### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE A ssi gne d onBr ie fs Apr il 9, 200 8

MIC HAE L SKIN NER

v. KA REN THOM AS

. Appeal f rom the Circ uit Court for Willi am son Coun ty No. 95422 Jeffery S. Bi vins, Ju dge

No. M2007- 01583-COA-R 3-CV - F iled Dece m ber 11, 2008

This is a post -divorce case wher e Father petitioned for modification of t he child custody order based on alleg e d ma te r ial chang e in circ umstances. The Wil liamson County Circuit Court partially

g rante d the petition finding a

materia l chang e in circ umstances, but that a cha ng e in custody

from Mother to F a the r wa s in the be st inte re st of on ly on e of the c hil dr e n, le avin g c us tod y of the oth e r c hil d w ith Mother. B oth Father and Mother assert err or by the t rial court. We aff irm in part, re verse in part and
rema nd this case f

or fur ther proc eeding s. Tenn R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Aff irm ed in p art, Reve rsed in part and Rem anded

R I C HAR D H. D I NK I NS , J ., delivere d the opinion of the cour t, i n whi ch F RAN K G. C L EME NT , J R ., J ., joined. P ATR I C I A J. C O T T RE LL , P. J ., M. S

. , n o tp art i ci p at i n g.
Jon Ste ve n Jab lon sk i, N a sh vil le , T e nn e sse e , f or the a pp e lle e , K are n T ho ma s.
Phill ip Edward Sche ll, Fra nklin, Tennessee , for the a ppellant, Michae l Skinner.

OP IN ION

Dr. Michael S kinner (“Father” ) and Kar en Thomas (“Mother ”) were divorce d in 1997; they
are the par ents of thre e childre n born during the marria g e. At the time of trial, the oldest had r eac hed the ag e of ma

jority , the m iddle child was 16 and the y oung est was 12. When the pa rties’ divorc ed, Mother wa s named the pr imary residential pare nt a nd Father rec eived standard visitation consisting of eve ry other we ekend, one night e ach w eek, split holiday s and t wo wee ks in the summer with the three children.

In 1998, Father mar

ried Stephanie Skinner; they have be en married for

ten y ear s and have two children bor

n duringtheir marr iag e. B y all acc ounts, the y have a stable home and mar riag e and Father ha s signific antly

improved his pare nting skil ls and invol vement in his children’ s lives. Since the div or c e fr om F athe r, Mo the r m arr ie d a nd , s ub se qu e ntl y , d ivo rc e d D r. Clif f M yle s a n d is c ur re ntl yT he cont emp t ch ar ge was appare nt l y l at er wi t hdr awn , but t he cour t procee di ng s ex pl ai ni ng t he ci r cums t anc es 1 of t h e or i g i n al c on t empt or der a n d s u bs equ en t w i t h dr aw al a r e n ot i n t h i s r ec or d.

Fa t h er t es t i f

i ed at t r i al t h at h e di d n ot w an t t o r edu ce h i s v i s i t at i on , bu t t h at M ot h er wa s mak i n g a n y v i s i t at i on 2

v e ry d iff ic u lt fo r F a the r an d F a the r wa s u n d e r o the r f ina n c ia l p re ssu re s w ith M rs

. S te p h a n ie S k inn e r p re g n a n t w ith the ir first ch ild a n d his d e n ta l p ra c tice o n the ve rg e o f b a n k ru p tc y.

T h e Apr i l 2000 O r der w as omi t t ed f r om t h e r ec or d, bu t t h er e i s n o di s pu t e t h at i t i s t h i s O r der t h at t h i s a ct i on 3

se e k s to m o d ify.
-2- marrie d to Scott Thomas, although they have be en sepa

rate d since January 2 0 0 6

. Al l of Mother’ s marria g es we re tumultuous; he r marria g e to Dr. Myles resulted in the police beingcalled to Mother ’s house in 1999 and 2002 for domestic violence

.
In 1999, conflict ove r visitation and co-pa rentingbetwee n Mother and F ather esca lated; the tr ia l court fo un d Moth e r in co nte mpt fo r int e rf e ri ng wi th F a the r’ s v isi tatio n a nd a pp ointe d D r. Da

vid McMillan, a clinical psy cholog ist, to conduct a custody evaluation. Mother wa nted her then cur rent 1 husband, Dr. My

les, to adopt the children, althoug h she later chang ed her mind; she f reque ntly used Myle s a s th e c hil dr e n’ s la st n ame . D r. Mc Mil lan r e c omm e nd e d at the tim e tha t F a the r g ive up his pa re nta l r ig hts be c a

us e the c on fl ic t w ithMo the r w a s so int e ns e and be c a us e F a the r h a d y e t to establish himself as a de pendable pare ntal fig ure. Father was adama nt that he did not want to g ive up his pa re nta l r ig hts ; ho we ve r, he did a g re e to re du c e his vis itatio n in e xch ang e fo r a re du c tio n in his child support obligation. As a res u l t , t h e t ri al cour t entere d an Ag ree d Orde r in April 2000, 2 which re duced Fathe r’s visi tation to one weekend per mont h and one w eek dur ing the summer and
re du c e d h is c hil d s up po rt ob lig a ti on fr om $ 5, 50 0 p e r m onth t o $ 5, 00 0 p e r m on th; the or de r a lso transfe rre d the burde n of pay ing f or the c hildren’s c olleg e educ ation from F ather to Mother with the stipulation t hat i f F ather

ever soug ht to increa se his visitation he would resume the oblig ation of paying for the children’ s colleg e education. Neither Father, Dr . McMillan, nor the c ourt was a war e 3 of the domestic violenc e betwe en Mother a nd Dr. Myles at the time.

S in ce 20 00, F a the r s ou g ht D r. Mc Mil lan’ s a dv ic e in d e a lin g wi th t he pa rt ie s’ tw o o lde st children a s they

rea ched a dolesce nce a

nd beg an to exh i b i t b eh av ior problems. In 2004, Father contac ted Dr. Mc Millan beca use he w as co n ce rn ed about the increa sing le vel of c onflict betwe en Mother and the parties’ oldest child just before she turned 16. The re was at least one inc ident wher e Mo the r w a s ang ry

a t her fo r s tayinga t on e fr ie nd ’s ho us e wh e n s he tol d M oth e r s he wo uld be a t a dif fe re nt f ri e nd ’s ho us e ; Moth e r dr ov e he r to Fathe r’ s h ou se , to ld h e r t o g e t out of the c ar i n th e ra in and then thre w her books in a puddle of mud. The child was c rying a nd told Father

that she hate d Mother and that Mot h er h ad t ri ed to make her say things in cour

t about Father that we re not true ; F a the r t oo k th e c hil d to se e Dr . M c Mil lan w ho sp ok e wi th h e r f or a bo ut 4 0 mi nute s. F a the r a g a in
c o n t a c t e d D r

. M c M i l l ani n 2 0 0 6 , b e c a u s e th e p art i e s ’ m i d d l e c h i l d w a s s t art i n g t o a c to u ti nth e w ays the older c hild had when she was the same ag e. Dr. McMillan g ave Father some advice on pare nting adolesc ents, but told Father that in order to work throug h the child’s issues both Mother a nd Father sh ou ld c ome wi th h e r t o his of fi c e ; F a the r a sk e d M oth e r t wi c e to m ake the a

pp ointme nt, but sh e did
no t.O ne i nci d ent i nvo l ved M o t her s cream i ng and curs i ng at several i nd i vi d ual s at t he chi l d ’ s d ri vi ng s cho o l

. T he 4 juveni l e co urt i nci d ent was preci p i t at ed by an exchange b et ween M o t her and t he chi l d ove r t he Jul y 4 w eekend revol vi ng
ar ound wh et her s he coul d s t ay over ni gh t wi t h a f r i end. M ot her had gi ven her permi s s i on t o s t ay over f or a n a dd i t i onal ni ght , b ut t hen revers ed t hat d eci si o n, t hen revers i ng y et agai n p erm i t t i ng t he chi l d t o s t ay, and t hen changed her mi nd y et a g ai n

. Appa r en t l y w h en M ot h er c al l ed t h e ch i l d t h e l as t t i me t o t el l h er t o c ome h ome t h e ch i l d’ s c el l phon e wa s on speake r pho ne and M o t her s ai d s o m e d eroga t o ry t hi ngs ab o ut her f ri end and her f

ri end ’ s m o t her whi l e t hey were i n t he

r oo m, w h i c h e mb a r r a s s e d t h e c h i l d. L a t e r t h a t s a me da y , t h e c h i l d a pp a r e n t l y we n t t o t h e M a l l i n s t e a d o f r e t u r n i n g h om e and M ot her wen t t her e t o f i nd he r

. W hen M ot her f ound her s he order ed her t o g et i nt o t he car ; t he chi l d w as y el l i ng at M ot her an d M ot her r eac hed i nt o t he backs eat t o “ s i l enc e” her ; i n s o do i ng s he gr abbed he r l eg whi ch r es ul t ed i n a bru i s e. Fr om t h er e M ot h er dr ov e t h e ch i l d t o J u v en i l e Cour t w h er e she f i l ed a n U n r u l y Pet i t i on

. T h e Ju v en i l e Cour t h el d a hea r i ng , wh i ch Fat her was un abl e t o at t end, an d t he ch i l d was o r dere d t o s t ay one n i gh t i n j uv eni l e det ent i on an d t hen

re m a in u n d e r h o m e d e te n tio n fo r o n e m o n th.

In as m uc h a s t he p arti es’ old est chil d ha d rea ch ed 1 8 at t he t i m e o f t rial , t he f

i na l o rd er d o es no t ad d ress 5
cust o d y of her.
-3- Starting a round 2004-2005, F ather ’s re lationship with t he ch il d r e n , p a r ti c u la r ly th e o lde r two, beg an to improve. This w as around the time that the oldest child rec eived her driver’ s license a nd
a c ar; sh e te sti fi e d that she be g an to stay awa y fr om M oth e r’ s h ome a s mu c h a s p os sib le in o rd e r t o avo id c on fl ic t wi th Mo the r. Th e old e st c hil d be g an sp e nd ing e xtra tim e a t he r F a the r’s home including ba

by -sitting his two y oung est children, completing chore s around his house, a nd staying
ov e rn ig ht d

ur ingthe we e k a

nd e xtra we e ke nd s. Som e tim e s th e old e st c hil d w ou ld b ri ngthe mid dle child with her whe n she visited Father, but they would not tell Mother because she would g et ang ry with them and make the m fee l guilty for wa nting to spend time with F ather

.
In the s u m m er of

2006, Father c ame to believe that Mother wa s no longe r suitable as the pr ima ry re sid e nti a l pa

re nt. He le arn e d f

or the fi rs t tim e a

bo ut the high le ve l of

c ha os and

te ns ion in Mother’s home a

nd, in particular , about t he domesti c viol ence the children had obser ved betwe en Mo the r a nd Dr . M yle s w he n th e y

we re marr ie d. F a the r w a s a lso c on c e rn e d b y se ve ra l in c ide nts betwee n Mother and the middle child that culminated in Mother filing an unruly petition ag ainst her in Wi lliamson Count y

J uvenile Court. Father pe titioned to modi fy cu s t o d y on August 6, 2006, 4 seeking to b e n ame d

th e p r im ar

y r e s id e n ti a l p ar e n t o f

th e p arti e s ’ thr e e c h il dr e n

. F a th e r a lle g ed 5 the re wa s a

mate ri a l c ha

ng e in c ir c ums tanc e s; t

hat Mo the r w a s r outin e ly un a ble or u nwi ll ingto proper ly supervise the children a

nd was phy sically abusive with at le ast one of the children; that she spoke badly of Father and hi s wife; and that she was in need of psycholog ical counse ling, tre atment and possibly

medication to deal with her behaviora l issues. The court ag ain appointed Dr . McMillan to e va luate the fa

mil y wi th r e g ard

to t his pe tit ion

be c a us e of his pr ior

inv olv e me nt a

nd fa mil iari ty with the family

. Dr. McMillan c oncluded that while F ather had not alwa

y s been a s t rongpare nt, he had alway s provided for the children financ ially and his pa renting skills had improved with the help a nd
su pp or t of his c ur

re nt wif e

. Sin c e the Ap ri l 2000 Agre e d Or de r, F a the r h a d p a id $ 5, 00 0 p e r m on th in child support as well as pr ovided the childre n’s h ea l t h insurance ; he boug ht them clothes, took them out to eat and on va cation. F ather also paid the c hildren’s private school tuition at an amount equal to that cha

rg ed by the private school they

attended when they

wer e young er.-4-

Dr. McMillan’s e valuation also conc luded that Mother had been a very g ood pare nt when the children w ere y oung , but tha t she strug g led to cre ate a n authority

structure as the c hildren re ache d adolesc ence

. Mother enmeshe d the children in he r persona l life and she soug ht to plea se them at a ny cost. Mother a

nd the childre n cons tantly eng ag ed in sibling-like f ights a nd Mother would ofte n barga i n wi t h t h e children to win their af fec tion. W hen she did punish one of the childre n for ba d behavior the child would ea sily

manipulate her

and neg otiate out of the punishment. Dr. Mc Millan deter mined that the childre n wer e Mother’ s whole world and she had not de veloped a n identity that was sepa rate from them; she only o cc as ionally held par t-time jobs and relied e x tensively on the children f or moral support throug h her thre e disastrous mar riag es. Dr. Mc Mil l an obser ved that Mother ofte n provided the c hildren with inappropr iate deta ils about her per so n al p ro b l ems. The children r eporte d to Dr. McMillan and in the ir testimony at the hea ring that Mother told them she wished F ather

wer e dea d or that he should “bur n in hell” and that Mother often made the c hildren fee l guilty about wanting to see and spend time with Father, ofte n callingthem “tra itors,” which led the childre n to be dishonest with Mother. I t was appa rent to Dr. Mc Millan that when the c hildren
wer e young they

did not trust Father , b u t as t h ey g ot older they

beg an to deve lop their own independe nt views of him and beg an wa nting to spend more time with him and his current wife . The
c hil dr e n a lso repo rt ed to himtha t on a t le a st o ne oc c a sio n F a the r’ s c ur re nt w if e too k th e g ir ls shopping a

nd the oldest child told the y oung est child to tell Mother that she had boug ht the clothes
an d n o tF a th e r ’ s w i f

e s o th a tM o th e r

w o u l d n o tg e tan g r

y an d th r o w th e c l o th e s aw ay.
After sever al day s of trial with twenty witnesses including Mother, F ather , Dr. McMillan a nd all three children a s well as fa mily , friends, a

nd school offic ials, the trial cour t found t here had bee n a mater ial chang e in circ umstances; howe ver, the court found that a cha ng e in custody

from Mother to Father was in the best interest of only the m iddle child, leavingthe y oung est child in the primary
c are of Mo the r. F a the r a

pp e a ls a sse rt inge rr or

wi th r e g ard

to t he cou rt ’s fi nd ingthat a

c ha ng e in custody was not in the best intere st of the y o u n ges t ch i l d

. Mother asse rts err or with reg ard to the court’s f inding that there was a material chang e in circ umstances and that a cha ng e in custody

was in the middle child’s best interest. Mother also appea ls the amount of child support she i s to rece ive. B oth pa rt ie s a pp e a l th e tr ia l c ourt ’s or de r r e qu ir inge a c h p art y to p ay the ir ow n atto rn e y

fe e s.
STA ND AR

D O F RE VI EW

We r e v ie w th e tr ia l c o urt’ s c o n c lu s io n s o f la w “ un d e r a pure de novo standard of revie w, acc ording no defe renc e to the conc lusions of law” made by the trial cour

t. Kendrick v. Shoem ake , 90 S.W. 3d

56 6, 56 9- 70 (T e nn . 2 00 2) ; Southern Constructors, Inc. v. Loudon County Bd. Of Educ. , 58 S.W .3d 706, 710 (Tenn. 2001) . A “r eview of finding s of fa ct by

the trial cou rt i n civil actions shall be de novo upon the record, ac companied by a pre sumption of corre ctness, unless the pr e po nd e ra

nc e of the e vid e nc e is o the rw ise .” Te nn . R. Ap p. P. 1 3( d) ; Kendrick, 90 S.W .3d at 570.

In applying the de novo standard, “ we a re mindful that ‘[t] rial cour ts are v es t ed with wide discretion in matters of

child custody ’ and that ‘the appe llate cour ts will not interfe re e x cept upon a showingof er

roneous e x erc ise of that discre tion.’” Johnson v. J ohnson , 169 S.W .3d 640 , 645 (T e n n

. C t

. Ap p

. 2 0 0 4 ) ( qu o t i n g Koch v. Koch , 874 S.W .2d 571, 575 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993))

.R ule 6 o f t he R ules o f

t he C o urt o f

A p p ea l s o f

T en ne ssee st ates: 6

(a ) W ritten a rg u m e n t i n re g a rd to e a c h issu e o n a p p e a l sha ll c o n ta in: (1) A s t at em ent by t he ap p el l ant of t he al l eged err o neo us act i o n of t he t ri al co urt whi ch rai ses t he i ss ue and a s t at eme n t by t h e appe l l ee of an y ac t i on of t h e t r i al cou r t wh i ch i s r el i ed u pon t o co rr ect t he al l eg ed er r or , w i t h c i t at i on t o t h e r ec or d w h er e t h e er r on eou s or c or r ec t i v e ac t i on i s r ec or ded. ( 2) A s t a t e me n t s h ow i n g h ow s u c h a l l e g e d e r r or w a s s e a s on a bl y c a l l e d t o t h e a t t e n t i on of t h e t r i al ju d g e w ith ci t at i o n t o t hat pa rt of t he reco rd where ap p el l ant ’ s chal l enge o f t he al l eged err o r i s
r ec or ded. (3) A st at em ent recit i ng w herei n a p p el l ant w as prejudiced b y s uch al l eged err o r, wi t h ci t at i o ns t o t he

r ec or d s h owi n g w h er e t h e r es u l t an t pr ej u di ce i s r ec or ded. ( 4) A s t at eme n t of

ea ch det er mi n at i v e f

ac t re l i ed u pon wi t h ci t at i on t o t h e r ec or d w h er e ev i den ce of

ea ch s u ch f

ac t ma y be f

ou n d. (b) N o co m p l ai nt of o r rel i ance up o n a ct i o n b y the t ri al c o urt w i l l b e co nsi d ered on ap p eal unl ess t he

a rg u m e n t co n ta ins a sp e c ifi c re fer e n c e to the p a g e o r p a g e s o f t h e re c o rd w h e r e su c h a c tio n is

r ecor ded. N o as s er t i on of f act wi l l be cons i dere d on appeal un l es s t he ar gu ment cont ai ns a r ef er enc e t o t h e pag e or pa g es of t h e r ec or d w h er e ev i den ce of s u ch f ac t i s r ec or ded.
-5- “B eca use ‘[c]ustody

and visitation determinations often hing e on subtle fa ct o rs, including the pare nts’ demea

nor and c redibility

during ...proce eding s themselves,’ a ppellate courts ‘ar e re luctant to second-guess a tria l court’s de cisions.’” Johnson , 1 6 9 S

. W

. 3 d at 6 4 5 (q u o t i n g Ga sk

ill v . G as k ill , 936 S.W .2d 626, 631 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993))

. AN AL YSI S

I. Waiver of Issu e On Appeal

Mother asse rts that Father’s brief to this court f ails to “state the a lleg ed er roneous a ction of the trial cour

t which ra ises the issue and f ails to show how such alleg ed err or was sea sonably called to the attention of the trial judg e....” Mothe r cites Rule 6 of the Ru les of the Court of A ppeals of Te nn e sse e a s w e ll a s Be ll v . B e ll , No. M200 4

- 0 1 9 7 5

- CO A-R3-CV, 2007 WL2095422 at *2-3 (T enn. Ct. App. J uly

18, 2007), in support of this assertion. Mother fur ther a sserts that she pre serve d her 6 iss ue s o n a

pp e a l by fi lin g a Mo tio n to Al te r or Am e nd , or in t he Al te rn a tiv e Mo tio n f

or a Ne w T ri a l. Tenn. R. App. P. 3(e) require s the filing of a Motion for New Trial befor e an appea l in a jury tr ia l c an be ma de to a highe r c ourt

. Te nn . R. Ap p. P. 3 (e ); Mc Cor mi c v . S mi th , 659 S.W .2d 804, 805 (T e nn . 1 98 3) . T his ru le state s th a t:

...in all case s tried by

a jury , no issue prese nted for r eview sha ll be predic ated upon
err or in the admission or exclusion of evidenc e, jury instructions gr anted or

ref used, misconduct of jurors, pa rties or co u n s el , or other a ction committed or occ urring duri ngthe tr ia l of

the c a se , or oth e r g ro un d up on wh ic h a ne w tri a l is so ug ht, un le ss the same w as spec ifically st at ed in a motion for a ne w trial; otherwise such issues will be treated as wa ived.Rul e 1 of t h e Rul es of

t h e Cour t of Appea l s of T en n es s ee per mi t s “ f or g ood c au s e, i n cl u di n g t h e i n t er es t of 7 expedi t i ng a dec i s i on upon an y mat t er , t hi s Co ur t

. . . [t o] s us pend t he r equi r ement s or provi s i ons of an y of t hes e r ul es in a p a rtic u la r c a se o n m o tio n o f a p a rty, o r o n it s o w n m o tio n , an d m a y o rd e r p ro c e e d ing s in a c c o rd a n c e w ith its di s cr et i on. ”
-6- Tenn. R. App. P. 3(e) . The Te nnessee Supreme Court in Mc Cor mi c v. S mi th , 659 S.W .2d 804 (Tenn. 1983) rea ffirme d that Tenn. R. App. P

. 3(e) applies only to case s tried by

a jury

. Mc Cor

mi c , 659 S.W .2d at 806. The Court further stated t hat precede nt “does not...stand for the proposition that all err ors of the t ri al j udg e...must be broug ht back f or fur ther c onsideration by

the trial cour

t on a motion under Rule 59, T.R.C.P . befor e such issues c an be c onsidered on a ppeal.” Id. The pre sent ca se wa s tried bef ore a chanc ellor without the prese nce of a jury . Ba sed on Tenn. R. A p p

. P

. 3 ( e ) , F a th e r w a s n o t r e qu i r e d f i l e a m o t i o n f

o r n e w tr i a l a s a p r e r e qu i s ite to a pp e a l. Fur thermore , the Be ll c a se re lie d u po n b y Mo the r i s in a

pp lic a ble a s th a t c a se i nv ol ved a pa rt y a tte mpt ingto a

pp e a l a tr ia l c ourt ’s F ina l D e c re e of Di vorc e a ft e r f

a ili ngto a

pp e ar a t th e tr ia l in person or throug h counsel. Be ll , N o

. M 2 0 0 4

- 0 1 9 7 5

- C O A

- R 3

- C V , 2 0 0 7 W L 2 0 9 5 4 2 2 a t* 2

. In reje cting the appe al, the cou rt re l i ed o n Rule 36 of the Te nnessee Rules of Appellate Procedur e which provide s that an appe llate cour t is not required to g rant relief to a party responsible for

an er ror o r w h o f a i l e d t o t ak e r e a s o n a

b l e a c t i o n t o p r e v e n t o r nu l l i f y th e h ar m f u l e f f o rto f ane r r o r

. F i n a l l y, while Father’s a

rgument section of his or igina l B rief failed to inc lude citations to the rec ord, the fa ct
se c tio n c on ta ine d c omp le te c itatio ns to the re c or d; mor e ov e r, thi s er ro r wa s lar g e ly c or

re c te d in his Reply Br ief. The ref

ore, w e will revie w Father’s issues on a ppeal in orde r to ex p edit e a de cision upon the matter pur suant to Rule 1 of the Rules of the Court of A ppeals of T ennesse e. 7

II. M odi fic at ion of C ust ody

A. Standard f

or Modifyin g a Custody Order

Be cause children a

re more likely

to thrive in a stable e nviro n m en t , the cour ts favor maintaining e x isting custody arr ang ements. Taylor v. Taylor, 849 S.W .2d 319, 332 (Tenn. 1993) ; Ke lle tt v . S

tua rt , 2 06 S.W. 3d 8, 14 (T e nn . Ct . App . 2 00 6) ; Hoalcraft v. Smithson, 19 S.W .3d 822, 828 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999). Avalid custody order or re sidential place ment schedule , once e ntere d by the c ourt , is res judicata as t o the facts in exi stence or re asonably fore seea ble when the decision was made

. Keisling v. Keisling , 196 S.W. 3d 70 3, 71 9 ( Te nn . Ct . App . 2 00 5) ; Ho alc ra ft, 19 S.W .3d at 828.

Nonethele ss, a custody and visitation order, or

the re sidential schedule in a perm anent pare nting plan, may be modi fied in cer tain situations. Such an order remains within the control of the cour t and is subject to “such c hang es or modification as the exigenc ies of the c ase ma y require .” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 6-101(a )(1) . Both the le g islature a n d t h e cour ts have a ddresse d the require ments for such a

modification, in rec og nition of the fac t that the circ u m s tance s of childre n and their pare nts chang e, som etimes requir ing c hang es in the existi ng pare nting a rra ng ement. When a petition to c hang e custody is f iled, the pare nt se eking the chang e has the burden of showing that-7-

a mate ri a l c ha

ng e in c ir c ums tanc e s h a s occ ur re d whi c h mak e s a cha

ng e in cu sto dy in the c hil d’ s b e st interest. Blair v. Badenhope
, 77 S.W. 3d

13 7, 14 8 (T e nn . 2 00 2) ; In re M .J.H., 196 S. W .3d 731, 744 (T e nn . Ct . App . 2 00 5) ; In re Bridges , 63 S.W .3d 346, 348 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001).

A dec ision on a reque st for m o d i fi ca t ion of a pa rentingarr ang ement re quires a two- step analy sis. Cranston v. Combs , 106 S.W .3d 641, 644 (Tenn. 2003). A party petitioning to cha ng e an exis ting c ustody

order must prove both (1) that a materia l chang e of c ircumstance s has occ urre d and (2) that a chang e of c ustody

or re sidentia l s ch ed u l e i s i n the child’s best intere st. Kendrick, 90 S.W .3d at 575. Only

afte r a thre shold finding that a materia l chang e of circ umstances ha s occur red is the court per

mitted to go on to make a fre sh determ i n at i o n o f t h e best int ere st of the child. Kendrick, 9 0 S. W.3 d at 56 9; Badenhope , 7 7 S. W.3 d at 15 0; Cur tis v . H ill , 215 S.W .3d8 3 6 , 8 40 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006).

As to the first re quirement, i.e. , a mate ri a l c ha

ng e of c ir c ums tanc e s, the Te nn e sse e Sup re me Court has stated:

Al though th e re are no br ig ht l ine ru le s a s to wh e the r a mate ri a l c ha

ng e in circ umstances has occur

red afte r the initial custody deter mination, there a

re se vera l rele vant considerations: (1) whether a chang e has occur red afte r the entry of the orde r soug ht to be modified; (2) whe ther a chang e wa s not known or re asonably anticipated when the or der w as ente red; and (3) whether a chang e is one that a ffe cts the child’s
w e l l

- b e i n g i na

m e an i n g f

u l w ay.
Cranston , 1 0 6 S

. W

. 3 d

at6 4 4 (c i t i n g Kendrick, 90 S.W .3d at 570).

T h e G en er al As s em b l y

h as al s o ad dre s s edth e qu es t i o n o f wh at co n s t i tu t es a ma t er i al ch an ge of c ir c ums tanc e s: (B ) I f the issue be fo re t h e co u rt is a modification of the c ourt’s prior de cre e perta ining to c ustody , the petitioner must prove by a pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e a materia l c hang e in c ircumstance

. A materia l c hang e of circ umst an ce d o es not require a showingof a su b s t an tial risk of harm to the c hild. A material c hang e of cir c u ms ta n c e ma y in c lu d e , b u t i s n o t l im it e d to , f a il ur e s to a dh e r e to th e p ar enting plan or a n order of custody and visitation or circ umstances that make the par enting plan no long er in the be st interest of the c hild. (i) In eac h contested c ase, the court shall make such a findingas to the re ason and the fa cts that constitute the basis for the custody deter mination.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 6-101(a )(2) (B ).

On ly if a mater ia l c ha

ng e of c ir c ums tanc e s is sh ow n to e xist is the tr ia l c ourt a llo we d to proce ed to the nex t step of t he ana ly sis: whether modification of the exist ing pa rentingarr ang ement-8-

is in the child’s best interest. Cranston , 10 6 S. W.3 d at 64 4; Kendrick, 9 0 S. W.3 d at 56 9; Cur tis , 215 S.W. 3d a t 84 0. Th a t de te rm inatio n re qu ir e s c on sid e ra tio n of a numbe r of fa c tor s, inc lud ingtho se set out in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106( a) ( fac tors to consider in custody deter mination). Kendrick, 90 S.W .3d at 570.

The fa ctors to be c onsidered in the se cond step of the analy sis that fall under Te nn. Code. Ann. § 36-6-106( a) inc lude: (1) The love, af

fec tion and emotional ties exi sting be tween the pare nts and child; (2) The dispositi on of the pare nts to provide the child with food, clothing , medical
car e, educ ation and other nece ssary car e and the deg ree to which a pa rent ha s been the primary

car eg iver; (3 ) T he imp or

tance of c on tin uit y in t he c hil d’ s li fe and

the le ng th o f t ime the c hil d h as l i v edi na s t ab l e, s at i s fa ct o ry en v i ro n m en t ; p ro v i d ed , th at wh er e th er e i s a f i n d i n g, under § 36- 6-106(a )(8) , of child abuse , as def ined in §§ 39-15-401 or 39-15-402, or ch i l d s ex u al abuse, as define d in § 37-1-602, by one (1) pare nt, and that a nonperpe tratingpare nt has reloc ated in orde r to flee the per petrat i n g p ar en t , that such
r e l o c a t i o ns h a l l n o tw e i g ha g a i n s tanaw ar d o f c u s t o dy; (4 ) T he sta

bil ity of the fa mil y un it o f t he pa re nts ; (5 ) T he me nta l a

nd phy sic a l he a lthof

the pa re nts ; (6) The home, school and c ommunity rec ord of the c hild; (7)( A) The rea sonable pre fer ence of the c hild if twelve (12) y ear s of ag e or olde r; (B ) The c ourt may

hear t h e p re fer ence of a young er c hild upon request. The pref ere nces of older c hildren should normally be g iven g reater we ight than those of y oung er c hildren; (8) Evide nce of

phy sical or e motional abuse to the child, to the ot her parent or to any other pe rson; provided, that whe re the re a re a lle gat ions that one (1) pa rent ha s committed

c h il d a b u s e , a s d e f

in e d in § § 3 9

- 1 5

- 4 0 1 o r

3 9

- 1 5

- 4 0 2 , o r

c h il d s e xual
a bu se , a s d e fi ne d in

§ 3 7- 1- 60 2, a g a ins t a fa

mil y me mbe r, the c ourt sh a ll c on sid e r a ll evidenc e re levant to the phy sical an d emotional safe ty of the c hild, and deter

mine, by a cle ar pr eponder ance of the e vid ence , whether such abuse has occ urre d. The
co urt s h al l i n cl u d e i n i t s d ec i s i o n a wr i t t en fi n d i n g o f al l ev i d en ce , an d al l fi n d i n gs of fa cts conne cted ther eto. In addition, the court shall, where appropr iate, re fer any iss ue s o f a

bu se to t he juv e nil e c ourt

fo r f ur the r p ro c e e din g s;-9-

(9) The char acte r and be havior of a ny o t h er p erson who resides in or f reque nts the home of a pare nt and such pe rson’s intera ctions with the child; and (10) Ea ch par ent’s past a nd potential for f

uture perf

ormanc e of pa

renting
re sp on sib ili tie s, inc lud ingthe wi lli ng ne ss and ability of e a c h o f t

he pa re nts to fac ilitate and enc ourag e a close and c ontinuing par ent-c hild relationship betwee n the child and the other

pare nt, consistent with the best interest of the c hild.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 6-106(a ).
B. App lication of

the Standard

Th e fi rs t st e p o f o ur

ana ly sis re qu ir e s a

re vie w o f t

he a lle g e d c ha

ng e d cir cum st anc e s to de te rm ine if

the y are mate ri a l and

un fo rs e e n. We r e vie w t he tr ia l c ourt ’s fi nd ing s o f f a c t de novo wi th a pr e sumpt ion

of c or re c tne ss, but we re vie w its c on c lus ion s of law ba se d o n th os e fa c ts de novo with no presumption of corr ectne ss. Kendrick, 9 0 S. W.3 d at 57 0. Th e tr ia l c ourt fo un d:
[T] here to be a materia l chang e of circ umstances in this case . And par ticularly the Court notes that althoug h [ M o t h er ] has to some extent remedied pa st bad relationships, t here does appe ar in the Court’s mind to be a pattern of

somewhat chaotic a nd disruptive persona l relationships involved, be it throug h both of her subsequent mar

riag es....

In the Court’s mind the g reatest conce rn of t h i s Court is [ Mother’s] continuing
re fu sa l to fo ste r t

he re latio ns hip be tw e e n th e c hil dr e n a nd [ Fathe r]. Th e re c or d is reple te from se vera l witnesses of instance s in which [Mot her] cont i n u es to speak badly of [Father ], t o speak ba dly of [Father’ s] new – well, not new wife now, but the
c ur re nt w if e

. . . . And co nti nu e s to be ra te him and c a ll h im n ame s. Th is i s something this cour

t cannot tol erate. And [ Mother’s counsel] has m ade a very g ood argument to the Court in t h at h i s argument that this is really not a cha

ng e of circ umstances be cause this is s imply – has bee n g oing on throug h this relationship. And while it is true , the Court f inds that that obviously has bee n g oing on thr oug hout the relationship, if the C ourt wer e to acc ept t hat ar g ument it would be acc epting an argument that this Court cannot expect compliance with its previous orders onc e they
are enter ed.

In this sit uation, with the orig inal custody order , with the ag ree d order of April 2000, and with any

order this Court enters reg ardingchild custody matters, i t is assumed
and e xpe c te d a

nd re qu ir e d b y

thi s Co ur t th a t bo th pa

re nts fo ste r a

g oo d r e latio ns hip with the other pa

rent. And it is require d that they particula rly take no steps towa

rd dem e an in g o r

ma k in g d e r o g a to r

y c o mm e n ts o na

c o n s is te n t b a s is a

b o u t t h e o the r. For all of t hose reasons i n combination the Court does conc lude that there has bee n a mater ial chang e of c ircumstance s in this case.-10-

Mother asse rts that the trial cour t erre d by considering Mother’s circ umstances; she conte nds that courts may

only look to th e ch i l d ’s circ umstances, not the pa rents’, in orde r to find there has been a materia l chang e in circ umstances since the entry of the last Or der. The circumstances that most concer

ned the tria l court her e for the purposes of deter

mining a chang e in circ umstances we re Mo the r’ s in a

bil ity to a da pt h e r p are nti ngsk ill s to de a l w ith the c hil dr e n a s th e y be c ame a do le sc e nts , Mother’s inter fer ence with Fathe r’s a bility t o develop a

meaning ful relationship wit h his children and the c haotic and disruptive pe rsonal relationships in which Mother enmeshe d the childre n. The trial court properly considere d Mother’s chang e in circ umstances a s those particula r circ umstances aff ecte d the childre n’s well-be ing. A s the Kendrick court noted in its discussion of the fa ctors for deter mining whe n a child’s c ircumstance s have c hang ed sufficie ntly to w arr ant a cha ng e of his or her c ustody , “a pare nt’s chang e in circ umstances may be a materia l chang e in circumstances f or the purposes of modify

ing c ustody

if such a c hang e af

fec ts the child’s well-be ing.” Kendrick, 90 S.W .3d at 570. The tria l court hea rd expert testimo n y fr o m Dr

. McMillan on the ill-eff ects of Mothe r’s ina pp ro pr iate pa

re nti ngte c hn iqu e s. Mo the r’ s c a jol ingand

ba rg a ini ngwi th the c hil dr e n le d th e m to not respe ct M other and manipulate her to g et out of punishments. Mother’s tende ncy to provide the children w ith too much adult information about her pe rsonal re lationships resulted in them seeing and tre ating Mother as a

sibling rather than a

uthority fig ure.
Mother contends that many of these issues of conce rn for the trial cour t were prese nt in 1999 and 2000 whe n the ag ree d order was entered and, t here fore , are not a chang e in circ umstance. The issue of Mother’ s ability

to properly

pare nt adolesce nt c hildren was clea rly a cha ng e since the entry of the Apr il 2000 ag ree d order , as Mother was by all acc ounts a “ve ry

g ood” par ent to the childre n when they

wer e young er; howe ver, she continued to use tec hniques for young er c hildren such a s coddling and bar g aining as the children g rewinto adolesce nce r ather than establishing and enf

orcing conseque nces within a respe ctful, structure d environment. Whil e the latter two matters may

have exis ted bac k in 1999 and 2000, Mother’ s chaotic a nd disruptive persona l r elationships were not the subject of pr oof in t h at p ro ce ed i ng . Wit h reg ard to Mother ’s speaking ba dly of F ather , the cour

t operates under the assumption that parties will abide by its orders re quiring the par ents to foster a g ood relation s h i p with the other pa rent. Those matters we re not known or rea sonably

anticipated by th e c o urt a t th e ti me th e a g r e e o r d e r w a s e n te r e d in Ap r il 2 0 0 0

. T h e r e f o r e , w e aff

irm the trial court’s f inding of a mater ial chang e in circ umstances.

The sec ond step of our analy sis require s a review of the t rial court’s deter mination of whether the modification of c hild custody was in the best interest of the children. The trial c ourt found that fa c tor s ( 1) , ( 5) , a

nd (9 ) w e re ne utr a l ne ith e r f avo ri ngMo the r o r F a the r; fa c tor s ( 2) wi th r e g ard to both c hildren and (6) and (7) with r eg ard to the y oung est child favor ed Mother; a nd fac tors (3), ( 4), (8) a nd (10) with re g ard to both chi l d ren and (6) a nd (7) with re g ard to the middle c hild favore d Father. We will discuss the trial court’ s determination with re spect to ea ch child sepa rate ly as the court found that modification to be in the best intere st of one, but not the other.-11- 1. Cus to dy o f the M iddle Chi ld

Mother asser

ts that the trial court err ed in c hang ing custody of the parties’ middle child from Mother to Father because “[her] best interest is not serve d by the P erma nent P are nting Plan ente red by the Court on J uly

3, 2007.” Mother relies on testimony by Mother’s friends and neig hbors that the childre n are polite and well-be haved to show that despite her trouble d marria g es and pe rsonal problems that s he “has still raised three fine y oung women.” Whil e the trial court f ound the childre n to be polite, their lives have not been without difficulty . All three c hildren testified to constant arguing a nd raised voic es in Mother’s home – betwee n Mother and her ex - and curr ent husbands and betwee n Mother and the children. The y also testified that Mot her of ten cur ses at them and at others in their presence

. The level of ange r and disrespect that Mother allows the childre n to show her ha s c e rt a inl y no t be e n w ith out r e pe rc us sio n a s the tw o o lde r c hil dr e n b oth de ve lop e d b e havio r p ro ble ms around the ag e of 14. Dr. McMillan testified that the older child was raised by Mother unti l s he
rea ched the ag e of 14 a

nd then raised herse lf; at the ag e of 16 she beg an spendingas much time aw ay from Mother’ s house as possible, includingspending extra day s and nights at Father’s house . The mid dle c hil d’ s b e havio ra l pr ob le ms a pp e ar t o b e mor e dr a sti c th an th e old e r c hil d’ s, re su lti ngin Mother filingan unruly

petition in J uvenile cour

t ag ainst her.

The trial c ourt found that, based on the t otality of t he evide nce a nd upon consideration of the st at u t o ry fac tors, it was in the best intere st of the middle child that custody be cha ng ed to Father. In particula

r, the trial c ourt found that Father appea red to be better able to control her than Mother. SeeTenn. Code. Ann. § 36-6-106( a)( 6). The court appointed psy chiatrist, Dr. McMillan, believed this child presented a g reat c halleng e to any pare nt, but that Mother in particular was ill-equipped to deal wit h h er; Mother‘s lack of boundarie s and enme shment with her childre n resulted in an inability to provide the authority structure that she nee ded. Id. The c ourt found that the stability of the fa mil y un it w ithF athe r a

nd F a the r’ s c ur

re nt w if e a pp e are d to be str on g a t th is p oint in c on tr a st with Mother’s household. Id

. § (a) (4). The court was “ very conce rned” about whethe r the c hildren
wer e living in a

“stabl e an d satisfac tory environment” and wa s particular ly troubled by

the deter ioratingrelationship between the middle c hild a nd Mother. Id. § ( a )( 3) . Wh ile the c ourt did not believe Mother ’s ac tions rose to the level of emotional abuse, the court found that she “f ailed and ref used to enc ourag e a c lose and c o n t i n u i n g p are nt/child relationship betwee n [t he childre n] and [F a the r] a nd [F a the r’ s c ur

re nt w if e ]” i nc lud ingc a lli ngthe m na me s and c a lli ng the c hil dr e n “ tr a ito rs ” for wishingto spend time with them. Id. § (a) (8), ( 10). Contrasting wi t h M o t h er ’s behavior, the court noted that Fathe r and F ather ’s cur rent wife encourag ed the children to have a continuing and strong relationship wit h Mother. Id. Th e mid dle c hil d d id n ot w ish to e xpre ss a

pr e fe re nc e in t

his matter, but the c ourt deduc ed fr om h er t es timony that, in all likelihood, she would prefe r to live primarily with Fathe r. Id. § (a) (7). F inding no e rror , we a ffirm the tria l court’s de termination that
a c ha ng e in c us tod

y fr om M oth e r t o F a the r i s in the mid dle c hil d’ s b e st i nte re st.

2. Cus to dy o f the Yo unge stChi ld

F a the r a sse rt s th a t th e tr ia l c ourt e rr e d in no t c ha ng ingc us tod

y of the pa rt ie s’ y oung e st c hil d from Mother to F ather

beca use the same fac tors that lead the trial court to chang e the c ustody of the-12-

middle child exi sted for the y oung est child and the tria l court fa iled t o ar t i culate suf ficient re ason for lea ving he r in the ca

re of Mother.

The trial co u rt fo u n d t h at the best intere st of the y oung est child to be a “ close c all” and acknow ledg ed that its conclusion to g rant c ustody to diffe rent pa

rents with re g ard to diff ere nt children w as “r are for this Court to do, a s it should be.” The c ourt was most conc erne d about “the fra g ile state of [y oung est child] at this point and her strong emotional ties to her mother.” The c ourt further explained its decision:

The Court re cog nizes Dr. McMill an’s r ed fla g for that ve ry rea son and is conce rned about the fa ct that [Mot her], as Dr. McMillan points out, appe ars to be a wonder ful mot he r a s th e se c hil dr e n a

re y oung e r c hil dr e n, but te nd s to have pr ob le ms w iththe se c hil dr e n a s th e y

g ro w o lde r a

nd the re latio ns hip be g ins to d e te ri or a te . T he re c le arl y is no ill wi l l an d i n tent in the Court’s finding with [ Mother] with that reg ard. Howeve r, it is a fac t. And while the Court is no t re ad y t o change custody of [the y oung e st c hil d] at this po int in t ime , th e Cou

rt do e s n ote fo r t

he re c or d f

or [Mothe r’ s]
c on sid eration

that th is C ourt

is v e ry c on c e rn e d a

bo ut t hat r e latio ns hip , a

nd is
c o n c e r n e d a b o u t [M o th e r ’ s ] d e s ir e to g iv e th e s e c h il dr e n e v e r y th in g a t th e cost of
a pp ro pr iate dis c ipl ine in m any ins tanc e s.

I t a pp e ars to t

he Court that a s th e se c hil dr e n b e c ome old e r that [Mothe r] do e s n ot – wi sh e s f or the ir re latio ns hip to re ma in the same a s it wa s. An d unf

or tun a te ly fo r a ll of us as pare nts, that simply cannot be. And whil e thi s Court strug g les with the issue of [the y ou ngest ch ild ], a g a in, be c a us e of the str on ge mot ion a l ti e s, a t th is p oint in tim e the Court

do e s n ot f

e e l th a t it is a pp ro pr iate to c ha

nge c us tod

y wi th r e g ard

to [th e y o un g e s t c h il d ].

Dr. McMillan testified that while the y oung est child had g ood things to sa y about Father, she
was ve ry frig htened to talk and was t he mos t frag ile of the c hildren. In explaining her fra g ility , Dr. McMillan said that she wa s “ver y , very connec ted” to Mother a

nd oft en s l ep t wi th Mother. See Tenn. Code. Ann. § 36- 6-106(a )(1) , (7 ). I n the family dy namic, she is Mother’ s apolog ist to t he other children and takes on Mother’s ve rsion of re ality

. Id. Dr. McMillan noted that the same wa s true of the two older children when they wer e this child’s ag e. Dr . McMillan explained that Mother
was ve ry depende nt on her role as mother and did not know how to se parate her own identity from the childre n. This put a l o t o f p re s s u re o n the childre n and he w arne d that, with the two older children growing up and not be ing around the house much any more, Mother was likely to put all of this pressure on the y oung est child, which c ould be dis as t ro u s for he r. Id. § (a) (10). While the y oung est child was a

ppare ntly alway s a shy

child and stru ggl ed i n school, she see med to find an outlet in athletic ac tiviti es, which Mother was a ble to fac ilitate. Id. § (a) (2), ( 6). The c hild testified th ats h e pl ay ed s ev er al s p o rt s an d M o th er wa s v ery ac t i v e i ns u

p p o rt i n g th o s e a ct i v i t i es b o thth ro u gh attendanc e and c oaching

. Id. Father, on the othe r hand, w as unable to be a s ac t i v e i n the child’s extracurr icular a ctivities beca use of his work schedule, although he attended g ames whe n he could.-13-

Dr. McMillan re commended that initi ally the y oung est child’s custody chang e fr om Mother to F a the r, but e xpre sse d h op e tha t sh e wo uld

be a ble to b e re tur

ne d to Mo the r’ s p rimary

c are if Mother could be reha

bilitated ba ck into the role of primar y residential pa

rent. Dr . McMillan testified that it would be a lot of work for Mother, but that it would be “a f ine outcome” and he hope d that would be the outcome . Dr. McMillan tes t i fied that, in addition to workingon her pa renting te c hn iqu e s and

a bil ity to c o- pa re nt w ithF a the r, Mo the r h a d many pe rs on a l pr ob le ms s he ne e de d to work on. SeeTenn. Code. Ann. § 36-6-106( a)( 5). Whil e he was not a ble to provide a dia g nosis on whether Mother wa s bipolar, he thought proba bly she wa s not. Id. Reg ardle ss, Mother’s consta nt “cha oti c ra g ing a

nd dramatic behavior ” wa s something he believed she should seek prof essional assis t an ce to c orre ct either throug h medication or c ounseling

. Id. Dr . M c Mil lan n ote d th a t w hil e he thoug ht it would be positive for the y oung est child to return to Mother’ s primary car e if Mother improved, he did not believe the same reg arding the middle c hild. When aske d whether he pre fer red the sisters live with the same pr imary residential pare nt, D r. McMillan said that they need not live toge ther; that the most important fac tor was that e ach c hild lived with an effe ctive par ent and he hoped that Mother w ould work on her ability to be an eff ective pare nt for the young est child and c opare nt with Father

.
We are mi n d f

u l th a t “ [t ]r i a l c o urt s ar e v e s t e d w i th w i d e d i s c r e t i o n i n m a t t e r s o f c hil d custody ” Johnson , 169 S.W .3d at 645 (quoting Koch, 87 4 S

. W

. 2 d at 575), bec ause, a mong othe r things, “ [c] ustody

and visitation determinations often hing e on subtle fa ctors,” Id. (q uo tin g Ga sk ill , 93 6 S.W.2 d at 631 ), inc lud ing the de me ano r an d cr e dib ili ty of the pa rt ie s dur ing the pr oc e e din g s; conseque ntly , “appe llate courts ‘ar e reluctant t o second- g uess a tria l court’s de cisions.’” Id. I n th is
c a se the tr ia l c ourt

ob vio us ly

c on sid e re d D r. Mc Mil lan’ s r e c omm e nd a tio n th a t th e y oung e st child chang e custody , at l ea s t t empora rily , from Mother to F ather , but was ultimately sway ed by

other
s u b t l e f a c t o r s i nth e c a s e i n c l u d i n g th e c o urt ’ s o b s e r v a t i o no f t h i s c h i l d

d ur i n g h e r t e s t i m o n y. Although the court de parte d from Dr . McMillan’s ultimate rec ommendation on custody , the cour t
a c c e p te d D r

. M c M il la

n ’ s r e c o mm e n d a ti o n th a t th e y o un g e s t c h il d r e c e iv e c o un s e li n g b e cause the court found D r. McMillan to be a cre dible witness. In so doing, the court also gave Mother a stern
wa rn ingto s e e k c ouns e lin g fo r h e rs e lf in o rd e r to a dd

re ss h e r p are nti ngand

pe rs on a l is su e s w hil e there was still tim e for

her to salva g e her relationship with the y oung est child. The c ourt explained that it wa s “c on c e rn e d if [Mo the r] c on tin ue s in he r c ur re nt p are nti ngsk ill s, c on tin ue s to uti lize tho se same wa y s she has, that w e wi l l b e bac k here ag ain in a fe w y ear s with [ the y oung est child].” F ind ingno e rr or , w e a ff

ir m th e tr ia l c ourt ’s de te rm inatio n th a t it is i n the be st int e re st of

the y oung e st child to remain in the primar y car e of Mother , but that the y oung est child rec eive c ounseling

. III. Chil d Su pport

Mother asserts that the t rial court erre d in not deviating upw ard when setting the amount of child support in this action. The April 2000 Agre ed Or der se t child support for the thre e childre n at $5,000.00 per month, whic h was a deviation upward of a pproxi mately

$900.00 per month fr om that a s w a s re qu ir e d by the Chi ld Sup po rt Gu ide lin e s. F oll ow ing the e ntr y of the or de r t

hat f or ms th e b as i s o f t h i s ap p ea l , M o th er fi l eda M o t i o nt o Al t er

o r A m en d

s ee k i n g, inte r a lia , “a ne w trial on the issue of the amount of child support.” Mother’s moti on was denied by the t rial court and, onT h e o rd e r d isp o sin g o f he r M o tio n d id no t sp e c ify w h y the c o u rt d e n ie d the re q u e st fo r a he a rin g

. 8

-14- appea l, she asks this Court to a pply the same upwar d deviation to the cur rent c hild support order a s e xiste d in the Ap ri l 20 00 Agreed Orde r o r, in t he a lte rn a tiv e , f

or a he ari ngto d e te rm ine if

sh e is entitled to a deviation.

Be cause child support decisions re tain an ele ment of discretion, we revie w them using the defe rential " abuse of

discretion" standard. Richardson v. Spanos , 1 89 S.W. 3d 72 0, 72 5 ( Te nn . Ct

. Ap p. 20 05 ). Th is s tand ard is a re vie w- c on st rai ni ng st and ard of re vie w tha

t c a lls fo r l e ss i nte ns e appellate revie w and, ther efor e, less likelihood that the tri al co u rt ' s decision will be re verse d. Id. (c i t i n g State ex re l. Jones v . Looper , 86 S.W.3 d 189 , 193 (T e nn . Ct . App . 2 00 0) ; W hite v . V an de rb ilt Univ. , 21 S.W .3d 215, 222-23 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999)). Discre tionary decisions must, however , take the applica

ble law a nd the re levant fa cts into acc ount. Ballard v. Herzke , 9 2 4 S.W .2d 652, 661 (Tenn. 1996)

. The amount of support derive d from a proper application of the formula in the Child Support Guidelines becomes t he presumptive amount of child support owed. Richardson , 189 S.W .3d at 725 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005). T his amount of support, howeve r, is rebuttable , T en n

. C o d e An n . § 36 -5 -1 01 (e )( 1) (A ); Tenn. Co mp . R. & Re g s. 12 40 -2 -4 -. 01 (1 )( d) (1 ) ( 20 08 ); Tay lor v . F e ze ll , 158 S.W .3d 352, 357 (Tenn. 2005) , and a tr ial court may , in its di scre tion, deviate fr om the amount of support require d by the Child Suppo rt Gu i delines. State v. W ilson , 132 S.W .3d 340, 343 (Tenn. 20 04 ); Jones v . Jones , 930 S .W .2 d 541 , 545 (Ten n. 19 96 ). Ten n. Co de A nn . § 36 -5- 10 1(e) (1) (B) permits the cour

t to deviate fr om the Child S upport Guidelines “if the net income of

the obligor exceeds ten thousand dollars ($10,000) per month;” however , the custodial par ent “must prove, by
a pr e po nd e ra

nc e of the e vid e nc e , th a t c hil d s up po rt in e xce ss o f t

he amou nt p ro vid e d f

or in the c hil d support g uidelines is rea sonably nece ssary to provide for the nee ds of the minor child or c hildren of the par ties.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101( e)( 1)(B ).

The trial c ourt order ed child support to be calc ulated in acc ordanc e with the Guidelines. The court a dopted the Perma

nent Pare nting Plan and Chil d Support W orkshee t, which re sulted in Fathe r paying $2,100.00 pe r month to Mother for the support of the young est child. Mother then f iled a Motion to Alt er or

Amend, inter alia, seekinga new trial on the issue of c hild support; she sought to put on proof with reg ard to whe ther a n upwar d deviation was a ppropriate . In light of the modification of other

provisions of the April 2000 Ag ree d Orde r, Mother is not cor rec t that an upwar d deviation is automatic or that the amount of the deviation should be automatica lly continued. Whe n see kin g an upw ard de viatio n, the statut e c le arl y pla c e s the burd e n on the c us tod ia l pa re nt t o “prove , by

a prepondera

nce of the evidence, that child support in excess of the amount provided f or in the Guidelines wa s rea sonably nec es s ar y t o provide for the nee ds of the minor child left in her primary car e.” T enn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101( e)( 1)(B ). Since Mother is the custodial par ent of the y oung est child and wa s awa rded c hild support, she b ea rs t he burde n of provingthat an upwa rd de viatio n is a

pp ro pr iate . Wh e n th e tr ia l c ourt de nie d h e r m oti on , s he did no t ha ve an o pp or

tunity to present suc h proof; conseque ntly , we r ever se this action of the c ourt and re mand the case to the 8-15-

tr ia l c ourt

fo r t he lim ite d p ur

po se of de te rm ini ngwh e the r a

n u pw ard de viatio n f

ro m the Chi ld Support Guidelines is appropriate.

IV. Att orney’s F ees
Bo thp art i es t ak e i s s u e wi th th e tri al co urt 's d en i al o f t h ei r r es p ec t i v e r equ es t s fo r a t t o rn ey 's fee s. Father asserts that beca use custody of t he mi ddle child was chang ed from Mother to Father that he is the pr e va ili ngpa

rt y and e nti tle d to an award of atto rn e y ’s fe e s; M oth e r a sse rt s th a t be c a us e custody of the young est child was not cha ng ed that she is also a pre vailing pa rty and bec ause F ather ha s th e a bil ity to p ay that sh e is e nti tle d a

n a wa rd of a tto rn e y ’s fe e s.
There is no question that Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5- 103(c) empower s the court s to awar d
re a so na ble a tto rn e y ' s f

e e s inc ur re d by pe rs on s who are re qu ir e d to re tur n to c ourt to e nf or c e a c hil d
su pp or t or de r. Th e statut e pr ov ide s in re le va nt p art : “the spouse or

other pe rson to whom the custody of the c hild, or children, is aw arde d may rec over f rom the other spouse rea sonable attorney fee s incurre d in enforc ing a ny

. . . suit or action conce rning the adjudication of the custody or the chang e of custody of any child, or child re n , o f t h e parties, . . . at any subsequent hea

ring , which fe es may be fi xed and a llo we d b y

the c ourt , b e fo re wh om su c h a c tio n o r p ro c e e din g is pending , in the discretion of suc h court.”

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-103( c). The question of whether to awar d attorney ’s fe es, and the amount there of, ar e within the sound discre tion of the trial cour t and we w il l n o t d i s t u rb the trial cour t’s decision on appe al abse nt an abuse of discre tion. Id. ; See R ichardson v. Spanos , 189 S.W .3d 720, 725 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005). An abuse of discretion occ urs “only

wh en t h e t ri al court applies an incorre ct l eg al s tandar d, rea ches a decision t hat i s illogica l, bases its decision on a clear ly err oneous assessment of the evidenc e, or employ s rea soning that cause s an injusti ce to the complaining party .” P e rr y v

. Pe rry , 11 4 S.W.3 d 4 65 , 4 67 (T e nn . 2 00 3) ; Clinard v. Blackwood , 46 S.W .3d 177, 182 (Tenn. 2001)

. Both pa rties in this case we re partially succe ssful; thus, neither par ty is a clea r winner . Under the se c ir c ums tanc e s, we do no t f ind that th e tr ia l c ourt

a bu se d it s d isc re tio n b y

de nyingbo th p art ie s'
re qu e sts fo r atto rn e y ' s f

e e s; c on se qu e ntl y , w e a ff ir m th e de nia l of

the re qu e sts

.-16- CO NC LU SION

F or the re a so ns se t f

or th a bo ve , w e a ff

ir m th e ju dgment of

tr ia l c ourt

wi th r e sp e c t to modification of custody

and attorne y ’s fe es; we rever se t he court’s denial of a hear ing on Mothe r’s reque st for a he aringon the amount of child support and re mand the issue of c hild support to the trial court for the purpose of

deter mining whe ther Mother

is entitled to an upward de viation from the Child S upport Guidelines. Costs ar e assessed to the parties e qually , for whic h execution may issue, i f n e c e s s ar y.

___________________________________ RI CHARD H. DI

NKI NS, J UDGE