Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.csce.gov

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 2001

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: (202) 5121800 Fax: (202) 5122250

Mail Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 204020001

75722PDF

TROUBLING TRENDS:

HUMAN RIGHTS IN RUSSIA

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND

COOPERATION IN EUROPE

ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

Printed for the use of the

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe

JUNE 5, 2001

[CSCE 107-1-3]

 
(ii)

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS

EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS

(VACANT), Department of State

(VACANT), Department of Defense

(VACANT), Department of Commerce

COMMISSION STAFF

 RONALD J. MCNAMARA,, Chief of Staff

DOROTHY DOUGLAS TAFT, Deputy Chief of Staff

BEN ANDERSON, Communications Director

OREST DEYCHAKIWSKY, Staff Advisor

JOHN FINERTY, Staff Advisor

CHADWICK R. GORE, Staff Advisor

ROBERT HAND, STaff Advisor

JANICE HELWIG, STAff Advisor

MARLENE KAUFMANN, Counsel

MICHELE MADASZ, Office Administrator

MICHAEL OCHS, Staff Advisor

ERIKA B. SCHLAGER, Counsel for International Law

H. KNOX THAMES, Staff Advisor

MAUREEN T. WALSH, General Counsel

ASHLEY WILSON, Staff Assistant

HOUSE

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey

Co-Chairman

FRANK R. WOLF, Virginia

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania

ZACH WAMP, Tennessee

ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama

STENY H. HOYER, Maryland

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland

LOUISE McINTOSH SLAUGHTER, New York

ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida

SENATE

BEN NIGHTHORSE CAMPBELL, Colorado

Chairman

KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas

GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut

BOB GRAHAM, Florida

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin

HILLARY RODHAM. CLINTON, New York
(iii)

TROUBLING TRENDS:

HUMAN RIGHTS IN RUSSIA

JUNE 5, 2001

PAGE

COMMISSIONERS

Sen. Ben Nighthorse Campbell, Chairman.................................................... 1

Rep. Joseph R. Pitts ........................................................................................ 3

Sen. Russell D. Feingold.................................................................................. 4

WITNESSES

Testimony of John Beyrle, Special Advisor to the Secretary of State

for the Newly Independent States, U.S. Department of State ................. 4

Testimony of Dr. Elena Bonner, Chair, Andrei Sakharov Foundation........ 13

Testimony of Paul Goble, Director of Communications, Radio Free

Europe and Radio Liberty ........................................................................ 18

Testimony of Dr. Emil Pain, Galina Starovoitova Fellow on Human

Rights and Conflict Resolution, Kennan Institute at the Woodrow

Wilson Center ........................................................................................... 24

APPENDICES

Prepared Statement of Hon. Ben Nighthorse Campbell ............................. 30

Prepared Statement of Hon. Christopher H. Smith .................................... 32

Prepared Statement of Hon. Joseph R. Pitts ............................................... 34

Prepared Statement of Mr. John Beyrle ...................................................... 35

Materials Submitted for the Record by John Beyrle:

State Departments Response to GAO Report, Former Soviet Union:

U.S. Rule of Law Assistance Has Had Limited Impact and

Sustainability..................................................................................... 38

Minutes of Russia Religious Roundtable, May 10, 2001 ....................... 54

Prepared Submission of Dr. Elena Bonner ................................................... 61

Prepared Submission of Mr. Paul Goble ...................................................... 66

Prepared Submission of Dr. Emil Pain ........................................................ 70

Prepared Submission of Mr. Boris Jordan ................................................... 72
TROUBLING TRENDS:

HUMAN RIGHTS IN RUSSIA

TUESDAY, JUNE 5, 2001

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE,

WASHINGTON, DC

The Commission met in Room 334, Cannon House Office Building,

Washington, DC, at 9:30 a.m., Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell, Chairman, presiding.

Commissioners present: Hon. Ben Nighthorse Campbell, Chairman;

Hon. Joseph R. Pitts, Commissioner; Hon. Russell D. Feingold, Commissioner.

Witnesses present: John Beyrle, Special Advisor to the Secretary of

State for the Newly Independent States, U.S. Department of State; Dr.

Elena Bonner, Chairman, Andrei Sakharov Foundation; Paul Goble,

Director of Communications, Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty; Emil

Pain, Fellow on Human Rights and Conflict Resolution, Kennan Institute, Woodrow Wilson Center.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BEN NIGHTHORSE CAMPBELL,

CHAIRMAN

Sen. CAMPBELL. Good morning and welcome to this hearing of the

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Helsinki Commission. Before proceeding, I note for the record that this week marks

the Commissions 25th anniversary of promoting human rights, democracy and the rule of law. The bipartisan work of the Commission, in

partnership with non-governmental organizations at home and abroad,

has had an impact on the lives of tens of thousands of individuals denied their fundamental freedoms.

Todays hearing of the Helsinki Commission will examine the course

of human rights in Russia after a year and a half of President Putins

presidency. I visited St. Petersburg, Russia in 1999, to participate in

the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. While there, I had an opportunity

to meet with a diverse group of Russian NGOs at the U.S. Consulate.

That meeting underscored in my mind the importance of civil society in

Russia.

There is no doubt that human rights and the human rights movement in Russia have come along way since the fall of the Soviet Union

almost 10 years ago. From an unfree Soviet Union, Russia has consistently been rated by Freedom House as partially free. Our hope is

that Russia will overcome the legacy of the past and achieve the freedom the Russian people deserve.

(1)
2

Indications of this downward trend in Russias human rights record

were noted by several experts at a Commission hearing held in May of

last year, and regrettably the situation has not improved since.

One of the most disturbing events has been the forceful takeover by

individuals connected with the Russian Government of the NTV television network, an independent network that had been critical of the Putin

administration. The pattern of harassment against the few independent news outlets is quite clear.

The NTV case and the campaign against Mr. Gusinsky are not isolated events. According to the New York-based Committee to Protect

Journalists, members of the independent press are being harassed and

persecuted far more than any time since the Soviet era. In an editorial

entitled Russias Dying Free Press, the Washington Post wrote that

Mr. Putins campaign already has spread a severe chill through the

vibrant press that sprouted and flourished during the 1990s.

Incidentally, with respect to law enforcement and the press in Russia, I dont intend to say that law enforcement in our own country is

flawless, but one of the best safeguards against arbitrary acts by law

enforcement agencies in this country is, indeed, the existence of a free

media.

For the second year in a row, the United Nations Human Rights

Commission adopted a European Union-sponsored resolution criticizing

Russias actions in Chechnya, specifically calling attention to widespread violence against civilians and alleged violations of human rights

and humanitarian law, in particular forced disappearances, extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, torture, and arbitrary detentions . . . 

The discovery of dozens of bodies in a mass grave near the main Russian military base in Chechnya is only the most egregious horror in a

long line of horrors being visited upon noncombatants in that region.

This does not excuse atrocities committed by Chechen forces, or detract

from legitimate concerns about conditions in Chechnya after the first

war. The gravity of the violations in Chechnya demand our attention in

light of Russias international obligations, including her OSCE commitments.

During last years hearing on Russia, we heard testimony about the

increasing pressure from the security services against Russian scientists and environmental activists, who were being accused on flimsy

charges of espionage, revealing state secrets, etc. At least two American citizens have been caught up in this net. Two years ago, President

Putin told a Russian newspaper that environmental groups were in

the employ of foreign intelligence agencies. It is now reported that

Russias Academy of Sciences has ordered its scientists to report to

state authorities on their contacts with foreign officials. Russias Deputy

Prime Minister for social policy has denied this report, and we will

certainly monitor related developments. If it is true, it will certainly

have, at the very least, a chilling effect on academic freedom and the

intellectual exchanges.

While it is important to recognize the positive changes that Russia

has experienced in the last decade, recent trends are disturbing and

give rise for concern. Russias own human rights commissioner has

stated that Russias resurgent security forces are threatening to wreck

democracy and basic freedoms.
3

I look forward to hearing from our Administration witness and our

experts assembled this morning as we examine the human rights picture in Russia in anticipation of next weeks summit meeting between

President Bush and his Russian counterpart.

I would like to recognize other Commissioners before introducing our

panelists for any opening statements.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. PITTS,

COMMISSIONER

Mr. PITTS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding this

timely hearing, Troubling Trends: Human Rights in Russia. As you

and others know, the current reports coming out of Russia raise great

concerns about the continued protection of fundamental human rights

for the Russian people. I look forward to hearing from the distinguished

witnesses here today regarding their insight into the current trends in

Russia, and possible positive action to encourage the protection of the

basic freedoms of the Russian people.

Various reports suggest that President Putin is attempting to return

to previous eras and centralize power in Moscow. This move would most

likely pave the way for, not end, more corruption and less freedom for

the Russian people.

The international concerns over current abuses of religious freedom

and the media and human rights in Chechnya would most likely increase under Putins new power structure.

Last week, I met with a group of Russian Pentecostal Christians,

who shared stories of the persecution they are currently experiencing

in Russia, including what they believe is the religiously-motivated killings of four of their members, and the liquidation of their churches in

the far east of Russia.

Muslims in Vologda are facing extreme opposition to the building of

their mosque, including reported financial harassment by local officials.

Protestants in Viborg have been blocked by officials from using and

restoring a building they purchased in 1998.

Officials in the Karbadino Balkar area refused to register Jehovahs

Witness communities despite the Ministry of Justice ruling that the

group should be registered. Religious literature is confiscated from religious groups. Congregants are barred from renting or using particular

buildings, and other general harassment occurs.

Unfortunately, from the reports my office has received, the current

trends do not bode well for religious freedom. Similarly, the trends for

freedom in the media do not bode well. Examples abound of media personnel, whether owners, editors, or journalists feeling the ire of Russian officials regarding print and/or broadcast media. Many know the

case of Vladimir Gusinsky, but other harassment continues against

journalists, harassment that can even lead to death.

The governments control of the press, led by President Putin, reflects another manifestation of the desire to turn back the tide of democratic reform. In Chechnya, the Russian Government tries to cover up

the brutal human abuses, including rape, mass slaughter, random shooting of civilians, and other horrific conduct by the military.

Mr. Chairman, we must continue to shine the spotlight of truth on

the human rights violations in Russia. The Russian people deserve to

live in freedom and peace, to prosper on the foundation of the great
4

history and heritage they have. These hearings will shine the light for

the Russian people so that they, too, may enjoy true freedom. I thank

you, Mr. Chairman.

Sen. CAMPBELL. Senator Feingold, do you have a statement?

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD,

COMMISSIONER

Sen. FEINGOLD. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Id like to thank you, Mr. Chairman and Congressman Smith, for holding this hearing today, and to

thank all the witnesses for their time and their insights. The hearing

clearly comes at an opportune time as the Administration prepares for

the United States-Russian summit in Slovenia. It is critically important to underscore the important role that human rights issues should

play in our bilateral talks at the highest level, not simply because of our

national values but also because of our national interest in the longterm stability of Russia.

In the long-run, of course, order cannot be sustained without justice.

So, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to learning more about the pressing

human rights in Russia today. Thank you.

Sen. CAMPBELL. Thank you. We will now start with our witnesses.

First, speaking on behalf of the Administration, will be Mr. John Beyrle. Mr. Beyrle is Acting Special Advisor to the Secretary of State for

the Newly Independent States.

Our second panel will feature Dr. Elena Bonner, Chair of the Andrei

Sakharov Foundation, and an internationally respected figure in the

Soviet, and now Russian, human rights movement. Then we will go to

Mr. Paul Goble, who is Director of Communications at Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, and former Special Assistant for Soviet Nationalities at the U.S. State Department. Then we will hear from Dr. Emil

Pain, who is from Moscow and a current Fellow on Human Rights and

Conflict Resolution of the Kennan Institute of the Woodrow Wilson Center and a former Advisor to President Yeltsin on National Problems.

We look forward to hearing all of your presentations, and we will

start with Mr. Beyrle.

TESTIMONY OF JOHN BEYRLE,

 SPECIAL ADVISOR TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE

NEWLY INDEPENDENT STATES, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. BEYRLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for this invitation to talk with you today about some troubling trends we see regarding human rights in Russia.

Any discussion of this subject in 2001, I think, has to start by taking

into account some remarkable changes and achievements that the Russian people achieved and have benefitted from since the start of glasnost

and perestroika in the mid-1980s, but especially since the collapse of

communist rule 10 years ago. Freedom of travel and worship, the right

to assemble and speak openly without fear of certain arrest and imprisonment, and the growth of independent media and an impressive community of NGOs, including human rights NGOs, all constitute a remarkableyou could even say unimaginablechange from the

strictures that developed and grew roots during 70 years of communist

totalitarian rule.
5

So, when viewed against that sad historical legacy, you can say that

the human rights picture in Russia looks encouraging, but this also

means that this record, this laudable record of achievement of the last

10 years must itself become a new standard of measure as we state our

expectations for further progress in this area. To put it more simply,

Mr. Chairman, it is not enough for Russia to be judged simply on how

the current human rights situation differs from the communist past.

To be true to our desire to support Russias integration into international structures, we need to look at the Russian record on human rights

in light of international standards and practices and, in this light, I

would like to comment on some troubling trends that threaten to undermine the progress that I cited at the start of these remarks, with

particular focus on media freedom in Chechnya, and Id like to conclude

by elaborating a bit on our long-term strategy to promote democratic

values and civil society in Russia.

As you noted, it was just over a year ago that President Putin was

elected with a promise to the Russian people to restore order in the

country. This has remained among his top priorities and the Russian

public appears to support him overwhelmingly in this effort.

The Russian Government isnt seeking order simply for orders sake.

Its stated goal is civil and economic development. Of course, we as a

nation should strongly support civil and economic development in Russia, but we need to be concerned about some means that are being chosen to achieve these ends, means which appear inconsistent with and

perhaps even threaten the progress of the past decade, and which raise

questions about Russias compliance with international human rights

obligations.

Russia appears to be pursuing a managed democracy in which the

boundaries of free speech, the media, civil society, even politics, are

loosely determined by the executive and are enforced and maintained by

law enforcement, security services, and other authorities.

The most conspicuous recent example of this is the case of MediaMost that you referred to, Mr. Chairman, and its independent television station, NTV. NTV was an important catalyst for expanding media freedom in Russia because its broadcasts brought criticism of the

government into the home of ordinary citizens. They got used to the

fact that it was somehow normal to turn on the television and the radio

and hear constructive criticism of what the government was doing and,

at the same time, it accustomed the government itself, and government

officials, to hearing criticism from the media.

The governments takeover of NTV relied on a combination of civil

and criminal cases with state-controlled Gazprom acting as something

as a surrogate. The Russian Government claims that the Media-Most

takeover was primarily and simply a commercial affair, but through its

single-minded pursuit of Media-Most and its founder, Mr. Gusinsky,

the government demonstrated a much broader set of goals that included

the stifling of outspoken critics in a way that, as you mentioned, Mr.

Chairman, has already had a chilling effect on how other Russian journalists go about their jobs.

The most persistent troubling human rights issue in Russia today, I

would argue, is Chechnya. While we recognize Russias territorial integrity and its right to fight terrorism and armed insurgencies on its
6

soil, we are deeply disturbed by the continuing and very credible reports of arbitrary arrests, torture, and extrajudicial killings carried out

by federal forces there.

Especially troubling is the lack of a serious investigation and accountability for these crimes. The culture of impunity which has developed is

not compatible either with respect for human rights or for achieving a

peaceful solution of the conflict in Chechnya.

More broadly, Mr. Chairman, this is a question of values. What kind

of long-term relationship can we, the United States, pursue with a government that wages such a brutal and seemingly endless war against

its own people on its own territory?

Our policy on Chechnya insists that there must be a political settlement to the crisis, an end to the ongoing violations of human rights,

and credible accountability for past abuses, and we call for unimpeded

humanitarian access and assistance including the return of the OSCE

Assistance Group to Chechnya and visits by U.N. special representatives.

Ultimately, an important hope for influencing change in Russias

policies away from violence and toward accountability and dialogue and

reconciliation in Chechnya will be the insistence of many voices in the

international community, as well as inside Russia, and those voices

inside Russia are growing.

Efforts like the Joint Resolutions over the past 2 years in the U.N.

Commission on Human Rights, and the frank discussion of Chechnya

thats taken place in RussiaEU summits and G8 meetings are part of

making this point and help amplify our own national complaints to the

Russians on this score.

Mr. Chairman, let me touch briefly, in conclusion, on the U.S. response to the human rights challenges in todays Russia. At the government-to-government level, we have and will continue to raise human

rights issues with the Government of Russia at every opportunity. I

have something more to say about that regarding the upcoming summit in just a moment. We will work directly, but as well in concert with

the EU and other multilateral institutions like the U.N., like OSCE, to

amplify the message that we are trying to deliver to Moscow on this

score. But underpinning these political and diplomatic efforts is our

work at the grassroots level.

Supporting the growth of a strong and vibrant independent media

has been, and remains one of our highest priorities in Russia

We are now focused more on a fact-based investigative journalism.

Weve moved from that focus on investigative journalism, to more of a

focus on a business-oriented training and promoting financial independence. Legal assistance for print and broadcast journalists has become

a more central feature of our work, including protection against federal

and local government libel suits and tax investigations, because these

are the preferred methods of attack.

We see more than overt efforts at censorship, more efforts to get at

the independent media through libel, through suits, through tax police

raids and such, and so we are trying to re-tailor our assistance to bolster the ability of the independent media owners and journalists to fight

this.
7

Finally, were looking to step up our support Russias media watchdog NGOs to allow them to track developments in the regions and draw

attention to national and local government attempts to suppress the

news.

U.S. international broadcasting can play a pivotal role in supporting

the development of independent media in Russia in fostering stronger

ties between U.S. broadcasters and affiliated Russian media outlets.

Before I joined the Foreign Service, I worked for Voice of America for

3 or 4 years, and Im a great supporter still of what they are doing, as

well as Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty broadcasting out of Prague, which are extremely important now.

In addition, nearly 45,000 Russians have traveled to the United States

on our exchange programs. Through these programs, we are exposing

the next generation of Russian leaders to democratic values in action.

These exchange programs provide an opportunity for any Russian who

competes openly for these slots to apply to gain a substantive knowledge

of how things work in the West, and to make contacts with U.S. counterparts that typically endure long beyond the actual stay of the exchangee

in the United States. These programs have a very strong track record,

and we need to increase the number of exchangees where the capacity

allows. This is a resource question, and we look to Congress for support

on this.

Mr. Chairman, as you noted, next week President Bush meets with

President Putin in Ljubljana, Slovenia for their first summit meeting.

They will be discussing their respective views and vision for the bilateral relationship between the United States and Russia. Issues of human rights will be an important part of this dialogue, for it is clear that

a Russia whose respect for human rights accords with international

standards and practices is a Russia with whom we can live and work

more effectively and comfortably.

The significant progress that weve seen over the past decade in the

human rights area has played an important role in creating a very

changed dynamic in the United States-Russia relationship. It has permitted a much broader and more ambitious agenda to develop between

our two countries in areas that dont have a direct bearing on human

rights. Arms control monitoring comes to mind as one example.

If we have a sense that progress on human rights and democratization in Russia has stopped, or that it is being reversed, then this cannot

help but have a serious impact on how we go about our relations with

Russia as a whole.

Mr. Chairman, again, thank you very much for this time and hearing. Im happy to try to answer your questions.

Sen. CAMPBELL. Thank you. Let me just start with one of the last

comments you made about the exchange program. Have they increased

or decreased since the Putin administration has come in power?

Mr. BEYRLE. Were in the process now of reviewing all of the exchange programs that we have going, and we expect to be finished with

that, I think, at the end of this month, and our hope is very much that

we will be able to continue the kind of support for democratic change,

civil society building.

Sen. CAMPBELL. Are these youngsters going both ways, or are these

just Russian youngsters coming to America?
8

Mr. BEYRLE. These are Russians and not only Russians, but Ukrainians and those from other areas of the Soviet Union coming here. Its

not only youngsters, its also through the Billington Exchange, its regional leaders who come to the United States and meet with local mayors and governors for a time. Id have to go back and check whether the

numbers actually increased since President Putin took over in January

2000. My sense is there may have been a marginal increase, but there

certainly has not been a decrease.

Sen. CAMPBELL. Have you noticed any attempt by the Putin administration to screen the type of youngsters that would come over here?

Mr. BEYRLE. No, I cant say that weve seen an overt effort for them

to screen the applicants who come here. What weve been concerned

about is the American exchangees who have gone to Russia to study on,

for instance, the Fulbright Program, in the case of Mr. Tobin, who was

recently picked up and is now in a jail in Voronezh on a very minor

drug charge, facing an extreme sentence of 34 years in a penal colony.

Sen. CAMPBELL. What sentence is he facing?

Mr. BEYRLE. The sentence is 31/2 years in a penal colony for a charge of

a very minor possession of a small amount of marijuana, with some question whether or not there may have been some planting of evidence there.

But the point I was making is that the security services now seem to

be turning a much more careful eye on who is taking part in the exchange programs, and we dont see that as a very positive development

at all. These exchange programs have done a lot over the last 10 years

to help knock down some barriers of mistrust that developed over 40-50

years of the Cold War, and to have security services now levying unfounded allegations of espionage activity to scholars, Fulbright Scholars, hasto use a word you usedI heard a couple of times from the

Chairman and the Commissionersa chilling effect on the kind of

relationship wed like to be able to build with the Russian people.

Sen. CAMPBELL. When the youngsters from Russia come to America,

whats the length of stay for that exchange program?

Mr. BEYRLE. There are several exchange programs, but one of the

most successful ones, the Future Leaders Exchange, the FLEX Exchange

typically has high school and early university students coming here for

a year to a year and a half, living with an American family in every

State of the Union. I try to meet with as many of these kids when they

come through as possible becausenot only to show them that we support this, but also because I learn a lot from them about whats happening in Russia and what the new generation is like, but typically they

stay a year, a year and a half.

The problem that we have is finding host families who are willing to

do this. I mean, its a terrific commitment by Americans to take a

stranger into their home, but the families who do this find it pays great

dividends.

Sen. CAMPBELL. Well, one of our neighbors in Colorado took a Russian youngster in for a while, and it was just a great relationship. In

fact, it became almost like family in that period of time, and they still

communicate by mail regularly back and forth between Russia and the

family in Colorado.

Mr. BEYRLE. Thats exactly the point. This plants a seed, but the

plant can continue to grow for decades afterwards, after-the-fact.

Sen. CAMPBELL. In his presentation before the Senate Appropriations

Committee, Secretary Powellthis was in MaySecretary Powell stated

that despite the loss of our seat on the U.N. Human Rights Commis-
9

sion, we will still, according to him, be able to communicate in a very

powerful, clear voice our concerns about human rights. In that connection, has the Administration raised human rights issues with the Russian Government, and what has been their response?

Mr. BEYRLE. Well, Mr. Chairman, obviously we are very disappointed

by the vote in the U.N. Human Rights Commission. We think that the

Commission probably wont be as strong a body without the United

States as a member for the coming year, but as Secretary Powell has

said, were going to work very hard to regain our seat next year, and

were certainly not going to slacken our commitment to human rights.

As for our contact with the Russians, Ive now sat in on every meeting that Secretary Powell has had with Foreign Minister Ivanov, and

on the meeting that President Bush had with Foreign Minister Ivanov

as he prepares for the meeting in Slovenia. Human rights has featured

prominently in all these discussions. Weve made clearI think the

President made it clear when he had his discussion with Foreign Minister Ivanov, that this is a question of values. If were going to have a

relationship with Russia thats productive and constructive, as we want

to, it has to be based on a sense that we share some of the same values

with the Russian people and with the Russian Government.

Sen. CAMPBELL. Where do we go now, since we are not on that Commission? Is there another vote next year, and since some people that

voted to exclude us from that body have pretty bad human rights records

themselves, what is the hope of the United States getting back on that

U.N. Commission?

Mr. BEYRLE. Well, I think were hopeful that when the vote is taken

next yearmy understanding is that its an annual votethat we will

be re-voted onto the Commission. Secretary Powell has said that we

intend to work very hard and make sure that we do everything possible

to make sure that happens.

Sen. CAMPBELL. President Bush, in his summit meeting with President Putin in Slovenia next week at the G8 in Genoa, a senior Administration official has said that the Administration is looking for possible

broad cooperation with Russia in terms of a host of thingsmissile

defense, nuclear reduction, nonproliferation, economic affairs, and so

on. Those are all very important, but will there also be human rights

on that agenda at next weeks summit?

Mr. BEYRLE. Absolutely, Mr. Chairman. The meeting that Secretary

Powell just had with Foreign Minister Ivanov in Budapest, we went

over the agenda for the meeting to start to prepare for the two Presidents to have a useful discussion for the 221

/2 hours that theyll meet,

and theres no doubt in the Russian mind that there are several issues

regarding human rights, regarding some of the specific issues that I

raised in my testimony, media freedom and Chechnya, which will be on

the agenda, which President Bush wants to talk to President Putin

about, and hear from President Putin about as well.

Sen. CAMPBELL. I see. At the OSCE Istanbul summit in November of

1999, the Russian Government agreed to a communique that stated,

We will agree that a political solution to the situation in Chechnya is

essential, and that the assistance of the OSCE would contribute to achieving that goal. Given Russias unwillingness to at least attempt negotiations with President Maskhadov. How do you assess Russias so-called

agreement that a political solution is essential.

Mr. BEYRLE. Chechnya, Mr. Chairman, is a very difficult problem

for Russia and for the Chechen people. Obviously, its a conflict thats
10

gone on for centuries, and as we meet with Russians and raise this, we

hear consistently them agree with us that there can be no military

solution to this, that there needs to be a political resolution through

dialogue, but weve seen no action to actually make that happen.

What we see instead is a continued effort by Russian military forces

to subjugate the Chechen people and to establish some dominance over

them. That is, in our mind, not the basis for starting a dialogue. We are

not in a position of telling the Russians or telling the Chechen people

who the dialogue partners on the Chechen side need to be. This is something that the Russians and the Chechen people, Chechen officials, need

to work out, but I think weve made it amply clear that we, bilaterally,

are probably more usefully, through the OSCE, stand willing to facilitate that dialogue if we can be helpful in putting the sides together in

some way, but I have to say at this juncture it looks like the puttingtogether process is still somewhat far off.

Sen. CAMPBELL. You mentioned the possible return of the OSCE mission to Chechnya. Is there an update on that which you could share

with us?

Mr. BEYRLE. Yes. Secretary Powell raised this when he met with

Foreign Minister Ivanov in Budapest, and I had a separate meeting

with Foreign Minister Geoana of Romania, who is the Chairman in

Office of OSCE. He updated me on his own discussions with the Russian authorities and, as always, were in something of a xeno-paradox

here. We seem to be having the distance between the two sides, Russia

and OSCE, but never quite getting to the goal. Put in football terms,

its hard to cross that last 3 or 4 yards, but we were able, through

Secretary Powells discussions with Foreign Minister Ivanov and my

discussions with the Romanian Foreign Minister, to identify where the

outstanding problems are, and were pushing both sides very hard to

get this resolved.

When Secretary Powell met with Mr. Ivanov here in Washington on

May 18, Foreign Minister Ivanov said he expects this to be resolved in

the very near future, and we expect him to live up to that.

Sen. CAMPBELL. Whatever very near future means. I have four or

five more questions, but Id like to yield to Congressman Pitts for a few.

Mr. PITTS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Beyrle, the General Accounting Office recently released a report to Congress regarding U.S.

assistance to the New Independent States for the promotion of the rule

of law.

From 1992 through 2000, the U.S. Government provided about $216

million in such assistance to the NIS. The GAO report focused primarily on Armenia, Georgia, Russia, and Ukraine, and in its conclusion

the GAO found that the rule of law assistance efforts have had limited

impact so far, and results may not be sustainable in many cases. Furthermore, the GAO rated Russias rule of law trend as worse compared

to better or no change for some other recipient nations.

My question is, what is the Administrations assessment of this critical report, and will the concerns raised therein alter the U.S. approach

to assistance in the rule of law area or other areas relating to civil

society?
11

Mr. BEYRLE. I think we take the GAO report very seriously. Weve

looked at it in some detail, and I believe weve actually prepared a detailed response which may have been sent back to GAO, I need to check

on that, but Ill be glad to give you a copy of that, submit it for the

record.

As I mentioned, were in the process of a review of all of the assistance

programs we have going on with Russia, so the GAO report, frankly,

was quite timely. It has, I think, prompted us to focus even more attention on the question of rule of law in Russia and how we go about trying

to promote it.

I think one conclusion weve come to after the efforts of the last 6 or 7

years is that rule of law is going to be established in Russia only when

its demanded by the people. Thats why I think as part of the assistance review, youll see a much greater effort to build grassroots reform, increase things like community policing, legal partnerships, focus on the terrible and growing problem of domestic violence inside

Russia. At the same time, rule of law can be established in Russia when

you have a functioning judiciary which is well trained and well paid.

Those are things we can help with the training, we cant really help

much with the paying, but weve made it clear to the Russians that our

view is they need to do much more to make the profession of being a

judge more attractive to people coming out of law school, and they frankly

need to reduce the lure of bribery and corruption for judges who frankly

arent paid enough.

Mr. PITTS. The Administration has requested $167 million in assistance to Russia in FY 2002. Can you give us an idea of how the Administration proposes to allocate these funds, and to what extent would

monies be directed at assisting in promotion of human rights or civil

liberties? What protections do we have to ensure that the U.S. funds

will not go toward reinforcing corruption in Russia?

Mr. BEYRLE. All very fair questions. As to precisely how the assistance is going to be allocated, I think well owe you a report at the end of

the month when we take the assistance review, go to the White House

with some recommendations. Ill suggest we come up and brief staff at

the same time on where the priorities are starting to come into focus,

but I think its very likely that a substantial portion is going to continue to promote democracy and rule of law in Russia. We need to look

at things like training grants for NGO human rights monitors.

I think in light of everything thats happened over the last six months

not only with Media-Most and NTV, which has gotten a lot of the attention in Moscow, but also a lot of the unreported pressures on regional

media in some regions of Russia. We need to try to upgrade the support

for independent media, especially in the regions. What I discussed earlier about training not only journalists to be more effective at what they

do and better advocates, but also how to deal with the financial and tax

pressures that are increasingly used by authorities.

I think, increasingly, our assistance in the democracy area being

directed at the grassroots goes in the form of small grants and training

to NGOs, and so this reduces the scope of opportunities for corruption,

but most of the implementing agenciesI think all of the implementing agenciesconduct audits periodically to ensure that this money

isnt being misused.
12

Mr. PITTS. Regarding religious liberty, Ive noticed a recent trend in

Russia and Ukraine and Belarus especially, of increased persecution

against the Pentecostals. I have not seen that reflected in the media. I

have not seen it in the country report or the Commission report for

religious liberty.

Is the State Department aware of what is occurring against this minority group?

Mr. BEYRLE. We follow the status of religious liberty in Russia very

closely. Just about three weeks ago, I chaired a meeting of a round table

with the Commission on International Religious Liberty. Senator Gordon Smith joined us. Hes co-Commissioner of this effort. We did a tour

dtable of many of the religious denominations which are operating in

Russia. The Pentecostals were represented there. They spoke about, as

I recallI have to go back, we did a summary of the meeting, and I will

provide that to you for the recordbut my sense is the Pentecostalists

described less of a sense of increased pressure on them. We felt that the

Jehovahs Witnesses and the Scientologists, in particular, were coming

under increased scrutiny and, in fact, just in the last few days there

was a Russian court action which overturned a favorable ruling that

had been in favor of the Jehovahs Witness organization and its activities in Russia.

The Pentecostalists in Russia make up a large denomination. There

are many Pentecostalists in Russia. I go back in my own experience in

Russia to the days when we had seven Pentecostalists living in the

basement of the American Embassy in Moscow. So, obviously, this is

something Im familiar with personally, but something we also follow

closely. Again, I would say my sense is that there are other denominations feeling themselves under more pressure, but let me go back and

look and check with some of our Pentecostalist contacts. I appreciate

your raising this issue.

Mr. PITTS. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Sen. CAMPBELL. The Administration requested $167 million in FY

2002 for Russia. My question also deals with how we monitor that assistance. Its my understanding that theres about $1.5 billion a month

leaving Russia in capital flight, going into other countries and often

into private bank accounts. Knowing that theres that kind of flight of

money out of Russia, how do we monitor the money we are sending to

Russia? How do we know its actually getting to help solve the problem?

Mr. BEYRLE. Thats a tough question, and its something that we

devote much scrutiny to because we want to be sure that the American

taxpayers who, after all, are funding this effort to support development

of civil society in Russia are getting the best return for their money.

Increasingly, as I mentioned, weve gone to smaller grants to grassroots

support and training, which reduces the scope for misuse of money, and

certainly I think the kind of internal audits which USAID, the State

Department, other implementing agencies carry out have found no evidence of any large-scale diversion of money.

One thing, though, that we are doing in parallel with this is an effort

through the Financial Action Task Force, which is an outgrowth of the

G8/G7, which is on the verge of declaring Russia as a country of

concern because it has not instituted the kind of money laundering

regulations which would allow the international community to have

more confidence about where this money flowing out of Russia is goingis coming from and going to. The consequences of Russia being on
13

this list means that U.S. banks would be under much tighter regulations in terms of reporting suspicious financial transactions which, in

turn, would have an effect on the Russian business community in a

way that we hope would get back to Russian leaders.

Sen. CAMPBELL. Do U.S. banks have access to information if money

is leaving Russia and going into Swiss banks, lets say?

Mr. BEYRLE. I dont know the answer to that question directly, Im

not really an expert on that. Let me check and Ill get you an answer for

that. I just hesitate to say because

Sen. CAMPBELL. Id be interested in knowing that.

Mr. BEYRLE. My sense would be yes, but let me check and well find

out.

Sen. CAMPBELL. Okay. Well, I thank you very much, Mr. Beyrle, for

appearing today and, since all Commissioners are not here today, we

may send some additional questions to you to be answered in writing, if

we could.

Mr. BEYRLE. Id be happy to do that, Mr. Chairman, and always

happy to meet with your staff informally anytime, to keep this dialogue

up. Thank you very much for hosting this hearing.

Sen. CAMPBELL. Thank you very much.

We will now go to our second panel: Dr. Elena Bonner, Chairman of

the Andrei Sakharov Foundation; Mr. Paul Goble, Director of Communications, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, and Dr. Emil Pain, from

Moscow, currently the Fellow on Human Rights and Conflict Resolution at the Kennan Institute of the Woodrow Wilson Center. If the three

of you would come up.

It is the Commissions understanding that Dr. Bonners son will

present her prepared remarks, and she will answer questions through

him. Dr. Bonner.

TESTIMONY OF DR. ELENA BONNER,

CHAIRMAN, ANDREI SAKHAROV FOUNDATION

Dr. BONNER. Mr. Chairman, members of the Commission, I am very

grateful to be present here and to have the opportunity to participate in

this hearing on human rights in Russia. To save time, I have asked my

son to read my statement in English, and afterwards I will be ready to

answer your questions.

The period of Russian history, which began in September 1999 with

the tragic explosions of apartment buildings in Moscow and Volgodonsk,

can properly be called the Putin Era, the successor to the Yeltsin Era.

This new era has been characterized by several distinctly troubling

tendencies fundamentally affecting the Russian nation.

1. Violations of the Constitution by the President and state officials.

First, there is the creation of a union of Russia and Belarus, with the

prospect of combining them into a single state. This can be lawfully

accomplished only if it is preceded by popular referendums confirming

the desire of the two peoples to unite, followed by the introduction of

appropriate amendments into the two constitutions.

Second, there is the virtual liquidation of the Federal Council, depriving it of the functions assigned to it by the Constitution and turning it

into an advisory organ. This destroys the federal structure of Russia,

which de facto is turned into a unitary state. The division of Russia

into seven regions, although formally not a violation of the constitution,
14

reinforces the emasculation of the upper chamber, giving the president

additional levers to pressure local authorities and to centralize state

power.

Such fundamental changes in state structure reduce the societys

possibilities for influencing the government and impair the rights of

voters. Besides, this kind of reorganization, strengthening the vertical

chain of authority as Russian officials call it, has led to a colossal growth

of the bureaucracy and to exorbitant expense for its maintenance which

cause further grief to citizens and taxpayers.

High-ranking officers of the army and security services have left their

former posts and infiltrated central and regional government bodies,

and they continue to do so. The dependence of procurators and judges

on the central and local executive organs has grown.

A number of laws adopted by the Duma and presidential decrees clearly

illustrate the retreat from the democratic principles of government and

humane values proclaimed during the previous era. The following examples are far from exhaustive and vary in importance.

There is the law on political parties, which deprives significant groups

of voters of the opportunity to elect persons to the legislative bodies who

will represent their particular interests and which also allows the president to secure a parliament even more compliant than the present one.

There is the doctrine of information security. There is the interruption of the work of the Presidential Pardons Commission, introduced by

President Yeltsin.

There is the introduction of military training for high school students, the allocation of money from the budget for so-called education

in patriotism, and the creation of a pro-Putin organization of young

people with the help of the presidential administration. At the same

time we see a steady increase in the number of runaway children, in

drug use by young people, and in child prostitution. Today there are

more homeless children in Russia than there were in 1921 after our

Civil War; 18,000 children are serving sentences in reformatories. The

tragic fact affecting many children is the result of mass impoverishment. According to official statistics, more than a third of the population lives below the poverty level.

There is the recurring spymania and the recently revealed circular of

the Russian Academy of Sciences obliging scientists and scholars to

report, again, to their bosses their contacts with Western colleagues

and any plans to publish abroad or receive grants from foreign sources.

Truly, what goes around, comes around.

2. The use of financial and legal pressure to curb the independent

mediatelevision, radio, and the press.

We still havent seen the end of the crushing of the independent television company, NTV, as well as Media-Mosts press holdings. This will

be followed, judging from actions of the Procurators Office, by the destruction of TV Channel 6 and the Echo of Moscow radio station. The

situation is even more catastrophic in the provinces, where, besides the

financial and legal pressures leading to the closing of local newspapers,

radio and television, there are frequent reports of threats, beatings, and

sometimes even murders of independent journalists. Furthermore, I do

not know of a single case when investigation of such crimes has resulted in the conviction of the perpetrators. Recent examples of the persecution of independent journalists was the indictment in Belgograd of

Olga Kitova and the scheduling of a second trial of Grigory Pasko. In
15

short, the proclamation in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights

that everyone has the right to receive and impart information and

ideas through any media is being violated in Russia today.

3. The Chechen war.

In Chechnya, mass violations of the rights of the civilian population

looting, cleansing of villages, torture, imprisonment in pits, extrajudicial executions, including shooting of childrenare continuing. The

military authorities are trying to cut off access to information about

Chechnya and to interfere in every possible way with the work of the

Red Cross, Amnesty International, the Memorial Society, and other

humanitarian organizations.

Investigations of mass crimes against civilians are sabotaged. Independent investigators are not permitted access to the investigations of

mass burial sites. According to official statistics, more than 3,000 Russian soldiers have died in the second Chechen war. No one knows how

many civilians have perished because there are no statistics on civilian

deaths. These statistics should include not just those killed directly

during military operations, but those who have died of cold and disease

as well as the majority of those who have been detained during cleansing actions and then have vanished without a trace. In time the bodies

of some disappeared persons have turned up in the mass graves of the

executed.

The situation of Chechen refugees is going from bad to worse. According to the numbers recently published by the State Commission on Statistics, there are 77,000 refugees in Russia, mostly migrants from Kazakhstan and the other Central Asian Republics. Chechens are not

included in that figure. This is the result of a technicality, only a person arriving from a foreign country is considered to be a refugee. In this

way, tens of thousands of Chechens, who fled bombing, shelling, and

other horrors of the war, who have lost their homes, their possessions,

and often family and friends, are not counted as refugees and are thereby

deprived of the right to choose their place of residence within Russia

and the right to international assistance and defense.

The temporary camps for displaced persons in Ingushetia are filled

beyond capacity. People survive in them only thanks to the assistance

of international humanitarian organizations. Russian Government representatives, instead of helping these organizations, do everything possible to hinder their work and to compel the return of the exhausted,

half-starved, often diseased people to Chechnya. But no one can guarantee that they will be safe there. The Chechens fear, with good reason,

that they will be left without shelter, food or humanitarian assistance.

They fear robbery, violence, and the continual cleansing actions, during which practically all adult and adolescent males are detained. The

genocide of the Chechen nation is continuing.

On May 25, 2001, the Russian National Committee to End the War

and Make Peace in the Chechen Republic received a letter from Aslan

Maskhadov, President of Chechnya, in which he has again confirmed

that he is ready to engage in peace negotiations without preconditions.

I am in agreement with the main points of Mr. Maskhadovs letter. I

ask that this letter be included in the record together with my testimony.
16

Sen. CAMPBELL. Without objection, your letter will be included in the

record. I think that normally we hear from everyone at the table, but I

think in this case we will go ahead and ask Dr. Bonner a few questions

before we go on, if that meets with your approval.

Dr. Bonner, when President Putin came to power, we heard a lot

about his intentions to combat corruption. Do you think that corruption has lessened, or increased, or remained about the same since President Putin has come to power in Russia?

Dr. BONNER. Indeed, there was a lot of talk about fighting corruption

when President Putin came to power, but a strange process has taken

place since Mr. Putin came to power. The recent persecutions of some

so-called oligarchsin particular, Mr. Gusinsky and Mr. Berezovsky

are striking in that they have been directed against particular individuals who have been singled out because their wealth has presumably come from corrupt sources, while the others are not mentioned at

all. It seems that the situation of the various oligarchs is very similar.

That leads one to conclude that the motivation for these particular actions is political.

I would say that the tactic of pressuring only certain individuals has

a political meaning, not a meaning of fighting corruption. Indeed, the

very fact of such selective prosecution destroys the legitimacy of the

laws involved. The intent to fight corruption is being undermined by

the selectivity and political intent of the process.

Sen. CAMPBELL. Well, some authorities believe that President Putins

so-called fight against corruption is simply a vehicle to suppress civil

liberties of people who dont agree with him.

Dr. BONNER. First, I want to continue a little bit with my answer to

your first question. I want to remind you of a situation that existed

back in the Soviet Union, which also had a period of corruption fighting. That was the time when Heydar Aliyev, who is now President of

Azerbaijan, was the head of the Soviet Government of the Azerbaijan

Republic. Mr. Aliyev publicly vilified and very actively prosecuted and

demanded, and in some cases received, death penalties for people who

were accused of corruption. Some of them were probably corrupted

most, probablybut really, Mr. Aliyev at that time was using the complaints to form his own even more corrupt, more powerful, more Mafialike government structures that were controlled by him directly. I think

we are witnessing something similar. Presently, the state apparatus is

pressuring some corrupt groups and destroying certain groups and individuals, but at the same time it is creating its own even more powerful corrupt structures.

The term, the Petersburg Group, is commonly used now in Russia

in a colloquial sense to describe the government of Mr. Putin because

he came to Moscow from Petersburg. With him came certain associated

politicians, but the term is also being used to denote certain economic

or even criminal structures that are also associated with these circles.

Sen. CAMPBELL. I see. Mr. Pitts, I will yield to you if you would like

to ask a few, and Ill get back to a few more.

Mr. PITTS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Bonner, last year, President Putin opened a Jewish community center in Moscow, in what the

news called a remarkable public show of support for Jews in a country

that has suffered centuries of state-sponsored anti-Semitism. However,

in March of this year, the Union on Councils for Soviet Jews issued a
17

report stating that Jews continue to face in Russia an infrastructure of

anti-Semitism, grassroots and officials, that has solidified in several

regions.

How do you assess the situation of anti-Semitism in Russia? Do you

think President Putin has sufficient authority or the desire to direct

local authorities to respond appropriately to anti-Semitic incidents?

Dr. BONNER. Obviously, I have nothing against the opening of the

Jewish center in Moscow, but I consider Mr. Putins participation in

the opening ceremony as a banal and rather vulgar act of propaganda

with no real meaning. At the same time, I want to state that in Russia

not only anti-Semitism is on the increase, but in general there is a

growth of what I would call racist sentiments directed not only against

Jews, but against many minorities. Not only does anti-Semitism exist,

but there are also hostile feelings toward people of so-called Caucasian

nationality. There is the same very bad behavior toward people from

Central Asia that used to prevail in the Soviet Union. The authorities

have taken no active measures to counter any of these attitudes, not

against the growth of anti-Semitism nor against any of the other acts of

intolerance.

In general, I would say that the authorities are forming a society in

Russia right now that is becoming a danger to all its neighbors, and the

process in some ways is reminiscent of Germany at in the late 1920s,

and early 1930s.

Mr. PITTS. According to some human rights activists in Russia, one

positive trend is the growth of local and regional human rights groups

throughout Russia. How do you assess the human rights activity locally in Russia, and what means do local human rights activists have

to affect policy in their local communities?

Dr. BONNER. I am very grateful for this question because that is an

issue that directly affects me. Indeed, in Russia there is a significant

growth of human rights organizations of very different directions and

goalswe know now of more than 1600 such organizations in Russia.

But all these organizations are facing dire situations. Apart from recruiting volunteers and performing the work they were formed to do,

all these organizations need financial support, and the fact is that the

greater the distance from Moscow, the more difficult it is for such groups

to survive.

There is little charitable activity on the part of rich people in Russia.

The Soros Foundation for several years has been financing provincial

human rights organizations. Boris Berezovsky has recently created a

fund that just a couple of months ago gave grants to 163 provincial

human rights organizations. However, there are two problems related

to charitable giving in Russia.

First, in Russian law there is no such thing as tax deductions for

donations. Moreover, the activity of foreign humanitarian organizations

and grants from such organizations are taxed by the state.

The second thing is that U.S. AID is providing financial assistance

primarily to the Russian Government, and I think that such assistance

should perhaps be decreased or even stopped until Russia ends the war

in Chechnya. However, at the same time, I think that U.S. AID should

continue to support human rights organizations. Unfortunately, in the

last 2 years U.S. AID has been decreasing their assistance to Russia

precisely by decreasing their assistance to human rights organizations.

Mr. PITTS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
18

Sen. CAMPBELL. Thank you, Dr. Bonner. We will now proceed with

Mr. Gobles testimony, but if you can stay we would appreciate it. You

may be interested in hearing their comments or have some questions.

The Commission will also submit further questions to you, Dr. Bonner,

in writing. Thank you.

TESTIMONY OF PAUL GOBLE,

DIRECTOR OF COMMUNICATIONS,

RADIO FREE EUROPE AND RADIO LIBERTY

Mr. GOBLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me commend you for

holding this meeting, and allow me to congratulate you on the 25th

anniversary of the Helsinki Commission. I fear that your most important work is not behind you, but ahead of you, especially with respect to

the Russian Federation.

In recent weeks, a Soviet-era anecdote has resurfaced again in Moscow. According to the story, Napoleon returns from the dead sometime

during the era of Leonid Brezhnev, and attends a Soviet May Day parade in Red Square. As he watches the heavily armed troops, tanks and

missiles go by, a big smile appears on his face.

A Soviet citizen takes note and says, Emperor, obviously you are

thinking that if you had had such weapons, you would have won at

Waterloo.

No, Napoleon replies. Im thinking that if I had had a newspaper

like your Pravda, no one would ever have known that I lost.

The fact that anecdote has reappeared in Moscow is testimony to some

very disturbing developments. Over the last year, President Vladimir

Putin and those around him have moved to gain unchallenged control

over the electronic media most Russians now rely on. Eight-five percent

of the Russian people rely exclusively on television for their news, so

that even if newspapers continued to have some freedom in what they

present, control over the electronic media, and especially over television, represents a threat to the free exchange of information on which a

free society is built.

Over the last year, there has been a retreat from the progress of the

Yeltsin years in a wide variety of areas, but nowhere has that retreat

from the progress of the last decade been greater than in the area of

media freedom. Putin has shown himself unwilling to tolerate any criticism of himself or his government, and he has moved both to intimidate

journalists and to silence those who carry their work, but his ability to

do so, the amount he has achieved so far reflects two underlying realities. First, the Russian media were never as free even under Yeltsin as

many people had self-satisfactorily thought and, second, the Russian

people, at least in their overwhelming majority, were not nearly as interested in or supportive of media freedom as many of us in the West

had assumed.

When Putin came to power by Yeltsins sleight of hand at the beginning of 2000, the Russian media were already in difficult straits. Privatization had not led to a free media. It created owners who did not have

the kind of subscription payments or advertising sector that is the basis

of divided financial support that guarantees some protection of the media, nor was there a legal situation which provided journalists a defense

at what they do. Moreover, the people who had seized control of the

media were the kind of oligarchs, the Boris Berezovskys and the Vladimir

Gusinskys, whom many Russians did believe were dishonest and had
19

gathered their property in illegal ways. Hence, it was in fact popular for

Mr. Putin to move against some of these people even though his moves

against them were designed to silence an opposition rather than to correct corruption.

That situation, in turn, has been compounded by problems in the

journalistic community itself. We tend to forget that 15 years ago it

was precisely the crusading journalists in the years of former Soviet

President Mikhail Gorbachev who took the lead in ripping away the

cover on a very ugly Soviet reality. But with the collapse of the Soviet

Union, so, too, the status of journalists declined, and with their declining status came a decline in their salaries.

Right now, journalists across the Russian Federation, on average,

earn $50 a month. As a result, they are frequently in the position of

having to sell their stories to the highest bidder, a situation that has

become so nearly universal that an entirely new jargon has emerged in

the Russian language to describe it.

I learned the other day that one newspaper that was reporting on oil

investments said that it charged more for the story it put on page 1

than the ad from the oil company it put on page 3 because it assumed

that the story on page 1 did more good for the company and therefore

expected it to pay more. But that kind of thing hardly builds much

support in the authority of the press.

Congressman Pitts, you raised the issue of religion and coverage of

religion. One of the tragedies is that, with the single exception of the

Russian Orthodox Church, the patriarchal church which enjoys the

support of the state, none of the other religious congregations have had

the funds to buy this kind of coverage, and coverage of religious activities has dropped off the papers across the Russian Federation, dropped

out of the news, and the situation has become so serious that six weeks

ago a group of journalists who thought religion ought to be covered

presumably that had been their beefformed an organization to promote new religious coverage. So far, however, they have not been able

to get more articles into the newspaper, and because the reporting isnt

there, it makes it far more difficult for the American Embassy or for

Western experts to track what is going on, and precisely because local

authorities know that no one will be watching them, they have fewer

reasons not to behave badly. This is happening across the Russian Federation.

Unlike Boris Yeltsin, Putin, who is, after all, a former KGB lieutenant colonel, had little reason to like the press even if he could still claim

to be supportive of market reforms and capitalism. Within days of taking power, he showed his true colors with respect to the media, by being

behind the arrest RFE/RL correspondent Andrei Babitsky and the comic

opera behavior of the Russian Government with respect to Babitsky. He

said only one true thing in those first two months of power, he said that

work of journalists like Babitsky was more dangerous than the activities of the Chechen gunmen. In fact, the reports of a free media are

more dangerous to an authoritarian government than any gunman.

Over the last year, we have seen a drumbeat of developments representing a threat, first, to the free media, and hence to all the other

freedoms which depend on the media.

Putin and his government have presided over a country that a variety of international journalist organizations now say is the third most

dangerous place on earth for people working in the media. An average
20

of one Russian journalist dies each month, and as Dr. Bonner has pointed

out, none of the perpetrators of those crimes have been brought to justice. Moreover, Putin and his government have promulgated an information security doctrine that puts the state in effective charge of all

media activities, and last week we saw the appearance of a new decree

which recalls the worst of the Soviet era about controlling academic

contacts between Russian scholars and their Western counterparts. Not

surprisingly, the discovery of this was because of some heroic activities

by human rights activists. Not surprisingly, the reports were initially

denied by members of Mr. Putins government. Not surprisingly, the

following day members of the Academy of Sciences confirmed that the

order had, in fact, been issued.

Putin and his government have hounded into exile and into bankruptcy Mr. Berezovsky and Mr. Gusinsky. They have restored Soviet

era symbols and actions, and that restoration of symbols, which may

not seem terribly important to us and may not be all that important in

Moscow, has sent a signal to regional officials of what will be tolerated

and has led to worst behavior in the regions than anything that has

happened in the capital of the Russian Federation.

Finally, Putin and his government have used their broad powers to

reward editors, owners, and journalists who say what they want to

hear and to punish those who dont. I could extend that list easily, as

could other members of the panel, but the fact is we have a problem in

the Russian media and, hence, in Russian society.

Many of Putins defenders, both in Russia and this country, argue

that no leader likes to be criticized. Thats certainly true. Indeed, none

of us likes criticism. But the fact is that unless leaders in a society and

their policy are prepared to be criticized, there will not be democracy.

Putin, moreover, they say, has said that he needs to restore the Russian state. Theres no question that such a need exists, but there is a

problem. There are many ways to rebuild a state, and Putin has chosen

a way that begins by attacking the foundations of a free society. Unfortunately, many Russians support what he is doing.

According to the results of a poll taken in the Russian Federation in

November of last year, 49 percent of Russians believe that the reimposition of censorship would be a good thing for the government to do. Four

months later, that number had risen to 57 percent. The idea that the

attacks on the media have generated a countervailing force inside Russia unfortunately has not happened.

There appear to be three reasons for this. First, many Russians are

simply deferring to Putin because he is the President. Second, the quality of the media in Russia has deteriorated both because the reliance on

market forces has reduced the ability of many print media, print outlets, to employ people at a reasonable wage, and because of the actions

of Putin himself. Finally, many Russians, accustomed to the

cheerleading of the press in Soviet times and appalled by the conditions

that the Russian media do report when they have the chance, are less

and less concerned about listening to the media, and are upset even

when the media is reporting things they dont want to hear.

In this environment, I would not want to suggest that there are no

positive developments. Some newspapers, a few radio stations, and an

occasional television broadcast do perform according to the highest standards of journalism. Moreover, an advertising sector is beginning to

emerge after the ravages of the August 1998 collapse. Some journalists
21

and editors appear to be concerned about their image and their responsibilities. But those developments are being overwhelmed by Putins

campaign and by the indifference of large parts of the population.

A decade ago, the media could rally people to its side and mobilize

people to march in its defense. That achievement helped end communism and start Russias troubled transition toward democracy. But now

the media in Russia do not have that power. Mr. Putin has gelded them.

Worse, they do not appear likely to regain it anytime soon, making

hearings like this, the activities of international broadcasters, and the

attention of international human rights activists more important.

As a result, few listeners and readers in Russia are likely to do much

if Putin continues his crackdown against the press. That is something

Putin knows well, but that many in the West so far have failed to understand. That makes it incumbent on us to speak out in the West, as

we are doing today, lest the dream of Napoleon again prove true in

Russia. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Sen. CAMPBELL. Thank you, Mr. Goble. I was really interested in

your testimony. I was trying to read parts of it while you were speaking

because some of it you did not articulate, but it was written.

Where are the two places where it is currently more dangerous for

journalists in Russia? You mentioned Russia was the third place?

Mr. GOBLE. Colombia is No. 1, and Im sorry, I didnt find out which

one is No. 2, but I remember Colombia being No. 1 because of the drug

cartel.

Sen. CAMPBELL. Well, certainly not in D.C. The only danger they

face here, there are so many of them, they run over each other in our

time frame right now. You ought to try to get on the floor of the Senate

sometimes.

Also, you mentioned that more Russians now believe that government has a right to distort the media?

Mr. GOBLE. Thats right. One of the most disturbing things isseveral polls have been taken over the last 18 months, which show that an

increasing percentage of Russians believe that it is not only right for

the government to suppress information, which is one thing, where you

dont report something, but that it is all right for the government to

distort coverage in order to advance national goals. In other words, that

its not only people are saying the government should stop information

from coming out if it has negative consequences for the government or

the society, but that the government has a positive right to encourage

the distortion of information. That, in some ways, is more pernicious

because half-truths are always more difficult to fight than complete

falsehoods.

Sen. CAMPBELL. Well, I dont really want to make light of it, but as

you know, in this country, we dont believe government has a right to

distort coverage by the media, we believe they can do it quite well by

themselves, as you probably know, but thats just my own personal

view, not the view of this Commission.

In that light, to what extent should the U.S. Government, i.e., the

taxpayer, promote the free press in Russia, if so many Russians themselves oppose the concept and believe its okay for the government to

distort the media?

Mr. GOBLE. Well, many Russians believe that because the government has told them that thats the way to go. Moreover, the experience

theyve had with the free media has not been an entirely positive one.

The President of Estonia Lennart Meri once observed that the transi-
22

tion from a controlled press of the Soviet time to a free press passes

through a yellow press, and an awful lot of these places in Russia are

locked in that process.

Now, the fact is that the free flow of information that was promoted

by international broadcasting, by U.S. Government support of exchange

programs, had a lot to do with the demise of communism and the possibility that Russians could make a change.

If the Helsinki process had not taken place, many people, including

one at least at this table, I think, might not have been nearly as successful precisely because the information, the arguments they were

making, were played back to a much larger group. Many people thought

a decade ago that there was no need for that kind of international broadcasting, such as Voice of America or BBC or my own organization, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, engages in. Nevertheless, the fact is

there is more need for that today precisely because the governments in

Russia and some of these other countries not calling themselves Communists are, nonetheless, authoritarian and enemies of a free press.

What Ive discovered in talking to Russians over the years is that

when you sit and talk about what a free press means and how it can

function, you find very few Russians who dont, after 10 or 15 minutes,

agree with you that its an absolute essential that they have a free

press, but that many of them, at first blush, will tell you a free press

doesnt really exist, its the mouthpiece of big business or someone else.

So our task in international broadcasting and in the American Government supporting exchanges, the kinds of things you talked about with

Mr. Beyrle, is to convert more Russians to that point of view about the

importance of this because, if there is a free press, then Russia will

have all the other freedoms. If there isnt, it wont.

Sen. CAMPBELL. How do we do that, though? It sounds like were

fighting a losing game with the government controlling the press over

there. How do we turn that around? What would you recommend?

Mr. GOBLE. Well, as Mr. Beyrle wisely pointed out a few minutes

ago, 20 years ago the press and the media in the Soviet Union was a

great deal more controlled than it is yet under Mr. Putin. Despite that

fact, the activities of the United States Government, USIA and whatnot, and our broadcasts, had the effect of helping the people of Russia

who wanted change to get there. You have victories, you have defeats.

The idea that this was going to be a single straight line up to the

mountaintop was, I think, naive on our part. We are right now in a lull.

I personally do not believe that Mr. Putin can succeed. I believe that

he will fail. I think that is ultimately a good thing for the people or

Russia as well as others. Thats my personal view.

Sen. CAMPBELL. Meanwhile, many good journalists are going to suffer. Its my understanding several Russian journalists have been murdered, more of them physically assaulted. Have any of those people, the

perpetrators, been brought to justice?

Mr. GOBLE. Since the end of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991, 121

Russian journalists have been killed. Thats approximately one a month.

As far as Im aware, several people have been charged, no one has been

convicted.

Sen. CAMPBELL. No one has been convicted?

Mr. GOBLE. No one has been convicted. When you have that kind of

activity, it only encourages people to do otherwise. Thats the tip of the

iceberg. Beating up journalists, breaking into their houses, intimidat-
23

ing them, charging them with crimes that are made up, all these things

are intended to silence people and, more importantly, to intimidate others into not taking the risk of speaking out.

Sen. CAMPBELL. Well, Ill tell you, were going to be in Paris in another month, at the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly Annual Session, as

you probably know. Im just amazed that so many have been killed and

so many more have been injured. Im going to look into introducing

some kind of a resolution so at least our colleagues from other countries

in the Helsinki process will understand the depth of that in Russia.

Russia probably wont like that, but I think its important.

You also mentioned that many journalists are movingat least I

believe that was in your written testimonywho worked for NTV, have

moved out to smaller broadcasting outlets. Has there been more movement to silence or restrict them at these smaller outlets, too?

Mr. GOBLE. Well, what has happened is people have left NTV and

news department, people have moved to other channels. Those other

channels are now under attack, too. There is widespread speculation,

as Dr. Bonner pointed out, that TV 6 where many of them have moved

to will now be under pressure to get rid of them.

More than that, the act of intimidation, the fact that you do it once

and you get away with it, has a chilling effect on what the people, even

honorable people, will choose to report. People who know that if they

report one way, nothing will happen to them, but if they report another

way, that they or their families may suffer, are going to think twice.

What Im more concerned about than the actions against individuals,

is the climate of intimidation, the climate of fear that is being reintroduced in Russia by Mr. Putin and his regime, that is discouraging people

from telling the truth.

Sen. CAMPBELL. Most of the journalists that become professionals in

this country, most of them go to schools in this country to learn how to

do it. They have journalism schools. Every university probably offers

courses on journalism. Are there such programs in Russian universities or colleges?

Mr. GOBLE. There are journalism programs, but most of the people

working in journalism today were trained in Soviet times, and so you

can imagine what they were trained as.

Sen. CAMPBELL. Does the present Government of Russia do any attempt to control the schools of journalism within the university system?

Mr. GOBLE. There is increasing evidence that the Russian Government is working through the administrations of these institutions to

dictate the course of study, and to even select those who are involved

and those who are not. If one takes the document that I mentioned and

that Dr. Bonner mentioned at the Academy of Sciences, its clear that

the government, the Kremlin, intends to supervise very closely who

gets to travel abroad, who gets to go on these exchanges, and that we

are likely to see the restoration of many controls that we all hoped were

over 20 years ago.

Sen. CAMPBELL. You mentioned also that a journalist makes about

$40 a month.

Mr. GOBLE. Fifty, $50 a month.

Sen. Campbell. $50 a month in your written testimony. When we

were in St. Petersburg, the gentleman driving our car at nighttime was

a physicist from the local university in St. Petersburg, and he told us
24

that he had to drive the car at nighttime to make ends meet, thats

about what he was making, about $50 a month, which is the national

average for salaries.

He also mentioned that a friend of his who was the janitor at the

same university, was a heart surgeon, and that as a heart surgeon he

was makinghe was doing better, he was making about $200 a month.

When I compare that with the opportunities of any free nation, its just

appalling how difficult it must be for the average Russian citizen to just

try and stay alive and pay the bills and get his kids through school.

Mr. GOBLE. People who face those kinds of difficulties frequently dont

care as much about some things we consider very important, namely, a

free media.

Sen. CAMPBELL. Well, clearly, with pay that bad, it opens the door

for alternative ways of making money, which are very often not within

the lines of legal confines. Thank you, Mr. Goble, I appreciate it.

Dr. Pain, would you proceed.

TESTIMONY OF DR. EMIL PAIN,

GALINA STAROVOITOVA FELLOW ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND

CONFLICT RESOLUTION, THE KENNAN INSTITUTE,

WOODROW WILSON CENTER

Dr. PAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is really a great honor for me

to speak in such a distinguished committee. You have my written statement, so I will summarize my remarks and expand a few points.

First, in Russia and partly in the West, there is a tendency to call the

second Chechen war a low-intensity conflict similar to the fighting in

Northern Ireland. In my mind, nothing could be farther from the truth

than this notion. In all the years of the Northern Ireland conflict, there

was nothing near the magnitude of casualties and destruction as in the

31/2 years of two Chechen wars.

In the first war, according to Russian official records, more than 4,000

Russian soldiers and more than 30,000 civilians were killed. In the

second war, however, experts have shown that more than twice that

amount have perished. In a year and a half, according to official records,

Russia has lost more than 3,000 soldiers and more than 9,000 wounded.

Thus, the monthly losses of the Russian army now is bigger than in the

previous war.

I am confident that the losses among civilians also are greater. The

Chechen war has been second only to World War II in terms of its

destructiveness. Even Bosnia and Kosovo could not compare with this

war. So, it is a tragedy not only for Chechens, not only for Russia, it is

also a tragedy for Europe as a whole.

The Russians have no chance of victory in this war. Even in a purely

military sense, there is little probability of victory, especially utopian

idea to have an economic victory in Chechnya. It means turning the

Chechen population to the Russian side through the economic restoration of Chechnya.

How is it possible to restore industry in Chechnya if more than 80

percent of it was concentrated in peaceful times in Grozny, which is

now completely destroyed? Grozny was one of the biggest and probably

one of the richest cities among the old capitals of the North Caucus

Republic.

The army cannot be located for a long time in a hostile occupied territory. It will begin to demoralize, and demoralization of 100,000 Russian

troops in Chechnya is already displaying itself. With every month of
25

the war, a larger part of the home country population becomes dissatisfied with it. Opinion polls show that this change is taking place now. If

in the beginning of this year more than 60 percent of respondents supported the continuation of the war until final victory, in May of this

year less than 40 percent still did.

In this type of conflict it is incorrect to talk of the guilt of only one

side. One cannot demonize Russia and idealize the Chechen rebels. There

are people among the Chechens that are without question international

terrorists. But that is the problem. The longer the war lasts, the greater

the influence of radicals in the rebel camp.

So, the Russian leadership, our government, still has a chance to

begin a dialogue with the moderate forces in the Chechen armed resistance grouped around President Maskhadov.

In my opinion, international organizations must, above all else, help

the Russian Government understand that continual reliance on force to

solve the Chechen problem is self-defeating for Russia. That is all. Now

I am ready to answer your questions.

Sen. CAMPBELL. Dr. Pain, thank you for being here. I know sometimes it is difficult to be able to testify in front of this Commission when

you have to go home, but were quite aware of the risk that people take

when they testify here, and I just want to commend you on your courage for appearing here because your testimony is very important for us

to know.

Let me ask you two or three questions dealing with Chechnya. You

mentioned that in the last Chechen war, Russia suffered about 3,000

casualties, 9,000 wounded. Does that lead to a large-scale desertion? I

understand that many Russian soldiers were young, inexperienced, not

really committed from an ideological standpoint, poorly trained, and so

on. Is there a large desertion problem within the Russian military?

Dr. PAIN. I suppose that there are such problems. What I know for

sure is, that the Russian army, the Russian Government, has had ever

more problems with reinforcement of the war.

Sen. CAMPBELL. Recruitment?

Dr. PAIN. Recruitment, yes. So it will be more and more difficult to

continue this war for the Russian Government.

Sen. CAMPBELL. You mentioned that their policy of using force in

Chechnya is self-defeating. Is there any indication that opinion is shared

by the military leadership?

Dr. PAIN. Some of them should understand. First, among those who

experienced the war in Afghanistan, they learned by their experiences

and they understand that it is impossible to win such a war. However,

I know that it is a two-stage process. First of all, if society could understand the self-defeating, and if they begin to understand my friend Paul

will tell you about the approach for the mass media. The majority of

Russians said that it became worse since Putin came into power. So,

they understand because it is gross. I suppose after this will be the

changes among the political elite.

Sen. CAMPBELL. Well, you know, in the history of warfare, Russian

soldiers have always been known for great strength and great courage.

I think of the terrible circumstances they went through during World

War II against Nazi Germany. Ive always had great respect for Russian soldiers, but sometimes Russian soldiers, if they dont believe they

are righteous in their mission and on the right side of what is fair, then

it makes it a lot more difficult to expect them to be involved in a war

like that with Chechnya.
26

Do you think that theres a specific policy in the Russian military of

terrorizing non-combatant civilians in Chechnya? Is that a policy, or

just what they call collateral damage in some circles?

Dr. PAIN. There are two positions in which I want to stress my opinion, and I am sure that many peacemakers in Russia will disagree with

my position.

In my opinion, these two wars were not ethnic wars, so there was no

idea of genocide of the nation. I can give you many arguments for this.

First of all, if you compare this war with what Milosevic did in Serbia,

in Bosnia or Kosovo, he supported full privileges for the Serbs. Nothing

like this was in Chechnya. The Russian Government never supported

Russians who lived there, and the majority of them were forced to emigrate before these wars. During the bombing of Grozny, maybe half of

those people who died were Russians. Outside of Chechnya, the majority of Chechens live now, more than a half. And there is no measuring

of Chechens outside by government. Of course, there is xenophobia, big

xenophobia now grows, by both sides, by the way. But there is a big

difference between xenophobia and murdering. About the tactic of fear

against civilian at all, without ethnic groups? Yes, they use this tactic.

In Chechnya, they use this tactic as they use it in previous war, and in

a bigger scale in the second Chechen war.

Sen. CAMPBELL. There have been many atrocities on both sides of it,

I know. If Russia were to grant independence to Chechnya, what would

be the implications for the rest of the Caucausthe North Caucasus

region or for the Russian Federation? Would it start a further escalation of breakaway republics?

Dr. PAIN. First, now in the situation in Chechnya it is not the time

for speaking about the status, in my mind, and I am supported by the

position of Aslan Maskhadov, who said that its not necessary tono

preliminary position on this. If, in its time, Russia would exclude Chechnya from its composition, it wouldnt at all produce a domino effect, in

my mind, because the example of Chechnya didnt inspire anybody. In

principle, in general, it is impossible to keep integrity on the basis of

fear. Thats all what I can say.

Sen. CAMPBELL. Mr. Goble, would you like to respond to that, too? Id

be interested in your perspective.

Mr. GOBLE. I think that I completely agree that if Chechnya were

allowed to be independent, that it would not immediately lead to the

departure of other republics or other parts of the Russian Federation.

At the same time, it is worth noting that the pressure that the Putin

government has placed on the regions is generating a countervailing

reaction.

The President of Tatarstan, Mintemir Shameyev, pointed out last

week that if the Russian Government continues with its rules or with

its effort to harmonize legislation and insists on the dropping of the

powersharing treaty between Moscow and Kazan, the people in the Kremlin should remember that Tatarstan is the only other place besides

Chechnya that did not sign the Federation treaty, and that pressure on

the regions may affect others to leave. I dont think anyone wants to

follow Chechnya into destruction, but I think if the central government

attempts to rule the country by fear, by pressure, that there are other

parts of the Russian Federation that will ultimately look elsewhere. I

think that the distances involved in Russia11 time zones wide, still

the diversity will lead to that unless the Russian Government is built

on the basis of democratic legitimacy. If it isnt, then I believe that the
27

process of decolonization will proceed, but it will not be primarily on

ethnic basis, but on a basis of regions that want to protect their own

rights, and that some of the regions that may be the most interested in

leaving may be made up of ethnic Russians, such as the Far East.

Sen. CAMPBELL. I see. Mr. Semyonov, youve been translating for

your mother. If she would like to participate or answer in any way, she

is certainly welcome to do so.

Dr. BONNER. I would like to respond a little bit on the question about

whether there are deliberate genocidal actions being committed by the

Russian army. I am not sure if there is a direct order from the authorities higher up to that effect, but the fact is that the commanders in the

field are not controlled by the chain of command as they should be, and

that their actions, in fact, objectively amount to genocidal actions.

When there is a cleansing operation in a village, and all males,

including boys as young as 12 years old, are taken into custody and

most of them disappear and are never seen again, that is genocide in

my opinion.

I agree with the others and the letter of President Maskhadov which

I enclosed with my testimony that right now is not the time to decide

the final status of Chechnya, but there are issues that need to be addressed immediately, including by Western states.

I am sure that unless there is pressure to ensure that an investigation of mass burial sites is carried out in Chechnya right now, that we

will neverthat the population of Russia will never know the truth. I

am certain that civilians and innocent victims have been executed in

huge numbers, and are buried in these sites. They should be investigated and the results made known so as to not allow Russians to live

with the comfortable thought that their country is not doing anything

unusual when, in fact, the country is responsible for cruel actions that

come close to or perhaps satisfy the definition of crimes against humanity.

Sen. CAMPBELL. Well, in that context, in 1994, the OSCE Assistance

Mission was in Grozny and then was evacuated, I guess for fear of some

dangers. There is a possibility that it may return. How do you assess

the future role of the OSCE in efforts to resolve the problems in Chechnya? Perhaps, Dr. Pain, if you would answer, and then maybe I could

get all three of your opinions.

Dr. PAIN. I suppose the role would be the most important, but the

efficiency of the OSCE Mission relates to the personality who represents OSCE in this territory. I have dealt with two of them. First, I

even forget his name, it was a person from Hungary, who was nothad

not paid too much attention to this, and then it was Tim Guldimann.

His role was crucial in preparation of the peace agreement and finishing the first Chechen war. So, it will be largely depend on what person

will be the representative of OSCE in this territory.

Mr. GOBLE. I would add only that its not only a question of getting a

mission into Chechnya, it is important for the OSCE to consider what

the Russian state is doing as a whole.

Sen. CAMPBELL. The Russian state

Mr. GOBLE. Being Moscow.

Sen. CAMPBELL.Apparently would not like them to return at this

juncture, is that true?

Mr. GOBLE. They do not want to be returned, but the fact is one

needs to pay attention to what Russian officials are saying. There is

currently a trial going on of a Russian colonel who is accused of raping
28

and killing a Chechen young woman. A series of senior Russian officials, including the Defense Minister, the leaders of several of the largest political parties in the Duma, have said that the individual involved

is a victim of circumstances and that its unfortunate that he is being

tried. Prosecutors have indicated that hes not going to be punished all

that severely in any case. Those are issues that the OSCE needs to

address, too.

It may not be that theres a specific order to kill Chechens, as such,

but when those kinds of comments are being made by the Defense Minister of a major power, then I think the OSCE needs to intervene and

speak up on those things. I would love to see a return of a serious OSCE

mission in Chechnya because I think the reason that Mr. Putin thinks

he can get away with what he is doing is because no one is watching.

But, unfortunately, people dont seem to be watching very much what

is being said and done in Moscow itself on this issue. I havent seen a

single op-ed in an American newspaper, for example, asking about why

the Defense Minister of the Russian Federation should be expressing

sympathy and understanding to someone who is apparently guilty of

raping and murdering a Chechen girl.

Sen. CAMPBELL. Dr. Bonner, did you have any comments on that?

Dr. BONNER. I think that unfortunately OSCE as well as other international organizationsfor example, the European Parliamentary Assemblyhave conducted conversations about Chechnya, but have not

really taken any actions.

I think that European countries, as well as the United States, have

means, diplomatic means, of pressuring Russia, strongly pressuring

Russia, to ensure that there is a cease-fire. A cease-fire by the Russian

side would be immediately followed by a cease-fire on the Chechen side.

Then the Chechen and Russian sides can negotiate and figure out how

to repair the consequences of this terrible war, but right now a ceasefire is up to the Russian side and can be declared unilaterally since it is

Russia that is on the offensive.

I want to point out two possibilities for Western action. First, in my

opinion, all economic assistance to Russia should be stopped immediately, blocked completely, as long as the war continues. No assistance

should go to a country that is conducting such a war. The only exception I would make to this statement is that human rights organization

should continue to receive international aid, but there should be no

assistance to the state, as such.

Second, Russia likes prestige. The government wants prestige and,

in particular, the prestige of being a member of the G8. Of course,

according to purely economic standards, Russia should not have been

made a member of the G8 to begin with, but now I think that it would

be useful to reward the Government of Russia by continuing its membership in G8 if it ends the war in Chechnya, but if Russia continues

the war in Chechnya, Russia should be dropped as a member of the G

8. It is not a country that belongs in a select group of democracies.

Sen. CAMPBELL. It is my understanding from staff that there is a

resolution that has been introduced on this side, on the House side, to

exclude Russia from membership in the G8, but whether that gets

passed or not is anybodys guess because it is a long process.

Last comment, and then we will close.
29

Dr. PAIN. It is one thing which I strongly disagree with is the resolution and this notion. There are two aspects. Now it is impossible to

threaten Russia with the economic assistance because they dont need

it. Now they have good favorable condition in oil market and it is not

very efficient instrument of action.

Another aspect is that international organizations can influence Russia only if they include Russia in their workin the previous round a

representative of the State Department was testifying, and you said to

him, what Mr. Bush will tell to Mr. Putin when they meet, if they

meet, how they will influence, if Russia will have any possibility to be

involved in symbolic organization, what do you propose for Russia. But

there is no strategy for Russia at all as to how to live in history with

this big country. So, it must be very careful with such notion.

I suppose that within the organization it is much more easier to influence Russia than a situation of isolation. The situation of isolation

will grow in Russia, that is all. That will be danger not only to Chechen,

to everybody.

Sen. CAMPBELL. Well, theres a difference of opinion here within Congress, as you probably know, about aid to Russia. Some say that we

should cut off aid to Russia just because of their human rights record

and many other reasons. Others say that it would be worse to cut it off

because some of the money is specifically earmarked to dismantling of

Soviet nuclear armaments. So, some of the supporters of aid to Russia

here in Congress say that its in our best interest to continue aid under

some conditions, but its an ongoing dialogue that we get into every

year, as Mr. Goble knows, and I suppose before we get through this

years appropriations process, that same question will come up again.

Well, let me conclude by thanking all of you for your testimony, and

to tell you that we will keep the record open for 15 more days if you have

additional comments, and that we may submit some to be answered in

writing, and we will share all of your comments and your testimony

with the other Commissioners.

With that, thank you for being here. This hearing is adjourned.

(Whereupon, at 11:40 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.)
30

PREPARED STATEMENT OF

HON. BEN NIGHTHORSE CAMPBELL, CHAIRMAN,

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

Good morning and welcome to this hearing of the Commission on

Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Helsinki Commission. Before

proceeding, I note for the record that this week marks the Commissions

25th anniversary of promoting human rights, democracy and the rule

of law. The bipartisan work of the Commission, in partnership with

non-governmental organizations at home and abroad, has had an impact on the lives of tens of thousands of individuals denied their fundamental freedoms. Todays hearing of the Helsinki Commission will examine the course of human rights in Russia after a year a half of

President Putins presidency. I visited St. Petersburg, Russia in 1999,

to participate in the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. While there, I had

an opportunity to meet with a diverse group of Russian NGOs at the

U.S. Consulate. That meeting underscored in my mind the importance

of civil society in Russia.

There is no doubt that human rights and the human rights movement in Russia have come a long way since the fall of the Soviet Union

almost ten years ago. From an unfree Soviet Union, Russia has consistently been rated by Freedom House as partially free. Our hope is

that Russia will overcome the legacy of the past and achieve the freedom the Russian people deserve.

Indications of this downward trend in Russias human rights record

were noted by several experts at a Commission hearing held in May of

last year, and regrettably the situation has not improved since.

One of the most disturbing events has been the forceful takeover by

individuals connected with the Russian Government of the NTV television network, an independent network that had been critical of the Putin

administration. The pattern of harassment against the few independent news outlets is quite clear.

The NTV case and the campaign against Mr. Gusinskys are not

isolated events. According the New York-based Committee to Protect

Journalists, Members of the independent press are being harassed

and persecuted far more than any time since the Soviet era. In an

editorial entitled Russias Dying Free Press, the Washington Post wrote

that Mr. Putins campaign already has spread a severe chill through

the vibrant press that sprouted and flourished during the 1990s.

Incidentally, with respect to law enforcement and the press in Russia, I dont intend to say that law enforcement in our own country is

flawless, but one of the best safeguards against arbitrary acts by law

enforcement agencies in this country is, indeed, the existence of a free

media. For the second year in a row, the United Nations Human Rights

Commission adopted a European Union-sponsored resolution criticizing

Russias actions in Chechnya, specifically calling attention to widespread violence against civilians and alleged violations of human rights

and humanitarian law, in particular forced disappearances, extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, torture, [and] arbitrary detentions, ...

The discovery of dozens of bodies in a mass grave near the main Russian military base in Chechnya is only the most egregious horror in a

long line of horrors being visited upon non-combatants in that region.

This does not excuse atrocities committed by Chechen forces, or detract

from legitimate concerns about conditions in Chechnya after the first
31

war. The gravity of the violations in Chechnya demand our attention in

light of Russias international obligations, including her OSCE commitments. During last years hearing on Russia, we heard testimony

about the increasing pressure from the security services against Russian scientists and environmental activists, who were being accused on

flimsy charges of espionage, revealing state secrets, etc. At least two

American citizens have been caught up in this net. Two years ago,

President Putin told a Russian newspaper that environmental groups

were in the employ of foreign intelligence agencies. It is now reported

that Russias Academy of Sciences has ordered its scientists to report

to state authorities on their contacts with foreign officials. Russias

Deputy Prime Minister for social policy has denied this report, and we

will certainly monitor related developments. If it is true, it will certainly haveat the very leasta chilling effect on academic freedom

and the intellectual exchanges.

While it is important to recognize the positive changes that Russia

has experienced in the last decade, recent trends are disturbing and

give rise for concern. Russias own human rights commissioner has

stated that Russias resurgent security forces are threatening to wreck

democracy and basic freedoms.

I look forward to hearing from our Administration witness and our

experts assembled this morning as we examine the human rights picture in Russia in anticipation of next weeks summit meeting between

President Bush and his Russian counterpart.
32

PREPARED STATEMENT OF

 HON. CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, CO-CHAIRMAN,

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling this important hearing today.

This is the first opportunity, since the beginning of this new Administration, the Commission will have to examine current United States

policy toward Russia.

Certainly we all understand that Russia has had a difficult political

transformation over the past decade after seventy years of communism.

No one expects Russia to be a carbon copy of the G7 countries or other

Western nations with their own historical experiences and long established democratic traditions and institutions.

I remember how encouraged many of us were in 1991, when the Soviet delegation at the OSCE Conference in Moscowand I would note

that the co-chairman of that delegation was our distinguished colleague

in the Russian Duma, Sergei Kovalevgave its consensus to the principle that human rights issues were not exclusively the purview of the

nation in which the issue was raised. Now, ten years later, in a public

statement, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation

has stated that the OSCE should not become a mechanism for interference in the internal affairs of participating States of the OSCE....

While I believe it is reasonable to expect that Russianow a member

of the United Nations, the Organization on Security and Cooperation in

Europe, and the Council of Europewill not turn its back on the progress

that has been made in civil liberties and human rights up to now, this

statement by the MFA is very disturbing. It reflects an attitude toward

human rights and international cooperation that we thought had been

relegated to the Cold War archives.

Mr. Chairman, I am especially concerned about the carnage that continues to take place in Chechnya. The death and destruction continues,

taking Chechen and Russian lives and making a peaceful solution appear even less possible. The Helsinki Commission has held several hearings on this subject, and I am pleased to see that today we have a guest

from Moscow who is very well versed in the events in that region of

Russia.

I was very critical of the previous Administration and what I felt was

a green light given to Moscow to conduct a brutal war against both

combatants and non-combatants in Chechnya. I notice that the last

State Department Country Reports issued by the previous Administration is quite critical of Russias conduct in Chechnya. Let me quote

from one section:

On February 5 Russian riot police and contract soldiers ... executed

at least 60 civilians [in the suburbs of Grozny.] The perpetrators raped

some of the victims and extorted money, later setting many houses on

fire to destroy evidence. According to Human Rights Watch, authorities

suspended their investigation of the incident, and there were no indications that those responsible for similar incidents in late 1999 were apprehended or punished.

I think we all understand that guerrilla warfare can be savage, and

there have been documented instances of atrocities committed by

Chechen forces. However, Russia military actions in Chechnya suggest

less of a military operation against an armed secessionist forcesor an

anti-terrorist operation, as Moscow phrases itthan a war against an

entire people who are its own citizens.
33

I look forward to hearing the current Administrations thoughts on

the subject of Chechnya.

I am especially delighted today to see again our friend Dr. Elena Bonner

in this 80th year after the birth of the late Dr. Andrei Sakharov. The

entire world owes a huge debt of gratitude to both Dr. Sakharov and Dr.

Bonner for their selfless struggle in defense of human rights in the

Soviet Union and Russia. And I know Mr. Goble will provide us with his

characteristic expertise in analyzing the challenges facing the independent press in Russia under the Putin administration.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would just touch on one area of human

rights where the picture in Russia is decidedly mixed, that of religious

liberty. Although things are not nearly as bad as in some other countries of the world, there are continuing attempts by local officials to

limit worship activities in some regions of Russia, and anti-Semitic acts

and the propagation of Zionist conspiracy theories continue to contaminate parts of Russia, although President Putin has personally made

high-profile efforts to improve relations with some representatives of

the Jewish community in Russia.

Again, thank you, Mr. Chairman, for convening this hearing. I look

forward to hearing from our witness, and will have some questions to

follow.
34

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. PITTS,

COMMISSIONER, COMMISSION ON SECURITY

AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this timely hearing on Troubling Trends: Human Rights in Russia. As you and others know, the

continued reports coming out of Russia raise great concerns about the

continued protection of fundamental human rights for the Russian people.

I look forward to hearing from the distinguished witnesses here today

regarding their insight into the current trends in Russia and possible

positive action to encourage the protection of the basic freedoms of the

Russian people.

Various reports suggest that President Putin is attempting to return

to previous eras and centralize power in Moscow. This move would most

likely pave the way for, not end, more corruption and less freedom for

the Russian people. The international concerns over current abuses of

religious freedom, the media, and human rights in Chechnya would

most likely increase under Putins new power structure.

Recently, I met with a group of Pentecostal Christians who shared

stories of the persecution they currently are experiencing in Russia,

including what they believe is the religiously motivated murder of a few

of their members. And, their churches have been liquated in the Far

East of Russia. Muslims in Vologda are facing extreme opposition to the

building of their mosque, including reported financial harassment by

local officials. Protestants in Vyborg have been blocked by officials from

using and restoring a building they purchased in 1998. Officials in

Kabardino-Balkaria refuse to register Jehovahs Witness communities

despite the Ministry of Justice ruling that the groups should be registered. Religious literature is confiscated from religious groups,

congregants are barred from renting or using particular buildings, and

other general harassment occurs. Unfortunately, from the reports my

office has received, the current trends do not bode well for religious

freedom.

Similarly, the trends for freedom in the media do not bode well. Examples abound of media personnel, whether owners, editors or journalists feeling the ire of Russian officials due to print or broadcast media.

Many know the case of Vladimir Gusinsky, but other harassment continues against journalists, harassment that can even lead to death.

The governments control of the press, led by President Putin, reflects

another manifestation of the desire to turn back the tide of democratic

reform.

And, in Chechnya, the Russian government tries to cover up the brutal human rights abuses, including rape, mass slaughter, random shooting of civilians and other horrific conduct by the military.

Mr. Chairman, we must continue to shine the spotlight of truth on

the human rights violations in Russia. The Russian people deserve to

live in freedom and peace, to prosper on the foundation of the great

history and heritage they have. By holdings hearings such as this one,

we shine the light for the Russian people, so that they too may enjoy

true freedom.
35

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. JOHN BEYRLE,

SPECIAL ADVISOR TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE

NEWLY INDEPENDENT STATES, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the invitation to talk with you today

about the troubling trends regarding human rights in Russia. Any discussion of human rights in Russia in 2001 must take into account the

remarkable changes and achievements the Russian people have benefited from since the start of glasnost and perestroika in the mid-1980s,

but especially since the collapse of Communist rule ten years ago. Freedom of travel and worship, the right to assemble and speak openly without fear of certain arrest and imprisonment, and the growth of independent media and an impressive community of non-governmental

organizationsincluding human rights groupsall constitute a remarkable, one could even say unimaginable change from the strictures that

developed over 70 years of totalitarian, authoritarian rule. When viewed

against that sad historical legacy, the human rights picture looks quite

encouraging indeed. But it also means this laudable record of progress

over the past decade must itself become new standard of measure as we

consider and state our expectations for further progress in this area,

which speaks to the values of liberty and democracy that are so much a

part of what the United States stands for in the world. To put it more

simply, it is not enough for Russia to be judged simply on how the

current human rights situation differs from the communist past. To be

true to our desire to support Russias continued integration into international institutions, we must look at the Russian record in light of

international standards and practices. And in this light, I would like to

comment on some troubling trends that threaten to undermine the

progress I cited at the outset of these remarks. In particular, I would

like to focus on the attempt to restore order in Russia today and the

impact of this strategy on media freedoms. We must also discuss the

crisis in Chechnya because it represents the fundamental dilemma for

human rights in Russia today. Finally, I would like to elaborate on our

long-term strategy to promote democratic values and civil society in

Russia.

MANAGED DEMOCRACY

Just over one year ago, President Putin was elected with a promise to

the Russian people of restoring order in the country, and this remains

his top priority. The Russian public overwhelmingly supports him in

this effort. The Russian government is not seeking order simply for

its own sake. Its goal is civil and economic development. We, of course,

strongly support civil and economic development in Russia. However,

we are concerned by some of the means chosen to achieve these ends,

which may be inconsistent and perhaps even threaten the progress of

the past decade, and which also raise questions about Russias compliance with international human rights obligations. Russia appears to be

pursuing a managed democracy, in which the boundaries of free speech,

dissent, the media, religion, civil society and politics are loosely determined by the executive and maintained through the use of law enforcement and other authorities. The biggest and most recent example of

such action is the case of Media-Most and its independent television

station, NTV. NTV was an important catalyst for expanding media

freedom in Russia because its broadcasts brought criticism of the government and its policies into the homes of people, and, at the same
36

time, accustomed the Russian government to hearing criticism of itself. The governments takeover of NTV relied on a combination of civil

and criminal cases with state-controlled Gazprom as a business surrogate. The Russian government claims that the Media-Most takeover is

simply a commercial affair, but through its single-minded pursuit of

Media-Most and its head, Vladimir Gusinskiy, the government has demonstrated a broader set of goals that includes the stifling of outspoken

critics in a way that has had a chilling effect on how other journalists

go about their jobs.

CHECHNYA

The most persistently troubling human rights issue in Russia remains Chechnya. While we recognize Russias territorial integrity, and

right to fight terrorism and armed insurgencies on its soil, continuing

and very credible reports of arbitrary arrests, torture, extrajudicial killings on the part of federal forces are deeply disturbing. Especially troubling is lack of serious investigation and accountability for such crimes.

The culture of impunity which has developed is not compatible with

either respect for human rights or a achieving a peaceful solution to the

conflict. More broadly this is a question of values; what kind of longterm relationship can we pursue with a government that wages a brutal and seemingly endless war against its own people on its own territory? Our policy on Chechnya insists on a political settlement of the

crisis, an end to ongoing violations of international humanitarian and

human rights law, and credible accountability for past violations. We

call for unimpeded humanitarian access and assistance, including the

return of the OSCE Assistance Group to Chechnya and visits by UN

special representatives. Ultimately, the best hope for influencing a

change in Moscows policies away from violence and toward accountability, dialogue, reconciliation and reconstruction, will be the insistence of many voices in the international community as well as inside

of Russia. Efforts like the joint United Nations Commission on Human

Rights of the past two years and frank discussion of Chechnya in the

Russia-EU Summit are part of making this point.

Mr. Chairman, let me touch briefly on the U.S. response to the human rights challenges in todays Russia.

At the government-to-government level, we have and will continue to

raise human rights issues with the government of Russia at every opportunity. We will work directly, as well as in concert with EU and

others in multilateral institutions including the UN and the OSCE.

Underpinning these political and diplomatic efforts, however, is our work

at the grassroots level. Supporting the growth of a strong and vibrant

independent media is one of our highest priorities in Russia. We are

assisting both print and broadcast media throughout Russia by providing them with technical assistance and training to further their economic viability and to enable them to become more effective advocates

for journalistic freedom. We are also giving direct assistance such as

production grants and training. Training has grown from a focus on

fact-based, investigative journalism to more business-oriented training

to promote financial independence. Legal assistance for print and broadcast journalists has become a more central feature of our work, including protection against federal and local government libel suits and tax

investigations. Finally, we are looking to step up our support for Russias

media watchdog NGOs and media monitors to allow them to track de-
37

velopments in the regions and draw attention to national and local government attempts to suppress the news. U.S. international broadcasting can play a pivotal role in supporting the development of independent media in Russia and foster stronger ties between U.S. broadcasters

and affiliated Russian media outlets. In addition, nearly 45,000 Russians have traveled to the U.S. on our exchange programs. Through

these programs, we are exposing the next generation of Russian leaders

to democratic values in action. Our openly-competed exchange programs

provide an opportunity for any Russian to apply to gain substantive

knowledge of how things work in the West, and make contacts with his

or her U.S. counterparts that typically endure beyond the exchange.

The programs have a strong track record, and we should increase the

numbers of exchangees where capacity allows.

Mr. Chairman, next week President Bush will meet with President

Putin in Ljubljana, Slovenia, for their first summit. They will be discussing their respective views and vision for our bilateral relationship.

Issues of human rights will be an important part of this dialogue, for it

is clear that a Russia whose respect for human rights accords with

international standards and practices is a Russia with whom we can

live and work more comfortably and effectively. A Russia committed to

democracy and individual rights is a Russia with which we will have a

close and productive relationship, in spite of any disagreement we may

have on one or another issue of the day. The significant progress we

have seen over the past decade in this area has played an important

role in creating a changed dynamic in U.S.-Russian relations that has

permitted a much broader and more ambitious agenda to develop between our two countries. If we have a sense that progress on human

rights and democratization has stopped or is being reversed, then it

cant help but have a serious impact on the relationship as a whole.
38

MATERIALS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

BY DEPARTMENT OF STATE

LETTER TO HON. BEN NIGHTHORSE CAMPBELL, CHAIRMAN,

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE,

FROM MICHAEL C. POLT, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY,

LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS, THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

United States Department of State

Washington, DC. 20520

January 15, 2002

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In response to your request at the June 5 hearing of the Helsinki

Commission I am pleased to provide documents with the Department of

States response to a GAO study on Rule of Law Assistance in what

were then called the New Independent States. The Department previously provided these same documents to other congressional committees.

I hope you will find these materials of help. Please do not hesitate to

contact us again if we can be of further assistance.

Sincerely,

Michael C. Polt

Acting Assistant Secretary

Legislative Affairs

The Honorable

Ben Nighthorse Campbell, Chairman

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe,

United States Senate.
39

LETTER TO HON. CHRISTOPHER SHAYS,

CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY,

VETERANS AFFAIRS, AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM,

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This is in response to your letter of May 29 concerning the May 17

hearing, Rule of Law Assistance Programs: Limited Impact, Limited

Sustainability.

Enclosed please find responses to the questions posed in your letter.

The documents requested in that letter were provided earlier. We are

glad to have the opportunity to discuss further the successes we have

already had with our programs and explain in greater detail the management changes we have made in the last several years. Those changes

have gone a long way toward addressing the weaknesses identified in

the GAO report, and we believe the programs will be even more successful than they have been in the past.

We hope this information is helpful to you. Please do not hesitate to

contact us again if we may be of further assistance on this or any other

matter.

Sincerely,

Paul V. Kelly

Assistant Secretary

Legislative Affairs

Enclosure:

Question Responses
40

QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD

SUBMITTED TO

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE RAND BEERS

BY CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, CHAIRMAN OF SUBCOMMITTEE

ON NATIONAL SECURITY, VETERANS AFFAIRS, AND

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE ON

GOVERNMENT REFORM,

MAY 29, 2001

Examples of Successes

Question: What other successes have U.S. programs had, particularly

in Russia and Ukraine?

Answer: U.S. assistance programs have had successes throughout the

region. In addition to the programs mentioned during the testimony on

May 12, we can add the following examples:

 With U.S. assistance, Russian and Ukrainian legal education systems are incorporating practice-based teaching methodologies and

clinical operations into their curricula. Assistance providers are

currently working with 22 law school clinics in Russia and additional programs were started in five more cities this year. In

Ukraine, the law clinic at Donestsk State University Law Faculty has grown from 10 to 120 students handling over 500 cases

annually. Emphasis has been placed on providing Russians and

Ukrainians with the skills necessary to effectively manage and

operate these programs without outside assistance. These programs

continue to grow and there is every indication they will be sustained by the participating institutions.

 With U.S. assistance, Russia organized a Bailiffs Service, with

effective procedures for processing and collecting judgments. The

Service has helped increase the percentage of judgments successfully enforced in Russia.

 With U.S. assistance, Russia established a Judicial Department

which functions as an administrative office for its judiciary. The

Department has obtained a threefold increase in budget resources

for the courts over the last three years and is a key component of

the Russian legal reform process.

 Nine Russian regions implemented jury trials in 1994-1995; we

have been working with them since the beginning. President Putin has announced that jury trialsa key element in developing

the rule of lawwill be expanded nationwide by 2003. Russian

alumni of U.S. training programs will serve as trainers and role

models as the program expands.

 We have assisted the Russian Duma over the past year in developing a reformed Criminal Procedure Code. The draft code, which

passed its second reading June 20, includes revolutionary changes,

such as empowering the judiciary, rather than prosecutors, to

authorize search, seizure and arrest warrants, introduction of plea

bargaining and expansion of jury trials throughout Russia. During the course of todays debate, recent U.S. Government assistance programs on the code were cited by Duma deputies as very

helpful.
41

 We have also worked closely with the Duma to develop money laundering legislation. Once this legislation is passed into law, we intend to

work with law enforcement and regulatory personnel to create the capacity to enforce it effectively.

 In Ukraine, U.S. assistance was instrumental in the drafting of a

new Criminal Code which will go into effect on September 1, and in

implementing a national action plan on enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights.

 U.S. assistance has also been instrumental in the development of a

draft Criminal Procedure Code, that includes many safeguards for the

protection of individual rights, and comprehensive anti-money laundering legislation. Both are now before the Ukrainian Parliament. The

Law on Banks and Banking Activity, enacted in December 2000 and

developed with U.S. assistance, contains anti-money laundering provisions now being implemented by the National Bank of Ukraine.

 With U.S. assistance, Ukraine established Environmental Public

Advocacy Centers (EPACs) that provide pro bono counseling services

to citizens and NGOs on environmental complaints. These centers have

won numerous environmental lawsuits and opened up aspects of the

Ukrainian law-making process to the public. A number of these centers

have been created in partnership with existing NGOs and an increasing number are becoming self-sufficient.

 U.S.-Ukrainian cooperation on law enforcement matters deepened

with the entry into force in 2001 of a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty

and a Treaty for the Avoidance of Double Taxation.

Assessing Host Government Commitment

Question: How and how often does the State Department assess the

interest and political will of a host country during program planning

and program implementation?

How and how often does the State Department assess a host countrys

ability to sustain a program monetarily during program planning and

implementation?

Answer: Assessment of these issues is an ongoing process.

Embassies in the region are in daily contact with host governments

at various levels and, among other things, monitor host government

commitment to reform and the status of reform legislation and programs. The presence or absence of the requisite political will and willingness to commit resources factor greatly into embassy identification

of projects and the Departments willingness to fund them.

If a host government proves unwilling to support a program (with inkind contributions, financial and political support, or with requisite

legislation), a .project can be delayed, funds can be re-programmed to

areas where cooperation is possible, or a

project can be abandoned altogether. As was mentioned during the

May 17 testimony, we suspended forensics lab programs in Georgia and

Armenia and anti-money laundering programs in Ukraine and Russia

pending adequate host government commitment.

As part of the program design, a determination of the life of project-

normally one to three years  is made. INL usually funds a project

incrementally, no matter the planned life of project. We are therefore

able to assess the status of the project annually before deciding to add

additional funds. If the project does not appear to be meeting its objec-
42

tives, provision of additional funding can be delayed, or other action can

be taken. We agree with the GAO that difficult political and economic

conditions in the Newly Independent States have been obstacles to

achieving objectives and sustainability. However, as the examples of

success cited above demonstrate, real progress has been made.

A good example of the Departments ability to redirect funds if a host

country does not live up to its commitments is assistance to Russia on

money laundering. After the U.S. provided significant training and technical assistance on money laundering, Russia not only did not have an

effective anti-money laundering regime, President Yeltsin had vetoed

the anti-money laundering law (1999) . Viewing the veto as a lack of

political will to address seriously the issue, the Department of State

suspended technical assistance on combating money laundering, allowing only the

Resident Legal Advisor to continue efforts to promote the legislation.

Once the legislation is passed, INL will resume training on technical

matters, including investigating and prosecuting money laundering. In

the interim, INL has worked with U.S. law enforcement agencies to

reprogram existing money previously identified for money laundering

in order to provide assistance for other priorities which we believe have

a greater opportunity for success. These include legal reform, efforts to

combat organized crime, and technical assistance on specific investigative and prosecutorial issues.

Management Changes

Question: Provide a detailed description of the steps State and the law

enforcement agencies have undertaken to address the management

weaknesses identified in the GAO report.

Answer: The weaknesses in program management and implementation identified by the GAO report focus on program design, sustainability, measures of effectiveness and coordination from the 1995-1998 period.

The Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) of the Department of State began receiving Freedom Support Act (FSA) funding for Rule of Law programs in the Newly Independent States (NIS) in 1995, when INLs mandate was expanded from

counternarcotics to include international crime. Between 1995 and 2000,

INL moved from funding the activities of three law enforcement agencies to working with more than twenty-five, in the NIS and worldwide.

In that time, the amount of FSA funding INL received doubled from

$13 million in 1995 to $26 million in 1999.

In response to this tremendous growth, INL has developed more thorough interagency coordination mechanisms to monitor assistance funds.

For example, last spring, INL convened an interagency meeting with

law enforcement agencies during which the funding pipeline was discussed. We then launched a series of meetings with individual agencies

to identify, reprogram and otherwise account for the outstanding funding. Additionally, INL strengthened the agencies reporting requirements. INL now requires after action reports and complete budget reports on all programs, with interim reporting for longer-term advisory

programs. Through time and experience, INL has improved its dia-
43

logue and coordination with the law enforcement agencies. The improvements have built trust and transparency in the budget and programming processes.

INL also developed a database to track training courses and other

assistance programmed with the law enforcement agencies, as well as

new and better spreadsheets and databases to track the financial side,

clearly identifying by agency and funding source what has been obligated and expended. Staffing has been increased, with clear mandates

for program management.

INL has also reorganized to address the growing program management demands. Staffing has been increased, with clear mandates for

program management. INL now employs a cadre of regional program

officers with responsibility for monitoring programs by country as well

as a team of subject experts (such as in the fields of money laundering,

anti-corruption and trafficking in persons) . INLs training division has

begun a series of assessment trips to key countries to review outcomes

of training and to review project implementation. INLs country program officers have also made more frequent visits to the NIS region to

evaluate INLs overall country program and review the political/criminal enforcement environment in which assistance is provided.

Not only has INL grown organizationally, it has implemented new

procedures to ensure that programs are designed by those with the most

current knowledge of the region and take into account local conditions

and priorities. In March, INL asked all posts that have significant and

sustained narcotics and crime control programs, as well as posts in

countries where there is a significant narcotics or crime threat to U.S.

interests, regardless of the current level of assistance, to prepare law

enforcement assistance coordination plans that look out over the next

three years. The objective is to take a more comprehensive and balanced view about what needs to be done to develop more reliable international drug and crime control partners. Posts were encouraged to

ensure that their training, technical assistance, and public diplomacy

efforts were directed at rule of law, improving judicial institutions and

promoting anti-corruption practices.

This request for a crime and narcotics strategy meshes with INLs

new project-based approach to assistance, which Mr. Prahar detailed in

his testimony. To summarize, this new approach moves away from offthe shelf courses toward developing and implementing country-specific,

comprehensive, multi-year, multidisciplinary, interagency law enforcement projects. This approach is embassy-driven; project ideas are developed by embassy law enforcement working groups and communicated to Washington for fine-tuning and funding. Sustainability and

measures of effectiveness are integral parts of the project design. This

new approach, developed prior to the GAO report, addresses many of

the concerns the GAO raised, which INL had already independently

identified and is correcting.

The final component of INLs steps to address weaknesses as identified by the GAO is the move to negotiate Letters of Agreement (LOAs)

with NIS governments for INL projects. Again, Mr. Prahar addressed

the LOAs in his testimony. To reiterate, the LOA serves three primary

purposes. As a bilaterally document, it secures host-government commitment to receive and use the assistance provided for mutually agreed

priorities and demonstrates host-government commitment. Addition-
44

ally, the LOA outlines specific goals and objectives for each project.

Finally, the LOA provides performance measures and evaluation mechanisms.

Conditions for Assistance

Question: What preconditions are placed on host countries in order to

receive assistance? What are the consequences if a host country does

not meet a precondition of the LOA and are these consequences detailed

in the LOA? If it is determined the best course of action is to abrogate a

program, what are the procedures .for doing so and who makes the

decision?

Answer: The first filter through which a country must pass to receive

assistance is the Freedom Support Act (FSA) and other legislation passed

by Congress. Once the Department has certified that by law a country

and/or government may receive law enforcement assistance, the Department asks the Embassy for their views on whether law enforcement assistance is worth pursuing in the host country. In order to receive law enforcement assistance, host country agencies must

demonstrate a willingness to work with their U.S. law enforcement

counterparts. The Department depends largely on Embassy inputs for

determining the feasibility or appropriateness of our assistance programs,

and setting benchmarks for success.

The next precondition is the Letter of Agreement (LOA) signed between the host government and U.S. Government. The LOA contains

several important preconditions for assistance: e.g., protection of human rights, narcotics certification for recipients of training, an agreement to retain people who have received training for at least two years,

and monitoring and evaluation provisions. If a government does not

wish to sign an LOA, it will not receive assistance. Of course, assistance can still be provided to and through non-governmental entities in

the absence of an LOA with the host government.

If, over the course of the agreement, a situation arises demanding

new priorities, or additional resources for already identified priorities,

an LOA can be amended. If a situation is determined to have deteriorated to a point affecting our bilateral relationship (or requiring termination of our assistance programs altogether), the LOA can be terminated. The decision to annul an LOA would be made through joint

consultations among INL, the regional office of the State Department

and the Embassy.
45

LETTER TO HON. CHRISTOPHER SHAYS,

CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY,

VETERANS AFFAIRS, AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM,

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED BY CONGRESSMAN

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This is in response to your letter of July 5 concerning additional questions from Mr. Kucinich from the Subcommittee regarding the May 17

hearing, Rule of Law Assistance Programs: Limited Impact, Limited

Sustainability. On behalf of the Department of State, I apologize for

the delay in our response to your initial questions. I hope that the Committee finds that these responses, in addition to our previous answers

and the forthcoming results of our document search, provide a complete

picture of our views on the GAO report. Enclosed please find responses

to the questions posed in your July 5 letter.

Please do not hesitate to contact us again if we may be of further

assistance on this or any other matter.

Sincerely,

Paul V. Kelly

Assistant Secretary

Legislative Affairs

Enclosures:.

1. Correspondence Returned

2. Responses to July 5 letter
46

QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED BY

CONGRESSMAN CHRISTOPHER SHAYS,

CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY,

VETERANS AFFAIRS, AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM,

JULY 5, 2001

Question: What in your view, could the GAO evaluation have benefitted from? What should have been reviewed that was not? How might

that have affected their finished product?

Answer: The State Department notes two key omissions in the GAO

review. First, the GAO evaluation would have benefitted from an examination of the community policing grants funded by the Bureau for

International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) during the

1997-1999 time frame. In FY 1997, INL obligated $6,381,715 to community policing and other grants for Russia and the NIS. This funding

clearly represents an important component of the Departments rule of

law programs. INL has long used grant programs to broaden the scope

of issues covered by moving beyond the strict interests and abilities of

federal law enforcement agencies. There are a number of NGOs and

universities active in Russia and the NIS, promoting rule of law, and

combating trafficking and domestic violence. These grantees take a

multidisciplinary approach to addressing law enforcement concerns,

bringing all interested parties in a community together to address law

enforcement issues based on the U.S. model. The grantees bring their

U.S. experience and resources to bear including the link between law

enforcement and humanitarian concerns (protection of victims and

prevention/education programs) . The grants allow the Department to

focus on key regions which have expressed a willingness to undertake

reform, devote more longterm concentrated attention to a specific field

or area (such as community policing or combating trafficking in women),

and build on the strengths of community-based, local law enforcement

in the U.S.

Secondly, the report fails to examine the long-term exchanges and

partnership activities administered initially by USIA and now by the

Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs at the Department of State.

In FY-99 and FY-00, the U.S.C. spent $4.2 million on these activities,

which bring young students, professionals, and faculty members to the

U.S. to study law and legal education in depth. University partnerships pair U.S. and NIS law schools to promote curriculum development and reform. The GAO team acknowledges that they did not meet

with Public Affairs Officers in the countries they visited. While we understand that given the broad scope of the review the GAO could not

include every activity, we believe this is a significant omission.

Question: What in the GAO report do you think is the most valuable

suggestion for how to improve the delivery, impact,. and sustainability

of the programs administered by your agency?

Answer: The State Department agreed with most of the GAOs conclusions and recommendations highlighting the need to: 1) focus programs

on longerterm sustainability, and 2) identify and measure impact

more concretely. To this end, as has been noted before, the Department

had already begun to redesign rule of law programming. INL specifi-
47

cally had reached the same conclusions and by August 2000 (prior to

the GAOs report) moved to implement programs that were focused on

long-term, sustainable, host-government supported institutional development and capacity building. We have highlighted the reforms both in

our testimony and in our response to Mr. Shayss original questions.

Finally, INL has refined its approach to programming, moving from

the catalogued list of offtheshelf training courses to developing longterm, countryspecific, comprehensive, multidisciplinary, interagency

projects that are agreed to by the host-government through Letters of

Agreement. We are confident that this new approach, developed based

on five years of experience in providing assistance to the NIS, will provide for more. effective program management and more effective programs.
48

STATEMENT OF DANIEL ROSENBLUM,

DEPUTY COORDINATOR OF U.S. ASSISTANCE TO

THE NEW INDEPENDENT STATES,

BEFORE THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY,

VETERANS AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,

MAY 17, 2001

Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the

opportunity to speak with you today about U.S. Government assistance

programs to promote rule of law in the New Independent States (NIS) of

the former Soviet Union. The establishment of legal systems and governing institutions anchored in the rule of law is a prerequisite if the

NIS countries are going to make a successful transition to democracy

and market-based economies. Therefore, rule of law programs are an

essential component of our overall assistance effort, which is aimed at

facilitating this transition. We welcome the GAO review, and have been

pleased to work with Steve Lord, Jim Michels and the GAO team.

I am here representing Ambassador William Taylor, the Coordinator

of U.S. Assistance to the NIS, who is traveling overseas today. The

position of NIS Assistance Coordinator was created in 1992 by Congress

in order to ensure program and policy coordination among U.S. Government agencies involved in providing assistance to the NIS. Our office

allocates the funds appropriated each year under the FREEDOM Support Act, which represent the majority of funds being spent on rule of

law programs in the NIS. We are responsible for ensuring proper management, implementation, and oversight by the agencies who implement these programs, and because we track the whole spectrum of assistance activities in the NIS, we often serve as a source of information

for our embassies, the public, and of course, the Congress.

The major implementing agencies for rule of law programs in the

NIS are represented on this panel with me today, and they are the real

experts. Before turning to my colleagues, however, Id like to make a

few comments on three major issues from the big picture vantage

point of the NIS Assistance Coordinators office.

First, Id like to emphasize that our NIS rule of law assistance programs exist to support U.S. foreign policy goals, and are intended to

promote U.S. national interests. Each implementing agency will emphasize in their own comments the considerable benefit of these programs to U.S. interests. I will simply emphasize that in addition to the

long-term benefits that would result from stronger rule of law in the

NIS, there are substantial short-term benefits as well. In the long-term

of course, if these countries succeed in establishing democratic societies

based on the rule of law, they are more likely to adopt external policies

that we like, and to become reliable trading partners, and good places

for U.S. investment. In the meantime, however, these programs are

helping develop relationships between law enforcement counterparts in

the U.S. and NIS, leading to cooperation in international crime cases

and enhancing the ability of our law enforcement agencies to enforce

U.S. laws.

Second, the Subcommittee has asked about existing mechanisms for

establishing U.S. Government rule of law objectives. When it comes to

setting priorities and coordinating activities, we believe it is appropriate for our embassies to take the lead, since they are closely in touch

with the needs of the country in question, and can best assess changes
49

in the political environment that might call for changes in strategy.

Each NIS mission now has a Law Enforcement Working Group, typically chaired by the Deputy Chief of Mission and including representatives of law enforcement agencies that have full-time representatives in

country, as well as political and economic specialists. Washington agencies wishing to conduct training must get approval from the embassy to

ensure that the training or equipment falls within the embassys Mission Program Plan, and that the host country is prepared to receive the

training or equipment and use it productively. At the same time, here

in Washington, the INL Bureau in the State Department, working with

the Departments of Justice and Treasury, serves as a central clearinghouse for all law enforcement training activities. Close coordination

between State, Justice, and Treasury strongly promotes the identification and implementation of law enforcement-related objectives. Finally,

the Coordinators office attempts to connect the law enforcement-related

objectives of these law enforcement activities with the full range of rule

of law programs carried out by USAID and others.

In the cases of Russia and Ukraine, the role of host governments in

establishing program priorities has been formalized through the work

of bilateral law enforcement working groups. The U.S.-Russia law enforcement group, for example, has jointly agreed that money laundering and financial crimes, corruption, legal sector reform, and mutual

legal assistance are the top priorities for U.S. assistance. These groups

are co-chaired by the Departments of State and Justice and include

representatives of the other agencies represented here today. These bilateral working groups foster regular contact between counterparts and

provide a formal opportunity for the U.S. to make the case for reform.

An indirect but important side benefit of these bilateral groups is that

they compel interagency cooperation and coordination on the Russian

and Ukrainian sides, which is otherwise sorely lacking.

 Third and finally, I think it is important to recognize that the U.S.

Governments strategy has evolved since we first began to address rule

of law in the NIS in 1994. We now have a deeper appreciation of what is

effective.

We have learned to apply the principle that aid follows reform. That

is, once a government has indicated a serious interest in reforming its

legal system, then and only then should we provide carefully targeted

assistance in those areas where reform seems most likely to succeed.

Where a persistent lack of political will on the part of central authorities has stymied reform, we curtail assistance accordingly. Efforts to

combat money laundering in Russia provide a good example of where

we pulled back and redirected our assistance to reflect realities on the

ground. We offered the Russians assistance in drafting the necessary

legislation but any further assistance is conditional upon their passing

it. In Ukraine, USAIDs rule of law program has been reduced to virtually zero, pending passage of a basic Law on the Judiciary, which will

establish a new system of courts and define judicial independence.

On the other hand, where we find an open doorwhere there are

government institutions and civil society groups willing to overhaul

policies and institutionswe push on it. For example, two years ago,

when the Government of Georgia agreed to develop a national strategy

to combat corruption and pledged to take the steps necessary to put the

plan into action, the Department Justice sent an Assistant U.S. Attorney with years of anti-corruption experience in the U.S. to work side-
50

by-side with the government and local NGOs. President Shevardnadze

recently established a new Anti-Corruption Council to carry out the

recommendations of the national strategy.

Second, while our rule of law programs have always worked with

civil society as well as governments, we have increasingly come to appreciate the need for a comprehensive approach that recognizes a role

for both top-down and bottom-up reform. Rule of law will never be

firmly established in the NIS countries until it is demanded and expected by the citizens of those countries. The post-Soviet period has

shown conclusively that if NIS citizens wait for rule of law to be granted

to them by their governments, they will be waiting a long time. Consequently, bottom-up reform has assumed an increasingly important

place in our overall strategy.

For this reason, we believe the GAO study could have benefited from

a more thorough review of the many grassroots efforts supported by the

U.S. Government, such as community policing, legal partnerships, and

programs to combat domestic violence. These activities generally take

place outside of Moscow, Kyiv, and other capital cities. An excellent

example is the legal partnership between the State of Vermont and

Russias Karelia region. The brainchild of a Vermont Supreme Court

Justice, the project has resulted in improved access to legal services for

ordinary Russian citizens.

As we noted in our comments on the GAO report, we also regret the

GAO was unable to meet with alumni of U.S. Government exchange

programs and examine the results of this important component of our

overall assistance package. Our follow-up research shows that these

exchanges have a major impact on the participants, by giving them

firsthand exposure to how a society based on rule of law functions. Over

the long-term, many of these exchange alumni will become leaders in

their respective countries, and this is bound to have an impact on the

prospects for rule of law becoming established in the NIS.

In the end, of course, it is not up to the United States to establish rule

of law in the NIS countries. We can simply encourage them to make the

necessary changes and provide necessary expertise when they demonstrate the necessary political will. Meanwhile, we can use a variety of

approaches to help build a constituency for rule of law reform. Above

all, we need to keep our assistance strategy flexible enough to allow us

to respond to changing conditions.

Mr. Chairman, we appreciate the GAOs recommendations and will

follow up to ensure that rule of law programs are well-integrated into

our overall assistance efforts and continue to support important U.S.

national interests. We will also encourage implementing agencies to

conduct additional external evaluations of law enforcement and rule of

law assistance. We look forward to continuing this dialogue with Congress as we refine our programs in FY 2002 and beyond.
51

STATEMENT OF PETER PRAHAR,

DEPUTY DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF ASIAN, AFRICAN AND

EUROPEAN/NIS PROGRAMS BUREAU FOR INTERNATIONAL

NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS,

 BEFORE THE NATIONAL SECURITY, VETERANS AFFAIRS,

 AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

MAY 17, 2001

RULE OF LAW ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS:

LIMITED IMPACT, LIMITED SUSTAINABILITY

Mr. Chairman, and distinguished members of the Committeethank

you for the opportunity to talk about the direction of our rule of law

programs in the Newly Independent States (NIS). Today, I will present

to you the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement

Affairs (INL) response to the GAO report and am happy to report the

initiatives INL has already undertaken, prior to the draft GAO report.

We believe the fundamental restructuring of INLs assistance programs

in the NIS and, for that matter, worldwide address many of the legitimate criticisms in the GAO report.

First, let me stress that we agree with the GAO that difficult and

sometimes worsening political and economic conditions in Russia,

Ukraine, Georgia, and Armenia are obstacles to effective implementation of rule of law programs during this period. We think, however,

that we have seen some real progress.

We also agree with the GAO that INL-managed assistance in the

19951998 period fell short in the areas of sustainability and monitoring. Based on lessons learned in the NIS and elsewhere, however, we

have taken a hard look at how we do business there and, as a result,

have substantially modified our approach. We have become skeptical,

in particular, of the value of stand-alone training courses for host country law enforcement officials. Our experience has been that such courses

are often not country-specific and may draw heavily on interesting but

not necessarily universally applicable U.S. experiences and practices.

Some students had only a limited opportunity to interact with the instructors, and sometimes there was no follow-up. Our assistance to the

NIS until recently was built upon such training programs. We agree

with the GAO that, while good work has been done, this approach has

not built institutions.

Accordingly, in August 2000, INL initiated a fundamental restructuring of our assistance program worldwide. FY2001 is the first year of

this new approach and although we cannot yet show you results on the

ground, we are confident that our revised approach will address the

concerns raised by the GAO and our own reviews.

Our new approach has two key elements. First, it is project-based. By

this we mean we are developing and implementing multi-year, multidisciplinary, interagency law enforcement projects in the NIS and worldwide in lieu of offering training courses in isolation. Sustainability and

measures of effectiveness are integral parts of the project design. For

example, a comprehensive border security project might include the US

Customs Service, DEA, and other federal agencies working together to

combat drug trafficking, customs violations, commercial smuggling,

and fraud. Such a project might include not only training but technical

assistance with short-term advisors to consult with the host nation on
52

developing new laws and regulations as needed, or an exchange of experts to discuss best practices. The project might also address illegal

immigration and trafficking in persons, and work with non-governmental

organizations (NGOs) to facilitate protection of trafficking victims. Additionally, such a project might provide certain infrastructure needs,

such as computers or communications equipment. Finally, a project

such as this in a country like Russia, which receives assistance from

multiple U.S. sources, would be vetted through a U.S. interagency process to ensure coordination with non-proliferation programs and other

efforts.

Second, in INLs new approach, initial decision-making is decentralized. The Chief of Mission for each country requesting INL-managed

assistance -not INL or a Washington-based law enforcement agency -

has the initial responsibility for requesting and determining the priority of his or her training requirements, in conjunction with the law

enforcement agency representatives at post. We believe the law enforcement working group, comprised of representatives of all law enforcement agencies at post under the Chief of Mission, should initially identify and prioritize country specific issues. Of course, INL, DOJ and

Treasury based law enforcement agencies are prepared to assist overseas missions in developing such proposals. Many projects may well

require technical expertise beyond that typically found at some of our

overseas missions. In this manner, the Chief of Mission can assure that

the assistance programs directly address the objectives in the posts

Mission Performance Plan, the key planning document for each mission.

Let me describe our project-based approach in more detail. We know

full well that our projects cannot succeed and that our assistance will

be wasted absent host government commitment and will. INL has long

required Letters of Agreement (LOAs) with countries receiving INLmanaged assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act. These LOAs

represent host country engagement in and commitment to the bilateral

relationship that is necessary for a successful program. This budget

cycle, we have asked the US missions in the NIS, too, to develop, negotiate and sign LOAs with the governments in the NIS region. A LOA

clearly describes the law enforcement programs we have agreed to cooperate on, sets forth what is expected of both governments with regard to

the programs, and describes the measures that will be used to evaluate

the success of the programs. Standard provisions in the LOA require,

for example, that equipment, supplies and materials be accounted for

periodically and that personnel receiving training under the agreement

remain in relevant positions for at least two years thereafter. One of the

standard provisions contains language that has been developed in consultation with the Congress to reflect our shared desire to highlight the

issue of human rights when providing law enforcement assistance. There

are other protections for the USG in the LOAs, too, such as agreement

to allow duty-free entry of commodities and supplies and the privileges

and immunities of personnel entering the country under the agreement.

We believe it is absolutely critical and only good management to have

these rules spelled out and agreed to in writing. LOAs have been a

powerful management and internal control tool in Latin America, Africa, Asia and the Middle East. They will be a powerful tool in the NIS

region as well.
53

While we are in agreement with the recommendations of the GAO

Report, let me draw your attention to one comment (on page 38) that

may be somewhat misleading. The GAO report notes that about $33

million in INL-managed funding for fiscal years 1995 through 2000 had

been obligated for law enforcement training and other assistance that

has not yet been provided. It may leave the misimpression that these

funds are sitting idle. In fact, about $9 million of that was only recently

provided the law enforcement agencies (the end of FY 2000), who are in

the process of putting together useful projects approved by the post law

enforcement working group. Additionally, I wish to assure the committee that we at INL have been working with the law enforcement agencies for the past year and a half to ensure that the $33 million in undelivered courses and technical assistance in the pipeline is fully

integrated into comprehensive, sustainable projects. In Russia, for example, no FY 2001 funding will be needed specifically for training. It is

our intention to use funding provided in prior fiscal years for the necessary training, and current fiscal year funding for technical assistance,

advisory programs, and procurement. It may take some time to draw

down this pipeline, but I wish to assure the committee that it will be

well spent. I am pleased to say that we are receiving excellent cooperation from the law enforcement agencies in accomplishing this.

I would also like to draw your attention to one other point in the

report. Aside from efforts to reform the assistance provided through

federal agencies, the report failed to note the extensive work with NGOs

that INL has undertaken. In the last five years, INL has funded over

$6 million in community-policing, domestic violence, and anti-trafficking grants with NGOs and universities, working especially with Russian and Ukrainian counterparts. In Russia in particular these grantees often work outside of Moscow, throughout the regions, engendering

cooperation and transparency between police and their communities

and thereby promoting rule of law. We are proud of these programs and

believe they are effective in contributing to the creation of a rule of law

culture in Russia.

In conclusion, I would like to stress the importance of assistance programs and their relevance to national security. My law enforcement

colleagues can address the specific crime threat to the U.S. from these

countries, and will highlight the role that assistance programs play in

developing competent and reliable foreign counterparts. It is thanks in

part to the assistance from INL-managed programs that our U.S. law

enforcement colleagues can operate successfully against transnational

crime threats to the United States. In a nutshell: If we do not implement programs to develop effective institutions, U.S. law enforcement

agencies will have no one with whom to cooperate. Thank you.
54

MATERIALS SUBMITTED BY MR. JOHN BEYRLE

EXCERPT FROM APPENDIX II: COMMENTS FROM

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE OF THE GAO REPORT,

FORMER SOVIET UNION: U.S. RULE OF LAW ASSISTANCE

 HAS HAD LIMITED IMPACT AND SUSTAINABILITY

United States Department of State

Chief Financial Officer

Washington, D.C. 20520-7427

March 16, 2001

Dear Ms. Westin:

We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report, FORMER

SOVIET UNION: U.S. Rule of Law Assistance Has Had Limited Impact and Sustainability, GAO01354, GAO Job Code 711540.

The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report.

If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact

Lorraine Predharn Keir, Director, Democratic Initiatives, Office of the

Coordinator for U.S. Assistance to the NIS, who can be reached on (202)

6474337.

Sincerely,

Mary J. Eisenhart

Acting

Enclosure:

As stated.

cc: OIG  Ms. Cook

GAO/IAT  Mr. Ford

State/S/NIS/C  Ms. Keir

Ms. Susan S. Westin,

Managing Director,

International Affairs and Trade,

U.S. General Accounting Office.

Note:GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear

at the end of this appendix.
55

FORMER SOVIET UNION: U.S. RULE OF LAW ASSISTANCE HAS

HAD LIMITED IMPACT AND SUSTAINABILITY

GAO-01-354, GAO JOB CODE 711540

The State Department appreciates the opportunity to comment on

this draft GAO report. The GAO is correct in identifying the difficult

and sometimes worsening political and economic conditions in Russia,

Ukraine, Georgia and Armenia as obstacles to effective implementation

of Rule of Law (ROL) programs during this period. Assisting these countries in developing ROL institutions, practices and cultures will clearly

be more difficult and take more time than imagined when the U.S. and

other international donors first embarked on this endeavor. We believe

that we and the recipient countries now have a deeper appreciation of

what will be required and the strategies that will most likely lead to

success.

We have seen some progress. Slowly, the states are enacting

anti-corruption and anti-crime legislation. The incidence of some types

of crime has moderated, particularly in Russia. Further progress depends upon the willingness and ability of the NIS to pass fundamental

legislation to form the basis of a rule-of-law society; increase transparency and competition in the economy; strengthen implementation and

enforcement mechanisms; and establish regulatory and oversight mechanisms that allow for efficient investigation and prosecution of crime

and corruption.

We offer the following observations about the reports premise and

conclusions.

While the report identifies several key factors that contribute to the

impact and sustainability of rule of law programs in the NIS, it measures the effectiveness of U.S. Government (USG) efforts by an extraordinarily high standarda fishy functioning and well-funded rule of law

system. It is worth noting that eight years is a short time frame in

which to transform 12 different societies that have never experienced

the rule of law. The amount of money the USG has spent is also a drop

in the bucket compared to the considerable needs and could not, even

under the best of circumstances, have brought about the rule of law so

quickly.

The report appears to stress equally three conditions identified as

contributing to a lack of progress: lack of a political consensus on reform, weak economic conditions that limit government funding, and

program management shortcomings. While each factor is valid, we would

weight most heavily the lack of political will evidenced by NIS governments to give up the control necessary to govern under the rule of law.

Where elected leaders have shown the necessary commitment, reforms

have progressed more quickly than in neighboring countries where elected

leaders continue to manipulate the law enforcement and judicial systems to suppress opposition. The issue of available resources in many

cases is also directly linked to government willingness to commit resourceswith recent economic growth, a few NIS countries have the

means to pay for some of these reforms but simply choose not to.

As noted in the report, based on lessons learned in the 1995-1998

period, the Department of States Bureau of International Narcotics and

Law Enforcement Affairs (State/INL) has developed and begun implementing comprehensive, multidisciplinary, interagency law enforcement

projects in lieu of simply offering training courses in isolation. Sustain-
56

ability and measures of effectiveness have been integral parts of the

project design process. We are confident that this new project-based

approach is consistent with GAO recommendations, and will result in

more effective and sustainable programs.

We would also like to underscore that State/INL is working with

U.S. law enforcement agencies to resolve the issue referred to in the

GAO report (page 29) regarding the $33 million in courses and technical assistance either undelivered or as yet unexpensed by recipient agencies. Those courses not yet delivered will, of course, be fully integrated

into INLs comprehensive projects. Under INL leadership, law enforcement agencies have also taken steps to redirect funds previously programmed for training and equipment to meet current needs identified

as priorities by the embassy for example corruption, a new forensics

lab and prison reform in Georgia. S/NIS/C plans to work closely with

INL to monitor the disbursement of these funds and to try to speed up

the billing time from recipient agencies once courses are completed. We

understand that Washington often does not receive a full accounting of

training-related expenditures until a year after the training has taken

place. State/INL encourages the GAO to include in its recommendations that the U.S. law enforcement agencies should cooperate with

State/INL in its ongoing effort to reschedule and/or reprogram undelivered assistance to complement the newly designed projects. (See comment 1.)

The report fails to examine the long-term exchanges and partnership

activities administered initially by USIA and now by the Bureau of

Educational and Cultural Affairs at the Department of State. In FY-99

and FY-00, the USG spent $4.2 million on these activities, which bring

young students, professionals, and faculty members to the U.S. to study

law and legal education in depth. University partnerships pair U.S.

and NIS law schools to promote curriculum development and reform.

The GAO team acknowledges that they did not meet with Public Affairs

Officers in the countries they visited. While we understand that given

the broad scope of the review the GAO could not include every activity,

we believe this is a significant omission. (See comment 2.)

The report paints a bleak picture of an NGO sector entirely dependent on western funding. In fact, many NGOs were founded without

USG funding and continue to operate on a shoestringfrequently out of

a room in someones apartment, with dedicated volunteer labor. In Russia alone there are 65,000 NGOs; USAID has provided support to only

15 percent of them. The other 85 percent operate without USG assistance. As economies in the region improve we are hopeful that businesses will contribute more extensively to the NGO sector. This is already happening to a small extent in Russia, and if the Russian

government changes the tax code to include incentives for businesses to

donate to non-profit entities, we predict the trend will expand further

still. Again, the key factor is policy choices and political decisions to be

made by NIS govemments, something over which we have no direct

control. (See comment 3.)

The report chides the USG for not putting in place effective monitoring and evaluation systems, yet it also cites conclusions of several

USG-funded studies. We recognize that some implementers have evaluated their efforts more often than others have and plan to encourage all

recipients of FSA funds to undertake more systematic and thorough

evaluations.
57

Finally, we would note an important lesson learned in implementing

rule-of-law and law-enforcement programs: the need for better coordination in the field. U.S. embassies in the NIS have now established

working groups to coordinate law enforcement efforts, usually chaired

by the DCM and composed of representatives of all agencies working in

the field. These law enforcement working groups now set the priorities

for training, equipment and technical assistance, and request resources

from the Department to implement these goals. We believe that

field-directed management of these programs is the best approach to

insuring that the work of different agencies all contributes to mission

goals and that host governments have a single local point of contact

with which to work.
58

MINUTES OF RUSSIA RELIGIOUS ROUNDTABLE

MAY 10, 2001, SUBMITTED BY JOHN BEYRLE

Principles:

The Honorable Senator Gordon Smith

Paula J. Dobriansky, Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs

John Beyrle, Acting Special Adviser to the Secretary for the New Independent States

Michael Parmly, Acting Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human

Rights and Labor

Dan Fried, Senior Director for Europe and Eurasia, National Security

Council

Introduction:

John Beyrle

Roundtable continues commitment within new Administration to the

promotion of religious freedom.

Announcement of Russias certification under Smith Amendment contained in the Foreign Operations bill .

All but one organization have been re-registered at the Federal level.

Ministry of Justice statistics say 90 percent of local organizations have

re-registered regionally. Most of remainder are defunct.

Concerned about involvement of GOR in religious communities, activities.

Important for missionary activity to be conducted under appropriate

visa to avoid contributing to difficulties for all foreign religious workers.

Paula Dobriansky

Administration has taken note of USCIRF publication on religious freedom: Russia has an uncertain future.

Mike Parmly

Central government, with some exceptions, seems to understand religious freedom.

Dan Fried

Values are important to Bush Administration.

There is a complicated relationship with Russia: cooperation vs. pressure.

Conflicting signals from Federal government.

Senator Gordon Smith

The Smith Amendment will be again included in Foreign Operations

bill.

Senator Smith will circulate another letter on our views of anti-Semitism in Russia

Russia wants to be part of West, it should act the part.
59

2. Views of Religious Groups:

Registration:

Confirmation that situation in Russia not nearly as bad as expected

after the Dec. 31, 2000 deadline for re-registration. Concur with data

presented.

Some groups are choosing not to re-register.

Groups led by non-Russians unable to register.

Some groups unable to build places of worship or get permits to gather,

etc.

Some local organizations are not registered in the regions because of 15-

year rule.

Re-registered organizations feel insecure in their legal status; they fear

having their registration revoked.

Harassment:

Some groups feel threatened, want to be government sanctioned.

Some organizations have won court cases against harassment or bans

by GOR.

Operating in Russia is a labored process, groups harassed through redtape process.

Additional harassment by FSB, Customs, Militia reported; Militia is

now reported to be careful of blatant harassment.

USG should make the point to Russian Government that disagreements

within a religious community should be settled by that community.

Improvement:

Impact of U.S. activism is felt on the ground in Russia.

One group commented that situation in Russia is vastly improved visa-vis Soviet times.

There are still some concerns about influence of extremist elements,

including outsiders such as David Duke, in Russia.

3. Questions for Discussion:

Q: What regions should the US Government pay special attention to?

Moscow is a real problem for some groups.

Q: What do you feel are the implications of the newly formed Presidential Council on Cooperation with Religious Groups? What are your

views on the composition of this council?

It is used in the nexus of national security policy  foreign religious

organizations are a threat.

Ministry of Justice representative on the council was replaced by a FSB

operative.

FSB refusing to register organizations in Moscow with foreign links.

Intelligence rooting out ôaliensö fits in with a sense of order based on

strong Statist overtone with emphasis on xenophobia.

Apparent treatment of religious organizations in Russia can be divided

into three classes because of the re-registration process. The A-list:

those who have re-registered and are sanctioned (2000 groups). B

list: not re-registered, but not harassed: default sanction (1000 groups).

C list: Not registered and not sanctioned.
60

Q: What were the results of the Nizhni Novgorod Conference on Cults:

Conference organized by the Russian Orthodox Church to identify and

get rid of groups they consider to be totalitarian cults.

No official Russian Government participation.

Ideas were an export from a European governments, especially the

French and German movement against totalitarian cults and sects

in general.

Conference produced a list of cults.

Q: How can we empower people in oppressed groups/societies?

Hold equivalent (of this) roundtables in Russia. Harassed groups in

Russia should organize as well.

These meetings are valuable simply in the fact that the Russians know

they take place.

In the regions, people have no knowledge of international human rights

standards. Need a series of conferences to broaden knowledge.

Encourage NGOs and Russian Government to cooperate, have conferences.

If there is a trend in Europe towards intolerance, help Russians draft

anti-discrimination laws.

Slavic legal center is translating international texts into Russian/Slavic

languages. They could use more money.

Although there is anti-imperialist sentiment in Russia re: U.S. monies, we need to be upfront about our beliefs and the reasons for our

involvement.

Russia doesnt have enough lawyers. Legal education is crucial.

International religious advocacy documents and links put on Embassy

Moscow website.

Post the Russian-language version of the Department of State publication ôHuman Rights and Youö by Fred Quinn on website.

4. Next Meeting

There was a consensus that it would be useful to have roundtables that

cover other countries in the former Soviet Union, besides Russia.

Will be scheduled in 4 to 6 months.
61

PREPARED SUBMISSION OF DR. ELENA BONNER,

CHAIR, ANDREI SAKHAROV FOUNDATION

The period of Russian history, which began in September 1999 with

the tragic explosions of apartment buildings in Moscow and Volgodonsk,

can properly be called the Putin era, the successor to the Yeltsin era.

This new era has been characterized by several distinctly troubling

tendencies fundamentally affecting the Russian nation.

1. VIOLATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION BY THE PRESIDENT

AND STATE OFFICIALS

First of all, there is the creation of a union of Russia and Belarus,

with the prospect of combining them into a single state. This can be

lawfully accomplished only if it is preceded by popular referendums confirming the desire of the two peoples to unite, followed by the introduction of appropriate amendments into the two Constitutions. Second, there

is the virtual liquidation of the Federal Council, depriving it of the functions assigned to it by the Constitution and turning it into an advisory

organ. This destroys the federal structure of Russia, which de facto is

turned into a unitary state. The division of Russia into seven regions,

although formally not a violation of the Constitution, reinforces the

emasculation of the upper chamber, giving the president additional levers to pressure local authorities and to centralize state power. Such

fundamental changes in state structure reduce societys possibilities

for influencing the government and impair the rights of voters. Besides,

this kind of reorganization (strengthening the vertical chain of authority as Russian officials call it) has led to a colossal growth of the bureaucracy and to exorbitant expense for its maintenance which cause

further grief to citizens and taxpayers. High-ranking officers of the army

and security services have left their former posts and infiltrated central

and regional government bodies, and they continue to do so. The dependence of procurators and judges on the central and local executive organs has grown. A number of laws adopted by the Duma and presidential decrees clearly illustrate the retreat from the democratic principles

of government and humane values proclaimed during the previous era.

The following examples are far from exhaustive and vary in importance. There is the law on political parties, which deprives significant

groups of voters of the opportunity to elect persons to the legislative

bodies who will represent their particular interests and which also allows the president to secure a parliament even more compliant than the

present one. There is the doctrine of information security. There is the

interruption of the work of the Presidential Pardons Commission, introduced by President Yeltsin. There is the introduction of military training for high school students, the allocation of money from the budget for

so-called education in patriotism, and the creation with the help of the

presidential administration of a pro-Putin organization of young people.

At the same time we see a steady increase in the number of runaway

children, in drug use by young people, and in child prostitution. Today

there are more homeless children in Russia than there were in 1921

after our Civil War. And 18,000 children are serving sentences in reformatories. The tragic fate affecting many children is the result of mass

impoverishment. According to official statistics, more than a third of

the population lives below the poverty level. There is the recurring

spymania and the recently revealed circular of the Russian Academy of

Sciences obliging scientists and scholars to report (once again!) to their
62

bosses their contacts with Western colleagues and any plans to publish

abroad or receive grants from foreign sources. Truly, what goes around,

comes around.

2. THE USE OF FINANCIAL AND LEGAL PRESSURE TO CURB THE

INDEPENDENT MEDIA TELEVISION, RADIO, AND THE PRESS

We still havent seen the end of the crushing of the Independent Television Company (NTV) as well as Media-Mosts press holdings. This

will be followed, judging from actions of the Procurators Office, by the

destruction of TV Channel 6 and the Echo of Moscow radio station. The

situation is even more catastrophic in the provinces, where, in addition

to the financial and legal pressures leading to the closing of local newspapers, radio and television, there are frequent reports of threats to,

beatings of and sometimes even murders of independent journalists.

Furthermore, I do not know of a single case when investigation of such

crimes has resulted in the conviction of the perpetrators. Recent examples of the persecution of independent journalists was the trial in

Belgograd of Olga Kitova and the scheduling of a second trial of Grigory

Pasko. In short, the proclamation in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that everyone has the right to receive and impart information and ideas through any media is being violated in Russia today.

3. THE CHECHEN WAR

In Chechnya, mass violations of the rights of the civilian population

looting, cleansing of villages, torture, imprisonment in pits, extrajudicial executions, including shooting of childrenare continuing. The

military authorities are trying to cut off access to information about

Chechnya and to interfere in every possible way with the work of the

Red Cross, Amnesty International, the Memorial Society, and other

humanitarian organizations. Investigations of mass crimes against civilians are sabotaged. Independent investigators are not permitted access to the investigations of mass burial sites. According to official statistics, more than 3,000 Russian soldiers have died in the second Chechen

war. No one knows how many civilians have perished. There are no

statistics on civilian deaths. These should include not just those killed

directly during military operations, but those who have died from cold

and disease as well as the majority of those who have been detained

during cleansing actions and then have vanished without a trace. In

time the bodies of some disappeared persons have turned up in the

mass graves of the executed. The situation of Chechen refugees is going

from bad to worse. According to the numbers recently published by the

State Commission on Statistics, there are 77,000 refugees in Russia,

mostly migrants from Kazakhstan and the other Central Asian Republics. Chechens are not included in that figure. This is the result of a

technicalityonly a person arriving from a foreign country is considered to be a refugee. In this way tens of thousands of Chechens, who fled

bombing, shelling, and other horrors of the war, who have lost their

homes, their possessions, and often family and friends, are not counted

as refugees and are thereby deprived of the right to choose their place of

residence within Russia and the right to international assistance and

defense. The temporary camps for displaced persons in Ingushetia are

filled beyond capacity. People survive in them only thanks to the assistance of international humanitarian organizations. Russian government

representatives, instead of helping these organizations, do everything
63

possible to hinder their work and to compel the return of the exhausted,

half-starved, often diseased people to Chechnya. But no one can guarantee that they will be safe there. The Chechens fearwith good reason

that they will be left without shelter, food or humanitarian assistance.

They fear robbery, violence, and the continual cleansing actions, during which practically all adult and adolescent males are detained. The

genocide of the Chechen nation is continuing. On May 25, 2001, the

Russian National Committee to End the War and Make Peace in the

Chechen Republic received a letter from Aslan Maskhadov, President of

Chechnya, in which he has again confirmed that he is ready to engage

in peace negotiations without preconditions. I ask that this letter be

included in the record together with my testimony.

OPEN APPEAL OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE CHECHEN REPUBLIC ICHKERIA TO THE RUSSIAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO

END THE WAR AND MAKE PEACE IN THE CHECHEN REPUBLIC

First of all, I would like to thank the world renowned human rights

advocates who signed the appeal of The Russian National Committee

to End the War and Make Peace in the Chechen Republic for their

courage, for their firm civic stand, and for their humane and civilized

perspective on the situation in Chechnya. I would like once again to call

to the attention of President Putin, the people of Russia and the world

at large that no one has gained and no one can gain from this war and

from our many years of conflict. People on both sides are dying, and

instead of constructive development, we see only havoc and destruction.

Enormous material resources have been allocated, supposedly for rebuilding, but they have disappeared no one knows where, and whatever

was rebuilt after the first war is being destroyed once again. We are

caught in a vicious circle which we cannot and must not ignore. I am

convinced that we can resolve our differences in the interests of our

peoples if only both leaders have a sincere desire to do so and are willing

to listen to each other with open minds. This war has benefited neither

Russians nor Chechens and only aggravates our mutual relations which

were complicated enough already. I assure you that we Chechens derive

no pleasure from this war. We are fighting not for the first time to save

our nation from genocide, from the barbaric scorched earth strategy

which has been employed by Russia against the Chechen people for 300

years. I was chosen by the Chechen people to be President of the Republic by means of a legitimate election monitored by Russian as well as

international observers. Neither I nor the true sons of the fatherland

who have joined me in our struggle against aggression, against the

monstrous and repeated violence suffered by the Chechen people, are

bandits or terrorists. The very accusation is blasphemous and cynical.

I ask and insist that the choice of my people be respected, that they be

given the right to decide for themselves who will be their leader and

what will be the character of their state and government. From the

very beginning of the current war I have repeatedly stated that we are

taking the wrong road to settle our mutual relations. We have already

tried this road and nothing good has come of it. Revenge, hatred, punitive measures do not lead anywhere. It is impossible to resolve international or interethnic conflicts in this way. History has demonstrated

this on more than one occasion. This road brings grief, suffering, and

great hardship to all the peoples involved and provokes still more mutual resentment and hatred. I offered to sit down at the negotiating
64

table even during the full-scale war which Russia has been waging

against my people, falsely depicting it as a counterterrorist operation.

I suggested that we decide all contested issues in a civilized manner

and declared myself ready, given appropriate evidence, to conduct a

joint struggle to suppress the terrorism, drugs and banditry infesting

the Chechen Republic and other regions as well. As President of the

Republic, I needed then and need now to engage in dialogue with the

Russian leadership. I am quite sure that Boris Yeltsin sees many issues of our mutual relations in a different light today than he did when

he was President of Russia. Much could have been done otherwise, but

the scales are tilted again toward the use of force because continued

chaos and lawlessness make it easier for certain people to acquire property, to grow rich, to rise in rank and office. History and geography

oblige us to accept compromises in our mutual relations and the bloody

outcome of our past interactions is the best evidence that we have been

on the wrong track. Until now, however strange it may seem, no one

has tried to base their dealings with the Chechens on a good neighbor

policy, on the principles of mutual respect and recognition of our lawful

claim to this land. I know my people and I am confident that Russia

would gain a reliable and loyal neighbor if it instituted equitable relations with us. But so far, no one has tried to settle all the outstanding

issues on the basis of a good neighbor policy. Instead, Russian generals

and politicians have indulged in wishful thinking, they have twisted

facts and wildly distorted reality, giving these a nationalistic, great

power spin, and thereby provoking both the first and second RussianChechen wars. After the first war, our Republic lay in ruins, our people

were impoverished. We tried to repair our relations with Russia. I know

this and Boris Yeltsin knows this. But instead of assistance and support we were subjected to the full range of the Russian special services

subversive operations. That was not the kind of help we should have

had. Now we need a new approach. When the first war began, the presidents were Boris Yeltsin and Jokhar Dudaev. Now they are Vladimir

Putin and Aslan Maskhadov. The consequences of these two wars are

not at all what the past and current presidents anticipated. We need a

fresh approach. I cannot accept the present state of affairs which only

aggravates the conflict and hatred between our peoples. That is not my

way. For the sake of my peoples future, despite everything that has

happened, I sincerely believe that the Chechen and Russian peoples will

have to reach an accommodation. I officially declare that I am ready to

sit down at the negotiating table with the Russian leaders and to engage in a dialogue about peace without prior conditions. Whatever the

outcome of these talks, I am convinced that the future of our peoples

depends on mutual respect and understanding. If we dont succeed in

achieving this, others will do so in the future. And whoever they may

be, they will go down in history as wise statesmen and leaders.

Repectfully,

Aslan Maskhadov

President of the Chechen Republic Ichkeria

The appeal of the Russian National Committee to End the War and

Make Peace in the Chechen Republic called upon Presidents Putin and

Maskhadov to proclaim a cease-fire and open peace negotiations. Persons signing the appeal included: Ruslan Aushev, President of Ingushetia;

Sergei Kovalev, Boris Nadezhdin, Yuli Rybakov, and Sergei Yushenkov,
65

deputies of the Russian State Duma; Victor Astafiev, Andrei Bitov, Victor Erofeyev, Felix Svetov, Alexander Tkachenko and Arkady Vaksberg,

members of the Russian PEN center; and Elena Bonner, Oleg Orlov,

Lev Ponomarev, and Yuri Samodurov, representatives of the Russian

human rights community.
66

PREPARED SUBMISSION OF PAUL GOBLE,

 DIRECTOR OF COMMUNICATIONS,

RADIO FREE EUROPE AND RADIO LIBERTY

THE DREAM OF NAPOLEON

A Soviet-era anecdote has resurfaced in recent weeks in Moscow. According to the story, Napoleon returns from the dead and attends a

Soviet May Day parade in Red Square. As he watches the heavily armed

troops, tanks, and missiles go by, a big smile appears on his face. A

Soviet citizen notes this and says Emperor, obviously you are thinking

that if you had had such weapons, you would have won at Waterloo.

No, Napoleon replies. Im thinking that if I had had a newspaper like

your Pravda, no one would ever have known that I lost. That story has

suggested itself because of moves by the Russian government under

President Vladimir Putin to gain unchallenged control of the electronic

media most Russians now rely on, to reverse one of the greatest gains

the Russian people have made since the fall of communism, and to set

the stage for a creeping authoritarianism that threatens all the other

freedoms which cannot thrive without freedom of the press. In the year

since Vladimir Putin became president of the Russian Federation, hopes

both there and in the West that Russia would continue to move in the

direction of democracy and free markets have been largely dashed both

by what he has done and what those in his country appear increasingly

prepared to accept. Nowhere has that retreat from the progress of the

Yeltsin years been greater than in the area of press freedom. President

Putin has shown himself unwilling to tolerate any criticism of himself

or his government, and he has moved both to intimidate journalists and

take control of the most important media outlets. But his ability to do

so reflects two other disturbing realities: The Russian media were never

as free as many in the West had thought, and the Russian people were

not as interested in or supportive of media freedom as many in the West

had expected. When Putin came to power by Yeltsins sleight of hand at

the beginning of 2000, the Russian media were already in difficult straits.

Privatization had not lead to media freedom. Instead, in the absence of

a population with enough money to purchase newspapers and of an

advertising sector capable of supporting media outlets, both electronic

and print media had fallen into the hands of the oligarchs, most of

whom were former Soviet officials who viewed the press as a weapon in

the struggle for power rather than as a means of communicating information to the population at large. And because the oligarchs had acquired their property largely through illegal collusion with the state

and because these properties were typically monopolies or oligopolies

both before and after privatization, these new Russians as they have

come to be called continue to be dependent on the state and therefore

can be manipulated by it. Those who try to resist in any wayBoris

Berezovsky and Vladimir Gusinsky are the most obviousfind themselves subject to the full power of the state and have been pushed out of

the media scene. As a result, the Russian government now controls

virtually all the electronic media from which most Russians get their

news. This situation was both compounded and made possible by developments in the journalistic community itself. After enjoying unprec-

* The views expressed here are Mr. Gobles own.
67

edented respect and remuneration during the period of glasnost under

Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, journalists fell on hard times during the 1990s. Their status tumbled along with their salaries, and by

the later part of that decade, they were earning an average of around

$50 a month. In that situation, they frequently sold their stories to the

highest bidder, a situation that has become so nearly universal that an

entire new jargon has emerged in the Russian language to describe it.

Because this practice is so widespread, it has further reduced their credibility and the support they had enjoyed from their audiences and readerships earlier. And that in turn has only led ever more of the best and

the brightest to look to other careers than journalism, a vicious circle

from which Russia shows no signs of escaping anytime soon. Putin

came to power in this context. Unlike Boris Yeltsin who generally backed

media freedom despite everything else, Putin, a former KGB lieutenant

colonel and communist, had little reason to like the press even if he

could still claim that he was interested in market reforms. Within two

weeks of taking office as acting president, Putin showed his true media

colors, not only appearing to be behind the arrest of RFE/RL correspondent Andrei Babitsky for his reporting in Chechnya but also presiding

over a comic opera transfer of Babitsky to Chechen rebels and telling interviewers that Babitsky and those of his ilk were more dangerous than Chechen gunmen. Some people at the time blamed all this on

Putins newness to office, his supposed inexperience with the media.

But the events of the last year have proven them wrong. Putin has

taken a series of actions, all of which show him to be an enemy of the

free media. Among the most egregious:

Putin and his government have presided over a country that international journalist organizations now say is the third most dangerous

place on earth for people in the media. During 2000, several journalists

were killed in Russia and their attackers remain at large. Far more

were beaten up or threatened by thugs who appear to have close ties to

the regime.

Putin and his government have promulgated an information security

doctrine that puts the state in charge of all media activities, calls for

restrictions on Internet access, and creates a new Kremlin bureaucracy

to oversee the right thinking of the population through the press.

Putin and his government have hounded the two most important

owners of independent media into exile and potential bankruptcy, forcing both Boris Berezovsky and Vladimir Gusinsky to yield most if not

all of their media positions.

Putin and his government have restored Soviet-era symbols and actions, including the creation of a patriotic propaganda campaign system and of a Kremlin-financed propaganda apparatus. He has also overseen the return of the Soviet practice of denying paper to newspapers

that print something he doesnt like and of denying electric power to

radio and television outlets that carry stories he finds offensive.

Putin and his government have used their powers to reward those

owners, editors, and journalists who cooperate and to punish those who

dont by giving or denying access not only to cover the Chechen war but

also to cover events in Moscow itself.

This list could easily be extended, but the point is clear. Unlike Yeltsin

and unlike the leaders of democratic countries, Putin does not want a

free press. Instead of viewing it as an integral part of a civil society,

Putin sees it as an annoyance, as something to be silenced or bent to his
68

will. Many of Putins defenders argue that no leader likes to be criticized. That is certainly true. Indeed, none of us likes criticism. But

leaders who believe in democracy accept that criticism is part of the

system, More to the point, they understand that in the words of Thomas Jefferson, without a free press, there will not long be a free congress. And that is precisely the point: Putins attacks on the press both

frontal and more underhanded are not an end in themselves. They are

part of his attack on Russias chance to move from an authoritarian

past to a democratic future. Putin has made it clear again and again

that he is in favor of reviving the Russian state, of rebuilding what he

calls the vertical power as part of a process of restoring the majesty of

Russia. No one can argue that rebuilding the power of the state is wrong:

under Yeltsin, the Russian state had disintegrated to the point that

many people were saying that it had become a failed state in many

ways like Somalia. More to the point, no one can argue that Russians

buffeted by the difficulties of the post-Soviet decade would respond other

than positively to such a call. Butand here is the problemthere are

many ways to rebuild the state in Russia or anywhere else. Putin has

chosen to do it by attacking what is always the foundation of a free

societythe free pressand he has done it with a remarkable degree of

support from Russians as a whole. According to the results of a poll

taken in November 2000, 49 percent of Russiansnearly one in every

twobelieve that the reimposition of censorship would be a good thing

for the government to do. Four months later, that number rose to 57

percent. Both statistics are far higher than only a few years ago, and

together they constitute a dangerous trend. Moreover, this shift in Russian attitudes has been paralleled by a shift in Western ones, with the

latter increasingly believing that if Russia becomes a free market

economy all other issues will be taken resolved as well. There appear to

be three reasons for this entirely unexpected development. First, many

Russians are simply deferring to Putin and his anti-media campaign. It

is easy to go along with the new leader, especially one who has managed

to advertise himself as more vigorous and effective than his predecessor. Indeed, many people appear to think that supporting the media is a

kind of anti-Kremlin measure that they do not want to be a part of.

Second, the quality of the media has deteriorated both because of underlying market forces and because of the actions of Putin himself. At a

time when many Russians are still suffering from the transition from

communism, they have not only less money but less reason to look to

the media for anything other than entertainment. They are thus less

likely than before to want to defend the media or care about the fate of

broadcast or print news. Moreover, the Russian media now enjoys significantly less support from and respect by its Western counterparts, a

trend that also appears headed toward becoming a vicious circle as well.

And third, many Russians, accustomed to the cheerleading of the press

in Soviet times and appalled by the conditions that the Russian media

now report, are less and less concerned that the media tell the truth. A

recent poll suggested that many Russians now believe that the government not only has a right but an obligation to distort coverage on certain topics, not just prevent coverage but actively to manage it. In every

society, people understand that there are things no government can or

should allow to be openly discussed such as how to manufacture a

nuclear weaponbut that is something very different than supporting

open distortion of coverage of ongoing events. In this environment, there
69

are nonetheless a few positive developments. Some newspapers, a few

radio stations, and an occasional television broadcast do perform according to the highest standards of international journalism. Moreover,

an advertising sector is reemerging after the ravages of the economic

collapse of August 1998. And some journalists and editors appear to be

increasingly concerned about their image and their responsibilities. But

such developments are being overwhelmed by Putins campaign and

especially by the populations apparent indifference. A decade ago, the

media could rally people to its side and mobilize people to march in its

defense. That achievement helped end communism and start Russias

troubled transition toward democracy. But now the media in Russia do

not have that power. Worse, they do not appear likely to regain it anytime soon. As a result, few listeners and readers are likely to do much

to protest if Putin continues his crackdown against the press, something Putin knows well but that many in the West have so far failed to

understand. And that makes it incumbent on us in the West to speak

out lest the dream of Napoleon once more come true in Russia.
70

PREPARED SUBMISSION OF DR. EMIL PAIN,

GALINA STAROVOITOVA FELLOW ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND

CONFLICT RESOLUTION,

KENNAN INSTITUTE AT THE WOODROW WILSON CENTER

ON RUSSIAS MILITARY CAMPAIGN IN THE CHECHEN

REPUBLIC

Russias two military campaigns in the Chechen Republic in 1994-

1996 and the present one that began in 1999 are tragedies for both the

Chechen people and the whole of Russia. In his time President Yeltsin

called the war in Chechnya his biggest mistake. Unfortunately the

new Russian leadership is repeating and worsening it. It has been trapped

by some illusions or inadequate information on the situation in

Chechnya. The Russian army has no chance of victory in this war. It

has already dragged on more than a year, and according to official statistics the monthly losses of the Russian troops are greater than in the

first campaign. It is likely that the losses among the civilians are higher

as well.

Even in a purely military sense, there is little probability of a victory

for Moscow, but this is especially true regarding the utopian idea of

winning an economic victory in Chechnya. It means turning the

Chechen population to the Russian side through the economic restoration of Chechnya. How is it possible to restore industry in Chechnya if

more than 80 percent of it was concentrated in peaceful times in Grozny,

which is now completely destroyed? Even by official Russian statistics

one third of all rebels are concentrated in this city and it is namely here

that Russian troops constantly suffer the most losses.

The army cannot be located for long in a hostile occupied territory. It

will begin to demoralize. Demoralization of 100 thousand Russian troops

in Chechnya is already displaying itself. With every month of the war a

larger part of the home country population becomes dissatisfied with it.

And sociological opinion polls show that this change is taking place. If

in the beginning of 2001 more than 60 percent of respondents supported

the continuation of the war until final victory, in May less than 40

percent still did. The longer the war goes on, the more the government

demonstrates its weakness, which in turn weakens the governing of

the country as a whole. Sooner or later the Russian leadership will have

to enter into negotiations with the leaders of the Chechen resistance,

but the continuation of the war worsens the conditions for such negotiations.

Continuation of military operations leads to a greater involvement of

civilians in the fighting. The casualties grow and the savagery of both

sides grows as well. In this type of conflict it is incorrect to talk of the

guilt of only one side. One cannot demonize Russia and idealize the

Chechen rebels. Among them are people who bear a great part of the

responsibility for this war; there are people among them that are without question properly called international terrorists. But that is the

problem: the longer the war lasts, the greater is the influence of radicals in the rebel camp.

The Russian leadership still has a chance to begin a dialogue with the

moderate forces in the Chechen armed resistance grouped around President Maskhadov.
71

The continuation of military operations and the growth of violations

of the rules of war will unavoidably increase the attention of the international community and international institutions to the Chechen problem. In my opinion international organizations must, above all else,

help the Russian government understand that continual reliance on

force to solve the Chechen problem is self-defeating. The examples of

Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Israel and many other countries that

have similar problems may not be ideal, but they do show that even in

places where the political solution to ethnic conflict has not been reached,

the cessation of military operations is still necessary to achieve a political solution to the problem of self determination of peoples.

International organizations can influence Russia only if it is included

in their work. Any attempts of political isolation of Russia are counterproductive.

A useful initiative from international organizations to solve the

Chechen problem will be the creation of international expert groups,

that will of course include Russian and Chechen experts, to develop

mutually acceptable formulas for escaping the present conflict.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
72

SUBMISSION OF BORIS JORDAN,

GENERAL DIRECTOR, NTV

Thank you for inviting me to participate in the Helsinki Commissions

hearings on the state of human rights in Russia, and particularly the

events surrounding the change in management of the Russian television network NTV. I am especially grateful for this opportunity because I believe that NTV is one of the most important components of

Russias independent media, and its rehabilitation is essential to maintaining and improving the quality of human rights in Russia. Since

assuming control of NTV in April, I have endeavored to rebuild it into a

truly independent and professional news and entertainment company.

However, to be truly independent, NTV must be permanently unchained

from both the editorial and financial influence of the Russian state.

I cannot accomplish that unless NTV is also freed of the stigma cast

upon it by Vladimir Gusinsky in the months since he lost control of the

company. It is essential for the Commission to recognize that NTV has

been and remains the victim of Mr. Gusinskys practice of trading favorable media coverage for investment monies. The record is clear that

Mr. Gusinsky, in league with Russian state financial institutions,

crippled NTV with debts that it could not hope to repay. Moreover, as

the press has reported, Mr. Gusinsky was able to accumulate these

massive debts precisely because he was willing to trade favorable press

coverage for state funds and loan guarantees. Therefore, to the extent

that the freedom of expression in Russia is diminished or imperiled by

the current condition of NTV, the Commission must understand that

Mr. Gusinsky and his colleagues are responsible for this state of affairs.

I am intent on establishing NTVs independence both by putting it on

a sound financial footing and by ensuring the freedom of its editorial

voice. If I may, I would like to explain to the Commission how NTV

came to its current condition, what efforts the new NTV board of directors is undertaking to improve NTVs standing, and how these efforts

are critical to the maintenance of free expression in Russia.

MR. GUSINSKY TRADED FAVORABLE PRESS COVERAGE FOR

STATE-SPONSORED LOANS

Mr. Gusinsky would have the world believe that he is being persecuted for building an independent and critical media voice. That is an

utter falsehood. It is widely known that Mr. Gusinsky built his media

empire up by trading media influence for Kremlin support, and in turn

parlaying his Kremlin support into investments. This practice reached

its peak during Mr. Yeltsins 1996 presidential campaign, a fact that

Mr. Gusinsky himself admits. Last summer, Mr. Gusinsky said that

Media MOST became a major media power following the 1996 elections,

when the Kremlin gave him a license for daytime broadcasting as a

reward for his services in helping get Mr. Yeltsin re-elected. Mr.

Gusinskys deputy, Igor Malashenko, who today campaigns in defense

of Media MOST, was at that time Mr. Yeltsins campaign manager

while he was also serving as the General Director of NTV. There can be

no more direct evidence of Mr. Gusinskys willing lack of editorial independence. As Mr. Gusinsky himself said, I was part of the team that in

1996 gave birth to this system. Believe me, today I have to a large

extent re-assessed this process. If I could enter the same water twice,

we would have behaved the same during the 1996 elections as we behaved in 1999 and 2000. But unfortunately, time flows only one way.
73

(Andrei Zolotov, Jr., Gusinsky: Kremlin Tried To Bribe Me, St. Petersburg Times, #573, June 2,2000.) Mr. Gusinsky has also acknowledged that he used his organization to attack Mr. Yeltsin when Mr.

Gusinsky did not receive political favors that he felt were his due after

the presidential election. NTV's Chief Editor at the time, Mr. Kiselyov,

has also admitted that NTV was placed in the service of particular

political interests when it served Mr. Gusinskys agenda. Therefore,

although NTV may have at certain times criticized the government

under Mr. Gusinskys leadership, it is ridiculous for anyone to suggest

that such criticism was the act of an independent and objective media

outlet. When Mr. Gusinsky has been candid, even he has admitted that

this was not the case.

Given that Mr. Gusinsky owed his very broadcasting license to his

efforts in service of Mr. Yeltsin, it is particularly galling for NTV to

now suffer his current media campaign, wherein NTV is depicted as

the once free vassal of a newly repressive Russian state. Mr. Gusinsky

would have everyone ignore the fact that he operated NTV as a mercenary of the State and other paying interests. Indeed, since my appointment, I have been approached by numerous Russian entities that have

requested that I ensure that NTV does not broadcast negative information or that we broadcast positive information regarding their businesses

in return for personal payments of millions of dollars. I have rejected

such offers. However, I have received confirmation from both inside

and outside NTV that such offers were routinely accepted by the previous management. As far as I can tell, up to $50 million per year in

revenues came from such black advertising or payments by politicians and business executives in exchange for positive or non-critical

coverage. This is the legacy left by Mr. Gusinsky that NTVs new management must overcome. It is therefore my sincere hope that the irony

of Mr. Gusinskys rhetoric is not lost on the Commission.

MR. GUSINSKY LEFT NTV INSOLVENT

I first met with representatives of NTVs two other principal shareholders, Gazprom Media and Capital Group, in March of this year to

discuss NTV's critical financial situation. Gazprom Media is the media

holding company established by Russias dominant natural gas company, Gazprom. Capital Group is a highly regarded American private

investment fund. At that point, Gazprom Media and Capital Group together owned slightly over 50 percent of NTVs shares. Mr. Gusinskys

Media MOST holding company owned the remainder. At the time of

that meeting, NTV was insolvent. Because of my business and financial background, I was asked to lead NTV under a new Western-style

management group and to arrange for a necessary infusion of new capital. On April 3,2001, NTV's shareholders elected a new board of directors and appointed me as NTVs General Director.

As you may know, I am also involved with the Sputnik Group, one of

Russias largest private equity funds. I have been a part of the Russian

business and investing community for nearly ten years, and I have

participated in some of its most important developments. I was a founder

of Renaissance Capital, which is one of the first and most prominent

Russian investment banks. I built Renaissance Capital into Russias

first full-service financial institution, serving a diverse base of international and Russian blue chip clients. I first came to Russia with CS

First Boston and before that I worked on Wall Street for Kidder Peabody
74

& Co. I am also an American citizen, born and raised on Long Island

and educated at New York University. It is this unique combination of

training and experiencein both Russia and the United Statesthat I

bring to the current effort to rehabilitate NTV.

Eleven days after the new board was elected and I was appointed as

General Director, we were able to gain access to financial information

relating to NTV and Media MOST, including drafts of NTVs unsigned

audit statements for 1999 and 2000 prepared by PricewaterhouseCoopers.

Mr. Gusinsky never completed or presented these statements to NTV's

shareholders. When I received these draft audits, it was immediately

clear that NTV was not, in accounting terms, a going concern. Over

the last four years, NTV accumulated a loss of approximately $62 million. In addition, the company has been in arrears in its broadcasting

fees, rents, and many suppliers, subcontractors and employees had gone

unpaid for months. All told, at the time of the change in control, Mr.

Gusinsky had burdened NTV with more than $100 million in debt.

Ironically, despite borrowing so much money, NTV was under-investing in content purchases in 2000: specifically, the number of acquired movies dropped by more than 50 percent in 2000, compared to

1999; overdue payables to Russian content supplierssome of which

have not been paid for more than a yearexceed $2 million; overdue

payables to international content suppliers amount to another $1.4 million; and only $3.2 million of the planned $5.1 million was spent in the

first quarter of 2000 for new content.

Further, NTV was never run as a viable business. Mr. Gusinsky did

not practice proper budgeting or financial planning, and what financial

plans did exist for 2001 provided for negative cash flow; i.e., there was

no plan to pay for the expenses coming due this year. Despite this obvious disconnect between revenues and debt, expenses, salaries and perquisites at NTV were unreasonably lavish. For instance, twenty NTV

journalists were paid salaries in excess of $300,000 per year, and some

of NTVs money was loaned to its employees. As a matter of business

realities, NTV should never have had such high overheads and debts.

Likewise, the figures released this month by Media MOST to the Financial Tints show substantial overheads from Mr. Gusinskys parent

company, including up to $20 million per year in salaries for a head

office of around 600 employees, as well as airplane leasing costs of $11

million and legal and audit fees of $5 million in 2000. (See Andrew

Jack, Gazprom Stuggles With A Media Legacy, Financial Times, June

5, 2001.)

These business decisions were made with no regard to the realities of

the Russian media market. Therefore, it should come as no surprise

that under Mr. Gusinskys leadership NTV registered a profit in only

one quarter since in was founded in 1993. Since 1997, Mr. Gusinsky

has amassed $1.6 billion of debt, virtually none of which was ever repaid in cash; Mr. Gusinsky instead preferred to swap his debts for questionably valued pieces of his companies. To date, the Media MOST group

has converted $571 million of its debt into equity. It has also written off

$168 million in exchange for government securities. However, that still

leaves more than $857 million in borrowings outstanding on Media

MOSTs balance sheet. As a simple matter of finances, this massive

indebtedness is the reason that Gazprom and Capital Group found it
75

necessary to appoint new management at NTV. It was clear from Mr.

Gusinskys past practices that he will never pay his debts, including

the $261 million coming due to Gazprom in July.

Nor should the Commission be left with the impression that Mr.

Gusinsky only left large lenders such as Gazprom in the lurch. In reality, Mr. Gusinsky also left NTV with debts to many small independent

television producers and other journalists, thereby damaging their livelihoods as well as NTV. During Gusinskys tenure, NTV failed to pay

numerous program suppliers, and even many of its own employees..

Mr. Gusinskys unprofessional and ethically questionable practices were

therefore a scourge on much of the Russian media market.

NTVs insolvency is clearly the result of an intentional scheme by

Mr. Gusinsky to saddle all of the Media MOST companies with more

debts than they could possibly repay. The basic and irrefutable facts of

the Russian television industry show the deliberate folly of Mr.

Gusinskys excessive borrowing. The annual Russian commercial advertising market in electronic media does not exceed approximately

$350$400 million per year. NTVs legitimate advertising revenues

before the management change were less than $100 million per year.

Clearly that is not large enough to serve as the basis to pay the debts

that Mr. Gusinsky so indiscriminately heaped upon NTV and his other

companies, debts which arguably exceed the entire value of the Russian

television industry.

In sum, it is Mr. Gusinsky who bears the blame for compromising

the independence of NTV. Mr. Gusinsky left NTV extremely vulnerable

by his assumption of colossal debts coupled with his inability and unwillingness to repay them. The predicament that Mr. Gusinsky created

for NTV is extremely serious. Article 99 of the Russian Civil Code states

that if the net assets of a joint-stock company are lower than the minimum amount of charter capital required bylaw, the company must be

liquidated. Mr. Gusinsky left NTV without the necessary capital, and

the threat to its existence as an organization financially independent of

the State is therefore imminent unless we can secure additional funding on an urgent basis.

THE CHANGE IN MANAGEMENT AT NTV WAS LAWFUL AND

PEACEFUL

There have been serious misrepresentations in the media about the

way the change in management at NTV occurred. Some have wrongfully characterized it as a forceful takeover at the urging of the Russian

government. I want the record to be clear that the new NTV board of

directors assumed control of the station peacefully, lawfully and by the

will of NTVs shareholders. These are the facts: Following the April 3rd

shareholders meeting, former NTV general director Evgeniy Kiselyov

and a few of his close associates launched a protest and declared that

they would block me and my team from entering NTV headquarters.

When my attorneys conveyed my request for access to NTVs records,

Mr. Kiselyov denied the request and asked my attorneys to leave the

premises. These same persons disrupted normal NTV programming

and uttered a number of obscenities on the air. Just as in the United

States, these unprofessional acts violated the stations federal .broadcasting license. These same persons then cancelled commercials in

breach of NTVs agreements with its advertisers, which resulted in a

material loss of advertising revenue for the company. When I learned,
76

around midnight on April 13th, that these protestors were removing

television equipment belonging to NTV, along with the news departments

archives, I directed my Deputy General Director to prevent the theft

and to protect the station, but also to avoid confrontation. My Deputy,

together with a few attorneys, personal assistants, and ten unarmed

private security personnel peacefully entered NTVs premises that night.

Upon entering NTV, they discovered that Mr. Kiselyov and his associates had illegally diverted NTVs broadcast signal to TNT, another television station owned by Mr. Gusinskys group.

Contrary to media reports which have tended to repeat early and

inaccurate accounts, force was never used and no government officials

or security forces were involved. My Deputy General Director and his

assistants were admitted by NTV security guards after they were shown

various legal documents which verified our right to enter the premises,

including orders signed by me under the official seal of NTV. In other

words, NTV was voluntarily turned over to its new management in

recognition of the legal authority of the new board to assume control of

the station. I cannot stress heavily enough that the change in management at NTV took place peacefully and at all times in compliance with

the law. I can confidently say that such a change of control, as the

result of a legitimate vote of the majority of NTVs shareholders, would

have passed muster if it had taken place in the United States.

NTV IS ESSENTIAL TO THE MAINTENANCE AND IMPROVEMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN RUSSIA

Despite Mr. Gusinskys legacies of debt and influence peddling, I believe that NTV can be rehabilitated to realize its true potential as an

independent voice. I know that the Helsinki Commission is particularly

concerned with the death and destruction that continues to occur in

Chechnya. NTVs reporting of the Chechnya crisis has been an essential part of the Russian human rights equation. By bringing to light the

abuses occurring there, I think it is fair to say that NTV has served as

an engine for human rights reform.

What has been getting lost in the current media battle over NTV,

however, is the fact that NTVs reporting on the Chechnya crisis continues the professional investigation and analysis that characterized

NTVs coverage before the change in control. In fact, the team of NTV

reporters covering Chechnya remains the same. As I have said all along,

I only ask that the world judge NTV by its actions, and not by rumors

or speculation. I encourage you and the Commission to review the enclosed articles which trace NTVs recent reporting on various issues

within Russia, including its continued reporting of the events occurring in Chechnya. I think you will find that NTV's reporting continues

to be objective, professional and, most importantly, critical.

I AM TAKING THE MOST EFFECTIVE STEPS POSSIBLE TO

ENSURE NTVS EDITORIAL INDEPENDENCE

Perhaps one of the most concrete illustrations of NTVs commitment

to editorial independence is the fact that on April 25, 2001, NTVs own

journalists elected Tatiana Mitkova as NTVs Chief News Editor. Ms.

Mitkova is an award-winning journalist who is held in the highest regard for her reporting and news analyses, and she has the true credentials of an independent journalist. In 1991, she was fired from her position as a producer and correspondent for Soviet State Television after
77

she refused to read a government-influenced statement sanitizing the

storming of a television tower in Vilnius, Lithuania by Soviet forces,

during which more than a dozen protesters were killed. That same year,

Ms. Mitkova won an award for outstanding professionalism by the

Committee to Protect Journalists, and in 1994 she was awarded a medal

by the President of Lithuania in recognition of her actions during the

attack. Her acceptance of the editorial helm of NTV should be a cause

for confidence that NTV is taking the most meaningful steps possible

toward creating an editorially independent and professional media outlet.

The Commission should also know that not a single NTV journalist

has been fired, including the journalists who reported stories critical of

President Putin for the Russian governments actions in Chechnya.

Moreover, less than one-third of the members of NTVs news department have resigned since April 3rd. In fact, eight members of the news

staff have officially returned and more are expected to return in the

near future.

Above all, I want the Commission to understand that I am thoroughly

committed to establishing NTVs editorial independence. As I have informed NTVs shareholders, I shall immediately resign if there is any

attempt to influence NTVs editorial independence or journalistic freedom. I cannot think of any way to make my intention more clear.

I am working to ensure NTVs financial independence.

Ultimately, NTV has little chance of surviving as an independent

editorial voice unless a viable business model is put into place. That is

exactly what I intend to do. My agenda is to improve NTVs profitability

and build it into Russias leading independent media company. Perhaps

the most effective means by which I can ensure NTVs editorial independence is by establishing its economic independence. My mandate is

to run NTV as a business, to make its operations profitable and to attract strategic foreign investment to enable NTV to become a worldclass network.

Accordingly, we have embarked on an ambitious yet sensible program to establish NTVs independence. We have begun the task of carrying out a proper audit of the company, the first in two years. That

audit has been published under Russian Statutory Accounting Principles, and is now being completed in accordance with U.S. Generally

Accepted Accounting Principles. We are also creating a budget with a

detailed balance sheet and cash flow statements, another essential feature of a professional organization which will be new to NTV. We are

also streamlining operations and reducing out-of-control costs. But the

Commission needs to appreciate just how far NTV must go to overcome

Mr. Gusinskys fleecing of his own companies. My first task was to pay

hundreds of thousands of dollars in outstanding employee salaries and

debts to program producers. My second will be to raise more that $20

million to cover the outstanding costs of our foreign bureaus. NTV was

left entirely without resources, and therefore needs to be able to bring

itself current before it can move forward.

Unfortunately, even today Mr. Gusinsky plots to strip NTVs resources

away from it through various court actions in Russia.

I hope that this statement sheds light on those parts of this dispute

that have not received sufficient attention. I also encourage you to address any questions you may have to me and my colleagues at NTV.

You will find NTVs new management to be much more forthcoming

and open than its previous handlers.
x
x

x
x
This is a U.S. Government publication produced by

the Commission on Security and Cooperation

in Europe (CSCE).

«««

This publication is intended to inform interested

individuals and organizations about developments

within and among the participating States of the

Organization for Security and Cooperation in

Europe (OSCE).

«««

 All CSCE publications may be freely reproduced,

with appropriate credit, in any form. The CSCE

encourages the widest possible dissemination of its

publications.

«««

Visit our site on the World Wide Web at

http://www.csce.gov

The Commissions web site, http://www.csce.gov,

provides instant access to the agencys latest press

releases and reports on recent hearings and briefings in addition to an electronic subscription service. Using the Commissions subscription page,

readers with e-mail may choose to receive press

releases, notices, reports and other documents on

issues in which they are most interested. Please

subscribe today.