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H-312, The Capitol • 202.225.9091 • RULES.HOUSE.GOV
H-312, The Capitol • 202.225.9091 • RULES.HOUSE.GOV

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................... 1

II. OPTIONS UNDER EXISTING RULES................................................................................... 2

A. Unanimous Consent and Voice Votes ..................................................................................................2

B. Recorded Votes ....................................................................................................................................3

C. Paired Voting ........................................................................................................................................3

D. Provisional Quorum ..............................................................................................................................4

III. POTENTIAL RULE CHANGES ............................................................................................ 4

A. Enhanced Unanimous Consent ............................................................................................................5

B. Proxy Voting on the Floor .....................................................................................................................5

C. Remote Voting......................................................................................................................................6

IV. SECURITY OF REMOTE VOTING....................................................................................... 7

V. LOGISTICS SURROUNDING REMOTE VOTING................................................................. 8

VI. REMOTE VOTING AND THE HOUSE RULES ...................................................................10

VII. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF REMOTE VOTING ..................................................................11

VIII. HISTORY...........................................................................................................................11

A. Rules Committee Action .....................................................................................................................12

B. Continuity of Government Commission ..............................................................................................13

APPENDIX I: RULES IMPACTED BY POTENTIAL INCLUSION OF REMOTE VOTING ........14

APPENDIX II: SUMMARY OF POST-9/11 ACTIONS BY THE RULES COMMITTEE ON THE

CONTINUITY OF CONGRESS.................................................................................................15

APPENDIX III: SUMMARY OF THE FIRST REPORT OF THE CONTINUITY OF 

GOVERNMENT COMMISSION ................................................................................................19
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I. INTRODUCTION

This is a moment of national emergency. One that comes with a unique set of challenges. 

Americans are being asked to stay home. Americans are being asked to socially distance 

themselves from their neighbors, colleagues, friends, and even family. Yet others are 

being asked to put themselves at risk to take care of the sick, protect their communities, 

and keep the supply chains running. Likewise, Congress must be prepared to do the 

urgent work of responding to the massive challenges we face as a country. That work 

must proceed thoughtfully, while keeping public safety at the forefront and at the same 

time preserving the integrity of the institution.

Since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Rules Committee has heard from 

Members who want to come back to Washington and vote on critical legislation, and 

Members who want to implement remote voting due to concerns Congress will be unable 

to pass legislation while also protecting the health of Members, staff, and the public. While 

these concerns are completely valid, implementing remote voting would raise serious 

security, logistical, and constitutional challenges. 

Security and reliability are hallmarks of the current system and any divergence from 

current practices must retain the same level of integrity. Although off-the-shelf products 

exist to allow a Member to videoconference their vote, for example, they have not been 

tested under the sort of pressure they would face from enemy states or other bad actors

trying to force the system offline or prevent individual Members from accessing it. Such a 

system has to be extensively tested, not used for the first time on must-pass legislation.

A rule change of this magnitude would also be one of the biggest rule changes in the last 

century, in one of the most critical institutions in our country. It would require major 

changes to foundational House rules surrounding deliberation, voting, and attendance, 

which would almost certainly cause unintended consequences if not done with adequate

forethought and discussion.1 Remote voting is also a novel method of voting with no 

parliamentary history or basis. Some may argue that it runs counter to the Constitution's 

references to the House meeting to conduct business in the chamber. While arguments 

can be made in favor of its constitutionality, to avoid a court challenge, it is inadvisable to 

use unprecedented parliamentary procedures on critical legislation. 

It may be prudent to consider the feasibility of remote voting for certain emergency 

situations, but that decision should be a multi-committee effort with substantial study and 

1 For a list of House rules impacted by remote voting, please see Appendix I. In particular, rules XX (Voting 

and Quorum Calls) and XXI (Committee of the Whole) would require modification throughout.
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development. This change cannot be implemented overnight, and likely cannot be 

accomplished in time to address the current crisis. Without complete consensus, which 

we do not currently have, it would also require us to come back to Washington to vote to 

change House rules to allow for remote voting. However, there are several other routes 

the House may take in order to pass legislation addressing COVID-19.

II. OPTIONS UNDER EXISTING RULES

A. Unanimous Consent and Voice Votes

By far the best option is to use the existing House rules and current practices. During 

the 1918 Influenza Pandemic, the House did not adopt a method of remote voting – e.g. 

by telegraph or correspondence. Instead they eventually utilized a unanimous consent 

agreement to pass critical legislation despite not having a physical quorum present, 

recognizing the importance of conducting business in the chamber at a time of national 

crisis.2

Likewise, today, the House could pass legislation by unanimous consent, which does 

not require a quorum; or by a voice vote, where the House presumes a quorum is present 

unless a point of order is made. Members could submit a statement for the Congressional 

Record stating how they would have voted had there been a recorded vote. Congress 

could even vote on a symbolic resolution supporting the legislation after the crisis passes

and Members return to Washington. 

Advantages: Unanimous consent agreements and voice votes are longstanding 

practices that have stood the test of time, and successful use of them is not out of the 

realm of possibility given the fact that any critical legislation would have to have broad 

bipartisan support to reach the President’s desk and receive a signature. Their use 

would also ensure that Members do not have to travel back to Washington in order 

to vote, potentially keeping Members and staff from exposing themselves and the 

public to the virus. 

2 History, Art & Archives – U.S. House: “less than 50 Members were in attendance. But, in a remarkable 

step, those present had agreed to a ‘modus vivendi’—as Speaker Clark explained from the rostrum—to 

consider the PHS bill under a unanimous consent agreement that would only work if no one ask for a 

quorum call.” 

https://history.house.gov/Blog/2018/December/12-14-Flu/
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Disadvantages: A single Member could object to a unanimous consent agreement, 

or make a point of order that a quorum is not present and call for the yeas and nays 

after a voice vote. While this is clearly the best option before us, it may be the most 

difficult to use.

B. Recorded Votes

Should travel become necessary, the House could pass legislation by a recorded vote

but limit Member and staff exposure by holding votes open longer than normal and having 

Members vote in shifts, sanitizing voting stations between uses, and controlling how many 

people are in the chamber and their proximity to each other. 

Advantages: This would allow Members to record their votes, and unanimous support 

would not be required. 

Disadvantages: If there are large numbers of absences due to Members being under 

quarantine or unable to travel, the voting membership may not reflect the current 

majority/minority ratio. In other words, the minority party could have a majority of the 

votes, which would not reflect the outcome of the latest election. 

C. Paired Voting

The House could utilize a “paired voting” process, or another process that formalizes 

Members recording how they would have voted. House rules currently permit paired 

voting. A pair was an informal agreement between Members on opposite sides not to vote 

on a specific question or for a stipulated time during their anticipated absence from the 

House. Since the pairing Members were on opposite sides, their absences did not affect 

the result of the vote. Pairs were not counted in vote totals, but their names were recorded 

in the Congressional Record, allowing Members to indicate their position when absent. 

The rules were changed during the 106th Congress to now only allow for "live pair" voting 

where one Member votes present and the other is absent. Previous to this change the 

rules allowed for a pairing of Members who were both absent (known as a "specific pair"). 

Pairing was a common practice when travel to and from Washington, D.C. was difficult, 

and Members were absent for extended periods of time. 

Advantages: Paired voting sets up a more formal structure than simply telling 

Members to insert how they would have voted in the Congressional Record, even 

though it is in essence the same outcome. It could give Members in “pairs” peace of 

mind that their absence will not change the outcome of the vote. It would not require 

a change to House rules, only a change to current practice. 

Disadvantages: It is complicated to explain and requires coordination by the 

cloakrooms in order to pair Members. It also does not solve the quorum problem, so 
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it would need to be combined with utilizing the provisional quorum process (below) if 

over half the body is absent.

D. Provisional Quorum

If over 215 Members are quarantined or otherwise unable to travel to Washington, the 

House could reset the necessary quorum to a provisional amount. A House rule3

adopted three years after the attacks of September 11th, 2001, allows the House to use 

a provisional quorum based on the number of Members able to return to the Capitol if, 

post-catastrophe, a traditional quorum cannot be achieved after 96 hours of attempts due 

to a “natural disaster, attack, contagion, or a similar calamity rendering Representatives 

incapable of attending the proceedings of the House.” This rule was put in place after 

years of study by the Rules Committee and outside experts. 

Advantages: It would provide a backstop for the quorum problem, ensuring that 

Congress is able to act on critical legislation in the face of mass vacancies even if the 

majority of Members are unable to attend a session. 

Disadvantages: Several Democrats questioned the constitutionality of this provision 

when it was adopted in 2005. While there are strong arguments in favor of its 

constitutionality, this process has never been used. As is the case with any recorded 

vote with mass vacancies, the voting provisional membership may not reflect the 

current majority/minority ratio.

III. POTENTIAL RULE CHANGES

While passing legislation without a recorded vote is the easiest path procedurally and the 

best option for Member and public safety, it may not be possible since any single Member 

can prevent it. If universal agreement is not reached, a time-limited change like enhanced 

unanimous consent or proxy voting could be adopted to help the House function. 

Remote voting – in addition to facing logistical and security challenges – is untested 

constitutionally and there is no precedent for its use in Congress. Using this process to 

pass legislation could run the risk of legislation being challenged in court, for example by 

an outside group opposing the legislation. Although there are potentially winning 

arguments to be made regarding constitutionality, any challenge could delay 

implementation of critical legislation. Remote voting would almost certainly require 

3 Clause 5(c) of rule XX
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hundreds of Members to return to Washington to vote on the rule change. The same could 

be the case for proxy voting, however, proxy voting has precedent in the House and 

Senate, and would not face many of the technology and security problems faced by 

remote voting.

A. Enhanced Unanimous Consent

The House could adopt a resolution stating that, for a prescribed period of time, the 

number of Members required to object to a unanimous consent request is 

increased to a specific number. 

Advantages: This would prevent a single Member or small cohort of Members from 

derailing critical legislation that is broadly supported by Members of the House. The 

House’s current guidelines requiring clearance by both leaderships would likely need 

to remain in place. 

Disadvantages: Members who frequently disagree with the majority of the House 

might object to this change; therefore, it could require a recorded vote to adopt it.

B. Proxy Voting on the Floor

There is currently no perfect solution to allow absent Members to vote on the floor. 

However, proxy voting is likely the best of the options available under the circumstances. 

The House could implement proxy voting, in which an absent Member gives a present 

Member their proxy to cast an actual vote for them, for a prescribed period of time. 

Legislatures in Oklahoma and Pennsylvania are implementing proxy voting for the 

duration of the COVID-19 pandemic, but in the House it could raise some of the same 

constitutional questions as remote voting – namely, whether a Member must be physically 

present in the chamber to vote. However, many scholars argue that the House has the 

right to determine its own rules, and that the courts would be unlikely to question the 

process the House used to pass a bill, if the House determined that it was within the 

bounds of the House rules. And unlike remote voting, proxy voting has a basis in 

parliamentary tradition4 and is not accompanied by the same security and technology 

concerns. 

If the House adopts a novel voting practice such as proxy voting, a process should be put 

in place by which the Sergeant at Arms certifies that an emergency situation exists before 

4 While proxy voting on the Floor would be unprecedented, there is precedent for it in House committees 

where the practice was in place until the 104th Congress when it was disallowed as part of then-Speaker 

Newt Gingrich’s slate of changes to the House rules. Proxy voting also has precedent in the Senate where 

it is still used in committee.
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proxy voting could be used. Various decisions would have to be made on how proxy 

voting would function procedurally. In practice, absent Members could potentially 

communicate their vote to their Regional Whips or to a Member of Leadership, and could 

certify with the Clerk which Member is serving as their proxy. For extra transparency, the 

Clerk could call the roll, with the Member serving as proxy announcing that they are a 

proxy and verbally casting a vote for the absent Member. 

Advantages: Proxy voting would give Members the option of casting their votes on 

legislation without traveling to Washington, which could help limit the spread of 

COVID-19. These votes would count toward the vote total. Of course, Members who 

can reach the Capitol and wish to vote in person on the floor would still be able to. 

Disadvantages: Proxy voting would require a change to House rules, which would 

have to be adopted on a record vote if universal agreement could not be reached to 

utilize unanimous consent or a voice vote.

C. Remote Voting

The House could implement a system by which Members could cast their votes 

remotely for a prescribed period of time. 

Advantages: Members who are unable to travel to Washington due to the COVID19 pandemic would be able to cast votes on legislation from their home or district 

office. 

Disadvantages: Significant security and logistical concerns surround remote 

voting, and opponents of the legislation could raise constitutional questions 

surrounding the process. Allowing remote voting would require major changes to 

the House rules for this purpose – and much smaller changes have taken years of 

study and consideration to implement. The House and outside experts studied the 

continuity of Congress following the attacks of September 11th, 2001, and it took 

years of careful deliberation to agree to change the quorum rule for catastrophic 

circumstances. While remote voting deserves similarly thoughtful study, to create 

a secure, reliable, and user-friendly system while in the midst of a crisis is not 

realistic. 

For a more in-depth examination of the challenges surrounding implementation of remote 

voting, please see the following sections. 
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IV. SECURITY OF REMOTE VOTING

The electronic voting system on the House floor is a closed system with no access to the 

internet, and it took almost 100 years and over 50 bills and resolutions to finally put it in 

place in 1970.5 The House regularly tests and reviews this system to ensure the security 

and integrity of votes. In order to allow Members to vote remotely from all over the country, 

a new electronic system would have to be put in place, raising several security concerns: 

foreign and domestic cyber-attacks, interference by third parties, and challenges 

authenticating Members’ identities as they cast votes remotely. 

In the age of the internet, foreign and domestic cyber threats are a near certainty for any 

system Congress would implement to allow remote voting or participation. The Pentagon 

has already reported that cyber-attacks on the Department of Defense’s networks have 

increased as more employees telework and take precautions to slow the spread of 

COVID-19.6 The Department of Health and Human Services suffered an attack on its own 

computer systems – part of a campaign to spread disinformation to undermine the 

department’s response to the pandemic.7

In the wake of the 2016 election interference and potential 2020 election interference, 

implementing a secure method for voting would be critical and require an expert staff 

dedicated to ensuring there are no foreign or domestic attacks threatening the integrity of 

a vote by any Member, or threatening the system’s functionality as a whole. Even with 

such a staff, we may not be able to thwart a cyber-attack that could prevent Congress 

from acting or delegitimize any vote Members take. 

Cyber interference is not the only risk associated with remote voting. The House chamber 

provides Members with a central location to deliberate and vote without being subject to 

the influence or interference of third parties. If voting were decentralized away from one 

secure chamber, there would be no way to ensure Members casting votes remotely are 

doing so without undue interference by a bad actor. This would require the availability of 

secure voting locations in every state for Members to cast their votes. Such infrastructure 

5 History, Art & Archives – US House: “Between 1886 and 1970, more than 50 bills and resolutions related 

to electronic or mechanical voting were introduced in the House, but most never made it out of committee. 

Ultimately, the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 amended House rules to allow votes to be taken 

electronically and authorized funding to build an electronic voting system.” 

https://history.house.gov/Exhibitions-and-Publications/Electronic-Technology/Electronic-Voting/

6 Defense One – 3/16/2020: Attacks on DOD Networks Soar as Telework Inflicts ‘Unprecedented’ Loads 

https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2020/03/attacks-dod-networks-spike-telework-bringsunprecedented-loads/163812/

7 Bloomberg – 3/16/2020: Cyber-Attack Hits U.S. Health Agency Amid Covid-19 Outbreak 

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-03-16/u-s-health-agency-suffers-cyber-attack-duringcovid-19-response
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may already exist, but this raises logistical concerns for staffing and maintaining these 

locations in times of crisis.

Finally, remote voting systems come with challenges in authenticating Members’ 

identities as they cast their votes. Currently, Members may use their Member ID cards to 

cast their votes on the House floor. This is an in-person verification of a Member’s identity. 

Entrance into the chamber is regulated by the Sergeant at Arms. Remote voting raises 

serious concerns for the potential for another person accessing a Member’s system and 

voting on their behalf, including “deepfakes” in a video-based system. One method of 

authentication could be biometric, such as fingerprint scanners, eye scanners, or facial 

recognition. However, this technology would take time to put into place.

One possible way to improve the security of a remote voting system would be to use a 

system similar to that used by Executive Branch officials who need to access classified 

information while traveling. In these cases, they go to a secure federal building or military 

facility and use their existing secure communications infrastructure. However, use of a 

classified system could conflict with ensuring transparency. 

V. LOGISTICS SURROUNDING REMOTE VOTING

There are countless logistical challenges associated with remote voting that would need 

to be addressed, some with solutions that could fundamentally change the operations 

and public’s perception of the House of Representatives.

Iowa Caucuses Case Study

The 2020 Iowa Caucuses provide an instructive example of the dangers 

of placing matters of immense importance in the hands of untested 

technology: the app that the Iowa Democratic Party commissioned to 

count and report results was not properly tested at a statewide scale, and 

the results of the elections are still disputed over six weeks later. 

According to the New York Times, the app was quickly put together in the 

two months leading up to the Caucus date. This resulted in 

inconsistencies in the reporting of three sets of results due to human error 

while using the app. A computer science and law professor at Georgetown 

University said that any technology should be tested and retested by the 

broader cybersecurity community before being publicly introduced. The 
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app was not created with transparency or shared with the Iowa precincts, 

and was not vetted by the Department of Homeland Security.8

Additionally, on February 27th, 24 days after the Iowa Caucuses on 

February 3rd, the Associated Press reviewed updated results released by 

the Iowa Democratic Party and declared that it would not call a winner, 

given the remaining concerns surrounding whether the results as reported 

by the party are fully accurate.9

House Floor Case Study

A disputed House vote in 2007 provides an example of factors such as 

technology failure and human error that can cause Members – and the 

public – to lose confidence in a voting system even when everyone is 

voting in the same room. In August 2007, an inconsistency between the 

Electronic Voting System’s display and the Chair’s announcement of a 

vote total led to a disputed vote and resulted in the creation of the Select 

Committee on the Voting Irregularities of August 2, 2007. The Committee 

was charged with investigating the circumstances surrounding a record 

vote10 requested by Rep. Lewis (R-CA) on a motion to recommit. The 

confusion surrounding the vote was due to an inconsistency between the 

Chair’s announcement of the vote total and the vote total that was 

displayed on the Electronic Voting System’s summary board. The Select 

Committee found11 that there was human error at play in a premature 

announcement of the total by the Chair and a cascading series of errors, 

including a failure to process “well card votes” submitted by the Minority 

and Majority Leaders. In addition, the Select Committee found that there 

was a failure in the Electronic Voting System, which prevented the House 

from immediately moving onto the next vote. All of this undermined many 

Members’ confidence in the integrity of the vote. This error – which 

spurred the creation of an investigative committee – occurred during an 

in-person vote on well-tested equipment. One can imagine the 

complications that could arise if multiple new electronic devices were 

introduced to the live voting environment without proper testing.

8 https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/03/us/politics/iowa-caucus-app.html?

9 https://apnews.com/fc6777e93b8c50b2fd20e0d31fcc43b3

10 Roll Call vote 814, 110th Congress

11 House Report 110-885
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Logistical challenges that would face any House remote voting system include, but are 

not limited to:

Technology Hardware & Software – Any remote voting system would rely on every 

Member having reliable, connected technology, knowledge of how to use that technology, 

and access to round-the-clock technical support. Right now, Members and staff use many 

varying platforms with varying degrees of reliability, support, and general understanding 

of the technology. Additionally, if the secure remote system were ever compromised there 

would need to be a back-up system in place, in particular given that remote voting is being 

contemplated by some for must-pass legislation.

Connectivity – Every participant would need access to secure connectivity with the 

capacity to transmit potentially large amounts of data (in the case of a video system) 

quickly, consistently, and securely. Power grid security to ensure connectivity is also a 

vulnerability. While such a system is possible in theory, it would be difficult to implement 

with 100% consistency using existing equipment. Additionally, in a crisis, travel is often 

restricted. Many Members could be unable to access the system if away from their 

connected hardware or be unwilling to remain with or retain the necessary hardware in 

light of a crisis or evacuation.

Transparency – Congress has a fundamental responsibility to be transparent to the public 

with their actions and deliberations. Some level of significant transparency would have to 

be maintained in any forum establishing remote deliberation or legislative activity let alone 

voting, especially with outstanding questions about the legitimacy of such a practice. 

Staff Support – On the floor, Members frequently ask questions of staff or other Members 

about a vote. There would be far less opportunity for assistance when a Member isn’t in 

the chamber, or to correct mistakes in real time. 

Vote Timing – Currently, a vote cannot be closed if a Member is in the chamber and 

attempting to vote. With a remote voting system, the chair would be unable to determine 

if a Member is trying to change their vote, is logging on late and about to vote, or is 

experiencing connectivity issues while attempting to vote. 

VI. REMOTE VOTING AND THE HOUSE RULES

Providing for remote voting would require significant changes to multiple core House 

rules—it would not be possible to simply add a clause allowing Members to vote from 

elsewhere. Alterations much smaller than the ones contemplated have taken years of 

deliberation and debate. Rules that would require significant changes include, among 

others:
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− Rule XX (“Voting and Quorum Calls”) to address issues including how quorums 

are determined, how the House can compel attendance of non-appearing 

Members, and how “rising” would work remotely.

− Rule XVIII (Committee of the Whole) to include similarly widespread modifications 

to function.

− Rule III, clause 1 (“Voting”) to remove the in-person requirement.

− The application of “unanimous consent” as it has been understood since its roots 

in the Parliamentary system, to address non-present Members wishing to object.

A longer list of major rules that would be impacted is included in Appendix I.

VII. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF REMOTE VOTING

The constitutionality of remote voting is an untested principle. As a threshold question, 

this uncertainty should give the House pause from transitioning wholesale to any remote 

voting or “virtual presence” scheme of conducting business. If challenged, remote voting 

would be a novel question for a court and there is no guarantee of a favorable ruling 

affirming its constitutionality. Engaging in an untested practice, especially when 

considering complex and critical legislation in response to an historic pandemic, presents 

risks.

Article I of the Constitution mentions in various places the need to bring Members together 

to conduct business. The Constitution speaks of “meeting” (Art. I, Sec. 4, Cl. 2), 

“assembling” (Art. I, Sec. 3, Cl. 2), and “attendance” (Art. I, Sec. 5, Cl. 1) in describing 

how Congress would conduct its business. Yet, the Constitution also explicitly provides 

each house with the ability to make its own rules (Art. I, Sec. 5, Cl. 2).

Given this uncertainty and the risk of pursuing a novel mode of voting on legislation, 

working within the current rules and practices of the House – such as passing legislation 

via unanimous consent or voice vote – is preferable. However, should the situation 

deteriorate in such a way that remote voting becomes necessary, any changes to current 

House rules must be as analogous to the current in-person voting practices as possible 

and must have appropriate safeguards in place to ensure transparency, fairness, and 

legitimacy.

VIII. HISTORY

After the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001, Congress spent substantial time 

reviewing the possibilities of establishing a remote voting system for the House of 
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Representatives. This effort, led by Rep. Baird (D-WA), was eventually dissolved without 

successfully implementing a comprehensive solution. There was not enough 

Congressional or public support to make the difficult decisions and investments needed 

to address challenging questions that were identified.

However, a number of other changes were examined, and some were adopted – largely 

focused on the post-catastrophe challenges of establishing a quorum and filling vacancies 

in the House.

A. Rules Committee Action

Several changes to the House rules have been adopted since 9/11 to help the House 

continue its work in the face of an emergency. The most notable change was the adoption 

of clause 5(c) of rule XX in 2005, which allows the House to reset the necessary quorum 

to a provisional amount if, post-catastrophe, a traditional quorum can’t be achieved after 

96 hours of attempts due to a “natural disaster, attack, contagion, or a similar calamity 

rendering Representatives incapable of attending the proceedings of the House.” If travel 

were to become impossible, this provision could be triggered to permit proceedings with 

only those Members who are able to return to the Capitol. 

This provision, the constitutionality of which remains untested, did not happen overnight. 

It followed a years-long effort by the Committee on Rules from 2002-2005 to improve the 

continuity of Congress. In addition to examining changes to rule XX, the Committee on 

Rules spent significant time considering alternate scenarios, including holding a full 

committee hearing in 2004 specifically to discuss proposed changes. Witnesses included 

the Parliamentarian, two Deputy Parliamentarians, and the Attending Physician. The 

hearing built on work by a bipartisan task force formed in 2002 to examine the issue of 

continuity, chaired by Reps. Christopher Cox (R-CA, then-chair of the Republican Policy 

Committee) and Martin Frost (D-TX, then-chair of the Democratic Caucus). Please see 

Appendix II for a summary of the hearing’s findings. 

Then-Chairman Dreier (R-CA) also introduced, and the House adopted, a concurrent 

resolution in 2003 to establish a joint committee to review House and Senate rules to 

assure the continuity of Congress. It did not receive Senate action. Following the Rules 

Committee hearing on the topic, Chairman Dreier co-authored legislation in 2004 

requiring expedited special elections to fill mass vacancies, which passed the House 306-

97. Similar legislation was subsequently enacted into law in the 109th Congress. 

Other changes to the House rules regarding the continuity of Congress include a rule 

requiring the Speaker to designate in writing a list of Members who would serve as 

Speaker pro-tempore in the event of the Speaker’s death or disability; a rule authorizing 

the Speaker and the chair of the Committee of the Whole to declare an emergency recess 

when notified of an imminent threat to the House’s safety; and a rule authorizing the 
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Speaker to convene the House in a place other than the Hall of the House. Please see 

Appendix II for a more comprehensive list of changes to the House rules and statute to 

assist with the continuity of Congress.

B. Continuity of Government Commission

The events of 9/11 also prompted experts outside the chamber to look seriously at how 

best to ensure the continuity of Congress. The American Enterprise Institute and the 

Brookings Institution formed the Continuity of Government Commission, spearheaded by 

Norm Ornstein and Thomas Mann. The Commission’s 2003 report focused on the 

potential problem of filling mass vacancies in Congress, as House Members in particular 

must be elected and Congress would be unable to function without a quorum. Even if the 

House could operate with a handful of Members, the Commission pointed out that it could 

be seen as illegitimate or could be unbalanced if the majority of Members were from a 

single party or region. The Commission concluded that the vacancies issue could only be 

addressed with a constitutional amendment. For a complete summary of the 

Commission’s findings, please see Appendix III.
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APPENDIX I

RULES IMPACTED BY POTENTIAL INCLUSION OF REMOTE VOTING

Below is a list of House rules that would require modification in order to permit remote 

voting — it does not include changes to cross-references nor the (much longer) list of 

rules that would need to change to allow greater remote participation beyond voting. 

Note that this list is likely not comprehensive.

House Proceedings

− Rule XX throughout (Voting and Quorum Calls) 

− Rule XVIII throughout (Committee of the Whole procedures)

− Clause 1 of rule I (to address whether a Member can demand a Journal vote 

remotely)

− Clause 6 of rule I (reference to voting procedures under rule XX)

− Clause 8(b)(3) of rule I (due to potential arguments that the office of Speaker is 

vacant due to “physical inability”)

− Clause 12(c) of rule I (if an impairment to the place of convening needs to be first 

established)

− Clause 1 of rule III (to remove the in-person voting/attendance requirement)

− Clause 6(a)(1) of rule XIII (to permit 2/3rds votes for same-day rule, remotely)

− Clause 1 of rule XV (to permit 2/3rds votes for suspensions, remotely)

− Clause 5 of rule XV (quorum required to dispense with call of the Private Calendar)

Committee Proceedings

− Clause 2(f) of rule XI (to specify that remote voting does not constitute proxy voting)

− Clause 2(g) of rule XI (to not require permitting physical attendance of the public)

− Clause 2(h) of rule XI (to adjust quorum-taking procedures)

− Clause 2(k)(5) of rule XI (to permit non-physically present Members to assert 

defamatory testimony is being given)

− Clause 2(m) of rule XI (to explicitly permit subpoena proceedings remotely)
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APPENDIX II

SUMMARY OF POST-9/11 ACTIONS BY THE RULES COMMITTEE ON THE

CONTINUITY OF CONGRESS

Rules Hearing: Incapacitations and the Quorum (2004)

− Barriers to Changing the Quorum:

• The Constitution requires the presence of a majority of the House to do 

business. However, the Constitution leaves it to the House to determine 

what is business. Clause 7(a) of rule XX states that the mere conduct of 

debate, where the Chair has not put the pending proposition to a vote is not 

“business”, thus does not require a quorum. 

• The Supreme Court upheld in United States v. Ballin that the authority of 

the House to transact business is “created by the mere presence of a 

majority.” Since 1890, the point of order regarding lack of quorum has been 

that a quorum is not present, not that a quorum has not voted. 

• In 1906, consistent with Ballin, Speaker Cannon held that once the House 

is organized for a Congress “a quorum consists of a majority of those 

Members chosen, sworn, and living, whose membership has not been 

terminated by resignation or by the action of the House.”

• Neither the Constitution nor the Ballin decision contemplate any notion of 

“virtual presence.” The founders provided for Houses of Congress that 

“assemble” and “meet” and forge bicameral consent to adjourn for any 

extended period or to meet elsewhere. They provided for Houses of 

Congress that keep a journal, adjourn day to day, and easily admit votes by 

the yeas and nays. Even if the House chooses to approve journals less 

frequently than every day, the availability of daily votes by the yeas and 

nays on adjourning, alone, should rule out any notion that the founders 

contemplated any 18th-century analog to the “virtual presence” that today 

might be achieved by proxy or by teleconferencing or by discounting 

incapacitated Members.

− Idea Proposed: 

• If the House were to devise a plan to recalculate its number for the purpose 

of computing a quorum, under specified catastrophic circumstances, 

departed from the current living-and-sworn standard, we could change the 

measuring device to “physical attendance.”
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Cox-Frost Task Force on the Continuity of Legislative Operations (2002)

− In the 107th Congress, Reps. Cox and Frost created a bipartisan task force. Their 

work was conducted privately in order for Members to freely and openly discuss 

their own possible demise and a plan for the continuity of Congress. 

− Chairman Dreier issued a statement that said the three major categories of the 

Continuity of Congress are 1) vacancies, 2) mass incapacitation, and 3) 

administrative questions. 

− Chairman Dreier also stated that the House voted to work with the Senate in a 

bipartisan manner to see where they could agree on continuity issues, but the 

Senate declined to work with the House. 

− As a result of the Commission, Chairman Dreier co-authored with Rep. 

Sensenbrenner (R-WI) H.R. 2844, the Continuity in Representation Act of 2004.12

It passed 306-97. The legislation requires the states to conduct expedited special 

elections to fill vacancies created by the deaths of large numbers of Members. It 

was not voted on by the Senate. 

− In the April 2004 Rules hearing, Dreier referenced a discussion draft developed by 

majority staff. Dreier says in summary that the draft does not define incapacitation 

itself; rather, it addresses the question for the House: how will the House be able 

to act if there are large numbers of Members incapacitated?13 The discussion draft 

suggests that the inability of Members to respond to multiple and lengthy calls of 

the House when coupled with measures designed to confirm to the Speaker that 

a catastrophe has occurred, may allow for a House to proceed with a provisional 

quorum. This temporary, provisional quorum, existing only in a time of catastrophe, 

would consist of a majority of those able to respond to the calls of the House. A 

similar idea was instituted in the Rules Package for the next Congress. 

Rules Changes Regarding the Continuity of Congress

− Rule I, clause 8(b)(3): Requires the Speaker to designate in writing a number of 

Members who would serve as Speaker pro tempore in the event of the Speaker’s 

death or disability, until a successor Speaker or Speaker pro tempore could be 

elected by the House. Soon after a new Congress convenes, the Speaker’s list is 

12 https://www.congress.gov/bill/108th-congress/house-bill/2844/text

13 https://archives-democrats-rules.house.gov/archives/incap_CDD_open.htm
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delivered to the Clerk, and the delivery is announced on the House floor. See 

“Recall Designee” and “Announcement by the Speaker Pro Tempore” 

Congressional Record, daily edition, Jan. 6, 2009, p. H24.

− Rule I, clause 12(b)(1): H. Res. 6 in the 110th Congress authorized the chair of 

the Committee of the Whole, when notified of an imminent threat to the House's 

safety, to declare an emergency recess subject to the call of the chair. The change 

eliminated potential confusion over whether the Committee of the Whole would 

need to rise (to return to the House sitting as the House) so that the Speaker could 

declare an emergency recess.

• Amended Rule I, clause 12, from the 108th Congress (2003-2004), which 

simply granted the Speaker and chair of the Committee of the Whole 

emergency recess authority subject to the call of the Chair.

− Rule I, clause 12(d): In the 114th Congress, H. Res. 5 provided the Speaker with 

authority to reconvene the House during an adjournment or recess of less than 

three days at a time other than the appointed time and to notify Members. The 

Speaker was directed to consult the Minority Leader, to decide when the public 

interest warranted, and to act within the limits of Article I of the Constitution. This 

change included in House rules separate orders from the 112th and 

113th Congresses. The rule change also allowed the Speaker to name designees 

to exercise the reconvening authorities listed in this new subparagraph and two 

existing subparagraphs of Rule I.

• In the 115th Congress, H. Res. 5 contained a technical, one-word change to 

the rule allowing the Speaker to convene the House in the District of 

Columbia at a place other than the Hall of the House in the Capitol "if" rather 

than "whenever" it was in the public interest. 

• Amended Rule I, clause 12 from the 108th Congress (2003-2004) that 

declared that the Speaker was authorized to convene the House in a place 

at the seat of government other than the Hall of the House, when warranted, 

by the public interest. 

• During the 108th Congress, both chambers agreed to H. Con. Res. 1, 

regarding consent to assemble outside the seat of government. The 

measure authorized the Speaker of the House and the Majority Leader of 

the Senate, or their respective designees, acting jointly after consultation 

with the Minority Leader of the House and the Minority Leader of the Senate, 

to convene the House and Senate at a place outside the District of Columbia 

whenever, in their opinion, the public interest warranted it.
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− Rule II, clause 2: The 115th Congress rules resolution H. Res. 5 clarified that an 

acting Speaker pro tempore would hold priority over the Clerk of the House in 

preserving order and decorum pending the election of a new Speaker.

− Rule XX, clause 5(c): In the 113th Congress, H. Res. 5 allowed the designees of 

the Majority leader or Minority leader to consult with the Speaker in the event of 

catastrophic quorum failure report, rather than solely the two leaders. In practice, 

the Speaker or Speaker pro tempore now typically announces a revised whole 

number of the House in light of changes in the membership of the House, but the 

question of whether a provisional quorum is constitutional has not been addressed. 

• Amended Rule XX, clause 5, from the 109th Congress (2005-2006) which 

originally established a provisional quorum after catastrophic 

circumstances, formally codifying longstanding House practice that a 

quorum is a majority of the Members elected, sworn, and living. 

• In 1906, under Speaker Cannon, the House established the precedent that 

“a quorum consists of a majority of those Members chosen, sworn, and 

living, whose membership has not been terminated by resignation or by the 

action of the House.” Hind’s Precedents of the House of Representatives of 

the United States, vol. IV (Washington: GPO, 1907), p. 64.

Statutory Action

− In addition to rules changes, during the 109th Congress, legislation (2 U.S.C. 8(b))

was enacted to require states to hold special House elections when extraordinary 

circumstances cause mass vacancies in the House. The act provides that 

extraordinary circumstances exist following an announcement by the Speaker of 

the House that vacancies in the chamber have exceeded 100 seats. States in 

which a vacancy exists in its House representation are then required to hold a 

special election within 49 days, subject to some exceptions. States are required to 

(1) make a determination of the candidates who will run in the special election not 

later than 10 days after the vacancy announcement by the political parties 

authorized by state law to nominate candidates, or by any other method the state 

considers appropriate; (2) ensure to the greatest extent practicable that absentee 

ballots for the election are transmitted to absent uniformed services voters and 

overseas voters not later than 15 days after the Speaker announces that the 

vacancy exists; and (3) accept and process any otherwise valid ballot or other 

election material from an absent uniformed services voter or an overseas voter, as 

long as the ballot or other material is received by the appropriate state election 

official not later than 45 days after the state transmits the ballot to the voter. 2 

United States Code 8(b).
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APPENDIX III

SUMMARY OF THE FIRST REPORT OF THE CONTINUITY OF GOVERNMENT 

COMMISSION

The Problem of Mass Vacancies/Incapacitated Members 

− With 535 Members, Congress would struggle to fill a potential large number of 

vacancies. Due to quorum requirements, if fewer than 218 Members of the House 

were alive, Congress could not function until the vacancies were filled. Therefore, 

Congress couldn’t do things like elect a new Speaker, confirm a new appointment 

of a President, Vice President, etc. 

− The Commission believed that in the current system, it would take over four 

months to reconstitute full membership in the House because the Constitution says 

that the House can only fill vacancies by Special Election and not by appointment. 

• There are a limited number of ballot printing companies and, if many special 

elections needed to be held at once, ballot printing could be a barrier. 

• Confusion and chaos after an attack or major event could also play a role 

in delaying a special election to occur.

− For the Senate, the 17th Amendment to the Constitution states that a state can

designate a person to appoint a temporary Senator when there is a vacancy. Most

states have given that power to their Governor. 

− There is no way to fill what is, in effect, a temporary vacancy. 

− The Commission believed that mass incapacitation is worse than mass vacancies 

in three ways: 

• Mass incapacitation affects both the House and Senate. 

• The temporary vacancies caused by incapacitation would not be filled for 

an indefinite amount of time— only until the Member recovers, resigns, dies, 

or the term of office ends.

• Mass incapacitation makes it virtually certain that Congress would be 

unable to reach its quorum requirement under its most lenient interpretation. 

Quorum Requirements 

− Defined by precedent, the quorum requirement in the House is that of Members 

who are “chosen, sworn, and living.”

− Defined by precedent, the quorum requirement in the Senate is “a majority of the 

Senators duly chosen and sworn.”
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− Therefore, the current definition would allow the House to operate with a handful 

of Members. The Commission believes that there are several problems with that, 

most importantly it would question the legitimacy of government after a 

catastrophe. Other problems the Commission states are listed below. 

• An attack could wipe out most of one party while not affecting another, 

leaving Congress politically imbalanced in comparison to the country.

• The commission questioned whether a Congress with just a handful of 

Members would be considered legitimate once the vacancies were 

eventually filled.

• A lenient quorum requirement might result in a small number of Members 

acting as the whole Congress and calling into question the legitimacy of 

congressional actions.

• There is currently no plan or rule for Members who are incapacitated. 

Ideas to Solve the Problem of Mass Vacancies 

− Constitutional Amendment: The Commission believed that there is no way to 

quickly fill mass vacancies without a constitutional amendment. 

• Their recommendation was “a constitutional amendment to give Congress 

the power to provide by legislation for the appointment of temporary 

replacements to fill vacant seats in the House of Representatives after a 

catastrophic attack and to temporarily fill seats in the House of 

Representatives and Senate that are held by incapacitated Members.”

− Location of Congress:

• Rules originally enacted in the 108th Congress allow the Speaker to 

reconvene the Congress to another location and provide for successors to 

do the same. 

Why Changes to House Rules Alone Cannot Fill Vacancies 

− The Commission believed that an approach to appoint Members through a change 

in House rules would be unconstitutional. 

− The House could provide a rule that its current Members supply a list of successors 

who would serve as temporary replacements for the Members in case of 

catastrophic attack. An appointed person (e.g. the Governor) could choose the 

successor from that list. [Advocates for this plan cite U.S. v. Ballin.]

− The courts were clear that the House rules could not violate constitutional 

restraints. 
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− “The House could no more provide for the filling of vacancies by method other than 

special elections than it could decide by House rules that less than a two-thirds 

vote is needed to override a presidential veto or pass a constitutional amendment.” 

Argument Against Temporary Appointments in the House

− Temporary appointments could change the party make-up of Congress.

− People should be able to choose their representatives in the People’s House.

• “While the elected character of the House is extremely important, the 

principle that all the people should be equally represented is essential to its 

democratic character.” 

− Even if a Governor or other appointee appoints a temporary replacement, they 

could appoint people solely from their political party, which could differ greatly from 

the original delegation’s composition. 

− The commission questioned if there should be two separate protocols on filling 

vacancies, one for ordinary circumstances and one for emergency circumstances.

Commission Report Development 

− The commission consulted with current and former Members of Congress, legal 

and constitutional scholars. In addition, the commission held two public meetings 

where they heard testimony from expert witnesses.