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HORN OF AFRICA:

CURRENT CONDITIONS AND U.S. POLICY

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA AND GLOBAL HEALTH

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JUNE 17, 2010

Serial No. 111–108

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California, Chairman 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BILL DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

MICHAEL E. MCMAHON, New York 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

JOHN S. TANNER, Tennessee 

GENE GREEN, Texas 

LYNN WOOLSEY, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

BARBARA LEE, California 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

MIKE ROSS, Arkansas 

BRAD MILLER, North Carolina 

DAVID SCOTT, Georgia 

JIM COSTA, California 

KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

RON KLEIN, Florida 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

RON PAUL, Texas 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

BOB INGLIS, South Carolina 

GUS BILIRAKIS, Florida 

RICHARD J. KESSLER, Staff Director 

YLEEM POBLETE, Republican Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA AND GLOBAL HEALTH

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey, Chairman 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

BARBARA LEE, California 

BRAD MILLER, North Carolina 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

LYNN WOOLSEY, California 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Mr. Ted Dagne, Specialist in African Affairs, Congressional Research Service . 11

Ms. Leslie Lefkow, Senior Researcher, Africa Division, Human Rights Watch . 28

Ms. Sadia Ali Aden, Human Rights Advocate and Freelance Writer ................. 41

Kenneth John Menkhaus, Ph.D., Professor of Political Science, Department 

of Political Science, Davidson College ................................................................ 49

Mr. Pagan Amum Okiech, Secretary General, The Sudan People’s Liberation 

Movement ............................................................................................................. 57

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Donald M. Payne, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of New Jersey, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Africa and Global 

Health: Prepared statement ................................................................................ 4

Mr. Ted Dagne: Prepared statement ...................................................................... 17

Ms. Leslie Lefkow: Prepared statement ................................................................ 30

Ms. Sadia Ali Aden: Prepared statement .............................................................. 44

Kenneth John Menkhaus, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ......................................... 52

Mr. Pagan Amum Okiech: Prepared statement .................................................... 59

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 78

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 79

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HORN OF AFRICA: CURRENT CONDITIONS 

AND U.S. POLICY 

THURSDAY, JUNE 17, 2010

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA AND GLOBAL HEALTH, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:13 a.m. in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Donald M. Payne, 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. PAYNE. The hearing will come to order. Good morning and 

welcome. I have convened this important hearing, ‘‘The Horn of Africa: Current Conditions and U.S. Policy,’’ to discuss the region of 

Africa that stays in the headlines perhaps more than any other region on the continent but is yet so misunderstood. This hearing 

comes on the heels of a similar one on the Great Lakes Region that 

we had recently. The point of this type of approach is to broaden 

the focus from particular countries to a regional outlook. 

The Subcommittee on Africa will continue to have hearings dealing with other regions in Africa because it is so important that regional integration and cooperation is occuring to determine the future of Africa. Some of you may wonder why a discussion about the 

Horn of Africa would include the Secretary General of the Sudan 

People’s Liberation Movement. Sudan abuts the Horn and is both 

impacted and impacts on what happens there. It is a key country 

which borders nine countries and therefore very essential. 

We cannot and must not take a myopic view when we approach 

these challenges in the African countries and regions. With that 

view in mind, the inclusion of a witness from Sudan makes absolute sense. As you will hear from our witnesses, the Horn of Africa—named for the shape the peninsula takes as it juts out into the 

Arabian Sea—has been marred by civil wars, internal political turmoil, inter-state wars, famine, man-made humanitarian disasters. 

It is a focal point for the U.S. foreign policy mainly for our counterterrorism—as it is highly vulnerable to terrorist attacks and is 

considered a safe haven for international terrorist groups as well 

as for humanitarian concern. Ethiopia and Somalia fought three 

major wars over the past several decades, while Eritrea and Ethiopia fought a bloody war from 1998 to 2000 in which over 100,000 

people were killed and many more displaced. The results of the 

Hague Decision and the efforts of the Hague decision and the efforts of the Eritrean-Ethiopian Border Commission remains 

unimplemented, and the two countries have yet to move forward on 

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the issue of Badme, recognized as part of Eritrea by the Boundary 

Commission. 

Prime Minister Meles of Ethiopia rules with an iron fist, overseeing the violence of the 2005 elections after which nearly 200 innocent people were killed by Ethiopian sharpshooters and countless 

people were imprisoned. Last month elections were held. Although 

they were relatively peaceful, they did not meet international 

standards, according to the U.S. and the EU’s commissions. Harassment, detention, and killings of opposition members preceded 

the elections. Also, changes in laws pertaining to NGOs must have 

been absent of outside support and also weakened opposition 

groups. Opposition leader, Ms. Birtukan Mideksa remains in prison 

and according to Meles will never be released. 

Somalia, one of the world’s poorest nations, has been marred by 

fractional fighting and humanitarian disasters since the collapse of 

the central government in 1991. Famine and lawlessness ensued 

and an estimate 300,000 Somalis died of starvation during the civil 

war in the early 1990s. 

A peace agreement was reached in 2004, and a Transitional Federal Government was established following a long process in 

Nairobi. However, Ethiopia invaded in 2006 tacitly encouraged by 

the former U.S. administration and ousted the Unions of Islamic 

Courts (ICU). The relative calm that followed the Islamic Courts 

rule ended abruptly; open conflict erupted in Mogadishu and beyond, and the humanitarian crisis exploded. 

The TFG is now led by President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, 

and he faces a major challenge by the terrorist group Al-Shabaab. 

I commend the administration for the support it has provided the 

TFG, and I urge it to increase that support to defeat Al-Shabaab 

and restore peace. 

On the humanitarian side, I am outraged by the continued suffering of the Somali people. The World Food Program’s suspension 

of activities in January in the south and central regions of Somalia 

has had a devastating effect on the vulnerable populations. We 

must do more to protect and provide support to the Somali people. 

In the North, the people of Somaliland will go to the polls on 

June 26. I hope the elections are fair and free. In a region that has 

suffered from wars and anarchy, Somaliland has consistently maintained relative peace and stability. This upcoming election provides 

a positive milestone for the future of the region and Somaliland. 

One of the root causes of political instability in the Horn is the 

underlying impact of the unresolved Eritrea-Ethiopia stalemate. 

These two countries have not had diplomatic relations with each 

other for 11 years, and the two have resorted to pursuing a proxy 

agenda in Somalia rather than resolve their differences. 

Eritrea has become increasingly isolated. However, over the past 

several years, President Isaias has stated that his government is 

ready to constructively engage Washington on a wide range of 

issues, including cooperation on the war on terror. Some opportunities have been missed by the U.S., but President Isaias must also 

do more to show he is serious about the future. 

Djibouti serves as the host to the U.S. Combined Joint Task 

Force Horn of Africa, a staging area in the war on terror. Djibouti 

is a strong partner. However, U.S. assistance has been on the deVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:38 Aug 25, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\AGH\061710\56997 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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cline. I hope to see this change. I also hope recent developments 

in the border dispute between Djibouti and Eritrea bear fruit 

where recently they have come to an accommodation, and I commend both countries for that. 

In Sudan, the U.S. is committed to seeing the referendum take 

place on January 9, 2011, and must respect the will of the Sudanese people. We must also do more to help prepare the South as 

the referendum approaches and for both possible outcomes. 

Finally, a word on Kenya: On August 4, the people of Kenya will 

vote on a referendum to approve or reject the draft Constitution. 

Outside forces have been waging a negative campaign over the past 

several months. 

The new Constitution includes sweeping and much needed reforms, as called for following the deadly post-election violence in 

2008. The process must be allowed to move forward without outside 

interferences. We cannot go into the 2012 elections without having 

a Constitution that is approved by the majority of the people of 

Kenya, and absent that or anything to deter that could once again 

lead to the horrible bloody deaths which followed the past national 

elections. 

With that, let me turn to the ranking member for his opening 

statement. Mr. Smith? 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Payne follows:]

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Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank you 

for calling this very important hearing. The peoples living in the 

Horn of Africa confront some of the most repressive governments 

in the world, and for many of them, the conditions of daily life constitute a humanitarian disaster. In southern and central Somalia, 

which has lacked a functioning government since 1991, most of the 

people live in areas controlled by Al-Shabaab, a foreign terrorist organization affiliated with al-Qaeda. 

We can hardly imagine the injustices and hardship of their lives 

in an ungoverned land that has become a haven for terrorists and 

pirates. It seems that the situation has only grown worse since last 

June when Chairman Payne last called a hearing to examine the 

situation in Somalia, and certainly it has grown worse since 2006 

when I, as chairman of this committee, called a hearing on Somalia. I understand the administration is reviewing its policy toward 

Somalia. Certainly, it is time to do that, and I look forward to hearing and learning about the options in this very, very sad and tragic 

situation. 

As to Ethiopia, Mr. Chairman, in recent years our Government 

has officially recognized the grave human rights abuses of the 

Meles government. But both under President Bush and now under 

President Obama, our diplomacy has given Meles a free pass. I 

would like to read from the summary of the State Department’s 

2009 Country Report on Human Rights Practices on Ethiopia:

‘‘Unlawful killings, torture, beating, abuse and mistreatment 

of detainees and opposition supporters by security forces often 

acting with evident impunity; poor prison conditions; arbitrary 

arrest and detention, particularly of suspected sympathizers or 

members of the opposition or insurgent groups; police, administrative and judicial corruption; detention without charge and 

lengthy pretrial detention; infringement on citizens’ privacy 

rights, including illegal searches; use of excessive force by security services in internal conflict and counterinsurgency operations; . . . arrest, detention and harassment of journalists; restrictions on freedom of assembly and association. . . .’’

The rest of the report continues that very significant indictment 

of the human rights policies of the Meles government. You mentioned the killings that occurred, the slaughter, in 2005. Well, right 

after that occurred, I traveled to Ethiopia. In Addis I met with 

President Meles, who was absolutely dismissive and really held in 

contempt the international community’s concern and my concern 

regarding those killings where security forces gunned down people 

in the street who were protesting the corrupt election and the process that was followed. 


56997f-3.eps
7

In regard to the May 23 elections in Ethiopia and the weeks and 

months prior to the elections, it is well established that the Meles 

government suppressed the democratic opposition. Human Rights 

Watch concluded that

‘‘the Ethiopian Government is waging a coordinated and sustained attack on political opponents, journalists and rights activists ahead of the May 2010 elections. Opposition candidates 

and activists including Birtukan Mideksa were assaulted or detained by police, and many opposition groups were prevented 

from opening local offices.’’

In December of ’09, the most prominent opposition newspaper 

was closed, and in April 2010, the government began jamming 

Voice of America broadcasts, so I want to thank other members, including my colleague, Mr. Royce, who joined me in a letter to Assistant Secretary Carson calling on our Government to send a 

strong unequivocal message to the Ethiopian Government that its 

conduct during and after these elections will be a very important 

factor in the development of U.S.-Ethiopian relations 

Since the election was in fact a sham, what is called for are not 

a few soft post-election words but a fundamental reorientation of 

our policy supporting not Meles, but the aspirations of the people 

of Ethiopia to live in freedom and dignity. Eritrea is a country that 

should receive much more attention than it does from our Government and from the international media. Five million people suffer 

under that government which Freedom House lists as among the 

nine countries it judges to have the worst of the worst humans 

rights conditions in the world. 

Somalia is also on the worst of the worst list, but of course, there 

was no government responsible for the tragic state of that country. 

Since there was strong evidence that the Eritrean Government supplies Al-Shabaab and similar groups in Somalia, it seems our Government should classify Eritrea as a state sponsor of terrorism, and 

I look forward to a discussion on that point. Mr. Chairman, I look 

forward to hearing our witnesses. I am glad we will be focusing 

again as we do almost every time this subcommittee convenes, and 

that is on the situation in Sudan. 

Obviously, our concerns are absolutely profound with the upcoming elections from the plebiscite that will occur, and as we have 

had witnesses tell us again and again, the huge caches and munitions and arms that are being smuggled into Southern Sudan 

raises very, very ominous concerns about what is intended, in the 

disruptions and the slaughter, the killings that might occur if that 

situation is not defused and mitigated. 

Finally, on Kenya, you did make mention of outside sources trying to influence the outcome of the Kenyan Constitution. I would 

point out that the Kenyan Constitution includes language that was 

crafted by a panel of experts, apparently with an enormous amount 

of input from outside of Kenya, that radically rewrites their Constitution with regards to abortion. Virtually all of the churches in 

Kenya—the Catholic Church, the Anglican Church, the National 

Council of Churches’ representatives and Evangelicals—are against 

the Constitution because it allows abortion on demand, which has 

not happened. 

8

Kenya’s population and the polling that has been done shows 60 

to 70 percent of the people in Kenya believe in the sanctity of unborn children and reject the violence of abortion whether it be 

chemical poisoning or dismemberment of a child, and that is the 

reason why there is such angst regarding this Constitution. Recently, a group of ‘‘no’’ campaigners, mostly under church auspices, 

were attacked by bombs just within the last few days. A half a 

dozen died, and maybe the number is higher by now. Approximately 70 were wounded. 

The source of that is not known, but it does raise very serious 

concerns about the attempts to disrupt the ‘‘no’’ campaign. The 

Constitution ought to be, in my opinion, the pro-abortion language 

excised out of it. If that is going to be discussed, let it be done by 

the legislature, but not through a Constitution reform, which contains a lot of other things that ought to be put into place. Nobody 

disputes that, so it is not outside forces I would respectfully say. 

It is internal. The people of Kenya, especially the faith community, 

is diametrically opposed to the killing of Kenyan babies and the 

wounding of their mothers by way of abortion. 

Let me also say that the Obama administration has provided some $11 million, and we do not know to whom and how that 

money has been used. It may be higher. I have been joined by 

Ileana Ros-Lehtinen and Darrell Issa of the Government Reform 

Committee. We have asked for a full Inspectors General investigation and a General Accountability Office investigation into what 

the money has been used for because if we are backing legislation 

that radically alters the Constitution, which then radically alters 

the pro-life policy of Kenya, that is in violation of United States 

law. 

The Siljander Amendment makes it absolutely clear that the 

U.S. Government cannot lobby either for or against abortion, and 

if we are lobbying for a vehicle, a bill, a Constitution reform proposal that radically changes it, our Government will be in violation 

of our own U.S. law. So the ‘‘outside forces’’ are really the inside 

forces. The outside forces are really the U.S. Government, we believe, and foreign non-governmental organizations, including at 

least 20 pro-abortion, non-governmental organizations heavily 

backed by U.S. funding that are trying to promote the ‘‘yes’’ campaign. 

I hope that they go back to the drawing board and quickly excise 

that abortion-related language and bring back a Constitution reform that the country can rally around because they certainly do 

need a Constitution. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. We will begin with our witnesses. Excuse me? Yes, Mr. Fortenberry. I didn’t see you slip in. 

Thank you. Sorry. I yield you as much time as you may consume. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your 

willingness to hold this hearing today, and I appreciate the opportunity to dialogue with our distinguished witnesses and look forward to your scholarly insights on the developing in the Horn of 

Africa, but, Mr. Chairman, I would like to focus my comments on 

Somalia. 

As I see it, Somalia is hanging by a thread, and the United 

States is in the unenviable position of reconciling two complex yet 

9

fundamental policy objectives brought into stark relief by the release this week of the Department of State’s Trafficking and Persons Report, which noted that the Somali Government is using 

child soldiers as young as 9 years of age in its fight against militants. There is a harsh dichotomy that presents an affront to our 

principles and moral sensibilities. 

On the one hand, we must work to help prevent spiraling instability and promote a semblance of just order in the midst of a highly volatile security situation, and in tandem we are obligated by 

law to combat the gruesome crime of child conscription, a most serious human rights violation especially prevalent in the world’s 

ungoverned spaces where children can easily fall victim to coercion 

and abhorrent abuse. As one of the authors of the Child Soldiers 

Prevention Act, which was incorporated into the William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Prevention Act of 2008, I am deeply concerned about this situation, and we must have an urgent dialogue 

about ending this pernicious human rights abuse. 

Given that Somalia’s defense, culture and higher education ministers recently quit their post in frustration over the Transitional 

Federal Government’s lack of progress in bringing order to that 

country, we need to have a clear understanding of the current situation as well as the United States policy options. We must also discuss how the U.S. can best use its limited resources to compel the 

responsibility communities of the nations to strengthen their efforts 

to combat Somalia’s rapid evolution into a barbarous and chaotic 

safe haven for terrorists. 

I would welcome hearing from our panelists on the way forward 

for U.S. security interest as well as human rights policy in Somalia. How do we move forward most effectively to both support stability and justice in such a chaotic and unpredictable environment? 

Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask you to convene a followup hearing on the specific situation in Somalia if you would give that consideration, and I think we need to explore this critical issue with 

the administration as well. Thank you. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. I agree. I know we are all opposed to the use of child soldiers, and if that is indeed occurring 

with the TFG, we certainly should have that looked into. We have 

also been joined by Dr. Boozman. I yield to him. 

Mr. BOOZMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I don’t have a comment. I just appreciate the hearing. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. Now we will introduce our 

witnesses. First, we will hear from Ted Dagne. Mr. Dagne is a specialist in Africa Affairs at the Foreign Affairs Defense and Trade 

Division of the Congressional Research Service (CRS) and has offered his expertise to the CRS since 1989. Between his work at 

CRS, Mr. Dagne served as professional staff member of the House 

Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Africa under chairmanship of Congressman Henry Johnson from 1993 to 1995. 

From 1999 to 2000, Mr. Dagne served as a special advisor to 

President Clinton’s Special Envoy for Sudan and to Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Dr. Susan Rice, our U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Over the past 20 years, Mr. Dagne has written 

over 2,000 major studies on Africa and has co-authored two books 

on Somalia and Africa and the war on terror. He also serves as the 

10

associate editor of the Mediterranean Quarterly journal. Mr. Dagne 

is a graduate of Howard University here in Washington, DC. 

Next, we will hear from Ms. Leslie Lefkow, who currently serves 

as senior researcher and Horn of Africa team leader in the African 

Division at Human Rights Watch. While at Human Rights Watch, 

Ms. Lefkow has used her specialty in abuses in armed conflict and 

humanitarian crisis to conduct research in Sudan, Cote d’Ivoire, Liberia and Somalia. Before joining Human Rights Watch, Ms. 

Lefkow worked for humanitarian organizations in Sudan, the Democrat Republic of the Congo and Sierra Leone. She holds graduate 

degrees from the University of Columbia in law and Bryn Mawr 

College. 

Following Ms. Lefkow is Ms. Sadia Ali Aden. Ms. Ali Aden is a 

human rights advocate, freelance writer and co-founder of the Adar 

Foundation, Somali Diaspora Youth and the founder of the Diaspora Voice. Ms. Ali Aden’s articles have been published in various 

publications, including foreign policy forum, IslamOnline, alJazeera 

Magazine and the World Press. She has appeared for a number of 

interviews on NPR and BBC and other media outlets. Notably, Ms. 

Ali Aden is also finalizing her studies in medicine. Congratulations. 

Next, we have Dr. Ken Menkhaus. Dr. Menkhaus is professor of 

political science at Davidson College and joined the Davidson faculty in 1991 with his specialization, which includes development, 

conflict and peace operations in the Horn of Africa. Dr. Menkhaus 

served as a special political advisor to the United Nations operation 

in Somalia from 1993 and 1994 and as a visiting civilian professor 

at the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute from 1994 to 1995. 

Dr. Menkhaus has authored over 50 articles and books, has made 

many interviews, and has appeared on media outlets including 

BBC, CNN and the Voice of America. Dr. Menkhaus holds a Ph.D. 

in international studies from the University of South Carolina and 

received a Fulbright Scholarship during his studies. 

Lastly, we have Mr. Pagan Amum Okiech, Secretary General of 

the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement. Dr. Okiech was elected 

to SPLM Secretary General in May 2008 and has served as a member of the SPLM Political Bureau and SPLM National Liberation 

Council. 

Mr. Amum Okiech has an extensive career with SPLM and the 

Sudanese Government, including his contributions to the formation 

of the Southern Sudan Liberation Front back in 1982—one of the 

original members. Prior to his position as Secretary General, Mr. 

Amum Okiech was appointed as Minister for Cabinet Affairs in the 

Government of National Unity from 2007 to 2008. He also completed an appointment as Secretary General of the SPLM and 

member of both the Interim Political Bureau and the International 

Committee in 2006. 

In 2005 during the pre-interim period of the CPA, Mr. Amum 

Okiech served as the appointed caretaker supervisor for Lakes 

States by the late chairman Dr. John Garang of Sudan. We have 

been joined by three other members, and I might ask, Ms. Watson, 

would you like to make an opening statement, or, Ms. Lee or Ms. 

Woolsey? Of course, we are moving behind, but if you would like 

to make a statement—okay. Great. All right. Go ahead. 

11

Ms. WOOLSEY. Excuse me. I will just try to incorporate this with 

my questions. 

Mr. PAYNE. Excellent. Thank you very much. We will start with 

our first witness, Mr. Dagne. 

STATEMENT OF MR. TED DAGNE, SPECIALIST IN AFRICAN 

AFFAIRS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 

Mr. DAGNE. Thank you, Chairman Payne, Ranking Member 

Smith and members of the subcommittee for the opportunity to testify before this subcommittee. The Horn of Africa region is by far 

the most unstable region in sub-Saharan Africa today. Millions of 

people have died and many more have been displaced or forced into 

exile. One does not have to look in a refugee camp in Kenya to find 

an Ethiopian, Eritrean or a Somali. Hundreds of thousands of people from the Horn of Africa region are now second-generation 

American citizens. Some have returned to help their fellow brothers and sisters as humanitarian workers, human rights advocates 

and journalists. Many have lost their lives. 

Ibrahim Addou, an American Somali, is one such person. In December 2009, he was killed in a suicide attack in Mogadishu along 

with over a dozen students, teachers and several ministers. A number of Somali journalists covering the crisis in Somalia have been 

assassinated by insurgents. Dozens of humanitarian and human 

rights workers have been killed or injured. I am making this point 

because what has gotten the attention of the media is the dozen 

or so people who went back to kill and maim their own people and 

not those who died while helping others. 

The Horn of Africa region has been marred by civil war, internal 

political turmoil, interstate war, famine and man-made humanitarian crisis. The region has also emerged as a place highly vulnerable to terrorist attacks. The suffering in the Horn of Africa is 

largely man made and some of the conflicts were triggered in part 

because of failed leadership. Somalia remains in a state of anarchy 

despite a peace agreement signed in 2004. 

Ethiopia’s intervention in December 2006 made Somalia more 

unstable than it was during the 6 months the Islamic Courts was 

in power. What is forgotten is in those 2 years’ period, more than 

22,000 people, most of whom innocent civilians, were killed. Another area little is heard about is the Ogaden region of Ethiopia 

where hundreds of thousands of civilians have fled to refugee 

camps in Kenya over the past years. The Ogaden is a forgotten 

tragedy. Efforts to resolve the conflicts in the region have lead to 

an important peace agreement. Although, this agreement has not 

lead to lasting peace and stability in the region. 

The United States has been actively engaged in the Horn of Africa since the early 1960s. We helped secure the border dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea and the comprehensive peace agreement in Sudan. Relations between Eritrea and the United States 

once strong are currently poor. Our relations between Ethiopia and 

the United States are strong. Although, some Members of Congress 

and human rights groups have been critical of Ethiopia’s human 

rights record and the handling of the 2005 and 2010 elections. 

What is the terrorist threat in the Horn of Africa? Well, the takeover of power in Sudan by the NIF government in 1989 led to a 

12

significant increase in the activities of international terrorist 

groups. The NIF government provided safe haven for well-known 

international terrorist organizations and individuals, and the government security services also were directly engaged in facilitating 

and assisting domestic and international terror groups. It was during the 5 year’s stay in Sudan Osama bin Laden laid the foundation of al-Qaeda. The penetration by al-Qaeda into east Africa is directly tied to Sudan’s early years of support to international terror 

organizations. 

Indeed, the 1990s saw dramatic and daring terrorist attacks 

against American interests in east Africa. Over the past 2 years, 

a number of local terrorist groups have emerged in Somalia, including Al-Shabaab, the Ras Kamboni Group and Hizbul Al-Islam, but 

what is the evolution of the terrorists groups in east Africa? Well, 

we have to go back to the early ’90s where Islamic Courts began 

to emerge in parts of the country. At the beginning, these courts 

functioned as local governments and often enforced decisions by 

using their own militia. Members of the Al-Ittihad Al-Islami, for 

example, provided the bulk of the security forces for these courts 

in the 1990s. 

By the late 1990s, Ethiopian Security Forces and their allies severely weakened Al-Ittihad. However, the absence of a central government in Somalia created an environment conducive to the proliferation of armed factions throughout the country. In 2003, the 

leadership of Al-Ittihad, including Sheik Ali Warsame, who is the 

brother-in-law of the terrorist listed, now Sheik Aweys, and the 

leader of one of the terrorist groups Hizbul Al-Islam, met and later 

decided to form a new political front, the Islamic Courts Union, 

which came to the scene in 2006 included some of the top leaders 

of Al-Ittihad. 

However, the young members of those Islamic movements did not 

agree with the old guard and instead they decided to form their 

own organization. This young generation of Islamists, some of 

whom had fought in Afghanistan, met and formed later on AlShabaab. Some of the key commanders and leaders of Al-Shabaab 

come not from central Somalia or southern Somalia but 

Somaliland. One of the top leaders is Ahmed Abdi Godane, also 

known as Abu Zubayr, who was trained in Afghanistan, fought in 

Afghanistan, is now one of the top leaders of Al-Shabaab. 

Mukhtar Robow, also another Afghani trainee, is the top leader 

and the face of the Al-Shabaab. Ibrahim Haji, also known as AlAfghani, who is also on the U.S. terrorism list, is also from 

Somaliland and one of the top leaders of Al-Shabaab. Hassan Al 

Turki, a member of the Ogaden clan from Ethiopia, is one of the 

extremist leaders and a member of Al-Shabaab now. The U.S. 

counterterrorism efforts in the Horn of Africa region have shown 

some success in containing terrorism and extremism. 

Several countries in east Africa have benefitted from training 

and material support from the United States. Several known terrorists have been killed. In mid-September 2009, U.S. forces killed 

Saleh Nabhan, a senior al-Qaeda member and one of the three involved in the attacks of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. 

Of the three most wanted al-Qaeda leaders in east Africa, the only 

13

one left now is the leader of the group and the alleged mastermind 

of the embassy bombings, Haroon Fazul. 

On the other hand, the Ethiopian invasion, with the support of 

the United States, is seen by some as having contributed to the 

emergence of Al-Shabaab and the proliferation of other extremist 

groups in Somalia. The ouster of the Islamic Courts Union leadership by Ethiopia in 2006 created a security vacuum that was quickly filled by the most radical elements of the Islamist movement. As 

was the case when the withdrawal of the U.S. and U.N. forces in 

the mid-1990s from Somalia also created a security vacuum which 

was quickly filled by Somali warlords. 

Al-Qaeda and its allies are reportedly much stronger today than 

they were a few years ago even though al-Qaeda has not been able 

to penetrate deeper into Africa and win a strong following. AlShabaab has been able to recruit dozens of Somalis from the 

United States, Europe and the Middle East, a number of whom 

have carried out suicide attacks inside Somalia. Many of these recruits joined Al-Shabaab at the height of the fighting between the 

Ethiopian forces and Al-Shabaab. Some thought they were going to 

fight a foreign invader. Others saw this as a religious duty. Moreover, more Somalis sees now themselves as victims of Al-Shabaab 

and view this group as a foreign-controlled and led organization. 

Let me now just speak briefly about the Horn of Africa countries 

Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia. Djibouti’s pro-Western foreign policy stance and close alliance with the modern Western government over the years have earned Djibouti friends, including the 

United States. Djibouti is an important strategic ally. During the 

2003 Iraq War, Djibouti provided access to its port and airfields as 

well as facilities for training purposes. Djibouti also served as one 

of the two locations worldwide for USAID Food for Peace program’s 

storage facilities. 

Over the years, Djibouti has played key roles in facilitating negotiations especially among Somali factions. The last peace agreement, which led to the formation of the TFG was negotiated in 

Djibouti. The government in Djibouti can be said as open but dominated by one party. It is a multi-party system, but the ruling party 

controls all the seats in Parliament and regional councils. On April 

8, 2005, President Guelleh won the elections. He unfortunately was 

limited to two terms, but in April of this year, the Djibouti Parliament amended the Constitution by removing the Presidential 

term limits paving the way for President Guelleh to run for a third 

term. 

One issue that has been of major concern to the region and the 

U.S. is the border disputes between Djibouti and Eritrea. In June 

2008, Eritrean and Djibouti forces clashed and an estimated 35 

people were killed with more than 50 wounded. The crisis erupted 

after several months of tensions following troop deployments to the 

border by both Eritrea and Djibouti. The dispute centers around 

claims by both sides over Ras Doumeira and the Doumeira Island. 

After almost a year of no progress, 2 weeks ago the Governments 

of Djibouti and Eritrea agreed to resolve their dispute through negotiations under the auspices of the Government of Qatar. Eritrean 

forces this then have withdrawn from the border area, and Qatar 

has deployed its forces as observers. Now to Eritrea. Over the past 

14

decade, Eritrea has faced serious internal and external challenges. 

In 1998, the war between the two neighbors led to the killings of 

100,000 people and displacement of over 1 million. 

The dispute between the two was followed by the most serious 

rift within the Eritrean Liberation Movement. The crisis split the 

top leadership, and in 2001, President Isaias ordered the arrest of 

15 top ruling-party leaders. The government alleges that these officials, known as the Group of 15, were engaged in a conspiracy to 

overthrow the government during the conflicts with Ethiopia. The 

Government of Eritrea also accused some American officials in the 

Clinton administration of being co-conspirators. Two Eritrean employees of the U.S. Embassy were also arrest, accused of being part 

of the conspiracy. 

None of these prisoners have been formally charged and have 

been given access for visitors. Political parties in Eritrea are not 

permitted to operate, and there have been no elections since independence. The crackdown and allegations against the former Clinton administration officials strained relations between the United 

States and the Government of Eritrea. For most of the 1990s, the 

government of Isaias Afewerki was considered a strong strategic 

ally. Eritrea indeed played a key role in the fight against the 

Bashir regime and support to the SPLM and its allies. Eritrea was 

also one of the first African countries to join the U.S.-led coalition 

of the willing. 

Since the late 1990s however, U.S. officials have expressed concern about the wide range of issues, including human rights conditions, Eritrea’s role in Somalia, border disputes with Djibouti and 

Ethiopia and freedom of the press. Over the past decade, the 

United States has imposed a number of punitive measures on Eritrea. There is no U.S. assistance program in Eritrea, and the U.S. 

also closed its consular section in Eritrea. 

Eritrea nationals seeking U.S. visa must now obtain their visa 

in a third country. The Eritrean Government has also imposed restrictions on visas. Although, in recent years the government has 

issued visas to U.S. officials, journalists and human rights organizations. In March 2010, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary 

of State for Africa and another State Department official were 

issued. What were the efforts made to improve relations? 

Over the past several years, President Isaias has stated that his 

government is ready to constructively engage Washington on a 

wide range of issues, including cooperation on the war on terror. 

In 2008, the Eritrean Government sent a letter to then President 

Bush offering dialogue in order to improve relations. The letter was 

delivered with a cover letter by a Member of Congress to the White 

House in early 2008. The Bush administration did not respond to 

offer for dialogue. 

The Obama administration early on expressed interest in engaging the Eritrean Government in order to address some areas of concern. President Isaias in a letter to President Obama in May expressed similar interests. A few months later, Assistant Secretary 

of State Carson announced his intention to go to Eritrea. The proposed visit by the Assistant Secretary however took a different turn 

by late 2009. In December 2009, Carson wrote to the Eritrean foreign minister stating that

15

‘‘I registered my willingness to meet with you in Europe or Africa to discuss some of the issues that have generated division 

in our relationship. That offer still stands. No meetings in 

Washington however will take place.’’

A few months after the offer to meet in a third country, Carson’s 

Principal Deputy, Donnie Yamamoto, applied for and received a 

visa to go to Eritrea. Yamamoto went to Eritrea in May 2010, but 

the Eritrean Government officials refused to meet with him arguing that he obtained his visa to do work related to the U.S. Embassy. Ambassador Yamamoto stated that he intends to go back to 

Eritrea and has submitted another request for a visa. 

Interestingly, he is the only foreign official who has been given 

access to the Eritrean prisoners in 2003. In late 2009, the U.S. took 

the lead in the imposition of sanctions against Eritrea and the U.N. 

Security Council. The sanctions were imposed because of Eritrean 

alleged support to armed groups. Eritrea also provided safe haven 

to the current President and a number of ministers serving in the 

TFG. Now to Ethiopia. 

I am sure you know what transpired. As the chairman said, the 

elections were peaceful, but the outcome of the election clearly indicates that the ruling party emerged dominant. The ruling party, for 

example, won 545 seats out of 547. They have also won the entire 

city council seats in the capital city as well as all the regional state 

council seats. Now, if you look at what happened in 2005, it was 

quite the reverse. The opposition won over 160 seats and the entire 

seats in the capital. What happened and what led to this? What 

were the environments before the elections? 

Well, pre-election conditions were marred by the harassment, detention and in some cases killings of opposition members. The combination of measures taken by the ruling party over the past several years not only weakened legal opposition but also crushed civil 

society, human rights groups and the independent press activities. 

Moreover, use of government resources, the civil service and the security forces to strengthen constituency base of the ruling party 

through intimidation and incentives help the EPRDF build a strong 

following. 

The forced exile of opposition leaders, civil society groups and 

independent journalists also help the EPRDF to secure victory. 

Some Ethiopians and outside observers also assert that many were 

fearful of being killed or injured should they express support to opposition groups. Recently adopted laws restricting NGOs, media 

and the anti-terrorism law are being used to stifle the activities of 

opposition groups, the independent press and civil society groups. 

It is also important to point out that opposition groups also contributed to the sweeping victory of the EPRDF. 

Since the 2005 elections, opposition groups in Ethiopia and Diaspora have been fragmented and fought each other more than preparing a united front. Opposition groups have often spent more 

time in the capital or outside the capital than in building a constituency base throughout the country. Opposition groups were successful in 2005 in large part because of the grass roots work that 

was done. The 2010 elections result clearly show Ethiopia moving 

toward a one-party rule despite the presence of other parties affiliated with the ruling party. 

16

Prime Minister Meles Zenawi has stated that he and a number 

of the senior leadership of the ruling party will retire by 2015. 

Even at this juncture, the prime minister has served in power 

longer than the military junta Mengistu. Moreover, it is not clear 

at this juncture if the retirement of the old guard will pave the way 

for a true multi-party democracy in Ethiopia. I think I will conclude briefly by mentioning the situation in the Ogaden. Once 

again, there are many people who have been displaced and many 

people who have fled and many civilians who are being targeted 

through rape, hanging and outright destruction of their villages. 

Lastly, on Somalia, I am sure my colleagues will cover it, but let 

me briefly talk about what happened a few weeks ago with the central government. In mid-May 2010, the Somali Speaker of Parliament resigned after several months of disputes with the Prime 

Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister. A day later, President 

Sheikh Sharif Ahmed fired the Prime Minister. However, the reversal of the decision seemed pre-planned to oust the Speaker from office by those close the President. 

In late May 2010, the former Finance and Deputy Prime Minister, Sheik Sharif Hassan, ran for Speaker and won the support 

of 217 members out of 550. The Deputy Prime Minister has been 

campaigning to oust the Speaker for several months. He received 

the support in Parliament in part through bribing and other 

means. The former minister resigned in protest arguing that this 

was pre-planned and that Hassan used government resources to 

bribe members of Parliament to support his candidacy. 

The current state of affairs in Mogadishu threatens the authority 

of the President and the government and could also lead to more 

defections. This situation could also help those extremist groups 

and extremist element to get the upper hand. Let me stop here, 

and I thank you, Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Dagne follows:]

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Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much, and I asked Mr. Dagne to 

take additional time, which is unusual, but we wanted to get a 

focus on the overall region. The State Department did not send a 

representative, and this was about as close as we could get to what 

the U.S. policy is, and I know it went over a bit, but I appreciate 

the indulgence of everyone because this has to be a matter of the 

record as we move forward as our committee determines what we 

will be doing legislatively, and so I do appreciate the indulgence of 

everyone and certainly appreciate your very thorough testimony, 

Mr. Dagne. 

We will now hear 5 minutes from Ms. Lefkow, and the others 

will follow in that order, and then we will open for questions. 

Thank you very much. I appreciate your being here, and thank you 

for your patience. 

STATEMENT OF MS. LESLIE LEFKOW, SENIOR RESEARCHER, 

AFRICA DIVISION, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 

Ms. LEFKOW. Thank you very much, Chairman Payne and members of the subcommittee for inviting Human Rights Watch to participate in this incredibly important hearing. I am very happy that 

Mr. Dagne has already covered so eloquently many of the countries 

because I am going to focus my remarks on Ethiopia, not obviously 

because it is more important than the other countries, but it is at 

a critical moment with the elections that just passed in May. Mr. 

Chairman, Ethiopia is not democratizing. The May 2010 elections 

provided a stark illustration of this fact. 

As you know, the ruling party won more than 99 percent of the 

vote, but what concerns Human Rights Watch more even than the 

results of these elections is the fact that they are simply a milestone in a broader agenda and strategy of consolidating control. We 

are particularly concerned that the assault on civil society in Ethiopia is a trend that will continue and worsen, and this should deeply concern Ethiopia’s friends and partners. 

It is clear now that the brief window of political space that 

opened up before the elections in 2005 was an anomaly, and that 

window has now been slammed shut. Human Rights Watch’s research on the ground indicates that the government has used a 

multi-pronged strategy of oppression, and as I said, this was partly 

in the lead up to the elections, but it is a strategy that we fear will 

continue long after the elections, and one of the elements in the 

strategy has been the repression of the political opposition. I think 

you are all aware that government critics have been subjected to 

arbitrary detention, to harassment and sometimes even torture in 

detention. 

The case of Birtukan Mideksa, of course one of the most prominent opposition leaders, is emblematic of this trend. She was re-arrested in December 2008 for allegedly violating the terms of her 

pardon, but we hear about prominent cases like Birtukan’s. We 

don’t hear very much about the millions of Ethiopian’s who suffer 

repression on a day-to-day basis outside of Addis Ababa where 

there is very little spotlight on what is happening. Eighty-five percent of Ethiopians live in the rural areas. 

I would like to just spend a moment talking about the apparatus 

of control that is used in these areas. This is an apparatus that is 

29

an inheritance from the Derg, from the military regime of 

Mengistu, and it is a collection of households into cells at village 

or neighborhood levels, sometimes eight households, sometimes 10 

households in cells, and these administrative structures, as you can 

imagine, they can be benign, but they can also be a very effective 

tool of surveillance and monitoring and control, and this structure 

of course is what was used very effectively in the lead-up to the 

elections, but it is also a structure that will be there long after any 

electoral period is over. 

These structures are very much at the core of the repression that 

is used in the rural areas. As one teacher told Human Rights 

Watch a few months ago when we were doing research in the country, you have to understand, he said, that at the grass roots level 

everything is organized according to the EPRDF ideology. Everything is organized and controlled by cells. If you are opposition, you 

are excluded. 

I think I am stressing this because to understand the climate of 

fear that exists, that is sometimes not very tangible if you are visiting for a day or a week or even a month, but exists there and 

touches the lives of millions of Ethiopians on a day-to-day basis, I 

think to understand that is to understand how this strategy of oppression works and succeeds. I would like to just spend one moment mentioning as I mentioned the targeting of civil society because as I said, this is a concern that is going to last far longer 

than any electoral repression. 

What we have seen in the last year since the adoption of this 

very repressive NGO law is basically the evisceration of independent civil society in Ethiopia. Most of the most prominent Ethiopian human rights activists have fled in the last year. The most 

prominent organizations have been gutted. Their staff are now in 

hiding. Their budgets have been frozen. They have had to shut offices. This is the bottom line in terms of the effect of this law. 

The media of course has also been a target over the last year or 

2, and I think we see that in a number of ways, and one of the 

primary impacts of the media law and of the hostility toward independent media is self-censorship. In fact, you see even the semiindependent press will often not touch very sensitive subjects. I see 

that I am running out of time. I am going to take just another few 

seconds if I may to just mention one other issue which is a key concern, and that is impunity of the security forces. 

The Ethiopian military’s record in dealing with the very real and 

legitimate security threats that Ethiopia faces is a terrible record. 

As I said, the government faces genuine security issues, but the 

way that security forces have dealt with these threats has often 

been to indiscriminately attack civilians, and there has been utter 

impunity conferred on the perpetrators be they in Gambella, be 

they in the Ogaden area of Somali Region or be there in neighboring Somalia. 

This I think is an area of concern that the United States as a 

friend and as an ally of Ethiopia must press in the coming weeks 

and months. Accountability is at the core of a stable and viable 

partnership with Ethiopia, and that of course should be all of the 

shared goals of both the Ethiopian Government, the U.S. Government and all of us here today. Thank you very much. 

30

[The prepared statement of Ms. Lefkow follows:]


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Mr. PAYNE. Thank you. Ms. Ali Aden? 

STATEMENT OF MS. SADIA ALI ADEN, HUMAN RIGHTS 

ADVOCATE AND FREELANCE WRITER 

Ms. ALI ADEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Payne, 

Ranking Member Smith and distinguished members of this committee, thank for your holding this very important hearing that 

sheds light on Somalia’s humanitarian catastrophe and the impact 

on women and children. Mr. Chairman, I am honored to be given 

the opportunity to come and speak today on a subject that is dear 

to my heart: The suffering of Somali women and children. Mr. 

Chairman, with your permission, I would like to ask that my full 

testimony be submitted into the record. 

Mr. PAYNE. Without objection. 

Ms. ALI ADEN. Protracted wars, civil or otherwise, victimizes predominantly woman and children, and nowhere is this fact more 

pronounced than in Somalia. Whether in refugee camps or in the 

neighborhoods of Mogadishu, the grim images of women and children in profound state of anguish, vulnerable human beings tormented by endless inter-Somali, inter-clan, inter-warlords, intersectarian strife for power and domination, but their stories are 

never the dominant narrative of consequence of that long conflict. 

Since the collapse of the Somali state in 1991, Somali women 

have played a pivotal role at the most dire period of their country’s 

history, especially in the social and economic sector of the society. 

Women play an active role in maintaining integrity, values and the 

structure of Somali family and community. While by and large men 

fought in offense or the defense of senseless clan strife, Somali 

women became the bread winners of the society. That is reaffirming their profound resilience and selfless capacity. 

Today, because of insecurity created by the conflict between warring forces, hundreds of thousands, particularly women and children and elderly, are forced to flee and become internally displaced 

persons. This on again, off again massive security-related displacement of civilian population has become the predictable nightmare 

resulting from each time the insurgents and government clash. 

Today, Somalia remains one of the worst humanitarian catastrophes in the world. 

With nearly 1.5 million internally displaced, these IDPs are lacking water, shelter and food. Most cluster in make-shift refugee 

camps outside Mogadishu. These IDPs may not have food or water 

for days. Sadly, through these dire conditions, women give birth to 

children and raise them under such uncertainties. In Afgooye 

alone, 30 kilometers south of Mogadishu, there are about 400,000 

IDPs according to UNICEF. One-quarter of those are children 

under the age of five. 

Hundreds of thousands more refugees, women and children mostly, ended up in refugee camps such as the Dadaab, which was 

originally built for 90,000 refugees but now holds over 280,000 refugees of mostly women and children. According to Refugee International, these refugees are in four main asylum countries, 

Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and Yemen. Some have been in exile for 

the past 18 years. Moreover, Mr. Chairman, there are nearly 3.5 

42

million civilians out of total population of 8 million are on the verge 

of starvation. 

Whenever fighting intensifies, the flow of essential foods stops, 

sometimes for months an in early 2010 when the World Food Programme decided to suspend its delivery and distribution of emergency food in the south and central Somalia. Armed conflicts, 

droughts and absence of public infrastructure have led to famine, 

disease and death of hundreds of thousands of people. USAID’s report of June 1, 2009, shows 3.5 million are in need of humanitarian 

assistance. 650,000 of those are children under the age of five. 

Children are also increasingly being denied access to education 

because of the continuing civil war. Seventy-five percent are located in central and southern Somalia. Of the displaced, some of 

those, especially women with maternal mortality ratio of 1,044 per 

100,000, live in difficult conditions making Somali women among 

the most high-risk groups in the world. Mortality among the children under the age of 5 is staggering 142 per 1,000 compared to 

world’s combined 68. 

The heroes under the radar at the Dr. Hawa Abdi Hospital, 

which is located outside Mogadishu-Afgooye corridor kilometer 21 

is run by Dr. Hawa Abdi assisted by her daughter Dr. Deqa 

Mohamed. They hold in their camps surrounding the hospital about 

72,000 IDPs. Of those, 18,000 are families with children. Out of 

those, 43 percent are children, 32 percent are women, 16 percent 

are elderly, and 9 percent are men. They have a daily visit of 980 

per day. Of those, 580 are children, 320 are women and 80 are 

men. 

They have five doctors, 60 nurses, 160 healthcare personnel, 

some of them trained before the collapse of the state. The assistance they get is only coming from medications provided by Doctors 

without Borders and Dr. Hawa Abdi’s Hospital, herself, and other 

sponsors such as individuals and Somalis in the Diaspora and 

sometimes the Italian Embassy. I will touch on the child soldiers, 

Mr. Chairman, hopefully with question/answer session, but the 

senseless game of tit for tat between the insurgents, government 

and AMISOM is something also that I would like to talk about 

later. 

Without talking about the toxic waste, I would not think I would 

be able to cover the humanitarian crisis in Somalia. Mr. Chairman, 

there is a ticking environmental bomb beneath the Indian Ocean 

that were something to go wrong could potentially cause or exceed 

damages being caused by the current massive BP oil damages to 

countless barrels dumped in the Somalia waters. Mr. Chairman, 

the illegal hyper-fishing still continues. 

This practice has put certain Somali fishing communities in economic dire straights, and I would like to emphasize that more 

later, but I would like to offer my recommendations if that is okay. 

I would like for the U.S. Government and for you to help provide 

adequate access to humanitarian assistance; support the formalization of the U.S.-Somali relationship. It is encouraging that now Somalia has appointed an envoy to United States. 

We would like for President Obama, since he has started already 

the process, to also appoint an envoy; provide incentive for disarmament, especially for children; help sustain the TFG to become 

43

strong and politically capable to secure the country but also firmly 

press the TFG to continually engage and reconcile with the opposition groups; engage and empower the Somali Diaspora because 

they are essential to the stability of the Somali state; and pass 

laws that prevent the illegal fishing and toxic waste dumping from 

American companies. 

Lastly, support and provide services to individuals, Dr. Hawa 

Abdi and other centers. I thank you for giving me the opportunity 

to speak regarding this life and death situation. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Ali Aden follows:]

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Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much for your testimony and your 

recommendations. Dr. Menkhaus, you may take more than the allotted 5 minutes if you need since Mr. Smith kindly invited you. 

I don’t want to hear from him later that I didn’t give you the equal 

footing. Not as much time as you may consume, but if you have to 

exceed 5 minutes, that is fine. Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF KENNETH JOHN MENKHAUS, PH.D., PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, DAVIDSON COLLEGE 

Mr. MENKHAUS. Thank you. Congressman Payne, Congressman 

Smith, distinguished members, thank you for the opportunity to 

share my assessment of the situation in the Horn of Africa and its 

implications for U.S. policy, and with your permission, I would like 

to go off script rather than read excerpts from my submitted testimony, and instead provide some summary remarks that I hope can 

tie together some of the issues that we have discussed as a group 

this morning. 

Mr. PAYNE. All right. 

Mr. MENKHAUS. I am focusing my remarks on Somalia and our 

policy specifically with regard to the political crisis in Somalia. My 

colleagues have already made reference to the security threats and 

the humanitarian policies there, so I won’t return to that in great 

detail. Our policy in Somalia has been framed for several years by 

support to the Transitional Federal Government or TFG. That has 

never been a policy that has been embraced because it was seen 

as having high promise but because it was always seen as the best 

of bad options. 

The bad news; after 6 years of a 5-year transitional government 

is that the TFG is no longer the best of bad options. It is simply 

a bad option. It is not working. The government is in disarray. 

Most of its members have resigned or reside outside the country. 

It controls only a few districts of the capital that are in fact secured 

by African Union peacekeepers. It has been notorious for corruption. Its security forces have been a law until themselves at times. 

It has, in short, been an enormous disappointment at the cost of 

millions of dollars. 

The fundamental problem with the Transitional Federal Government is not that it is weak. If it were only weak, state capacitybuilding assistance would be the cure. This is not a case of a government that is willing but not able. This is a case of a government 

that is neither willing nor able. Top political elites see the Transitional Federal Government as an opportunity to make money without taking the risks and the hard work of actually reviving the 

failed state in Somalia. 

Shabaab as a result has consolidated control over all the territory from the Kenyan border to most of the districts of Mogadishu 

and now all the way up to Beledweyne on the Ethiopian border and 

south central Somalia. Shabaab is not strong. It has numerous internal divisions, but it is the only player on the playing field, and 

so it is strong mainly as a function of the TFG’s weakness. Many 

observers believe that Shabaab can be melted. There can be defections. 

50

There are large groups within Shabaab that are not really committed to hard-core jihadism, but those individuals and groups, as 

with the rest of Somali society, will not rally against Shabaab, will 

not defect from it unless they see a viable alternative, and at 

present, there is no viable alternative in Somalia. So the population is acting in a predictably risk averse manner supporting tacitly or acquiescing to Shabaab control. 

What can we do in the face of this very deeply frustrating situation? I would like to add that by all accounts there is frustration 

in U.S. Government and frustration in other foreign capitals over 

this. The time is ripe for a policy shift. I would argue that for starters we need to look at a diversification strategy, not to decertify the 

Transitional Federal Government, but to demote it to a transitional 

authority tasked strictly with implementing key transitional tasks 

in this government. 

Meanwhile, we should be engaging any legitimate powerful and 

effective authorities that we find at the subnational level. That is 

not simply to say that we should be supporting a policy of building 

blocks of regional states. There are some regional states, such as 

Somaliland and Puntland that can and should be engaged. We already provide support to them. We can deepen that support, but 

that is not necessarily a model for the rest of the country. In fact, 

in much of southern Somalia, regional states, Federal states are actually an invitation to war. 

Instead, we need to look where governance is actually happening 

empirically in Somalia. It is not in fact an anarchic country. There 

is lots of ‘‘governance with a small g’’ going on, and most of it is 

actually happening at the municipal level in towns, Cross-clan alliances forged by common business interests and the need to secure 

basic law and order do occur. They occur beneath Shabaab in some 

cases, in spite of Shabaab in other cases, and beyond Shabaab’s 

control in other areas of the country. 

We should be engaging any local authority that we can find that 

is effective to create some competition for good governance in Somalia to put pressure on the TFG and to end its monopoly on access to external assistance. In addition, we need to consider a regional strategy. As Ted Dagne has already alluded to, Somalia 

forms part of a regional conflict complex. We have got to in particular put pressure on Ethiopia and Eritrea to resolve that longrunning impasse that infects the rest of the region. 

We also need to put pressure on our friends in the Ethiopian 

Government to come to some kind of rapprochement with the 

Ogaden National Liberation Front. Those two developments alone 

would have enormous positive benefit in Somalia. We need to recognize that the U.S. Government has good relations with most of 

the governments in the region, and that is a great tool for us, but 

the problem is, as many of my colleagues have alluded to, those 

governments are in fact enemies of large sections of their own populations, and that is a problem for us. 

Recruitment by al-Qaeda or other radical groups is going to enjoy 

ideal conditions where people are angry with repressive, predatory 

governments that are supported by the United States. We need to 

recognize that some of these allies of ours in the region are allies, 

but we are fighting somewhat different wars. Our principal concern 

51

is al-Qaeda’s influence in the region and by extension Shabaab’s 

ability to engage in terrorist attacks in the region. Their principal 

interest is political survivalism and sometimes the use of counterterrorism agendas against domestic opponents who may or may not 

in fact be enemies of ours. 

Finally, if we were gaining more security in the region at the cost 

of some compromises on humanitarian access, human rights, democratization, we could at least be having an interesting ethical 

debate over tradeoffs. The tragedy in this region and the tragedy 

for U.S. foreign policy is we are getting none of those. The region 

is palpably more insecure today than it was 5 years ago even as 

we have forfeited voice on matters of humanitarian access and democracy and human rights deferring to some of our regional allies 

rather than confronting them, and we are getting nothing right 

now, and I think that is really grounds for a major policy rethink 

in the region. I will stop there. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Menkhaus follows:]

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Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. We have our final witness, 

Mr. Amum Okiech. 

STATEMENT OF MR. PAGAN AMUM OKIECH, SECRETARY 

GENERAL, THE SUDAN PEOPLE’S LIBERATION MOVEMENT 

Mr. AMUM OKIECH. Thank you, Chairman Payne, Congressman 

Smith and members of the subcommittee. I thank you for holding 

this important hearing on current conditions and U.S. policy in the 

Horn of Africa. I appreciate the opportunity to speak on behalf of 

the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement and the people of Sudan 

about the momentous changes taking place in our country and the 

role we hope the United State of America can play in helping us 

avoid a return to conflict in Sudan and ensure a brighter future for 

the Sudanese people who have seen so many years of war and suffering. 

Mr. Chairman, sir, if you may allow me, I have submitted a written testimony, and I would like to use to the few minutes to proceed to make recommendations? 

Mr. PAYNE. Without objection. 

Mr. AMUM OKIECH. And I will start by stating that Sudan, my 

country, is a failed state. Sudan is a failed state because at independence, the Sudanese political leadership have failed to develop 

and agree to an inclusive nation-building consensual project, a 

project that would have transformed the decolonized, multi-cultural 

society and build it into a multi-cultural inclusive nation. This failure led to profound national crisis expressing itself in multiple devastating civil wars and to an entrenchment of a highly repressive 

extremely violent military dictatorships, transforming the Sudanese state into a predictory state. 

Mr. Chairman, sir, this state failure and national crisis and misrule is responsible today for causing the imminent disintegration of 

the Sudanese state. The CPA, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, was an attempt to resolve the Sudanese national crisis and 

to end the conflict between the Central and Southern Sudan, Abyei 

Nuba Mountain and Blue Nile regions on the other hand, while 

civil wars still continued in other parts of the country in eastern 

Sudan and in the Darfur region in western Sudan. 

Today, with the developments that are happening in our country, 

I would recommend the following: That the Government of the 

United States of America support a full implementation of the CPA 


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and that it will lend its active support to ensure the conduct of the 

referendum on self-determination for the people of Southern Sudan 

in time as agreed in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement that is 

no later than January 2011. 

We ask for your support for the conduct of this referendum to ensure that it is transparent, free and fair and would result to a credible choice by the people that would be credible on reflecting the 

will of the people of Southern Sudan, and we would call on the 

Government of the United States of America to accept, respect and 

recognize the choice of the people of Southern Sudan in the interest 

of peace, which most likely will be a choice for independence or secession of Southern Sudan given the fact that unity has not been 

made attractive in 51⁄2 years of the interim period. 

I also recommend that the United States of America assist the 

North and Southern Sudan to negotiate post-referendum arrangement to establish friendly cooperative relations to serve the best interest of Southern and Northern Sudanese peoples. I recommend 

that the Government of United States recognize the new independent state in Southern Sudan and focus its support to the Government of Southern Sudan to build capacity of institutions of governance in the would be new state so as to emerge as a stable, 

peaceful and prosperous state that would contribute to peace and 

stability in our region, the Horn of Africa. 

And with regard to Northern Sudan, we recommend that the 

Government of United States continue to support the conduct of 

popular consultation in the two states of Blue Nile and Southern 

Kordofan and continue to work to end the conflict and war in 

Darfur and achieve peace and justice through a peaceful settlement 

that would end the marginalization of people of Darfur and respond 

to the legitimate needs and aspirations of the people of Darfur to 

govern themselves and participate in a fair manner in the governance of the rest of Northern Sudan. 

We also believe that it would be important to support the democratic forces in Northern Sudan, including the SPLM in the north 

to achieve a fundamental transformation of Northern Sudanese 

state from a totalitarian fundamentalist state into a secular democratic state that would achieve inclusivity and realize peace and 

marginalization within Northern Sudan so that there would be 

peace within Northern Sudan and transform the relations between 

Northern Sudan and its neighbors, including Southern Sudan and 

all the other neighbors, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Chad, Libya and Egypt 

into peaceful relations and ending all forms of interventions and attempt to export destabilization which has been the practice of the 

ruling political force in the north. 

To end, Mr. Chairman, I believe that the United States of America can use in a smart manner incentive and disincentives in the 

Sudan to encourage the Sudan achieve a transition into peace, possibly into becoming two stable states, and the two stable states will 

join hands together, work in good relations and join with the other 

states in the region to build a free peaceful and prosperous Horn 

of Africa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Amum Okiech follows:]

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Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much, and let me thank all of the 

panelists, and as I indicated and so that it is clear for the record 

that our witness who just testified is representing the SPLM, 

which is a movement. He is not a representative of the Government 

of South Sudan just so it is very clear. Let me begin. You heard 

the bells. What I will do is to ask a quick question, perhaps take 

3 minute or so. I will let Mr. Smith give that quick question. We 

would then recess for 15 minutes, and we should be back. We have, 

as you can see, a 15-minute vote, and there is 5 more minutes to 

go, but we will stay. When it is zero numbers on the time remaining, we will still get there in time. 

Then, when that vote is completed, there will be a 5-minute vote 

and perhaps a second 5-minute vote, so we should actually be back 

within 15 minutes supposedly, but let me ask the first question in 

regard to Sudan, Dr. Menkhaus. We all feel that the current Government of Somalia is weak. We are aware of the fact that I guess 

for 15 years there was no government, and I imagine when the 

TFG actually started with the concept, it was really not an elected 

body. It was a body put together by clans and subclans. It was felt 

that if everyone could included, that at least that can transition toward an official election. 

Of course, it is very difficult to have elections when you have the 

lack of security. With the sort of merger more or less or the coming 

together of the TFG or ICU. Initially, the TFG said they would not 

accept any members of the ICU after conferences and so forth over 

a course of a number of years. They tended to accept moderate 

members of the ICU, and that is how Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed 

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Having said all that, and you did mention regional possibilities 

of working underneath the government, so I just wonder if you 

could spend a couple of minutes once again sort of going over your 

theory of how a governing body could at this time be installed and 

what it would look like, how would it operate? You are not going 

to do that in about 2 minutes, but you could do as much as you 

can, and then I yield to the gentleman from New Jersey. 

Mr. MENKHAUS. Thank you. The first principal behind a diversification strategy would be to cease rewarding the very bad behavior that is causing the failure of the TFG in the first place. We 

have got with the Transitional Federal Government—and we have 

had this in other parts of the world as well where we have governments that appear to be both unwilling and unable to govern—we 

run the risk of moral hazard, in which we are reinforcing the very 

behavior that we are trying to overcome. 

In the case of the Transitional Federal Government, the millions 

of dollars that have gone to it virtually unconditionally over the 

years have provided a very nice living for a number of people who 

have positioned themselves at the spigot of foreign aid in the TFG, 

and they have exhibited no interest in building a government capacity. How to work around them? By working with regional 

polities as well, not decertifying entirely the TFG. 

I think there are powerful arguments that at least the shell of 

a transitional government is needed to be filled by whomever in the 

near future. But why not work with Somaliland more aggressively, 

more with Puntland, more potentially with the Galmudus region, 

other regional or municipal authorities where they appear. Presumably this would only occur across south central Somalia if Shabaab 

were in fact to lose control over some of these areas, and I think 

that is entirely possible in the coming year or 2. 

They are deeply unpopular among Somalis. If given the right 

conditions, I think they can be pushed out of different areas. What 

we could do is provide Somalis, particularly at the municipal level, 

with opportunities for functional cooperation. It is at the town level 

where cross-clan alliances are forged. We are already pretty good 

at this, UNICEF, NGOs, a number of different U.N. specialized 

agencies have worked with town authorities across the country. 

It is where I have seen over the past 15 years some of the best 

most effective, most legitimate governance occurring. What that 

would do is it would give people confidence in an alternative, and 

it might provide Somalia with the opportunity to cobble together 

what some of us have been calling, for lack of a better term, a ‘‘mediated state.’’ That is to say a state that isn’t built from the top 

down, but rather one which is negotiated from Mogadishu with 

these local fluid polities, whatever is found at the local level. 

It is going to be messy. It is going to be hybrid. It is going to 

be difficult for us to interface with at times, but the Somalis understand it full well and have learned to work within it over the past 

20 years. 

Mr. PAYNE. Very good. Thank you very much. When I return, I 

would like to expand a little bit more and also hear from Ms. Ali 

Aden about some of those points that you mentioned, the two 

things that must stop, the toxicity and the fishing. Mr. Smith? 

63

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Ali Aden, let me ask 

you a question if I could, and thank you for your very troubling and 

incisive testimony. The AMISOM mission of 5,200 people mostly 

from Burundi and Rwanda, in your view is it enough? You spoke 

of the 1.5 million internally displaced persons. You quoted USAID 

about 3.5 million people in need of humanitarian aid, and obviously 

the security situation totally exacerbates that problem if not creates it in the first place, and the others might want to speak to this 

as well, whether or not that mission is sufficient. 

I remember when the first deployment of AU peacekeepers went 

to Sudan, I went over and met with them, and they were grossly 

underpaid, getting $1 a day. They were in very, very hostile situations. They had very poor rules of engagement, not their fault, but 

the fault of those who sent them, and I am just wondering if your 

sense is that this is a robust mission. Also, we found in DR Congo, 

and I actually chaired three hearings on it, with regards to peacekeepers committing atrocities against individuals, mostly women, 

mostly small, young girls in terms of rape, and in Goma it was a 

terrible and is a terrible situation. 

Has anti-human trafficking protections been integrated into the 

AU mission there, and anyone else who would like to speak to that 

as well? 

Ms. ALI ADEN. Thank you. On the issue of AMISOM, if it is 

enough, has become obvious with the Somali community and how 

the Somali society sees as foreign intervention. Some would say 

that the AMISOM is not needed in Somalia, but because of the way 

the conditions are in Somalia, there has to be some sort of elements or troops like AMISOM that can keep the peace, but there 

is no peace to keep, so peace has to be established first. 

What the Somalis always talked about, and we have argued consistently on different forums is that perhaps the international community, especially the United States should consider bringing in 

forces that are coming from surrounding nations rather than just 

the neighboring countries and avoiding the front-line states such as 

Ethiopia, Kenya and now Uganda. As far as the capacity is concerned, we don’t believe AMISOM has the capacity to do the work. 

They are not underpaid. They get paid much better than the Somali soldiers that have been trained in Uganda and now that are 

coming back with no pay and selling their guns, so perhaps reducing the numbers from 5,000 in a smaller pace and bringing in Somali soldiers and paying the Somali solder from some of that salary would do a better job for Somalia on security. As for AMISOM, 

now there are unconfirmed reports that it has established a prison 

in this compound that keeps closed not only from the international 

community, but also from the Somali Government. There has to be 

a mandate that clearly states that law has to be respected and civilians have to be protected. 

Mr. SMITH. I am going to have to run over to vote, I guess you 

too, Mr. Chairman. I would like to hear whether or not there is a 

protocol to combat human trafficking to make sure that women and 

children especially are not exploited. 

Mr. PAYNE. You can go ahead. 

Mr. SMITH. You are going to stay? 

Mr. PAYNE. Yes. You can answer that. 

64

Ms. ALI ADEN. Human trafficking? 

Mr. PAYNE. Yes. 

Ms. ALI ADEN. Well, there is a more of a child soldier than trafficking. There is some that exist, but it is more with the women, 

especially from the refugee camps surrounding Dadaab, and there 

have been reports that it has been talking about that not only inside Somalia and refugee camps but also where the Somalis have 

sought refuge such as in Kenya and in Dubai where Somali women 

are being sold as sex slaves. 

Mr. PAYNE. Now, once again in regard to the military, what is 

your opinion as it relates to the African Union’s forces as opposed 

to Somali-trained forces who have been trained in Kenya and other 

places? If you were in charge, how would you fit that group in? 

Ms. ALI ADEN. As far as the Somali soldiers that have been 

trained are concerned, like I say, when they come back, there is no 

salary for them, and there is no food, so the only alternative that 

they have is having a soldier that has been trained and who has 

a gun in his hand either join the insurgence or sell his gun to gain 

food for his family. A better way to go about it would have been 

to train these soldiers inside Somalia so they become familiar not 

only with their colleagues that they are working with, but with 

their superiors because when they come back, the superiors have 

been trained outside so the soldiers and superiors don’t have a relationship, and when they come back, there is no respect between 

the two. 

Training the soldiers inside Somalia, offering them a salary that 

can sustain them and their families will help them and keep them 

away from joining the insurgents and thinking more of a nationalist rather than always supporting their clan, and that will only 

come if they are recruited on the base of their capacity, their 

knowledge, their previous experience and their health. Instead, 

they are being recruited when they are being taken to these different countries based on the clan of who recruiting these soldiers 

to be trained. 

Mr. PAYNE. And, Dr. Menkhaus, what is your opinion on the soldiers, the military element? 

Mr. MENKHAUS. First with regard to the African Union, the 

AMISOM forces, I think our first observation has to be that their 

mandate is to protect the Transitional Federal Government first 

and foremost. Their relations with the Transitional Federal Government are very poor. There is no trust on either side between the 

two, and as a result, the AMISOM forces are deeply frustrated. 

They would like to expand their mandate to be able to work with 

other entities like Al-Sunna wa al-Jama’a in taking the fight to 

Shabaab. I am deeply concerned about that. 

As someone who served in UNOSOM, I know even 30,000 plus 

of the world’s best peacekeepers confronted with a sustained urban 

guerrilla war are not going to be able to succeed in Somalia. I think 

in the long run Shabaab is going to see its demise, not from military defeat, but from being eroded from beneath, and I think that 

is first and foremost a Somali task, not an AMISOM task. Moreover, AMISOM has been responding to Shabaab shellings by returning fire in densely populated neighborhoods. That results in extensive civilian casualties which is precisely what Shabaab wants. 

65

It has infuriated Somalis against AMISOM, and as a result, that 

is just exacerbated the general feeling of anti-foreign sentiment 

among the population in Mogadishu. The problem with bringing 

Somali militia in as security forces is not only that they haven’t 

been paid, but the money has been made available, but because of 

corruption, TFG officials are taking that money, and as a result, 

up to 75 percent of the TFG security forces who have been trained 

by outsiders have in fact either deserted or defected. 

I would add a final point, and this is a potential game changer. 

If AMISOM were to withdraw, which is another scenario, not necessarily to expand, but to withdraw due to frustration and Uganda 

and elsewhere, the Transitional Federal Government would not be 

able to protect itself at all. It would almost certainly have to flee 

the country, so it would be a game-ending change. 

Mr. PAYNE. Okay. Thank you. The hearing will stand recessed. 

Thank you. 

[Whereupon, the subcommittee recessed.] 

Mr. PAYNE. The hearing will reconvene. I thank those of you in 

the audience who could stay and thank the witnesses for remaining 

with us. Let me ask you, Mr. Dagne, the situation in the Ogaden 

region of Ethiopia is deeply concerning, troubling as you have already mentioned considering reports of sexual violence perpetrated 

by Ethiopian troops and the effective isolation of the region imposed by the Ethiopian Government. 

Since the government suspended food aid to Ogaden in 2006, it 

seems the humanitarian situation has continued to deteriorate, yet 

very little has been done by the international community to pressure the Ethiopian Government to peacefully resolve the issue in 

the Ogaden. In your opinion, why has so little been done to engage 

the Ethiopian Government on this issue, and given that the 

Ogaden region is cut off from contact with outside entities and access to the region, it is highly restricted, from what sources are we 

able to collect information on the status and the condition of the 

inhabitants in the Ogaden? 

Mr. DAGNE. I think most of the information that we are getting 

about the Ogaden comes from the refugees near the border in 

Kenya. There are also human rights groups, journalists who have 

gone into the Ogaden without the permission of the Ethiopian Government, and they have documented what they have seen, interviews of the victims. I have gone at least three times in the past 

couple of years. I went into the refugee camps and in Nairobi and 

documented a number of interviews of the victims as well as conditions internally. 

What is different about the Ogaden is that rarely you will see reporting about the atrocities that are being committed. The targeting in the Ogaden is exclusively against civilians, especially 

women. Rape is one of the methods used by the Ethiopian security 

as well as hanging. We have a number of cases of individuals who 

were handed. One particular person that comes to mind that you 

and I had met 2 years ago and last year is a young lady named 

Redwan. She was hanged by the Ethiopian security, left for dead. 

Fortunately, for her, she wasn’t dead, and she was helped out, 

moved into a neighboring country, and she is still awaiting for the 

United Nation’s Refugee Agency to process her status. 

66

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you. Let me ask you, Ms. Lefkow, the Ethiopian judiciary has been under severe criticism for years by some 

observers and opposition groups for allegedly lacking independence 

and effectiveness. Do you agree with this assessment and criticism, 

and what are the major problems facing Ethiopia’s judiciary? What 

can, in your opinion, the U.S. do to help strengthen the independence of the judiciary in Ethiopia? 

Ms. LEFKOW. I would be happy to try and address that. May I 

also add a couple of points with regard to your question on the 

Ogaden area? 

Mr. PAYNE. Yes. 

Ms. LEFKOW. Maybe if I start with that? The allegations of 

abuses in the Ogaden is an issue that Humans Rights Watch has 

been extremely concerned about over the last 3 years. We did a 

very in-depth investigation in 2007 into these allegations and documented crimes that we in our assessment amounted to war crimes 

and crimes against humanity, so these are very, very serious 

crimes by the Ethiopian military, to some extent also by the 

Ogaden National Liberation Front. They are not clean. Their record 

is not entirely clean either. I think it is important to say that clearly, but the scale of the abuses against civilians was overwhelmingly 

for the most part on the part of the Ethiopian military. 

In our assessment, the patterns of crime declines somewhat in 

2007, 2008 after the initial campaign by the government. We have 

actually been doing another set of research just in the last few 

months on what is happening in the Ogaden trying to get an updated picture of what is happening on the ground because as you 

know, it is extremely difficult to get solid and credible information, 

and we are very concerned about some ongoing military clashes in 

the region and ongoing targeting of civilians. 

I think there are two new elements that we are seeing in the region. One is that the regional government in Somali region has established like almost a paramilitary force called the New Police, 

and it is these forces that seem to be responsible for a lot of abuses 

against civilians now, so this is a new development since 2008. The 

other I think new element in the Ogaden area is a real expansion 

of oil development. 

We were hearing this from dozens of people we spoke to just last 

month of an expansion of the oil exploration in the area, which is 

having kind of a knock-on effect because this is a conflict zone, and 

a lot of people are pastoralists, nomadic herders, and they are actually not able to go to their traditional lands anymore because the 

oil companies with Ethiopian military support have actually seemingly fenced off large areas, so this is a kind of new dynamic that 

we are seeing, which I think will have some serious effects on the 

ground and on civilians, and I may just quickly——

Mr. PAYNE. And on that point, is there the presence of the People’s Republic of China’s military there or security forces armed 

from China since it is PetroChina that is doing the exploration in 

the Ogaden? 

Ms. LEFKOW. Not that we are aware of. The security forces for 

the oil seems to be primarily Ethiopian military, so the national defense forces. Although, there are also——

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Mr. PAYNE. Okay. I know that several years ago there was a conflict with the OLF, and I think a number of Chinese security forces 

were killed in a combat with OLF and Chinese military or paramilitary or security, and you can go on. 

Ms. LEFKOW. Thank you. The other issue I wanted to mention, 

I mean, I guess it is in relation to the Ogaden. I think there is a 

couple of points worth making. I think with regard to the U.S. policy, I think there is a positive and negative side to the U.S. positioning, the government positioning on Ogaden. On the one hand, 

I think the U.S. has been pressing quite hard for humanitarian access over the last few years. I think there is a recognition that the 

humanitarian situation in the Ogaden area has been very, very serious and continues to be very serious, and I think that is an important positive position. 

I think the problem is that there hasn’t been enough push back 

on the fact that the Ethiopian Government has essentially closed 

down this region to any kind of independent access. Journalists 

can’t get in there, diplomats can’t get in there. We certainly can’t 

get in there. They have effectively established an information 

blackout on the Ogaden area, and I think there needs to be much 

greater challenging of this by the U.S. and by other of Ethiopia’s 

partners. 

I think on that score, what we see, the National Security Council 

statement after the elections last month was an important signal 

it seems of a shift in U.S. rhetoric toward Ethiopia. It think it was 

a strong statement. It was a welcomed statement of concern about 

the electoral process, but what we need to see is those words 

matched by action and to see the apparent greater concern for the 

human rights situation translate into real policy consequences for 

Ethiopia if it does not shift course. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. Just finally, Mr. Amum 

Okiech, could you explain to us the relevance of the change and the 

split in the energy portfolio by President Bashir into three, separating oil, mining and electricity recently, and has the cooperation 

of the NCP changed or improved after the national election and the 

recent appointment of the new cabinet? You can give me your assessment of the new appointees in the North and as I mentioned, 

the splitting of the energy portfolio. Do you think this has something to do with the upcoming referendum on January 9, 2011? 

Mr. AMUM OKIECH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The decision to 

split the ministry of mining and energy into three separate ministries is driven by the consideration that possible outcome of the 

referendum may be secession of Southern Sudan where petroleum 

is largely produced in Southern Sudan, and it may be a ministry 

that may not be there after the referendum in Northern Sudan or 

possibly having very limited functions. 

In that case also, the National Congress Party has been investing 

in the center of Sudan, particularly in the northern parts of Sudan 

in building dams for the production of energy from hydroelectric 

power as well as also developing plans to develop agricultural irrigated schemes along the Nile, particularly in Northern Sudan. 

Now, this program of building hydroelectric power and dams in 

Northern Sudan has caused a very serious concern that would need 

68

attention by the international community and the Government of 

United States. 

The Nubian people, who are a marginalized people in the far 

north or Northern Sudan, are under attack and are in danger of 

extinction because the process of the constructions of the dams is 

being done without their consultation. Their villages and land is 

being submerged under water. Also, there is an intentional cultural 

genocide that is being carried out where the ancient civilization of 

the Nubian people is being destroyed and submerged under water. 

This is going to be a loss not only to the Sudanese people, not to 

the Nubian people; this is a human patrimony that need to be protected. 

Also, the land of the Nubian people is being usurped from them. 

They are being displaced and being sent to inhospitable areas without compensation, and actually tomorrow here in Washington there 

is going to be a memorial by the Nubian people to remember the 

victims who have been killed by the Sudanese authorities resisting 

to defend their land from being usurped in the process of building 

dams, so the ministry of energy is a ministry that is going to focus 

in development of energy, particularly hydroelectric energy, and 

building of dams. 

Why the mining, the third ministry, is being separated was the 

aim of development of mineral resources, particularly in eastern 

Sudan, especially gold, and the people of eastern Sudan are 

marginalized, are excluded from these processes. There land is 

being taken. Their resources are being used, and revenues from the 

exploitation of the mineral resources in eastern Sudan are not 

being brought to benefit the marginalized people of eastern Sudan, 

particularly the very people whose land these resources are found. 

Again, there is also an issue of concentration of the opportunities 

of development in the center and exploitation of resources of the 

marginalized areas like the far north or the east in the benefit of 

the ruling elites in Khartoum to the total marginalization and exclusion of the people of eastern Sudan, particularly the Bija, so the 

petroleum ministry now has been assigned or has been located to 

the SPLM, and an SPLM minister would be developing this portfolio. I believe the main important task would be to bring in transparency in how the oil sector has been developed and managed. 

There has been a serious lack of transparency. The National 

Congress has developed this sector exclusively and in a very controlled-type process excluding the Government of Southern Sudan 

from participating in the management of the oil sector whether in 

the development of the production in the fields or in the management of its transport and processing as well as in the auction and 

sale of the Sudanese petroleum. The reports, including of international and independent organization like Global Witness indicate 

that Southern Sudan has been cheated for up to nearly 26 percent 

of its share, which is giving Southern Sudan less than half of its 

deserved rights, and this is a serious issue. 

With the formation of the government of national unity or the 

Government of Sudan in Khartoum, definitely there is cooperation. 

The SPLM has been allocated 30 percent of the total portfolios representing Southern Sudan having been the party that has won 

election in the south while the remaining 70 percent is occupied by 

69

the National Congress Party and other parties associated with it 

or allied to the National Congress Party. We are desirous to develop better relations with the National Congress as we manage 

the transition of our country through the remaining short period of 

the interim period possibly to emerge as two independent states. 

It is only through dialogue and serious discussions that the parties are required to have that we will be able to avoid a return to 

war and avoid a collapse of real peace but achieve a transition to 

permanent peace even if that would mean establishment of appeals 

of two states. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. At this time, before I turn 

over to the ranking member, let me recognize in the audience the 

Honorable Asha Abdalla, chairperson of the Somali’s Women’s Parliamentary Association. Would you stand please and be recognized? 

Thank you. We are very pleased to have you with us here. Mr. 

Smith? 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Ali Aden and Mr. 

Menkhaus, could you tell us do you believe that the United States 

is doing enough with regards to Somalia? Resources, policy-wise 

and the like, Ms. Ali Aden? 

Ms. ALI ADEN. Thank you. First of all, as a student who is 

trained in medicine, I have always learned the importance of history, knowing the history of the patient in order to treat the patient. I believe our Government, United States Government, whether it is this one or the previous ones truly missed the opportunity 

to study the history of the conflict and all the contributors of that 

conflict. When Ethiopia invaded Somalia back in 2006, we have 

consistently spoken to the State Department discouraging that support should not be given to the invasion, and of course we thought 

that policy was an ill-advised foreign policy. 

That was not going to work, and we found out the results. It created more radicals in Somalia and in the region, and everybody 

else who was involved since that was the worst decision the United 

States has ever made to support Ethiopia. Now, coming back, if the 

current administration is doing enough, I would say no, and the 

reason I say that is because the U.S. administration is depending 

always on neighboring countries to understand Somalia and to find 

a cure to the disease that lies on land. We see 150 ships are in the 

seas outside Somalia, all trying to stop the piracy, when in fact the 

piracy is the symptom. It is not the disease. 

The disease lies on land, and that is to find political stability in 

Somalia. Therefore, what the United States Government should do 

is instead of depending on the intelligence collected by the Ethiopian Government, Kenyan or Ugandese to actually do things in 

their own way and engage the Somali people, especially the Diaspora. There is a huge force of Somali Diaspora sitting outside Somalia, some in neighboring countries. 

Somalis in the Diaspora send every year what we know documented by the UNDP, $1.5 billion to Somalia, and that is only how 

much we know. They sustain Somalia plus the resilience of those 

inside, so what the U.S. needs to do is to empower what existed 

because I don’t believe in anarchy, and most of us who advocate for 

change believed to build on what existed. Let us not make the 

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same mistake that we made with the Islamic Courts when we destroyed them because we had opportunity there to build on them. 

There are safe regions in Somalia, in the northwest, northeast. 

Let us have reconciliations supported by United States Government and allies and hold a serious and genuine reconciliation that 

is holistic that includes all the stakeholders and hold inside Somalia, the safe areas, and most of us have been proposing lately in 

different forums to have the next reconciliation, which is the last, 

the most holistic, hopefully the most productive and the only one 

that is needed from here on forward held in Hargeysa. Why take 

it outside? The people in the northeast and northwest need the 

funds that we spend outside trying to reconcile these people. 

Also, the 4.5 formula, the clan formula system is not working. It 

is a formula that has become the worst obstacle and impediment 

to peace process in Somalia because these people selected are loyal 

to the clan and not to the nation. We should elect people based on 

their capacity, capabilities and previous experience and inject the 

Diaspora into the government. We have few right now in the government who left from the Diaspora, but it is like a drop in the sea. 

We need to have more, maybe flood more of the Diaspora into the 

government and hopefully create the change that we need with the 

help of the nationalities like the American citizens who went there. 

Mr. MENKHAUS. In my view, I think we are not doing enough on 

several levels, first on humanitarian relief. Somalia is the site of 

the worst humanitarian crisis in the world. Historically the United 

States Government has been extremely generous. It is been a leader in the provision of humanitarian assistance to those in need, but 

because of the suspension of food aid, there is a debate right now 

as to why WFP and others have suspended their activities in south 

central Somalia. 

On the one hand, it is because of insecurity from Shabaab and 

other groups. On the other hand, it is because of concerns about 

the Patriot Act and OFAC and the liability that Americans and organizations might have if substantial benefits accrue to a terrorist 

organization from our assistance. We need to grant a waiver to 

those organizations. For organizations working in areas controlled 

by Hamas and Hezbollah, that would be not only an important way 

to remove one of the hurdles to resumption of humanitarian aid, 

we would also put all of the burden on Shabaab when Somalis ask 

the question, ‘‘Where is the assistance?’’ Somalia is in huge trouble 

now. It is the hungry season, there is no food aid, and we need to 

make sure that they understand exactly who the obstacle is. It is 

not us. It is not the Treasury Department. It is Shabaab. I think 

that we can do that without guarantees that the aid will not substantially benefit Shabaab. I think it is low-handing fruit for us. 

Politically, another set of low-hanging fruit is engagement. We do 

not have enough people in our embassy in Nairobi engaging on Somalia. The State Department will be the first to tell you, and 

USAID as well, we need a full-court press of engagement across 

every spectrum of society. Right now, we have very limited opportunities to dialogue with Somalis in civil society, in business and 

politics and religion. 

We are actually losing a public relations battle with Shabaab, 

which is doing outrageous things in the country, such as banning 

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the viewing of world cup soccer matches. How that is possible, I 

don’t know. We need to be able to take control of the narrative. 

There is so much that we are doing that is positive. There is so 

much that Somalis do like about the United States, and I think one 

of the things that we can do much more is people to people development and diplomacy. 

That is one of our great strengths around the world, the amount 

of foreign assistance that isn’t necessarily official. It is unofficial, 

sister city programs. All kinds of opportunities are out there for the 

American people to engage with Somalis so that they start again 

to see us as they once did, which is the land of opportunity and 

a source of freedom and development. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you so much. Because we are running out of 

time, I have a number of questions, but we have another set of 

votes. On Eritrea, the International Religious Freedom Act designation of country of particular concern, again Eritrea has been 

named a CPC country. This week, Eritrea became a Tier 3 country 

on its violations of human trafficking and particularly as it related 

to labor trafficking. 

A number of important recommendations have been made by the 

U.S. Commission on International and Religious Freedom about 

going beyond the 2005 actions, which was just to prevent the sale 

of defense articles to Eritrea, including, and I think one of the best 

targeted sanctions against individuals and institutions identified as 

responsible for or complicit in serious human rights abuses. I was 

wondering either now or for the record if any of you had any specific thoughts? 

It would seem to me two terrible designations, CPC and Tier 3, 

religious freedom, human trafficking and all the other problems 

Eritrea has. We need to take it a new level I would think, but what 

is your view? Ted? 

Mr. DAGNE. I think it is important to put this in proper context. 

One, I do think that putting Eritrea along the line of Saudi Arabia 

and Sudan in terms of religious discrimination in my view is way 

off target. The major religions, including Christians, Muslims and 

the minorities, Jews coexist peacefully for centuries, and yes, there 

has been a problem registering the evangelicals in particular in 

Eritrea, but to make the conclusion that across the board there is 

religious discrimination I think is in my view wrong and cannot be 

factually supporting. 

I have read the International Religious Commission report. I met 

with them a week ago, and I asked the last time they went there 

to investigate this. It was 2004, so while there are problems in registering some religious groups, I think it is important that this 

issue is put in proper context. 

Mr. SMITH. But with all due respect, is it your testimony that 

forced recantations of faith and torture of believers is not happening or not happening to the degree? I mean, if they asked to go 

tomorrow, would they be allowed to go and visit with the religious 

prisoners? I am talking about either State Department or the 

United States Commission on International Religious Freedom because both bodies, independent and separate, our own State Department and this independent commission, have come to the identical conclusions, which are contrary to yours. 

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Mr. DAGNE. My investigation, my research, and I have been to 

Eritrea more so than those who had claimed to have been there to 

do this report is that yes, there are people who we have been detained and arrested by the Eritreans, but I have not witnessed, 

heard or saw any credible evidence to show me that the religious 

leaders have been tortured. There have been a number of releases 

of religious individuals who have been arrested for one reason or 

another, some of whom have been arrested for refusing to serve in 

the national service. 

Some have been arrested for meeting according the government 

rules and regulations illegally, but I am not here to say that there 

are now discrimination, there are no arrests, yes. Have there been 

deliberate delays and denials of registration of religious groups? 

But what I am stating for the record is that this has to be put in 

the proper context that Eritrea does not deliberately discriminate 

or penalize its religious leaders or followers. 

Mr. SMITH. Ms. Lefkow, do you agree with that? 

Ms. LEFKOW. I do, and I don’t. I mean, I think we have documented some very serious human rights abuses in Eritrea, including on the score of denial of freedom of religion to various groups 

including Pentecostals and Jehovah’s witnesses, and I think we are 

extremely concerned about the human rights situation, actually. 

There is no question that it is a society that has become increasingly militarized where military service and conscription, for example, continues indefinitely. 

This is generating an outflux of refugees from Eritrea that has 

grown substantially in the last couple of years, and I think this is 

always a good indicator of things going very wrong at home when 

you have these kind of increased migration flows, but I think 

where I would agree with my colleague is there is another dimension to Eritrea’s human rights crisis. 

It is also very much part of the regional picture, and I think the 

one thing that the United States has to be incredibly cautious 

about is having a balanced and principled approach to the region 

because I think that the appearance of imbalance and of partisan 

backing to forces that commit abuses as has been referred to already, for example, supporting or being perceived to support the 

Ethiopian military when it commits abuses, being perceived to support the TFG when it commits abused, being perceived to support 

AMISOM when it indiscriminately shells civilians in Mogadishu. 

I think this is very much contrary to the interests of the United 

States to have this perception circulating, and I think that is why 

it needs to be extraordinarily careful about how it handles the situation with Eritrea because to be seen as zealously anti-Eritrea and 

not taking a balanced approach to the very serious human rights 

abused that the Ethiopian Government is committing I think is not 

the interest of this government in this country. 

Mr. SMITH. I would agree. I mean, we have raised when it was 

under the Bush administration, and I actually did the Ethiopia 

Human Rights Act. Mr. Payne, our chairman, did it the following 

2 years later, and we were very discouraged by our Government 

through both administration’s response, but with Eritrea, it seems 

to me that we are trying to stand in solidarity with those who are 

in prison, and I would love it if the U.S. Commission for InterVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:38 Aug 25, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00076 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\AGH\061710\56997 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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national Religious Freedom could visit and have access to prisoners. I doubt that they can, but I will follow up on that. 

Finally, and this would be for the record because we are out of 

time, but, Ms. Ali Aden, you talked about the toxic waste and radiological, and Eni Faleomavaega on this committee has been absolutely dogged in reminding us year in and year out that the French 

detonated so many atomic weapons which have had a disproportionate, horrific impact on the ecosystems and the lives of people 

living in the South Pacific, and now it would appear there is a kind 

of de ́ja` vu here with regards to toxic dumping. 

I wonder if for the record or briefly now but certainly for the 

record because Nick Nuttall of the U.N. Environmental Program 

has raised this. He did it during the tsunami when he said people 

were getting sick because of this stuff washing up on shore. Could 

you provide a more detailed record and anyone else who would like 

to on this toxic dumping of radiological and mercury and all the 

other terrible things that do grave injury to people? 

Ms. ALI ADEN. Also included in my testimony, written statement, 

the information that I put in there is what is out there so far because it seems the international community is busy with the piracy, and like I say, it is a symptom, so for the past 15 years or 

so, toxic waste dumping has been taking place in the Somali Sea, 

most of it coming from the European countries and Asian countries. 

Mr. SMITH. Do you have any names of companies that might be 

doing that? 

Ms. ALI ADEN. There are no names that have been publicly announced, but there has been certain countries in Europe, and there 

are some in Asia, so I would not want to go ahead of the game 

when this hearing was not just about these countries, but I would 

love to have a hearing where really the whole issue is dominated 

by the toxic waste dumping in Somalia because what you have is 

a ticking environmental bomb. If things even work out in Somalia, 

we don’t know what is going to happen on the next tsunami or if 

anything else goes wrong. 

I cannot name particular countries, but we know consistently European countries and Asians have been named even by the U.N. 

agencies and also the former U.N. Envoy, Ould-Abdallah, has also 

mentioned that. 

Mr. PAYNE. Let me thank you all very much. I think we are on 

the court on most of these issues. However, I don’t want you to say 

I said something behind your back after you left, but let me also 

talk about the conscription in Eritrea now. It is wrong, and they 

say you must join the military. However, as you may recall, when 

I was coming up, I had to also by law go into the military, and if 

I didn’t, I could be imprisoned or not allowed to have student aid. 

Many in the United States of America left the country and went 

to Canada if they did not want to go into the military. I am not 

condoning it. I am just simply saying, and I think your point was 

good about on balance on the religions. I visited religious places in 

Eritrea myself and saw the Jewish, the Catholic, the Protestants 

and so forth. There is no question that there has been a restriction 

on the registration of new religions, including some of the 

Evangelicals, and we discussed that. 

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The other thing too we were able through negotiations on a trip 

that I had with Mr. Dagne many years ago after consultation with 

the leadership of Eritrea that a number of prisoners were released 

after we had dialogue with the President and his cabinet people, 

and so I think that dialogue is much more important than a hammer. To try to exclude and cut Eritrea off and have no dialogue I 

think gains us nothing. 

I do think that as long as there is some opportunity to have dialogue, I would not like to see them put on a state sponsor of terrorism with North Korea and Iran. Eritrea is not, in my opinion, 

a North Korea or Iran. With 5 million people, I am not sure they 

can bring the world down, but we need to try to get them to understand that there must be more cooperation. Mr. Dagne? 

Mr. DAGNE. Just for the record, Chairman Payne, the national 

service in Eritrea is a service for everyone across the board for less 

than 2 years, and it is not entirely military training. You are not 

recruited into the military. The 1 year actually is studying for your 

twelfth grade, and it is about 6 months where they will be getting 

military training, and no one, including the President’s son, actually had gone through that, the son of the defense minister. Everyone had to do that service the same way they do it in Israel and 

in other countries. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you. 

Ms. LEFKOW. Sorry. I just want to clarify for the record, and our 

objection at Human Rights Watch is not toward conscription per se, 

not at all. 

Mr. PAYNE. Okay. 

Ms. LEFKOW. Our concern with Eritrea is the indefinite nature 

because we have found that in many, many cases the 2 years ends 

up actually being many, many years and sometimes indefinite service in Eritrea, so that is the concern. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you. All right. I do hope we can revisit Somalia. As you know, I went to Mogadishu and had an excellent day 

there on the ground and met with women’s groups and education 

groups and 30 different women’s groups at one time, educators and 

so forth, and I think that there is a great opportunity. I think we 

are not maximizing it. Of course, I had an unpleasant experience 

on the way out because it was so positive. 

The press conference was so positive about my wanting Americans to come back. I was the first American to go there maybe in 

a dozen years or so. Al-Shabaab shot missiles at my plane on the 

way out, however. Fortunately, they didn’t succeed, but I think it 

was desperation because they don’t want people to come in because 

they thrive when others stay out, so I hope that we can have 

enough security so that we can get the EU and other Americans 

to go into work with the fledgling government. 

Now since I must get over to vote again, but there was one thing 

I wanted Mr. Smith to hear, but I am sure that staff can relay it 

to him that we looked at the language in the Constitution, and the 

draft Constitution of Kenya says that abortion is not permitted unless in the opinion of a trained health professional there is a good 

need for emergency treatment or the life of the health of the mother is in danger, so to say that the new Constitution will allow abortion on demand is totally incorrect. 

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It does not say that, and people continue to say that, but it is 

not correct. Abortion is illegal in Kenya. This reaffirms the current 

Kenya penal code. It does not change the penal code, and that outsiders are going in and reinterpreting what it says. It says that 

abortion is not permitted unless in the opinion of a trained health 

professional there is a need for emergency treatment or the life or 

the health of the mother is in danger, period. 

With that, I will ask unanimous consent that members have 5 

legislative days to revise and extend their remarks. Without objection, it is so ordered. Let me once again thank the witnesses. We 

could be here all day, and if there were not votes, we would be here 

all day, but thank you all. You were an excellent panel, and thank 

you those in the audience. Thank you. The meeting is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 1:03 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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