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37–217 PDF 2007

THE PROGRESS OF THE DHS

CHIEF INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, 

INFORMATION SHARING, AND 

TERRORISM RISK ASSESSMENT

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

MAY 24, 2006

Serial No. 109–80

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

PETER T. KING, New York, Chairman 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas 

CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut 

JOHN LINDER, Georgia 

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana 

TOM DAVIS, Virginia 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

JIM GIBBONS, Nevada 

ROB SIMMONS, Connecticut 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

STEVAN PEARCE, New Mexico 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

BOBBY JINDAL, Louisiana 

DAVE G. REICHERT, Washington 

MICHAEL MCCAUL, Texas 

CHARLIE DENT, Pennsylvania 

GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

JANE HARMAN, California 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

NITA M. LOWEY, New York 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON-LEE, Texas 

BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey 

DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, U.S. Virgin Islands 

BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, INFORMATION SHARING, AND 

TERRORISM RISK ASSESSMENT

ROB SIMMONS, Connecticut, Chairman 

CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania 

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

JIM GIBBONS, Nevada 

STEVAN PEARCE, New Mexico 

BOBBY JINDAL, Louisiana 

CHARLIE DENT, Pennsylvania 

GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida 

PETER T. KING, NEW YORK (Ex Officio) 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

JANE HARMAN, California 

NITA M. LOWEY, New York 

SHEILA JACKSON-LEE, Texas 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (Ex Officio)

(II) 
(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page 

STATEMENTS

The Honorable Rob Simmons, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Connecticut, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information 

Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment .......................................................... 1

The Honorable Zoe Lofgren, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of California, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Intelligence, 

Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment: 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 2

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 2

The Honorable Jim Gibbons, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Nevada .............................................................................................................. 14 

The Honorable James R. Langevin, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Rhode Island ........................................................................................... 16

WITNESS

Mr. Charles E. Allen, Chief Intelligence Officer, Officer of Intelligence and 

Analysis, Department of Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 3

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 6 

(1)

THE PROGRESS OF THE DHS 

CHIEF INTELLIGENCE OFFICER 

Wednesday, May 24, 2006

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, INFORMATION

SHARING, AND TERRORISM RISK ASSESSMENT, Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 4:39 p.m., in Room 

311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Rob Simmons [chairman 

of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Simmons, Gibbons, Lofgren, and 

Langevin. 

Mr. SIMMONS. [Presiding.] The Homeland Security Subcommittee 

on Intelligence Information Sharing and Terrorism Risk Assessment will come to order. 

Today, the subcommittee meets to hear testimony on how Mr. 

Charlie Allen, the DHS chief intelligence officer, has progressed in 

his efforts to better integrate the DHS intelligence enterprise and 

strengthen its ability to share intelligence and analysis with state, 

local, tribal and private sector partners. 

In October 19, 2005, we held a hearing with Assistant Secretary 

Allen in the wake of a very public dispute over the New York and 

Baltimore tele-threat streams. Since that time, I have been assured 

by Assistant Secretary Allen and officials from New York and Baltimore that the issues related to that dispute have been largely resolved. 

Coordination has improved, and DHS has begun deploying analysts to state and local fusion centers. And I can say yesterday that 

2 days ago, I went to the Maryland fusion center, and we saw firsthand that those improvements have been made. 

While DHS assistance to states, localities and tribes can and will 

be improved, the Office of Intelligence and Analysis is taking important steps to integrate with and support state, local and tribal 

sector information sharing initiatives. 

In October, we also discussed the secretary’s plans for integrating the department’s intelligence offices, and he indicated that 

better integration of operational intelligence components would be 

a top priority. 

Mr. Allen, I would be interested in hearing from you today on 

how this effort has progressed and what the continued challenges 

are. Seven months ago, you had a lot on your plate. Today’s hearing is designed to be an update and progress report on how things 

are going. 
2

I would ask that the remainder of my opening statement be inserted into the record as if read. 

Mr. SIMMONS. And I would like to make a brief comment based 

on a reading of Chapter 13 in the 9/11 Commission report, Page 

399: ‘‘As presently configured, the national security institutions of 

the United States government are still the institutions constructed 

to win the Cold War. The United States confronts a very different 

world today. Instead of facing a few very dangerous adversaries, 

the United States confronts a number of less visible challenges that 

surpass the boundaries of traditional nation states and call for 

quick, imaginative and agile responses.’’

Mr. Allen, you were instrumental in the fight to win the Cold 

War. Now, you have been placed in a position of responsibility at 

the beginning of another kind of war that takes new organizations, 

one of which you now serve in, new ideas, new responses, new approaches. 

We wish you all the best in this, but we also wish to be kept up 

to date on how this process is developing and what progress there 

is to report. It is an important and it is an exciting challenge, because the safety and security of the American people in this democracy are at stake. 

So I look forward to hearing your testimony. 

And at this point, I will yield to the distinguished ranking member of the committee, Ms. Lofgren. 

Ms. LOFGREN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And my apologies for 

being late. I was at another markup. 

I look forward to continuing to work with you, Mr. Allen. I appreciate your courtesy in keeping us apprised of your progress. And as 

we all know, the job you have is enormously important for the security of our country, and I thank you for your willingness to take 

it on. 

I would just also note that we were able to have a briefing in a 

classified setting, and I also appreciated. And one concern that I 

have talked about publicly is the issue of the NSA Warrantless 

Wiretap Program that the president has discussed. And certainly, 

the Department of Homeland Security is not a collector of information but a recipient of information and then also a distributor of 

information. 

Rather than repeating all of the questions, I would simply say, 

are there any of the questions they asked you in a classified setting 

that you are able to answer here in this public setting? And if so, 

I would welcome those answers. If not, I would respect what you 

are not able to answer. 

And with that, I would yield back the balance of my time. And 

thank you, Mr. Chairman.

PREPARED OPENING STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ZOE LOFGREN

I am also very happy that we are meeting with you again, Mr. Allen, to get an 

update on your progress as the Chief Intelligence Officer. I am certain that the 

longer you serve in your position, the clearer that both your challenges and resulting mission focus are becoming. 

This is precisely the type of oversight hearing that this Subcommittee should be 

having on a regular basis on the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) to ensure 

that we are up-to-date on your needs, priorities, and progress, and I look forward 

to regular briefings and hearings with you in the future. 
3

I might add, Mr. Allen, that your May 10th letter to me addressing your progress 

was very helpful, and I would encourage you to continue such communication with 

us. 

While I am pleased to learn that I&A is making progress on many fronts, I do 

have several concerns—including one that has been a major subject of discussion in 

recent months. 

As you know, Mr. Allen, I have been very troubled by reports about the NSA’s 

domestic surveillance program and its implications for privacy and civil liberties. 

I am particularly concerned about the NSA domestic surveillance program’s implications for the Department and your office. 

Regardless of whether or not I&A has received intelligence information from the 

NSA’s domestic surveillance program, I believe that your office—if it cannot already—should be able to track the origin of intelligence information it receives, segregate out information that it learns has been obtained illegally, and report such 

instances to the relevant Congressional committees. 

The Department of Homeland Security must have the public trust. If your office 

receives ‘‘fruit of the poisoned tree’’—intelligence information that has been obtained 

illegally—that trust understandably will be shaken. Over time, if we don’t level with 

the American people, we are bound to lose their support in the war on terror. 

I don’t think you or anyone else wants to happen, Mr. Allen, and I hope you will 

share your thoughts on how we can ensure that DHS does not become complicit in 

activity that trades the liberties and civil rights that make our nation great for a 

promise of security that—without those liberties and rights—leaves everyone insecure. 

I also hope we will be able to revisit with you your progress on developing your 

IT network architecture. 

Your staff was kind enough to generate for us a general outline of how you want 

that architecture to look and a sense of what things might cost. 

I hope you’ll be able to address your current priorities, where this funding should 

be coming from, and the consequences of your not getting the resources you need 

to build a seamless system connecting you, the Department’s intelligence components, and your intelligence consumers. 

Finally, Mr. Allen, I remain very interested in the Department’s efforts to secure 

the nation’s critical infrastructure. 

I appreciated Dr. Connell’s (CON–L) testimony on HITRAC (HI-TRACK) when we 

last met in February, and I hope we’ll have a chance to discuss your progress there 

as well.

Welcome, again, Mr. Allen. I look forward to our discussions today.

Mr. SIMMONS. The gentlelady, having yielded back, and the 

chairman of the committee and the ranking member of the full 

committee not being present to make any statements, I will now 

recognize Mr. Allen. 

Please proceed. 

STATEMENT OF CHARLES E. ALLEN, CHIEF INTELLIGENCE OFFICER, OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. ALLEN. Thank you, Chairman Simmons, Ranking Member 

Lofgren, for giving me the opportunity to report on my progress 

during my first 7 months as the chief intelligence officer of the Department of Homeland Security. 

I have a brief statement that summarizes my longer statement, 

and I ask that to be submitted for the record. 

The mandate of the chief intelligence officer is to lead, to integrate and manage the department’s intelligence program. Thanks 

to the hard work of our employees in the Office of Intelligence 

Analysis and the department’s intelligence components, I believe 

we have made solid progress towards transforming DHS intelligence, that we are finally beginning to leverage unique capabilities and officers of the DHS intelligence enterprise. 
4

The future is promising for DHS intelligence, and with the continued support of Secretary Chertoff and the Congress, we will continue to make significant progress in the next 7 months. 

Last October, I discussed with you five equally important priorities for Homeland Security intelligence. Today, I will briefly review those and then conclude, speak to some of the challenges that 

I will have in the next 7 months. 

First, by all accounts, under the leadership of Dr. Mary Connell, 

the deputy assistant secretary for intelligence who sits behind me, 

we have improved the quality of intelligence analysis across the department. 

Key customers, including the secretary and the deputy secretary, 

have praised her products, and we have produced analytic products 

for the ‘‘National Terrorism Bulletin’’ and the ‘‘President’s Daily 

Brief.’’

We have increased our overall production, applied analytic best 

practices to distinguish what is known from what is surmised, and 

to ensure the fair consideration of competing hypotheses. 

We are aggressively expanding training opportunities for our employees and developing department-wide standards for production 

and dissemination of homeland intelligence. 

Substantively, we have broadened our mission to ensure that we 

are addressing the full scope of homeland security. This includes, 

not only assessing immediate threats, but also focusing on such 

issues such as potential threats to U.S. critical infrastructures, security of our borders, use of nonconventional weaponry by terrorists, and the phenomenon of radicalization of American society. 

Second, to promote the integration of DHS intelligence, I have established a Homeland Security Intelligence Council. This council 

comprising the leadership of all DHS intelligence components is a 

decision making body which addresses cross-cutting issues such as 

recruitment, training, analytic standards, budgetary and programmatic issues. We engage on issues that need a management 

decision and look to develop enterprise-wise solution in tackling difficult intelligence problems. 

As part of this integration, I have approved the first ever DHS 

intelligence enterprise strategic plan. This plan sets in place our 

strategic vision with clear-cut objectives to address requirements, 

collection dissemination and information sharing, analysis and 

warning and to create the overall DHS intelligence culture that is 

supported by solid business practices. 

We have conducted the first-ever review of component intelligence programs, a process which not only evaluated component 

intelligence efforts, but also permitted me to engage in direct dialogue with the heads of the operating components of DHS on ways 

to strengthen their intelligence programs. 

In addition, I have initiated a comprehensive intelligence campaign plan in a department-wide strategy for intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance to integrate component and national resources to focus on border security, as well as to support disaster 

relief. 

DHS and the intelligence community must come together to support this critical initiative. 
5

Finally, we have developed a key enabler, an enterprise information architecture that will accelerate DHS’ intelligence integration, 

ensuring we have the information management systems that provide connectivity to the intelligence elements of the operating components, as well as permitting robust sharing of information with 

state and local governments and the private sector. 

To strengthen my office’s support to state, local and tribal authorities in the private sector, my principal deputy assistant secretary, Mr. Jack Tomarchio, who is not here today but elsewhere, 

has traveled extensively to listen to and learn from these important 

partners and to improve our understanding of their need for intelligence and information sharing. 

My office also recently prepared a plan, now under review by 

Secretary Chertoff, to support and engage with state and local fusion centers around the country. We have deployed DHS intelligence officers to New York City, Los Angeles, Maryland and Louisiana. 

We are running a pilot program with the additional states to 

widen interaction with their intelligence centers via a homeland security information network, a pilot project, as I stated, which will 

be far more robust for sharing information in the future. 

Additionally, we are disseminating a wide range of Homeland Security related products to state and local governments, as well as 

to the private sector at both classified and unclassified levels. 

Another of my priorities is to ensure that DHS intelligence takes 

its full place in the intelligence community. In this respect, we are 

working closely with Ambassador Negroponte and his deputies in 

the office of the director of National Intelligence to ensure that 

budget guidance emphasizes a need of homeland security partners. 

We are also are enhancing our relationship with the National 

Counterterrorism Center, the National Counter Proliferation Center, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 

Last but not least, to solidify our relationship with Congress, I 

and my intelligence officers have maintained a rigorous schedule of 

intelligence briefings to the congressional leadership and key committees of both chambers. 

Additionally, we have taken steps to ensure members and staff 

have access to relevant DHS intelligence products and personnel. 

I am working to develop a transparent and open relationship 

with the Congress and so enhance and sustain a close cooperative 

working relationship with all the committees to which I report. 

Some of our transformation efforts cut across my five priorities. 

We have developed an end-to-end strategy to increase significantly 

the use of open sources in our analysis, and we have developed and 

are implementing a recruiting program to ensure we hire and develop into all-source analysts a cadre of the best and brightest officers out of America’s universities. 

Serious challenges, however, remain. Looking ahead 6 to 12 

months, we will need to strengthen further our analytic capabilities, including accelerated training for analysts. 

I must work ever more closely with the heads of DHS operating 

components to ensure that their intelligence elements are strengthened and that they collaborate on threats far more closely than 

they do today. 
6

Above all, we must increase our interaction as you pointed out 

with state and local fusion centers, as well as the private sector, 

to ensure that we significantly increase our information sharing 

with all segments, government and non-government. 

In many respects, however, our greatest challenge will be implementation of our enterprise architecture, which will be the transmission belt for integrating our DHS intelligence enterprise, as 

well as the means by which we reach out to state and local governments and to the private sector. 

Chairman and ranking minority member, we are still at war 

with an adaptive enemy who mean to do us great harm. We continue to track closely serious threat streams, working closely with 

Ambassador Negroponte and the rest of the intelligence community. 

We must stay ahead of these threats, and we plan to increase 

substantially our analysis in the coming months. 

I am thankful for the support I receive from the administration, 

my colleagues in the intelligence community, and from the Congress, including members of this subcommittee. I look forward to 

your questions and to your recommendations. 

Thank you. 

[The statement of Mr. Allen follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHARLES E. ALLEN

Introduction 

Chairman Simmons, Ranking Member Lofgren, members of the Subcommittee, it 

is my pleasure to return to report on my progress during my first seven months as 

Chief Intelligence Officer (CINT) of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). 

We are moving rapidly to transform the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) 

across a broad front. 

When I appeared before you last October, I set forth five equally important priorities, which remain unchanged: • Improving the quality of intelligence analysis across the Department; • Integrating the DHS intelligence enterprise; • Strengthening our support to state, local, and tribal authorities, as well as 

the private sector; 

• Ensuring that DHS intelligence takes its full place in the Intelligence Community; and, 

• Solidifying our relationship with the Congress by improving our transparency 

and responsiveness. 

Today I will my report progress on addressing these priorities, as well as outline 

some specific goals for the next 6 to 12 months. But first, I would like to revisit 

briefly why the Department has a Chief Intelligence Officer and what my responsibilities are serving in this capacity. 

You are undoubtedly aware that the guiding principle of intelligence reform since 

the attacks of September 11, 2001, is integration. Two major commissions—the 9/

11 Commission and the WMD Commission—have made integration of the national 

intelligence community the centerpiece of their recommendations. The principal reason to integrate is to improve intelligence performance, as well as employ our scarce 

intelligence resources more efficiently. 

These guiding principles for intelligence integration at the national level apply to 

integration of DHS intelligence as well. Our Department shares with others the 

most important mission of all—protecting the Homeland from terrorist attacks. DHS 

has a wide range of other critical missions, such as securing our borders and critical 

infrastructure against all other threats and hazards. A department with so many 

interconnected missions cannot succeed without a fully integrated intelligence enterprise supporting it. Just as our nation needs an integrated intelligence enterprise, 

so does DHS. Furthermore, by integrating its own intelligence community, DHS contributes to integration of the national intelligence community. 

This thinking informed the Secretary’s Second Stage Review, which resulted in, 

among other things, the establishment of the position of CINT. DHS Management 

Directive 8110, which Secretary Chertoff signed in January, establishes the authori-
7

ties of the CINT to effectively integrate and manage the Department’s intelligence 

programs. It makes the CINT accountable for designing the DHS intelligence system to optimize the intelligence function, setting standards for functional performance, creating Department-wide policies and processes, and providing automated solutions to yield greater efficiencies.

Progress on priorities 

Improving the quality of analysis 

We have made significant improvements in our analysis, concentrating on issues 

that matter to Secretary Chertoff, our DHS leadership, and our nation. Under the 

leadership of my Deputy Assistant Secretary for Intelligence, Dr. Mary Connell, we 

have changed the focus and format of key products to make them more relevant and 

accessible to a wider range of consumers—policymakers, operators, and other analysts—at all levels. We have increased our monthly production. In keeping with best 

analytic practices, we take pains to distinguish for our readers what is known from 

what is surmised, and we ensure fair consideration of competing hypotheses—there 

is no ‘‘groupthink’’ among my analysts. A measure of our success in improving our 

analysis is that we have now begun to submit intelligence articles for the National 

Terrorism Bulletin and the President’s Daily Brief. 

We continue to improve the quality of our analysis by expanding training opportunities for our analysts within the context of a DHS Intelligence Learning and Development Strategic Plan, completed in January, 2006. We are offering a full range of 

courses to improve our key analytic skills, including critical thinking, intelligence 

writing, and briefing, not only for I&A’s employees, but across our DHS intelligence 

enterprise. I look forward to a time when our bench is full enough and deep enough 

to fully accommodate the need for continuous training and education without compromising our ability to fulfill our day-to-day mission. 

Through the recently established Content Management Board, we are developing 

consensus on Department-wide standards for formatting and dissemination of intelligence products, including posting of relevant products for use by state, local, and 

private-sector partners. We are also recommending enhancements to DHS intelligence production and dissemination standards to achieve the highest possible quality, and we are championing ‘‘write-to-release,’’ tearlining, and other practices to ensure the broadest dissemination of DHS intelligence products. 

Substantively, while terrorist threats and networks remain central concerns, we 

have broadened our focus to include potential U.S. vulnerabilities such as border 

and critical infrastructure security, as well as the spread of pandemic disease, which 

could weaken our ability to secure and protect the Homeland. Beyond these issues, 

we also are concerned with the proliferation of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive (CBRNE) materials and we are working to understand the 

growth and spread of extremist ideology, which terrorists could exploit to multiply 

their resources and capabilities to attack the United States. 

• Border Security: We are taking an aggressive approach to support the securing our nation’s borders. We believe the threats to our security must be viewed 

across a spectrum of concerns—narcotics, terrorism, illegal immigration, human 

smuggling and trafficking, to name a few—and at the nexus of these threats. 

We are working tirelessly to support the intelligence and information needs of 

our frontline border agencies, including Customs and Border Protection, the 

Coast Guard and Immigration and Customs Enforcement. 

• Critical Infrastructure: Partnering with Robert Stephan, Assistant Secretary 

for Infrastructure Protection, I have strengthened the Homeland Infrastructure 

Threat and Risk Analysis Center (HITRAC), the linchpin in our support to the 

efforts of the Department and the private sector to determine the risk of attack 

against key infrastructure as well as the protective measures that may be 

taken. Additionally, at the direction of the Secretary, I&A has begun to provide 

intelligence support to the Committee on Foreign Investments in the United 

States (CFIUS)—fulfilling a critical intelligence need to secure our homeland. 

• CBRNE: I&A analysts provide all-source intelligence support to assist DHS 

customers identify, prevent, disrupt, and prepare for chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, explosive, and cyber attacks on the Homeland. They assess and 

forecast adversary capabilities, intent, and methods of terrorists through collaboration with DHS components—especially the Science and Technology Directorate and the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO)—and federal, state, 

local, tribal, and international partners. Outside of DHS, our analysts work 

closely with the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), the National 

Counterproliferation Center (NCPC), and the FBI to leverage expertise and information and produce analytic products of the highest quality for the Secretary, DHS components, and governmental partners at all levels. 
8

• I&A provides a range of support for DNDO and helps link DNDO to the 

Intelligence Community. On an ongoing basis, I&A gathers and assesses intelligence reporting for situational awareness, analyzes emerging trends, incorporates DNDO’s information requirements, and supports the establishment of regional centers for radiation detection support. In addition, I&A 

supports high-level DNDO Congressional briefs, participates in Nuclear 

Alarm Assessment Conferences for unresolved radiation alarms, and interfaces with DNDO’s Nuclear Assessment Program. • Radicalization: We have sharpened and refined our focus on radicalization, 

viewing it as a strategic warning issue—if we can understand the radicalization 

phenomenon, we can identify the root of terrorism before it matures and manifests itself in attacks against the Homeland. Working closely with selected state 

and local government partners across the U.S., we are examining the places 

where radicalization occurs and the individuals it touches. Our efforts are coordinated with and complement the work being done by the FBI and other Intelligence Community colleagues, as well as international partners who confront 

similar issues. Together, we intend to develop a comprehensive understanding 

of the radicalization challenge. 

Integrating the DHS intelligence enterprise 

As I said at the outset, the role of the CINT is to integrate the DHS intelligence 

enterprise. In this respect, I have taken a number of important steps in fulfillment 

of this role, including: • Establishing the Homeland Security Intelligence Council (HSIC), consisting of 

the heads of the DHS component intelligence offices, to serve as my principal 

decision-making forum for intelligence issues of Department-wide significance; 

• Developing and approving the first-ever DHS Intelligence Enterprise Strategic 

Plan, which provides all DHS intelligence components with a strategic context 

for their operations and investments; 

• Conducting a review of component intelligence programs that will result in 

my making substantive inputs to the Secretary’s Resource Allocation Decisions—the first time this has occurred, and a major step toward treating the 

budget resources the Department devotes to intelligence as a coherent program; 

• Through the efforts of I&A’s Collection and Requirements Division, developing a Department-wide roadmap for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), ensuring that the surveillance capabilities of DHS’s operating components will be employed with those of the Intelligence Community and the Department of Defense in national crises or natural disasters; and 

• Initiating a comprehensive Intelligence Campaign Plan for Border Security, 

with an initial emphasis on the Southwest border, bringing the resources of 

both the national and Departmental intelligence communities to bear on this 

acute problem. 

To help weld together the component parts of the DHS intelligence enterprise and 

bring them closer to both national and local consumers, we are designing an enterprise information architecture. Dr. Carter Morris, Director of I&A’s Information 

Sharing and Knowledge Management Division, has developed a comprehensive assessment of the existing intelligence information technology architecture in DHS, 

along with recommendations to improve and enhance it. I am now reviewing this 

assessment. Nothing has higher priority programmatically for DHS intelligence 

than strengthening our ability to manage our information. 

Strengthening support to state, local, and tribal authorities and the private sector 

DHS has a crucial responsibility to serve state, local, and tribal authorities and 

the private sector. This set of partners is so important that I have given my Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis, Mr. Jack Tomarchio, 

the primary responsibility for enhancing our relations with them. He is my ‘‘Mr. 

Outside,’’ and his extensive travels across the country listening to state, local, tribal, 

and private-sector officials’ need for intelligence and information sharing have greatly enhanced our understanding of their issues, and has provided us with meaningful 

insights on how to better serve them. Complementing his efforts is the work of 

I&A’s External Relations and Law Enforcement Partners Program. This outreach 

team, consisting of former law enforcement and public safety officials, attends association conferences and meetings to inform state and local representatives about 

DHS information-sharing programs and initiatives. 

Substantively, our analysts and briefers have provided immediate warning and 

outreach to state homeland security advisers and to other state and local officials 

on threat reporting. 

Another important aspect of our plans to serve state, local and tribal authorities 

and the private sector is our plan to support the state and local fusion centers that 
9

many states and large cities are establishing. Our recently developed plan is under 

review by the Secretary. Meanwhile, we have deployed DHS intelligence personnel 

to New York, Los Angeles, Maryland, and Louisiana to improve our support in these 

key regions. We plan to deploy several more officers to a number of fusion centers 

before the end of the current fiscal year. Additionally, we have initiated a pilot program with six states—California, Arizona, Illinois, Florida, Virginia, and New 

York—to widen our interaction with intelligence analysts at their fusion centers via 

the HSIN-Intelligence portal; after further evaluation, we expect to extend this pilot 

program to a wider community of fusion centers. 

We are also taking advantage of information technology to facilitate our outreach. 

We regularly hold teleconferences with state Homeland Security Advisors and other 

key officials at the state and local level. We have given new technical direction to 

the Homeland Security Information Network—Secret (HSIN–S)—which should be 

operational this quarter. We will extend HSIN–S to state and local fusion cells on 

an interim basis until a more capable system is available. Finally, we are working 

hard on the deployment of a more robust information handling system, the Department’s Homeland Security Data Network (HSDN). 

Ensuring that DHS intelligence takes its full place in the Intelligence Community 

We are also transforming our role in the national intelligence community. DHS 

I&A engages daily, at all levels, with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) and the individual Intelligence Community departments and agencies. Our collaboration with NCTC is strengthening by leaps and bounds. We have 

begun to submit articles for production in the National Terrorism Bulletin (NTB) 

and plan to increase our NTB submissions in coming months. Last month we participated along with other Intelligence Community members in an NCTC-sponsored 

joint requirements review for open-source intelligence needs to complement the previous joint requirements reviews for the other intelligence collection disciplines. Additionally: • We have worked with the ODNI to shape its budget guidance to serve better 

the unique needs of Homeland Security. As a result of our efforts, departments 

and agencies with Intelligence Community members received guidance to provide resources for the development of sensitive but unclassified (SBU) intelligence products more readily used by state, local, and tribal authorities and the 

private sector; 

• We are leading the Intelligence Community’s efforts to support border security through the development our comprehensive Intelligence Campaign Plan 

for border security. We are developing this plan in full partnership with the IC 

collection agencies and hand in hand with the staff elements of the Deputy Directors of National Intelligence for analysis, collection, and customer outcomes; 

—I&A analysts have served as the functional lead for the Department’s participation in the National Counterterrorism Community Terrorist Threat Warning 

System, and have provided consistent support to the monthly meetings of the 

Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism; 

• We are engaged in a continuing and constructive dialogue with the ODNI on 

a wide range of issues. With DNI oversight, we are refining our roles and responsibilities, authorities, and capabilities vis-a`-vis the rest of the Intelligence 

Community in the domain of homeland security. In particular, we are collaborating with the FBI on DHS’s responsibilities for sharing information with state 

and local governments. 

• Our relationships with other Intelligence Community organizations continue 

to strengthen measurably, for example, the FBI has added four intelligence analysts to its existing special-agent liaison officer team in our office. This will improve analytic collaboration between FBI and DHS and provide DHS with new 

and continuing database access to FBI holdings, improving our ability to provide unique information to our customers. In turn, we have announced a DHS 

liaison officer position to the FBI at a senior leadership level to emphasize the 

importance we put on this relationship.

Solidifying our relationship with Congress 

Since my arrival, I have initiated briefings with members and senior staff designed to enhance awareness of threats to the Homeland and how we are reinvigorating and strengthening our overall intelligence efforts. The Homeland Threat 

Stream Matrix is a continuing and high-interest briefing that my Office provides to 

Congressional officials with a need to know. Additionally, senior intelligence officers 

from our current analysis division provide regular threat briefings to the leadership 

and key committees of both chambers, a well as to individual members as required. 

Finally, we have taken measures to ensure members and staff have access to relevant DHS intelligence products.
10

Cross-cutting accomplishments 

I want to mention several accomplishments that do not fall neatly into one or another of my priorities but which are crucial enablers to our mission. 

Open source 

We have developed a concept of operations for aggressive use of open sources 

(OSINT) that leverages current activities of the Department, other departments and 

agencies including the DNI Open Source Center, the private sector, and our state 

and local partners in order to improve analysis and, when applicable, to protect intelligence sources and methods. • We will gather domestic open-source information—including ‘‘gray literature’’—directly, and we will purchase access to value-added collections that 

complement those already available to DHS through its partner departments 

and agencies. 

• DHS officers will handle open-source information as a normal part of their 

everyday routine. Additionally, a cadre of specialists will support the mission 

needs of the Secretary and DHS components. The value provided by these specialists will include economies of scale, quality control and qualification of 

sources, and linkages and indexing to related open-source information as well 

as to intelligence and threat-advisory issuances. 

• Dissemination will be both ‘‘push’’ and ‘‘pull.’’ We will use existing channels 

of information dissemination. Additionally, we may offer open-source information ‘‘wholesale’’ to authorized organizations and ‘‘retail’’ to selected users by direct subscription, and as a service available through a common services architecture. 

Human capital 

We developed and implemented a DHS Intelligence Recruitment Strategic Plan to 

bring onboard the best and brightest people fresh out of America’s universities and 

colleges. We have taken 30 of our positions and converted them to GS–7/9/11 levels 

to take advantage of the ongoing recruiting efforts and build the foundation for a 

sustainable DHS intelligence enterprise. We are building a DHS Intelligence Basic 

Course to train our GS–7/9/11s—not only those hired by DHS I&A but by other Departmental intelligence components—to instill a true DHS intelligence culture at 

the beginning of our new intelligence professionals’ careers.

Looking ahead 6–12 months 

We have made progress but I am determined to move forward even stronger in 

the coming months. My agenda to continue I&A’s transformation includes: • Continuing to strengthen the quality of our analysis, focusing on training our 

analysts in core analytic skills, continuing to extend this training throughout 

the DHS Intelligence Enterprise, and tailoring our counterterrorism threat 

warning and assessment products more closely to our customers’ requirements; 

• Continuing to build our expertise in the analytic focus areas of border security, critical infrastructure, CBRNE, and radicalization, while also strengthening our intra-Departmental support; 

• Enhancing intelligence support to the Department’s principals through enhanced briefing programs, which capitalize on the skills and expertise of our 

most experienced analysts; 

• Making urgently needed improvements to our I&A facilities to enhance the 

effectiveness and well-being of our workforce to provide our officers with critically needed information technology and workstations; 

• Achieving key deliverables in our integration of the DHS intelligence enterprise, such as enhanced training efforts, a DHS intelligence officer rotation program, and strengthening our interoperability with DHS our components. 

• Significantly strengthening our growing relationship with state and local authorities and the private sector, especially by increasing the interaction we have 

with State and Local Fusion Centers and by making more of our production 

available to our non-federal customers via HSIN and ultimately via HSDN; and 

• Expanding relationships with our international partners, especially our closest allies. We have made progress in this area in the past six months and we 

must now move quickly to make further gains in our relationships with these 

close friends. 

Conclusion 

Members of the Subcommittee, I want to conclude my testimony as I did six 

months ago: by reminding you—and the American people you represent—that we 

are in a war with an adaptive enemy who means to do us grave harm. In addition, 

we are on watch for possible hazards to the homeland arising from illegal immigration, natural disaster, and pandemic disease, among other things. To stay ahead of 
11

these threats, the dedicated employees of I&A have been working long, hard hours 

to transform the way we do business. We must be resolute in our efforts and we 

cannot rest. I am grateful for the support and dedication of the men and women 

of I&A. I am also thankful for the support I have received from the Administration, 

from my colleagues in the Intelligence Community, and from Congress, including 

the members of this Subcommittee. Our transformation at I&A is well under way, 

but much work remains to be completed. I look forward to this challenging work. 

We owe it to ourselves and we owe it to the American people. 

I am eager to work with this Subcommittee to continue I&A’s transformation, and 

I look forward to answering your questions.

Mr. SIMMONS. I thank the gentleman. 

I mentioned that earlier this week, I had the opportunity to visit 

a fusion center in Maryland. I look forward to visiting a number 

of additional fusion centers located in different areas of the country. It is my belief that these fusion centers are going to be critically important as sources of information and as locations where 

responses can be coordinated, not only in the event of a terrorist 

threat, but also in the event of other natural crises. 

That being said, the National Governors Association recently surveyed all of the governors of the United States. They placed the 

state intelligence fusion centers as top priorities, and so I think 

your concern and my concern coincide with that of the governors. 

It is my understanding that when you look at the fusion centers, 

however, they are organized differently in different areas. They 

have different lead sponsors. Some are sponsored principally by the 

FBI, others by DHS, others by municipal police. 

It is my understanding that some federal guidelines on fusion 

centers have been developed by DHS, but they have not yet been 

released. 

I wonder if you could comment on the issue of fusion centers and 

what we need to do to move those concepts forward. 

Mr. ALLEN. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I strongly agree with the need 

for us to develop this strong relationship with the fusion centers, 

but they do differ remarkably in many ways. Some states as yet 

have not formed fusion centers. Others are in the early stages of 

doing so. 

And we are, I think, in agreement with you, and I know that the 

Secretary will want to issue some guidelines, because as we give 

out grants and as we begin training under legislation, the head of 

grants and training can actually help provide money so that the fusion centers can hire officers and analysts to come in. 

So the federal money will be involved with these. We will want 

to have some general guidelines so that there is a common understanding of roles, missions, functions, the flow of information down 

as you spoke earlier. 

One of the things that we know that is very important is to be 

able to harvest some of the information that has been lawfully obtained by these fusion centers, which deals perhaps with suspicious 

activities or trends and patterns of things that either states or local 

law enforcement organizations have detected. So in my view, the 

federal guidelines is going to be a key way of guiding this. 

The one thing we do not propose to do is tell any of the states 

or local governments how they should structure and organize their 

fusion centers. But we would hope that they would welcome federal 

guidelines as suggestions on how they can most effectively organize 

themselves. 
12

As you know, there are a number of fusion centers that will be 

opening. New Jersey will be opening soon a fusion center in Trenton, and, of course, the Regional Intelligence Center in Los Angeles 

will be opening in mid–July where I will be present to speak on 

behalf of Secretary Chertoff. 

Your point, sir, extremely well taken. 

Mr. SIMMONS. I thank you for that response. 

And again, I refer to Page 399 in the 9/11 Commission report 

which says that current threat calls for quick as well as imaginative and agile responses. So, if, in fact, the department’s assessment of its recommendations on fusion centers is stuck on somebody’s desk, and I don’t mean yours, my inclination is to move forward with some legislative initiatives on the subject, and maybe at 

some point, that set of recommendations and our legislative initiative can meet. 

Again, I think it is critically important, and I thank you for the 

work that you have done in that line. 

Again, I now recognize the ranking member. 

Ms. LOFGREN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

As I mentioned in my opening statement, we did have a good opportunity to meet with Mr. Allen in a classified setting yesterday, 

and just going?I have another question other than the NSA issue. 

But the concern that I have is that, if there is information that 

is collected by another agency, not DHS, that in the end is decided 

was collected in violation of the statute, whether there is an ability 

to audit where information came and where it went as distributed 

from DHS. 

And the question is: Are you able to discuss this in this public 

setting? 

And if so, could you talk about that, and if you cannot talk about 

that, then just tell me that, and I will go to my second question. 

Mr. ALLEN. Yes, Congresswoman Lofgren, I can speak to the 

point of view that we receive information from all of the collection 

agencies of U.S. intelligence community as well as we receive information, obviously, of a law enforcement nature. 

We believe that all of the information collected by these other 

agencies is lawfully obtained. We know of no occasion of information that we have received that was unlawful, because we view 

that those agencies work with their general councils, with their inspector generals, and we know of absolutely no occasion on which 

any unlawful information has been received by the Department of 

Homeland Security. And, obviously, we respect the information of 

a law enforcement nature. 

So, I can say that we receive a wide variety of information just 

like the National Counterterrorism Center receives a wide variety 

of information. We apply our intelligence to these areas of homeland security, which I spoke about the fact that we analyze intelligence warnings and threats, and we try to be agile and nimble. 

If there is a threat of any urgency, we do secure borders. 

We are doing a tremendous amount of work on the critical infrastructures that is working to ensure that the private sectors of U.S. 

society are protected. We work against unconventional weaponry, 

and we work very closely with our director of science and technology. 
13

And then, of course, there is information from the open domain 

which come into us as well as that from the collection agencies in 

the intelligence community. 

We know of no unlawful information, and we are very confident 

that the information we have is lawfully obtained as part of our 

analysis. 

Ms. LOFGREN. If I may, Mr. Allen, certainly, whatever information we have from whatever source, we would use to interrupt an 

attack on this country. The question really is, if it turned out that 

your trust in the information coming in was?you were disappointed, 

if that information became the basis for a law enforcement action 

and prosecution instead of an interruption issue whether we would 

be able to track it into light. 

So I am going to move on to the second question, which really 

relates to High Track. In February, you and Dr. Mary Connell 

talked about the progress of the critical infrastructure vulnerability 

assessment that High Track is doing. And I am worried and, frankly, maybe a little concerned about the private sector participation 

in these efforts. 

The GAO report says that only 290 voluntary submissions have 

been made on critical infrastructure information from the private 

sector. And they identify some things in their judgment the department should do, that we should define specific government needs 

for critical infrastructure information, explain how the information 

will be used, assure the private sector the information will be protected, who will have access to the information, and somehow give 

an indication of benefit to the owners of the information for sharing. 

Have you had a chance to think about these suggestions, and do 

you agree with them, or is there something else that we should be 

doing? 

Mr. ALLEN. I believe that the High Track, which I think is absolutely vital that we further enhance and strength our high track 

production. Dr. Connell, who is with me, has worked very hard to 

put additional analysts into High Track. 

We also have requested substantial increase in the number of 

sector specialists which have to come from the infrastructure protection directorate so that we can get the synergy that is involved. 

I understand the anxiety of the private sector, but I think that 

in the last 6 months, you have seen a true increase in the amount 

of information we flow to the private sector. I just had a very senior official in the private sector from your state call on his own and 

compliment the kind of support that he was now receiving, that it 

was effective. It enabled him to take the kinds of protective measures for his sector that he needed. 

I am meeting with the—because there is a critical infrastructure 

security committee, I meet with the heads of each of the 17 U.S. 

private sectors. They like our new product. 

We have a lot of work to do there, Congresswoman. You put your 

finger right on something that we are going to work very hard. We 

are very proud of what we have done. 

One of the things that we have started to do is working with the 

private sector on suspicious activities and reporting out to those 

sectors things that have been detected either in intelligence or law 
14

enforcement channels in order to enable them to understand what 

might be going on as far as trends and patterns of someone wishing to harm the private sector. 

We are very pleased with where we are, but in the next 6 

months, I want to come back very strongly and tell you that we are 

a lot better off than we are today. 

Ms. LOFGREN. Mr. Chairman, if I may, I never dreamed that we 

would start our 3:30 hearing at 4:30, and unfortunately, Chairman 

Sensenbrenner and I and Mr. Conyers are hosting a members 

meeting for roughly a hundred people at 5 o’clock. And Jim Sensenbrenner is a very strong chairman, but I don’t want to tick him off, 

so I am thinking that I will rush over to that meeting and then 

try and come back, leaving the minority in the capable hands of 

Mr. Langevin for the moment. 

Mr. SIMMONS. Good luck with Mr. Sensenbrenner. 

The chair now recognizes the distinguished gentleman from Nevada, a member of the Intelligence and Armed Services Committee, 

who has on the distant horizon perhaps the opportunity to be a 

governor. And so these issues might be of particular interest to 

him. 

Mr. GIBBONS. Well, they are, Mr. Chairman, and I want to thank 

you for the lead-in. You are a very good, straight man, and I appreciate that as well. 

Mr. Allen, it is always a pleasure to see you before our committee, and I know oftentimes that the stress of a rigorous schedule 

of reporting and briefing Congress oftentimes puts a hardship on 

the agency to do their job. And for that, we apologize, but there is 

no over alternative for us but for you to be here. 

What I am interested in, of course, is the state-federal relationship here. As you have mentioned, there are a number of states 

that are just beginning or started or are in the early phases of having an analytic center or a fusion center, if you will. 

I would like you to tell me, if you can, how do you gauge what 

they are doing correctly or what they are doing incorrectly today? 

And if you can, tell me which states are doing it right and which 

ones are doing it wrong. 

Mr. GIBBONS. That is a very good question, how to evaluate and 

judge the efficacy of the various state fusion centers. And some are 

so in their early stages, they are just now getting computers and 

equipment and getting the personnel staff, say, like the state of 

Virginia. 

I was with Governor Kaine a few weeks ago, and he is anxious 

for me to send an analyst down to work in his state fusion center, 

which is going to be really outstanding, and the Homeland Security 

adviser there working closely with the governor to ensure that he 

builds what we want. 

We go to, I believe, some states out in the far northwest. Montana, Idaho, and others have yet to come online with the state fusion center. 

But there are some very strong ones. There is some in the south. 

I know that Georgia has a very strong one. It is obvious that Tennessee is extremely active. New York is very, very active up in Albany. Very pleased with some of the—

Mr. GIBBONS. How do you gauge those? 
15

Mr. ALLEN. Based on what they are doing, based on their own 

content of their own analyses, based on their interactions with us, 

and we have steady interactions either on—if it is a class-mat matter, on a secure phone or nonsecure phone. I have calls with them 

or my subordinates on a regular basis. So we can make judgments 

as to how well they are faring or not faring. They obviously need 

assistance from our training and grants directorate. They need 

funding, because they do not necessarily have the funds themselves. 

So I think the guidelines that Chairman Simmons spoke of are 

very important. Those are guidelines that are, of course, being 

worked closely with the Department of Justice so that we ensure 

that we have the very best guidelines and supporting of intelligence and law enforcement activities that may occur in these fusion centers. 

Mr. GIBBONS. That support and the guidelines, does that include 

the training of the individuals for these state fusion centers? 

Mr. ALLEN. Yes, sir, because under the legislation which the 

Congress has provided, under grants and training, which I do not 

control, but obviously, we work closely with grants and training, 

can give funding for training programs. They can give training—

they can actually give funds so they can hire analysts or other officers to staff the fusion centers. 

Mr. GIBBONS. Well, those would presumably already be trained 

officers, trained analysts that come from some other agency, can 

which in my view, brings the question of: Do we have enough analysts, trained intelligence officers for this kind of this opportunity 

that can go and participate in these state functions without shortchanging the work of the 10 different offices of the intelligence that 

you have under your direction. 

Mr. ALLEN. That is going to be an issue. We are going to put 

some analysts and some liaison officers to coordinate relationships. 

As far as training, we actually, under the law, have been able too 

bring some of the people, for example, New York and Maryland, 

some of their analysts into some of my training programs which I 

initiated. So we are working very closely with the states. 

Right now, given how stretched we are in the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, deploying additional officers out to the states 

will be a strain, but we are going to—I have talked to the secretary 

and the deputy secretary, and they both feel that we need to do 

this. So we are going to put officers in many of these state fusion 

centers over the next 2 to 3 years. 

Mr. GIBBONS. One final question, Mr. Allen, and I don’t mean to 

belabor this. Have we improved the long delays that it has been 

taking to get local and state law enforcement officers certified or 

cleared for classified information, giving them the classification to 

receive that? 

I mean, there have been a number of complaints that we have 

heard over the last many, many months, that it is just taking too 

long. 

Mr. ALLEN. I have learned of this since my arrival. I am unhappy 

with the progress that has been made. I am working with the director of office security to clear additional officers with the state fusion centers, local government. 
16

For example, I have all but completed clearing 50 officers with 

the intelligence division of New York state. I just met with Mr. 

McClary, police chief of Las Vegas. He is putting in a request to 

clear four of his people. We are going to do that. 

So, yes, I am very active and working directly with the chiefs of 

police, with the sheriffs of the major counties to clear some of their 

people. There is no reason why we should be behind or delay clearing these people, clearing all of them. Compartmenting information 

will be a little difficult, but we ought to be able to give them secret 

clearances, and we ought to be able to do it rather rapidly, Congressman. 

Mr. GIBBONS. And what does that rapidly mean? With your influence say, for example, if—

Mr. ALLEN. Well, we can do it in a matter of weeks once they 

get the information in. The ones in New York have been cleared 

very rapidly. We are clearing a number of people. And I am clearing people in the private sector, people who really run security of 

major private sectors. They need the clearances too. 

And I have worked directly with the private sector to get them 

clearances at the secret level. We need to accelerate this. We have 

not done what should have been done, and I am not too happy with 

that, by I am doing my level best to improve that. 

Mr. GIBBONS. Well, you sound like you are the right person for 

the job. You are the first one that has shown any enthusiasm about 

moving that issue along quickly, and I appreciate it. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. SIMMONS. I thank the gentleman for his questions. 

The chair now recognizes the distinguished gentleman from 

Rhode Island, Mr. Langevin. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Allen, I want to thank you for being here today and for your 

testimony. Just on a personal observation and note, I appreciate 

how accessible you have been. You have been before this committee 

now several times, and we have had private briefings with you in 

closed session. In addition, you and I have had one-on-one discussions in my office. I appreciate how accessible you have been. 

Let me turn to a topic that we have discussed before and builds 

on the line of this issue of open communication—more effective intelligence sharing with state and local officials. 

I know one of the times we have had discussion in my office, we 

talked about RISSNET, Regional Information Sharing Systems 

Network, that law enforcement already uses right now for communicating with respect to sharing intelligence on criminal activity. 

And it seems to be a good model that works, and law enforcement is comfortable with it. I know you sent a representative, as 

I understand it, because you said you would, to RISSNET to evaluate their capabilities and whether that is something the Department of Homeland Security should be using to share information 

about potential terrorist activity. 

Can you just report to the committee your assessment of 

RISSNET and just the information sharing mechanism that you 

will be using in homeland security? 

Mr. ALLEN. Congressman, that is a promising capability. My deputy went up to Massachusetts to talk to officials there. I will get 
17

back to you with their assessment. I do not have a final assessment 

on his visit. We will get back to you on RISSNET with the formal 

writing, formal question for the record, if I may, sir. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I appreciate that. And again, I appreciate the fact 

that you dispatched one of your deputies so quickly to go and at 

least evaluate the capability of RISSNET. 

If I could, you also said that state regional fusion centers obviously are being touted as an important resource to promote information sharing with state and local and tribal law enforcement officers and other entities nationwide. My understanding, though, is 

that DHS is planning to send I&A representatives to fusion centers—I know you have mentioned that several times here today as 

well—in order to basically act as liaisons with the DHS. 

I also understand that the various folks that you will be sending 

are at different levels of experience, different skill sets and will be 

playing different roles. So my question is: How will there be a consistent DHS footprint in the fusion centers without some common 

standards for the people that you are sending into the field? 

What is your concept of operations implementation plan for the 

fusion centers initiative being finalized only now after you have already deployed personnel to the field? Basically, what are the key 

points from your concept of operations and implementation plans? 

Mr. ALLEN. That is a good question. I did deploy people with the 

Secretary’s approval before the concept of operation and implementation plan has been fully staffed and all the funding for fiscal year 

2006 and fiscal year 2007 have been identified. 

I did that because when I arrived, I found we had nothing in the 

field. We had New York, we had Los Angeles, we had other cities 

that wanted support. So I pressed hard to get some people out on 

an ad hoc basis. That is no substitute for a plan and for implementation of the plan. And some of the officers I have sent have?and 

it depends to some degree on the fusion center and their requirements. Out in Los Angeles, we need an officer to help coordinate. 

Up in New York, particularly in New York City, we need not 

only a liaison officer, but they also want analysts to help work with 

the intelligence divisions in New York City and with the 

Counterterrorism Division to help them shape their analyses and 

to do mentoring. So it does differ from state to state. 

Our implementation plan suggests that most of our people will 

work in liaison and coordinating capacities. But, for example, down 

in the state of Virginia, because they have a laboratory there with 

the military with Governor Kaine, I believe he wants to have an 

analyst down in the state of Virginia. 

The state of Maryland, we sent one of our finest analysts Dr. 

Connell has up to Maryland to help with the one that Chairman 

Simmons met. 

We have to get all this together, and very candidly, our concept 

operation has come together since January. And now, we have to 

get the implementation plan out and approved by the Secretary, 

and then we have to carefully determine the work and the activities that each will undertake out in the state fusion center. 

In most cases, I think it will be liaison officers, coordinating officers, but a number of these places really do need analysts. Governor Kaine made that very clear in the state of Virginia. 
18

Mr. LANGEVIN. So it is your intent that although this first appointment of individuals from I&A were more of an ad-hoc basis 

that eventually, there will be a uniform plan for the type of people 

that is deployed with various capabilities and, skill sets? 

Mr. ALLEN. Yes, sir, that is absolutely my intention. My principal 

deputy, Jack Tomarchio, has been charged with doing the kind of 

detailed implementation plan. He is a person from the private sector who has worked very closely at the state and local government 

levels in his career, and I have every confidence that in 6 months 

from now, we can come back, and we will lay out a plan that will 

be very satisfactory to you. 

We will not have a lot of people out in fiscal year 2006, but we 

hope to put 15 or 20 more out possibly in fiscal year 2007. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. SIMMONS. I thank the gentleman for his questions, and I 

would like to do a second round if the gentleman would accommodate me. Thank you very much. 

I had the opportunity to meet Robert Stephan, the assistant secretary for Infrastructure Protection. He is an impressive guy, Air 

Force career, retired colonel, I believe, and he filled me in quite a 

bit on High Track and how that is going. 

I appreciate your comments that there seems to be more cooperation from the private sector, and I think that is a good sign that 

we are getting that cooperation. 

I raised with him one issue that concerns me when it comes to 

critical infrastructure and protection. And that is passenger rail, 

particularly Amtrak. I sit on the Railroad Subcommittee of Transportation. I have Amtrak through my district, in fact, through my 

hometown. Many of my constituents ride on a regular basis. 

And looking back to the Baltimore tunnel and the New York City 

tunnel issues, looking to the Spain commuter rail attack, and also 

the British subway attack, it seems to me that that is a model of 

attack that has been used by the terrorists in the past. And certainly, with our rail infrastructure, our situation might lend itself 

to that kind of attack, in particular because Amtrak police are so 

limited in their numbers. 

We have three Amtrak police, who are based in New Haven, 

Connecticut, who cover the Amtrak line from the New York border 

to Providence. There are another three that operate out of Maryland. Very limited resource, stretch resource. They do not fill all 

their slots. Their new recruits frequently disappear and go off to 

work with municipal police. 

And so I guess my question would be: What effort or what focus 

has been applied to the issue of passenger rail, in particular Amtrak? And do you share my concern over the lack of numbers and 

of the Amtrak police? 

Mr. ALLEN. Chairman Simmons, I share completely your concern 

about passenger rail, mass transit. Nothing probably gives us more 

worries. We obviously work, as Kip Hawley, the head of the Transportation Security Administration, has stated about the passenger 

rail mass transit, that it is a deep concern to him. 

We have hardened our aviation security, although there are still 

risks there, and Mr. Hawley is concentrating particularly on detecting explosives. 
19

But passenger rail, you are right. It is a very open society, thousands of miles, either above ground or underground across this 

great country. And the amount of security is, of course, limited. 

What we are doing is providing our assessments, providing suggested potential ways that the mass transit sector can mitigate 

some of these risks. 

There are more measures being taken, certainly, at the federal 

level, by Mr. Hawley. I believe in a classified session, he could tell 

you more specifically some of the very subtle measures that are 

being taken that may not be totally evident. There are a number 

of areas. 

I do agree that based just on what we know about al-Qa’ida’s interest in this or affiliated networks, that this gives us—this is the 

kind of thing that certainly keeps me up at night. And if we get 

a threat that deals with mass transit, rest assured that that gives 

heavy scrutiny. 

We work with the FBI and the National Counterterrorism Center. We get the Homeland Security adviser on secure phone or send 

secure messages. If it is a classified matter or if it is one that we 

can just use the official-use only level, we get it to them quickly. 

This is probably as worrisome a sector as we have, sir. 

Mr. SIMMONS. Thank you for that, and I will ask one more question, realizing my time is disappearing. 

Open-source intelligence—we have talked about it before. That is 

my understanding that the Oklahoma City National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism has a terrorism knowledge 

base that includes over 30 years of open-source terrorism data. 

We have a new open-source center that is affiliated with CIA, the 

FBIS, which I am sure you are familiar with. It is interesting and 

instructive to look at the recent concern expressed over the National Security Agency surveillance program to understand how 

Americans are instinctively concerned about secret operations, in 

particular, those that could possibly involve their own privacy here 

domestically within the United States. 

That is one argument among many for a focus on open-source, 

in particular, for the Department of Homeland Security which has 

responsibilities primarily within the domestic United States to be 

using as much information as possible that is derived from openly 

publicly available sources so Americans are assured or get some assurance that their privacy is not being violated. 

I know you have testified in favor of open source. I know you are 

an advocate for it. Over the last 6 months or 7 months, what 

progress do you see incorporating open source into your analytical 

product? 

Mr. ALLEN. Chairman Simmons, under Dr. Connell here and 

with the advice of some real specialists in open source, we are now 

in the early phases of developing a comprehensive open-source 

strategy, one of things that we have done is, for the first time, the 

Department of Homeland Security, my office is taking over the 

open-source information system portal of information that deals 

with the homeland. This is something that we have just now taken 

over. 

We are looking at putting together a cadre of government specialists as well as contractors from my office to work as a virtual 
20

satellite bureau of the open source center that is run by CIA to ensure that we meet the requirements, not only of the federal government for Homeland Security open source information, but that we 

also make available this information we put down to the states. 

The states also, as you know, have open source things publicly and 

lawfully acquired that we hope to have push back towards us. 

One of the things that Dr. Connell has done is to scrub all the 

requirements for open source. When we came in 6 months ago, 7 

months ago, none of that had been done. There was no open source 

strategy, no open source program. We now have the beginnings—

and this is going to be one of my highest priorities. Commercial imagery is something that I feel very strongly about. 

There are many ways that we can benefit homeland security and 

through information sharing down and pull information back from 

state and local government, all of which is open in the public domain, all of which is legal. 

Mr. SIMMONS. Thank you. 

The gentleman from Rhode Island? 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Allen, I note one of I&A’s major concerns is radicalization 

within the United States and the threat that this phenomenon 

poses to the homeland. 

Without disclosing any classified information, of course, what is 

your assessment of the extent of the radicalization problem today, 

and what challenges is the intelligence committee facing in this 

sphere, and what can be done to prevent radicalized individuals, be 

they violent Jihadists or right-wing extremists, from committing 

terrorist acts? 

Mr. ALLEN. Yes. I appreciate the question, Congressman, because 

we have formed a radicalization cell within our finest officers under 

Dr. Connell within the Office of Intelligence and Analysis. They are 

looking at the very broad aspects of radicalization. They are also 

looking, not only at what you might call those who are engaged in 

believing in the Jihad, but we are looking at extremists on the 

right. We are looking at animal liberation movements, earth liberation movements, people who would use violence or do damage to 

our infrastructure. 

Our greatest worry, however, of course, those right now are those 

involved in starting to believe in the Jihadist message. And as we 

know, we have this virtual world where we see people connected 

to the Internet and the Internet culture—there is Internet culture 

supporting the Jihad, as you are well aware. It is a major driver. 

We are not trying to get into the work that is done by the National Counterterrorism Center or the Federal Bureau of Investigation. We are working in a complementary way that, because we 

have found out that states have a great deal of information, a great 

deal to offer, all the states are looking at radicalization. Your own 

state, I am sure, as well. 

We know that California, New York and others are doing a remarkable job, and we hope to work with state and local governments and with the major cities, law enforcement departments to 

be able to get a better understanding of how perhaps radicalization 

is spreading across the United States. It is very small, it is very 
21

limited, but we know what damage only one or two individuals can 

do to our society. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. On that point, my understanding is 

that much of the radicalization in the United States that is of concern to the intelligence community is actually occurring in our federal and state prison systems. 

From your perspective, how easy is it for the prison authorities 

to share information about radicalized inmates with the intelligence community and state and local law enforcement authorities? 

And what areas of improvement are called for in terms of improving information sharing in this area, and what role do you envision your office playing in this regard? 

Mr. ALLEN. I believe that we will play a very vital role along 

with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and with the National 

Counterterrorism Center. States and local law enforcement agencies can share information that may involve U.S. persons if those 

persons are engaged in advocating or directing the violent actions 

against our society. 

So we believe, though, that we are not looking at individuals as 

we are looking at how this happens. What is the phenomenon that 

causes a student from the University of North Carolina to suddenly 

try to kill students, as he tried to do on the 3rd of March 2006, 

an individual, that, for all ostensible purposes, was not radical, was 

not an extremist, but obviously had extremist beliefs and some extremist ties, particularly probably the Internet? So these are things 

that are very difficult for us to understand. 

We are partnering with Dr. Maureen McCarthy of the director of 

the Science and Technology of Homeland Security, which is doing 

some very interesting research in behavioral sciences in trying to 

look at this phenomenon of radicalization. 

I am very pleased with where we are. We have got a long way. 

Until Dr. Connell put together this team about a couple of months 

ago, this radicalization studies were not being done in Homeland 

Security. So we will be doing some assessments, coordinating them 

with the rest of the intelligence community, including the intelligence elements of the FBI. 

I think this will help a great deal. Our Secretary is very interested in this phenomenon of radicalization. It troubles him greatly. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. It certainly concerns me. I know members of the 

committee as well as other people in law enforcement. Thank you 

for your answer on that issue. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. SIMMONS. I thank the gentleman. 

My recollection is that President Kennedy said many years ago 

in reference to some of the activities the intelligence community 

and the CIA that success has many fathers, but failure is everywhere an orphan. It is particularly difficult in our free and open 

society for American citizens to have a sense of how their intelligence organizations are doing. 

Yes, 9/11 was a terrible event for us, and some would say a failure for the intelligence community. Since 9/11, we have not had a 

similar event, but it is hard to know what that means. Does that 

mean that we have been supremely successful and we have thwart-
22

ed hundreds and hundreds of attempts to replicate that day here 

in the United States? Does it mean we are just simply lucky, and 

the bad guys aren’t trying anymore? 

I wonder if it would be possible for you to share with us your 

sense of whether we have had successes in the interim, whether 

you are aware of successes where attempts have been thwarted. 

And you may not be able to talk about that in detail, but I think 

it would be useful to respond to that kind of question in open session. 

Mr. ALLEN. Thank you Mr. Chairman. I was a young officer 

when President Kennedy came to CIA headquarters and what was 

then a very new building and stood in the quadrangle in front and 

said those famous words, and I stood about 30 yards from the 

president. So that stands out vividly. 

Mr. SIMMONS. Did I get it right? 

Mr. ALLEN. Yes, sir, you certainly did. And he spoke those words. 

Mr. SIMMONS. I was not there. 

Mr. ALLEN. And it was an emotional moment for all of us after 

the Bay of Pigs. We had a great director then, John McCone, one 

of the most famous directors we ever had. So it was a historic moment. There is no question of that. 

We have serious threats. We have had serious threats since September 11, 2001. We have had extraordinary success, I think, overseas led by intelligence and by the U.S. military. But I think the 

intelligence operations overseas have been simply nothing short of 

magnificent. I have been involved in many of them in my previous 

capacity at the Central Intelligence Agency. I am very proud of 

what the agency has done and continues to do. 

In this country, there have been clearly plots disrupted and 

thwarted. Some of them were in preliminary stages. Others were 

moving along to a more direct attack upon Americans. And they 

take place in a number of forms. Some are fairly ambitious, some 

are rather modest. 

It is my belief that these threats will not diminish, that even 

though we have an al-Qa’ida that has weakened and has been battered, it is clear that the leadership of al-Qa’ida still wants to conduct transnational operations. We have heard from Osama bin–

Laden in audio tape three times: 19th January; 23 April; and then 

23 May just in this year. We have heard from Zawahari, the number-two guy, I believe four times this year. 

So in my view, we are a country at war and a country under 

threat. It is going to take all of us. It is going to take all the national intelligence community and all the state and local law enforcement working collaboratively to keep the country safe. That is 

what I do every day. It is what I have done. Particularly in the last 

15 or 20 years in my career, I always go to work thinking, my job 

is to keep the country safe, and that is what I try to do. 

Mr. SIMMONS. Well, I thank you for that, and I thank you for 

your success thus far. 

As you recall, after the collapse of the wall and the dissolution 

of the Soviet Union, the end of the Warsaw Pact, there was a sense 

in this country that we no longer had any special threats. And we 

glided through the 1990s defunding our military and defunding our 

intelligence. 
23

Now, we are in a situation where we not only have to refund, but 

we have to reorganize. What would be the one or two principal hurdles that you face in this refunding and in this reorganization that 

this subcommittee can be helpful on? 

Mr. ALLEN. I think, first of all, is the quality of our people. I 

think that the U.S. intelligence community drew down by almost 

25 percent in personnel in the 1990s. Our military intelligence fell 

by about 33 percent. There is a big deficit. We are trying to grow 

analysts now and also intelligence operations officers and the best 

and brightest technologists. 

I am out recruiting on college campuses now, and we are getting 

hundreds and hundreds of applications for, say, a hundred or 120 

positions. That is very encouraging to me. We are going to have to 

grow these analysts. And CIA and FBI are going to have to grow 

wonderful operatives to help do this. 

So the first thing we have to do is continue to get support from 

you, sir, and helping us build and grow and train the best minds 

in the country, whether they are in operations, whether they are 

in science, or whether they are all-source analysts. We have a real 

deficiency. 

Dr. Connell is trying to build and grow and mentor a lot of officers right now, and we are looking forward to these bright, young 

Americans coming in to work for our DHS intelligence enterprise. 

The second thing that has to be done, of course, is to get us out 

of the 20th century when it comes to information technology and 

information sharing. We are doing a lot of this. I believe that what 

has gone on under previous Director Tenet and now under Ambassador Negroponte trying to be able to find ways to lawfully share 

information far more effectively than we have in the past and to 

support us in this information technology, what Congressman 

Langevin talked about, the system up in Massachusetts. 

Those kinds of tools, we need to have tools like that, which will 

be very invaluable. It will help us understand what is going on in 

the country, help us link information quickly. Those things have to 

be funded. So your continued support and information technology 

in helping us grow officers, whether they be operations officers or 

analysts or scientists, we appreciate it. We appreciate it very much. 

Mr. SIMMONS. The gentleman from Rhode Island? 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I may have some questions, but I will submit it 

for the record at a later time, Mr. Chairman. But at this point, I 

have no further questions. 

Mr. SIMMONS. I thank the gentleman for his participation. 

Mr. Allen, I thank you and your staff for being here today. We 

apologize for the late start because of the previous committee activity that kept the room. But we appreciate very much this update. 

We will have some questions for the record. The members of the 

committee may have some additional questions for you, and we will 

ask you to respond to these in writing. The hearing record will be 

held open for 10 days. 

And there being no further business, without objection, the subcommittee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 5:30 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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