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H.R. 3197, SECURITY HANDLING OF

AMMONIUM NITRATE

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON PREVENTION OF 

NUCLEAR AND BIOLOGICAL ATTACK

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

DECEMBER 14, 2005

Serial No. 109–59

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

PETER T. KING, New York, Chairman 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas 

CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut 

JOHN LINDER, Georgia 

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana 

TOM DAVIS, Virginia 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

JIM GIBBONS, Nevada 

ROB SIMMONS, Connecticut 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

STEVAN PEARCE, New Mexico 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

BOBBY JINDAL, Louisiana 

DAVE G. REICHERT, Washington 

MICHAEL MCCAUL, Texas 

CHARLIE DENT, Pennsylvania 

GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

JANE HARMAN, California 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

NITA M. LOWEY, New York 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON-LEE, Texas 

BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey 

DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, U.S. Virgin Islands 

BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida

SUBCOMMITTEE ON PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR AND BIOLOGICAL 

ATTACK

JOHN LINDER, Georgia, Chairman 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

JIM GIBBONS, Nevada 

ROB SIMMONS, Connecticut 

BOBBY JINDAL, Louisiana 

CHARLIE DENT, Pennsylvania 

PETER T. KING, New York (Ex Officio) 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

JANE HARMAN, California 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, U.S. Virgin Islands 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (Ex Officio)

(II) 
(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page 

STATEMENTS

The Honorable John Linder, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Georgia, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Prevention of Nuclear and 

Biological Attack .................................................................................................. 1

The Honorable James R. Langevin, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Rhode Island, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Prevention 

of Nuclear and Biological Attack ........................................................................ 13

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland 

Security ................................................................................................................. 71

The Honorable Donna M. Christensen, a Delegate in Congress From the 

Virgin Islands ....................................................................................................... 70

The Honorable Charlie Dent, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Pennsylvania .................................................................................................... 69

The Honorable Eleanor Holmes Norton, a Delegate in Congress From the 

District of Columbia ............................................................................................. 72

The Honorable Rob Simmons, a Representative in Congresss From the State 

of Connecticut ....................................................................................................... 70

The Honorable Curt Weldon, a Representative in Congress From the State 

if Pennsylvania ..................................................................................................... 38 

WITNESSES

Mr. Gary W. Black, President, Georgia Agribusiness Council, Inc.: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 54

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 56

Mr. James W. McMahon, Director, New York State Office of Homeland 

Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 51

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 52

Mr. William Paul O’Neill, Jr., President, International Raw Materials: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 59

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 61

Dr. Jimmie C. Oxley, Professor of Chemistry, University of Rhode Island: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 39

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 40

Mr. Carl Wallace, Plant Manager, Terra Mississippi Nitrogen, Inc.: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 63

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 65

(1)

H.R. 3197, SECURITY HANDLING OF 

AMMONIUM NITRATE ACT OF 2005 

Wednesday, December 14, 2005

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR AND

BIOLOGICAL ATTACK, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in Room 

2237, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. John Linder [chairman 

of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Linder, Simmons, Dent, Weldon, 

Langevin, Norton, Christensen and Thompson (Ex Officio). 

Mr. LINDER. The subcommittee will come to order. 

The Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on Prevention of Nuclear and Biological Attack is here today to hear testimony on H.R. 3197, the Secure Handling of Ammonium Nitrate Act 

of 2005. 

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Mr. LINDER. I would like to thank and welcome our witnesses for 

appearing before the subcommittee today. 

On April 19th, 1995, the world looked in horror at the images of 

the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, which 

was destroyed when nearly 5,000 pounds of ammonium nitrate, 

mixed with motor fuel, was delivered in a rental truck and detonated in the building’s parking lot. On that day, 167 lives, including the lives of 19 children at the building’s daycare facility, were 

lost in what was at the time the worst terrorist attack on American 

soil. 

The ammonium nitrate used in that attack is an inexpensive and 

easily accessible fertilizer used around the world and is very popular with farmers due to its high nitrogen content. In fact, 2.7 million tons of agricultural ammonium nitrate alone was traded internationally in 2001. It is also utilized as an explosive agent by miners looking to blast coal out of rock. Ammonium nitrate is also 

used, unfortunately, as a popular compound for terrorist bombings, 

including Oklahoma City, the 1998 East African Embassy bombings, the November, 2003, bombings in Istanbul, Turkey, and was 

suspected in the October, 2002, Bali bombing. 

Countries with histories of terrorism, including the Philippines, 

Colombia and Ireland, have banned the use of ammonium nitrate 

completely. A number of European Union countries have either 

banned or restricted its use. Turkey joined the EU in regulating 

sales of ammonium nitrate in 2004 in the wake of ammonium nitrate bombings there. 

There appears to be no doubt as well in the minds of Australian 

officials in the wake of the Bali bombings and the bombing of the 

Australian embassy in Jakarta that if al-Qa’ida were able to acquire and deploy any weapon to cause mass devastation it would 

do so. Considering this, they have also agreed to place restrictions 

on ammonium nitrate fertilizers within Australian borders. 

Here at home, New York, New Jersey, Michigan, Oklahoma, 

South Carolina, California and Nevada have implemented their 

own regulations of ammonium nitrate. 

Ten years after Oklahoma City, however, the United States Government has done little to prevent the repeat of this horrific tragedy. It is still too easy to acquire ammonium nitrate for terrorist 

use in this country. 

Later today, the subcommittee will mark up H.R. 3197, the Secure Handling of Ammonium Nitrate Act of 2005, which authorizes 

the Secretary of Homeland Security to regulate the purchase of ammonium nitrate by registering sellers and buyers of this potentially 

dangerous material. This represent the first serious effort on the 

part of the Federal Government to prevent future attacks of this 

nature on the American people. 

I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses on the implications of this regulation, whether they agree that we should regulate 

ammonium nitrate fertilizer and whether this bill represents a 

positive step to our preventing future terrorist acts. 

I am hopeful that these and other questions will be answered as 

we review this important U.S. homeland security issue; and I yield 

to my friend from Rhode Island, the ranking member of the subcommittee, Mr. Langevin. 
13

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Chairman Linder. 

I would like to take this opportunity to welcome our panel. I look 

forward to their input on the legislation that is before us today. 

In particular, I am pleased that Dr. Jimmie Oxley is among our 

distinguished witnesses this morning. Dr. Oxley is not only a 

world-renowned explosives expert but a very well regarded chemistry professor at the University of Rhode Island, an institution 

that I have the great privilege of representing in Congress. Welcome, Dr. Oxley. 

I have had the opportunity to visit Dr. Oxley in her lab to learn 

about the land mine detection technology research that she is undertaking through the URI forensic science partnership. Certainly 

she is an asset to URI, and I know that she is going to be a great 

asset to today’s hearing as well. 

To many of us, the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing was our first 

introduction to the devastating impact ammonium nitrate can have 

in the hands of a terrorist. Since that time, fertilizer bombs have 

been used to deadly effect, in 2002, by the Islamic group linked to 

al-Qa’ida outside the nightclub in Bali, Indonesia, and in 2003 by 

an al-Qa’ida cell in Istanbul, Turkey. 

The risks that ammonium nitrate-based fertilizer, so critical to 

the agricultural operation of many of our Nation’s farmers, will be 

used by a terrorist in an improvised explosive device must be confronted and reduced. 

A June, 2005, analysis conducted by Syracuse University’s Institute for National Security and Counterterrorism makes clear why 

Federal leadership is so vital. The authors of this report, entitled 

Legal Controls on Explosive Materials, found that only four 

States—Nevada, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and New Jersey—had 

established security regulations for ammonium nitrate. 

Mr. Chairman, with your permission I would like to ask that we 

include that report in the record. 

Mr. LINDER. Without objection. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. 

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Mr. LANGEVIN. Since the time of the report, New York, California, and Michigan, have passed ammonium nitrate laws of their 

own. 

I look forward to hearing from Mr. McMahon, New York’s homeland security director, how the rollout of New York’s law is going; 

and I understand that it took effect on November 30th. 

While I commend these States for taking the initiative, I cannot 

help but think that the job of securing ammonium nitrate should 

be a Federal concern. Specifically, I believe it could be a Department of Homeland Security concern. It is my understanding that 

the legislation that will soon be considered in the committee, H.R. 

3197, puts the Department in charge of this effort to ensure that 

ammonium nitrate is still available to farmers, even as we try to 

keep it away from terrorists. I think that is important. 

I commend Ranking Member Thompson as well as Mr. Weldon 

for authoring this legislation. I certainly look forward to hearing 

the testimony of our witnesses. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. LINDER. Thank you. 

The Chair will now recognize the gentleman from Pennsylvania 

for an introduction. 

Mr. WELDON. I thank the distinguished chairman and ranking 

member for this hearing and mark-up. 

It gives me great pleasure to introduce a constituent of mine who 

actually brought this issue in legislative form to me. It is rare that 

an industry group brings an issue to Congress for regulation. In 

this case, it was an industry who did exactly that. 

I have a special interest in this issue, because a year after the 

Murrah Building bombing I chaired a hearing where the lead witness was Chief Morris. Chief morris is the fire chief of Oklahoma 

City and a personal friend of mine, and Chief Morris give us the 

lessons that he learned and the need for us to support people like 

the Oklahoma City Fire Department to respond to disasters like 

the one that occurred with the Murrah Building. 

So I was very happy when Tip O’Neill came to me and said, 

Curt, we have got an area that the industry will support, an issue 

that needs to be dealt with at the Federal level. Tip is a personal 

friend of mine. He is an international fertilizer business leader, a 

member of the Fertilizer Institute. He is a Wharton School grad 

from the University of Pennsylvania and is also a graduate and 

was an instructor for the U.S. Army Artillery Officers Candidate 

School, and he served as executive officer of an artillery battery in 

Vietnam. 

Tip is a distinguished American, in my opinion hero and role 

model. And so, Tip, I want to thank you personally and let you 

know that we are pleased that you brought this to our attention; 

and I know with John’s leadership and Bennie’s support and Jim’s 

support, we will move this legislation quickly in the Congress. 

Thank you. 

Mr. LINDER. Thank you. 

Our guests today are Dr. Jimmie Oxley, a professor of Chemistry 

at the University of Rhode Island and a recognized expert in explosives. She has worked with the FBI simulating the 1993 actions. 

I want to thank Professor Oxley. 
39

Mr. James McMahon is the Director of the New York State Office 

of Homeland Security, which was created after the attacks of September 11th and charged with coordinating and enhancing anti-terrorist efforts. 

Gary Black is President of Georgia Agribusiness Council, the 

State’s trade association for the entire food and fiber industry. He 

also serves as the Chairman of the Economic Development Committee on the Governor’s Rural Development Council. He is also a 

friend of too many years and hopefully will be the next commissioner of agriculture in Georgia a year from today. 

Mr. William O’Neill, Tip O’Neill, a name we well know, is a 

member of the Agriculture Retailers Association Board of Directors 

and President of International Raw Materials Limited in Pennsylvania. 

Carl Wallace is a Plant Manager of Terra Mississippi Nitrogen, 

Inc. He is testifying on behalf of The Fertilizer Institute. Thank 

you, Mr. Wallace. 

Mr. LINDER. Dr. Oxley— Ms. Oxley, please proceed. 

STATEMENT OF DR. JIMMIE C. OXLEY 

Ms. OXLEY. Thank you for that kind introduction and for the opportunity to speak to you today. I am a Professor of Chemistry at 

the University of Rhode Island, and I have been working with explosives for almost 20 years, starting with ammonium nitrate, and 

that is one of the few that I have been able to study through detonations on the ton scale. 

Let me make a few remarks about explosives. One of the hardest 

problems I have is looking at a chemical and predicting whether it 

will be explosive or not. The requirements to be an explosive is that 

the material must release gas and heat very rapidly when initiated. It is that ‘‘very rapidly’’ that is hard to predict. 

DOT has regulations that say if a material has certain groups 

like NO2 in it and releases a certain amount of heat, then you 

must go through Series 1 testing. Series 1 testing is now codified 

in a U.N. book on how to do the testing. But because you cannot 

make tons of a new material safely, you test on a couple of pounds 

scale and therefore many materials pass on the pound scale that 

would not pass on the ton scale. That is simply a fact. The ammonium nitrate test is not a nonexplosive. 

Now in terms of this legislation, I think we need to consider 

availability. Terrorists use the material that is available. In the 

U.S. and in Ireland, ammonium nitrate is available. Many other 

parts of the world, for example, Israel, where solid ammonium nitrate is not allowed for sale, the terrorists use urea nitrate; and indeed in World Trade 1, in 1993, you saw urea nitrate used. You 

saw the millennium bomber in 1999 attempt to use urea nitrate 

bombs. Shining Path in Peru, urea nitrate. Bali bomb, sodium chlorate. It depends on the availability in the region. 

So one of my recommendations to you is if you stop and restrict 

ammonium nitrate, think ahead to where the terrorists and criminals are going to be going next. By thinking ahead to that, I mean, 

think about materials that are available in large quantities. We are 

not worried about small bombs. Indeed, materials like ammonium 

nitrate for fuel oil or ammonium nitrate sugar, which is what the 
40

1 dstl is a British government at Fort Halsed—Defense Science and Technology Laboratory. 

Irish Republican Army was using, are so insensitive that you really 

cannot make small bombs effectively with them. 

People do not make briefcase bombs with ANFO. They use military explosives for that. They make truck or car bombs. So you are 

interested in ton scale. 

I suggest that on the legislation you have a lower quantity limit 

simply to facilitate seeing the data of what you are really interested in, which is where thousands of pounds are going, or hundreds of pounds. But certainly you are not interested in the pound 

scale on this material. It would take an incredible effort to make 

any kind of effective bomb. 

The British in their legislation have written one ton. Their legislation governs one ton or more for straight ammonium nitrate and 

for the 28 percent of regulated materials, 50 ton. So that is how 

they are handling quantity. 

And while I mention that, I should suggest that consulting the 

international arena that is also dealing with this project would be 

worthwhile. I have been working with the British on their inerting 

project since 1995. 

In mentioning the problem with testing, I am certainly not suggesting that we have to test all materials on the one-ton scale, but 

what we need to do is to find some methodology that allows us to 

tell on the small scale what is happening on the large scale. 

One of the stories I like to tell comes from World War II where 

a famous chemist said, give me enough peanut butter, and I will 

blow up the world. And I like to add to that, but Skippy never 

funded that research. His point was, size matters. And that is important. 

The last comment I understand has been fixed in markup, is to 

make sure that your regulation is exempting explosive grade ammonium nitrate, because that is already more strictly regulated at 

the present time. Thank you. 

Mr. LINDER. Thank you very much, Dr. Oxley. 

[The statement of Ms. Oxley follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. JIMMIE C. OXLEY

ABOUT THE AUTHOR 

Dr. Oxley is Professor of Chemistry at the University of Rhode Island. Her field 

of research is the study of explosives and other energetic materials. She has studied 

the behavior of most explosives, but ammonium nitrate (AN) she has examined from 

the milligram to the ton scale. Dr. Oxley has worked with various military laboratories and law enforcement agencies in the U.S. Over the last decade, she has 

worked with the British Forensic Explosive Laboratory (dstl) 1 on projects ranging 

from attempts to inert ammonium nitrate to those examining ways to enhance its 

explosive potential. 

GENERAL COMMENTS ON CHEMICAL EXPLOSIVITY 

For a chemical to be an explosive it must undergo a rapid, self-contained, chemical reaction that releases energy and heat. Most explosives achieve this by oxidation. Oxidation produces heat and gas, generally carbon dioxide or monoxide and 

water. The detonation gases do the work of an explosive. Explosive power comes 

from the rapidity of the reaction that supports the detonation wave. Although burning is also oxidation resulting in heat and gas, the reaction is too slow to create a 

detonation wave. Explosives can sustain rapid oxidation because they contain their 

own oxygen—either as part of the molecule, as in military explosives (TNT, RDX, 
41

2TNT 2,4,6-trinitrotoluene; AN ammonium nitrate; PETN pentaerythritol tetranitrate; HMX 

octahydro-1,3,5,7,-tetranitro-1,3,4,5-tetrazocine; RDX hexahydro-1,3,5-trinitro-s-triazine; HMTD 

hexamethylene triperoxide diamine; TATP triacetone triperoxide. RDX is the active ingredient 

in C4; PETN is the active ingredient in sheet explosive and most detonating cord. 3 A shock wave traveling through an explosive charge will be reflected at the edges of the 

charge where it hits a high-density region (much like water hitting the wall of a swimming 

pool). The reflected waves (rarefaction waves) degrade the shock wave, so that at such edges 

the wave is slowed and an overall curvature of the wave develops. If the diameter of the explosive is narrow, the rarefaction waves may be sufficient to kill the shock wave. The minimum 

diameter at which an explosive can support detonation is termed the ‘‘critical diameter.’’ 4To detonate an explosive charge, a detonator containing a ‘‘primary’’ explosive, sensitive to 

mild stimulation (impact, friction, heat), is used to create a shock wave. This shock wave is directed into the ‘‘secondary’’ explosive, the main charge. In military devices the secondary explosive (e.g. TNT, RDX, HMX, PETN or formulations thereof) is sufficiently insensitive that it can 

be initiated only by such a shock wave. Most AN formulations are even more insensitive than 

military explosives. They require an amplification of the shock wave from the detonator; thus, 

a booster, a secondary explosive, is placed between the detonator and the AN charge.

PETN) 2 or in intimate mixtures of oxidizers and fuels, as in composite explosives 

such as ammonium nitrate (AN) with fuel oil (FO). 

The number of potential oxidizers for use in composite explosives is large, but 

practical considerations, i.e. availability, limit the potential threat. The number of 

potential fuels, however, is nearly limitless—combustible non-explosives, e.g. rosin, 

sulfur, charcoal, coal, flour, sugar, oil, paraffin as well as fuels that are explosive 

in their own right, e,g, nitromethane and hydrazine. To date terrorists have used 

fuel oil (ANFO) or icing sugar (AN/S) in combination with AN. 

While chemical make up is important, the configuration of the explosive device 

is also critical. Rapid energy release is necessary to ‘‘support’’ the detonation front, 

much like a piston; therefore, the configuration of the chemical must be such that 

the wave is not quenched by dissipation at the edges of the device.3 The concept 

of ‘‘critical diameter’’ addresses the limit where the explosive charge is too small to 

support a detonation wave. Thus, 200g of a military explosive in a cylindrical configuration is probably detonable; but the same amount of that material sprinkled 

across a table top is probably not. 

Most military and composite explosives require a detonator, made of highly sensitive explosive, to initiate a detonation. In addition, composite explosives, being 

particularly insensitive, often require a booster and a detonator to initiate.4 In the 

past, these requirements restricted who could make explosive devices to those who 

could acquire detonators and boosters by theft or good black-market contacts. Nowadays, most terrorists and some teenagers are aware that the solid peroxide explosives can be readily used in this capacity. 

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Availability of a material is a major factor in its use by terrorists. Creating a bomb from military explosives requires theft of the explosive; black-market 

connections to purchase the explosive, or a skilled synthetic chemist and lab facility. 

Composite explosives require as little as stirring the oxidizer and fuel together. Either type of bomb requires acquisition of detonators, and composite explosives usually require boosters, as well. The availability of all these factors dictates the nature 

of the explosive device. 

Fuels are ubiquitous, and oxidizers are widely available, having major roles in purification and bleaching. It is likely that a number of oxidizers, on a sufficiently 

large-scale, could be formulated into composite explosives. The terrorist choice is, to 

a large degree, governed by regional availability. 

Terrorist use of ammonium nitrate (AN) began in the bombing campaign of the 

Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) (1969 to 1994). During that period there 

were 14,000 bombing incidents, most involving commercial explosives or sodium 

chlorate/nitrobenzene. At the peak of the campaign in the early 1970’s, the British 

government issued a ban on the sale of chlorate, nitrobenzene, and pure AN in 

Northern Ireland. Nevertheless, large AN fertilizer bombs were used in the City of 

London. Approximately 1000 pounds were used at St Mary le Axe (April 1992) and 

about 3000 pound at Bishops Gate (April 1993). In other countries, AN has been 

used less frequently in terrorist bombings; a notable exception were the African embassy bombings (Aug. 7, 1998). In the United States (U.S.) about 18 billion pounds 

of AN are produced annually. Of that, about 5 billion pounds are made and used 

for commercial explosives; the rest goes to the fertilizer market. Because the preparation of AN explosives is straightforward and well-known and because the bombing 

of the Murrah Federal building (Oklahoma City, April 1995) was devastating, the 

U.S. followed the British in funding research attempting to desensitize AN. No out-
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5 ‘‘TNT equivalence’’ is a rough method of comparing explosive power. Often, it is obtained by 

comparing the blast pressure of an explosive charge to that of the same amount of TNT with 

all other factors being held equal. 6See documents at Internet site http://www.hse.gov.uk/explosives/ammonium. 

standing successes have been reported from that effort though, at a modest level, 

research continues. 

In Israel, where sales of solid AN are prohibited, rather than evaporate the water 

from commercially available AN solution, terrorists have chosen to use urea nitrate. 

For a number of years, urea nitrate has been a favorite of Arabic terrorists. It was 

used in the bombing of the World Trade Center (Feb. 1993). Urea intended to be 

made into urea nitrate was brought across the U.S.-Canadian border by the wouldbe millennium bomber Ahmed Ressam. The Shining Path used urea nitrate so frequently in bombings that in 1992 sales of urea were banned in Peru. 

Potassium chlorate, like AN, is one of the few oxidizers readily available in bulk. 

In the U.S. 1.2 billion pounds of chlorate salt are used annually by the pulp and 

paper industry and agriculture. Before AN became the oxidizer of choice in large 

charges, chlorate was used. Replaced by AN for large devices, it continued to be recommended in the ‘‘do-it-yourself’’ literature for use in small, anti-personnel devices. 

The Bali bombing (Oct. 12, 2002) once again demonstrated its explosive potential 

on a large-scale. 

Dozens of peroxide compounds are used as free-radical initiators by the polymer 

industry or in bleaching processes. Although a degree of hazard is associated with 

the handling of most peroxides, TATP and HMTD are unusual in that their three 

peroxide functionalities give them explosive potential. TATP has about 88%, and 

HMTD, about 60% of TNT blast strength.5 The unusual danger in these peroxides 

is not their blast strength; it is their ease of initiation (due to the peroxide linkage) 

and the ease with which terrorists have acquired and used the materials for their 

synthesis. Richard Reid, the would-be shoe bomber, intended to use TATP to initiate 

a PETN charge (Dec. 2001). HMTD was prepared and carried into the U.S. by 

Ahmed Ressam with the intention of using it to initiate urea nitrate bombs (Dec. 

1999). Peroxide explosives have also been used as the main charge (e.g. the London 

bombings of July 2005 and countless suicide vests and car bombs in Israel). These 

solid peroxides require a special degree of skill to synthesize successfully and safely. 

In contrast, concentrated hydrogen peroxide can be used without synthesis. The 

aborted bombing in Karachi (Mar. 15, 2004) suggest that terrorists are well aware 

of its potential. 

Recommendation: There should be a worldwide survey of availability of 

oxidizers, and methods of tracking purchase and transport of large quantities of oxidizers should be developed. Such information would highlight unusual patterns of activity and aid in predicting and preventing incidents.

2. Only large-quantities of oxidizer need be considered a threat.

Because AN formulations tend to be insensitive a fair amount is required to support detonation.3 Briefcase bombs of ANFO have not been used, rather AN is formulated into effective car or truck bombs. To make an AN-based device, the formulator 

must have large quantities of AN and also means to initiate and boost it. It is wasted effort and masks the important data to track every small sale of AN. The British 

in their various regulations 6 have addressed the quantity issue in terms of ‘‘sufficient material to have an explosive effect’’ or in quantities greater than ‘‘1 tonne.’’

Recommendation: There should be a lower limit on the amount of oxidizer 

of concern in this legislation. Not only does it require Herculean effort to detonate AN on a small-scale, but in the U.S. the widespread availability of smokeless 

and black powders makes them more likely candidates for small bomb construction.

3. Tracking purchasers of bulk oxidizer is a modest step toward restricting illegitimate use. Countermeasures are obvious. Credit card companies already 

have a start on the problem of fraudulent use. 

Recommendation: Require credit card purchase for large quantities (e.g. 1 

ton) of oxidizer. This makes use of some of the built-in checks and information 

found in credit cards.

4. International collaboration should be sought. 

Recommendation: The British have faced a serious AN threat for over two 

decades. Open dialog between all levels working on this problem.

5. Consider other potential threat materials. Once one material becomes 

harder to obtain, others may be substituted. 

Recommendation: Consider the explosive potential of large quantities of 

oxidizers and other energetic, non-explosives. Develop better methods to 
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7 ‘‘Recommendation on the Transport of Dangerous Goods: Manual of Tests and Criteria,’’ 3rd 

ed. United Nations, N.Y. 1999.

indicate potential explosivity of large quantities. The Department of Transportation (DOT) Test Series 1 is used to classify chemicals as explosive or non-explosive 

for purposes of transportation.7 However, the DOT test series uses no more than 

2 pounds of the candidate material. Tested on that scale, AN and other materials 

pass as non-explosives. Tested on a larger scale, some detonate. In general, materials which require ton-quantities to detonate do so at low (30–40%) TNT equivalencies.5 Nevertheless, many such chemicals with one third TNT equivalence of 3000 

tons is 1 kiloton TNT equivalence. 

6. Exempt explosive-grade AN from this legislation. Some grades of AN are 

classified as explosives under DOT regulations because of their specific chemical and 

physical properties. 

Recommendation: The bill needs a clause to specify that any grades of AN 

that are classified as explosives under DOT regulations will continue to be 

controlled under the existing and stricter explosives regulations rather than 

this new law aimed at control of fertilizer-grade AN.Folio
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Mr. LINDER. Mr. McMahon. 

STATEMENT OF JAMES W. McMAHON, DIRECTOR, NEW YORK 

STATE OFFICE OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. MCMAHON. Thank you, Chairman Linder, and good morning, 

Ranking Member Langevin, members of the subcommittee. It is a 

pleasure for me to be able to speak to you today about what we 

have recently enacted in New York dealing with ammonium nitrate. 

As the chairman said, we are all well aware of the use by terrorists, both domestic and otherwise. Certainly Oklahoma City, that 

we are all aware of. But it goes back longer than that. I think my 

first introduction to it was when I was a young trooper in New 

York State. On August 24th, 1970, we remember seeing the pictures and the reports of a van filled with ammonium nitrate and 

fuel oil that was detonated next to a building on the University of 

Wisconsin-Madison campus that killed a physics researcher and 

caused massive damage to that facility. 

Then since then and then certainly now, subsequent to 9/11, 

where people are much more interested, we have seen many instances around the world in different countries, including Great 

Britain and France and other areas. We always know about the attacks and the damage caused, but there has been many foiled attacks, most recently earlier in the year in Britain, Great Britain. 

They foiled an attack with eight terrorists who had 1,320 pounds 

of ammonium nitrate stored in a self-storage warehouse in West 

London. 

Most recently, with Joel Henry Hinrichs, III, the Oklahoma University student who killed himself this year outside a stadium with 

84,000 spectators in it, as publicly reported, he had unsuccessfully 

attempted to purchase ammonium nitrate in the days preceding 

the incident. So we can only think what he might have done with 

that. 

Ammonium nitrate, as has been said, is one of the most common 

commercially available ingredients traditionally exploited by terrorist makers. Unfortunately, instructions for producing ammonium nitrate explosive mixtures have been incorporated in the 

training manuals and produced both domestically and internationally by terrorists and widely disseminated over the Internet. 

In the aftermath of 9/11, New York’s Governor, George Pataki, 

has made prevention of terrorism New York’s number one priority. 

Our State legislature has enacted some of the most stringent 

antiterrorism laws in the Nation and has statutorily required the 

identification and reduction of vulnerabilities to terror attacks in 

our critical infrastructure, with specific emphasis in sectors like energy, toxic chemical sites and general aviation. 

This past year, we struck a balance between commerce and security to require that ammonium nitrate is properly secured by retailers in our State and buyers of this material are properly identified, 

yet at the same time ensure the continued proper commercial trade 

in fertilizer products. 

On August 28th, 2005, Governor Pataki signed into law certain 

measure that are now required surrounding the sale of ammonium 

nitrate fertilizer products. Under this law, effective only weeks ago, 
52

on November 28th, and accompanying regulations issued by our 

State Department of Agriculture and Markets, the latter promulgated in consultation with New York’s Office of Homeland Security, 

retailers of ammonium nitrate fertilizer are now required to do five 

basic but important things. 

First, they must register with the Agriculture and Markets Department and publicly display their registration certificate. Second, 

ammonium nitrate retailers must comply with certain baseline security requirements that include providing reasonable protection 

against vandalism, theft or unauthorized access, ensuring that 

storage facilities are inspected daily for signs of attempted entry, 

vandalism and structural integrity and that they are fenced or otherwise enclosed and locked when unattended. In addition, retailers 

must also employ proper inventory controls for this sensitive material. 

Third, retailers must obtain required forms of governmentalissued picture identification from all purchasers. 

Fourth, retailers must record the name, address, and telephone 

number of the purchaser, along with the intended use and quantities of ammonium nitrate purchased. 

And, fifth, retailers must also maintain this retail sale information for a 2-year period and make it accessible on demand to the 

Office of Homeland Security and to the Department of Agriculture 

and Markets. 

A copy of the law, regulations and associated forms has been appended to my written testimony. 

We did not do this in a vacuum. With the support of the New 

York State Office of Homeland Security, the New York State Department of Agriculture and Markets conferred with the industry 

and their counterparts in other States to identify ammonium nitrate materials of concern and to ascertain what successful practices have been put in place. 

Input was also solicited by the Office of Homeland Security from 

a variety of law enforcement and explosives-related organizations 

in the United States and abroad, including the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, the New York City Police Department, the Institute of Makers of Explosives, and members of the International Association of 

Bomb Technicians and Investigators from the United States, Canada and overseas. We received positive feedback on the measures 

we were planning and implementing. 

We believe these new common-sense measures are a valuable 

step to not only assist homeland security at home and in our communities but to prevent criminal use of ammonium nitrate fertilizer. 

I hope you will find the measures New York State has taken 

helpful in your deliberations in the mark-up session following this 

hearing which will consider H.R. 3197. 

Mr. LINDER. Thank you. 

[The statement of Mr. McMahon follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JAMES W. MCMAHON

INTRODUCTION 

Good morning Chairman Linder and members of the Subcommittee on Nuclear 

and Biological Attack. My name is James McMahon and I am the Director of the 
53

New York State Office of Homeland Security. I applaud and thank you and other 

members of Congress for addressing this critical issue.

Use of Ammonium Nitrate As A Weapon 

The use of ammonium nitrate as a weapon by terrorists, unfortunately, is not new. In the early morning hours of August 24, 1970, a van filled with ammonium nitrate and fuel oil was detonated next to a building on the University of WisconsinMadison campus housing the Army Mathematics Research Center, killing a physics 

researcher and causing massive damage to the facility. 

We all know that on April 19, 1995, Timothy McVeigh detonated a Ryder truck 

containing a 4800 pound bomb of consisting of ammonium nitrate fertilizer, fuel oil 

and nitro-methane, in front of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma 

City, killing 168 American men, women, and children. 

Internationally, the picture is just as troublesome. 

In October 2000, authorities in Singapore foiled an al-Qa’ida plan to drive trucks 

each loaded with a ton of ammonium nitrate, purchased by al-Qa’ida operatives 

through a Kuala Lumpur clinical pathology company, into the US, Australian, British and Israeli embassies in Singapore. On March 30, 2004, British anti-terrorism 

police arrested eight men suspected of planning a terrorist attack and confiscated 

1,320 pounds of ammonium nitrate from a self-storage warehouse in West London. 

For decades, the United Kingdom has experienced numerous high consequence Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) bombings involving the conversion of ammonium nitrate fertilizer into deadly and damaging high explosives. Notable bombings 

include attacks at the Baltic Exchange, Bishopsgate, Canary Wharf and Omagh. 

Most recently, Joel Henry Hinrichs III, an Oklahoma University student, was 

killed in October of this year when an explosive device he built detonated as he sat 

on a bench 100 yards from a stadium filled more than 84,000 spectators. Of particular interest is the fact that the investigation into his apparent suicide shows 

Hinrichs had unsuccessfully attempted to purchase ammonium nitrate in the days 

preceding the incident. If he had been successful there is no telling what devastation he may have caused. 

Ammonium nitrate is, of course, one of the most common, commercially available 

ingredients traditionally exploited by terrorist bomb makers throughout the years 

and continuing in the new millennium. It can be mixed with common diesel fuel to 

create an extremely potent and deadly improvised explosive mixture. Instructions 

for producing ammonium nitrate explosive mixtures have been incorporated into 

training manuals produced by both domestic and international terrorists and widely 

disseminated over the Internet. 

There is considerable and heightened concern these prior attacks and plots will 

serve to inspire acutely isolated and unbalanced ‘‘lone wolves’’ to utilize relatively 

easy to get ammonium nitrate to carry out highly destructive attacks with virtually 

no indication, prior warning or affiliation to known terrorist organizations.

New York State Ammonium Nitrate Legislation 

In the aftermath of September 11th, Governor Pataki has made prevention of terrorism New York’s number one priority. Our State Legislature has enacted some of 

the most stringent anti-terrorism laws in the nation and has statutorily required 

the identification and reduction of vulnerabilities to terror attack in our critical infrastructure with a specific emphasis in sectors like energy, toxic chemicals sites 

and general aviation security. This past year we struck a delicate balance between 

commerce and security to require that ammonium nitrate is properly secured by retailers in our state and buyers of this material are properly identified, yet at the 

same time ensure the continued proper commercial trade in fertilizer products. 

On August 28, 2005, Governor Pataki signed into law certain measures that are 

now required surrounding the sale of ammonium nitrate fertilizer products. These 

include the registration of ammonium nitrate fertilizer retailers, a requirement that 

certain records be created and maintained of all such retail sales, along with specific 

baseline security standards for ammonium nitrate retailers to safeguard this product from misuse. 

Under this law, effective only weeks ago on November 28th, and accompanying 

regulations issued by the State Department of Agriculture and Markets, the latter 

promulgated in consultation with New York’s Office of Homeland Security, retailers 

of ammonium nitrate fertilizer are now required to do five basic but vitally important things:

• First, they must register with the Agriculture and Markets Department and 

publicly display their registration certificate. 

• Second, ammonium nitrate retailers must comply with certain baseline security requirements that include providing reasonable protection against van-
54

dalism, theft or unauthorized access, ensuring that storage facilities are inspected daily for signs of attempted entry, vandalism and structural integrity 

and that they are fenced or otherwise enclosed and locked when unattended. In 

addition, retailers must also employ proper inventory controls for this sensitive 

material. 

• Third, retailers must obtain required forms of governmental-issued picture 

identification from all purchasers. 

• Fourth, retailers must record the name, address and telephone number of the 

purchaser, along with the intended use and quantities of ammonium nitrate 

purchased; and 

• Fifth, retailers must also maintain this retail sale information for a two-year 

period and make it accessible, on demand to the Office of Homeland Security 

and Department of Agriculture and Markets. 

A copy of the law, regulations and associated forms has been appended to my 

written testimony as previously submitted for your review. 

In the past, the ability to trace purchases of ammonium nitrate was a game of 

chance—now we have established a firm methodology for data collection and enabled an ability to develop patterns and thus ‘‘connect the dots.’’ This system of 

verifying and recording identities and amounts of ammonium nitrate purchases will 

serve as an essential investigatory tool that did not exist before this law was signed. 

We did not do this in a vacuum. 

We used the pre-existing state statutory framework that already required the registration of ammonium nitrate wholesale distributors in New York with the state 

Department of Agriculture and Markets to enhance security with this new legislation at the point of obvious need and greatest potential exposure—where ammonium 

nitrate is sold on the open retail market. 

With the support of the New York State Office of Homeland Security, the New 

York State Department of Agriculture and Markets conferred with the industry and 

their counterparts in other states to identify ammonium nitrate materials of concern 

and to ascertain what successful practices have been put into place. Input was also 

solicited from a variety of law enforcement and explosives-related organizations in 

the United States and abroad, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the 

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, the New York City Police Department, the Institute of Makers of Explosives (IME) and members of the International Association of Bomb Technicians and Investigators (IABTI) from the 

United States, Canada and overseas. We received positive feedback on the measures 

we were planning and implementing. 

We believe these new common-sense measures are a valuable first step to not only 

assist homeland security at home and in our communities to prevent the criminal 

use of ammonium nitrate fertilizer, but also in encouraging the implementation of 

best practices by the industry to more effectively deter the potential misuse of ammonium nitrate fertilizer and thus make us all more secure.

Conclusion 

I hope you will find the measures New York State has taken helpful in your deliberations in the markup session following this hearing, which will consider H.R. 

3197, the Secure Handling of Ammonium Nitrate Act of 2005. I do however, leave 

you with this final thought—while New York State has recognized and begun to address the potential misuse of ammonium nitrate fertilizer—it is essential to keep in 

mind that evildoers, of course, do not recognize borders. National rules and standards across the board in all 50 states as a matter of federal law must be set in order 

to truly make this effort successful. 

Thank you again.

Mr. LINDER. Mr. Black. 

STATEMENT OF GARY W. BLACK PRESIDENT, GEORGIA 

AGRIBUSINESS COUNCIL, INC. 

Mr. BLACK. Good morning. 

Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, I am Gary Black. 

I am President of the Georgia Agribusiness Council, located in 

Commerce, Georgia. I appreciate the opportunity to testify before 

your subcommittee this morning on the House Homeland Security 

Committee, Subcommittee on Prevention of Nuclear and Biological 

Attacks, regarding H.R. 3197, the Secure Handling of Ammonium 

Nitrate Act of 2005. 
55

The Georgia Agribusiness Council is a chamber-like organization 

with a 40-year history of promoting sound policy for the breadth of 

Georgia’s agricultural industry. 

Mr. Chairman and members, today I find myself in a rare and 

unenviable policy dilemma. Mr. Chairman, as you know, I have 

met with you and your staff dozens of times over the course of our 

careers as a spokesman for Georgia farmers and food producers 

and rural business. Many of our meetings have focused on how we 

can work together to relieve Georgia farmers and agribusinesses of 

overreaching Federal regulations and the unnecessary bureaucracy 

and burdensome paperwork that usually follows it. 

The last thing that Georgia farmers need is another regulation. 

The last thing Georgia livestock and food producers need is a more 

burdensome bureaucracy and paperwork. However, today I am here 

to state my support for the basic tenets of H.R. 3197. It is obvious 

that regulation of this vital agricultural input is on the horizon. 

Further, I believe the best way to institute the most amicable solution to regulatory challenges, Mr. Chairman, is to come to the table 

early in the process. That is my purpose for being here today. 

As you may know, ammonium nitrate fertilizer is an excellent 

plant nutrient for Georgia’s temperate climate and clay soils. More 

than 59,000 tons of ammonium nitrate is used annually in our 

State on a variety of row crop and livestock farms. Because this important plant nutrient is so effective on our crops and soils, Georgia 

is the tenth highest State regarding ammonium nitrate fertilizer 

consumption in the United States. 

I believe this important legislation establishes a framework for 

providing the Georgia Department of Agriculture and the Federal 

Department of Homeland Security the important security information they need. I believe the legislation sets important guidelines 

for improving our Nation’s security. Yet, passage of a final version, 

Mr. Chairman, must accomplish these goals without placing unreasonable burdens on Georgia farmers and agricultural retailers. 

My greatest concern with the legislation—and I want to again 

commend your staff. I understand we have moved forward with different issues with the subcommittee’s markup procedures here this 

morning, and my comments are going back to the original legislation. But I did want to point out some of those concerns that we 

did have. 

I do support maintaining the inspection authority at the State 

level, since State inspectors already perform duties designed to ensure the integrity and quality of fertilizer products. The bill seeks 

to register ammonium nitrate fertilizer producers, sellers, purchasers and users, with the objective of keeping this necessary agriculture plant nutrient in the hands of food producers, rather than 

in the hands of those with criminal intent. 

A totally new systemic registration plan may not be necessary. 

Many retailers already voluntarily record sales data, including the 

driver’s license information of the purchaser. I believe simple actions to standardize forms and electronic reports throughout the 

existing system would sufficiently serve the public purpose. 

My members would rather not deal with a new set of Federal 

regulators visiting their facilities. Federal block funding for enforcement at the State level by State departments of agricultural 
56

would be my preference. While a subjective fine allows for situational judgments to take place, the $50,000 maximum fine looms 

as a daunting threat over farmers and other small businesses. 

Well-meaning business owners will on occasion make mistakes, and 

zealous enforcers sometimes seek to gain an upper hand. Please 

consider a more reasonable fine structure based on frequency and 

severity of violations. 

Mr. Chairman, with amendments to accommodate the concerns 

I have outlined, I believe H.R. 3197 would meet the objectives of 

the Department of Homeland Security and help keep this valuable 

agricultural fertilizer in use for continued food production in Georgia and in this Nation. We in agriculture want to contribute to initiatives that continue State and Federal efforts to maintain and 

improve national security for the United States and its citizens. 

To conclude, allow me again, Mr. Chairman, to thank you and 

members of the subcommittee for your leadership in addressing 

this critically important issue of secure handling of ammonium nitrate agricultural fertilizers. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. 

Mr. LINDER. Thank you, Mr. Black. It is my understanding that 

there will be an amendment in the nature of a substitute that will 

deal with many of your issues. 

[The statement of Mr. Black follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GARY W. BLACK

Introduction 

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I am Gary Black, President of 

the Georgia Agribusiness Council located in Commerce Georgia. I appreciate the opportunity to testify before the House Homeland Security Committee, Subcommittee 

on Prevention of Nuclear and Biological Attacks regarding H.R. 3197, the ‘‘Secure 

Handling of Ammonium Nitrate Act of 2005.’’ 

Furthermore, I would like to thank you Chairman Linder for scheduling this important hearing and for your leadership in addressing the critical issue of advancing 

ammonium nitrate security measures, which are so vital to the U.S. plant food industry, its many local retail agribusiness outlets and the farmers and livestock producers they serve.

Georgia Agribusiness Council 

The Georgia Agribusiness Council (GAC) is a Chamber-like organization with a 

40-year history of promoting sound policy for the breadth of Georgia’s agricultural 

industry. Our members range from farmers to input suppliers and from processors 

to those in transportation of food and fiber. Promoting environmental stewardship 

and educating the public about the importance of agriculture are the hallmark objectives of our organization. 

Mr. Chairman, today I find myself in a rare and unenviable policy dilemma. As 

you know I have met with you and your staff dozens of times over the years as a 

spokesman for Georgia farmers, food producers and rural businesses. Many of our 

meetings have focused on how we could work together to relieve Georgia farmers 

and agribusinesses of overreaching federal regulation and the unnecessary bureaucracy and burdensome paperwork that usually follows it. 

The last thing Georgia farmers need is another regulation. The last thing Georgia 

livestock and food producers need is more burdensome bureaucracy and paperwork. 

However, today I am here to state my support of the basic tenets of H.R. 3197, The 

Secure Handling of Ammonium Nitrate Act. I believe regulation of this vital agricultural input is on the horizon. Further, I believe the best way to institute the most 

amicable solution to regulatory challenges, Mr. Chairman, is to come to the table 

early in the process. That is my purpose for being here today. 

As you may know, ammonium nitrate fertilizer is an excellent plant nutrient for 

Georgia’s temperate climate and clay soils. More than 59,000 tons of ammonium nitrate is used annually in our state on a variety of row crop and livestock farms. The 

product is a premiere source of supplementary nitrogen when used alone. The product is also a key element in a host of prescriptive fertilizer blends. Because this im-
57

portant plant nutrient is so effective on our crops and soils, Georgia is the 10th 

highest state (see attached 2004 Commercial Fertilizer Report) regarding ammonium nitrate fertilizer consumption in the United States. 

I believe this important legislation establishes a framework for providing the 

Georgia Department of Agriculture and the federal Department of Homeland Security the important security information they need. I believe the legislation sets important guidelines for improving our nation’s security. Yet, passage of a final 

version, Mr. Chairman, must accomplish these goals without placing an unreasonable burden on Georgia farmers.

H.R. 3197, The Secure Handling of Ammonium Nitrate Act 

On June 13, 2005, Representatives Curt Weldon (R–PA) and Bennie G. Thompson 

(D-Miss.), as well as other key members of congress, introduced H.R. 3197, the Secure Handling of Ammonium Nitrate Act of 2005. 

The legislation before you gives the Department of Homeland Security the authority to create a regulatory system for ammonium nitrate-based fertilizers. The bill 

contains the following provisions: 

The ‘‘Secure Handling of Ammonium Nitrate Act’’ grants the Department of 

Homeland Security the power to regulate those who produce, sell, and store ammonium nitrate-based fertilizer. Specifically, this bill would allow the Department, in 

consultation with the Department of Agriculture, to develop regulations that do the 

following:

1. Create a registry of facilities that handle ammonium nitrate fertilizer; 

2. Limit the sale and storage of ammonium nitrate-based fertilizer to facilities 

that register with the Department; and 

3. Condition the sale of ammonium nitrate-based fertilizer on recording the 

name, address, telephone number, and registration number of the purchaser. 

My greatest concern with the legislation centers on the proposed relationship between the Department of Homeland Security, state departments of agriculture and 

the regulated community. I would prefer that the states maintain the inspection authority since state inspectors already perform duties designed to ensure the integrity and quality of fertilizer products. 

The bill seeks to register ammonium nitrate fertilizer producers, sellers, purchasers and users, with the objective of keeping this necessary agriculture plant nutrient in the hands of food producers rather than in the hands of individuals with 

criminal intent. A totally new systemic registration plan may not be necessary. 

Many retailers already voluntarily record sales data including the driver’s license 

information of the purchaser. I believe simple actions to standardize forms and electronic reports throughout the existing system would sufficiently serve the public 

purpose. 

My members would rather not deal with a new set of federal regulators visiting 

their facilities. Federal block funding for enforcement at the state level by state departments of agriculture would be my preference. While a subjective fine structure 

allows for situational judgments to take place, the $50,000 maximum fine looms as 

a daunting threat over farmers and other small businesses. Well-meaning business 

owners will on occasion make mistakes, and zealous enforcers sometimes seek to 

gain an upper hand. Please consider a more reasonable fine structure based on frequency and severity of the violation.

Conclusion 

Mr. Chairman, with amendments to accommodate the concerns I have outlined, 

I believe H.R. 3197 would meet the objectives of the Department of Homeland Security and help keep this valuable agricultural fertilizer in use for continued food production in Georgia and in this nation. We in agriculture want to contribute to initiatives that continue state and federal efforts to maintain and improve national security for the United States and its citizens. 

To conclude, allow me to again thank you Chairman Linder and members of the 

subcommittee for your leadership in addressing the critically important issue of secure handling of ammonium nitrate agricultural fertilizers. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today.
58

Top 20 Ammonium Nitrate Consuming 

States—2004

Missouri 292,934 

Tennessee 146,149

Alabama 105,100

Texas 103,555

California 92,352

Kentucky 74,361

Oklahoma 62,640

Idaho 60,752

Kansas 60,460

Mississippi 59,121

Georgia 47,842

Louisiana 39,341

Arkansas 36,767

Oregon 30,590

Nebraska 30,138

Washington 30,030

North Carolina 29,733

Wyoming 24,605

Florida 21,943

Iowa 21,866

Source: 2004 Commercial Fertilizer Report

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I am Gary Black, President of 

the Georgia Agribusiness Council located in Commerce Georgia. I appreciate the opportunity to testify before the House Homeland Security Committee, Subcommittee 

on Prevention of Nuclear and Biological Attacks regarding H.R. 3197, the ‘‘Secure 

Handling of Ammonium Nitrate Act of 2005.’’ 

The Georgia Agribusiness Council (GAC) is a Chamber-like organization with a 

40-year history of promoting sound policy for the breadth of Georgia’s agricultural 

industry. 

Mr. Chairman, today I find myself in a rare and unenviable policy dilemma. As 

you know I have met with you and your staff dozens of times over the years as a 

spokesman for Georgia farmers, food producers and rural businesses. Many of our 

meetings have focused on how we could work together to relieve Georgia farmers 

and agribusinesses of overreaching federal regulation and the unnecessary bureaucracy and burdensome paperwork that usually follows it. 

The last thing Georgia farmers need is another regulation. The last thing Georgia 

livestock and food producers need is more burdensome bureaucracy and paperwork. 

However, today I am here to state my support of the basic tenets of H.R. 3197, ‘‘The 

Secure Handling of Ammonium Nitrate Act.’’ I believe regulation of this vital agricultural input is on the horizon. Further, I believe the best way to institute the most 

amicable solution to regulatory challenges, Mr. Chairman, is to come to the table 

early in the process. That is my purpose for being here today. 

As you may know, ammonium nitrate fertilizer is an excellent plant nutrient for 

Georgia’s temperate climate and clay soils. More than 59,000 tons of ammonium nitrate is used annually in our state on a variety of row crop and livestock farms. Because this important plant nutrient is so effective on our crops and soils, Georgia 

is the 10th highest state regarding ammonium nitrate fertilizer consumption in the 

United States. (2004 Commercial Fertilizer Report attached) 

I believe this important legislation establishes a framework for providing the 

Georgia Department of Agriculture and the federal Department of Homeland Security the important security information they need. I believe the legislation sets important guidelines for improving our nation’s security. Yet, passage of a final 

version, Mr. Chairman, must accomplish these goals without placing an unreasonable burden on Georgia farmers and agricultural retailers. 

My greatest concern with the legislation centers on the proposed relationship between the Department of Homeland Security, state departments of agriculture and 

the regulated community. I would prefer that the states maintain the inspection authority since state inspectors already perform duties designed to ensure the integrity and quality of fertilizer products. The bill seeks to register ammonium nitrate 

fertilizer producers, sellers, purchasers and users, with the objective of keeping this 

necessary agriculture plant nutrient in the hands of food producers rather than in 
59

the hands of individuals with criminal intent. A totally new systemic registration 

plan may not be necessary. Many retailers already voluntarily record sales data including the driver’s license information of the purchaser. I believe simple actions to 

standardize forms and electronic reports throughout the existing system would sufficiently serve the public purpose. 

My members would rather not deal with a new set of federal regulators visiting 

their facilities. Federal block funding for enforcement at the state level by state departments of agriculture would be my preference. While a subjective fine structure 

allows for situational judgements to take place, the $50,000 maximum fine looms 

as a daunting threat over farmers and other small businesses. Well-meaning business owners will on occasion make mistakes, and zealous enforcers sometimes seek 

to gain an upper hand. Please consider a more reasonable fine structure based on 

frequency and severity of the violation. 

Mr. Chairman, with amendments to accommodate the concerns I have outlined, 

I believe H.R. 3197 would meet the objectives of the Department of Homeland Security and help keep this valuable agricultural fertilizer in use for continued food production in Georgia and in this nation. We in agriculture want to contribute to initiatives that continue state and federal efforts to maintain and improve national security for the United States and its citizens. 

To conclude, allow me to again thank you Chairman Linder and members of the 

subcommittee for your leadership in addressing the critically important issue of secure handling of ammonium nitrate agricultural fertilizers. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today.

Mr. LINDER. Mr. O’Neill. 

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM PAUL O’NEILL, JR., PRESIDENT, 

INTERNATIONAL RAW MATERIALS 

Mr. O’NEILL. Chairman Linder and members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to testify today on behalf of 

the Agricultural Retailers Association concerning H.R. 3197. 

I am Tip O’Neill, the President of International Raw Materials, 

which is headquartered in Philadelphia. Our company is an importer and domestic wholesale distributor of fertilizer products. The 

ARA represents a significant majority of America’s agricultural retailers and distributors in Washington, D.C. 

Retail dealers provide essential crop input material to America’s 

farmers. This is a responsibility of growing importance, because, as 

America develops new biosources of energy, America is going to be 

relying on its farmers not only to grow its crops but also to grow 

its fuels. We need, therefore, to make sure that we give our farmers an adequate and safe supply of agricultural inputs, including 

ammonium nitrate fertilizer, that they will need to accomplish 

these critical missions. 

I currently serve on the ARA’s Board of Directors and the ARA’s 

Public Policy Committee. I am a constituent of the sponsor of this 

legislation, U.S. Representative Curt Weldon. We appreciate the 

leadership that Representative Weldon and Representative Bernie 

Thompson have shown on this issue by sponsoring the legislation 

we are discussing here today. 

As we all know, plants need nutrients to grow, primarily nitrogen, phosphate and potash, each in some available form; hence the 

need for fertilizer in crop production agriculture. Variations in the 

crop, weather, temperature and soil help determine the amount 

and types of fertilizers utilized. 

As Mr. Black mentioned, ammonium nitrate is primarily used on 

pasture lands and specialty crops. The principal advantage of using 

this product as a fertilizer is that crops can immediately utilize 

part of its nitrogen content in the form of nitrate. While this formu-
60

lation was discovered in 1659, it has only been in the last 60 years 

that it has significantly been used worldwide as an important plant 

nutrient. 

Its use as an explosive was not discovered until the end of World 

War I and reaffirmed with the tragic explosions in Texas City in 

1947. As we all well know today, both domestic and foreign terrorists have illegally used ammonium nitrate in bombings such as 

those that took place on April 19th, 1995, the Federal Building in 

Oklahoma City, and October 12th, 2002, in Bali, Indonesia. These 

bombings took many innocent lives. 

As a personal aside, I should mention that my cousin’s son, Joe 

Milligan, was one of the seven Americans killed in the Bali tragedy. He was a newly minted college graduate on one last surfing 

trip before pursuing a career. 

In response to these potential threats, agriculture retailers, distributors and manufacturers have and continue to be proactive in 

voluntarily addressing security concerns related to the storage, 

handling, transportation of agricultural fertilizers, such as ammonium nitrate. 

Our industry is working with the U.S. Department of Homeland 

Security on security related issues. Many within our industry, with 

the support of the ARA, the Fertilizer Institute, have utilized the 

security vulnerability assessment tool to obtain recommendations 

to improve overall security of their facilities. 

ARA and others within our Nation’s agricultural industry are 

committed to working with Congress and the administration on effective measures such as H.R. 3197 that will help prevent terrorists 

and other criminals from gaining access to products like ammonium nitrate fertilizers. A number of States mentioned this morning, including New York, California, Oklahoma, Nevada, and South 

Carolina, have enacted registration and record-keeping laws for 

ammonium nitrate fertilizer with the support of our industry. 

While these State programs are working well and to our knowledge 

have not placed too great a burden on retailers or their farmer customers, a national more unified approach is needed to address this 

matter. 

It is not easy for an industry to support traditional Federal regulations. However, in this case, we believe it is necessary to help 

maintain ammonium nitrate’s continued availability for use on agricultural operations heavily dependent on this plant nutrient. 

The Weldon-Thompson bill as introduced would put in place fair 

and equitable Federal regulations that address security concerns 

related to the production, storage, sale and distribution of solid ammonium nitrate fertilizer. H.R. 3197 authorizes DHS to enter into 

cooperative agreements with State departments of agriculture or 

other State agencies that regulate plant nutrients to ensure that 

any person who produces, stores, or sells or distributes solid ammonium nitrate registers their facility and maintains records of sale 

or distribution, including the names, addresses, telephone numbers 

and registration numbers of purchasers. Purchasers would also be 

required to register this proposal. 

ARA is working with the TFI in support of this important legislation, and we look forward to working on this bill with this committee and this bill’s sponsors on securing its enactment. 
61

1Doane’s Ag Professional Magazine, Summer 2003, p. 40–41

In this context, I would like to tell a short story. Fifteen years 

ago I attended a lecture series given by the late Peter Drucker. At 

the time he observed that America does not legislate social change, 

America litigates social change. I would hope that today we can all 

rise to the late professor’s challenge. 

In conclusion, we would like to reiterate the Agriculture Retailers Association greatly appreciates this opportunity to testify on 

this important issue. We respectfully request your support for the 

enactment of H.R. 3197. Thank you. 

Mr. LINDER. Thank you, Mr. O’Neill. 

[The statement of Mr. O’Neill follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF WILLIAM P. O’NEILL, JR. 

Chairman Linder, Ranking Member Langevin and other members of the Subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to testify today on behalf of the Agricultural 

Retailers Association (ARA) regarding the ‘‘Securing Handling of Ammonium Nitrate Act of 2005’’ (H.R. 3197). My name is Tip O’Neill. I am the President of International Raw Materials, headquartered in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Our company 

is an importer and wholesale distributor of fertilizer products. I am here today on 

behalf of the ARA, which represents the interests of agricultural retailers and distributors in Washington, D.C. I currently serve on the ARA Board of Directors and 

the association’s Public Policy Committee. ARA represents a significant majority our 

nation’s retail dealers who provide essential crop input materials to America’s farmers, including ammonium nitrate fertilizer. In this capacity ARA is vitally interested 

in any federal laws or regulations affecting the sale and use of key agricultural fertilizer products such as ammonium nitrate. 

We appreciate the leadership shown by U.S. Representatives Curt Weldon (R–PA) 

and Bennie Thompson (D–MS) by sponsoring this important legislation. In this testimony, I will provide an overview of ARA, our industry, the use of ammonium nitrate as a fertilizer, how the illegal use of this product has impacted me personally, 

and in this context the strong need for enactment of the legislation we are discussing here today.

OVERVIEW OF ARA AND AG RETAILERS 

From the perspective of an overview, in 2002, there were an estimated 10,586 agricultural retail outlets in the United States.1 The overall number of retail outlets 

is lower today and has been declining due to a number of factors taking place within 

the industry including: consolidation, increased domestic and global competition, 

higher operating costs, and low profit margins. ARA members range in size from 

family or farmer cooperative owned businesses, to large companies with many outlets located in multiple states. Many of these facilities are located in small, rural 

communities. 

As we all know, plants need nutrients to grow, primarily nitrogen, phosphate and 

potash, each in some available form; hence the need for fertilizers in crop production 

agriculture. Soils do not retain nitrogen from year to year, therefore, nitrogen fertilizer must be added during each planting season to ensure optimum growth and 

yield conditions. Demand for fertilizers tends to be seasonal, depending on when 

crops are planted. Variations in the crop, weather, temperature and soil help determine the amount and types of fertilizers utilized. It is estimated that farmers in 

crop production ultimately use more than 85 percent of fertilizer consumed in the 

United States. The remaining fertilizer is used on golf courses, landscaping, nurseries or home use. 

Ammonium nitrate fertilizer is primarily used on pasturelands and specialty crops 

produced in the United States. The principal advantage of using this product as a 

fertilizer is that crops can immediately utilize part of its nitrogen content in the 

form of nitrate. Ammonium nitrate was first synthesized by Johann Glauber in 

1659, when he combined ammonium carbonate and nitric acid, but it has really been 

only within the last 60 years that ammonium nitrate has been significantly used 

worldwide as a important plant nutrient. Its use as an explosive was not discovered 

until the end of World War I, and reaffirmed with the tragic ship explosions in 

Texas City in 1947. As we all well know today, both domestic and foreign terrorists 

have illegally used ammonium nitrate fertilizer in bombings such as those which 

took place on April 19 1995 at the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma 
62

City, Oklahoma and on October 12, 2002 in Bali, Indonesia. As a personal aside I 

should mention that my cousin’s son Joe Milligan was one of the seven Americans 

killed in the Bali tragedy.

INDUSTRY WORKING TO ADDRESS SECURITY ISSUES 

In response to this potential threat, Ag retailers and distributors have and continue to be pro-active in addressing security concerns related to the storage, handling and transportation of agricultural fertilizers. It is important for Congress and 

the Administration to know that our nation’s agricultural industry is committed to 

support effective measures that will prevent terrorists or other criminals from gaining access to ammonium nitrate fertilizer or other crop production materials. In fact, 

DHS has and continues to work with the private sector to identify risks, build systems to communicate those risks, and to prepare plans to keep those risks from becoming terrorist’s targets. Our industry has taken a very proactive role in dealing 

with DHS and has participated in the development of the sector working groups. 

ARA is a supporter of Asmark’s Security Vulnerability Assessment (SVA) program. The Asmark SVA tool is licensed to ARA and is currently being utilized by 

member and non-member companies. ARA is working with CropLife America (CLA) 

and The Fertilizer Institute (TFI) under the ‘‘Agri-Business Security Working 

Group’’ and state associations to promote security measures and the SVA program. 

To date this SVA has been utilized by nearly 2,500 retailers. ARA and Asmark earlier this year reached agreement with Clemson University to make the SVA tool 

available to all Ag retail facilities in the state of South Carolina. This web-based 

software enables retail facilities to conduct a security vulnerability assessment of 

their facilities and receive recommendations to improve overall security. 

ARA and its members are committed to providing increased security for solid ammonium nitrate fertilizer. Several states such as New York, California, Oklahoma, 

Nevada and South Carolina have enacted registration and record keeping laws for 

this product with the support of the state agribusiness association. It is our understanding that these state ammonium nitrate fertilizer registration programs have 

worked very well and not placed too great a burden on retailers or their farmer customers. While as you might expect it is not easy for us as an industry to support 

additional regulations, in this case we believe it is necessary to help maintain Ammonium Nitrate’s continued availability for use on agricultural operations heavily 

dependent on this plant nutrient product. 

ARA is therefore supportive of efforts by Congressmen Curt Weldon (R–PA) and 

Bennie Thompson (D–MS) to put in place fair and equitable federal regulations that 

address any security concerns related to the production, storage, sale and distribution of solid ammonium nitrate fertilizer. H.R. 3197 authorizes DHS to enter into 

cooperative agreements with state departments of agriculture or other state agencies that regulate plant nutrients to ensure that any person who produces, stores, 

sells or distributes solid ammonium nitrate fertilizer registers their facility and 

maintains records of sale or distribution including the name, address, telephone and 

registration numbers of purchasers. Also, purchasers would be required to register 

under this proposal. ARA is working closely with the TFI and sponsors of the Senate 

and House bills to ensure that the interests of agricultural retailers are represented 

and has a voice at the table with Congress and the Administration as this legislation moves forward in the House and Senate and any subsequent regulations that 

are implemented. 

ARA supports a common sense, fair and simplified federal registration system for 

ammonium nitrate fertilizer in order to ensure the product’s continued availability 

for sale, purchase and use by America’s agricultural industry. ARA believes it is important for retailers to maintain the ability to sell ammonium nitrate fertilizer if 

they so desire to their long standing and known farmer customers, as well as ensuring their customers maintain the ability to purchase the product for use on their 

farming operations. Over the past year many domestic manufacturers and distributors have publicly announced they will no longer be producing or selling ammonium 

nitrate due to security and liability concerns. There are now only two domestic manufacturers making this fertilizer product, with at least some of this shortfall, being 

replaced by imports. We believe that enactment of H.R. 3197 will help provide increased vigilance in the handling, sale and use of this product and provide some assurances for the industry against any potential liabilities that would otherwise exist 

without a federal registration system in place. 

We would also request support for the establishment of a security tax credit that 

would allow eligible agricultural businesses to use their own financial resources to 

take the necessary steps installing state of the art security measures that better 

protects ammonium nitrate and other crop production materials and the American 

public from the potential threat of terrorism or other illegal activities. Rep. Ron 
63

Lewis (R–KY) introduced the ‘‘Agricultural Business Security Tax Credit Act of 

2005’’ (H.R. 713) with the support of ARA, TFI, CLA, Chemical Producers & Distributors Association (CPDA), and the National Agricultural Aviation Association 

(NAAA). ARA urges committee members to also support this important legislation 

by co-sponsoring H.R. 713.

CONCLUSION 

In conclusion, we would like to reiterate that the Agricultural Retailers Association greatly appreciates this opportunity to testify on this important issue. We respectfully urge this committee to pass H.R. 3197.

Mr. LINDER. The Chair would now like to recognize the gentleman from Mississippi for the purpose of introducing our final 

panelist. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the courtesy. 

I have, I guess, a dual distinction of introducing Mr. Carl Wallace. He is a constituent, but he is also a hunting buddy of mine. 

So we have real reason to have him here. He is the plant manager 

of one of the production facilities that we are talking about regulating, and I think he brings another perspective to the testimony 

here today. 

He operates a plant with 220-odd employees, who also have the 

distinction of being the highest paid employees in this county because of this facility; and it has been around for a good number of 

years. So we are happy to have Mr. Wallace here as a witness and 

look forward to his testimony. 

Mr. LINDER. Mr. Wallace. 

STATEMENT OF CARL WALLACE, PLANT MANAGER, TERRA 

MISSISSIPPI NITROGEN, INC. 

Mr. WALLACE. Mr. Chairman, on behalf of Terra and the Fertilizer Institute, TFI, of which Terra is a member, I appreciate the 

opportunity to testify before this group in support of H.R. 3197, the 

Secure Handling of Ammonium Nitrate Act of 2005. TFI is the 

leading voice of the Nation’s fertilizer industry, representing the 

public policy, communication and statistical needs of fertilizer producers, retailers and transporters. 

Chairman Linder, I would like to thank you for scheduling this 

important hearing and for your leadership in addressing the critical issue of advancing ammonium nitrate security measures. 

I would like to thank my Representative, Congressman Thompson, whose district the plant is located in, for his leadership as the 

chief sponsor in this important legislation and for inviting me here 

today to testify. 

Terra Industries is a leading international producer of nitrogen 

products which we sell to industrial customers and agribusiness retailers for sale to farmers. Terra employs approximately 1,200 people in North America and the United Kingdom and is 

headquartered in Sioux, City, Iowa. Terra owns and operates seven 

nitrogen manufacturing facilities, four of which are in the midwestern and southern United States. 

Our Yazoo City ammonium nitrate plant has been in operation 

for more than 50 years. This facility provides a major boost to the 

local economy, providing good-paying and stable job opportunities. 

As the Congressman mentions, at our Yazoo facility, we employee 200 full-time employees with an annual payroll of $12.5 million. We have an additional 20 security-related contract employees 
64

associated with the facility. Terra Mississippi Nitrogen has an annual production capacity of 500,000 tons of anhydrous ammonia, 

the basic ingredient for most nitrate fertilizers and many industrial 

products. We upgrade this ammonia to 775,000 tons of ammonium 

nitrate, 600,000 tons of urea ammonium nitrate, commonly called 

UAN, 7,000 tons of urea. 

Ammonium nitrate fertilizer, the focus of this hearing, is vital to 

the U.S. plant food industry and many local retail agribusiness outlets and the farmers and livestock producers they serve. Ammonium nitrate is valued by our Nation’s farmers for its use on pasture lands, citrus and specialty crops and for its use in no-till farming. In 2004, Mississippi farmers, like Georgia farmers, consumed 

about 60,000 tops of ammonium nitrate. Nationwide during that 

same period agricultural consumption of ammonium nitrate totaled 

1.5 million tons. 

After the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995, the fertilizer industry 

undertook several voluntary efforts to prevent ammonium nitrate 

from getting into the wrong hands. TFI partnered with the Bureau 

of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, its member companies, State fertilizer associations and the State fertilizer control officials within the State departments of agriculture to promote fertilizer security. The outreach program called Be Aware for America 

and Be Secure for America were aimed at securing our products, 

particularly ammonium nitrate, in our places of business. After the 

terrorist attacks on September 11th, 2001, the fertilizer industry 

launched America’s Security Begins with You, a new program, 

which has been endorsed by ATF, the Department of Homeland Security and the Association of American Plant Food Control Officials 

who regulate fertilizer at the State level. The campaign urges retailers and producers to develop and implement security plans, 

record sales and alert law enforcement to any suspicious activity. 

After the tragic events of September 11, 2001, TFI’s board of directors endorsed a voluntary security code of management practices, which Terra has made mandatory at all of our facilities. Accordingly, our Yazoo City plant has conducted a security vulnerable 

assessment and developed a security plan based on that assessment. To further strengthen our product security requirements, we 

also require proof of delivery for all shipments of ammonium nitrate within 24 hours. We have recently had our security plan audited by an independent third party auditor. 

We at Terra believe that the provisions contained in H.R. 3197 

further strengthen ammonium nitrate security by providing a uniform national system for registration and recordkeeping. We do not 

believe this legislation would be overly burdensome to handlers of 

ammonium nitrate or our farmer customers. By giving the Department of Homeland Security the authority to work with State departments of agriculture to create, maintain and enforce the program, this legislation uses an existing and effective State fertilizer 

regulatory system to further secure ammonium nitrate. 

Mr. Chairman, Terra Industries and TFI recommend that H.R. 

3197 be passed as introduced by the subcommittee and the full 

House Homeland Security Committee. Similar legislation is pending in the U.S. Senate, and we hope the Senate will follow with 
65

passage of their bill. We believe this is necessary to protect the continued use of ammonium nitrate for agricultural purposes. 

Thank you today for your time and for this opportunity to have 

our views heard. 

[The statement of Mr. Wallace follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CARL WALLACE

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I am Carl Wallace, plant manager at Terra Mississippi Nitrogen, Inc., doing business as Terra Industries, located 

in Yazoo City, Mississippi. 

On behalf of Terra and The Fertilizer Institute (TFI) of which Terra is a member, 

I appreciate the opportunity to testify before the House Homeland Security Committee, Subcommittee on Prevention of Nuclear and Biological Attacks in support 

of H.R. 3197, the ‘‘Secure Handling of Ammonium Nitrate Act of 2005.’’ TFI is the 

leading voice of the nation’s fertilizer industry, representing the public policy, communication and statistical needs of fertilizer producers, retailers and transporters. 

Chairman Linder, I would like to thank you for scheduling this important hearing 

and for your leadership in addressing the critical issue of advancing ammonium nitrate security measures. And I would like to thank my representative, Congressman 

Thompson, in whose district the plant I manage is located, for his leadership as a 

chief sponsor of this important legislation and for inviting me here today to testify. 

Terra Industries is a leading international producer of nitrogen products which 

we sell to industrial customers and agribusiness retailers for sale to farmers. Terra 

employs approximately 1,200 people in North America and the United Kingdom and 

is headquartered in Sioux City, Iowa. Terra owns and operates seven nitrogen manufacturing facilities, four of which are in the midwestern and southern United 

States. 

Our Yazoo City ammonium nitrate plant has been in operation for more than 50 

years. This facility provides a major boost to the local economy, providing good-paying and stable job opportunities. At our Yazoo City facility, we employ 201 fulltime 

employees with an annual payroll of $12.5 million. We have 19 additional security 

related contract employees. Terra Mississippi Nitrogen has an annual production capacity of 500,000 tons of anhydrous ammonia, the basic ingredient for most nitrogen 

fertilizers and many industrial products. We upgrade this ammonia to 775,000 tons 

of ammonium nitrate; 600,000 tons of urea ammonium nitrate (UAN), and 7,000 

tons of urea. 

Ammonium nitrate fertilizer, the focus of this hearing, is vital to the U.S. plant 

food industry, its many local retail agribusiness outlets and the farmers and livestock producers they serve. Ammonium nitrate is valued by our nation’s farmers for 

its uses on pasture lands, citrus and specialty crops and for its use in no-till farming. In 2004 Mississippi farmers consumed 59,000 tons of ammonium nitrate. Nationwide during the same period consumption of ammonium nitrate totaled 1.5 million tons. 

After the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995 the fertilizer industry undertook several voluntary efforts to prevent ammonium nitrate from getting into the wrong 

hands. TFI partnered with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives; its member companies; state fertilizer associations and the state fertilizer control officials within the state departments of agriculture to promote the fertilizer security. The outreach programs called ‘‘Be Aware for America’’ and ‘‘Be Secure for 

America’’ were aimed at securing our products, particularly ammonium nitrate, in 

our places of business. After the terrorist attack on Sept. 11, 2001, the fertilizer industry launched America’s Security Begins with You, a new program, which has 

been endorsed by ATF, the Department of Homeland Security and the Association 

of American Plan Food Control Officials, who regulate fertilizer at the state level. 

The campaign urges retailers and producers to develop and implement security 

plans, record sales and alert law enforcement to any suspicious activity. 

After the tragic events of Sept. 11, 2001, TFI’s Board of Directors endorsed a voluntary security code of management practices which Terra has made mandatory at 

all of our facilities. Accordingly, our Yazoo City plant has conducted a security vulnerability assessment and developed a security plan based on that assessment. To 

further strengthen our product security efforts, we also require proof of delivery for 

all shipments of ammonium nitrate within 24 hours. We have recently had our security plan audited by an independent third party auditor. 

We at Terra believe that the provisions contained in H.R. 3197 further strengthen 

ammonium nitrate security by providing a uniform national system for registration 

and recordkeeping. We do not believe this legislation would be overly burdensome 
66

to handlers of ammonium nitrate or our farmer customers. By giving the Department of Homeland Security the authority to work with state departments of agriculture to create, maintain and enforce the program, this legislation uses an existing and effective state fertilizer regulatory system to further secure ammonium nitrate. 

Mr. Chairman, Terra Industries and TFI recommend that H.R. 3197 be passed 

as introduced by this subcommittee and the full House Homeland Security Committee. Similar legislation is pending in the U.S. Senate and we hope the Senate 

will follow with passage of their bill. We believe this is necessary to protect the continued use of ammonium nitrate fertilizer for agricultural purposes. 

Thank you for your time today and for providing this opportunity to have our 

views heard.

Mr. LINDER. Thank you all. 

Mr. Wallace, what is the typical purchase for a farmer in a year 

of ammonium nitrate in terms of tonnage? 

Mr. WALLACE. It can vary greatly. Because we have some farmers that might have only 100 acres, up to large corporate facilities 

of 10,000 acres. 

Mr. LINDER. What would 100 acres require? 

Mr. WALLACE. How many units of nitrogen per acre? Again, that 

varies greatly by crop and personal preference and the economics 

of the year. 

Mr. LINDER. Mr. Black, do you have a shot at that? 

Mr. BLACK. Well, yes, sir. If you look at a small producer, let us 

say a northeast Georgia producer up where we are from, 70 acres, 

and they do 200 pounds to an acre, maybe as a late wintertime application, preparation for the spring, so that is 70 acres times 200 

pounds per acre. 

Mr. LINDER. Dr. Oxley, educate us on the weight and the damage. You suggested that we should lower the quantity for reporting. 

How much damage does one ton do and how much damage does 10 

pounds do? 

Ms. OXLEY. Well, 10 pounds in this room, fragment, would probably blast a hole in that wall sitting here where I am. If we have 

a ton, we are going to severely damage the whole building. 

The reason I am suggesting that we put a lower limit is so that 

we do not have to worry about the small stuff, is that if all I want 

to do is kill a few people, there are lots of unregulated materials, 

and I am thinking smokeless powder, that I can do that. 

Mr. LINDER. You are not saying that is fine. You are not saying 

that is acceptable, I know, to kill just a few people. 

Ms. OXLEY. Yes. That’s right. I am saying, what is the goal? We 

certainly want to stop the mass destruction. 

I remember after the Oklahoma City bombing that the press was 

being kind of quiet about reporting it, and they reported it as a fertilizer bomb. You maybe remember the Washington Post reported 

a fellow trying to kill his girlfriend with potting soil. That certainly 

was a fertilizer bomb. But with individual-type bombs, you have 

lots of other choices. 

Mr. LINDER. If I, a passenger, brought five pounds strapped 

around his body on an airplane, would it do serious damage? 

Ms. OXLEY. Certainly five pounds would do serious damage. The 

problem is that to initiate five pounds of ammonium nitrate ANFO 

is extremely difficult. You have to have a booster that is a commercial material. So you would probably want to have a half pound or 
67

so of a military explosive to initiate it, and you have to have a detonator. 

That would not be the choice. If you wanted to do that kind of 

damage, you would do something like Richard Reed, where you 

used a peroxide explosive or he had a military explosive, PETN. 

Mr. LINDER. Mr. O’Neill, do you agree with Mr. Black that the 

best thing to do is to let the States continue to do the oversight, 

with standards set by the agencies? 

Mr. O’NEILL. Yes, we do. 

Mr. LINDER. And that would keep from having excess numbers 

of investigators coming out to each farm site? 

Mr. O’NEILL. There is also the process established. What we are 

looking for is a minimum standard. 

Mr. LINDER. Mr. McMahon, is it your judgment that this bill is 

sufficient to meet the tests that New York has passed on November 

28th? 

Mr. MCMAHON. Yes, I believe so. The thing that is important is 

that it gives the Secretary, only on the application of the Governor, 

the right to allow people, law enforcement or whoever in the individual States, to have access to the records. 

Initially, most investigations or inquiries are going to be conducted by State or local law enforcement; and they have many 

more resources than the Federal. They deal with the fertilizer industry. They deal with the farmers in many ways. So I think that 

component would be critical. 

I do agree that they should be standardized. Because if one State 

has laws and another State does not, that does not make sense either. And that is what we have seen with the chemical bills, like 

we have the chemical bill in New York. Surrounding States, New 

Jersey finally just passed one. I think you are going to see that 

piecemeal approach for a lot of these vulnerabilities unless there is 

some Federal legislation like this. 

Mr. LINDER. Thank you. 

The Chair would like to ask unanimous consent to allow Mr. 

Weldon to sit on the committee, give an opening statement if he 

chooses, and to question the panel. 

Now I recognize Mr. Langevin for 5 minutes. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I thank the panel again for your testimony today. It has been 

very enlightening and educational. 

My first question for Dr. Oxley, in your report, you discuss efforts to eliminate the explosive properties of ammonium nitrate. 

First, do you have Federal support for that research? And if you 

could just tell us the status of those efforts. 

Ms. OXLEY. The Federal funding for that came immediately after 

Oklahoma City, and I believe ATF got $18 million to look at 

inerting ammonium nitrate. They established a National Research 

Council Committee, which a report has now been issued; and they 

funded various efforts. Their line of research followed very closely 

the British effort, because the British had already started a program some 10 years earlier and were doing testing here in the 

States, because they do not have that much real estate. I don’t believe that program is funded at this time. We are certainly not 

funded over it, and I think I would hear if other folks are. 
68

Mr. LANGEVIN. Can you elaborate for the committee? Do you see 

great promise in being able to remove the explosive effects of ammonium nitrate? Is this something we should redouble our effort to 

do, so that ammonium nitrate would be available to farmers for 

commercial use but obviously we have taken steps to protect ourselves and would no longer have the explosive effect? 

Ms. OXLEY. To date, I have not seen a technology with great 

promise. However, I have had a new technology just presented to 

me, and I haven’t had time to evaluate it. So I would hesitate to 

say. But we should try. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Since your report was released in 1998, have you 

been disappointed with the lack of Federal response to the risk 

posed by ammonium nitrate? 

Ms. OXLEY. Well, I guess when you turn on those NRC committees you are not really expecting a response. So I wasn’t disappointed. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Mr. McMahon, does New Yorkw give you the 

power to compel compliance, and what enforcement powers do you 

have? 

Mr. MCMAHON. There is no penalties involved with that. Permits 

could be revoked by the Commissioner of Agriculture, but there is 

no civil penalties or criminal penalties. We are relying on the industry’s voluntary compliance, which I think we are going to have 

a very high rate of. 

Some of our other bills dealing with the chemical assessment, 

our general aviation bill that deals with general aviation facilities, 

had no penalties. There is over 500 of those. We have got compliance with that by almost 100 percent without penalties. So we are 

looking at partnership with the industry. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. And can you elaborate on what the New York law 

envisions as reasonable protections against vandalism, theft and 

unauthorized access to ammonium nitrate? 

Mr. MCMAHON. Yes. It would be in a security area with a fence 

or secured building when it is unattended on it. And then we would 

also expect and it requires that there be a frequent inventory. Because there has been—in many instances, theft has been involved 

with ammonium nitrate by terrorists or criminals on that. So that 

is the main components of it. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Mr. O’Neill, if I could ask you, can you just walk 

us through the standard process for distribution of ammonium nitrate once it is produced or imported? Does it get delivered to retailers in large drums or is it in bags and bar coded for sale? 

Mr. O’NEILL. I would say, Mr. Langevin, that the vast majority 

of this product is distributed in bulk from producers like Terra. On 

the domestic side, it would be delivered by rail car or by truck. 

Very little of it is distributed by bags. Farmers do not use bags in 

America. I think the industry as a whole, because of the security 

threat, has reduced the distribution of bags voluntarily. 

The other product stream is, the reason for this serious consideration of this bill, is as some manufacturers have gone out of the 

business and a number of people have stopped distributing the 

product, the demand has shifted to imports. The imports are coming from primarily the former Soviet Union and producers beyond 
69

the jurisdiction of the Congress, coming in by boatloads in the Mississippi River into our ports. 

To put it in context, the Texas City explosion, those ships that 

blew up were about 2,500 tons. The ships that are coming in today 

are 10 times that size. 25,000 tons, 20,000 tons would be a reasonable size shipload of the ammonium nitrate coming in. 

Now there is Coast Guard regulations, but those ships are soft 

targets to terrorists. So once the terrorists could commandeer or pirate one of these ships, then you have a whole different circumstance, because you have got a thousand tons of fuel oil on 

these vessels, and it is contained in their holds. So it is very quickly that we could have a very dangerous circumstance. 

So it is important that the committee, you know, looks at this 

carefully and realizes that we have domestic producers like Terra 

that is very responsible, but we have a shifting in the supply chain 

here that needs to be looked at regularly. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Good point. Thank you. 

Mr. LINDER. Mr. Weldon. 

Mr. WELDON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I won’t take the entire 

time. 

As a sponsor of the bill with Mr. Thompson, I appreciate again 

your leadership and that of Mr. Langevin for supporting Bennie 

Thompson and I on this important legislation. To me, it is a very 

vital issue, one I want to reiterate here publicly, is that we have 

industry coming forward to government saying help us regulate 

this product so that in fact we can keep it out of the hands of the 

bad guys. 

Too often, we criticize the private sector for not wanting to do the 

right thing; and this is probably the best example I can think of 

where the private sector came to Congress and said, look, we want 

to work with you. We do not want to harm our farmers, our distributors, our economy, but this is a problem that America has had 

to deal with, and we in fact want to be supportive. 

So I want to just publicly thank the industry groups who have 

come together on this initiative, and we look forward to working together. 

I would like to yield to my good friend and colleague from Pennsylvania, Mr. Dent. 

Mr. DENT. Thank you, Congressman Weldon. 

I, too, want to thank you gentlemen and lady for being here 

today; and Mr. O’Neill in particular, I want to thank you for taking 

such a leadership role on this very important initiative. 

I have asked to have my name added as a cosponsor to the legislation that is strongly supported by Mr. Weldon and Mr. Thompson 

of Mississippi. 

Again, I just commend you for your extraordinary leadership. It 

is—as Representative Weldon just said, it is not often that industry 

comes to us with an issue like this and is willing to work with us. 

For that, I thank you. 

Unfortunately, I cannot stay for the balance of the hearing. I just 

wanted to express my thanks and gratitude to all of you. 

Mr. WELDON. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, you might 

want to consider doing something at your level or the full committee level to name this legislation perhaps in honor of some of 
70

the victims that paid the ultimate price for this disaster in Oklahoma City. That would be a fitting tribute, maybe, to their memory. But I leave that judgment to you. 

With that, I yield back. 

Mr. LINDER. Mrs. Christensen. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and thank you for 

this hearing. 

I do not have any questions at this point. I think many of mine 

have been asked by the prior members of the panel. But I want to 

thank you all for being here and thank you for the words of caution 

about the other explosives that we need to be aware of and concerned about as well and the recommendations that all of you have 

made in improving the legislation. I understand that many of those 

are incorporated in the substitute. 

Thank you. 

Mr. LINDER. They are. 

Mr. Simmons. 

Mr. SIMMONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I look forward to supporting this legislation, but I did have a couple of questions. I would like to focus a little bit on the expertise 

of Dr. Oxley, if you have a moment. 

Years ago, during what my mother referred to as my wasted 

youth, I worked for the Central Intelligence Agency. I was a paramilitary operative. As a consequence of that assignment, I spent a 

lot of time working with explosives. 

I remember on one occasion working with a bag of ammonium nitrate. We used some sort of commercially available fuel and generated a very nice explosion that did a lot of damage to a building. 

But we also took a bag of flour and sequenced the detonation of a 

bag of flour and blew out the windows in one side of a barn. The 

way it was done was the bag was exploded into a fine particulate 

material, and then the sequenced detonation came a few seconds 

later, ignited the flour and blew out the windows, the doors of this 

barn. 

I notice in reading through your materials here that composite 

explosives require as little as stirring and oxidizer and fuel together, such as sawdust and other materials. 

Clearly, ammonium nitrate works better. It combusts faster. It 

has got oxidizers within the material itself, which helps, but there 

are many other things that are commercially available that can be 

used for explosive purposes. So I guess what I am getting at here 

is, while I support this bill and I support regulation, I wonder if 

there are not some ways, using your expertise or the expertise of 

other people who are in the scientific community, of perhaps manufacturing ammonium nitrate, urea nitrate and other materials in a 

way that inhibits their use as an explosive from a chemical standpoint. Is that possible or is that just too complicated? 

Ms. OXLEY. It is extremely difficult in terms of diluting it, which 

is the attempt in Ireland. That material is diluted with Dolomite, 

yet the Irish Republican Army continued to use it even after it was 

diluted. It was a matter of it was available in their hometowns so 

they could take it and import it to London and use it in 

Bishopsgate, which they had 30,000 pounds. So the dilution has not 

proved a solution to the problem. 
71

There are some attempts now that I am aware of to make it a 

double salt. I do not if that is going to—it seems to make the material more stable. 

And if you alter the materials so that instead of having to have—

I mentioned that setting off 5 pounds is very difficult. But if instead of having 100 pounds before you can get a decent detonation, 

if you had to have 1,000 pounds, that is one more hurdle. 

That is all we are doing really in our combating terrorism, is setting another hurdle. They can always figure out a way around it. 

I did not mean to be discouraging when I said they could figure out 

a way around it. I want to be ahead of them. 

Mr. SIMMONS. I think that’s reality. Israel, I believe, outlaws ammonium nitrate. They use urea nitrate. But that also can be used 

for explosive purposes in some configurations. 

And so I agree with your basic premise that if we regulate one 

material successfully, I also agree that in my State of Connecticut 

I don’t want a bunch of Federal regulators coming down. Set out 

the Federal standards; let the State enforce it. 

But I also agree that people who are determined to do these 

things will find other ways of getting materials, so we create a regulation regime for ammonium nitrate and we may have to add to 

that at some future date. 

Are there any agricultural countries around the world that have 

solved the problem? 

Ms. OXLEY. The problem has not been solved, but I suggest that 

we do some more international dialogue. The problem that Mr. 

O’Neill brought up of the boatloads coming in is something I think 

that the United States needs to take a lead role in, tracking commodity chemicals. It is going to be a huge problem when the boatloads of ammonium nitrate change hands maybe six times while 

they are out in the ocean. 

But if we can track variations in our stock market, certainly we 

can track how these oxidizers are bought and sold worldwide, because basically we can’t stop the use of oxidizers. People need them 

for purifying their water, for doing bleaching, in this case for fertilizer. What we can do is take a role in tracking where they are 

going for legitimate use. 

So if we control it here and we have got uncontrolled material 

coming in or going somewhere else, to go after U.S. interests, it is 

still a problem. 

Mr. SIMMONS. I thank you for those questions and I thank the 

witnesses for coming here today. I appreciate it. I yield back. 

Mr. LINDER. Mr. Thompson. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, ranking 

member. I appreciate the hearing. I have a written statement for 

the record. 

Mr. LINDER. Without objection. 

Mr. THOMPSON. In light of what Mr. Simmons talked about, we 

have sent DHS a request earlier in the year asking them to work 

with some of the major companies who develop a potential, less 

dangerous ammonium nitrate possibility. But we have not been 

able to get much movement out of that, and from what I understand, the industry doesn’t really have a lot of problem with it if 
72

it is a new technology that won’t cost a lot, but we just have to 

prove it. 

I think it would make good sense for us to kind of go on record 

saying, Why not look at it. And I think this would be an opportunity. I think Honeywell is one of the companies that is kind of 

pioneering this effort. But anything to help us be safer would be 

encouraged. 

Two comments: Mr. McMahon, can you tell me whether or not 

the New York model has created any unnecessary burden on those 

users of the product? 

Mr. MCMAHON. The law was just passed on November 28th, so 

it is too early to tell, but I think in the outreach that was done by 

our Department of Agriculture and markets to the industry, I don’t 

think it is. The purchaser form has, I think, 21 categories on it; 

seven of those could be filled out by the distributor in advance. 

So—I think it would probably take about 2 minutes to fill out the 

form, so I am not sure that would be undue, but I think that is 

something, as you look at it, that you should consider in looking 

at those States that have forms in. 

Now Nevada and South Carolina have had theirs—and Oklahoma—have had their laws in place a lot longer. Ours is very close. 

We did outreach with those. Those laws are all very similar, so 

they might be able to say better than us because we are just rolling 

ours out now. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Did you do yours in consultation with industry? 

Mr. MCMAHON. Yes. Department of Agriculture and Markets 

with industry, we did with law enforcement agencies actually on an 

international level as the Office of Homeland Security; and the bill 

calls for the Department of Agriculture and Markets and the State 

office of homeland security to consult with each other, which we did 

throughout the process on that. 

Mr. THOMPSON. I think the intent of the legislation was to work 

with the industry, but also give us some accountability for the 

product and not to, if you please, add an additional layer. We are 

very sensitive to that. We made sure that this law did not preempt 

any existing State law, so that if there were States who wanted to 

do more, they could feel absolutely comfortable in doing that and 

not trying to contest that. 

But we just felt the need to have some accountability built into 

the existing system. 

Mr. Wallace, do you think the accountability that is proposed in 

this legislation is reasonable? 

Mr. WALLACE. I do. And I think that it does not place an undue 

burden on the end consumer. 

We voluntarily put into place many security measures, including 

our delivery confirmation program which requires the customer to 

respond with a positive delivery note. We had some concern as to 

how that would be received in the farming industry and were 

pleasantly surprised that it was well received almost unanimously. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Yield back, Mr. Chair. 

Mr. LINDER. Ms. Norton. 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I regret that I was not 

able to be here and hear the testimony. 
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I would be interested to know whether you know if the present 

state of regulation has left the industry vital to liability of any 

kind. Were there any cases that indicate that exposure? 

Mr. LINDER. Anybody want to take a shot at that? 

Mr. WALLACE. Well, from our standpoint, again, we have put in 

place measures to track our product after it leaves our gate both 

on a truck and rail, which would be common transport for us. From 

a delivery confirmation, we have security measures in place to assure that the proper person is picking up the proper product; and 

then also, within the rail system, the proper tracking of product 

from source to destination. 

Mr. BLACK. I will comment just on a perceived liability. 

I manage also within our group a self-funded workers compensation insurance program for agribusiness. Some of the products, we 

are continuing to see pressure from excess insurance market just 

on the potential liability or potential exposure to some of these type 

things, so insurance markets and the excess—the potential liability 

that would come of that, we have seen a little pressure from that. 

Ms. NORTON. Typically—and industry is a more even playing 

field for industry if there is some regulation. Some will be more—

perhaps because of liability, perhaps because they are more safety 

conscious, because they want, indeed, to do the right thing—will be 

more inclined than others, and of course, there are costs associated 

with that. 

And to leave it to industry to decide whether to spend the money 

is one thing. When the government says, look, everybody ought to 

be accountable to a certain degree, some of that competitive pressure, at least it seems to me, is removed in what is responding to 

what is required of the industry by the Federal Government. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LINDER. Thank you, Ms. Norton. 

Thank you all for being here. We are grateful for your contributions. The hearing is adjourned. 

Members of the subcommittee, we are going to, in 5 minutes, reconvene and mark up this legislation rather than this afternoon. 

[Whereupon, at 11:10 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned, to 

reconvene in approximately 5 minutes.]

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