

Arabia.

IV. Change U.S. Government and Business Practices 

The following two recommendations can be implemented immediately by the U.S. 

government as they relate directly to U.S. official and business practices.

8. The U.S. government should ensure that any existing restrictions on the religious

practice of U.S. military and diplomatic personnel be lifted permanently and that 

American citizens visiting or residing in Saudi Arabia have full access to embassy 

and consular services under current U.S. law, particularly any American citizens 

seeking refuge or assistance.

As mentioned above, there have been reports that allege that U.S. policy restricts 

American military and diplomatic personnel from worshipping on military and diplomatic 

compounds. In a response to a March 2003 Commission letter, the Department of Defense 

stated: 
29

U.S. military personnel serving in Saudi Arabia practice their religion freely 

within the confines of any U.S. military facility in the Kingdom. We are 

unfamiliar with any Saudi government restrictions on such practices, and the 

Department of Defense currently has a number of military chaplains representing 

many faiths, who provide services to our military personnel on bases in Saudi 

Arabia.... Regarding abayas, with the passage of Section 563 of the National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (HR 4546) General Franks has 

issued a directive stating that the wearing of abayas, both on or off duty by 

servicewomen, is not required. This is the policy U.S. commanders are now 

implementing.131

The U.S. government should ensure that restrictive practices do not exist and that they 

become a thing of the past. To the extent that U.S. military personnel remain stationed in Saudi 

Arabia, the U.S. government should conduct a “review of all orders and instructional briefings 

issued to troops relating to religious adornments and expressions” and rescind “any directives 

that restrict personal religious expressions.”132 It should also ensure that current U.S. 

government and military practices comport with international human rights standards. 

On March 25, 2003, the United States Postal Service announced “that certain conditions 

and restrictions apply when mailing items to military and civilian personnel deployed to 

Operation Iraqi Freedom in the Middle East and Persian Gulf areas,” including Saudi Arabia.133 

Among the prohibitions are “any matter containing religious materials contrary to the Islamic 

faith.”134 Enforcing this prohibition could put U.S. officials in the position of determining the 

suitability of distributing religious materials through the U.S. mail according to the standards of 

Islam rather than the standards of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The Postal 

Service should rescind any restrictions on religious materials.

In June 2002, the House Government Reform Committee held a hearing on child custody 

cases involving American mothers and Saudi fathers. According to a witness, several years ago

an American citizen had been escorted out of the U.S. embassy in Riyadh while seeking refuge 

with her two small children.135 According to U.S. Representative Dan Burton, the “Saudi 

Foreign Minister pledged that no adult American woman will ever be held in Saudi Arabia 

against her will....” U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia Robert Jordan has “pledged that no 

American seeking help will ever again be turned away from the Embassy.”136 The U.S. 

government should ensure that these guarantees are upheld.

9. The U.S. government should investigate reports that some U.S. companies doing 

business in Saudi Arabia engage in practices that constitute or facilitate 

discrimination or violations of religious freedom or other human rights. A public 

report of the investigation’s findings should be submitted to Congress and updated 

every year thereafter. If such practices are found, the U.S. government should take 

steps to encourage reform of discriminatory practices. 

The Commission is concerned about reports that some U.S. businesses in Saudi Arabia 

have modified their policies and have adopted discriminatory practices in accordance with local 

customs. For example, some U.S. restaurant chains doing business in Saudi Arabia reportedly 

maintain segregated dining areas, one for men and another only for “women and families,” and 
30

also do not allow any women to enter the establishment unless accompanied by their 

husbands.137 Other reports indicate that some U.S. businesses do not hire women at all or, in 

some cases, women are hired but segregated from men in the workplace. These kinds of 

practices, if confirmed, would illustrate acquiescence to demands to comply with strict religious 

norms that promote sex discrimination.

The U.S. government should investigate these allegations and report to the Congress on 

the extent to which U.S. businesses are engaging in discriminatory practices.138 While U.S. 

businesses operating in Saudi Arabia have an obligation to respect Saudi law, following customs 

and practices that violate international norms regarding discrimination and other human rights 

undermines respect for those norms. If such practices exist, the U.S. government should 

encourage reform, for example, by encouraging U.S. businesses to adopt workplace principles 

that uphold the rights of workers and promote fair business practices based on previously 

established guidelines such as the Sullivan principles or the UN Global Compact.139

 

1

 See World Bank country profile of Saudi Arabia, 

(http://devdata.worldbank.org/external/CPProfile.asp?CCODE=SAU&PTYPE=CP, accessed 

February 12, 2003); and CIA World Fact Book 

http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/sa.html, accessed February 12, 2003). The 

Web site of the Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia in Washington, D.C. estimates its population at 

22.8 million (http://www.saudiembassy.net/profile/saudi-profile00.htm, accessed February 19, 

2003). 

2

 Ismailis, also known as “Seveners,” dispute the identity of the seventh Imam in the Shi’a 

tradition in the eighth century and have developed their own independent Shi’a sect that has 

spread in small pockets throughout the Middle East, Central and South Asia and later in Europe 

and North America. See Encyclopedia.com: Ismailis 

(http://www.encyclopedia.com/html/I/Ismailis.asp, accessed February 17, 2003).

3

 U.S. Department of State, International Religious Freedom Report, “Saudi Arabia” October 

2002 (http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2002/14012.htm, accessed April 21, 2003). 

4

 In February 2003, Interior Minister Prince Naif announced that the foreign workforce will not 

exceed 20 percent by 2013 and that no single nationality should exceed 10 percent of the total 

population of expatriates in Saudi Arabia. See Ain-Al-Yaqeen, February 7, 2003 

(http://www.ain-al-yaqeen.com/issues/20030207/feat10en.htm, accessed April 3, 2003).

5

 Human Rights Watch, World Report 2003: Saudi Arabia, January 14, 2003 

(http://www.hrw.org/wr2k3/mideast6.html, accessed April 11, 2003).

6

 Historically, the al-Saud royal family maintained close ties with religious leaders, especially 

with members of the al-Shaykh family – several hundred of which are direct male descendants of 

Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab. Since the late 1970s, as declining oil revenues eroded the 

standard of living in Saudi Arabia, and after Muslim extremists forcibly took over the Grand 
31

 

Mosque in 1979 resulting in dozens of executions by Saudi authorities, the Saudi government

renewed its alliance with the Wahhabi religious establishment. The government has over time 

conceded greater responsibility to the Wahhabi clerics in areas important to them, including the 

judiciary, education, religious guidance, and the spread of Islam globally. At present, the 

Ministers of Justice and Islamic Affairs and the President of the Higher Council of Ulema are 

members of the al-Shaykh family. For a listing of current government officials in Saudi Arabia, 

see CIA, “Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments,” Saudi Arabia 

(http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/chiefs/chiefs154.html, accessed February 16, 2003). 

7

 There are a few Shi’a mosques that function in the Eastern province, primarily in Qatif. 

Western critics generally refer to the Saudi religious establishment as “Wahhabi,” although 

within Saudi Arabia they typically refer to themselves as muwahhidun (unitarians). 

8

 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), Art. 18; International Covenant on Civil and 

Political Rights (1966), Art. 18; UN Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance 

and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief (1981), Art. 1; and the UN Convention on the 

Rights of the Child (1989), Art. 14.

9

 Library of Congress, “Saudi Arabia: Shi’a,” Country Studies: Saudi Arabia 

(http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+sa0095), accessed February 

28, 2003).

10 In Gulf states such as Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Kuwait, Oman, and Bahrain, 

non-Muslim worship is permitted to varying degrees. In Kuwait and Yemen, churches are 

recognized and public worship is permitted. The UAE and Qatar have specifically designated or 

given land to Christian denominations to build churches and generally do not interfere in the 

religious activities of non-Muslims. In Oman, both Christian and Hindu public worship is 

permitted.

11 See Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 15 (27) on the Position of Aliens Under 

the Covenant, UN GAOR 28th Session, July 22, 1986, Paragraphs 2, 7, UN Doc. 

CCPR/C/21/Add.5/Rev.1 (noting that “the general rule is that each one of the rights of the 

Covenant [on Civil and Political Rights] must be guaranteed without discrimination between 

citizens and aliens” with exception of art. 25 on political rights).

12 See Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 22 (48) (Art. 18), UN Doc. 

CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4 (1993), ¶ 8; Arcot Krishnaswami, Study of Discrimination in the 

Matter of Religious Rights and Practices, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub. 2/200/Rev.1, UN Sales No. 

60.XIV.2 (1960); The Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the 

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1984). See Art. 14, subparagraph 3 in the 

Convention on the Rights of the Child. The text of the CRC can be found at: 

(http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/k2crc.htm, accessed March 30, 2003).

13 2002 International Religious Freedom Reports, “Saudi Arabia” (Internet).

14 Blasphemy charges in Saudi Arabia generally encompass any derogatory statements made 
32

 

against Islam or the Prophet Muhammad.

15 Middle East Newsline, “Saudis Sentence Man to Death for Insulting Religion,” February 3, 

2003.

16 Saudi Institute, “Religious Freedom in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Focus on Citizens,” 

January 2001 (http://www.saudiinstitute.org/Reports/Religious_Freedom/rlgfrdm_en.html, 

accessed March 28, 2003).

17 Based on January 2003 interviews by Commission staff with current and former foreign 

contract workers.

18 Most recently in March and April 2003, respectively, Defense Minister Prince Sultan and 

Deputy Interior Minister Prince Ahmad publicly reaffirmed the Saudi government’s policy of 

permitting non-Muslims to worship in private.

19 These criteria were outlined expressly for the Commission by the Minister for Islamic Affairs 

in a March 2001 meeting in Saudi Arabia.

20 Formerly the jointly owned Arabian American Oil Company, Saudi ARAMCO is now wholly 

Saudi-owned.

21 In response to inquiries in August and September 2001 by the UN Special Rapporteur on 

Freedom of Religion or Belief, the Saudi government claimed that Prabhu Isaac, Eskinder 

Menghis, and 11 other Ethiopians and Eritreans that were arrested during the summer of 2001, 

were all expelled from the country for converting residential apartments in Jeddah into places of 

refuge for people residing in the country illegally. See report submitted by Mr. Abdelfattah 

Amor, Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief, in accordance with Commission on 

Human Rights resolution 2000/33, E/CN.4/2002/73, March 14, 2002, ¶¶ 66-67 

(http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/TestFrame/06a76b69c494060cc1256b9e00456a

85?Opendocument, accessed February 19, 2003).

22 See International Christian Concern’s profile on Saudi Arabia 

(http://www.persecution.org/humanrights/saudi_arabia.html, accessed, November 4, 2002); and 

Christian Solidarity Worldwide, “Saudi Arabia: Annual Report 2002” 

(http://www.csw.org.uk/Protest/Saudi%20AR2%202002.pdf, accessed February 17, 2003).

23 Commission staff interviewed Dennis Moreno-Lacalle in June 2002.

24 2002 International Religious Freedom Reports, “Saudi Arabia” (Internet).

25 Recent reports from interlocutors indicate that, in some cases, the government does not deport 

foreign workers directly but instead has begun to rely on employers to initiate the process. Some 

of those released in September 2002 were informed by their Saudi sponsors that they could not 

resume their jobs and would have to leave the country.
33

 

26 See Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child, Consideration of 

Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 44 of the Convention, CRC/C/15/Add.148, 

February 22, 2001, ¶¶ 31-32 

(http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/385c2add1632f4a8c12565a9004dc311/83d5295595532530c1

2569ed00585df4?OpenDocument, accessed February 5, 2002). Three of the 10 members were 

from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Qatar.

27 See Donna Abu-Nasr, “Saudis Protest Religious Cops’ Role,” Reuters, July 31, 2002.

28 See Conclusions and Recommendations of the Committee Against Torture: Saudi Arabia, 

CAT/CR/28/5, June 2002 

(http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/385c2add1632f4a8c12565a9004dc311/a1d3cd6a1c89d294c1

256bd00055bac6?OpenDocument, accessed November 1, 2002).

29 Ibid.

30 U.S. Department of State, International Religious Freedom Report, “Saudi Arabia” October 

2001 (http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2001/5758.htm, accessed October 31, 2002).

31 Human Rights Watch, “Human Rights in Saudi Arabia: A Deafening Silence,” December 

2001 (http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/mena/saudi/, accessed April 15, 2003).

32 U.S. Department of State, 2002 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, “Saudi Arabia” 

March 2003 (http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2002/18288.htm, accessed April 11, 2003.)

33 Human Rights Watch, “World Report 2000,” Human Rights Developments in Saudi Arabia

(http://www.hrw.org/wr2k1/mideast/saudi.html, accessed November 14, 2002). 

34 New York Sun, “The Shuttle,” April 23, 2003 

(http://daily.nysun.com/Repository/ml.asp?Issue=NYS/2003/04/23&ID=Ar00200&Mode=HTML

accessed April 28, 2003).

35 2002 International Religious Freedom Reports, “Saudi Arabia” (Internet).

36 Saudi Institute, “Religious Freedom in The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: A Focus on Citizens,” 

January 30, 2002 (http://www.saudiinstitute.org/Reports/Religious_Freedom/rlg_en.htm, 

accessed April 16, 2003).

37 For a detailed discussion of the violations of human rights against women, see Amnesty 

International Canada, “Saudi Arabia: Gross Human Rights Abuses Against Women,” September 

27, 2000 (http://www.amnesty.ca/library/mde2305700htm.htm, accessed March 24, 2003).

38 This example clearly violates Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 

(UDHR) which states that “Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within 

the borders of each state” and that “Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his 

own, and to return to his country.” See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 13(1)(2)
34

 

(http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html, accessed February 25, 2003).

39 Arab News, “Girls Education Chief Takes Early Retirement,” March 25, 2002 

(http://www.arabnews.com/SArticle.asp?ID=13755&sct=Murshid&, accessed April 21, 2003).

40 See report submitted by the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion and Belief, 

Abdelfattah Amor, in accordance with Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1999/39, 

E/CN.4/2000/65.

41 U.S. Department of State, 2001 Country Report on Human Rights Practices, “Saudi Arabia” 

March 2002 (http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2001/nea/8296.htm, accessed October 31, 

2002).

42 U.S. Department of State, 2002 Country Report on Human Rights Practices, “Saudi Arabia,” 

March 31, 2003 (http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2002/18288.htm, accessed April 16, 2003).

43 2002 Country Reports, “Saudi Arabia” (Internet).

44 Interviews with Commission staff in January 2003.

45 U.S. Department of State, Background Notes, “Saudi Arabia” 

(http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3584.htm, accessed November 1, 2002).

46 See “Issue Brief for Congress,” Saudi Arabia: Current Issues and U.S. Relations. 

Congressional Research Service, October 3, 2002.

47 U.S. Department of State: Background Notes: Saudi Arabia (Internet).

48 Hudud is an Islamic legal term literally meaning “limits.”

49 Ibid.

50 These prominent clergy constitute the members of the Council of Senior Ulema, an official 

body created by the king in 1971 “to serve as a forum for regular consultation between the 

monarch and the religious establishment.” In return for official recognition of their special 

religious authority, the leading ulema provided implicit approval and, when requested, public 

sanction for potentially controversial policies. For example, in 1979 members of the Council of 

Senior Ulema issued a fatwa that sanctioned the use of force to subdue armed dissidents who had 

occupied the Grand Mosque in Mecca, Islam’s holiest shrine. In 1990, King Fahd received 

approval from the ulema for the deployment of U.S. military personnel on Saudi soil. 

51 See the government of Saudi Arabia’s 2001 report to the Committee Against Torture 

(http://193.194.138.190/tbs/doc.nsf/385c2add1632f4a8c12565a9004dc311/c0e2d98a58366e19c

1256af00043f218/$FILE/G0144698.pdf) and the Report on the Mission to the Kingdom of Saudi 

Arabia of the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, Dato’ Param 

Cumaraswamy, submitted in accordance with Commission on Human Rights Resolution 
35

 

2002/43, E/CN.4/2003/65/Add.3, January 14, 2003

(http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/1fa4d2b31bb90ce6c1256cd800372b43/$FILE/

G0310264.pdf, accessed April 28, 2003).

52 Ibid.

53 This information is based on interviews with Saudi interlocutors the Commission staff 

conducted in January 2003.

54 See the Center for Monitoring the Impact of Peace and the American Jewish Committee, 

Arnon Groiss, ed., The West, Christians and Jews in Saudi Arabian Schoolbooks, (February 

2003); see also Eleanor Abdella Doumato’s forthcoming study, “Manning the Barricades: Islam 

According to Saudi Arabia’s School Texts” in Middle East Journal received by the Commission 

in January 2003; Steven Stalinsky, “Preliminary Overview – Saudi Arabia’s Education System: 

Curriculum, Spreading Saudi Education to the World and Official Saudi Position on Education 

Policy,” The Middle East Research Media Institute (MEMRI), December 20, 2002 

(http://www.memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=countries&Area=saudiarabia&ID=SR01202, 

accessed December 30, 2002); and Michaela Prokop, “The Politics of Education in Saudi 

Arabia,” The Royal Institute of International Affairs (January 2003).

55 See Steven Stalinsky’s, “Preliminary Overview – Saudi Arabia’s Educational System” and 

Groiss, ed., The West, Christians, and Jews in Saudi Arabian Schoolbooks which examined 93 

books used in grades 1-10 primarily between 1999-2002.

56 Ibid.

57 See “Friday Sermons in Saudi Mosques: Review and Analysis,” translations by MEMRI from 

Arabic to English of excerpts of sermons delivered by religious leaders in Saudi Arabia 

(http://www.memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=sr&ID=SR01002, accessed 

March 3, 2003).

58 Ibid.

59 The government also strictly limits freedom of the press in Saudi Arabia. Privately owned 

newspapers in Saudi Arabia are under the close supervision of the Ministry of Information. 

Further, a recent study concluded that the Saudi government has been found to restrict public 

Internet access by censoring thousands of Web sites, including many non-Muslim religious Web 

sites and those that insult Islam. See Jonathan Zittrain and Benjamin Edelman, “Documentation 

of Internet Filtering in Saudi Arabia,” Berkman Center for Internet and Society, Harvard 

University Law School, July 2002 (http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/filtering/saudiarabia/#concl, 

accessed February 16, 2003); also see Nicholas Kristof, “Can This Marriage be Saved?”, The 

New York Times, November 1, 2002, late edition, for a discussion of specific religious and other 

Web sites that he found blocked while visiting Saudi Arabia. The Saudi government’s Internet 

Service Unit of the King Abdulaziz City for Science and Technology, established in 1998, 

provides Internet access for the Saudi population and decides what Web sites will be blocked. 
36

 

60 See multiple translated articles with anti-Semitic and discriminatory language from the Saudi 

press at the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) Web site: 

(http://www.memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=countries&Area=saudiarabia&ID=SP42102

http://www.memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=countries&Area=saudiarabia&ID=SP38102

http://www.memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=countries&Area=saudiarabia&ID=SP35402

http://www.memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=countries&Area=saudiarabia&ID=SP32702, 

accessed November 4, 2002).

61 See Council on Foreign Relations, “Terrorist Financing: Report of an Independent Taskforce,” 

October 2002 (http://www.cfr.org/pdf/Terrorist_Financing_TF.pdf, accessed April 16, 2003); 

also see a report prepared for the president of the UN Security Council by Jean-Charles Brisard, 

“Terrorism Financing: Roots and Trends of Saudi Terrorism Financing,” December 19, 2002 

(http://www.nationalreview.com/document/document-un122002.pdf, accessed April 16, 2003).

62 Michaela Prokop, “The Politics of Education in Saudi Arabia,” The Royal Institute of 

International Affairs (January 2003): 85.

63 Ibid.

64 Please refer to the larger list of countries where the Saudi government has itself claimed it has 

funded the spread of Islam globally, including madrassas, in the March 21, 2002 edition of the 

government weekly, Ain-Al-Yaqeen.

65 See Kamal Matinuddin, The Taliban Phenomenon (1999) and Ahmed Rashid, The Taliban: 

Militant Islam, Oil & Fundamentalism in Central Asia (2002). 

66 U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, Annual Report, May 2001: 106.

67 See Stalinsky, “Inside the Classroom.”

68 International Crisis Group, “Religion in Kosovo,” January 31, 2001 

(http://www.crisisweb.org/projects/balkans/kosovo/reports/A400226_31012001.pdf, accessed 

April 1, 2003).

69 James Woolsey in testimony before the House International Relations Subcommittee on the 

Middle East and South Asia, May 22, 2002.

70 Martin Indyk, “Back to the Bizarre,” Foreign Affairs (January-February 2002): 75.

71 John Esposito, Unholy War (2002), 49.

72 Martin Indyk, “Back to the Bizarre,” 86.

73 Gregory Gause, “Be Careful What You Wish For: The Future of U.S.-Saudi Relations,” World 
37

 

Policy Journal (Spring 2002): 46.

74 Graham Fuller, “The Future of Political Islam,” Foreign Affairs (March-April 2002): 48; also 

see the International Crisis Group report, “Pakistan: Madrasas, Extremism and the Military,” 

July 29, 2002 

(http://www.crisisweb.org/projects/asia/afghanistan_southasia/reports/A400717_29072002.pdf, 

accessed April 9, 2003).

75 Andrew Marshall, “A Jihadi’s Tale; What Drives so Many Muslims to Find Peace in a Holy 

War?”, Time Asia, March 10, 2003. Also see Ahmed Rashid, Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam 

in Central Asia (2002).

76 Susan Sevareid, “When Relations Soured, U.S. and Saudi Arabia Called in the PR Pros,” 

Associated Press, February 20, 2003.

77 United Nations Development Programme, Arab Human Development Report

(http://www.undp.org/rbas/ahdr/, accessed March 19, 2003).

78 Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia in Washington, D.C., “Charter for Reform of Arab 

Condition,” January 15, 2003 (http://www.saudiembassy.net/press_release/statements/03-STArab-Reform-Charter-Jan03.htm, accessed March 19, 2003).

79 Donna Abu-Nasr, “Saudi Rulers Explore Political Reform,” Associated Press, February 9, 

2003.

80 Reuters, “Reform Debate Rages in Saudi Arabia,” March 4, 2003.

81 September 8, 2002 interview on television newsmagazine 60 Minutes cited in Groiss, ed., The 

West, Christians, and Jews in Saudi Arabian Schoolbooks, 190. 

82 Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia, Washington, D.C., “Minister of Education Vows to Improve 

Education System,” January 7, 2003 (http://www.saudiembassy.net/press_release/releases/03-

PR-0107-education.htm, accessed March 17, 2003).

83 Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia, Washington, D.C., “Statement Regarding Saudi Education 

System,” February 4, 2003 (http://www.saudiembassy.net/press_release/releases/03-PR-0204-

education.htm, accessed February 13, 2003).

84 Steven Stalinsky, “Inside the Saudi Classroom,” National Review Online, February 7, 2003 

(http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/comment-stalinsky020703.asp, accessed March 17, 

2003).

85 Ibid.

86 Ain-Al-Yaqeen, “In Comprehensive Interviews on the Current Issues,” December 6, 2002 

(http://www.ain-al-yaqeen.com/issues/20021206/feat5en.htm, accessed April 1, 2003).
38

 

87 Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia, Washington, D.C., “Crown Prince Abdullah urges Muslims 

to Shun Extremism in Islam,” November 2, 2002 

(http://www.saudiembassy.net/press_release/releases/02-PR-1102-Abd-Islam.htm); see also 

“Saudi Crown Prince Calls for Moderation and Tolerance,” January 13, 2003 

(http://www.saudiembassy.net/press_release/releases/03-PR-0113-Abd-moderation.htm, 

accessed April 21, 2003).

88 BBC News: World Edition, Saudi Minister Rebukes Religious Police, November 4, 2002 

(http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2399885.stm, accessed November 4, 2002).

89 Ain-Al-Yaqeen, “In Comprehensive Interviews on the Current Issues,” December 6, 2002 

(http://www.ain-al-yaqeen.com/issues/20021206/feat5en.htm, accessed April 1, 2003).

90 Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia, Washington, D.C., “Saudi Religious Leaders Forbid Attacks 

on Non-Muslims,” February 11, 2003.

91 Associated Press, “Saudis Won’t Allow Churches on Its Land,” March 10, 2003.

92 On April 9, 2003, Deputy Interior Minister Prince Ahmad further affirmed the right of nonMuslims to worship in private: “There are thousands of non-Muslims with different religious 

faiths in the Kingdom. We don’t interfere in their personal faiths...Everybody is aware of this 

when they come to the Kingdom. We don’t interfere in the affairs of other countries and we 

don’t allow anybody to do anything contrary to Islam. People are free to practice their religious 

faiths and beliefs at home and in private.” P.K. Abdul Ghafour, “Non-Muslims Free to Practice 

Faiths in Private,” Arab News, April 9, 2003 (http://www.arabnews.com/Article.asp?ID=24947, 

accessed April 9, 2003).

93 U.S. Department of State: Background Notes: Saudi Arabia (Internet).

94 The United States officially ceased all economic aid to Saudi Arabia in 1959, although small 

amounts of aid continued until 1975 through an international military education and training 

program after 1968. See “Issue Brief for Congress,” Saudi Arabia: Current Issues and U.S. 

Relations, Congressional Research Service, January 22, 2003.

95 Andrew Hammond, “U.S. Withdrawing Virtually All Forces From Saudi Arabia,” Reuters, 

April 29, 2003.

96 “On-the-Record Briefing: Release of the 2002 Annual Report on International Religious 

Freedom,” October 7, 2002 (http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/spbr/14201.htm, accessed April 16, 

2003).

97 See “Daily Press Briefing” by State Department Spokesman, Richard Boucher, March 10, 

2003 (http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2003/18512.htm, accessed April 16, 2003).

98 See Section 563 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (HR 4546). 

Previous to this legislation, female military officers were required to wear abayas when off the 
39

 

military compound.

99 See Elaine Sciolino, “For Outsiders, Worship is Risk in Saudi Arabia,” New York Times, 

February 8, 2002; and John W. Whitehead, “”Religious Apartheid for American Troops 

Abroad,” Rutherford Institute, March 17, 2003 

(http://www.rutherford.org/articles_db/commentary.asp?record_id=213, accessed March 20, 

2003).

100 Whitehead, “Religious Apartheid for American Troops Abroad.”

101 Rich Lowry, “American’s Unspecial Relationship: A Cold Look at the Saudis,” National 

Review Online, August 8, 2002.

102 See Timothy Hunter, “Appeasing the Saudis,” Middle East Quarterly, March 1996 

(http://www.meforum.org/article/283, accessed March 17, 2003).

103 Thomas E. Ricks, “Briefing Depicted Saudis as Enemies,” Washington Post, August 6, 2002, 

Final edition.

104 Jack Shafer, “The PowerPoint that Rocked the Pentagon,” Slate Magazine, August 7, 2002.

105 Oliver Burkeman, “Legal Action Jeopardizes 9/11 Compensation,” The Guardian, September 

20, 2002.

106 See especially Article 26 of Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 5 of the 

Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on 

Religion or Belief. Saudi Arabia is a state party to the Convention on the Rights of the Child.

107 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 18; UN Declaration on the Elimination of All 

Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, Art. 1; International 

Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 18.

108 U.S. Department of State, International Religious Freedom Report, “Qatar” and “United Arab 

Emirates,” October 2002 (http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2002/14011.htm, accessed March 27, 

2003).

109 U.S. Department of State, International Religious Freedom Report, “Qatar,” October 2002 

(http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2002/14011.htm, accessed March 27, 2003).

110 Peter Slevin, “U.S. Considers Citing Saudi Arabia for Intolerance,” The Washington Post, 

January 18, 2003.

111 U.S. Department of State, 2002 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, “Saudi Arabia,” 

March 31, 2003 (http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2002/18288.htm, accessed April 9, 2003).

112 See page 17, ¶81 of the Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and 
40

 

Lawyers, Dato’ Param Cumaraswamy, E/CN.4/2003/65/Add.3; see also April 6, 2000 statement 

at the 56th Session of the UN Commission on Human Rights by Prince Turki Muhammad Saud 

al-Kabeer (http://www.saudiembassy.net/press_release/press_release00.htm, accessed February 

16, 2003).

113 See “Daily Press Briefing” by State Department Spokesman, Richard Boucher, March 10, 

2003 (http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2003/18512.htm, accessed April 16, 2003).

114 Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia, Washington D.C., “Statement Regarding Saudi Education 

System,” February 4, 2003.

115 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 26(2). The Convention on the Rights of the 

Child (CRC), to which Saudi Arabia is a party, contains a similar provision. 

116 For the UNESCO criteria, please see(http://www.unesco.org/education/pdf/34_71.pdf,

accessed April 28, 2003). They include ensuring that wording likely to create prejudice, 

misapprehension, and conflict are avoided, and the goals of freedom and the dignity of all 

persons are advocated.

117 See USCIRF 2002 Annual Report, 27.

118 See a September 2002 joint report by the Saudi Institute and the Foundation for the Defense 

of Democracies documenting the propagation of hate literature by the Saudi government in the 

United States and abroad: (http://www.saudiinstitute.org/hate.htm, accessed November 5, 2002).

119 See both reports at the Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia Web site, 

(http://www.saudiembassy.net, accessed December 4, 2002). 

120 Peter Slevin, “U.S. Considers Citing Saudi Arabia for Intolerance,” The Washington Post, 

January 18, 2003.

121 “Dialogue,” American Embassy TV Network, U.S. Department of State, Office of Broadcast 

Services, September 12, 2000 (transcript of interview of then Ambassador-at-Large for 

International Religious Freedom Robert Seiple found at http://www.usembassy.it/file2000_09/ 

alia/a009130b.htm, accessed April 1, 2003).

122 On-the-Record Briefing: Release of the 2002 Annual Report on International Religious 

Freedom, John V. Hanford III, Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom, 

Washington, D.C., October 7, 2002. (http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/ spbr/14201.htm, accessed 

April 1, 2003).

123 See, e.g., Letter from Sen. John McCain of Arizona to Secretary of State Colin Powell, 

December 17, 2002 (urging Secretary Powell to designate Saudi Arabia as a CPC); Peter Slevin, 

“U.S. Considers Citing Saudi Arabia for Intolerance,” Washington Post, January 18, 2003, 

(citing Sen. McCain, Representatives Lantos of California and Wolf of Virginia, as well as 

Human Rights Watch, as supporting designating Saudi Arabia as a CPC); Michael Isikoff, 
41

 

“Saudis: No ‘Particular Concern’,” Newsweek, March 10, 2003 (stating that after a “contentious 

internal battle” within the Department of State, Saudi Arabia was not going to be designated as a 

CPC); Agency France-Presse “U.S. Rebukes Saudi Arabia for lack of religious freedom,” March 

11, 2003; Editorial, “No Particular Concern,” Washington Post, March 17, 2003 (stating that 

leaving Saudi Arabia off the CPC list is “a particular affront to fact and logic”; and stating that 

“[t]o the extent the [U.S.] government contrives ways to keep American allies off its list, the 

designation process is a political joke”).

124 Richard Boucher, Spokesman, U.S. Department of State, Daily Press Briefing, Washington, 

DC, March 10, 2003 (http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2003/18512.htm, accessed April 1, 

2003).

125 IRFA, Section 402 (b)(1)(B), 22, U.S.C., Section 6442 (b)(1)(B).

126 Stephen Hayes, “Uncle Sam’s Makeover,” The Weekly Standard, June 3, 2002.

127 Statement by Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs William J. Burns, House 

International Relations Committee, Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia, March 

19, 2003.

128 See the text of Assistant Secretary Burns’s testimony before the House International Relations 

Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia, March 19, 2003.

129 “Radio Sawa Launches The Free Zone, New Program on Democracy; Secretary of State 

Powell Calls for More Openness in the Middle East” 

(http://www.bbg.gov/_bbg_news.cfm?articleID=58&mode=general, accessed March 5, 2003).

130 Donald Lambro, “Beaming Up for Iraq’s Future,” Washington Times, March 20, 2003.

131 This was stated in a March 24, 2003 letter to the Commission.

132 Whitehead, “Religious Apartheid for American Troops Abroad.”

133 See press release from the United States Postal Service, “Operation Iraqi Freedom Postal 

Tips,” March 25, 2003 (http://www.usps.com/communications/news/press/2003/pr03_018.htm, 

accessed April 2, 2003). The original press release issued by the Postal Service on March 25, 

2003 included the above quoted language regarding restrictions on religious materials. When 

accessed on its Web site on April 21, the March 25 press release read: “Although religious 

materials contrary to the Islamic faith are prohibited in bulk quantities, items for personal use of 

the addressee are permissible.” The Commission was told by the Postal Service that the 

Department of Defense’s Military Postal Service Agency approved the language in the original 

press release.

134 Ibid.

135 Editorial, Wall Street Journal, January 3, 2003.
42

 

136 Press release from the office of Representative Dan Burton, “Burton Delegation Returns from 

Saudi Arabia,” September 5, 2002 (http://www.house.gov/burton/pr9502.htm, accessed March 

30, 2003).

137 See Donna Abu-Nasr, “Saudis Protest Religious Cops’ Role,” Reuters, July 31, 2002 and 

Colbert I. King, “Saudi Arabia’s Apartheid,” The Washington Post, December 22, 2001, A23.

138 Reporting on this information could be included in the State Department’s Annual Report on 

International Religious Freedom. See IRFA, § 701(b)(1)(2), 22 U.S.C. 6481.

139 In 1977, Leon Sullivan, a Baptist preacher who served on the board of General Motors, 

drafted a set of workplace principles, known as the Sullivan Principles, for U.S. businesses in 

South Africa that required companies to practice “corporate civil disobedience” against 

apartheid. Several companies eventually agreed to the principles, which eventually led to the 

divestment of more than 100 U.S. businesses by 1979. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan 

initiated the Global Compact in 1999 to challenge business leaders to join an international 

initiative that would bring companies together with UN agencies, labor, and civil society to 

support nine principles in the areas of human rights, labor, and the environment. The Global 

Compact seeks to advance responsible corporate citizenship and is based on principles derived 

from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Labor Organization’s 

Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, and the Rio Declaration on 

Environment and Development. Also, the MacBride Principles in Northern Ireland were 

initiated by the Irish National Caucus in 1984 in response to discrimination against Catholics, 

particularly in employment. As a result, 44 U.S. companies agreed to “make all lawful efforts to 

implement the fair employment practices embodied in the MacBride Principles” in their 

Northern Ireland Operations. For a list and discussion of the MacBride principles, see 

(http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/links/macbride.html#principles, accessed April 28, 2003).