0

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Operational Environments to 2028: The Strategic Environment for Unified Land Operations 2

Executive Summary

The Army does not have the luxury of focusing on any one potential adversary or any one mission type 

across the range of military operations. Instead, leaders and Soldiers must be exposed to the multiple 

conditions representing threats that exist across the globe. Potential threats will range from standing 

conventional and unconventional forces, to irregular militias and paramilitaries, to terrorist groups and 

criminal elements. Training, education, capabilities development, and concept development should 

reflect this reality.

Currently, in the midst of a global recession, the Army finds itself at a strategically important crossroad 

as it tries to determine where to wisely invest its limited training, personnel, and materiel resources. The 

strategic environment (SE) to 2028, with its combination of tough enduring problems and newly 

developed conditions and characteristics, will add complexity to this challenge. 

To help unravel the complexities of current and near-term challenges, the following paper provides a 

description of the key conditions manifesting across the SE through 2028. Adversarial strategies based 

on these conditions are also addressed. The concluding chapter explores the military implications of 

both the conditions and potential adversarial strategies. We know that the current and future strategic 

environment will be characterized by uncertainty, complexity, and increasingly nuanced relationships. 

The conditions of the strategic environment must be understood, captured, and factored into Army 

decision-making. Only then can realistic training, the correct mix of systems and capabilities, and the 

proper approaches to leader development and education be identified and implemented across 

TRADOC and the Army in general. 

STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT CONDITIONS 

The strategic environment is defined, in the context of this estimate, as the set of global conditions, 

circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of all elements of U.S. national power. The SE

contains multiple potential operational environments (OEs), which are defined as any areas in which U.S 

forces may operate, from a locale as small as a village to entire regions of the globe.

The strategic environment remains as it has always been: complex. The interaction of the many 

variables within the environment, including human behavior, assures both fog and friction. The current 

strategic environment seems more ambiguous, presenting multiple layers of complexity and challenging 

the Army with requirements beyond traditional warfighting skills and training. Capturing the key 

strategic conditions is fundamental to understanding current and future military operations. Strategic 

conditions will be analyzed through the lens of eight OE variables—political, military, economic, social, 

information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time (PMESII-PT). The resulting conditions are 

listed below and explained in detail in Chapter 2 of this estimate.

POLITICAL CONDITIONS

• Changing International Distribution of Power

• Decline of Global Governance

• Shortfalls in State Governance
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3 Operational Environments to 2028: The Strategic Environment for Unified Land Operations

MILITARY CONDITIONS

• Global Military Expenditure Rates

• Wide Range of Potential Missions and Adversaries

• Rise of Private Security Organizations (PSOs)

• Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Proliferation

• Importance of the Global Commons

• Continued Vulnerability of the U.S. Homeland

• Emerging and Proliferating Military Technologies

ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

• Economic Shifts

• Income Inequality

• Economic Interdependence

SOCIAL CONDITIONS

• Demographic Transition

• Population Growth

• Persistent Youth Bulge

INFORMATION CONDITIONS

• Proliferation of Information and Communications Technology (ICT)

• Transparency across Societies

• Actor Empowerment

• Controlling the Strategic Narrative

• Technological Vulnerability

INFRASTRUCTURE CONDITIONS

• Urbanization

• Expanding Physical Infrastructure

PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT CONDITIONS

• Competition over Natural Resources

• Climate Change

• Special Cases

TIME CONDITION

• Cultural Perception of Time

IMPLICATIONS OF THE CONDITIONS 

The current and future strategic environment will be—as the above conditions reflect—characterized by 

multiple actors, adaptive threats, chaotic conditions, and advanced-technology-enabled actors seeking 

to dominate the information environment. The Army must be operationally adaptive to defeat these 

complex challenges and adversaries operating within this environment.
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Operational Environments to 2028: The Strategic Environment for Unified Land Operations 4

Through 2028, the Army will face many unique OEs and simultaneous decisive action operations will be 

the norm within these environments. Training for sequential operations with clearly defined phases will 

not suffice. Conflict, post-conflict/failed state, humanitarian, disaster relief, and support and 

reconstruction operations will occur simultaneously. Such operations will require increased 

coordination/integration with a range of civilian organizations, both domestic and international. U.S.

forces will be required to interact with and to protect nongovernment organizations (NGOs), private 

voluntary organizations (PVOs), and humanitarian organizations more than ever before.

Long-term implications of the SE conditions are uncertain and can lead to a multitude of potential 

alternative security futures (ranging from some variant of the status quo, to a more violent world, to a 

less brutal outlook marked by greater cooperation and more effective international institutions). Future

conflicts, moreover, will primarily:

• Require simultaneous operations of varying kinds (combat and reconstruction) vs. sequential,

phased operations 

• Be identity- (ethnic, religious) and/or deprivation-based

• Occasionally rise to the level of genocide and/or mass atrocity

• Be asymmetric and irregular rather than symmetric (involving at times states but also various 

types of non-state actors, e.g. terrorist groups, criminal organizations, guerrillas, etc.)

• Occur increasingly in complex terrain to mitigate perceived technological advantages

• Require better cultural understanding to avoid broadening or deepening the conflict

POTENTIALLY CONTENTIOUS OES AND RELATED MISSIONS 

Focusing on OEs likely to see increasing tension or conflict can help us understand the types of 

environments, conditions, missions, and adversaries we might face. The OEs of Iran, China, Yemen, 

North Korea, Pakistan, and Nigeria will be presented to highlight types of possible environments.1

ADVERSARIES IN THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT 

The strategic environment is essentially the sum of all the OEs in which commanders and units could 

find themselves conducting decisive action. Adversaries take the means provided to them in the 

strategic environment and use those means in conceptually enduring ways to achieve their ends. That 

is adaptive strategy. Adaptation, broadly defined, is the ability to learn and to adjust behaviors based on 

learning, and is closely linked to one’s environment and its variable conditions.

WAYS—THE METHODS OF ADAPTIVE STRATEGY

Success goes to those who master the skills necessary to act, react, and adapt with speed and creativity.

Enemies learn quickly and can change, although sometimes haphazardly and incompletely, making the 

“new” skills difficult to counter. Adversaries will continue to be adaptive in terms of using all available 

sources of power at their disposal. The methods of adaptive strategy are as follows: conduct preclusion,

control tempo, attack will, neutralize technological overmatch, change the nature of conflict, allow no 

sanctuary, and employ shielding.
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5 Operational Environments to 2028: The Strategic Environment for Unified Land Operations

MEANS—THE HUMAN AND PHYSICAL CAPITAL OF ADAPTIVE STRATEGY

While, conceptually, adaptive strategy is the use of available means in the strategic environment to 

achieve goals, these activities occur in specific OEs. Inside these OEs, the means vary widely. U.S. 

national interest will also vary widely across the various OEs. The components that exist from which to 

build an improvised explosive device (IED) in South Asia are not the same as those available in Central 

Asia or Central America. The means are what change from year to year and OE to OE. However, given 

our analysis of the strategic environment, we know the means adversaries will need to accomplish their 

goals and the means available to them. This allows us to draw basic conclusions about the threats that 

will exist in the strategic environment during this period. The tactical manifestation of an actor using a 

hybrid strategy is a hybrid threat.

HYBRID THREAT

The hybrid threat components of adaptive strategy include two or more of the following:

• Military forces

• Nation-state paramilitary forces (such as internal security forces, police, or border guards)

• Insurgent organizations (movements that primarily rely on subversion and violence to change 

the status quo)

• Guerrilla units (irregular indigenous forces operating in occupied territory)

• Criminal organizations (such as gangs, drug cartels, or hackers)

Hybrid threats will use a strategic capability that forces any intervening power to adjust operations

(WMD, special-purpose forces [SPF], etc). This capability may not be fully developed or developed at all. 

This will not affect the transition between regular and irregular operations, and the threat of the 

capability still provides a tool for manipulating the intervening force (e.g. Iraq’s WMD capability circa 

2001). All components of a hybrid threat will use cyber operations to either degrade U.S. mission 

command capabilities, or to conduct global perception management campaigns.

Hybrid threats have the ability to combine and transition between regular, irregular, and criminal forces 

and operations and to conduct simultaneous combinations of various types of activities that will change 

and adapt over time. Such varied forces and capabilities enable hybrid threats to capitalize on perceived 

U.S. vulnerabilities. Perhaps even more confusing will be when those combinations of threats are 

uncoordinated and simply seek to maximize their own organizational goals rather than any overarching 

objective.

TACTICAL DESIGNS

At the tactical level, hybrid threats will employ four key designs that specifically adapt resources 

available in the strategic environment for use against the U.S. and its partners.

• Exploit Regular/Irregular Synergy

• Employ Range of Technologies

• Information Warfare as Key Weapon System

• Employ Complex Battle Positions and Utilize Cultural Standoff Capabilities
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Operational Environments to 2028: The Strategic Environment for Unified Land Operations 6

Adversarial challenges will require that the Army be prepared for a wide range of missions over the 

forecast period. The leader development, training development, capabilities and concepts development 

implications are significant. 

MILITARY IMPLICATIONS 

The conditions and strategies highlighted in Chapter 2, Conditions of the Strategic Environment, reveal 

the implications for leader, training, capabilities, and concepts development as well as several 

implications across Army Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, 

Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF).

DEVELOPMENT IMPLICATIONS

• Leader Development: Leaders must be able to deal effectively with the complexity and 

uncertainty of potential OEs, be culturally aware, understand the information environment, 

master consequence management, and be prepared to conduct decisive actions. 

• Training Development: Training venues must reflect an understanding of the influence of 

various cultures and actors present in potential OEs, must continue the tradition of providing an 

arena that allows free play, and must adapt to new methods and mediums for training. Current 

and future Soldiers will demand that the Army keep pace with ICT developments for training.

• Capabilities Development: Capabilities development must anticipate the operational needs of 

commanders and incorporate the adaptability inherent in “off-the-shelf” technology to support 

the near future. 

• Concepts Development: Accounting for adaptive adversaries requires scenario-based concepts 

that are informed by collaboration from ongoing operations but look well beyond the current 

fight.

IMPLICATIONS SHAPING DOTMLPF

Conditions across the strategic environment indicate future conflict will not be confined to one simple 

category. It will range in scope from major conventional fights to humanitarian support and nationbuilding missions. Very capable adversaries will continue to challenge U.S. interests globally, while rising 

military powers, coupled with existing militaries, will work to advance their regional and global interests.

Training and preparation against these changing conditions will drive adaptation and flexibility within 

the Army and ensure U.S. forces are prepared for any potential OE and any potential mission:

• Increasing Challenge of a Wide Range of Threats

• Increasing Multiplicity of Actors across Potential OEs

• Increasing Importance of Gaining a Holistic Understanding of each OE

• Increasing Degree of Uncertainty

• Increasing Occurrence of Simultaneous and Continuous Engagements

• Prepare for Decisive Action

• Increasing Importance of the Information Environment
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7 Operational Environments to 2028: The Strategic Environment for Unified Land Operations

• Increasing Likelihood of a WMD Event and Consequence Management Activities

• Prepare for Homeland Security/Defense Missions

• Prepare to Defend Access to the Global Commons

• Prepare for Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief Operations

• Prepare for Reconstruction Operations

• Prepare to Counter Threat Anti-Access Capability

Clearly, this estimate of the strategic environment to 2028 demonstrates that any future OE will be 

complex and demanding. Key themes emerging from analysis of SE conditions and adversaries are 

proliferation of WMD, hybrid threats, advancements in technology, and an explosion of ICT capabilities 

among actors of all types. Adaptation will be rampant among adversaries, so we must train and prepare 

for a multitude of these conditions on a wide array of OEs. Only through these measures will the U.S. 

military be able to successfully navigate any future OE.
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Contents

Chapter 1: Introduction

PURPOSE 10

STRUCTURE 10

METHODOLOGY 10

THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS 11

CONCLUSION 12

Chapter 2: Conditions of the Strategic Environment

THE COMPLEX STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT 13

CONDITIONS SHAPING THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT TO 2028 14

POLITICAL CONDITIONS 15

MILITARY CONDITIONS 16

ECONOMIC CONDITIONS 20

SOCIAL CONDITIONS 21

INFORMATION CONDITIONS 22

INFRASTRUCTURE CONDITIONS 24

PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT CONDITIONS 26

TIME CONDITION 27

IMPLICATIONS OF THE CONDITIONS 27

POTENTIALLY CONTENTIOUS OES AND RELATED MISSIONS 28

ADVERSARIES IN THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT 31

CONCLUSION 42

Chapter 3: Military Implications

INTRODUCTION 43

KEY MILITARY IMPLICATIONS SHAPING DOTMLPF 45

CONCLUSION 52

Annex A: The Operational Environment Assessment Framework of Analysis

INTRODUCTION 54

OEA FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS 54

VARIABLES AND SUBVARIABLES 55
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CONCLUSION 56

Annex B: Asia-Pacific Regional OE Conditions and Characteristics

U.S. STRATEGIC INTERESTS AND GOALS 57

CONDITIONS SHAPING THE REGION 58

FUTURE ARMY MISSION AREAS 60

Annex C: Middle East and Southwest Asia Regional OE Conditions and Characteristics

U.S. STRATEGIC INTERESTS AND GOALS 62

CONDITIONS SHAPING THE REGION 63

FUTURE ARMY MISSION AREAS 64

Annex D: Europe and Russia Regional OE Conditions and Characteristics

U.S. STRATEGIC INTERESTS AND GOALS 67

CONDITIONS SHAPING THE REGION 67

FUTURE ARMY MISSION AREAS 69

Annex E: Africa Regional OE Conditions and Characteristics

U.S. STRATEGIC INTERESTS AND GOALS 71

CONDITIONS SHAPING THE REGION 72

FUTURE ARMY MISSION AREAS 75

Annex F: Central and South America and the Caribbean Regional OE Conditions and Characteristics

U.S. STRATEGIC INTERESTS AND GOALS 77

CONDITIONS SHAPING THE REGION 78

FUTURE ARMY MISSION AREAS 80

Annex G: North America Regional OE Conditions and Characteristics

U.S. STRATEGIC INTERESTS AND GOALS 83

CONDITIONS SHAPING THE REGION 84

FUTURE ARMY MISSION AREAS 85

Annex H: Additional Adversarial Designs and Capabilities 87
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Chapter 1

Introduction

An operational environment has no constant form or static conditions. Each OE has its own unique 

flavor and characteristics given that conditions across the strategic environment manifest differently in 

each potential OE. While such constantly shifting conditions make it difficult to develop a foundation for 

comprehending the strategic environment and the multiple OEs within that environment, such 

understanding is essential to all aspects of TRADOC’s responsibilities.

Obtaining knowledge of the strategic environment, by observing its key conditions and facts, is the first 

step in gaining the understanding required to apply resources against ever more capable adversaries—

adversaries that are able to create and take advantage of the complexity of the situation. This document 

is written as TRADOC’s view of the near- and mid-term strategic environment (from the present to 2028) 

to provide leaders at all levels with the knowledge required to make critical decisions across the leader 

development, training development, capabilities development, and concepts development domains that 

will shape the Army of the future. 

PURPOSE 

The purpose of this estimate is to describe the strategic conditions Army forces will encounter as they 

complete the mission in Afghanistan and prepare for operations beyond the current fight. The primary 

goal is to provide an overview of the conditions—both current and future—and types of actors in the 

strategic environment and the many potential OEs that reside within it. To this end, the paper provides

the Army’s capstone view of the conditions of the SE, the most likely adversaries and their strategies, 

and the military implications of both. 

STRUCTURE 

This estimate consists of three chapters and eight annexes which are designed to provide an overview of 

the key conditions of the strategic environment along with an analytic tool—the Operational 

Environment Assessment (OEA) framework of analysis—to capture the unique characteristics and 

conditions of a specific OE. Chapter 1 provides the introduction, purpose of the paper, and key 

definitions. Chapter 2 provides an overview of the strategic environment along with some key examples 

and presents a discussion of potential adversaries and their associated strategies within that 

environment. Chapter 3 offers the implications to the Army of the conditions of the strategic 

environment.

METHODOLOGY 

In order to capture the most significant conditions, the SE is analyzed through the lens of eight OE 

variables (the OEA framework of analysis; see Annex A: The Operational Environment Assessment 

Framework). The OEA framework allows an analyst to develop a deeper and more robust understanding

of the key conditions and characteristics of a specific OE. Key conditions across each variable have been
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11 Operational Environments to 2028: The Strategic Environment for Unified Land Operations

selected for discussion, and only those conditions deemed to have the most important security 

implications are included in this paper. The selected conditions have current significance and are the 

most likely to have future implications across the SE. Each variable discussion shows the current and 

projected future path of each condition.

The OEA framework is typically used to gain a holistic understanding of one specific OE—most often at 

the state or regional level of analysis. Detailed analysis is required, given that strategic conditions 

manifest differently across each OE and change constantly. At the operational level, a high degree of 

resolution is needed to capture the required level of detail for training or pre-deployment. The OEA 

framework provides such resolution. For use at the strategic level, the framework discussion highlights 

only the key conditions or observations from each variable that are deemed to have both global reach 

and significant security implication. Only after the conditions of the strategic environment are 

articulated can a discussion of the types of adversaries and their potential strategies begin. 

Annexes B-G provide regional discussions of the selected conditions. Conditions shaping each region are 

presented followed by a discussion of potential future Army missions in each region. Finally, Annex H

presents an overview of additional adversarial designs and capabilities.

THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS 

It is important for the reader to understand the difference between the strategic environment and an 

operational environment. The SE is the global environment in which the U.S. President employs all the 

elements of national power (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic). For the purpose of this 

paper the strategic environment is defined as the set of global conditions, circumstances, and influences 

that affect the employment of all elements of U.S. national power. The SE contains multiple potential 

OEs.
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Therefore, there is no one operational environment. By Department of Defense (DOD) definition, an OE 

is “a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of 

capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander” (JP 3-0). This definition applies to an OE for a 

specific operation, at any level of command, and any level of analysis. Multiple OEs can and do exist. 

This distinction becomes important in order to avoid confusion when discussing conditions in the 

strategic vs. potential operational environments. 

CONCLUSION 

We know that the current and future strategic environment will be characterized by uncertainty, 

complexity, and increasingly nuanced relationships. TRADOC must develop an understanding of the 

conditions of this fluid environment and their interactions. The strategic environment must be 

discussed, captured, and factored into all decision-making. Only then can the right training, correct mix 

of systems and capabilities, and suitable approaches to leader development and education be identified

and implemented across the Army. 
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13 Operational Environments to 2028: The Strategic Environment for Unified Land Operations

Chapter 2

Conditions of the Strategic Environment

THE COMPLEX STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT 

The strategic environment remains as it has always been: complex. The interaction of the many 

variables within the environment, including human behavior, assures both fog and friction. The Cold 

War SE, despite the many variables involved, proved to be a relatively stable and understandable milieu 

for decision-makers. Both options and limits were considered in the context of an overarching strategic 

view based on a broad consensus. The nuclear weapons standoff between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., 

arguably, produced deterrence and, combined with strong conventional forces, reduced and contained

the scale of both proxy wars and simmering ethnic and ideological tensions.

The collapse of Soviet communism has left us with a paradox; there is less threat but also less peace.2

General Manfred Woerner, NATO Secretary General

The current strategic environment seems more ambiguous, presenting multiple layers of complexity and

a multiplicity of actors challenging the Army with requirements beyond traditional warfighting skills and 

training. A wide-range of actors across the current and projected SE – friendly and neutrals, malicious 

actors, and threats – will interact, often in an uncoordinated manner, to produce a complex 

environment. Neutral or even friendly actors will act in accord with organizational goals that may be 

contrary to U.S. national interests causing friction. Malicious actors will use violence in pursuit of their 

goals and will potentially challenge U.S. national interests and vulnerabilities. Threats will use this 

complexity to their advantage and often employ hybrid strategies. This multiplicity of actors will 

continue to operate across potential operational environments during the forecast period. 

Current ethnic and sectarian tensions within and between countries threaten stability around the world.

Economic distress, coupled with the long-term effects of bad governance and revolutionary demands for 

better governance, have contributed to global unrest. Economic distress is not limited to developing 

states. The European Union (E.U.) may yet fracture. The strength and influence of the Western alliance 

in global affairs seems, for the moment at least, in decline. The U.S. remains the most powerful state, 

but is beset by its own economic and political challenges which further muddy the water through which 

policy makers and military strategists must peer.

The anticipated strategic environment remains intricate and ambiguous due, in part, to the absence of 

an overarching consensus on how to approach current and future adversaries and challenges. The 

national military tools currently available are not always useful in unraveling such complexities in the 

absence of significant agreement on how to approach the current SE. In some cases, the application of 

current military tools in an effort to ease tensions has instead exacerbated such problems.

The complexity of today's SE is at least in part a result of U.S. military dominance. Weaker states, in 

response to U.S. military dominance, have developed strategies to counter U.S. intervention. These 

states have built conventional forces to coerce and deter neighboring countries while augmenting forces 
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Operational Environments to 2028: The Strategic Environment for Unified Land Operations 14

with irregular elements that provide advantages if the U.S. intervenes. Developing forces that take the 

U.S. away from its preferred method of warfare—through resources such as WMD, cyber attacks, SPF, 

or terrorist groups acting as proxies—are believed to significantly reduce the likelihood that the U.S. will

choose to enter a conflict.

However, U.S. non-action in this kind of environment can result in two fundamental risks. First, the 

strategic risk is that non-intervention in a turbulent area could produce an outcome contrary to U.S. 

interests. For example, in Afghanistan the U.S. supported a "proxy" ground force (the Northern Alliance)

with conventional air force assets and U.S. Special Forces. Had the U.S. chosen not to introduce 

significant ground forces capable of shaping the outcomes, then the probability of an end state 

incongruent with U.S. interests would have been increased. It may be argued that the current state of 

affairs in Afghanistan would be no worse had we not introduced ground forces. Even if Afghanistan does 

not become a functioning liberal democracy, there can be no argument that much of Afghanistan is 

better off now than under the Taliban.

Second, the risk of failure is accelerated with direct intervention. If ground forces were introduced in 

Libya, for example, missteps, miscues, and mistakes may have produced the same result as nonintervention—a Libyan government hostile to U.S. interests. Accessibility to cell phone cameras and the 

Internet ensure that any mistake made is immediately usable for enemy propaganda and perceptionmanagement activities. In spite of these challenges and potential opportunities, the failure to place 

forces on the ground to maintain a guiding presence forfeits the chance to shape the conditions of the 

environment to be congruent with U.S. national interests.

U.S. intervention into this complex SE will produce many outcomes, some unpredictable. U.S. forces 

may unwittingly release long-suppressed aggression and create chaotic and dangerous conditions for 

both U.S. forces and the population. Radical ideologies foster entities that see U.S. involvement in any 

conflict as an opportunity to weaken the U.S. will while bolstering their own claims to be the righteous 

purveyor of that radical ideology by attacking the U.S. This opportunistic venture produces its own 

complexity in an OE that would otherwise have been amenable to the tools U.S. forces bring to the fight.

Developing an understanding of these challenges and the complexities they present is critical to 

comprehending current and future military operations. To foster this understanding, the following 

discussion provides an analysis of the key conditions that will shape the strategic environment over 

time.

CONDITIONS SHAPING THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT TO 2028 

The eight OE variables—political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical 

environment, and time—provide a valuable lens through which to analyze conditions in the strategic

environment. Key conditions across each variable have been selected for discussion. The selected 

conditions are those conditions with current significance and the most likely to have future implications 

across the SE. Each variable discussion shows the current and projected future path of each condition.

This approach is based on the OEA framework of analysis (see Annex A: The Operational Environment 

Assessment Framework). The OEA framework is typically used to gain a holistic understanding of one 

specific OE—most often at the state or regional level of analysis. Detailed analysis is required, given that 

strategic conditions manifest differently across each OE and change constantly. At the operational level, 

a high degree of resolution is needed to capture the required level of detail for training or pre-
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15 Operational Environments to 2028: The Strategic Environment for Unified Land Operations

deployment. The OEA framework provides such resolution. For use at the strategic level, the framework 

discussion highlights only the key conditions or observations from each variable that are deemed to 

have both global reach and significant security implications. 

The individual variables are each significant, but the convergence point of one or more variables can 

have the most dramatic impact on an OE or group of OEs. For example, the Arab Spring political 

revolutions witnessed the convergence of political (shortfalls in state governance) with social (persistent 

youth bulge), manifesting in poor economic conditions that helped ignite a massive popular uprising 

against numerous regimes. Information conditions (ICT proliferation) then facilitated the movement. In 

the final analysis, it was the convergence of at least four variables in the OE that helped manifest the 

Arab Spring. When appropriate, the following discussion will address potential areas of convergence.

POLITICAL CONDITIONS 

CHANGING INTERNATIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF POWER

The most significant political condition over the forecast period is the shifting of the global balance of 

power. The U.S. faces a balance of power shift “that rivals the end of the Cold War, if not that facing the 

nation at the conclusion of World War II.”3 By 2028, the U.S. will remain the world’s dominant political, 

economic, and military power, but with a continually decreasing relative advantage over other nations.4

Emerging state powers and new, more powerful non-state actors will create a multipolar international 

system of power. The countries with the most potential to substantially increase their power during the 

forecast period include China, India, Russia, Indonesia, Turkey, and Brazil.

5 History indicates that 

“emerging multipolar systems have been more unstable than bipolar ones.”6 This shift in the 

international distribution of power has the potential to produce greater political, military, and economic 

tensions between those actors who are losing power and those that are gaining in significance. This 

strategic condition will no doubt converge with economic, social, information, and military conditions

across the strategic environment for years to come. 

DECLINE OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

Over the forecast period, global governance—the collective management of common problems at the 

international level—will likely decrease due to increasing numbers and influence of non-state actors. 

Businesses, organizations, and even individuals are liable to form networks or informal groupings and 

partnerships to address their collective problems, and regional actors will band together to achieve a 

regional solution.7

The number of NGOs, PVOs, PSOs, and non-state actors is expected to increase drastically as the 

Internet facilitates worldwide contact with low entry costs and low overhead for political and security 

participants.8 Both states and non-state actors will continue to be empowered by the proliferation of ICT 

and will use such capabilities for purposes of governance at the international level. The Army must 

prepare to deal with a wide range of actors operating in the current and future strategic environment. 

Over the course of the next sixteen years the number of actors will continue to increase. 
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SHORTFALLS IN STATE GOVERNANCE

State challenges to provide good governance—basic services and governmental legitimacy—to their 

populations will remain a constant over the forecast period. Many governments in Africa, the Middle 

East, Southern Asia, and Latin America face perennial challenges in maintaining political legitimacy in the 

eyes of their citizens. They lack the institutional, infrastructural, human, and material resources to 

provide physical security, deliver basic public services, administer justice, and promote economic 

development. Non-state actors are stepping in to fill this void (e.g. Hezbollah in Lebanon). This trend will 

likely continue well into the future as other non-state actors step into political roles across various OEs.

Over the past two decades, international and bilateral development programs have increasingly 

targeted governance shortfalls in these regions with little success. Western states are not exempt from 

this problem, as growing debt loads are forcing countries to institute austerity measures in order to 

obtain the financing required to avoid default. In Greece, this has caused major reductions in social 

services and resulted in strikes and riots.9

Yemen provides the most instructive current 

example of a state failing to govern. Increasingly 

divided elites, dwindling state resources, al-Qaeda 

presence and influence, and strong, unified 

opposition movements were among the Yemeni 

state’s pre-existing conditions when the Arab Spring 

ignited. Popular protests and an overly-violent state 

response may have dealt the regime a fatal blow.

Over the past year, the army has split and state 

authority and influence have contracted significantly, 

mostly concentrating around the capital city of Sanaa 

and surrounding districts. Non-state actors, including 

al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the 

Zaydi revivalist Houthi movement, are quickly filling 

the void.10 Areas suffering from poor state 

governance will remain an attractive locale for actors seeking to establish a base of operations

unconstrained by the rules of law. State failure can also trigger destabilizing events on both a regional 

and global level. For example, protracted state failure in Yemen would likely affect maritime traffic flow 

in the Gulf of Aden, with severe ramifications for access to the Suez Canal.

11 The Army must be prepared 

to deal with failing states and those actors seeking to benefit from such conditions.

MILITARY CONDITIONS 

GLOBAL MILITARY EXPENDITURE RATES

World military spending for 2011 did not increase for the first time since 1998. The major reason for 

either reductions or increases in an individual country’s military spending relates directly to how 

particular countries have been impacted by the global financial crisis which began in 2008. Western and 

Central Europe suffered a particularly strong impact causing a reduction in military spending by 1.9 

percent from 2010 to 2011. The inability of the United States Congress to agree on a 2011 budget led to 

a small real-term reduction in U.S. military expenditures. Africa represented the greatest increase in 

military expenditures by 8.6 percent. This increase is due, in large measure, to the increasing oil 

2011 Protests in Yemen

Wikimedia Commons, Yemen Protests, 3 February 2011
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17 Operational Environments to 2028: The Strategic Environment for Unified Land Operations

revenues from countries such as Algeria. Algeria increased military spending by 44 percent due to 

increased oil revenues, threats from al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and regional ambitions. 

Middle Eastern countries increased military spending by 4.6 percent. 12

Into the future, military expenditures should not rise significantly and may see reductions in some 

countries. Western Europe is seeing continued demands for “austerity” measures. In the face of high 

unemployment, diminishing domestic public services, and greater debt, most Western European 

countries will focus discussions on how to reduce military expenditures through better European Union 

member country cooperation. The U.S. withdrawal of troops from Iraq and the anticipated pull-out of 

U.S. forces from Afghanistan should lead to status quo or reduction in U.S. military expenditures into the 

near future. North African and Middle Eastern countries facing increasing threats from international and

local terrorist organizations such AQIM and Nigerian Boko Haram, paired with large oil revenues, will 

continue to increase military spending.13

WIDE RANGE OF POTENTIAL MISSIONS AND ADVERSARIES

Conflict is a constant condition across the strategic environment, with intrastate conflict increasing 

while state-on-state conventional fights are decreasing.14 During the forecast period, governments 

worldwide will face networks of adversaries with a wide range of sophistication, capabilities, and 

goals.15 The range of threats across the strategic environment over the forecast period, include criminal 

organizations, terrorists, states and non-state actors, insurgents, transnational groups, proxies, 

technologically-empowered individuals, and paramilitaries.

16 These actors are increasing in number 

and capabilities, and may operate as regular, irregular, or hybrid threats that can and will challenge 

conventional military forces.

In addition, traditional armies are investing in more effective, conventional capabilities including armor, 

air defense, and robotics. China, Russia, and India are examples of traditionally-configured militaries that 

will grow more capable in the future. Their extensive international military training and sales programs 

are enabling other states and/or proxies to field highly-capable conventional militaries.

Allegiances and alignments within the complex network of actors, state and non-state, will often 

change. Adversarial forces will constantly study the military operations of their foes and seek to exploit 

perceived weaknesses. Transitions in operations of adversarial military forces and changes within the 

patterns of networks must be constantly monitored and anticipated to avoid surprise and maintain the 

ability to conduct operations within a designated OE. The Army must be capable of decisive action 

against a wide array of adaptive threats, and be operationally prepared for a wide range of missions.

17

Non-state actors and unconventional operational methods will have a greater impact on U.S. military 

operations. Responding to these types of adversaries “is already blurring the lines between civilian law 

enforcement and the military; it may also constrain and stress the use of political, economic, and 

military power.”18 Providing security for the nation in this environment requires the ability to conduct 

operations across the range of potential military operations. The Army will need to continue to mature 

its capabilities to counter foreign insurgents and extremists, especially in the Homeland, while 

maintaining the ability to fight a regular or hybrid threat against state actors and their proxies.
August 20, 2012 TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND (TRADOC) G-2

Operational Environments to 2028: The Strategic Environment for Unified Land Operations 18

RISE OF PSOs

Beginning in the 1990s, international conditions created an environment ripe for the creation of private 

security organizations. Several reasons account for this growth. First, post-Cold War downsizing and the 

increase in small conflicts of little interest to the great powers created a security market opportunity for 

private sector companies. Second, governments were experimenting with the outsourcing of traditional 

government jobs and roles to the private sector; security became a natural extension of this experiment. 

Third, complex military systems required contractors with requisite experience that could train, support,

and maintain increasingly sophisticated equipment.19

All indications are that PSOs will continue to be an integral part of the strategic environment to 2028.

Recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have brought attention to the use of PSOs, but lesser conflicts 

all over the world currently use the services of international companies that provide a variety of security 

services ranging from direct tactical military services, to military consulting, to military support in the 

form of logistics, intelligence, and maintenance services.20 One estimate puts the number of PSOs at 

several hundred global companies with generated revenues of over $100 billion dollars annually.21

Serious implications have not been completely resolved, including the legal status of PSOs in conflicts, 

operational and tactical control, and oversight. The consistency of small conflicts around the world, the 

hesitancy of great powers to intervene with military forces, and the complexity of modern military 

systems guarantees that PSOs will continue to be an integral part of the strategic environment in 2028.

WMD PROLIFERATION

The proliferation of WMD and related technologies will continue during the forecast period despite nonproliferation being a global priority. WMD capabilities provide actors with a strategic lever to deter their 

enemies from pursuing certain military strategies. An operational capability may give hostile states and 

non-state actors a bargaining chip to sue for a negotiated settlement short of complete defeat and 

regime change. Several extremist organizations are known to be seeking WMD capabilities as well—

especially nuclear and biological weapons. The Director of National Intelligence (DNI) predicts that 

“terrorist or insurgent organizations acting alone or through middlemen may acquire nuclear, chemical, 

and/or biological weapons and may seek opportunistic networks as service providers.”22 Recent Joint 

Staff analysis concluded that “considering the efforts by radical, non-State actors to obtain and employ 

WMD, the likelihood that WMD will be used somewhere in the next 25 years is high.”23

The proliferation of WMD and related technologies “represents the most serious future threat to 

America.”24 The DNI recently stated that the “ongoing efforts of nation-states to develop and/or acquire 

WMDs constitute a major threat to the safety of our nation, our deployed troops, and our allies.”25 The 

potential for WMD use in warfighting cannot be dismissed across the forecast period. The Army must be 

prepared to operate in WMD environments and continue to improve its ability to locate and defend 

against such capabilities.
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19 Operational Environments to 2028: The Strategic Environment for Unified Land Operations

IMPORTANCE OF THE GLOBAL COMMONS*

Adversaries will seek to deny their enemies access to the global commons, thus limiting their foes’ 

offensive and defensive capabilities. Many states—China, Brazil, India, Russia, Iran, and Saudi Arabia—

“are already beginning to orient their militaries toward the global commons, fielding significant 

maritime capabilities including advanced surface combatants, increasingly capable submarines, 

sophisticated anti-ship cruise missiles, and (in China’s case) ballistic missiles designed to strike major 

ships at sea.”26 Over the course of the forecast period, there is greater potential for cyberspace or 

space-based attacks from state, non-state, and proxy actors.27 China has spoken openly of the 

“inevitability of space conflict” and the “the requirement of [building] both offensive and defensive 

space capabilities.”28 Developing countries may be just as much of a concern. The skills required for 

India and Pakistan to create a nuclear bomb might as easily be used to develop the capability to disrupt 

space technology-generated images and information. As just one example of current attacks in the 

cyberspace common, external sources—both governmental and non-state actors—are working daily to 

penetrate U.S. DOD networks, and foreign intelligence organizations have acquired the capacity to 

disrupt the U.S. military’s information infrastructure. U.S. cyber strategy acknowledges that it is possible

that certain systems within DOD’s network have been compromised and are as yet undetected.29

CONTINUED VULNERABILITY OF THE U.S. HOMELAND

The U.S. Homeland remains vulnerable to attack from extremist groups. Despite success in reducing the 

effectiveness of al-Qaeda and its affiliates, extremists—both foreign and domestic—will use terrorist 

tactics in attempts to strike the Homeland during the forecast period. Extremists will continue to recruit

members and sympathizers, and religious fervor may not be their only incentive to fight. In addition, the 

expanding collaboration and cooperation between criminal enterprises and entities associated with 

extremism and terrorism will exponentially boost their potential for success. The Army must remain 

prepared to counter threats to the Homeland. 

EMERGING AND PROLIFERATING MILITARY TECHNOLOGIES

Over the forecast period, military technologies will continue to proliferate to all types of adversarial 

actors. If actors have the financial resources, the capabilities are there for the taking. Nanotechnologies 

will likely provide the impetus for most key emerging military technological breakthroughs over the 

forecast period. These breakthroughs will probably occur in the areas of ICT, sensor or network 

technology, biotechnology, and energy storage and transfer. Military leaders will leverage emerging ICT 

that connects intelligence to enhance their mission command to better visualize, describe, direct, and 

lead forces against a hostile, thinking, and adaptive enemy. Sensor or network technology will focus on 

unmanned systems as a means to gain information and intelligence over enemy terrain while reducing 

physical risk to military personnel. 

Biotechnology breakthroughs will have important civilian applications in the areas of medicine, food 

science, and industrial manufacturing; but they could also lead to new WMD threats to military 

personnel. It is also probable that biotechnology improvements will provide human strength 

 

* According to the Oxford Dictionary, the global commons is “the earth’s un-owned natural resources, such as the 

oceans, the atmosphere, and space.” For the purpose of this paper, the domains of the global commons are 

maritime, air, space, and cyberspace. 
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Operational Environments to 2028: The Strategic Environment for Unified Land Operations 20

augmentation through breakthroughs such as lightweight exoskeleton systems that give the wearer 

greater protection while increasing physical power. New energy storage technology will range from 

smaller, lighter, and more powerful batteries that operate military equipment to renewable energy 

systems that use wind and solar power instead of hydrocarbon fuels. The military may turn to vehicles 

powered by more accessible biofuels and reduce reliance on gasoline, diesel, and aviation fuel produced 

from overseas sources. At the extreme end, directed energy weapons may reach the stage where they 

possess the ability to incapacitate or kill the enemy without collateral damage to either people or 

infrastructure.30 Training and education, and leader, concepts, and capabilities development will need to 

embrace and adapt to key emerging technologies. Adversaries with financial resources will certainly be 

ready to adapt. 

ECONOMIC CONDITIONS 

ECONOMIC SHIFTS

Two main global changes in relative wealth and economic power are now underway. The first is a shift 

from Western to Eastern nations that will continue over the course of the next decade—if not longer. 

This change will affect the current, global political and military balance of power through the gradual 

move to a multipolar world, one in which pre-eminence of the West cannot be taken for granted. 

Nontraditional economic alliances exclusive of the U.S.—such as the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, 

and South Africa) alliance—are likely to become stronger, and have the potential to bring another 200 

million people with incomes over $15,000 into the world economy by 2050.31 South Korea, Indonesia, 

Nigeria, and Chile will also emerge, laying a firm foundation for global economic strength.32 The second 

change is that economic alliances between criminal organizations and non-state actors will create new 

global agents of change, control, and influence in the economic and political realm. The National 

Intelligence Council estimates that organized crime will continue to grow in influence, with the potential 

to control several Eastern European governments by 2025.

33 The current and future strategic 

environment will require the Army to understand such new alliances and shifts and be prepared to deal 

with the potential tensions stemming from such change.

INCOME INEQUALITY

Income inequality will remain a key economic consideration in the SE. According to the World Bank, over 

the next several decades the number of people considered to be in the global middle class is projected 

to increase from 7.6% to 16.1% of the world’s population, with most of the new entrants coming from 

China and India. By 2025-2030, the portion of the world considered poor will shrink by about 23%, but 

will still constitute 63% of the global population and will be worse off than it is now.34 Research on 

trends in armed conflict demonstrates that a disproportionate share of internal conflicts occurs in poor 

countries with low economic growth rates. 

ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE

Globalization has and will continue to raise the level of economic interdependence between states, nonstate actors, and individuals across the global economy. While this condition is apt to be an engine for 

accelerated economic growth, it is also a source of risk, as local markets face increased exposure to 

destabilizing fluctuations in the global economy.35 Resources, trade, capital, and intellectual property 

will rely on complex networks of physical and virtual infrastructure and the supply chains that support 
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21 Operational Environments to 2028: The Strategic Environment for Unified Land Operations

Trend in Global Population, 1750-2050

United Nations Dept of Social and Economic Affairs, World Population 

Prospects: The 2006 Revision, February 2007

globalization. Disruptions or attacks anywhere along these supply chains risk propelling once-isolated 

local events into potentially catastrophic global events. Assuring continued access to the global 

commons may involve the use of military force, while interdependence may shift political power 

balances in favor of exporting nations over their importing partners or vice versa.

SOCIAL CONDITIONS 

DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION

Across the strategic environment, states are going through what is referred to as demographic 

transition—the tendency for families to have increasingly fewer children per household. Developed 

countries’ populations have transitioned to a demographic pattern of low birthrates and slow 

population decline, presaging an end to the exponential growth of world population during the late 20th 

century. China, Japan, Russia, Korea, and most of Europe will experience aging populations and gradual 

population decline that will test their governments’ abilities to maintain economic growth, provide 

health care and pensions to growing senior populations, and provide for national defense. The number 

of elderly people will likely double in the developed world by 2028.36

Aging and even declining populations for many of America’s traditional allies in Europe and Asia is 

already affecting their ability to contribute to collective defense. Even China, which is often posited as a 

security challenge to the U.S., faces problems associated with a rapidly aging and declining population, 

especially after 2030. Unlike the 

already-industrialized countries, these 

demographic challenges will appear in 

China before its economy has fully 

developed and will likely affect the 

direction and pace of its economic 

growth. Aging populations might also 

trigger higher migration levels as 

states seek to find adequate sources 

of labor.

POPULATION GROWTH

Despite the ongoing transition to 

fewer children per household, the 

world is adding the largest numbers 

to its population in history, with an 

increase of 83 million annually. The 

global population reached an 

estimated seven billion in 2011. Both 

the six and seven billion marks were 

reached in a period of 12 years from 

the previous billion. If birth rates 

decline as projected, a population of 
August 20, 2012 TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND (TRADOC) G-2

Operational Environments to 2028: The Strategic Environment for Unified Land Operations 22

eight billion will be reached in 2023.37 By mid-2025, more than a billion will be added to the population 

of the less developed world while the more developed world will see growth of only 48 million.38

Over the past half-century, fertility rates fell dramatically in Europe, particularly in Eastern Europe. 

Simultaneously, fertility appears to be on the rise in a few countries, such as Burundi and Zimbabwe in 

Africa, and Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in Central Asia.39 Russia, Ukraine, Italy, Japan, and almost all 

countries in Eastern Europe are expected to see their populations decline by several percentage points

by 2025. In Russia, Ukraine, and a few other Eastern European countries, these declines could approach 

or even exceed 10% of the current populations.40 The U.S. population is projected to grow by more than 

40 million, Canada by 4.5 million, and Australia by more than 3 million. India will be the nation with the 

largest population increase, representing about one-fifth of world growth. India is projected to add 

about 240 million people by 2025, reaching a population of approximately 1.45 billion. At the same time, 

China’s current population of over 1.3 billion is expected to increase by more than 100 million.41

Nearly all of this growth will be in the developing world. The increased world population will fuel greater 

demand for resources such as energy, minerals, clean water, and food. The competition for resources—

aggravated by a larger world population—also heightens the possibility of armed conflict, with 

populations desperate for essential resources being more likely to resort to extreme measures. The 

mistreatment of a weaker group by a stronger group could lead to mass atrocities and even genocide, 

requiring a response from the global community.

42

PERSISTENT YOUTH BULGE

Many countries around the world are now dealing with a youth bulge, which is defined as a 

disproportionately large percentage of a population between the ages of 15 and 29. The current youth 

bulges in Turkey, Lebanon, and Iran will decrease, but those in the West Bank, Iraq, Yemen, Saudi 

Arabia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Sub-Saharan Africa will continue throughout the forecast period.43

Such a bulge can have either positive or negative effects for a country: it can supply needed workers in a 

robust economy and a large pool of applicants for military recruitment, or it can create a large 

population of discontented youths with no prospects for employment or self-improvement.

44 A youth 

bulge is often accompanied by high unemployment among young men that in turn increases the 

potential for instability. Nigeria, for example, has thus far been unsuccessful in finding work for its 

massive youth bulge—almost half the population is under the age of 15, with a staggering 45 million 

between 10 and 24 years old.

45 The result has been some youth turning toward radicalized elements, 

particularly the terrorist group Boko Haram in the country’s north, as a means of livelihood and an 

outlet for their frustration. The Arab Spring occurred in countries with the same conditions—large youth 

bulge and high unemployment. Similar conditions prevail across much of Africa, Asia, and parts of Latin 

America. 

INFORMATION CONDITIONS 

PROLIFERATION OF ICT

ICT has evolved tremendously since the creation of the first electric programmable computer in 1941, 

and will continue to do so during the forecast period and beyond.

46 Items such as cell phones, smart 

phones, and tablets will continue to become smaller, more powerful, more versatile, and less expensive. 

As a direct result, the possession of advanced technology is no longer limited to nation-states or wealthy 
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23 Operational Environments to 2028: The Strategic Environment for Unified Land Operations

Trend in Volume of Mobile Communications, 2009-2014

Cisco Systems Inc, Cisco Visual Networking Index: Forecast and Methodology, 2009-2014, June 2010

individuals, but is available to even the poorest persons living in the most poverty-stricken countries in 

the world. For example, a recent survey in India revealed that over half the population—53.2%—owns a 

mobile phone, and that more households possess televisions than toilets.47 Many developing nations are 

taking advantage of technological advances such as “skipping” landlines and building communications 

infrastructure based on cell phone technology. The implications of technology proliferation are multiple 

and varied, but four stand out in particular: transparency, actor empowerment, strategic narrative, and 

technological vulnerability. The Army must be prepared to operate within all types of information 

environments. Adversaries will attempt to control the narrative and deprive U.S. forces of ICT 

capabilities across all potential OEs.

Transparency across Societies

Individuals and states can no longer expect to keep the world ignorant of their actions. All military 

actions and activities have the potential to be digitally captured (perhaps even digitally manipulated) 

and distributed to a global audience. Information could previously be suppressed through lack of 

evidence and/or lack of access to broadcast methods, but this is no longer the case. From the beating of 

Rodney King in Los Angeles in 1991 to the treatment of the “blue bra woman” by Egyptian security 

forces in 2011, such actions that could formerly be kept hidden are now open for all to see. Regardless 

of where an event happens, someone will be there with a cell phone, recording it and uploading it to the 

Internet within minutes. It will become increasingly difficult for actors to conduct diplomacy and military 

operations with the continuous threat that all their actions and comments are recorded and distributed 

to a global audience.48

Actor Empowerment

The rise of social media, such as Facebook and Twitter, is having a direct impact on the ease with which 

individuals can 

communicate with 

each other. With 

older software 

technologies, mass 

communication was 

still limited in time 

and space. The best 

a person could do 

was post something 

to a Web site or 

send out a mass email, and hope that 

the intended 

audience would 

check the Web site 

or e-mail account in 

the near future. 

Now, an individual 

can post something 

with a cell phone, and it is instantly communicated to a large audience via cell phones, computers, and 

tablets. Others can just as quickly post a response that is seen by the original recipients. This fast, 
August 20, 2012 TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND (TRADOC) G-2

Operational Environments to 2028: The Strategic Environment for Unified Land Operations 24

interactive way of communicating can lead to activities as innocuous as “flash mobs,” and as serious as 

full-scale riots. Though the role of social media during the Arab Spring is not yet clearly understood, 

there is little doubt that it did indeed play a part. As technology is placed in the hands of more and more 

people, social media will make it easier to instantly mobilize large crowds, be it political, military, or 

social in nature.

Controlling the Strategic Narrative

With the instantaneous nature of global communications via ICT, the importance of rapid and credible 

perception management is growing at an exponential rate. In the past, if an event could not be hidden 

from sight, the actors involved could reveal information slowly and in the manner of their choosing. 

With mounting transparency and actor empowerment, it is no longer the party that explains his case 

best that wins the argument, but the one who explains it first. The ability to decide on a narrative and 

get it out into public view in a timely fashion is paramount: the first narrative presented is seen as 

authoritative, and those holding other views are automatically put in defensive mode—they must hope 

to persuade their intended audience of the correctness of their view and the wrongness of the other, 

whereas the holders of the first narrative have no such difficulties. This has strong implications for both 

the political and military variables, as modern governments and militaries are usually constrained by 

some form of approval chain that limits their ability to rapidly respond to events, whereas their 

opponents have no such constraints.

Technological Vulnerability

The spread of ICT on a global basis and developed nations’ dependence on technology will place them at 

an amplified risk over the forecast period. Cyber attacks, previously the domain of hostile governments, 

are now easily within the realm of individuals and loosely-knit organizations, such as the hacker group 

Anonymous. These effects can be felt by both individuals and organizations alike, from the person who 

discovers his e-mail account has been hacked to the gaming company whose customer names and credit 

card information are stolen. U.S. cyber strategy has acknowledged that it is possible that certain systems 

within DOD’s network have been compromised and are as yet undetected.49

One other risk of dependence is the growing existence and ready availability of technological 

countermeasures, two examples being cell phone jammers and global positioning system (GPS) 

jamming/spoofing. Both have been used successfully in military situations: the first by U.S. and affiliated 

forces as counter-IED measures in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the second by Iran to capture a U.S. drone 

in 2011.50 As such devices continue to grow in availability, the technological advantage held by one party 

over another is reduced or even eliminated. With their heavy dependence on ICT, U.S. forces and other 

modern militaries may find their opponents equal or even superior to them in some ways.

INFRASTRUCTURE CONDITIONS 

URBANIZATION

The urbanization of countries around the globe will continue during the forecast period. According to 

the National Intelligence Council, “by 2025 about 57% of the world’s population will live in urban areas, 

up from 50% today [2008].”51 As these areas continue to grow and expand, problems inherent to urban 

communities will be intensified. Those seeking political change can easily reach and mobilize large 

numbers of people with effects up to and including the overturning of governments, as occurred during 
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25 Operational Environments to 2028: The Strategic Environment for Unified Land Operations

the Arab Spring of 2011. Urban populations are also difficult to control from a security perspective, as 

both criminals and insurgents can easily blend into the environment. News and opinions are quickly 

passed from person to person—either by word-of-mouth or electronically—allowing for freedom of 

expression and simultaneously making government control of information more difficult. Rising 

demands on infrastructure will result in larger and more frequent breakdowns of utility and 

transportation systems. The sheer number of people within a fixed area will make any humanitarian 

crisis—whether earthquake, famine, or epidemic—more severe in both size and scope. Prolific 

urbanization has the potential to exacerbate issues faced by a government, military, or organization.

EXPANDING PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE

Physical infrastructure, such as road, utility, and communications systems, will expand and improve 

during the next sixteen years. China is expanding its road infrastructure with the goal of having a 

network “suitable for the entire Chinese population by 2020,” including at least 27 new highways.52 The 

country is also making bilateral agreements with other nations whereby natural resources are 

exchanged for infrastructure improvement programs. For example, in 2007 China signed an agreement 

with the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in which China provides $5 billion for infrastructure 

improvements in exchange for rights to DRC’s natural resources.53 Access to electricity is of major 

import as well: in light of global concerns over hydrocarbon resource levels and nuclear power safety 

issues, hydroelectric power projects will expand worldwide. Turkey is currently working on an extensive 

project that includes multiple dams and hydroelectric plants on the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, and the 

Supreme Court of Chile recently ruled to allow the HidroAysen dam project in Patagonia to proceed.54

ICT infrastructure will also continue to grow in both developed and developing countries, such as the 

current project to build a land-based fiber-optic system linking the countries of Sierra Leone, Guinea, 

and Liberia in West Africa.55

Largest Urban Agglomerations, 1975, 2000, 2025

United Nations, World Urbanization Prospects: The 2007 Revision, Population Reference Bureau, 12 April 2012
August 20, 2012 TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND (TRADOC) G-2

Operational Environments to 2028: The Strategic Environment for Unified Land Operations 26

Trend in Water Availability in Africa, 1990-2050

United Nations Environment Programme, Global Environment Outlook 2000, 1999

PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT CONDITIONS 

COMPETITION OVER NATURAL RESOURCES

Competition over limited 

natural resources—such as 

water, hydrocarbons, metals, 

and rare earths—will continue 

to intensify during the 

upcoming decades, fueled by 

regional economic and population growth; unequal resource 

distribution and limited supply; 

unstable political, military, 

and/or physical environments in 

source regions; and a distinct 

lack of suitable alternatives for 

the resources sought. Of 

particular note is that 

hydrocarbons will continue to 

experience mounting demand—

and prices—as both developed 

and developing countries 

increase their energy consumption. Reactions to this struggle

over natural resources will 

mainly occur in the political, 

military, and economic arenas, 

and may manifest in such ways 

as the arms-for-oil agreement 

between Venezuela and 

Belarus; the mining of conflict 

diamonds in camps run by 

Zimbabwean security forces; 

and the current lawsuit brought 

by the U.S., E.U., and Japan against China regarding Chinese production and use of rare earths.56

CLIMATE CHANGE

Global weather patterns have diverged significantly from the norm in recent years.57 While a discussion 

on the prospect of global climate change is not within the purview of this paper, a consideration of 

possible implications is both appropriate and relevant. Potential effects of lasting weather shifts 

generally fall into two broad categories: short-term and long-term. Short-term effects include 

catastrophic events that are inherently one-time in nature—e.g. hurricanes, typhoons, tornados, and 

mudslides—and may or may not be severe enough to require a U.S. humanitarian response. Long-term 

changes in regional climate are characteristically slower and more lasting, and include expanding or 
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27 Operational Environments to 2028: The Strategic Environment for Unified Land Operations

shifting deserts, changes in average annual temperature or rainfall, and increases in seasonal flooding. 

The effects of such changes play out through the economic, social, political, and military variables.

SPECIAL CASES

Two specific physical environment conditions bring together the interplay of natural resources and 

climate change, namely access to fresh water and the opening of the Arctic Ocean. Changing weather 

patterns will cause a decrease in available water in some regions, leading to a loss of arable land, 

population movement, increased social and political conflict, and potential military clashes. For 

example, Turkey’s Southeastern Anatolia Project centered on dam construction and increased irrigation 

of Turkish farmland. The project focused on the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers as the main sources of 

water, leading to reduced levels of fresh water flowing to Iraq and causing major tension between the 

two countries.58

Reduced levels of ice in the Arctic Ocean have opened up northern waters to a host of possible activities, 

two of which are natural resource exploration and maritime commerce. As much as 22% of the world’s 

undiscovered oil and natural gas may lie in the Arctic, and use of the Northeast Passage for shipping 

goods between Asia and Europe promises significant time and cost savings over the current route 

through the Suez Canal and the Strait of Malacca.59 Greater activity in the area may lead to political 

conflict over international borders, as well as possible militarization of the region by bordering 

countries.

TIME CONDITION 

CULTURAL PERCEPTION OF TIME

Political and military decision-makers need to understand that perceptions of time are not universal, but 

vary depending on the country, culture, or government under consideration. Western cultures tend to 

have a view of time that is concrete and short-term, whereas Eastern cultures are more likely to focus 

on the long term and make decisions accordingly. Recognizing the manner in which time is viewed by a 

particular group of people is necessary to understand its actions toward, and reactions to, other actors 

in a given operational environment. If one party is working from a five-year plan and its opponent is 

working from a twenty-year plan, the first party will find itself at a distinct disadvantage. If the opponent 

sees time in terms of centuries, then the first has already lost. Unless the first party achieves total 

control through either annihilation or conquest and assimilation, its opponent will simply wait until the 

opportune time—be that ten, fifty, or two hundred years later—and then reassert itself. Successful 

interactions across political, military, economic, and social variables require a thorough understanding of 

all parties’ perceptions of time in order to effect lasting change.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE CONDITIONS 

The current and future strategic environment will be—as the above conditions reflect—characterized by 

multiple actors, adaptive threats, chaotic conditions, and advanced-technology-enabled actors seeking 

to dominate the information environment. The Army must be operationally adaptive to defeat these 

complex challenges and adversaries operating within this environment. 
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Operational Environments to 2028: The Strategic Environment for Unified Land Operations 28

Over the course of the forecast period, the Army will continue to deploy to a multitude of distinct OEs, 

and concurrent decisive action operations will be the norm within these environments. Training for 

sequential operations with clearly defined phases will fail to prepare forces for the realities of an OE. 

Conflict, post-conflict/failed state, humanitarian, disaster relief, and support and reconstruction 

operations will occur simultaneously. Such operations will require better coordination/integration with a 

range of civilian organizations, both domestic and international. U.S. forces will be required to interact 

with and to protect NGOs, PVOs, and humanitarian organizations more than ever before.

Many of the longer-term implications of these conditions are murky. Depending on how they play out 

over the next sixteen years, a multitude of alternative security futures are possible (potentially ranging 

from some variant of the status quo, to a more violent world, to a less brutal future marked by greater 

cooperation and more effective international institutions). Yet clearly, they also suggest that armed 

conflicts and crises will continue to occur. These conflicts, moreover, will primarily:

• Require simultaneous operations of varying kinds (combat and reconstruction) vs. sequential,

phased operations 

• Be identity- (ethnic, religious) and/or deprivation-based

• Occasionally rise to the level of genocide and/or mass atrocity

• Be asymmetric and irregular rather than symmetric (involving at times states but also various 

types of non-state actors, e.g. terrorist groups, criminal organizations, guerrillas, etc.)

• Occur increasingly in complex terrain to mitigate perceived technological advantages

• Require better cultural understanding

• Require all elements of national power to achieve success

OE variable conditions across the SE portend future events such as new failing states, the rise of new 

political and military actors, the possibility of terror attacks, persistent cyber and space events, higher 

potential for humanitarian disasters, continuing WMD proliferation, and demographic challenges 

potentially triggering conflict across the current and future strategic environment.

The interaction of the OE variables depicted in the previous paragraphs describes a world that is 

increasingly interconnected but more fractious. The ubiquitous spread of information through 

technological advances, both true and false information, seems to be failing to empower understanding 

and instead is stimulating friction. Economic woes and demographic indicators point to decreasing 

influence of the traditional world powers in bending the course of world events to suit their needs. 

Rising influence of non-state organizations and nations with demographics and conditions favoring 

economic solvency are gaining power in shaping the world to accommodate their desires. Although not 

a popular prediction over the next 20 years, the former “world powers” may be relegated to second 

chair, including the United States. The implications of this are profound and at this point in no way 

certain. The trajectory of the OE variables indicates that course, but there are many national choices yet 

to be made between now and 2028. Those choices will set the stage for the range of missions the U.S.

Army must accomplish in the conditions described.

POTENTIALLY CONTENTIOUS OES AND RELATED MISSIONS 

Geographical areas where variable conditions converge may point to areas of potential friction and 

possible conflict. If such areas also hold U.S. national interests, then such friction can lead to U.S. 

military action. The following discussion will highlight a sampling of such areas. This discussion is not all 
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29 Operational Environments to 2028: The Strategic Environment for Unified Land Operations

inclusive, nor is it an attempt to predict the next location for U.S. Army actions. It is not a list of 

upcoming adversaries of the U.S. Instead, it is a discussion to inform Army leaders and Soldiers of types 

of potential flashpoints—based on converging conditions and U.S. national interests—they are likely to 

encounter over the course of the forecast period. Whether the U.S. Army conducts missions in one or 

more of the following OEs will be the result of political decisions based on criteria not within the scope 

of discussion of this estimate. Focusing on OEs likely to see increasing tension or conflict, however, can 

help us understand the types of environments, conditions, missions, and adversaries we might face. The 

OEs of Iran, China-Taiwan, Yemen, North Korea, Pakistan, and Nigeria will be presented to highlight 

types of possible environments.60

IRAN

The converging variable conditions manifesting in Iran include WMD proliferation, domestic political 

problems, a stalling economy, political elite infighting, and ICT empowerment of political opposition 

groups. Such conditions not only sow the seeds of budding internal discord, but also potentially 

germinate regional and global actions counter to U.S. national interests. The state sits on a major 

strategic chokepoint that it has threatened to close, is pursuing a nuclear weapons program, and is a 

confirmed supporter of terrorism, all of which challenge U.S. national interests in the region. Iran is 

regionally aggressive, and is openly hostile to the U.S. A 2012 DNI statement concludes that “Iran’s 

intelligence operations against the United States, including cyber capabilities, have dramatically 

increased in recent years in depth and complexity.” The DNI concludes his statement with the 

assessment that Iran will remain a top threat to the United States in the coming years.61 Possible 

missions related to this OE include counter access-denial operations to open the Strait of Hormuz or 

counter-proliferation missions. 

Iran would most likely present a highly adaptive threat, using both high- and low-tech threat capabilities. 

Regular, irregular, and criminal elements would combine to counter U.S. forces and employ anti-access 

strategies. Iran would use its large, conventional force to employ advanced missiles, air defense, rockets, 

and naval assets. Its irregular force would focus on clandestine and covert operations with proxies and 

sleeper cells prepared to act. Iran would also conduct well-organized and well-executed information 

warfare activities against the U.S. Electronic warfare and computer warfare attacks would be significant. 

Iran may also conduct terrorist operations against the U.S. homeland or against targets in state friendly 

to the U.S., including threatening to use long-range surface-to-surface missiles. 

CHINA

Converging variable conditions directly impacting China include changes in the international distribution 

of power as it begins to rise in economic and military stature, proliferation of ICT, and emerging and 

abundant military technologies. Further, China clearly understands the importance of the global 

commons and will seek to maximize its position in the cyber and space commons, potentially challenging 

U.S. national interests. Over the course of the last decade, China has pursued a robust military 

modernization program. Gathering lessons learned by watching the U.S. operate in DESERT STORM and 

the Balkans, China “responded by investing in shorthand medium-range ballistic missiles, modern naval 

platforms, improved air and air defense systems, counterspace capabilities, and intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) to support over-the-horizon military operations.”62 While unlikely 

to challenge the U.S. with direct military confrontation, China does pose a regional challenge of 

ownership of territory in the South China Sea (Spratly Islands), and presents a potential challenge to the 

strategic chokepoint of the Strait of Malacca, both of which counter U.S. national interests in the region. 
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Operational Environments to 2028: The Strategic Environment for Unified Land Operations 30

Some believe that the U.S. would be drawn into action if China launched operations against the Spratly 

Islands or if support to regional allies (e.g. the Philippines) became necessary.63 Although at first glance 

this appears to be primarily a Navy and Air Force problem set, there are many ways the Army might be 

involved, from theater missile defense to “shaping” the theater.

YEMEN

An excellent example of shortfalls in state governance resulting in a failing state is Yemen. Demographic 

challenges of young, disenfranchised males help set the conditions for instability and violence. Recent 

youth protests helped spark a movement for political reform in Yemen. Poor state governance has 

allowed a safe haven for al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and associated groups in Yemen and 

across the globe in similar environments. The Intelligence Community concluded in 2012 that AQAP “will 

remain committed to the group’s ideology, and in terms of threats to U.S. interests will surpass the 

remnants of core al-Qa`ida [sic] in Pakistan.”64 Potential challenges to the U.S. include issues related to 

the closure of the Bab-el Mandeb Strait, to exports of hydrocarbons to the U.S., to a direct threat posed 

by terrorist groups with freedom of maneuver across Yemen. The most likely missions related to this OE 

would be for counterterrorism or support and stability operations.

NORTH KOREA

The converging conditions manifesting in North Korea include WMD proliferation and shortfalls in state 

governance. A recent DNI testimony stressed the severity of the threat from North Korea and its 

challenge to the U.S. national interest of nonproliferation of WMDs. The DNI states:

North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missile programs pose a serious threat to 

the security environment in East Asia. Its export of ballistic missiles and 

associated materials to several countries, including Iran and Syria, and its 

assistance to Syria—now ended—in the construction of a nuclear reactor 

(destroyed in 2007) illustrate the reach of the North’s proliferation activities. 

Despite the October 2007 Six-Party agreement—in which North Korea 

reaffirmed its commitment not to transfer nuclear materials, technology, or

know-how—we remain alert to the possibility that North Korea might again 

export nuclear technology.65

Openly hostile to both its southern neighbor and the U.S., multiple possible mission types related to the 

OE include a response to an invasion of South Korea, counterproliferation missions and activities, and 

stabilization and stability efforts after a collapse of the North Korean regime. Much like Iran, North 

Korea would present the U.S. with the challenges of countering a hybrid threat. It would utilize both its 

conventional forces and irregular elements to conduct hit-and-run attacks and terrorist acts. SPF would 

be deployed and several proxy actors would be used to assist in terrorist activities possibly targeting the 

U.S. Homeland. Access denial strategies and operations would be used. North Korea would also apply

sophisticated information warfare activities against U.S. forces both in the region and at home. 

PAKISTAN

WMD proliferation, direct threat to the Homeland, terrorist organizations, and regional tensions with 

India are examples of the key converging variable condition for this OE. Shortfalls in state governance in 

Pakistan have produced safe havens for various insurgent and terrorist organizations. For example, al-
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31 Operational Environments to 2028: The Strategic Environment for Unified Land Operations

Qaeda is relying on “ideological and operational alliances with Pakistani militant factions to accomplish 

its goals within Pakistan and to conduct transnational attacks” resulting in a direct challenge to U.S. 

national interests.66 Poor economic performance in Pakistan is also fostering tensions and conditions 

that extremist groups can use to their advantage. This, coupled with a potentially vulnerable stockpile of 

nuclear weapons and terrorist groups dedicated to harming the U.S., makes this OE a potential 

flashpoint. Possible scenarios requiring U.S. action include an internal coup causing regime collapse and 

“loose nukes,” stabilization efforts, and counterproliferation and counterterrorist actions. 

NIGERIA

Converging variable conditions for Nigeria include persistent youth bulge, income inequality, shortfalls in 

state governance, and competition over natural resources. According to a recent DNI testimony, 

“Nigeria is critical to U.S. interests—it is Africa’s most populous nation and the source of 8 percent of 

total U.S. oil imports.”67 A young population has severely strained economic development in Nigeria. 

Shortfalls in governance have lead to regional tensions, violence, and the rise of terrorist groups such as 

Boko Haram. Evidence suggests that Boko Haram and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) are 

strengthening ties and coordination with stated interests in hitting Western targets in the area.68

Stabilizing the government to counter an expansion of transnational terrorism in the region would be a 

possible reason for U.S. actions in this OE.

CONCLUSION

All the conditions discussed have the potential to create friction and tensions across the highlighted OEs. 

While it is impossible to determine when or if a condition will actually trigger a conflict, it is possible to 

study such conditions to better understand the environment and the Army’s potential actions in such an 

environment. Adversaries are certainly aware of and studying the SE conditions to determine their best 

course of action. They will seek both purpose and opportunity in the conditions of the current and 

future strategic environment. The commonalities of the OEs and threats represented in the foregoing 

discussion include the potential use of proxies, possession of WMD, and the possible use of a hybrid 

approach to challenge regional contenders while remaining resilient to the threat of a U.S. intervention. 

In the next section, potential adversary strategies and likely methods of operation will be described.

ADVERSARIES IN THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT 

The character of emergent threats will depend on how the United States focuses its resources. 

Paradoxically no matter what it emphasizes, the military threats the United States is—or will be—

most capable of defeating are the ones it is least likely to face, since potential adversaries will be 

deterred and seek other ways of confrontation.

69

Horowitz and Shalmon, “The Future of War and American Military Strategy,” 2009

Reviewing the key conditions of the strategic environment is fundamental to develop an understanding 

of potential adversarial strategies. Adversaries take the means provided to them by the strategic 

environment and use those means in conceptually enduring ways to achieve their ends. That is 

adaptive strategy.
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Operational Environments to 2028: The Strategic Environment for Unified Land Operations 32

ADAPTATION

Success goes to those who master the skills necessary to act, react, and adapt with speed and creativity.

Enemies learn quickly, and can change unconstrained by rules or bureaucracy. Because these changes 

occur so quickly and often incompletely, they are difficult to counter. Adversaries will continue to be 

adaptive in terms of using all available sources of power at their disposal. Adaptation, broadly defined, is 

the ability to adjust behaviors based on learning, and is closely linked to one’s environment and its 

variable conditions. 

Adversaries can approach adaptation from two perspectives: natural and directed. Natural adaptation 

occurs as an actor (state or non-state) acquires or refines its ability to apply political, economic, military, 

or informational elements of power. Natural adaptation may be advanced through the acquisition of 

technology or key capabilities, resources (financial and materiel), effective organization, and effective 

use of the information environment or even key regional or global alliances. Directed adaptation is

based specifically on lessons learned to counter U.S. power and influence. Such counters to U.S. actions 

will be ever-changing and likely conducted by an adaptive threat. Adversaries will offer a mix of 

capabilities along the range of military operations, and will learn from U.S. operations what works and 

what needs refinement. They will be whatever the U.S. is not. Adversaries will attempt to sidestep the 

U.S.’ preferred way of war.

ENDS—THE GOALS OF ADAPTIVE STRATEGY

The ends that actors in the SE strive to achieve are based on the timeless motivations of:

• Wealth

• Resources

• Political authority

• Influence

• Sovereignty

• Identity

• Legitimacy70

These pursuits are the motivations of any actor in the strategic environment. It is when these ends are 

at odds with our interests or, in the view of the actor, require harm to U.S. people or property, that the 

actor becomes an adversary. Entities pursue those ends by cooperation, competition, or conflict. The 

choice of the means to pursue those ends sets the conditions for the U.S. response. The choice of the 

response is a national policy issue and not in the purview of the Armed Forces to decide. As a result, the 

decision to employ the military tool of national power will be driven by U.S. elected officials’ tolerance 

level for world conditions that are not congruent with U.S. national interests. Understanding the 

motivational impetus of the ends described above provides insight on what types of military operations 

may be helpful in assisting or thwarting other nations to achieve goals that support U.S. international 

security goals. Thus the Army must prepare for the widest range of employment that is affordable and 

retain the ability to rapidly adapt to the actual needs of the moment. “Getting it right” is simply not 

possible with the vagaries of the SE and shifting U.S. national interests. The best course is to train, 

prepare, and equip to high levels of task proficiency that minimize the degree of adaption required.
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33 Operational Environments to 2028: The Strategic Environment for Unified Land Operations

Adversaries are those human actors who employ violence and fear to oppose our interests, harm our 

people, and attack our will. To oppose the U.S. is a dangerous undertaking. We are strong, resolved, 

well-equipped, and possessed of the finest fighting force in the world. Adversarial strategies are 

designed to increase costs beyond political benefit, as opposed to trying to defeat U.S. military might.

Therefore, adversaries are likely to—and have long shown a marked predilection to—exploit any and all 

ways and means available to them in order to pursue courses of action that make the cost of the mission 

too high to pay.

WAYS—THE METHODS OF ADAPTIVE STRATEGY

There are a number of ways in which adversaries will act. These ways are the conceptually enduring 

methods that bring about desired ends. While a wide array of methods is available to our adversaries 

across the SE, the one method currently perceived to be unavailable to them is to defeat us in a 

conventional battle. Instead, any aggregated violence will be designed not to defeat us on the 

battlefield, but to cause enough damage, both real and perceived, in both the physical and 

informational spheres, that we cannot sustain our will through to mission accomplishment. Such a 

strategy requires two major lines of effort: attacks that cause this damage, and actions that extend the 

time to mission accomplishment so it does not occur before sufficient damage is caused. Likely 

adversarial courses of action are the nexus of the need to move along these two lines of effort and the 

means available in the near-term SE. These methods of adaptive strategy are conduct preclusion, 

control tempo, attack will, neutralize technological overmatch, change the nature of conflict, allow no 

sanctuary, and employ shielding.

Conduct Preclusion

Anti-access is defined as those actions and capabilities, usually long-range, designed to prevent an 

adversary from entering an operational area. Area denial includes actions and capabilities, usually of 

shorter range, that are not designed to keep an adversary out, but rather to limit its freedom of action 

within the operational area. Preclusion refers to the combination of anti-access and area denial 

methods, and seeks to influence an extraregional enemy’s ability to introduce forces into the theater 

and sustain combat power.

Adversaries use preclusion to selectively deny, delay, and disrupt entry of extraregional forces into the 

region (anti-access), and to compel extraregional forces to keep their operating bases beyond 

continuous operational reach (area denial). This is the easiest manner of preventing the accumulation of 

enemy combat power in the region and thus defeating or denying victory to a technologically-superior 

enemy. 

Capable adversaries will attempt a comprehensive anti-access strategy that aims to prevent the Army 

from getting involved in conflicts in the first place. Potential adversaries have noted the repositioning of 

Army units from overseas bases to the continental U.S., along with ongoing U.S. investments in strategic 

mobility and joint forcible entry capabilities. As a result, the first element of their strategy will be to 

deter the U.S. government from making the political decision to initiate an overseas deployment. For 

example, an adversary might exploit and manipulate international media to paint foreign intervention in 

a poor light, decrease U.S. domestic and international resolve, and affect the force mix and rules of

engagement (ROE) of potentially deploying extraregional forces. It might also seek to prevent potential 

U.S. allies, coalition partners, and NGOs from offering military, logistical, and political support, basing, 

and overflight rights to U.S. forces via diplomacy, economic, or political connections; information 
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Operational Environments to 2028: The Strategic Environment for Unified Land Operations 34

campaigns; and/or hostile actions. Basing rights are of particular import: while it is possible for the U.S. 

to conduct an air and missile campaign without forward basing, a campaign using exclusively strategic—

rather than a mix of strategic and operational reach—would be greatly diminished in its effectiveness 

and tempo. These effects, when combined, may prove sufficient to deter the U.S. from deploying forces 

to the region.

Should this fail, the next step taken by the adversary will be to limit the accumulation of applicable U.S. 

combat power to a level and location(s) that do not threaten the accomplishment of its goals through 

interdicting ingress routes, denying bases, and undermining international support. The adversary will 

use any means at its disposal to strike U.S. forces along routes to the region, at transfer points en route, 

at aerial and sea ports of embarkation (APOEs and SPOEs), and even at troop home stations. If 

unsuccessful, it will attempt to limit or interrupt our deployment through actions against aerial and sea 

ports of debarkation (APODs and SPODs) in the region.71 An adversary will also try to disrupt and isolate 

U.S. forces that are in the region or coming into it, so that it can destroy them piecemeal. It will threaten 

and attack forward bases and supplies via operational fires and recruitment of host-nation individuals to 

conduct terrorist activities against U.S. logistics systems, including contamination of fuel and water and 

theft of supplies during transit. This raises the risks to U.S. forces, hinders operational phasing, and 

diminishes host nation support for protection of U.S. lines of communication (LOCs). The adversary 

might also attack population and economic centers for the intimidation effect.

Potential adversaries may now or in the near future have access to multiple weapons platforms to assist 

in conducting preclusion. Medium- and long-range, precision strike munitions—including the Iranian 

Fatah-ll0, the Chinese DH-10 land attack cruise missile, the YJ-83 cruise missile, the Russian AS-18 

KAZOO air-to-surface missile, Club K missile, and SS-N-27 cruise missile—can provide the ability to target 

deploying forces, strategic mobility 

assets, forward operating bases, staging 

areas, and LOCs. Proliferation of longrange air defense systems such as the 

Russian SA-20 and the more advanced 

SA-21—with an estimated engagement 

range of 250 miles—could present 

significant challenges as adversaries 

attempt to exclude or limit U.S. access 

to areas where the Army is forced to 

deploy by air. Other adversarial 

platforms may include unmanned aerial 

vehicles (UAVs), such as the Chinese 

ASN 207 that employs a GPS jammer, 

space-based sensors, anti-satellite and 

EW capabilities, sea mines, Akula-II and 

Kilo class submarines, WMD, SPF, and 

cyber capabilities. In addition, readily 

available commercial imagery and 

omnipresent media sources provide early warning of U.S. actions that will become increasingly difficult 

to elude.72

Chinese Unmanned Aerial Vehicle ASN-207

TRADOC Intelligence Support Activity-Threats, Worldwide Equipment Guide,

December 2011, 4-11
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35 Operational Environments to 2028: The Strategic Environment for Unified Land Operations

VIGNETTE

The young man nervously played with the switch in his 

hand; he wondered what he would feel when he killed the 

Americans. His leader had told him that they were 

barbarians and no better than animals, but after working 

around them for weeks he had seen that they were much

like him. It did make him feel better that his target was a 

military storage site where the United States had 

stockpiled weapons to be used on his people when they 

came to steal the resources they badly needed to escape 

from poverty. As the soldier locked the gate to the 

warehouse, the young man flipped the switch and was 

rewarded with a huge explosion that engulfed the 

warehouse and the soldier. As huge plumes of black 

smoke billowed skyward, his only thought was, “I have 

struck a blow for the freedom of my people from the 

Americans.” Hours later, a video of the attack was on the 

Internet emphasizing that a U.S. military target was struck 

as a prelude to other attacks on U.S. military interests in 

the region. The message to the American people was clear 

in the posting: “This is a local affair, if you remove your 

forces from the region they will not come to harm.”

Control Tempo

An adversary will employ rapid tempo in 

an attempt to conclude regional 

operations before an extra-regional force 

can be introduced. It will also use rapid 

tempo to set conditions for preclusion 

operations before the extraregional force 

can establish a foothold in the region. 

Once it has done that, it needs to be able 

to control the tempo—to ratchet it up or 

down—as is advantageous to its own 

operational or tactical plans. 

During the initial phases of an 

extraregional force’s entry into the region, 

an adversary may employ a high 

operational tempo to take advantage of 

the weaknesses inherent in enemy power 

projection. (Lightly equipped forces are 

usually the first to enter the region.) This 

may take the form of attack against enemy 

early-entry forces, linked with diplomatic, 

economic, and informational efforts to 

terminate the conflict quickly before the 

main force can be brought to bear. 

If an adversary cannot end the conflict quickly, it will likely take steps to slow the tempo and prolong the 

conflict. Adversaries realize the importance of coalitions for their self-preservation. They have observed 

successes and failures of U.S.-led coalitions. If timely victory does not occur, U.S. public backing begins 

to wane and ultimately influences political decisions. Therefore, threats will seek protraction of conflict 

to keep U.S. forces engaged to weaken resolve and drain military and economic resources. The 

preferred tactics during this period would be those that avoid decisive combat with superior forces. 

These activities may not be linked to maneuver or ground objectives, but may instead be intended to 

inflict mass casualties or destroy flagship systems, both of which will reduce the U.S.’ will to continue 

the fight. 

Attack Will

Victory does not always go to the best-trained, best-equipped, and most technologically advanced force. 

The collective will of a state or non-state organization encompasses a unification of values, morals, and 

effort among its leadership, its forces, and its individual members. Through this unification, all parties 

are willing to individually sacrifice for the achievement of the unified goal. The interaction of military 

actions and other instruments of power, conditioned by collective will, serve to further define and limit 

the achievable objectives of a conflict for all parties involved. These factors can also determine the 

duration of a conflict and conditions for its termination. 
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Operational Environments to 2028: The Strategic Environment for Unified Land Operations 36

Adversaries will try to inflict highly visible and embarrassing losses on U.S. and partner forces to weaken 

domestic resolve and national will to sustain the deployment or conflict. Modern wealthy nations have 

shown an apparent lack of commitment over time. They have also demonstrated sensitivity to domestic 

and world opinion in relation to conflict and seemingly needless casualties. Potential adversaries believe 

they can have a comparative advantage against superior forces because of the collective psyche and will 

of their own forces and leadership to endure hardship or casualties, while we may not be willing to do 

the same. 

Potential adversaries also have the advantage of disproportionate interests. The extraregional force may 

have limited objectives and only casual interest in the conflict, while our adversary will approach it from 

the perspective of total war and the threat to its aspirations or even survival. Our adversaries will be

willing to commit all means necessary, for as long as necessary, to achieve strategic goals. They will try 

to influence public opinion in the Homeland to the effect that the goal of intervention is not worth the 

cost. They will use violence, intimidation, and coercion against U.S. supporters and partners.

Adversaries will exploit the lack of cultural understanding inherent in U.S. forces. They will conduct 

information campaigns dedicated to portray the U.S. culture as an institution bent on political and 

economic global domination in the name of “Western” democracy. Information campaigns will paint 

U.S. military forces as brutal and unconstrained by the accepted rules of warfare. They will also exploit 

instances of U.S. missteps due to cultural differences. The fabrication and exaggeration of U.S. cultural 

shortcomings are designed to alienate the populace from supporting the U.S. and aid in recruiting 

people to support the threat.

Neutralize Technological Overmatch

Against an extraregional force, adversarial forces will forego massed formations, patterned 

echelonment, and linear operations that would present easy targets. They will hide and disperse forces 

in areas of sanctuary that limit the ability to apply our full range of technological capabilities. However, 

an adversary will attempt to retain the ability to rapidly mass forces and fires from those dispersed 

locations for decisive combat at the time and place of its own choosing. 

Adversaries will attempt to use the physical environment and natural conditions to neutralize or offset 

the technological advantages of modern reconnaissance, surveillance, and intelligence operations.

Forces will be practiced in operating in adverse weather, limited visibility, rugged terrain, and urban 

environments that shield them from the effects of our high-technology weapons and deny us the full 

benefits of advanced mission control and related systems. 

Adversaries will also look to use our robust array of reconnaissance, surveillance, and intelligence 

systems against us. Large numbers of sensors can overwhelm a unit’s ability to receive, process, and 

analyze raw intelligence data and provide timely and accurate intelligence analysis. Adversaries seek to 

add to this saturation problem by using deception to flood sensors with masses of conflicting 

information. Conflicting data from different sensors at different levels (such as satellite imagery 

conflicting with data from UAVs) can significantly degrade situational awareness.

The destruction of high-visibility or unique systems employed by our forces offers exponential value in 

terms of adversarial goals. These actions are not always linked to military objectives; they also maximize 

effects in the information and psychological arenas. High-visibility systems that could be identified for 

destruction might include stealth aircraft, attack helicopters, counterbattery artillery radars, aerial 
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37 Operational Environments to 2028: The Strategic Environment for Unified Land Operations

surveillance platforms, or rocket launcher systems. Losses among these premier systems may 

undermine U.S. morale, degrade operational capability, and inhibit employment of these weapons

systems. 

If available, precision munitions can degrade or eliminate high-technology weaponry. Camouflage, 

deception, decoy, or mockup systems can degrade the effects of sensor systems. Also, adversaries can 

employ low-cost GPS jammers to disrupt precision munitions targeting, sensor-to-shooter links, and 

navigation. Lethal weapon systems such as advanced missiles, advanced air defense, sensor and EW 

weapons, UAVs, precision-guided artillery, and directed energy weapons will all be used to degrade U.S. 

capabilities. Another way to operate on the margins of U.S. technology is to maneuver during periods of 

reduced exposure, those periods identified by a detailed study of our capabilities and patterns. 

Basic low-tech counters to U.S. capabilities provide the threat with near-peer or even niche advantages. 

Counter-collection capabilities such as counter-signal GPS jammers, radar scattering, landlines, couriers, 

and language itself create effective counters to U.S. technical signals intelligence collection and will 

increase the importance of U.S. human intelligence (HUMINT) capabilities. Threat actors may purchase 

military and commercial technology that can easily be modified for collection or analytical purposes. 

Examples include UAVs with multiple sensors and weapon packages, commercially-available satellite 

imagery, image intensifiers, first-generation forward-looking infrared (FLIR), computer geographic 

information systems, and EW technologies. 

Rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) and man-portable anti-tank (AT) missiles are easily concealed, 

withstand detection from anti-radar detection systems, can be cached and carried in large numbers, and 

make an attractive low-cost alternative for the threat in lieu of conventional surface-to-air missiles.

Adversaries may have access to commercial products to support precision targeting and intelligence 

analysis. This proliferation of advanced technologies permits organizations to achieve a situational 

awareness of deployments and force dispositions formerly reserved for selected militaries. Intelligence 

can also be obtained through greater use of HUMINT assets that gain intelligence through 

noncombatants or local workers contracted for base operation purposes. Similarly, technologies such as 

cellular telephones are becoming more reliable and inexpensive. It is becoming harder to discriminate 

between the use of such systems by civilian and military or paramilitary actors. 

Change the Nature of Conflict

Adversaries will try to change the nature of conflict to exploit the differences between friendly and 

enemy capabilities. To do this, they can take advantage of the opportunity afforded by phased 

deployment of an extraregional force. For example, following an initial period of regionally-focused

conventional operations, an adversary could change its operations to focus on preserving combat power 

and exploiting enemy ROE. This change of operations will present the fewest targets possible to the 

rapidly growing combat power of the intervening coalition. It is possible that coalition power-projection 

forces, optimized for a certain type of maneuver warfare, would be ill suited to continue operations. An 

example would be a heavy-based projection force confronted with combat in complex terrain.

Any adversary will likely have different criteria for victory than the extraregional force—a stalemate may 

be good enough. Similarly, its definition of victory may not require a convincing military performance. 

For example, it may call for inflicting numerous casualties to the enemy. The adversary’s perception of 

victory may equate to its survival. 
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Allow No Sanctuary

Our adversaries seek to deny our forces safe haven during every phase of a deployment and as long as 

they are in the region. The resultant drain on manpower and resources to provide adequate forceprotection measures can reduce our strategic, operational, and tactical means to conduct war and erode 

our national will to sustain conflict. Along with dispersion, decoys, and deception, adversaries will use 

urban areas and other complex terrain as sanctuary from the effects of our forces. Meanwhile, their

intent is to deny U.S. forces the use of such terrain. This forces us to operate in areas where adversary

fires and strikes can be more effective. Terror tactics are one of the effective means to deny sanctuary. 

Terrorism has a purpose that goes well beyond the act itself: the goal is to generate fear. Adversary SPF

can also use terror tactics and are well equipped, armed, and motivated for such missions.

Adversaries are prepared to attack our forces anywhere across the strategic environment, at overseas 

bases, at home stations, and even in military communities. They will attack our airfields, seaports, 

transportation infrastructures, and LOCs. These attacks feature coordinated operations by all available 

forces, using not just terror tactics, but possibly long-range missiles and WMD. Targets include not only 

military forces, but also contractors and private firms involved in transporting troops and materiel into 

the region. The goal is to present us with a nonlinear, simultaneous operational environment. Striking 

such targets will not only deny sanctuary, but also weakens national will.

Employ Shielding

Adversaries will use any method necessary to protect key elements of combat power from destruction 

by an extraregional force, particularly by air and missile forces. This protection may come from use of 

any or all of the following:

• Complex terrain

• Noncombatants

• Risk of unacceptable collateral damage

• Countermeasure systems

• Dispersion

• Fortifications

• Information campaigns

Adversaries will employ a wide variety of counter-precision techniques that include camouflage, 

concealment, and deception; GPS jamming; terminal defenses; forcing close-in fights; advanced aircraft; 

and extended-range precision munitions. Adversaries will seek shielding by exploiting civilian 

populations and cultural sites to hide weapons systems and shape the battlefield. They will reduce U.S. 

air defense system reaction times with technology such as penetration aids on missiles, low observable 

aircraft, and jamming. Adversaries will increasingly employ hardened and buried facilities and 

multispectral decoys of key, operational-level targets such as short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) and

surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). Many adversaries have invested in short- and medium-range missile 

systems, such as the Russian Smerch and Chinese PHL-03, capable of counterfires with ranges out to 

150km. Improved air defense systems including counter-TBM [tactical ballistic missile] capabilities will 

provide protection to these advanced fires capabilities.
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39 Operational Environments to 2028: The Strategic Environment for Unified Land Operations

MEANS—THE HUMAN AND PHYSICAL CAPITAL OF ADAPTIVE STRATEGY

While, conceptually, adaptive strategy is the use of available means present in the strategic 

environment to achieve goals, these activities occur in specific OEs. Inside these OEs, the means vary 

widely. The components that exist from which to build an IED in South Asia are not the same as those 

available in Central Asia or Central America. The means are what change from year to year and OE to 

OE. However, given our analysis of the SE, we know the ways adversaries might use to accomplish their 

goals and the means available to them. This allows us to draw basic conclusions about the threats that 

will exist in the strategic environment during this period.

The tactical manifestation of an actor using adaptive strategy that will be encountered by our forces is 

a threat employing hybrid strategies. The hybrid is the natural result of a political entity arming and 

organizing to coerce or deter other entities in the region. As a result of arming in this fashion and 

pursuing interests, however, there is the fear of intervention by the U.S. and the resultant existential 

threat. Such threats provide the operational and tactical space for moving rapidly from conventional 

operations against a neighbor to decentralized irregular operations against an intervention. The 

combinations of forces also create opportunities to exploit discovered vulnerabilities against any 

adversary. The enemy of our future is a highly-resolved fighter that mixes the characteristics of those 

who fight outside the law with those who fight using deadly weapons in a reasoned manner. This fighter 

will steal, murder, conduct assaults, snipe, bribe, prepare defenses, and execute cyber attacks. He will

equally be able to choose a rocket launcher firing position as to shoot a mayor from a moving car. He 

will, possibly in the same day, dress in a host-nation uniform, no uniform, or one of our uniforms.

HYBRID THREAT

Generally speaking, a threat that employs a hybrid strategy or strategies can be defined as a hybrid 

threat. A hybrid threat is the diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, 

terrorist forces, and/or criminal elements unified to achieve mutually benefitting effects (ADRP 3-0). 

Hybrid threats can combine state-based, regular military forces with attributes usually associated with 

irregular forces and criminal organizations. Regular forces are governed by international law, military 

tradition, and custom. Irregular forces and criminal elements are unregulated and as a result act with no 

restrictions on violence or targets for violence. To be a hybrid, these forces cooperate in the context of 

pursing their own internal objectives. For example, criminal elements may steal parts for a profit while 

at the same time compromising the readiness of a U.S. force’s combat systems. Militia forces may 

defend their town or village with exceptional vigor as part of a complex defensive network. Some hybrid 

threats will be a result of a state (or states) sponsoring a non-state actor.

Hybrid Threat Components of Adaptive Strategy

The key components of a hybrid threat are two or more of the following:

• Military forces

• Nation-state paramilitary forces (such as internal security forces, police, or border guards)

• Insurgent organizations (movements that primarily rely on subversion and violence to change 

the status quo)

• Guerrilla units (irregular indigenous forces operating in occupied territory)

• Criminal organizations (such as gangs, drug cartels, or hackers)
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Hybrid threats will use a strategic capability that forces any intervening power to adjust operations 

(WMD, SPF, etc). This capability may be undeveloped or only partially developed. This will not affect the 

transition between regular and irregular operations, and the threat of the capability still provides a tool 

for manipulating the intervening force (e.g. Iraq’s WMD capability circa 2001). All components of a 

hybrid threat will use cyber operations to either degrade U.S. mission command capabilities or to 

conduct perception management campaigns.

Hybrid threats have the ability to combine and transition between regular, irregular, and criminal forces 

and operations and to conduct simultaneous combinations of various types of activities that will change 

and adapt over time. Such varied forces and capabilities enable hybrid threats to capitalize on perceived 

U.S. vulnerabilities.

Examples of Hybrid Threats

Although the term hybrid threat has emerged only recently, such combinations are not new. History is 

full of examples:

• 1754 to 1763: Regular British and French forces fought each other amidst irregular Colonialists 

fighting for the British and American Indians fighting for both sides.

• 1814: The Peninsula War ended after the combination of regular and irregular allied forces from 

Britain, Portugal, and Spain prevented France from controlling the Iberian Peninsula.

• 1954 to 1976: The Viet Cong and the People’s Army of Vietnam combined irregular and regular 

forces in fighting the French and U.S. forces. Viet Cong would organize into conventional and 

irregular units.

• 2008: Russian-Georgian conflict in the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, in 

which both sides used combinations of regular forces, irregular forces, and criminal elements.

Iran and North Korea would most likely present a hybrid threat. Regular, irregular, and criminal 

elements would be combined to challenge U.S. forces. Iran would utilize its large conventional force to 

employ advanced missile, air defense, rockets, and naval assets. Its irregular force would focus on 

clandestine and covert operations with proxies and sleeper cells prepared to act. North Korea would 

likewise use its conventional forces and irregular elements. Irregular and criminal forces would conduct 

hit-and-run attacks and terrorist acts. SPF would be deployed and several proxy actors (Hezbollah, etc.) 

would be tapped to assist in terrorist activities possibly targeting the U.S. Homeland. Access denial 

strategies and operations would be implemented as well as the employment of ballistic missiles and 

mining of sea lanes. Both states would also use sophisticated information warfare activities, SPF, and 

perhaps even criminal elements against the U.S. Both states are examples of a hybrid threat prepared to 

employ varying combinations of forces and capabilities against the U.S.

Potential Evolution of Threats through 2028

As various actors observe the effectiveness of threats in recent conflicts, they are more likely to unite 

their resources and capabilities into a similarly successful type of threat. Although states and various 

non-state actors may continue to pursue their own particular goals and objectives, they are apt to seek 
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41 Operational Environments to 2028: The Strategic Environment for Unified Land Operations

out alliances or at least loose affiliations with other actors in order to exploit the synergy of their 

collective capabilities to achieve mutual benefit.

Threats may employ sophisticated weapons in specific niches to attack perceived U.S. weaknesses. They 

may threaten to employ WMD, targeting concentrations of U.S. forces and urban centers. When 

projecting power into a region, Army leaders may find themselves without one or more of the 

advantages they normally have. U.S. forces encountering new and unanticipated enemy capabilities 

have to rapidly adapt while engaging in operations. Enemies may organize themselves for highly 

decentralized operations over a protracted period. They will work to secure the active support of other 

regional powers and supporters. Enemies seek to create disruptive effects oriented toward U.S. 

activities within the Homeland through cyber attacks and terrorism.

TACTICAL DESIGNS

At the tactical level, threats will employ four key designs that specifically adapt resources available in 

the strategic environment for use against the U.S. and its partners.

Exploit Regular/Irregular Synergy

Adversaries understand that the environment that would produce the most challenges to U.S. forces is 

one in which conventional military operations execute in concert with irregular warfare. Units that are 

well-trained and equipped for counterinsurgency (COIN) operations often do not retain the precise 

skills, equipment, and mindset for conventional combat and vice versa. In addition, there is a synergy to 

the simultaneous use of conventional and unconventional methods by both regular and irregular forces

that is difficult to counter. Synergy will be achieved in one of two basic ways: by a threat state actor 

executing conventional operations that ensure the U.S. is also simultaneously presented with an 

irregular warfare environment; or by a threat non-state actor conducting irregular warfare that 

integrates conventional means and tactics into its operations.

Non-state threat actors will continue to seek and employ paramilitary capability. They will organize, 

train, and equip themselves as cohesive units. This training will continue to require sanctuary—training 

facilities and industrial partners, or covert/protected supply lines will be necessary for acquiring modern 

equipment.

Employ Range of Technologies

Adversaries will employ niche technologies at the tactical level that are just as sophisticated, and 

sometimes more so, than those possessed by the local U.S. unit and its partners. Tandem-warhead antitank guided missiles (ATGMs), sophisticated EW, communications and encryption devices, and modern 

air defense missiles are just some examples of the many types of systems in which threat actors can and 

will achieve parity or superiority in tactical actions. This is not to say that threat actors will not continue 

to employ improvised devices of many types. On the contrary, the trend will be for threat actors to 

employ modern niche technologies in a synergistic manner with improvised devices.

One of the most important areas in which threat actors will seek to operate in the future is in the 

acquisition and employment of sophisticated EW systems. Threat actors understand the continued 

reliance the U.S. places on communications, intelligence and surveillance, and visualization 

technologies. These technologies are vulnerable to disruption and exploitation by systems far easier to 
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obtain and simpler to master. The cycle of threat acquisition of EW technology will continue to operate 

inside the cycle of U.S. acquisition of major communications, intelligence and surveillance, and 

visualization systems.

The enemy’s use of countermeasures (both traditional and nontraditional) will limit the U.S. military’s 

ability to achieve overmatch against a determined enemy in restricted terrain. Forces will have to 

engage in close combat to find and defeat the enemy. In addition, future enemies will attempt to 

counter our most significant advantages in communications, surveillance, long-range precision fires, 

armor protection, and mobility. Tactical units will require a suite of adaptable combined arms 

capabilities and the ability to integrate joint effects.

Information Warfare as Key Weapon System

Adversarial tactical actions will be designed to achieve information warfare objectives rather than purely 

military ones. Causing U.S. casualties; exposing weaknesses in training, equipment, or resolve; and 

forcing redeployment will be paramount over such considerations as seizing or retaining terrain features 

or battlefield victory. Adversaries will attempt to deny and degrade U.S. mission command by constant 

cyber and EW attacks.

Employ Complex Battle Positions and Utilize Cultural Standoff Capabilities

Adversaries reduce exposure to stand-off fires and reconnaissance, surveillance, and intelligence by 

utilizing complex battle positions (CBPs) and cultural standoff. CBPs are locations designed to protect 

the occupants from detection and attack while denying their seizure and occupation by the enemy. They 

are not necessarily tied to an avenue of approach. CBPs protect forces while providing sanctuary from 

which to launch attacks. Camouflage, concealment, and deception measures are critical to the success 

of a CBP. These efforts and actions include, but are not limited to, underground facilities, complex/urban 

terrain, fortification, false and decoy positions, and information warfare support.

Cultural standoff is the act of using social aspects of the environment to provide protection and freedom 

to maneuver. Cultural standoff tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) employed by threat actors 

include integrating religious, medical, and other sensitive facilities into CPBs; employing human terrain 

for deception purposes; and exploiting a population using information warfare.

CONCLUSION 

Adversarial challenges will require that the Army be prepared for a wide range of missions over the

forecast period. Based on the conditions discussed above, Army missions could range from major 

combat operations to humanitarian and disaster relief operations. The leader development, training 

development, and capabilities and concepts development implications are significant and are addressed 

in Chapter 3, Military Implications, along with key implications based on conditions of the strategic 

environment presented in this chapter.
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43 Operational Environments to 2028: The Strategic Environment for Unified Land Operations

Chapter 3

Military Implications

INTRODUCTION 

Conditions across the strategic environment indicate future conflict will not be confined to one simple 

category. It will range in scope from major conventional fights to humanitarian support and nationbuilding missions. Very capable adversaries will continue to challenge U.S. interests globally, while rising 

military powers, coupled with existing militaries, will work to advance their regional and global interests. 

The U.S. could potentially face a variety of missions and adversaries operating in a wide range of OEs.

The Chief of Staff of the Army, General Raymond T. Odierno, captured this outlook in his statement from 

January 2012: 

Our standing as the most dominant land force on the planet can never be up for debate. We must be 

able to operate across any operational environment, in a broad mission set, including regular and 

irregular warfare, stability operations, counterinsurgency, humanitarian assistance, and any other 

mission that is out there.73

Training and preparation against these changing conditions will drive adaptation and flexibility within 

the Army and ensure U.S. forces are prepared for any potential OE and any potential mission. The 

TRADOC focus areas discussed below will fall across the four domains of leader development, training 

development, capabilities development, and concepts development to varying degrees. Some 

implications are more important to one domain over another, but most apply to all of the domains in 

both impact and applications. 

LEADER DEVELOPMENT

Army leaders will need to embrace the concept of complexity and fluidity and understand that they will 

have to operate in a decentralized manner and function with some level of uncertainty across the 

various OEs. The strategic environment and potential OEs require adaptive leaders who are intuitive, 

recognize changing patterns, and can solve problems through critical thinking and adaptive decisionmaking skills. Leaders will need to discern patterns and have broad perspective so that they can deal 

with the range of potential threats and military operations. Leaders and units must be taught 

continuous recognition and response skills. 

Leaders must be culturally aware and sensitive. They must understand the human dimension of an OE 

and factor this dimension into all facets of leadership, decision-making, and training. Culture matters.

Leaders must be able to understand the implications of the information environment—from the 

human side of developing and controlling a narrative to the technical side of developing effective 

filtering and management strategies—so Soldiers do not become overwhelmed by the large volume of 

data. Knowledge management skills and advanced analytical skills (in an age of too much information vs. 

too little analytic competency) need to be continuously honed at all levels. 
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Leaders must be able to master consequence management: understand second- and third-order effects 

of actions or inaction and be willing to apply risk analysis to critical decisions. They must develop skills to 

lead adaptively and allow creativity and new approaches to emerge across the force. They must be 

willing to allow for more creative and free thinking from subordinates and to encourage and foster such 

an environment. 

TRAINING DEVELOPMENT

Just as with leader development, the training environment—whether live, virtual, or constructive—must 

be imbued with the complexities of potential OEs. This includes the development of scenarios and 

drivers that contain conditions of the SE and adversarial strategies as part of their base design. 

Training venues must reflect an understanding of the influence of various cultures and incorporate the 

increasing array of actors that will be present in any OE, from NGOs, PVOs, and PSOs to allied partners. 

Each actor has the potential of working side by side with the Army as it conducts operations. Each of 

these actors will bring its own culture, agenda, and operating procedures to the situation. U.S. forces 

working directly with such actors will need to be trained to deal with the unique requirements each will 

bring. 

Training venues must continue the tradition of providing an arena that allows free play. Training events 

must contain adaptive, intelligent, and innovative opposing forces (OPFOR), organized and equipped in a 

flexible fashion that can replicate a mix of regular and hybrid threats capable of pushing units to failure 

in an effort to expose shortfalls. Adversarial portrayal must reflect current strategic environment 

realities while helping to identify potential future adversaries.

Training venues and events must quickly adapt to new methods and mediums for training. Distributed 

content and more, personally-tailored training methods will overtake the more traditional 

“schoolhouse” approach. Advanced ICT capabilities are and will continue to change how we educate the 

Army. Current and future Soldiers will demand that the Army keep pace with ICT developments for 

training. Advanced educational platforms and applications must be rapidly absorbed, and the content of 

training must be updated as quickly as possible to stay relevant and effective. 

CAPABILITIES DEVELOPMENT

To provide Soldiers the capabilities they will need requires a much more agile capabilities-development 

process. It must anticipate the operational needs of commanders and incorporate the adaptability 

inherent in “off-the-shelf” technology to support the near future. At the same time, it must look deep 

enough into the future to anticipate the “fight after next.” 

Capabilities development must quickly and effectively incorporate technological advances, 

developments in strategic partner capacities, ICT advances, and science and engineering developments.

The Army must develop a capabilities approach that allows for a quick and continuous absorption of 

scientific advances. Our adversaries are doing this now. Leaders and Soldiers must be trained to operate 

in such a technologically fast-paced environment and to understand how threat actors are responding to 

this environment.
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CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT

As with other TRADOC core competencies, the strategic environment has implications for approaches to 

concept development. Accounting for the adaptive, transitioning adversaries described in this 

environment calls for concepts that are explored and validated through robust experimentation.

Accomplishing this requires scenario-based concepts that are informed by collaboration from ongoing 

operations yet look well beyond the next five years. Once initiated, key ideas from these concepts need 

to be integrated, examined, and critiqued as part of leader development.

KEY MILITARY IMPLICATIONS SHAPING DOTMLPF 

The strategic environment conditions and adversarial strategies presented in Chapter 2 lead to several 

military implications requiring consideration across the areas of Army Doctrine, Organization, Training, 

Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF).

INCREASING CHALLENGE OF A WIDE RANGE OF THREATS

While the existence of innovative adversaries is not new, today’s strategic environment demands that 

U.S. forces prepare for a range of conflicts and potential adversaries. These may involve states that 

employ protracted forms of warfare, possibly using proxy forces to coerce and intimidate, or non-state 

actors using operational concepts and high-end capabilities traditionally associated with states.74

The Army does not have the luxury of focusing on any one potential adversary or any one mission type 

across the range of military operations. Instead, leaders and Soldiers must be exposed to the multiple 

conditions representing various types of threats that exist across the globe. Potential threats will range 

from standing conventional and unconventional forces, to irregular militias and paramilitaries, to 

terrorist groups and criminal elements. The Army must build and sustain capabilities to deter threats 

ranging from counterterrorism, to counterinsurgency, to aggressive states conducting major combat 

operations. Training, education, capabilities development, and concept development should reflect this 

reality.

INCREASING MULTIPLICITY OF ACTORS ACROSS POTENTIAL OEs

The Army must be prepared to face an ever-changing array of actors in any potential OE. Nation-states 

still matter, but the stage is becoming more and more crowded. Conflicts involving non-state actors are 

progressively becoming the norm, and non-state actors will be a key component of any future OE. For 

example, between 2007 and 2008, “non-state conflicts—violent confrontations between communal 

groups, rebels, or warlords that do not involve a state as a warring party—increased by a startling 

119%.”75 Conversely, during roughly the same period, there were virtually no interstate conflicts except

a small border conflict between Eritrea and Djibouti in 2008.76

Given the widespread and rapid dissemination of technology, non-state actors are more able to 

challenge state-based militaries. Access to such technology is leveling the playing field. The likelihood 

that the U.S. Army will find itself operating with or against a technologically sophisticated non-state 

actor is extremely high. 
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Operations in a JIIM environment are apt to be the norm in the future. Current operations already 

illustrate the capabilities that NGOs, PVOs, PSOs, and international organizations bring and their overall 

importance to supporting various types of operations. Conditions in the strategic environment indicate 

the importance of these organizations will continue. It will become increasingly more important for 

Army forces to know and act within the unique legal requirements such operations will bring. The Army 

must also enhance its ability to integrate with partners. 

From humanitarian relief to reconstruction, units will be required to work alongside a number of nonDOD organizations. Leaders and Soldiers must understand these organizations and their capabilities to 

assess how they can shape any OE. The Army must “be able to work with other government agencies, 

indigenous forces, and international partners to build unity of effort.”77 Achieving this unity of effort will 

require focused training along with education and leadership development. Concept and capabilities 

development will need to address issues of organizational interoperability and communication system 

compatibility. Training should reflect various types of actors, with varying types of political, military, and 

economic goals. Training, education, capabilities development, and concept development should reflect 

the proliferation of technology and related capabilities. The investment in language, regional expertise, 

and cultural knowledge of multiple OEs will be required over the forecast period.

INCREASING IMPORTANCE OF GAINING A HOLISTIC UNDERSTANDING OF EACH OE

In addition to understanding the wide range of actors, leaders and Soldiers must be able to analyze and 

understand the strategic environment and each potential OE that U.S. forces may operate within. 

Leaders and Soldiers will also need to develop a mindset that allows for quick and competent adaptation 

across various OEs. Each OE will present different and challenging conditions, and such variations must 

be taken into consideration. OEs will be distinguished by unique and particular political, military, 

economic, social, infrastructure, information, physical environment, and time conditions and 

characteristics. Leaders and Soldiers must be able to function in any environment with the forces on 

hand and be “culturally astute enough to operate effectively among the people.”78 This requires a 

knowledge and understanding of each OE and the conditions and characteristics of the PMESII-PT 

variables inherent in each OE. Leaders must actively promote the value of a holistic look at and 

understanding of an OE and prepare for operational adaptability at all times. For more detail on the OEA 

framework, see Annex A: The Operational Environment Assessment Framework. 

INCREASING DEGREE OF UNCERTAINTY

Predicting the future of human endeavors is an inherently difficult task. As a result, we have to educate 

for uncertainty by providing opportunities for Army leaders and Soldiers to learn and understand basic 

principles and enduring concepts relative to any OE. This is a critical skill that must be stressed across all 

leader development and training venues. Before the U.S. deploys units to a conflict, there will be much 

energy devoted to gathering information about the area of operations, but there will remain much that 

is still unknown. Training and education venues must prepare leaders and Soldiers to become 

accustomed to and even thrive in situations of uncertainty. As the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

General Martin E. Dempsey, recently stated, “War is discovery—we must continue to out-think and outadapt our adversaries.”79
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47 Operational Environments to 2028: The Strategic Environment for Unified Land Operations

INCREASING OCCURRENCE OF SIMULTANEOUS AND CONTINUOUS ENGAGEMENTS

A clear delineation of combat and post-combat operations no longer exists, and will likely become even 

more blurred in the future. Training must incorporate offensive, defensive, and stability operations 

running concurrently or changing quickly in nature, direction, and scope over an extended period of 

time. Our Army must learn to recognize indicators when the adversary is adapting in order to make 

tactical adjustments. Therefore, our training should reflect this condition to help develop skills necessary 

for leaders and Soldiers to adapt and respond appropriately. General George W. Casey, Jr. succinctly 

postulated that in order to respond to such diverse and dynamic conditions, “The Army must be 

expeditionary: organized, trained, and equipped to go anywhere in the world, fight upon arrival, and 

sustain that response for uncertain durations.”80 The Army must achieve and maintain a capability that

“provides a balanced mix of multipurpose capabilities and sufficient capacity to accomplish a broad 

range of tasks.”81

PREPARE FOR DECISIVE ACTION

Counterinsurgency and counterterrorist training is still important, but the scope and depth of training 

must expand to include the entire spectrum of potential operations. The Army must focus on 

preparation of conducting decisive action operations. Our OPFOR at the Combat Training Centers (CTC) 

must be robust to challenge decisive action mission essential task list (METL). The atrophy of our OPFOR 

in both equipment and personnel has placed a great training risk on our ability to provide a realistic 

threat against decisive action objectives. Outdated armor; a heavy reliance on augmentation to fill 

OPFOR ranks; and lack of wheeled combat vehicles, information warfare, and air defense capabilities 

must be addressed in order for our OPFOR to once again become the toughest opponent our Army will 

face short of actual combat.

INCREASING IMPORTANCE OF THE INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

The force that controls the information environment or controls the perception of information has the 

advantage. This is true today and will be more so in the future as ICT capabilities continue to spread 

across the globe and into the hands of potential adversaries and other critical actors. U.S. forces must be 

prepared to successfully operate in and shape this environment. DOTMLPF development should focus 

on fully integrating all aspects of information operations (IO) at all levels and across all operations. Units 

must be prepared to understand their role in IO and specifically that all actions have reactions that will 

be captured digitally and used in the adversary’s information campaign. Training and education must go 

beyond simply stating that IO is important; it must teach and prepare leaders and Soldiers how to 

operate and thrive within the information environment. 

INCREASING LIKELHOOD OF A WMD EVENT AND CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT ACTIVITIES

The abundance of scientific, technological, and engineering (ST&E) developments has increased the 

possibility of WMD attacks against the U.S. or a U.S. ally. Proliferation of ST&E has helped shape the rise 

of the non-state threat. In many cases the non-state threat will be more capable of carrying out attacks 

because of its ability to remain ambiguous and thus blend within its surroundings. Although the U.S. 

Department of Homeland Security has mitigated the possibility of attacks to the Homeland, the lack of 

identity normally associated with nation-states allows the non-state threat to move across borders and 

within our borders almost at will. The challenge for the Army is two-fold: first, become capable of 

identifying and defeating this threat; second, effectively assist law enforcement, federal and state 
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emergency management, and other agencies in consequence management should an attack occur in the 

Homeland.

U.S. forces should be prepared to operate in WMD environments and in response to environmental 

disasters across the globe. Our Army should train to operate in contaminated areas and mitigate the 

effects of a WMD attack or an outbreak of a regional or global pandemic. Training should stress 

operating under the threat and/or occurrence of a WMD attack. Training should also include working 

with host-nation and domestic law enforcement, emergency relief, and humanitarian assistance 

agencies. This entails providing security for an area and its populace, conducting humanitarian 

assistance and disaster relief operations, and restoring/protecting essential services. Central to a crisis 

and consequence management is the populace and infrastructure. CTCs must be manned with the 

appropriate skilled role players and facilities equipped as per the Operational Environment Master Plan 

(OEMP) to replicate these conditions. Capabilities and concept developments must also adequately 

prepare U.S. forces to operate in such environments and provide the necessary equipment and facilities. 

PREPARE FOR HOMELAND SECURITY/DEFENSE MISSIONS

Homeland defense/security, which requires shared intelligence and assistance in domestic security 

missions, will test traditional relationships and boundaries with law enforcement and other domestic 

entities. U.S. joint forces, combined with law enforcement and intelligence activities, will have to deal 

both with regular military and irregular forces, such as criminal organizations, terrorists, religious 

extremists, or individuals who seek to profit from instability. The U.S. Army must train vigorously for 

such operations to include Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA) activities. This should include not 

only preparation for operations between the active component (AC) and the reserve component (RC) of 

the Army, but with other domestic agencies as well, particularly law enforcement. Issues of 

communication system interoperability and connectivity should be addressed by the Army. The 

collection and use of intelligence by all parties involved may require new processes and partnerships, 

which should be part of all Army training. 

PREPARE TO DEFEND ACCESS TO THE GLOBAL COMMONS

Global commons are those areas of the world beyond the control of any one state—sea, space, air, and 

cyberspace—that constitute the foundation of the international system. Protection of U.S. access to the 

global commons will increase in importance in the coming years, specifically for space and cyberspace. 

U.S. forces must be prepared for degraded operations in both tactical and operational level exercises. 

The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) states that “maintaining secure access to the global 

commons is of critical importance to the U.S.”82 Adversaries will continuously challenge our access to 

the global commons. U.S. forces will confront lower-end naval challenges in littoral waters, as well as 

high-end threats from missiles and advanced surface and subsurface ships.83 Given the Army’s reliance 

on these commons, protection of each will be critical to mission success. 
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49 Operational Environments to 2028: The Strategic Environment for Unified Land Operations

Potential Global Chokepoints

Map created by TRISA-Threats OEA Team, 2012

The Cyber Commons

The cyber commons provides an area of unlimited potential complicated by unlimited vulnerability. 

Progressively greater access to information once constrained by hierarchical organizations signals the 

erosion and perhaps dissolution of many organizations that once appeared immutable. To say only 

knowledge is power may be a misstatement; in cyberspace access to knowledge creates power. 

Individuals and non-state actors now exhibit ICT capabilities as powerful as most state actors’. 

The importance of protecting the commons will increase in significance over the forecast period. Critical 

military communications and logistics systems, along with civilian financial and infrastructure networks,

are now dependent on their supporting information systems, leaving them more and more exposed to 

crippling cyber attacks. Across the cyberspace common, potential adversaries “are employing and 

developing the means to deny, degrade, disrupt, deceive, and destroy the U.S. military’s capability to 

operate, and its ability to operate effectively in other warfighting areas.”84 Current and future 

adversaries will relentlessly target Army information systems, data, and network links.

Critical military and civil information systems will be at risk of cyber attacks from states, non-state 

actors, rogue political actors, criminal networks, and terrorists. Adversaries will also employ carefully 

prepared perception management campaigns and targeted information events, launching surprise 

information attacks with false news stories, tampered or fabricated photographs and videos, spoofed 

Web sites and databases, false/stolen online identities, and other measures. These tactics are effective 

because of the growing use of the Internet worldwide. Adversaries may use these tactics to provoke 
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Operational Environments to 2028: The Strategic Environment for Unified Land Operations 50

public hysteria, misdirect security efforts, create false intelligence patterns and leads, and to generate 

opposition to U.S. operations.

The Army will operate in this information-rich environment, and must become adept at utilizing new 

tools and methods for success. People today have tremendous access to a wide variety of information—

some useful and some not so useful—and to tools that quicken the pace of human interaction.

Phenomena like social networking and hacking are products of these easily accessible tools. In the 

military arena, cyber provides tremendous opportunity for those seeking ever greater efficiency in 

combat operations. Precise knowledge of enemy, weather, terrain, and friendly forces information

rapidly disseminated allows accurate application of combat power, whether fire or maneuver. This very 

efficiency also creates vulnerability. With little excess capacity needed because of the multiplying effect 

of cyber, loss of “freedom of maneuver” in that space will tax the ability of a unit to accomplish assigned 

missions. The Army will need to be cognizant of such conditions and train, prepare, and educate for this 

environment.

Future OEs will be even more wired to cyberspace and further sensitized to its content; adversary 

messaging may need to be analyzed and countered in near-real time. As a hypothetical example, if 

adversary messaging attributed civilian casualties to host-nation or Army forces, imagery and eye 

witness documentation (or refutation) of these incidents could be needed within minutes to forestall 

the formation of flash mobs by otherwise innocent civilians. This will place greater demands on Army 

staff elements down to the brigade and battalion level. Enhanced real-time intelligence capabilities will 

be needed to offset adversary capabilities, and local culture and foreign language skills will become ever 

more important, along with faster and more sophisticated analysis of public attitudes, media content, 

and the range of effects for potential information courses of action. 

The Space Commons

As with cyberspace, the protection of the common of space will rise in importance during the forecast 

period. Over the course of the next two decades, “space will be increasingly congested, competitive, and 

will likely be more reliant on partnerships and collaborations.”85 Threats to U.S. space assets and their 

supporting infrastructure will swell.86 The common of space is fundamental to Army operations. As more 

Internet World Stats: Usage and Population Statistics, 2011 (accessed 12 April 2012)
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51 Operational Environments to 2028: The Strategic Environment for Unified Land Operations

Humanitarian Operations in Haiti, 2010

Photo from www.army.mil, 24 April 2012

states and non-state actors recognize these benefits and seek their own space or counterspace 

capabilities, the Army will be challenged across the space common.87

U.S. military dependence on the space common runs the entire gamut of military operations and is one 

of the key reasons for our military superiority, both in conventional and strategic operations. Our 

current relative strength in and dependence on space operations, however, means other countries are 

intent upon gaining parity with the United States. It is therefore critical to continue developing both 

defensive and offensive space capabilities to maintain the military superiority of the U.S. Space assets 

will be targeted more by a “wide-range of man-made threats.”88 Adversaries will attempt electronic 

warfare (EW) attacks, computer network attacks, anti-satellite weapons, high energy lasers, and more 

conventional physical destruction methods to challenge the Army’s access to space assets.89

In addition, the number of state actors or businesses developing space assets is rising. Space is no longer 

the private playground of the U.S. and Russia, according to Deputy Defense Secretary William J. Lynn 

who stated, “twenty-five years ago, the United States controlled two-thirds of the space market; today, 

that presence has slipped to below 40 percent.”90 This trend will continue into the future. New actors 

will present challenges to U.S. space access. In February 2011, 37 senators sent a letter to Secretary of 

State Hillary Clinton stating fears that the E.U. was “developing a space code of conduct that could 

undermine the U.S. space presence and harm security.”91

Space itself is has also become more congested. DOD tracks approximately 22,000 man-made objects in 

orbit, 1,100 of which are active satellites.92 The radiofrequency spectrum, so critical to mission 

command, is also crowded. Over the forecast period, the demands on the spectrum are expected to 

increase as global satellite services increase. By 2015, “as many as 9,000 satellite communications 

transponders are expected to be in orbit.”93 Greater congestion can lead to more instances of 

radiofrequency interference. This congestion of space and the radiofrequency spectrum will continue to 

increase over the forecast period. 

Protection of U.S. access to the global 

commons will gain importance in the 

coming years, specifically for space and 

cyberspace. At a minimum, adversaries 

will seek to deny the U.S. access to these 

commons. The Army, along with the rest 

of the U.S., will continue to be challenged 

by capabilities across the commons by a 

host of state and non-state actors 

including China, Russia, and their proxies.

PREPARE FOR HUMANITARIAN 

ASSISTANCE/DISASTER RELIEF 

OPERATIONS

Since environmental and manmade 

disasters are a global constant, the Army 

must be prepared to conduct 

humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations. The world is currently witnessing the effects of 

climate changes and related consequences. A condition contributing to the severity of potential 
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Operational Environments to 2028: The Strategic Environment for Unified Land Operations 52

disasters is that by 2028, close to 60% of the world’s population will live in and around urban areas.

94

Many of these urban areas are littoral, thus increasing their vulnerability to natural or man-made 

disasters. The combination of populations, stressed infrastructures, and a natural disaster produces 

catastrophic outcomes. Disasters are a global issue and no one is immune. Missions will range from 

providing security assistance to beleaguered humanitarian organizations and host-nation forces, to 

conducting outright humanitarian operations, to decontaminating a WMD site from a terrorist event. 

The likelihood that the Army will be involved in these types of operations is high over the forecast 

period.95

PREPARE FOR RECONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS

The U.S. Army Field Manual 3-07 defines reconstruction as “the process of rebuilding degraded, 

damaged, or destroyed political, socioeconomic, and physical infrastructure of a country or territory to 

create the foundation for long-term development.” No matter if such destruction is caused by natural or 

man-made actions, U.S. forces will likely be called upon to assist in reconstruction efforts in the future. 

Such efforts will typically involve maintaining internal peace and stability, ensuring the rule of law, 

restoring or providing basic services, and repairing critical infrastructure. These conditions and missions 

should be stressed in training events and must be resourced with the appropriate equipment 

requirements.

PREPARE TO COUNTER THREAT ANTI-ACCESS CAPABILITIES

As noted in Chapter 2, the adaptive adversary is always learning and shifting strategies and tactics to 

counter U.S. military power. There is clear evidence that adversaries are interested in denying U.S. 

forces regional access. For example, Iran has a small fleet of frigates, patrol craft, submarines, mines, 

and advanced anti-ship cruise missiles that could be used to control access to the Strait of Hormuz.

96

Such capabilities oblige U.S. forces to train to “counter anti-access and area-denial strategies.”97

Michele Flournoy, the former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, stated, “The proliferation of 

knowledge and technology will allow an increasing number of state and non-state actors to deploy antiaccess capabilities and high-end asymmetric technologies that can put allied infrastructure at risk and 

hamper U.S. power projection.”98 The Army must develop capabilities and strategies to counter 

adversarial anti-access activities. 

CONCLUSION 

Armed conflict will continue to be a course of action for both state and non-state actors. Any future OE 

will be complex and demanding. Conditions of this environment will include unprecedented amounts of 

information being transmitted over commercial networks, potential technological surprise, proliferation 

of WMD, selected conventionally advanced weapons systems, and the innovative use of highlyproliferated ones. The continued advancement of information-age technologies provides adversaries 

the capability to apply military force with greater precision, lethality, agility, and survivability. 

Potential threats in this environment will retain hybrid capabilities and transition between traditional 

and adaptive constructs to counter conventional threats, add complexity to a given environment, and 

seek sanctuary in complex terrain. It is important to note that even as threats develop and master 

adaptive means, they will retain and improve traditional military capabilities.
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53 Operational Environments to 2028: The Strategic Environment for Unified Land Operations

The U.S. will remain globally engaged—called upon to execute missions across the spectrum of conflict. 

Increasingly interconnected economies and greater access to technology and information will challenge 

U.S. forces in unique and unexpected ways. To succeed will require a force that can deal with 

sophisticated information campaigns, integrated regular and irregular operations, and myriad 

improvised tools, networks, and innovation. Forces must be adaptive and master complex situations.

Capabilities must be built to support decisive action operations and to take advantage of technology—

especially ICT, strategic responsiveness, and joint interoperability. Only through these means will the 

U.S. military be able to successfully navigate any future OE.
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Operational Environments to 2028: The Strategic Environment for Unified Land Operations 54

Annex A

The Operational Environment Assessment Framework of Analysis

INTRODUCTION 

Once the conditions of the strategic environment have been identified (using the OE variables of PMESIIPT), the same framework of analysis can be used at the operational level with greater variable 

resolution. As noted, all OEs are unique and require independent analysis with strategic environment 

conditions manifesting differently across all OEs. The following framework provides details for PMESII-PT 

variables for application at the operational level. 

OEA FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS 

The framework for thoroughly and systematically analyzing and understanding any potential OE and all 

the challenges and opportunities inherent in it consists of the eight variables: political, military, 

economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time. The memory aid for 

these variables is PMESII-PT. 

Army forces apply the PMESII-PT variables to the specific OE in which they are conducting or plan to 

conduct operations. Use of the framework by Army commanders and staffs at all levels to analyze and 

understand their OEs:

• Enables lower commands to use their higher command’s analysis of its own OE and just add 

details to capture the nature of variables and sub-variables in their own specific OE, which is 

part of that higher-level OE or the strategic environment. 

• Enables higher commands to assimilate into their own OE analysis the relevant information 

developed by their subordinates.

• Facilitates a common operational picture (COP) at all levels of command.

• Provides compatibility with the PMESII framework used at joint level and in the Interagency 

Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF).

The PMESII-PT variables are fundamental to development of a comprehensive understanding of the OE 

for planning and decision-making at any level, in any situation. These variables and their 

interrelatedness determine the nature of an OE and how it will affect or be affected by an operation. 

The following is a brief description of each PMESII-PT variable, along with examples (in parentheses) of 

questions a commander might need to have answered about each variable in his particular OE:

• Political: Describes the distribution of responsibility and power at all levels of governance—

formally constituted authorities, as well as informal or covert political powers. (Who are the 

tribal leaders in the village? Which political leaders have popular support?)
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55 Operational Environments to 2028: The Strategic Environment for Unified Land Operations

• Military: Explores the military and/or paramilitary capabilities of all relevant actors (enemy, 

friendly, and neutral) in a given OE. (What is the force structure of the enemy?)

• Economic: Encompasses individual and group behaviors related to producing, distributing, and 

consuming resources. (What is the unemployment rate?)

• Social: Describes the cultural, religious, and ethnic makeup within an OE and the beliefs, values, 

customs, and behaviors of society members. (What is the ethnic composition of the OE?)

• Information: Explains the nature, scope, characteristics, and effects of individuals, 

organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information. (How much 

access does the local population have to news media or the Internet?)

• Infrastructure: Details the composition of the basic facilities, services, and installations needed 

for the functioning of a community or society in the OE. (What are the key modes of 

transportation?)

• Physical Environment: Depicts the geography and man-made structures as well as the climate 

and weather in the OE. (What types of terrain or weather conditions in this area of operations 

favor enemy operations?)

• Time: Describes the timing and duration of activities, events, or conditions within an OE, as well 

as how the timing and duration are perceived by various actors in the OE. (What is the cultural 

perception of time in this OE?)

VARIABLES AND SUBVARIABLES 

Each of the eight PMESII-PT variables also has associated core subvariables. These headings can be 

further broken down to provide the level of detail required. The degree to which each subvariable 

provides useful information relevant to a particular OE depends on the specific situation and echelon. 

The following table gives some examples of subvariables that require consideration. 

PMESII-PT Variables and Examples of Subvariables

Political Variable

- Attitude toward the United States

- Centers of political power

- Type of government

- Government effectiveness and 

legitimacy

- Influential political groups

- International relations

Social Variable

- Demographic mix

- Social volatility

- Education level

- Ethnic diversity

- Religious diversity

- Population movement

- Common languages

- Human rights

- Centers of social power

- Basic cultural norms and values

Physical Environment Variable

- Terrain

- Natural resources

- Climate

- Weather
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Operational Environments to 2028: The Strategic Environment for Unified Land Operations 56

PMESII-PT Variables and Examples of Subvariables

Military Variable

- Military forces

- Government paramilitary forces

- Non-state paramilitary forces

- Unarmed combatants

- Nonmilitary armed combatants

- Military functions

Information Variable

- Public communications media

- Information warfare

- Intelligence

- Information management

Time Variable

- Knowledge of the AO

- Cultural perception of time

- Information offset

- Tactical exploitation of time

- Key dates, time periods, or events

Economic Variable

- Economic diversity

- Employment status

- Economic activity

- Illegal economic activity

- Banking and finance 

Infrastructure Variable

- Construction patterns

- Urban zones

- Urbanized building density

- Utilities present

- Utility level

CONCLUSION 

Army commanders and staffs—at all levels—should use the PMESII-PT framework. TRADOC G-2 

Intelligence Support Activity (TRISA-Threats) produces Operational Environment Assessments (OEAs), 

which are an overview of the variables operationalized to a specific OE. To date, TRISA-Threats has 

produced seven OEAs focused on Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, North Korea, Azerbaijan, the Horn of 

Africa, and Iran. Each OEA contains a detailed analysis of the PMESII-PT variables, trends analysis, and an 

events list to show the reader the real-world manifestation of the variables in the selected OE. All OEAs 

and related products can be found on Army Knowledge Online (AKO).
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57 Operational Environments to 2028: The Strategic Environment for Unified Land Operations

Annex B

Asia-Pacific Regional OEConditions andCharacteristics

ASIA-PACIFIC REGION MAP

U.S. STRATEGIC INTERESTS AND GOALS 

The Asia-Pacific region will become entrenched as the global economy’s center of gravity over the 

forecast period. By 2020 the world’s four largest national economies will be the U.S., China, India, and 

Japan; their economic interests will converge in the sea lanes and littoral areas of this region, increasing 

the already vital importance of mature security relationships, political stability, and the free flow of 

commerce in Asia. Regional security mechanisms will continue to adapt to accommodate the rising 

power of China and India along with concomitant military buildups throughout the region. U.S.-Asian 

mutual defense treaties dating from the 1950s have served as a pillar of stability in the region, but over 

the forecast period these are likely to be augmented by deeper U.S. bilateral and multilateral security 

ties with additional Asian nations. 
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The U.S. is committed to maintaining a significant forward military presence in Northeast Asia over the 

forecast period and seeks to build a comprehensive security partnership with Japan and the Republic of 

Korea (ROK) that enhances the capabilities of both partners. This will include transferring operational 

control of combined forces on the Korean peninsula to the ROK by 2015, adopting a more flexible force 

posture, aiding Japan’s development of out-of-area capabilities, and developing Guam as a hub for 

future U.S. joint operations.

In Southeast Asia the U.S. will promote greater bilateral and multilateral security agreements and 

exercises, including both intraregional activities and those with U.S. forces. The U.S.-Australia alliance 

will continue to deepen and serve as a model for interoperability and collaboration in the region. The 

U.S. will seek greater security collaboration on counterterrorism, piracy, narcotics trafficking, and WMD 

proliferation with key regional partners including the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, Indonesia, 

Singapore, and Malaysia. Across the region the U.S. will work to develop a diversified and flexible set of 

basing agreements that will provide rapid operational access, robust sustainment capabilities, and allow 

a forward deployed presence as required. In addition to security missions, emphasis will be placed on 

the ability to support humanitarian operations.

The U.S. will seek opportunities to solidify a military-to-military (mil-mil) relationship with China, both as 

a trust and confidence-building measure and for collaboration on security issues such as piracy and 

WMD proliferation. At the same time, the U.S. will monitor China’s military modernization and address 

regional security concerns with the country. The U.S. will also pursue greater mil-mil cooperation with 

India, in the expectation that India’s growing capabilities in all elements of national power will serve as a 

pillar of stability and security throughout the Indian Ocean basin. 99

CONDITIONS SHAPING THE REGION 

POLITICAL—CHANGING INTERNATIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF POWER

China will continue to accumulate the tools associated with superpower status: a large, dynamic 

economic base; political and economic alliances capable of persuading or coercing other regional actors; 

world class technological resources; and full-spectrum military capabilities. Over the next decade, China 

will continue to invest enormous amounts of hard currency in joint ventures with cash-strapped 

Western technology firms, appropriating or reverse-engineering production methods and products, thus 

cutting years off of research and development cycles and leveling the technological playing field in many

industries. China has already gained access to many of Russia’s advanced military technologies, allowing 

newly profitable defense firms to reverse-engineer advanced systems such the Su-27 fighter, and 

facilitating development of potentially world-class platforms such as the J-20 stealth fighter ahead of 

expected timelines. Five- and ten-year defense technology plans are intended to elevate China’s 

indigenous defense firms into the first tier of the global defense industry in the 2020-2025 timeframe.100

China’s rapid military modernization has prompted a military spending binge throughout Asia, as 

neighboring states accumulate submarines, surface warships, aircraft, and other systems to counter 

China’s burgeoning maritime capabilities.101

It is unlikely that the U.S. will face China in armed conflict over the forecast period. However, China’s 

military strength and technological prowess will manifest beyond its borders in other ways that will 

significantly impact the U.S. Army. A mercantilist version of the Cold War is a potential outcome from 

China’s rise, as Beijing seeks natural resources, political influence, and strategic partners throughout the 
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59 Operational Environments to 2028: The Strategic Environment for Unified Land Operations

world. China’s laissez-faire approach to human rights encourages repressive regimes such as North 

Korea, Sudan, Iran, Burma, Venezuela, and others to pursue or deepen strategic partnerships with 

Beijing. This will contribute significantly to the proliferation of anti-access capabilities including ballistic 

and cruise missiles, air defense systems, and nuclear weapons technology that will threaten the ability 

of the U.S. Army to deploy and sustain in key regions of the world.102

Although Beijing’s ambitions appear to be purely economic, China will use the full range of incentives—

including military equipment and training—in developing bilateral relationships throughout Central and 

Southern Asia, South America, and Africa, altering regional security dynamics and creating the potential 

for ground conflicts between U.S. allies and regional rivals. Countries wishing to counter the military 

capabilities of Chinese client states may look to the U.S. for security relationships that will preserve 

regional stability. In recent history, China has preferred to employ economic leverage and information 

campaigns to achieve its ends, however future leaders of the Chinese Communist Party may choose a 

more muscular foreign policy. Therefore, the possibility of proxy conflicts should be anticipated.

India’s international status is increasing rapidly due to its economic growth, democratic governance, 

technological prowess, and military strength. If India maintains its current 9% economic growth rate it 

will become the world’s third largest economy by 2020.103 While Indian-Chinese relationships remain 

cordial and their bilateral trade has grown rapidly, Indian leaders frankly comment on the potentially 

destabilizing effects of China’s advancing military capabilities. Even as China establishes bases and 

conducts naval operations in the Indian Ocean, India’s maritime strategy now cites the South China Sea, 

Western Pacific, and neighboring littoral regions as areas of national interest; the Indian Navy has 

conducted joint exercises in the China Sea with the U.S., Japan, Singapore, and Vietnam. India is 

expending significant resources to extend its military capabilities and has recently surpassed China as 

the world’s largest importer of weapons systems.104 A deeper U.S.-India, mil-mil relationship would be a 

positive development for each country’s navy and for regional maritime security. However, the Indian 

government has refused to sign logistics support and communication interoperability agreements that 

the U.S. has lobbied intensively for since 2005, maintaining an independent security stance that—among 

other considerations—protects India’s easy access to Iranian energy supplies.105

MILITARY—WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

The nuclear rivalry between India and Pakistan will continue to threaten South Asia’s stability; as India’s 

economic and technical means grow apace, Pakistan’s political and military leaders will struggle with the 

perception of an inferior military position vis-à-vis India. Transfers of nuclear and missile equipment, 

technologies, and expertise among North Korea, China, Pakistan, Iran, Russia, and other actors will 

continue to create dangerous opportunities for proliferation of WMD capabilities into the hands of 

rogue state and non-state actors. 

INFORMATION—PROLIFERATION OF ICT

China’s military is making increasing ICT investments and placing doctrinal emphasis on the use of 

information warfare, including robust cyber and EW capabilities. Drawing on a large domestic talent 

pool of hackers, China’s cyber capabilities have been tested against Army and other U.S. government 

systems. At the same time China has built a virtual “Great Wall,” fencing off Chinese cyberspace from 

international social networking, communications, and search engines. India, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and 

other regional states also have deep reservoirs of expertise in this field. Continued economic 

development may eventually lead to this region becoming the world’s leading source of innovations in 
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the ICT industry; cyber competition driven by business, military, social, or other rivalries is likely to make 

it a source of cyberspace threats worldwide, and a dangerous environment for U.S. military information 

systems. Deployed U.S. forces will find themselves operating in an environment where information 

systems are under continuous threat of penetration and cyber attack.

SOCIAL—DEMOGRAPHICS

Demographics will increasingly affect the security calculations of regional powers including China and 

Japan; both will face major challenges in maintaining a labor force capable of producing economic 

growth, providing for increasing numbers of retirees, and manning their military forces. Similar 

pressures will affect their military budgets. In China the prevailing gender gap (over 120 males per 100 

females by some estimates) caused by selective abortions may contribute to increased social tensions 

and large-scale emigration of young males.

PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT—NATURAL RESOURCES

China’s rapid economic growth has created surging demand and prices for energy, metals, and other 

raw materials worldwide. Rapid growth throughout the Asia/Pacific region has also contributed to this 

global commodity market’s boom. Price movements in global equity, bond, and product markets are 

increasingly driven by automated electronic trading, leading to major swings in raw material prices and 

the financial fortunes of key business elites. If the global economy continues in its current state of 

fragility for an extended period—a very real possibility—the financial markets will become increasingly 

sensitized to risk. Even small changes in risk perceptions associated with access to raw materials could 

have severe political and economic impacts in Asian markets. These risk perceptions can arise 

unpredictably in source regions for raw materials in Africa and the Middle East due to local political 

instability, military conflict, commercial competition, or natural events. In a tense economic and 

information environment, adverse market adjustments due to events in politically unstable regions 

could trigger further destabilizing actions by Asian governments: strong diplomatic pressure, aggressive 

financial sanctions, or military deployments focused on securing access to critical natural resources.

FUTURE ARMY MISSION AREAS 

PEACETIME MILITARY ENGAGEMENT

The Army will be committed to combined training and exercises on the Korean Peninsula for the 

duration of the forecast period. This will involve assisting the ROK Army to develop the skills for 

employing combined arms teams in high-intensity conventional combat. The North Korean threat will 

also mandate training that realistically simulates WMD contaminated environments. Coalition-building is

a critical objective in this theater; deployed Army leaders may find themselves uniquely placed to 

promote collaboration and interoperability between the Korean and Japanese militaries.

The Army may be called on for a higher tempo of combined training and exercises with Southeast Asian 

militaries. Light infantry training for counterterrorism, counter-piracy, and counterinsurgency missions 

will predominate. Another important activity will be the creation of a flexible basing structure that will 

allow U.S. forces to rapidly surge into the theater for crisis response. Vietnam is in the process of 

refurbishing the port at Cam Rahn Bay with the intent to reopen its facilities to transiting foreign navies 
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61 Operational Environments to 2028: The Strategic Environment for Unified Land Operations

in 2014; a mil-mil relationship between Vietnam and the U.S. is an important contingency for the next 

decade.106

LIMITED INTERVENTION

The Asia-Pacific region is extremely prone to earthquakes, and many of its coastal areas and river plains 

are vulnerable to deadly flooding. A recent United Nations (UN) report documents the lack of disaster 

response capabilities in the region and the disproportionate death tolls that result.107 China, Japan, 

Indonesia, India, and Taiwan have experienced over 1/3 of the world’s major earthquake disasters 

(death tolls over 1,000) since 1900, while Bangladesh, Burma, and India remain especially vulnerable to 

massive losses of life from tropical cyclones.108 As the Army increases its peacetime engagement 

activities in Southeast Asia, it becomes more likely that deployed units will be in the path of natural 

disasters and/or be called on as first responders. Important provisions for such contingencies may 

include early-warning services; logistics support agreements, communications interoperability with hostnation forces, and knowledge of local culture, climate, and geography.

PEACE OPERATIONS

The deployable security capabilities of regional actors such as Australia, combined with the overall 

stability of the region, make it unlikely that the U.S. would be involved in Asia-Pacific peacekeeping 

missions. The only current peace operation in the region is the United Nations Integrated Mission in 

Timor-Leste (UNMIT), established in 2006. U.N. Resolution 1704 authorized 34 military liaison and staff 

officers to this mission. 

IRREGULAR WARFARE

Over the past decade, India, Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, and Bangladesh have all experienced 

insurgent and terrorist violence from Islamist extremist groups that continue to operate in Southeast 

Asia and receive support from Persian Gulf extremists.109 Although these threats are largely contained at 

present, the U.S. will need to be prepared to assist any democratic nation in the region whose stability is 

threatened by future growth of extremist violence via the deployment of special operations forces 

(SOF), light infantry, and support forces, as has occurred in the Southern Philippines since 2002. 

MAJOR COMBAT OPERATIONS

Outside the Korean peninsula there is little prospect for major combat operations in the Asia-Pacific 

region. Should a conventional conflict break out, it will most likely be fought by naval, air, and missile 

forces. The geography of the theater dictates that major international conflicts will be fought for control 

of SLOCs, the major port facilities they serve, and the key bases that can interdict them. In such a 

conflict the Army’s role would be limited to defense of established basing infrastructure in Guam, Korea, 

Japan, or of temporary U.S. installations in Singapore, Indonesia, the Philippines, Vietnam, or Australia. 

Threats could come from ballistic and cruise missiles, aerial bombardment, electronic and cyber attacks, 

amphibious SPF missions, or terrorist attacks. In this contingency the Joint force would benefit from 

improved methods for physical hardening of facilities, more capable missile defenses hardened against 

electronic and cyber threats, and improved surveillance and monitoring capabilities to support fixedinstallation defense. On the Korean peninsula the threat would also include the risk of a high-intensity 

conflict, combined arms maneuver, and operations in WMD-contaminated environments.
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AnnexC

Middle East and Southwest Asia Regional OE Conditions and

Characteristics

MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTHWEST ASIA REGION MAP

U.S. STRATEGIC INTERESTS AND GOALS 

Vital U.S. security goals in the Middle East and Southwest Asia include political stability, the defeat of 

violent extremist organizations, promotion of democracy, and the strengthening of regional security 

structures and non-proliferation regimes. Critical economic interests include promoting economic 

prosperity for the region’s underdeveloped states, integration of regional economies into global 

markets, and access to regional energy supplies.

Iran’s program to develop nuclear weapons directly threatens the states of the Gulf Cooperation Council 

(GCC), Israel, Russia, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and may provoke a nuclear 

arms race in the region. This could lead to future diplomatic confrontations or conflicts between 

nuclear-armed states with immature security and control systems for their weapons. Iranian 

sponsorship of Hezbollah, Hamas, Iraqi militias, and Shia minority groups throughout the region will 

contribute to further mistrust, instability, and violence. U.S. policy objectives will continue to include the 

discontinuation of Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons and its sponsorship of terrorist groups.

The U.S. will continue to seek the conclusive defeat of al-Qaeda in the Afghanistan-Pakistan theater and 

to strengthen the capacity of both states to resist violent extremist movements. This includes dedicated 
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support to Afghanistan’s Security Forces to advise, train, and assist them in resisting a Taliban return to 

power and to reintegrate former insurgents into Afghan society. Similar support will be provided to Iraqi 

security forces to expand security and freedom in a prosperous, democratic Iraqi state.

The U.S. will remain committed to the security of Israel, while simultaneously pursuing stronger bilateral 

and multilateral security relationships with Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Yemen, and the GCC states. The 

current basing infrastructure, force mix, and defense posture of U.S. military forces in the region will 

have to be reassessed alongside these security partnerships, due to the increasing threat from ballistic 

missiles and WMD. The U.S. will need to develop a regional military presence that is optimized against 

several competing criterion: to demonstrate a credible long-term commitment to regional security; to 

minimize perceptions of American military “occupation”; to protect U.S. bases and provide reliable 

logistic support in crisis situations; and to promote regional security architectures including air and 

missile defenses. 110

CONDITIONS SHAPING THE REGION 

MILITARY—WMD PROLIFERATION

Iran’s nuclear program, risks to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and the willingness of external actors to sell 

nuclear technology and components all heighten the salience of WMD proliferation for the region’s 

future. A conventional arms race is already under way and a nuclear arms race may follow: Saudi Arabia, 

Kuwait, and the UAE have already signed contracts for nuclear reactors, while the Saudis are actively 

considering their own nuclear weapons program.

111 Israel’s nuclear deterrent is often cited as 

justification for WMD programs in Arab states. Syria possesses the most active chemical warfare 

program in the region and, should the regime fall, Syria’s weapon stocks would be at risk of seizure by 

local factions. Should the Assad regime survive, it will continue to cooperate with Iran in supplying 

Lebanese Hezbollah with advanced weapons systems, including medium-range missiles. Future 

biological weapons development by Iran and Syria is a potential threat, made more severe by their 

demonstrated willingness to share military capabilities with non-state actors who threaten the interests 

of the U.S. and its allies worldwide.

POLITICAL AND INFORMATION

During the Arab Spring of 2011, ICT-empowered social movements succeeded in ousting heads of state 

in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, spawned sustained civil conflicts in Yemen and Syria, and created a political 

crisis in Bahrain that was only turned back by an armed coalition response from the GCC states. Each of 

the uprisings in the Middle East in 2011 called for democratic reform—full participation of the people in 

the formation and operation of their national governments. In the short term this may contribute to 

greater instability, creating opportunities and threats for Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and outside actors 

(including the U.S., the European Union [E.U.], China, Russia, and India) seeking to influence the 

outcomes. By 2028 democracies could be the norm in the region, although they may include “illiberal” 

elected regimes that oppress minority groups and foster xenophobic attitudes toward other nations and 

cultures. 
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SOCIAL

Virulent anti-Israeli sentiments run deep in the region and the ouster of authoritarian regimes may give 

freer rein to these public attitudes, raising the risk of further armed conflicts driven by the IsraeliPalestinian rivalry. National foreign policies in the region may move further into opposition of the United 

States, its policies, presence, and interests in the region, especially with respect to U.S. support for 

Israel. The hegemonic aspirations of the leading Sunni and Shia nations, Saudi Arabia and Iran, may 

spark an armed conflict as each seeks to assume religious and political leadership in the Middle East at 

the expense of the other. As Iran achieves nuclear weapons capability the Sunni-Arab world could 

respond in kind, with Israel forming the third leg of an unstable triad of well-armed protagonists with 

longstanding political grievances and deeply entrenched ideological divisions. 

Violent Islamist extremist groups have been at the root of many conflicts in the region over the last 

three decades. A future wave of Islamist movements may gain political influence or control in emerging 

democracies, promoting populist hostilities against Israel, international institutions, and political, 

economic, and security relationships with Western nations. In the future al-Qaeda, its affiliates, and/or 

successor terrorist movements may refine their ideological message and limit their targeting of Muslims 

to gain broader public support. These developments would multiply the tactical threat of terrorist 

attacks on deployed U.S. and allied forces, embassies, businesses, and citizens.

PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT—NATURAL RESOURCES

Competition for natural resources will continue to be a source of instability and conflict in the region 

over the forecast period. Oil-importing nations in Asia, Europe, and the Americas continually vie for 

political influence, oil and gas investment opportunities, security relationships, and arms-export deals 

with the region’s oil producers.

Access to water is another issue that will threaten the security and stability of the region. By 2025, 

“water stress will increase significantly in many locations throughout the world, including North Africa, 

the Middle East, and Asia.”112 Changing weather patterns are impacting the natural water cycle in the 

region: as of mid-2011, most of the Middle East and much of Southwest Asia has endured 7–10 years of 

drought. The disputed Golan Heights region of Syria (captured by Israel during the 1967 “Six Days War”) 

is home to the headwaters of the Jordan River. Syria will continue to demand that Israel return this 

captured territory that is home to Israel’s most important fresh water source; Israeli governments will 

be loathe to comply. Another flashpoint involves Turkey’s Southeastern Anatolia Development Project, 

which centers on a series of 22 dams and 19 hydroelectric plants that will further diminish the flow of 

water to Syria and Iraq from the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers.113 Both Syria and Iraq receive over half of 

their fresh water supplies from other countries. Most major urban areas lack sufficient watermanagement infrastructure to supply their increasing populations, making delivery of fresh water and 

the disposal of wastewater sources of popular discontent and potential drivers of conflict.

FUTURE ARMY MISSION AREAS

PEACETIME MILITARY ENGAGEMENT

The U.S. will seek to preclude the creation of new terrorist safe havens and eliminate existing havens 

through security assistance and cooperation with Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen, and other willing 
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partners. This will require the Army to refine its methods for providing long-term training and material 

support to host-nation security forces. These operations may take place in austere and hostile 

environments, with host-nation forces possessing limited fires and logistics support. Greater insurgent 

infiltration of urban populations, host-nation security forces, and other government or NGOs may 

greatly increase the threat to Army personnel. U.S. training missions may also include training for 

defense from external conventional threats, intelligence monitoring of Iranian-sponsored terrorist and 

information operations, security of critical infrastructure, and the prevention of internal sectarian 

conflicts. Public resentment toward the presence of Western military forces may preclude large-scale 

joint training and exercises in the Middle East. However, small-scale multinational training exercises may 

continue in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other nations in the region. 

LIMITED INTERVENTION

Violent extremist and insurgent groups will remain active throughout the region and low-intensity 

conflicts will continue. U.S. forces must increase their mastery of robotic systems as technologies 

advance, taking full advantage of the increasing precision, persistence, and autonomy of unmanned 

systems to conduct strikes against key terrorist targets. SOF raids may be required in select cases to 

ensure neutralization of very high-value targets, to secure intelligence, or to rescue hostages. 

Challenging mission profiles may require extremely close coordination of armed unmanned systems 

with U.S. Soldiers on the ground. 

Increasingly severe drought, flooding, desertification, and urbanization of populations in economically 

depressed nations may combine to produce humanitarian crises in which the U.S. will join multinational 

efforts to provide security and contribute to humanitarian relief operations. The growing number of 

chemical and nuclear facilities in the region will increase the risks associated with earthquakes, terrorist 

attacks, missile strikes, and other events that could complicate disaster-relief efforts. Weak host-nation 

governments may be unable to provide security to foreign disaster-relief efforts; in such scenarios the 

Army could be required to provide security for evacuation efforts and relief agencies in urban 

environments already infiltrated by terrorist groups and other political organizations with anti-Western 

agendas.

PEACE OPERATIONS

U.S. forces could be called on to participate in multinational peacekeeping efforts in the Middle East and 

South Asia. For example, any future Middle East peace process that moves toward a resolution of IsraeliPalestinian territorial disputes may require an international force to occupy neutral security zones 

between Israeli and Palestinian areas. As part of a United Nations peacekeeping force operating under 

restrictive rules of engagement, the Army could be placed in close proximity to Iranian-backed Hezbollah 

and Hamas forces equipped with a range of standoff weapons including modern short-range ballistic 

missiles, Katyusha rockets, UAVs, and successive generations of Improvised Rocket Assisted Munitions 

(IRAMs), along with terrorist wings well-versed in IED and suicide tactics. 

IRREGULAR WARFARE

The sovereignty and security of the Afghan and Iraqi governments will remain at risk as these nations 

face multiple internal and external threats in the coming decades. In both countries, ethno-sectarian 

factions will remain significant centers of local authority, challenging or preempting the authority of the 

national governments. Sectarian factions such as Iraq’s Kurdish Peshmerga and the Hezb-e Islami 
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Gulbuddin in Afghanistan include highly-organized, well-trained and well-armed militias devoted to 

protecting the political interests and territorial integrity of their ethnic group. Al-Qaeda will continue 

terrorist attacks to spark sectarian conflict in Iraq and support the Taliban’s efforts to overthrow the 

Afghan government. Iran’s Quds Force will continue arming and training insurgent groups and 

performing clandestine operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. In this environment the Army may be tasked 

with supporting domestic security forces against evolving multiple threats with declining coalition 

resources. 

Islamist terrorist organizations will continue honing their methods for exploiting weak and failed states 

to establish and maintain bases of operation. Despite successful targeting of al-Qaeda leaders and an 

overall decline in its global capabilities, such places will still include conditions favorable to Islamist 

militant groups seeking to maintain their presence in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Central Asia, the Arabian 

Peninsula, and Africa over the forecast period.114 A successful mass-casualty terrorist attack on U.S. 

citizens or installations would compel the U.S. to initiate a decisive response; if the attack issued from a 

terrorist safe haven, this could involve conventional forces conducting joint forced-entry operations to 

capture/kill terrorist leaders and destroy their base infrastructure. The adversary may employ IEDs and 

suicide tactics that have advanced well beyond current capabilities, employing miniaturization, robotics, 

more powerful explosives, improved electronic components, and prepared ground to inflict maximum 

casualties on U.S. forces. 

MAJOR COMBAT OPERATIONS

Over the forecast period the Israeli-Palestinian confrontation may become tenser, the Saudi-Iranian 

rivalry and arms race may grow, and domestic challenges to authoritarian regimes could continue. In 

consequence, the Middle East may be the most likely theater for future major combat operations. These 

operations may involve large-scale aerial and missile attacks, high-intensity mechanized ground combat, 

and mid-intensity conflicts involving adversaries along the lines of the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah clash. These 

conflicts could escalate to the point of U.S. involvement if U.S. allies are attacked, if critical oil 

infrastructure such as the Abqaiq oil processing facility are at risk, or if maritime chokepoints vital to the 

global economy are threatened. In this type of contingency the Joint Force could face a spectrum of 

anti-access capabilities including WMD, missiles, submarines, swarming UAVs and small boats, suicide 

attacks on bases and critical infrastructure, and cyber and EW attacks.
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67 Operational Environments to 2028: The Strategic Environment for Unified Land Operations

AnnexD

Europe and Russia Regional OEConditions andCharacteristics

EUROPE AND RUSSIA REGION MAP

U.S. STRATEGIC INTERESTS AND GOALS

The NATO alliance (along with America’s non-NATO democratic allies in Europe) will remain a central 

pillar of U.S. international security and a priority for mil-mil engagement over the forecast period. 

NATO’s new strategic concept is focused on strengthening capabilities for ballistic missile defense, space 

and cyber security, interdiction of illicit trafficking, non-proliferation regimes, and increasing NATO’s 

capabilities by mission specialization among its members. The U.S. will maintain a few brigade combat 

teams (BCTs) stationed in Europe alongside an enhanced naval presence, providing an in-theater 

capability to meet the Article 5 requirements of the North Atlantic Treaty, as well as a flexible forward 

posture that supports combined operations both inside and outside the continent. 

The U.S. will seek to build on collaboration with European allies to combat violent extremism in 

Afghanistan and to leverage NATO capabilities to act as a stabilizing force across the Middle East, North 

Africa, the Balkans, and the Caucasus. Other important areas of NATO cooperation will include 

addressing emerging security issues in the Arctic and developing closer mil-mil relationships with nonNATO Europe. The U.S. will work with European partners (especially the U.K. and France) to share 

facilities in Africa and to collaborate on capacity-building and contingency responses there. The U.S. will 

pursue an expanded security dialogue and mil-mil relationship with Russia, encouraging Moscow to play 

a more active role in promoting security and stability in Asia (especially in Afghanistan), developing 

closer cooperation on counterterrorism, counter-proliferation, space and ballistic missile defense 

initiatives, and negotiating the future of the Arctic. 115

CONDITIONS SHAPING THE REGION 

POLITICAL—CHANGING INTERNATIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF POWER 

Demographics and economics are gradually weakening the military capabilities of the NATO alliance; 

over the last decade average defense spending in NATO’s European member states shrank to 1.7% of 
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gross domestic product (GDP) and total military personnel fell by 50%. These downward trends are 

driven by factors—including reduced perceptions of military threats and increased demands for social 

spending—that may continue. However, Europe’s great powers will retain significant advanced military 

capabilities augmented by newer NATO members such as Poland, whose wealth and national power will 

continue to rise relative to Europe’s core states. 

Russia is also facing a general decline in military capabilities and is struggling to fund and implement a 

sweeping set of military reforms that would slash the size of ineffective reserve forces, stockpiles of 

antiquated equipment, a bloated officer corps, and military bureaucracy, while simultaneously 

transforming the armed forces into a professional force with modern weapons, doctrine, and enhanced 

readiness. Russian military doctrine is still focused on the core mission of a large Asian land war, with 

China gradually supplanting NATO as the principal threat. However the de facto primary mission is 

maintaining an adequate security structure in the Caucasus and Central Asia. To that end, Russia has 

mutual defense pacts with Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan under 

the auspices of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and has recently established or 

renewed long-term leases on military bases in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Sevastopol (Ukraine), Armenia, 

and Kyrgyzstan.

PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT—NATURAL RESOURCES

An emerging area of strategic interest will be the Arctic Ocean. As ice floes melt and oil-recovery 

methods advance, the Arctic will become increasingly accessible to maritime traffic and oil 

exploration/production. Five nations—Russia, Canada, Norway, Denmark, and the U.S.—border the 

Arctic and have territorial claims there. Other nations seek access to the energy resources in 

international waters. Russia, whose territory rings almost half the Arctic Circle, has placed “a naval 

infantry and an army brigade on the Kola Peninsula,” setting the conditions for a potential increase in 

military operations in the Arctic. 116

SOCIAL—DEMOGRAPHICS

The Europe/Russia region faces the demographic challenges of an aging, shrinking native population 

confronted with increasing numbers of less affluent, culturally diverse immigrants. The UN Population 

Division forecasts that Europe’s population will rise less than 1% through 2020, and then decline to its 

present level of 738 million by 2035. The elderly will increase from 16% to 24% of the population, with a 

corresponding increase in healthcare and other social spending burdens, while Europe’s proportion of 

the world’s 15-24 year olds will fall from 7.7% to 6.5%. The size of the E.U. labor force is spiraling 

downward. Labor shortages, combined with massive debt implications, will retard economic growth for 

decades and have a long-term impact on European defense budgets and, by extension, NATO.117

POLITICAL

Russia’s semi-autocratic “managed democracy” is characterized by pervasive corruption, economic 

inefficiencies, crumbling infrastructure, declining social services, entrenched organized crime, and rising 

inter-ethnic and religious violence. Governance is further complicated by the economic dominance of 

the oil industry and the corrupting influence of competition for control of oil-export revenues. Russia’s 

manufacturing exports have been undermined to the point of collapse due to their poor quality and low 

demand. The corrosive economic climate contributes to a brain drain of young, tech-savvy professionals, 

with as many as 1.25 million having emigrated in the 2008-2011 timeframe to seek opportunities 
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outside of Russia.118 The ability to reverse these trends will depend critically on the leadership qualities 

of key national leaders over the next decade. The return of Vladimir Putin to the presidency for another 

six years does not bode well for major changes in Russian governance. While Russia faces serious 

security threats along its southern borders (for which NATO assistance could be extremely helpful), Mr. 

Putin appears bent on erecting barriers against the West to protect the flagging legitimacy of his 

decades-long rule. Failure to improve Russia’s governance could eventually contribute to more 

breakaway regions (e.g. new nations) in the Caucasus, early dominance of Central Asia by China, 

accession into the E.U. and/or NATO applications by the Ukraine and Georgia, and an expansion of 

Chinese influence/territory in Eastern Siberia.

FUTURE ARMY MISSION AREAS 

PEACETIME MILITARY ENGAGEMENT

The primary mission areas for the U.S. Army in Europe will be to strengthen the existing bilateral and 

multilateral ties with NATO’s member states, to develop closer mil-mil relations with Europe’s nonNATO states, and to maintain a forward basing presence that enables rapid force projection into 

neighboring regions. The Army will participate in combined training and exercises with European 

partners to facilitate mission specialization among NATO members. For NATO’s capabilities to improve 

through specialization, the Army may be required to provide focused training and tutelage to NATO 

partners in critical mission-specialization areas such as rotary-wing ground support and airlift, logistics, 

and field medicine. The mil-mil relationship with Turkey will become increasingly important, due to the 

country’s role as a hub for a European missile defense network and the growth of its national power and 

regional influence across the Middle East. Future deterioration in Russia’s security environment could 

eventually (post-2020) lead to increased dialogue and mil-mil relations with Russia, potentially leading 

to combined training or small-scale combined operations with Russian ground forces in the Arctic, the 

Caucasus, or Central Asia. 

The U.S. Army’s presence in Europe will entail continuing security risks due to the ability of terrorist 

operatives to transit Europe’s open borders to access U.S. military targets. Since the Madrid and London 

bombings in 2004-2005, European law enforcement agencies had been successful in preventing further 

mass-casualty attacks; ironically this success ended in Norway in 2011 at the hands of an anti-Islamist 

extremist. Al-Qaeda and other extremist groups will continue to pursue opportunities to target U.S. 

installations, while European law enforcement organizations and U.S. counterterrorism intelligence 

programs maintain robust capabilities to defeat such plots. However, isolated attacks on U.S. military 

personnel in transportation hubs, restaurants, and social gatherings will remain a threat and may 

become more frequent if Europe experiences heightened cultural clashes between native populations 

and growing Muslim immigrant communities. Continuing financial crises could lead to defunding of 

critical European law enforcement and intelligence activities, creating greater scope for terrorist 

operations.

LIMITED INTERVENTION

There are no likely scenarios requiring a U.S. limited intervention over the next decade. Later in the 

forecast period (2025-2030) there is a possibility that population declines and continuing financial 

weakness will seriously erode social and economic conditions in some European states, leading to 
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widespread collapse in civil order, failure of national governments, or humanitarian crises due to natural 

disasters that weakened states are unable to contend with. 

PEACE OPERATIONS

U.S. involvement in peace operations may be limited to background support to European military forces 

in the Balkans, including transport, logistics, and communications and intelligence support. This will 

continue as long as the yearly UN mandate is renewed. 

IRREGULAR WARFARE

U.S. Army involvement in irregular warfare in the Europe/Russia region during the forecast period 

appears unlikely. Only the Balkans and the Caucasus exhibit the potential for insurgent movements, and 

neither region currently harbors vital U.S. interests that would justify the Army being committed in a 

counterinsurgency role. One exception that could arise late in the forecast period would involve a 

request by a weakened Russia for NATO assistance to stabilize key oil producing regions upon which 

Europe depends.
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71 Operational Environments to 2028: The Strategic Environment for Unified Land Operations

Annex E

Africa Regional OEConditions andCharacteristics

AFRICA REGION MAP

U.S. STRATEGIC INTERESTS AND GOALS 

U.S. national security objectives in Africa focus on building governance capacity to deal with its manifold 

threats to human security, political stability, and international commerce. The U.S. will encourage willing 

African partners to assume leadership roles in regional security and will work collaboratively with extraregional partners to build security capacity. 

U.S. security assistance will focus on: South Africa, a critical partner with the greatest extant capacity for 

assisting other states; linchpin states such as Nigeria and Kenya, where terrorist and criminal 

organizations pose the greatest threats to stability and U.S. interests; regional security organizations 

including the African Union and Regional Economic Communities (RECs); and weak and failed states such 

as the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, 

and Zimbabwe. In addition to developing military capabilities, these efforts will seek to improve civilmilitary relations within African society by emphasizing civilian control of the military, professionalism, 

and the rule of law.
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The U.S. military will work more closely with European allies, seeking to improve contingency response 

capabilities by sharing facilities, developing logistics agreements, and improving African-owned 

infrastructure. These measures will enable rapid deployment for security activities in theater, and a 

correspondingly light external military footprint via short-term deployments in theater. 119

CONDITIONS SHAPING THE REGION 

POLITICAL

The number of African countries considered electoral democracies increased from four in 1991 to 

eighteen in 2011.120 Yet African governments, including new democracies, are frequently crippled by 

widespread corruption, legal restrictions on civil society, entrenched political leaders who repeatedly 

amend constitutions to extend their rule, and the historical absence of a democratic political culture. A 

recent wave of coups, civil conflicts, and political stalemates between opposing factions suggest a trend 

of democratic backsliding across the region. Weak and failed states throughout the continent contain 

ungoverned spaces that provide operational bases for Africa’s numerous irregular threats.

SOCIAL—DEMOGRAPHICS

There are two demographic regimes at work in Africa: the first in Northern Africa (countries bordering 

the Mediterranean Sea) where birth rates have been declining for a generation and youth bulges are 

currently near or at their maximum size, creating conditions ripe for social unrest and revolt, as has 

taken place in Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt. By 2035 Northern Africa’s under-25 population will fall from 

51% to 40% of total population; this should lead to greater political stability and higher economic 

growth. The second demographic regime is in Sub-Saharan Africa, where UN population growth 

forecasts exceed 2.0% per annum through 2035, with the majority of the population under age 25 

through the year 2050. Sub-Saharan Africa’s global share of 15-24 year olds will increase from 14.3% to 

23.3% over the forecast period.121 Under these circumstances, mega-cities will continue to grow rapidly, 

poverty will persist, and governments will struggle to provide basic services. Insurgent and terrorist 

groups will seek to exploit these conditions: competing with the state to provide social services; 

employing violence to intimidate political opposition; using terror attacks to provoke external actors 

into delegitimizing military interventions; and aggressively recruiting among the region’s youth. 

MILITARY

Irregular threats in Africa include standing militias and insurgent groups with conventional military 

capabilities, well-organized and well-equipped terrorist groups, pirate groups deeply embedded in local 

communities, and drug-trafficking organizations (DTOs) and other smuggling organizations with a broad 

range of land, maritime, and aviation mobility assets. These threat groups catalyze and participate in 

interstate conflicts such as the Second Congo War, which eventually involved eight African nations and 

claimed over five million lives from 1998-2003.

Islamist terrorist groups are a persistent, evolving threat to security and stability in the Trans-Sahel and 

the Horn of Africa. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has been contained by a decade-long 

Algerian COIN campaign, but still maintains approximately 1,000 fighters operating in Algeria, Mali, 

Mauritania, and Niger.122 AQIM employs small arms and IEDs in ambushes on Algerian government 

security forces, while its southern battalions operate across wide reaches of the Sahara and the Sahel in 
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machine gun-armed civilian trucks. The group continues to finance itself with criminal activities including 

provision of safe passage for smugglers and kidnapping for ransom. Western hostages seized in the 

poorly-policed Sahel states have been especially lucrative for AQIM, allowing it to provide support to 

other terrorist groups, such as Boko Haram. This homegrown Nigerian group, also known as the Nigerian 

Taliban, maintains a political goal of overthrowing the government and imposing Sharia law across the 

country. A heavy-handed crackdown by the Nigerian military caused serious losses to the group in 2009

but generated sympathy and support from conservative social elements in the Muslim community. In 

2010-2011 Boko Haram rebounded, greatly increasing its operational tempo and targeting police 

officers, government officials, and Nigerian Christians.

Al-Shabaab is a clan-based Islamist militant group that employs conventional, insurgent, and terrorist 

tactics against the weak Somali government, African Union peacekeeping forces, and Western civilian 

targets in the Horn of Africa. In 2006, al-Shabaab took over most of southern Somalia and the capital of 

Mogadishu; five years later it still controls large swaths of the country. Al-Shabaab also has ties to alQaeda, many of its members are believed to have trained and fought in Afghanistan, and it has several 

hundred foreign fighters within its ranks.

Despite significant international commitment, pirate groups in the Horn of Africa comprise a major 

threat to shipping, and the extent of their predations has grown. Somali pirates are attacking along the 

Kenyan and Tanzanian coasts, extending their operations into the Mozambique Channel, and striking as 

far east as India’s exclusive economic zone. In April 2011, at least 50 hijacked vessels were in pirate 

hands, along with over 750 hostages.123 Piracy has also grown into a thriving business in the Gulf of 

Guinea, placing the flow of important oil exports at risk. The Gulf of Guinea produces more than three 

million barrels of oil a day (roughly 4% of global production) and, together with Angola and the waters 

off Congo, is expected to supply up to one-quarter of all the United States’ imported oil by 2015.124 In 

2009, 28 pirate incidents were reported in Nigerian waters and smaller numbers of incidents (one-three 

per country) occurred off the coasts of Guinea, Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Togo, Benin, Cameroon, and the 

Democratic Republic of the Congo.125

Transnational DTOs have expanded their operations in Africa over the past decade in response to 

growing narcotics demand in Europe and increasing interdiction of alternative routes. DTOs now 

manage a sophisticated “portfolio” of trafficking platforms, routes, and methods, constantly adapting to 

law enforcement efforts. In Africa these include: maritime platforms including cargo vessels, fishing 

boats, and high-speed powerboats; aviation assets ranging from single-engine light aircraft to multiengine jetliners; land-based shipments moved by trucks across traditional Saharan caravan routes; and 

large numbers of drug “mules”—individuals who carry or ingest small amounts of drugs for transport via 

airlines or passenger vessels. Insurgent and terrorist groups are increasing their involvement with DTOs, 

receiving payments for drugs transiting their operating areas or actively providing security for drug 

shipments.

POLITICAL—CHANGING INTERNATIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF POWER

China, India, and several other external powers have dramatically increased their economic, political, 

and military involvement in Africa as a means to expand their access to important strategic resources. 

Over the last decade China has signed a string of multibillion-dollar deals with African nations to build 

highways, schools, hospitals, and other infrastructure in return for rights to African minerals and oil 

reserves. China’s investments and mineral-rights agreements span the continent, supported by a rapidly 

expanding volume of financing targeted by the Chinese government’s five year plans.126 India’s 
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economic ties with Africa have largely been led by the private sector, with the Indian government 

focused on diplomatic initiatives designed to gain African support for a permanent Indian seat on the 

United Nations Security Council while also posturing itself for access to the natural resources it needs to 

fuel its economic development. 

China has developed close military ties with many African states, including Chad, the Central African 

Republic, Congo, Liberia, Nigeria, Senegal, Sudan, and Zimbabwe. From 2003 to 2006, China’s arms sales 

to Africa made up 15.4% ($500 million) of all conventional arms transfers to the continent, including 

weapons sales to Burundi, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sudan, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe.127 From 

2007 to 2009, China was the largest source of arms exports to sub-Saharan Africa; 72% of Sudan’s arms 

imports come from China.128 In recent years, Sudan has built several weapons factories with assistance 

from China, and its domestic arms production has become a major source of small arms and light 

weapons for other African countries such as Chad, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Uganda.129 India has 

also begun to expand its military presence in Africa by signing defense cooperation agreements with 

Kenya, Madagascar, Mozambique, and the Seychelles, due in part to concerns over Chinese 

expansionism.130 Over the past decade, U.S. mil-mil relationships have expanded in many of the 

countries listed above. For example, the U.S. has made significant investments in Nigeria’s security 

forces, seeking to develop their capacity to lead regional stabilization efforts, perform counterterrorism 

missions, and secure Nigeria’s oil industry. Any future crisis response in Nigeria would require careful 

analysis of China’s interests, presence, and role in the crisis. 

PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT

African nations with large concentrations of exportable mineral wealth often find themselves cursed by 

it; natural resources have been a causal factor in many armed conflicts over the last decade, both as a 

motive and as a funding source for violence. Revenues from mineral wealth are used to build the 

personal fortunes of corrupt leaders, to buy political support that entrenches corruption, and to finance 

armies and insurgents that fight for control of the resources. Throughout Africa, the potential for 

conflict over access to water will continue to increase over the forecast period, as populations grow and 

scarce water sources shrink. The most prominent example is the Nile River, where Egypt will advance its 

claims for a majority of the river’s flow, while Sudan and other upstream nations will have increasing 

needs to develop the Nile for local economic advantage. 

Africa’s vulnerability to drought and famine, along with the decline in fresh water availability and arable 

land, has led to numerous humanitarian crises in recent decades. These crises are frequently initiated or 

exacerbated by armed conflicts that disrupt agricultural cycles and/or create large refugee populations. 

Continued violence in Darfur can be traced back to climate change and water shortages, as disappearing 

pasture and evaporating water holes sparked deadly disputes between nomadic Arab cattle herders and 

black African farmers. Approximately 27% of the world’s degraded land is located in Africa, with much of 

the cultivable land now degraded due to erosion, deforestation, and desertification; land degradation is 

now of major concern to 32 countries in Africa.131
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75 Operational Environments to 2028: The Strategic Environment for Unified Land Operations

FUTURE ARMY MISSION AREAS 

PEACETIME MILITARY ENGAGEMENT

The Army’s primary mission in Africa over the forecast period will be to conduct training to develop 

African military capabilities for combating the wide range of irregular threats in the region. Training 

requirements will include basic light-infantry combat skills, communications, maintenance, logistics, and 

familiarization with U.S.-provided weapons, vehicles, and equipment. Training and materiel assistance 

must be tailored to accommodate the logistical realities facing host-nation forces, such as shortages of 

facilities, spare parts, fuel, ammunition, and other supplies. A recurring requirement will be to improve 

African forces’ performance as members of regional and UN peacekeeping missions. 

Coincident with these mission-focused goals, the Army will be involved in broader efforts to improve the 

professionalism of African militaries, including respect for civilian authority, human rights, and private 

property. Previous efforts to build security capacity in Sub-Saharan Africa offer few examples of durable 

improvement; sustained effort and innovative new methods will be required. African states require 

assistance in simultaneously increasing the professionalism and capabilities of military forces, border 

guards, police, courts, and civil administrations. Holistic reforms of this type will require Army personnel 

to coordinate their work with joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partners, and to 

integrate with interagency, bilateral, and multilateral assistance efforts.

LIMITED INTERVENTION

Humanitarian Assistance

Droughts, crop failures, civil conflicts, and other disasters will continue to trigger famines, ethnic 

cleansing, forced migration, and epidemics in Africa. International relief efforts may require security 

assistance for protection against irregular threat groups. Although deployments of Army maneuver 

elements to Africa for these missions would face serious political obstacles, the presence and 

participation of small detachments of U.S. trainers, advisors, and logistics support troops would not. In 

the absence of sustained improvement in African public-health measures, these Army personnel could 

face the threat of contact with new pathogens for which immunizations and treatments do not exist.

Counter-Piracy

Piracy threats in the Horn of Africa and the West African littoral have the potential to grow if 

governance and security capacity in fragile regional states deteriorate. Eventually the piracy threat could 

require outside intervention to eradicate pirate shore bases, requiring the Joint force to embed military 

advisors, conduct persistent surveillance and raids, or temporarily occupy base areas. Such operations 

would occur in austere, arid/jungle environments, in pursuit of elusive, irregular adversaries embedded 

in local clan structures.

PEACE OPERATIONS

In the aftermath of Operation Provide Relief/Restore Hope in Somalia from August 1992 to March 1994, 

there was a marked decline in U.S. participation in UN peacekeeping missions worldwide, especially in 

Africa. The failure of the Somalia mission led to a reevaluation of the proper employment of U.S. forces, 

as stated by Secretary of State Colin Powell in testimony to Congress; “It is often best to use American 
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GIs for the heavy lifting of combat and leave the peacekeeping to others.”132 However, the U.S. has 

provided critical airlift, sustainment, and technical support to subsequent UN peacekeeping missions, 

and these requirements can be expected to increase as African forces assume greater responsibility for 

African peacekeeping. 

IRREGULAR WARFARE

Extended COIN operations on the African continent would be problematic due to the absence of direct 

threats to vital U.S. interests. However, a successful mass-casualty terrorist attack on the U.S. Homeland

or overseas installations by an Africa-based terrorist organization could change this calculation. COIN 

operations in Africa would involve many of the same challenges as current operations in Afghanistan: 

providing sufficient force densities to secure local populations; building indigenous security forces from 

a very low level of capability; bolstering weak governments with little political legitimacy; protecting U.S. 

forces from mechanical ambushes and improvised rocket munitions; and rapidly acquiring knowledge of 

local culture, language, and customs. 

MAJOR COMBAT OPERATIONS

There are few obvious scenarios relating to possible U.S. Army involvement in major combat operations 

in the Africa region, as vital U.S. interests are at minimal risk and there are few serious full-spectrum 

threats. The most likely case would be a government stabilization operation in Nigeria to counter an 

expansion of transnational terrorism in the region.
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77 Operational Environments to 2028: The Strategic Environment for Unified Land Operations

Annex F

Central and South America and the Caribbean Regional OE

Conditions and Characteristics

CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN REGION MAP

U.S. STRATEGIC INTERESTS AND GOALS 

The U.S. security strategy in the region of Central and South America and the Caribbean is based on 

promoting regional security mechanisms (e.g. the South American Defense Council) and emphasizes 

Brazil’s role as a vital U.S. security partner and leader on regional issues. The principal security threats 

are drug trafficking organizations (DTOs), insurgent movements, terrorist groups, and the potential for 

collaboration between them. Other critical security issues include border and coastal security (focused 

on illicit trafficking and WMD interdiction), outbreaks of social unrest and political instability, 

humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief. The U.S. military will seek to maintain a limited presence 
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throughout the region, improve mil-mil relationships, and support development of U.S. interagency 

capabilities to address security issues.

Through these international and interagency partnerships, the U.S. will seek to deny safe havens to 

narco-terrorist groups in the Northern Triangle (Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador), the cocaine 

producing regions of the Andean range, and the Tri-Border Area of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay. 

Security assistance to capable, willing partners like Colombia will be integral to U.S. efforts to enhance 

regional security. Efforts by hostile outside actors (i.e. Iran and its Hezbollah proxies) to disrupt regional 

stability and threaten U.S. interests may pose special challenges over the forecast period and require 

adjustments to U.S. regional strategy and force posture.

133

CONDITIONS SHAPING THE REGION 

MILITARY

The region has seen the comingling of a dangerous mix of irregular threats, including DTOs, communist 

insurgencies, and Islamist terrorist groups, some being supported by state sponsors such as Venezuela, 

Cuba, and Iran. Major DTOs generate multi-billion dollar revenue streams, leftist insurgencies maintain 

large formations of trained guerillas, and Islamist terrorists have access to global facilitation networks 

and decades of expertise in terrorist tradecraft. Future combinations of these threats could seriously 

threaten vital U.S. interests over the forecast period. These threats are complicated by state sponsors 

that provide passports and other legal documents, access to international arms markets, international 

transportation and communication services, public media outlets, and potential access to WMD. Finally, 

the mountainous jungle terrain through much of the region provides cover and concealment for illicit 

activities and insurgent formations while imposing additional costs and logistic challenges to security 

forces. 

The Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) and another loosely aligned Marxist group, 

the Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional (ELN), have waged a decades-long insurgency against the Colombian 

state. In the late 1990s, Colombia was on the brink of collapse from the predations of these guerilla 

movements, with the Colombian Army and National Police frequently suffering the annihilation of 

platoon- and company-size garrisons and patrols to thousand-strong FARC columns. The guerillas were 

far more mobile than government forces, well-trained, and equipped with small arms and highly 

destructive improvised mortars originally developed by the Irish Republican Army (IRA). Countervailing 

violence from a coalition of right-wing paramilitaries—the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC)—

further eroded the legitimacy of the Colombian government; both left- and right-wing militants preyed

on civilian populations through kidnapping, torture, and mass executions while collaborating with DTOs 

to supplement their finances. 

A successful COIN campaign was launched against the FARC and ELN during the administration of 

Colombian president Alvaro Uribe (2002-2010). Previous U.S. support had been strictly limited to druginterdiction missions, but in March 2002 the George W. Bush Administration acknowledged the linkage 

between the insurgents and drug trafficking, expanding U.S. assistance to support developments in the 

Colombian military’s airmobile, riverine, intelligence, and logistics capabilities.134 Insurgent strength 

declined from 20,000 to fewer than 10,000, several senior leaders of the FARC were captured or killed 

during this period, and large segments of the AUC were demobilized.135 Yet the FARC has weathered this 

storm and maintained a steady tempo of operations, adopting a new force posture of smaller units able 
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to operate in close proximity to police stations and military bases, and returning to the employment of 

car bombings, hit-and-run attacks, and IED ambushes against security forces.136 The FARC has developed 

cross-border safe havens in Venezuela and Ecuador, sought collaborative relationships with diverse 

terrorist groups including Hezbollah, the Basque separatists of the Eusakdi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), and the 

IRA and received significant assistance from the Chavez regime.

137

The group has also pursued an aggressive international information campaign against the Colombian 

state and U.S. security assistance, courting public sympathies and leftist political supporters in the 

region, Europe, and the United States.138

Regional DTOs are continuously evolving in response to changing security measures, drug markets, 

social conditions, and technological advances. During the 1980s and 1990s, Colombian DTOs sought to 

avoid incidents that would provoke the United States, as extradition to the U.S. was one of the greatest 

threats to their leaders. The Medellin and Cali cartels sought to mitigate this threat via corruption by 

bribing public officials and other influential elites; directed violence and assassination was used against 

those who could not be bought off.139 Eventually the government developed effective intelligence 

methods—with assistance from U.S. agencies—and captured or killed several generations of cartel 

leadership. There have been only temporary reductions in the amount of cocaine cultivation and 

processing, however, while DTOs have continually reconstituted and reestablished their trafficking 

routes and financial networks. DTOs have adopted several generations of smuggling technologies 

including light aircraft, powerful speed boats, long-range diesel semi-submersibles, “narco-torpedoes” 

towed by fishing boats, fully-functional submarines, and sophisticated tunnels beneath the U.S.-Mexican 

border. 

The Islamist terrorist threat in the region has been slow to develop, limited by a lack of large Muslim 

populations to hide the activities of militants, and perhaps by strategic patience on the part of terrorist 

leaders. But recent events provide clear signals of a growing threat: Colombia’s arrest of Hezbollah 

money launderers working with the FARC; Turkey’s seizure of Iranian explosives manufacturing 

equipment bound for Venezuela; and the Iranian Quds Force plot to hire Mexican DTO assassins to 

target Saudi Arabia’s ambassador to the United States.140 While the nominally Shia threat of Hezbollah 

has garnered the most attention, extremist Sunni elements sympathetic to al-Qaeda have also engaged 

in sustained proselytizing and recruiting efforts in the region over the past decades. A future 

combination of Iranian nuclear weapon proliferation, political support from regional insurgencies or 

states, and DTO smuggling technology and expertise could create a threat vector to the Homeland that 

would require major changes to the U.S. security posture in the Western Hemisphere.

POLITICAL

At the same time these threats are developing, the corrosive effects of the drug trade are undermining 

governments and civil society in the region, especially in the Central American transit zone for cocaine 

shipments to the United States and Europe. In sharp contrast to global trends of declining violence, 

homicide rates in the region increased from 19.9 per 100,000 people in 2003 to 32.6 in 2008.141 The 

governments of Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador have been gravely compromised by DTO 

corruption and violence. New commercial real estate in Guatemala City has an occupancy rate of 25%—

a telling indicator of large-scale money laundering—while homicide rates in the Northern Triangle rose 

to approximately 57 per 100,000 population in 2010 (in the U.S. the rate was 4.6).142 Although regional

governments score relatively well on national-level governance indices, these metrics conceal the 
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existence of many localized “black holes” throughout the region where the hand of government does 

not extend.

Brazil’s perennial status as the “next” great power is coming to an end; the country is rapidly emerging 

as a leader in global affairs. Major offshore oil fields have fueled a rapid growth in state resources: since 

2005 Brazil’s annual growth in military spending has exceeded 10%. The country’s 2008 National 

Defense Strategy articulates an ambitious 20-year plan to modernize the armed forces: spending on new 

and upgraded equipment; making strategic investments in cyber, space, and nuclear technologies; and 

laying the foundation for power projection capabilities.143 A further objective is to develop an 

autonomous domestic arms industry through strategic foreign partnerships and technology transfers; 

nuclear submarines are one of the priorities for domestic manufacture. Multiple-launch rocket systems, 

artillery, UAVs, air defense systems, and helicopters are all manufactured domestically.

From 2001 to 2010, China’s trade in this area reshaped the economic landscape of the region. China’s 

share of the region’s international trade rose from less than 5% in 2001 to approximately 15% in 2010, 

and the country supplanted the U.S. as the leading trade partner of Brazil, Chile, Argentina, Peru, and 

Uruguay. China became Brazil’s leading source of foreign investment in 2010, with an estimated $12-20 

billion invested primarily in the steel, oil, mining, transportation, and energy sectors.144 In support of 

these economic interests, the PLA is extending its influence across the region through high-level mil-mil 

discussions, officer training and exchange programs, military sales, and a low-level presence of military 

personnel. As China’s defense industries continue to expand and acquire advanced technologies, it is 

possible that China will seek to broaden its mil-mil relationships in the region as a basis for promoting 

arms exports and enhancing its overall international status.145

FUTURE ARMY MISSION AREAS 

PEACETIME MILITARY ENGAGEMENT

The principal regional threat over the next decade will continue to be DTOs; the Army will conduct 

training missions in this region to develop host-nation capabilities for drug interdiction and, to a lesser 

extent, COIN missions. Many training requirements will mirror those in the Africa region: light infantry 

skills, communications, maintenance, and logistics. Development of airmobile capabilities, border 

monitoring, and intelligence collection and sharing will also be important given the physical 

environment of the region. The U.S. must support host-nation forces in developing indigenous doctrine 

and force structure to perform these missions, in order to build sustainable security capacity that will 

endure beyond periods of intensive U.S. engagement.

The DOD was assigned as lead agency for the detection and monitoring of drug trafficking into the U.S. 

by the Defense Authorization Act of 1989; these responsibilities are best executed through joint 

interagency intelligence fusion centers that develop actionable intelligence for law enforcement 

agencies and foreign partners. Intelligence drives operations through a shifting coalition of civilian and 

military organizations that face the challenge of pursuing DTO operations across national and 

international jurisdictions, with diverse legal authorities and technical capabilities. Army personnel 

assigned to these activities must have a broad base of work experience and the flexibility to function 

collaboratively in a non-military work environment. 
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The 2010 signing of defense cooperation and classified information-sharing agreements between Brazil 

and the U.S. signals both countries’ intent to help secure regional prosperity and stability through 

transparent and collaborative security measures by the Western Hemisphere’s largest military 

establishments. Over time, the Army will be required to develop more robust institutional ties with its 

Brazilian counterparts, involving combined training and exercises, student exchanges, technology and 

information sharing, and the potential for more combined military operations such as the Haitian relief 

effort of January 2010.

LIMITED INTERVENTION

By 2020 it is possible that anti-U.S. terrorist groups will develop working relationships with insurgent 

groups in this region, allowing them to establish an operations infrastructure in remote jungle areas and 

large urban centers of the Caribbean basin from which attacks can be launched against the U.S. 

Homeland, the Panama Canal, and U.S. interests throughout the region. Early detection of such threats 

is imperative and will require thorough intelligence preparations in the region. Preemptive action would 

also be dictated to eliminate such threats, either unilaterally or through combined raids or strikes. 

Effective information operations that establish the legitimacy of preemptive counterterrorism measures 

by the U.S. will be vital to ensure that insurgent and terrorist groups don’t gain strength due to political 

backlash against the U.S. 

This region is vulnerable to a range of natural disasters; many states lack the capacity even to coordinate 

international disaster relief. SOUTHCOM has been involved in humanitarian assistance operations in 

more than ten regional countries in the last five years, responding to earthquakes, flooding, hurricanes, 

and a volcano. Due to geographic proximity, these missions may involve higher proportions of U.S. 

resources, longer mission durations, and more intensive joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and 

multinational collaboration. 

PEACE OPERATIONS

Interstate conflicts have been rare in this region and there are no obvious reasons for this to change 

over the forecast period. However, the potential exists for a very weak or failed state to experience civil 

war, potentially drawing neighboring states and international organizations into peacekeeping and postconflict stabilization missions. Potential contingencies include Central American states overcome by DTO 

corruption and violence, and succession crises in leftist authoritarian regimes in Cuba or Venezuela. The 

U.S. would encourage Brazil, other Latin democracies, and regional organizations to assume leadership 

roles in such sensitive, long-term missions. However, in some contingencies U.S. participation may be 

essential; in such cases mission success could depend critically on Army personnel’s knowledge of local 

culture, history, and political and socioeconomic drivers of conflict. 

IRREGULAR WARFARE

The events of 9/11 highlighted the dangers of ungoverned spaces inhabited by combustible mixtures of 

extremists, guerillas, and drug traffickers. It is possible that Colombia will face a resurgent FARC with 

substantial material assistance from external sponsors; the introduction of MANPADs into the FARC’s 

arsenal would tip the scales significantly against Colombian security forces. 
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MAJOR COMBAT OPERATIONS

At present there are no obvious major combat operations contingencies in the region that would involve 

the Army.
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83 Operational Environments to 2028: The Strategic Environment for Unified Land Operations

AnnexG

North America Regional OEConditions andCharacteristics

NORTH AMERICA REGION MAP

U.S. STRATEGIC INTERESTS AND GOALS 

The U.S. will seek to build regional defense partnerships to disrupt the threats of illicit trafficking and 

transnational terrorism, to enhance the defense relationship with Canada, and to develop a joint 

approach toward the security of the Arctic. Stability and security in Mexico are critical to U.S. national 

interests; the U.S. seeks a close partnership that improves cooperation on border security, allows early 

identification of threats, combats violent transnational criminal organizations, and enhances capacity for 

joint operations.

The U.S. military will maintain a domestic force posture that supports overseas missions, disperses 

critical strategic assets, secures the Homeland from attack, and provides the ability to support civil 

authorities and manage the consequences of natural disasters, terrorist attacks, and other domestic 

contingencies. The Army will continue to prepare National Guard elements for Homeland defense and 

defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) missions, including the creation of a Homeland response 

force in each of the ten Federal Emergency Management Agency regions. 

The DOD will support interagency efforts to secure U.S. borders and to interdict illicit trafficking. 

Research efforts will focus on developing technologies that comprehensively monitor air, land, 

maritime, space, and cyberspace domains for early detection of threats; assistance will be provided to 
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Operational Environments to 2028: The Strategic Environment for Unified Land Operations 84

Mexico and Caribbean partners for developing maritime and air capabilities to monitor their territorial 

waters. Improved capabilities for the standoff detection of nuclear/radiological devices will be a special 

area of emphasis.

CONDITIONS SHAPING THE REGION 

MILITARY

The Army will face increasing challenges in maintaining its force structure and readiness in the face of a 

sustained Federal budget crisis, along with a decline in the pool of eligible military recruits due to 

negative trends in U.S. public health and education. The Army will face a critical challenge in trying to 

retain a cadre of combat veteran officers and NCOs after the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts wind down, 

as budget pressures will present difficult choices between force structure, acquisition programs, 

overseas deployments, training, quality of life, and military benefits. A second critical challenge will be 

to maintain an intake of quality recruits while competing in a tightening labor market, screening 

incoming Soldiers for security risks, and developing education and fitness programs as required in 

preparing marginal recruits for service. National-level policy considerations may also impact Army 

readiness in terms of securing access to energy supplies and other critical resources, such as rare earth 

elements, and maintaining an adequate defense industry base.

MILITARY—IRREGULAR ADVERSARIES 

Irregular threat groups that operate inside the U.S. or transit its borders pose unique challenges to the 

Army. Direct action against these adversaries is typically a law enforcement responsibility; however, 

DOD responsibilities for counterterrorism and counterdrug intelligence/interdiction require seamless 

collaboration between the U.S. military, law enforcement, and intelligence communities. These threat 

groups also have the potential to enlist their members in the Army, recruit current Army personnel, and 

employ extortion or corruption against service members and their families.

Mexican DTOs 

Open-source reporting indicates that the number of DTO “foot soldiers” may rival that of Mexican 

security forces.146. Drug-trafficking violence, according to one source, caused over 13,000 deaths in 

Mexico in 2010, up from approximately 2,500 deaths in 2007.147 The death toll for the first nine months 

of 2011 was already at 12,903; a number approaching, if not poised to exceed, the high point in 

2010.148Mexican DTOs are the primary transporters of South American cocaine to the U.S. and also are 

the largest source of marijuana for U.S. markets and a major source of methamphetamine. In December 

2006, the Mexican government began a gradually escalating campaign to capture or kill DTO leadership; 

like the Colombian cartels of the 1990s, they have become decentralized, less hierarchical, and more 

violent. Removal of DTO senior leaders spawns deadly episodes of executions and reprisals as mid-level 

leaders and competitors vie for control of trafficking routes. Mexican DTOs now use torture, execution, 

and corruption as general tools for controlling populations and local authorities, in a fashion not unlike 

that of many insurgent groups. 
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U.S. and Transnational Street Gangs 

The U.S. National Gang Intelligence Center (NGIC) estimates that there are over 20,000 street gangs 

operating across the U.S. with about one million members.149 The largest and most violent of these 

include 18th Street (50,000 members), Gangster Disciples (50,000 members), MS-13 (10,000 U.S. 

members, 50,000 worldwide), Crips (35,000 members), Vice Lord Nations (35,000), Bloods (30,000 

members), and Latin Kings (20,000 members).150 Mexican DTOs rely on U.S. street gangs as retail 

networks for much of the drugs they ship to the U.S. They have also employed members of Latin gangs 

such as MS-13 and 18th Street for contract killings in Mexico and Central America. A 2007 NGIC report 

documented multiple threats from street gang members in the U.S. military: theft of military weapons 

and equipment, use of military training in violent crimes against rival gangs and U.S. law enforcement 

officers, weapons and drug smuggling, armed robberies, and recruitment of service member 

dependents.151

Terrorists 

From May 2009 to October 2011, there were 32 known terrorist plots by homegrown jihadists in the 

U.S.152 The impact of this upsurge in homegrown extremism fell disproportionately on the Army; the 

only terrorist incidents resulting from the 2009-2010 plots were Major Nidal Hasan’s attack at Fort 

Hood, Texas and Abdulhakim Muhammed’s attack on the Army-Navy Career Center in Little Rock, 

Arkansas. Many law enforcement actions have disrupted targeting of military installations, including the 

May 2007 arrest of six men planning to attack Soldiers at Fort Dix, New Jersey with small arms, and the 

May 2009 arrest of four individuals who planned to shoot down military aircraft at a New York Air 

National Guard base with Stinger missiles. These types of small group and lone wolf attacks will continue 

to pose a threat to military installations and personnel over the forecast period.

FUTURE ARMY MISSION AREAS 

PEACETIME MILITARY ENGAGEMENT

The severity of the future threat from DTOs, terrorist groups, and street gangs will drive the scale of 

engagement with the Mexican military. This will continue to involve targeted training to develop 

counternarcotics and raid capabilities, and could expand to include regular joint exercises focused on 

border security. Achieving the U.S. national security goal of early threat detection through 

comprehensive monitoring of maritime, land, air, space, and cyberspace domains will require increasing 

levels of intelligence sharing, data fusion, and analysis. This mission is best performed by Joint 

Interagency Task Forces (JIATFs) focused on border security and counternarcotics missions. Army 

formations supporting these missions (e.g. National Guard or Military Police units supporting the U.S. 

Border Patrol) would be linked to the JIATF communications and coordination architecture to facilitate

intelligence-driven joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational operations.

Engagement with the Canadian military will include a focus on creating an integrated security 

architecture for the Arctic region. New basing infrastructure will be needed to support air defense, 

maritime surveillance, land patrols, search and rescue, and environmental disaster response missions. 
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Operational Environments to 2028: The Strategic Environment for Unified Land Operations 86

LIMITED INTERVENTION

Over the forecast period it is possible that Mexican DTOs will present imminent threats or engage in 

large-scale violence against U.S. citizens within Mexico’s borders. It is feasible that they could act in 

concert with extremist jihadist organizations or U.S. street gangs to engage in violence on U.S. soil, 

supported from bases in Mexico. In such contingencies the Army could be called on to conduct limited 

interventions, including non-combatant evacuation operations, hostage rescues, or raids against 

imminent armed threats. Such contingencies would involve extreme political sensitivities surrounding 

issues of Mexican sovereignty, legal authorities, and jurisdictions of Mexican and U.S. law enforcement 

agencies. Such interventions might only be allowed under the terms of explicit international agreements 

with the Mexican government, requiring combined operations and highly restrictive rules of 

engagement.

PEACE OPERATIONS

There are no obvious contingencies involving peace operations in the North America region over the 

forecast period.

IRREGULAR WARFARE

The only feasible irregular warfare contingency in the region would involve a request by the Mexican 

government for assistance in restoring government authority over Mexican territory that had fallen 

under DTO control. 

MAJOR COMBAT OPERATIONS

There are no obvious contingencies leading to major combat operations in the North America region 

during the forecast period. 

DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES

Defense support of civil authorities could involve the U.S. Army providing support following domestic 

disasters (man-made or natural) or a WMD event. A more difficult DSCA operation would involve direct 

support to local law enforcement during an episode of massive civil disorder, which could result from a 

terrorist attack or a financial and organizational collapse of local government. The 1992 Los Angeles riots 

(54 dead, over 2,300 injured, and over 5,000 fires set) provided an important example that required 

intervention by military forces under Executive Order (i.e. permitting the U.S. military to function as a 

posse comitatus in support of law enforcement agencies). Should such operations be required in the

future, important lessons from 1992 would include: the need for a more rapid response by local 

National Guard forces; a clear understanding of the legal ramifications of the 1876 Posse Comitatus Act 

(which did not apply during the federal response to the L.A. riots due to the Executive Order); more 

flexibility by commanders providing direct support to law enforcement; and the potential for future 

interventions to face an organized armed threat from street gangs, DTOs, or other organized criminal 

elements.153
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87 Operational Environments to 2028: The Strategic Environment for Unified Land Operations

AnnexH

Additional AdversarialDesigns and Capabilities

In addition to implications for the U.S. Army, conditions across the strategic environment also impact 

adversarial designs and capabilities. This section will explore the most significant adversarial responses 

across U.S. warfighting functions. Two major features of the SE are the adaptation of adversary designs 

to counter the strengths of U.S. forces, and the gradual leveling of military capabilities across all of the 

warfighting functions. Over the next decade this could lead to the Army facing overmatch in multiple 

areas. Adversarial designs presented below are median threats that aggregate across a range of 

potential adversaries and therefore are not representative of any specific nation-state or non-state 

actor. Similarly, no single adversary is investing in all the capabilities discussed below, yet the Army must 

prepare for all technological threats that could adversely affect its conduct of decisive operations. 

MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER

Strategically, potential adversaries will deploy a range of weapon systems and other technologies that 

directly threaten U.S. strategic mobility assets and staging areas. Readily available commercial imagery 

and omnipresent media sources provide early warning of U.S. actions that will become increasingly 

difficult to elude. Proliferating capabilities such as precision-guided munitions, UAVs, spaced-based 

sensors, anti-satellite and electronic warfare capabilities, sea mines, cruise missiles like the YJ-83 and RS 

SS-N-27, Akula-II and Kilo class submarines, longer-range missiles like the Chinese DH-IO and the Russian 

Club K, and long-range air defense systems will contribute to a greater strategic access challenge in any 

region.

154

Operationally, the U.S. Army maintains overmatch in movement and maneuver, mainly as a result of 

investments in rotary-wing aviation and mobile protected fires; much of this capability resides in Joint 

partners. Potential adversaries are investing in capabilities to counter this advantage by increasing the 

lethality of their systems, improving their situational awareness, and increasing their own mobility, then 

incorporating these capabilities into operational designs such as Iran’s “mosaic” defense doctrine. 

Adversaries will position forces to launch rapid precision attacks against sea/aerial ports of debarkation 

(SPOD/APOD), staging areas, and intra-theater lift platforms to interrupt the flow of logistics and followon forces.

Access denial depends on threat capabilities that have operational reach, such as medium-range ballistic 

and cruise missiles, special operations forces, WMD, and cyber capabilities. As early as 2020, the Army 

may face increasingly capable UAV platforms like the Chinese ASN 206 that employs a GPS jammer, 

long-range precision strike systems such as the Chinese DH-10, a Tomahawk-like land attack cruise 

missile, and the Russian AS-18 KAZOO air-to-surface missile. Proliferation of long-range air defense 

systems such as the Russian SA-20 and the more advanced SA-21—which has an estimated engagement 

range of 250 miles—could present significant challenges as adversaries attempt to exclude or limit U.S. 

access to areas where the Army is forced to deploy by air.155

At the tactical level, potential adversaries recognize U.S. strengths in ground and rotary-wing maneuver 

and will look to counter this advantage through employment of large under-vehicle IEDs and antihelicopter mines. Adversaries will vary the tempo and intensity of their operations to disrupt U.S. and 

coalition operations and exploit unique environmental conditions that are unfavorable to our combat 
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Operational Environments to 2028: The Strategic Environment for Unified Land Operations 88

systems. They will employ advanced technologies secured from third-party nation-states, like the longrange tandem warhead, Russian KORNET ATGM. Adversaries will use commercial technologies such as 

2nd and 3rd generation night vision devices, similar to the French Sophie-MF handheld thermal imager, 

offsetting U.S. advantages in night operations. They will employ tactical UAVs similar to the Chinese BZK005 or micro-UAVs like the Japanese TRDI to increase their situational awareness and to target U.S. and 

coalition forces. Threats will also employ small, portable electronic jammers, like the Russian Eksiton 

jammer, to degrade U.S. GPS-enabled systems.156

MISSION COMMAND

Potential adversaries have observed the U.S. Army’s increasing reliance on communications. Therefore, 

part of their preclusion strategy will be the development of capabilities to deny the Army access to the 

global information grid. Such a capability would limit the Army’s efforts to coordinate operations, 

provide logistics support, and conduct information operations. Adversarial conduct of strategic mission 

command will focus on enabling simultaneous operations, fracturing coalitions, and executing 

integrated and continuous information campaigns. Greater investments in cyber and electronic warfare, 

special-purpose forces, and space-based capabilities including anti-satellite weapons and satellite 

communications jammers will impact Army operations in any major overseas contingency well before 

2028. 

The most significant operational challenge to the Army is in the area of mission command. Adversaries 

will seek to disrupt and degrade joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) unity of 

command through a variety of means, including cyber operations and electronic warfare. The presence 

of multinational corporations, NGOs, terrorist organizations, religious movements, political factions, and 

organized criminal enterprises will further complicate the conduct of operations. Adversaries will work 

to identify and attack critical linkages and seams in coalitions, in an attempt to fracture coalitions, and to 

deter non-coalition parties who are assisting or cooperating with JIIM operations. NGOs, U.S. military 

contractors, and private security forces are particularly attractive targets due to the potential IO benefits 

for the adversary of attacking foreigners.

Adversaries are gaining parity in the conduct of integrated information campaigns, including cyber 

operations. Some adversaries have already conducted progressively more complex cyber attacks 

integrated with military operations. Russia and China have made significant efforts to integrate cyber 

capability and units into their force structure at the operational level. Other challenges arise from 

continued U.S. reliance on commercial software, the potential for introduction of malware into U.S. 

systems by overseas vendors, and the ever-present threats from trusted insiders and lax security 

practices.157

Recognizing the Army’s reliance on the electromagnetic spectrum, potential adversaries have invested 

heavily in the full spectrum of electronic warfare capabilities. Threats may exploit advances in 

microelectronics, digital memory, and jamming capabilities. SATCOM jamming capabilities are already 

fielded and have been demonstrated. Several nations are developing digital radiofrequency memory 

(DRFM) jammers that can take down radar and communications signals. Spread spectrum jammers that 

target frequency-hopping and direct sequence-encoding communications devices will become available 

over the next decade.

At the tactical level, adversaries will seek capabilities to intercept U.S. and coalition communications; 

along with spread spectrum jammers to disrupt tactical communications and degrade U.S. combined 
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89 Operational Environments to 2028: The Strategic Environment for Unified Land Operations

arms synchronization. The use of short-range electromagnetic pulse weapons, artillery, and rocketdelivered radio frequency jammers will deny or degrade U.S. and coalition use of surveillance sensors, 

communications, and computer systems. Adversaries will use ethnic and religious opportunities—such 

as services at Friday mosque, painting simple slogans on building walls, and encouraging hackers to carry 

out cyber attacks through host-nation computers to support perception management operations—as 

components of an integrated information warfare campaign.158

INTELLIGENCE

Adversary human intelligence (HUMINT) capabilities may equal or exceed U.S. capabilities in many 

theaters of operations. Other methods being touted to counter U.S. technical intelligence dominance 

include employing commercial information technology, operating among populations, and recruiting

insiders over the Internet.

Adversaries will seek to exploit cultural differences between the U.S. and host-nation populations 

through information operations designed to alienate the local populace from U.S. and coalition forces, 

and to choke off the most valuable potential sources of HUMINT. Basic low-tech counters to U.S. 

intelligence capabilities include counter-signal GPS jammers, radar scattering, landlines, couriers, and 

the use of local languages. Threat actors may purchase military and commercial technology that can 

easily be modified for collection or analytical purposes. Examples include UAVs with multiple sensors 

and weapon packages, commercially-available satellite imagery, image intensifiers, first-generation 

forward-looking IR, computer geographic information systems, and electronic warfare technologies.

Potential adversaries recognize that the U.S. has highly capable aerial- and space-based sensors. 

Camouflage, concealment, and deception operations among populations are increasingly used to 

counter this technological advantage; conversely, threats will exploit international and local 

sympathizers employing secure Internet-based communications to conduct surveillance of U.S. 

deployments and theater movements. Potential new capabilities will include the deployment of lasers to 

attack reconnaissance satellites, denial of air-breathing collection using long-range SAMs, and 

continuing improvements to underground facilities such as those constructed in North Korea and Iran. 

Threat actors will incorporate commercially-available encryption systems in order to provide mission 

command and deny U.S. access to their intentions and plans. 

In the face of superior U.S. tactical intelligence, threats will leverage the human terrain to conduct 

reconnaissance and deny U.S. capabilities to observe patterns and trends via technical intelligence 

collection. Tactical jamming and radiofrequency (RF) weapons will be employed at critical times to 

disrupt U.S. monitoring capabilities, especially systems like the Distributed Common Ground System 

Army (DCGS-A) and Tactical Ground Reporting System (TIGRnet), thereby denying situational awareness 

to brigade and battalion staffs. These threat capabilities will also impact U.S. logistics support by 

disrupting timely communications and slowing logistics unit reactions. Long-range, precision strike 

munitions such as the Iranian Fatah-ll0 will provide adversaries the ability to target forward operating 

bases and lines of communication. Threats will recruit individuals from the host-nation population to 

conduct terrorist activities against U.S. logistics systems, including contamination of fuel and water and 

theft of supplies during transit.159
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FIRES

U.S. investments in long range conventional fires, missile defense, theater high-altitude air defense, and 

associated equipment are currently unmatched. U.S. investments in technical collection for a variety of 

intelligence functions including Homeland defense, supporting forcible entry, and rapidly realigning 

assets to the point of need are also unmatched by any other nation. Adversaries understand that U.S. 

superiority in these areas places a premium on adaptation. Cyber attacks, shielding—including the use 

of human shields—and first strikes are all methods for mitigating U.S. strategic fires superiority.

The U.S. will continue to enjoy an advantage in the area of fires through 2028 due to two major sets of 

investment: (1) air and missile defense capabilities such as the Medium Extended Air Defense System 

(MEADS), the Sentinel system, and the Joint Tactical Ground Station (JTAGS), and (2) fire support 

capabilities such as the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS), improvements in the Army 

Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), and the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS).

To mitigate this advantage, adversaries will employ a wide variety of counter-precision techniques that 

include camouflage, concealment, and deception; GPS jamming; terminal defenses; forcing close-in 

fights; advanced aircraft; and extended-range precision munitions. Adversaries will seek operational 

shielding by exploiting civilian populations and cultural sites to hide weapons systems and shape the 

battlefield. They will reduce U.S. air defense system reaction times with technology such as penetration 

aids on missiles, low observable aircraft, and jamming. Adversaries will increasingly employ hardened 

and buried facilities and multispectral decoys of key operational-level targets such as SRBMs and SAMs. 

Many adversaries have invested in short- and medium-range missile systems, such as the Russian 

Smerch and Chinese PHL-03, capable of counterfires with ranges out to 150km. Improved air defense 

systems including counter-TBM capabilities will provide protection to these advanced fires capabilities.

Tactically, adversaries understand and respect the highly responsive and accurate indirect fires available 

to U.S. forces. To counter these fires they will employ simple decoys and radar corner reflectors to 

confuse U.S. surveillance. Threats will employ mortars, cannon, and rocket artillery with increased range 

munitions, like the 122mm Grad 9M218 rocket High-Explosive (HE) and High-Explosive Anti-Tank (HEAT) 

submunitions and GPS to improve target finding. The longer standoff will enable adversaries to 

accurately target logistical and forward operating bases. Adversaries will carefully plan their tactical 

actions to exploit complex terrain and urban areas to obtain tactical shielding and offset U.S. artillery 

range advantages. More capable short-range air defense systems, like the Chinese FN-16 MANPADs or 

SA-11/15, will enable threats to effectively target U.S. tactical UAVs and rotary-wing assets.160

PROTECTION

Investments in high-tech camouflage, concealment, and deception systems and increasing use of 

hardened and underground facilities, lasers, and GPS jammers are technological counters to U.S. 

intelligence overmatch being pursued by potential adversaries. 

If U.S forces attain entrance into an operational theater, most threat operations will transition to a 

defensive posture oriented on creating excessive U.S. and coalition casualties and eroding the political 

will of their governments. Opponents will generally seek to avoid U.S. military firepower, instead 

attacking soft targets such as mission command nodes, intelligence collection systems, logistical 

components (APOD/SPOD/FOB), and contracted support. To protect themselves, threats will make every 

attempt to create chaos among the civilian and non-combatant populations to mask their movements. 
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91 Operational Environments to 2028: The Strategic Environment for Unified Land Operations

Dense urban populations, protest mobs, and refugees will be exploited to conceal and shield adversary 

activities, overwhelming U.S. intelligence and defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) capabilities.

Technologies to overmatch U.S. protection will focus on increased lethality; longer range/stand-off, 

nontraditional chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive weapons (CBRNE) agents 

(including fourth-generation chemicals that challenge traditional detection and decontamination 

methods); toxic industrial chemicals; and the use of armed UAVs. The current range of improvised 

munitions will grow more sophisticated, lethal, and difficult to detect over the forecast period.

SUSTAINMENT

Logistics capabilities like the Global Combat Support System-Army (GCSS-A) gives the Army unparalleled 

capability to sustain anywhere that it might be required to fight. Adversary strategies to counter U.S. 

strategic sustainment may include disruption of vulnerable logistics nodes in the Homeland, including 

sea and air ports of embarkation and other critical infrastructure. Cyber attacks may be employed 

against U.S. military networks and civilian supply chains to disrupt the smooth functioning of production 

facilities and logistic nodes that supply the Army.

The U.S. will maintain dominance in sustainment capabilities over the forecast period, inviting 

adversaries to pursue more effective means to target the entire logistics trail. U.S. forces will remain 

vulnerable when conducting phased entry into a theater; threats will seek to coordinate attacks on 

SPOD/APODs to meter U.S. entry into the area of operations. Disrupting the flow of U.S. military 

capabilities sets the conditions for threats to note patterns in U.S. operations, exploit the physical 

environment to their favor, and adapt their operations to engage soft targets including supply convoys, 

base areas, and host nation infrastructure. Adversaries will attempt to employ criminal organizations to 

slow operations in SPOD/APODs and forward movement of U.S. and coalition logistics. They will exploit 

cyber attacks against U.S. computer networks to further disrupt logistics operations.161

CONCLUSION

At the strategic level some adversaries focus on a comprehensive anti-access strategy that aims to 

prevent the Army from getting involved in conflicts in the first place. Potential adversaries have noted 

the repositioning of Army units from overseas bases to the continental U.S., along with ongoing U.S. 

investments in strategic mobility and joint forcible entry capabilities. One adversary response to this 

evolution in U.S. global force posture has been to enhance its capabilities for strategic preclusion. The 

first element of this strategy seeks to deter the U.S. government from making the political decision to 

initiate an overseas deployment. It focuses on coercing or dissuading potential U.S. allies, coalition 

partners, and NGOs from offering military, logistic, and political support and basing and overflight rights, 

as well as undermining the will of the American people to support military operations.

At the operational level the adversary’s preferred design is to deny access to U.S. forces from a theater

of operations through interdiction of ingress routes, denial of bases, and undermining international 

support. Potential adversaries will pursue access denial through diplomacy, economic threats, military 

coercion, and the development of operational fires capabilities. Based on their observations of recent 

U.S. operations, potential adversaries will use complex and urban terrain, attempt to limit U.S. mobility, 

separate U.S. combat formations, and neutralize U.S. technological advantages. Although their capability 

investments are concentrated on countering regional foes, they pose significant threats to U.S. forces, 

particularly in the areas of operational movement and maneuver, mission command (particularly cyber), 
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Operational Environments to 2028: The Strategic Environment for Unified Land Operations 92

and protection. Even adversaries lacking defense industries may have access to weapons and technology 

that allow them to achieve limited, unexpected parity or overmatch in niche technologies for short 

periods of time. Enemies will understand U.S. strengths, leverage their superior knowledge of local 

physical and human terrain, and exploit U.S. rules of engagement to their advantage.162

At the tactical level adversary military investments are spread across a wide range of capabilities that 

include precision strike, survivability, and the defeat of individual U.S. systems. Adversaries will also seek 

to exploit lessons learned from recent operations to negate U.S. advantages in fires, technical 

intelligence collection, training, and logistics. Adversaries will deploy in complex urban environments, 

fighting among the population to challenge U.S. and coalition forces rules of engagement, create the 

potential to alienate host-nation populations, and generate negative international media coverage of 

U.S. operations. Adversaries will mass weapons systems to launch surprise strikes that inflict large 

numbers of casualties, again with the intent of generating media coverage. Threats will continually 

transition between conventional combat formations and dispersed irregular groups, focusing effects at 

critical times and places to diffuse U.S. and coalition employment of force.163
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93 Operational Environments to 2028: The Strategic Environment for Unified Land Operations

 

1

Likely OEs based upon the TRADOC Intelligence Support Activity Top 10 Project February 2012. The Top 10 Project 

was created to provide the Army training community with a list of the operational OEs most likely to require Army 

brigade operations in the near- to mid-future. The list was not an attempt to determine the next location for U.S. 

ground troop deployment, nor is it predictive analysis reflective of a specific political policy. Instead, the Top 10 is 

an aid to inform the training community on the range of potential OE conditions that U.S. ground forces are liable 

to encounter, thus allowing commanders and trainers to focus and tailor their efforts in these areas. 2 Quoted in "U.S. Military and Peacekeeping Operations," in Peace Support Operations and the U.S. Military, Barry 

R. McCaffery, ed. Dennis J. Quinn (Washington D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense 

University, 1994), 3.

3 Joint Staff J-7, Joint Force 2030 - Evolve, Lead, Secure: Exploring Lessons of the Past and Present to Prepare for the 

Future, Draft, 23 March 2012. 4 Joint Staff J-7, Joint Force 2030 - Evolve, Lead, Secure: Exploring Lessons of the Past and Present to Prepare for the 

Future, Draft, 23 March 2012. 5 National Intelligence Council, Global Trends: A Transformed World, November 2008 (accessed February 2012). 6 National Intelligence Council, Global Trends: A Transformed World, November 2008 (accessed February 2012). 7 National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World, November 2008, and National 

Intelligence Council, Global Governance 2025: At a Critical Juncture, September 2010. 8 National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World, November 2008. 9 BBC, “New Greece austerity move prompts strikes and protests,” 22 September 2011 (accessed 23 March 2012); 

BBC, “Greece brought to standstill by anti-austerity strike,” 20 May 2010 (accessed 23 March 2012). 10 Note: Zaydism is a branch of Shi’a Islam that split early from what became the mainstream branch. It is endemic 

to Yemen. 

11 Photo from Wikimedia Commons, Yemen Protests, 3 February 2011. 12 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook 2012: Armaments, Disarmaments and 

International Security Summary, pp. 8-9 (accessed 18 June 2012). 13 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook 2012: Armaments, Disarmaments and 

International Security Summary, pp. 8-9 (accessed 18 June 2012). 14 Joint Staff J-7, Joint Force 2030 - Evolve, Lead, Secure: Exploring Lessons of the Past and Present to Prepare for 

the Future, Draft, 23 March 2012, 2. 15 USSOCOM Strategic Appreciation 2: Global Synthesis, Meta-Trends and Strategic Challenges, 5 March 2012. 16 ARCIC, “Army 2020 Operational Environment,” 23 March 2012, Briefing. 17 ARCIC, “Army 2020 Operational Environment,” 23 March 2012, Briefing. 18Joint Staff J-7, Joint Force 2030 - Evolve, Lead, Secure: Exploring Lessons of the Past and Present to Prepare for the 

Future, Draft, 23 March 2012, 2. 19 Matthew Quirk, “Private Military Contractors,” The Atlantic, September 2004 (accessed 26 March 2012); Peter 

W. Singer, “Peacekeepers, Inc.,” Brookings Institute, June 2003 (accessed 26 March 2012). 20 Peter W. Singer, “Humanitarian Principles, Private Military Agents: Some Implications of the Privatized Military 

Industry for the Humanitarian Community,” Brookings Institute, 1 February 2006 (accessed 26 March 2012). 21 Peter W. Singer, “Peacekeepers, Inc.,” Brookings Institute, June 2003 (accessed 26 March 2012). 22 Director of National Intelligence (DNI) James R. Clapper, Statement for the Record on the Worldwide Threat 

Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community for the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 10 

February 2011. 23 Joint Staff J-7, Joint Force 2030 - Evolve, Lead, Secure: Exploring Lessons of the Past and Present to Prepare for 

the Future, Draft, 23 March 2012, 12. 24 Joint Staff J-7, Joint Force 2030 - Evolve, Lead, Secure: Exploring Lessons of the Past and Present to Prepare for 

the Future, Draft, 23 March 2012, 12. 25 Director of National Intelligence (DNI) James R. Clapper, Statement for the Record on the Worldwide Threat 

Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community for the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 10 Feb 

2011.
August 20, 2012 TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND (TRADOC) G-2

Operational Environments to 2028: The Strategic Environment for Unified Land Operations 94

 

26 Abraham M. Denmark, “Managing the Global Commons,” The Washington Quarterly, July 2010, 167. 27 Joint Staff J-7, Joint Force 2030 - Evolve, Lead, Secure: Exploring Lessons of the Past and Present to Prepare for 

the Future. 23 March 2012.

28 Bruce W. MacDonald, Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission on The 

Implications of China’s Military and Civil Space Programs, (accessed 23 March 2012). 29 Department of Defense, Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace, July 2011 (accessed 1 

November 2011).

30 National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World, November 2008, 47-48 (accessed 26 

March 2012); United States Secretary of Defense, Unmanned Systems Roadmap 2007-2032, 10 December 2007 

(accessed 26 March 2012); United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, “Strategic Trends Programme Global Strategic 

Trends – Out to 2040, 4th Edition, 12 December 2010, 78-79, 92, 97, 132, 135-138, 141, 143-148, 154-155; U.S. 

Army Via Defence Talk, “Army Exploring Emerging Technologies,” 14 January 2011, (accessed 26 March 2012). 31 Rachel Morarjee, “Russia’s Raw Deal Among the BRIC Countries,” Telegraph, 7 February 2012. 32 Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) G-2, Army Strategic Environment 2012, 2012. 33 Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO), Economic Trends Analysis, February 2012. 34 National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World, November 2008 (accessed February 

2012), 7. 35 United Kingdom Ministry of Defense, Strategic Trends Programme: Global Strategic Trends – Out to 2040, 12 

January 2012 (accessed February 2012), 10.

36 Dr. Daniel Goure, “Global Challenges in the 21st Century,” Presentation to the Lockheed Martin LEAD Graduation, 

6 December 2010.

37 Population Reference Bureau, “2011 World Population Data Sheet,” July 2011, 3. 38 Population Reference Bureau, “2011 World Population Data Sheet,” July 2011, 6. 39 Population Reference Bureau, “2011 World Population Data Sheet,” July 2011, 8. 40 National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World, November 2008, 19. 41 National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World, November 2008, 19. 42 Director of National Intelligence (DNI) James R. Clapper, Unclassified Statement for the Record on the Worldwide 

Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 31 January 

2012, 9.

43 National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World, November 2008 (accessed 19 March 

2012), 21.

44 Dr. Christopher Rice, Demographic Analysis of the Operational Environment, TRADOC G-2. 45 USAID, Nigeria Strategy 2010 - 2013, 4. 46 Lucy Sherriff, “Germans claim first programmable computer,” The Register, 2 June 2004 (accessed 23 March 

2012). 

47 BBC, “India census: Half of homes have phones but no toilets,” 14 March 2012 (accessed 23 March 2012). 48 USSOCOM Strategic Appreciation 2: Global Synthesis, Meta-Trends and Strategic Challenges, 5 March 2012. 47. 49 Department of Defense, Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace, July 2011 (accessed 1 

November 2011), 1-2. 50 Mathew J. Schwartz, “Iran Hacked GPS Signals to Capture U.S. Drone,” InformationWeek, 16 December 2011 

(accessed 23 March 2012); Jeff Hecht, “Did Iran capture U.S. drone by hacking its GPS signal?” One Per Cent, 16 

December 2011 (accessed 23March 2012).

51 National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World, November 2008 (accessed February 

2012), 7. 52 Kerri Shannon, “China’s Highway System Growth Paves the Way to a Stronger Economy,” Money Morning, 1 

April 2011 (accessed 5 April 2012).

53 BBC, “China opens coffers for minerals,” 18 September 2007 (accessed 5 April 2012). 54 USDA, “Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP),” 20 November 2003 (accessed 22 March 2012); Julia Harte, 

“Turkish Water Projects Stirring Resentment Around The Region,” Green Prophet, 1 November 2011 (accessed 22 
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95 Operational Environments to 2028: The Strategic Environment for Unified Land Operations

 

March 2012); BBC, “Chile court rules in favour of Patagonia HidroAysen dam,” 04 April 2012 (accessed 5 April 

2012).

55 Sahr Morris Jr, “Sierra Leone: Information Ministry Launches Fiber Optic Cable Project Today,” AllAfrica, 2 

September 2011 (accessed 5 April 2012). 56 Ed Barnes, “Chavez Seals Arms-for-Oil Deal With ‘Europe’s Last Dictator’,” FOX News, 21 March 2010 (accessed 

21 March 2012); Bruno Waterfield, “European Union to lift ban on Zimbabwe’s ‘blood diamonds’ despite torture 

claims,” The Telegraph, 08 August 2011 (accessed 21 March 2012); Stephanie Ginter, “WTO Lawsuit Over China’s 

Rare Earths,” Energy & Capital, 15 March 2012 (accessed 21 March 2012). 57 John Vidal, “Warning: extreme weather ahead,” The Guardian, 13 June 2011 (accessed 22 March 2012); Justin 

Gillis, “Scientists perplexed by weird weather patterns,” The Seattle Times, 23 January 2011 (accessed 22 march 

2012).

58USDA, “Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP),” 20 November 2003 (accessed 22 March 2012); Julia Harte, “Turkish 

Water Projects Stirring Resentment around the Region,” Green Prophet, 1 November 2011 (accessed 22 March 

2012).

59 U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Arctic Oil and Natural Gas Potential,” 19 October 2009 (accessed 22 

March 2012); Shigeki Toriumi, “The Potential of the Northern Sea Route,” ChuoOnline, 28 February 2011 (accessed 

22 March 2012).

60Likely OEs based upon the TRADOC Intelligence Support Activity Top 10 Project February 2012. The Top 10 

Project was created to provide the Army training community with a list of the operational OEs most likely to 

require Army brigade operations in the near- to mid-future. The list was not an attempt to determine the next 

location for U.S. ground troop deployment, nor is it predictive analysis reflective of a specific political policy. 

Instead, the Top 10 is an aid to inform the training community on the range of potential OE conditions that U.S. 

ground forces are liable to encounter, thus allowing commanders and trainers to focus and tailor their efforts in 

these areas. 61 Director of National Intelligence, James R. Clapper, Unclassified Statement for the Record on the Worldwide 

Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community or the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 31 January 

2012.

62 Director of National Intelligence, James R. Clapper, Unclassified Statement for the Record on the Worldwide 

Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community or the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 31 January 

2012.

63 Remarks by Ambassador Harry K. Thomas, Jr. at the National Renewable Energy Program Launch, 14 June 2011. 64 Director of National Intelligence, James R. Clapper, Unclassified Statement for the Record on the Worldwide 

Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community or the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 31 January 

2012.

65 Director of National Intelligence, James R. Clapper, Unclassified Statement for the Record on the Worldwide 

Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community for the Senate Committee on Armed Services, 16 February 

2012.

66 Director of National Intelligence, James R. Clapper, Unclassified Statement for the Record on the Worldwide 

Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community for the Senate Committee on Armed Services, 16 February 

2012. 

67 Director of National Intelligence, James R. Clapper, Unclassified Statement for the Record on the Worldwide 

Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community for the Senate Committee on Armed Services, 16 February 

2012.

68 Director of National Intelligence, James R. Clapper, Unclassified Statement for the Record on the Worldwide 

Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community for the Senate Committee on Armed Services, 16 February 

2012

69 Michael C. Horowitz and Dan A. Shalmon, The Future of War and American Military Strategy, 23 February 2009. 70 USSOCOM Strategic Appreciation 2: Global Synthesis, Meta-Trends and Strategic Challenges, 5 March 2012.
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Operational Environments to 2028: The Strategic Environment for Unified Land Operations 96

 

71 It is important to note that even when U.S. military capabilities eventually overwhelm threat capabilities at 

SPODs and APODs, adversaries will still maintain a viable capability through paramilitary and guerrilla organizations 

to conduct raids at such locations.

72 DIA, 8 April 1997; Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2006; “S400 Triumf/SA-21 Growler: New Threat Emerging,” Defense Media Network, 8 April 2011; “China news tagged 

with: electronic warfare,” China Digital Times, May 2007; “Global Combat Support System-Army (GCSS-Army),” 

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2011. 

91 American Forces Press Service, “New Strategy Shows Importance of Space Domain, Lynn Says,”16 February

2011.

92 Department of Defense and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, National Security Space Strategy,

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93 Department of Defense and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, National Security Space Strategy,

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TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND (TRADOC) G-2 August 20, 2012

97 Operational Environments to 2028: The Strategic Environment for Unified Land Operations

 

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127 Onyi Udegbunam, “How China is Taking Over Africa,” The Afropolitan Experience, 20 April 2011.
August 20, 2012 TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND (TRADOC) G-2

Operational Environments to 2028: The Strategic Environment for Unified Land Operations 98

 

128 Onyi Udegbunam, “How China is Taking Over Africa,” The Afropolitan Experience, 20 April 2011; Richard F. 

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2008. 

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March 2012). 

149 National Gang Intelligence Center, National Gang Threat Assessment 2009, January 2009. 150 National Gang Intelligence Center, National Gang Threat Assessment 2009, January 2009. 151 National Gang Intelligence Center, Gang-Related Activity in the U.S. Armed Forces Increasing, 12 January 2007.
TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND (TRADOC) G-2 August 20, 2012

99 Operational Environments to 2028: The Strategic Environment for Unified Land Operations

 

152 Jerome P. Bjelopera, American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat, Congressional Research 

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153 Matt Matthews, The Posse Comitatus Act and the United States Army: A Historical Perspective (Fort 

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The People’s Republic Of China, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) report to Congress, 8 April 1997; “Cruise Missiles 

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