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CHINA’S FAR WEST: CONDITIONS IN XINJIANG 

ONE YEAR AFTER DEMONSTRATIONS AND RIOTS 

ROUNDTABLE 

BEFORE THE

CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE 

COMMISSION ON CHINA 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

JULY 19, 2010 

Printed for the use of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.cecc.gov 

(II) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Opening statement of Charlotte Oldham-Moore, Staff Director, CongressionalExecutive Commission on China ........................................................................ 1 

Kan, Shirley A., Specialist in Asian Security Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense, 

and Trade Division, Congressional Research Service ....................................... 2 

Toops, Stanley W., Associate Professor, Department of Geography and International Studies Program, Miami University .................................................... 5 

Richardson, Sophie, Asia Advocacy Director, Human Rights Watch .................. 8 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENT

Toops, Stanley W. .................................................................................................... 28 

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD

Prepared Statement of Kathleen E. McLaughlin, China Correspondent for 

BNA Inc., Freelance Journalist ........................................................................... 35 

Statement of the Chairman and Cochairman: Xinjiang—One Year After Demonstrations and Rioting ....................................................................................... 36 

(1) 

CHINA’S FAR WEST: CONDITIONS IN XINJIANG 

ONE YEAR AFTER DEMONSTRATIONS AND 

RIOTS 

MONDAY, JULY 19, 2010 

CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE

COMMISSION ON CHINA, 

Washington, DC. 

The roundtable was convened, pursuant to notice, at 2:03 p.m., 

in room 628, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Charlotte OldhamMoore, Staff Director, presiding. 

Also present: Kara Abramson, Advocacy Director. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHARLOTTE OLDHAM-MOORE, 

STAFF DIRECTOR, CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA 

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. Good afternoon. I’m Charlotte OldhamMoore. I’m Staff Director at the Congressional-Executive Commission on China. You are here today at the fifth roundtable of the 

year for the Congressional-Executive Commission on China [CECC]. 

We have one panelist, Ms. Shirley Kan, on her way to the hearing room. Unfortunately, we have another panelist who got 

snagged in Minneapolis in a flight slowdown and had to return 

home. So, unfortunately, Ms. McLaughlin will not be joining us. 

But we have present here today Dr. Stanley Toops and Dr. Sophie 

Richardson. 

At this CECC roundtable panelists will examine conditions in the 

far western region of Xinjiang one year after demonstrations and 

rioting occurred there. Events in July 2009 exposed long-standing 

tensions in the region and Uyghurs’ grievances toward government 

policies that threatened their basic rights. Authorities pledged, in 

2010, to improve economic conditions in Xinjiang and appointed a 

new Party secretary for the region. 

The questions that will be examined at today’s roundtable are: 

How will these new developments shape Xinjiang’s future? Is the 

government effectively addressing Uyghur grievances? How have 

government controls over the free flow of information affected our 

understanding of events in the region? 

Before I turn to the panelists, I want to make a couple of brief 

announcements. First, we have a wonderful group of people in our 

audience today, but I certainly want to give particular attention to 

Ms. Rebiya Kadeer. Many of you know Ms. Rebiya Kadeer. She is 

head of the Uyghur American Association, and also head of the 

World Uyghur Congress. She is joined by many of her associates; 

some of you may have met them. 

2 

Ms. Kan? Great. So glad you could make it. I am also joined by 

Kara Abramson, our Senior Analyst on Uyghur issues, as well as 

religion and minority concerns, at the Commission. Many of you 

know Ms. Abramson’s work. She does outstanding analytic pieces 

for the Commission, and she is with us here today. 

I am going to turn to introduce our panel. Then after the panelists give their statements, we will turn to the audience, you, for 

questioning of the panelists. 

Our panel of witnesses, as I mentioned, will examine the current 

conditions in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region one year after 

demonstrations and rioting took place in the capital city of Urumqi. 

To help us understand these developments, we have three distinguished witnesses who will speak today. First, Ms. Shirley Kan, a 

Specialist in Asian Security, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade 

Division at the Congressional Research Service. For those of you 

who cover Asia for the Congress, you know Shirley’s work very 

well. She is really just an outstanding resource for Members of 

Congress and their staffs. 

Next, we have Dr. Stanley Toops. He is Associate Professor in 

the Department of Geography and International Studies Program 

at Miami University. Dr. Toops will address demographic and economic developments in Xinjiang. Finally, Dr. Sophie Richardson 

will speak. She is the Asia Advocacy Director at Human Rights 

Watch. Dr. Richardson will discuss disappearances in the aftermath of the July demonstrations and riots, which, as all of you 

know, took the lives of many Han Chinese, as well as Uyghur citizens of China, a very tragic event for the country. She will discuss 

other recent human rights events in the region as well. 

So I am going to turn it over to you, Ms. Kan. Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF SHIRLEY A. KAN, SPECIALIST IN ASIAN SECURITY AFFAIRS, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEFENSE, AND TRADE 

DIVISION, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 

Ms. KAN. Thank you. I’m going to briefly go over the political and 

security implications of the People’s Republic of China’s [PRC] response in the past year to the unrest in Xinjiang in July 2009. 

The Communist Party of China [CPC] changed leaders in 

Xinjiang, convened the first Xinjiang Work Conference, and expanded security forces. These developments have added complexity 

because the PRC regime tends to target Uyghurs with a tinge of 

‘‘terrorism.’’ What are the implications for the PRC’s approach to 

internal security and for the United States? 

First, the CPC changed leadership, both civilian and military 

leaders in Xinjiang. In September 2009, the CPC replaced the Secretary of the Communist Party of Urumqi. Then the Party Secretary of Xinjiang since 1995 was expected to be replaced also, but 

the top rulers apparently waited because Wang Lequan is also a 

Politburo member and they could not appear to bow to dissent. 

In April, General Secretary Hu Jintao convened a Politburo 

meeting on Xinjiang and removed Wang Lequan, putting him 

under Politburo Standing Committee member Zhou Yongkang as 

his deputy in the Politics and Law Commission. 

Wang appears to be the only member of the Politburo to be demoted. Assigned as the new Xinjiang Party Secretary was Zhang 

3 

Chunxian, formerly the Party Secretary of Hunan Province, where 

he reportedly paid attention to public opinion. Before that, Zhang 

was a professional bureaucrat as the Minister of Transportation, 

but he is still an outsider to Xinjiang and a Han. 

Zhang continued the call on the military forces to crack down on 

the ‘‘Three Evil Forces,’’ which is a PRC term that conflates religion, 

ethnicity, and fighting into one threat. In June, the leadership replaced the Political Commissars of the Production and Construction 

Corps and the People’s Liberation Army’s [PLA] Xinjiang Military 

District. 

Second, the CPC leaders convened a Xinjiang Work Conference. 

Like the Tibet Work Conferences, with the fifth one held in January, there was the first Xinjiang Work Conference in May. All nine 

members of the Politburo Standing Committee attended both the 

Tibet Work Conference in January and the Xinjiang Work Conference in May. While it appears that General Secretary Hu has 

the lead on the Tibet Work Conference and fourth-ranked Jia 

Qinglin has the lead on the Taiwan Work Conference, ninth-ranked 

Zhou Yongkang has taken the lead on Xinjiang. With Zhou as the 

Chairman of the Politics and Law Commission, the indication is 

that security has the priority in Xinjiang rather than economic development. 

Ironically, this fact was brought home on the first anniversary of 

last July’s unrest. Even an effort to showcase a supposed return to 

business as usual at the famous international bazaar in Urumqi 

saw Uyghur vendors selling scarves and such alongside armed police with guns, batons, and shields. I am sure that is just great for 

business and tourism. 

Third, the CPC leaders expanded security. They transferred 

5,000 elite special police from around China from last July until 

this April, and recruited 5,000 special police from within Xinjiang, 

starting in February. In March, the paramilitary People’s Armed 

Police [PAP] added a new elite, rapid-reaction unit, as what they 

themselves call a ‘‘fist’’ in Urumqi. 

PAP units have trained in the use of helicopters for armed assaults on people on the ground and trained special operation units 

for armed raids, even into residences. The PAP set up rapid-reaction units in other cities as well. 

In the military, the PLA, there has been at least one army aviation unit with helicopters that appears to have the mission of rapid 

reaction and long-distance deployment. They also have increased 

spending on security in 2010. Just this year, security spending increased by 88 percent, to $423 million. 

The police have been installing 60,000 security cameras in the 

city of Urumqi alone, and that is to be completed by the end of this 

year. They take pictures of all drivers and passengers in every vehicle near that famous bazaar I mentioned earlier. 

In conclusion, what are some implications for internal security? 

The PRC’s new approach appears to be comprehensive, involving 

economic, security, military, religious, legal, energy, diplomatic, 

propaganda, transportation, and local policies—that is, the governments of other localities in China. 

The impact on Uyghurs and Hans appears to be mixed. There is 

now top-level attention from the top leadership which would enVerDate Mar 15 2010 17:20 Oct 27, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 U:\DOCS\57904.TXT DEIDRE
4 

courage economic development, but that raises the political cost of 

any unrest and the incentive to take harsh, or even preemptive, 

measures to crack down in the name of ‘‘stability.’’ 

On the plus side, there has been recognition that the root of the 

unrest last July was internal problems, not external forces as the 

officials had charged. Second, there was the implicit admission that 

the local leaders were part of the problem, even a Politburo member. 

Externally, the PRC regime has allowed foreign reporters, both 

last July as well as for this first anniversary. The PRC also allowed 

for the first time some foreign monitoring, including the first visit 

to Xinjiang by the Organization of the Islamic Conference [OIC] in 

June. OIC’s Secretary General visited Xinjiang, including Kashgar, 

and called for attention not only to the economy, but also cultural 

concerns. 

Improved crisis control could provide more accurate and objective 

information for restraint in the use of force. There could be more 

economic benefits, including use of the region’s own energy resources. There could be greater respect for the culture and religion 

of Uyghurs. The Work Conference I mentioned could be regularized 

to continue to assess problems as well as progress. 

On the negative side, if there is another protest, the beefed-up 

security forces are likely again to overreact to unrest. There is likely greater use of intelligence, including using informants in their 

own communities, and monitoring of people’s everyday lives: 

through emails, phone calls, cameras. 

Even with the implicit admission of an internal and economic 

problem, there is no change to the rhetorical use of the tinge of 

‘‘terrorism’’ through attacks on the so-called ‘‘Three Evil Forces.’’ 

There is no indication that there are reversals in the flows of 

Uyghurs, particularly women, out of Xinjiang to work where they 

face discrimination, and of greater numbers of Hans into Xinjiang. 

As can be seen in the ethnic or cultural grievances around the 

world, including in the United States, economic determinants alone 

are not sufficient to address perceived wrongs. Moreover, the PRC’s 

economic policies and increased transportation could actually result 

in even greater numbers of Hans going to Xinjiang. Based on the 

PRC’s policy to force Uyghurs to learn the Mandarin language, 

there is implicit admission that economic benefits are biased toward those who use Mandarin, especially the Hans. There is also 

the implicit dismissal of the Uyghur language, but actually their 

Turkic-based language historically has helped with trade ties to 

central Asia and Europe. 

In short, there does not appear to be a fundamental change in 

the PRC’s approach of the Hans controlling the Uyghurs: assimilation, not autonomy as promised even in the name of the so-called 

‘‘Xinjiang Autonomous Region.’’ 

What are some implications for the United States? Consideration 

of whether to work with the PLA in Xinjiang in support of U.S. 

military operations in central Asia requires a great deal of caution. 

There are acute tensions, crackdowns are likely, and communication is even more tightly controlled. 

Second, the PRC’s claim that the Uyghur-linked terrorism is the 

greatest threat to China is not credible. There could be a different 

5 

problem for Americans and other foreigners, especially businesses, 

of greater discontent and lawlessness throughout China. 

Let us look at just reported bombs on buses in 2010 so far. In 

February, there was an explosion on a bus in Yunnan Province 

that killed the bomber himself and injured 11. Earlier this month, 

an explosion on a bus in Jiangsu Province killed 24 people and injured 19. Then, over months, attackers terrorized innocent children 

in schools in at least five incidents. The PRC did not call the suspects ‘‘terrorists’’ or ‘‘suicide bombers.’’ 

As President Obama said at the U.S.-PRC Strategic and Economic Dialogue last July, ‘‘Religion and culture of all peoples must 

be respected and protected’’ and ‘‘all people should be free to speak 

their minds.’’ He said, ‘‘That includes ethnic and religious minorities in China . . . ’’ 

Thank you. 

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. Thank you, Ms. Kan. 

Now we have Dr. Stanley Toops, please. 

STATEMENT OF STANLEY W. TOOPS, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, 

DEPARTMENT OF GEOGRAPHY AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES PROGRAM, MIAMI UNIVERSITY 

Mr. TOOPS. Thank you very much. 

I am a geographer, an academic, and I study demography and 

development. I’ve been going to Xinjiang on and off for the past 25 

years, as I found it a very interesting place to look at for demography and development, as that is what the bulk of my research 

has been upon. 

I will talk about two things. One is essentially looking at the development issues as transpired or the policies with the Xinjiang 

Work Forum—or the Xinjiang Work Conference, I’ve seen it both 

ways—and then the other part is to look at the demographic components of Xinjiang and think a little bit about the possible impacts 

of the policies derived in the Xinjiang Work Conference. 

Xinjiang is, of course, the largest territorial unit within China, 

about one-sixth of China’s total area, so it’s actually quite large. 

There’s a population of 21 million, a large population, but compared to, say, Sichuan, not so much. 

When you look at it, also, you realize that while the population 

in total is kind of sparsely populated for China, given the climate 

and the physiography within Xinjiang, actually 20 million is a 

large population; there is just not enough water for everybody 

eventually. 

Xinjiang, as a part of China, has been involved in the Western 

Development Program, which developed in 1999 to address regional 

inequities faced by China’s western regions. Eastern China had already gone through development programs, so in some ways the 

current policies with the Xinjiang Work Forum really expand upon 

the Western Development Program. 

When you take a look at development in Xinjiang, you realize 

that prior to the advent of, say, the People’s Republic of China, you 

can see economic activities in herding, oasis agriculture, trade, but 

certainly in the modern era, the latter part of the 20th century 

with oil exploration and oil development, that production has been 

very important in Xinjiang’s development overall. So, oil, textiles, 

6 

agri-business. Given the size of Xinjiang, the transportation construction development—road, air and rail—has also been fairly important when you take a look at it. 

Many of the transportation linkages on the rail side of things 

were very much concentrated around Urumqi, and that connects 

then by rail on to Beijing. That was built in the 1960s. It was not 

until the 1990s that that rail link then continued on to 

Kazakhstan, the former Soviet Union. The rail goes to the south, 

by 1999, all the way to Kashgar. 

So this rail system is very important, just taking a look at the 

economic development of the area overall. I mean, part of the rationale for having the rail into the south is because the south is 

also where you start to find oil in the Tarim Basin in southern 

Xinjiang. There had already been oil discoveries in northern 

Xinjiang and Karamai, so the rail linkage and pipelines are also 

important for that area, but I think the rail connections into southern Xinjiang then connect both in terms of development, as well as 

the demographics. 

On the agricultural side of things, the state created the Xinjiang 

Production Construction Corps [XPCC], or the Bingtuan, that is, 

it’s an army [bing] corps [tuan]. In English, it’s just translated as 

‘‘corps,’’ but it’s an army corps composed of demobilized units from 

the PLA, and also Guomindang soldiers in the area, and some 

other local soldiers. 

These state farms kind of ran out in the 1960s at the end of the 

Cultural Revolution, but then they were brought back as a way to 

maintain development, but also stability and control. So you have 

got circumstances in Xinjiang with the oil, and then with the state 

farm system, the Production Construction Corps, that are different 

from other parts of China. Of course, in the eastern coastal areas 

there is oil, but you do not really have these kinds of state farms 

in other parts of China now. All those have gone by the wayside. 

The development program, through the People’s Republic of 

China, ended up restructuring, reorienting the development landscape, whereas before you had traditional centers in Kashgar, 

Turpan, and Gulja—that is, Ili—now, of course, it’s much more concentrated around Urumqi, and then the oil centers, such as in 

Karamai. 

So we have that kind of economic distinction here, so that now 

with the rail connections in northern Xinjiang, that is the area that 

has been developed mostly and has higher levels of income or per 

capita GDP. Southern Xinjiang does not. The economy there is 

mostly focused on agriculture, and with some small amounts of industry. But with the oil production in the Tarim, in the southern 

part of the region, you will probably see things increase there. 

So with oil, we see the impact in northern Xinjiang and Karamai, 

and then processing in Urumqi. We see the beginnings of economic 

development in the south as far as oil, but this oil does not necessarily contribute to the economic development for local people. It 

goes into the regional kind of overall character, but not necessarily 

translated into the local area. Many of the oil crews are from, say, 

eastern China, so they are not really involved in development of 

the local landscape. 

7 

So if we take a look at the Xinjiang Work Conference, the new 

policies that Dr. Kan spoke about, there are several different aspects. One is the regional component. So what is going on now? 

The policy as it has developed is that, say, Beijing will be responsible or help the Hotan area. Shenzhen will help the Kashgar area. 

So you have all of these coastal provinces that are targeting or 

are going to be linked up as maybe sister cities or sister prefectures 

with various parts of Xinjiang. It seems that the southern area is 

actually getting the attention to have more economic development 

in the south. However, when you start taking a look at the types 

of projects, it seems that most of it is geared toward infrastructure 

and not necessarily development of human capital. 

Then you see, for example, that Shenzhen, which is next to Hong 

Kong and specializes in the export markets, is going to work with 

Kashgar. That is a completely different situation. Kashgar’s neighbors are Kyrgyzstan and Pakistan, in contrast to, say, Xinjiang’s 

neighbor being Hong Kong. It is a much different kind of circumstance. 

So, looking at that, you see the infrastructure development issue, 

then also this kind of regional development issue. In terms of demography, much of the central areas around Urumqi, you have a 

larger percentage of Han population compared with the south, 

where you have more of the Uyghur population. According to the 

government statistics, of the 21 million, Uyghurs are about 46 percent; the Han, 39 percent; and Kazakhs, 7 percent. That does not 

count, of course, the floating population into the area, or military, 

which would be a much smaller number. 

Han migration has come into the area and has followed mostly 

and matches up fairly well with urban and transportation linkages. 

So with the rail linkages into Urumqi, and we see, of course, 

Urumqi is now 80, 90 percent Han population, Uyghur a much 

smaller percentage, and then even I think with the rail connection 

going to Kashgar, whereas Kashgar in the past has been 90 percent and more Uyghur, we expect to see that there will be more 

Han population coming into the area. 

The migrants have come from Sichuan in particular, also Hunan 

and Gansu. Gansu, of course, is a neighboring province, so you 

would expect that. Sichuan is a little farther away, but there seems 

to be a kind of a connection through perhaps the Bingtuan, the 

Xinjiang Production Construction Corps, or others. 

So we see that the population here is young and ethnically diverse. There are a number of recent migrants, perhaps up to 10 

percent of the population according to the 2000 census, and we will 

see what the 2010 census shows. 

So probably with the projects continuing, we will see a larger 

percentage of workers moving into Xinjiang from other parts of 

China, and most of these migrants will be Han. We will see a population shift, certainly in the north that has already occurred, so 

then it will be, to how much of an extent will that occur in southern Xinjiang? 

I think with the construction of the railroad system and then this 

new plan with the Xinjiang Work Conference, Xinjiang Work 

Forum, that would probably entail some transfer of personnel and 

not just money into the area, coming from the east coast, people 

8 

with special skills and other types of skilled labor. That would 

probably increase the relative percentage of Han in southern 

Xinjiang as well. 

So, in that case then southern Xinjiang would probably become 

more like northern Xinjiang. So there is a very strong kind of regional component to my analysis and taking a look at the sorts of 

changes that we are expecting. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Toops appears in the appendix.] 

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. Thank you, Dr. Toops. We very much appreciate it. 

Now, Dr. Sophie Richardson. She is, as I mentioned, Advocacy 

Director for Human Rights Watch [HRW] in Asia. 

STATEMENT OF SOPHIE RICHARDSON, ASIA ADVOCACY 

DIRECTOR, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Thanks very much for inviting me to be with 

you this afternoon. It should go without saying, but I will repeat 

it here, that we are big fans of the CECC’s work. 

I am going to try to get quickly through a couple of topics, starting with a report that we released in October 2009, in which we 

examined the aftermath of the July 2009 protests in Xinjiang, 

which according to the Chinese Government, killed at least 197 

people. While it is clearly the Chinese Government’s duty to uphold 

public order, thoroughly investigate incidents of violence, and punish perpetrators in accordance with the law, our research indicates 

that instead of launching an impartial investigation in accordance 

with international and domestic standards, Chinese law enforcement agencies have instead carried out a massive campaign of 

unlawful arrests in the Uyghur areas of Urumqi, many of which resulted in the disappearances of detainees. 

This report documents the enforced disappearances of at least 43 

Uyghur men and teenaged boys—the youngest was 13—who were 

detained by Chinese security forces in the wake of the protests. It 

is worth clarifying that enforced disappearances are some of the 

most alarming kinds of abuses that we deal with, so it is worth explaining what exactly we mean by this term. 

An enforced disappearance occurs when state authorities—state 

authorities, not random people, but state authorities—detain a person and then refuse to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or 

the person’s whereabouts. This is highly problematic because it 

places the person outside the protection of the law and increases 

the likelihood of other abuses, such as torture and extra-judicial 

execution. Given the Chinese Government’s already appalling track 

record particularly with respect to torture of detainees, this takes 

on particular significance in Xinjiang. 

To date, the Chinese Government has failed to respond to all the 

inquiries made about these arrests; perhaps there is somebody here 

with us this afternoon from the Embassy, if you would care to explain that to us. We included in a copy of this report, which is 

standard operating procedure for us, a letter we sent to the Chinese Government in advance of publication asking a series of questions about number of detainees, the ethnic breakdown of them, 

what people were being charged with, where they were being held. 

9 

Not only did we not get a response after the report was released 

on October 22, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson was 

asked about the report. He replied that he ‘‘didn’t know on what 

grounds we based our assertions’’ and said that HRW had ‘‘fabricated rumors to attack China on many occasions.’’ 

The severe and ongoing limitations on access to Xinjiang complicate what we can know about what has happened since that 

time. One of the journalists who recently traveled there reported 

having been stopped seven times by Public Security Bureau personnel on her first day, and she later suggested to us that that was 

actually the best day of her visit. 

We have not yet begun to conduct new investigations, but it is 

our understanding that the problem remains as serious now as it 

was then. Another journalist who was in Urumqi last month 

quoted a 33-year-old Uyghur resident of Urumqi as saying, ‘‘Every 

single family on this block is missing someone.’’ 

One of the issues I was asked to touch on today has to do with 

violations of due process that have compromised the possibility of 

fair trials for defendants. It is worth pointing out that these are all 

problems that are pervasive throughout China, where the judicial 

system is highly politicized. 

The first problem has to do with restrictions on legal representation, 

including the fact that judicial authorities in Urumqi and Beijing, 

on July 11—so just a few days after the protest started—effectively 

warned lawyers against accepting cases related to these protests. 

At the same time, partners of law firms were told to ‘‘positively 

accept monitoring and guidance from legal authorities and lawyers’ 

associations,’’ meaning, let the Party decide how these cases should 

be handled, not the law. Multiple examples of the overpoliticization of the judiciary here would point to the president of 

the Xinjiang High People’s Court, a memo dated July 16, 2009, saying that the Xinjiang judicial authorities to hear these particular 

cases have been ‘‘selected politically qualified personnel drawn 

from the entire region,’’ so again, not really much of an interest 

there in upholding the law. 

Third, I would point to the failure to publicly publish notification 

of the trials. This is a clear violation of China’s own criminal procedure laws. Then, fourth, the failure to hold genuinely open trials, 

which is also mandated by law in China. The same July 11 warning that placed certain limitations on lawyers also prohibited them 

from talking to the media or discussing these issues online. 

In the past, we know that authorities have arbitrarily restricted 

people’s ability to actually be in the courtroom, and instead essentially packed the room with court personnel and civil servants. And 

while we do not know who was actually present at these trials, we 

know who was not. That includes members of the foreign press, 

diplomatic representatives, family members, or other associates of 

the people being tried. 

Very little information is available about the trials that have 

taken place to date. We, and others, are aware of the announcement made by Nur Bekri in March 2010 that 198 people have been 

tried, but that is really about it. We have no reason to believe why 

these trials should be any better than any of the ones that preceded them in either Xinjiang or in any other part of the country. 

10 

We do not know all that much about the sentences that people 

have been given. We know that reeducation through labor has been 

a very common penalty applied in the past, which has the additional effect of keeping people from talking to their family members 

or appealing their charges, and it is a way also of circumscribing 

criminal investigations. 

With the appointment of Zhang Chunxian, who has sort of been 

offered up as the warm and fuzzy alternative to Wang Lequan, the 

questions are, will his leadership really result in any sort of policy 

changes? Will it be better, will it be worse? He seems—it is a relatively recent development, but from our perspective—he seems to 

be trying to bring a new style of governance to the region. 

He appears to be trying to be popular, which is setting the bar 

kind of low. By the time Wang Lequan finished, he had not only 

alienated Uyghurs, but he had alienated a significant chunk of the 

Han population by not being tough enough on Uyghurs. So, there 

is really no place to go but up. 

He seems to be trying to administer the province along more sort 

of normal lines rather than as a special security problem. He is engaged in a flurry of activities, including talking publicly about the 

importance of opening up the Internet and trying to be sort of more 

visible. We will see whether this turns out to be a good thing or 

bad thing. 

From our perspective, there also appears to be a little bit more 

of an acknowledgement of the socioeconomic roots of ethnic disenfranchisement and possibly—possibly—an attempt to reach out 

to a new generation of Uyghur graduates that is conversant in both 

cultures, but this really could go either way. This could be a very 

concerted effort. We have seen similar efforts elsewhere in the 

country to co-opt this generation rather than actually give it real 

autonomy. 

In retrospect, it looks like the July protests finally prompted Beijing to allow some discussion over issues that were previously politically taboo, contrary to Tibet where the united front has really 

blocked the way for policy adjustments. Beijing has acted with 

uncharacteristic speed and determination in the case of Xinjiang. 

The $64,000 question, of course, is whether this will be enough and 

whether this will be a good thing, and the jury is really out on 

that. 

Fundamentally, some of the policy changes or adjustments that 

we have seen in the last few months are ones of magnitude, not 

of direction. The simple take-away here is that Uyghurs are still 

excluded from the decisions about the future of their homeland. 

They are no more empowered to participate in those discussions 

now than they were at the time of the protests. Discussions about 

autonomy are absent from the political discourse, and there is no 

discussion of the issues that top the list of Uyghur discontent, including discrimination, Han in-migration, and ever more invasive 

curbs on language, culture, and religious expression. 

I would couple with that some particularly aggressive externally 

oriented policies we have seen from the Chinese Government about 

Uyghurs, not least incredible pressure from the Chinese Government on Cambodia and a couple of other central Asian governments to force back to China Uyghurs who were seeking asylum, 

11 

and also a whole new level, I think, in the campaign to essentially 

paint all Uyghurs worldwide as terrorists. 

At the end of the day, this is a pretty volatile mix. The chief 

source of Uyghur alienation is a perception that they are becoming 

strangers in their own land, and without any sort of stake in the 

place’s future, I think people may wind up behaving very differently regardless of what the policies actually are. 

I want to touch very quickly on some of the recommendations 

that we have made, particularly to the Chinese Government: That 

it end the practice of enforced disappearances; that it release accurate information on all those detained, released, and formally arrested in the aftermath of the protests; that it release all of those 

against whom no charges have been brought—that is a pretty novel 

concept; ensure that peaceful religious observation and practice are 

not equated with, or incur liability from, state security forces; and 

end the criminalization of the advocacy for Uyghur autonomy. 

Quickly, on the recommendations that we have made to the U.S. 

Government and to other members of the international community, 

ensure that your own policies regarding terrorism and counterterrorism do not exacerbate problems in Xinjiang. The threat of 

terrorism cannot be used to justify the repression of a particular 

ethnic minority, and I am not entirely confident that the U.S. Government is really following through on this. It is a very important 

part of the debate. 

The United States and others should extend full and active support to an international investigation into the Urumqi events under 

the auspices of the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human 

Rights. The United States should continue to press the Chinese 

Government for accountability. 

The United States should offer asylum to Uyghurs under threat 

of being returned to China. Every U.S. Ambassador worldwide: if 

you have Uyghurs and if they are under some sort of threat of 

being sent back to China, don’t mess around. Open the door, let 

them into the Embassy, bring them here. It is no more complicated 

than that. 

Then last but not least, reject the idea that any discussion of the 

human rights in Xinjiang, Tibet, or any other part of the PRC constitutes a violation of the ‘‘core interests’’ articulated by the People’s Republic. This is a term that is nothing more than the PRC 

saying we don’t want to talk about this, and if anything should direct the U.S. Government’s human rights agenda in China, it is 

precisely that which the Chinese Government labels as a core interest. 

Thank you. 

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. Thank you, Sophie. It’s always a pleasure 

having you here. 

Now we are going to open it up to our audience. 

So, the first question will come from Kara Abramson, and then 

we’ll turn to the audience. You can project if you know you’re good 

at vocalizing. Stand up and just project. If you know you need a 

little electronic help, we have a microphone up here. 

Kara is going to start us off. 

Ms. ABRAMSON. Thank you. And thanks to all of the panelists for 

your testimony today. 

12 

I’d like to ask a question about the Xinjiang Work Forum which 

took place in May. My question is, are these new initiatives likely 

to be successfully implemented? The scope is large. It’s a really ambitious program. Some aspects of it, on paper anyway, could be potentially positive, and other aspects, clearly less so. 

We have seen plenty of cases of Chinese Government projects 

that have fallen flat on implementation, and the Work Forum has 

set some very ambitious targets: 2015 to meet basic goals, 2020 to 

have an all-around ‘‘healthy society’’ in Xinjiang. 

Already we have seen criticism of existing counterpart programs 

in Xinjiang, where cities and localities on the eastern seaboard of 

China provide assistance to Xinjiang. These programs already have 

been in place in Xinjiang for 13 years, I think. We have seen criticism that, to date, they have not been that effective. So in terms 

of the current Xinjiang Work Forum, how successful is the government going to be in implementing various objectives? Is there the 

will and the resources to make it different this time? 

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. Any panelist who wants to take this question, please? You want to, Stan? Great. 

Mr. TOOPS. I think that the Xinjiang Work Forum or Xinjiang 

Work Conference is interesting in that, in part, it seems to be modeled on previous conferences and work forums in Tibet. So it is 

kind of taking a Tibet model—and that has been very successful of 

course [winks]—to take a look at that in Xinjiang. 

The other kind of component is that it is having various provinces involved, and to what extent will the provinces feel that, yes, 

we support the central government, therefore we are also going to 

support the activities going on in Xinjiang. So it depends on the 

kind of attitudes for the various east coast provinces. 

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. Can you talk about that in some detail? 

What that means is east coast provinces have to fund, send their 

money, to Xinjiang. Isn’t that right? 

Mr. TOOPS. Well, in some cases it is more money or technology 

or experts, or some sort of assistance. So it’s kind of like overseas 

development assistance, but it’s situated within China. So, it’s like 

an internal development program, in a way. In the United States, 

in different parts, you have various kinds of policies for povertystricken areas and those kinds of things. 

But it’s to have it that somehow one province is going to take responsibility for what is happening in a prefecture of a city in 

Xinjiang, which is a kind of an interesting pairing to take a look 

at. I think that is where the difficulty, at least in terms of the logistics, might be. But maybe then it would involve these various 

provinces, and it’s not just a central government kind of program. 

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. Good. Okay. Yes? Then we’ll go to the audience. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. I would just tack on two quick points, one of 

which is that the Tibet model hasn’t necessarily worked all that 

well in Tibet. I mean, the Chinese Government can spend as much 

money as it wants, but this is not a problem fundamentally that 

you can spend your way out of. 

And while I can’t speak nearly as well as the other panelists can 

to whether the Chinese Government can follow through on sort of 

the hard data—spending, education, those sorts of things—the idea 

13 

that by 2015 they will have established a harmonious society in 

Xinjiang is reasonably laughable, as long as the population itself 

does not get to have a part in that conversation. 

One of the things that concerns me, actually, about the goals set 

out by the Work Forum is that the narrative that the central government has given out, and that I think a lot, particularly, of the 

urban Han population has bought into, is that the central government has pumped enormous resources into this region and into 

Tibet, and look at these ungrateful minorities. Look at what they 

turned around and did to us, right? 

And as we’re seeing the economy slow down in a couple of different parts of the country, it really concerns me that if they continue to pump a lot of money into Xinjiang, the stakes are going 

to be that much higher to deliver on some kind of security, but it 

shouldn’t necessarily be confused with a kind of stability. 

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. Great. Thank you. 

Let’s go to the audience. The gentleman with the blue shirt? 

AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT. This question is for Sophie Richardson. 

Even though the Chinese police forces are in some way [inaudible] 

are there any indications that these abducted civilians are being 

forced into a form of human trafficking? 

Ms. RICHARDSON. We have no information that would enable me 

to answer that question. None. Sorry. 

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. Anybody else want to take that on? No. 

Okay, to another question. Mr. Pillsbury? 

Mr. PILLSBURY. Michael Pillsbury—I have a question about the 

Uyghurs outside of China [inaudible] Han in some of the regions 

[inaudible] as well. I’m trying to understand the difference between 

the world reaction to Tibet over the last 20 or 30 years and contrasted to Uyghurs in the sense of asking this question: What 

would it take to have the same level of concern about the Uyghurs 

as the world has about Tibet? Now, I can think of some more specific sub-questions. It seems to me the Tibetans have a long history 

of involving Western governments. 

If you look at various memoirs, even in the 1950s they were already making contact [inaudible] they have the Dalai Lama as a 

religious figure. They have a government in exile. They have a 

parliament they elect people to. They seem to have a set of organizations around the world with names like the International Campaign for Tibet. So my specific question is, is there anything like 

that for the Uyghurs now, and what would it take to have that sort 

of thing [inaudible] much worse level of oppression [inaudible] in 

Xinjiang before that will ever happen. Then [inaudible] Muslim 

world should be more concerned about Xinjiang than they are. So 

my general question is, what is the level of concern by governments 

on the outside of Xinjiang for Uyghurs in Xinjiang? 

Ms. KAN. Because I work at CRS, I really cannot get into any 

policy recommendations. But I would just note, in answer to your 

question directed at me, that there has been increased attention by 

foreign governments, including the U.S. Government, to Uyghurs 

because of what has happened since 2001. There’s been more attention than ever. 

If we think back to the 1990s and the unrest and crackdowns 

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14 

tually knew about what was going on. We had groups like Amnesty 

International that tried to show the spotlight when a lot of people 

didn’t understand. 

So actually the Uyghurs have seen an increase in attention, 

international attention, and an increase in governmental support, 

no less by the President of the United States himself. President 

Bush met not once, but twice, with Rebiya Kadeer, the leader of 

the democratic organization for the Uyghurs. 

Second, the Uyghurs also have seen increased legitimacy around 

the world, legitimacy provided not only right here in the Congress, 

but also as I mentioned by the White House itself and by the increased attention of a lot of groups, like the National Endowment 

for Democracy, Human Rights Watch, and Amnesty International. 

So, there’s been increased attention at the official level and increased legitimacy as compared with the Tibetans. 

For those who have worked in Congress for many years, we can 

remember days when we would talk about the PRC and Tibet, and 

that would be the end of it. Today, it is different. It would be the 

PRC, people in Tibet, and people in East Turkistan, or Xinjiang. 

Now, we see people talking about the Tibetans and the Uyghurs in 

the same sentence. So, that is also a change. 

Also, in 2002, the Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, 

Human Rights, and Labor himself went to Xinjiang. We have not 

seen that repeated, but it’s possible. It is also possible that our current President could meet with Uyghur leaders. But that has been 

the trend over several years. 

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. Thank you, Shirley. 

Sophie, did you want to comment? You don’t need to, but if you 

want to. Okay. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. I would associate myself with everything that 

Charlotte and Shirley have just said, although would toss out the 

clarification that this White House doesn’t seem to have gotten 

around to receiving Mrs. Kadeer yet. At the same time, this administration could undo one of the Bush Administration’s mistakes and 

think really carefully about whether there even is an organization 

called ETIM and whether it deserves to be on the terrorist watch 

list. 

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. What is ETIM? No acronyms. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. The East Turkistan Independence Movement, 

which is an organization the Chinese Government insists exists 

and is a terrorist organization. Many other knowledgeable people 

dispute that claim. 

And one of the huge obstacles the Uyghur community globally 

has been combating over the last 10 years is that really sort of one 

of the first gestures of attention to Xinjiang, at least in recent 

memory, was either Gitmo, where you saw a lot of perfectly innocent Uyghurs getting locked up and labeled, in effect, by the U.S. 

Government as terrorists, and then followed by the somewhat 

schizophrenic position that the Uyghurs who were let go had to be 

resettled someplace other than China because they have a legitimate fear of persecution if they were sent home. 

But putting ETIM on that list at the Chinese Government’s request really contributed, I think, to a perception worldwide that 

Uyghurs, you know they’re Chinese, but they’re Muslim, but we’re 

15 

not really sure who they are, and it all sounds a little dodgy. I 

mean, there’s a fair amount of just ignorance and racism at work 

here, coupled with shortcomings or oversights in U.S. or European 

policy. I think it’s a problem that this is not just a question of how 

the United States or Europe has responded. I think it’s also that 

the global Muslim community has not stood up really on behalf of 

the Uyghurs. 

To the extent that there was anything positive in the fallout from 

the protests last year, it was that you saw a little bit of flag flying 

from Muslim communities in Turkey and in Indonesia, which 

showed a little bit of solidarity, but you don’t see the big organizations speaking out about the persecution of Uyghurs. 

But to answer your approximate question very quickly, yes, there 

is a World Uyghur Congress. Some of the people who are sitting 

behind you can explain that to you. There are a number of NGOs 

that do research and advocacy work, but they simply do not have 

the global footprint or recognition that the Tibetans have had. 

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. Yes, sir. I’m sorry. Did you want to say 

something, Kara? Okay. Yes, sir? 

Mr. VAN DER WEES. Hi. My name is Gerrit van der Wees. I work 

for the Formosan Association for Public Affairs in Washington, DC. 

I have a question on the linkage between East Turkistan and Taiwan. In a sense, it’s a followup from Mike Pillsbury’s question. 

Last year, Mrs. Kadeer was blocked from entering Taiwan [inaudible] and the showing of her movie. Just last Friday, one of her 

associates was also blocked by the present government [inaudible] 

human rights and democracy, and there’s really a very [inaudible] 

notion of justice and democracy in Taiwan. The Government in Taiwan is increasingly leaning toward the PRC [inaudible]. 

So my question is, connecting the dots here, that Tibet [inaudible] Taiwan, can we look at this in a holistic fashion because the 

PRC Government is trying to [inaudible] one-by-one and then focus 

on the next one. [Inaudible.] 

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. Thank you for your question, because we 

hear, again and again, core interests: Tibet, Taiwan, Xinjiang. 

These are our core interests, stay out. So, thank you for your question. 

Does anybody want to respond? Ms. Kan? 

Ms. KAN. There was concern last year, when Taiwan’s Minister 

of Interior baselessly branded Rebiya Kadeer as a ‘‘terrorist’’ and 

denied her a visa, apparently when she didn’t even apply for one. 

Now we see that her daughter is there for a screening of ‘‘Ten Conditions of Love.’’ There are reports that Kadeer, again, was not welcomed. 

This policy repeated again this year is likely to increase concerns 

about Taiwan’s Government, because its approach is at odds with 

that of the United States, Japan, and other countries. It does not 

make any sense, because that implies somehow the United States 

is harboring a ‘‘terrorist’’ right here in Washington with an office 

practically across from the White House. President Bush would not 

have met with such a person, so it does not make any sense, and 

it will increase concerns. Thank you. 

16 

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. Do you want to say anything, Lisa? Okay. 

No? Okay. It’s outside our mandate, so I’m not going to speak to 

that, but it’s a very provocative and interesting point. 

Yes, sir? Please. 

AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT. Just a more general question. Is there 

any evidence of foreign organizations or countries aggravating the 

situation? 

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. That’s a very good question. I don’t know. 

Do you mean on the ground in Xinjiang? 

AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT. Mostly on the ground. 

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. Anybody want to take that, or take a pass? 

Ms. RICHARDSON. I need to know a little bit more what you mean 

by ‘‘aggravating.’’ 

AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT. Such as supplying any form of terrorist 

action or simply [inaudible] for reasons of their own. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Well, if you’re talking about something like 

selling weapons to some sort of Uyghur separatist groups, I don’t 

think I can help you very much on that. 

Again, I would point to governments who have taken rhetorical 

or political positions that have helped make it easier for the Chinese Government to paint Uyghurs as terrorists, but there are a 

number of academics, and certainly people in the security community, who do follow these sorts of things and I’d be happy to point 

you to some of their work. 

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. I have a question, if one of you would like 

to take it real fast. There was a tremendous amount of Uyghur-onHan violence. During that very dark, hot summer last July in 

Xinjiang, there was a lot of Uyghur-on-Han violence, and there was 

also a great deal of Han-on-Uyghur violence. Both groups suffered 

tremendous harm. 

If you could flesh out for me or explain and fill in for me a little 

bit, what were the Han grievances? What are the Han grievances 

or beefs with the Uyghur community? Maybe Dr. Toops could share 

with us what your understanding is of resentments or grievances 

the Han may have about the current situation in Xinjiang. 

Mr. TOOPS. I think there are different kinds of things. One, is to 

look at the violence in July last year. Then there was a response 

from some members of the Han community to attack members of 

the Uyghur community within Urumqi, but that was as much saying that the state somehow was not doing enough to protect them. 

This was also, along with the cost, to have the leadership, the 

Party leadership, change within Xinjiang, and now that has, so in 

some ways you can look at it in that kind of context. 

In another kind of context, it is more a view about, say, kind of 

affirmative action policies in Xinjiang, if you’re Uyghur, if you get 

a score, you get added points to maybe go to college or something 

like that. Of course, the college exams are in Chinese, so it’s not 

like you get that much points to compensate overall. But somehow 

a feeling that there’s some sort of a sense of entitlement. 

But I think it works the other way as well, where some Uyghurs 

would feel that the Han have a sense of entitlement within their 

region, and to call it the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region 

when it is not so autonomous is very problematic. So I think it 

17 

works on different levels. The part about the violence, that’s unfortunate no matter who is involved there. 

But the other kind of feelings about, somehow in Xinjiang, many 

people feel they are a minority, that Han in Xinjiang feel they are 

a minority, that it’s not a situation where the Han are the dominant in the demography of the area. Then for Uyghurs, Kazakhs, 

or others, they also feel that they’re a minority. So, everybody has 

a little bit of that, so I think that’s a broader kind of construct 

rather than talking about, say, the issues of the violence. 

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. That’s extremely helpful, thank you. 

Yes, sir? 

Mr. FOX. Hi. My name is Henry Fox. I’m an intern here on the 

Hill. I think it’s significant that we’re actually discussing this in 

this room—the Indian Affairs Committee room—which has a lot of 

pictures in this area about autonomy and its history in this country. It’s relevant that the [inaudible] national lacrosse team did not 

get access to England to get to the [inaudible] tournament. There 

are a lot of issues [inaudible] political assassinations. So given that 

we have issues within our country and we have one of the most 

represented democracies in the world, what would an ideal situation for autonomy be for this group in China? 

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. That’s excellent. Do you want to take that, 

Kara? Shirley, do you want to take it? Kara, you should reply, too. 

Ms. KAN. Well, I think this might not be the time to inject Hawaiian sovereignty into the discussion. Anyway, that’s another 

story. We don’t want to get sidetracked into something very much 

alive, even here, with Hawaiian sovereignty. But there is a question of autonomy. 

One possible way is to basically call it like it is. I mean, I think 

it’s questionable when reporters, researchers, or people who should 

know better continue to use the term ‘‘Xinjiang [Uyghur] Autonomous Region’’ without pointing out that there is no autonomy and 

that’s just an Orwellian term to use. That’s one thing, to recognize 

that there is no autonomy, just like in Tibet. 

The second thing is that I think there have been some calls for 

dialogue. I think some people have mentioned about looking at the 

Tibet experience—I don’t want to say model, but let’s say experience. There is a record to go by, and the United States has supported dialogue. So is there some way to look at that experience? 

I’ll stop there. 

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. That’s great. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. I would just add onto that that, like a lot of 

Chinese laws, the autonomy law is pretty good on paper. I would 

strongly urge you to go and read it and understand exactly what 

it spells out as not just possible, but what actually ought to be happening and contrast it to the reality. I mean, what the government 

has on paper already committed to is not bad. The problem is, 

there is absolutely no followthrough on it. 

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. I think the CECC, in its reports and recommendations, previous, has said implementation of Chinese laws 

on autonomy would be a huge step forward. Chinese laws on the 

books on autonomy and how that is structured are not bad. If those 

laws were actually fully implemented, it would be a significant step 

forward. 

18 

Ma’am? 

Ms. HOPKINS. Hi. I’m Lisa Hopkins and I work at the Army. I 

would like to ask, how does information flow or not flow out of 

Xinjiang, and how is it that we know that we understand the situation on the ground? 

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. Lisa, you may know more than we do on 

that question. Does anybody have anything to say on that? Lisa, 

do you want to comment on that? I’ll take your name out of the 

transcript. 

Ms. HOPKINS. [Inaudible.] 

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. Okay. Okay. Oh. Excuse me. Shirley? 

Please. 

Ms. KAN. As I mentioned in my remarks, I think it’s been encouraging that foreign reporters were allowed into Xinjiang, both 

last July as well as this year. That really contrasts with the lack 

of foreign reporting, I think, in Lhasa in 2008. During the riots in 

2008, there was only one foreign reporter who just happened to be 

there. He was a British reporter, and he was able to get out some 

very good information. 

Then someone else earlier mentioned about the harassment. So 

even when reporters are going in from Japan, from the United 

States, from Hong Kong, from other places, they face severe harassment. They have been beaten up, where it has required diplomatic protests. 

So with these kinds of things, there would be a question of 

whether the U.S. Government follows up on such harassment, 

would seek to get greater assurances against these kinds of physical as well as other kinds of harassments against foreign reporters, and would continue to encourage a good trend, to give some 

credit where credit is due, when there are foreign reporters who 

have been allowed in. 

Second, American diplomats. We do not have a consulate there— 

we have one in Chengdu, but there would be a question of whether 

American diplomats would be able to travel. Now, significantly, I 

have not seen our ambassador go out there. So, I mean, how many 

times can you go to Shanghai? [Laughter.] 

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. No. But it’s a very good point you raise. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. In a perfect world, we are able to actually send 

researchers openly to the country that they’re working on, and in 

a perfect world we’re able to have conversations directly with a variety of the actors who are involved in whatever the kind of problem is, hence the letter here to the government. 

With a country that is incredibly hostile to, among others, international human rights organizations, obviously you’ve got to play 

things a little bit differently. We try to talk to as many people as 

we can, particularly people who we suspect might tell us something 

other than what we expect to hear. We try to talk to lots of different communities geographically and we try to consult with as 

many other people who have looked at the same situation to see 

if the information somehow significantly differs. 

In a case like this where you’re talking about an unbelievably 

tense security environment, a lot of restrictions on movement, enormous restrictions on the people that you’re trying to talk to, and 

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19 

long blackout on all communications, which we haven’t really 

talked about much—— 

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. Yes. Which is the Internet shutting down, 

basically. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Internet, cell phones, SMS capabilities. Lots of 

forms of communication to the entire region just shut down made 

it that much more difficult. 

If I’m remembering correctly, this report involves interviewing 

people in 11 different countries. Well, we’ll leave it at that. 

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. Yes, please? 

Ms. KAN. And since we are here in Congress, it’s very important 

that there is another option to consider, which would be the visits 

by staff and Members—and there’s someone in the room now, talk 

about giving credit where credit is due—whereby staff have gone 

and reported on their visits to Urumqi and what was happening on 

the ground. And that kind of thing can also be important for getting information as well as showing international attention and 

monitoring. Thank you. 

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. Yes, please? 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Can I just make a quick recommendation to 

the Commission, if it is within your mandate? I think actually it 

would be incredibly helpful if somebody kept and publicized a roster of who is asked to go and when, and whether they got turned 

down, because I’m aware of various staff members who have asked 

to go, I’m aware of people in the Embassy in Beijing who have 

asked to go. Just because they get turned down doesn’t mean that 

we should acknowledge their efforts, but it can be very hard to 

know even who has made the effort, and when. 

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. There is an amendment floating around in 

Congress that would mandate reporting on visa and permit requests by U.S. academics, and U.S. Government officials, including 

Congressional and State Department staff, to visit China or specific 

regions like Tibet and Xinjiang. The amendment would require 

that our government report on the known number of those requests, and the number of visa and region-specific denials the Chinese Government imposed. Many Members of Congress continue to 

be alarmed by the number of China academic experts who are denied visas, because the Chinese Government is displeased by their 

research topics. Also, they are alarmed by the number of U.S. Government officials and staff who are not permitted to travel to 

China. This is the case despite the large numbers of Chinese academics and Chinese officials who travel to the United States without facing significant obstacles in entry. 

Yes, ma’am? Please. 

AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT. Hi. Thank you for doing this. [Inaudible] 

from the [inaudible] we’ve reported pretty extensively on this, but 

I always wondered what we’re leaving out. I know that [inaudible] 

on this last week [inaudible] on the anniversary of the demonstrations and riots. I’m just kind of wondering, is there any information 

that [inaudible] but is there anything big that we’re not reporting? 

[Inaudible.] 

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. That’s a great question. Let’s go, girls and 

boy. Now’s your chance. 

20 

Ms. RICHARDSON. I’m happy to tell you what’s at the top of my 

list, which is really detailed information, pretty granular stuff, 

about the number of death sentences that have been handed down 

and carried out. 

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. Dr. Toops, is there something you think 

should receive greater coverage in the mainstream media? 

Mr. TOOPS. I think a lot of times elements of the mainstream 

media, they might have some experts that speak Chinese and they 

know something about China, but very few would speak Uyghur or 

Tibetan or something like that. So then they have to go through 

third parties as translators, and sometimes these things just don’t 

translate very well. 

So a long-term analysis, at least from an academic perspective, 

is really lacking in terms of looking at what’s coming out of the 

media. So, it’s rather to try to understand the kind of social contacts that are going on in Xinjiang. There was some mention here 

made about Hawaii. It was like, well, there are lots of issues in the 

United States. Of course, that’s not the purview of this Commission, but in some ways they’re similar, and in other ways, not. At 

the same time, there have been riots in the streets in different 

parts of the United States. So, I have to kind of take it into overall 

context. 

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. Yes. 

Ms. KAN. I guess I will just say two things, briefly. One would 

be, from the perspective—I know you’re writing for a Japanese 

newspaper, but I think this does not pertain only to U.S. security 

interests, this would also pertain to a lot of the security interests 

of Japan and the countries around the world. We are very concerned about the ability to stabilize the situation in central Asia in 

Afghanistan and elsewhere. Stability requires a comprehensive 

multilateral, multinational approach involving the resources and 

attention of many countries, and Japan has contributed significantly to our efforts. 

The Uyghurs in Xinjiang are very well-positioned to provide the 

links to play a greater role in the economic development and the 

greater stability of central Asia. They have the linguistic links. 

They have the historical links. They have the trade ties. They may 

even have family ties. They can play a much greater role, and it 

does not necessarily require people to be forced into learning Mandarin or something like that. So there are contributions that perhaps we may be missing, or we could encourage, or we have not 

seen in terms of economic and humanitarian people-to-people links. 

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. Great. 

Mr. Halpin? 

Mr. HALPIN. Yes. I was going to comment about this question 

about access. An issue for [inaudible] and I think when I made my 

famous ill-fated trip to Xinjiang—what we were talking about, it 

led to a reaction where there was the rounding up and actually detention and abuse of Mrs. Kadeer’s children. But we were very fortunate to be [inaudible] there was one Fulbright scholar who was 

actually there, and we did get to meet her and have a very good 

discussion. 

I would just say there’s nothing like striped pants on the ground, 

as opposed to boots on the ground. In Mr. Lantos’ act, he called for 

21 

us to try to negotiate a consulate in Lhasa, and the same could be 

said for Urumqi or other places in western China. We see this with 

Shenyang and the Korean border and refugee issues. 

As restricted as UNHCR is in Beijing, as restricted as we are, 

we’ve had some great information come out of that consulate in 

Shenyang by [inaudible] at least the general proximity of the Korean Autonomous Prefecture. There’s always been officers in 

Shenyang who really contributed a lot to our understanding. So I 

think we know the Chinese, they’re great horse traders. They still 

want, I guess, Atlanta, Boston—— 

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. And Hawaii. They want Hawaii. 

Mr. HALPIN. Yes. Atlanta, Boston, and Honolulu. Right. I guess 

we’ve got the American Presence Post, open up that APP, that old 

Condoleezza Rice idea of the one-person post. But another one person and another city on the east coast of China does not meet the 

national interest of the United States. 

So I guess in response, I guess it has to be legislatively—and it 

can’t even be as nice as Mr. Lantos was, suggesting to the State 

Department or to, whether it’s the Bush Administration or the 

Obama Administration, that you would have consulates, but to say 

on reciprocity, there will now be no Chinese consulate in Boston, 

or Honolulu, or Atlanta until we have consulates in these western 

areas of China. 

They are supposedly wanting to expand trade, the ‘‘Go West, 

Young Man’’ movement to develop these areas, and they are going 

to be more internationalized. We had an issue where there was an 

arrest in Tibet of American citizens. As tourists, we have consular 

issues. I guess you just have to legislatively say, if you want Boston, we want—if you want Honolulu, we want Urumqi. Make it 

very clear as a reciprocity issue. 

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. Thank you. Thanks. 

Ms. KAN. I’d just add one thing. 

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. Yes. 

Ms. KAN. Outside of government, there are, of course, a lot of 

universities and academics doing a lot of research. One of the problems that we hear about over the years is some sort of a blacklist 

that would be kept on certain academics. So the question then for 

our side is: What are these universities doing about it? Are they 

standing up to it, are they holding their own united front, or are 

they appeasing at the expense of intellectual freedom and academic 

pursuits? 

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. That is a very excellent question. Somebody want to take this on? Do you want to respond, anybody? 

Okay. Yes. Amy? 

Ms. REGER. I’m Amy Reger from the Uyghur Human Rights 

Project. I think one of the things we’re trying to stay concerned 

about is the [inaudible] acknowledge, certainly on the part of the 

Chinese Government, but also on the part of the international community, that there was use of live fire by the state last year—and 

there has been [inaudible] on the aftermath and repression of 

Uyghurs, such as [inaudible] excellent Human Rights Watch [inaudible] this last December. 

There has been, in my opinion [inaudible] to Uyghur accounts of 

violence committed by the state against Uyghurs, and we certainly 

22 

appreciate the [inaudible] in response to the questions about information, it is certainly very difficult for us to get information about 

[inaudible] information that we have gotten from interviews of 

Uyghurs who were in Urumqi on July 5 and afterward, and also 

that Amnesty International has gotten from Uyghurs [inaudible] 

accounts [inaudible] against Uyghurs [inaudible] more international attention [inaudible] but if I can ask another question, I 

just wanted to remark on Dr. Toops’ comment about the perceived 

perception of Uyghurs having special privileges. I think that’s a 

really good observation. 

I recently [inaudible] that was written by [inaudible] I’m not sure 

if they were from Beijing or if they were from [inaudible] but they 

also remarked on these, what they perceived to be special Uyghur 

privileges, such as the lower requirements to get into university or 

the allowance of Uyghurs to have more children. I just wondered 

if you could speak more about whether you think now [inaudible] 

government policies [inaudible] perceived privileges or if perhaps 

there might be an implication of [inaudible]. 

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. Okay. Thank you. I think I got the second 

part of the question, which was Han perceptions of special privileges for Uyghurs. Do you guys want to speak to that again? No, 

I guess not. Amy, we got it. I think we can have a further conversation up here. Okay? Thanks. 

Does anybody else have a question, a quick question before we 

close down? One last question. Come on. How about the man in the 

uniform? No? No? We all want to hear from you. Anna Brettell. 

Ms. BRETTELL. You started talking about the news blackout in 

Xinjiang, but could you tell us a little more about the scope and 

timing of the blackout? What has happened recently, is the Twitter 

site working? Do people across the province have access to the 

Internet? 

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. And is Twitter up? 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Twitter? 

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. I can answer that question: No. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. I’m showing my age. But the question about 

the media blackout, the Chinese Government revised its playbook, 

I think, in responding to these protests, clearly by looking back at 

what, from its perspective, had gone wrong in Tibet. From its perspective, one of the problems became not letting the media in itself. 

I mean, this is just a total no-brainer, if you know journalists. If 

you don’t let them in to report, not letting them in to report becomes the story. 

So the response in Xinjiang was to let them in, but to try to control the story. The other piece of the puzzle was essentially to shut 

down really all means of communicating with the outside world. It 

became very difficult for, I think it was about nine months, to have 

any kind of email exchange, any sort of electronic communications. 

Again, I don’t want to give Zhang Chunxian any credit before he’s 

actually earned it, but he was the one who said, shortly after being 

appointed to this new position, ‘‘There can’t be an open Xinjiang 

without an open Internet.’’ 

Now, that’s a very nice idea. We’ll see if his idea of an open 

Internet is consistent with what people who are accustomed to a 

genuinely open Internet would think of or whether he’s talking 

23 

about what the Chinese Government thinks of as an open Internet, 

which is still not nearly what we would all like it to be. The ability 

to report on and get information in and out is still very difficult. 

Getting people in and out, getting stories in and out, getting information corroborated can be very difficult. That’s ongoing. 

Twitter, as I understand it, over the last couple of weeks, has 

kind of come and gone. We’ve done a little bit of Tweeting with 

some of our friends; sometimes it’s worked, sometimes it hasn’t. 

But as I understand it, there are a couple of different potential 

technological explanations for that. 

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. Okay. Thank you. 

And Kara Abramson will wrap up. 

Ms. ABRAMSON. Great. Actually, may I wrap up with one question? 

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. Yes. 

Ms. ABRAMSON. Do we have time? Great. I will take advantage 

of having the microphone and do that. 

One issue that we haven’t touched on today is the Chinese Government project to demolish and reconstruct the old city of 

Kashgar. I would be interested in hearing the panelists’ perspectives on why this is being done. Dr. Toops, you’ve looked at Silk 

Road tourism. The old city of Kashgar is a huge tourist site, so on 

one level we have to ask, isn’t the Chinese Government shooting 

itself in the foot by getting rid of this excellent tourist attraction? 

I’d like to hear from all of the panelists, or whoever would like to 

address this. Why this is taking place and what’s the logic behind 

it? 

Mr. TOOPS. The stated logic behind the destruction of those old 

buildings is that they are old and that it’s unsafe and it’s not up 

to standards for housing, and to have a more developed society you 

need to have better housing. So the older style housing, which may 

be only a few stories, it may be earthen, and those are being demolished. People have opportunities to move into newer apartments 

that are on the outside of town, so a little bit further away from 

work, so not everybody takes advantage of that. You get some fiscal 

compensation, but not that much. 

In some ways it’s analogous to what’s gone on in other parts of 

China, in Beijing or other areas, where some older kinds of buildings have been demolished and then brought in with the new one. 

What’s happening, though, in Kashgar in this context, is that the 

newer buildings are then being populated by people who are not 

from Kashgar, but are maybe from other areas, and so it’s also connected with a population shift, I think. As far as the tourism kind 

of aspect of it, yes, there’s certainly a lot of tourists that went to 

see the old city of Kashgar. 

But the concession to get in there, the concession was granted to 

the Xinjiang Production Construction Corps because they have a lot 

of skills in managing things, so you’re paying the Production Construction Corps ticket entry fee, but it doesn’t really go to the local 

neighborhood. So there’s an issue kind of at the cultural level, and 

then of course there’s the economic components. 

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. Thanks. 

Shirley, do you want to speak to this? 

24 

Ms. KAN. Well, I just find it interesting, as I mentioned earlier, 

that the Secretary General of the OIC just was allowed into 

Xinjiang last month and he was able to visit Kashgar. So one question is whether this policy to demolish the Uyghurs’ cultural center 

will still continue, given that the Muslim world is watching what 

happens. 

Second, it’s not just a question of demolishing the old cultural 

center in Kashgar. There have been reports that the PRC authorities were seeking to demolish the Rebiya Kadeer building right in 

Urumqi, the famous landmark in Urumqi right down the road from 

the two famous international bazaars. What would happen to the 

Uyghur women trying to eke out a living and other things around 

that landmark? 

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. What is the Rebiya Kadeer building? 

Ms. KAN. It is a very tall, commercial-looking building right in 

the middle of Urumqi, just down the road from the two major international bazaars. There have been questions about what would 

happen to them, possibly in retaliation. A lot of women make their 

living out of that building. 

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. Great. Thank you. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. I’ll just add on that the stated logic is, new 

modern housing, won’t that be nice for everybody, that should go 

a long way toward addressing some of the grievances that the local 

population has. From our perspective, not only are there problems 

like this rampant across China, and there’s an obvious lack of compensation and consultation—I mean, under Chinese law people 

have the right to say, no, I don’t want to move, and only be moved 

if the circumstances are shown, through a legal proceeding, to be 

extraordinary and necessary, which obviously we don’t think really 

happens all that often. 

But I think to do this, even if you left out the cultural dimension 

and the fact that the parts of Kashgar that got razed have been 

designated by the World Heritage Organization as important 

monuments, I think it’s a pretty potent way for a centralized government to say to people, we will remake this place the way we 

want it to be. We do not care what you want, we do not care what 

your history is, we do not care what you think, we will make it our 

way and you will like it or you will lump it. I think that’s a pretty 

ill-informed policy, particularly in a region that’s already as restive 

as it is. 

Ms. ABRAMSON. Great. We’ve reached our time limit. I’d like to 

thank all of our panelists for their testimony today, and everyone 

here for coming. We will have a transcript of this roundtable on our 

Web site, www.cecc.gov. We will also have the written testimony of 

Kathleen McLaughlin, the journalist who has reported from 

Xinjiang who was unable to join us here today, so please visit our 

Web site. We look forward to seeing you at future events. Thank 

you. [Applause.] 

[The prepared statement of Ms. McLaughlin appears in the appendix.] 

[The joint statement of Senator Dorgan and Representative Levin 

appears in the appendix.] 

[Whereupon, at 3:33 p.m., the roundtable was adjourned.] 

(25) 

A P P E N D I X 

26 

PREPARED STATEMENTS

PREPARED STATEMENT OF STANLEY TOOPS

JULY 19, 2010

DEMOGRAPHICS AND DEVELOPMENT: XINJIANG WORK FORUM MAY 2010 

Thank you for the opportunity to present these remarks to you today. I am an 

Associate Professor of Geography and International Studies at Miami University. I 

have been conducting research on demographic and development issues in the 

Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of northwest China for 25 years. My remarks 

will focus on two facets concerning the policies outlined in the May 2010 Xinjiang 

Work Forum in China. The first is to situate the policies of the Xinjiang Work 

Forum within the general trends of China’s development efforts in Xinjiang. I will 

discuss how economic development varies in different parts of Xinjiang depending 

on local inputs of agriculture, industry and transportation access. I will examine the 

Xinjiang Work Forum and see how the stated goals of the Work Forum will impact 

the different areas of Xinjiang. The second is to examine the demographic components of Xinjiang. I will be talking about the distribution of population in Xinjiang. 

μOne focus is on the changing ethnic composition of Xinjiang in terms of Han, 

Uyghur, Kazakh and others. Another element to consider is migration within the 

region as well as the Han migration to Xinjiang. I will examine recent demographic 

trends. 

What is now the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) has been labeled 

a variety of names. This Inner Asian area is composed of the Tarim Basin, the 

Turpan Basin, the Dzungarian Basin, and the Ili Valley. This area is known as 

Eastern Turkistan to distinguish it from Western Turkistan, the former Soviet Central Asia. The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, the largest of China’s political 

units, covers an area of 1,650,000 square kilometers, one-sixth of China’s total area, 

three times the size of France. Xinjiang now has a population of 21 million. Located 

in the northwest of China, Xinjiang is bounded on the northeast by Mongolia, on 

the west by Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and on the south by 

Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. Xinjiang’s eastern borders front Gansu, Qinghai, 

and Tibet (Figure 1). 

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

China started the Western Development Program in 1999 to address some of the 

regional inequities faced by China’s western regions in comparison to the more developed eastern portions of China. China’s development programs are addressed to 

the needs of its various regions. The current policies outlined by the Xinjiang Work 

Forum expand on the Western Development Program. 

Developmental change occurs in Xinjiang based on the dynamism of the region. 

Xinjiang is composed as well of different localities that vary in character and responses to government policies. The traditional economic landscapes of this Silk 

Road region were herding, oasis agriculture, and trade. On top of that the state has 

added the modern including distribution (road, rail, air), as well as production (oil, 

textiles, agri-business) and consumption (urban and rural). 

The state’s project of developing Xinjiang restructured the economic landscape. 

Transportation linkages lead to Urumqi and thence to Beijing in a hierarchical centralized fashion. Traditional economic centers such as Kashgar, Turpan, and Gulja 

are superseded by Urumqi’s industries based petrochemical and textiles. Oil found 

in the north at Karamay (black oil in Uyghur) and the current oil exploration in 

the Tarim has added to Xinjiang’s economic value to China. Oasis agriculture by the 

Uyghurs and animal herding by the Kazakhs were superseded by commercial agriculture on state farms. The state created the Xinjiang Production and Construction 

Corps (XPCC) out of demobilized elements of the People’s Liberation Army in the 

1950s to run the state farms. The XPCC still runs these state farms and has 

branched out into industry as well. In terms of consumption, Urumqi has been the 

focus of the economy with people paying high prices, earning not so high wages and 

living in high rises. In rural areas in the south farther from the markets, people 

still live in poverty. Border trade was nonexistent in the 1960s, limited in the 1970s, 

and grew in the 1980s–1990s. 

China embarked on a ‘‘develop the west’’ campaign in 1999. Policies in the 1980s 

focused on developing the eastern coast while the western interior should prepare 

for future development. After the coastal development strategy of Deng Xiaoping, 

27 

the PRC began to turn its attention to rural poverty much of which was located in 

the interior. In June 1999, Sec. Jiang Zemin formally opened the western development strategy at CCP and government meetings. This policy elaborates on Deng 

Xiaoping’s coastal program by turning to regional inequalities in the west. 

Reasons for the new ‘‘develop the west’’ campaign focus on reducing regional inequality. In the 1990s, the interior regions began to be discontent with the siphoning off of resources, human and natural, to coastal development. Lack of economic 

growth in the west meant underdevelopment—in turn leading to social instabilities. 

For western regions that have areas characterized by poverty and a larger percentage of minority population in the ethnic makeup, there is a potential for political instability as well as social instability. So the basic formula of development 

leading to stability is one that is followed in China. 

Under the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), the PRC commanded a 

great restructuring of the area. That restructuring occurred through many different 

programs. Their focus has been an orientation of Xinjiang to Beijing. Historically, 

Xinjiang’s centers of power and activity were in Kashgar, Turpan and Gulja. In 

modern Xinjiang under the PRC, the centralizing force of the state has meant that 

Urumqi has become the dominant center in terms of productions, administration, 

culture, population, and power. For Xinjiang this has meant a re-orientation to Beijing and lessening of the status of Kashgar, Turpan, and Gulja in a hierarchy of 

power. This re-orientation to China has created a geography of development. The 

reconstruction of the development landscape has meant the distribution of productive forces and their concentration in central Xinjiang. As migrants from other portions of China move to Xinjiang, a new development landscape is created which 

means further directional shift—toward Beijing. 

Agriculturally, the hallmark of Xinjiang’s development has been the Production 

and Construction Corps (XPCC). Large amounts of central investments and subsidies were directed to rebuilding the land. At the same time central funds and 

demobilized troops contributed to the consolidation of central control. Animal husbandry has continued growth but the production policies during the collectivization 

period hindered the pastoralists. Most disastrous was the formation of agro-herding 

complexes that plowed up rangelands for grain. Xinjiang has the capacity to be a 

great meat producer for China. Production gains in agriculture must be understood 

in the context of reversals in animal husbandry. 

Production in industry and agriculture as well as the tertiary sector inscribes an 

activity region of Xinjiang and smaller sets of regions within Xinjiang. Regions of 

cultural identification in Xinjiang are constituted through relations between and 

within ethnic groups. The region is the medium for social interaction; the relationships that link together institutions and people shape that region. Northern 

Xinjiang has most of the industry and commerce. Substantial numbers of Han and 

Uyghur along with Kazakh reside here. The focus of the north is found in the industrial municipalities of Urumqi, Karamay, and Shihezi—this is the modern day core 

of Xinjiang’s economy populated mostly by Han. In contrast Southern Xinjiang is 

more rural, with an agricultural economy. Much of the population in the south is 

Uyghur, Kashgar in the south is mostly Uyghur; however there are more Han in 

the cities now especially in Korla and Aksu. 

As the region modernized most of the industrial advancements took place in the 

core Xinjiang area of Urumqi, Karamay, and Shihezi. The economy is focused on 

this area. Urumqi was connected to the rest of China by railroad in the 1960s and 

by 1990 to Kazakhstan. Urumqi and Karamay have the largest values in industrial 

production. Urumqi is well diversified in industrial output including heavy industry, 

petrochemicals and textiles. Karamay’s industry derives mostly from oil production, 

besides crude oil and gas production, processing also occurs here. Karamay is connected by pipeline to Urumqi. Districts in the south, such as Aksu and Kashgar, 

produce mostly for local use (cement, fertilizer, food processing). The railroad was 

extended to Kashgar in 1999. Processing of the Tarim oil adds to the GDP of Korla 

in Bayangol; otherwise industrial GDP in southern Xinjiang is not large. 

Karamay leads in per capita GDP, because of its oil processing and relatively low 

population. Urumqi has approximately double the average for Xinjiang. Other leaders include Bayangol, Turpan, and Shihezi. The low points in this economic landscape are Hotan, Kizilsu and Kashgar, all in the south and far from the economic 

heart of Xinjiang. Urumqi is the major economic center. The traditional centers of 

Kashgar and Ili fall short, while the traditional center of Turpan has made a bit 

of a comeback because of oil. 

All in all the impact of oil (Karamay, Urumqi and even Bayangol and Turpan) 

is clear. Refining all of the oil in the XUAR would add to the GDP. For the south 

having more refineries in Bayangol, Aksu or Turpan would boost local GDP. 

Urumqi’s refineries take in most of the Tarim and Turpan oil. Most of the oil crews 

28 

are from Northeastern China, for example Daqing. Thus the oil migrants add their 

labor force to the local areas. 

What is the nature of the development landscape in Xinjiang? Production is up 

as is GDP per capita. However these two measures show only part of the picture. 

Much of the rise in GDP is due to the processing extractive products; there is an 

over reliance on oil to describe a rosy scenario. Much of labor force is still in the 

agricultural sector. Many basic needs have been met. The difficulty comes with seeing the regional differentiation. There is an underdeveloped south compared with 

developed north. The historical economic centers of Turpan, Kashgar and Gulja have 

been superseded by the new modernized economic centers of Urumqi, Shihezi, 

Karamay, and Korla. 

To develop southern Xinjiang along the lines of northern Xinjiang would require 

significant amounts of capital investment. The ‘‘develop the west’’ campaign would 

seem on the surface to bring new investment to Xinjiang, but most of those capital 

and labor flows will be directed to northern rather than southern Xinjiang. 

The new policies outlined by the Xinjiang Work Forum have a more detailed plan 

for Xinjiang’s development prospects. Representatives from the various coastal provinces met with counterparts in Xinjiang earlier this year before the Work Forum 

to start the planning for these projects. One key aspect is the regional component. 

Attention is paid to southern Xinjiang. There is also an interesting pairing up of 

provinces on the east coast with the prefectures of Xinjiang. 

Beijing Municipality—No.14 Division (XPCC), Hotan Prefecture—7.26 billion yuan 

($1.06 billion) over the next five years for housing and protected agriculture 

Guangdong Province—Tumushuke City of the XPCC’s No.3 Division, Kashgar Prefecture—9.6 billion yuan ($1.41 billion) over the next five years for infrastructure 

construction and public services 

Shenzhen—Kashgar City and Taxkorgan County—supply of financing, technologies, 

talent and management expertise 

Jiangsu Province—No.4 Division and No.7 Division of the XPCC, Yili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, Kizilsu Kirgiz Autonomous Prefecture—people’s livelihoods, 

education, vocational training and oil pipeline projects 

Shanghai Municipality—Kashgar Prefecture—earthquake-resistant housing 

projects, vocational training and agriculture facilities 

Shandong Province—Kashgar Prefecture—earthquake-resistant housing projects 

and safe drinking water projects 

Zhejiang Province—Ala’er City of the No.1 Division of the XPCC, Aksu Prefecture— 

a total investment of 16.7 billion yuan ($2.45 billion) over the next 10 years in industries, modern agriculture and social welfare 

Liaoning Province—Tacheng Prefecture—180 million yuan ($26.36 million) as disaster relief for residents affected by the blizzard in 2009, job training and modern 

agriculture 

Henan Province—Hami Prefecture and No.13 Division of the XPCC—orchards, protected agriculture and reconstruction of dilapidated houses 

Hebei Province—No.2 Division of the XPCC and Bayingolin Mongol Autonomous 

Prefecture—an investment 1.8 billion yuan ($263.62 million) in agricultural technologies, housing, employment and education over the next five years 

Shanxi Province—Wujiaqu City of the XPCC’s No.6 Division, Changji Hui Autonomous Prefecture—coal mining, education and reconstruction in shanty areas 

Fujian Province—Changji Hui Autonomous Prefecture—investments in the textile 

industry, social welfare and rural infrastructureHunan Province—Turpan Prefecture—affordable housing programs and coal mining 

Hubei Province—Bortala Mongol Autonomous Prefecture and No.5 Division of the 

XPCC—protected agriculture, tourism and educationAnhui Province—Hotan Prefecture—an investment of 1.3 billion yuan ($190.4 million) over the next five years in 

protected agriculture and modern industries 

Tianjin Municipality—Hotan Prefecture—fruit processing and construction of railways and roads 

Heilongjiang Province—No.10 Division of the XPCC and Altay Prefecture—mining, 

education and job training 

Jiangxi Province—Kizilsu Kirgiz Autonomous Prefecture—an investment of 2.07 billion yuan ($303.16 million) in infrastructure, education and people’s livelihoods 

Jilin Province—Altay Prefecture—flood prevention projects and people’s livelihoods 

(Hu Yue, ‘‘Hand in Hand,’’ Beijing Review June 7, 2010, No. 23 http:// 

www.bjreview.com.cn/business/txt/2010-06/07/) 

Southern Xinjiang then will have connections with Beijing, Guangdong, Shenzhen, 

Shanghai, Shandong, Zhejiang, Anhui, and Tianjin. This direct pairing may be useful, yet there are some problems. Take for example Kashgar’s pairing with 

29 

Shenzhen. Shenzhen is a special economic zone administered separately from 

Guangdong province, Shenzhen has special economic rules compared with the rest 

of Guangdong. Shenzhen specializes in the factories for the global export market. 

Shenzhen is to supply financing, technologies, talent and management expertise. 

While the financing of projects in Kashgar may be useful, talent and technology will 

not go very far in Kashgar. Shenzhen’s economic success has depended on its neighbor 

Hong Kong for investment and expertise. Kashgar’s nearest neighbors are Pakistan 

and Kyrgyzstan in contrast. There is of course an overseas community of people 

from Xinjiang that is Uyghur and Han in other countries. Perhaps their expertise 

and skills could be tapped into. This artificial pairing of East Coast—Xinjiang partners would need to go beyond sister city pairing to be beneficial. 

Another interesting part of the plan is that Divisions of the XPCC are also partners. This reflects the economic reality of the Xinjiang—the XPCC forms a major 

part of Xinjiang’s economy. It functions as a separate company. The Xinjiang Production Construction Corps XPCC (Shengchan Jianshe Bingtuan) was established in 

1954. The Corps as the other state farm systems was dissolved after the Cultural 

Revolution in 1975 but was reinstated by 1981. The Corps is still organized along 

military lines; indeed, the Chinese name Bingtuan identifies the XPCC as an Army 

Corps. The XPCC has developed a vast state farm system as well as factories, hotels, and whole cities. The Corps utilizes migrant Han labor as well as prison labor. 

The Corps receives substantial support from the state and has been a major element 

of state control in Xinjiang. In the 50 years of the Corps’ existence, it has become 

a twin to the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region government, both twins cast 

large shadows. Fifty years have past but the Corps numbers 2.5 million members, 

making it the largest state organization after the People’s Liberation Army in 

China. So the plan provides for east coast provinces to support a Centrally administered entity—the XPCC. 

The types of programs are also of interest. Much of the projects are for material 

infrastructure. These include housing, agriculture, pipelines, mining, fruit processing, textiles, and modern industries. There are some projects on education and 

‘‘people’s livelihood’’ which deal more with the human infrastructure. Investment in 

human infrastructure will have a more beneficial impact than more road construction in the region. The coordination of all these projects will be quite difficult particularly since the experts form the east coast may not be very familiar with local 

conditions in Xinjiang. 

One of the focuses should be on education and literacy for southern Xinjiang. Investment in human as well as natural resources is a key to sustained development. 

Education though needs to be followed by employment. Education without employment is a short ticket to disastrous development. Another issue is that of language. 

Would Xinjiang be able to follow a path of bilingualism? Can a Uyghur get ahead 

in society without also being fluent in Chinese? Can a Han get ahead in society 

without being fluent in Uyghur? Given the current answers to these questions (probably no and definitely yes) the language of instruction is critical for Xinjiang. The 

universities in Xinjiang have moved from a bilingual (Chinese and Uyghur) to a 

monolingual system (only Chinese). This changed has continued in the Xinjiang educational system with ramifications on down through primary school. 

DEMOGRAPHIC LANDSCAPE

The demographic landscape of Xinjiang has undergone changes as well. There has 

been an influx of Han migrants thus changing the ethnic composition of the region. 

The migrations were regionally selective as well thus changing the distribution of 

population. Xinjiang ethnic diversity forms a basis for regionalization. With a variety of ethnic groups living in the area, all of their experiences and traditions can 

be brought to bear on any issue. An understanding of the distribution of the ethnic 

groups provides clues to the cultural landscape of the area. 

Of the 30 different ethnic groups in Xinjiang, 13 have made Xinjiang their home. 

The 13 are Uyghur, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Uzbek, Tatar, Xibo, Manchu, Mongol, Daur, 

Han, Hui, Tajik, and Russian. They represent different language groups, religions, 

and customs. Within Xinjiang’s 2008 population of 21.3 million, Uyghur account for 

46 percent, Han 39 percent, Kazakh 7 percent, and the rest 8 percent. Within the 

cities one may see a great variety of ethnic groups, but most of the minority groups 

live on the periphery. A definite Central Asian component is the population base 

in the region, particularly outside of the capital Urumqi. 

Han migration has filled in many corners of Xinjiang. Much of the migration has 

focused on the major lines of transport, Urumqi south to Korla, Urumqi west to 

Shihezi. Kashgar and Gulja have maintained their general ethnic composition. The 

central portion of Xinjiang has continued to grow with Han migration. In the future, 

30 

though, Xinjiang sees a problem with water supply, especially in Urumqi. Xinjiang 

is large but not all of its land can be settled. 

When considering the level of development, one also needs to consider the ethnic 

composition of the population. Xinjiang is about 40 percent Han. There are higher 

percentages of Han in the northern corridor in Urumqi, Shihezi and Karamay. The 

south is mostly Uyghur in contrast. An interesting observation, though, is the relative increase in the Han population in the south. Kizilsu, Kashgar and Aksu have 

the most relative change in the numbers of Han. Much of this new population is 

urban, so the effect is even stronger in Kashgar City, Artush City and Aksu City. 

Modern population settlement and migration patterns have followed the railway. 

This increase in Han population is probably due to the new railway extended to 

Kashgar in 1999. 

Han populations match up well with urban and transportation linkages, roads 

and railroads; migrants tend to follow transportation lines. Xinjiang has distinctive 

nationality concentrations. The cities as well have distinctive ethnic neighborhoods, 

for example, Uyghur in Urumqi, or Hui in Turpan. Uyghurs live in the south, which 

is the poorest area. Han live in the wealthier urban corridor of the north. 

The 2000 census like the 1990 included questions on migration Respondents were 

asked if they were registered in other localities. In Xinjiang, over 1.4 million people 

(7.64 percent) indicated they were registered elsewhere; I assume most of these 

were Han or Hui, most likely not Turkic minorities. Not all migration data from the 

census has been released. The registrants came from all over China, primarily from 

the Southwest, North, and Northwest. Major sources for the registrants are 

Sichuan, Henan, and Gansu. The Sichuan migrants (over 400,000) are well known 

in Xinjiang, witness the large number of Sichuan restaurants. Sichuanese have been 

coming to Xinjiang since the 1950s. There are many registrants who have come to 

Xinjiang from the Three Gorges area. The Henan people coming to Xinjiang are Yellow River people. There are many ties from the north China Plain to Xinjiang going 

back to the 1950s. The Gansu people are true north westerners who have moved 

along the Hexi corridor into Xinjiang. These migrants are working in industry and 

agriculture, in oil and in cotton, in households and in government, as cadres and 

as maids. Like any immigrant group they are seeking a better life, in this case primarily economic life. Xinjiang is a very different place from Sichuan or Henan, not 

so different from Gansu. Migrants are aided and recruited. There are centers in 

Urumqi, Korla and other major cities to facilitate the flow of the migrants for jobs 

and housing. Or recruiters, whose original home is in Sichuan, go back to Sichuan 

to bring labor to Urumqi. Since there is a surplus of labor in Sichuan, since the people speak the same dialect, since jobs are scarce in Sichuan and the population is 

large, why not go to Xinjiang for a time to make some money? 

What is the nature of the demographic landscape in Xinjiang? The population is 

concentrated in two segments, Northern Xinjiang and Southern Xinjiang. In both 

cases the roads and now railroads linking the settlements have proved to be the 

major paths for migration. The population has a male/female ratio comparable with 

the rest of China, the Uyghur have a lower male/female ratio than the Han. 

Xinjiang’s age profile is younger than other parts of China; southern Xinjiang is particularly young. In terms of nationality (minzu /millet) the Uyghur are still in the 

south and the Kazakh are in the north. The Han are migrating in a steady stream 

into the central area and following paths of migration to the other urban centers. 

Major sources of migrants are from Sichuan, Henan, and Gansu. 

What direction does this young, ethnically diverse population with large numbers 

of migrants take? If the border were open to cross border migration, some Kazakhs 

might move to Kazakhstan or Uyghurs to Central Asia. But there is no Uyghur land 

across the border. Indeed if the border were open there might well be many Han 

in Kazakhstan and Central Asia rather than the few who are there now. South to 

Pakistan, north to Russia and Mongolia does not seem readily possible, although the 

local connections to these neighboring countries are strong. Given economic tendencies Han migrants are looking not to Xinjiang but to Shanghai, Hong Kong, Beijing, and further afield to US, Canada, Australia or Europe. 50–60 million Han live 

outside of the country as huaqiao overseas Chinese. 

Looking across the border to Kazakhstan, one sees a similar situation a young 

ethnic diverse population, with a large number of migrants from Russia rather than 

China. Of course, since 1990 the political situation is now quite different. 

Xinjiang’s demographics show a population that is getting older little by little and 

more urban. The demographic trends also show a population that is becoming less 

ethnically diverse with more migrants. That is the future of Xinjiang’s demography. 

Xinjiang has certainly prospered materially. I first studied in Urumqi in 1985; 

since then cell phones, cable TV, computers, and 20-story buildings are commonplace. There has been a technological growth. Transportation improvements air, rail, 

31 

and highways connect the region together, focusing on Urumqi. Now all taxicabs in 

Urumqi have Global Positioning Systems. 

Han hold many of the technological and jobs in Xinjiang. A higher percentage of 

Uyghurs have advanced education than in the past, but to get a good job is not so 

easy in Xinjiang, to do so one needs connections or guanxi. Tapping onto the network of connections one relies on government, university, family, kith and kin. Connections for Han are more forthcoming than for Uyghur. Of course a well-connected 

highly educated Uyghur has more chance than a poor Han peasant from Hunan. A 

well-qualified individual has a better chance among his or her own ethnic group. 

Ham migrants have contributed greatly to the economic development of the region 

but not necessarily to the local inhabitants of Xinjiang. Those who have worked in 

technical fields training local Uyghur and Kazakh population have also contributed 

to the social development of the region and its inhabitants. 

The plans for development in Xinjiang place a great deal of emphasis on physical 

infrastructure (roads and railways). For example, World Bank loans were previously 

used for improving the highway between Urumqi and Turpan, between Kuitun and 

Sayram Lake. In contrast the Tarim Basin Project is aimed at poor farmers in the 

south. China also has a World Bank Project aimed at education among indigenous 

peoples in Sichuan, Yunnan and Guizhou. This is a good example of a project that 

could be adapted to southern Xinjiang. 

The new policies outlined by the Xinjiang Work Forum will also have a considerable impact on the local demography. Often times with work projects in China, the 

skilled workers move into the areas. So many of the jobs in the new infrastructure 

projects would go to people with experience in those fields. This would entail more 

people migrating from eastern China to Xinjiang. And since the projects would go 

deep into southern Xinjiang, there will be more migration of Han into the traditionally Uyghur populated areas of southern Xinjiang. Usually the supervisors and foremen at job sites would be Han and prefer have a work force that operates in the 

Chinese language. So it is more difficult for a Uyghur to get hired in this formal 

sector of the economy. This Xinjiang development program could lead into an eastwest population transfer across China. 

The resultant impact of the development program on the demographic character 

of Xinjiang lies in two areas: the combination of ethnicity and migration. The development program will entail a movement of population from the east. Prior migrations from the east have been directly organized by the center. The major migration 

of Han into the region occurred during the 1950s. Many soldiers as well as peasants 

and urban dwellers settled in the region. In some cases, demobilized soldiers formed 

the new Production and Construction Corps. Oftentimes this settlement extended 

into land that was used for pastureland, converting it to agricultural purposes. Or 

new patches of ‘‘desert’’ were converted by tapping into the local aquifer (such land 

could only be used for a few years before nature would reclaim it). Many from as 

far as Shanghai came, as well as Sichuan and Hunan, in addition to the traditional 

flow of migrants from Gansu and Shaanxi. Migration slowed in the 1970s as the 

political situation stabilized. 

In the 1990s a new element began to appear—the floating population. China has 

about 100 million people that can be classified as floating population. We do not 

know how many there are in Xinjiang. These could also be described as temporary 

or circular migrants, in that they do not move permanently but could constitute an 

extra 10 percent of any urban population. In Urumqi, the temporary migrants can 

be seen at the train station, emerging from the 3–4 day journey. There is a large 

enclave of the temporary migrants living near the train station. Downtown, there 

is an office for the temporary residents where they can line up jobs and get housing. 

A stroll by this area and a discussion with the migrants shows that many of them 

are looking for construction or other skilled labor jobs. The better skilled can command 2000 yuan per month. Similar facilities are available in Korla and Aksu. So 

there is a provision for the temporary migrants even though a permanent move may 

not be in the future for them. Many would only plan to stay a while to try their 

luck in the city. This new development program would bring more formal migrants 

as well as floating population into Xinjiang. Most of the migrants had been heading 

toward the central areas of Urumqi and Shihezi. Now there will be more migrants 

headed toward Kashgar and southern Xinjiang. The vast majority of these migrants 

will be Han. Thus the cultural character of southern Xinjiang will change from one 

predominantly Uyghur to one with a larger Han component. 

Finally, what are the prospects for population growth? Population growth continues in Xinjiang, as does the migration to the region from other parts of China. 

If anything, the migration seems to be increasing in recent years, particularly with 

the addition of the floating population. This migration will ensure a larger percentage of Han in the region. The focus for the Han population will continue to be northVerDate Mar 15 2010 17:20 Oct 27, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00033 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 U:\DOCS\57904.TXT DEIDRE
32 

ern and central Xinjiang around Urumqi. With the completion of the railway to 

Kashgar, migration flows into southern Xinjiang will continue. Already the Han proportion of the population in southern Xinjiang has begun to increase. The only real 

limit to population growth in the region is access to water not access to land. The 

state has decided to tap into local aquifers and is using that water for agricultural 

expansion, oil production, construction and industry and residential use. In the 

oases of southern Xinjiang, overexploitation of water points to a serious ecological 

disaster in the making. 

33 

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF KATHLEEN E. MCLAUGHLIN, CHINA CORRESPONDENT FOR

BNA, INC., AND FREELANCE JOURNALIST

JULY 19, 2010

Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen, and thanks very much to the CECC for 

inviting me to take part in this important discussion. As a journalist and not a 

scholar, I’d like to focus primarily on the difficulties journalists face in reporting on 

Xinjiang, and how the strict barriers to reporting on the region have left the international media with a general lack of facts and understanding about what is happening there. 

When deadly riots erupted in Urumqi last summer, foreign correspondents in 

China expected the same kind of scenario we had encountered the year earlier when 

violent riots hit Tibet. Most of us believed that Xinjiang would be blocked off to reporters and the outward flow of information tightly controlled. 

So it was a pleasant surprise to find that the capital of Xinjiang was relatively 

open to foreign correspondents. Though Chinese media were not allowed free access 

to the region, foreign reporters flocked to Urumqi, where dozens of them found they 

had relatively open access to the city. 

There were some problems, some hassles with police (including one incident in 

which reporters were beaten up), but given the violent and potentially dangerous 

situation, reporting conditions in Urumqi were far less difficult or complicated than 

most had expected. I personally did not go to Urumqi but was told by several colleagues who did that they moved about with relative ease, and that a governmentestablished press center with a dedicated Internet line was quite helpful in their 

work. The region’s Internet was shut down, so journalists were scrambling to file 

stories and communicate. 

A few months after the riots, Chinese officials acknowledged that they had made 

a deliberate, top-level decision to open the Xinjiang capital to foreign journalists, 

saying that they believed it was in China’s best interest to let open reporting prevail 

and allow the facts to come out. In many cases, the facts did emerge from Urumqi. 

Foreign journalists were able to talk with both Han Chinese and Uighurs who were 

involved in the riots, and detailed accounts emerged from Urumqi. 

But the entirety of Xinjiang was far from transparent. Kashgar, the political and 

cultural heart of Xinjiang, was largely shut off to foreign journalists and remains 

so to this day. Reporters have been turned away at the airport upon landing in 

Kashgar, followed and warned by police and ordered to leave the city. In my own 

case, I travelled to Kashgar at the end of last year and managed to escape police 

notice for nearly a week. That ended on my last night in town, however, when I 

had to check into a hotel on my own passport, which contains a journalist visa. The 

manager did what is required in all of China and notified police that a foreign journalist had checked into his hotel. Within 30 minutes, five officers were knocking on 

my door, demanding to know why I was in Kashgar and when I would be leaving. 

One officer took my passport and checked me in for the first departing flight back 

to Urumqi. 

And even though was able to stay in Kashgar for several days before being noticed, reporting was extremely difficult because locals did not want to be interviewed. I was told there were clear directives that residents should not be speaking 

with foreign journalists and that all local tour guides had been issued guidelines to 

report journalists to the local police. This has been borne out by the experience of 

other journalists who have tried to work in Kashgar over the past year. It’s a 

marked turnabout from conditions before the riots, when Kashgar was relatively 

open to reporters and locals talks with journalists without extreme fear of reprisals. 

That’s no longer the case. 

As a result, the flow of information from Kashgar and other parts of Xinjiang has 

been barely a trickle. This should perhaps not be a surprise. After all, the root of 

the riots likely started in Kashgar, though we still don’t know exactly what or how 

things transpired. 

The initial spark for the riots was ignited at a toy factory in Guangdong Province 

in late June, when what has been described as either a fight or an attack left at 

least two Uighurs dead at the hands of Han Chinese coworkers. After several days 

and no arrests in the Shaoguan toy factory murders, it seems that Uighurs began 

organizing protests which later escalated into the July 5 riots in Urumqi. 

As I mentioned earlier, I didn’t go to Urumqi during the riots or their immediate 

aftermath. Instead, I travelled to Shaoguan to try to find out what had happened 

34 

at the toy factory. What I found was that hundreds of Uighur workers (most from 

Shufu, a suburb of Kashgar) who many say had been pressured to moved to 

Guangzhou under the governments outward migration push, were sequestered off 

from the rest of the factory, the bosses said for their own safety. Residents, businesses owners and factory workers around the giant toy factory had been told not 

to speak to journalists, but many did. Still, despite the chatter, what emerged was 

a picture as clear as mud. There was a clear atmosphere of ethnic tension between 

Uighurs and Han Chinese in the factory town in the aftermath of the murders, but 

it was far less clear what tensions led to the incident. Wide disagreement remains 

to this day over what sparked the brawl and how many people were killed. 

Uighurs I spoke with in a nearby factory town said they were forced through economic pressures to leave Kashgar and work in Guangdong. They said their friends 

in Shaoguan were under tight controls and directed not to speak of the incident. 

They had very real concerns for their safety and that of their families. 

To this day, essential facts remain unknown about what happened last summer, 

and what caused Urumqi to devolve into China’s deadliest ethnic riots in decades. 

What led to the riots, how they were organized, and what happened to those involved are all questions that have not been satisfactorily answered. China has 

earned credited for allowing free flow of information during the Xinjiang riots, but 

the flow was not free enough to answer imperative questions. 

In a recent survey of our correspondent members, the Foreign Correspondents’ 

Club of China found that most journalists who responded believe government restrictions make it impossible to do balanced and accurate reporting on Xinjiang. 

Travel restrictions and intensive pressure on sources are major barriers. Even 

though Xinjiang is ostensibly open to foreign journalists, correspondents liken it to 

Tibet—the only part of China where journalists are still required to get prior government permission to visit. Correspondents reported being harassed and monitored 

while working in Xinjiang in recent years, particularly in Kashgar and other nonUrumqi locations during and after the riots. The pressure seems to have ramped 

up even higher around the one-year anniversary of the riots earlier this month. 

Reported one correspondent who travelled to Xinjiang last year: ‘‘We were followed and forced to leave Kashgar by the police. Some people were too scared to 

talk to us.’’ 

Too often in Xinjiang, this seems to be the case. Sources face very real repercussions for speaking to journalists, which has become an effective tool for containing 

information. Without the ability to investigate the facts or talk to people who live 

there, we may never know the real story of the Xinjiang riots and so many other 

things about life and politics there. 

Thanks very much for your attention and I look forward to the discussion. 

STATEMENT OF THE CHAIRMAN AND COCHAIRMAN: XINJIANG—ONE YEAR AFTER

DEMONSTRATIONS AND RIOTING

JULY 9, 2010

We are deeply concerned by human rights conditions in Xinjiang, one year after 

demonstrations and rioting in the region. Events that started on July 5, 2009 resulted in injury and death to Han and Uyghur citizens alike. Repressive policies in 

the region have continued, and, in some cases, have intensified. 

In the aftermath of last year’s violence, the government tightly restricted the free 

flow of information, and curbed Internet access for 10 months. Authorities intensified security campaigns and conducted large scale sweeps and raids. Security forces 

detained some Uyghurs, primarily men and boys, whose whereabouts still remain 

unknown. We are alarmed by reports that trials have been marred by violations of 

Chinese law and international standards for due process. 

We are concerned by reported curbs on independent legal defense and a general 

lack of transparency in trials. Conditions in the region today remain tense. The 

Internet is back up, but a number of Uyghur Web sites remain shuttered. And 

throughout the last year, the government issued regulations to restrict free speech. 

As we noted immediately after last year’s tragic events, we urge the Chinese government, when addressing events in Xinjiang, to abide by its domestic and international commitments to protect citizen’s fundamental rights and to promote the 

rule of law, and we urge the Chinese government to address the longstanding grievances of the Uyghur people, especially those related to official suppression of 

Uyghurs’ independent expressions of ethnic, cultural, and religious identity. 

Æ