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LEGISLATION TO STRENGTHEN FEMA AND BETTER

INTEGRATE IT INTO THE DEPARTMENT OF

HOMELAND SECURITY, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

FULL HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

MAY 9, 2006

Serial No. 109–74

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

PETER T. KING, New York, Chairman 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas 

CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut 

JOHN LINDER, Georgia 

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana 

TOM DAVIS, Virginia 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

JIM GIBBONS, Nevada 

ROB SIMMONS, Connecticut 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

STEVAN PEARCE, New Mexico 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

BOBBY JINDAL, Louisiana 

DAVE G. REICHERT, Washington 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

CHARLIE DENT, Pennsylvania 

GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

JANE HARMAN, California 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

NITA M. LOWEY, New York 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON-LEE, Texas 

BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey 

DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, U.S. Virgin Islands 

BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida

(II) 
(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page 

STATEMENTS 

The Honorable Peter T. King, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of New York, Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security ............................ 1

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of Mississippi, Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland 

Security ................................................................................................................. 2

The Honorable Donna M. Christensen, a Delegate in Congress From the 

U.S. Virgin Islands ............................................................................................... 61

The Honorable Peter A. DeFazio, a Representative in Congress From the 

States of California .............................................................................................. 50

The Honorable Charlie Dent, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Pennsylavnia .................................................................................................... 60

The Honorable Norman D. Dicks, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Washington ............................................................................................. 27 

The Honorable Bob Etheridge, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of North Carolian ................................................................................................. 54

The Honorable Sheila Jackson-Lee, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Texas: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 57

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 60

The Honorable Daniel E. Lungren, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of California ................................................................................................ 48

The Honorable Michael T. McCaul, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Texas ....................................................................................................... 44

The Honorable Bill Pascrell, Jr., a Representative in Congress From the 

State of New Jersey ............................................................................................. 42

The Honorable Stevan Pearce, a Representative in Congress From New 

Mexico ................................................................................................................... 55

The Honorable Dave G. Reichert, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Washington ............................................................................................. 4

The Honorable Mike Rogers, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Alabama ............................................................................................................ 52

WITNESSES 

Mr. Eric Holdeman, Director, Office of Emergency Management, King County, 

State of Washington: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 38

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 40

Dr. William O. Jenkins, Jr., Director, Homeland Security and Justice, 

Government Accountability Office: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 4

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 7

Mr. Barry Kasinitz. Director, Governmental/Legislative Affairs, International 

Association of Fire Fighters: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 27

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 29

Mr. Steven V. Lenkart, Director of Legislative Affairs, International 

Brotherhood of Police Officers: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 33

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 36

(1)

LEGISLATION TO STRENGTHEN FEMA 

AND BETTER INTEGRATE IT INTO THE DHS, 

AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES 

Tuesday, May 9, 2006

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 2:05 p.m., in Room 345, 

Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Peter King [chairman of the 

committee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives King, Lungren, Rogers, Pearce, 

Reichert, Dent, Brown-Waite, Thompson, Dicks, DeFazio, Norton, 

Jackson-Lee, Pascrell, Christensen, Etheridge, and Meek. 

Mr. KING. The Committee on Homeland Security will come to 

order. The committee is meeting today to hear testimony on proposed legislation addressing emergency management problems 

within the Department of Homeland Security, which were exposed 

by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 

I recognize myself for 5 minutes, and my opening statement will 

be brief, but I want at the very outset to commend Chairman Dave 

Reichert and Chairman Mike McCaul for the leadership they have 

shown on our side in putting together what I believe is very comprehensive legislation. 

I would also, since this is, I believe and I hope, to be a very bipartisan effort, want to once again the Ranking Member Mr. 

Thompson from Mississippi for the work that he has done and also 

my good friend from New Jersey, Bill Pascrell, and Congressman 

Etheridge from the State of North Carolina for the work they have 

done in working to I think bring together a very, very worthwhile 

piece of legislation. 

All of us saw what happened last summer, August and September, with Katrina, and then after that, Rita. We saw serious deficiencies at all levels of government. It is our job, however, to do 

what we can to address the serious gaps which did exist at the 

Federal level, and that is the purpose of this hearing, and that is 

what the purpose of the legislation is going to be. Those of us supporting the legislation strongly believe that FEMA should not be 

taken out of the Department of Homeland Security. 

We can’t always be overreacting or have a knee-jerk reaction to 

the last crisis. We have to do what is best, and what is best for 

the long term, I believe, is for FEMA to be kept within the Department of Homeland Security. However, as the testimony today and 

as the markup, which we hope to have conducted next week, will 
2

bring out, we want to combine the preparedness and response functions of the Department of Homeland Security and provide the 

under secretary for Preparedness with a direct reporting relationship to the President during incidents of national significance. By 

raising it to this under secretary level, by setting in motion this direct line of communication with the President, that, to me, is probably the most significant change that is going to be brought about 

by this. 

But, in any event, we have experts here today that I want to 

thank for coming, and I certainly want to thank those of the members of the committee on both sides who are working so hard to 

come up with a coherent response, not just a knee-jerk response, 

but one which makes sense and which will get results and will certainly and hopefully have us much better prepared the next time 

if, God forbid, such a tragedy should occur as Katrina. 

With that I now recognize the ranking member of the committee, 

the gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Thompson. And before I ask 

him to speak, I want to thank him again for the bipartisan help 

he gave us on the port security bill, which did pass the House overwhelmingly last week by a vote of 421–2. I think it was a great, 

great effort by this committee, and it certainly asserted ourselves 

as real players in the areas of great national and international importance. 

With that, I recognize the ranking member from Mississippi. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I appreciate your kind comments. I think a lot of us, even though we 

supported the port bill, we would have loved to have had 100 percent cargo screening as one of the components, and I look forward 

to a conference report or something to try to get that in. 

However, we are here today to look at FEMA. As most of you 

know, my area was impacted by Hurricane Katrina. I was without 

lights personally for 7 days. However, those persons impacted in 

the gulf coast region couldn’t communicate with each other for 3 

days, and that was a problem. 

All of us recognize that FEMA failed the test. The question is 

whether or not they will become any better inside the Department 

of Homeland Security or outside. There are examples where they 

failed as an independent agency, and, obviously, the Katrina-Rita 

experience indicates that they failed inside. But there are some 

basic things that I am convinced that we have to have. 

First of all, we need someone to run the agency who is qualified. 

We just can’t have a political crony running an agency as important as FEMA. The other thing is that person has to have direct 

communication with the White House. That individual in time of 

an incident of national significance should not have to go through 

some chain of command to marshal the assets necessary to respond 

to that emergency. It just should not be. 

So with all of the lessons learned from Katrina, I hope we can 

put together and support legislation that is being considered by 

this committee. Moving the furniture is not just good enough, we 

have to fix the internal controls. Why have we put the preparedness directorate outside of FEMA? That is absolutely a no-brainer 

for a lot of us on this committee because that adds one layer of bureaucracy to an already cumbersome process. 
3

So I look forward to the testimony. I want to compliment the 

chairman in moving forward on trying to get something done. We 

have to do it. The public demands it. I was embarrassed at what 

I saw, especially in the New Orleans area. As a member of the 

committee and as a Member of Congress, I was assured we could 

do better, and we didn’t. 

I would not want to see any of the calamities associated with 

Katrina repeated again. I am not certain that by June 1 we are 

there. I have not had any briefings, as far as I know, Mr. Chairman, by FEMA or the Department to assure us that the lessons 

learned from Katrina won’t be repeated. So this legislation is timely. It is unfortunate that in some instances we might have to 

micromanage the agency rather than let the professionals do it. 

But I think we are convinced that this hearing is in order, and I 

look forward to the testimony. 

I yield back the balance of the time. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Thompson. 

I have been advised by staff that the new FEMA Director Chief 

Paulson has offered to come in and brief us, so we will certainly 

take him up on that. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Good. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Under our committee rules, opening statements are limited to 

the chair and ranking member. However, all members are entitled 

to submit written opening remarks for the record. Due to our time 

constraints today, we will move immediately to the testimony from 

our witnesses. 

And now I would recognize the gentleman from Washington, Mr. 

Reichert, who along with Mr. McCaul has done so much work on 

this legislation, and I would ask him to introduce our distinguished 

panel. 

Chairman Reichert. 

Mr. REICHERT. [Presiding.] Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for yielding, and I am pleased to welcome our distinguished panel today to 

share their thoughts and opinions on the National Emergency 

Management Reform and Enhancement Act of 2006, the proposed 

legislation before us, which is based on multiple hearings and 

countless hours of testimony from emergency response providers, 

emergency response support providers, emergency managers, State 

and local and tribal officials, and many others. 

It is completely bipartisan and is the product of much hard work 

by Congressman McCaul, Pascrell, Etheridge, King, and Thompson. 

As the legislation’s sponsor, I want to thank all of them for their 

tremendous work, partnership, and their support on this important 

bill. The legislation offers a 21st century solution to the Department’s problem by strengthening and better integrating FEMA into 

DHS, and by implementing many of the commonsense lessons 

learned from the various investigations into Hurricane Katrina. 

This panel is representative of the transparent and inclusive 

process that Congressmen McCaul, Pascrell, Etheridge, King, 

Thompson and I adopted in drafting the legislation at issue here 

today. 

Testifying on behalf of the Government Accountability Office is 

Dr. William Jenkins. Dr. Jenkins has been with the GAO for more 
4

than 26 years and is widely recognized as an expert on homeland 

security issues. 

Dr. Jenkins, it is good to see you today. Thank you for being 

here. It is a pleasure to have you, and we look forward to your testimony. 

Representing the International Association of Fire Fighters today 

is Barry Kasinitz. I hope I pronounced that halfway correctly. The 

IAFF has testified before this committee on numerous occasions, 

and we are pleased to see them represented here again today. 

You have been involved, I know, in some of the most critical 

issues related to firefighters, such as the creation of the Fire Act 

Grant Program, and we welcome your comments on behalf of IAFF. 

As a former cop, it is good to see a representative of the International Brotherhood of Police Officers and the Law Enforcement 

Steering Committee. Stephen Lenkart is no stranger to testifying 

before this committee. And, as always, we appreciate your sharing 

your views with us today. 

Finally, I am especially pleased to introduce Eric Holdeman, the 

Director of the Office of Emergency Management in King County, 

Washington, where I served as sheriff, and Eric and I worked as 

partners. Not only is he a resident of the district but a good friend. 

Good to see you, and thank you for being here. 

He participated in and the TopOff two exercise in Seattle. As the 

Director of Emergency Management, Eric has been with King 

County since 1996, and he is responsible for facilitating regional coordination between all levels of government, as well as across 

emergency management programs in the public and private sectors. Eric is the past president of the Washington State Emergency 

Management Association, and in 2005, Eric was given a national 

award by the National Association of Counties for establishing a 

regional approach to homeland security. Additionally, the September 11th Commission recognized King County’s regional disaster response plan as a best practice for integrating the private 

business sector into community-wide disaster planning. 

Immediately prior to assuming his position in Kent County, Eric 

worked for the Washington State Division of Emergency Management for 5 years. And previously, Eric completed a 20-year career 

in the U.S. Army as an infantry officer. While in the military, he 

served in a variety of assignments in which he developed and managed operation centers and was responsible for contingency planning. 

I am very pleased the full committee is holding this hearing 

today, and I look forward to hearing from our panel and I thank 

the chairman. 

We will begin by recognizing Dr. Jenkins. 

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM O. JENKINS, JR., DIRECTOR, 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND JUSTICE GOVERNMENT 

ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Mr. JENKINS. Congressman Reichert, Ranking Member Thompson, and members of the committee, I appreciate the opportunity 

to be here today to discuss some of the issues associated with the 

future success of the Federal Emergency Management Agency and 

national emergency management functions. In geographic scope, 
5

severity of damage, and the number of persons displaced from their 

homes, Hurricane Katrina was a catastrophic disaster without 

precedent in our Nation’s history. It strained and, in many cases, 

overwhelmed the response capacities of affected State and local 

governments and the Federal Government. The effects of Katrina 

will be felt for many years to come. 

As the various reports on Katrina have detailed, Katrina graphically demonstrated the limitations of the Nation’s readiness and 

ability to respond effectively to a catastrophic disaster, even one for 

which we had clear and accurate warning. FEMA within DHS has 

the primary responsibility for coordinating and implementing key 

aspects of emergency management preparedness and response. Reports from the House, Senate, White House, DHS Inspector General and FEMA itself have all identified shortcomings in FEMA’s 

performance before and after Katrina landed, and a number of 

those recommendations have been made for addressing those shortcomings. 

Among these proposals, some have recommended altering the organizational placement of FEMA, including returning it to an independent agency. In the last 40 years, there have been several organizational structures for Federal disaster preparedness, response 

and assistance responsibilities. In the 1960s and 1970s, disaster assistance activities were within the Department of Housing and 

Urban Development. FEMA was created as an independent agency 

in 1979, consolidating responsibilities with a number of other Federal agencies, and was elevated to Cabinet status in 1996. In 

March 2003, FEMA became part of the new Department of Homeland Security. 

The history of the Federal Government’s approach to emergency 

management reflects the experience with specific major disasters, 

such as Hurricane Andrew in 1992, the September 11th terrorist 

attacks and, most recently, Hurricane Katrina. As Congress considers the future of FEMA, it is useful to remember that FEMA 

provides little direct assistance. Rather, historically, its role has 

been generally one of coordination: to identify, marshal and coordinate the resources and actions of others. 

A catastrophic disaster such as Katrina almost immediately overwhelms local and State capacity to respond effectively or even to 

respond at all. In preparing to respond to any major disaster, but 

particularly a catastrophic one, the roles, responsibilities and lines 

of authority at all levels of government must be clearly defined and 

effectively communicated to facilitate rapid and effective decisionmaking. At the same time, the best decision-making can have little 

results unless it can rely upon the trained and experienced leaders 

equipped with the resources and capabilities needed to implement 

those decisions effectively. 

Capabilities, that is the ability to carry out specific tasks with 

desired results, are built upon the appropriate combination of resources, including people, technology and funds. Ensuring those capabilities are available and effective requires sound planning, coordination, training and exercises in which capabilities are realistically tested, problems identified and appropriately addressed. 

Although organizational placement is important, other factors 

may ultimately be more important to FEMA’s future success. These 
6

include, number one, the clarity of FEMA’s mission and related responsibilities and authorities; number two, the experience of and 

training provided to FEMA’s leadership; three, the adequacy of its 

human, financial and technological resources; and four, the effectiveness of planning, exercises and related partnerships with State 

and local governments and nongovernmental entities. 

At the same time, as Congress considers the most appropriate 

placement for FEMA, they may also wish to consider some additional issues, such as the following: the relevance of FEMA’s mission to any broader organization in which it may reside; the extent 

to which there are shared goals and objectives; the ability to leverage effectively the resources of other agencies and programs; and 

any gains in efficiency and effectiveness through eliminating unnecessary duplication and overlaps. 

The next major response and recovery challenge the Nation will 

face, whether from natural or manmade causes, is unpredictable. 

However, success in responding to the next catastrophe is less likely to rely on organizational placement than upon such factors as 

clear focus, skilled leadership, clear roles and responsibilities, operational plans realistically exercised, and key resources appropriately and effectively deployed. 

That concludes my statement, and I will be happy to answer any 

questions members of the committee may have. 

[The statement of Mr. Jenkins follows:]
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Mr. REICHERT. Thank you, Dr. Jenkins. 

The chair recognizes Barry Kasinitz. 

STATEMENT OF BARRY KASINITZ, DIRECTOR, GOVERNMENTAL/

LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF 

FIRE FIGHTERS 

Mr. KASINITZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I take it we are going to wait for all 

the others to testify before we ask questions? 

Mr. REICHERT. That’s correct. 

Mr. KASINITZ. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Pascrell, and 

members of the committee. My name is Barry Kasinitz, and I serve 

as Director of Governmental Affairs for the International Association of Fire Fighters, and I am pleased to be here today on behalf 

of General President Harold Schaitberger and more than a quarter 

million emergency response personnel who belong to our organization. 

Whenever and wherever disaster strikes, the Nation’s professional fire fighters are on the front lines working tirelessly to save 

lives and protect the public. Whether it is a terrorist event or a 

natural disaster, the men and women of the IAFF are the first to 

arrive and the last to leave. Their dedication is matched only by 

the technical expertise they bring to their mission. 

Today’s professional fire fighter, an all-purpose responder, is 

trained in such disciplines as emergency medical care, hazardous 

materials response and specialized rescue missions. It is from this 

perspective, as the frontline emergency responders, that we commend you on the initiative before you today. 

Our Nation’s emergency response system is badly broken and 

desperately in need of repair. The National Emergency Management Reform and Enhancement Act is an important stride forward 

in creating a new paradigm for the way our Nation responds to disasters. 

FEMA’s response to Katrina offers a case study of all that is 

wrong with our current system. The first role of government in a 

disaster is to protect lives, which is what the fire fighters did in 

the days and weeks following the onset of Katrina. FEMA played 

no role in aiding emergency response and, in fact, hindered our efforts. By hoarding desperately needed resources, FEMA prevented 

local emergency responders from doing their job. And as New Orleans fire fighters worked around the clock, exhausted and in desperate need of relief, FEMA called up over a thousand fire fighters 

nationwide to serving as community relations officers, tasking 

them with the distribution of informational fliers. FEMA even hindered the deployment of fire fighters under the EMAC system by 

creating confusion regarding whether or not local communities 

would be reimbursed for sending fire fighters to the scene. 

But perhaps the greatest tragedy of all was that the response to 

Katrina should have been so much better. Following the cataclysmic events of September 11th, our Nation decided we needed 

a better way to respond to major disasters. Congress responded 

forcefully by creating the Department of Homeland Security, the 

National Response Plan, and the National Incident Management 

System. And the President issued a series of directives that were 
28

meant to change not only programs but ways of thinking. Katrina 

was the first test of this new order, and it failed miserably. 

So what went wrong? The first problem lies in how the Department was created. Whole agencies, each with their own culture and 

history, were haphazardly scotch taped together to form the new 

department. Personnel still functioned within the bubbles of their 

original agencies and didn’t even understand their new missions. 

DHS officials at the highest level undertook actions in Katrina that 

ran counter completely to the Natural Response Plan. 

Moreover, much of the NRP simply doesn’t make sense in the 

real world. The plan fails to utilize the greatest resource our Nation has to respond to disasters: The network of highly-trained 

emergency response personnel stationed in nearly every community 

in America. Responsibility for mobilizing fire fighters is given to 

the Department of Agriculture. 

The legislation before you would address many of these shortcomings and would provide the necessary framework to improve 

NIMS and the NRP. The Act provides FEMA with a fresh start. By 

eliminating old boundaries and establishing a new directorate, 

complete with new structures and relationships, we believe you 

eliminate many of the problems that have plagued the Department. 

The legislation appropriately reunites preparedness and response 

and restores strong leadership by assuring that the under secretary 

is an experienced emergency manager with direct access to the 

President during disasters. We also thank you for including a medical monitoring program to protect the health of our emergency responders. And we strongly support the act’s all-hazards approach. 

Too much time has been spent on misguided attempts to differentiate between natural and manmade disasters. Whether a 

building’s collapse is caused by an earthquake or terrorist bomb, 

the response is the same. None of us knows what the next disaster 

will look like. And by recognizing this fact, the government will be 

better prepared to respond to the challenges that faces us next. 

There remains, however, one significant omission in the current 

drafted legislation. Government’s paramount mission when disaster 

strikes is to save lives and protect the public safety. Yet the current Federal emergency response system fails to adequately utilize 

the single most valuable resource we have: our Nation’s emergency 

response personnel. 

To be sure, fire fighters and other responders already respond in 

a massive way to disasters, but they do so largely outside the scope 

of the Federal Government. Fire fighters are officially deployed 

under an interstate compact and various mutual aid agreements 

and unofficially deployed based on nothing more than a personal 

desire to help. 

The arrival of fire fighters on the scene has too often been chaotic and less than fully effective. Too many well—meaning fire 

fighters self dispatch, not waiting to be mobilized as part of an official call-up. And also the qualifications for fire fighters vary widely. 

Just because a person calls themselves a fire fighter doesn’t always 

mean they are capable of doing what fire fighters should be able 

to do. 

Standards for fire fighter training are too often ignored, and 

there is no way to determine who has the proper training. This un-
29

1Williams, Dave. ‘‘2004 JEMS 200 City Survey’’. Journal of Emergency Medical Services 23.2 

(February 2005): 42–60. 

certainty prevents on-scene incident commanders from fully utilizing their most valuable resources. And there appears to be little 

coordination between EMAC, which deploys fire fighters, and 

FEMA, which reimburses communities for the cost. 

The solution is to amend the National Response Plan to make 

full use of everything local fire fighters can provide. We propose establishing a Federal credentialing and deployment system to provide incident commanders with a group of highly-trained and 

equipped fire fighters in a timely fashion. Making this one change 

would do more to protect our citizens than anything else we can 

recommend. 

I am pleased to note, Mr. Chairman, that we have been working 

with your extraordinary staff in recent days on language to achieve 

this goal, and I thank you for your support of this effort. 

In conclusion, let me just say that implementing the changes 

that you have outlined will be challenging. But the IAFF has every 

confidence that restructuring our Nation’s emergency response system can and will succeed. The National Emergency Management 

Reform and Enhancement Act is a great start. Our Nation’s fire 

fighters are ready to respond to the next disaster, Mr. Chairman, 

no matter what form it takes, but we can’t do it alone. Congress 

must act now to help the fire service more effectively respond to 

future disasters. 

I thank you for your attention, and I will be happy to answer any 

questions you may have. 

[The statement of Mr. Kasinitz follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF BARRY KASINITZ

Thank you Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Thompson and distinguished members of the Committee for the opportunity to testify before you today. My name is 

Barry Kasinitz, and I serve as Director of Governmental Affairs for the International Association of Fire Fighters (IAFF). I am pleased to appear before you 

today on behalf of our General President Harold Schaitberger and the more than 

quarter million full-time emergency response personnel who comprise our organization. 

Whenever and wherever disaster strikes, America’s professional fire fighters and 

emergency medical personnel are on the front lines working tirelessly and heroically 

to save lives and protect the public safety. Whether it is a bomb in Oklahoma City, 

an earthquake in San Francisco, terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center or 

massive flooding in the Gulf Coast, the men and women of the IAFF are the first 

to arrive on the scene and the last to leave. 

Our members’ dedication and bravery is matched only by the technical expertise 

they bring to their mission. The days of fire fighters whose primary function was 

simply putting water on the fire are long gone. Today’s professional fire fighter is 

an all-purpose emergency responder trained in such specialized disciplines as hazardous/WMD materials response and high-angle, confined space and water rescue. 

The modern fire service is also our nation’s preeminent provider of emergency medical services. In a 2004 survey of the 200 most populous American cities by the Journal of Emergency Medical Services, 90% reported that medical first response is provided to their populace by fire service personnel.1

It is from this perspective as front line emergency responders that we commend 

and congratulate the Committee on the initiative before you today. Our nation’s 

emergency response system is badly broken and in desperate need of repair. The 

National Emergency Management Reform and Enhancement Act is an important 

stride forward in creating a new paradigm for the way our nation responds to natural and man-made disasters. 
30

Our Katrina Experience 

The first response to any disaster, no matter its scope, is always at the local level. 

When Hurricane Katrina ravaged the Gulf Coast last summer, local fire fighters 

were the first to respond, performing search and rescue, providing emergency medical assistance, and yes, even putting out fires. 

But the federal government has a significant role to play as well. The single most 

important thing the government can do to save lives and protect public safety during a disaster is ensure the effective mobilization, and support, of the fire service. 

In this respect, the federal government completely botched its response to Katrina. 

After Katrina struck, it was over a week before exhausted New Orleans fire fighters first encountered anyone from FEMA. And even then, FEMA hindered, rather 

than helped, local response by hoarding desperately needed resources. Some local 

fire fighters in New Orleans were unable to fuel their engines, even though FEMA 

had a large fuel supply. Other local fire fighters were forced to break into a retail 

outlet to obtain a generator to charge their radios, because FEMA had stockpiled 

all the batteries. Despite the urgency of the situation and the lifesaving importance 

of fire fighters’ work, requests to FEMA for such basic supplies went unanswered. 

To alleviate FEMA’s shortcomings, the IAFF mobilized its own members to deliver 

supplies and provide general support to fire fighters along the Gulf Coast, assisting 

over 5000 frontline responders with basic needs such as communications, food, medical care and supplies. 

And as New Orleans fire fighters worked around the clock, exhausted and in desperate need of relief, FEMA called up over 1000 fire fighters to serve as ‘‘community 

relations officers,’’ tasking them with the distribution of informational fliers. But 

rather than deploy these highly skilled and highly trained professionals to relieve 

local first responders, our members sat in hotel rooms in Atlanta. 

Separately, hundreds of fire fighters from around the nation participated in the 

response efforts under the EMAC deployment system, but here too FEMA hindered 

rather than helped the effort. By creating confusion regarding whether local communities would be reimbursed for sending fire fighters, FEMA delayed by several days 

the mobilization of emergency response personnel. 

FEMA should be a resource for first responders to do their jobs—not the other 

way around. Put simply, Mr. Chairman, FEMA failed our first responders.

The Post 9–11 World 

These failures of the government’s response are horrific, but perhaps the biggest 

tragedy of all was that the response to Katrina should have been much better. Following the cataclysmic events of September 11, 2001, our nation decided that we 

needed a better way to respond to major disasters. Congress and the Administration 

moved quickly and forcefully to develop new systems to be better prepared for the 

next disaster. 

We created the Department of Homeland Security, the largest reorganization of 

the federal government in half a century. The President of the United States issued 

a series of Directives that were meant to change not only programs, but ways of 

thinking, leading to the creation of the National Incident Management System 

(NIMS) and the National Response Plan (NRP). 

Katrina was the first test of this new order, and it failed miserably. 

So what went wrong here? Why, after four years, billions of dollars, and countless 

man-hours, did the first test of our nation’s new preparedness and response system 

fail?

Problems with the Federal Emergency Response System 

The first problem lies in how the Department of Homeland Security was originally 

created. Whole agencies, each with their own culture and history, were ‘‘scotchtaped’’ together, sometimes haphazardly, to form the new Department. The result 

was as though pieces from various jigsaw puzzles had been forced together to form 

a single picture. Personnel still functioned within the bubbles of their original agencies, and they kept doing their jobs as they had all along. The result didn’t always 

best serve the new department. 

Furthermore, it seems clear that Department personnel didn’t even understand 

their own emergency response plans. According to the Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane 

Katrina, ‘‘the Secretary [of Homeland Security] was confused about the role and au-
31

2 United States Cong. House. Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for 

and Response to Hurricane Katrina. A Failure of Initiative. 109th Cong., 2nd sess., 2006. H. 

Rpt. 109–377. Washington: GPO, 2006. 3 Ibid. 

4 Ibid. 

5 U.S. Department of Homeland Security. National Response Plan. Washington: 2004.

thority of the PFO’’ as outlined in the National Response Plan.2 The report cites 

Secretary Chertoff’s designation of Michael Brown as PFO, even though Brown had 

not completed the training program required by the NRP.3 Furthermore, the report 

notes that the Secretary did not seemingly recognize until almost two weeks after 

Michael Brown’s replacement as PFO that it was the FCO who had the authority 

to direct federal funds and agencies to respond to the disaster.4

Perhaps it is understandable that even Secretary Chertoff didn’t understand the 

National Response Plan. In many ways, the Plan didn’t, and doesn’t, make sense 

in the real world. For example, the Plan fails to adequately utilize the greatest resource our nation has to respond to disasters: the network of highly trained emergency response personnel stationed in nearly every community in America. Under 

the NRP, the Department of Agriculture, specifically, the Forest Service, is responsible for ‘‘mobilizing firefighting resources in support of State, local and tribal 

wildland, rural, and urban firefighting agencies.’’ 5 It is hard to imagine a less appropriate assignment. 

Reforming National Emergency Preparedness and Response 

Mr. Chairman, this Committee has recognized these failures and has taken important steps to correct them in the legislation at hand. The National Emergency Management Reform and Enhancement Act would implement a number of important 

changes at the Department of Homeland Security, and would provide the necessary 

framework to improve the National Incident Management System and the National 

Response Plan. 

First and foremost, the Act provides the Department of Homeland Security, and 

FEMA, with a fresh start. You do what should have been done four years ago when 

the Department was first created—you ignore the old ‘‘pieces of the puzzle’’ to create 

an entirely new entity—the Directorate of Emergency Management. By eliminating 

old boundaries and establishing a new directorate, complete with new names, structures, and relationships, from scratch, we believe you will eliminate many of the 

problems that have plagued the Department since its inception. 

One of the biggest flaws with the Department’s Second Stage Review initiative 

was the separation of FEMA’s preparedness and response activities. It makes little 

sense to have one federal agency work with local communities to develop response 

plans, and then have different federal agencies implement those plans. By reuniting 

Emergency Preparedness and Emergency Response under the Directorate of Emergency Management, you are helping ensure that future emergency response efforts 

are in sync with today’s preparedness efforts. 

The Act also restores strong leadership to FEMA by ensuring that the Undersecretary of Emergency Management has demonstrable experience, and knowledge of 

emergency management. Undersecretary-nominee David Paulison is a great example of the sort of leader the Committee has envisoned; as a former IAFF member 

and fire chief, Paulison has the necessary experience and knowledge to spearhead 

the federal government’s emergency response efforts. We also agree with the Committee that the Undersecretary should be given direct access to the President during 

disasters, ensuring that he or she is not encumbered by bureaucracy when faced 

with a snap decision. 

We are also extremely pleased that the Act applies an all-hazards approach to 

emergency preparedness and response. Entirely too much time and effort has been 

spent on a misguided attempt to differentiate between natural versus man-made 

disasters. Whether a building collapse is caused by an earthquake or terrorist bomb, 

the response efforts are the same. Whether a terrorist deliberately releases a toxic 

chemical into the air or that same chemical is released because a train accidentally 

derails makes little difference to those working to mitigate the dangers. None of us 

knows what the next disaster will look like. By recognizing this fact, the federal government will be better prepared to respond to whatever test next faces our nation. 

There remains, however, one significant omission in the current draft of the legislation. Government’s paramount mission when disaster strikes is to save lives and 

protect the public safety. Yet, the current federal emergency response system fails 

to adequately utilize the single most valuable resource we have: our nation’s emergency response personnel. 
32

To be sure, fire fighters and other responders already respond in a massive way 

to disasters, but they do so largely outside the scope of the federal government. Fire 

fighters are officially deployed under an interstate compact and various mutual aid 

agreements, and unofficially deployed based on nothing more than a personal desire 

to help. 

Although their impact on disaster response has been overwhelmingly positive, the 

arrival of fire fighters on the scene has often been chaotic and less than 100% effective. There are several reasons for this. 

First and foremost, too many well meaning fire fighters self-dispatch, not waiting 

to be mobilized as part of an official call-up. Second, the qualifications of fire fighters vary widely. Just because a person calls himself or herself a fire fighter does 

not always mean they are capable of doing what fire fighters should be able to do. 

Universally accepted standards for fire fighter training are widely ignored, and 

there is currently no way to credential those who do have adequate training and 

experience. This uncertainty prevents on-scene incident commanders from being 

able to make appropriate use of their most valuable resources. Finally, as noted 

above, there is little coordination between EMAC, which deploys fire fighters, and 

FEMA, which reimburses communities for the costs incurred. 

The solution is to amend the National Response Plan to make full use of everything that local fire fighters can provide. The NRP should be amended to establish 

a fire fighter credentialing system (a project already well underway at the U.S. Fire 

Administration), and a more effective and efficient deployment model. 

There simply is no reason why the federal government cannot provide incident 

commanders with a group of highly trained and equipped fire fighters in a timely 

fashion. Making this one change would do more to protect our fellow citizens than 

anything else we can recommend. I am pleased to note, Mr. Chairman, that we have 

been working with your extraordinary staff in recent days on language to achieve 

this goal, and I thank you for your support of these efforts. 

The challenges in implementing these changes to the Department and to our 

emergency response system are not insignificant. This Committee has set high 

standards for the new Directorate of Emergency Management, which we very much 

appreciate. Although it is a large undertaking, the IAFF has every confidence that, 

with the right leadership, restructuring our nation’s emergency response system 

can, and will, succeed. Your bill is a great start.

Additional Improvements 

I would be remiss if I didn’t mention a few additional sections of the bill that we 

believe will benefit emergency response. 

The National Advisory Council on Emergency Management will provide the Emergency Management Directorate with expertise and assistance that, to date, has been 

largely missing. The nation’s fire fighters are looking forward to working within this 

structure to enhance NIMS and the NRP. 

We believe the National Integration Center (NIC) will play an invaluable role in 

improving federal disaster response efforts. As a focal point for both NIMS and the 

NRP, NIC should be able to address the coordination and integration problems that 

have plagued emergency response efforts in the past. We add a word of caution that 

the responsibilities given to this agency are both critical and very broad, and we 

urge the Committee to assure that NIC will have the necessary resources and leadership for this massive undertaking. 

We have been less than impressed by DHS efforts to date to define the essential 

capabilities of emergency response providers, and we commend you for including in 

your proposal a requirement that these capabilities be revised and updated. 

Authorizing the Regional Offices will preserve one of the best things about the 

old FEMA. These offices will ensure better coordination between the Directorate, 

state and local governments, and local emergency response providers. 

We are especially appreciative of the language in the bill authorizing medical 

monitoring programs following disasters. This language will allow for the early detection and treatment of potential health issues in first responders, and lead to new 

ways to protect fire fighters and prevent harmful exposures from future disasters. 

The successful World Trade Center Medical Monitoring program, which evaluated 

almost 12,000 individuals after 9–11, found respiratory problems among emergency 

responders that would not have been otherwise detected. We believe similar efforts 

as part of any response to future disasters would likewise provide vital information 

to those who rush directly into harm’s way. 

There is one area of concern that I wish to note. Section 522 of the Act authorizes 

the National Domestic Preparedness Consortium, and names five specific institutions as its members. While these institutions do a good job training state and local 
33

first responders, we are concerned that naming them in law would limit the Consortium’s membership. There may be institutions around the country that would be 

just as effective, if not more effective, than the institutions currently named in the 

Act, and there may come a time when DHS wishes to expand or change membership 

in the consortium. In Congressman Reichert’s district, for example, the Department 

of Energy’s Hazardous Materials Management and Emergency Response (HAMMER) training center provides one of the best hazmat/WMD training programs in 

the country. 

My own organization’s WMD training program is another case in point. The 

IAFF’s training program is the most cost effective and successful WMD training provided to fire fighters. Using a cadre of instructors who are both certified fire service 

instructors and certified hazmat responders, we offer real-world training that few 

institutions can match. And because we send instructors into local communities and 

use local resources, we have a far lower per pupil cost than any fixed site training 

facility. We have been providing this training with federal support since the inception of this federal program—before there was a DHS—yet we are not currently designated as a member of the Consortium. We respectfully request that if you do decide to name specific institutions in law, you consider adding exceptional institutions and programs such as HAMMER and the IAFF.

Conclusion: A Great First Step 

The National Emergency Management Reform and Enhancement Act takes great 

strides towards improving the manner by which our nation prepares for, and responds to, natural and man-made disasters. We appreciate this Committee’s willingness to incorporate many of the recommendations of the IAFF and other responder 

organizations, and we applaud the fact that you have worked in a bipartisan manner to produce this legislation. 

Mr. Chairman, our nation’s fire fighters have never hesitated to put themselves 

in harm’s way to protect our nation and its citizens, and we are at the ready to respond to the next disaster, no matter what form it takes. But our nation’s first responders can’t do it alone. Congress must now act to help the fire service more effectively respond to future disasters, and to that end, the National Emergency Management Reform and Enhancement Act serves as a great first step. 

This concludes my testimony. Thank you for your interest and attention. I am, 

of course, happy to answer any questions you may have.

Mr. REICHERT. Thank you for your testimony. 

Mr. Lenkart is recognized. 

STATEMENT OF STEVEN V. LENKART, DIRECTOR OF 

LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF 

POLICE OFFICERS 

Mr. LENKART. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

Pascrell and members of the committee. I am Steve Lenkart, Director of Legislative Affairs for the International Brotherhood of Police 

Officers. My comments this afternoon are also shared by three 

other national police organizations, the Major Cities Chiefs, the 

National Troopers Coalition, and the National Association of Black 

Law Enforcement Executives. All four of these organizations are 

members of the Law Enforcement Steering Committee, currently in 

its 21st year of operation on Capitol Hill. I have had the honor of 

serving as chairman of that committee since January of 2004. 

Mr. Chairman, the last time I appeared before this committee 

was in September of 2004 when I testified on the necessity of the 

complete integration of law enforcement functions into the National 

Incident Management System. Much has happened since that time. 

I was concerned back then, as many of my colleagues were also, 

that the United States didn’t have solid procedures in place to handle large-scale incidents efficiently, be it a natural disaster or 

human induced. To the credit of this committee, you had the same 
34

concerns and, as a result, stepped forward to redefine how America 

prepares and responds to its threats and disasters. 

Over the past few years, this committee demonstrated how solid 

policy ideas can trump politics, and for that I commend all of you. 

In addition, because these policy ideas are written with regard to 

their practical application to the real world and not how they appear on paper in Congress, these ideas garnered a tremendous 

amount of support from law enforcement and other first responder 

communities. 

This committee is again seeking the lead in public safety and 

emergency response by putting forth the idea of consolidating the 

operations of FEMA with the responsibilities of a Directorate of 

Emergency Preparedness under DHS, combining them to create a 

new Directorate of Emergency Management. What is important to 

note is that the idea to create a new directorate was developed 

after extensive outreach and discussion with every conceivable 

stakeholder in national preparedness and response. As a result, the 

legislative language that this committee has constructed embraces 

the most important element vital to the success of any emergency 

management operation, and that is the relationship between preparedness and response. 

For some reason, the relationship between preparedness and response is viewed by many as a tug-of-war. Is our priority to invest 

in preparedness and prevention, or is our priority to invest in responding quickly and recovering completely? Mr. Chairman, that is 

like asking, which comes first, the chicken or the egg? The answer 

is very simple: It doesn’t matter, because one can’t exist without 

the other. You cannot be prepared without the means for a proper 

response, and you cannot respond properly without being prepared. 

The bill’s language incorporates this concept by moving these two 

pillars of emergency management under one roof, a move that is 

long overdue. Then the language takes this concept further by elevating emergency management within DHS by establishing a legally qualified under secretary to oversee the directorate and establishing two qualified deputy under secretaries as the chiefs of preparedness and response. In addition, the under secretary is given 

a direct line of communication to the President during incidents of 

national significance, and, thus, a clear chain of command is instantly established. 

I would like to take a moment to explain why these changes 

within the senior management structure are so critical. By now, 

most people are very familiar with the results of our response to 

Hurricane Katrina. Hurricane Katrina was an unmitigated disaster 

by any definition and devastated a large region of the country. We 

spent a lot of time and energy in trying to figure out who failed 

and how, which resulted in a great deal of finger pointing. 

None of that finger pointing would have been necessary if an efficient, well-polished and practiced plan had been in effect. The 

breakdown in the chain of command could have been pinpointed 

and not lost to the ambiguities of who had what authority and responsibility and who didn’t. The loss of chain of command was the 

key to a total systematic failure of rescue and recovery operations 

after Katrina hit, which exposed gaping holes in our Nation’s response. 
35

I want to point out that while a systematic failure occurred, some 

elements of emergency response continued to operate, such as the 

Coast Guard, certain State agencies and many localized first-responder efforts. These efforts were forced to run independently, but 

they were able to do so because they had the flexibility to operate 

under extreme circumstances. They had this flexibility because 

these smaller components had within them two core components of 

emergency management: accountability and procedure. 

Accountability and procedure within emergency management allows all entities involved to adjust to contingencies quickly, move 

resources in a timely manner and to continue with the overall mission, which is to preserve life and begin immediately on the road 

to recovery. By placing preparedness and response under one under 

secretary and placing the responsibilities of each under two chief 

deputies, we are closing the infinite loop of accountability and procedure for emergency management. 

Perhaps there is no message of greater importance that I can 

provide here today than the significance of continuity in accountability and procedure during emergency management operations. 

The simple equation of bringing preparedness and response within 

distance of each other under one department can revolutionize how 

we respond to emergency situations. It can decrease uncertainty 

along the chain of command and can strengthen our abilities to 

react quickly to other emergencies that often arise from the original incident, such as the levee breaks in New Orleans after the 

hurricane struck. 

In addition to these vital structural changes within the Federal 

Government, draft language also extends to State and local jurisdictions the opportunity to become better prepared and integrated 

into a much larger system. This integration is lacking in many 

areas of the country. And while certain improvements have been 

made in recent years, we still have a long way to go before we can 

consider ourselves prepared. 

This addition of crucial resources is provided under a design of 

programs constructed to provide guidance and assistance where it 

is needed and to ensure our communities take the proper steps to 

ready themselves without the Federal Government taking charge 

at the local level. The programs and offices are too numerous to 

mention in my comments today. However, I would like to emphasize a few of them. 

The establishment of regional emergency management offices 

with mandated staff training to more effectively coordinate and integrate local efforts, including inventory and use of private sector 

resources; the establishment of an emergency management advisory council, composed of national and local specialists to ensure 

representation at all levels and in all areas of concern to the Secretary, including an assessment of essential capabilities; several offices to assist with grants, planning, training and education; the establishment of an office for emergency communications to take further the mission of interoperability, as supported by leading communications organizations, such as the Association of Public Safety 

Communications Officials International; and last but certainly not 

least, proactive additional safeguards against waste, fraud and 

abuse. 
36

Mr. Chairman, it has been my experience that this committee is 

resolved to finding solutions to very tough questions and is also 

careful to avoid the addition of unnecessary bureaucracy while 

seeking a remedy. When you ask the right questions of the right 

people, you get the right answers. This is why the actions of your 

committee, including the issues discussed today, are so widely supported by law enforcement and other first responders. 

I appreciate the great burden this committee has accepted on behalf of the American people, and on behalf of the International 

Brotherhood of Police Officers and my law colleagues in the national law enforcement community, we look forward to continuing 

our work with you and to further prepare our country for any crisis. Thank you. 

[The statement of Mr. Lenkart follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF STEVEN V. LENKART

Good afternoon, Chairman King, Ranking Member Thompson and Members of the 

Committee. 

I’m Steve Lenkart, Director of Legislative Affairs for the International Brotherhood of Police Officers, representing federal, state and local police officers from 

around the country. Before coming to Washington, I served for 14 years as a police 

officer, firefighter and emergency medical technician in and around the city of Chicago. 

My comments this afternoon are also shared by the Major Cities Chiefs, an organization that represents police executives from more than 150 major metropolitan 

areas; by the National Troopers Coalition, an organization representing 30,000 

state trooper and highway patrol officers throughout the nation; and by the National Organization of Black Law Enforcement Executives, representing executive and command officers from all levels within the law enforcement community. 

All four of these organizations are members of the Law Enforcement Steering 

Committee, currently in its 21st year of operation on Capitol Hill. I have had the 

honor of serving as its chairman since January of 2004. 

Mr. Chairman, the last time I appeared before this committee was in September 

of 2004 when I testified before the Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness and 

Response on the necessity of complete integration of law enforcement functions into 

the National Incident Management System. 

Much has happened since that time. I was concerned back then, as many of my 

colleagues were also, that the United States didn’t have solid procedures in place 

to handle a large-scale incident efficiently, be it a natural disaster or human-induced. To the credit of this committee, you had the same concerns and as a result, 

stepped forward to redefine how America prepares and responds to its threats and 

disasters. Over the past few years, this committee has demonstrated how solid policy ideas can trump politics, and for that I commend all of you. In addition, because 

these policy ideas are written with regard to their practical application to the real 

world, and not how they appear on paper in Congress, these ideas garner a tremendous amount of support from the law enforcement and other first responder communities. 

I. The Department of Homeland Security, FEMA, and National Preparedness and 

Response. 

This committee is again taking the lead in public safety and emergency response 

by putting forth the idea of consolidating the operations of the Federal Emergency 

Management Agency (FEMA) with the responsibilities of the Directorate of Emergency Preparedness under the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), combining them to create a new Directorate of Emergency Management. It is important 

to note that the idea to create a new directorate was developed after extensive outreach and discussions with every conceivable stakeholder in national preparedness 

and response. 

As a result, the draft language that the committee has constructed embraces the 

most important element vital to the success of any emergency management operation: the relationship between preparedness and response. For some reason, the relationship between preparedness and response is viewed by many as a tug of war: 
37

Is our priority to invest in preparedness and prevention, or is our priority to invest 

in responding quickly and recovering completely? 

Mr. Chairman, that’s like asking: Which should come first, the chicken or the egg? 

The answer is simple: It doesn’t matter because one can’t exist without the other. 

You cannot be prepared without the means for a proper response, and you cannot 

respond properly without being prepared. 

The draft language incorporates this concept by moving these two pillars of emergency management under one roof, a move that is long overdue. Then the language 

takes this concept further by elevating emergency management within DHS by establishing a legally-qualified undersecretary to oversee the directorate, and establishing two qualified deputy undersecretaries as the chiefs of preparedness and response. 

In addition, the Undersecretary is given a direct line of communication to the 

president during Incidents of National Significance, and thus, a clear chain of command is instantly established. I’d like to take a moment to explain why these 

changes within the senior management structure are so critical. 

II. The Importance of Accountability and Procedure. 

By now, most people are very familiar with the results of our response to Hurricane Katrina. Hurricane Katrina was an unmitigated disaster by any definition and 

devastated a large region of the country. We’ve spent a lot of time and energy in 

trying to figure out who failed and how, which has resulted in a great deal of finger 

pointing. None of that excessive finger pointing would have been necessary if an efficient, well-polished and practiced plan had been in effect. The breakdown in the 

chain of command could have been pin-pointed and not lost in the ambiguities of 

who had what authority and responsibility, and who didn’t. 

The loss of chain of command was the key to a total systematic failure of rescue 

and recovery operations after Katrina hit which exposed gaping holes in our nation’s 

response. I want to point out that while a systematic failure occurred, some elements of emergency response continued to operate, such as the Coast Guard, certain 

state agencies, and many localized first responder efforts. These efforts were forced 

to run independently but they were able to do so because they had the flexibility 

to operate under extreme circumstances. They had this flexibility because these 

smaller operations had within them two core components of emergency management: Accountability and Procedure. 

Accountability and procedure within emergency management allows all entities 

involved to adjust to contingencies quickly, move resources in a timely manner, and 

to continue with the overall mission which is to preserve life and begin immediately 

on the road to recovery. 

By placing preparedness and response under one Undersecretary, and by placing 

the responsibility for each under two chief deputies, we are closing the infinite loop 

of accountability and procedure for emergency management. Perhaps there is no 

message of greater importance that I can provide than the significance of continuity 

in accountability and procedure during emergency operations. 

This simple equation of bring preparedness and response within working distance 

of each other under one department can revolutionize how we respond to emergency 

situations, can decrease uncertainty along the chain of command and can strengthen our ability to react quickly to other emergencies that often arise from the original 

incident, such as the levy breaks in New Orleans after the hurricane struck. 

III. The Benefit to States and Local Communities. 

In addition to these vital structural changes within the federal government, the 

draft language also extends to state and local jurisdictions the opportunity to become better prepared and integrated into a much larger system. This integration is 

lacking in many areas of the country and while certain improvements were made 

in recent years, we still have a long way to go before we can consider ourselves 

properly prepared. This addition of crucial resources is provided under a design of 

programs constructed to provide guidance and assistance where it is needed, and 

to ensure our communities take the proper steps to ready themselves without the 

federal government taking charge at the local level.

The different programs and offices are too numerous to mention in my comments 

today, however I would like to emphasize a few of them: 

• The establishment of regional emergency management offices with mandated 

staff training to more effectively coordinate and integrate local efforts, including 

inventory and use of private sector resources; 
38

• The establishment of an Emergency Management Advisory Council composed 

of national and local specialists to ensure representation at all levels and all 

areas of concern to the Secretary, including an assessment of essential capabilities; 

• Several offices to assist with grants, planning, training and education; 

• The establishment of an office for emergency communications to take further 

the mission of interoperability as supported by leading communications organizations such as the Association of Public-Safety Communications Officials International; and 

• Proactive, additional safeguards against waste, fraud and abuse. 

Mr. Chairman, it has been my experience that this committee is resolved to finding solutions to very tough questions, and is careful to avoid the addition of unnecessary bureaucracy while seeking remedy. When you ask the right questions to the 

right people, you get the right answers. This is why the actions of your committee, 

including the issues discussed today, are so widely supported by law enforcement 

and other first responders. I appreciate the great burden that this committee has 

accepted on behalf of the American people, and on behalf of the International Brotherhood of Police Officers and my colleagues in the national law enforcement community, we look forward to continuing our work with you to further prepare our country for any crisis. 

Thank you.

Mr. REICHERT. Thank you so much for your testimony. 

The chair recognizes Mr. Holdeman. 

STATEMENT OF ERIC HOLDEMAN, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF 

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT KING COUNTY, STATE OF 

WASHINGTON 

Mr. HOLDEMAN. Mr. Chairman and other members, for the 

record, I am Eric Holdeman, Director for the King County Office 

of Emergency Management, and thank you for the opportunity to 

appear before you today. 

I would like to say that remarks were made about Katrina being 

an embarrassment for you. It is an embarrassment for every emergency manager at every level of government, and I am pleased to 

see someone and organizations working to fix that. 

I would like to express my overall support for this bill, and while 

there are many provisions in the legislation, there are four that are 

critically important to improving our Nation’s collective ability to 

respond. The first of that is combining once again the function of 

emergency preparedness with that of disaster response and recovery; secondly, establishing homeland security regional offices; thirdly, supporting an all-hazards approach to funding emergency management and disaster preparedness; and lastly, retaining the name 

of FEMA as defining the Federal Emergency Management Agency 

for the Nation. 

First of all, there is the reuniting of emergency preparedness 

with disaster response and recovery into the same organization. 

Disaster preparedness is the foundation for disaster response. 

What you do to prepare for disasters by planning, training and exercising will set the tone for your capability to respond collectively 

when disasters do strike. 

We have seen what the impact was of taking disaster preparedness away from FEMA. While it was not made official until the fall 

of 2005, in essence, FEMA has not had an emergency preparedness 

function for the last 5 years. Having both functions placed under 

the control of the Under Secretary for Emergency Management will 

measurably strengthen our disaster response capabilities. This is 
39

one of those times where the placement of an agency on the organizational chart does make a significant difference. 

Secondly, I have been saying for a long time that the one single 

step the Federal Government can do to quickly improve the Nation’s ability to respond to disasters is to establish homeland security regional offices. Without these offices, there has been no one, 

and that is no one, to coordinate the multiple Federal agency regional efforts in disaster preparedness, and no one in the regions 

of this Nation to work with State emergency management offices 

or, like in my case, major metropolitan areas. 

Without FEMA regional offices being empowered to perform this 

function—and FEMA region ten is only 20 miles from my office—

our ability to interact with a coordinated Federal agency effort has 

been eliminated. This legislation would fix that issue and provides 

for regional offices dedicated to the effort of coordinating and facilitating our Federal, State and local efforts in preparing for disasters 

and providing for a more effective response when disasters do 

strike. 

Thirdly, taking an all-hazards approach to disaster preparedness 

has proven over time to be the best way to maximize scarce financial resources and minimize risk to regions by being prepared for 

a broad spectrum of disasters. This legislation, in many places, 

uses language such as terrorism, natural hazards and other emergencies. The Senate recently recommended taking an all-hazardsplus approach to emergency management. 

The one thing I can tell you, and the one thing that still needs 

to be fixed in the bill, in section 521, the Office of Grants and Planning, is there is no reference to natural hazards or all hazards in 

that. I understand that may be an oversight, and so I would 

strongly recommend in the markup phase for this that you correct 

it. Because without correcting it, as we have been told previously 

by the Department of Homeland Security, the money can only be 

spent on terrorism. That is the direction we have been given by 

Congress. 

And retaining the name of FEMA. I recognize there are some 

calling recently, again by the U.S. Senate, to do away with the 

FEMA name and establish a new organization to replace it. Well, 

this is not a rebranding issue. There is no replacing the functions 

of FEMA. They must continue if we are once again to have an effective Federal disaster agency. 

If you recall years ago, when the Chrysler Corporation had a 

problem and was on the financial ropes, Lee Iacocca did not come 

in and say, we’re going to fix the problem at Chrysler by changing 

the name. No, he fixed the problem by rolling out improved products in the form of better automobiles. We need to fix the FEMA 

product, not the FEMA name. 

Lastly, I call on my peers in State and local emergency management offices across this great land to get behind this good bill. As 

stated before, it is not perfect, but we need something now. Don’t 

let an attempt to try to come up with a perfect piece of legislation 

become the enemy of doing something good. Implementing this legislation will not change things overnight, but the sooner we reunite 

disaster preparedness and response, establish regional homeland 

security offices, fund an all-hazards approach to disaster prepared-
40

ness, and decide to keep the FEMA name, the sooner we will be 

on a path to a more disaster-resilient America. 

While I have additional recommendations for this legislation, you 

can read them in my attached written testimony. Thank you for 

this opportunity to testify, and I look forward to any questions that 

you might have. 

[The statement of Mr. Holdeman follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ERIC E. HOLDEMAN

Mr. Chairman and other members, for the record I am Eric Holdeman, Director 

for the King County Office of Emergency Management. A position that I’ve held for 

the past ten years. Prior to working for King County I worked for Washington State 

Emergency Management for five years in a variety of supervisory positions, that included disaster response operations, planning, training, exercises, and public education. Previous to this I completed a 20 year military career as an infantry officer. 

My experience in the military included four years working as Chief of Operations 

and Chief of Contingency Planning for the then Fourth U.S. Army. These duties included working on plans such as Continuity of Government (COOP) for the National 

Command Authorities, Military Support for Civil Defense and Military Support to 

Civil Authorities. This responsibility was for a seven state area in the Mid-west, and 

included extensive coordination with FEMA Region V, headquartered in Chicago. 

I would like to express my overall support for this bill. While there are many provisions in the legislation there are three that are critically important to improving 

our nation’s collective ability to respond. 

• Combining, once again, the function of emergency preparedness with that of 

disaster response and recovery. 

• Establishing Homeland Security Regional Offices 

• Retaining the name of FEMA as defining the Federal emergency management 

agency for the nation. 

First of all there is the reuniting of emergency preparedness, with disaster response and recovery into the same organization. 

Disaster Preparedness is the foundation for disaster response. What you do to prepare for disasters by planning, training and exercising will set the tone for your capability to respond collectively when disasters do strike. 

We have seen what the impact was of taking disaster preparedness away from 

FEMA. While it was not made official until the Fall of 2005, in essence FEMA has 

not had the emergency preparedness function for the last five years. Having both 

functions placed under the control of the Under Secretary for Emergency Management will measurably strengthen our disaster response capabilities. This is one of 

those times where the placement of the agency on the organization chart does make 

a significant difference. 

Secondly, I have been saying for a long time that the one single step that the Federal government can do to quickly improve the nation’s ability to respond to disasters is to establish Homeland Security Regional Offices. Without these offices there 

has been ‘‘No One, that is No One’’ to coordinate multiple Federal agency regional 

efforts in disaster preparedness, and no one in the regions of this nation to work 

with State Emergency Management Offices, or like in my case major metropolitan 

areas. Without FEMA Regional Offices being empowered to perform this function 

(FEMA Region X is only 20 miles from my office) our ability to interact with a coordinated Federal agency effort has been eliminated. This legislation fixes that issue 

and provides for regional offices dedicated to the effort of coordinating and facilitating our Federal, State and Local efforts in preparing for disasters, and providing 

for a more effective response when disasters do strike. 

And, retaining the name of FEMA. I recognize that there have been calls, most 

recently by the U.S. Senate, to do away with the FEMA name and establish a new 

organization to replace it. Well, there is no replacing the functions of FEMA, they 

must continue if we are to once again have an effective Federal disaster agency. If 

you recall years ago when the Chrysler Corporation had a problem and was on the 

financial ropes. Lee Iacoca did not come in and say we are going to fix the problem 

at Chrysler by changing our name. No, he fixed the problem by rolling out improved 

products in the form of better automobiles. We need to fix the FEMA product, not 

the FEMA name. If the FEMA name is done away with, we will end up like the 

entertainer Prince, who changed his name to a symbol. Everyone referred to him 

as ‘‘Formerly known as Prince.’’ I can see that repeated in the future if we do away 
41

with the FEMA name. Whatever the new name is we’ll end up saying, ‘‘You know, 

what use to be FEMA.’’

• Lastly, I call on my peers in State and Local Emergency Management Offices 

across this great land to get behind this bill. As I stated before, it is not perfect, 

but we need something now. Don’t let an attempt at coming up with a perfect 

piece of legislation become the enemy of something good. Implementing this legislation will not change things over night. But, the sooner we reunite disaster 

preparedness and response, and establish Regional Homeland Security Offices, 

and decide to keep the FEMA name, the sooner we will be on a path to a more 

disaster resilient America. 

Thank you for this opportunity to testify, and I look forward to any questions that 

you might have.

Mr. REICHERT. Thank you, Mr. Holdeman. 

I thank the panel. I have a few questions, and then we will allow 

other members to ask questions regarding your testimony. 

We have done a lot of work over the past several months. We 

have had multiple hearings and heard hundreds of hours of testimony and the testimony and evaluated the responses to questions 

that the full committee and subcommittees have asked witnesses 

regarding incident command, command and control, communication, interoperability, operability, structure of FEMA, FEMA inside 

DHS, and FEMA outside DHS. All those discussions have taken 

place. 

This legislation that we are talking about, all of you have had 

a chance to review; am I correct? 

[Witnesses nodded affirmatively.] 

Mr. REICHERT. And have you had chance to have some input into 

the language of this legislation? 

[Witnesses nodded affirmatively.] 

Mr. REICHERT. With respect to FEMA, the Reichert-McCaulPascrell-Etheridge legislation will, among other things, create an 

office of emergency communications. One of the huge problems that 

we faced as first responders across this country and as emergency 

managers is our inability to communicate with each other, and we 

saw that as a big failure in the Katrina disaster. 

It also restores the nexus between preparedness and response, as 

has been stated in some of the testimony, consolidating FEMA and 

the Directorate for Preparedness. It elevates the Director of FEMA 

to an under secretary position and gives that person the authority 

to communicate directly with the President in times of emergency, 

and it does a number of other things, as has been mentioned. 

I have a question. With all those things that you know of in the 

bill that you have had a chance to review, will these proposed reforms, if enacted, improve the deficiencies in FEMA’s structure and 

leadership, as identified by the numerous investigations into Hurricane Katrina? 

And that is to anyone on the panel who chooses. Do you think 

this will help us improve our response and our preparedness? 

Mr. LENKART. Mr. Chairman, I don’t see how they can’t. You are 

taking quite a bureaucracy that is in bits and pieces right now, and 

you are putting them under one chief and supplying him with a 

couple of deputies. As I said in my testimony, the chain of command is everything in this kind of business. 

When we have not only separated response and preparedness, it 

has been under two different bosses, we have come up with a lot 

of problems. And when things do go bad, when the chips are down, 
42

there is a lot of finger pointing and people saying, that wasn’t me, 

it was you, and so forth. By consolidating it under ultimately one 

person who is in charge, with direct lines to the President, I don’t 

see how this can’t be more efficient. I just don’t see how there won’t 

be more accountability within the upper levels of the government. 

Mr. REICHERT. Thank you. Other responses? 

Dr. Jenkins, do you have a response. 

Mr. JENKINS. Definitely it has a number of things in it that we 

think are important and will be helpful, without question. I agree 

with everybody at the table, it is very important to bring preparedness and response together again, as this does, under a single organization, a single responsibility. 

It has provisions on interoperability that seem elementary to us, 

and I don’t mean that in a pejorative term. It is sort of silly that 

they haven’t been done already. One of those is the national inventory of communication frequencies and kind of equipment that is 

used across the country. That is something that seems like a nobrainer and something we recommended in 2004. 

We like the fact that it also includes some of the report, in particular the annual report on the status of the Nation’s response and 

capabilities. I think one of the issues that has been a frustration 

to us is being able to figure out what is actually being accomplished with the grant money, and there is no particular requirement as to what performance enhancements, if you will, have you 

gotten with the grant money. 

So there are a whole number of provisions we think will definitely improve the situation. 

Mr. REICHERT. Thank you. 

What are the potential benefits of strengthening FEMA but leaving it in the Department of Homeland Security? 

Mr. Holdeman. 

Mr. HOLDEMAN. If I can address that. I know there is division 

out there between organizations, individuals, about, should FEMA 

be a separate cabinet agency; to go back to what it was pre-9/11. 

But I don’t think that you can reinvent the past and romanticize 

what once was, given we have a new era here in the 21st century. 

Creating a new FEMA does nothing to then address, how is 

FEMA and the Department of Homeland Security going to interact 

and interface together? Are we going to undo the National Response Plan, the National Incident Management System, which 

again had been excellent steps in the right direction? 

We have seen some States actually take and bifurcate emergency 

management and homeland security in separate offices within the 

same State. I think the experience has shown that that is not good 

for taking an all-hazards approach and will lead to more turf battles and interjurisdictional rivalry that this bill does not promote. 

Mr. REICHERT. Thank you for your responses. 

The chair now recognizes the ranking member of the Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Mr. Pascrell. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just to put my questions into perspective, we seem to all be in agreement that we do 

believe in the reorganization bill that we have put before everybody 

right now; that this legislation strengthens FEMA by merging it 

with the preparedness directorate, so that the preparedness and re-
43

sponse functions are again unified, which was a major problem 

with Katrina, a major problem with Rita. In fact, we have kind of 

neglected southeast Texas, which has very serious problems which 

we have not addressed. 

Secondly, we have decided to listen to those folks who are in the 

boots on the ground, so that this legislation, correct me if I’m 

wrong, is an attempt by this committee to have a bottom-up approach, so that it is not something we impose without really going 

to those people who deal with this on a day-to-day basis. Number 

two. 

And number three, I think you put it best, Dr. Jenkins, that because of FEMA’s mission performance, you in your testimony said, 

during Hurricane Katrina, questions have been raised regarding 

the agency’s organizational placement, including whether it should 

be disbanded and functions moved to other agencies to remain 

within DHS or again become an independent agency. 

With that as a kind of umbrella, I would like to ask some questions, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Kasinitz, we have worked very closely since I have been here 

for the 10 years on the issues facing our first responders, and many 

of those issues had been ignored. But thanks to all the men and 

women across the United States who made Congress aware of 

those issues, we have addressed them, or started to address them. 

In your testimony, you said that the department has spent entirely too much time and effort on a misguided attempt to differentiate between natural versus manmade disasters. A quick question, 

quick answer hopefully: Do you believe that this legislation recognizes an all-hazards approach to emergency preparedness and response so that we don’t get caught up in the convoluted discussion 

about how did this catastrophe originate, be it manmade or natural? 

Mr. KASINITZ. Absolutely, Congressman. We are very pleased 

with the approach the legislation takes to make sure we don’t 

make those sort of artificial distinctions, and it is moving very 

much in the right direction. 

I think there is somewhat of a subtext whenever we hear this 

FEMA-inside-DHS or FEMA-outside-DHS debate. Although it is 

not specifically articulated, I think some of that is also people who 

make that distinction. They say, well, FEMA should really be about 

natural disasters versus manmade disasters. So by keeping the 

emergency response directorate within DHS, I think you address 

that on multiple levels. 

Mr. PASCRELL. How do you think this bill addresses the politics 

or the politicization of disasters that seems to be increasing as the 

years pass? How can we ensure that our first responders are being 

put to good use? 

You saw what happened during Katrina. You saw how a thousand fire fighters were left up in Atlanta, Georgia, waiting to be 

called into action, yet the folks down in the action area were given 

the job to hand out fliers. What is your response to that? 

Mr. KASINITZ. We think by creating a credentialing system and 

a deployment model, what you would have is you would address 

those issues on the front end. As part of your preparedness plans, 

you would indicate ahead of time how fire fighters are to be used 
44

when disaster strikes. And then when the disaster does come, you 

simply are putting the plan into place, so you are not going back 

to try to figure out what’s the best place to plug in this group or 

that group in any particular function. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Thank you. Mr. Jenkins, I have a question for 

you. 

In the GAO’s preliminary observations regarding preparedness, 

response, recovery and Hurricane Katrina, one of the recommendations which was carried forward from the GAO review in the aftermath of Hurricane Andrew in 1992 was that a single individual directly responsible and accountable to the President should be designated to act as the central focal point to lead and coordinate the 

overall Federal response when a catastrophic disaster has happened or is imminent. 

Question: Does the elevation of the FEMA director to Cabinet 

status during an incident of national significance address this recommendation? 

Mr. JENKINS. Yes. In terms of what this bill represents, we do 

think that it does respond to the recommendation that we made 

and implements it. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Does the fact that the FEMA director serves on 

a day-to-day basis as the principal adviser to the President affect 

your answer? 

Mr. JENKINS. No. I think it would affect our answer in one way, 

but the bill has also addressed that. We think one of the other recommendations that we made was that there be a statutory requirement for experience and skills for the FEMA director. And with 

that proviso, which we think is an important proviso in terms of 

that recommendation. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Well, we are trying that now. We are trying that 

now, so we will see how it works. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. REICHERT. The Chairman will now recognize other members 

for questions under the 5-minute rule. Members are advised that 

those who were present at the start of the hearing will be recognized in order of seniority on the committee. Those members coming in later will be recognized in order of their arrival. 

The chair now recognizes Mr. McCaul, chairman of the Subcommittee on Homeland Security Investigations. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you for 

your leadership, and Ranking Members Pascrell and Etheridge. 

This is truly a bipartisan piece of legislation. We did get input from 

all the first responders and emergency managers. It has been a lot 

of work, and I think we have a good product here. I was proud to 

coauthor this legislation as well. 

I recently led a delegation, along with Ranking Member 

Etheridge and Bennie Thompson, to the Gulf, to Louisiana and 

Mississippi, and saw the devastation and, quite frankly, the inadequate response effort that exists today. In addition, my home 

State of Texas was directly impacted by Hurricane Rita and indirectly impacted by Hurricane Katrina through all the evacuations. 

I saw FEMA firsthand and saw a lot of problems, and I think 

this bill goes a long way to addressing some of those concerns. But 

I want to get comments on two main areas. The big debate on the 
45

Hill right now is whether we take FEMA out of DHS or leave it 

inside. My prior experience on counterterrorism investigations is 

that I think FEMA, if taken out and just focusing on natural disasters, would be a huge mistake. 

I believe that it should be an all-hazards approach, fully integrated with the Department of Homeland Security. I think giving 

the Under Secretary direct reporting to the President alleviates a 

lot of the concerns about the President’s being able to weigh in and 

the interaction with the White House. 

But I want to get comments on that issue first, and then, number 

two, one of the biggest observations I had after Rita and Katrina 

was that the complaints coming to me in my office were that we 

don’t even know who our FEMA person is; and, number two, they 

can’t make decisions. They have to go through Washington. 

This bill basically sets up regional directors in a fashion where 

we mandate the Secretary to reallocate those resources, to fully integrate in a support role, not a parental role, in a support role with 

the State and locals so they are fully integrated at that level. And 

more importantly, it gives them or empowers them to make decisions on the ground without having to report to Washington. 

I think whether you’re talking about a terrorist attack or a natural disaster, that kind of real-time response is critical. So I would 

throw that out to the panel, if you could comment on those two 

issues. 

Mr. KASINITZ. Congressman, we are very supportive of the regional offices. We certainly agree with you that that is a far more 

effective way to respond. Even in this age of instantaneous communication, you can’t get people to respond to a disaster on line. There 

has to be people on the ground doing the work. 

What we have found with the regional offices is, certainly on the 

preparedness side, there have been tremendous advantages to 

building relationships. People know who their local FEMA person 

is, they work together, and that FEMA person brings together different emergency response professionals in the area. So when the 

unfortunate disaster does hit, these people already know each 

other, they already have relationships developed, and it makes for 

a far more effective response. 

Mr. HOLDEMAN. If I may, whether the building is blown up or 

falls down from an earthquake, FEMA and emergency managers 

are going to be there helping coordinate what we call the consequence management. Both terrorism and, for us, earthquakes are 

come-as-you-are disasters. And the preparation that is needed for 

those types of events is not happening now. There is no one orchestrating the Federal agencies, and there is a lot of them out there 

in the regions, and there is no one integrating the Federal, State, 

and local response. So those regional offices are absolutely critical. 

That is the number one thing that we need. 

And separating FEMA out, giving it a different name, whatever, 

is just going to confuse everybody as much as renaming the entertainer Prince by a symbol. We all still refer to him as the entertainer formerly known as Prince. If you give FEMA a different 

name, we will call it, you know, what used to be FEMA. 

Mr. MCCAUL. If I can follow up on that. I think taking it out on 

the eve of hurricane season would be a disaster. It would lead to 
46

confusion. And not only that, but duplication within our government. I think you would have two organizations that would duplicate efforts, and it would not be cost-effective for the taxpayers. 

Mr. HOLDEMAN. Absolutely. It would be duplication and lead to 

additional turf wars. And if I could add on that, the turf wars exist 

everywhere, in my local jurisdiction, at the States and all that. But 

we also need Congress to work also on the issue of oversight and 

which committees have oversight, because that can cause as much 

confusion and trickle-down effect for the local and regional level. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Mr. Lenkart, do you have a comment? 

Mr. LENKART. I would, sir. Thank you. Before 9/11, FEMA, to the 

police organizations and police officers and agencies, was nothing 

more than four letters. FEMA meant nothing to us. 

We have matured as a country. We have been through a lot. And 

to take a step back and isolate FEMA again to what it used to be 

would be isolating the law enforcement portion from our national 

response. Law enforcement is extremely important. Sometimes we 

rescue people; sometimes we chase bad guys; and sometimes we do 

both. 

To put us back out where we were before, segregating the efforts 

on the ground, I think would be a huge mistake. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. REICHERT. The chair now recognizes Mr. Dicks. 

Mr. DICKS. Thank you. I want to apologize. I had a bill on the 

Floor, so I had to run over—Congresswoman Donna Christensen 

was one of the managers of it—so I didn’t hear all of your testimony. But I take it that nobody on the panel supports taking 

FEMA out of DHS; is that right? 

[Witnesses nodded affirmatively.] 

Mr. DICKS. You all favor having FEMA, but with regional offices; 

is that correct? 

[Witnesses nodded affirmatively.] 

Mr. DICKS. Do you think it is a mistake that the Department of 

Homeland Security doesn’t have regional offices? 

By the way, I was on Senator Magnuson’s staff during the Nixon 

administration. 

Mr. LUNGREN. How old are you? 

Mr. DICKS. Older than I look; okay? 

And the Nixon administration created regional offices. Now, the 

bottom line for me here is that we are searching for an answer. But 

the fact is, the reality is, this administration did not pay attention 

to this issue. 

Mr. DICKS. And put people in management positions who could 

not respond. There is no James Lee Witt down in that department 

like there was during the Clinton Administration. So I am glad to 

see that this committee, led my colleague from Washington State, 

is taking this seriously. But it is this administration that undermined FEMA and is responsible for what happened out there, in 

my judgment. 

But, all of you agree that it shouldn’t be a separate office, I think 

we are going to have another committee of the House that may say 

that FEMA should be separated out. 

To me, it seems as if the key point is, we have got to put some 

people in charge of FEMA who are serious and get these regional 
47

offices functioning and start doing the exercises and the preparation for what could happen either in another hurricane. Or you 

could have the eruption of Mount St. Helens again in the State of 

Washington. We had some serious earthquakes from it. But it is 

just the fact that this was not the answer. 

Another thing that bothers me, too, is that a lot of changes that 

Mr. Chertoff made when he came in turned out to be very counterproductive. The efforts to create a strong FEMA were further undermined when, as part of this Second Stage Review, Secretary 

Chertoff split preparedness and response into separate directorates. 

Specifically, Secretary Chertoff abolished the EP&R directorate, 

made FEMA a separate operational response and recovery unit reporting directly to the Secretary, and transferred FEMA’s remaining preparedness functions to the office of domestic preparedness. 

Could we have screwed it up any worse than that? All of you that 

have testified in favor of this legislation, do you believe this legislation is the right fix for the problem that we are facing, based on 

your experience out there? 

Mr. REICHERT. Could one of you answer with the microphone so 

we could get a report? 

Mr. DICKS. I would love to hear from our colleague from Washington State. 

Mr. HOLDEMAN. I am not Steve Bailey, but will talk for him 

today. 

What we have seen is a top-down approach, and if you want to 

increase disaster preparedness, it has to be this bottom-up approach. People, just like ourselves at the State, fire, police, emergency managers, along with their Federal and State counterparts 

have to be working together on a daily basis, know one another, 

have the relationships, and be empowered, like this legislation 

does, to solve the problem at the lowest level. You can’t have direction and control coming from the beltway on every little issue. And 

that has been a huge issue, not just during disasters, but during 

our preparedness phase. And there is nobody to talk to out there. 

Mr. DICKS. I am pleased—and I want to ask the chairman about 

this—is it a fact now that the legislation does have provisions in 

there that deal with reprogramming? The reprogramming, the 

money that was taken away from FEMA by Secretary Chertoff is 

disgraceful. And we wouldn’t allow the Department of Defense to 

do that; they have to come up to the Congress and get approval for 

any transfer of funding over $5 million. 

Now, Mr. Chairman, do we have a provision like that in this bill? 

Mr. REICHERT. Yes, sir, that is absolutely correct. 

Mr. DICKS. To me, the way they drained the resources from 

FEMA, now that shouldn’t be a surprise that they couldn’t respond 

because, one, you have lousy leadership, and two, you gave them 

the ability—Chertoff the ability to take the money away from the 

agency. I am surprised they got anything done at all. 

Mr. REICHERT. Would the gentleman yield? 

Mr. DICKS. Yes, I will yield. 

Mr. REICHERT. I want to go back to a question you asked, Mr. 

Dicks, to the panel that they didn’t get a chance to answer on the 

record, and that is about a regional director for Homeland Security, 
48

I think that is an important point. And could someone address that 

question that Mr. Dicks posed, please? You all nodded your head. 

Mr. JENKINS. I would be happy to offer some observations. There 

were two things in the bill that I thought were important; one is 

that the regional directors themselves have to have some expertise. 

If they don’t have expertise in emergency management response, 

they are not going to have credibility with local first responders. In 

other words, if they are going to build relationships, they have to 

be seen as having some credibility in knowing what they are doing. 

So I think that credentialing in the bill is a very important provision for the regional managers. 

Mr. DICKS. Did the regional manager in your bill, Mr. Chairman, 

have to have credentials? 

Mr. REICHERT. Yes. There is language in the bill that addresses 

that issue. 

Mr. DICKS. Thank you, I appreciate your time. 

Mr. JENKINS. And I would say the second thing that is important 

is the importance of working with localities with the advisory council they have and so forth to be able to identify—and this is critical, 

they have to take this seriously—to identify key gaps in capabilities in their area and what that means in terms of the grants and 

priorities for the use of grants. One of the big problems, as I mentioned before, is we really don’t know how these grants are being 

used with what affect, and that seems to be the second important—

one of the other features of the way the bill is written that is important in terms of the role of the regional director. 

Mr. REICHERT. Thank you. The gentleman’s time has expired, 

and the chair recognizes Mr. Lungren. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

It is always fun to follow the stalwart defender of the Presidency 

of Richard Nixon; I appreciate that. 

Mr. DICKS. I said that all during the 2004 Democratic Convention, that I would give my right arm to have Richard Nixon back. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Oh, boy. I am not sure what I want to say. A onearmed Norm Dicks is quite something to think of. 

Mr. REICHERT. Mr. Lungren, you have the floor. 

Mr. LUNGREN. I appreciate that. 

I heard the comments of the panelists, and I appreciate them. 

What I am trying to do is to figure out what lessons we learned 

from the Katrina experience that we are addressing in this bill. 

And let me go at it this way; when I was Attorney General of California and served with Governor Pete Wilson, we had fires. We had 

floods. We had mudslides. We had riots. I am sure there was something else we had. Maybe we had a plague of locusts. We had everything you could possibly think of, and we always managed to respond with a regional focus within the State. And when we needed 

help, we got the Federal Government to come in and help through 

FEMA at the time, and we didn’t seem to have the problems that 

we saw in Katrina. Now you might say that Katrina wasn’t as 

overwhelming—I don’t know if I mentioned earthquakes. We had 

that, too, and they are pretty overwhelming for us. So I am trying 

to figure out, are we trying to go back to what FEMA was before 

it got put into Homeland Security? Are we trying to create a new 

animal in terms of your support for this? And what I mean by that 
49

is, I disagree with the idea of bringing FEMA out. For one thing, 

I think it would take us so much time to reorganize, to get people 

in a different spot that we would just waste that time. If we are 

going to reorganize, reorganize where they are. 

Mr. DICKS. Would the gentleman yield? I don’t think they have 

moved. I think they are still right where they were. 

Mr. LUNGREN. But I am talking about bureaucratically in those 

lines and so forth. Is there some synergy that actually would be a 

positive with FEMA where it is. That is, that we have a department that is supposed to respond to natural disasters and manmade disasters, that even though they are different, there is some 

commonality in terms of response, in terms of cooperation, in terms 

of the attitude that is necessary to respond to that? Or are we just 

making an excuse to keep FEMA where it is and trying to improve 

it? In other words, is there a benefit that we might see to be derived from actually having FEMA in DHS? Not just shrugging our 

shoulders and saying that is where it is, we are going to try to 

make the best of it, but is there a positive that might be established by having within one department an all-hazards approach, 

whether it is manmade or natural disaster? I would ask all four of 

the panelists to please respond. 

Mr. JENKINS. Well, I think from our institutional perspective that 

they can be beneficial. It has certainly not been beneficial the way 

it was structured. From the very beginning, it was almost structured for failure with terrorism being in the Border and Transportation Security Directorate and everything else being in the Emergency Response Directorate, and then things gradually moved until 

the Border and Transportation Security Directorate had virtually 

everything and FEMA had very little. And so that structure is part 

of what led to the problem is that it was set up for failure from 

the beginning because of the way it was set up. Emergency response, all-hazards response was never set up in the department 

as a single organization to begin with when the Department of 

Homeland Security was created. 

So that it can be beneficial to have it in the department. To the 

extent to which you have an integrated coordinated approach and 

you do not have the kind of divided lines of responsibility that you 

had within the department, if you keep that, there is no benefit, 

really, to necessarily keeping FEMA within the department. So it 

depends upon very much from our perspective on the way you approach it. And it requires a very integrated approach that takes 

care of both terrorist and non-terrorism incidents. 

Mr. KASINITZ. Congressman, certainly we think there are benefits from having response and preparedness together, which is the 

question if you pulled it out, how that would function, and certainty the all-hazards approach. But I think your question goes to 

an interesting point because you say, are we leaving it in just to 

leave it in? Well, we have to remember there didn’t used to be a 

Department of Homeland Security, and now there is. So I think the 

function, the dynamic would be different to say, back when there 

was an independent FEMA versus where would it be, and now having an independent FEMA versus in the Department of Homeland 

Security. For example, FEMA did a very good job in responding to 

the Oklahoma City bombing, which was a terrorism event. Now my 
50

question would be, if that would happen today, if it was pulled out 

as an independent agency and we had an incident such as that 

today, would FEMA be able to respond because there would be a 

jurisdictional question of, is that FEMA or is that Department of 

Homeland Security? So I think the very existence of DHS changes 

the dynamic, not just going back to what it used to be 

Mr. REICHERT. The gentleman’s time has expired. We are going 

to try to hold members to 5 minutes so all members have an opportunity to ask questions. 

Mr. DeFazio is recognized. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Just in response to the last witness, there is no reason we 

couldn’t give a mandate that says FEMA, an independent agency, 

Cabinet level office, whatever, has the responsibility to respond 

both to manmade and terrorist and non-natural and natural disasters. I think they did an admirable job not only with Oklahoma 

City. They did an admirable job on 9/11. But I would direct my 

question to Mr. Jenkins of GAO. 

Before the reorganization on 9/11, was there substantial criticism 

of FEMA’s response to a terrorist incident initiated by foreign 

forces? 

Mr. JENKINS. No, not—but I would say one thing with regard to 

that, however. There certainly were some problems with the way 

that they responded to 9/11. I mean, just there were some issues 

that we reported on in terms of lack of coordination and that. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. But that was essentially under new management. 

They were a year into the new management at that point. 

Mr. JENKINS. Right. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. And were those management problems? 

Mr. JENKINS. Well, they were not part of the Department of 

Homeland Security at that point. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. No, but were they management problems, i.e. we 

already had a hack of a political appointee at that point; I believe 

his name was Mr. Albough. 

Mr. JENKINS. There were some management issues. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Okay. Here is my problem with this grand reorganization here. As I count—and I will ask the professionals—do you 

think that this very serious response issue, potentially they will be 

involved in a pandemic, potentially they will be involved in another 

terrorist incident, they will certainly be involved in more natural 

disasters, should all of the top management be political appointees? 

Because as I look at this grand reorganization, because the problem has come from political appointments, or lack thereof, because 

as I understand it, aren’t there quite a few vacancies, Mr. Jenkins, 

at fairly high levels of management? 

Mr. JENKINS. Right now FEMA is trying to hire and close those 

positions, but right now FEMA has 400 vacancies out of 2,400 positions. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Right. Dislodged career people because of the political hacks at the top. Now, under this reorganization, we are going 

to have eight people, one undersecretary, two deputy assistant secretaries and five assistant secretaries all appointed by the President. Now imagine if they had been Mr. Albough, Michael Brown 

and all the rest of their roommates from college; how could this 
51

agency better respond with that sort of leadership? Wouldn’t it be 

better to make these into civil service positions so that they would 

be people who would not change every time an administration 

changes, with these or even more stringent qualifications? And 

don’t you think we might get some—does anybody object to the idea 

that they maybe should be permanent, merit-based, civil service 

with at least these requirements if not more? Do you think there 

is something inherently good about them being political? Anybody 

want to volunteer that is a great idea, they should be political? 

Mr. LENKART. The issue is not whether they are political appointments or not; the issue is whether they have the experience. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Right. Well, it is because, even if they have the experience and even if they are good—which thus far we didn’t have, 

maybe the new director—but the point is, they are going to change 

every time the President changes. Will that be good for the organization? Every time a President changes, we are going to change all 

eight top management positions at FEMA, and they go in what is 

called the plum book? Have you ever seen the plum book? It is 

thousands of appointments that are political. Now even if they 

have some qualifications attached, don’t you think t would be better if these were permanent civil service positions? I mean, 

wouldn’t that be better? Are you a political appointee? 

Mr. LENKART. In essence, yes, but I competed for my position, 

and it was selected based on my qualifications, not based on—

Mr. DEFAZIO. Right. But the problem is, you get varying degrees 

of scrutiny or competence demanded by the White House. And in 

this case, no one here is going to defend Michael Brown or his management of the agency, right? So that is a real question. Why do 

we to want continue to make it political? 

And you keep saying that well, it can’t be all—I want it to be 

all-hazards, too, but the question is, if you put it under a political 

appointment or next door to one who is the Secretary of Homeland 

Security and then, at certain times, the under secretary gets to report to the President, the rest of the time he or she is relating back 

to this other political—I mean, I think you are creating uncertainty 

that would be better dealt with with permanent professional appointments. Look, let’s face it, this is part of a big cover-up. The 

Department of Homeland Security was created one night out of the 

basement of the White House to get Colleen Rowley off the front 

page of all the newspapers in America. She was spilling her guts 

about what happened at the FBI before 9/11. The White House to 

that date had fought it. Suddenly we have got one. It is passed intact in Congress; they use it as a political club against Democrats— 

Mr. REICHERT. Does the gentleman have questions? 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Yes. 

Mr. REICHERT. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. We tried to take FEMA out twice, and it was resisted by the Republicans. And we have a disaster, and now we are 

going to try to paper it over again. I think we should go back to 

an independent agency with professionals and not political appointees. 

Mr. REICHERT. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

We have Mr. George Forsman, who is— 
52

Mr. PASCRELL. Mr. Chairman, can I make just one quick comment? 

Mr. REICHERT. Mr. Pascrell. 

Mr. PASCRELL. I consider Mr. Forsman to be a professional. Well, 

he is there now. 

Mr. REICHERT. I would also add Mr. Forsman to that list of—

there are qualifications that are laid out in the bill that require appointments to be qualified. 

Mr. DICKS. I think there is— 

Mr. REICHERT. Mr. Dicks is recognized. 

Mr. DICKS. I think there is an important point whether you have 

all political appointees. I can certainly see the director and the deputy, but maybe, after that, you go to a senior executive service and 

you get more continuity to FEMA and give people to whom this is 

their whole life. Their whole career is being there at that Federal 

agency. It is something you might want to consider. I think it is 

worth considering. 

Mr. REICHERT. Thank you, Mr. Dicks. 

Mr. Rogers is recognized. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would like to get back to what Mr. Lungren referenced, and 

that is, talk about what we learned from our most recent experience with Katrina and Rita. 

After Hurricane Katrina last year, FEMA called on the Federal 

Protective Service to help with securing food distribution sites as 

well as other disaster-related sites in New Orleans and other coastal areas. As a part of that effort, they turned to Blackwater USA 

and Wackenhut Services and St. Bernard’s Parish Sheriff’s department also turned to DynCorp security personnel to assist in that 

initiative. I would like to ask, Dr. Jenkins—and maybe, Mr. 

Holdeman, if you would like to kick in—tell me about your 

thoughts on the role of private security forces in these disaster response efforts. 

Mr. JENKINS. I think it is one of those issues in terms of preparedness, one of the things that FEMA has not done a very good 

job of is being able to identify non-governmental resources that 

they can draw on. Certainly, for example, one of the issues in 

Katrina, in terms of being able to have security forces that could 

provide public safety, was the effect that normally the way it is set 

up is, you would draw upon the National Guard to do that. There 

weren’t as many National Guard in the country as there might 

have been under different circumstances; it was a limited number. 

One of the things that we have recommended that FEMA do is 

identify private resources that they can draw on, identify those resources in advance, have them as a contingency available of training that is needed when it is not possible for local law enforcement 

as it was in New Orleans to do everything they needed to do. 

Mr. ROGERS. But from your review of what happened in New Orleans, Louisiana, Florida and Texas, did they perform adequately, 

the private security personnel, or have you reviewed that at all? 

Mr. JENKINS. We have not reviewed that in detail. We do have 

some work ongoing on that right now. 

Mr. ROGERS. Do you have any thoughts, Mr. Holdeman? 
53

Mr. HOLDEMAN. Just very briefly, as an emergency manager, we 

are looking for assets that can quickly be deployed and be put to 

use, whether public, private, Federal, military, volunteers, what 

have you. So we are not concerned about the source of it but that 

it is effective in all manners. And I personally have not looked at 

the security side; I would like to recommend that our law enforcement colleague speak to that directly. 

Mr. LENKART. Thank you, Congressman. 

There definitely is a value for private security. There is a place 

for private security within the overall response system. In Europe, 

a lot of countries where security forces are actually careers more 

so than they are part-time jobs or temporary jobs. They are actually part of the first responder community. When you see a bomb 

go off on the subways or wherever, a lot of those folks running 

around in those vests are private security companies. So there is 

a place for that. There is room for development of that. Just the 

same when you are dealing with private security companies; there 

are some companies in the U.S. where their ability to protect has 

certainly been questioned—you mentioned Wackenhut was one of 

them—certainly under the Department of Homeland Security, that 

has come under scrutiny. 

If we were going into a situation where we were going to use 

them permanently as part of the first responder process, I think 

there needs to be a lot of careful scrutiny that needs to be done and 

certainly a lot of training as well. But there is room for that, yes. 

Mr. ROGERS. It seems to me, when you look at who FEMA turned 

to, which is the Federal Protective Service, for assistance; even 

their organization, which has 15,000 employees, of those 15,000, 

13,500 are private contractors. In FEMA or in the post-Katrina 

New Orleans circumstance, 750 folks from Blackwater, 600 from 

Wackenhut, and 75 in St. Bernard Parish, these are folks that are 

available for surge capacity. It just seems to me, and I gather from 

the responses that you all believe that we ought to be looking at 

these resources as part of our contingency planning, just like we 

look to private contractors post-disaster clean-up resources. 

And the last thing that I want to leave with—Mr. Kasinitz, you 

made a comment in your statement that you thought the most important part of this legislation is credentialing of firefighters. I 

would love to hear you expand on that. 

Mr. KASINITZ. Sure. There are models in place for this, but the 

basic concept of this would be, in advance, the Federal Government 

would be able to work with the national consensus standards-making bodies which define what qualifications fire fighters should 

have and develop some protocols where these would be the credentials for people to respond. I should note that the U.S. Fire Administration has already developed a model for this, so it is simply a 

matter of implementing it. 

Mr. ROGERS. Would this be full time or volunteer? See, I represent a poor rural district where most of my firefighters are volunteers. 

Mr. KASINITZ. Absolutely, volunteer firefighters would be part of 

this as well. There is no reason to differentiate on employment status. The only differentiation would be your quality and your level 

of training. 
54

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you. 

I see my time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MCCAUL. [Presiding.] 

The chair now recognizes the ranking member on the Subcommittee on Investigations, Mr. Etheridge. 

Mr. ETHERIDGE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And let me thank each of you for being here testifying today and 

to my colleagues for their work on a piece of legislation that I hope 

we will be marking up next week. 

Whether we are talking about an all-hazards approach or others, 

it seems to me that what you have said is that we don’t need one 

piece of the agency working on terrorism over here and another 

piece of it working on natural disasters over here, because all that 

does is create a division of responsibility. And if you have something happen and a fireman shows up, a police officer shows up, 

EMS shows up, whoever shows up, they are going to have to deal 

with what is there. So if we haven’t already had the prepared people trained for it and ready, we create the problem. And ultimately, 

not only do we have confusion at the top, but we have a difficult 

job down where people are getting the job done. 

And I, like many of my colleagues, have been to Louisiana and 

Mississippi twice now, and I think the people there will tell us, 

folks, those of you in Washington or wherever, fix the problem because it sure didn’t work for us, that is what I heard. And they 

want results. And we are now three weeks away from hurricane 

season, and whatever we do here, we probably won’t have it finished by the time hurricane season starts. And North Carolina is 

one of those States that is sort of in the middle zone; we sort of 

have a bull’s eye on our back and have for a long time. 

So let me ask you a couple of questions. Setting up the scenario 

of a response from terrorism and a natural disaster, it seems to 

me—can you agree that that would create confusion for locals and 

increased bureaucracy? Is that yes or no? 

Mr. LENKART. That is yes, especially when the Feds show up. 

Mr. ETHERIDGE. So it would create a bigger burden on planning 

and reporting and all the other things. 

With that being said, let me ask you a question, Coach. On Saturday, I was at the establishment of a Fallen Fire Fighters Memorial in North Carolina, the first one we have had, to remind us that 

they have been at it for a long time. Many of the groups we have 

heard from have raised a concern over the types and number of reports that they now have to submit to DHS. Can you comment on 

this? And do you have any suggestions about how we can streamline this process as we are writing legislation now so there won’t 

be such a burden? You know, if we are trying to create an all-hazards approach, can we make sure that our grants and our paperwork, we don’t wind up adding more burden than we already have? 

Mr. HOLDEMAN. If I may briefly. We actually track our time in 

the King County Office of Emergency Management. In 2001, we 

were spending 75 percent of our time on disaster preparedness, and 

today we are spending about 25 percent of our time on disaster 

preparedness, and the other 50 percent is now on grant administration. So the big thing that would be very helpful to us is, streamline the grant-making process. We need block grants; give us block 
55

grants. Tell us what the guide is, hold us accountable to it. But 

that would be immensely helpful. 

Mr. ETHERIDGE. Do each one of you agree with that? 

Mr. JENKINS. I would say that we believe it is important; it can 

be streamlined. There are a lot of legitimate complaints by local responders, the number and variety of reports that they have to 

make, and it is less important what they spend it on than what 

they have accomplished with it. And so it is—I agree it is the accountability issue that is key, some kind of reporting that gives you 

accountability for the funds and how you have used them well. 

Mr. KASINITZ. Congressman, just to raise one example, in Fire 

Service grants, as you all know, the FIRE act and SAFER grants, 

I am sure Mr. Holdeman is familiar with these grants, but I certainly understand from his perspective why block grants are advantageous. We actually see it from a different perspective, from 

the front line emergency responder, because FIRE grants and 

SAFER grants are the one grants we know are coming directly to 

the fire department. And the frustration our people have on the 

front line is, when they do see block grants, they are saying we are 

not seeing it, the money is disappearing in the process. So that is 

why grants that have specific purposes, we see some real benefits 

to. 

Mr. ETHERIDGE. But to streamline the ones that we have, okay. 

Mr. Holdeman, you are in county emergency management, and 

you are probably on the front line if anything happens, whether it 

is natural—whether it be terrorism or otherwise. Based on your experience, what would you consider the best division of responsibility between the county, the State and the Federal Government, 

whatever the disaster may come? 

Mr. HOLDEMAN. It is not a divisional responsibility, and I think 

that is one of the issues we have got. We have got to say we, we 

are in it. The unified command means we. We are not in Iraq. In 

the former—it was clear who was in charge of Iraq before the Iraqi 

war. We have a Federal system, and we have to do it. And the only 

way the we is going to work is if we know one another in advance 

and we are working the issue before something bad happens. If you 

see people exchanging business cards at the scene of an incident, 

it is not going to go well. 

Mr. ETHERIDGE. Good answer. Thank you, sir. 

I yield back. 

Mr. MCCAUL. The chair recognizes Mr. Pearce. 

Mr. PEARCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Kasinitz—thanks to all of you for your testimony—but thank 

you for the exact examples. Yours are the only examples that we 

have that are solid examples of failure to perform. So as you reconsider, you have heard some of the comments here that if we just 

were rid of the top dog, Bush, if we were rid of that demon, Mr. 

Chertoff, that this thing would have run a lot better. But when I 

start looking at your exact examples, do you think it was Mr. 

Chertoff or Mr. Bush that put those thousand people down there 

in that Atlanta hotel room and had them sit down there at the government expense rather than coming down helping your firefighters who are beating the daylights out of their bodies to get in 
56

and out and around, do you think that came from the top level or 

do you think that was a little lower level? 

Mr. KASINITZ. I am sorry, Congressman, I have no knowledge of 

where those orders actually came from. 

Mr. PEARCE. What did you say? Could you speak more closely to 

the microphone? 

Mr. KASINITZ. I do not know who it was that— 

Mr. PEARCE. Mr. Jenkins, do you want to speculate? Was that 

any failure from the top levels? 

Mr. JENKINS. Probably not. 

Mr. PEARCE. Probably not. How about those batteries? In other 

words, you say in your testimony that it was a failure of resources, 

to an extent, financial, human, yet we had the money to go out and 

by the daggone batteries, but we didn’t have anybody with enough 

God-given sense to give them out to the people that needed them. 

The same thing existed with the fuel. Do you think those decisions 

to hoard the batteries and the fuel originated with the President 

of the United States or with the Secretary or with Mr. Brown, for 

all his failures? 

Mr. JENKINS. Really, I doubt that they originated with the President, but I have no idea where they did originate. 

Mr. PEARCE. Now your agency went down there to take a look 

at this. Did you ever take a look at any of the problems that were 

actually on the ground—let me finish up. Because when I look at 

your testimony, I see four clear findings on page 3, the clarity of 

FEMA’s mission, and for the life of me I can’t see where the mission is going to put a thousand people in an Atlanta hotel room 

when they are killing our people on site day in and day out, 24/

7. I can’t see a thing about the clarity of the mission that would 

cause them to hoard the fuel, buy all the fuel and then not give 

it to all those fire fighters. And I for the life of me can’t see anything about the clarity of the mission that would cause them to do 

the same thing with batteries. So your first comment related to the 

actual circumstances Mr. Kasinitz brought up lacks some thoroughness. 

Then you talk about experience, and for the life of me, I can’t see 

that people have the experience to go out and know that they are 

going to need to buy the fuel, but somebody made a decision not 

to hand that fuel out, and I don’t think that came from the President or Mr. Chertoff. 

And then your next two findings, the adequacy of human, financial and technological resources. And finally the effectiveness of 

planning exercises. So none of those things actually address the circumstances that Mr. Kasinitz brought up, and I think he brought 

them up adequately because every failure—you can talk about it in 

general terms, but some day you have got to talk about the specific 

problems. And when I look at the specifics, the only specifics in 

front of this committee today, I don’t see anything in your report 

that deals with the specific failures. Have I missed something in 

your report? 

Mr. JENKINS. I think, for example, that exercises are crucial. 

That is how you know what people are going to do, how they are 

going to get together, what the problems are. Hurricane Pam was 

an exercise that wasn’t followed through on. If you have good exer-
57

cises, where everybody that is working together knows what you 

know, one of the things that will come out is, what if I don’t know 

where the batteries are? What if I don’t know who is responsible 

for getting those batteries to the right people? So one of the key 

areas in terms of knowing what you need to do, what the problems 

are, specifically what the problems are is very good exercises that 

are realistic and that address—they are designed to stress the system and identify the problems that you have and correct those 

problems. 

And so one of the things that can address the fuel and the other 

things is, when you do exercises and the fuel doesn’t get there and 

nobody knows who has the fuel or where it is, you can then identify 

what the problem is. 

Mr. PEARCE. With all due respect, sir, you can take every single 

person in this room today and you put them in charge of the fuel, 

and no matter what their written orders were, no matter what the 

President of the United States is directing them to do and no matter what Mr. Chertoff and Mr. Brown are doing, any single one of 

those people would have looked at those dog-tired fire fighters and 

called those thousand people down and quit giving out brochures 

and get out here where the problem is. They would have handed 

the batteries out. They would have broken the boxes open and 

walked out and started giving them to the people to put into their 

radios. And to say that we need more training to cure those kind 

of problems in my mind avoids that you have got some problems, 

and with all due respect to my colleagues, those problems I think 

originated deep within the department, deep down inside, those 

people who are merit-based, who are civil service positions; they 

are the ones making those decisions not to give that stuff out. I 

don’t think I see anything in your report to deal with that. 

I thank each one of you for your comments today. 

Mr. Chairman, thanks. I am a little bit over. 

Mr. MCCAUL. The chair now recognizes the gentlelady from 

Texas, Ms. Jackson-Lee. 

Ms. JACKSON-LEE. Let me thank the witnesses for your presentations. They have been extremely insightful. And let me thank 

the—instructive, not exciting, but let me thank the proponents of 

the legislation, one, for your thoughtfulness, but also for allowing 

those of us who might be celebrating Mother’s Day not to go into 

the holiday with a headache of a mark up, so we thank you very 

much for your sensitivity to that. But at the same time, it will give 

us the additional time to review this legislation and to hopefully 

provide a complimentary, if you will, assessment of some of the 

areas that I think are keenly in need of addressing. 

It is very clear that I have thought that leadership is important, 

and I made the point. And I will use, first of all, the backdrop of 

Hurricane Katrina and Rita. And I think it is important to re-state 

that I think leadership was missing. In fact, I won’t say, I think; 

it was evident that leadership was missing, at least from the very 

top of the agency. I don’t think the present Secretary of Homeland 

Security gets it. And he didn’t get it at the time of Hurricane 

Katrina. He didn’t put on his leadership general hat that Mr. 

Holdeman, I would imagine, you would put on if there was a disaster in your county. He didn’t bother to get an understanding that 
58

you had to gather the troops, whether they were State troops or 

city troops or—and I use the term in quotes, you had to gather the 

boy scouts and the girl scouts and you had to make this thing work 

because people were dying. 

So we know that we had a crisis in leadership. We then had a 

crisis in leadership at the FEMA level. And so I am somewhat empathetic and sympathetic to the idea of an independent FEMA, but 

I also see a very valid theory with the proposal in this legislation, 

particularly the concept of an all-hazards leadership, that is very 

important. So let me pose these questions. 

And let me say to Mr. Kasinitz, I don’t think there is a time 

when a firefighter is in front of me that I don’t begin trying to remind America and my constituents of the enormous debt of gratitude that we owe our firefighters, not only for the lives and the 

protection they have given us through the decades, through the 

centuries, but certainly 9/11 stands as a very prominent example 

of the heroics and the absolute sacrifice that was made. 

So the first question goes to you—and I might add the Fraternal 

Order of Police and as well your service. We should never forget 

9/11 for the ones that lost their lives, but certainly the first responders who went in with no question of their own safety. So this 

question, Mr. Kasinitz, goes to one of the elements of this bill that 

I hope that you would think would be crucial, but I want a timing 

element to it, the interoperability issue; do we need to be doing this 

yesterday—excuse me, do we need to be waiting to do this next 

month, 2 years from now? Or is this something that we should be 

doing or should have done yesterday, last month, last year? This 

whole question of interoperability, how damaging, how much of a 

concern do you have on the issue of interoperability? 

Mr. KASINITZ. Thank you, Representative, and it is a huge problem, a continuing problem. You cannot name a major disaster 

where we have not seen serious communication issues. We think 

the provisions of this bill are extremely helpful and will go a long 

way toward addressing the problems, but the problems are even 

broader than that. Before we can even address the question interoperability, we have to address the problem of basic operability. 

You have firefighters within the same department, even within the 

same company who at times are unable to communicate on an 

emergency scene. So it is a very serious issue that keeps cropping 

up. You are absolutely right; we were long overdue. This is a problem that has been identified for more than 10 years, and we are 

very eager to see it is addressed as quickly and as rapidly as possible. 

Ms. JACKSON-LEE. So along with this authorizing bill, you obviously need money and you need to move quickly, and you need to 

include language possibly dealing with the operability question for 

fire departments across America. 

Mr. KASINITZ. Absolutely. 

Ms. JACKSON-LEE. First responders. 

Let me go to Dr. Jenkins and say to you that one of the appalling 

representations or acts that occurred with Hurricane Katrina was 

the enormous abuse of American taxpayer dollars. I don’t think we 

will ever come from underneath the mud of the abuse of funds. 
59

Let me ask you this question about the layering of contracts. And 

also, even though we are talking about FEMA, one of the nexus 

that we failed to include is the nexus of the Army Corps of Engineers. I believe that there should be some connection, because 

when you go into a disaster area, part of your colleagues come from 

the Army Corps, part of the letting of contracts. And we found that 

the Feds overpaid by 20 percent, some $39.5 million dollars in nobid contracts. Can you speak to this question of layering of contracts? I don’t know where that came from. All of a sudden you are 

giving a contract to big shot corporation so and so—I am going to 

be nice maybe and not call out a name—but big shot so and so, 

somebody’s friend, and all of a sudden you have four and five layers so the guy at the bottom is making $6, but the taxpayers are 

being hung around the neck. Is there something that we can point 

at and fix, or is there something you would like to point out that 

really addresses that question in this legislation? 

Mr. JENKINS. I am not sure I can point out something specific in 

the legislation. 

Ms. JACKSON-LEE. Do you find that to be a problem? 

Mr. JENKINS. It definitely is a problem. It is not my area, but the 

GAO has issued a couple of testimonies on this. Two basic issues 

here, one is having, in Katrina, the big contracts, the ones where 

there were the biggest problems were contracts that didn’t have in 

advance express contracts with accountability of who was going to 

do what; they just simply made what are called mission assignments or blocked mission assignments to the Corps and to these 

large corporations and said, this is what we want you to do. There 

wasn’t a lot of accountability for the subcontracts and how they 

were priced, accountability for them. And so one of the recommendations that GAO has is that these contracts, you do not let 

these contracts, after the disaster you have these contracts with 

performance clauses in them and pricing clauses in them before the 

disaster happens, and then they can be activated after the disaster 

happens. But part of the problem was that issuing very large contracts to get something done quickly, they were done without competition for the most part, and they were done without clear pricing. 

Ms. JACKSON-LEE. And maybe we needed to go to the smaller 

companies in the first place. There was no advantage to going to 

large companies who then were going to let it to smaller and smaller and smaller and up the price; was there an advantage to that? 

Mr. JENKINS. You know, with regard to debris removal, for example, there was no reason that FEMA could not also have contingency contracts with local companies for debris removal as opposed 

to having a national company do that. There is all sorts of options 

in terms of who they have that contract with, but the important 

thing is that they contract in advance for a specific price. There 

were lots and lots of problems with these contracts, people getting 

paid for the same dump load because they took it to point A, and 

they got paid for it. And then they took it to a second point and 

they got paid for exactly the same load of debris over again. 

Ms. JACKSON-LEE. I thank the chairman for his indulgence, and 

I see there are other members. I do have an additional 1 minute, 

I would like to probably wait and ask the chairman for his indul-
60

gence to be able to probe another individual on a question that I 

had. 

[The statement of Ms. Jackson-Lee follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE SHEILA JACKSON-LEE

I thank the Mr. Chairman and the Ranking Member. I thank the witnesses for 

their attendance. 

The devastation and wreckage wrought by Hurricane Katrina last summer is powerful testimony to the damage that can be done to our country by natural disasters 

and terrorist attacks. Hurricane Katrina also showed us how unimagined human 

suffering can be exacerbated when leaders fail to prepare adequately or simply do 

not measure up to the requirements of their job. We simply can no longer afford 

to entrust the safety of our people and the security of our nation to those who are 

unqualified to do the job entrusted to them. 

Today we hear from representatives of the fire service, law enforcement, and 

emergency management on how the Department of Homeland Security could enhance its preparedness and response to acts of terrorism, natural disasters, and 

other emergencies. I am particularly interested in hearing from the witnesses as to 

whether they endorse the ‘‘National Emergency Management Reform and Enhancement Act of 2006,’’ the bill the Committee will be marking up next week. I hope 

the witnesses are able to tell us whether the proposed legislation is likely to succeed 

in: 

(1) strengthening and better integrating the Federal Emergency Management 

Agency (FEMA) into DHS; 

(2) implementing many of the lessons learned from the inadequate national response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita; 

(3) enhancing Federal coordination with State, local, and tribal governments, the 

National Guard, emergency response providers, emergency response support providers, nongovernmental organizations, including faith-based groups, and the private sector; 

(4) restructuring DHS’ activities and programs to accelerate the development of 

redundant, survivable, and interoperable emergency communications capabilities; 

and 

(5) preventing waste, fraud, and abuse in all DHS assistance programs. 

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I want the record to be clear that the problems FEMA 

encountered before, during, and after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita did not plague 

the agency during the 1990s under the Clinton Administration. Leadership matters. 

Competence matters. It was a Democratic Administration that valued the importance of emergency management and FEMA by appointing a qualified leader in 

James Lee Witt. This Administration appointed Michael Brown. No legislation, no 

matter how well drafted or crafted, can compensate for the lack of competent leadership. 

Thank you. I yield the balance of my time.

Mr. MCCAUL. Sure. And I would like to make a quick response 

that I share the gentlelady’s concern about fraud. That is why we 

put a fraud, waste and abuse provision in this bill that mandates 

that the Secretary put fraud controls in place. 

The chair now recognizes Mr.Dent. 

Mr. DENT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would like to thank our panelists today. 

There was a lot of talk about whether FEMA should become an 

independent agency as it had been before or remain in the Department of Homeland Security, but my question to all of you—and I 

would like to hear what you think about this, but given the catastrophic nature of Hurricane Katrina, do you believe that if FEMA 

evolved as a stand-alone independent agency, it would have been 

able to respond adequately under those difficult circumstances? 

Dr. Jenkins, do you want to try it? 

Mr. JENKINS. To be honest with you, probably not. FEMA had 

problems—I mean with logistics, it just had no ability to track material, where it was, where it was headed. We were asked to do 
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some work looking at, fairly quickly, about mission assignments 

and whether or not the material that FEMA approved to be delivered actually got there, and there was no way to find that out. 

So there were some fundamental problems that FEMA had in 

terms of logistical support, particularly for anything of the size that 

it was, housing and so forth, and it is unlikely, to be honest, that 

those problems would have been much different had FEMA been 

independent. 

Mr. DENT. So merely moving FEMA wouldn’t enhance its capabilities, in other words. 

Mr. JENKINS. No. 

Mr. DENT. Anybody else wish to comment on it? 

Mr. HOLDEMAN. The House report that calls it a failure of initiative I think nails it right on the head there that this was a catastrophe, and all resources are overwhelmed there. But they were 

doomed from the start by not maintaining situational awareness 

and having the leadership in place to be able to respond quickly. 

Mr. DENT. My other question was, under James Lee Witt, do you 

think FEMA’s effectiveness was a function of his personal relationship with President Clinton or because FEMA was an independent 

agency? 

Mr. HOLDEMAN. Absolutely. It is one of the things—James Lee 

Witt came out of Arkansas, he was his Governor’s emergency manager. There was a personal relationship aspect to that, so you can’t 

discount that. But I don’t think that could be a selection criteria 

for the director of FEMA for the future. I think the qualifications 

are key, and then ensuring that the access is there. 

Mr. DENT. I guess the question I have, too—maybe this would be 

again to Dr. Jenkins—but if we were to move FEMA out of Homeland Security and say we also moved some areas as it relates to 

preparedness, prevention and first response activities, and if you 

look at the budget for DHS, we are talking about 39 percent of 

DHS budget in that area; it is about $14 billion, if we were to move 

those functions out of Homeland Security, I guess my question 

would be, what would be the remaining mission of the Department 

of Homeland Security if we moved those functions out of the Department? 

Mr. JENKINS. Well, I mean, obviously FEMA has Secret Service, 

and it has Coast Guard. It has Border and Transportation Security, 

Immigration, so it would still have all of those functions, those are 

not really preparedness emergency response functions, so it would 

still have all of that. 

Mr. DENT. Anybody else wish to comment? 

I yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. REICHERT. The chair recognizes Mrs. Christensen. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And with less 

than a month to go until hurricane season, and for other reasons, 

I really want to commend the committee chairs, subcommittee 

chairs and ranking members for this bill and for today’s hearing. 

It is very important. 

And on many occasions over the last 3 years or so, I have asked 

why FEMA was not the Office of Preparedness and why preparedness and response was so separated. And even after several responses by the Secretary as late as his last appearance before the 
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full committee, I had to say to him that I was not satisfied with 

his response and this structure. I just couldn’t understand it. So 

this bill, the National Emergency Management Reform and Enhancement Act of 2006 provides the appropriate remedy, I think. 

And most important, I think it responds to some of what we have 

heard through many, many hearings, especially with our first responders, those on the front line. 

And I am also glad that we have such a substantive bill that 

does not take FEMA out of the Department of Homeland Security, 

perhaps because I have had experience with FEMA over the years 

and seen it working in a much more effective manner, even though 

I would—granted, this was a catastrophe, I feel that it can work. 

It needs to be torn down and rebuilt from scratch, and I think this 

bill does that. 

I want to make a couple of suggestions though before I go to 

questions; one you can probably guess at, which is that wherever 

it says State, local and tribal, it also say territorials. I know my 

people at home and those in Guam and American Samoa and Puerto Rico would want to have that. 

And I also want to just say for the record, too, that I strongly 

support the GAO recommendation that gives explicit authority to 

FEMA to predeploy resources and personnel and assets before the 

incident. They have a history of doing that even without the explicit authorization, but I think that would just make it firmer, and 

it would be a good thing to also have in the bill. 

Mr. MCCAUL. If the gentlelady will yield, territories are defined 

as States in the Homeland Security Act, and we thought that 

would be important to note. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. It is as States? Okay. Thank you. Thank you 

for that clarification. 

My first question would be to Dr. Jenkins. I wonder if you had 

a chance to look at section 505, the Chief Medical Officer part of 

the section, and if you would be able to tell me whether this is a—

this clearly defines his role, vis-a-vis that of the assistant secretary 

for emergency preparedness and response in the Department of 

Health and Human Services and whether it also defines how they 

coordinate activities? I am always concerned that we are going to 

get into a situation, and there will be this person in HHS and this 

person in DHS or FEMA, and something will fall between the 

cracks. 

Mr. JENKINS. And I actually asked—we have a healthcare group, 

and I have actually asked them to look at that to see—because 

they are more expert on that, and so I can get back to you on that. 

But I did ask them to look at that for that very reason, though, 

the whole issue of clarity and roles there. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. I would really appreciate that. And Mr. 

Chairman, I think that—both chairmen, I think that would be 

something that the committee would find useful as we move this 

through mark-up and to the floor. 

Mr. Lenkart, in your testimony, you say the draft language also 

extends to State and local jurisdictions the opportunity to become 

better prepared and integrated into a much larger system. And I 

would ask you and Mr. Kasinitz, do you see this all providing a 

better and more structured opportunity for first responders to be 
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an integral part of the planning and the standard setting as we 

move forward if this bill were passed? 

Mr. LENKART. Yeah, absolutely. I would say a great model for it 

is how this committee has handled the construction of this bill. It 

was reached out to the first responder industry, police, fire, EMS, 

public, private entities, environmental, medical folks. By reaching 

out to the folks on the ground to build this bill, this bill is more 

reactive to those folks all the way on the ground. So it is a bottomup and top-down bill and absolutely will give the first responder industry—it will give them the tools that they need to do and get 

more integrated at the same time. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Thank you. 

Mr. Kasinitz. 

Mr. KASINITZ. In addition—and I do wish to compliment the 

staff, who have done a tremendous job of reaching out, including 

the input from emergency responder groups, but there is actually 

a provision in the bill which creates a new advisory council which 

will guarantee that we will have an ongoing opportunity to provide 

input into revisions to the National Response Plan and the National Center Management System and other systems and protocols. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MCCAUL. The chair now recognizes Ms. Jackson-Lee for 1 

minute. 

Ms. JACKSON-LEE. I thank the Chair very much. 

Let me ask you—I am just going to probe you, Dr. Jenkins, because I may not have read every line in your report. Mr. Kasinitz 

has talked about the 30-person advisory committee. Walking 

through the areas of New Orleans with Hurricane Katrina and seeing some of the damage of Hurricane Rita in parts of Texas and 

then of course living with 200,000-plus Hurricane Katrina survivors, people were impacted by this horrible disaster, and my colleagues already said we are approaching hurricane season; I think 

it would be helpful to have—the language on the advisory committee says experts—I think it would be enormously advisable to 

have citizen type, at least a representative of that individual who 

represents the impactee, if you will. Would you find that valuable 

in such a committee? 

Mr. JENKINS. I think it is useful to have citizen input generally. 

One of the reasons for that, to be honest with you, is, in many instances, what is most valuable for people to do is understand why 

staying in place is the best thing. And so they have a better sense 

of what the considerations are. 

Ms. JACKSON-LEE. And I have another question— 

Mr. JENKINS. It is a communications tool. 

Ms. JACKSON-LEE. So there is value from their input. 

And the other question I will put together. There is an aftermath 

that FEMA was responsible for. And I am still looking through the 

bill to see if that happens, the whole housing question, disaster recovery centers; a complete mess, one, because it again contracted 

out for huge conglomerates, not using local people. What is the 

value looking at the aftermath treatment? And also, there is a 

small minority provision in here, but it creates a database. And I 

don’t want to get into affirmative action and such. But can we be 
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more forceful in looking for those local businesses that can get on 

the ground faster? 

Mr. JENKINS. Again, as I mentioned earlier, what we recommended that FEMA do, whether it is housing, whether it is immediate food and shelter, whether it is security or whatever, that 

FEMA really needs to be reaching out to look at non-governmental 

entities that can help them and particularly ones that have knowledge of the local community, whether it is the faith-based organizations or others, that they need to be reaching out to be able to do 

that and communicate with them and be able to draw them into 

the process. 

Ms. JACKSON-LEE. So, in conclusion, then, I hear what you are 

saying is that, in the aftermath, where they have done housing and 

the collapse, where people were saying, I didn’t get my benefits, the 

disaster recovery center wasn’t working because they brought massive numbers of corporate strangers—not the FEMA workers who 

come in from around the country, but corporate strangers into the 

area; we need to be a better job with the aftermath. And you are 

saying the same thing with the small business scenario, that it can 

be better by looking at the local community to be of help. 

Mr. JENKINS. Yes. 

Ms. JACKSON-LEE. I thank the gentleman. 

Mr. MCCAUL. The chair recognizes Mr. Etheridge. 

Mr. ETHERIDGE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would say to the gentlelady that one of the reasons for the advisory committee is to help this very situation, not only is it to hear 

from first responders but also to get input from the communities. 

And I think that would be a valuable piece to the legislation. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you. 

And I want to thank the witnesses for your valuable testimony 

and the members for their questions. The members of the community may have additional questions for you, and I would ask that 

you respond in writing to those. 

The hearing record will be open for 10 days. And the chairman 

again thanks the members of the committee and our witnesses. 

And without objection, the committee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:58 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

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