COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Elder, Frank and Senior Judge Hodges 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

GERALD ELLIS McWILLIAMS 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 2021-98-2 JUDGE WILLIAM H. HODGES 

 OCTOBER 12, 1999 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 

James B. Wilkinson, Judge 

 William J. Viverette for appellant. 

 Linwood T. Wells, Jr., Assistant Attorney 

General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellee. 

 Appellant was convicted of grand larceny of an automobile. 

On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to 

support the conviction because the Commonwealth failed to prove 

that he knew that the automobile was stolen and that he 

exercised dominion and control over it. We agree and reverse. 

 When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged on 

appeal, "'we review the evidence in the light most favorable to 

the Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable inferences 

fairly deducible therefrom.'" Archer v. Commonwealth, 26 

Va. App. 1, 11, 492 S.E.2d 826, 831 (1997) (citation omitted). 

 

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code 

§ 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication.
 So viewed, the evidence proved that on the afternoon of 

June 15, 1998, appellant and Michael Brown, a codefendant, saw a 

man named Walter. Appellant had a VCR that he wanted to pawn, 

and Walter offered to drive appellant and Brown to the pawnshop. 

Either Brown or Walter drove the car, starting it with a key on 

a ring that contained several other keys. 

 William and Debra Mitchell lived three houses away from 

appellant. The Mitchells owned an automobile that they parked 

on the street in front of their house. The Mitchells last saw 

the automobile on June 14, 1998, and noticed that it was missing 

on the morning of June 15, 1998. Mr. Mitchell could not find 

his keys to the automobile on June 14, 1998. 

 On June 15, 1998, the Mitchells were driving in another 

automobile when they saw their missing automobile. While stopped 

at a traffic light, the Mitchells confronted appellant, Brown and 

Walter. Appellant testified that he got out of the automobile and 

told Brown and Walter to give the automobile to the Mitchells. 

Appellant attempted to retrieve his VCR, and he struggled with Mr. 

Mitchell. The police arrived and only Walter ran from the scene. 

 Larceny is defined as the "wrongful taking of the goods of 

another without the owner's consent and with the intention to 

permanently deprive the owner of possession of the goods." 

Bright v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 248, 251, 356 S.E.2d 443, 444 

(1987) (citation omitted). "Once the crime is established, the 

unexplained possession of recently stolen goods permits an 

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inference of larceny by the possessor." Id. For the larceny 

inference to arise, however, "the Commonwealth must establish 

that the accused was in exclusive possession of property 

recently stolen." Best v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 387, 389, 282 

S.E.2d 16, 17 (1981) (citation omitted). Consequently, there 

must be evidence that the defendant exercised dominion and 

control over the property. See Moehring v. Commonwealth, 223 

Va. 564, 568, 290 S.E.2d 891, 893 (1982). Evidence of mere 

presence in a stolen vehicle is insufficient to establish 

exclusive possession. See Nelson v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 

268, 271, 403 S.E.2d 384, 386 (1991) (citation omitted). 

 The automobile did not have any signs of forced entry, and 

the steering column and windows were intact. A key on a key 

ring was used to start the automobile. When the Mitchells 

stopped the automobile, appellant was a passenger in the 

automobile, and he did not flee from the scene. 

 "[A] suspicion of guilt, however strong, or even a 

probability of guilt, is insufficient to support a criminal 

conviction." Bishop v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 164, 170, 313 

S.E.2d 390, 393 (1984). No evidence was presented to show that 

appellant assisted in the theft of the automobile. The evidence 

did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant exercised 

any degree of dominion or control over the automobile or that he 

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shared joint exclusive possession of the stolen automobile. 

Accordingly, we reverse the larceny conviction. 

Reversed and dismissed.

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