59096 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 190 / Wednesday, October 1, 2014 / Rules and Regulations 

National Archives and Records 

Administration (NARA). For information on 

the availability of this material at NARA, call 

202–741–6030, or go to: http://

www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibrlocations.html. 

Issued in Renton, Washington, on 

September 19, 2014. 

Michael Kaszycki, 

Acting Manager, Transport Airplane 

Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2014–22978 Filed 9–30–14; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2013–0792; Directorate 

Identifier 2013–NM–118–AD; Amendment 

39–17979; AD 2014–20–06] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing 

Company Airplanes 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: We are adopting a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for all The 

Boeing Company Model 737–600, –700, 

–700C, –800, –900, and –900ER series 

airplanes, and Model 777 airplanes. 

This AD was prompted by testing 

reports on certain Honeywell phase 3 

display units (DUs). These DUs 

exhibited susceptibility to radio 

frequency emissions in WiFi frequency 

bands at radiated power levels below 

the levels that the displays are required 

to tolerate for certification of WiFi 

system installations. The phase 3 DUs 

provide primary flight information 

including airspeed, altitude, pitch and 

roll attitude, heading, and navigation 

information to the flightcrew. This AD 

requires replacing the existing phase 3 

DUs with phase 1, phase 2, or phase 3A 

DUs, and for certain replacement DUs, 

installing new DU database software. 

We are issuing this AD to prevent loss 

of flight-critical information displayed 

to the flightcrew during a critical phase 

of flight, such as an approach or takeoff, 

which could result in loss of airplane 

control at an altitude insufficient for 

recovery, or controlled flight into 

terrain. 

DATES: This AD is effective November 5, 

2014. 

The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference 

of certain publications listed in this AD 

as of November 5, 2014. 

ADDRESSES: For service information 

identified in this AD, contact Boeing 

Commercial Airplanes, Attention: Data 

& Services Management, P.O. Box 3707, 

MC 2H–65, Seattle, WA 98124–2207; 

telephone 206–544–5000, extension 1; 

fax 206–766–5680; Internet https://

www.myboeingfleet.com. You may view 

this referenced service information at 

the FAA, Transport Airplane 

Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., 

Renton, WA. For information on the 

availability of this material at the FAA, 

call 425–227–1221. 

Examining the AD Docket 

You may examine the AD docket on 

the Internet at http://

www.regulations.gov by searching for 

and locating Docket No. FAA–2013– 

0792; or in person at the Docket 

Management Facility between 9 a.m. 

and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, 

except Federal holidays. The AD docket 

contains this AD, the regulatory 

evaluation, any comments received, and 

other information. The address for the 

Docket Office (phone: 800–647–5527) is 

Docket Management Facility, U.S. 

Department of Transportation, Docket 

Operations, M–30, West Building 

Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 1200 

New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, 

DC 20590. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Jeffrey W. Palmer, Aerospace Engineer, 

Systems and Equipment Branch, ANM– 

130S, Seattle Aircraft Certification 

Office, FAA, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., 

Renton, WA 98057–3356; phone: 425– 

917–6472; fax: 425–917–6590; email: 

jeffrey.w.palmer@faa.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Discussion 

We issued a notice of proposed 

rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR 

part 39 by adding an AD that would 

apply to all The Boeing Company Model 

737–600, –700, –700C, –800, –900, and 

–900ER series airplanes, and Model 777 

airplanes. The NPRM published in the 

Federal Register on September 24, 2013 

(78 FR 58487). The NPRM was 

prompted by testing reports on certain 

Honeywell phase 3 DUs. These DUs 

exhibited susceptibility to radio 

frequency emissions in WiFi frequency 

bands at radiated power levels below 

the levels that the displays are required 

to tolerate for certification of WiFi 

system installations. The phase 3 DUs 

provide primary flight information 

including airspeed, altitude, pitch and 

roll attitude, heading, and navigation 

information to the flightcrew. The 

NPRM proposed to require replacing the 

existing phase 3 DUs with new phase 

3A DUs and installing new DU database 

software. We are issuing this AD to 

prevent loss of flight-critical 

information displayed to the flightcrew 

during a critical phase of flight, such as 

an approach or takeoff, which could 

result in loss of airplane control at an 

altitude insufficient for recovery, or 

controlled flight into terrain. 

Clarification of Cause of Unsafe 

Condition 

The cause of the unsafe condition 

stated in the Discussion section of this 

AD is a known susceptibility of the 

Phase 3 DUs to RF transmissions inside 

and outside of the airplane. This 

susceptibility has been verified to exist 

in a range of RF spectrum (mobile 

satellite communications, cell phones, 

air surveillance and weather radar, and 

other systems), and is not limited to 

WiFi transmissions. 

Comments 

We gave the public the opportunity to 

participate in developing this AD. The 

following presents the comments 

received on the proposal (78 FR 58487, 

September 24, 2013), and the FAA’s 

response to each comment. 

Request To Change Applicability 

Three commenters requested that we 

revise the applicability. A4A requested 

that we change the applicability to 

address only airplanes that have phase 

3 DUs installed. Mr. Philipp Schmid 

requested that the applicability only 

address airplanes that have a WiFi 

system installed in the cabin. All 

Nippon Airways (ANA) requested that 

we revise applicability paragraph (c) of 

the proposed AD (78 FR 58487, 

September 24, 2013) to refer to the 

airplanes identified in Boeing Special 

Attention Service Bulletin 737–31– 

1471, dated November 29, 2012; and 

Boeing Special Attention Service 

Bulletin 777–31–0187, dated November 

29, 2012. 

A4A stated that the FAA is making 

the NPRM (78 FR 58487, September 24, 

2013) applicable to all Model 737 NG 

and Model 777 series airplanes, 

regardless of the operator’s intent to 

install a Wi-Fi system. A4A expressed 

that in paragraph (e) of the proposed 

AD, the FAA acknowledges that the 

unsafe condition is directly related to 

electromagnetic interference (EMI) 

characteristics exhibited at specific 

frequency ranges related to Wi-Fi 

transmission. A4A stated that the phase 

3 DUs have passed all applicable 

certification testing required for 

approval and use on transport category 

airplanes, including the DO–160 

environmental standards. A4A asserted 


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that the phase 3 display units have 

proven to be reliable under normal 

operating conditions. A4A also stated 

that the failure mode identified by the 

NPRM is specific to an additional test 

procedure prescribed by DO–294C that 

is required only as part of the 

certification requirements of an 

operator-installed Wi-Fi system. 

ANA stated that the those airplanes 

not specified in Boeing Special 

Attention Service Bulletin 737–31– 

1471, dated November 29, 2012; and 

Boeing Special Attention Service 

Bulletin 777–31–0187, dated November 

29, 2012; were/will be delivered with 

the requested changes in production. 

We partially agree with the 

commenters’ requests. We recognize 

that operators will not be able to comply 

with the proposed replacement 

specified in paragraph (g) of the 

proposed AD (78 FR 58487, September 

24, 2013) if airplanes do not have any 

phase 3 DUs installed. Therefore, we 

have revised paragraph (g) of this AD to 

allow operators to inspect to determine 

if phase 3 DUs are installed and if no 

phase 3 DUs are installed, no further 

action is necessary. 

The intent of this AD is to remove all 

DUs with an unsafe condition from all 

Model 737NG and Model 777 series 

airplanes, regardless of whether or not 

the airplanes are listed in the effectivity 

of Boeing Special Attention Service 

Bulletin 737–31–1471, dated November 

29, 2012; and Boeing Special Attention 

Service Bulletin 777–31–0187, dated 

November 29, 2012. 

DUs can be rotated among other 

airplanes. As noted by Boeing, the phase 

3 DU’s are interchangeable and 

intermixable with earlier versions of 

DU’s on 737NG and 777 airplanes, and 

may have been installed on any 737NG 

or 777 airplanes, and may be in operator 

spares inventory. 

In regards to A4A’s comment that 

phase 3 DUs have proven to be reliable 

under normal operating conditions, the 

testing that revealed the DU 

susceptibility was verified by inspection 

of the phase 3 DU qualification test 

reports provided by the DU 

manufacturer. The intent of this AD is 

to eliminate this known susceptibility of 

the phase 3 DUs to RF transmissions, 

including those from sources outside 

the airplane. This susceptibility is not 

limited to WiFi transmissions, but has 

been verified to exist in a range of the 

RF spectrum used by mobile satellite 

communications, cell phones, air 

surveillance and weather radar, and 

other systems. The phase 3 displays that 

failed the test did so substantially below 

the RF immunity levels set forth in 

paragraph 1 of the ‘‘High Intensity 

Radiated Fields (HIRF)’’ section of the 

preamble to 737 Special Condition 25– 

ANM–132, dated September 26, 1997; 

and paragraph 1 of the HIRF discussion 

in the preamble to 777 Special 

Condition 25–ANM–78, dated 

November 10, 1993. Under the 

provisions of paragraph (h) of this AD, 

we will consider requests for approval 

of an AMOC if sufficient data are 

submitted to substantiate that the DU 

change is not necessary. We have not 

changed this AD in this regard. 

Request To Withdraw the NPRM (78 FR 

58487, September 24, 2013) 

Virgin Australia (VOZ), Air France 

(AFA), Ryanair, Airlines for America 

(A4A), and Honeywell requested that 

we withdraw or review the need for the 

NPRM (78 FR 58487, September 24, 

2013). 

VOZ stated that during testing of the 

WiFi inflight entertainment system on 

the VOZ Model 737NG fleet, it noted 

that the DU blanking occurred only 

when the WiFi radiated power source 

(set-up in the flight deck) was increased 

to a high level. VOZ also stated that 

under normal operating conditions of 

the WiFi radiated power, there was no 

blanking of the DU, but interference was 

present only at a certain frequency. VOZ 

commented that as part of the WiFi 

supplemental type certificate (STC), a 

decal is installed in the flight deck that 

states that WiFi is not to be used when 

airplane engines are running for the 

purpose of flight, and flight operation 

procedures also restrict transmitting 

devices in the flight deck. We infer that 

VOZ requested that we withdraw the 

NPRM (78 FR 58487, September 24, 

2013). 

AFA stated that since April 2013, 

AFA and Koninklijke Luchtvaart 

Maatschappij N.V.(KLM) have operated 

two Model 777 airplanes equipped with 

WiFi that have had no DU problems. 

AFA commented that the WiFi signal is 

available on the flight deck, but its use 

is prohibited. AFA suggested that it is 

likely that the WiFi signal level is too 

low to cause the DU blanking problems 

that led to the NPRM (78 FR 58487, 

September 24, 2013). AFA also stated 

that on its other Model 777 airplanes (85 

airplanes equipped with phase 2 or 3 

DUs with no WiFi), neither AFA nor 

KLM, have experienced DU problems. 

AFA stated that the DU discrepancies 

are caused by WiFi interference directly 

associated with design defects of the 

phase 3 DU, and since replacement cost 

is at customer expense, estimated more 

than $2,000 per DU, the cost to comply 

with the NPRM for the quantity of phase 

3 DUs in service in both fleets is not 

reasonable or justified. 

Ryanair and Honeywell commented 

that testing performed on the phase 3 

DUs concluded that a Federal 

Communications Commission (FCC) 

compliant WiFi radiating device does 

not result in interference on the phase 

3 DU unless the transmitting device is 

within 1 meter of the DU. Ryanair and 

Honeywell stated that is not possible for 

FCC compliant WiFi devices to cause 

interference to the DUs from outside the 

airplane during flight and that 

intentional emitting devices by 

passengers are prohibited from use on 

an airplane, and in any case will always 

be more than the required 1 meter 

distance from the DU, and consequently 

cannot cause interference to the DUs. 

Ryanair and Honeywell also stated that 

the installation and operation of any 

intentional emitting devices in the 

cockpit during flight is subject to 

regulatory approval and such regulatory 

approval process includes 

electromagnetic interference testing at 

WiFi frequencies. Ryanair asserted that 

requiring the NPRM (78 FR 58487, 

September 24, 2013) actions on all 

airplanes, irrespective of the installation 

or operation of WiFi systems in the 

cockpit, is imposing a high, and 

unnecessary, financial burden on 

operators. 

Honeywell stated that instead of 

requiring all phase 3 DUs to be replaced 

or modified, as proposed by the NPRM 

(78 FR 58487, September 24, 2013), the 

need for modifying the DUs should only 

be considered in the process for 

authorizing the use of WiFi devices in 

the cockpit. Honeywell explained that 

since the cockpit is a controlled 

environment, the airline has the 

opportunity to select acceptable devices 

and establish procedures for their use 

and storage that can mitigate any 

interference risk. Honeywell stated that 

Delta Airlines has been safely operating 

WiFi-enabled Apple iPads in its flight 

decks, including those with phase 3 

DUs, based on a waiver granted by the 

FAA. 

Honeywell also stated that they have 

performed an assessment of continued 

operational safety (COS) risk to an 

external high intensity radiated field 

(HIRF) condition using the methods 

defined in the Transport Airplane Risk 

Assessment Methodology (TARAM) 

Handbook published by the FAA, 

Transport Airplane Directorate, and that 

its TARAM analysis concluded that the 

COS risk from external HIRF condition 

falls well within the FAA’s acceptable 

risk zone. 

A4A requested that we withdraw the 

NPRM (78 FR 58487, September 24, 

2013) because it believes that the risk is 

not adequately substantiated, and that 


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conflicting data exists questioning the 

susceptibility of the DUs to WiFi 

interference. A4A also commented that 

the economic impact of the NPRM 

actions is far greater than the cost 

estimate stated in the NPRM and should 

be acknowledged and weighed against 

what it characterized as questionable 

risk. 

We do not agree with the commenters’ 

request to withdraw the NPRM (78 FR 

58487, September 24, 2013). The testing 

that revealed the DU susceptibility to 

WiFi interference was verified by 

inspection of the phase 3 DU 

qualification test reports provided by 

the DU manufacturer. The intent of this 

final rule is to eliminate this known 

susceptibility of the phase 3 DUs to 

radio frequency (RF) transmissions, 

including those from sources outside 

the airplane. The phase 3 displays that 

failed testing did so substantially below 

the RF immunity levels set forth in 

paragraph 1 of the HIRF section of the 

preamble to 737 Special Condition 25– 

ANM–132, dated September 26, 1997 

(http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR2009-09-03/pdf/E9-21299.pdf); and 

paragraph 1. of the HIRF discussion in 

the preamble to 777 Special Condition 

25–ANM–78, dated November 10, 1993 

(http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR2004-11-08/pdf/04-24847.pdf). 

As part of our assessment of the safety 

issue in accordance with our established 

safety process, the FAA also performed 

a TARAM analysis of the issue with the 

assistance of the airplane manufacturer. 

This analysis did not agree with 

Honeywell’s assessment. The FAA 

issued an operating rule exemption to 

Delta Airlines for use of iPads on the 

flight deck because it was in the public 

interest to do so in order to enable 

testing and evaluation of other aviation 

safety-enhancing technology the FAA 

was researching. The FAA’s exemption 

was granted to Delta based on extensive 

testing and supporting data, use of 

specially trained flight crews, and 

establishment of appropriate operating 

procedures to ensure safe flight 

operations during the time period of the 

exemption. The NPRM (78 FR 58487, 

September 24, 2013) will not be 

withdrawn because it meets the intent 

of correcting the unsafe condition listed 

in the SUMMARY section. Under the 

provisions of paragraph (h) of this AD, 

we will consider requests for approval 

of an alternative method of compliance 

(AMOC) if sufficient data are submitted 

to substantiate that the DU change is not 

necessary. We have not changed this AD 

in this regard. 

Request To Disclose Underlying Data in 

Support of the NPRM (78 FR 58487, 

September 24, 2013) 

A4A requested that we fully present 

our underlying data in support of the 

NPRM (78 FR 58487, September 24, 

2013) risk allegation. Mr. Philipp 

Schmid stated that WiFi operational 

limitations should be considered in the 

risk assessment and that to his 

knowledge, WiFi systems must be 

disabled during the critical phases of 

flight such as an approach or take-off. 

A4A stated that the FAA does not 

disclose in the NPRM (78 FR 58487, 

September 24, 2013), the nature of DU 

testing conducted nor its source, and 

that a rulemaking of this magnitude 

must be supported in incontrovertible 

data from appropriate and reliable 

sources. 

A4A submitted information from 

Southwest Airlines (SWA) that stated 

that SWA collected data from both 

certified lab and engineering designed 

airplane ground tests indicating that the 

Honeywell phase 3 DUs are not 

susceptible at or below the energy levels 

required for certification. SWA also 

stated that it has performed extensive 

testing with respect to susceptibility of 

the Honeywell phase 3 DUs in the WiFi 

bands outlined in the NPRM (78 FR 

58487, September 24, 2013) and that 

this testing indicated that significant 

safety margins are available; and that 

there are no threat susceptibilities 

recorded at or below the WiFi 

certification levels. SWA also 

commented that it has flown 2,375,481 

hours with 435 airplanes since WiFi 

system installation with no unattributable DU blanking or blinking 

defects that would be a consideration 

under the NPRM. SWA concluded that 

‘‘this experience indicates a negligible 

level of risk.’’ 

A4A submitted information from 

United Airlines (UAL). UAL explained 

that an alternate means of assuring an 

equivalent level of safety while a 

replacement program is undertaken has 

been accepted by FAA at UAL. UAL 

stated that it has been granted 

certification limitations which allow 

operation of the WiFi system provided 

that the flight deck is placarded to 

disallow use of transmitting portable 

electronic devices (TPED) when engines 

are operating for purposes of flight. UAL 

stated it believes such limitations are 

the appropriate means to address the 

unsafe condition because they apply 

directly to the certification of airplane 

with an operator-installed WiFi system. 

A4A stated that it agrees with UAL that 

such a restriction provides an 

equivalent level of safety, for if it did 

not, it would not have been approved by 

the FAA. 

We do not agree with the commenters’ 

requests. We do not agree to share the 

underlying data in the AD. An AD is not 

an appropriate vehicle for sharing 

proprietary data. 

The susceptibility of phase 3 DUs to 

RF transmissions was initially identified 

during a WiFi STC installation by an 

operator and a WiFi vendor and 

reported to the FAA. As a result of this 

discovery, we performed a risk 

assessment for in-service airplanes 

equipped with phase 3 DUs using our 

established COS process, which 

determined that an AD action was 

warranted for this issue. In addition, 

Boeing did an independent safety 

review and also determined that the DU 

blanking was a safety issue using its 

own risk assessment process. 

Although various entities (operators, 

vendors, etc.) may have done testing 

which may seem to contradict our 

findings, the WiFi tests conducted 

during the above referenced STC project 

failed to meet RF immunity level 

requirements. The testing that revealed 

the DU susceptibility was further 

verified by inspection of the phase 3 DU 

qualification test reports provided to the 

FAA by the DU manufacturer. 

The intent of this AD is to eliminate 

this known susceptibility of the phase 3 

DUs to RF transmissions, including 

those from sources outside the airplane. 

The phase 3 displays that failed testing 

did so substantially below the RF 

immunity levels set forth in paragraph 

l of the ‘‘High Intensity Radiated Fields 

(HIRF)’’ section of the preamble to 737 

Special Condition 25–ANM–132, dated 

September 26, 1997; and paragraph l. of 

the HIRF discussion in the preamble to 

777 Special Condition 25–ANM–78, 

dated November 10, 1993. 

We do not agree that no problems 

have occurred on in-service airplanes, 

since the WiFi STC testing that 

disclosed this susceptibility was 

conducted on an in-service airplane 

equipped with phase 3 DUs. With 

respect to operational limitations 

providing an acceptable level of safety, 

we approved certain STCs with such 

limitations as a means of compliance 

until a permanent solution was 

available. However, we intended those 

limitations as interim action until 

permanent corrective actions for the 

unsafe condition became available for 

the baseline airplanes. We do not 

consider it adequate to leave those 

operating limitations in place 

permanently as the sole corrective 

action for the unsafe condition. 

Under the provisions of paragraph (h) 

of this AD, we will consider requests for 


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approval of an AMOC if sufficient data 

are submitted to substantiate that the 

DU change is not necessary. We have 

not changed this final rule in this 

regard. 

Request To Change Compliance Time 

A4A requested that we revise the 

compliance time in the proposed AD (78 

FR 58487, September 24, 2013) from 60 

months to 72 months, and that we 

recognize system redundancy when 

considering its compliance time request. 

A4A stated that multiple 

redundancies associated with the 

display system are designed to assure 

the flight crew always has access to 

critical information, and even in the 

event three DUs become inoperative, all 

normal primary flight display, 

navigation display, terrain guidance, 

and engine instrument information will 

still be displayed to the pilot. A4A also 

stated that there are vastly more affected 

units than were identified by the 

proposed AD (78 FR 58487, September 

24, 2013). A4A stated that two of its 

largest operators alone account for over 

one thousand affected DUs. A4A 

contends that a 72-month compliance 

time is a reasonable time to comply with 

the NPRM and is an appropriate time 

given the risk. 

We partially agree with the 

commenter. We agree with the 

commenter’s statement that there are 

more units and airplanes affected than 

those listed in the proposed AD (78 FR 

58487, September 24, 2013) because this 

has now been verified with the 

manufacturer’s service information and 

comments to the NPRM. We disagree 

with extending the compliance time 

beyond 60 months. Our risk assessment 

considered system redundancy. 

However, along with DU susceptibility 

to RF transmissions, we have also 

considered other risk factors such as 

human factors, pilot workload, and 

phase of flight, etc. It is possible for all 

primary flight display units to fail at 

once during a critical phase of flight 

such as a takeoff or approach and 

landing. This could lead to loss of 

control of the airplane at an altitude 

insufficient for recovery, or controlled 

flight into terrain or obstacles, the 

availability of standby instruments in 

such a situation notwithstanding. 

Our compliance time is based on a 

detailed and in-depth risk assessment 

by the FAA and Boeing that has 

determined that the requirements of this 

AD must be accomplished within 60 

months to mitigate the unsafe condition 

in the interest of the safety of the flying 

public. We recognize that in some cases, 

it may be necessary to accomplish the 

AD requirements outside normal 

scheduled maintenance cycles, and that 

some level of additional cost and/or lost 

revenue may result in such cases. 

However, the risk assessment indicates 

60 months is an appropriate compliance 

time that will ensure an acceptable level 

of continued operational safety for the 

Model 737NG and Model 777 series 

airplane fleets. However, according to 

the provisions of paragraph (h) of this 

AD, we may consider requests to adjust 

the compliance time if the request 

includes data that prove that the new 

compliance time would provide an 

acceptable level of safety. We have not 

changed this AD in this regard. 

Request To Change Compliance Method 

Boeing requested that we remove 

Boeing Special Attention Service 

Bulletin 737–31–1471, dated November 

29, 2012; and Boeing Special Attention 

Service Bulletin 777–31–0187, dated 

November 29, 2012; from the 

terminating action, since terminating 

action should include alternate part 

number DUs. Or, alternatively, Boeing 

recommended that operators be allowed 

to replace at a minimum, the phase 3 

DUs and corresponding database 

software with earlier or newer certified 

units installed in the left outboard, right 

outboard and upper center DU 

positions. Boeing stated that earlier 

versions of intermixable/

interchangeable DUs also do not exhibit 

HIRF susceptibility, so the terminating 

action could include replacement of 

phase 3 DU’s with earlier certified units. 

Boeing also requested that we revise 

the language in the NPRM (78 FR 58487, 

September 24, 2013) to specify that 

terminating action is to remove phase 3 

DUs from Model 737NG and Model 777 

series airplanes, with replacement of 

any other DU certified for the Model 

737NG and Model 777 series airplanes. 

Boeing stated that the NPRM should not 

require the installation of the phase 3A 

DUs, but instead only require that the 

phase 3 DUs be replaced or not installed 

on any airplane. 

We partially agree with the 

commenter’s requests. We agree that 

terminating action is to replace all phase 

3 DUs with certain other DUs certified 

for the Model 737NG and Model 777 

series airplanes. We have revised this 

final rule so that it does not require the 

installation of phase 3A DUs, but 

instead only requires that the phase 3 

DUs be replaced with the following 

approved DU part numbers that do not 

have the unsafe condition: Phase 1, 

phase 2, and phase 3A DUs. Phase 1 and 

phase 2 DUs do not have the RF 

susceptibility that has been identified in 

the phase 3 DUs, are intermixable and 

interchangeable with the phase 3 DUs, 

and therefore, are an acceptable option 

for replacement of the phase 3 DUs to 

correct the unsafe condition. The intent 

of this AD is to remove all DUs with an 

unsafe condition and replace them with 

an acceptable alternative. 

We disagree with the request to 

remove the references to Boeing Special 

Attention Service Bulletin 737–31– 

1471, dated November 29, 2012; and 

Boeing Special Attention Service 

Bulletin 777–31–0187, dated November 

29, 2012; from the terminating action. 

Installing phase 3A DUs as specified in 

these service bulletins is an acceptable 

option for correcting the identified 

unsafe condition. 

We have revised paragraph (g) of this 

AD to require replacing phase 3 DUs 

with phase 1, phase 2, or phase 3A DUs. 

Request To Allow DU Upgrade 

Honeywell requested that we allow 

for phase 3 DUs to be upgraded to phase 

3A DUs, rather than replacing with new 

phase 3A DUs. Honeywell stated that 

phase 3 DUs can be upgraded to phase 

3A DUs via a modification kit and 

rework process defined in service 

information that has previously been 

provided to operators. 

We agree with the commenter’s 

request to allow for phase 3 DUs to be 

upgraded to phase 3A DUs. We have 

removed the requirement in paragraph 

(g) of this AD to replace phase 3 DUs 

with ‘‘new’’ phase 3A DUs. Either new 

or modified phase 3A DUs may be 

installed. 

Request To Revise Cost Estimate 

Several commenters requested that we 

revise the cost estimate in the NPRM (78 

FR 58487, September 24, 2013). A4A 

requested that we revise the cost 

analysis to include all affected airplanes 

and DUs in the U.S. registry, and 

increase the per-airplane replacement 

time to three hours. A4A stated that the 

FAA states that the NPRM affects 157 

airplanes of U.S. registry, encompassing 

942 DUs. A4A commented that UAL 

alone operates 150 such airplanes, 

exposing a significant error in 

estimation. A4A also stated that 

Honeywell indicates there are 10,100 inservice phase 3 DUs affected; and that 

using the NPRM figure of $1,700 parts 

cost per DU ($10,200/six units per 

airplane), the parts cost alone rises to 

$17,170,000, or more than ten times the 

stated total cost of compliance. A4A 

also commented that while the NPRM 

estimates two hours per airplane for DU 

replacement, one carrier estimates three 

hours, a 50 percent increase in labor 

hours. 

Ryanair requested that we review the 

cost of compliance. Ryanair stated that 


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the estimated cost of compliance for the 

U.S. carriers seems to be a gross 

underestimate of the actual figure. 

Ryanair explained that it has 707 phase 

3 DUs in its fleet of 737–800s. This is 

approximately the same number the 

FAA is assuming for the entire US fleet 

of Model 737NG series airplanes. 

Boeing requested that we review the 

estimated costs table for the number of 

affected airplanes for both Model 737 

and Model 777 series airplanes; and that 

we include the cost of updating phase 

3 DUs which may have been installed 

on airplanes not delivered with phase 3 

DUs as replacement units for failed DUs, 

and spare phase 3 DUs provided to 

airlines. Boeing explained that phase 3 

DUs are interchangeable and 

intermixable with earlier versions of 

DUs on Model 737NG and Model 777 

series airplanes, and may have been 

installed on any Model 737NG and 

Model 777 series airplane, and may be 

in operator spares inventory. Boeing 

also stated that a review of Boeing 

Special Attention Service Bulletin 737– 

31–1471, dated November 29, 2012; and 

Boeing Special Attention Service 

Bulletin 777–31–0187, dated November 

29, 2012; shows an effectivity of 1,326 

U.S. registered airplanes. 

We partially agree with the 

commenters’ requests. We agree with 

revising the estimated U.S. fleet size in 

the Cost of Compliance section in this 

final rule. Boeing has indicated in its 

comments that the number of affected 

U.S. airplanes is greater than the 

number of airplanes estimated in the 

NPRM (78 FR 58487, September 24, 

2013). We disagree with revising the 

estimated labor hours. The labor hour 

estimate has been provided by the 

manufacturer. A4A’s comment indicates 

that only one operator estimates that the 

labor hour estimate should be increased. 

We do not account for individual 

operator differences in the calculation of 

total labor hour estimates. We also 

disagree with considering airplanes that 

may have had phase 3 DUs installed 

after production as we have no way of 

estimating how many airplanes may 

have had this modification. We have 

changed the cost estimate in this final 

rule to reflect 1,149 Model 737 airplanes 

and 177 Model 777 airplanes. 

Comment Regarding Certification 

Process 

Mr. Philipp Schmid commented that 

in today’s world with more and more 

transmitters in the cabin and on the 

ground, the FAA should have more 

carefully taken into account the design 

and system integrations of line 

replaceable units for immunity to EMI. 

We acknowledge the commenter’s 

concern. We make efforts to ensure that 

systems and equipment are immune to 

EMI effects during certification. We 

recently published rules with 

compliance requirements for HIRF 

immunity (e.g. section 25.1317 of Title 

14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR 

25.1317)) (http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

pkg/CFR-2011-title14-vol1/pdf/CFR2011-title14-vol1-sec25-1317.pdf). 

However, we continue to conduct 

monitoring and surveillance of 

approved designs in service and require 

accomplishment of corrective actions 

for unsafe conditions when needed to 

ensure continued operational safety. 

This AD accomplishes continued 

operational safety by addressing an 

identified unsafe condition. The 

commenter did not request any changes 

to the NPRM (78 FR 58487, September 

24, 2013). We have not changed this AD 

in this regard. 

Clarification Regarding the Installation 

of Winglets 

Aviation Partners Boeing (APB) stated 

that the installation of winglets per 

Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) 

ST00830SE (http://rgl.faa.gov/

Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/

rgstc.nsf/0/E3615811C4A7D87B8

6257C1C00720D67?OpenDocument&

Highlight=st00830se) does not affect the 

accomplishment of the manufacturer’s 

service instructions. 

We agree with APB’s statement that 

the installation of winglets as specified 

in STC ST00830SE (http://rgl.faa.gov/

Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/

rgstc.nsf/0/E3615811C4A7D87B

86257C1C00720D67?OpenDocument&

Highlight=st00830se) does not affect 

accomplishment of the requirements of 

this AD, and for airplanes on which STC 

ST00830SE is installed, an alternative 

method of compliance (AMOC) 

approval request to account for the 

installation of that STC is not necessary 

to comply with the requirements of 

section 39.17 of the Federal Aviation 

Regulations (14 CFR 39.17). 

Conclusion 

We reviewed the relevant data, 

considered the comments received, and 

determined that air safety and the 

public interest require adopting this AD 

with the changes described previously 

and minor editorial changes. We have 

determined that these minor changes: 

• Are consistent with the intent that 

was proposed in the NPRM (78 FR 

58487, September 24, 2013) for 

correcting the unsafe condition; and 

• Do not add any additional burden 

upon the public than was already 

proposed in the the NPRM (78 FR 

58487, September 24, 2013). 

We also determined that these 

changes will not increase the economic 

burden on any operator or increase the 

scope of this AD. 

Costs of Compliance 

We estimate that this AD affects 1,326 

airplanes of U.S. registry. 

We estimate the following costs to 

comply with this AD: 

ESTIMATED COSTS

Action Labor cost Parts cost Cost per 

product 

Cost on U.S. 

operators 

Replacement (1,149 Model 737 airplanes) .... 2 work-hours × $85 per hour = $170 ............. $10,200 $10,370 $11,915,130 

Replacement (177 Model 777 airplanes) ....... 3 work-hours × $85 per hour = $255 ............. 10,200 10,455 1,850,535 

Authority for This Rulemaking 

Title 49 of the United States Code 

specifies the FAA’s authority to issue 

rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, 

section 106, describes the authority of 

the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: 

Aviation Programs, describes in more 

detail the scope of the Agency’s 

authority. 

We are issuing this rulemaking under 

the authority described in Subtitle VII, 

Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: 

‘‘General requirements.’’ Under that 

section, Congress charges the FAA with 

promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in 

air commerce by prescribing regulations 

for practices, methods, and procedures 

the Administrator finds necessary for 

safety in air commerce. This regulation 

is within the scope of that authority 

because it addresses an unsafe condition 

that is likely to exist or develop on 

products identified in this rulemaking 

action. 


wreier-aviles on DSK5TPTVN1PROD with RULES
Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 190 / Wednesday, October 1, 2014 / Rules and Regulations 59101 

Regulatory Findings 

This AD will not have federalism 

implications under Executive Order 

13132. This AD will not have a 

substantial direct effect on the States, on 

the relationship between the national 

government and the States, or on the 

distribution of power and 

responsibilities among the various 

levels of government. 

For the reasons discussed above, I 

certify that this AD: 

(1) Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory 

action’’ under Executive Order 12866, 

(2) Is not a ‘‘significant rule’’ under 

DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures 

(44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979), 

(3) Will not affect intrastate aviation 

in Alaska, and 

(4) Will not have a significant 

economic impact, positive or negative, 

on a substantial number of small entities 

under the criteria of the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation 

safety, Incorporation by reference, 

Safety. 

Adoption of the Amendment 

Accordingly, under the authority 

delegated to me by the Administrator, 

the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as 

follows: 

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS 

DIRECTIVES 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 39 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. 

§ 39.13 [Amended] 

■ 2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding 

the following new airworthiness 

directive (AD): 

2014–20–06 The Boeing Company: 

Amendment 39–17979; Docket No. 

FAA–2013–0792; Directorate Identifier 

2013–NM–118–AD. 

(a) Effective Date 

This AD is effective November 5, 2014. 

(b) Affected ADs 

None. 

(c) Applicability 

This AD applies to The Boeing Company 

airplanes, certificated in any category, as 

identified in paragraphs (c)(1) and (c)(2) of 

this AD. 

(1) Model 737–600, –700, –700C, –800, 

–900, and –900ER series airplanes. 

(2) Model 777–200, 777–200LR, 777–300, 

777–300ER, and 777F series airplanes. 

(d) Subject 

Air Transport Association (ATA) of 

America Code 31, Instruments. 

(e) Unsafe Condition 

This AD was prompted by testing reports 

on certain Honeywell phase 3 display units 

(DUs). These DUs exhibited susceptibility to 

radio frequency emissions in WiFi frequency 

bands at radiated power levels below the 

levels that the displays are required to 

tolerate for certification of WiFi system 

installations. The phase 3 DUs provide 

primary flight information, including 

airspeed, altitude, pitch and roll attitude, 

heading, and navigation information, to the 

flightcrew. We are issuing this AD to prevent 

loss of flight-critical information displayed to 

the flightcrew during a critical phase of 

flight, such as an approach or takeoff, which 

could result in loss of airplane control at an 

altitude insufficient for recovery, or 

controlled flight into terrain. 

(f) Compliance 

Comply with this AD within the 

compliance times specified, unless already 

done. 

(g) Inspection, Software Installation, and DU 

Installation 

Within 60 months after the effective date 

of this AD: Inspect to determine if any phase 

3 DUs are installed. If any phase 3 DUs are 

installed, within 60 months after the effective 

date of this AD, do the applicable actions 

required by paragraph (g)(1) or (g)(2) of this 

AD. A review of airplane maintenance 

records is acceptable in lieu of this 

inspection if the phase number of the DUs 

can be conclusively determined from that 

review. 

(1) For Model 737 airplanes: Remove all 

phase 3 common display system (CDS) DUs 

and replace with phase 1, phase 2, or phase 

3A CDS DUs. If any phase 3 CDS DUs are 

replaced with phase 3A CDS DUs, replace the 

phase 3 CDS DUs and install new database 

software into the display electronics units, in 

accordance with the Accomplishment 

Instructions of Boeing Special Attention 

Service Bulletin 737–31–1471, dated 

November 29, 2012. 

(2) For Model 777 airplanes: Remove all 

phase 3 DUs and replace with phase 1, phase 

2, or phase 3A DUs. If any phase 3 DUs are 

replaced with phase 3A DUs, replace the 

phase 3 DUs and install the DU database 

software into the left and right airplane 

information management system core 

processor module/graphics generator, in 

accordance with the Accomplishment 

Instructions of Boeing Special Attention 

Service Bulletin 777–31–0187, dated 

November 29, 2012. 

(h) Alternative Methods of Compliance 

(AMOCs) 

(1) The Manager, Seattle Aircraft 

Certification Office (ACO), FAA, has the 

authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if 

requested using the procedures found in 14 

CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19, 

send your request to your principal inspector 

or local Flight Standards District Office, as 

appropriate. If sending information directly 

to the manager of the ACO, send it to the 

attention of the person identified in the 

Related Information section of this AD. 

Information may be emailed to: 9-ANMSeattle-ACO-AMOC-Requests@faa.gov. 

(2) Before using any approved AMOC, 

notify your appropriate principal inspector, 

or lacking a principal inspector, the manager 

of the local flight standards district office/

certificate holding district office. 

(3) An AMOC that provides an acceptable 

level of safety may be used for any repair 

required by this AD if it is approved by the 

Boeing Commercial Airplanes ODA that has 

been authorized by the Manager, Seattle 

ACO, to make those findings. For a repair 

method to be approved, the repair must meet 

the certification basis of the airplane, and the 

approval must specifically refer to this AD. 

(i) Related Information 

For more information about this AD, 

contact Jeffrey W. Palmer, Aerospace 

Engineer, Systems and Equipment Branch, 

ANM–130S, Seattle Aircraft Certification 

Office, FAA, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, 

WA 98057–3356; phone: 425–917–6472; fax: 

425–917–6590; email: jeffrey.w.palmer@

faa.gov. 

(j) Material Incorporated by Reference 

(1) The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference 

(IBR) of the service information listed in this 

paragraph under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR 

part 51. 

(2) You must use this service information 

as applicable to do the actions required by 

this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise. 

(i) Boeing Special Attention Service 

Bulletin 737–31–1471, dated November 29, 

2012. 

(ii) Boeing Special Attention Service 

Bulletin 777–31–0187, dated November 29, 

2012. 

(3) For Boeing service information 

identified in this AD, contact Boeing 

Commercial Airplanes, Attention: Data & 

Services Management, P.O. Box 3707, MC 

2H–65, Seattle, WA 98124–2207; telephone 

206–544–5000, extension 1; fax 206–766– 

5680; Internet https://

www.myboeingfleet.com. 

(4) You may view this service information 

at FAA Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 

Lind Avenue SW., Renton, Washington. For 

information on the availability of this 

material at the FAA, call 425–227–1221. 

(5) You may view this service information 

that is incorporated by reference at the 

National Archives and Records 

Administration (NARA). For information on 

the availability of this material at NARA, call 

202–741–6030, or go to: http://

www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibrlocations.html. 

Issued in Renton, Washington, on 

September 19, 2014. 

Jeffrey E. Duven, 

Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, 

Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2014–23231 Filed 9–30–14; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 


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