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i 

65–588 2011

[H.A.S.C. No. 112–21] 

LONG-TERM READINESS CHALLENGES 

IN THE PACIFIC 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

MARCH 15, 2011 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia, Chairman 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

JOE HECK, Nevada 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

CHRIS GIBSON, New York 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

BOBBY SCHILLING, Illinois 

JON RUNYAN, New Jersey 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

STEVEN PALAZZO, Mississippi 

MARTHA ROBY, Alabama 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

DAVE LOEBSACK, Iowa 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina 

BILL OWENS, New York 

TIM RYAN, Ohio 

COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii 

DAVE SIENICKI, Professional Staff Member 

VICKIE PLUNKETT, Professional Staff Member 

CHRISTINE WAGNER, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2011 

Page 

HEARING: 

Tuesday, March 15, 2011, Long-Term Readiness Challenges in the Pacific ...... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Tuesday, March 15, 2011 ........................................................................................ 31 

TUESDAY, MARCH 15, 2011 

LONG-TERM READINESS CHALLENGES IN THE PACIFIC 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Bordallo, Hon. Madeleine Z., a Representative from Guam, Ranking Member, 

Subcommittee on Readiness ................................................................................ 2 

Forbes, Hon. J. Randy, a Representative from Virginia, Chairman, Subcommittee on Readiness ...................................................................................... 1 

WITNESSES 

Alles, Maj. Gen. Randolph, USMC, Director, J–5, Strategic Planning and 

Policy, U.S. Pacific Command ............................................................................. 9 

Pfannenstiel, Hon. Jackalyne, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Energy, Installations and Environment ............................................................................... 11 

Schiffer, R. Michael, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Asian & Pacific 

Security Affairs, East Asia .................................................................................. 5 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Alles, Maj. Gen. Randolph ............................................................................... 50 

Forbes, Hon. J. Randy ...................................................................................... 35 

Pfannenstiel, Hon. Jackalyne .......................................................................... 58 

Schiffer, R. Michael .......................................................................................... 37 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Ms. Bordallo ...................................................................................................... 77 

Mr. Forbes ......................................................................................................... 77 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Ms. Bordallo ...................................................................................................... 84 

Mr. Forbes ......................................................................................................... 81 

Mr. Palazzo ....................................................................................................... 85 

(1) 

LONG-TERM READINESS CHALLENGES IN THE PACIFIC 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS, Washington, DC, Tuesday, March 15, 2011. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:00 p.m. in room 

2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. J. Randy Forbes (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. J. RANDY FORBES, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE 

ON READINESS 

Mr. FORBES. Good afternoon and we are calling this meeting of 

the Readiness Subcommittee to order. Several of my members will 

be coming in in a few minutes, so just to let our witnesses know 

they are in other meetings right now in subcommittees that are 

overlapping, and also we expect to have a vote probably about 2:30. 

So we may have to break briefly and go to that vote. 

We want to welcome our witnesses here. We think this is going 

to be a crucial hearing for us on our readiness in the Pacific region. 

We have three witnesses that bring a great deal of experience and 

expertise to this issue, and we welcome them here today. 

First of all, we have Mr. Michael Schiffer, the Deputy Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs, East 

Asia. Michael, thank you for being here. We are looking forward to 

your testimony with our members. 

We also have Major General Randolph Alles. General, thank you. 

The General is the Director of J–5 for Strategic Planning and Policy in the U.S. Pacific Command. General, as always, we appreciate 

your service to our country and we thank you for your willingness 

to be here today and to lend your expertise to the subcommittee. 

And finally, we have the Honorable Jackalyne Pfannenstiel, and 

thank you for being here, Jackalyne. She is the Assistant Secretary 

of the Navy for Energy, Installations and Environment. 

This subcommittee is unusual in that it is probably one of the 

most bipartisan subcommittees in Congress. We are all trying to 

look to make sure that we have answered the question, ‘‘Are we 

ready?’’ And that is the purpose of the hearing. 

My partner in this endeavor and the ranking member from 

Guam is Madeleine Bordallo, and I would like to defer at this time 

to Madeleine for her opening remarks. 

Ms. Bordallo. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Forbes can be found in the Appendix on page 35.] 
2 

STATEMENT OF HON. MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM GUAM, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I appreciate your willingness to hold this hearing on long-term readiness challenges in the Asia-Pacific region, which is certainly very 

important to me. As we have heard from witnesses in our previous 

hearings and briefings, this area of the world requires our focus 

and our attention. 

Before I begin with my statement, I would like to recognize the 

people of Japan and ask that we keep them in our thoughts and 

prayers as they recover from the horrific tragedy of last week’s 

earthquake and tsunami. These unfortunate events, however, underscore the importance of our alliance and our strong relationship 

with the Japanese people. Our military forces in Japan are helping 

with search and recovery efforts. Further, other civilian agencies 

such as the USAID [United States Agency for International Development] and FEMA [Federal Emergency Management Agency] and 

the Nuclear Regulatory Commission are assisting Japan. 

In the wake of this unfortunate tragedy, we must continue to 

focus our military resources on this important region of the world. 

Nearly 42 percent of all U.S. trade occurs with Asian-Pacific nations, which make this area critical to our national economic security. 

And I applaud this Administration for its greatly increased focus 

on the Asia-Pacific region. To highlight this point, one of the first 

major actions of the Obama Administration was the signing of the 

so-called Guam International Agreement by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and then-Foreign Minister Nakasone. 

However, despite greater focus, we must continue to assess the 

readiness of our forces to protect our economic, political and other 

strategic interests in this vital region. 

One of the most important strategic matters is continuing to fulfill the United States’ obligation under the Guam International 

Agreement, which is based on the 2005 U.S.-Japan Alliance Transformation and Realignment for the Future Agreement. This agreement outlines the numerous realignments of military personnel in 

Japan. 

Of the greatest impact to Guam is the construction in northern 

Okinawa of a replacement facility for Marine Corps Air Station 

Futenma. This new facility will allow the transfer of more than 

8,000 marines and nearly 9,000 family members from Okinawa, 

Japan, to Guam. This committee has been supportive of this strategic realignment in the past, and I hope that we will remain so 

in the future. 

I ask our witnesses today to make clear to the committee the significance of tangible progress by Japan toward the Futenma Replacement Facility and what commitments the United States must 

make in the meantime to achieve the goal of moving the Marines 

to Guam. 

While dealing with the challenges of the military buildup on 

Guam, we must not overlook the strategic importance of Guam’s location and the value of the freedom of action from bases on Guam. 

Just this past weekend, several Global Hawks based at Anderson 
3 

Air Force Base, Guam, conducted sorties over Japan to assist the 

region with mapping the destruction caused by the massive tsunami. Our strategic location in the Pacific can never be overstated. 

The Governor of Guam, Eddie Calvo, recently signed a Programmatic Agreement with the Department of Defense that outlines a process for consultations to ensure the preservation of certain historic sites and paves the way for spending military construction funding authorized in previous fiscal years. The Administration has budgeted for certain infrastructure support that will 

help to improve our quality of life on Guam and at the same time 

enhance the military mission. 

Further, the U.S. Government has been successful in obtaining 

financing for certain other improvement projects on Guam that are 

needed for the buildup to be successful. However, I remain concerned about the placement of a proposed firing range on Guam 

and would ask today’s witnesses to explain to the committee the 

strategic necessity of the range site as currently proposed. 

Many have questioned whether alternatives to the Route 15 

ranges were adequately vetted. There have also been questions 

raised as to whether the Navy properly examined alternatives that 

would keep the ranges within their existing footprint, thus negating the need to pursue leasing Government of Guam land adjacent 

to Route 15. 

While I respect the ongoing process wherein the Department of 

Defense will conduct discussions with the Governor over the Route 

15 range location, I would caution that it may be very difficult for 

DOD [the Department of Defense] to reach a deal that will be approved by the Guam Legislature, who ultimately approves the leasing or the sale of Government of Guam lands. I continue to urge 

DOD to consider alternatives such as more robust training capability on Tinian, to include individual skill qualifications. 

Finally, it is important to reiterate, as I have in previous hearings, that we must keep in mind the threats we face in this region 

of the world. China’s secretive military buildup coupled with North 

Korea’s continuing nuclear ambitions are certainly at the forefront 

of our strategic posture in Asia. However, we must not lose sight 

of other nontraditional threats in this region, such as the southern 

Philippines or southern Thailand. 

I hope that the witnesses will discuss our strategic posture in the 

Asia-Pacific region through both a military asset framework as well 

as a soft power framework. This Administration’s focus on militaryto-military engagements is very important to establishing greater 

cultural understanding and foster stability in our region. 

In particular, the mil-to-mil [military-to-military] efforts with 

China I believe can help us avoid misunderstandings that will lead 

to far greater concerns in the future. 

So ladies and gentlemen, I look forward to the testimonies from 

each of you as I yield back my time. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Madeleine, for those remarks. 

And as we discussed prior to the hearing, I ask unanimous consent that we dispense with the 5-minute rule for this hearing and 

depart from regular order so that members may ask questions during the course of the discussion. I think this will provide a round-
4 

table-type forum and will enhance the dialogue of these very importance issues. 

Without objection, that is so ordered. 

And just so the witnesses know, we have explained it to all three 

of you, we do things a little differently in here. We try to really get 

at some issues, and rather than have 5 minutes of staccato questions, if one of the members wants a follow-up question, the chair 

will recognize them and we will try to do that to keep the dialogue 

going. 

The other thing I ask the members for is permission to submit 

for the record a written statement that I prepared and any of the 

members that have written statements feel free to submit those for 

the record. 

Without objection, all the statements will be entered in the 

record. 

Ladies and gentlemen, I am going to ask you to do now what I 

am going to do myself, and that is take my written remarks and 

put them aside. For these kinds of hearings normally what we do 

is this. You submit to us written statements, which you have done 

very admirably, we thank you for that. We read your statements, 

and so we appreciate the time that you put in those statements 

and the fact that you delivered them to us. Then oftentimes what 

we have is our witnesses will take about 5 minutes each and they 

give us a regurgitation of what they have put in the written statements, but we have already read the written statements so we 

don’t need to do that. 

And so I want to change it a little bit today and I want you to 

take the written remarks that you might have and just put them 

aside for a moment. If you want to submit them for the record, we 

will read them. But here is what I want to pose to you, that you 

can start and we will give you each 5 minutes or so to have a bite 

at this question. 

The goal of this committee is to ask a very simple question, ‘‘Are 

we ready?’’ And over and over again, our witnesses come in and the 

response that they rightly give us back is, ‘‘Ready for what?’’ We 

should be having a strategy that we can use as a yardstick so that 

we can compare where we are against that strategy. We try to do 

that in the Quadrennial Defense Review and the National Defense 

Strategy. But as you know, more and more, there is a consensus 

building that the Quadrennial Defense Review and the National 

Defense Strategy is driven a lot by budget and bureaucratic desires 

simply to reinforce what they are already doing. In fact, when the 

independent panel was created to look at the QDR [Quadrennial 

Defense Review] that was the exact conclusion that that bipartisan 

group determined. And they used a word like ‘‘train wreck’’ if we 

continue doing what we are doing. So we have to kind of reach to 

get the strategy and build the yardsticks that we are comparing 

our military to to make sure that, in fact, we are ready. 

Just last week we had our Deputy Chiefs sitting right where you 

are sitting, and where Mr. Schiffer is sitting we had the Deputy 

Chief for the Marine Corps; Jackalyne, where you are sitting, we 

had the Deputy Chief for the Army. And the two of them agreed 

on one thing. They said the greatest component that they could 
5 

have for readiness was time. They needed to be able to react quickly and as quickly as they possibly could. 

So ladies and gentlemen, the question I have for you is this: If 

we look at the Pacific, and we recognize that we may not as a committee have a strategy to use as a yardstick, one of the things we 

know is that the most probable conflict we would have may not be 

with China, but if we ever had a conflict, probably the most devastating conflict we would have with China. None of us want that 

conflict. We hope it doesn’t take place. But when we are looking for 

readiness, we want to make sure that we are prepared. Because oftentimes, if we have a lack of capability, that determines decisions 

that players make in that area. 

So the question I would like for you to start within your 5 minutes or so today is this. We know if we don’t have a strategy that 

we can get our hands around, we know that from our readings 

China does. One of their strategies, we know, is their Anti-Access/ 

Area Denial strategy that they have been trying to implement. A 

year ago, Secretary Gates directed the Air Force and the Navy to 

develop an Air-Sea Battle concept to address that Anti-Access/Denial problem. 

The first question I would like for you to respond to is, is that 

concept ready? Do we have it? And are we prepared in our readiness to implement that strategy? If not, when is it coming? 

The second thing we know is my dear friend sitting to my left 

not too far from her home she has been willing to take me and she 

show me those huge fuel reserves that are sitting there on Guam. 

We know that one of the strategies as part of the denial strategy 

that China has would be able to do something to those fuel reserves. 

So the other question I have for you to be responding to is if 

something happened to those fuel reserves, how long would it take 

us to replace them and where would that replacement have to come 

from? 

And then the third thing is, if we look at China’s strategy, it is 

very clear from their writings that one of the things they believe 

is that the United States can’t endure a long conflict, that we need 

to have short conflicts, and they are prepared for a long one. 

The question for you is, if we had a conflict and that conflict had 

a high-intensity operations that lasted more than a month, is our 

industrial base capable of supporting that kind of long-term conflict 

and, if so, for how long? 

I know that is a lot. But it kind of sets the parameters that we 

need to be looking at for readiness in the Pacific. 

And so with that, Mr. Schiffer, I am going to ask you if you 

would start whatever response that you might have to that and feel 

free to interject anything else that you would like to in that. 

STATEMENT OF R. MICHAEL SCHIFFER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, ASIAN & PACIFIC SECURITY AFFAIRS, EAST ASIA 

Mr. SCHIFFER. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And 

thank you, Ranking Member Bordallo, and the other distinguished 

members of the committee, and thank you for the privilege of allowing us to appear before you today. 
6 

Let me try to provide you in my opening comments with the strategic context that underlies our approach to the Asia-Pacific region 

and how we are preparing our presence and pursuing our presence 

and our policy in the region, and I think in so doing I will be able 

to shed some light on the questions that you have raised. 

Before I begin my comments, however, I want to join Ranking 

Member Bordallo in reiterating that our thoughts and our prayers 

today are with the people of Japan. I was in Japan last week when 

the earthquake struck, and though I was not near the area affected 

by the tsunami, the magnitude of the earthquake in both real and 

psychological terms was palpable. We are still learning the total extent of the devastation, and the United States is working side-byside with the people of Japan, the Japanese Government, and the 

Self-Defense Forces to manage the consequences of the earthquake 

and the tsunami. 

In addition to the humanitarian assistance in helping to address 

ongoing nuclear issues at the Fukushima Daiichi plant, U.S. Forces 

are engaged in helicopter search and rescue operations and support 

from U.S. Navy ships, including the Ronald Reagan Carrier Strike 

Group, are providing services such as water purification, medical 

teams and hospital beds. 

Our forward presence in Japan and throughout the Asia-Pacific 

region has allowed us to respond to Japan’s urgent needs quickly, 

and we will continue to facilitate rapid engagement to provide 

whatever assistance our Japanese friends require. 

You have asked us to address the question ‘‘Are we ready?’’ and 

in your comments, Mr. Chairman, you elucidated some of the 

issues that we need to dig into as we address that question. It is 

an important question and one with many facets. And at the risk 

of stating what other witnesses have stated before, I do want to be 

clear from the outset that the Department of Defense and our men 

and women in uniform wherever they may be stationed, at home 

and abroad, are indeed ready to meet any of the challenges that 

we may face in the region in the near-, medium-, or in the longterm. 

Our ability to respond rapidly and effectively to provide assistance to our Japanese friends is one facet of the question ‘‘Are we 

ready?’’ and especially the related question of ‘‘Ready for what?’’ It 

will come as no surprise to members of this committee, and as the 

ranking member pointed out, that the Asia-Pacific region is the 

most dynamic region in the world today. It holds over half the 

world’s population, more than $1 trillion in annual U.S. trade, 15 

of the world’s largest ports, and is home to six of the world’s largest 

armies, China, India, North Korea, South Korea, Russia, Japan, 

and of course our own. 

Over the past six decades, the region has experienced extraordinary growth, in large part because of the peace, stability, and 

prosperity that our security presence, our robust U.S. military 

presence, made possible for all states in the region. That military 

presence remains critical to our long-term readiness and to ensuring that peace and prosperity continue to prevail in the Asia-Pacific 

region. The United States and the Department of Defense remain 

committed to our enduring presence in the Asia-Pacific, and to the 

investments in forces and capabilities necessary for protecting our 
7 

national interests and those of our allies and partners in the region, as well as for meeting the full range of potential traditional 

and nontraditional 21st-century security challenges. 

I would like to focus for a little bit in getting at some of the questions that the chairman raised, focus my attention on three particular issues: The rise of China, North Korea, and our evolving regional posture. I will keep my comments brief in the remaining 

time that I have, and my written testimony provides a more detailed assessment. 

As you know, over the past 30 years, China has transformed 

itself from an impoverished country to the world’s second largest 

economy. As its economy has grown, so has its capabilities across 

a range of measures, including its military capabilities. President 

Obama and Secretary Gates have stated that the United States 

welcomes and encourages a strong and prosperous China that 

makes positive contributions to the stability, resilience, and growth 

of the international system. 

We continue to see positive examples of cooperation and partnership from China on certain regional challenges. There are, however, other areas, such as its military modernization efforts, its 

opaquely defined long-term strategic intentions, and questions 

about the development of its Anti-Access/Area Denial capabilities 

that are causing concern in the United States and around the region. 

In this respect, long-term readiness means that the United 

States must continue to work with our allies and partners and with 

China to positively shape China’s rise both within the Asia-Pacific 

region and globally. U.S. strategy must be flexible enough to anticipate and balance multiple possible outcomes and must be able to 

capitalize on the cooperative potential of the U.S.-China relationship while also managing the risks inherent in China’s rise and 

that includes the investments that the Department is undertaking 

precisely to make sure that we can counter Anti-Access/Area Denial capabilities. 

If I can ask the indulgence of the committee to continue for a little bit. 

Mr. FORBES. You go ahead, Mr. Schiffer. 

Mr. SCHIFFER. As China continues to rise and its military capabilities continue to increase, both the United States and China benefit from having a healthy, stable, and reliable military-to-military 

relationship. 

During the recent state visit by President Hu Jintao, both sides 

agreed on the need for enhanced and substantive dialogue and 

communication at all levels. While we will continue to engage in 

dialogue with the Chinese, we will also continue to strengthen our 

posture, presence, and capabilities in the region and to strengthen 

our alliance partnerships to ensure a common view of how the 

United States can best continue to work in and with the region for 

peace and stability. 

The second issue that I would like to highlight briefly is the continuing challenge of North Korean provocations. As members of the 

committee are well aware, North Korea continues to be a complicated security threat. In face of North Korean provocations, including the sinking of the Cheonan and the shelling of Yeonpyeong, 
8 

the United States and our ally, the Republic of Korea, are enhancing our deterrent capabilities and so ensuring that we are fully prepared to meet any threat from North Korea. 

The United States has drawn ever closer in our bilateral relationship with our allies in South Korea and Japan and have also 

seen positive progress in the past year in trilateral relations as 

well. 

Critical to ensuring our long-term readiness to meet a North Korean threat is maintaining a forward-deployed military posture on 

the Peninsula. It is our forward presence, 28,500 strong, that effectively communicates our resolve to defend the Republic of Korea 

and preserve our vital interests in Asia, and our regular exercises 

like Key Resolve and Full Eagle serve to enhance U.S.-ROK [Republic of Korea] alliance’s ability to defend the ROK and to protect 

the region. 

Lastly, let me address the efforts we are taking to implement the 

Realignment Roadmap and our broader posture moves in the region. As you know, the Department of Defense is evaluating U.S. 

global posture on an ongoing basis to better position us and our 

forces to meet the demands of the myriad emerging threats and 

provocations in the region. This subject will be addressed in greater 

detail in an upcoming global posture review. 

However, the important point to note for this hearing is that the 

U.S. defense posture in Asia, where Secretary Gates has stated 

that our goal is to maintain or posture in Northeast Asia while enhancing it in Southeast Asia, is shifting it one that is more geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable. 

While the focus on the implementation of the relocation of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma has been intense, the United 

States and Japan are working closely together on FRF [Futenma 

Replacement Facility] and on Guam. It is important to note that 

the Government of Japan has publicly affirmed the importance of 

the U.S. alliance, of the U.S. Marine Corps’ having forward-deployed forces on Okinawa and of moving forward with the Futenma 

Replacement Facility at Camp Schwab, Henoko. 

Indeed, events in the region have conspired to remind us of all 

of the importance and the necessity of marine forces in Okinawa 

and the vital role in both deterring potential conflict and responding to crisis played by U.S. Forces in Japan, including the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Forces in Okinawa. 

This capacity to respond quickly to regional challenges, both traditional and nontraditional challenges, rests in no small part on 

the maintenance of rapidly deployable ground forces in the region, 

and we look forward to continuing to work with the Government 

of Japan to move forward with the full implementation of the Realignment Roadmap. 

The Asia-Pacific region is one where America has deep roots and 

enduring interests. As the United States looks to the challenges, 

threats and opportunities of the future, the Department of Defense 

remains focused on protecting American interests and allies 

against the range of threats and challenges we will face together 

in the 21st century. 
9 

Thank you for your time. Thank you for your indulgence. I look 

forward to engaging more deeply on some of the questions that you 

raised, and let me turn to my colleagues for their comments. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Schiffer can be found in the Appendix on page 37.] 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Schiffer, and again we appreciate 

your expertise and coming here. 

Now Mr. Schiffer did exactly the opposite, though, of what I am 

asking you guys to do. I know it is comfortable to hang on to those 

prepared remarks. But we have read those. What we want you to 

do is try to address the readiness issue. And General, maybe you 

are the perfect person to do that. 

So General Alles, if you would please see if you could address 

those remarks and throw those written remarks away because we 

just want to hear your expertise. We can put those in the record. 

But the time we have got, how are we prepared and are we ready 

to meet those challenges? 

General, thank you for being here. 

General ALLES. All right, sir. I will keep my remarks brief here. 

I would ask that the written remarks that I have submitted be included in the record. 

Mr. FORBES. And we are including all of your written remarks. 

We appreciate your time in preparing them. 

STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. RANDOLPH ALLES, USMC, DIRECTOR, J–5, STRATEGIC PLANNING AND POLICY, U.S. PACIFIC 

COMMAND 

General ALLES. Chairman Forbes and Ms. Bordallo and members 

of the committee, thank you for this opportunity to appear today 

and discuss the readiness challenges here in the Pacific. 

I do want to acknowledge before I continue with my responses 

here my condolences to our very close ally in Asia, Japan, as Mr. 

Schiffer has already mentioned during their ongoing trial here, this 

great earthquake and tsunami. I just want you to rest assured the 

U.S. Pacific Command is doing everything in our power to assist 

the Japanese people during this hour of need. 

I also would like to extend my best wishes to Representative Giffords and her husband Mark. We hope to see her back soon fulfilling her responsibilities as a member of the committee. 

I wanted to build on one comment that Mr. Schiffer had made 

as he talked about China and the rise of China, as we consider the 

rise of China. And I wanted to emphasize I had a conversation previously with Ms. Bordallo about the importance of dialogue between the Chinese and the U.S. sides. Both myself and Mr. Schiffer 

get to occasionally participate in dialogues with the Chinese, usually with the PLA [People’s Liberation Army] is who we talk with, 

and I think those dialogues are beneficial. Yes, I mean they are 

scripted in a certain degree, there is a degree that we tend to hear 

the same points coming back from the Chinese, but the fact that 

we are able to meet and actually have a dialogue together I think 

is important. 

One of my responsibilities is to function on the MMCA, the Military Maritime Consultive Agreement, which is our meeting that we 

have with the Chinese to discuss operational safety in the inter-
10 

national air space and off the coast of China and in the international waters. 

And I think I would comment that I have seen effect out of that 

dialogue. It has done much to ensure that tensions when U.S. and 

Chinese forces interact remain low, and I think there is great benefit in the overall dialogue between the two sides. Even if sometimes it may just appear to be an exchange of talking points, I 

think nevertheless it is an important interchange that we have. 

Turning to the topic of the question on the Air-Sea Battle, I 

would like to just point out a few things about that. It is, as you 

noted, Mr. Chairman, an attempt to address Anti-Access/Area Denial. I would point out that it is a concept that is broader in thinking than just looking at the Chinese situation. We are looking at 

this more broadly across the globe on how countries are attempting 

to deny access to U.S. forces and how this might address it. 

I do think there are significant and effective work going on currently in near-term initiatives. I would just note we have met on 

several occasions recently with the Under Secretary for Defense for 

AT&L [Acquisition, Technology & Logistics], Mr. Carter, and he 

has made substantial progress in addressing some of these Anti-Access/Area Denial issues in the current defense program. 

Just as a list of a few items here, there is modernization efforts 

underway to the tune of $41⁄2 billion in the FYDP [Future Years 

Defense Program] on the F–22 to leverage radar and electronic protection technologies coming out of the JSF [Joint Strike Fighter]. 

We have $1.6 billion over the FYDP going into the F–15 radars to 

address electronic attack and warfare issues that they would have 

in this A2AD environment. There are also efforts underway with 

the E–18 Growler, our AMRAAM [Advanced Medium-Range Air-toAir Missile] weapons systems, our Aegis-equipped ships, and improving antisubmarine capabilities that will address Anti-Access/ 

Area Denial challenges. 

So I think there has been great progress made in the Department here. They are moving forward rapidly, and I am encouraged 

by what I have seen. Even today we talked with the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Development, addressing this 

particular issue of Anti-Access/Area Denial across the globe, and I 

think they are making good progress in their long-range strike 

family of systems that are addressing the issues we are going to 

have with Anti-Access/Area Denial holistically across the spectrum 

of military capabilities and capacities that we would need. 

I do think it is a concept that is going to take a number of years 

to implement. It is not something that is going to occur in 1 or 2 

years. I think it is a long-term question that the Department is addressing, so clearly funding the initiatives that the Department 

puts forward to address Anti-Access/Area Denial will be very important to us, but I think we have a good handle on how we are 

approaching this particular issue and the things that we are going 

to need to do in the future to ensure access for U.S. forces and to 

be that stabilizing influence that the U.S. has been in Asia really 

for over 60 years. 

Thank you. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, General. 
11 

[The prepared statement of General Alles can be found in the Appendix on page 50.] 

Mr. FORBES. Madam Secretary. 

STATEMENT OF THE HON. JACKALYNE PFANNENSTIEL, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, ENERGY, INSTALLATIONS AND ENVIRONMENT 

Secretary PFANNENSTIEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Congresswoman Bordallo, distinguished members of this committee. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today. I will focus my 

comments on the realignment in Guam, specifically to the question 

of ‘‘Are we ready?’’ And that will begin with the recognition of the 

strategic importance of Guam. 

The Marine Corps relocation, along with the other Defense Department alignments to Guam, represents a unique opportunity to 

strategically realign the future posture in the Pacific for the next 

50 years. We need to get this right. 

And this time last year we were still working on the Environmental Impact Statement for the realignment. We had some 10,000 

comments that we were working on. Since then, we have moved 

forward. We have issued the final Environmental Impact Statement, we have issued the Record of Decision, we have made decisions in certain areas for moving the facilities to Guam. We have 

deferred decision on the aircraft carrier berth and on the ranges, 

as the Congresswoman pointed out earlier. 

We have made some progress. Just this week we signed the Programmatic Agreement, which allows us to move forward, completing the Section 106 for the National Historic Preservation Act 

process. With that, we are now able to start letting contracts and 

beginning some military construction associated with the realignment. 

I should point out that a long-term, positive relationship with the 

people of Guam is essential to the success of the Marine Corps mission in the Pacific. With this in mind, we have laid out what we 

are calling the four pillars of working with the community in 

Guam. And they are that we will work towards OneGuam; in other 

words, that outside of the base and on the base will be of the same 

community, that we will pursue a green Guam, an environmentally 

preferred base, and help Guam with their renewable resources, and 

we will make sure that access to the cultural sites, specifically the 

Pagat site, would be protected. 

In addition, in recognizing the amount of land the Department 

of Defense already consumes on Guam, we will commit to making 

sure that we do not expand and in fact that we reduce the footprint 

on Guam. 

We believe that our commitment to these four pillars will allow 

us to work well with the Government, with the people of Guam. We 

have worked with Governor Calvo in trying to gain access to the 

land that we will need for the training, for the Marines’ training. 

And that is a really critical element of the ‘‘Are we ready?’’ We 

need to be ready to train the Marines when they come to Guam. 

And so we are spending, we are focusing our attention on getting 

the land that we are going to need for the training resources. 
12 

This is an important year for the Guam realignment. The start 

of construction is imminent, and additional contracts will be awarded in the next weeks and months. 

Building on the projects from the fiscal year 2010 and fiscal year 

2011, we are seeking additional funding for fiscal year 2012 to 

begin vertical construction and to allow off-island workers. 

Also this year, we will continue the discussions with the Government and the legislature and the private landowners to begin an 

agreement in principle for the land that we need for the ranges. 

The Guam realignment is a multi-faceted, dynamic endeavor 

with many component parts. Successful execution will be the key 

to the Department’s success in the Pacific. We will continue to 

work with our partners in Guam and Japan and the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas to develop solutions to the challenges we are facing. 

Thank you for the opportunity to address you today. I look forward to continue to work with you, and I am available for your 

questions. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary Pfannenstiel can be found 

in the Appendix on page 58.] 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Madam Secretary. I thank all of our 

witnesses for their comments. Normally I defer my questions to the 

end, but I am going to start because I am going to come back with 

the three questions that I asked at the beginning to see if anyone 

is willing to address them. And let me fill in the context for you. 

There was a sunny summer day that took place when, before I 

was born, when Oahu was just beginning to wake up in the morning, most of the people who had been out doing what they would 

do on a Saturday night were still sleeping in, there were a handful 

of people that were policing the area. A fleet was making its way 

up to the northern portion of Oahu. It was sailing inside some rain 

squalls that were taking place, staying out of the commercial lanes 

so that shipping couldn’t pick them up, the planes couldn’t pick 

them up. As it got to the northern portion of Oahu, they launched 

three types of planes—fighters, bombers and torpedo planes. Just 

as they came into Oahu, the sun came up, they were able to see 

their targets, our battleships were all lined up in Battleship Alley. 

They did all the things they were supposed to do. By the time our 

fighters could scramble and get up, they had already gone. They 

landed back on the airfield. The next thing that happened as soon 

as they landed another wave came in, and that was successful. 

As you would hear that, you would think that would be Pearl 

Harbor. As many of you know, that was not Pearl Harbor. That 

was a war game we did in 1932, 10 years before with Admiral 

Yarnell, and the Department of Defense threw it out because they 

basically said it was unfair to attack on Sunday, and nobody would 

attack on Sunday. If we had seen that 10 years ago before, we 

would have been better prepared 10 years later. 

Now I say that because I come back to looking at the scenarios 

when we are asking if we are ready we are not just asking what 

our goals are or what our philosophies are. We are trying to ask, 

‘‘Are we ready when those conflicts come?’’ We know that there is 

a strategy by the Chinese, we hope that that doesn’t happen, all 

of us want to have the dialogue, but it is the Anti-Access/Area De-
13 

nial problem. They have told me that, they have told many of the 

members here, they write about it all the time. If we deny the 

strategy, let us know, but if there is a strategy there, we had the 

Secretary saying a year ago we were going to create this concept. 

My question for any of you today is do we have the concept? Not 

are we making good progress, but do we have that concept today 

and if we don’t have the concept today, when can we expect to have 

that? Anybody want to tackle the question? 

Mr. SCHIFFER. I will try to take a first cut at that question, Mr. 

Chairman. 

I think it is fair to say that as we talk about Air-Sea that it is 

an evolving operational concept. But the important point, and I 

think this is something that General Alles got at, is that the AirSea concept needs to be put inside the larger framework of the activities that we are undertaking to counter Anti-Access/Area Denial 

challenges, not just as it might relate to China, but as the General 

said, globally, wherever those challenges may occur. 

We take as a predicate the necessity for the United States to 

maintain its ability to project power across the globe and to maintain the integrity of U.S. alliances and partnerships and to achieve 

that objective and to make sure that Anti-Access/Area Denial 

threats and capabilities will not in fact slow the deployment of 

forces into a theater or prevent U.S. forces from operating in a particular theater. 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Schiffer, I don’t want to cut you off but other 

people—— 

Mr. SCHIFFER. I am going to be getting to the enumeration. 

There are a number of things that we are currently engaged in. 

There are procurement activities that include the new penetrating 

bomber and pressing forward with the mass production of the F– 

35, that we are expanding procurement of proven cruise missile 

systems. We are looking to procure robust an air defense network 

that will prevail against ballistic and cruise missile attacks. We are 

upgrading the B–2 bomber. We are modernizing our fourth-generation fighters with new sensors, electronic protection and modernized missiles. We are ensuring resiliency by hardening key logistics 

infrastructures, building dispersed operating locations, and creating redundant and resilient command and control networks with 

increased bandwidth. 

We are also pursuing in addition to these investments new concepts of operations, including new horizons and power projection by 

integrating the presence of the Navy with the global reach of the 

Air Force, which is the essence of what the Air-Sea Battle concept 

of operations is all about. 

And we are pursuing new technologies and new technologies that 

will allow us to counter competitors’ Anti-Access/Area Denial investments, specifically their investments in ballistic missiles, 

counter-space, and cyber capabilities, and we are examining such 

technologies as prompt global strike capabilities to be able to precisely strike time-sensitive, high-value targets. 

So when you put that together as a package I think it provides 

a fairly robust response to the threats and challenges that you outline. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you. General, do we have the concept? 
14 

General ALLES. The concept is in development, which is what we 

are currently doing and what the Navy and the Air Force are currently in the process of doing. And they have started that work 

over the past year or so, I think extending beyond a year, it is still 

something that is in development and there are many enabling 

pieces of that once we have that finally developed. So I think as 

Mr. Schiffer is saying, it is evolving in its development, it is at the 

point, it is not at the point where obviously I am going to deliver 

you a pamphlet on the Air-Sea Battle concept. It is something that 

we are still developing. 

Mr. FORBES. Do you have any idea when we might expect it, 

General? 

General ALLES. Candidly, I would have to ask the services and 

come back to you on that. I think I would be speaking out of turn 

to say we have an actual timeline for that. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 77.] 

Mr. FORBES. Madam Secretary, question on Guam, if we lost that 

fuel capacity, how long would it take us to replace it and where 

would we have to get that energy from? 

Secretary PFANNENSTIEL. Mr. Chairman, I will have to get back 

to you on the date. I do know that there are other fuel sources in 

the Pacific and that we would be perhaps—in fact perhaps the 

General can be more specific on where that would come from. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 77.] 

Mr. FORBES. General, maybe you can. 

General ALLES. I would say that I can address the specifics. The 

specifics are classified in nature. 

Mr. FORBES. That is okay. Don’t tell us anything classified. 

General ALLES. There are alternative fuel sources in the Pacific 

that we would leverage. There is a concern about the vulnerability 

of above-ground facilities there. There is a resiliency effort going on 

by the Air Force. Currently they have $300 million put against 

that, I am not sure over the exact time period, but to address some 

of the vulnerability issues that we are going to have in this AntiAccess/Area Denial environment. 

So I think we are looking at that and looking at the actions we 

need to take to make those facilities better protected. 

But I think also, as described earlier, we talked about this briefly 

in your office this morning, is it is more than just a single piece, 

a single system. It is more than hardening. It is really as Air-Sea 

Battle is attempting to address it needs to address the end-to-end 

chain of operations. So it is complex and it is broad in nature. 

Mr. FORBES. Before we go to Ms. Bordallo, Mr. Kissell has a 

quick follow-up question. 

Mr. KISSELL. Just a quick question here. We talk about the fuel 

capacities on Guam and other set places, a specific location. But 

one of our colleagues in the last Congress said what about getting 

the fuel to the ships themselves because you wouldn’t want the 

ships to have to come back to a set location, what about the refueling capacity at sea in the midst of battle? Do we have the ships 

that can do that? 
15 

General ALLES. Candidly, I am not aware of any shortages that 

we have in refueling the fleet. That one is the best I can address. 

So we would need to address it with the Navy. 

Mr. FORBES. My last question, very quickly, if we had a protracted battle with high-intensity operations do we have the industrial base here to sustain that, and if so, for what period of time 

do you think? 

General ALLES. Candidly, I am not qualified to answer that. 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Schiffer, any idea? 

Mr. SCHIFFER. I would have to also plead that when it comes to 

speaking to the industrial base in the United States I am not qualified to answer that but will be happy to make sure that—— 

Mr. FORBES. If you can give us that information. And now my 

colleague and friend from Guam, Ms. Bordallo. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 77.] 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I would like to ask my first question to Secretary Schiffer, and 

that is regarding the concept of tangible progress with regards to 

the construction of the new Futenma facility and what that means 

for the realignment on Guam. What exactly is tangible progress 

and when tangible progress occurs what will that allow the United 

States to accomplish? 

And further, what must the United States be doing concurrently 

as the Government of Guam—the Government of Japan works 

through its processes to reach tangible progress in Okinawa? 

Mr. SCHIFFER. Thank you. As we look at tangible progress on the 

Futenma Replacement Facility, we see it as not a single specific 

event but rather a series of steps roughly in parallel between 

Japan and the United States as spelled out in the Realignment 

Roadmap, the Guam International Agreement, and other bilateral 

agreements. 

It will allow us to move forward with the Government of Japan 

as progress is made on the FRF to in turn take associated steps 

that we have to take on Guam. There are a number of different indicators that we are looking at, starting with the decision on the 

runway configuration for FRF that we expect at the upcoming 

‘‘Two-plus-Two’’ meeting with Japan and then other issues that we 

expect to come down, down the line, including issuance of the landfill permit, construction of the seawall, and progress on the landfill 

itself. 

The other critical point for the committee, which I know that you 

understand, is that preparation on Guam needs to begin well in advance of actual construction on the ground for the replacement facility at Camp Schwab and that relocation of the Marines from 

Okinawa will be phased with completion of suitable infrastructure 

on Guam sequenced in such a way as to maintain unit cohesion 

and operational readiness. And that is why this entire process has 

to move in lockstep and why we need to look at all of the different 

indicators as we go along, including for one other item to offer, Japanese financing for infrastructure improvements on Guam as part 

of this continuum that comprises tangible progress and that will 

enable us to relocate from Futenma Air Station to the Futenma Re-
16 

placement Facility and to relocate the Marines from Okinawa to 

Guam. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

I have one quick question, Mr. Chairman. This is for Secretary 

Pfannenstiel. As you know, last year’s defense authorization bill 

contained a provision that gave the Department of Defense the permissive authority to integrate the water and the wastewater lines 

on Guam. I have long believed that the Navy, indeed all services, 

should be out of the business of being a utility provider. And that 

said, I continue to believe that the integration of power in Guam 

provides us the right model for utility integration. 

In that case, Madam Secretary, Guam took over control of the 

Navy’s power system but did so after agreeing to reach certain performance milestones. 

Additionally, there was a third-party expert that helped to oversee the integration process and ensure that the agreed-upon milestones were met. However, this was all done at no cost to the ratepayers on Guam. 

Would you agree that this is a model that should be used for the 

consolidation of the water and wastewater system on Guam? And 

would you also agree that consolidation of the utilities should occur 

without burdening the ratepayers on Guam? 

Secretary PFANNENSTIEL. Thank you, Congresswoman Bordallo. 

We are, in fact, working with the Guam Water Authority to interconnect with their lines, and some of the money that will come 

from the Japanese financing for infrastructure will be used to improve the infrastructure for the water facilities, the water on base, 

and those will be interconnected. 

Now, as I understand, the agreement in the NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] about the integration set some conditions 

for meeting performance standards before there could be such thing 

as an integration, and that is what happened with power. And so 

my suggestion with water is that we continue to work towards 

meeting the standards that will work for the needs of the Department of Defense as well as the Guam water agency. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Madam Secretary, I noticed in the agreement 

there that they are saying that the Navy should have a voting 

member on our utility board. 

Can you indicate where else in the United States that the Navy 

is a voting member on a utility board or any other local governing 

body? Isn’t this a cumbersome requirement for the Navy or any 

service and intrusive to the Federal, State, and local relationship? 

Secretary PFANNENSTIEL. I don’t know of any place where it 

would be, but I believe that the requirement there was based on 

this need to make sure that certain operational standards were 

met, and I believe that was one way that that could be done. 

Ms. BORDALLO. So your answer is then nowhere else in the 

United States? 

Secretary PFANNENSTIEL. None that I know of, Congresswoman. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. FORBES. Now the chair recognizes Mr. Runyan from New 

Jersey for 5 minutes. 

Mr. RUNYAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank all three 

of you witnesses for coming out. 
17 

General Alles, talking about readiness in a current light, how is 

Pacific Command engaging with our international partners over 

there to really address terrorism? I mean, you have elements of the 

Philippines, Indonesia, Southeast Asia that are obvious threats. 

How are our partners coming together and do we need more resources and/or funding to accomplish this and be ready for that? 

General ALLES. Thank you, sir. That is being addressed at multiple levels. Let me talk about kind of current events. As you are 

probably aware, we have a Joint Special Operations Task Force operating in the southern Philippines of around 600 U.S. personnel. 

That has been there for a number of years and continues to be effective in addressing terrorist issues that were occurring in that 

part of the Philippines, I think very effectively. So that is one specific instance. 

So we are also concerned, as we look at the South Asia region, 

with the LET, or the Lashkar-e-Taiba terrorist group, which emanates out of Pakistan but has a presence in India and Nepal and 

Bangladesh, and we are concerned how that—let me backtrack for 

a second. As you are aware, the LET was responsible for the 

Mumbai attacks, where so many people lost their lives. So we are 

very concerned about that interaction that LET is having on India 

and the effect, that compression effect that you had between two 

nuclear powers when there is an attack into India from LET. 

So we are concerned about that very much in the South Asia 

area. We are attempting to address that by focusing not only in 

India but also in Bangladesh and Nepal to ensure that we work on 

facilitation networks, and, more importantly, how we address 

building the capacity of our partners to, in fact, address those internal issues so that they can secure their borders, so that they 

have developed networks for intelligence, they can develop intelligence on things that might be occurring inside of their country, 

and then also how they might—you know, law enforcement and actual counterterrorism operations. 

So that is another line of our operation there, and we facilitate 

that mainly through your Theater Security Cooperation Plan, 

which addresses each of the countries in the Pacific AOR [Area of 

Responsibility] and the ones that are specific concerns for terrorist 

activities, clearly a big part of that, TCP [Theater Security Cooperation Plan] is addressing that building partner capacity to address either endemic or military issues that are causing those situations to occur. 

Mr. RUNYAN. A kind of problem in the same realm to kind of 

defuse the tensions also with the South China Sea, the Taiwan 

Strait, is that kind of the same angle you are taking with that or 

is that a totally different game? 

General ALLES. The real, the building partner capacity part of 

this I think is in a different sense, you know. Of course when we 

interact with the Chinese, it is a different interaction than we have 

with our allies and our partners, if that is what you are asking, sir. 

Mr. RUNYAN. I was just curious about, we know there is a lot of 

tension there, specifically in the Strait and that type of thing and 

how we are dealing with that moving forward. 

General ALLES. I think, again, and Mr. Schiffer may want to 

comment also, I think the importance of the interaction military- 
18 

to-military between ourselves and the Chinese is of prime importance, and we do remain concerned that the nature of that interaction tends to be episodic at best. 

Mr. RUNYAN. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Runyan. 

And now our submarine expert from Connecticut, Mr. Courtney. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Actually to follow up 

on Mr. Runyan’s question, a test of that military-to-military relationship was the sinking of the Cheonan, which again there was exhaustive forensic investigation that it was inescapable that it was 

a completely unprovoked attack by a North Korean mini sub, and 

yet we were unable to get China’s acknowledgment of, again, something that was just totally black and white that North Korea was 

responsible for this. 

And in terms of just the prospects of a productive military-tomilitary relationship, even government-to-government relationship, 

to not be able to even succeed in terms of getting a basic baseline 

of what actually happened there and in terms of just what impact 

that is going to have in terms of transit of traffic, both commercial 

and military, in that part of the world, I guess I would ask you to 

comment on that Mr. Schiffer, in terms of it seems like using that 

as a test, the relationship really is not doing that well and maybe 

it is just episodic, is the right way to describe it. 

The second question in terms of readiness is the press reports 

show that there was clearly a gap there in terms of sonar technology, in terms of being able to detect that mini sub and when you 

gave your list of investments and help that we are giving to our 

allies in that region, that was one of the items that, I didn’t hear 

it, and I am just wondering if maybe you could address that because clearly 46 sailors lost their lives because they didn’t see that 

submarine coming or that attack. 

Mr. SCHIFFER. Let me address part of the question, and then 

turn the floor over to General Alles. 

I guess I would note first that when the Cheonan incident occurred, our military-to-military relationship with the People’s Republic of China was in one of its periodic and, from our perspective, 

very unfortunate periods of suspension because the Chinese had 

suspended the relationship in January of last year following our 

announcement of an arms sale package to Taiwan. So we were actually unable at that point in time to have any discussions with the 

Chinese in the military channels about the Cheonan. 

I am not sure that would have made much of a difference, frankly. And much like you, we continue to be somewhat mystified by 

how the Chinese have approached what seems to us to be very, 

very clear evidence about culpability in the Cheonan incident. 

We hope now that we have resumed the military-to-military relationship with China, that we are going to be able to put it on stable 

and reliable footing and that in so doing, we will be able to reduce 

misunderstanding, miscommunication, and misapprehension, and 

perhaps have some real discussions with them about some of the 

larger strategic issues in the region, including how we each view 

and approach North Korea. That is certainly something that when 

Secretary Gates was in China this past January he engaged on. 
19 

Insofar as the readiness issue that you identified before, turning 

things over to General Alles, I will just note that the list that I offered was, by necessity, given the open nature of this hearing, not 

complete, and obviously we will be happy to brief any member of 

the committee that is interested in a closed session more fully on 

the fuller list of the capabilities that we are seeking to develop. 

But I certainly can say in this open setting that, as you are no 

doubt aware, we have undertaken a series of very robust exercises 

with our ROK ally since the sinking of the Cheonan, including a 

number of exercises at sea off both coasts of Korea. And those exercises have been intended in no small part to increase ROK capabilities and increase alliance capabilities precisely so we are bettered 

postured to be able to respond to these sorts of provocations in the 

future. 

General ALLES. Thank you, sir. Thank you, Mr. Schiffer. 

I would make a couple of comments about Cheonan. One is the 

nature of the attack was unexpected. It was unprovoked and unexpected, so from that standpoint it was a surprise attack and a surprise to the Koreans. 

As indicated, a lot of our focus here in the near term has been 

on increasing the capacity of the South Koreans in terms of ASW 

[Anti-Submarine Warfare]. We have conducted a number of ASW 

exercises with them to increase their capabilities in those areas. 

I think the Chinese remain concerned about the stability of 

North Korea in general, and I think that is a large part, that is 

a large calculus in how they respond to these situations here. We, 

as all would expect, are mystified, given the evidence we saw for 

Cheonan, that that was not attributed to the North Koreans. 

Thank you. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you. Just to let everybody know, we have 

three votes that have just been called. Our witnesses have graciously agreed to wait as we run over and do those and come back. 

I want to try to get in one more set of questions. So I would like 

to turn now to the gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Rogers. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Alles, I understand that the Department is reevaluating 

its prepositioned stocks as a part of Secretary Gates’ efficiency 

drills, and we are already beginning to see reductions in funding 

for prepo in the 2012 budget that the Secretary just submitted to 

us. Was PACOM [U.S. Pacific Command] a part of this evaluation 

of the prepo strategy? 

General ALLES. Yes, sir, we were a part of that evaluation. I 

would note that we have calculated the effects of that as it is 

booked against our operations plans to ensure those plans remain 

viable in execution, and they are from our standpoint. 

So I can’t address the whole worldwide posture of that. That is 

beyond my scope at PACOM. But from our standpoint of sourcing 

our plans and addressing the very difficult time-distance equation 

we have in the Pacific theater, we are currently satisfied. 

Mr. ROGERS. And you feel like that is going to be adequate in the 

near future? 

See, given what is happening with the recent national disaster 

in Japan and what is going to be required of resources and the volatility in North Korea, it seems to me that bringing those 
20 

prepositioned stocks down is risky, and you are saying you don’t 

think that is true? 

General ALLES. That was one of the concerns we addressed to the 

Department, was to ensure that we were looking beyond just the 

near term, really at the 5-year and beyond horizon, because of 

course, the dynamic, the security posture in Asia is changing as we 

consider the rise in powers in Asia itself. So that was part of our 

calculation there and part of our response back to the Department 

to ensure that we had adequate stocks for our operations plans. 

Mr. ROGERS. I understand that we need to get use out of every 

dollar, but I also want to make sure we are ready, and I have very 

real concerns about these reductions. 

We know that the readiness posture of PACOM is negatively affected by the ongoing military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, 

and now by humanitarian assistance in Japan. 

How significant is the shortage of forces and equipment required 

to effectively deal with the broad range of security concerns in 

PACOM’s Area of Operation? 

General ALLES. I would comment there, sir, that for our day-today theater security operations, I think we are adequate resourced, 

and I have had this conversation with Admiral Willard, my boss. 

There is a significant presence of U.S. forces from PACOM in Afghanistan and Iraq. Obviously, there is an effect of those forces. 

There is a long-term effect, I believe, about the strategic expression 

we are making by having those forces out of theater year after year 

after year, that we do have to address our operations. And I think 

as a long-term equation, we need to continue to look at that. 

It is having, though, probably a different effect you may not be 

aware of. As the ground forces are gone obviously to Afghanistan 

and Iraq, we are relying more on our air and our Navy forces, so 

that requires more basic steaming days or air operations days out 

of those forces, which is more wear and tear on those aircrafts and 

those ships. It affects maintenance schedules and also the longterm viability of those. In other words, we are using those assets 

up because we are relying on them more with our deployment of 

ground forces out of theater. 

Mr. ROGERS. What would you like to see this committee or this 

Congress do to help you with that wear and tear and that problem 

that you just described? 

General ALLES. Well, I think in one sense, as we continue on the 

continuing resolution, that is going to affect maintenance schedules 

for our ships and our aircraft because of funding levels that they 

don’t have. That is one aspect of it. I think, also, we have to look 

at the long-term equation of what our shipbuilding program looks 

like. 

Mr. ROGERS. Just as a last point, I want to go back to this 

prepositioned stocks. When I asked you if PACOM had been involved in the evaluation, did you feel any pressure from the Secretary’s Office or the Administration to tell them what they wanted 

to hear on that issue? 

General ALLES. No, sir. I think we had a robust dialogue with 

them and clearly expressed what our positions were. 

Mr. ROGERS. Excellent. Thank you, General. 

That is all that I have, Mr. Chairman. 
21 

Mr. FORBES. We will stand in recess until we return from the 

votes. Thank you for your patience. It will probably be about 30 

minutes. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. FORBES. I will call the hearing back to order. 

I thank our witnesses for their patience and apologize for us having to leave during the votes. 

The chair now recognizes the gentleman from North Carolina, 

Mr. Kissell, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. KISSELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to our 

witnesses for being here. 

Mr. Chairman, being a past world history teacher, I couldn’t help 

but to enjoy your story this morning about Pearl Harbor. When I 

was teaching, I would start out every semester by reading a preamble to a book, and I believe it was ‘‘Flyboys,’’ but don’t quote me 

on that. And it talked about the Japanese surprised the fleet, 

caught them in the harbor in December, and the end result of the 

battle was they sunk all of the fleet. I would tell my students, if 

you can tell me where that happened, I will give you an A for the 

semester and you don’t have to come to class; you can do whatever 

you want. All of them would raise their hands, and of course they 

thought it was Pearl Harbor. I would say: Well, the next line in the 

book says that President Roosevelt wrote a letter to the Japanese 

and congratulated them to their great victory. That stumped them 

a bit. It was 1905, it was the Russians. 

We have great capacity to think we have all of the answers, and 

we have to keep looking for the things that may surprise us. 

The reason I asked the question, General, earlier about the supply ships, Gene Taylor was one of our former colleagues who was 

very knowledgeable of these things. I remember one session he was 

very concerned about how do we resupply the oil when we are on 

the seas, in the battle, do we have enough oilers. He had concerns 

whether we did or not. I will follow up with this with a question, 

and you can take it off the record. 

My question being this: If we are in a prolonged engagement in 

the Western Pacific, do we have the resources, and the chairman 

asked do we have the industrial resources, well, not answering 

that, but do we have the resources, the capacity, whether it be 

ships, airplanes, whatever, to get what we need on a continuing 

basis to where the engagement may be. 

I encourage you to be brief because I have a couple of other questions. 

General ALLES. We can’t get obviously into classified discussions, 

obviously. I would need to answer specifics off the record. 

But generally, I would say yes, we do have the capacities we 

need in terms of resupply for the plans that I have booked right 

now, sir. 

Mr. KISSELL. Good. One country we haven’t specifically mentioned, even though we have said in the general area, is Vietnam. 

Where do we see Vietnam emerging? Or do we see them emerging 

in terms of the military, but where do we see them emerging politically, especially as it relates to our relationship with China? 

Once again, whoever wants to jump at this one. 
22 

Mr. SCHIFFER. I think as a general statement we have been extraordinarily pleased by the progress that we have made in our relationship with Vietnam over the past number of years since normalization. And we certainly look to deepen and strengthen the relationship that we have between the United States and Vietnam in 

the years ahead. 

Mr. KISSELL. Does China view that as a threat, because historically those two countries have been at odds? 

Mr. SCHIFFER. I wouldn’t speak and couldn’t speak about Beijing’s threat perception; but certainly, as you know, China and 

Vietnam have had a rocky history of their own. I am certain there 

are those in Beijing that probably do view our burgeoning relationship with Vietnam in a less-than-favorable light. 

From our perspective, our deepening and strengthening relationship with Vietnam, and our desire to enter into a genuine partnership with Vietnam, is a relationship that we pursue in and of itself. 

It is not about China; it is about the United States and Vietnam. 

But I should also note that we don’t have any illusions, given our 

own history with Vietnam, about the future of that relationship either. There are issues that we have to continue to work out. There 

are human rights questions that we still have in terms of how Vietnam treats some of its own religious minorities that we still need 

to be able to cycle through as well. 

Mr. KISSELL. Thank you, and thank you once again for your patience. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Kissell. 

Now, someone who the Pacific is near and dear to her heart, the 

gentlelady from Hawaii. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I don’t believe we can discuss readiness out of the context of 

what has happened and what the implications are of what happened, the devastation and the catastrophe in Japan. Having said 

that, I would like to know, Japan is considered like our anchor 

partner in terms of our security defenses in the Pacific. What impact is the tsunami and the earthquake having on whatever strategic locations we have in Japan? Mr. Secretary, if you can answer 

that. 

Mr. SCHIFFER. Certainly. To begin with, I would say it would be 

speculative at best at this point to comment on any of the longerterm implications of the earthquake and the tsunami. But I would 

note that certainly I think the assistance that we have been able 

to offer, the engagement of the U.S. military and the U.S. Government across the board in response to this crisis has helped to 

strengthen the bonds that we have between our two countries and 

helped make a case, I think, for the logic of why we have a forward-deployed presence in the Asian-Pacific region, including the 

base and footprint that we have in Japan. 

Ms. HANABUSA. I understand that part, Mr. Secretary. I guess 

my question is more in line of what role does Japan play, if any, 

in our readiness posture in the Pacific, and how is it now going to 

be affected by what has happened? 

Mr. SCHIFFER. Japan is the cornerstone of our approach to security issues in the Asian-Pacific region, and there is a reason why 

we term it that way and it is not just rhetoric. Japan is an incred-
23 

ibly important ally. The contributions that they bring to the alliance, including our base and footprint in Japan is absolutely critical to our enduring presence in the Asian-Pacific region. 

I have absolutely no reason to believe that anything that has 

transpired in the past few days following the earthquake and the 

tsunami will undermine the commitment, the depth, the strength 

of the U.S.-Japan alliance. As I noted I think just to the contrary, 

that we will emerge from this and Japan will emerge from this 

with a closer, better, and deeper relationship. 

Ms. HANABUSA. One of the issues that we are aware of is the fact 

that the Japanese Government structure has changed. We have 

gone from, since I think 1955 when the Liberal Democratic Party 

actually had control of their Parliament, and now we have the 

Democratic Party of Japan; and I don’t believe necessarily the 

Democratic Party of Japan felt as strong about our military presence as the Liberal Democratic Party. Do you feel that somehow 

that structure is now going to be affected as well? 

Mr. SCHIFFER. I would offer that we have been extraordinarily 

happy to be working with the DPJ [Democratic Party of Japan] 

Government over the past years. As I noted in my opening statement, the Prime Minister, the Defense Minister, the Foreign Minister, Chief Cabinet Secretary, all of the senior members of the DPJ 

Government have made very, very strong and forward-leaning 

statements about the value of the alliance, the value of the U.S. 

military presence in Japan, and about their commitment to move 

forward with the Realignment Roadmap and FRF. So we view 

them as a good and strong partner. 

Ms. HANABUSA. I understand what you are saying, but isn’t it 

true that the reality of it is as to the Futenma transfer that Japan 

has yet to come up with approximately their $6 billion of the $10 

billion price tag for Futenma. Given the disaster, given the catastrophe, what are the probabilities that they are going to pay for the 

move of part of the Marines from Futenma to Guam? 

Mr. SCHIFFER. Again, I think that would be highly speculative. 

I guess I would note that Japan has offered $415.5 million in funding for Guam infrastructure improvements in the Japan fiscal year 

2011 budget. That has already been approved by their lower house. 

We expect it to be fully approved, and that we are not aware of any 

effort, have not heard any voices in the past few days that would 

suggest that that funding is not going to go forward. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Have you heard an affirmation that even if they 

have got this critical situation where they are going to be rebuilding a huge part of their nation that they are still going to continue 

with their commitments to the United States? 

Mr. SCHIFFER. The discussions that we have been having with 

the Government of Japan in the past few days have been how to 

respond to the immediate humanitarian crisis and the situation at 

the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. Once we have managed to deal with the management of the immediate consequences, 

the thousands of people that have died, the hundreds of thousands 

that are internally displaced, and the ongoing situation with the 

nuclear power plant, I am sure we will have those discussions. And 

I am fully confident that the Government of Japan will continue to 

be positively engaged. 
24 

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you for your questions. 

To follow up on what the gentlelady from Hawaii was asking, 

Mr. Schiffer, you and General Alles have both talked about the importance of our allies working in a partnership fashion for us to be 

able to do the type of defense that we need in the Pacific. Have 

there been any thoughts about perhaps selling some export version 

of the F–22 to Japan or any of our other allies given the fact that 

we are concerned perhaps that the Russians may be selling their 

PAK FA [fifth-generation jet fighter] to other players across the 

world? And if we did that, and I am not suggesting we do, I am 

just asking for your thoughts, but there is arguments that it would 

help bring the cost of the F–22 down in doing that. Have there ever 

been any discussions about doing that? 

Mr. SCHIFFER. I think Secretary Gates is very, very clear on 

where he is on the F–22 program. As I did not bring along a copy 

of my letter of resignation in my backpack, that will be the entirety 

of my remarks on the issue. 

Mr. FORBES. Well placed. 

General ALLES. I will leave the F–22 to Mr. Schiffer. 

But I would just comment, we have had discussions with the 

Japanese about what their needs are in terms of aviation requirements. We think the F–35 makes a very logical fit for them. I think 

it is what they are exploring currently. So that makes eminent 

sense to us in many ways. I think it more adequately addresses the 

defense of Japan needs. 

I think another aspect of this, back to our allies and partners in 

the region, in the Northeast Asia region we are seeing increased 

levels of cooperation between the Government of South Korea and 

Japan. Even this recent tragedy shows a degree of cooperation between them in terms of assistance. So we are encouraged by that 

and by the trilateral cooperation that we are having between the 

three sides. 

Mr. FORBES. Madam Secretary, I am going to let you slide on 

that question, and we are going to go to Ms. Bordallo. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Mr. Chairman, if you would bear with me. I have 

a number of questions to ask. I really just want to get answers for 

the record, so if the witnesses could make it very brief. 

First, Secretary Pfannenstiel, now that the Programmatic Agreement has been signed, when can you expect task orders to be 

issued to contract awardees? And when will some initial construction efforts get underway on Guam? 

Secretary PFANNENSTIEL. Congresswoman Bordallo, we will be 

issuing contracts and notices to proceed on several of these contracts very soon. We have some contracts have already been awarded, and we will be able to issue notices to proceed on those. On a 

number of others we have specific dates that we are ready to go 

on them. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Very good. 

Regarding the training ranges, I hope that General Alles can 

help to answer this. The QDR addresses training in the Pacific. 

General, can you describe the current challenges to training in this 

region? And also, are there any efforts by PACOM to lead a com-
25 

prehensive approach to develop a truly effective solution to training 

issues in the future? 

General ALLES. Thank you, ma’am. There is an effort on the part 

of PACOM to start an EIS [environmental impact statement], 

which actually I think the funding is in the current year’s budget, 

that would address holistically the issues for PACOM as far as 

joint training is concerned across the Pacific region. So I think that 

addresses partially the issues on Guam. 

We have discussed earlier the sighting of ranges on Guam itself 

and the need for individual training of the Marines in terms of 

small arms and those issues and where the broader degrees of 

training can be conducted throughout the theater. 

One of our prime considerations, though, as we have discussed, 

is that we maintain ready forces throughout our region. We think 

that is critical as a deterrence aspect. It is so very important to us 

at the combatant commander’s levels that we are able to train our 

marines, soldiers, sailors, and airmen across their range of required skills. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. 

Secretary Pfannenstiel, I hope that you can help me better understand the rationale for a firing range on Guam. I have long expressed my concern about the preferred alternative location for the 

firing range on Guam. The Marine requirements seem to have 

shifted since the beginning of the EIS process in 2006; and as such, 

why are these individual qualifications needed to be met on Guam? 

Has a cost-benefit analysis, and I think we talked about this earlier, been conducted to determine why the Island of Tinian may or 

may not be feasible? 

Secretary PFANNENSTIEL. We have looked at the Island of Tinian, 

and in fact we will be doing some group training there. But the individual qualifying training needs to be on site close to where the 

Marines will be. We have looked at the ability to move the Marines 

as would be required, to move them to Tinian often, to support 

them there, to move them back. You end up not with just a lot of 

additional expense, you reduce the time they have to train. You reduce the throughput of training for them. 

Given all of that, we have concluded that the training needs to 

be on the Island of Guam. And we have sought for, since we have 

been doing the process, to find a place on the island of Guam that 

meets the needs; that is, sufficient size, that has the least impact 

on the community, that does not interfere with business or recreation, that is operationally safe, which is why we ended up with 

a preferred alternative that we are now looking at. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Another question for you, Secretary. Many institutions of higher learning have cooperative agreements with DOD 

to support the mission and provide technical studies and analysis. 

Are you open to developing a cooperative agreement with the University of Guam, and what steps are you taking to get an agreement on a cooperative agreement? 

Secretary PFANNENSTIEL. We have the highest respect—I personally have the highest respect for the University of Guam and Dr. 

Underwood. I have met with him every time I have gone to Guam. 

I believe that the university is a true asset for the island. I am not 
26 

sure what the cooperative agreement is that you would be proposing, but I am certainly open to talking about it. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. 

And another one for you, Secretary. As you know, included in the 

Record of Decision was a commitment to Adaptive Program Management throughout the duration of the military buildup. However, 

there is still a lack of common understanding of APM’s [the Adaptive Program Management’s] specific meaning for the buildup. What 

role do you see APM and CMCC [Civilian Military Coordinating 

Council] playing as the relocation moves forward? 

Secretary PFANNENSTIEL. The Adaptive Program Management 

was developed as a way of slowing, if necessary, the activity of the 

buildup to keep from overwhelming the infrastructure of the island, 

whether it is water or wastewater or power or roads or any other 

aspect of the infrastructure. So the idea is that as the buildup happens, as construction happens, we will look continually at the logistics that are needed and slow down or change the schedule. And 

the CMCC, the Civilian Military Coordinating Council, would be 

the oversight body that would meet and decide whether the buildup 

was in fact moving too fast, whether it needed to be slowed down 

in some aspects. 

Right now we are in the process of working with the other parties who would be involved in this to develop the operating charter 

for the CMCC. 

Ms. BORDALLO. A follow-up on this, if a project related to the 

buildup is causing significant environmental impacts, how will 

DOD adequately adapt given the short timeframe for the buildup? 

Secretary PFANNENSTIEL. I believe that depends on what the impacts of the project would be. We are working with the Environmental Protection Agency and many other resources agencies to 

mitigate where we can, to slow down if that is what would be required. 

Ms. BORDALLO. All right, and I have a further question for you, 

Secretary. Throughout the course of this series of hearings on ‘‘Are 

we ready?’’, we have discussed the element of risk in the operations 

and maintenance. Now, I would like to bring an element of serious 

risk in the acquisition strategy for the military buildup on Guam. 

The current acquisition strategy requires that each contractor 

provides a certain level of medical care at each work site as well 

as health insurance coverage. The plan also calls for the 

prescreening of any guest workers at their origin. The fragmented 

strategy could result in seven different plans for how to care for 

workers. Given the state of the health care system on Guam, I 

think this part of the plan assumes way too much risk for our overall health infrastructure. 

So can you detail for the committee why this strategy was settled 

on and what steps are being taken to ensure that the 

predeployment screening of guest workers is done to a certain 

standard? 

Secretary PFANNENSTIEL. Congresswoman, the concern here was 

to specifically avoid overwhelming the medical facilities available 

on Guam. So it became part of the contract award process that the 

contractors would have to provide medical care for their workers. 
27 

That is an important part of what determined whether they would 

be selected. 

Our expectation is that these workers will be able to be treated 

by their employers. If they need to go to the hospital for stabilization, they would do that, then they would be airlifted off. They 

would be able to put the least possible impact on the island’s existing medical facilities. 

In terms of screening before they came, we would have to ensure 

that that would happen and that it would be effective. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Can I get your word on working with my office 

further on this detail? 

Secretary PFANNENSTIEL. Oh, absolutely. I would be glad to do 

that. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Very good. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 77.] 

One last question for you. The Micronesian Bio-Security Plan 

was developed by various Federal agencies, to include the DOD and 

DOI [the Department of the Interior], to determine how to address 

the risks of terrestrial and marine invasive species to the Micronesian region resulting from the buildup. Can you tell me how the 

DOD will implement the MBP [Micronesian Bio-Security Plan] and 

what proactive actions the DOD will take to prevent new invasive 

species from being introduced? 

Secretary PFANNENSTIEL. We have a fairly elaborate plan of how 

it would work, and I would be glad to get more information on that 

to your office. I think that would probably be more productive than 

trying to walk through the various pieces of it here. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 78.] 

Ms. BORDALLO. Very good, because we do have enough brown 

tree snakes now forever. 

General Alles, the lease for the Guam shipyard is up next year. 

General, can you address what level of readiness our forward-deployed ship repair capability provides PACOM? 

General ALLES. Ma’am, I will have to take that for the record. 

I am not in a position to address that one. But I can definitely get 

you the answer. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 77.] 

Ms. BORDALLO. Mr. Chairman, that concludes. I wanted the answers to those questions for the record. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you. Feel free to supplement any of those answers that you have for the record. 

General, Admiral Willard when he was here last year, gave some 

testimony about the number of ships in the Chinese Navy. Do you 

have any idea how many ships the Chinese have in their Navy 

today? 

General ALLES. I can comment on their modernization. The specific numbers, I would need to get. 

Mr. FORBES. If you can get those numbers for us and supply 

them to us. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 77.] 
28 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Schiffer, today is March 15, 2011. Ten years 

from now, do you have any idea, if we continue on the same building plan we are on right now, how will the number of submarines 

that we have in our Navy compare with the number the submarines the Chinese will have based on our projections of what 

they are building? 

Mr. SCHIFFER. I will have to get back to you on the record in 

terms of the exact number. 

Mr. FORBES. I understand. If you could get that number back to 

us so we can see it. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 77.] 

Mr. FORBES. General, you and I talked the other day, one of the 

interesting things right now, most of our strategies are dependent 

upon our forces being able to attack and then move back to sanctuaries where they have basically safe harbors at that particular 

point in time. But if we had a major conflict in the Pacific, more 

likely than not these safe harbors or sanctuaries wouldn’t be available. So my question is: Do U.S. forces typically operate under degraded battle network conditions when training for operations in 

the Western Pacific? And if so, what are the key lessons we have 

learned from such training? And if not, why are we not training in 

this manner, especially since the Chinese military writings cite our 

battle networks as our Achilles heel? 

General ALLES. I think one of the areas that we have identified 

that we will continue to work on is the need to be able to operate 

in missions-controlled environments, and that is something certainly that we have done in a robust nature in the past. It is an 

area that we need to address now and into the future. It is an area 

that is not being ignored. It is not an area that we don’t ever practice to, but I think, like other issues as we look at a potential country that would be a near-peer, we are going to have to look at the 

kinds of training we are doing and how we prepare for that kind 

of a situation. 

Mr. FORBES. If you could keep our subcommittee posted on your 

progress on that, we would appreciate it. 

Our Navy and Air forces, are they trained and ready to operated 

under sustained loss degradation based on space capabilities and 

capacities because we know that we see the Chinese perhaps looking at taking away some of those capabilities? Are we training to 

deal with that degradation if it were to take place? 

General ALLES. Again, we are looking at that during our exercises. I think there is more improvement that we can gain in those 

areas, both in the type of technology we are using that provides a 

more robust space network as far as jam resistance, those kinds of 

things, and also from the standpoint of practicing those types of operations in degraded environments. There are certainly improvements that can be done there. I don’t want to imply there that is 

not practiced at all now. That would be an incorrect statement, too. 

Mr. FORBES. My last question, maybe all three of you could take 

a bite at this at how we can do better. I want to go back to the 

very first question that I raised, and it is the fact that the Secretary did direct the Air Force and the Navy to develop an Air-Sea 

Battle concept to address the growing Anti-Access/Area Denial 
29 

problem, which many people feel is the most acute in the Western 

Pacific. 

We know from writings that this challenge has been emerging 

really for the better part of the last decade, and yet we had the instruction come out last year to develop the concept, and all of your 

testimonies today were that it was evolving. What takes us so long 

to create a concept to respond to a threat that we have? Any suggestions on how we can cut that timeline down? 

Mr. SCHIFFER. I think that is an excellent question, Mr. Chairman, and one that I would very much like to be able to take back 

and consult with some of my colleagues on so we can provide you 

with a better answer on how we might be able to be more nimble 

in our own thinking. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 77.] 

Mr. FORBES. I would appreciate it, and we are not pointing the 

finger at you. We are pointing the finger at us, too, and we want 

to work in a partnership so that we can respond faster. We would 

love to have that dialogue and any input you can give us to how 

we can make that work better. 

General, you have lived with this most of your career. Any suggestions? 

General ALLES. I don’t have the answer for what takes so long. 

I do think that this has come into a much better focus over the 

past few years on the direction that China has done with this AntiAccess/Area Denial strategy of theirs. And as it has come into 

focus, I think that is moving us toward action in this one area of 

Air-Sea Battles, and numerous other areas. 

Mr. FORBES. General, one thing I would just throw out, we are 

not just limiting it to the Anti-Access/Area Denial problem, it is 

generally when we are trying to deal with these concepts, sometimes it just takes us so long to get our arms around it. I know 

in many hearings that we had we were talking about this very 

problem, and we have the Department of Defense telling us it is 

no problem, it is no problem, it is no problem. And then it seems 

like everybody went to bed one night and woke up the next morning and said: Oh, my gosh, it is a problem. And so we would appreciate any insight you have from your years of experience on how 

we can make that better. 

Madam Secretary, I know, not particularly on this issue, but on 

a lot of the other issues across agencies, you have lived with this 

a long time, too. What are your suggestions on how we cope with 

it a little faster? 

Secretary PFANNENSTIEL. Mr. Chairman, I am not sure that I 

have any wisdom beyond what my colleagues here have offered. I 

am, as you note, relatively new to the Pentagon and the processes. 

I see dedication, I see very knowledgeable people who are answering questions as well as they can, and I believe that the interaction 

with Congress is strong and is positive. Clearly if I have any ideas 

on this I would be glad to share them with you. 

Mr. FORBES. We are about out of time. I just want to give our 

witnesses a couple of minutes to say anything that you left out or 

that you think is important or you got short-changed on that you 

didn’t get to get in the record. 
30 

Mr. Schiffer. 

Mr. SCHIFFER. No, Mr. Chairman, I think we have had ample opportunity, and thank you very much for this opportunity to come 

up and engage in this important dialogue with you. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Schiffer. 

General. 

General ALLES. I would just mention what we discussed in your 

office, and that is we look at this issue of Anti-Access/Area Denial. 

We are in kind of a formative period here, and the support of Congress in working on these particular programs I think will be essential to addressing the issue. 

Mr. FORBES. Madam Secretary. 

Secretary PFANNENSTIEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like 

to thank you and Congresswoman Bordallo for the opportunity to 

come and talk about what I see as a very important part of our Pacific posture, and I know Guam is one piece of it, but I think for 

many of us it is a key strategic piece. 

Mr. FORBES. Our doors remain open to all three of you if there 

is anything we can do to help. 

I would like to leave with Ms. Bordallo, any closing comments. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Just a few seconds, Mr. Chairman. I want to 

thank you very much for focusing on this very important move for 

the military, probably one of the biggest in the history, I understand. It is going to cost our Government and the Government of 

Japan about $16 billion when all is concluded, and I just want to 

thank you very much for focusing on the Asia-Pacific area and its 

importance. 

Mr. FORBES. With that, we are adjourned. Thank you all very 

much. 

[Whereupon, at 4:15 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

MARCH 15, 2011 

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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

MARCH 15, 2011 

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RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES 

Mr. SCHIFFER. The United States defense industrial base is sufficient to meet general current and projected DOD requirements. However, the Department has faced 

capacity concerns centered on difficulties associated with rapidly increasing production of ‘‘critical’’ (based on unique evolving operational scenarios) items; for example, 

those items associated with body armor, up-armoring vehicles, and precision-guided 

munitions. As the Department continues to improve its requirements generation 

process, particularly for contingency operations, it will provide better and timelier 

guidance to its industry partners, who will then be better able to plan and build 

their capacity accordingly. However, in circumstances where capacity for certain 

items becomes problematic for unforeseeable reasons, the Department has a variety 

of tools at its disposal to address these situations, such as prioritizing industry deliveries to meet the most critical war fighting needs first. [See page 15.] 

Mr. SCHIFFER. Ten years from now, China and the United States are likely to 

have roughly the same number of submarines, although with very different capabilities. Currently, China possesses approximately 55 submarines, most of which are 

diesel-electric, and its submarine force is likely to grow by approximately 15 submarines in the next 10–15 years, primarily due to the introduction of new diesel 

and air independent power (AIP) submarines. Over the next decade, the U.S. submarine force is projected to decline from 71 to 67 submarines. 

The U.S. Navy operates three types of submarines—nuclear-powered attack submarines (53 in service), nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (14 in service), 

and nuclear-powered cruise missile and special operations forces (SOF) submarines 

(four in service). 

The Navy’s proposed FY2012 budget requests $3,232.2 million in procurement 

funding to cover the procurement cost of two additional attack submarines. Based 

on U.S. Navy projections, the total number of U.S. attack submarines will peak in 

2013–2014 and will then decline to a total of 49 submarines by 2021. [See page 28.] 

Mr. SCHIFFER. The Air-Sea Battle concept is a ‘‘next-step’’ evolution in U.S. joint 

warfare. It builds on the extensive experience of the Department of the Air Force 

and the Department of the Navy in conducting joint operations together over the 

last twenty years. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review emphasized the importance of preparing for the broadest possible range of conflicts, requiring continuous 

operational innovation and rebalancing. This is consistent with our aims as we continue to develop the Air-Sea Battle concept as an effective approach to serve U.S. 

security interests most effectively. 

In the future, the Air-Sea Battle concept will be a driver of new and innovative 

programs. The military capabilities envisioned in the initial Air-Sea Battle concept 

either exist at present or are currently funded programs. [See page 29.] 

General ALLES. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] [See 

page 14.] 

General ALLES. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] [See 

page 27.] 

Secretary PFANNENSTIEL. There are alternative fuel sources in the Pacific that 

could be leveraged and there exists a concern about the vulnerability of aboveground facilities as stated by General Alles during the hearing. More specific information on subject matter is classified in nature. 

Additional information on specific time required to replace or replenish fuel capacity in Guam can most appropriately be answered by the Department of Defense’s 

lead activity for this project, Defense Logistics Agency. [See page 14.] 

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. BORDALLO 

General ALLES. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] [See 

page 27.] 

Secretary PFANNENSTIEL. The Department of the Navy has put in place strict contractual requirements for workforce health care to be enforced through an aggres-
78 

sive and coordinated oversight program cooperatively managed by DON and regulatory agencies including the Guam Department of Labor and the U.S. Department 

of Labor. All contractors are required to have plans to cover health care needs associated with the introduction of an off-island workforce, including detailed medical 

screening and surveillance, primary care and emergency care needs. This efficient 

and cost effective approach has been coordinated with the Center for Disease Control (Pacific Region), the Government of Guam Public Health and Social Services, 

Navy Medicine West and Navy Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (Occupational and 

Environmental Medicine Policy). During a recent visit to Guam (April 2011) by the 

Navy Medicine’s Occupational and Environmental Policy Expert and Special Assistant for Asia-Pacific Affairs, Navy Medicine West, DON’s current plan for addressing 

medical care requirements for H–2B workers was endorsed and supported by the 

private medical sector, the medical insurance industry, representatives of the regional CDC and the Government of Guam Department of Public Health. 

The Department of the Navy is committed to working with Guam health providers, CDC, you and your staff regarding workforce medical care on Guam. We will 

continue to review and provide feedback on amendment language regarding this 

subject, as we did prior to the committee’s mark-up on the FY–2011 National Defense Authorization Act. [See page 27.] 

Secretary PFANNENSTIEL. The Department of Navy (DON) has contracted with the 

National Invasive Species Council, the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the US Geological Survey, and the Smithsonian Institute to develop and coordinate risk assessments and prepare a Micronesian BioSecurity Plan (MBP) in cooperation with the 

U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Guam Division of Aquatic and Wildlife Resources, 

Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands Division of Fish and Wildlife, and 

other interested parties. The approach will integrate techniques involving exclusion, 

detection, rapid response, and control of non-native and invasive organisms that can 

be readily implemented into standard operating procedures, training instructions, 

and construction projects. Experts in various fields are collaborating to provide the 

best scientific decision support to develop the MBP. The MBP is still under development, and the final plan is anticipated in December of 2011. After the MBP is finalized, DON will develop an implementation plan that will identify feasible mitigation 

and management actions associated with DOD activities. DON will implement biosecurity measures identified in the MBP that will reduce the risk of introduction 

and spread of invasive species via DON activities. Implementation of identified mitigation/management actions will be dependent on forecasts of the tempo and sequencing of the realignment construction effort, compliance with regulatory requirements, and compatibility with military training. [See page 27.] 
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

MARCH 15, 2011 

(81) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES 

Mr. FORBES. The 2006 International Agreement between the United States and 

Government of Japan requires that the Government of Japan make ‘‘tangible 

progress’’ on the construction of a Marine Corps Air Station Futenma replacement 

facility in northern Okinawa before implementing the Guam realignment. How does 

the U.S. define ‘‘tangible progress’’? If the Government of Japan has not made ‘‘tangible progress’’ in Okinawa, should Congress continue funding for the Guam realignment? 

Mr. SCHIFFER. We see tangible progress on the Futenma Replacement Facility 

(FRF), not as a single specific event, but rather as a series of steps taken roughly 

in parallel between Japan and the United States, as spelled out in our bilateral understandings on realignment. As the Government of Japan makes progress on the 

FRF, the United States will take associated steps to move forward on Guam. There 

are a number of different indicators of this progress, starting with the decision on 

the runway configuration that we expect at the upcoming two-plus-two meeting with 

Japan, the issuance of the landfill permit, the construction of the sea wall, and 

progress on the landfill itself. 

An essential point of our realignment understanding with Japan is that preparations for facilities on Guam need to begin well in advance of the actual construction 

of the replacement facility at Camp Schwab. It is necessary to ensure that when 

we are satisfied with the progress Japan has made on the FRF, suitable facilities 

will be available on Guam to allow the phased relocation of Marines from Okinawa, 

such that any relocation can be sequenced to maintain unit cohesion and operational 

readiness. 

Mr. FORBES. The Japanese Prime Minister has indicated that he intends to ‘‘start 

from scratch’’ in reviewing options to relocate the U.S. Marines on Okinawa and has 

proposed a May 2010 deadline to provide a new basing proposal. What information 

can the Department of Defense provide regarding the status of negotiations in providing for a Marine Corps Air Station Futenma Replacement Facility? 

Mr. SCHIFFER. On May 28, 2010, the Security Consultative Committee (2+2) 

issued a Joint Statement reconfirming both governments’ commitment to the Realignment Roadmap, and in particular, to the establishment of a Futenma Replacement Facility in the Camp Schwab/Henoko location identified in the Roadmap. 

Mr. FORBES. A) The relocation of U.S. forces within South Korea has been postponed for several years beyond 2008. Why? 

B) Is it correct that the Yongsan portion of the relocation plan is now set for 2015? 

Are there also new dates for other elements of the relocation plan? How likely is 

it that there will be further delays beyond these dates? 

C) What defense capabilities will be gained or reduced from the relocation, and 

how will it improve or potentially hinder our ability to respond to a North Korean 

attack against the South? 

Mr. SCHIFFER. A) Both the Yongsan Relocation Plan (YRP) and the Land Partnership Plan (LPP) have been delayed due to challenges with the procurement of land 

in the Republic of Korea, slow construction of facilities, and Korean bureaucratic 

challenges that have delayed funding of projects. 

B) Yongsan Relocation Plan (YRP)- and Land Partnership Plan (LPP)-related construction projects are scheduled for completion in 2015, with relocation of forces 

scheduled to be complete in 2016. YRP relocates a majority of U.S. forces and HQ 

United Nations Command activities in and around the capital city of Seoul to U.S. 

Army Garrison Humphreys. LPP relocates and consolidates U.S. forces north of 

Seoul into areas in the south and expands infrastructure at Osan Air Base and 

Camp Mujuk. The YRP/LPP initiatives were incorporated into the Strategic Alliance 

2015 (SA 2015) plan signed by both the U.S. Secretary of Defense and the Republic 

of Korea Minister of Defense in October 2010. The progress of these initiatives, as 

well as others included in the SA 2015 plan, are tracked regularly through a series 

of governing committees to ensure milestones are effectively met. Any deviations are 

addressed by the next higher committee, and ultimately by the Secretary and Minister for adjudication if necessary. 
82 

C) The U.S. and Republic of Korea (ROK) governments reached an understanding 

to consolidate and relocate American forces stationed in the ROK onto installations 

south of the capital city, Seoul. Prior to the year 2005, the United States had 107 

installations in Korea. Once relocation is complete, the United States will utilize 49 

sites, concentrated for the most part around two enduring hubs: a southwest hub 

and a southeast hub. The southwest hub is centered on Osan Air Base and U.S. 

Army Garrison Humphreys. It will be the future centerpiece of U.S. military force 

structure in Korea. The southeast hub will include installations located in the cities 

of Daegu, Chinhae, and Busan. This hub will serve as the logistics distribution center and storage location for wartime and contingency prepositioned stocks. 

The consolidation of forces onto two enduring hubs improves warfighting capabilities in a number of ways. First, the 2nd Infantry Division and future Korea Command will be collocated at U.S. Army Garrison Humphreys, improving coordination 

and planning between staffs of the two organizations. Similarly, relocating 2nd Infantry Division to U.S. Army Garrison Humphreys consolidates the division’s subordinate units at a single location, increasing direct face-to-face contact among unit 

personnel while reducing the physical span of control and infrastructure needed to 

support the division. The unit is better postured to train and fight. 

Consolidation at two enduring hubs also enhances command and control and coordination. In addition to strengthening relationships between operational staffs of 

the 2nd Infantry Division and a future Korea Command, 2nd Infantry Division is 

better positioned to effect initial liaison and coordination during reception, staging, 

and onward movement of deploying maneuver and sustainment brigades. Early liaison and coordination sets the conditions to more reliable and effective command and 

control during later phases/stages of conflict. Positioning of the 2nd Infantry Division at U.S. Army Garrison Humphreys also improves tactical flexibility by posturing the division in a better tactical location for rapid commitment in support of 

either of the forward stationed ROK armies and corps. This position also shortens 

logistical lines during the initial phases of conflict that better postures the division 

for successful employment later. 

Consolidation also enhances the execution of noncombatant evacuation operations 

(NEO). By reducing the dispersion of transportation assets, movement times are cut. 

By separating U.S. forces from initial wartime threats such as North Korea’s longrange artillery and its ground forces threatening Seoul, the vulnerability of these 

forces is reduced and their survivability enhanced. A 2nd Infantry Division located 

at U.S. Army Garrison Humphreys will be better able to integrate follow-on maneuver and sustainment brigades while not under the fire of North Korean long-range 

artillery. This factor supports the division’s preparation for combat activities. Finally, force consolidation enhances warfighting capabilities by improving soldier 

quality of life, realization of stationing efficiencies, optimizes use of land in Korea, 

and enhances force protection and survivability. 

Mr. FORBES. The readiness posture of PACOM is negatively affected by the ongoing military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. How significant is the shortage of 

forces and equipment required to effectively deal with the broad range of security 

concerns in PACOM’s AOR? What does PACOM need to meet existing requirements? 

General ALLES. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. FORBES. On April 5, 2009, North Korea launched a Taepo-Dong-2 (TD–2) missile over Japan and on May 25, 2009, it conducted a second nuclear test. The regime 

has also kicked out inspectors and re-started its nuclear facilities. How do existing 

basing arrangements in South Korea, Japan and Guam contribute to the defense 

of South Korea? 

General ALLES. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. FORBES. The Chinese have an extensive conventional missile capacity and 

range to strike many of our existing bases. How does the Department assess the 

adequacy of the U.S. military’s capacity to withstand a Chinese air and missile assault on regional bases? How do our existing basing arrangements in South Korea, 

Japan and Guam serve to impede the growing Chinese extra-territorial ambitions? 

What steps are being pursued to further strengthen regional bases’ capacity to survive such an assault and continue or resume operation? 

General ALLES. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. FORBES. How does PACOM assess the adequacy of resources available to Department of Defense programs that seek to defend forward-deployed U.S. bases to 

include theater missile defense and early warning systems, hardened structures and 

hangers, air defense systems, and runway repair kits? 

General ALLES. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 
83 

Mr. FORBES. The U.S. agreed to draw down its troops on the Korean peninsula 

from 37,000 to 25,000, but in June 2008, DOD announced that the drawdown would 

halt at 28,500 and that level would be maintained indefinitely. What changed? If 

eventually there is a peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsula, how will this 

affect U.S. troop requirements on the peninsula? Is there a long-term rationale for 

U.S. troop presence there? 

General ALLES. U.S. Pacific Command exercises operational control over U.S. military forces assigned and allocated to it by the Secretary of Defense. In accordance 

with the Presidential decision of April 2008, the Department of Defense maintains 

an authorized end-strength of 28,500 U.S. Service members in the Republic of 

Korea. I respectfully refer the Congressman to the Office of the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Policy/Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs for further information regarding the policy background of this matter. 

U.S. force posture in the Republic of Korea is tailored to meet current U.S. security and alliance commitments. A peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsula 

would, presumably, necessitate changing U.S. force posture; however, specific force 

requirements would depend on the actual security situation and on the particular 

missions assigned to U.S. Pacific Command. 

U.S. military forces on the Korean Peninsula support the U.S.-ROK Alliance, 

whose mission is to defend the Republic of Korea through a robust and combined 

defense posture. The Alliance is vital to the interests of both nations in securing 

peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia. 

Mr. FORBES. The United States and Japan concluded an international agreement 

to move 8,000 Marines from Okinawa to Guam by 2014. The Guam Environmental 

Impact Statement (EIS) uses the 2014 date as a benchmark to complete the overall 

realignment. However, there are indications that completing the move by 2014 is 

unachievable, and Navy’s MILCON Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) supports 

completing the move beyond 2015. What is the target date to conclude the Marine 

Corps realignment to Guam and what are the principal impediments to completion? 

Secretary PFANNENSTIEL. The Record of Decision for the Guam and CNMI Military Realignment EIS indicated the Department was implementing Adaptive Program Management (APM) as a mitigation measure to ensure that Guam’s utility infrastructure is not overstressed and significant environmental impacts do not occur. 

Through the use of APM, the pace and sequencing of construction projects will be 

adjusted. As such, the construction timeline and force flow of Marine Corps units 

into Guam from Okinawa will ultimately depend upon improvements to Guam’s infrastructure capacity and proper management of environmental impacts. Investments are being made to increase infrastructure capacity by addressing improvements to utilities systems, the Port of Guam, and roadways, all of which will allow 

the construction program to ramp-up. 

We have developed an updated cost estimate and notional timeline for the Guam 

realignment and we are prepared to brief the Chairman or committee staff regarding these issues at their convenience. 

Mr. FORBES. What is the overall cost of the Marine Corps relocation from Okinawa to Guam? Does this include the expanded training capabilities that the Marine Corps is pursuing? 

Secretary PFANNENSTIEL. The Department understands Congress’s concerns regarding the total cost of the Guam realignment and is committed to providing an 

accurate picture of current costs. We have developed an updated estimate and notional timeline and have offered to brief committee staff regarding these issues. 

Mr. FORBES. How can the Department of Defense move forward with the Guam 

realignment without having resolved Guam land acquisition issues that are integral 

to the overall Marine Corps capability? If Congress provided land acquisition appropriations to support training and family housing requirements, would the Navy pursue eminent domain to acquire land? 

Secretary PFANNENSTIEL. The projects appropriated in FY–10 and FY–11 and 

those requested in FY–12 are necessary to enable subsequent construction. Waiting 

to begin military construction projects until after training range land acquisition 

issues are resolved would create a significant bottleneck in Guam’s limited construction capacity, which could ultimately result in a delay the Marines’ ability to relocate from Okinawa in fulfillment of our international agreement with Japan. 

Discussions between the Department and Guam’s leaders have enabled the DOD 

to better appreciate concerns regarding issues such as access to cultural sites and 

the expansion of DOD’s footprint. Senior DOD officials and Guam’s leaders are committed to work together to resolve such issues. The Department has committed to 

four principles for reaching a negotiated settlement for acquiring land necessary for 

the proposed training range complex: 
84 

• One Guam: Address infrastructure improvements outside the fence that are directly related to the buildup, and work with other federal agencies to identify 

solutions for addressing Guam’s needs indirectly or unrelated to the military realignment. 

• Green Guam: Develop the most energy efficient base possible and support 

Guam’s efforts to develop sustainable and renewable energy projects. 

• Unfettered Access to Pagat Village and Cave: Conduct training activities in a 

manner which will allow access to the Pagat Village and Pagat Cave historical 

sites 24 hours per day, seven days per week, as it is today. 

• Net Negative: Following the completion of the realignment, DOD will have a 

smaller footprint than it has today. This commitment will directly address concerns regarding an expanding DOD footprint on Guam. This concept is currently in the early stage of development. Studies will be conducted to determine 

if missions can be relocated and assess any potentially underutilized properties. 

As a result of these discussions with Guam’s leaders, the Governor of Guam has 

stated publicly his willingness to discuss land use issues with the Department and 

we believe that we will be able to reach a negotiated agreement. We will continue 

to have discussions with the Governor and Guam Legislature with a goal of being 

ready to commence formal land negotiations once appropriate Congressional approval for land acquisition has been received. The Department will continue to update the Congress on land use matters and the status of informal discussions with 

the Government of Guam. The Navy position is and remains, that we seek agreement with landowners on the fair market value for the land, using existing authorities and processes, and thus the use of eminent domain will not be necessary. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. BORDALLO 

Ms. BORDALLO. The Civil-Military Coordination Council was established to implement Adaptive Program Management (APM) on Guam; however there is still a lack 

of common understanding of APM’s specific meaning for the build-up. What role do 

you see APM and the CMCC playing as the Relocation moves forward? From my 

understanding, the build-up is not the first time APM has been used however; its 

short timeline differs from previous federal projects. If a project related to the buildup is causing significant environmental impacts, how will the DOD adequately 

adapt given the short timeframe for the build-up? 

‘‘Adaptive’’ means you will be using data to adjust, can you tell me how the DOD 

will be monitoring and collecting new data as projects move forward? If you are not 

collecting new data, how can you prevent any unforeseen environmental impacts? 

Can you detail what efforts are being taken to develop specific metrics that will help 

decision makers in the CMCC ensure the build-up does not overly burden the local 

Guam community? To what extent is the Government of Guam integrated into the 

development of these metrics? 

Secretary PFANNENSTIEL. Adaptive Program Management (APM) is a mitigation 

measure designed to keep the military construction effort within the infrastructure 

capabilities on Guam. With implementation of APM, DOD would evaluate infrastructure capacity/limitations and adjust the tempo and sequencing of construction 

activities accordingly. This would result in adjustments to the growth in the workforce population so as to not overwhelm Guam’s utilities, port, roadways and other 

systems, and ultimately can result in a stretched out timeline for implementing the 

buildup. The Record of Decision for the Guam/CNMI Military Realignment included 

an initial operating charter for a Civil Military Coordination Council (CMCC). The 

CMCC, comprised of military, federal agency, and Government of Guam representatives, will assist in implementing APM. The focus of the Council will be to coordinate military, public, and private construction activity conducted during the military 

realignment effort. It will develop recommendations on how to integrate future DOD 

construction activity and other actions undertaken by Guam or federal agencies associated with the military realignment to avoid or reduce the potential adverse impacts on Guam’s environment, infrastructure, public agencies, and the public at 

large. Efforts continue to finalize the CMCC charter. 

Two possible actions could result from a finding that significant impacts may 

occur in the future: 1) change the pace of construction (i.e. contract awards or construction start dates, and/or 2) modify the sequence of construction projects. Decisions regarding the pace and sequencing of construction remain with each participating organization as dictated by existing roles and authorities. 

The CMCC is comprised of multiple working groups responsible for developing 

metrics, thresholds, and trigger points that can inform decision-making regarding 
85 

the implementation of APM. The working groups will exhaust all available sources 

for relevant data including reports, surveys, ongoing projects and similar sources 

generated by local, federal and other organizations. 

The Government of Guam is an integral participant in the CMCC with the Guam 

Buildup Office serving as the primary point of contact. As many as ten executive 

agencies, the University of Guam and representatives from several legislative offices 

continue to participate in workshops, organizational and planning meetings. As the 

need arises, DOD anticipates a dynamic environment in which other working groups 

and Guam agencies may join the effort. 

Ms. BORDALLO. The Secretary of Defense laid out a framework of pillars for the 

development on Guam to accommodate the movement of Marines from Okinawa. 

The ‘‘Net Negative’’ pillar implies that the Department of Defense will have less 

land overall on the island of Guam after the buildup is complete than when it 

began. My question is whether or not that footprint would include leased lands 

under that plan? In other words, does DOD consider leased lands towards their 

overall footprint? Will leased land be factored in to the overall ‘‘Net Negative’’ sum? 

Secretary PFANNENSTIEL. As stated by Under Secretary Work, the Department 

understands the Guam community’s concerns regarding the amount of land controlled by DOD. In response, we have committed to the Net Negative concept, which 

means that at the completion of the military buildup DOD will have a smaller footprint that it currently has today. If property is reserved for military use, and therefore unavailable for the public, we would consider that property to be part of our 

inventory regardless of the method of acquisition. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. PALAZZO 

Mr. PALAZZO. I represent South Mississippi, a heavy military district where all 

branches of service are represented. My district has also seen its share of devastation due to natural disasters, most memorably Hurricane Katrina. Last week we 

saw another example of the destructive power of Mother Nature as Japan was hit 

by a major earthquake followed by a devastating tsunami. 

1. Almost exactly one year ago, in his testimony before the Senate Armed Services 

Committee, Admiral Willard mentioned that ‘‘In the Asia-Pacific, we respond to natural disasters about every 60 days.’’ Following the recent devastation in Japan, 

could you comment on our military’s readiness to respond to natural disasters in 

the Pacific at this point? 

Mr. SCHIFFER. 1. The United States Armed Forces are ready. We maintain the 

capabilities necessary to respond to the full range of contingencies that may occur 

in the region whether they are natural or man-made. In addition to being welltrained and highly capable, when it comes to military readiness, there is no substitute to being forward deployed. Our highly capable forces have a history of rapid 

response and have been present on the scene after some of the most devastating 

natural disasters to hit the Asia-Pacific region. After the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, the 2008 Cyclone Nargis in Burma, the 2009 Typhoon that hit the Philippines, the 2010 Typhoon Fanapi that struck Taiwan, and most recently the earthquake, Tsunami, and nuclear crisis in Japan, our forces have shown an ability—unmatched in the region or elsewhere—to respond to these crises and help to save 

lives. 

Following the 11 March earthquake and tsunami in Japan, we launched Operation TOMODACHI, which enabled us to provide support to the Japanese Government and people. We provided continuous airlift, delivering goods and services to 

remote, hard to reach, devastated areas in the northern part of Japan most affected 

by the quake. To respond to challenges posed by the nuclear crisis, we deployed an 

Incident Response Force (IRF), comprised of personnel specifically trained to operate 

in contaminated environments. The IRF provided a rapid response capability as well 

as capabilities for monitoring support for agent detection and identification; casualty 

search, rescue, and personnel decontamination; and emergency medical care and 

stabilization of contaminated personnel. 

Our experience in Operation TOMODACHI underscores the importance of being 

forward deployed in the region and the value of partner capacity building as an integral part of our theater security cooperation activities with all of our regional allies 

and partners. This serves not only to enhance the preparedness of partner forces, 

but also the readiness of our own. 

Mr. PALAZZO. 2. Do you feel that this high rate of humanitarian missions, particularly in the Pacific, is hurting our readiness to respond or plan for other, more traditional threats in the region? 
86 

Mr. SCHIFFER. 2. The high operations tempo of our humanitarian response missions has not diminished our readiness. Quite the contrary, through these operations, we are able to conduct critical training of our forces in real-world scenarios 

that allow us to exercise command and control and interoperability. The Department of Defense maintains a high-level of readiness to respond to an array of 21st 

century threats and challenges. As the first decade of the 21st century taught us, 

the United States Armed Forces must remain prepared to address threats that 

range from the impacts of climate change on the environment to the dangers posed 

by global terrorism and piracy. And wherever traditional threats may linger, such 

as in the case of North Korea, we must remain forward deployed and maintain our 

capabilities, while bolstering those of our allies and partners. 

Mr. PALAZZO. 3. Who pays for these humanitarian responses? 

Mr. SCHIFFER. 3. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) is the 

lead federal agency for foreign disaster assistance and is appropriated funding to 

support these efforts. The Department of Defense may be asked to support USAID 

in providing foreign disaster relief, which is funded through the Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA) appropriation. Through OHDACA, DOD 

was able to respond to Japan’s earthquake and resulting tsunami; U.S. forces supported U.S. operations to assist Japan with airlift support, at-sea search and rescue, 

and the provision of relief commodities. 

Mr. PALAZZO. 4. What Asia-Pacific countries concern you most at this point and 

where are we lacking to respond (equipment, technology, manpower, money) to realistic threats from potential hot spots in the region? 

Mr. SCHIFFER. 4. Within Northeast Asia, the United States has concerns about 

North Korea. In the last 12 months, North Korea has attacked and sunk a ROK 

naval vessel, killing 46 sailors; publicly revealed a uranium enrichment program in 

contravention of multiple UN Security Council Resolutions; and launched an artillery attack that killed both Republic of Korea (ROK) Marines and civilians. These 

are examples of the type of destabilizing actions of concern to the United States and 

reasons why we need a forward-deployed presence in the Asia-Pacific area. 

The United States also continues to have concerns about China’s military modernization program. As China’s economy has grown, it has understandably invested 

in its military. However, the United States continues to have concerns about the 

lack of transparency from China regarding its capabilities and its intentions. This 

is something we discuss with the PRC regularly, and on which we hope to see continuing progress over time. 

There are a range of non-traditional security threats in Asia that also concern the 

United States. These include proliferation prevention, countering the impacts of climate change, and, as we have seen most recently in Japan, responding to disasters. 

As we plan and prepare for a range of possible uses of the U.S. Armed Forces, 

we have worked—and will continue to work—with our regional Allies and partners 

to maintain peace and ensure stability throughout Asia. For example, we intend to 

enhance our forward presence in the Pacific as it is a critical region to long-term 

U.S. economic security. We are investing in base resiliency to protect critical infrastructure and also developing new concepts of operation for how we will project 

power when challenged by emerging capabilities in the future. 

We will continue working with Japan to implement the bilateral Realignment 

Roadmap and relocate 8,000 Marines from Okinawa to Guam in order to offer strategic flexibility, enhance contingency response capabilities, and improve peacetime 

engagement. 

We will enhance the readiness of our forces in Korea with Tour Normalization. 

This initiative will further our long-term commitment to provide greater stability for 

forward-stationed service members and their families. We will also continue transition of wartime operational control to South Korea in December 2015. The ROK and 

the United States will establish separate, complementary national commands consistent with the ROK–U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty and focused on the defense of 

the ROK. 

Mr. PALAZZO. 5. If we were to face a threat from China, would it be more beneficial for our marines to be in Japan or Guam? 

Mr. SCHIFFER. 5. Our bases across Asia, including in Japan and in Guam as well 

as our rotational forces and ship deployments, contribute to a U.S. defense posture 

in Asia that is becoming more geographically distributed, operationally resilient, 

and politically sustainable. In addition to being well-trained and highly capable, 

when it comes to military readiness there is no substitute to being forward deployed. There should be no mistaking the importance of U.S. military power as one 

of the essential elements of our strategy for protecting our national interests in the 

Asia-Pacific region. 
87 

Our realignment agreement with Japan is intended to ensure a stable basing arrangement for our U.S. Forces in Japan, while at the same time addressing longstanding local concerns about a substantial presence in the relatively small island 

of Okinawa. Relocating a portion of the Marines to Guam helps ensure that we meet 

objectives while retaining capable and sustainable posture. 

Guam is becoming a strategic hub for our presence in Asia, helping to ensure the 

resiliency and geographical distribution that we seek. Our Marine Forces will be 

configured in the most operationally effective manner consistent with our commitments to our partners and allies in the region. 

The Department of Defense evaluates our global posture on an ongoing basis to 

position our forces most effectively to maintain deterrence and contingency response 

capabilities, and to shape the security environment in ways that best strengthen 

stability, peace, and prosperity for the region. 

Mr. PALAZZO. 6. Do you believe that Japan wants us to demobilize our Marines? 

Mr. SCHIFFER. 6. I believe the Government of Japan recognizes the importance of 

the US–Japan Mutual Defense Treaty to the security of Japan, and the critical contribution of the forward-stationed US Marine Corps forces to fulfilling that commitment. Senior Japanese leaders, including Prime Minister Kan, have in the last six 

months made several public statements regarding the central importance of the U.S. 

force presence in Japan to regional stability and the defense of our nation. They recognize that the Marines provide an essential element of that presence. The capabilities and responsiveness of the Marines forward-deployed to Japan was highlighted 

to the Japanese public by their high-profile in the response effort following the 11 

March earthquake and tsunami. 

Even after the movement of some Marines to Guam, the realignment agreement 

with Japan will keep approximately 10,000 Marines on Okinawa, and another 3,500 

Marines on mainland Japan. 

A true sign of the value Government of Japan places on the Marine Corps is their 

willingness to fund nearly $3 billion towards the construction of some of the facilities on U.S. territory, in Guam, for the exclusive use of the Marines. As then Defense Minister Ono explained at the time of the agreement, doing so helps to ‘‘maintain the deterrence, while reducing the burden.’’ 

The Government of Japan has also committed to providing an additional $3 billion 

in financing for utility improvements on Guam and family housing for Marines. 

Mr. PALAZZO. 7. In 2009 the U.S. imported over 220 bilion dollars in goods from 

China, over double the imports of any other western nation. Do you believe that this 

U.S. consumer behavior is actually fueling China’s military buildup? 

Mr. SCHIFFER. 7. China’s leaders can draw from a diverse range of sources to support PLA modernization, including: domestic defense investments, indigenous defense industrial development, a growing research and development and science and 

technology base, dual-use technologies, and foreign technology acquisition. Although 

the United States currently imports more in goods from China than China imports 

from the United States, China has committed to expanding its domestic consumption and imports in order to promote a more balanced trade relationship with the 

United States. 

Mr. PALAZZO. I represent South Mississippi, a heavy military district where all 

branches of service are represented. My district has also seen its share of devastation due to natural disasters, most memorably Hurricane Katrina. Last week we 

saw another example of the destructive power of Mother Nature as Japan was hit 

by a major earthquake followed by a devastating tsunami. 

1. Almost exactly one year ago, in his testimony before the Senate Armed Services 

Committee, Admiral Willard mentioned that ‘‘In the Asia-Pacific, we respond to natural disasters about every 60 days.’’ Following the recent devastation in Japan, 

could you comment on our military’s readiness to respond to natural disasters in 

the Pacific at this point? 

General ALLES. USPACOM is able to respond to natural disasters through detailed understanding of the region and potential requests through the following: 1) 

Understanding the regional perspective, 2) Joint response, 3) Force availability, and 

finally understanding of funding to support Host Nation requests, military response, 

and return to Host Nation, Non Governmental Organizations, and other efforts upon 

our exit. 

1. Regional Perspective: USPACOM is divided into 4 regions: Northeast Asia, Central Asia, Southeast Asia, and South Asia. Northeast Asia: North Korea and potential need for FHA/HADR may arise from natural or manmade disasters. Disaster 

in this affected state would cause great concern because of ability to interact, visibility, and other concerns that naturally arise. Central Asia: China. Although disasters in China have occurred since 2009, access is limited and typical requests are 
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in the form of funding or spare parts for military hardware. Southeast Asia: We 

have seen significant improvement within the Philippines and their ability to respond to FHA. Additional support is still required for Indonesia, but access is not 

always guaranteed, granted, or requested. As seen in 2007, Burma and associated 

relief is problematic. Lastly, South Asia: Concern and planning has been focused on 

the Government of Nepal (GON) due to its geographical isolation and recent predicative earthquake models that suggest potential earthquake on the scale of Haiti 

2010. Just recently, USPACOM has concluded strategic and operational level planning to address these concerns. 

Refinements are being made through tactical planning to best support GON and 

help mitigate potential disaster through leveraging regional neighbors, international 

and non-governmental organizations, and United Nations support. In summary, 

countries that have adversarial relationships with USG are the most problematic to 

support and provide FHA and HA/DR. 

2. Joint Response: USPACOM forces are capable through joint effort and unity of 

command to execute Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA)/Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HADR) from the strategic to tactical level. Natural disasters 

that occur in our Area of Responsibility (AOR) are frequent, but PACOM readiness 

is not adversely affected. Although FHA/HADR is not a trained military skill set, 

it is inherent to all the services. To mitigate strain on force readiness, USPACOM 

employs a variety of forces ‘‘tailored’’ for response related to the scope of the disaster. 

Common to all disaster response from USPACOM are the following: Command 

and Control, tailored forces, legal authorities, funding, and ability to effectively/efficiently transfer response to appropriate Host Nation, International Organizations, 

or Non Government Organizations. 

Operations such as TOMODACHI are unique. The Japan Disaster of March 2011 

incorporated an earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear disaster and increased the aperture for response and need to best support our alliance with Japan. Operation 

TOMODACHI incorporated FHA, Foreign Consequence Management (FCM), and 

Department of State (DOS) Voluntary Authorized Departure (VAD). In each case 

USPACOM forces were prepared, able to quickly respond and adapt to the natural 

and manmade disaster, while bolstering and strengthening our alliance with Japan. 

3. Force Availability: FHA and HA/DR are inherent to USPACOM forces. As stated, although FHA and HA/DR skills are not a skill set specifically trained by the 

services, our subordinate units understand the importance and strategic implications to respond with accuracy, effectiveness, and compassion to the Host Nation 

(RN) affected. Additionally, our response within our AOR signifies to our Allies and 

Partners our commitment to the region. Conversely, our response in the AOR 

leverages our potential adversaries and provides strong strategic communication 

throughout the region. In short, we do not just respond with ‘‘monetary’’ assistance, 

if requested, we provided a tailorable and scalable joint force to support the affected 

host nation, thus improving our position and alliances within the AOR. 

4. Funding: With respect to monetary assistance, Humanitarian Responses are 

paid for through USAID/OFDA. The Host Nation (RN) must request DOD support 

through the Ambassador or American Embassy. Upon approval and request of DOD 

forces from DOS, funding for HA/DR or FHA commences. Caveat: DOD forces may 

initiate crisis response and HA/DR or FHA with a 72 hour Vocal Command, 

IOT safeguard lives, alleviate human suffering, and mitigate great property 

damage. 

Simultaneously, as funding is being approved and adjudicated, the Disaster Response Team (DART) from DOS or military equivalent may be vectored to the HN 

IOT to provide initial assessment, scope of the disaster, and potential cost. As first 

responders work under the first 72 hours, additional authorities and funding must 

be approved by USAID/OFDA and OSD. The funding approved outlines the military 

support that will be provided by the USPACOM to the Host Nation. Typically, funding will support helicopter lift, food, water, shelter, and other consumable items. 

Modification of funding may be requested if the disaster warrants. As funding dissipates, USPACOM anticipates departure of tailored forces and enables transfer 

back to the Host Nation or Non Governmental Organizations or other efforts IOT 

for our forces to reset the force posture and prepare for other potential crisis or contingencies. 

Mr. PALAZZO. 2. Do you feel that this high rate of humanitarian missions, particularly in the Pacific, is hurting our readiness to respond or plan for other, more traditional threats in the region? 

General ALLES. The recovery effort in Japan was a first-class effort which underscored the United States’ commitment to Japan, one of our most important regional 
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allies. United States Pacific Command (USPACOM), with help from the United 

States Interagency, was able to provide humanitarian assistance to Japan without 

impacting our capability to support other potential operations or contingencies. The 

Japan Self Defense Force’s (JSDF) ability to quickly respond to the disaster and integrate U.S. Force support into its efforts was impressive. U.S. assistance and assets 

were vital to the rapid and successful implementation of disaster response measures, the voluntary departure of American Citizens and the timely and effective execution of nuclear response and cleanup procedures. This disaster, and the effective 

coordination of relief efforts between USPACOM, the United States Government 

and the Government of Japan, provided a valuable platform for us to exercise our 

rapid response capability for emergencies and disasters and to improve bilateral 

processes with a key ally, Japan. Throughout Operation TOMODACHI, USPACOM 

had the ability to quickly redirect forces, if required, to other areas in the Pacific. 

Absent a large on-going crisis in the Pacific Area of Operations, USPACOM is positioned to accomplish a variety of humanitarian operations without having an immediate, adverse effect on its readiness to respond to or plan for traditional threats 

in the region. 

Mr. PALAZZO. 3. Who pays for these humanitarian responses? 

General ALLES. USD (P) is the primary stakeholder in DOD for humanitarian response with USG HA/DR issues primarily managed by USAID. Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA) funding as approved by USD (P) is utilized to support incremental costs associated with military humanitarian assistance 

operations. 

Mr. PALAZZO. 4. What Asia-Pacific countries concern you most at this point and 

where are we lacking to respond (equipment, technology, manpower, money) to realistic threats from potential hot spots in the region? 

General ALLES. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. PALAZZO. 5. If we were to face a threat from China, would it be more beneficial for our marines to be in Japan or Guam? 

General ALLES. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. PALAZZO. 6. Do you believe that Japan wants us to demobilize our Marines? 

General ALLES. The Marines that participated in the rescue and relief efforts following the earthquake and the resulting tsunami and nuclear incident have returned to their normal duties. Their ability to react swiftly following these events 

was a direct result of being forward based in Japan. Local reaction to the efforts 

of the Marines, and all the participating members of our other services in Operation 

TOMODACHI, was overwhelmingly positive. While there will always be opponents 

to the forward basing of our forces, this event provided a tangible domestic example 

of the value of our forward military presence in Japan and highlighted the strength 

of our alliance. The Government of Japan strongly supports the presence of U.S. 

military forces in Japan and their commitment to the defense of their homeland and 

our fulfillment of obligations under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. 

Mr. PALAZZO. 7. In 2009 the U.S. imported over 220 bilion dollars in goods from 

China, over double the imports of any other western nation. Do you believe that this 

U.S. consumer behavior is actually fueling China’s military buildup? 

General ALLES. This is not PACOM’s area of expertise. I would defer to the U.S. 

Treasury or Department of Commerce for response. 

Mr. PALAZZO. 1. Do you believe that Japan wants us to demobilize our Marines? 

Secretary PFANNENSTIEL. United States Pacific Command (US PACOM) is the appropriate organization to respond to questions about military strategy in the AsianPacific region. 

Mr. PALAZZO. 2. If we were to face a threat from China, would it be more beneficial for our marines to be in Japan or Guam? 

Secretary PFANNENSTIEL. United States Pacific Command (US PACOM) is the appropriate organization to respond to questions about strategic military capabilities 

in the Asian-Pacific region. 

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