IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
VITO DeGRANDIS, an individual, Respondent,

JAMES STANFORD and JANE DOE STANFORD, in their individual capacities and as a marital community; and STANFORD DEVELOPMENT, INC., a Washington corporation, Defendants, JANE DOE (KRISTENE) STANFORD, an individual, Appellant. No. 71422-8-1
DIVISION ONE UNPUBLISHED OPINION

FILED: March 9, 2015

Trickey, J. —Where more than a year has passed, a party filing a motion to 

### vacate ajudgment must show extraordinary circumstances to warrant relief. Claims of 

### legal errors are pursued underadirectappeal from thejudgment, notfrom adenial ofa CR 60 motion. Here, the defendant was properly served and failed to respond. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's motion to vacate for either inadequate service or an error oflaw. Affirmed.
FACTS On November 29, 2010, Vito DeGrandis sued Stanford Development, Inc., a 

### Washington corporation, togetherwith James Stanford and Jane Doe Stanford, in their individual capacities and as a marital community, to recover monies owed on a 

### promissory note executed by James Stanford dba Stanford Development, Inc. onNo. 71422-8-1/2 September 2008. Kristene Stanford was married to James Stanford, the owner of Stanford Development, Inc. at the time. On December 4, 2010, a summons and complaint was served personally on James Stanford at his residence. James also accepted a second summons and complaint on behalf of Kristene at their residence. On December 10, 2010, Kristene 

### filed for legal separation. On December 27, James, pro se, filed a response to the complaint. James's response did not indicate that he was replying for Kristene. Kristene did not respond. DeGrandis moved for summary judgment, mailing the motion to the address 

### supplied on James's response. There was no response to the summary judgment. 

### Judgmentwas entered against all defendants on July 8, 2011. Atthe time the summary 

### judgment was entered, Kristene was living in Washington and James had moved to Arizona. In October 2012, Kristene moved to Alaska, and she and James began to reconcile. Kristene was unaware that a judgment had been issued against her 

### individually until sheand James attempted to sell theirhouse in Lynden, Washington. On December 2, 2013, Kristene moved to vacate thejudgment under CR 60. The trial court denied the motion. Kristene appeals.
ANALYSIS 

### Kristene argues thatthe trial courterred in notvacating thejudgmentagainst her. She asserts that she was unaware of the initial service upon her, that she was not 

### notified ofthe summaryjudgmentmotion, and finally thatthe trial court erred in entering
ajudgmentagainst herin herindividual capacity as a matteroflaw.No. 71422-8-1/3 Generally, we will not reverse a trial court's denial of a motion to vacate under CR 60 unless the courtmanifestly abused itsdiscretion. Halev v. Highland, 142Wn.2d 135, 156, 12 P.3d 119 (2000). Atrial court abuses its discretion when its decision is 

### manifestly unreasonable orbased on untenable grounds. Maverv. Sto Indus., Inc., 156 Wn.2d 677, 684, 132 P.3d 115 (2006); CR 60. Unlike an appeal, a CR 60(b) motion is not a means ofcorrecting errors oflaw. Burlinaame v. Consol. Mines &Smelting Co., 106Wn.2d 328, 336, 722 P.2d 67 (1986). Thus, Kristene's appeal oftheorderdenying her motion tovacate does not allow herto 

### raise legal issues about the summary judgment order she seeks to vacate. See Biurstrom v. Campbell, 27 Wn. App. 449, 450-51, 618 P.2d 533 (1980). 

### We review questions ofwhether service was proper de novo. Scanlan v. Townsend. 181 Wn.2d 838, 336 P.3d 1155, 1159 (2014). Substitute service ofprocess 

### is effective when a copy ofthe summons is left atthe defendant's "usual abode with 

### some person ofsuitable age and discretion then residenttherein." RCW 4.28.080(15); Blankenship v. Kaldor, 114 Wn. App. 312, 316, 57 P.3d 295 (2002) (citing Sheldon v. 

### Fettig, 129 Wn.2d 601, 607, 919 P.2d 1209 (1996)). Here, there is no dispute that Kristene was a resident ofthe housewhere thecomplaintwasserved at thetime James 

### accepted service on herbehalf. See In re Marriage ofYearout, 41 Wn. App. 897, 902, 707 P.2d 1367 (1985) (relief under CR 60(b)(11) is limited to extraordinary circumstances not covered by any other section ofthe rule). The fact that the parties separated shortly thereafter is immaterial.No. 71422-8-1/4 Indeed, Kristene's reply brief admits that she does not dispute that she was served the summons and complaint.1 Rather, she argues that she was not served with notice of the summary judgment motion and subsequent pleadings. But a party who has failed to respond to a complaint is notentitled to notices ofsubsequent procedures. CR 5(a).2 Kristene argues that DeGrandis should not be entitled tojudgment against her because he did notfile a notice of default. But Kristene's reliance upon CR 55(a)(3) for that proposition is misplaced. CR 55(a)(3) requires notice of a motion for default to 

### "[a]ny party who has appeared in the action." Kristene did not appear as shefailed to

answer the summons. The facts here show that the only party who responded to the summons and 

### complaint was James.3 His response included the address where he maintained a business. Notice ofsummaryjudgmentwasappropriately sent to thataddress. James did not respond to the summary judgmentnotice. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Kristene's
unawareness of deadlines and subsequent motions were not circumstances that amounted to a mistake, inadvertence, surprise, excusable neglect, orirregularity under 

### CR 60; nor did those issues rise to the level ofextraordinary circumstances under CR

1Appellant's Reply Br. at 6. 2CR 5(a) provides, in pertinent part: No service need be made on parties in default for failure to appear except that pleadings asserting new or additional claims for relief against them shall be served upon them in themannerprovided for service ofsummons in rule 4. 3 Kristene's argument that James's response was irregular because it amounted to an 

### appearance on her behalf violating Washington's prohibition of a non-attorney representing another iswithout merit. James's response does notpurportto represent Kristene.No. 71422-8-1/5 

### 60(b)(11). See Yearout. 41 Wn. App. at 902 (relief under CR 60(b)(11) is limited to extraordinary circumstances notcovered by any othersection ofthe rule). 

### Finally, Kristene argues that as a matter of law she should not have been held individually liable forthedebt. In support, shecites Max LWells Trustv. Grand Central Sauna &Hot Tub Co.. 62 Wn. App. 593, 604, 815 P.2d 284 (1991). There, the court held that the trial court should not have entered judgmentindividually against the wives ofhusbands who were partners in a tenantpartnership. Wells Trust, 62Wn. App. at

604. Even if it was error to enter thejudgment against Kristene individually, Kristene 

### failed to appear and argue the issue or appeal thejudgment. This case is more similar to Halev v. Highland, 142 Wn.2d 135, 158, 12P.3d 119 (2000). In Haley, an oral ruling 

### ofthe trial court indicated that the judgment against Haley was a separate liability for 

### each party, while the judgment in Haley's favor was acommunity asset and thus the 

### judgments could not be executed to satisfy each other. 142 Wn.2d at 157. The trial court's written order cited RCW 26.16.200 as controlling the disposition of the case. 

### Highland did not appeal that portion ofthe order. Instead, Highland moved to vacate the order under CR 60(b)(1), (4). In denying his motion, the court noted that Highland


### was attempting to use CR 60(b) to reach the merits of an issue that he had not 

### appealed. Haley. 142Wn.2d at 158. Further, the Supreme Court agreed with the trial court's ruling, holding that the "error claimed by defendant is not an irregularity but a conclusion of law, and as such is not properly to be vacated [ujnder Civil Rule 60." Halev, 142 Wn.2d at 158 (alteration in original).No. 71422-8-1/6 Similarly, here, it is theconclusion oflaw as to Kristene's individual liability that is being appealed. "The exclusive procedure toattack an allegedly defectivejudgment is by appeal from thejudgment, not by appeal from a denial of a CR 60(b) motion." Biurstrom. 27Wn. App. at451. As noted previously, Kristene was properly served and failed to respond. The trial court did notabuse itsdiscretion. DeGrandis requests an award ofattorney fees based on the filing of a frivolous 

### appeal under RAP 18.9(a). "An appeal is frivolous ifthe appellate court is convinced thatthe appeal presents no debatable issues upon which reasonable minds could differ and is solacking in meritthatthere is no possibility ofreversal." In re Marriage ofFoley, 84 Wn. App. 839, 847, 930 P.2d 929 (1997). We conclude that Kristene's arguments, 

### although generally weak, are notfrivolous underthe governing standard. We therefore deny DeGrandis's requestfor attorneyfees.
Affirmed. 

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CJ1 WE CONCUR:



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