Strategic Studies Institute

U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA

ADAPTING, TRANSFORMING,

AND MODERNIZING UNDER FIRE:

THE MEXICAN MILITARY 2006-11

Inigo Guevara Moyano

Letort The

Papers

Visit our website for other free publication 

downloads

http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/

To rate this publication click here.
The

Letort Papers

In the early 18th century, James Letort, an explorer 

and fur trader, was instrumental in opening up the 

Cumberland Valley to settlement. By 1752, there was 

a garrison on Letort Creek at what is today Carlisle 

Barracks, Pennsylvania. In those days, Carlisle Barracks 

lay at the western edge of the American colonies. It was 

a bastion for the protection of settlers and a departure 

point for further exploration. Today, as was the case 

over two centuries ago, Carlisle Barracks, as the home of 

the U.S. Army War College, is a place of transition and 

transformation.

In the same spirit of bold curiosity that compelled the 

men and women who, like Letort, settled the American 

West, the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) presents The 

Letort Papers. This series allows SSI to publish papers, 

retrospectives, speeches, or essays of interest to the 

defense academic community which may not correspond 

with our mainstream policy-oriented publications.

If you think you may have a subject amenable to 

publication in our Letort Paper series, or if you wish 

to comment on a particular paper, please contact Dr. 

Antulio J. Echevarria II, Director of Research, U.S. Army 

War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 632 Wright Ave, 

Carlisle, PA 17013-5046. The phone number is (717) 245-

4058; e-mail address is antulio.echevarria@us.army.mil. 

We look forward to hearing from you.
Letort Paper

ADAPTING, TRANSFORMING, AND 

MODERNIZING UNDER FIRE:

THE MEXICAN MILITARY 2006-11

Inigo Guevara Moyano

September 2011

The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do 

not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. Authors of Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) publications 

enjoy full academic freedom, provided they do not disclose classified information, jeopardize operations security, or misrepresent official U.S. policy. Such academic freedom empowers them 

to offer new and sometimes controversial perspectives in the interest of furthering debate on key issues. This report is cleared for 

public release; distribution is unlimited.

*****

This publication is subject to Title 17, United States Code, Sections 101 and 105. It is in the public domain and may not be copyrighted.
ii

*****

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should 

be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army 

War College, 632 Wright Ave, Carlisle, PA 17013-5046. 

*****

All Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) publications may be 

downloaded free of charge from the SSI website. Hard copies of 

this report may also be obtained free of charge while supplies last 

by placing an order on the SSI website. The SSI website address 

is: www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil.

*****

The Strategic Studies Institute publishes a monthly e-mail 

newsletter to update the national security community on the research of our analysts, recent and forthcoming publications, and 

upcoming conferences sponsored by the Institute. Each newsletter also provides a strategic commentary by one of our research 

analysts. If you are interested in receiving this newsletter, please 

subscribe on the SSI website at www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.

army.mil/newsletter/.

ISBN 1-58487-505-4
iii

FOREWORD

Since President Felipe Calderon took office in December 2006, Mexico has embarked upon the implementation of a culture of law and security that has triggered 

a war with organized crime. This war has involved all 

sectors of society and has activated a series of renovations in its armed forces, which to date remain the most 

trusted institutions in Mexican society. 

This groundbreaking Letort Paper is an important 

contribution to an understanding of the structure, culture, motivators, and challenges of the Mexican military in the 21st century. Mr. Iñigo Guevara Moyano, a 

Mexican researcher and writer, provides a clear picture 

of doctrinal and structural transformations, adaptations, 

and improvement that the Mexican armed forces have 

endured over the past 5 years. Mr. Moyano focuses on 

how the counternarcotic role has impacted its organization, deployments, and operations, and how it has generated new doctrinal and equipment requirements. The 

paper also addresses key areas of national and international concern such as respect for human rights and and 

the military justice system. 

Given Mexico’s importance to the United States as 

its neighbor, ally, and third largest trading partner, understanding the transformation that its armed forces are 

enduring to assist in the implementation of a culture of 

law should be of prime concern to all actors—government, private sector, and academia—involved in the decisionmaking process.

 

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute

v

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

INIGO GUEVARA MOYANO is a Mexican 

writer and analyst specializing in Latin American defense and security issues. He is a former advisor to 

Mexico’s Office of the National Security Council and 

a former head of statistical analysis at a State-level 

law enforcement agency in Mexico. Mr. Moyano is a 

member of the Collective for the Analysis of Security 

for Democracy (CASEDE), the International Institute 

for Strategic Studies (IISS), and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), where he contributes to the Military Expenditure and Arms Transfer projects. In Washington, DC, he has lectured at the 

Brookings Institution, Georgetown University, the 

Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 

the State Department’s Foreign Service Institute (FSI), 

Council of the America’s (COA), Industrial College of 

the Armed Forces (ICAF), and Committee on Hemispheric Security of the Organization of American 

States (OAS). Mr. Moyano’s focus is on armed forces’ 

policy, structure, and the procurement of equipment, 

infrastructure, and technology. Mr. Moyano is the 

author of Latin American Fighters (HARPIA, 2009), a 

history of jet fighters and armed jet trainers in service 

with Latin American air arms since 1947, and has published over 50 articles in academic journals and specialized magazines. Mr. Moyano holds a Certification 

in Administration of Public Security from the Instituto 

de Administracion Publica de Queretaro (IAPQ), a 

bachelor’s degree in international trade (LIN 00) from 

the Instituto Tecnologico y de Estudios Superiores de 

Monterrey (ITESM) in Mexico, a master’s degree in international security from Georgetown University, and 
completed the Strategy and Defense Policy course presented by the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies 

(CHDS) at National Defense University. 

vi
vii

SUMMARY

Mexico’s armed forces are in the midst of a transformation to better perform in an ongoing war against 

organized crime. Their role and visibility have escalated considerably since President Felipe Calderon assumed office in December of 2006. 

Although the fight against organized crime is 

clearly a law enforcement matter, the absence of effective and accountable police forces has meant that the 

Army, Navy, and Air Force have been used as supplementary forces to defend the civilian population and 

enforce the rule of law. While the federal government 

has striven to stand up a capable police force in order to relieve and eventually replace the military, that 

possibility is still distant. Five years into the Calderon 

administration, the armed forces continue to be the 

main implementers of the National Security policy, 

aimed at employing the use of force to disrupt the 

operational capacity of organized crime. Their strong 

institutional tradition, professionalism, submission to 

political control, and history of interaction with the 

population mainly through disaster relief efforts have 

made them the most trusted institution in Mexican society. 

Mexico’s armed forces have long been used as 

an instrument of the state to implement all kinds of 

public policies at the national level, from emergency 

vaccinations, to post-earthquake rescue, to reforestation campaigns. They have been at the forefront of 

disaster relief operations in reaction to the calamities 

of nature, within and beyond their borders, with humanitarian assistance deployments to Indonesia, the 

United States, Haiti, and Central America among the 

most recent. 
viii

The Mexican armed forces are quite unique, as they 

are divided into two separate cabinet-level ministries: 

the Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional (the Secretary 

of National Defense or SEDENA), which encompasses 

the Army and Air Force, and the Secretaría de Marina (the Secretary of the Navy or SEMAR), which 

comprises the Navy. The level of engagement with 

society and the results obtained from this division in 

military power confirms the utility of their independence. Their use as the state’s last line of defense has 

led to severe criticism from opinion leaders, opposition forces, international analysts, and human rights 

organizations. Their level of commitment remains unaltered and they have undertaken a number of significant transformations to better address their continued 

roles as the guardians of the State and protectors of 

the population. 
1

ADAPTING, TRANSFORMING, AND 

MODERNIZING UNDER FIRE:

THE MEXICAN MILITARY 2006-11

Despite considerable attention to and investment 

in Mexico’s law enforcement sector during the past 5 

years, the armed forces continue to be the only Mexican institutions with the capabilities to conduct nationwide operations and the main implementers of 

the government’s security policy. This paper analyzes 

how the counterdrug role has influenced, and in some 

cases directed, its modernization. It also addresses the 

main challenges the counterdrug role is associated 

with, including human rights concerns, and proposes 

some options for its future. 

The Mexican Defense Structure: Roles and 

Missions. 

The fight between state and nonstate groups has 

characterized warfare in the 21st century; nonstate 

groups include a wide assortment of terrorists, insurgents, pirates, and criminals. Theaters of operation are 

as varied as the enemy, ranging from the jungles of 

Colombia to the mountains of Afghanistan, the coast 

off Somalia to cyber-space. Urban and suburban settings have generally experienced rapid growth and, 

with it, the need for governments to provide sufficient 

services and execute the rule of law. 

This variety of threats poses a challenge for security forces, which are generally underfunded and 

consequently find it difficult to stay ahead of their 

rapidly evolving enemies. Lack of appropriate police 

and justice systems generally leads to power vacuums 

where crime develops. Old and new democracies have 
2

turned to their largely cold war militaries to face these 

new adversaries and, in some cases, provide the only 

visible presence of the state. Hence, democracies are 

faced with the problem of not having the appropriate 

forces to deal with the problem, which in some cases 

requires good judges and social workers rather than 

soldiers. 

Since the administration of Felipe Calderon assumed office in December 2006, the Mexican armed 

forces have been the main implementing agents of the 

country’s national security policy, which identifies 

organized crime, drug trade organizations, and arms 

trafficking as its priority targets.1

 Mexico possesses 

a sui generis defense establishment composed of two 

independent institutions: the Ministry of National 

Defense (SEDENA), which includes the Army and the 

Air Force (FAM); and the Marine Ministry (SEMAR), 

comprised of the Navy (ARM), including its general 

fleet, naval air force, and marine infantry corps. This 

unique style of organization dates back to 1940, when 

the Department of the Navy was established as an autonomous entity separate from the Ministry of War. In 

1941 the Navy Department received full cabinet ministry status in order to provide it with financial and 

operational independence to implement the country’s 

maritime policy.2

 The FAM, however, continued to be 

subordinated to the Army-controlled Ministry of War, 

which assumed the name of the National Defense 

Ministry. 

The three armed forces are assigned the mission of 

preserving national security, defined by the Mexican 

Constitution as defense from external enemies and 

internal threats.3

 Thus, unlike other armed forces in 

the hemisphere that are legally barred from projecting 

power internally, the Mexican Constitution explicitly 
3

mandates it. Deployment outside of its borders during peacetime, even to participate in international exercises, requires congressional approval. 

The chain of command is simple: the President is 

commander in chief and has direct control over the 

armed forces via SEDENA and SEMAR. Each ministry is headed by an active duty four-star general-secretary and admiral-secretary, respectively; the FAM is 

headed by a three-star general who reports directly to 

the SEDENA general-secretary. 

Both ministries’ functions and responsibilities are 

regulated by the Federal Public Administration Organic Law,4

 with each service having its own organic 

laws that further specify its roles and missions5 which 

are additional to those traditional missions growing 

out of Mexico’s historical and geo-political situation. 

In general terms, they comprise the defense of the 

country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, internal security from destabilizing forces, and disaster relief assistance to the population. The Mexican armed 

forces therefore carry out roles that in other countries 

are assigned to a variety of civilian agencies and intermediate forces, such as national guards, coast guards, 

and national police. 

There are a number of elite military units, representing all services, directly subordinate to the Office of the President through the Presidential High 

Command Staff or Estado Mayor Presidencial (EMP). 

These units include a Presidential Guards Corps, a 

Marine Infantry Presidential Guard Battalion, and a 

Presidential Transport Air Group (GATP).6

 The EMP 

is responsible for the president’s personal security. It 

also acts as a liaison with the military and advises the 

president on matters of national security. By law, the 

EMP is headed by an Army general. 
4

Defense Budgeting and Spending. 

With the country having no external enemies, 

funding for the defense sector has been traditionally 

low. When calculated as a proportion of the country’s 

gross domestic product (GDP), defense expenditures 

average around 0.5 to 0.7 percent. When compared to 

other large countries in the hemisphere, Mexico is at 

the lower end of defense spending. 

In the past 5 years the defense budget (including 

pensions and social services) has gone up 100 percent, 

but when adjusted for inflation, the real increase has 

been only slightly over 50 percent (see Figures 1 and 

2). As manpower levels increased only by 4 percent 

from 2006 to 2009 (the last published public figure), 

most of this increase went to raising salaries and increasing benefits; troops employed in high impact operations received an 80 percent increase between 2006 

and 2010. Benefits included the granting of 15,000 

housing credits and 35,000 scholarships for military 

dependents.7

Source: Presupuestos de Egresos de la Federacion 2006-2011 published by the Secretaria de Hacienda y Crédito Publico.8

Figure 1. Budgets Assigned to Defense Institutions

in Millions of Mexican Pesos (MXN).

 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

SEDENA 26,032 32,201 34,861 43,623 43,632 50,039

SEMAR 9,163 10,951 13,383 16,059 15,992 18,270

ISSFAM 2,545 2,729 2,998 3,459 4,542 5,852

Total 37,740 45,881 51,242 63,141 64,166 74,161
5

Source: Elaborated by author based on INPC (inflation) figures consulted in the Banco de Mexico inflation portal on December 30, 2010, data for 2010 is as of November 30.9

Figure 2. Proportional Changes

to the Defense Budget and Inflation.

Interservice Rivalries and the Competition for 

Resources.

Despite the administrative division in the services, 

which guarantees the individual development of the 

naval and land forces, the armed forces are not immune to the normal interservice rivalries that usually 

dictate competition for additional resources, especially when it comes to role and mission overlap.

• In February 2007, the SEMAR Commission in 

Congress petitioned the President to transfer 

the Army’s five Amphibious Special Forces 

Groups (GANFES) to ARM—along with its 

financial resources—in order to expand the 

Navy’s Marines.10 The petition was not accommodated. GANFES remains under SEDENA 

control, with its five groups stationed in Baja 

California, Baja California Sur, Sonora, Quintana Roo, and Yucatan, respectively.

• In June 2007, a SEMAR plan to stand up a total 

of 30 marine infantry battalions (BIM) report2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

Nominal Increase % 21.6% 11.7% 23.2% 1.6% 15.6%

INPC previous year (PY) 4.1% 3.8% 6.5% 3.6% 4.3%

Increase after PY INPC 17.5% 7.9% 16.7% -1.9% 11.3%
6

edly caused antagonism within SEDENA sectors that see their traditional areas of operation 

co-opted by the Navy’s growing land-based 

component. 11

• Plans by SEMAR to acquire six Sukhoi Su-27 jet 

fighters from Russia were cancelled, with the 

existence of the plans later denied in an official 

SEMAR communiqué in 2007.12 This change 

in requirement was attributed to a redesign in 

the ARM’s power projection capabilities by the 

incoming 2006-12 SEMAR administration. Acquisition of these 4.5 generation fighters would 

have put the SEMAR-controlled naval air 

force’s (FAN) combat capabilities above those 

of the Air Force. The Air Force is equipped with 

third generation Northrop F-5E/F Tiger II fighters acquired in 1981.

Despite this obvious competition for resources, the 

proportion of the defense budget assigned to each institution has not varied considerably during the past 5 

years (see Figure 3). 

Source: Elaborated by author based on Presupuestos de Egresos 

de la Federacion 2006-2011.

Figure 3. Proportional Allocation of

Financial Resources to Defense Institutions.

Proportion 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

SEDENA 69% 70% 68% 69% 68% 67%

SEMAR 24% 24% 26% 25% 25% 25%

ISSFAM 7% 6% 6% 5% 7% 8%
7

Funding for the interservice social security institution ISSFAM, which addresses healthcare, life insurance, and other services for members of the armed 

forces and their dependents, has received the largest 

increase in real terms. This sort of joint institution is 

a good example of the efficiencies obtained from centralizing supporting services. 

Evolution of the Army.

The Army is composed of some 200,000 personnel. 

The last public document detailing SEDENA personnel composition by ranks shows an 80/20 mix of enlisted and officers, with 537 generals.13

The country is divided into 12 Military Regions 

(RM), each subdivided into a variable number of Military Zones (ZM). ZMs are created according to operational requirements; as of December 2010, there were 

46 ZMs.14 Each zone has a variable number of units 

assigned. As of February 2011, there are 104 infantry 

battalions, 24 motorized cavalry regiments, 9 armored 

reconnaissance regiments, 8 mechanized regiments, 

12 Special Forces battalions, 10 military police battalions, 4 engineer battalions, 1 logistics battalion, 3 airborne rifle battalions, 9 artillery regiments, 8 recoilless 

rifle groups, and 25 independent infantry companies 

(CINE).15

This type of territorial deployment follows a pattern established in 1924 shortly after the end of the 

Mexican revolution and remains the most viable form 

of accomplishing the Army’s three main missions. 

The strategic rationale for this type of deployment is 

the felt need for a “blanket of forces” that provides 

a multi-layer defense system against a hypothetically 

larger and superior invading force. The forces would 
8

execute light infantry and guerrilla-type operations 

in order to defeat the invader through attrition. The 

Army’s presence in every major population center, 

and in some of the most remote places in the country, 

allows the Army to have a real time power projection 

capability to counter an insurrection. 

Since most of the second half of the 20th century 

was relatively peaceful, Army forces also took on additional responsibilities regarding the population and 

the environment. From 1966, the Army began implementing disaster relief operations as part of its mission 

portfolio and participated in national vaccination, literacy, nutrition, and reforestation campaigns, which 

created a strong bond between the civilian population 

and the military. In isolated areas, the Army provided 

the only state presence. 

Adapting the Land Forces. 

As part of the SEDENA 2007-2012 Directive for Integrated Combat against Narco-trafficking, the high command decided to implement the Centralized planning 

and decentralized execution scheme, providing region 

and zone commanders the operational autonomy 

needed in order to conceive, plan, and execute high 

impact operations.16 The SEDENA high command also 

issued the General Directive for Army Training 2007-

2012, which is designed to identify potential leaders 

and develop leadership qualities, as well as to increase 

the level of training effectiveness.17 This new training 

program is divided into five phases: individual combat, small team, battalion, large unit (brigade level) 

combined arms, and large forces air-land joint operations. The last two phases, pertinent to conventional 

warfare operations, will not be implemented during 
9

the current administration, making it clear that there 

is no need at the moment for conventional military 

training.18 The initial three phases reflect a heavy emphasis on urban operations, establishing roadblocks, 

conducting patrols inside and around small towns, 

and restoring public law and order.19 These are the 

types of operations that the Army has been active in 

throughout the country. 

Initiatives to create separate, specialized forces 

that would focus on the counterdrug role have not 

prospered. In May 2007 SEDENA announced the establishment of a 10,000-strong Federal Support Forces 

Corps (CFAF) especially trained and equipped to fight 

organized crime. This force would be under the direct 

orders of the President. The initiative faced strong 

opposition in Congress, where its funding for 2008 

was cut off amid concerns that it could mutate into 

a Praetorian Guard used for political purposes.20 The 

initiative was then redrafted and presented in 2009 as 

a 5,000-strong force under direct orders of the SEDENA General-Secretary. Mexico’s Congress also turned 

thumbs-down on the budget for this initiative.21

The Human Rights Component: Complaints vs. 

Violations.

The prospect of military forces operating in urban 

settings, especially residential areas, is disturbing to 

most citizens in the Western Hemisphere. Although 

it is a valid concern, some human rights-oriented 

think tanks and advocacy groups have inaccurately 

portrayed human rights as being violated by the mere 

presence of soldiers in the streets. The news media 

have picked up on some of these studies, mostly as 

headlines without any sort of analytical depth, but 
10

propagating the perception that the Mexican Army 

was engaged in systematic human rights violations. 

 This perception stems from the fact that the increase in Army deployments to urban areas since 

December 2006 has occurred in tandem with a rise in 

complaints filed before the National Human Rights 

Center (CNDH). These complaints, however, do not 

constitute violations (see Figure 4). 

Source: Elaborated by author based on SEDENA and CNDH 

reports, accessed on January 26, 2011.

Figure 4. Number of Complaints, Status, and 

Recommendations.

Over half the complaints filed are not related to 

human rights violations; they are related to electoral, 

labor, agrarian, environmental, or constitutional interpretation issues (see Figure 5). But by law, all complaints presented at the CNDH have to be filed and 

processed. 

 Status 2006 22 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total

Total Filed 

Complaints 8 376 1,143 1,644 1,320 4,491 

Pending from 

processing - - 10 32 369 411 

Processed 8 376 1,133 1,612 951 4,080 

Recommendations 

issued by the CNDH - 7 14 30 22 73 

Proportion of 

recommendation vs 

complaints

0.0% 1.9% 1.2% 1.8% 1.7% 1.6%
11

Figure 5. Resolution of Complaints Processed by 

CNDH from 2006-10.

Out of the 73 recommendations (on cases that refer to actual human rights violations) issued by the 

CNDH, all were accepted by SEDENA as of January 

2011. Of these 73 recommendations, 14 are identified 

by SEDENA as being of an internal “administrative 

nature,”referring to military personnel or their survivors who filed a compliant against SEDENA due to 

cases of medical malpractice by military healthcare 

personnel. The other 59 recommendations are directly linked to the Army’s operations against organized crime. Of these 59 recommendations, 21 refer 

to citizens that reported an abuse of power by Army 

personnel, most of them at roadblocks, but where no 

physical injury occurred; a further three refer to drivers who failed to stop at Army roadblocks and were 

fired upon, one of which was reported to be driving 

Not related to Human Rights Violations 2,347 58%

Lack of evidence of a Human Rights Violation 1,125 28%

Complainant desisted 236 6%

Conciliated (solved) 107 3%

Integrated into existing investigations (repeat or 

coincidental complaints) 78 2%

Accepted and transformed into recommendation 73 2%

Complaint was resolved during the process 46 1%

CNDH was not the appropriate agency for the 

complaint 33 1%

Complainant lacked interest in pursuing the 

complaint 33 1%

Sent to the corresponding authority 2 0%

Processed complaints 4,080 100%
12

while heavily intoxicated. Three more cases relate to 

civilians who were killed in cross fires, while the remaining 32 recommendations refer to cases of injury, 

disappearance, torture, and homicide caused by military personnel. Military justice personnel reportedly 

have investigated 217 of its personnel and as of January 2011, found 39 guilty as charged. 

The concept of having civilian courts rule over military-caused abuses is a positive concept when there 

is a strong and proven judicial system in place. In the 

case of Mexico, that is not currently the situation. The 

entire justice system is undergoing what can only be 

described as a complete overhaul as it morphs from 

an inquisitorial to an accusatorial system. According 

to Article 13 of the Mexican Constitution and Articles 

57-58 of the Military Code of Justice, the military judicial system has jurisdiction over crimes committed 

by active duty military personnel against civilians. 

All other cases are handled by the civilian justice 

system. 23

With over 200,000 personnel, the Mexican Army 

is certainly not immune to the presence of criminal 

elements within its ranks. To address this liability, 

SEDENA outlined the need for further professionalization through a doctrine that requires strict adherence to human rights and the rule of law; this need 

led to the creation in 2008 of the position of General 

Director for Human Rights in the SEDENA Command 

structure, a milestone that passed relatively unnoticed 

by most media and analysts. It is a position designed 

to promote and strengthen the practice and protection 

of human rights within the Army’s ranks, as SEDENA 

envisions continuing internal security operations in 

the long term.24
13

SEDENA acknowledges that as a consequence of 

its actions against organized crime, criminals, and/or 

common citizens associated with criminals file false 

complaints in order to discredit the armed forces.25

A number of nongovernmental organizations 

(NGOs) and think tanks have relied on the larger, unprocessed human rights complaint figure to produce 

public reports. The repercussion of these reports on 

the perception of trust in the armed forces was grave, 

but momentary (See Figure 6, Year 2008). Motivation 

for these inflammatory reports, beyond a perception 

of criminal association, lies in the NGOs’ need to access funding from national and international government grants, foundations, and private individuals. 

The U.S.-funded Merida Initiative alone allocated 

U.S.$61.5 million in FY 2008-10 to programs involving 

organized civil society.26

 Source: LAPOP 2010 from Bailey et al., “Army as Police? Correlates of Public Confidence in the Police, Justice System, and the 

Military: Mexico in Comparative Context,” January 28, 2011.

Figure 6. Institutional Trust in Mexico 2004-10.
14

A Wake Up Call.

As SEDENA modified its doctrine, training, and 

deployment to better adapt to long-term internal security operations, it created permanent community liaison offices that would work to minimize the impact 

of its operations on society. In June 2010, SEDENA 

created the Civil–Military Liaison Unit (UNIVIC), 

with the mission to strengthen communication and 

foment constructive links between SEDENA and civil 

society. It is designed to solve problems and minimize the negative effects of the prolonged presence 

of troops in the streets.27 Civilians with experience in 

public policy, human rights, and the Culture of Peace 

have been invited to form part of this unit. During the 

2 months of operations before the SEDENA 2009-10 

report was published, UNIVIC resolved five cases 

in which people had been adversely affected by the 

Army’s presence in the streets. The type of support 

provided includes covering funeral expenses, reparations, medical treatment, and psychological therapy 

for victims. As of 2010, the trust perception of the military is back on top among Mexican institutions (see 

Figure 6, Year 2010).

The Need for Additional Manpower.

Several attempts to reform Mexico’s public security (police) system, which by December 2010 was composed of over 2,040 police departments and 447,922 

personnel at the municipal, state, and federal levels, 

have not progressed. The 2010 initiative to create 32 

state police forces that would absorb the roles and 

functions of the municipal forces, creating more resilient, accountable, and efficient forces, was held up in 
15

Congress, with debate delayed until the first term of 

2011. Even with this large police enforcement reform 

in place, the Unified Police Command will face an 

enormous challenge of acquiring credible capabilities 

over the next few years. Its focus will be on general 

public crime, rather than organized crime. 

The Federal Police has grown from 6,500 agents 

in December 2006 to 35,500 by December 2010,28 but 

still lacks the technical capability, infrastructure, and 

numbers to provide a permanent nation-wide presence. Expanding it continues to be a priority, but expansion needs to be performed at a slower pace; training professional police officers should not be rushed. 

The Army remains the only institution with the infrastructure and capabilities to stabilize large regions 

that come under intense criminal cartel violence. As 

the violence expands or shifts, additional forces are 

needed to secure areas where the state has historically 

neglected to establish its presence. Army troops cannot substitute for police in conducting day-to-day law 

enforcement activities, but they can provide security 

umbrellas in towns that are under siege by gangs of 

armed men. Latin American countries that use their 

armed forces for similar internal security, infrastructure protection, and national development roles have 

forces—military and paramilitary—that proportionately far exceed those of Mexico (See Figure 7). 
16

Source: elaborated by author based on figures in IISS The Military Balance 2010, the International Institute for Strategic Studies; 

Venezuelan figures are based on the author’s research from official Venezuelan sources.

Figure 7. Population, Active Military, and 

Paramilitary Forces, 2010.

Raising forces to a level comparable to that of these 

countries would need to see the Mexican military expand by a number in the range of 160,000-460,000, 

with the bulk of it destined for the Army. Intermediate 

forces would also need to be expanded in the 110,000-

330,000 range. 

Tackling Desertion.

Desertion in the Army has long been an issue. 

From 2000 to 2005, a total of 106,814 members of the 

Army deserted (17,802 per year on average).29 Retaining skilled troops became a priority for the new administration, and President Calderon announced in 

February 2007 that pay would increase by 46 percent 

for enlisted personnel.30 Additionally, recruiters began 

in 2008 to refine their promotion criteria, launching a 

Colombia Venezuela Bolivia Peru Mexico

Population 43,677,372 26,814,843 9,775,246 29,546,963 111,211,789

Military 285,220 163,000 46,100 114,000 267,506

Paramilitary 144,097 36,000 37,100 77,000 36,400 

Total Security 

Forces 429,317 199,000 83,200 191,000 303,906

Military per 100K 653.0 607.9 471.6 385.8 240.5

Intermediate 

Forces per 100K 329.9 134.3 379.5 260.6 32.7

SF per 100K 982.9 742.1 851.1 646.4 273.3
17

program to identify and promote leadership qualities 

among the ranks. In February 2009, President Calderon announced another 40 percent budget increase for 

enlisted personnel to be applied to pay and benefits.31

As part of a morale-boosting effort, SEDENA reinstated a directive providing military honors for troops 

killed in high impact operations, consisting of a 21-

gun salute burial, military band, and memorial flag, 

accompanied by a life pension for their dependents. 

The programs had an immediate beneficial effect on 

the number of desertions recorded from 2008 (see Figure 8). 

Source: SEDENA Response to a Federal Institute of Access to 

Information (IFAI) information request, file 0000700020310, and 

October 2010, p. 7.

Figure 8. Number of SEDENA desertions recorded 

2006-10.32

Conscription Not a Viable Option.

The objective of the National Military Service 

(Servicio Militar Nacional, or SMN) is twofold: first, 

to develop values and virtues to strengthen the selfidentify of the conscripts as Mexicans; and second, to 

form a cadre of reserves that are trained and available 

to satisfy the mobilization requirements in case of external war or the serious disruption of public peace 

and internal order.33 During the summer of 2009, the 

Army launched a pilot program using 330 conscripts 

to perform drug eradication duties in Michoacán. The 

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Desertions 16,405 16,641 9,112 6,879 2,986
18

unit was led by active duty officers, and conscripts 

were equipped and armed to the same standards as 

professional troops. They received a stipend equaling 

that of a private’s pay for the duration of their service. 

Once their tour was finished, they were excused from 

the year-long weekend drills. They eradicated illegal 

crops of 190 plantations from June 26 to July 28, 2009, 

and then went on to participate in a program in which 

they toured several public schools, sharing their experiences over the summer and promoting a culture of 

lawfulness.34

Provisional military service in Mexico is compulsory for all males that turn 18. They must all register 

for service, but only about 10 percent of the total have 

to take the program itself, consisting of Saturday-only 

drills, literacy campaigns, and public works. Females 

may volunteer to participate in the program; their participation has increased from 1,856 volunteers in 2008 

to 4,152 in 2009. 

In case of a mobilization, conscripts would reinforce battalions and regiments by 300 personnel each, 

and CINE and artillery groups by 100 each. In 2010 

the number of conscripts inducted for the weekend 

program was 83,192 from a possible total of 835,440.35

However, modifying the terms of service to embrace 

genuine full-time conscription is not an option, as it 

would lead to high desertion rates and likely pose a 

negative impact on society. Army recruitment continues to be directed at potential candidates for a military 

career. 

In October 2010, the SEDENA Commission in 

Congress promoted an initiative to fund the creation 

of 10,000 new slots that would allow for the establishment of 18 new infantry battalions.36 These new battalions, to be created from the expansion of CINE, would 
19

be fully operational by the end of 2011. The requested 

MXN 13 billion pesos (U.S.$1.08 billion) was turned 

down by Congress when it approved the 2011 budget 

in December 2010.37 As of March 2011, the expansion 

initiative continued to be debated by members of the 

National Defense Commission in Congress. 

The Combat Inventory. 

Conventional capabilities are very limited compared to other forces in Latin America. Since 2004, the 

Army has not acquired a single piece of military hardware considered to be within the conventional arms 

category.38

Armor holdings include 985 vehicles, most of them 

obsolete. Some 28 percent of them were built in the 

1980s, another 15 percent were built in the 1970s, and 

the rest were built in the 1940s to 1960s. Since the 

late 1990s, there has been a modernization effort in 

place based on standardizing key components, such 

as weapons and engines, in order to streamline maintenance and logistics. This program has resulted in a 

number of 1950s and 1960s vehicles, such as the M8 

Greyhound armored car and the AMX-VCI mechanized infantry vehicle, being almost completely rebuilt and redesigned. Local production of soft skinned 

vehicles known as the DN-series, which took place 

during the 1980s with the participation of local vehicle 

manufacturer DINA and the Army’s military industries, has not resumed. 

There are no heavy or medium artillery pieces in 

service. Artillery regiments are equipped with M101, 

M2A1, M3, and Italian OTO Melara M56 pack howitzers. The last known acquisition of artillery took place 

in 2004, when 13 NORINCO M90 105 mm howitzers 
20

were procured from China. Being a predominantly infantry force, the Army assures that mortar assets are 

abundant, including some developed indigenously in 

the 60 mm and 120 mm range. There are only a handful of anti-tank missiles of an early generation (Milan 

wire-guided), and the Army has no organic air defense capability. 

The Army is equipped only for low-intensity 

conflict, for which infantry weapons have assumed 

overriding importance in the past decade. The SEDENA-run Military Factories in Mexico City produced 

the Heckler und Koch family of small arms and light 

weapons under license, and have begun production 

of an indigenous assault rifle—the FX-05 Xiuhcóatl, a 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) standard 

5.56 mm assault rifle especially designed by the Military Factories. SEDENA is transitioning from the 7.62 

mm G-3 to the smaller and more efficient caliber. 

Unit-level communication systems were also in 

need of replacement by 2009, with close to 90 percent 

of the Army’s radio communication equipment considered obsolete.39 The Army began receiving a new 

generation of Harris Falcon II radios starting in 2008. 

Other major procurement programs during the past 

4 years have centered on the establishment of a complete Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 

(C4ISR) network, linking Military Regions, Military 

Zones, and units down to battalion level. 

Anti-Narco Influence on Procurement. 

The most representative example of how the antinarcotic role has influenced Mexican military procurement is the 2008 decision to acquire 4x4 pickup trucks 
21

over a 2006 stated requirement for 1,000 High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicles (aka Humvees 

[HMMWVs] or Hummers). Under [program 

9071100001] the Acquisition of Light Vehicles for Personnel Transport, the Army sought 1,640 4x4 pickup trucks 

and 360 double cab 4x4 pickup trucks in order to provide operational units with vehicles that have the adequate 

speed and characteristics for operations in support of public 

security forces against organized crime within the national 

territory.40 General Motors was the selected supplier, 

and the 2,000 pickup trucks were upgraded by the Army’s workshops by adding a roll bar, reinforced bumper, hooks, and armament bed to make them suitable 

for military urban operations. 

HMMWVs were still being acquired, but in 

smaller quantities; in 2009 the Army received 254 

HMMWVs, and in February 2010 it ordered another 

200.41 In February 2011, the Mexican Army announced 

that it would begin assembling the Oshkosh SandCat 

protected patrol vehicle at its Military Factories. The 

SandCat is part of a new generation of 4x4 vehicles designed for the 21st century battlefield, with additional 

armor protection for its crew and the speed and agility of a truck. It is based on a commercial Ford F-550 

chassis and is classed in the Protected Patrol Vehicle 

(PPV) category. 

While pickup trucks, Humvees, and new PPVs 

provide land mobility, the Army is implementing 

new technology to help its troops detect the presence of illegal substances, be they drugs, explosives, 

or weapons, through nonintrusive detection systems. 

As of February 2011, the Army operated 739 GT-200-

18 Buster contraband detector kits and 43 GE Mobile 

Trace devices used to detect drugs and other illicit 

contraband, primarily onboard commercial containers 

and vehicles.42
22

A final example is the MXN 1.7 billion (U.S.$140 

million) program to build 13 Strategic Control Posts 

(PPCCEE) designed to inspect vehicles to detect narcotics, weapons, and other illegal goods. The PPCCEEs 

will be located in Baja California, Chihuahua, Nuevo 

Leon, Oaxaca, Sinaloa, Sonora, and Tamaulipas.43

The Mexican Air Force Command.

The FAM headquarters is located across the street 

from the SEDENA building in Mexico City; in 2006 

FAM was a very centralized service with about 35 percent of its total assets concentrated at a single base a few 

miles north of Mexico City. Following the SEDENA’s 

decentralization initiative and in accordance with the 

Directiva para el Combate Integral al Narcotráfico 2007-

2012, aircraft and helicopters have been deployed and 

assigned directly to the regional commanders. 44

The FAM provides a clear example of an air arm almost entirely devoted to the anti-narcotic role; during 

the 2006-11 time frame, it has received or placed on 

order 80 aircraft and helicopters, eight of which have 

been funded by the United States through the Merida 

Initiative.45 Some 96 percent of these assets—including transport aircraft—have been acquired with counterdrug and organized crime as their stated primary 

or secondary roles, with training focused accordingly. 

The FAM has established specialized spraying and 

field-spotting training centers. 

FAM aircraft, equipment, procedures, technology, 

and capabilities have evolved over the years, but its 

organizational structure remains basically unchanged 

from post-World War II, when it included a single 

fighter squadron, half a dozen close-air support (CAS) 

squadrons, a reconnaissance unit, a transport wing 
23

equipped with heavy and medium transport aircraft, 

and some liaison units. 

Despite this World War II era structure, the FAM 

has not been immune to the global trend of introducing Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) operations. On 

April 30, 2009, it began operating an unknown number 

of Elbit Hermes 450 systems, and up to July 2010 their 

performance was rated as satisfactory by SEDENA.46

Electronic intelligence, signals intelligence, and 

airborne early warning operations are provided by an 

EMBRAER EMB-145MP patrol aircraft and an EMB145SA airborne early warning (AEW) craft, and four 

C-26B Metro tracker aircraft that make up the aerial 

detection component of the country’s Integrated Air 

Surveillance System (SIVA). SIVA, designed by SEDENA with the participation of private entities, comprises a collection of assets including air- and landbased radars. Its purpose is to detect suspicious or 

illegal flights and coordinate the air, sea, or land assets 

needed to intercept. 

Increasing the processing capabilities of the SIVA 

Command Center (CMCSIVA), expanding radar coverage, and replacing the obsolete Westinghouse TPS70 3-D radars are current priorities. Two additional 

EMB-145SA AEW aircraft are required to provide adequate surveillance along the southern border.47

Transport aviation has received some attention, 

including the acquisition of five C-295M medium 

transports from Airbus Military to replace the Antonov An-32B transports in the 301st Squadron, and 

procurement was announced of an additional five 

Lockheed C-130 Hercules heavy transports to complement the 302nd Squadron. The C-295M acquisition 

is of particular note, as it comprised the first use of 

leasing as a procurement method. Under this scheme, 

state-owned BANOBRAS public works bank acquired 
24

the aircraft and leased them to the FAM over a 20-year 

period. 

The transport helicopter fleet comprised some 44 

medium lift helicopters consisting of a mix of Sikorsky CH-53, UH-60L Black Hawks, Mi-8, Mi-17s, and 

AS-332 Super Pumas, plus 14 of the smaller Bell 212s 

and 4 of the Bell 412s. Expansion of the fleet has not 

been a priority. The U.S. Government supplied eight 

Bell 412EPs from December 2009 to December 2010 as 

part of the Merida Initiative to enhance the mobility 

of Mexico’s forces, and the FAM ordered 12 EC725 

medium helicopters in 2009 and 2010 through two 

separate contracts, with deliveries scheduled to begin 

in 2011. However, both types will replace older retiring Bell 212s and Mi-17s. The up-to-date technology 

of the new acquisitions will lower operational costs. 

The second batch of the EC725s was also underwritten by the leasing method, with BANOBRAS as the 

principal financial agent. The selection of the EC725 

over the UH-60 Black Hawk or Mi-17, both types with 

accomplished service records in the FAM, was facilitated by offset agreements signed between the Mexican government and Eurocopter, an EADS subsidiary, 

which will invest close to U.S.$550 million in a parts 

assembly plant in Mexico.48

Intensifying the Counterdrug Role. 

In February 2007, the FAM absorbed the aerial 

eradication duties that had previously been assigned 

to the Attorney General’s (PGR) Air Wing, receiving 

an inventory of 50 Bell 206 helicopters configured for 

aerial spraying, 8 Cessna TU206G light aircraft, MXN 

50 million for their repair, 175 PGR contract personnel who were hired by the FAM, five primary bases 
25

of operation, and five secondary bases of operation.49

Assimilation of this large package took a little over 

3 years, with the FAM also taking responsibility for 

the training of its personnel as well as providing the 

required maintenance to the Bell 206 fleet. By August 

2010, the FAM was operating 42 of the Bell 206 helicopters in aerial spraying duties, with the other eight 

undergoing repairs.50 

Helicopter crew training has received priority, 

with the FAM acquiring five flight simulators for the 

Bell 206, Bell 412, and MD530s. In December 2010, the 

FAM sent a group of 24 pilots to receive training at 

the Colombian Air Force’s Helicopter Flying School at 

Melgar, Colombia.51

Prior to the transfer of the PGR’s eradication duty, 

the FAM had already undertaken the heavy brunt of 

the counterdrug role. Six squadrons equipped with the 

Cessna 182S single engine aircraft were created in the 

early 2000s, serving as spotter and forward air control 

(FAC) craft in support of the Army’s eradication program. In 2007, the FAM established the Cessna Pilot 

Training Center (Centro de Adiestramiento para Pilotos 

Aviadores de Cessna) at El Cipres airbase in Baja, California, to specialize in this type of training.52

Air Defense Needs Neglected.

Retirement of the legacy Lockheed T-33 jet trainers in 

2007 has happened without a replacement, leaving air 

sovereignty patrols and interceptions to a dwindling 

number of Pilatus PC-7 turbo-prop armed trainers or 

the single squadron of supersonic F-5E Tiger II tactical 

fighters. In 2008 SEDENA sent a request to Congress 

for procurement of 12 Lockheed-Martin F-16 fighters, 

which would allow establishment of a second fighter 
26

squadron, and four batteries of air defense systems 

(of an unspecified type). The request was ignored.53

A proposed avionics update for the ageing F-5E and 

PC-7 fleets has also been mired in a state of uncertainty. The current national security priorities require at 

least a two-tier solution that can tackle targets ranging 

from very slow low-flying ultra lights to supersonic 

Biz-jets. Air defense, precision strike, close air support, 

and armed reconnaissance are conventional capabilities that will also need to be addressed eventually. 

The Naval Ministry.

The Secretaria de Marina (SEMAR - Ministry of the 

Navy) and its military service, the Armada de Mexico 

(ARM - Mexican Navy), have assumed considerably 

increased profiles by modernizing, transforming, 

and adapting their forces to be a major partner in the 

implementation of the government’s national security policy. Much like the Army, the ARM’s missions 

are to provide external defense and internal security, 

guarantee constitutional order (maritime law enforcement), and provide safety to the population in cases of 

natural disasters and emergencies.54

In the 2006-11 time frame, SEMAR reorganized its 

command structure, rebuilt its marine infantry force, 

created a naval intelligence agency (UIN), reinforced 

its naval aviation, and formed a network of coast 

guard-style stations to enhance SAR and law enforcement presence. Attention to its ocean-going fleet is less 

notable, as it has specialized in the anti-narcotic and 

maritime law enforcement roles since the 1980s. From 

2007, the sea, land, and air elements of SEMAR have 

been separated and reorganized within a so-called 

corps system, comprising a General Fleet Corps, Marine Infantry Corps, and Naval Aeronautics Corps.
27

Command and Territorial Reorganization. 

The previous command structure of the ARM 

comprised two regional headquarters (HQs), one on 

each coast, which controlled all surface, air, and land 

forces assigned to it and reported to SEMAR HQ. This 

organization was revamped with the regional HQs 

deleted. A single General HQ is based in Mexico City, 

overseeing all naval operations. This command restructure, which follows a political-strategic character, has the 

specific intention of generating better efficiency in the navy’s participation against organized crime and insecurity.55

SEMAR’s territorial organization follows a model 

comprising a Naval Region/Naval Zone/Naval Sector pattern that mirrors the Army’s Military Region/

Military Zone/Garrison pattern. Each naval region 

controls a flotilla of varying size. These are separated 

into destroyer (including destroyers and frigates) and 

auxiliary flotillas. The seven regions are divided into 

13 Naval Zones and 14 Naval Sectors.

The Green Water Fleet.56

The main seagoing fleet is spearheaded by four 

1970s-vintage Allende-class (ex-U.S. Navy Knox) frigates delivered between 1997 and 2002. These ships are 

the most powerful sea going vessels in service and are 

complemented by two more Bravo-class (ex-U.S. Bronstein-class) frigates and an ageing Quetzalcoatl-class 

(ex-U.S. Gearing) destroyer that dates from World War 

II. Another World War II-era ship, the destroyer escort 

Manuel Azueta (ex-U.S. Edsall), continues in service although it is designated for training; commissioned in 

1945 and 1943 respectively, the last two operational 
28

destroyers will need to be withdrawn shortly as increased maintenance costs make them burdens. Replacement with destroyer-size ships is unlikely under 

current budget allocations and requirements. This 

type of transformation follows a global tendency to 

shift from the larger power-projection ships to smaller, faster, multi-purpose vessels. 

The amphibious warfare fleet is composed of two 

Papaloapan-class (ex-U.S. Newport) landing ship-tanks 

(LST) that were delivered in 2000 and 2001. At 5,200-

tons, these are the largest ships in the fleet and have 

deployed in humanitarian assistance missions to foreign countries including the United States (Hurricane 

Katrina in 2005), the tsunami in Indonesia (2005), and 

major storm disasters in Haiti (2008, 2010). They are 

complemented by a pair of locally designed auxiliary 

support ships and a single Panuco (ex-U.S. LST-1152) 

which will be replaced soon (it was first commissioned 

in 1945) by a pair of 3,300-ton logistics support ships 

being built at Mexican shipyards, with construction 

having started in January 2010 and delivery expected 

in 2012-13.57

The Patrol Force Fleet comprises 31 ocean patrol 

vessels (OPV) and over 80 interceptor craft, the majority of which have been built in Mexican shipyards. 

Indigenous design and development of OPVs started 

in the late 1980s based on experience with the six 

Halcon-class corvettes acquired from Spain. From that 

point on, the anti-narcotic and maritime law enforcement role became the driving force in ship design and 

operational requirements. 

The most recent indigenous development is the 

Oaxaca-class OPV, a 1,680-ton vessel, similar in size to a 

USCG 270-ft medium endurance cutter. It is equipped 

with an AS-565MB Panther helicopter and two fast in-
29

terceptor crafts, making it an ideal platform for antinarcotic operations. There are four Oaxacas in service 

and two more under construction; they have been preceded by the 1,554-ton Durango-class vessel (delivered 

2000-01), 1,200-ton Sierra-class (delivered 1999-2000), 

and 1,290-ton Holzinger-class (1991-94). Ten Auk-class

ex-minesweepers modified as patrol vessels also need 

to be replaced shortly as these have been in service 

with the Mexican Navy since 1973, having been originally commissioned in the U.S. Navy between 1942 

and 1945.58

Since drug trafficking organizations concentrated 

on the use of fast boats in the late 1980s and 1990s, 

which could easily outturn and outrun the larger and 

older OPV and coastal patrol vessels, the ARM adapted. All of its OPVs are helicopter-equipped, either 

from scratch or as modified with platforms. The use 

of helicopters to spot and pursue targets at sea developed into the Trinomio tactic, which includes the use 

of an OPV, an air asset, and a fast interceptor craft. 

The need for additional fast interceptors was evident, and in 2000 the Mexican Government signed a 

deal with the Swedish shipyard Dockstavarvet for the 

procurement of 40 Combat Boat CB90HMN interceptor craft capable of speeds well over 45 knots.59 The 

agreement also included assembly of the craft in Mexico with follow-on requirements of at least 100 more 

of these boats in service. Sixteen were built locally by 

2006 before production shifted to the faster Interceptor craft IC16M, which has speeds of over 50 knots.60

The requirement for the 100-interceptor craft fleet was 

scaled back by the current administration to 17.
30

Building a Coast Guard Network. 

In order to enhance its search and rescue (SAR) capabilities, SEMAR launched the Sistema de Busqueda 

y Rescate (SAR System) consisting of 17 SAR naval 

stations (ENSAR) throughout the coastal region. Five 

of these are categorized as ENSAR-A, comprising 

two Safe Boat Defender-class patrol boats, a Marine 

Textron MLB unsinkable patrol boat, and an MD902 

helicopter. The remainder, categorized as ENSAR-B, 

are equipped with two Defenders each. The first ENSAR began operations during April 2007, and 12 were 

in operation by early 2011. In addition to their stated 

SAR role, these stations provide an enhanced law enforcement presence. 

Marine Corps Revival. 

The most demanding task for the current SEMAR 

administration has been the reestablishment of an adequate marine infantry force. The previous SEMAR 

administrations halved the 11,000-strong marine force, 

transferring 5,000 marines to the newly created Federal Preventive Police (PFP) between 1999 and 2006.61

In December 2006, the then new Secretary of the Navy 

was instructed to transfer another 2,500 naval personnel to support the PFP. By March 2007, it was clear 

that naval personnel would not voluntarily transfer to 

the PFP. The SEMAR leadership therefore offered an 

alternative to PFP: raise its own military forces that 

would be capable of implementing the maritime police role.62

At the time, the Marine Corps consisted of two 

amphibious force groups (one on each coast), trained 

and equipped for amphibious landings, and two ma-
31

rine infantry battalions (one airborne, one presidential 

guard) based in Mexico City. The challenge was to create a force of 30 marine infantry battalions that would 

be permanently based in the coastal states and provide 

internal security (protection of strategic installations; 

combating traffic of narcotics, people, and weapons; 

search and rescue; and maritime route security). Manpower allocations for Marine infantry battalions were 

also raised from a previously depleted level of around 

400 to the 650-680 mark, making the Mexican Marine 

Infantry Corps second in number only to that of the 

United States. Since the main task to be performed 

by these 30 battalions was anti-organized crime, the 

equipment procured for them included logistic vehicles such as pickup trucks and troop carriers, infantry 

weapons, and communications equipment. 

Along with the Marine Corps expansion, a third 

special forces unit was based in Mexico City during 

2008. These special forces are mainly drawn from 

marines and are being organized into a Marine Infantry Special Operations Brigade, with detachments 

throughout the country. Their close relationship with 

the UIN, which itself was formed during 2008, have 

made them the main reaction forces employed in hunting down cartel leaders, even in land-locked places 

such as Mexico City, Cuernavaca, and Monterrey. 

The UIN possesses advanced collection and analytical 

capabilities and is regarded as the most efficient and 

collaborative Mexican intelligence agency by foreign 

intelligence services. 

Transformation of Naval Aviation Requirements. 

A radical shift in naval aviation planning saw the 

decision to exchange a requirement for 12 jet fighters 

to a requirement for a fleet of 15 turbo-prop maritime 
32

surveillance aircraft. SEMAR, which already possessed 

eight C-212PM maritime patrol aircraft, selected the 

CN-235MP offered by EADS-CASA (now known as 

Airbus Military). Commonality with the C-212 (also 

an Airbus Military product) and with the U.S. Coast 

Guard’s HC-144 ocean sentry (the USCG designation of its CN-235MPs) was a factor. The SEMAR and 

USCG versions are not identical, differing in their mission control packages. 

Air transport requirements for naval aviation foresee an increase from the capability to ferry 5,816 troops 

and 224 tons of cargo in 2009, to 19,252 and 1,197 tons 

by 2012. This will require increasing the transport aircraft fleet from 6 to 17.63 So far, four C-295M medium 

transports have been acquired to complement the four 

Ukrainian-built An-32B medium transports procured 

in the mid 1990s. The last two C-295Ms were acquired 

through a leasing agreement with state development 

bank BANOBRAS. The acquisition of these aircraft 

was justified on the same basis: increased efficiency 

in aeronautical operations in military transport and 

cargo activities such as protecting human life at sea; 

combating illegal traffic of narcotics, people, and 

weapons; and assisting the population in case of disasters and emergencies.64

The ARM has also pioneered the use of indigenous 

unmanned aerial systems (UAS). Furthermore, the 

SEMAR research and development institute began its 

own UAS project during 2010. The first UAS unit was 

to have been set up in 2010 with the indigenously developed S4 Ehectal (God of the Wind) tactical UAV, 

E1 Gavilan mini-UAV, and mobile ground control centers in the state of Tamaulipas.65 Its implementation 

appears to have been delayed, but the beginning of 

UAS operations in support of marine counternarcotic 

operations is imminent. 
33

Naval Procurement, Assistance, and Cooperation.

Over the 2006-11 period, the Navy has received 

over U.S.$ 808 million worth of equipment comprising four Oaxaca-class ocean patrol vessels, nine IC16M 

interceptor craft (known as Polaris II), 34 Safe Boat 

Defender coastal patrol boats, and six unsinkable 

Textron MLB motor life boats; aviation assets have 

included three AS-565MB Panther multi-mission helicopters, one Kazan Mi-17V-5 medium-lift helicopter, 

one S4 Ehectal UAS, four CN-235MP maritime patrol 

aircraft, four C-295M medium transport aircraft, and 

one Gulfstream VIP aircraft; and land vehicles, mainly 

for the marines, have included 164 Unimog 4000 troop 

carriers, 84 Mercedes G-class and 22 Land Rover Defender 130 light armored vehicles. 

During the same period, the United States has announced transfers of four additional CN-235MP Persuader maritime patrol aircraft worth U.S.$210 million; 

and three UH-60M Black Hawk medium-lift helicopters 

worth U.S. $71 million. No deliveries of any of these 

were reported as of February 2011. 

Conclusion. 

The campaign against organized crime, particularly narco-trafficking and arms smuggling, has been 

the main driver in the modernization of Mexico’s 

armed forces. The need to rely on the armed forces as 

the lead instrument in implementing the national security policy is a reflection of historical neglect, which 

long precedes the current administration, of developing capable and democratic law enforcement institutions. Although federal police institutions have been 
34

considerably expanded in manpower and capabilities 

during the past 5 years, they still lack the institutional 

depth—experience and continuity—to take on a principal role. 

The main challenges to the Mexican military in the 

21st century will be: 

• To remain an apolitical force, which currently 

can be achieved only by being directly subordinate to the executive and increasingly accountable through the legislature to the bicameral 

Commission on National Security, as well as 

the National Defense and Navy Commissions.

• To continue to be a purely professional and 

volunteer-based force, striving towards specialization by forming dedicated agencies and 

mission-specific units.

• To prioritize respect of human rights and the 

rule of law in order to maintain the military’s 

legitimacy. This priority needs not only to be 

clarified, but to be communicated, both domestically and abroad.

• To remain a credible defense force by assimilating new technology and specializing so as to 

address the changing nature of threats. Cyber 

defense, information operations, and underwater warfare are also areas currently in need of 

attention. Finally, airpower needs to be modernized and expanded considerably, especially 

regarding air mobility, ISR, and sovereignty 

control capabilities.

• To cooperate and coordinate (C&C) with national and international agencies—military and 

civilian. C&C needs to be mission- or purposespecific, with specifically defined boundaries 

and responsibilities. C&C needs to be expand-
35

ed and enhanced considerably, especially with 

the main partners in the area: the United States, 

Guatemala, Belize, Colombia, El Salvador, and 

Honduras.

• To strengthen defense diplomacy. C&C requires effective negotiation by the corresponding diplomatic authorities. Participation in 

international peacekeeping and humanitarian 

relief operations—be they regional, multilateral, or binational—is entirely a political decision. 

The military, however, needs to be involved in 

the decisionmaking process to assure that the 

proper capabilities are in place to implement 

said policy.

• To create a civilian career service. The Mexican 

armed forces, despite nominal increases in salaries and benefits over the past 5 years, remain 

considerably underfunded and undermanned. 

Opening up civil service careers would lessen 

the strain on manpower resources as well as the 

cost of militarizing all members of the defense 

institutions. This would make the institutions 

more efficient and help provide a precedent 

and model on how to implement a professional 

career service in Mexican Government institutions. The professional career path is currently 

present only in the armed forces and foreign 

service.

Counterdrug and law enforcement operations 

ideally should be performed by capable and accountable civilian institutions. However, these are not yet 

in place. Institutions and communities need to be 

strengthened at the economic, judicial, educational, 

and cultural levels. These deep transformations will 
36

require decades of effort before they produce measurable effects. As of 2011, the Mexican armed forces 

remain the most valued and trusted forces in place to 

implement the national security policy, and to provide 

models for the type of stable and long-term institutions Mexico requires. 

ENDNOTES 

1. Programa para la Seguridad Nacional 2009-2012 (National 

Security Program 2009-2012), Mexico City, Mexico: Office of the 

President, p. 2.

2. Department of Historical Research, Veracruz Naval Museum, Creation of the Autonomous Department and the Ministry 

of the Navy, available from www.cesnav.edu.mx/foro_new/Historia/

siglo_xx/pdf/Departamento_Autonomo.pdf.

3. Idem. 

4. Organic Law of the Federal Public Administration, Arts. 29 and 

30.

5. For more on this, see Organic Law of the Mexican Navy, 

December 30, 2002; and Organic Law of the Army and Air Force, 

December 26, 1986.

6. Regulation of the Presidential High Command Staff, available from www.presidencia.gob.mx/estadomayor/.

7. Presidency of the Republic, Dialogues on the 4th year of 

government, p. 11.

8. Available from www.apartados.hacienda.gob.mx/presupuesto/

index.html.

9. Available from www.banxico.org.mx/portal-inflacion/index.

html.
37

10. Jorge Luis Sierra, “Duplicidad en las fuerzas armadas” 

(“Duplicity in the armed forces”), El Universal, February 27, 2007, 

available from www.eluniversal.com.mx/editoriales/36895.html.

11. Carrillo Olea, “Jorge in La guerra entre Ejército y Marina por el poder”(“The war between the army and the navy for 

power”), La Jornada, August 26, 2010, available from www.jornada.

unam.mx/2010/08/26/index.php?section=opinion&article=016a1pol. 

12. Ministry of the Navy press release, 015/2007.

13. Available from www.apartados.hacienda.gob.mx/presupuesto/

temas/pef/2009/temas/tomos/07/r07_app.pdf.

14. Ministry of National Defense, Reglamento General de Regiones y Zonas Militares (Ministry of National Defense, General 

Regulation on Military Regions and Zones), Art. 8.

15. Ministry of National Defense website; and author’s databases.

16. Ministry of National Defense, Cuarto Informe de Labores 

(Ministry of National Defense), Fourth Annual Report 2006-2012, 

p. 116.

17. Ibid.; Directiva General de Adiestramiento del Ejército y Fuerza 

Aérea Mexicanos 2007-2012 (experimental) (General Training Directive of the Mexican Army and Air Force 2007-2012 [experimental]). 

18. Ministry of National Defense, Cuarto Informe de Labores 

(Ministry of National Defense), Fourth Annual Report 2006-2012, 

p. 41.

19. Ibid.

20. Jesus Aranda, “Riesgo de que el cuerpo de fuerza especial 

se use para reprimir: experto” (“Risk that the Special Force will be 

used to repress: expert”), Jornada, September 20, 2007, available 

from www.jornada.unam.mx/2007/09/20/index.php?section=politica&

article=016n1pol. 
38

21. Benito Jiménez, “Frenan legisladores grupo elite de Ministry of National Defense” (“Legislators freeze Ministry of National 

Defense elite group”), Reforma, August 29, 2009.

22. Only December 2006. 

23. U.S. Department of State, Mexico-Merida Initiative report 

on Human Rights, August 2009.

24. Ministry of National Defense, Second Annual Report (2007-

2008). 

25. Ministry of National Defense, Quejas y recomendaciones

(Human Rights Complaints and Recommendations), available from 

www.sedena.gob.mx/images/stories/archivos/derechos_humanos/

quejasyrecom/SITUACIN_DE_QUEJAS_Y_RECOMENDACIONES._ENERO.pdf.

26. As part of the Merida Initiative, the U.S. Government designated U.S.$61.5 million in FY2008-10 for programs involving 

organized civil society. 

27. Ministry of National Defense, Fourth Annual Report (2006-

2012), p. 57.

28. Alejandro Poire, presentation at Georgetown University, 

February 2, 2011.

29. Ministry of National Defense, request for information dated November 30, 2009; file 0000700168009.

30. Miriam Castillo, “Aumentan hasta 46% salarios en el 

Ejercito” (“Army salaries increase up to 46%”), La Cronica, February 20, 2007, available from www.cronica.com.mx/nota.php?id_

nota=286803.

31. Ramos P. Fernando, “FCH anuncia aumento de salario a 

tropas” (“FCH increases troop wages”), El Universal, February 19, 

2010, available from www.eluniversal.com.mx/notas/660052.html.

32. Data for 2010 are as of September; annual projection 

would be 3,981. 
39

33. Ministry of National Defense, Definition on Servicio Militar Nacional (National Military Service definition), Ministry of 

National Defense website, available from www.sedena.gob.mx/index.php/servicio-militar-nacional.

34. Inigo Guevara Moyano, “Mexican anti-drug conscripts 

complete first tour,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, August 7, 2009 .

35. Ministry of National Defense, Fourth Annual Report (2006-

2012), p. 128.

36. Francisco Garfias, “Narco para rato” (“Narco for a long 

time”), Excelsior Newspaper, October 6, 2010, available from 

excelsior.com.mx/index.php?m=nota&id_nota=669731. 

37. “PRI surprised due to budget cuts to Ministry of National 

Defense,” El Informador, November 18, 2010, available from www.

informador.com.mx/mexico/2010/249878/6/sorprende-al-pri-recortesen-la-sedena.htm .

38. The UN Conventional arms register considers conventional weapons as being combat aircraft, attack helicopters, tanks, 

armored vehicles, artillery pieces over 75 mm in caliber, submarines, and naval vessels over 500 tons in displacement. 

39. Ministry of National Defense, “Estudio de Costo-Eficiencia, Programa de Adquisición de equipos de radio” (“Cost-Efficiency Study: Radio Equipment Acquisition Program”), p. 5.

40. Ministry of National Defense, “Documento de Analisis 

Costo-Eficiencia, Programa de Adquisición de Vehículos Ligeros 

para transporte de personal” (“Cost-Efficiency Study: Light Vehicle Personnel Transport Acquisition Program”), p. 5.

41. Ministry of National Defense, Fourth Annual Report (2009-

2010), pp. 62, 75.

42. Andres Merslo and Juan Arvizu Eroga, SEDENA, “4,600 

mdp para equipo anticrimen” (“4,600 million pesos for anticrime equipment”), available from www.eluniversal.com.mx/ 

nacion/183852.html.
40

43. SHCP Cartea de programas y Proyectos de inversión 

(Ministry of Finance, Investment Project and Programs Portfolio), 

No.10071170002.

44. Ministry of National Defense, Fourth Annual Report (2009-

2010), p. 95.

45. Eight Bell 412EP helicopters were transferred under the 

Merida Initiative; the rest include five C-295Ms, five C-130Hs, and 

50 Bell 206B/Ls transferred from PGR, and 12 EC725s.

46. Ministry of National Defense-IFAI, July 2010 Information Requirement, available from www.sedena.gob.mx/pdf/ifai/2010/ 

julio_2010.pdf.

47. SHCP Carpeta de Programas y Proyectos de Inversión 

(Ministry of Finance, Investment Project and Programs Portfolio), 

No. 07071320002.

48. Nicolas Lucas, “Queretaro apuntado para recibir a Eurocopter” (“Queretaro aims to obain Eurocopter plant”), El Financiero, January 14, 2011.

49. Ministry of National Defense, Second Annual Report (2007-

2008), p. 92.

50. Ministry of National Defense, Fourth Annual Report (2009-

2010), p. 95.

51. “Estrechan Colombia y Mexico cooperación de lucha antidrogas” (“Colombia and Mexico tighten anti-drug cooperation”), 

December 26, 2010, available from www.radioformula.com.mx/notas.asp?Idn=147756.

52. Ministry of National Defense, First Annual Report (2006-

2007), p. 75.

53. Jorge Luis Sierra, “La degradación de la fuerza militar” (“The 

degradation of military force”), El Universal, December 3, 2008, available 

from www.eluniversal.com.mx/editoriales/42272.htm.
41

54. Ministry of the Navy, Acuerdo Secretarial No. 87 (Secretarial Agreement No. 87), June 1, 2007.

55. Explanation of motives for the decree that reforms, adds, 

or derogates diverse dispositions that make up the Organic Law 

of the Mexican Navy.

56. Refers to vessels able to project power regionally.

57. Ministry of the Navy, Project 09132110001, Construcción 

de dos Buques de Aprovisionamiento Logístico, Cascos 42 y 4 

(Construction of two Logistics Supply Vessels), July 2010.

58. Inigo Guevara Moyano, A Full Throttle Future, Warships—

International Fleet Review, East Sussex, UK: HPC Publishing, February 2008, p. 19.

59. Dockstavarvet CB90 model webpage, available from www.

dockstavarvet.se/Products/Combat_patrol_boats/CB_90_H/Models.

aspx.

60. Dockstavarvet IC16M model webpage, available from 

www.dockstavarvet.se/Products/Combat_patrol_boats/IC_16_M.aspx.

61. Jesus Aranda, “’Desastroso’ alistamiento de marinos en la 

PFP; sufrieron ‘doble traición’” (“’Disastrous’ recruitment of marines in Federal Police: they suffered ‘double treason’,” La Jornada, 

December 30, 2006.

62. Ministry of the Navy, Secretarial Agreement No. 88, June 

1, 2007.

63. Ministry of the Navy, Project 10132160001, Adquisición 

de Aviones Versión Transporte Militar y Carga (Acquisition of 

Military Transport and Cargo Aircraft Program), June 2010, p. 5.

64. Ibid.

65. Ministry of the Navy, Programa de inversión de adquisiciones Adquisición de un Sistema de Vigilancia Aérea No Tripulado (Investment Program: Acquisition of an Unmanned Aircraft 

System), July 2009.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Gregg F. Martin

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria II

Author

Mr. Inigo Guevara Moyano

Director of Publications

Dr. James G. Pierce

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Jennifer E. Nevil