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i 

65–587 2011

[H.A.S.C. No. 112–20] 

NAVY, MARINE CORPS AND AIR FORCE 

TACTICAL AVIATION PROGRAMS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL 

AIR AND LAND FORCES 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

MARCH 15, 2011 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland, Chairman 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

JOHN C. FLEMING, M.D., Louisiana 

TOM ROONEY, Florida 

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

JON RUNYAN, New Jersey 

MARTHA ROBY, Alabama 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

BILL OWENS, New York 

JOHN R. GARAMENDI, California 

MARK S. CRITZ, Pennsylvania 

KATHY CASTOR, Florida 

JOHN SULLIVAN, Professional Staff Member 

DOUG BUSH, Professional Staff Member 

SCOTT BOUSUM, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2011 

Page 

HEARING: 

Tuesday, March 15, 2011, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force Tactical Aviation Programs ....................................................................................................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Tuesday, March 15, 2011 ........................................................................................ 41 

TUESDAY, MARCH 15, 2011 

NAVY, MARINE CORPS AND AIR FORCE TACTICAL AVIATION 

PROGRAMS 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Bartlett, Hon. Roscoe G., a Representative from Maryland, Chairman, Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces ...................................................... 1 

Reyes, Hon. Silvestre, a Representative from Texas, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces ...................................................... 5 

WITNESSES 

Shackelford, Lt. Gen. Mark D., USAF, Military Deputy, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, U.S. Air Force; and Lt. 

Gen. Herbert J. Carlisle, USAF, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, 

Plans and Requirements, U.S. Air Force ........................................................... 31 

Skinner, VADM W. Mark, USN, Principal Military Deputy to the Assistant 

Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development, and Acquisition), U.S. Navy; 

Lt. Gen. Terry G. Robling, USMC, Deputy Commandant of the Marine 

Corps for Aviation, U.S. Marine Corps; and RADM Kenneth E. Floyd, 

USN, Director of the Air Warfare Division, U.S. Navy .................................... 30 

Sullivan, Michael J., Director of Acquisition and Sourcing, U.S. Government 

Accountability Office ............................................................................................ 8 

Van Buren, David M., Acting Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, U.S. Air Force .............................................................................................. 6 

Venlet, VADM David J., Program Executive Officer for the F–35 Lightning 

II Program, U.S. Department of Defense ........................................................... 7 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Shackelford, Lt. Gen. Mark D., joint with Lt. Gen. Herbert J. Carlisle ...... 123 

Skinner, VADM W. Mark, joint with Lt. Gen. Terry G. Robling and 

RADM Kenneth E. Floyd ............................................................................. 91 

Sullivan, Michael J. .......................................................................................... 65 

Van Buren, David M., joint with VADM David J. Venlet ............................. 45 
Page

IV 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Bartlett ....................................................................................................... 149 

Mr. Garamendi ................................................................................................. 149 

Mr. Reyes .......................................................................................................... 149 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Bartlett ....................................................................................................... 153 

Mr. Garamendi ................................................................................................. 161 

Mr. Owens ......................................................................................................... 161 

Mrs. Roby .......................................................................................................... 160 
(1) 

NAVY, MARINE CORPS AND AIR FORCE TACTICAL 

AVIATION PROGRAMS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES, Washington, DC, Tuesday, March 15, 2011. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 11:32 a.m. in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Roscoe G. Bartlett 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MARYLAND, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES 

Mr. BARTLETT. The hearing will come to order. 

The subcommittee meets today to receive testimony on the Navy, 

Marine Corps and Air Force budget request for combat aircraft programs for fiscal year 2012. 

We welcome our visitors for today. 

The first panel is Mr. David Van Buren, Acting Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, also representing the Office 

of the Secretary of Defense; Vice Admiral David Venlet, Program 

Executive Officer for the F–35 aircraft program; and Mr. Michael 

Sullivan, Director of Acquisition and Sourcing. 

The subcommittee invited Dr. Ashton Carter, Under Secretary of 

Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics to provide testimony today, but he was unable to appear. 

The second panel will be Vice Admiral Mark Skinner, Principal 

Military Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition; Lieutenant General Robling, 

Deputy Commandant of the Marine Corps for Aviation; Rear Admiral Kenneth Floyd, Director of the Air Warfare Division, the U.S. 

Navy; and Lieutenant General Mark Shackelford, Military Deputy, 

Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition; 

Lieutenant General Carlisle, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, 

Plans and Requirements, U.S. Air Force. 

Thank you all very much for accommodating us today and coming to this hearing. 

We have a number of issues to cover today, but my opening remarks will focus primarily on the F–35 program. 

The F–35 is a complex program. There is no question, significant 

technology and manufacturing capabilities have been demonstrated. The thousands of people working at the major contractors, as well as the many suppliers and vendors, deserve a great 

deal of credit for their achievements. 
2 

But with tens-of-billions of dollars having been invested in F–35 

development to date, the program has encountered a series of 

major cost increases and schedule delays. Last year, the F–35 program experienced a Nunn-McCurdy cost breach that required a restructured program. 

The new program executive officer conducted a Technical Baseline Review this past year, which again has resulted in a restructured program and additional projected cost increases and program 

delays. 

Concerns about the F–35 program expressed annually for several 

years by the GAO [Government Accountability Office], having gone 

unheeded by the Pentagon, have largely been right on the mark. 

Our first panel today includes Mr. Mike Sullivan from the Government Accountability Office, who has provided the committee 

independent reports on the F–35 program for many years. In 2001, 

when the Department began the F–35 program, the GAO noted 

that the critical technologies for key aircraft performance elements 

were not mature, and recommended that DOD [the Department of 

Defense] delay the start of system development until critical technologies matured to acceptable levels. 

The DOD did not delay start of development and procurement costs, and procurement costs have climbed from $233 billion to over 

$382 billion since that time. 

In 2006, the GAO noted that the DOD planned to enter production with less than 1 percent of testing completed, and recommended a delay in production until flight testing demonstrated 

that the F–35 would perform as expected. 

DOD did not delay the start of production, believing the risk 

level was appropriate. Since that time, estimates for average F–35 

procurement costs have increased over 30 percent. 

In 2008, the DOD implemented a Mid-Course Risk Reduction 

Plan to replenish management reserves by reducing test resources. 

The GAO testified that this plan would likely actually increase 

risk, and recommended that DOD revise the plan to address concerns about testing, use of management reserves and manufacturing. 

Since then, development costs have increased 22 percent, and recent restructurings in the past year have added test aircraft back 

into the program. 

I might also add that in 2007, the GAO testified that experience 

with the first alternate engine program suggests that F135 and 

F136 engine competition could generate savings and benefits of up 

to 20 percent, if contractors are incentivized to invest their own 

money to remain competitive and produce more reliable engines, 

resulting in lower maintenance costs. 

Unfortunately, the Pentagon has also rejected the GAO’s conclusions on the F–35 alternative engine program, and has submitted 

a budget each year since fiscal year 2007 that would eliminate competition for the $110 billion F–35 engine program. 

This year we are told that an additional $4.6 billion and 2 years 

have been added to the development schedule. Another 124 aircraft 

have been removed from the planned buy for the next 5 years. We 

have yet to be provided an estimate of the current total F–35 program procurement costs. 
3 

The fiscal year 2010-to-completion of development cost estimate for the F–35 primary engine contract has increased from $385 million to $2.1 billion—445 percent since February 2008. However, a 

portion of this increase is due solely to cost increases associated 

with F–35B lift fan components and schedule increases in the aircraft program, and not the F135 engine itself. 

For those who might ask the question regarding F–35 program 

costs, at what point does this program become unaffordable, I 

would respond that, if you believe our Nation needs a fifth-generation stealth fighter, you have no choice. There is no viable competition for this aircraft. 

And I would also point out that, if the Pentagon has its way, that 

is exactly the position we will be in for the engine for this aircraft 

by giving a decades-long, $110 billion, sole source contract to the 

primary engine manufacturer for the F–35. 

Having no choice but to continue to pay for F–35 development 

and procurement cost increases is exactly why many of us do not 

believe that it is wise to create the same monopoly situation with 

the F–35 engine as we have done for the F–35 aircraft, that could 

comprise ultimately up to 95 percent of the U.S. fighter fleet. Given the $2.6 billion investment already made in a competitive 

engine program, the Pentagon’s analysis indicates that, over the 

life cycle of the F–35 aircraft program, that it would cost no more 

for a two-engine program than a one-engine F–35 program. 

The Pentagon is concerned with the near-term investment costs 

to maintain a competitive program—initial costs DOD incurs to initiate any competitive military acquisition program. 

This year, the costs to maintain the competitive engine program 

represent eight one-hundredths of one percent of the Pentagon’s 

budget request. The option is whether we believe that it is wise for 

eight one-hundredths of one percent of the defense budget to foreclose the option for competition on the only element—an estimated 

$110 billion element—of the F–35 program that Congress agrees is 

required for our forces. 

Discussion of the competitive engine issue has been made more 

difficult by misstatements regarding the F–35 engine program by 

former and current members of the Administration. The former 

deputy secretary of defense for Secretary Gates when he first became secretary of defense wrote an op-ed indicating ‘‘The F–35 second engine was not included in the Defense Department plan during or before my tenure as deputy secretary.’’ 

This statement is a total misrepresentation of fact. The F–35 development program began in 2001. The July 2000 Joint Strike 

Fighter program propulsion system acquisition strategy includes 

the design, development and qualification and production of a primary and an alternate propulsion system to support the JSF [Joint 

Strike Fighter]. 

In November 2006, the same former deputy secretary signed a 

memorandum of understanding with the eight partner nations for 

the F–35 program agreeing ‘‘the production work will include, but 

will not be limited to, the following: production of the JSF air vehicle, including propulsion systems, both 135 and 136.’’ 

This from the same Administration official, very close to the previous quote, which said that it had never been anticipated. 
4 

It is a total mystery how the former number one adviser to Secretary Gates could write that the F–35 engine was not included in 

the Pentagon’s plan during or before his tenure, when the alternate 

engine was in the original F–35 acquisition strategy, and he signed 

an agreement with eight other nations to produce the alternate engine. 

Some opponents of the competitive engine point out that the competitive engine is 3–5 years behind the primary engine—without 

also stating that is the case, because there is the acquisition strategy for the F–35 engine. 

The 136 engine development was started four years after the 

135. The 135 engine is about 24 months behind schedule. The 136 

is about 2 to 3 months behind schedule, which means, if the engines had been started at the same time, the second engine would 

be now nearly 2 years ahead of the first engine in development. 

Some opponents of the competitive engine say there already was 

a competition for the F–35 engine program when, as prescribed by 

the F–35 acquisition strategy, a sole source engine development 

contract was signed with the primary engine manufacturer in 2001, 

and a sole source contract was signed with a competitive engine 

contract in 2005. 

Some say that the primary engine has 20,000 flight test hours 

when the primary engine has, in fact, accumulated less than 

1,000—only 950—flight test hours, and continues to have modifications being made to achieve required capabilities. It takes 200,000 

flight hours to mature a fighter engine. 

We have had tens-of-billions of dollars in overruns on the F–35 

development and procurement program, years of delay and many 

misjudgments of risk remaining in the F135 program. 

Secretary Gates, speaking in Fort Worth, Texas, in August of 

2009 said, ‘‘My impression is that most of the high-risk elements 

associated with this development program are already behind us, 

and I felt a good deal of confidence on the part of the leadership 

here that the manufacturing process, that the supply chain, that 

the issues associated with all of these have been addressed, or are 

being addressed.’’ 

Since Secretary Gates made this statement, the F–35 program 

cost has increased $50 billion, has had two major schedule delays, 

and procurement of 246 F–35 aircraft has been deferred to after 

2016. 

F–35 development competition has slipped from 2014 to 2018, 

and increased by nearly $10 billion to $56.4 billion, approximately 

20 percent. The development test program has added 3 years to its 

schedule, one-third more flights, and Secretary Gates has put the 

Marine Corps short take-off and vertical landing F–35B on a 2-year 

probation to evaluate and engineer solutions to the F–35B. 

Major misjudgments of risk in the F–35 program have been 

made at the highest levels of the Pentagon over a number of years. 

Is it possible that wrong judgments are being made on the need for 

competition for the F–35 engine? What gives us confidence that the 

engine decision is anything other than a short-term decision? 

Just like many of us have had to watch the cost of the F–35 program spiral upward, many of you could have to live with a sole 

source F–35 engine decision for decades to come. 
5 

Before we begin, let me call on the ranking member of this subcommittee, my good friend, Mr. Reyes, for his opening remarks. 

STATEMENT OF HON. SILVESTRE REYES, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM TEXAS, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES 

Mr. REYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I also want to welcome our panelists here this morning. As 

today’s hearing on combat aviation programs is a critical part of 

this subcommittee’s work for the year, we are very much interested 

in listening to their testimony. 

Other than large Navy ships, the DOD spends more procuring 

aircraft of all types than any other kind of weapon system. In fiscal 

year 2012, the total request for Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps 

aircraft procurement is $33.9 billion. By comparison, the Army’s 

total procurement request for fiscal year 2012 is only $24 billion. 

That does not mean that the aircraft are not worth the price, but 

it does mean that we must carefully review the DOD’s request and 

ensure that the funds are, as always, spent wisely. 

Of the many topics today’s hearing will cover, the F–35 Joint 

Strike Fighter is probably the most critical issue. When the program’s schedule was developed, the DOD intentionally took some 

risk in ramping up large-scale production before a significant 

amount of test flights had been completed. The DOD is now living 

with both the benefits and the downsides of this plan. 

The good news is that we are building a lot of aircraft, thus 

learning a lot about how to ramp up production while at the same 

time gaining production efficiencies. The downside, on the other 

hand, is that we are finding a lot of things in test flights that will 

now have to be fixed during later production, or through later 

modifications that could prove much more expensive. 

With regard to the alternate engine, while I do not support continuing with the F136 alternate engine, I do—and I want to emphasize this—share the Chairman’s concerns about Congress being 

given accurate information from DOD. Regardless of the outcome, 

we have to deal with the facts at hand and not the spin. 

A final issue I hope to hear about in today’s hearing is the apparent disconnect in aircraft procurement strategies between the Air 

Force and the Navy. The Air Force has been adamant that it only 

wants to buy fifth-generation fighter aircraft in the future, and 

thus has refused to consider procuring F–16s or F–15s while the 

F–35 is under development. 

On the other hand, the Navy is planning to continue to procure 

fourth-generation F/A–18 Super Hornets for many years while 

waiting on next versions of the F–35. 

One benefit of the Navy’s approach is that as the F–35 is further 

delayed, they can more easily adjust fighter production to ensure 

that there are enough planes to meet future requirements, as they 

did this year by adding another 40 F/A–18s to their budget request. 

The Air Force, on the other hand, is essentially betting its entire 

future and force structure on the F–35. 

While we all hope that the F–35 proceeds as planned from here 

on out, to me, this does seem like somewhat of a risky approach. 

As a result, I look forward to hearing from our Air Force witnesses 
6 

what the back-up plan might be for additional delays in the F–35 

Strike Fighter program. 

So, with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back to you. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you. 

Without objection, all witnesses’ prepared statements will be included in the hearing record. 

Mr. Van Buren, please proceed with your opening remarks. Then 

you will be followed by Admiral Venlet and Mr. Sullivan. Thank 

you for coming. 

STATEMENT OF DAVID M. VAN BUREN, ACTING ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE FOR ACQUISITION, U.S. AIR 

FORCE 

Mr. VAN BUREN. Thank you, Chairman Bartlett, Ranking Member Reyes and distinguished members of the committee. Thank you 

for the opportunity to address this committee regarding the Joint 

Strike Fighter. 

The Joint Strike Fighter is the Department of Defense’s largest 

acquisition program, and its importance to our national security is 

immense. The JSF will form the backbone of U.S. air combat superiority for generations to come. 

For our international partners who are participating in the program, the JSF will become a linchpin for future coalition operations 

that will enhance the strength of our security alliances. 

Following the JSF Nunn-McCurdy criteria certification in June 

2010 by Dr. Carter, the F–35 program office under Admiral Venlet 

conducted the most comprehensive review of the JSF program ever 

accomplished. A Technical Baseline Review assessed the cost, 

schedule and technical risk of the work required to complete the F– 

35 system development and demonstration program. 

The TBR [Technical Baseline Review] involved 120 technical experts reviewing every detail of the program over a period of 

months, supported by the full strength of the Air Force and Navy’s 

tactical aircraft experts. 

As a result of the TBR, Secretary Gates directed several changes 

to the program. He directed the program decouple testing of the 

short take-off and vertical landing model from the carrier, and conventional take-off and landing variants to ensure that any problems with this STOVL [short take-off and vertical landing] would 

not delay the other variants. 

Additionally, the Secretary added resources to the system design 

and development program through its completion in 2016. Extra 

development funding will allow us to complete additional testing 

found necessary by the TBR, and properly fund testing cost estimates that were previously estimated at too low a level. 

The Department further decided to hold production levels to 32 

aircraft in fiscal year 2012. This allows the final assembly process 

at Fort Worth to mature, and reduces concurrency in the program. 

Beginning in fiscal year 2013, the Department will increase the 

production by a factor of 1.5 per year, as recommended by the manufacturing review team. 

Finally, the Secretary placed the STOVL on probation for 2 

years, as was noted, pending further successful development. The 
7 

probation period limits the procurement of 6 F–35B aircraft in both 

fiscal year 2012 and fiscal year 2013. 

This 2-year period will provide additional time to resolve engineering and technical challenges. And at the end of the 2-year probation, Department leadership will make an informed decision on 

how or whether to proceed with STOVL. 

The Department recognizes the concerns of Congress and the 

taxpayers regarding the cost overruns of this program. The Department estimates that the independent production unit cost estimate 

to the JSF have nearly doubled since the program began. This cost 

growth is simply unacceptable and must be reversed. 

The Department will be performing a rigorous LRIP [Low Rate 

Initial Production] 5 ‘‘should-cost’’ effort. This process has already 

shown some success, with cost reductions in LRIP 4, a fixed-price 

incentive fee contract, with the target costs substantially lower 

than the independent cost estimate. 

The program’s management over the past year has put in place 

the right fundamentals and realistic plans using sound systems engineering processes. And we are monitoring and tracking performance on a continuous basis using detailed metrics. 

Overall, there is much work still ahead of us. But through the 

multiple reviews and adjustments in the past year, Dr. Carter and 

I believe we have put the program on sound footing for the future. 

In our opinion, the TBR has given the Department the best basis 

it has had to plan and manage the JSF program. 

Admiral Venlet and I have submitted this detailed written statement for the committee. Admiral Venlet also has an opening statement, but I do wish to thank you again for the opportunity to discuss the program. 

Admiral Venlet. 

[The joint prepared statement of Mr. Van Buren and Admiral 

Venlet can be found in the Appendix on page 45.] 

STATEMENT OF VADM DAVID J. VENLET, PROGRAM EXECUTIVE OFFICER FOR THE F–35 LIGHTNING II PROGRAM, U.S. 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Admiral VENLET. Chairman Bartlett, Ranking Member Reyes 

and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for this 

opportunity to appear before you today. 

By any measure of progress or performance, the F–35 program 

has not delivered acceptable results. Previous reports and investigations cite a history of program plans and re-plans to which program performance does not measure up. 

You may fairly ask why any new plan presented can be depended 

upon to deliver to expectations or be bounded and under control. 

The changes and decisions reflected in the President’s 2012 budget 

are a result of 120 technical experts from the F–35 program office 

and the Services’ systems commands reviewing the remaining work 

from the bottom up. 

This plan derives its higher confidence by embracing fundamentals in every technical and business discipline. There is grounding 

in realism about cost, schedule and performance. 

Such a grasp on fundamentals and realism is the distinguishing 

characteristic that makes this plan different from all before it. This 
8 

plan has resilience and prudent reserve to absorb expected further 

learning and discovery. 

This is a plan resourced with realism that will begin building a 

record of dependable results. 

I am honored to respond to your further questions. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you. 

Mr. Sullivan. 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL J. SULLIVAN, DIRECTOR OF ACQUISITION AND SOURCING, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Good morning, Chairman Bartlett, Ranking Member Reyes and members of the subcommittee. 

It is my pleasure to be here again to talk about the Joint Strike 

Fighter program, DOD’s largest acquisition ever and so important 

to plans for recapitalizing our Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps 

tactical aircraft. I will make some brief comments, and then be 

happy to take your questions. 

Mr. Chairman, over the last 13 months, Defense leadership has 

taken positive action to restructure the Joint Strike Fighter program, and we strongly support these actions, many of which are 

overdue, that we and some other organizations have previously recommended. 

We have been concerned since program start about the risks 

posed by the high degree of concurrency between testing and production activities, and have consistently recommended reducing annual procurement quantities until sufficient testing is completed. 

The Secretary’s substantial reduction of 246 aircraft through 

2016 certainly helps lessen concurrency risk. Even with that reduction, however, total development cost is now estimated at $56.4 billion dollars, and will not be completed until 2018—a 26 percent 

cost increase and a 5-year schedule slip from the 2007 baseline. 

We also note that, over the next 5 years, the annual funding requirements for procurement more than double, and annual quantities more than triple. 

Looking forward, a focus is on affordability, which is critical. 

With future budgets likely to be austere, the program is planning 

an unprecedented amount of funding for a sustained period, averaging more than $11 billion per year through 2034. 

And this does not reflect all of the effects of the Secretary’s recent restructuring actions. We understand the Department has not 

yet calculated the net effects financially from differing aircraft 

quantities from the near term to future budgets, and we expect future procurement funding requirements to increase once this is 

done. 

The program had mixed results during the year of 2010, achieving 6 of 12 major goals that it set for itself, and progressing in 

varying degrees on the rest. 

There are some encouraging signs. The pace of flight testing, for 

example, accelerated in 2010, accomplishing three times as many 

flights as in the 3 years prior combined. 

Also, there is much more work in process on the factory floor. 

And we have taken annual tours of the factory floor, and found it 

much busier this year than in the past. 
9 

These signs of improvements are counterbalanced with continuing setbacks, however. For example, while the Air Force’s conventional variant and the Navy’s carrier variant performed well in 

limited flight tests, the short takeoff and landing variant essential 

to the Marines’ future aviation plans had numerous technical problems. And as has been stated earlier, DOD has directed a 2-year 

period to slow down procurement to engineer solutions. 

The final delivery of test and production aircraft is still lagging. 

That is a big concern for us. And a majority of improvements that 

the expert review teams did recommend have not yet been implemented. 

Improving factory through-put and the global supply chain are 

now urgent priorities for the program. 

Also, design changes continue at higher rates than expected, and 

may increase further as flight testing continues. This indicates the 

design is not fully stable, several years after critical design review. 

Finally, integration and testing of software essential for achieving 80 percent of the JSF’s functionality is significantly behind 

schedule as it enters its most challenging phase. 

Mr. Chairman, let me conclude by saying that the program’s time 

to perform to cost and schedule targets has come. 

The GAO pointed out several years ago that official estimates 

were unrealistic, that they were based on optimistic assumptions 

rather than robust systems engineering knowledge, and that plans 

to cut test assets and reduce flight testing during the Mid-Course 

Risk Reduction Plan were ill-advised. And we have consistently 

pointed out risks to the program that the Department has largely 

ignored until now. 

We now support recent restructuring efforts and believe that the 

added funding, extended time to complete systems development 

and a more robust flight test program provide a much more achievable program. 

However, let me say loud and clear again that this program still 

lags behind expectations and is not out of the woods yet. Continued 

strong oversight will be critical. 

Now is the time for much more disciplined decisionmaking concerning critical aspects of the program such as: The STOVL 

variants’ inefficient schedule; overall cost controls on the program; 

annual funding actions that the Department and the Congress will 

have to make; and management of critical software development efforts. 

The program has been supported through many turbulent years, 

and it does represent the fifth-generation fighter, and it is a very 

important piece of our tactical air portfolio. 

There have been a lot of smaller, perhaps lower-priority programs that have taken on some of the cost-sharing for the Joint 

Strike Fighter as it goes along. 

After 10 years of product development and 4 years of production, 

it is time for the program to make good on its estimates and deliver 

aircraft in a predictable manner. 

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my statement. I await your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Sullivan can be found in the Appendix on page 65.] 
10 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much. 

Thank all of you for your testimony. 

As is usually my practice, I will delay my questions until the 

end, hoping that my colleagues will have asked them all. 

Mr. Reyes. 

Mr. REYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you all for your testimony. 

I have two questions, one for Admiral Venlet dealing with the 

testing results and production plans, and the other one for Mr. Sullivan regarding the issue of the software and its development. 

For the Admiral, your testimony states that, due to a series of 

problems discovered during testing, Secretary Gates placed the F– 

35B short takeoff and landing variant JSF on probation for 2 years. 

He also directed major changes to the program that will add 

hundreds of additional test flights. While test data to date shows 

the other two F–35 variants somewhat ahead of schedule in this 

testing, but the 35B continues to fall behind. 

So my questions are, when exactly will the program, in your 

opinion, have enough flight test data to allow us to get off this probation designation? 

And secondly, in the meantime, does it make sense to put the 19 

additional F–35B aircraft on contract for production, which are 

being paid by fiscal year 2010 and fiscal year 2011 funds? 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 149.] 

Mr. REYES. And then, finally, why not build more of the other 

variants that are not on probation instead of the 35B? 

Admiral VENLET. Thank you, sir. Your reference to the STOVL 

falling further behind, I would lead with the recent months’ 

progress has been quite remarkable for the STOVL aircraft. 

It has flown quite a bit more. It has accomplished a lot more 

vertical landings, really, since the turn of the year. We have four 

of them return to flight test. 

If I might just start with a current event issue, sir, you mentioned discovery in flight test. Last week we had a dual generator 

failure on an Air Force test aircraft at Edwards Air Force Base. To 

take the time to understand what caused that, what its impacts 

were, we grounded the entire test fleet and their first two production aircraft. 

Over the weekend, they were able to do an investigation and tear 

the hardware apart. They understand what caused that failure and 

the failure of the other generator. 

And yesterday, they determined that there was a difference in 

configuration of generators in the first test aircraft built. This was 

a new configuration generator that was cut in. 

And the differences gave confidence that we could return the 

original, the older generator aircraft to flight. So yesterday, AF1 

flew at Edwards, and today, the four STOVL test aircraft are on 

the schedule to fly today at Pax River. 

So, I mentioned resilience in the schedule. This generator is actually an early opportunity to test that resilience in our schedule to 

see if we can absorb this and learn from it. 

So, when will we have enough data to basically come off of probation for the STOVL, sir? 
11 

The effect of probation was the suppression of the procurement 

quantities. The test program has been planned and is having detailed adjustments made to it this year, so it is going full-speed 

ahead. And it was planned to do that even before probation was 

pondered. 

So, the actual focus in this probation period—and I am meeting 

with the commandant every month. In fact, this week, Friday, I 

meet with my shipmate behind me here and several others to keep 

the commandant informed. 

We are going to focus on several characteristics. The first of all 

will be weight. We will watch how the weight is affected by what 

we learn in flight test. We will watch how it performs in its first 

sea trials, scheduled this fall. 

Our progress in testing has improved our confidence of our ability to meet what is our now-plan date of late October or early November for its first sea trials. I know that was originally planned 

to be late last year, slipped into the spring. Our current planning 

and progress is giving us good confidence that we will make this 

fall. 

So, the weight, the ship operability, the discovery of flight test 

that illuminates what we expect as key performance parameters to 

be, and then, its progress towards achieving an airworthiness determination by the technical assistance command, and its ability to 

fly unmonitored in the fleet’s hands without test instrumentation 

and engineers following it. 

Those are the characteristics that we will inform and we will 

evaluate. And it will be a combination of those things, not any one 

particular thing that will lead to the determination of the confidence to go forward near the end of 2012. 

You asked about the wisdom of continuing to buy. These are certainly challenging decisions. 

The complexity of the program and concurrency, the path that 

we have set about to test and build and deliver to the fleet, and 

operate at the same—this is our first year of experiencing that. We 

are delivering our first production aircraft this year, and we will 

be standing up testing for the Air Force in Eglin Air Force Base. 

Now, a comment. I have to wait and see what this generator 

issue is going to do to that. There is nothing known on that. We 

are evaluating that as we sit here. 

But to break production would add additional cost. I think the 

Secretary in this budget has moderated its spread production out 

to reduce the impacts of concurrency and the possibilities of modification due to learning and test. 

I will stop there. 

Mr. REYES. Thank you. I will have some follow-up, but I will wait 

until the next round. 

Let me go to Mr. Sullivan on software. In your testimony, you 

discuss the potential additional delays that could result from the 

software development effort within the F–35 program. And specifically, you note that each software block is likely to be at least 2 

years late, which obviously delays the overall program. 

The two questions I have: Are these delays primarily the result 

of overoptimistic initial estimates, or are they performance shortfalls by the contractors? That is number one. 
12 

And number two, given the size and the complexity involved, is 

the program doing well compared to the private sector, in your 

opinion? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. To answer your first question, I think your point 

about underestimating the time and resources that would be needed at the beginning of the program is probably the right answer. 

I think the program has found, number one, that the lines of 

code that are needed to make up all of the performance and 

functionality that software has to bring to this weapons system has 

grown by about 40 percent since that time. And it is already probably the most software-laden aircraft ever developed. I know it is 

more than the F–22 or F/A–18E/F. 

So, I think they underestimated the enormity of the challenge for 

software development. They did not plan for enough time. 

And I think that they did not plan to keep software engineering 

experts around long enough. That has been one, I think, one of the 

cost drivers on the program, as well. 

So, I think that, from our point of view, is the answer to the first 

one. They were optimistic in their original estimates. 

With regard to your second question, I do not have a whole lot 

of experience comparing defense programs with commercial, but we 

have done some work in the commercial world to find best practices 

in software, development in software engineering. 

And I would say that the commercial world takes the idea of spiral development a lot more seriously than what we see typically on 

a weapon system acquisition. 

What you have on the Joint Strike Fighter is that they want to 

go all the way to—the program will not be complete, and development is not complete, until they have all of the software delivered 

Block 3 and beyond, which tends to go beyond what you might 

think of as a 95-percent solution. 

Whereas in the commercial world, I think they are much more 

flexible with incrementally releasing software, getting better software to the field, if you will, more quickly, although it is not the 

ultimate. You know, they spin out. I think they are much more 

flexible. 

They reuse software a lot more. They do not rely as much on 

unique software writing and proprietary software, and things like 

that. 

You know, that would be my observations on that. 

Mr. REYES. And I think it is interesting, because in last week’s 

hearing, we talked about just that issue, that sometimes it does not 

make sense to—and unrealistic to expect—a 90, 95 percent level, 

when 75, 80 percent, and then evolving through that process. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes. 

Mr. REYES. So, that is something that I think the committee certainly understands, and maybe we can influence. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you. 

Mr. LoBiondo. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Mr. Chairman, I would like to yield my time to 

Mr. Shuster. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Oh, Mr. Shuster. 
13 

Mr. SHUSTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I thank the gentleman from New Jersey for yielding me his time. 

Mr. Van Buren, on the F–35, I have a couple of concerns, first 

and foremost on the alternative engine. 

We have seen a GAO report that has come out and says the alternative engine is, over the long run, cost-neutral, one engine or 

two engines. So, first, I wonder if you could address that, along 

with—I read a report that General Heinz, the former Joint Strike 

Fighter program manager, stated that he believes that the Pentagon has not considered, under his opinion, operational risk involved with doing away with the alternative engine. 

And looking at having an alternative engine, some of the other 

benefits, the technological innovation, enhanced contractor responsiveness and, I might add, keeping the costs down, which was what 

I think we have seen over and over again when you have competition and a more robust industrial base. 

So, I wonder if you might address those concerns that I have. 

Mr. VAN BUREN. Well, the issue of the alternate engine is clearly 

a case of constrained resources. And currently, in our defense budget, we feel that we do not have the resources to fund the alternate 

engine. The monies need to be put on higher priority programs. 

Secondarily, the issues of stability in the current engine, the 

F135, it is performing very well. It is very mature. There have been 

no major problems in the flight test program to-date. 

And I would say that the JPO [Joint Program Office] has concluded a fixed-price type contract with Pratt and Whitney on that 

engine, and that they appear to be working well to get the cost 

price down. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Then you would agree that, in the short term, it is a $430 million—or a $430 billion savings is what we are going 

after. But the long term, you do agree that there would be—the 

cost would be bear out, it would be neutral, or it would be the same 

cost by having the two engines, and reduce, according to General 

Heinz, operational risks? 

Mr. VAN BUREN. I do not agree with General Heinz on the operational risk. What I will say in the near term is that it is an expenditure of well over $2 billion, approaching $3 billion, funds that 

we currently do not have. 

Mr. SHUSTER. And again, we are going to have—in 25 years it 

appears we will have 95 percent of our fighter fleet will be the F– 

35. That is correct? 

Mr. VAN BUREN. A considerable portion of our fighter fleet for 

the Air Force. I would let the Navy speak to the force structure. 

But for the Air Force, certainly, the F–35 will become the largest 

element of our force structure. 

And I would say that the challenge that we have is to get to the 

‘‘should-cost’’ numbers, aggressively working at the reduction in the 

per-unit costs, not only for the engine, but also for the airframe. 

Mr. SHUSTER. So, one engine you are willing to make the bet— 

95 percent of the Air Force’s fleet. Having that one engine, you are 

confident that that is not going to cause an increase in operational 

risk when you have that kind of—we are going to rely on that single engine. 

Mr. VAN BUREN. I am confident with this engine. 
14 

Mr. SHUSTER. And you talked about unit cost. Economies of scale 

dictate that the more you produce, generally, it drives cost down. 

But yet, we continue to decrease the numbers that we are purchasing. 

And you are certain, or you feel certain that that is not going to 

drive up the cost per unit, if we reduce the quantity, and we continue to reduce the quantity that we contract to produce? 

Mr. VAN BUREN. Well, I will say that that particular factory in 

Middletown, Connecticut, is also responsible for producing F119 

and F117 engines for F–22 and C–17 fleet, and also will be producing the engines for our KC–46A tanker. 

So, we are confident with the situation up in Connecticut. 

Mr. SHUSTER. But when you are switching over assembly lines, 

they are not the same engine. Correct? 

Mr. VAN BUREN. No. They go in parallel lines—— 

Mr. SHUSTER. Right. 

Mr. VAN BUREN [continuing]. Coming through the factory. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Well, again, most economics I have studied, that 

when you reduce the units, you are going to drive up—or when you 

reduce the number you order, you are going to drive up the unit 

costs. And even if a plant is producing an engine, it is a different 

engine. Every time you switch over, it seems to me, there is going 

to be an increase in costs. 

So, I have a great concern that we are going with one engine. I 

know the House just recently voted to go with one engine. 

But again, with the reliance on the F–35 that we are going to 

be placing on it with 95 percent of the Air Force fleet, with our allies moving in that direction, again, I just think it is—in the short 

term, I think we are making a mistake by going with one engine. 

And I hope that as we move down the road, we can change that 

policy, because again, I think there are so many benefits to having 

a competitive program. 

And this Administration has said about going out and being competitive and transparent, yet we have seen time after time they 

want to go to sole sourcing on many different items, not just in the 

Defense Department, but across the government, which I think is 

the wrong direction to take. 

I see my time has expired. I thank the chairman and thank the 

gentleman for yielding from New Jersey. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you. 

Mr. McIntyre. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Van Buren, flight testing for the F–35 began in 2006. Is that 

correct? 

Mr. VAN BUREN. Yes, I think so. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. All right. So, that means you have been testing 

for over 4 years now, going on 5. Is that correct? 

Mr. VAN BUREN. Very limited testing early on. I think this past 

year was the preponderance of the testing, and we are roughly doubling, as I remember, the number of flight test sorties this year 

from last year. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Can the current aircraft fly throughout this specified envelope? 

Mr. VAN BUREN. Admiral. 
15 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Admiral Venlet, you are welcome to help answer, 

if you need. 

Admiral VENLET. Yes, sir. The envelopes are being expanded as 

we speak. 

Just for scale, we have roughly 550 flights under our belt now, 

and we are approaching 900 total flight hours. The Technical Baseline Review assessed that it would take up to 7,700 flights to complete developmental tests on all three variants, including the mission systems, which we will take out into 2016. 

So, as a matter of scale of how much flight test is behind us and 

how much is ahead of us, roughly 900 hours behind us, reaching 

for—excuse me. I mixed hours and flights. 

So, 550 flights behind us, 7,700 flights to attain. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. What are the specific reasons that after 4 years 

of flight testing, that the F–35 is still not cleared to fly throughout 

the specified envelope? Can you tell us—one, two, three, four— 

what those specific reasons are? 

Admiral VENLET. Developmental flight test incrementally opens 

an envelope. It does not begin with a full envelope at the beginning, sir. So, we know what envelope is required for the commencement of training by fleet ops. And so, our testing is focused on progressing to that size of envelope for all three models—Air Force, 

Navy and Marine Corps. 

You are casting a view of the length of time we have been in 

flight tests, sir, the first—there was only one test that we called 

it AA–1, that was flying for the first couple of years. So, it was one 

struggling airplane not accumulating very much flight time, nor 

was it prepared or instrumented to expand the envelope. 

So, we really have only begun to expand the envelope in this 

near the end of 2010. We will do so rapidly in 2011 and 2012. 

I don’t make excuses for that. I just say what it was. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Hasn’t the F135 engine contributed to the delays 

in the flight testing and the restrictions in the flight envelope? 

Admiral VENLET. Specifically, we had a characteristic called 

screech in the afterburner that caused us to have to avoid certain 

portions of the flight envelope, but that did not slow us down from 

going to other points in the envelope to make progress, sir. We are 

fixing—we are putting kits in so that the aircraft can go back and 

catch that up, sir. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. If you can tell me also, Mr. Van Buren, the Air 

Force variant, you have said, has been performing very well. 

So, then, the question becomes, why slow down by cutting production by 57 aircraft over the FYDP [Future Years Defense Program], and potentially dramatically increasing the cost per unit? 

Mr. VAN BUREN. Well, the reduction in the recurring number of 

jets to be built was caused by the need to more robustly fund the 

development program. And so, resources on the order of $4.5 billion 

were put into the budget between the 2011 budget and the 2012 

budget to fully fund that testing that needed to be done, software 

development that the Admiral mentioned, and to finish the program off in 2016. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. How much per unit is it going to increase the 

cost over the FYDP? 
16 

Mr. VAN BUREN. Our plan is to continuously reduce the per-unit 

cost from LRIP 4 and beyond on a fixed-price type basis. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Right. But during the FYDP, how much will it 

increase the cost per unit? 

Mr. VAN BUREN. Well, we do not know that. I think that will be 

a product of our ‘‘should-cost’’ activity. And we have not received 

our proposal yet on LRIP 5. And that is our task, is to robustly reduce the price for all of these variants. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. I hope that can be achieved. I share with Mr. 

Shuster the same concern, and with Mr. Bartlett, that government 

studies have shown that the alternative engine would bring down 

the cost over the life of the program for the F–35. And I am very 

concerned that we be responsible with taxpayer money, and that 

we also have an opportunity to increase job opportunity, which the 

alternative engine will do. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you. 

Dr. Fleming. 

Dr. FLEMING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I want to follow up a bit on the one-versus-two engine issue, 

as well. 

I have no dog in the hunt, so it has nothing to do with my district whatsoever. I am just interested in getting the best results for 

the taxpayer. 

And it is interesting. This is the only issue that I have dealt with 

in the over 2 years I have been on the Hill in which both sides 

claim the same ground, and that is savings. 

The people who are for one engine say that we are going to save 

money. The people who say we are for two engines say we are 

going to save money. So, both sides are using the same rationale. 

The best I can understand about this is that we are really looking at different budget windows, that one-engine proponents say we 

are going to save money early on, because we are not investing in 

that research and development. But then, proponents of two engines say, in out-years, that is where the savings are going to be, 

because we will have two sources and, therefore, we will have competition. 

So, is this really, by going with one engine, are we really in essence saving money in the short term in order to actually end up 

spending more money in the long term? 

And I will open to anyone in the panel who would like to answer 

that question. 

Mr. VAN BUREN. Again, we are constrained on resources here. In 

the near term we know that that would be some cost, and we do 

not feel that that is in our taxpayers’ interest. 

Dr. FLEMING. Okay. Anyone else like to tackle that question? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. I guess, from our point of view as an uninterested 

observer, if you will. You know, when we looked at this issue—it 

has been a few years ago—we made a number of assumptions. So, 

we did really a rather theoretical look at the impact of competition. 

And I think it does, more or less, boil down to near term and long 

term, which, you know, can be interpreted many different ways. 

But I believe where the Department stands now, is that they feel 

that they are in a short-term affordability crunch, and they are not 
17 

willing to invest what is now probably somewhere between $2.5 

and $3 billion in order to see if they can recoup that and more 

down the road. 

When we did our study, we found it reasonable to assume that 

over the long haul, over a 40-year buy of engines, if you competed 

them annually, you would achieve a return on investment that 

would exceed the investment. 

Dr. FLEMING. And I appreciate your honesty in that response. 

Do you have—and I know this is an off-the-top-of-your-head estimate—what the savings might be in the long term as compared to 

the $2 billion or $3 billion in the short term? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. We do not have a number for that. But what we 

did was we looked at—we used as a model the Great Engine War. 

I do not know if you are familiar with that, but it was the result 

of the competition that was infused into the F–15, F–16 engine programs. 

And it was done as a result of the—the prime engine maker was 

not being responsive. Reliability was lacking. Cost was going up on 

the engines. And it was a sole source buy. 

So, the Air Force at that time brought in competition and saw 

cost reductions—initially, a great deal of cost reductions as the 

competition kicked in. And then, through the program, was very 

happy, not only with the financial results of that, but also with 

the—they got much more responsiveness from both contractors, 

and reliability went up. 

Dr. FLEMING. Okay. I appreciate that answer. 

Then, would it make sense that down the road another year or 

two, we get our budgets in order, we are winding down our conflicts, perhaps we are able to invest that money. Would it make 

sense to open up a second-source engine at a later date? 

Mr. VAN BUREN. It does not make any sense to us. And we are 

comfortable with the efficiencies of having a single source. We find 

the contractor responsive. We find the costs coming down in a 

fixed-price environment. And there are no major technical issues. 

Dr. FLEMING. Okay. Okay, well, that being said, I thank you, 

gentlemen, and I yield back. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you. 

Mr. Kissell. 

Mr. KISSELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And as the chairman said earlier on, thank you, gentlemen, for 

the work you do, that obviously, this program is very important to 

our Nation. And obviously, we have had some issues with this program. 

And I am going to go through some numbers that have been repeated. I know the chairman said these, and others have referred 

to them. But I think it is important we not forget this as we assess 

where we are in the development of the F–35. 

In the 10th year of development, that we started out with pro- jected cost of $233 billion, is now up to $382 billion. By rough 

math, that is a 65 percent increase. We have cut the number of 

planes we are going to purchase by 400. 

In 2007, Congress appropriated and authorized 90, I believe, airplanes, none of which have been delivered. We were looking for 32 

this year. 
18 

We had less than 10 percent of the flight training completed that 

we wanted to. Referencing back to what Secretary Gates said in 

August 2009, that the rough spots are behind us, that we are moving forward. But yet, it seems like we have moved from 2014 to 

2018, in terms of when we expect the production to be completed. 

From the authorization of 2007, we are now 15 months behind 

schedule. And once again, we are talking about the first production 

plane to be delivered next month. 

And, Mr. Van Buren, I do find a lot of concern in my mind with 

your saying, short term, this is the best option for us with the single engine, when this program is anything but short term in nature. We are talking about 95 percent of our fighter fleet. We are 

talking about years of development leading to years that this will 

be an operational plane. 

There is nothing short-term about this. 

Mr. Sullivan, we have heard the words, and we have talked 

about that the F135 engine, I believe, that the manufacturers 

reached that point to declare an ISR [Initial Services Release]. 

They are ready to go into production. 

But my understanding is that they also asked for $1 billion more 

for development, changes, whatever. It sounds like we are anywhere but ready to go into production when you ask for $1 billion 

more. 

We have made words aplenty as to where we are. Where do 

words stop and we can be able to say specifically, this is what we 

have got to look for to be able to say we are on a production schedule that is meaningful, and that the projections we are making in 

terms of cost and delivery and expectations are being met? What 

are the key things we should be looking for other than just projections and words? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. From our perspective, we believe the restructure 

that they just went through was very comprehensive. So, I think 

you are getting somewhere close to a point where you are ready— 

you know, you are beginning to feel like you could go to production. 

However, until the flight test program, and for that matter, until 

the models and simulation that they have are accredited, and most 

of the development issues in testing are further along, we believe 

that right now, that the aircraft is too immature—and the engines 

are too immature—to go to production. I do not know. Maybe the 

program has more insight on that. 

Mr. KISSELL. Well, and Admiral—or Mr. Van Buren, you know, 

we talk about going to production. But yet, we are not there. And 

so, where are we in terms of going to production and actually being 

able to have, you know, these airplanes rolling out and meeting the 

needs that we have? 

Mr. VAN BUREN. Congressman, I think one of the biggest issues 

that affected the program was a high-level, a change traffic that occurred, notably in the first part of 2009. And it took the program 

some bit of time, delaying deliveries, to absorb that change traffic. 

If you look at the metrics on the production line with regard to 

travel, work and span times, and the other, the new changes that 

are occurring, it has come down significantly. So, I can say that the 

production maturity is far better than it was 2 years ago. 
19 

That is not to say, though, that there is a lot of work, there is 

a lot of flight test ahead of us and discovery. And that is why I 

think the changes that were made in the restructure were very 

prudent to reduce that concurrency, and produce the aircraft at a 

lower rate of production, which would allow the Admiral and the 

team to make sure that we had a much more mature product coming down that production line. 

Mr. KISSELL. Okay. Thank you, sir. Thank you, gentlemen, once 

again. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Mr. Critz. 

Mr. CRITZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for testifying. 

I did hear about the issue with the testing. What was that, the 

end of last week, where you had to ground the fleet? You say you 

are going to be up in the air today? Is that correct? 

Admiral VENLET. We flew yesterday, sir, with AF1 at Edwards. 

Mr. CRITZ. And no recurring problem with—— 

Admiral VENLET. No, sir. The generator configuration is different 

in the jets that are released for flight. And so, that is why they are 

flying. 

Mr. CRITZ. Okay, good. 

Now, there have been advertisements in local newspapers, and 

I have heard different figures. The Pratt Whitney engine is how 

many billion dollars over budget right now? There is an advertisement that says it has $3.9 billion cost overruns. Can you put a number on what is the real number? What is 

the real number of the cost overrun on the engine? 

Admiral VENLET. The contract for the F135 has a scope that includes the integration into the aircraft that is not on the F136. So, 

the size of the scope of work for the two contracts is so different. 

There was a reference to adding more money to that contract. We 

have talked about the Technical Baseline Review, that looked at 

the work to go, sir, and the additional flights from 5,500 in the old 

plan, the 7,700 in the new plan—5,800 to—it is an 1,800-flight increase. 

There was a need to buy more spares to support that extension. 

So, it was not related to a deficiency in the F135 as much a preponderance of that money is to support the extension in the flight test. 

We were going to fly 12 aircraft in test. We are now going to fly 

18. 

There was $470 or $480 million that the Technical Baseline Review assessed that was needed to address the integration of the 

STOVL issues that are not unique to the F135, sir. There is the 

lift-fan, drive shaft, clutch, roll-post heating. Addressing those technical issues, there are material solutions in hand. 

So, the original F135 contract—I would go through my notes 

here, but I—it is currently projected with these cost additions to be 

about 8.2. 

So, I haven’t got the beginning portion in my head to give you 

a good delta in that growth, sir. 

Mr. CRITZ. So, cost additions are $8.2 billion? 

Admiral VENLET. No, that is the total of the entire contract—— 

Mr. CRITZ. The entire, right, right. 
20 

Admiral VENLET [continuing]. From the beginning of 2002 to 

the—— 

Mr. CRITZ. And to separate out if the engine—now, you said you 

went from 5,500—5,800 to 7,700. What drove that additional flight? 

Admiral VENLET. It was not engine-related, uniquely, sir. It was 

the entire scope of the program. 

There were four characteristics of the growth in the test. The 

planned work was judged to be underestimated in cost and schedule. There was work that was not in the test program that was 

necessary to address risks that we saw. 

There was the schedule extension that needed to just pay for the 

more time of flight test and the people involved. And then, there 

was no reserve. 

So, those are the four characteristics that go in. And that is 

across the entire scope of work, aircraft and engine, sir. 

Mr. CRITZ. Mr. Sullivan, you wanted to say something? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, sir. I think the original contract, the develop- ment contract, began at $4.8 billion. And it is now $8.2 billion, so 

it is a $3.4 billion increase. 

Mr. CRITZ. But that is systemwide. That is not just the engine. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. That is the engine. 

Mr. CRITZ. That is the engine. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes. 

Mr. CRITZ. Oh, so there is a $3.4 billion—oh. 

Well, the reason I bring it up is that, you know, we had a presi- dential helicopter that got cancelled, because it was around $3 billion spent, and nothing to show for it. Then we just had an EFV 

program that was cancelled, that was around $3 billion. And, you know, we are at this magic number here, $3.4 billion 

creep. You know, obviously, that seems to be a magic number on 

your side of the equation as to when we have got problems. 

Of course, we have issues with it, too, when it grows exponentially like that, especially when we are told there is not enough 

money in the budget to fund an alternate engine, but we have got 

a $3.4 billion increase in the engine that we are buying. 

One other question, and I do not have much time left. But I saw 

where there was about $1 billion cost increase in development, and 

$600 million was for extra flight test engines. I am trying to figure 

this out. 

There were 15 test planes. And then I imagine you buy a couple 

extra engines, just in case. And I am curious why you have to buy 

more. 

Admiral VENLET. The test program did not have spare engines 

in it. It did not have enough spare components and support to 

carry it through. That was one of the areas that was judged underestimated and underresourced. So, it was putting the realism back 

in the work to go, sir. 

Mr. CRITZ. All right. Thank you, and I yield back. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you. 

Mr. Shuster was previously yielded Mr. LoBiondo’s time. And 

now he is in the queue for his own time. After that, we move to 

those who arrived at the committee after gavel fall. 

Mr. Shuster. 
21 

Mr. SHUSTER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I just, for the record, want to know, as Dr. Fleming stated, I have 

no manufacturing facilities for this aircraft in my district. What I 

care about is that we are doing what is right for this Nation. 

And the other thing Dr. Fleming said is, the argument is not one 

engine versus two engines saves money. It is two engines we believe is going to be neutral. 

But it is going to give us, I think as Mr. Sullivan said, as we 

learned from the F–16 and F–15, financially, it will improve the response—the response of the supplier to the Department of Defense 

is increased, and the reliability, the quality got better. 

So, that is what I care about, making sure we are doing—making 

the right choice. Because, Mr. Van Buren, you and I, 25 years from 

now, are probably going to be long gone from public service. And 

the Nation is going to have to live with what we do with this F– 

35, being that it is 95 percent of our—it will be 95 percent of the 

fighter fleet. 

So, I hope we get it right. And I hope, if I am up here today talking about this, I hope I am wrong, and I hope you are right if we 

go with one engine, because the Nation will be at risk. 

But just as we go through this, we talk about cost overruns and the schedule slipping. As Mr. Critz pointed out, $3 billion, and it 

seems to be the magic number. It is in baseball, too. Three strikes 

and you are out. 

So, you know, this is too important. And I know that when we 

develop new systems, that that often happens, unfortunately. But 

we need to make sure we do what is right for this Nation. 

And Mr. Sullivan, a question to you is, has the program been receptive to your advice in the past? When you have come to them 

and laid it out to them what you think, have they been receptive 

to it? Have they stiff-armed you? What has been their reaction? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Well, we, you know, we maintain an auditor, or 

a program relationship, which I think is good. But we make recommendations. We typically make recommendations, make them 

available to the program and the Department. And they weigh 

those and either concur with our recommendations or non-concur. 

And I would say, on this program, it has mostly been non-concur. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Right. That is unfortunate to hear. 

And again, if you would, just so I make sure I am completely 

straight on the record, the F–15 and the F–16, your testimony 

today was that it was—that it was financially positive, that the 

supplier was much more responsive to the military? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. The studies that we looked at—and they were 

mostly Air Force and industry studies—showed that there was 

much more—responsiveness went way up. Reliability went up. 

Quality went up. 

And the financial aspects of that, we looked at the first 4 years 

of competition to get the percentage savings that we saw. So, we 

did not have the entire lifecycle of the engines. But it was dramatic. 

Mr. SHUSTER. And your general experience in these situations, 

when you have competition, do you typically see financially the cost 

has not necessarily stayed down, but it does not grow as quickly, 

you get the responsiveness and you get the reliability? Is that typi-
22 

cally your response when—or typically what you have seen 

when—— 

Mr. SULLIVAN. I think that is what competition is all about. And 

in fact, the Department recently has tried to make it more of a policy to infuse more competition into these programs. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Right. And what would you say going forward? 

What would you recommend to the Department of Defense on the 

Joint Strike Fighter program to see that past mistakes have not 

been made? What recommendations would you put forward to 

them? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Well, right now, what we believe needs to be done 

is that we think the restructure was a really good, comprehensive 

restructure. But they need to continue to maintain very close oversight. We think that software management is something that they 

need to pay very close attention. 

We think that they should consider, with the problems that the 

STOVL aircraft is having, I think the Department would be good 

to try to manage that. You know, we have thought about perhaps 

separating that out from the program, so that the other two 

variants can get busy and get testing done. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Right. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. And, you know, the funding on this program is going to be critical for the Department and for the Congress; $11 

billion on average over the next 20 years. We believe that that 

should be very closely monitored and limited. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Right. All right. 

Well, thank you all. Thank you all for your testimony. 

And again, I just would say in closing that I hope we are making 

the right decision. I think it is a short-term decision for a long-term 

system, that we desperately need to make sure it is right. 

So, again, thank you very much. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Garamendi. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I noticed that a lot of the discussion on the new strike fighter, 

but also a lot of testimony on the existing equipment that we are 

using. And the structural integrity of the A–10, F–15, F–16 and F– 

22 has been in question and, apparently, to be dealt with. 

As I was reading that, I was reminded of an incident several decades ago in which a piece of equipment on my family’s ranch needed to be repaired. And an old blacksmith was working on it, and 

he was beating the heck out of that piece of steel with a ball-peen 

hammer. 

About a few decades, several decades later, I ran into a laser 

peening operation in coming out of Lawrence Livermore Laboratories and now out in the public, which is apparently beating the 

heck out of a piece of F–22 equipment, and strengthening it. 

That is what the blacksmith said. He said, why are you doing 

that? And he said, because it makes it stronger. 

And apparently, laser peening does the same thing, and has been 

proven to be successful on the F–22. And the aircraft structural integrity program has found it so. 

So, my question to all of the generals behind you, as well as 

those of you at the table is: Are you considering using the laser 
23 

peening process when you go about the repair or the maintenance 

or the strengthening of certain structural materials on the various 

jets that you are operating? For example, Admiral, tailhooks, where 

I understand it is able to increase the viability of a tailhook by twoand-a-half times. 

General. 

Or Admiral, and Mr. Van Buren. 

Mr. VAN BUREN. Congressman, I would like to take that for the 

record. I am unfamiliar with that. Perhaps some of the generals in 

the second panel might be, but we will take that for the record on 

the first panel. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 149.] 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Well, now you know why I asked you, because 

I figured you did not know about it. 

Admiral. 

Admiral VENLET. I would say that I do have confidence, though, 

that the most modern methods of repair and improvement are certainly going to be taken advantage of. But I am also not familiar 

with laser peening specifically. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. And I suspect most of the men and women behind you are also not familiar. 

Admiral VENLET. But that does not mean—the industry team 

that we have and the technical experts in our government systems 

commands might very well know about it, sir. I just might not, so 

I could get back to you. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Now you know why I raised the question. 

My next question goes to Mr. Sullivan. Could you tell me the 

three most important things that can be done to hold down the cost 

of the equipment that is being purchased by the military? One, 

two, three. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Define requirements a lot better at the beginning 

of the program. Take enough time early in the program to ensure 

that you have a stable design for the full-up weapon system 

through prototyping and good systems engineering knowledge. 

And limit the development time to a reasonable kind of a horizon 

that people can actually think about where you are getting added 

value capability to the field, but you are not putting yourself in a 

position where you are trying to invent and do trial-and-error on 

the fly—incremental, knowledge-based acquisition. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Are we doing those three things? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. You know, the Department and, in fact, the Congress a couple of years ago passed a bunch of acquisition reform. 

The Department has embraced it in its policies. I think there are 

people within the government—I think this program is beginning 

to think along those lines, but there is a long way to go. 

I do not know that I could name more than two or three programs that I have seen that seem to be doing things in that reasonable fashion. It really does all begin with setting requirements 

properly. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. What does it take to force the Department of 

Defense to do those three things? Another law? Apparently, that 

did not work. 
24 

Mr. SULLIVAN. That is a very good question, sir. You know, I 

have been doing this for 25 years, and there are an awful lot of 

stakeholders involved in the building of weapon systems. And it 

can be a very complex proposition. 

But I do not know that laws necessarily—we pass laws, we pass 

legislation. I think at some point, it is a matter of getting serious 

with the taxpayers’ dollars. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Which is our responsibility. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. That is all of our responsibilities—mine, the rest 

of the people on the panel—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. I was specifically referring to this committee. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. When we say that it is not, I suppose we should 

pull the plug. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. It does not happen very often, and it might—and 

decisions, tough decisions like that might make a difference in 

changing the culture, yes. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you. 

Mr. Wilson, and then Mr. Turner. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank all of you for 

being here today. 

And I am particularly interested in the F–35s, the F–35Bs. I am 

very grateful that I know how important they are and to our national security. And I represent communities that are very supportive of their being placed; for example, the Beaufort Marine 

Corps Air Station, and also, McEntire Joint Air Base near Columbia. 

And in fact, I just met with the mayor of Columbia, a new 

mayor, Steve Benjamin, and long-time city councilwoman, Tameika 

Isaac Devine. And we were talking about that we have got the 

right climate. 

It is a meteorological climate, so that people can train almost 365 

days of the year. And then, it is a climate where there are warm, 

supportive people. So, keep that in mind as you think of Beaufort 

and Columbia. 

I am concerned, Mr. Van Buren. On January the 6th, the Secretary of Defense stated he was placing the F–35Bs on a 2-year 

probation. It is my understanding that, over this entire year, the 

last 70 days, that the training, the test flights have been really 

very, very positive. 

The Commandant has stated, if this continues, he would like to 

see the probation status lifted and the normal procurement numbers restored as soon as possible. 

And so, my first question is: What criteria was established to 

measure its progress, and what is expected during the probation 

period? 

Mr. VAN BUREN. Well, I will let the Admiral get into a little bit 

more detail. But at a top level, Congressman, I would say that it 

is stability of the design that is not impacted by further discovery, 

and flight test sortie generations, flight test rates, is usually reliability, both in the vehicle overall, as well as the propulsion system. 

Mr. WILSON. And Admiral? Yes. 
25 

Admiral VENLET. Yes, the test program is structured to go at full 

pace either with or without probation. It did not affect the test program; it affected the procurement profiles. But to inform the Department, the focus on STOVL unique characteristics, sir. 

So, we are sharing with the Commandant and Department leadership that each of the technical issues in view right now, which 

are preponderantly integration-related to the STOVL characteristics of the airplane to land vertically and short take-off. We believe 

we have engineering solutions to everything in view today. 

We are focusing on its weight, its key performance parameter of 

its vertical lift bring-back. Every pound of weight is, you know, 

needs to be offset by thrust. They all line up in the same axis, so 

weight is very critical, and we are focusing on weight. 

We are focusing how it will perform around the ship—we expect 

to get there this fall—both how it operates around the ship and 

how it appears it will be able to be supported around the ship, as 

well. 

And then, its ability to work through these issues, and then be 

judged by the systems command to be worthy of an airworthiness 

flight clearance, to be flown by the fleet in an unmonitored sense. 

Those will be the characteristics in progress we will be closely 

helping the Commandant keep track of. 

Mr. WILSON. And I cannot wait for the American people to see 

the STOVL capability and what that means in projecting our military’s ability to save lives and make a difference. 

Mr. Van Buren, who will make the decision to remove the F– 

35Bs from the probation, or take other actions? 

Mr. VAN BUREN. I think it will be recommendations coming from 

Admiral Venlet, through me to Dr. Carter, the Under Secretary, 

and ultimately the Secretary of Defense. 

Mr. WILSON. And again, I just want to thank all of you for your 

service. 

But we are really looking forward. And the communities I represent, they love the sound of freedom. And I cannot imagine anything more meaningful to the people I represent than F–35Bs. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you. 

Mr. Turner. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, I want to return to the issue of the alternate engine. 

I know there has been some discussion. I know many times people 

raise the issue of having an alternate engine as being one of budgetary concerns. 

I fall on the side of being concerned of not having an alternate 

engine, that if we go to a single source, we could have both problems with price escalation. If there are problems that develop with 

the engine, you could have, certainly, devastating consequences to 

a fleet that has a single source. 

And when you look at the analyses that have occurred that indicate that, you know, the Joint Strike Fighter will ultimately comprise 95 percent of our fighter attack force structure, I think you 

can become concerned about our vulnerability. 

But one of the concerns that I have is the manner in which we 

discuss this issue. Since it is a financial issue, we talk about it in 
26 

terms of comparison. And when we talk about the 135 engine, the 

Pratt Whitney engine, people cast that discussion in terms of cost 

efficiencies in production. 

Admiral Mullen said you get savings by production levels. He 

says, I think with the kind of production levels we will talk about, 

that we are talking about, that they will come down—meaning the 

cost amounts will come down. 

Mr. Van Buren, I understand that you had stated in this hearing 

that you are confident that the prices would not be increased. 

One of the concerns that I have when we have this discussion is 

the difference between what is opinion, what is judgment and what 

is fact upon which we can rely. When we talk about the people who 

come before us, and even the people who sit in our seats, these are 

decisions that will long last us as we look to what the effects are. 

So, I raise my inquiry to the issues of, to what extent is it legally 

binding that these cost reductions will occur? Are they projections 

that people are saying of savings and production levels? 

When we go to one and we talk about confidence levels that 

prices will not be raised, is there currently—currently—any legally 

binding way in which it can be enforced that we get those cost savings? Or is this something that we are figuring and projecting? Because I think it does figure into our overall discussion. 

Mr. Van Buren, would you like to start? 

Mr. VAN BUREN. Surely. What we know in the way of fact is a 

fixed-price contract that we have with Pratt for LRIP 4. What we 

know is that there is substantial cost that will be required to continue the F136 development. 

So, our plan is to continue that cost reduction on the F135 on a 

fixed-price type basis—— 

Mr. TURNER. But excuse me. You said—but your fixed-price contract, does it currently have a price reduction provision? 

I mean, does it say, if you do not have 136, that your costs are 

a different amount? 

Mr. VAN BUREN. No. It is simply a contract with the manufacturer on a fixed-price incentive fee type basis for the quantity that 

we are procuring in LRIP 4. 

Mr. TURNER. And so, it already figures in what Admiral Mullen 

is saying that he believes they are going to be production savings 

and what you say are going to be confident of no cost increases, 

and that these cost reductions will be delivered. 

Mr. VAN BUREN. There is a ceiling or a cap on the price that the 

government would pay for those engines. 

Mr. TURNER. Does that contract currently require the cost savings that we have heard as a result of the increased production 

that is expected? Or will it have to be continually—will it have to 

be renegotiated? 

I mean, my understanding, my expectation is that there is going 

to have to be additional negotiation and documents that occur, that 

your current primary, underlying document does not take into consideration the full timeline of production or the increases in production, and deliver the cost savings that are projected, or that you 

are expecting. 

Is that correct? Or does your current document deliver those cost 

savings? 
27 

Mr. VAN BUREN. This contract is simply for the production quantity for the fiscal year 2010 procurement of engines. 

Mr. TURNER. That is what I thought. So, when we talk about 

what the cost comparison is going to be, and the budget effects for 

future years, we are talking about projections and expectations, not 

things that are absolute as we go forward with these cost comparisons. Am I accurate in characterizing it that way? 

Mr. VAN BUREN. Well, what is absolute would be the nonrecurring investment to fund a second engine. That is a known 

fact. 

Mr. TURNER. The cost per engine, though, is not known. Correct? 

I mean, you cannot tell me for every year what it is going to be. 

It is an expectation. 

Mr. VAN BUREN. Well, as I mentioned in my—— 

Mr. TURNER. The cost, it is a projection. Is that correct? 

Mr. VAN BUREN. As I mentioned in my opening statement, the 

challenge for us, our responsibility, our commitment to the taxpayer and to all of you, is to have to work very diligently on the 

cost reduction for this program—not just with the engine, but also 

with the airframe. 

Mr. TURNER. But which is yet to be done. My other portion of the 

point on this is for the issue of the cost for the 136. There are, of 

course, a significant number who have an opinion that, in the long 

run, those will actually be cost savings. 

But I appreciate your distinctions here and your explanation. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you. 

In the interest of full disclosure, I would like to note that, to the 

best of my knowledge, the only interest in my district relative to 

the engine is the 135, the prime engine. I think that they will do 

a better job if there is a 136. 

Some of my questions have been asked, not all of them. But I 

will submit most of them for the record. I would just like to ask 

two questions now. 

Mr. Van Buren, wearing your OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] hat, Secretary Carter indicated last September that dualsource procurement for the littoral combat ship would not be ‘‘real 

competition.’’ 

By December of 2010, Secretary Carter reversed his position, because of the lower-than-expected ship price—this is what competition does, gentlemen—bid and endorsed dual-source procurement 

for the LCS [littoral combat ship]. 

In justifying this reversal and stating dual-source procurement of 

LCS is different than dual-source procurement of the F–35 engines, 

the Pentagon has indicated LCS is different, because all of the development costs of the LCS have been expended. 

But this year’s budget request for development costs for LCS is 

$1.9 billion—$785 million higher than last year. 

Can you explain this contradiction to the Pentagon’s statement 

and explain why the LCS acquisition model does not apply to F– 

35 engines? 

Mr. VAN BUREN. Mr. Chairman, I am not equipped to discuss the 

LCS. That is not in an area of the Air Force’s portfolio. So, I would 
28 

like to take that for the record and have the Department get back 

to you on that issue. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 149.] 

Mr. BARTLETT. Admiral. 

Admiral VENLET. Sir, LCS strategy is beyond the vein of my 

awareness or ability to speak to. I am sorry. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Mr. Sullivan. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. I think I am in the same boat, your honor. I 

would not be able to speak intelligently to compare those two different acquisitions. 

Mr. BARTLETT. To whom should we address this question, so that 

we can get an answer? If we ask this question for the record, will 

somebody answer the question for us? 

Mr. VAN BUREN. Well, Secretary Stackley, the acquisition executive of the Navy, reporting up through Dr. Carter, are the most 

knowledgeable of this topic. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Are any of you in that chain of command? 

Mr. VAN BUREN. No. 

Mr. BARTLETT. No? Is anybody in the second panel in that chain 

of command? 

Mr. VAN BUREN. I will have to—— 

Mr. BARTLETT. I see a hand raised behind you. Okay, we will ask 

that question again in the second panel. And if you cannot answer 

it, sir, we hope you will go up the chain of command and get us 

an answer for the record. 

Okay, my second question. In your statement—this is Admiral 

Venlet—in your statement, you indicated a fixed-price contract has 

been signed with the contractor for $3.9 billion for 32 aircraft for 

fiscal year 2010. The amount appropriated for this—2010 was over 

$11 billion. 

Given the yet-to-be-determined contract amount for the F–35 engine, because the fiscal year 2010 contract has yet to be signed, 

how much of the total fiscal year 2010 appropriation is still subject 

to cost-plus determination? 

Admiral VENLET. Yes, sir. We contract on each year’s procurement fixed-price incentive for the aircraft, and we contract for the 

sustainment portion where we buy simulators, support equipment 

and sustainment activity at cost-plus, since we are still early in. 

So, the math—the difference between—you cited a budget number and an aircraft fixed-price engine contract number in the different—in the space between those two, there is a portion for costplus sustainment activity on the contract. But there are other costs 

in there, as well. So, I do not have that split out, sir. 

But there is a sustainment that is cost-plus, and it will be on the 

next couple of years’ contract. 

Mr. BARTLETT. We have eight or so foreign countries that are interested in buying this plane. I know that some of them—I do not 

know how many of them—are distressed that there may be only 

one engine. 

To your knowledge, are any of these sales at risk, if we do not 

have a second engine? 

Because if they are, then that simply drives up the cost of our 

planes, because we have got to spread the development costs across 
29 

the universe of planes that are sold. If fewer are sold, ours cost 

more. 

Wouldn’t just some minimal drop in foreign sales way offset any 

potential savings that you hope to achieve by this short-term not 

supporting the second engine? 

Mr. VAN BUREN. Mr. Chairman, I talk to many of the partner nations regularly. I know of no risk based on the engine issue. 

Mr. BARTLETT. I talked to one of them, and they were considerably concerned—I don’t know if concerned to the point that they 

are not going to buy. And as the price goes up, we risk that some 

of them will not buy. 

And if they are concerned about a second engine, it would not 

take very many planes not sold to increase our cost, to wipe out 

any miniscule savings that you could achieve by not funding the 

second engine currently. 

I have one other question. We have a vote on, so we will recess 

very shortly, and then we will come back and seat the second 

panel. 

Ultimately, 95 percent of all of our fighter aircraft in all of our 

Services, we hope to be this airplane. 

What percent of the fighter aircraft of our allies will be this 

plane? Do you have any knowledge of that? 

I do not know whether it will be big or small. But whatever number it is, I think it indicates a real risk. 

Should there be problems with the engine—there are occasionally 

problems with engines, and we have to ground the fleet that uses 

that engine. So far, that has not been a problem, because we have 

not had 95 percent of our fleet the same airplane. So, if one plane 

is down because of engine troubles, we have several other airplanes. That will not be the case in the future. 

Not only will a second engine provide competition and drive the 

cost down and the quality up, but shouldn’t we also have the second engine in some of our planes, so that we will not be at risk 

of having only 5 percent of our planes available in an emergency, 

should there be an engine problem? 

Mr. VAN BUREN. Mr. Chairman, you asked about the partner nations. I would like to take that for the record. 

I think it widely varies from country to country. For some countries, JSF is a very high percentage of their future force structure; 

for others, not as much. 

So, I would like to take that for the record. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 149.] 

Mr. BARTLETT. So, it is not only us who would have 95 percent 

of our planes grounded, but a significant percentage of the fighter 

aircraft, and our allies would also be grounded. Correct? 

That does not give you some pause that we might be in a situation where we desperately need fighter aircraft, and neither we nor 

our allies have very many? 

Mr. VAN BUREN. Mr. Chairman, I think it is an issue of risk. And 

I think the opinion of the Department right now is that the engine 

is performing very well. It is in a very mature state, and the risk 

is very low. 
30 

Mr. BARTLETT. Those are very qualitative terms, sir. The slippage in the increased cost would indicate that some would not concur with those terms. 

Well, I am just having trouble understanding how it is in our 

long-term best interest to save a few dollars now, and put ourselves 

at risk for the future of having increased cost and a lesser quality 

of engine. 

Competition always makes things better and cheaper. And having only one engine, so that if that is grounded, essentially our 

whole fleet is grounded for all of our Services—and a major part 

of the fleet for all of our allies. 

I would hope that would give you considerable pause as we look 

to the future. And I think that this short-term expediency of saving 

a few billion dollars now, that we will pay dearly for that in the 

future. 

Thank you all very much for your testimony. We will recess now 

for votes, and we will return so quickly as we can. 

Thank you. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. BARTLETT. Admiral Skinner, please proceed with your opening remarks, followed by General Robling, Admiral Floyd, General 

Shackelford and General Carlisle. 

STATEMENT OF VADM W. MARK SKINNER, USN, PRINCIPAL 

MILITARY DEPUTY TO THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE 

NAVY (RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND ACQUISITION), U.S. 

NAVY; LT. GEN. TERRY G. ROBLING, USMC, DEPUTY COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS FOR AVIATION, U.S. MARINE CORPS; AND RADM KENNETH E. FLOYD, USN, DIRECTOR OF THE AIR WARFARE DIVISION, U.S. NAVY 

Admiral SKINNER. Chairman Bartlett and Ranking Member 

Reyes, distinguished members of the subcommittee, it is our honor 

to appear before you today to discuss the Department of the Navy’s 

aviation procurement programs. 

Testifying alongside me today are Lieutenant General Terry 

Robling, Deputy Commandant for Marine Corps Aviation; and Rear 

Admiral Kenneth Floyd, the Navy’s Director of Air Warfare. 

We note the absence of Representative Gabby Giffords, and send 

her and our shipmate, Mark, our best. 

With the permission of the committee, I propose to keep our oral 

remarks brief and submit our combined statement for the record. 

That includes the specific questions requested by the subcommittee. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Without objection. 

Admiral SKINNER. The Department of the Navy’s fiscal year 2012 

aviation budget request provides Navy and Marine Corps aviation 

forces capable of meeting the wide spectrum of threats to our Nation, both today and in the future. 

This year, the Department of the Navy will procure 137 fixed 

wing aircraft, 66 rotary wing aircraft and 20 unmanned air vehicles, for a total of 223 aircraft. 

In the past year, we deployed the EA–18G in an expeditionary 

role to Iraq; the E–2D successfully completed an operational assessment; our MV–22 fleet reached 100,000 flight hours; the AH– 
31 

1 Zulu successfully completed operational test and entered full-rate 

production; and the CH–53K completed its critical design review. 

And with the leadership of Congress, we signed a multiyear procurement contract for the F/A–18 and EA–18G, which saved the 

taxpayers $605 million, and we are moving forward on the next 

MH–60 multiyear procurement. 

The Department of the Navy has emerged more confident that 

the essential F–35 Joint Strike Fighter program has been positioned for success. 

Taking into account the restructuring of the program approved 

by Secretary Gates last December, we reviewed our tactical aircraft 

inventory projections and initiated strong steps to mitigate the 

strike fighter shortfall to the operational commanders by increasing F/A–18E/F procurement quantity by 41 aircraft, and including 

funds to extend the life of 150 legacy Hornets. 

By doing this, we anticipate a manageable shortfall of approximately 65 aircraft that peaks in fiscal year 2018. 

We are integrating Dr. Carter’s Better Buying Power initiatives, 

and are implementing ‘‘should cost’’ parameters into our programs 

early, where it can make the most difference, such as with the E– 

2D. 

We are changing our approach to contract types and structures, 

to ensure that we get the most product for the warfighter. We are 

targeting affordability, both in procurement and sustainment. 

It is our privilege to testify before you today, and we look forward to answering your questions. 

[The joint prepared statement of Admiral Skinner, General 

Robling, and Admiral Floyd can be found in the Appendix on page 

91.] 

Mr. BARTLETT. Do I understand that you have made a combined 

statement for all of the group? 

Admiral SKINNER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Reyes. 

Oh, is there another to testify? It was not clear to me for how 

many you were speaking, sir. 

Who wishes to testify? 

Admiral SKINNER. General Robling and—— 

Mr. BARTLETT. Oh, thank you. Okay, go ahead, sir. 

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. MARK D. SHACKELFORD, USAF, MILITARY DEPUTY, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF 

THE AIR FORCE FOR ACQUISITION, U.S. AIR FORCE; AND LT. 

GEN. HERBERT J. CARLISLE, USAF, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF 

FOR OPERATIONS, PLANS AND REQUIREMENTS, U.S. AIR 

FORCE 

General SHACKELFORD. Chairman Bartlett, Ranking Member 

Reyes, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for 

calling this hearing and for the opportunity to provide you with an 

update on the Air Force’s tactical aviation programs. 

I am joined this afternoon by Lieutenant General ‘‘Hawk’’ Carlisle, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans and Requirements. 
32 

We acknowledge Congresswoman Giffords’ absence this afternoon, and wish her a speedy recovery. 

Today, the Air Force is fully engaged in operations across the 

globe, engaged in overseas contingency operations and providing 

support to the combatant commanders to enable them to successfully execute their missions. 

In the coming year, we will assess how the fiscal year 2012 budget aligns with our standing operational requirements, along with 

the upcoming needs of the entire Air Force. 

We understand your focus today is on the Air Force investment 

plans to ensure that conventional strike, air superiority and rotary 

wing capabilities are adequate for executing the national military 

strategy with an acceptable level of risk. 

Our rapidly aging aircraft fleet drives our urgent need to balance 

between acquiring new inventory with sustaining our current fleet. 

We look forward to discussing how we can match the requirements with available resources in order to execute the national 

military strategy. 

Lieutenant General Carlisle and I thank the subcommittee for allowing us to appear before you today, and for your continued support of the Air Force. I will request our combined written statement be submitted for the record. We look forward to your questions. 

[The joint prepared statement of General Shackelford and General Carlisle can be found in the Appendix on page 123.] 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you. 

Without objection, all of the written statements will be in the 

record in full. 

Thank you very much for your testimony. 

Now, Mr. Reyes. 

Mr. REYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, gentlemen, thank you for being here with us and for your 

service, and most of all for your gracious comments about Congresswoman Giffords. We really appreciate that. And I know it 

really makes a difference to her staff and family members, as well. 

So, thank you. Thank you very much for that. 

I have a question for General Carlisle, General Robling and Admiral Floyd. The committee has been told many times that the F– 

35 is a must-have weapon system for the future. 

I guess the most basic question is: Why is that the case? What 

about the F—what about the F–35, I guess, do we have in order 

to succeed in the future? What is it about the F–35? 

What specific threats are we most concerned about? And how 

does the F–35 counter those threats? 

And the third one is: How does the F–35, which is a relatively 

short-range fighter, fit into DOD’s overall need for the longer range 

systems to operate in regions such as the Pacific? 

In whatever order you wish to take that. 

General CARLISLE. Thank you, Congressman Reyes. I will start, 

if that is okay. 

Clearly, the Air Force believes that the move to a fifth-generation 

capability is paramount as we move into the future. And that is to 

be able to operate aircraft and have freedom of action across the 
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range of operations, military operations that would be required of 

us. 

We know that our adversaries, or potential adversaries out there, 

are continuing to develop and field anti-access/area denial capability, and that fifth-generation ability to penetrate those areas and 

still maintain freedom of maneuver and, if required, to hold targets 

at risk in an anti—or an area denial type environment. So, that is 

really the reason that we see it. 

And we see that those systems are proliferating throughout the 

world, and they are continuing—as very recently, the J–20 rollouts. 

You look at the short-range and medium-range ballistic missiles, 

surface-to-air capability and an integrated air and missile defense 

capability from our adversaries, we have to have that fifth generation to be able to maintain freedom of action in those environments. 

With respect to the legs, obviously, very much refueling aircraft 

and the ability to get it close and then refuel in and out. Also, certainly in the case of the Air Force. 

The announcement by the Secretary of Defense of the new longrange strike family of systems, which is a family of systems which 

includes communications, electronic attack, long-range weapons, as 

well as a long-range penetrating bomber—all aid our ability to penetrate airspace and to go deep, if required, sir. 

Mr. REYES. And the specific threats and how the F–35 is unique 

in that respect to counter them? 

General CARLISLE. Sir, I think that unique—would probably be 

the adversary’s advanced integrated air defense systems, SA–20s 

and SAN–20s, HQ–9s, in particular, as well as the denial capabilities, with respect to anti-satellite capabilities to deny access, as 

well as trying to keep surface combatants away from using antiship missiles, would be the three that would be the most prominent, sir. 

Mr. REYES. Anybody else? 

General ROBLING. Sir, I will just add, one of the things you asked 

in addition was, what makes the F–35 a must-have? 

I would say, over legacy aircraft right now, even at Block 2B and 

eventually Block 3, but even starting at Block B, what you get out 

of the F–35 that you do not get out of legacy aircraft is this very 

powerful, integrated sensor suite that is really designed to—you 

know, centered around the digital aperture system. 

You get fused information displays. You get better joint operability for data transmission and communications. You get increased capability with your precision weapons, particularly JDAM 

[Joint Direct Attack Munition] and AMRAAM [advanced medium 

range air-to-air missile]-type missiles. 

And all of that combined gives you an aircraft, really, that is 

much more survivable, much more lethal and less dependent on 

support aircraft, tanker aircraft and electronic attack aircraft. 

Mr. REYES. I will yield back. 

I do have some additional questions, Mr. Chairman, but I will 

submit those for the record. 

Thank you, gentlemen. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you. 
34 

Mr. LoBiondo. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you to our panelists for being here today and for your 

service to our Nation. 

I have got two questions I would like to ask. First, we have read 

a lot about the future of the Air Force’s fighter fleet. But I want 

to focus on a very specific portion of it right now. 

Due to the current Air Force recapitalization crisis, the fiscal year 2012 budget request adds only about $15 million to the design 

and development of structural and capability modifications for the 

F–16 Block 40, 42, 50 and 52 fleet. 

However, I believe a majority of the F–16s in the Air Guard fleet 

are flying Block 30s, which also includes the 177th Fighter Wing, 

which I represent. These aircraft are not in your current plan for 

service life extension program. 

My question is: How do you plan to maintain the air sovereignty 

alert mission if these planes cannot fly, if you do not provide the 

same modifications to the aircraft at our National Guard wings? I 

think this is confusing and sends a very bad message. 

And the second question I have is that I have been surprised by 

the reports that the Air Force is considering a sole-source approach 

to buying helicopters to replace its fleet of Hueys for the Common 

Vertical Lift Support Platform program. 

I anticipate a competition would be a fair one; it would not favor 

any one particular company or solution. And it is puzzling to me 

why a decision has not been made to have this competitively bid. 

Given that the mission is U.S.-only, non-combat, non-deployable, 

can we be assured that the Air Force is going to give consideration 

to affordable solutions in this time of budget crisis that are commercial, off-the-shelf, not in the current inventory? 

I think it would be a shame to waste what could be up to billions-of-dollars buying something that is overkill, just for the convenience that it is already in the Pentagon inventory. 

Whoever would choose to—— 

General CARLISLE. Thank you, Congressman. I will answer your 

first question, and my friend, Shack, will answer your second question, sir. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Okay. 

General CARLISLE. The first one referenced the F–16s and the 

ASA [air sovereignty alert] alert. The Air Force fully funded the 

program for ASA alert, and clearly, that is our primary mission is 

homeland defense, and we are committed to that mission. 

With respect to the service life extension and how we are going 

to maintain that fleet, the Block 30, the pre-blocks as we call them, 

Block 25, 30 and 32s, using structural sustainment using O&M 

[Operations and Maintenance] funding, those airplanes, our intent 

would be to fly those to the 8,000-hour limit of those airplanes, 

which brings those airplanes out into late in this decade and early 

in the 2020s. 

We are going to do a service life extension program to include 

structure and capability modifications for Block 40s and 50s, the 

newest, most capable F–16s. And as F–35s start coming off the 

line, we will move those Block 40s and 50s, backfill in Block 25, 

30 and 32 units. 
35 

So, the cascade of iron will be, as F–35s come in to both the 

Guard and the Active Duty, then we will take the newest F–16s 

that do have the SLEP [service life extension program] modernization and both the end capability improvements, and move those 

into the units that have the older aircraft, the Block 25s, 30s and 

32s, sir. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Just a brief comment, if I could, that it just 

seems that without the modifications, if the F–35 continues to slip, 

these F–16 Block 30s are made more irrelevant and incapable of 

doing the mission. I would hope somebody would consider that. 

And for the second part of the question, General? 

General SHACKELFORD. Yes, sir. If I might just elaborate on that 

for a second. The SLEP for the Block 40s or 52s leads to a production kit buyout in the—just beyond this current FYDP. 

That is prior to the time when the Block 30s—25, 30 and 32— 

are expected to time-out with their service life, which is between 

2018 and 2021. 

So, we still have time in the future, if we need to go back to 

those pre-blocks, to further modify them to pick that up. It is too 

early to be putting that into the budget right now. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Okay. 

General SHACKELFORD. Now, regarding your question about 

Common Vertical Lift Support Platform, clearly, there are a number of vendors. We believe three or four different companies are 

able to produce the type of helicopter that we are looking for there. 

So, we have a wide range of options to choose from as we finalize 

the acquisition strategy. 

I expect that to be a competitive acquisition strategy, so that we 

can take advantage of competition, and so that we can get the best 

arrangement that we can for the Air Force and the taxpayer. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Okay. 

Thank you, General. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Mr. Shuster. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for being here today. 

My question, General Shackelford, on the Common Vertical Lift 

Support Platform, the CVLSP, my understanding is that the Air 

Force is considering—well, I guess in March, you are going to come 

out with requirements on acquisition, the strategy. And my understanding is that you are going to put out there a sole source for 

the Huey helicopter replacement. 

Can you confirm or deny it, that that is going to happen, the 

sole-source contract? 

General SHACKELFORD. If you mean by a sole-source contract selecting an existing helicopter in a sole-source situation, that is not 

correct as a strategy. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Okay. 

General SHACKELFORD. Per my just previous comment, there are 

three or four different vendors that are able to produce a helicopter 

to our requirement for Common Vertical Lift Support Platform. We 

have a range of options. 

At one extreme end is going to a sole-source vendor for an existing capability, such as the H–60. That is not the direction we are 
36 

leaning towards. I expect we will go towards a competitive strategy, which will give all of those vendors an opportunity to compete. 

Mr. SHUSTER. I am sorry. You said, for one of the platforms you 

will go to an existing—— 

General SHACKELFORD. No, sir. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Okay. 

General SHACKELFORD. No, sir—— 

Mr. SHUSTER. There’s going to be competition? 

General SHACKELFORD. It will be a competitive strategy, as I understand it. 

Mr. SHUSTER. And you view there are at least four vendors out 

there that can meet the requirements. 

General SHACKELFORD. There are three to four that can meet the 

requirement for CVLSP. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Okay. That was my only question, so I yield back. 

Thank you very much. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much. 

Admiral Skinner, let me ask the question of you that I asked of 

the previous panel. Can you explain the contradiction to the Pentagon statement and explain why the LCS acquisition model does 

not apply to the F–35 engine? If competition and two LCS ships— 

those are pretty small classes, sir, compared to the number of engines that we would be buying for these planes. 

Can you explain why that is not a good model for F–35 engine 

procurement? 

Admiral SKINNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the question. 

Secretary Mabus has stated that the littoral combat ship procurement, we funded the research and development for both variants 

of the littoral combat ship. And we also obtained the data packages 

for both of those variants. 

We have funded the research and development for one variant of 

the F–35 engine, the F135. And the vast majority of the research 

and development for the other variant of the F–35 engine, the 

F136, is in front of us. 

I have seen the business case analysis. And it seems to be compelling in that regard. 

But those are the major differences between the procurement of 

the littoral combat ship and the current procurement of the F–35 

fighter engine. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Yes, but there is still a meaningful amount of development money to be expended yet in LCS, is there not? 

Admiral SKINNER. Well, we have both LCS–1 and LCS–2 are currently afloat. LCS–1 has already made one appointment to Southern Command. 

So, to my knowledge, we have committed to fully funding the research and development for both of those variants. And that was 

all part of our acquisition strategy, and the purchase of the design 

packages for both of those variants. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Why do we still have more money in this year’s 

budget for a development of the LCS than there was in last year’s 

budget? Is this for the ship itself? Or is it for the mission packages? 

Admiral SKINNER. We have money in the budget for procurement 

of the vessels themselves, and we are still developing the mission 

packages. 
37 

But Mr. Chairman, I can get you more information on that question, and take that question for the record and get back to you. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 149.] 

Mr. BARTLETT. Your budget request RDT&E [Research, Development, Test & Evaluation] continues through 2011, 2012, 2013 and 

2014 in decreasing amounts, from $226 million, $183 million, $110 

million, $82 million, and up a little to $87 million in fiscal year 

2015. 

I was very supportive of buying both of the LCS ships. 

The competition did what they were supposed to do. Each of 

them believed that they had to be the low bidder, or they were not 

going to be in the game anymore. So, they really sharpened their 

pencils, and we got bids that were like $100 million less than we 

expected, unexpectedly low numbers. 

I did not think we had enough sea trials with these ships to 

know which of those would be better for the multiple missions that 

we are buying these ships for. And so, I was very supportive of this 

dual buy. 

And I am still wondering why this is not a good model for procurement of the F–35 engine. 

Admiral Skinner, the Department has increased its emphasis on 

acquiring longer-range strike capabilities to address ever-increasing anti-access/area denial threat environments. These are obviously threat environments for the ships. 

This was evident by the Navy’s desire to field an Unmanned Carrier-Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike system by 2018, 

and the Air Force’s plans to acquire a new long-range penetrating 

bomber by mid-2020s. 

I have a couple of questions and concerns relative to this. First 

of all, this recent emphasis on the need for longer-range strike systems changed the Department’s thinking about its requirements— 

that is, the quantity, the mix, the fielding timeframes—for shorterrange fighter attack aircraft, such as the Joint Strike Fighter. 

Admiral SKINNER. Mr. Chairman, the systems that you refer to 

as the unmanned are the UCLASS [Unmanned Carrier-Launched 

Airborne Surveillance and Strike] system, a surveillance and strike 

system that we are going to put on our aircraft carriers in the 2018 

timeframe. 

We have a two-part process in order to do that. We have a current demonstration, the Navy Unmanned Combat Aerial System 

demonstration, that we are performing to-date. 

That system will operate off an aircraft carrier in the 2013 timeframe. What is unique about that is we will stop our carrier operations to get that unmanned air vehicle on and off our ships, and 

we will learn how to operate it from an arrested landing and a catapult launch and airspace means. 

All the knowledge that we gain from operating that unmanned 

combat air system will be put into the UCLASS system, the surveillance and strike system that you mentioned. And that system 

will fly in an integrated fashion with our carrier air wings in the 

2018 timeframe. 

With regards to the requirements part of your question, I defer 

that part of the answer to Admiral Floyd. 
38 

Admiral FLOYD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Regarding the requirements and whether there is anything specific ongoing right now in the manned aircraft realm, outside of our 

normal requirements review process every year, the answer to that 

would be no. 

We are focused on the carrier air wing and the mix of Joint 

Strike Fighter and F/A–18 out into the future for our strike requirements. 

Mr. BARTLETT. I understand that we are relooking at the mix of 

short-range and long-range attack platforms, because of some antiaccess platforms that potential enemies have, such as the Chinese 

anti-ship missile, which means that we need to stand off a considerable distance that that weapon is available to them. 

I have a question relative to the future. You are projecting the 

use of unmanned. That means you have not put a man at risk, if 

you are going into a hostile environment. And I think we need to 

move more in that direction. 

But there are three capabilities that one needs to consider. One 

is our ability to be stealthy—and we are pretty good. But radars 

are getting better, and the air—or the ground-to-air defenses are 

getting better. 

With whom do you counsel to determine which of these technologies will run faster? Will we be able to remain invisible to 

them with our stealth? Or will their radars run faster than stealth 

improvements, so that they can see us? 

And what about these ground-to-air capabilities? 

With whom do you counsel to determine which of these capabilities will run the faster? And, therefore, what kind of assets should 

we be developing for the future? 

General CARLISLE. Well, Mr. Chairman, I will start with an answer on that. 

I think that we look to all the agencies—obviously, DARPA [the 

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency], NASIC [the National 

Air and Space Intelligence Center] with respect to adversary capabilities and how well they are—how fast they are developing their 

new systems—AFRL [the Air Force Research Laboratory], the research laboratory. 

We look at the T.R. [Technology Readiness] level of different 

technologies, technology readiness levels of different technologies. 

And we look at where we are at, and what it has taken to get us 

to the position we are at with respect to our capabilities and our 

potential adversaries and where they are at, and what we assess 

to be their timeframe to get there. 

But I think, at the core of this, Mr. Chairman, is our ability to 

integrate and operate jointly in a cross-domain capability. Whether 

it is space, cyber or subsurface, surface combatant, air combatants, 

it is our ability to operate in an integrated—beyond joint—an integrated fashion and use capabilities to exploit the adversary’s weakness wherever that is, to deny him use of those systems that he 

has developed and put forth, so that we can achieve freedom of maneuver and gain access to hold targets at risk when we want to and 

when we need to. 

Mr. BARTLETT. I asked that question of the new director of 

DARPA—you mentioned DARPA—Regina Dugan. I asked if they 
39 

had the capability to advise us on the projected improvement in 

technology, so that we would know whether we were developing an 

airplane that was just going to be cannon fodder for the future, or 

would we be able to penetrate their defenses. 

She said, yes, they did that kind of thing. And as an example, 

she had with her an analysis they did of cyber, and the malware 

and the defense-ware that we are developing. 

It was a startling picture. The lines of code for malware have not 

increased significantly over the years. But there has been an exponential increase in the lines of code that we find necessary to protect our computer systems. 

If we cannot bend that curve, by-and-by, our computers will be 

consumed with protecting themselves, and they will not be able to 

do anything for us. And it is that kind of an analysis that I hope 

we are able to make for these technologies. 

Clearly, radar will get better. Clearly, we will be able to do better 

with stealth. And clearly, there will be improvements in ground-toair defensive capabilities. 

And again, I want to make sure that we are getting the best 

counsel we have. And these are very long-range programs, you 

know. It is going to be a decade or more before anything is in the 

field when you start a program. 

And when we get it in the field, is it already going to be obsolete, 

because the defenses against it have run faster than those developments? And you indicated that you counsel with DARPA for this 

kind of thing? 

General CARLISLE. Yes, sir, we do. We take advantage of what 

they are looking at. And again, NASIC and the entire I.C., intelligence community, as well as the research labs—Livermore, Lawrence Livermore, AFRL—all the labs. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much. We have a number of 

questions that we need answers to for the record. 

Let me turn to my colleague and ask him if he has additional 

questions? 

Mr. REYES. Just for the record. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Just for the record. He has questions for the 

record. 

I have a number of questions. But rather than take your time 

here, we will just submit those questions for the record. 

I want to thank you very much for your testimony. 

I want to note that I have been to the floor 50 times, I think, 

exactly, to speak for an hour on energy. And if you watch C–SPAN, 

you will notice that they pan the floor. There is nobody out there. 

But I need to know when I am at that microphone that there are 

somewhere between a million-and-a-half and two-and-a-half million 

people out there that are watching that. So, you are talking kind 

of to an invisible audience. 

We are doing quite the same thing today. There are a lot of people out there watching. And this becomes a part of the permanent 

record, and a lot of people will be poring over it in the future. 

So, thank you very much for your testimony. Thank you for the 

service to your country. 

And we will adjourn this hearing. 

[Whereupon, at 2:04 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

MARCH 15, 2011 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

MARCH 15, 2011 

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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

MARCH 15, 2011 

(149) 

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BARTLETT 

Mr. VAN BUREN. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] [See 

page 28.] 

Mr. VAN BUREN. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] [See 

page 29.] 

Mr. VAN BUREN. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] [See 

page 37.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. REYES 

Admiral VENLET. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] [See 

page 10.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI 

Mr. VAN BUREN, Admiral VENLET, and Mr. SULLIVAN. [The information was not 

available at the time of printing.] [See page 23.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

MARCH 15, 2011 

(153) 

1 Applying best commercial practices, we define maturity as achieving technology readiness 

level 7–system prototype demonstration in a realistic operational environment. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BARTLETT 

Mr. BARTLETT. Air Force witnesses before the subcommittee indicated the Air 

Force intends to conduct a fair and open competition for CVLSP. Can I assume that 

the Air Force will establish CVLSP requirements that do not exceed the requirements, to avoid having to pay for more capability than required for the CVLSP mission? 

Mr. VAN BUREN. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. BARTLETT. I understand the Air Force has two helicopter modernization requirements, CSAR and CVLSP. The CSAR mission is a demanding combat operation 

for which the Air Force originally intended to buy the HH–47 heavy-lift Chinook 

helicopter. The CVLSP mission is a non-deployable, non-combat mission performed 

today by UH–1 aircraft. Is it correct to assume that these are two very different 

missions that require a high-low mix of aircraft to ensure that the warfighter gets 

what is truly required, as affordably as possible? 

Mr. VAN BUREN. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. BARTLETT. Can the Air Force assure the subcommittee that it will run separate fair and open competitions for its Huey and its Pavehawk replacement programs, given that they are such different requirements? 

Mr. VAN BUREN. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. BARTLETT. On several occasions during your testimony on the F135 engine 

you characterized the F135 engine as a ‘‘mature’’ engine. Previously, the Department of Defense has informed the committee that 200,000 flight hours are required 

to achieve engine maturity. The F135 has accumulated approximately 1,000 flight 

hours. How can you characterize the F135 as a ‘‘mature’’ engine? 

Mr. VAN BUREN. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. BARTLETT. In your March 15, testimony before the subcommittee you indicated that the ‘‘JPO has concluded a fixed price type contract for the F135 engine.’’ 

When was the contract signed? 

What type of contract was signed? 

What was the total value of the contract? 

What percentage of the contract value was subject to cost plus reimbursement? 

What is the target value of the contract? 

What is the ceiling price of the contract? 

What is the cost share? 

Mr. VAN BUREN. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. BARTLETT. 1a. Mr. Sullivan, as you know, the JSF program has had a host 

of problems over the past years resulting in significant cost growth, schedule slips, 

and, most importantly, delays in fielding capabilities to the warfighter. 

From your observations, what have been the primary causes to the JSF’s development problems and challenges to date? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. JSF development problems and challenges can largely be traced to 

its extremely risky acquisition strategy, poor decisions at key junctures, and a management environment that was slow to acknowledge and address problems. At development start, JSF officials adopted a ‘‘single step’’ acquisition strategy to develop 

and acquire full combat capabilities on a very aggressive, risky schedule with substantial concurrency among development, testing, and production activities. Little 

systems engineering analysis was done to understand what resources would be 

needed to achieve the required capabilities. In implementation, the program started 

development before requisite technologies were ready, started manufacturing test 

aircraft before designs were stable, and moved to production before flight testing 

adequately demonstrated that the aircraft design meets performance and operational suitability requirements. None of the 8 critical technologies were mature at 

system start and now, almost 10 years later, only five are mature and three are approaching maturity.1 Also, all three variants fell significantly short of meeting best 

practice standards regarding release of drawings at the critical design reviews. The 
154 

2GAO, Joint Strike Fighter: Restructuring Places Program on Firmer Footing, but Progress 

Still Lags. GAO–11–325 (Washington, D.C.: April 7, 2011). 3GAO–11–325. 

late release of drawings—and continuing high rate of changes—resulted in a cascading of problems in establishing suppliers and manufacturing processes, which led 

to late parts deliveries, delayed the program schedule, and forced inefficient manufacturing processes to workaround problems. These issues are lessening now but the 

impacts are still felt in higher costs, late deliveries of test and production aircraft, 

and a much-delayed development test schedule. 

As part of its June 2010 Nunn-McCurdy certification to the Congress, DOD provided a root cause analysis for cost and schedule growth that identifies similar factors. Specifically, the analysis cites a very aggressive and concurrent development 

schedule, unrealistic cost and schedule estimates, flawed and overoptimistic assumptions, and management’s reluctance to accept unfavorable information, slowing 

down the ability of the contractor and government to recognize and respond to problems. 

Mr. BARTLETT. 1b. Has the program been receptive to your past advice and recommendations for establishing a knowledge-based acquisition process? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Until recently, the Department has not been very receptive to our 

findings and recommendations. Since 2001, defense officials have often non-concurred with our recommendations and, even when somewhat agreeable, did not usually fully implement them. For example, while officials generally acknowledged the 

merits of knowledge-based acquisitions and agreed that the JSF strategy was very 

risky, they chose to continue moving forward with the intent to manage the risks. 

They did not delay development start even though technologies were not ready and 

did not delay or reduce procurement when designs were not stable nor manufacturing processes mature. Appendix II of our recently issued report 2 summarizes our 

reports since 2001 and DOD’s general recalcitrance in adopting our recommendations. (Included in this document as appendix 1.) 

In the past year and a half, defense management appears to be somewhat more 

responsive to our findings and recommendations. Defense officials lately recognized 

numerous technical, financial, and management shortcomings and continue to significantly restructure the program, making changes we support and, in quite a few 

cases, had earlier recommended. Our work with DOD officials and the JSF program 

is now somewhat more collaborative than in the past and is open to, at minimum, 

an ‘‘agree to disagree’’ relationship. 

Mr. BARTLETT. 1c. What future steps can the Department take to ensure the JSF 

program does not repeat its mistakes from the past to achieve a more predictable 

and successful outcome? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. A new and sustained focus on affordability, effective implementation of restructuring actions, successful mitigation of cost and manufacturing risks 

identified by independent panels, and more active and involved oversight by OSD 

and military service headquarters should lead to more predictable and achievable 

outcomes. Regaining and aggressively pursuing affordability—both in terms of the 

investment costs to acquire the JSF and the continuing costs to operate and maintain it over the life-cycle—will be very challenging, but is paramount to future success. Restructuring actions include the adoption of more realistic cost and schedule 

estimates, a more robust flight test program, and directed implementation of critical 

improvements needed in the aircraft and engine manufacturing and supplier management processes. Still needed (and in the works) is a new, knowledge-based procurement cost estimate through completion of the program. Marine Corps leadership 

is directly involved in efforts to resolve technical deficiencies in the short take off 

and landing variant. 

Mr. BARTLETT. 1d. What steps can be taken to place bounds on the program and 

to help improve management and oversight of the program? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Our April 7 report 3 recommends the Secretary of Defense take the 

following actions to reinforce and strengthen program cost controls and oversight: 

(1) The JSF program should maintain total annual funding levels for development 

and procurement at the current budgeted amounts in the fiscal year 2012–2016 future years defense plan (modified, if warranted, by the new acquisition program 

baseline expected this year). It should facilitate trades among cost, schedule, requirements, and quantities to control cost growth. Having gone through the Technical Baseline Review and budget approval process, it is reasonable to expect the 

program to execute against the future years defense plan going forward. Only in instances of major and unforeseen circumstances, should the Department consider 

spending more money on the program. Even then, we would expect changes to be 

few and adopted only after close scrutiny by defense leadership. Approved changes 
155 

should be well supported, adequately documented, and reported to the congressional 

defense committees. 

(2) Establish criteria for the STOVL probation period and take additional steps 

to sustain individual attention on STOVL-specific issues, including independent F– 

35B/STOVL Progress Reviews with Senior Leadership to ensure cost and schedule 

milestones are achieved to deliver required warfighter capabilities. The intent is to 

allow each JSF variant to proceed and demonstrate success at its own pace and 

could result in separate full-rate production decisions. 

(3) Conduct an independent review of the contractor’s software development, integration, and test processes—similar to its review of manufacturing operations—and 

look for opportunities to streamline software efforts. This review should include an 

evaluation of the ground lab and simulation model accreditation process to ensure 

it is properly structured and robustly resourced to support software test and 

verification requirements. 

Mr. BARTLETT. 2a. DOD has been engaged in a comprehensive restructuring of the 

program since last year. In testimony last year before this Subcommittee, you said 

that GAO supports these actions. 

Do you still support the restructuring efforts, including the most recent ones 

added by the Secretary in January 2011? Have you seen concrete examples of improvements from these actions? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. We do still support JSF restructuring actions and note some tangible improvements already: 

• The technical baseline review was very comprehensive and applied solid systems engineering methods to thoroughly scrub the program and highlight key 

problem areas. 

• While cost analysts are still working toward a new program baseline that recalculates procurement costs to completion, the current cost and schedule estimates provided to the Congress in the Nunn-McCurdy certification package and 

the FY 2012 budget are more realistic and achievable. 

• The new development flight test schedule is also more realistic and better 

resourced, using more conservative assumptions about fly rates and test point 

achievements and providing for more flights and more test assets. 

• The ‘‘probation period’’ and high level of oversight ordered for the STOVL is appropriately focused on evaluating and resolving its problems to better inform future decisions on this variant, so critically important to the Marine Corps’ future aviation plans. 

• The substantial reduction in near-term procurement lessens, but does not eliminate, risks from concurrency. 

• Finally, the aircraft and engine manufacturers are making good faith efforts to 

implement the findings and recommendations of the Independent Manufacturing Review Team and Joint Assessment Team and some production and supply performance measures are improving. 

Mr. BARTLETT. 2b. Several actions seem the same or similar to GAO’s recommendations from years ago. What are some of these and why did the Department 

not previously implement your recommendations? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Several actions are quite similar. 

• Our March 2008 report criticized DOD’s so-called Mid-course Risk Reduction 

Plan, particularly the cuts made in flight test assets and the number of flight 

tests. We recommended that DOD revisit and, if necessary, revise the plan to 

address concerns about testing, use of management reserves, and manufacturing deficiencies. Instead, DOD wanted to replenish management reserves 

from within the program baseline and did not revise its plan, nor fix the problems. In short order, management reserves were again depleted. Recent restructuring actions added more test resources, increased the number of flight tests, 

and extended the schedule, effectively reversing the mid-course plan. In addition, the IMRT team recommended improvements in manufacturing and supply 

chain management. 

• Also in 2008, we determined that the program cost estimate was not reliable 

and that a new comprehensive independent cost estimate and schedule risk assessment are needed. We reiterated these concerns in subsequent reports, including the need to make a better projection of life-cycle operating and support 

costs. DOD’s joint estimating team did provide better cost estimates in the interim, but it was not until the recent restructuring (and after a Nunn-McCurdy 

cost breach) that comprehensive independent cost estimates for the program to 

completion were directed. DOD is also preparing a more informed forecast of life 

cycle costs. Restructuring also directed the program to finally do the schedule 

risk assessment, more than two after our recommendation. 
156 

• Since 2006, we have consistently warned against procuring quantities of aircraft 

much ahead of testing and the ability of the manufacturing process to produce 

at high rates. In 2009, for example, we reported on the risks posed by DOD 

plans to further accelerate procurement and to do so on cost reimbursement 

contracts. DOD responded to us that planned procurement rates were efficient 

and feasible. We were gratified when Defense leadership substantially reduced 

near term procurement and decreased the annual ramp rate (the percentage increase in production from one year to the next) and awarded the first fixed price 

production contract. 

We are not sure why the Department did not implement these recommendations 

earlier. We can only surmise that it did not because it did not have to. Funding for 

the JSF was plentiful and it was a top priority, meaning the Department could borrow from lower priorities to pay for its cost growth. While acknowledging the risks, 

program and contractor officials typically kept driving forward rather than admit 

and resolve problems. 

Mr. BARTLETT. 2c. Going forward, what critical challenges remain for the program 

from a cost and schedule standpoint? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Although encouraged by DOD’s ongoing restructuring actions, we 

remain concerned about the JSF program’s ability to successfully execute to testing 

and manufacturing schedules. The JSF program is still very early in demonstrating 

aircraft design and testing to verify it works as intended. Development testing continues to be hampered by late delivery of test aircraft, slips in delivering software 

to testing, and delays in accrediting and verifying ground test labs and simulation 

models. These issues must be addressed in order to implement the more rigorous 

test schedule going forward. Furthermore, development and operational testing will 

inevitably identify design and employment changes as a result of discovery and rework. Future changes may require alterations to the manufacturing process, 

changes to the supply base, and costly retrofitting of aircraft already produced and 

fielded. 

The program has still not adequately demonstrated stable designs and mature 

manufacturing processes as it enters the fifth year of production. We remain concerned about constraints in factory throughput and the increasing backlog of production jets on order but not delivered. Even after the Secretary reduced near-term procurement quantities, the program still plans to steeply ramp up annual production 

rates and make substantial investments, planning to purchase more than 300 aircraft for about $50 billion before development flight testing is completed in 2016. 

We will monitor contractors’ responsiveness in implementing the IMRT and JAT 

recommendations, especially efforts to improve global supply chain management. 

Additional program cost increases and schedule delays are likely as restructuring 

continues. The Secretary of Defense has not yet granted new milestone B approval 

nor approved a new acquisition program baseline. Originally planned for November 

2010, program officials now expect the new acquisition program baseline in summer 

2011. Cost analysts are still revising procurement funding requirements for the period fiscal year 2017 through completion of procurement in 2035. Accordingly, the 

net effect of reducing near-term procurement quantities and deferring these aircraft 

to future years is uncertain and depends upon the assumptions made about future 

unit prices, annual quantities, and inflation. We expect total procurement costs will 

be somewhat higher than the estimate submitted in the Nunn-McCurdy certification. A major unknown factor that could have major consequences is the potential 

costs and schedule changes resulting from the evaluation of STOVL deficiencies. 

Maintaining affordability—both in terms of the investment costs to acquire the 

JSF and the continuing costs to operate and maintain it over the life-cycle—will be 

very challenging. A key tenet of the JSF program from its inception has been to deliver an affordable, highly common fifth-generation aircraft that could be acquired 

by the warfighters in large numbers. Rising aircraft prices erode buying power and 

may make it difficult for the U.S. and its allies to buy as many aircraft as planned. 

The international partners are being counted on to buy about 730 aircraft; DOD’s 

unit cost estimates assume this level of participation. Quantity reductions could 

drive additional price increases for future aircraft. Further, while the Department 

is still refining cost projections for operating and supporting future JSF fleets, cost 

forecasts have increased as the program matures and more data becomes available. 

Current JSF life-cycle cost estimates are considerably higher than the legacy aircraft it will replace; this has major implications for future demands on military operating support budgets and plans for recapitalizing fighter forces. 

Mr. BARTLETT. 2d. In your current draft report at DOD for comment, what are 

some specific actions you would like them to take? 
157 

4GAO, Tactical Aircraft: DOD’s Ability to Meet Future Requirements Is Uncertain, with Key 

Analyses Needed to Inform Upcoming Investment Decisions. GAO–10–789 (Washington, D.C.: 

July 29, 2010). 5GAO, Tactical Aircraft: Air Force Fighter Reports Generally Addressed Congressional Mandates, but Reflected Dated Plans and Guidance, and Limited Analyses. GAO–11–323R (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 24, 2011). 

Mr. SULLIVAN. We issued the report on April 7. DOD concurred with all three recommendations. These are discussed above in the answer to the fourth question 

under part 1. 

Mr. BARTLETT. 3a. Mr. Sullivan, you issued a recent report on the Air Force’s tactical fighter shortfalls and inventory plans. One key point was the JSF’s sheer size 

and priority within the Department and how that impacts other programs in the 

acquisition portfolio. 

How has the JSF size and priority affected other programs in the portfolio? Considering the JSF’s central role in DOD’s future tactical aircraft recapitalization 

plans, what are the potential consequences to the program and other programs if 

the JSF cannot deliver on time with the numbers needed to replace legacy fighters 

and at a price the Department can afford? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Our July 2010 report on DOD’s tactical aircraft requirements 4

stated that the JSF is the linchpin in DOD’s tactical aircraft recapitalization plans 

because of its magnitude and the hundreds of legacy aircraft it is slated to replace. 

As a result, JSF program setbacks in costs, deliveries, and performance directly affect modernization plans and retirement schedules of the legacy aircraft. Uncertainty about JSF’s costs and deliveries makes it challenging for the Services to plan 

and implement modernization efforts and retire older aircraft that are becoming 

more expensive to operate. As a result, Service officials have been forced to react 

to changing JSF schedules and to put forward unfunded contingency plans to modernize and extend the life of some legacy aircraft. In addition to JSF’s problems, 

DOD’s investments in legacy systems have generally been assigned lower priority 

in the budgeting process, and many critical upgrade and modernization efforts face 

funding shortfalls. 

Going forward, the JSF is a top priority for the Department and will require large 

annual funding commitments from the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. As such, 

continued program cost increases have significant affordability implications for the 

Services, other programs in the acquisition portfolio, and the Nation as a whole. In 

this period of more austere budget conditions, continued cost increases may result 

in reduced quantity purchases by the Department or international partners. If this 

were to occur, we would expect unit prices to increase, further straining program 

affordability. At minimum, other lower priority programs will have to compete with 

the JSF for a shrinking discretionary pool of money. Looking forward, long-term 

JSF operating and sustainment costs will significantly affect future budgets; while 

the costs to develop and produce a weapon system are significant, these usually represent less than a third of total ownership costs. Current forecasts of JSF operating 

and sustainment costs project them to exceed those of legacy aircraft. 

Mr. BARTLETT. 3b. What are the Air Force and Navy doing with legacy fighter 

programs to help mitigate cost increases and schedule delays for the JSF? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. The Air Force plans to extend the service life and enhance capabilities on 300 newer legacy F–16s. Initial funding for this is in the Air Force’s 2012 

budget request, but the full cost is not yet known. Along with some structural work 

on older legacy F–16s, and assuming JSF at peak procurement of 80 aircraft per 

year, officials believe this will mitigate a projected shortfall in the tactical fighter 

force through 2030. Our February 2011 report on Air Force fighter force structure 

reports 5 noted the-Air Force is not expecting any major changes to its fighter recapitalization plan. However, better information on the JSF restructured program 

and on the F–16 fleet is expected to become available in 2011. This could enable 

a more informed analysis, comparing and contrasting various alternatives for mitigating the projected aircraft shortfalls. 

Similarly, the Navy is evaluating a service life extension program for approximately 280 F/A–18 aircraft in order to address its projected tactical aircraft shortfall 

in the near term. The new budget also directs the Navy to purchase an additional 

41 F/A–18E/F Super Hornets in the near-term to help cover the gap caused by JSF 

delays. 
158 

Appendix 1: GAO Reports and DOD Responses 

GAO 

report 

Est. 

dev. costs 

dev. length 

APUC(a) 

Key program 

event 

Primary GAO 

message 

DOD response 

and actions 

2001 

GAO– 

02–39 

$34.4 

Billion 

10 years 

$69 

Million 

Start of system 

development 

and demonstration approved. 

Critical technologies needed 

for key aircraft 

performance 

elements are 

not mature. 

Program should 

delay start of 

system development until critical technologies are 

mature to acceptable levels. 

DOD did not 

delay start of 

system development and demonstration stating technologies 

were at acceptable maturity 

levels and will 

manage risks in 

development. 

2005 

GAO– 

05–271 

$44.8 

Billion 

12 years 

$82 

Million 

The program 

undergoes replan to address 

higher than expected design 

weight, which 

added $7 billion 

and 18 months 

to development 

schedule. 

We recommend 

that the program reduce 

risks and establish executable 

business case 

that is knowledge-based with 

an evolutionary 

acquisition 

strategy. 

DOD partially 

concurred but 

does not adjust 

strategy, believing that their 

approach is balanced between 

cost, schedule 

and technical 

risk. 

2006 

GAO– 

06–356 

$45.7 

Billion 

12 years 

$86 

Million 

Program sets in 

motion plan to 

enter production in 2007 

shortly after 

first flight of 

the non-production representative aircraft. 

The program 

plans to enter 

production with 

less than 1 percent of testing 

complete. We 

recommend program delay investing in production until 

flight testing 

shows that JSF 

performs as expected. 

DOD partially 

concurred but 

did not delay 

start of production because 

they believe the 

risk level was 

appropriate. 

2007 

GAO– 

07–360 

$44.5 

Billion 

12 years 

$104 

Million 

Congress reduced funding 

for first two 

low-rate production buys 

thereby slowing 

the ramp up of 

production. 

Progress is 

being made but 

concerns remain about 

undue overlap 

in testing and 

production. We 

recommend limits to annual 

production 

quantities to 24 

a year until flying quantities 

are demonstrated. 

DOD non-concurred and felt 

that the program had an 

acceptable level 

of concurrency 

and an appropriate acquisition strategy. 
159 

GAO 

report 

Est. 

dev. costs 

dev. length 

APUC(a) 

Key program 

event 

Primary GAO 

message 

DOD response 

and actions 

2008 

GAO– 

08–388 

$44.2 

Billion 

12 years 

$104 

Million 

DOD implemented a MidCourse Risk Reduction Plan to 

replenish management reserves from 

about $400 million to about $1 

billion by reducing test resources. 

We believe new 

plan actually 

increases risks 

and that DOD 

should revise 

the plan to address concerns 

about testing, 

use of management reserves, 

and manufacturing. We determine that 

the cost estimate is not reliable and that a 

new cost estimate and 

schedule risk 

assessment is 

needed. 

DOD did not 

revise risk plan 

nor restore testing resources, 

stating that 

they will monitor the new 

plan and adjust 

it if necessary. 

Consistent with 

a report recommendation, a 

new cost estimate was eventually prepared, 

but DOD refused to do a 

risk and uncertainty analysis 

that we felt was 

important to 

provide a range 

estimate of potential outcomes. 

2009 

GAO– 

09–303 

$44.4 

Billion 

13 years 

$104 

Million 

The program 

increased the 

cost estimate 

and adds a year 

to development 

but accelerated 

the production 

ramp up. Independent DOD 

cost estimate 

(JET I) projects 

even higher 

costs and further delays. 

Because of development problems, we stated 

that moving 

forward with an 

accelerated procurement plan 

and use of cost 

reimbursement 

contracts is 

very risky. We 

recommended 

the program report on the 

risks and mitigation strategy 

for this approach. 

DOD agreed to 

report its contracting strategy and plans 

to Congress. In 

response to our 

report recommendation, 

DOD subsequently agreed 

to do a schedule 

risk analysis, 

but still had 

not done so as 

of February 

2011. In February 2010, the 

Department announced a 

major restructuring of the 

JSF program, 

including reduced procurement and a 

planned move 

to fixed-price 

contracts. 
160 

GAO 

report 

Est. 

dev. costs 

dev. length 

APUC(a) 

Key program 

event 

Primary GAO 

message 

DOD response 

and actions 

2010 

GAO– 

10–382 

$49.3 

Billion 

15 years 

$112 

Million 

The program 

was restructured to reflect 

findings of recent independent cost 

team (JET II) 

and independent manufacturing review team. As a 

result, development funds increased, test 

aircraft were 

added, the 

schedule was 

extended, and 

the early production rate decreased. 

Because of additional costs 

and schedule 

delays, the program’s ability 

to meet 

warfighter requirements on 

time is at risk. 

We recommend 

the program 

complete a full 

comprehensive 

cost estimate 

and assess 

warfighter and 

IOC requirements. We suggest that Congress require 

DOD to prepare 

a ‘‘system maturity matrix’’– 

a tool for tying 

annual procurement requests 

to demonstrated 

progress. 

DOD continued 

restructuring 

actions and announced plans 

to increase test 

resources and 

lower the production rate. 

Independent review teams 

evaluated aircraft and engine manufacturing processes. As we 

projected in 

this report, cost 

increases later 

resulted in a 

Nunn-McCurdy 

breach. Military 

Services are 

currently reviewing capability requirements as we 

recommended. 

The Department and Congress are working on a ‘‘system maturity 

matrix’’ tool, 

which we suggested to Congress for consideration, to 

improve oversight and inform budget deliberations. 

Source: DOD data and GAO analysis. 

(a) Average procurement unit cost. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. ROBY 

Mrs. ROBY. Gen Carlisle, what is the process you plan to use to ensure procurement of an affordable, right-sized helicopter for the mission? What assurances will 

there be that the American taxpayer is not paying too much for an aircraft that is 

overkill for this domestic, non-combat requirement? 

General CARLISLE. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mrs. ROBY. I am sure you are familiar with all of the fighter wings in the Air 

National Guard, and there is one I would like to highlight, in light of F–35 fielding. 

This is the 187th Fighter Wing which flies F–16s. Early on, Air Combat Command 

leadership led our Commanding General of the Alabama National Guard to believe 

that this unit would be on the first list of units to be fielded the F–35. Well, the 

list came out and the 187th FW was not on the list. My question is not if the 187th 

FW will be fielded the F–35, but when? 

General CARLISLE. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 
161 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. OWENS 

Mr. OWENS. Given our experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, and even previous air 

campaigns like Operations Desert Storm and Operation Allied Force how much of 

an operational and logistical advantage will it be in future conflicts, if three of our 

Services and our allies are all flying the F–35? 

General CARLISLE. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI 

Mr. GARAMENDI. On-going deployment of laser peening for life extension of the F– 

22 structure is going very well and represents an excellent example of addressing 

issues before they become serious and costly problems. It is also another example 

of US development of world leading aerospace technology that spins out creating US 

jobs in the commercial sector. We applaud this F–22 effort and the forward looking 

steps the Air Force and its OEMs took in this deployment. Do you see this and other 

new technologies being deployed to solve problems for new systems such as the F– 

35? What is the mechanism to ensure these advances move forward? 

Mr. VAN BUREN and Admiral VENLET. [The information was not available at the 

time of printing.] 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Laboratory test results funded by the Office of Naval Research 

and overseen by NAVAIR have indicated that up to 250% lifetime improvements can 

be obtained on arrestment hook shanks for carrier based aircraft with a simple advanced process adding processing cost of only about 1%. We applaud this work and 

highly recommend that it be followed through to deployment. We understand that 

if implemented cost savings will be in the many millions of dollars for the fleet as 

well as adding enhanced safety. Are efforts underway to field and identify other applications? Are programs such as the Navy’s BOSS III the appropriate vehicle to enable implementation and thus begin to realize cost savings? 

Admiral SKINNER. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

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