This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 PETE LEYBA, 2 Worker-Appellee, 3

v. NO. 32,636 4 COLORADO CASUALTY 5 INSURANCE COMPANY, 6 Insurer, 7 THUNDERBIRD SUPPLY CO., INC., and 8 CONTINENTAL WESTERN INSURANCE 9 UNION STANDARD INSURANCE, 10 Employer/Insurers-Appellants. 11 APPEAL FROM THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION ADMINISTRATION 12 Terry S. Kramer, Workers ’ Compensation Judge 13 Kathryn L. Eaton 14 Albuquerque, NM 15 for Appellee 16 Doughty & West, P.A. 17 Minerva C.R. Camp 18 Albuquerque, NM 19 Bannerman & Johnson, P.A. 20 Margaret Graham 212 Albuquerque, NM 1 for Appellants 2

MEMORANDUM OPINION 3 VANZI, Judge. 4
{1} Appellants Employer/Insurer Thunderbird Supply Co. and Insurer Continental 5 Western Insurance of the Union StandardInsurance Group (collectively, Insurer) 6 appeal from the workers’ compensation judge’s (WCJ) ruling that Appellee Pete 7 Leyba’s (Worker) second work accident di d not cause or contribute to Worker’s 8 shoulder injury from his first work accide nt. [RP Vol.II/248] Our notice proposed to 9 affirm, and in response, Insurer filed a supplemental record proper and memorandum 10 in opposition. We remain unpersuaded by Insurer’s arguments, and therefore affirm. 11
{2} Insurer continues to dispute the WCJ’s determination that Worker’s disability 12 was solely caused by his November 2008 wo rk-related accident (first accident), and 13 that Worker’s subsequent July 2010 wo rk-related accident (second accident) did not 14 cause or contribute to his injury or disability. [DS 3; MIO 3-17] See generally NMSA 15 1978, § 52-1-28(B) (1987) (“In all cases where the employer or his insurance carrier 16 deny that an alleged disabilityis a natural and direct re sult of the accident, the worker 17 must establish that causal connection as a probability by expert testimony of a health 18 care provider . . . testifying within the area of his expertise.”). In reviewing whether 193 Worker proved the requisite causal connecti on, we apply a whole record standard of 1 review and will affirm if, af ter taking the entire record into consideration, “there is 2 evidence for a reasonable mind to accept as adequate to support the conclusion 3 reached.” Tallman v. ABF (Arkansas Best Freight) , 108 N.M. 124, 128, 767 P.2d 363, 4 367 (Ct. App. 1988), holding modified on other grounds by Delgado v. Phelps Dodge 5 Chino, Inc. , 2001-NMSC-034, 131 N.M. 272, 34 P.3d 1148. We review the WCJ’s 6 application of the law to the facts, however, de novo. Tom Growney Equip. Co. v. 7 Jouett , 2005-NMSC-015, ¶ 13, 137 N.M. 497, 113 P.3d 320. 8
{3} As extensively detailed in our notice, evidence was presented through the 9 testimony of Dr. Babinski that Worker’s shoul der injury was solely caused by his first 10 accident. [RP Vol.II/253-54] Based on his evaluation of Worker and on his review 11 of Worker’s MRI studies [RP Vol.II/250], Dr. Babinski opined that, to a reasonable 12 degree of medical probability, Worker’s rightshoulder injuries – including a rotator 13 cuff tear ultimately necessitating surgical repair – were causally related to the first 14 accident [RP Vol.II/239, 250], and that the second accident provided only a temporary 15 flare-up of Worker’s shoulder injury that did not materially change the nature of 16 Worker’s shoulder injury. [RP Vol.II/229, 240, 250-51, 254] C onsistent with Dr. 17 Babinski’s opinion, Worker’s complaints of shoulder pain continued to worsen 18 following the first accident [RP Vol.II/237] and Worker did not have lasting relief 19 from the shoulder pain between the firs t and second accidents. [RP Vol.II/250] 204 {4} Despite the foregoing, however, Insurer continues its efforts to cast doubt on 1 Dr. Babinski’s causation testimony. In this regard, Insurer maintains that Dr. 2 Babinski’s causation testimony was “unrelia ble” on the asserted basis that Worker 3 misrepresented his medical history. [MIO 3, 7] As support for this assertion, Insurer 4 emphasizes that “Worker did not mention or explain the mechanism of the second 5 injury at the October 18, 2010, visit with Dr. Babinski.” [DS 5-6, 7; MIO 3, 4, 6] and 6 that Dr. Babinski “could not tell the judgethe mechanism or date of the second 7 injury.” [MIO 4, 6] As provided in our notice, however, these asserted deficiencies 8 were a matter for the WCJ as fact finder toconsider when weighing the evidence. See 9 Moya v. City of Albuquerque , 2008-NMSC-004, ¶ 6, 143 N.M. 258, 175 P.3d 926 10 (stating that it is for the WCJ as the factfinder to assess cred ibility and weigh the 11 evidence). 12
{5} We note also that, while Insurer emphasizes that Dr. Babinski had only 13 reviewed one MRI study at Worker’s initial October 18, 2010, office visit [MIO 3-4], 14 evidence was introduced that, ultimately, Dr. Babinski had knowledge of both work 15 place accidents [RP Vol.II/250] and reviewed separate MRI studies of Worker’s right 16 shoulder taken after both the first and s econd accidents. [RP Vol.II/229, 239, 250] 17 Moreover, to the extent Dr. Babinski did nothave complete medi cal records from Drs. 18 Ang, Thoms, or Kamps in his file [MIO 6], we note that this too was a matter for the 19 WCJ to consider in weighing the evidence, id. , and that Dr. Babinski nonetheless was 205 not prohibited from basing his opinion on hi s own evaluation of Worker and on his 1 own review of Worker’s MRI’s. Thus, although Dr. Kamps had a different medical 2 opinion than Dr. Babinski [MIO 9-10] and view ed the MRI results differently than did 3 Dr. Babinski [MIO 9], it was the WCJ’s prerogative as fact finder to rely on Dr. 4 Babinski’s assessment of Worker’s injury. See id. 5
{6} Further, while Insurer maintains that Worker’s repetitive use of his shoulder 6 after the first accident could have caused Worker’s bicep tear such that Worker did not 7 become a surgical candidate until after th e second accident [MIO 8, 10], the WCJ as 8 fact finder was entitled to rely on Dr. Babinski’s testimony that the second accident 9 provided only a temporary flare-up of Worker’s shoulder injury that did not materially 10 change the nature of Worker’s shoulder injury. [RP Vol.II/229, 240, 250-51, 254] In 11 doing so, the WCJ could have considered , among other matters, evidence that while 12 Worker did not have surgery after the firs t accident, Worker elected not to because he 13 desired to obtain a second opinion. [RP Vol.II/227, 236, 249] 14
{7} In sum, because it was within the WC J’s prerogative to weigh conflicting 15 evidence and because the MRI results may beviewed to support the WCJ’s conclusion 16 that Worker’s shoulder injury was causallyrelated only to the first accident, but not 17 the second work accident, we conclude th at the evidence supports the WCJ’s ruling 18 that Worker’s injury was solely cau sed by the first accident. [RP Vol.II/253-54] See 19 DeWitt v. Rent-A-Center, Inc. , 2009-NMSC-032, ¶ 12, 146 N.M. 453, 212 P.3d 341 206 (“Substantial evidence on the record as a whole is evidence demonstrating the 1 reasonableness of [the WCJ’s] decision, and we neither reweigh the evidence nor 2 replace the fact finder’s conclusions withour own.”). We therefore affirm. 3
{8} IT IS SO ORDERED. 4

__________________________________ 5 LINDA M. VANZI, Judge 6 WE CONCUR: 7

_________________________________ 8 JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge 9

_________________________________ 10 MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge 11