United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HALSEY MINOR, an individual,

Plaintiff,

 v.

CHRISTIE’S, INC., a New York corporation,

and DOES 1 through 20, inclusive,

Defendants. /

CHRISTIE’S, INC, a New York corporation,

Counterclaimant,

 v.

HALSEY MINOR, an individual, and

ROES 1 through 20, inclusive,

Counterdefendants. /

No. C 08-05445 WHA (Lead Case)

Consolidated with:

No. C 09-00471 WHA

FINAL PRETRIAL ORDER

FOR GOOD CAUSE and after a final pretrial conference, the Court issues the

following final pretrial order: 

1. This case shall go to a JURY TRIAL on MAY 10, 2010, at 7:30 A.M., and shall

continue until completed on the schedule discussed at the conference. 

2. Unlike the normal case where both sides, pursuant to the undersigned’s standing

order for civil jury trials, set forth a clear statement of the claims and defenses to be tried in

their proposed joint pretrial order, counsel in the instant action have let the Court down by

Case 3:08-cv-05445-WHA Document 77 Filed 04/26/10 Page 1 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

failing to agree on any of the issues to be decided at trial. FRCP 16(d) and (e) authorize district

courts to hold final pretrial conferences to formulate clear trial plans and issue final pretrial

orders that “control[] the course of the action.” The procedures for drafting final pretrial orders

— as explained in the FRCP committee notes — are left to discretion of district local rules and

individual judges. Here, the undersigned’s “Guidelines for Trial and Final Pretrial Conference

in Civil Jury Cases” clearly state the following:

“At least seven calendar days in advance of the final pretrial

conference, please file . . . [a] joint proposed pretrial order, signed

and vetted by all counsel, that contains: (i) a brief description of

the substance of claims and defenses which remain to be decided,

(ii) a statement of all relief sought, (iii) all stipulated facts, (iv) a

list of all factual issues which remain to be tried, stating the issues

with the same generality/specificity as any contested elements in

the relevant jury instructions, [and other information] . . . .”

Instead of filing a joint description of the claims and defenses remaining for trial, however, each

side presented separate and conflicting statements, interspersed with arguments. In short,

counsel failed to comply with the normal practices required under the Guidelines. The filing

submitted was neither joint nor helpful.

In these circumstances, the issues for trial will be strictly limited to those set forth in the

operative pleadings. The only exception to this will be Halsey Minor’s ninth claim for relief

under Section 17200 of the California Business & Professions Code. Mr. Minor’s own

statement of the claims and defenses remaining for trial did not include this claim. As such, this

order shall treat this claim as abandoned, and it is hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

With respect to whether plaintiff may assert new substantive claims for fraud,

conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of an implied contract of bailment (related to

the Richard Prince artworks) based upon the alleged fraudulent $25 million offer communicated

by Christie’s regarding a buyer in London, plaintiff will be limited to the legal claims set forth

in the operative pleadings. Plaintiff, however, will be allowed to present evidence of the

purported fraudulent $25 million offer — within the parameters set forth in the rulings on the

motions in limine — to provide relevant background for the claim. Plaintiff should be aware,

however, that this does not mean that unpled legal claims for relief will be submitted to the jury. 

Case 3:08-cv-05445-WHA Document 77 Filed 04/26/10 Page 2 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

Rather, the claims and defenses presented to the jury will be limited to those set forth in the

operative pleadings.

As such, the claims and defenses remaining for trial, with the exception of plaintiff’s

Section 17200 claim in the lead case, will be those set forth in the operative pleadings. 

Specifically, this includes Mr. Minor’s first amended complaint in the lead case (Dkt. No. 27,

CV 08-05445), Christie’s answer to the amended complaint and counterclaims in the lead case

(Dkt. No. 32, CV 08-05445), Mr. Minor’s answer to Christie’s counterclaims in the lead case

(Dkt. No. 37, CV 08-05445), Christie’s complaint in the consolidated action (Dkt. No. 1, CV

09-00471), and Mr. Minor’s answer to Christie’s complaint in the consolidated action (Dkt. No.

15, CV 09-00471). 

3. Except for good cause, each party is limited to the witnesses and exhibits 

disclosed in the joint proposed final pretrial order less any excluded or limited by an order

in limine. Materials or witnesses used solely for impeachment need not be disclosed and may

be used, subject to the rules of evidence. 

4. A jury of TEN PERSONS shall be used. 

5. Each side shall have FIFTEEN HOURS to examine witnesses (counting direct

examination, cross-examination, re-direct examination, re-cross examination, etc.). 

Opening statements and closing arguments shall not count against the limit. 

6. The parties shall follow the Court's current Guidelines for Trial and

Final Pretrial Conference, separately provided and available on the Internet at

http://www.cand.uscourts.gov, which guidelines are incorporated as part of this order. 

* * *

This order also sets forth the rulings on the parties’ motions in limine, which were

argued at the final pretrial conference on April 19, 2010. As with the proposed joint pretrial

order, the parties failed to reach a consensus on what was actually decided, forcing the Court to

repeat what has already been said.

Case 3:08-cv-05445-WHA Document 77 Filed 04/26/10 Page 3 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

1. Christie’s First Motion in Limine

With respect to whether plaintiff and counterdefendant Halsey Minor will not be

allowed to contradict the allegations in the operative complaint that he “entered into the

consignment agreement” with Haunch of Venison, the undersigned ruled that “if the plaintiff

wants to pursue the four claims based on the Richard Prince Artworks, then the Court will read

to the jury, upon request of the defendant, at an appropriate time in the trial, the allegation made

in the operative

complaint; namely, paragraph nine.” Since Mr. Minor’s counsel stated that plaintiff will be

pursuing the Prince artworks claims, Christie’s will be entitled to request that paragraph nine

from the first amended complaint be read to the jury.

That said, the allegation in the complaint is not a judicial admission that would bar the

presentation of contrary proof by plaintiff’s counsel. As such, Mr. Minor may testify that there

was no written contract, and that as far as he was concerned, he didn’t enter into it. On

cross-examination, however, at the request of Christie’s counsel, the Court will then read the

allegation in paragraph nine of the first amended complaint, and say something along the lines

of “[t]his is the allegation that was made by authorized agents on behalf of plaintiff in this

case.” Christie’s may also front this allegation in its opening statement, and then — at some

point during the presentation of the evidence when it would be meaningful to the jury —

request that the Court read the allegation in paragraph nine and provide a brief explanation as to

its source and effect.

In sum, Christie’s first motion in limine was GRANTED IN PART in that Mr. Minor will

not be allowed to completely run away from the allegations in paragraph nine of the operative

complaint, and DENIED IN PART in that plaintiff’s counsel will be allowed to present

contradictory evidence on this issue.

2. Christie’s Second Motion in Limine

This motion touched upon whether plaintiff Minor, under FRCP 37(c), would be barred

from introducing evidence or testimony contrary to admissions made in discovery and

disclosures regarding an alleged $25 million offer made by Christie’s for the Richard Prince

Case 3:08-cv-05445-WHA Document 77 Filed 04/26/10 Page 4 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

artworks. As explained at the final pretrial conference, Mr. Minor will not be barred from

offering proof and testimony at trial that Christie’s represented that it had a buyer in London

who was prepared to pay $25 million for the Prince artworks. This information may provide

relevant background to the legal claims and defenses as pled in the operative pleadings. 

Counsel for Christie’s, however, will be allowed to use Mr. Minor’s interrogatory responses or

any other relevant evidence for purposes of impeachment. Under these parameters, the motion

was DENIED.

3. Christie’s Third Motion in Limine

By this motion, Christie’s sought to exclude evidence or testimony that would contradict

Mr. Minor’s admission that he failed to pay for the New York and London artworks. As

explained at the final pretrial conference, Christie’s third motion in limine was GRANTED IN

PART in that Mr. Minor will be held to his admission in the pleadings that he failed to pay for

the New York and London Artworks. Counsel for Christie’s may ask the Court to read the

relevant paragraphs from the pleadings (specifically, paragraph 117 in Christie’s counterclaims

and the response thereto) and explain to the jury that the admission is binding on Mr. Minor. 

The motion, however, was DENIED IN PART in that Mr. Minor will be allowed to offer evidence

or testimony as to why he failed to pay for these artworks. To the extent that this testimony

contradicts his interrogatory responses or other relevant evidence, Christie’s may use such

evidence to impeach Mr. Minor at trial.

4. Christie’s Fourth Motion in Limine

Both sides agree that this motion — which pertained to the exclusion of evidence or

testimony irrelevant to defenses for breach of Mr. Minor’s alleged obligation to pay for the New

York or London artworks — was DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to Christie’s right to bring a

motion pursuant to FRCP 50.

5. Christie’s Fifth Motion in Limine

This motion focused on whether Mr. Minor would be allowed to introduce evidence or

testimony contrary to findings made in the Merrill Lynch case from the Southern District of

New York. As explained at the final pretrial conference, because there is no judicial estoppel

Case 3:08-cv-05445-WHA Document 77 Filed 04/26/10 Page 5 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

from Merrill Lynch case based upon an examination of the findings in that case, the motion was

DENIED. The question of whether and to what extent Christie’s can introduce evidence or

testimony from other lawsuits is fully addressed in Mr. Minor’s motions in limine below.

6. Christie’s Sixth Motion in Limine

For this motion, which targeted whether Mr. Minor could provide testimony as to the

value of the artworks at issue in this litigation (and damages based upon these valuations), the

undersigned accepted the proposal by plaintiff’s counsel to preliminarily limit Mr. Minor’s

testimony as to the value of the Prince artworks to party admissions made by Christie’s and to

seek the Court’s permission to go beyond such testimony. Counsel for Christie’s did not object

to this proposal. As such, the motion was DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to Christie’s renewing

its objections if plaintiff’s counsel seeks permission from the Court to go beyond the limited

testimony set forth above. 

7. Halsey Minor’s First Motion in Limine

By this motion, Mr. Minor sought to exclude Christie’s presentation of evidence of Mr.

Minor’s financial condition. As explained at the final pretrial conference, the motion was

DENIED IN PART as to Mr. Minor’s financial condition at the time of the transactions in question

and during the relevant time period in 2008, and GRANTED IN PART as to Mr. Minor’s financial

condition at times where such information would be irrelevant. The relevant time period would

encompass when Christie’s was holding on to the Prince artworks for security, and also when

the first consignment was made (approximately May through November 2008). This ruling is

without prejudice to plaintiff’s counsel objecting on relevance grounds to certain pieces of

evidence if they are too far removed in time from the transactions at issue in this case. As

explained at the pretrial conference, the relevant time period cannot be measured with

mathematical precision, and the Court would be inclined to admit evidence in the “ballpark” of

the transactions at issue.

The undersigned also explained at the pretrial conference how the current financial

condition of the parties would be used during the punitive damages stage of trial (if punitive

damages are awarded). There was no dispute over those parameters.

Case 3:08-cv-05445-WHA Document 77 Filed 04/26/10 Page 6 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

8. Halsey Minor’s Second Motion in Limine

This motion involved whether and to what extent Christie’s would be allowed to

introduce evidence of other lawsuits filed against Mr. Minor by third parties (such as Merrill

Lynch and Sotheby’s). As explained at the final pretrial conference, the Court distinguished

between (1) transactions with third parties that were afoot within the relevant time period in

2008, (2) revealing to the jury the fact that these other lawsuits existed, (3) the ultimate

judgments that were entered in those other lawsuits, and (4) deposition testimony given in the

other proceedings. 

With respect to evidence of transactions between Mr. Minor and third parties during the

relevant time period, the motion to exclude such evidence was DENIED. Such evidence is

relevant to a number of issues raised by both sides, such as whether Mr. Minor was financially

overextended at the time or whether a prior pledge agreement with Merrill Lynch existed and

involved the Prince artworks (which might violate terms or representations seen in the

consignment agreement). 

Mr. Minor’s second motion in limine, however, was GRANTED with respect to the

existence of the other lawsuits and the ultimate judgments entered in those lawsuits. The

undersigned explained at the final pretrial conference that such information could not be raised

without further permission of the Court, because the information could be too prejudicial. This

exclusion, however, is not absolute. If Mr. Minor “opened the door” to such evidence while

testifying, by — for example — denying at trial that in May 2008, he bid $13 million at

Sotheby’s and was the winning bidder, the information could then possibly come in. It will

depend on the specific testimony elicited from Mr. Minor at trial.

Finally, the motion with respect to deposition testimony from other lawsuits is DENIED. 

Such testimony — so long as it goes to Mr. Minor’s financial condition or pertains to

transactions within the relevant time period — would be admissible for impeachment purposes

only (unless such depositions were designated under Rule 26(a) or other reasons present

themselves at trial). As mentioned above, counsel would not be allowed to mention that the

Case 3:08-cv-05445-WHA Document 77 Filed 04/26/10 Page 7 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

deposition was taken in a different legal proceeding, unless the door is somehow opened for that

to be allowed. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 26, 2010. WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:08-cv-05445-WHA Document 77 Filed 04/26/10 Page 8 of 8