file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/01-186%20Opinion.htm

No. 01-186 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

2001 MT 183 

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF: 

DANNY STEPHEN RICHARDS,

Petitioner/Respondent,

v. 

JULIE ANN LADUKE RICHARDS,

Respondent/Appellant.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Park,

The Honorable David Cybulski, Judge presiding.

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

For Appellant:

C. Kathleen McBride, Corette, Pohlman & Keebe, Butte, Montana

For Respondent:

Karl Knuchel, Attorney at Law, Livingston, Montana

Submitted on Briefs: May 10, 2001 

Decided: September 6, 2001

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/01-186%20Opinion.htm (1 of 4)1/19/2007 10:48:57 AM
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/01-186%20Opinion.htm

Filed:

__________________________________________

Clerk

Justice Terry N. Trieweiler delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 Danny Richards filed a petition for the dissolution of his marriage to Julie Richards in 

the District Court for the Sixth Judicial District in Park County on October 3, 1997. After 

the District Court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and the Decree of 

Dissolution, Danny filed a motion for reconsideration or a new trial, citing Rules 52(d) 

and 59(d), M.R.Civ.P. Seventy-six days later the District Court granted Danny's motion 

for a new trial. Julie appealed the District Court's order. This Court granted Julie's motion 

to bifurcate the issues raised on appeal and consider first the jurisdictional issue. Having 

done so, we now reverse the order of the District Court. 

¶2 The dispositive issue is whether the District Court exceeded its jurisdiction when it 

granted Danny's motion for a new trial.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

¶3 Danny Richards petitioned for dissolution of his marriage to Julie Richards on October 

3, 1997. The trial occurred in Livingston, Montana, on September 21 and 22, 2000. 

Following trial, the District Court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 

Decree of Dissolution on November 14, 2000. The Notice of Entry of Decree was served 

on November 17, 2000.

¶4 On November 28, 2000, Danny filed a post-trial motion asking the District Court for 

either reconsideration or a new trial, pursuant to Rules 52(d) and 59(d), M.R.Civ.P. The 

District Court granted the motion for a new trial on February 14, 2001, seventy-six days 

after Danny filed his post-trial motion. Julie filed a notice of appeal from this order. This 

Court granted Julie's motion to bifurcate the issues, allowing the parties to separately brief 

the issue of the District Court's jurisdiction to enter the February 14, 2001, order and 

stayed the briefing of additional issues until after resolution of the jurisdictional question.

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/01-186%20Opinion.htm (2 of 4)1/19/2007 10:48:57 AM
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/01-186%20Opinion.htm

¶5 Whether a district court has jurisdiction to rule on a matter is a question of law which 

we review to determine whether the district court had authority to act. General 

Constructors, Inc. v. Chewculator, Inc., 2001 MT 54, ¶ 16, 304 Mont. 319, ¶ 16, 21 P.3d 

604, ¶ 16. A court exceeds jurisdiction through acts which exceed the defined power of a 

court, whether that power be defined by constitutional provisions, express statutes or rules 

developed by the courts. Lee v. Lee, 2000 MT 67, ¶ 20, 299 Mont. 78, ¶ 20, 996 P.2d 389, 

¶ 20.

DISCUSSION 

¶6 Did the District Court exceed its jurisdiction when it granted Danny's motion for a new 

trial?

¶7 On February 14, 2001, the District Court granted Danny's motion for a new trial, 

seventy-six days after Danny filed his motion. Julie contends that pursuant to Rules 52(d) 

and 59(d), M.R.Civ.P., the District Court no longer had jurisdiction to act.

¶8 Rule 52(d), M.R.Civ.P provides that:

Time for Determining Motions. Motions provided under subdivision (b) of this rule 

shall be determined within the time provided by Rule 59 in the cases of motions for 

new trial and amendment of judgment and if the court shall fail to rule on the 

motion within the 60 day period, the motion shall be deemed denied. 

Rule 59(d), M.R.Civ.P, provides that "[i]f the court shall fail to rule on a motion for new 

trial within 60 days from the time the motion is filed, the motion shall, at the expiration of 

said period, be deemed denied."

¶9 Danny concedes that the 60 day time requirement had passed and that "the case law in 

Montana, as well as the statutory scheme, clearly sets forth that the sixty (60) day time 

limit is inviolate." However, Danny contends that an exception should be made in cases 

such as this, when the presiding judge for the case is substituted between the time that the 

motion is filed and the motion is ruled upon. Danny contends that to do otherwise would 

lead to unfair results. In this case, the judge who granted Danny's motion assumed 

jurisdiction on November 29, 2000, one day after the motion was filed.

¶10 However, time and procedural limitations for motions subsequent to judgment set out 

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/01-186%20Opinion.htm (3 of 4)1/19/2007 10:48:57 AM
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/01-186%20Opinion.htm

in the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure are mandatory and strictly enforced. Kelly v. Sell 

& Sell Paint Contractors (1978), 175 Mont. 440, 443, 574 P.2d 1002, 1004; see also 

Bechhold v. Chacon (1991), 248 Mont. 111, 809 P.2d 586. And, we have repeatedly 

warned both judges and attorneys that they must keep careful watch of the requirements 

set forth in Rule 59 and "failure to comply results in a loss of jurisdiction and inability of 

the trial court and this Court to consider questions raised on the merits." Johnson v. Eagles 

Lodge Aerie 3913 (1997), 284 Mont. 474, 480, 945 P.2d 62, 65; see also Wallinder v. 

Lagerquist (1982), 201 Mont. 212, 219, 653 P.2d 840, 843. 

¶11 While the requirements are by design arbitrary, they were implemented to avoid the 

vagaries and resulting pitfalls that existed because of all the exceptions overlaid on 

previous rules of post-trial procedure. In other words, we have been there and done that 

and conclude that in this context, at least, arbitrariness is preferable.

¶12 Therefore, we conclude that the District Court erred when it granted Danny's motion 

for a new trial after the time to do so had expired. We reverse the District Court's order 

from February 14, 2001, and reinstate the original Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 

and Decree of Dissolution, dated November 14, 2000. 

/S/ TERRY N. TRIEWEILER

We Concur:

/S/ PATRICIA COTTER

/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART

/S/ JAMES C. NELSON

/S/ JIM REGNIER

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/01-186%20Opinion.htm (4 of 4)1/19/2007 10:48:57 AM