T he p anel unan im o u sl y f i nd s t hi s case s ui t ab l e f o r decis i o n wi t ho ut *
o ral argument. Fed

. R

. A p p
. P

. 34 (a)( 2 ).

F OR P UB LIC AT ION


### U N I TED STA TES C O U R T O F A PPEA LS F O R T H E N IN T H C IR C U IT

A L F R ED O R OL ANDO L A WREN CE , Petitioner ,

v.
E RI C H. H OL DER , JR ., Attorney Ge ne ra l, Respondent

. No. 07-74829 Ag ency No. A040-199-868
OPI NI ON

On Petition for Review of a n Orde r of the B oa rd of Immi g ratio n App e a ls
Submit ted April 8, 2013 * Pa sa de na , Ca lif

or nia
Filed Ma y 21, 2013
Be fore : Fer dinand F. F erna ndez, J ohnnie B . Rawlinson,
and Jay S. B y be e , Ci rc uit

Judg e s. Opinion by

J udg e F erna

ndezL AWRENC E V

. H OL DER

2

T hi s s ummary cons t i t ut es no part o f the o pi ni on of

t he cour t

. I t ha s ** b een p repa red b y co urt s t af f f o r t he co nveni ence o f

t he read er. SUMMAR

Y **

Im m igration The pa nel denied A lfredo Rolando L awr ence ’s petition for r eview o f t he B oard of Immigration Appeals’ de cision fi nd inghim

ine li gibl e fo r I

NA§ 2 12 (c ) r e lie f, be c a

us e he is an ag g ravated fe lon who filed his app l i ca t i on for r elief a fter November

29, 1990. The pa nel held t h at the term “ admissions” in § 212(c)’ s eff ective date provisi on ref

ers to the date that an a lien seeks
re lie f, and

thu s th e ag g ra

vate d f e lony ba r a pp lie s to applications filed afte r November 29, 1990, reg ardle ss of the date the a lien was initially admitted to the United States.

CO UN SEL
Duane M . Hamilton, Chow & Ha milton, Buena Par

k, California, for

Petitioner. Tony West, As s i s tant Attorney Gene ral, Aviva

L . Poczter, S e n i o r L i t i g at i o nC o un s e l , J e s s e D

. L o r e n z , T r i a l A t t o r n e y, United States Depa

rtment of Just ice, Civil Division, Office of Immi g ratio n L iti g atio n, Was hin g ton , D .C. , f or Re sp on de nt.L AWRENC E V

. H OL DER 3

See Cal

. Pen al Code § 211. 1

See C al

. P enal C o d e § 20 7 (a). 2 OP IN ION
FERNAN DEZ , Circuit J udg e:
Alfre do Rol an d o L awr ence , a native a nd citizen of P anama, petitions for revie w of the B oard of Immigration Appea ls’ (B IA) determination that he is not elig ible for r elief pursuan t to former

Immigration and Nationality Act (I NA) § 212(c) (8 U.S.C

. § 1 1 8 2(c) (1992)) beca use he is an ag g ravated fe lon, who filed his ap p l i cation for relief afte r November

29, 1990. We deny

the petition.
BACK GR OUND
L awr ence was a dmitt ed to the United States on June 16, 1987, as a la

wful per manent re s i dent (L PR). On May 12, 1992, the State of California char g ed him wi th armed
ro b b ery an d

k i dn ap p i n g. He pled guilty to both charg es 1 2 pursuant to a plea ag ree ment and was sentence d to nine y ear s imprisonment on each of fense . He se rved f

ive y ears and seven months of hi s term and was re lease d on Dec ember 16, 1997. A fe w wee ks befor e his rele ase, a Notice to Appe ar (NTA) was issued pursua nt to I NA § 237 (a)(2)( A)(iii), (a) (2)( A)(i) (8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)( 2)(A) (iii), (i)). It alleg ed that he was re movable as a

n L PR convicted of an a g g ravated felony and a c rime involving mora l turpitude.
A th i s h e ar i n go nth e N T A , the I mmi g r at i o nJu d g e ( I J) sustained th e fa ctual alleg ations in the NTA and f ound that L awr ence was re movable. L awr ence indicated to the I J thatL AWRENC E V

. H OL DER

4

U ni t ed N at i ons Co nv ent i on Agai ns t T ort ur e a nd O t her Crue l , I nh uman 3
o r D e g ra d ing T re a tm e n t o r P u n ish m e n t, ad op t ed D e c . 1 0 , 1 9 8 4 , S . T re a ty D oc
. No. 10 0- 20 ( 19 88 ) , 14 65 U. N

. T

. S. 85 , i mp l ement ed a t 8 C. F. R. § 1208. 18. he so ught a sylum

and wi thh old ingof

re mov a l. H e a lso briefe d the I J on the ava ilability o f relief under

the Convention Ag ainst Torture ( CAT). 3
On Octobe r 5, 1998, the I J issued a d ecision, finding L awr ence ineligible f

or as y l u m and withholding of remova l beca use he had been convicted of an ag g ravated felon y t hat
was a particula

rly serious crime, and statingthat the I J lacke d jur isd ic tio n o ve r L awr e nc e ’s CA T c la im. Th e I J ord e re d h im
remove d to Panama.
Law r e n c e a

p p e a l e d th e IJ ’ s d e c i s i o nt o th e B IA

. T h e B IA dismiss ed his appe al with respe ct to asylum and withholding of re moval, but r emande d on the question of CAT prote ction. I t determined that the I J did have jurisdiction to consider the CAT issue. On rema

nd, L awr ence applied for

a wa iver unde r § 212(c) of the I

NA (her eaf

ter § 212(c) ) for the f

irst time on Marc h 2, 2004. Howeve r, § 212(c ) re lief i s barr ed for applicants who ha

ve bee n convicted of an ag g ravated fe lony and ser ved over five year s in prison. I mmigration Act of 1990 (I MMACT), Pub. L

. No. 101–649, § 511 (a) & (b), 104 Stat. 4978, 5052 (here afte r § 511 (a ) and § 511(b), respe ctively

). L awr ence asser

ted that he c ould seek § 212(c )
re lie f d e sp ite the ba

r b e c a us e it a pp lie d o nly

to “ a dmi ssi on s” takingplace on or af

ter Nove mber 29 , 1 9 9 0 , but he was
a dmi tte d a s an L PR in 19 87

. He the n w ith dr e w h is
a pp lic atio n f

or CA T p ro tectio n, wh ic h le ft on ly his ap p l i ca t i o nfo r § 2 1 2 (c ) r el i ef p en d i n g.L AWRENC E V

. H OL DER 5

On Marc h 13, 2006, the I J prete rmitted L aw re nce’ s application for § 212(c) relief on the g round that he ha d been convicted of

an ag g rava ted fe lony

for whic h he had se rved more than f

ive y ear s i n p ri s o n and thus was ba rre d from seekinga § 212(c) waiver

. L awr ence appea led that decision to the BIA, which a dop ted and a ffirme d the I J ’s dec ision on November 13, 2007. The B IA noted that it was “ well settled” that the a g g ra

vate d fe lony ba

r to a § 21 2( c ) w a ive r a

pp lie d to applicatio n s for a waiver filed af ter Nove mber 29, 1990, reg ardle ss of the ali en ’s i nitial admission date to the United States. This petition for review followed.
JU RI SDI CT ION AN D ST AN DA RD S OF RE VI EW We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (1).
We reviewthe B IA’s fa ct ual deter minations for substantial evidence and tre at the B IA’s d et erminations as “‘c onclusive unless any

rea sonable a djudic at o r would be compelled to conc lude to the contra ry
. ’” Lopez-Cardona v. Holder , 6 62 F .3 d 1 11 0, 11 11 (9 th C ir . 2 01 1) ; see also INS v. Elias-Zacarias , 5 02 U. S. 47 8, 48 1 & n. 1, 48 3– 84 , 1 12 S. Ct

. 812, 815 & n.1, 817, 117 L . Ed. 2d 38 (1992).
We r e vie w i ssu e s o f l aw d e no vo , b ut “ su bje c t to established principles of def ere nce.” Edu v. Holde r , 624 F.3d 11 3 7 , 1 1 4 2 ( 9 th Ci r
. 2 0 1 0 ) ( inte r n a l qu o tati o nmarks omi tte d) ; see also Garc ia v. Holder , 659 F.3d 1261, 1265–66 (9th Cir. 2011). We owe de fer ence to the leg al interpre tations of the Attor ne y Ge ne ra l, i f t

he y are “ ba se d o n a

pe rm is si ble construction of the statute.” Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v . Natural Res. De f. Council, Inc. , 467 U.S. 837, 843 , 104 S. Ct . 2778, 27 82 , 81 L

. Ed

. 2d 694 (1 98 4); see also INS v. Aguir re -A gu irre , 526 U.S

. 4 1 5 , 424, 119 S. Ct . 1439, 1445,L AWRENC E V

. H OL DER

6

A l t ho ug h the se cti o n ha s b ee n re p ea l ed , i t i s st i l l a p p l i ca b l e to t ho se 4 al i ens who p l ed guil t y to o f f enses w hi l e i t w as i n ef f ect — t hat i s, be f

o re A p ril 1 , 1 9 9 7

. See I

N S v. St

. Cyr , 5 3 3 U .S . 2 8 9 , 2 9 7 , 3 2 6 , 1 2 1 S . C t. 22 71 , 22 77 , 22 93 , 15 0 L. Ed. 2d 34 7 ( 20 01 )

. B e c a u s e La w r e n c e pl ed g u i l t y on M a y 19 , 19 92 , t h e s e c t i on i s a pp l i c a bl e t o h i m.

A s it a p p lies to L a w re n c e , § 2 1 2 (c ) re a d s a s fo llo w s in p e rtine n t p a rt: 5

A l i ens l awf

ul l y a d m i t t ed f

o r perm anent res i d ence who t emp orar i l y procee ded a br oa d vol un t ar i l y an d not un der
an or der of

de por t at i on , a n d w h o a r e r et ur n i n g t o a l awf ul unrel i nq ui shed d o m i ci l e o f seven co nsecut i ve y ear s , may be adm i t t ed i n t he di s cr et i on of t he A t t orn ey 143 L . Ed. 2d 590 (1999). We also owe defe renc e to the leg al d e t e r m i n at i o n s o f

th e B IA , b u t th at p r e s e n t s m o r e c o mp l e x i ty. In this case, the BIA’s lega l deter mination was essentially

as set forth in a published opinion of five members of the B IA. See I n re A– A– , 2 0 I . & N. De c . 4 92 (B IA 1 99 2) . T hus, to the e xtent w e are re vie wing it s dec isi on , w e a lso ow e its de te rm inatio n d e fe re nc e if “ ba se d o n a

pe rm iss ibl e construction of the statute.” Chevron , 46 7 U. S

. at 843, 104 S. Ct. at 2 78 2; se e als o A gu irre -A gu irre , 526 U.S. at 424, 119 S. Ct . at 1445. Finally , a s to th e p arti c u la r s o f th e c a s e at h a

n d , we revie w “the de cision of the I J , as we ll as any additional
rea soning of

fer ed by the B IA.” Husye v v. M ukasey , 528 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 2008).

DI SCU SSIO N
L aw r e n c e s o u g h t r e l i e f f r o m r e m o v a l p ur s u an t to § 2 12(c) , despite the fa ct that he ha d committed an

4
a g g ra vate d f e lony and ha d s e rv e d mo re tha

n f iv e y ear s in pr iso n a s a

re su lt. 5L AWRENC E V

. H OL DER 7

G e n e ra l .

. . . T h e first se n te n c e o f th is s u b se c tio n sh a ll
n ot a ppl y t o a n a l i en w h o h as bee n con v i ct ed of on e or mo r e a gg r avat ed f

el oni es an d has s er ved f or s uch f elo ny o r f

elo nies a term o f

i m p ris o nm en t o f

at l ea st f i ve years.
O n i t s f ac e, t h e s t at u t e appl i ed t o ex cl u s i on pr oce edi n g s on l y , bu t i t c an be
a p p lied to d e p o rta tio n p ro c e e d ing s a s w e ll. See 8 C .F .R . § 1 2 1 2 .3 ; Pas cua v. H ol der , 6 4 1 F .3 d 3 1 6 , 3 1 9 n .2 (9 th C ir . 2 0 1 1 ); Ta pi a- Ac un a v

. I

NS , 6 4 0 F .2 d 2 2 3 , 2 2 5 (9 th C ir. 1 9 8 1 ), over r ul ed by A bebe v. M ukasey , 5 5 4 F .3 d 1 2 0 3 , 1 2 0 7 (9 th C ir. 2 0 0 9 ) (e n b a n c ) (p e r c u ria m ); I n r e Si l va , 1 6 I. & N

. D ec. 26 , 30 (B IA 19 7 6 ). Congr ess amende d § 212(c) when it ena cted the ag g ravat ed felony

bar to re lief on Nove mber 29, 1990. Sections 511(a) and 511(b) of I MMACT provide: (a) I N GENERAL. — Section 212(c) (8 U.S .C. § 1182(c) ) is amende d by addingat the e n d th e f o ll o w in g : “ T h e f

ir s t s e n te n c e of this subsection sha ll not apply to an alien who h as b een c onvicted of a

n ag g ravated fe lony and has se rved a term of imprisonment of at least five year s.” (b) EF FE C TIVE DATE . — The amendment
ma de by su bs e c tion ( a ) s ha ll a

pp ly to admissions occurr in g af ter the date of the
e na c tme nt o f t

his Ac t.
There afte r, the ba

r wa s expanded to cover an alien who h a s c o mm itte d “ o n e o r mo r e a g g r av ate d f e lo n ie s and hasL AWRENC E V

. H OL DER

8

See M i s ce l l an eou s a n d T ec h n i ca l I mmi g r at i on a n d N at u r al i za t i on 6 Amen dmen t s of

1991, P u b. L. N o. 102–232, § 306( a) ( 10) , 105 St at

. 1733, 1751. ser ved fo r s uc h f

e lony or fe lon ie s” a

te r m o f im p r is o n ment 6 of at le a st f ive y e ars , b ut t

hat do e s n ot a ff

e c t ou r a na ly sis

. There can be no doubt that the ag g ravated fe lony bar doe s a pp ly to L awr e nc e if

wi thi n th e me anin gof

§ 5 11 (b ) h is “admission” occ urre d afte r Nove mber 29, 1990. As alre ady ind ic ate d, his c onvic tio ns oc c ur re d o n May 19 , 199 2, and his application for § 212(c) relief was filed on Ma

rch 2, 2004. Th e B IA de te rm ine d that the ba r a pp lie d to him becaus e his application for

relief was filed a fter N ovember 29, 1990.
L awr ence disag ree s with the BIA’s d et ermination and points to t he fa ct that, i n g ener al, the wor ds “admission” and “admitted” me an “the lawful entry of the alien into the United States after

inspection and a

uthorization by

an immigration of f ic e r
. ” 8 U

. S. C. § 1 1 0 1 ( a ) ( 1 3 ) ( A )

. T hu s , h e ar g ues that beca use he w as admitted as a n L PR o n o r about June 16, 19 87 , th e fe lony

ba r d oe s n ot a

pp ly to h im.

L aw renc e’s a

rgument would be plausible, if it wer e not for the unique history

of § 212(c ). Read l i t er ally , § 212(c)
re lie f w ou ld n ot a

pp ly to h im at a ll — o n it s f a c e it o nly ref ers to aliens who had been “lawfully admitted” but left a

nd then soug ht to be admitted ag ain. Howe ver, t h at d o es not de sc ri be L awr e nc e ; he did no t li te ra lly

se e k admi ssi on

in 2004 beca

use he ha d never

left. When Congr ess ac ted, § 212(c) co u ld have be en applied to a person in his position beca use “th e distinction between re entry and depor

tation [had] been blur

red.” Sa ma nie

go -M e raz v . I NS , 53 F.3d 254, 257 (9th Cir. 1995), overrule d on other grounds by Toia v.L AWRENC E V

. H OL DER 9

See Tapi a- Acuna , 6 4 0 F .2 d a t 2 2 5 ; Fr an c i s v

. I NS , 532 F. 2d 268, 273 7 (2 d C ir. 1 9 7 6 ); I

n r e Si l va , 16 I

. & N

. D ec
. a t 30. Fasano , 334 F.3d 917, 921 ( 9t h C i r. 2003). Thus, whe n Con g re ss u se d th e te rm “admissi on s” in t he e ff e c tiv e date provision in § 212(c), it could have bee n ref err ing to the in it ia l a dmi s s io no f

ana lien ( i.e. , the first usag e of the term a dmi ssi on

in § 21 2( c ), whi ch re fe rs to “ [a]li e ns lawf ull y admitted for pe rmane nt res idence ”), or it could have be en ref err ing to the se cond admission reque sted when the alien
re turn edaf

t er l ea v i n g ( i.e. , the sec ond usag e of t h e term admission in § 212(c), which states that aliens “may be admitted in the discretion of the Attorney Gene ral” ). It is not likely that Congr ess meant the f ormer, r ather

than the latter , which is the date on which the alien would have be en see king
ree ntry but found himself in the status of an a g g ravated fe lon. Be cause t h e v er y

purpose of

the judicial expansion of § 212(c) re l i ef t o those who had not lef t was to ensure that they would be g iven treatment equal to that of r eturning
a lie ns , they should be treated in that fashion for the purposes 7 of § 511(b)

. That i s, the date that they seek the equivalent of

“ re tur nin g ” re lie f s ho uld

be us e d; t

hat date , at th e e arl ie st, is t h e date of their a

pplication for r elief. Still, we agree that
so me ambi guit

y re ma ins

. The Attorne y

Gene ral has resolved the ambiguity , and we owe that de termination defe renc e. On October 3, 1991, the Attorney Gene ral issued a

n interi m rule for

the purpose of amendingth e C ode of F eder al Regulations to im plement § 511(a) and (b)

. See Interim Rule re 212( c) Waiver , 56 Fe d. Reg . 50,033–34 (Oc t. 3, 1991). The Attorne y Gene ral noted that the ag g ravated fe lony bar ha d been e nacte d and we nt on to expl ain:L AWRENC E V

. H OL DER

10
As used in se ction 511(b) of I MMACT, the term “admissions” cove rs all applications under the Act for

section 21 2 (c ) re lief, whether actua lly made upon a

pplication for
a dmi ssi on

int o th e Un ite d State s o r m a de on ly afte r entry

. The languag e of the waiver
c onta ine d in

se c tio n 2 12 (c) a

pp lie s b y its terms only

t o applications for

rea dmission into the Unit ed S tates by

inadmissible lawful pe rm ane nt reside nt a lie ns wh o te mpo ra ri ly p roceede d abroa d voluntarily . Howeve r, the Attorney Ge n er al h as l o n g equate d applications for section 212(c) relief whi ch
are made dur ing de portation proce eding s after entry , with those ap p lications made at the tim e an ali e n p hy sic a lly

se e ks a dmi ssi on

int o the United States. This treatment has bee n acc epted a

nd expanded by

the cour t s , and applies eve n if the alie n d id not depart the United States afte r bec oming e x cludable. Thu s , un d e r

th e p r e v a il in ginte r

p r e tati o n , the phra se “ sh a ll a

pp ly to a dmi ssi on s” a s use d in
se c tio n 5 11 (b ) o f I MMA CT r e fe rs to a ll applications for

relief pursuant to s ection 212(c) of the Ac t submit ted af ter November 29, 1990 . . . .
Id. at 50,033 (c itations omi tted ). As sug g ested by our previous discussion, that deter minati o n was “ based on a permissible construc tion of the statute.” Chevron , 467 U. S.
at 843, 10 4 S. Ct. at 27 82 ; se e als o A gu irre -A gu irre , 5 26 U. S. at 424, 119 S. Ct. at 1445.L AWRENC E V

. H OL DER 11

See 8 C

. F.R

. § 21 2

. 3 (19 9 2 ); on F eb ruary 28 , 20 0 3 , t he num b er of t he 8

r egu l at i on was ch ang ed t o 8 C

. F. R § 12 12

. 3 wi t hout mat er i al ch ang e. T h e B IAlate r

c o mm e n te d

u p o nth e r e gu lation; it noted 8 that Congr ess had “specifie d that [t he ag g ravated fe lony bar] was to be virtually immediate.” In re A– A– , 20 I . & N . Dec

. at 501. It went on to decla re: “ The Attorne y

Gene ral ha s there by deter mined that the statutory

bar to sec tion 212(c) relief shall apply

only to those applications submitted after No v e mb e r 2 9 , 1 9 9 0

. W e ar e th e r e f o r e b o un d b y

his deter mina t i o n in this reg ard.” Id. at 502. That, of c ourse, was the r ule followed in the c ase at hand. Ag ain, we de fer

. Six oth e r c ir c uit

c ourt s o f a

pp e a ls h ave ha d o c c a sio n to comment on whethe r the d at e of application for re lief is the operative date f

or this purpose. Al l agr ee with the ag ency ’s construction of § 511( b).
The F ourth Circuit Court of Appea ls responded to an
atta c k s imi lar t o L awr e nc e ’s a s f oll ow s:
We find the Boa

rd’s a nd the Attorney Gene ral’s int erpretation to be re asonable and
c on sisten t wi th cong re ssi on a l in te nt. Although the [ali en s ] are cor rec t with reg ard to t he techn ic a l me anin gof

“ a dmi ssi on s” in the context of immi g ration l aws, the interpre tation the y advocate would re quire ignor ing the administrative and judicial interpre tations which have b roade ned the meaningof “a dmissio ns” in the § 212(c ) context. These dec isions have held that § 2 12 (c ) n o longer

e xclu siv e ly

a pp lie s to aliens who have depa

rted a nd are seekingL AWRENC E V

. H OL DER

12

ree ntry

or readmission back into the United States, but also to those who have not de pa rt e d but are in de po rt atio n p roc e e din g s. We do not believe it i s unrea sonable for Congr e s s to a s s ume th at i ts u s e o f th e te rm “a d missions ” in the ame ndment to § 212(c) would be subject to the pre vailing judicia l and
a dm i n i s tr at i v e i n t e r

p r e t at i o n
. A c c o r d i n g l y, we a ffirm the B oard ’s conclusion that the
a g g ra vate d f e lony ba r a pp lie s to t he [a lie ns ] bec a u s e th e ir a p p li c ati o n s f

o r § 2 1 2 ( c ) r e li ef
wer e filed af

t er . . . the ena ctment date of I MMACT.
DeOs or io v . I

NS , 10 F.3d 1034, 1039 ( 4th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted). Other c ourts of appeal s h ave a g ree d, althoug h sometimes with less than hy ali ne re asoning

. See Ve le z- Lote ro v . A c him , 414 F.3d 776, 7 8 0 , 781 (7th Cir. 20 05 ); Go me

s v . A sh c ro

ft , 311 F.3d 43, 45–46 ( 1st Cir. 2002); Sc he ide ma nn v . I

NS , 83 F.3d 1517, 1519–20, 1525– 2 6 (3rd Cir . 1 99 6) ; Cam

po s v . I NS , 16 F.3d 118, 120–21 (6 th Cir. 19 94 ); Bu itrago- Cue

sta v . I NS , 7 F.3d 291, 292 ( 2d Cir. 19 93 ); Cor te

s- Cas til lo v . I

NS , 99 7 F .2 d 1 19 9, 12 02 n. 1 ( 7th Cir . 1 99 3) ; see also Saravia-Paguada v. Gonzales , 488 F.3d 1122, 1132–35 (9th Cir. 2007) (applying § 511(a) to a n alien admi t t ed befor e the e ffe ctive date of I MMACT without any
re fe re nc e to § 511(b) ). I f w e ha d a ny re ma ini ngdo ub t, t

ho se c a se s w ou ld a

bs te rg e it.L AWRENC E V

. H OL DER 13

Law rence al so m akes a hal f heart ed e q ual p rotect i o n a rgume nt , wi t ho ut 9 ci t at i o n t o pe rt i nent aut ho ri t i es. H i s c la im is o t i o se. T here can be no d o u b t t h a t C o n g re ss ca n ra tio n a lly d isting u ish b e tw e e n a lien s w h o c o m m it felo n ie s a n d tho se w h o d o no t. S e e A lv a r e n g a -Vill a lo b o s v . A sh c ro ft , 2 7 1 F .3 d 1 1 6 9 , 1 1 7 4 (9 th C ir. 2 0 0 1 ); Uni t ed St at es v. Yac oubi an , 24 F. 3d 1, 8 n. 3 (9t h C i r
. 1 99 4). Si mi l ar l y , C ongr es s can cer t ai nl y d r aw l i nes t hat sp e c ify e ff

e c tive d a te s w h e n it e n a c ts o r a m e n d s re lief s ta tute s. See H e rn a n d e z- M e zq u i t a v. A shcro ft , 29 3 F.3d 11 6 1 , 11 6 4

– 6 5 (9t h C i r. 20 0 2 ). M oreove r , Lawr enc e, wh o com mi t t ed an d p l ed gu i l t y t o a f el ony af t er IM M A C T ’ s enactment, i s no t s i m i l arl y s i t uat ed t o t ho se who p l ed be f o re the e n a c tm e n t. See Chan v. Reno , 11 3 F .3 d 1 0 6 8 , 10 7 3

– 7 4 (9t h C i r. 1 9 9 7 ); s ee al

s o Toi a v

. Fas ano , 33 4 F.3d 91 7 , 92 0

– 2 1 (9t h C i r. 20 0 3 ). There fore , we hold that the ag g ravated felony bar a pplies to L awr ence ’s attempt to seek § 212( c) r elief. 9

CO NC LU SION
L awr ence , an L PR and ag gravated fe lon, hopes to take advanta g e of the rel i ef pr ovided by § 212(c) , but that hope has induce d him to chase a n eidolon. As an ag g ravated fe lon, who filed his application f or relief afte r Nove mber 29, 1990, he fa lls outsi de of the protec tive scope of § 212(c)

. P etition DENIED.