IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Anthonee Patterson :

: No. 439 C.D. 2018

v. :

: Submitted: December 28, 2018

Kenneth Shelton, :

Appellant :

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge

HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

BY JUDGE McCULLOUGH FILED: April 15, 2019

Kenneth Shelton (Shelton) appeals from the March 21, 2018 order of the 

Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (trial court) denying his petition 

requesting that the trial court strike its prior orders confirming an April 26, 2006 

arbitration award and refusing to vacate said award.

Facts and Procedural History

This case has a long and complicated history before this Court and the trial 

court, most recently summarized in Patterson v. Shelton, 175 A.3d 442 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2017). In our 2017 decision, we referred to a 2013 unpublished decision from this 

Court, Patterson v. Shelton (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 2396 C.D. 2011, filed March 6, 2013), 

appeal denied, 78 A.3d 1092 (Pa. 2013), wherein we provided the following procedural 

history: 
2

The key players involved in the present offshoot of the 

controversy are: (1) the Church of the Lord Jesus Christ of 

the Apostolic Faith (the “Church”), an unincorporated 

association, founded in 1919; (2) the “Trustees of the 

General Assembly of the Church of the Lord Jesus Christ of 

the Apostolic Faith, Inc.”, (the “Corporate Trustee”), a 

Pennsylvania nonprofit corporation formed in 1947 to act as 

the trustee and hold property in trust for the Church; (3) 

Patterson, a life-long member, elder, and minister of the 

Church; and (4) Shelton, the current “Bishop” and/or 

“Overseer” of the Church and “President” of the Corporate 

Trustee.

The dispute began in 1991 when then-Bishop S. McDowall 

Shelton, died, leaving vacancies in the offices of “Overseer” 

of the Church and “President” of the Corporate Trustee. 

Immediately upon Bishop S. McDowall Shelton’s death, 

Shelton and his “faction” took control of the accounts, trusts 

and properties of the Church and Corporate Trustee. After 

extensive litigation initiated by two other dissident factions 

of the Church congregation over the leadership of the Church 

and Corporate Trustee, the trial court ultimately determined, 

and this Court later affirmed, that Shelton and his Board of 

Trustees were in control.

. . .

On July 24, 1995, Patterson, as life-long member, elder and 

minister of the Church, commenced an action in equity 

against Shelton, in Shelton’s individual capacity and as the 

President of the Board of Trustees of the Corporate Trustee. 

Patterson alleged that since taking control of the Church and 

Corporate Trustee in 1991, Shelton and his Board of Trustees 

have misappropriated funds, “looted the Church’s assets,” 

paid themselves salaries in contravention of Church ByLaws, and funded private expenditures, lavish vacations, 

lingerie, cars, homes and other personal incidentals with 

assets which were donated and designated for Church 

religious and charitable missions. 

Patterson requested, inter alia: (1) the appointment of a 

receiver to take control of the assets of the Church held by 

the Corporate Trustee; (2) an order requiring Shelton to issue 
3

annual financial reports for the years 1991, 1992, 1993, and 

1994; and (3) an accounting.

The parties engaged in discovery. Patterson retained James 

A. Stavros, CPA (Stavros), a forensic financial investigator, 

to analyze the finances and expenditures of the Church and 

the Corporate Trustee. Stavros authored a report which 

detailed his findings that Shelton and his Board of Trustees 

withdrew hundreds of thousands of dollars from Church 

accounts with no accounting of where the funds went and 

that they expended Church funds on a significant amount of 

“personal” items and expenditures that appeared to be 

outside the normal course of business and outside Church 

laws and customs. He concluded that Church accounts had 

declined by nearly $1 million under Shelton’s control.[1]

In January 2006, the parties agreed to submit to binding 

arbitration. The Arbitrator concluded that the credible 

evidence established that Shelton had engaged in various acts 

of fraud, mismanagement, conspiracy, breach of fiduciary 

responsibilities, violations of By-laws and the Articles of 

Incorporation in seizing corporate funds and assets and 

depleting bank accounts designated for Church-related 

purposes. The Arbitrator concluded that Shelton had 

diverted Church funds and assets to himself and others for 

his and their benefit. The Arbitrator appointed a receiver and 

directed Shelton to account for all Church funds removed by 

him or those acting with him.

Shelton filed a motion to vacate the award which the trial 

court denied.[2] On appeal, this Court overturned the 

arbitration award because the Arbitrator went beyond the 

 

1 Patterson’s original complaint was stricken by the trial court in 1996 for unknown reasons 

and reinstated upon Patterson’s motion in 2004. However, during the interim, the trial court 

determined that Shelton was the rightful General Overseer of the Church and President of the 

Corporation. By decision dated April 10, 2001, this Court affirmed the trial court’s determination 

and our Supreme Court denied separate petitions for allowance of appeal. See Church of the Lord 

Jesus Christ of the Apostolic Faith v. Shelton (Pa. Cmwlth., Nos. 376, 559 C.D. 2000, filed April 10, 

2001), appeals denied, 790 A.2d 1019 (Pa. 2001), and 812 A.2d 1232 (Pa. 2001).

2 By order dated July 10, 2006, the trial court confirmed the Arbitrator’s award in favor of 

Patterson and against Shelton and entered judgment in conformity therewith.
4

scope of his authority in fashioning relief. See Shelton v. 

Patterson, 942 A.2d 967 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008). This Court 

remanded the matter to the trial court to determine whether 

Patterson was entitled to relief under the [Pennsylvania 

Nonprofit Corporation Law of 1988 (NCL), 15 Pa.C.S. 

§§5101-5998; 6101-6146].

On remand, Shelton moved for summary judgment on the 

ground that Patterson lacked “statutory standing” under 

Section 5782 of the NCL, 15 Pa.C.S. §5782. Shelton argued 

that only an officer, director, or member of a nonprofit 

corporation has “statutory standing” to enforce a right of a 

nonprofit corporation through a derivative action. 

. . .

Shelton pointed to the Corporate Trustee’s Articles of 

Incorporation which limited its membership in the nonprofit 

corporation to its Board of Trustees. Shelton asserted that 

because Patterson was never a member of the Board of 

Trustees he was never a “member” of the Corporate Trustee, 

and thus, he had no “statutory standing” to bring claims that 

are derivative of the Corporate Trustee’s rights.

The trial court agreed that under Section 5782 of the NCL, 

Patterson could only bring suit if he was a member of the 

Corporate Trustee at the time of the alleged events outlined 

in the Complaint. The trial court looked to Article IX of the 

Articles of Incorporation which states: “membership in the 

corporation [Corporate Trustee] shall consist of those 

persons serving as members of the Board of Trustees.” The 

trial court concluded that because Patterson had never been 

a member of the Board of Trustees he was not a member of 

the Corporate Trustee. The trial court reasoned that because 

the NCL created the cause of action and designated who may 

sue; standing was a jurisdictional prerequisite to any action. 

Grom v. Burgoon, 672 A.2d 823 (Pa. Super. 1996). The trial 

court “finding no possible way to affirm that [Patterson] has 

standing” granted the motion for summary judgment and 

dismissed the case. 

Id., slip op. at 1-6 (emphasis in original). 
5

Our 2017 decision further summarized as follows:

On appeal, this Court reversed the order of the trial court, 

concluding that Patterson, as a member of the Church 

congregation, was “part of the beneficiary class for which the 

Corporate Trustee held the Church’s assets in trust,” and, as 

such, had “standing to bring this action to enforce his own 

rights and the rights commonly held by all beneficiaries to 

obtain restoration to the Church of its full losses.” Id., slip 

op. at 16-17. We remanded the matter to the trial court to 

conduct a trial on the remaining factual and legal issues 

raised by Patterson in his complaint. 

On July 15, 2014, the trial court commenced a non-jury trial. 

During the course of the trial, an issue arose as to whether 

the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over this 

dispute. Following argument, the trial court concluded that 

it lacked such jurisdiction because the matter requires 

interpretation of religious doctrine and the same was 

prohibited by the First Amendment. Hence, the trial court 

issued an order granting a motion to dismiss filed by Shelton. 

Patterson appealed to this Court, but we affirmed the trial 

court’s order, concluding that the trial court ably disposed of 

the subject matter jurisdiction issue in its opinion. Patterson 

thereafter sought allowance of appeal with the Pennsylvania 

Supreme Court, but the same was denied. Patterson 

subsequently filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the 

United States Supreme Court, but the same was similarly 

denied.

On May 27, 2016, Patterson filed a motion with the trial 

court to determine certain orders void based on the lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction. In his motion, Patterson sought 

an order from the trial court “declaring that the January 31, 

2008 Commonwealth Court Order, and all other post-July 

10, 2006 rulings/orders not consistent with the judgments on 

the binding common law arbitration award, are void . . . .” 

Patterson alleged that the trial court “finally determined what 

[he] has been arguing all along – that there was no subject 

matter jurisdiction as the parties had agreed to resolve all of 

their disputes through binding, common law arbitration.” In 

sum, Patterson alleged that only the 2006 binding arbitration 
6

award remained valid and asked the trial court to declare as 

void all post-July 10, 2006 rulings/orders that were 

inconsistent with that award because the courts lacked 

subject matter jurisdiction to alter the same.

 

By order dated July 14, 2016, the trial court denied 

Patterson’s motion.[3] Patterson filed a notice of appeal with 

the trial court. The trial court thereafter issued an opinion in 

support of its order explaining that Patterson 

mischaracterizes its previous ruling regarding lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction. Contrary to Patterson’s allegations, the 

trial court did not rule that it lacked subject matter 

jurisdiction because of the parties’ agreement to litigate 

through binding arbitration; but rather, the trial court ruled 

that it lacked such jurisdiction due “to the Deference Rule, 

which prohibits courts from exercising jurisdiction over 

cases that would require them to decide ecclesiastical 

questions.” In other words, the trial court explained that it 

had no ability “to decide religious questions” and that its 

prior opinion “never mentions the issue of jurisdiction as it 

relates to common law arbitration.” Further, the trial court 

explained that it was “without jurisdiction to strike the 

Commonwealth Court’s January 2008 order vacating the 

Arbitration Award” and lacked the authority to disturb an 

appellate court ruling. Id. For the same reasons, the trial 

court noted that it had no power to reinstate the arbitration 

award which had been vacated on appeal.

Patterson, 175 A.3d at 446-47 (citations omitted).

Following an appeal by Patterson, this Court reversed the trial court’s July 

14, 2016 order, concluding as follows:

In this case, Patterson’s original complaint filed with the trial 

court sought relief under the NCL. The parties ultimately 

agreed to proceed to binding arbitration in November 2005, 

 

3 Shelton had filed a motion to strike Patterson’s motion as moot, alleging that Patterson’s 

motion “defies logic and violates bedrock principles of jurisdiction and substantive law.” In this 

motion, Shelton also sought sanctions for Patterson’s alleged bad-faith, frivolous motion. However, 

by separate order of the same date, the trial court dismissed Shelton’s motion to strike as moot in light 

of its order denying Patterson’s motion. 
7

with no right to appeal, as memorialized in an order from the 

trial court dated January 10, 2006. This order also dismissed 

the case from the trial court per agreement of the parties. 

Nevertheless, after the Arbitrator ruled in Patterson’s favor, 

Shelton filed a petition to vacate the arbitration award with 

the trial court. While the trial court denied Shelton’s petition, 

this Court reversed the trial court’s decision, vacated the 

arbitration award, and remanded to the trial court for further 

proceedings relating to these NCL claims. However, 

because this Court affirmed the trial court’s decision 

concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over his 

remaining NCL claims on the basis that resolution of the 

same would require the trial court to interpret religious 

doctrine, something it was prohibited from doing under the 

First Amendment, any prior decisions relating to the same 

are null and void. As a result, the only valid, remaining 

determination in this case is the binding arbitration award, as 

agreed to by the parties in November 2005, and confirmed 

by the trial court. As noted above, the trial court, by order 

dated July 10, 2006, confirmed the Arbitrator’s award and 

entered judgment in favor of Patterson and against Shelton 

in an order dated July 20, 2006.[4] Thus, Patterson’s remedy 

lies with enforcement of that judgment. 

Patterson, 175 A.3d at 449-50.5

 

4 A similar order was issued by the trial court on October 12, 2006, entering judgment in favor 

of Patterson. Additionally, the final adjudication and decree of the Arbitrator was entered as an order 

of the trial court on April 17, 2017. These orders, dated July 10 and 20, 2006, October 12, 2006, and 

April 17, 2017, collectively represent the last valid judgments in this case. 

5 Shelton subsequently filed a petition for allowance of appeal from this Court’s 2017 decision 

with our Pennsylvania Supreme Court, but the same was denied by order dated July 31, 2018. 

Patterson v. Shelton, 190 A.3d 592 (Pa. 2018). Shelton filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the 

United States Supreme Court, but the same was recently denied by order dated February 19, 2019. 

Shelton v. Patterson, ___ U.S. ___, 139 S.Ct. 1211 (2019).
8

Shelton’s Most Recent Motion

On January 31, 2018, Shelton filed the present motion with the trial court 

seeking to strike all prior orders of the trial court as void for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction. In this motion, Shelton alleged that “Pennsylvania courts do not have and 

never had subject matter jurisdiction over this religious dispute” and that “[t]herefore, 

[the trial court] must strike all of its prior orders as void ab initio and decline to take 

any further action in this matter.” (Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 90.)6 Shelton also 

simultaneously filed a brief in support of his motion.

Patterson filed a response asserting that Shelton’s motion constituted an 

impermissible attack on this Court’s prior orders dated November 29 and December 

22, 2017. Patterson stated that said orders held that the 2006 binding arbitration award

was the only valid, remaining determination in this case, referenced the trial court’s 

confirmation of the award and entry of judgment in his favor, and directed any attempts 

to enforce this judgment to the trial court. Patterson also contended that Shelton’s 

motion attempted to resurrect legal arguments that had been previously rejected by this 

Court and sought relief that wholly contradicted our prior opinions and orders. In an 

accompanying brief, Patterson noted that Shelton understood the impact of this Court’s 

November 29, 2017 order, as evidenced by his filing of an application for reargument 

providing that “[t]he apparent effect of the panel’s decision is the retroactive validation 

of an arbitration decision . . . .” (R.R. at 371.)

By order dated March 21, 2018, the trial court denied Shelton’s motion. 

Shelton thereafter filed a notice of appeal with this Court. The trial court subsequently 

issued an opinion in support of its order. The trial court noted that it had long ago 

denied a petition from Shelton to vacate the arbitration award, confirmed the award in 

 

6 Shelton’s reproduced record does not contain the lowercase “a” in the page number as 

required by Pa.R.A.P. 2173.
9

favor of Patterson, and entered judgment in his favor. The trial court also noted that 

this Court had recently declared the arbitration award to be the last valid judgment in 

this matter. The trial court explained that it was bound by this Court’s prior decisions 

and had no authority to grant Shelton’s motion. 

Discussion

On appeal, Shelton reiterates his arguments that the trial court was 

required to strike all of its prior orders as void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction 

and that no court can take any further action in this matter. For the following reasons, 

we disagree.

In our prior decision and order dated November 29, 2017, this Court 

specifically held that:

[T]he only valid, remaining determination in this case is the 

binding arbitration award, as agreed to by the parties in 

November 2005, and confirmed by the trial court. As noted 

above, the trial court . . . confirmed the Arbitrator’s award 

and entered judgment in favor of Patterson and against 

Shelton in an order dated July 20, 2006. Thus, Patterson’s 

remedy lies with enforcement of that judgment.

Patterson, 175 A.3d at 450. In a subsequent clarification order dated December 22, 

2017, this Court identified the various dates on which the trial court confirmed the 

Arbitrator’s award, entered judgment in favor of Patterson, and, most importantly, 

directed “[a]ny attempts to enforce these orders . . . to the trial court.” (R.R. at 306.) 

In other words, this Court found the trial court’s orders relating to the Arbitrator’s 

award to be valid and enforceable against Shelton and the trial court was bound by this 

Court’s prior orders. 

Moreover, as Patterson notes in his brief, Shelton’s most recent attempt to 

relitigate the validity of the trial court’s orders confirming the Arbitrator’s award and 
10

entering judgment in Patterson’s favor is barred by the doctrine of the “law of the case.” 

Our Supreme Court has declared that the “law of the case” doctrine prohibits an 

appellate court, upon a second appeal, from altering “the resolution of a legal question 

previously decided by the appellate court in the matter.” Commonwealth v. Starr, 664 

A.2d 1326, 1331 (Pa. 1995); see also In re Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission, 715 

A.2d 1219, 1223 n.10 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998) (“Issues decided by an appellate court on a 

prior appeal between the same parties become the law of the case and will not be 

considered on appeal.”) Further, while Shelton is correct that our 2017 decision did 

not expressly overrule this Court’s 2008 opinion (relating to the arbitrator exceeding 

the scope of his authority), the latter decision did in fact effectively overrule the 2008 

opinion by holding that any prior decisions were null and void and that the only valid, 

remaining determination in this case was the binding arbitration award.

Conclusion

Because Shelton’s current appeal challenges the trial court’s prior orders 

in this case confirming the arbitration award and entering judgment in favor of 

Patterson, which we have previously ruled to be the only valid, remaining 

determinations herein, thereby precluding any further challenge under the “law of the 

case” doctrine, the trial court did not err in denying Shelton’s petition seeking once 

again to strike these orders.

Accordingly, the order of the trial court is affirmed.

 

________________________________

PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Anthonee Patterson :

: No. 439 C.D. 2018

v. :

:

Kenneth Shelton, :

Appellant :

ORDER

AND NOW, this 15th day of April, 2019, the order of the Court of 

Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, dated March 21, 2018, is hereby affirmed. 

________________________________

PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge