alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### In the Matter of the Claim of Verna Fell, Appellant, v A & W Products, Inc., et al., Respondents. Workmen’s Compensation Board, Respondent.

Appeal from a decision of the Workmen’s Compensation Board, filed April 8, 1976, which denied claimant’s application to reopen and for a rehearing on her claim for compensation. On July 15, 1958, claimant filed a claim for compensation on the ground that she suffered an occupational disease by reason of inhalations for a period from January, 1958 to April, 1958 of plastic glue in her position as assembler and packer with her employer which resulted in the disease of cirrhosis of the liver. The claim was originally disallowed by decision of the referee and affirmed by the board in a decision filed December 22, 1961. The board, in a decision filed June 4, 1965, denied an application by claimant’s attorneys for reopening of the case and rehearing. From that decision, claimant filed a notice of appeal to this court. On September 19, 1966, this court dismissed the appeal unless claimant filed the record, brief and notice of argument before October 5, 1966. No such filing took place. On December 23, 1975, claimant’s counsel submitted a further request for reopening of the case and restoral to the calendar for testimony. The board denied the application, and from this decision claimant appeals to this court. The original claim was heard on the merits with testimony by claimant, the employer, lay witnesses and physicians who expressed differing opinions as to causal relationship and diagnosis. The present application to reopen claims that scientific developments disclose that similar symptoms and liver condition which affected claimant could be caused by exposure to the glue which claimant experienced in her employment. However, the scientific developments were not specified. The reopening of a claim by the board lies within the discretion of the board, and such denial is not reviewable unless arbitrary and capricious *(Matter of Cappellano v Harry M. Stevens, Inc.,*35 AD2d 861). In addition, section 123 *856of the Workmen’s Compensation Law provides that no claim disallowed after a trial on the merits shall be reopened after seven years, and that section is controlling under the circumstances here *(Matter of Stimburis v Leviton Mfg. Co.,*5 NY2d 360). Decision affirmed, without costs. Mahoney, P. J., Greenblott, Sweeney, Staley, Jr., and Mikoll, JJ., concur.
* The Honorable Joseph F. Bataillon, United States District Judge for the District of Nebraska. 

## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 02-1589

___________ United States of America, * * Appellee, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the District * of Nebraska. Rufus Todd Jones, also known as * Todd Jones, also known as Scott Lee, * [UNPUBLISHED] * Appellant. *

___________ Submitted: February 19, 2003 Filed: February 25, 2003

___________ Before BYE, FAGG, and RILEY, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM. Rufus Todd Jones pleaded guilty to trafficking in counterfeit Rolex watches. Jones did not object to the sentence imposed by the district court, * namely, a sentence of 36 months imprisonment, three years supervised release, and restitution. On appeal, Jones contends the district court improperly ordered restitution in the amount-2- of $116,779.50 for legal fees and expenses Rolex incurred while obtaining a civil judgment against him. In our view, the district court correctly ordered restitution for attorney fees. See 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(1)(A) (authorizing restitution); United States v. Jackson , 155 F.3d 942, 949 (8th Cir.) (Standard of review), cert. denied , 525 U.S. 1059 (1998). The record amply supports the district court's determination that the attorney fees were triggered by the specific conduct that was the basis for the offense of conviction. Indeed, Jones testified Rolex had brought multiple actions against him relating to his sales of watches, and an unobjected-to portion of the presentence report (PSR) asserted Rolex had accrued $116,779.50 in legal fees and expenses in pursuing him. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(b)(6)(D) (district court may accept unobjected-to portions of PSR); United States v. Akbani , 151 F.3d 774, 779-80 (8th Cir. 1998). The district court properly considered Jones's financial resources and ability to meet the restitution obligation inasmuch as it recognized his negative net worth, stated its desire that he be able to have at least a little money while incarcerated, and ordered him to pay only a fraction of his earnings while in prison and $50 per month following his release. See18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(1)(B)(i )(II) (court shall consider financial resources of defendant); United States v. Manzer , 69 F.3d 222, 229 (8th Cir. 1995). Accordingly, we affirm. A true copy.

Attest:
CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
#### L. F. Mostoller, appellee, v. Illinois Rural Credit Association, appellant.

Assumpsit for salary as treasurer and secretary of corporation. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Circuit Court of McLean county; the Hon. Edward Barry, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1922.

Affirmed.

Opinion filed April 23, 1923.

Rehearing denied June 26, 1923.

B. O. De Mange, for appellant. William B. Bach, for appellee.

Mr. Justice Shurtleff

delivered the opinion of the court.
#### § 512.6 Informal action.

Nothing in this regulation is intended to preclude utilization of informal administrative actions or remedies which may be available.
#### Cornelius C. Rose, Jr., et al., Appellants, v Avon Associates, Inc., et al., Respondents, et al., Defendants.

Order, Supreme Court, New York County, entered December 10, 1976, unanimously modified, on the law and the facts, and in the exercise of discretion, to reduce the commission to the receiver to $15,000, and otherwise affirmed, without costs and without disbursements. In view of the fact that a real estate agent and legal counsel were also involved in this matter, the commission to the receiver was excessive to the extent indicated. Concur—Kupferman, J. P., Birns, Markewich and Yesawich, JJ.
### IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESS EE AT NASHVILLE June 14, 200 1 Session
TRAVIS MILTON WA TT v. LUMBERMEN S MUTUAL CA SUALTY

INSURANCE CO., ET AL 

### . Appeal from the Chancery Court for Madison County No. 53638 Joe C. Morris, Chancellor

No. W2000-00104-SC-R3-CV - Filed December 20, 2001

J ANICE M. H OLDER , J., concurring and dissenting.

I concur in the majority’s holding that Watt is entitled to receive permanent and total disability benefit s. I write

separa tely, how ever, to

express my disagreement with the allocation of liability betwee n the empl oyer and

the Second Injury Fu

nd, consis tent wit

h my concur ring and dissenting opinion in Bomely v. Mid-America Corp. , 970 S.W.2d 929 (Tenn. 1998).

The clear purpose of the Second Injury Fund is to encourage employers to hire handicapped worker s. Bomely , 970 S.W.2d at 937 (Holder, J., concurring and dissenting) (citing E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Friar , 218 Tenn. 554, 560, 404 S.W.2d 518, 521 (1966)). This result is achieved by limiting an employer’s liability for a subsequent injury causing permanent and total disability to such compensation as would have been payable for the subsequent

injury without consideration of any previous injury. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-208(a)(1). The remainder of any compensation due for the subsequent injury is then paid out of the Second Injury Fund. Id.

In this case , Lumberm

ens should

be held r esponsibl e sole ly for the benefits it would have paid to Watt for the loss of his leg. Lumberme ns’ liabil ity would th

en be limit

ed to 200 weeks of compensation. The outc ome of the majority’ s alloca

tion of lia bility for benefit s is to expose the employer and its insurance company to greater liability than is contemplated under the Sec o nd In jury Fund legislation. I reiterate my position in Bomely that the majority’s analysis will deter employers from hiring ha

ndicapped worker s. Becau se this re sult is contrar y to the le gislature ’s intent i n creating the Second Injury Fu nd, I must r

espectf ully dissent to that section of the majority opinion allocating fifty per

cent of t he liability for Wa

tt’s permanent a

nd total disability

benefit s to Lumberme

ns.

___________________________________ JANICE M. HOLDER, J USTICE
### §3714a. Transferred

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Codification

Section 3714a was editorially reclassified as section 41508 of Title 34, Crime Control and Law Enforcement.
§ 51.6 Verification of passports and release of information from passport records. ( a ) *Verification.* When required by a foreign government, a consular officer abroad may verify a U.S. passport.
( b ) *Release of information.* Information in passport records is subject to the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and the Privacy Act. Release of this information may be requested in accordance with part 171 or part 172 of this title.
§ 34.6 Interest, penalties, and administrative costs. Except as otherwise provided by statute, contract or excluded in accordance with the FCCS, STATE will assess: ( a ) Interest on delinquent debts in accordance with 31 CFR 901.9.
( b ) Penalties at the rate of 6 percent a year or such other rate as authorized by law on any portion of a debt that is delinquent for more than 90 days.
( c ) Administrative costs to cover the costs of processing and calculating delinquent debts.
( d ) Late payment charges under paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section shall be computed from the date of delinquency.
( e ) When a debt is paid in partial or installment payments, amounts received shall be applied first to outstanding penalty and administrative cost charges, second to accrued interest, and then to outstanding principal.
( f ) STATE shall consider waiver of interest, penalties and/or administrative costs in accordance with the FCCS, 31 CFR 901.9(g).
(a)
    
    Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such
disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our
supervision, to ensure the material information relating to the
Registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to
us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in
which this report is being prepared;(b)
    
    Designed such internal control over financial reporting, or caused
such internal control over financial reporting to be designed under
our supervision, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the
reliability of financial reporting and the preparation of financial
statements for external purposes in accordance with generally accepted
accounting principles;(c)
    
    Evaluated the effectiveness of the Registrants disclosure controls
and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the
effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end
of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and(d)
    
    Disclosed in this report any change in the Registrants internal
control over financial reporting that occurred during the Registrants
most recent fiscal quarter (the Registrants fourth fiscal quarter in
the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is
reasonably likely to materially affect, the Registrants internal
control over financial reporting; and
  (a)
    
    All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or
operation of internal control over financial reporting which are
reasonably likely to adversely affect the Registrants ability to
record, process summarize and report financial information; and(b)
    
    Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
employees who have a significant role in the Registrants internal
controls over financial reporting.
  By:
    
    /s/ James W. Creamer, III

James W. Creamer, IIIPresident & CEO
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VERSIL MILTON, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

TRUEPOSITION, INC.,

Defendant. /

No. C 08-03616 SI

ORDER GRANTING UNOPPOSED

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE FIRST

AMENDED COMPLAINT

Plaintiffs have filed a motion for leave to file a First Amended Complaint, and defendant has

filed a statement of non-opposition. The motion hearing currently set for May 14, 2010 is hereby

VACATED and plaintiffs’ unopposed motion is GRANTED. (Docket No. 48). Plaintiffs are

directed to file their First Amended Complaint by May 7, 2010.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 5, 2010 

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

Case 3:08-cv-03616-SI Document 51 Filed 05/05/10 Page 1 of 1
8 : 4 5 : 0 5 1 1 / 3 / 2 0 0 6 1 4 : 1 5 : 0 5 1 1 / 3 / 2 0 0 6 1 9 : 4 5 : 0 5 1 1 / 3 / 2 0 0 6 1: 1 5 : 0 5 1 1 / 4 / 2 0 0 6 6 : 4 5 : 0 5 1 1 / 4 / 2 0 0 6 1 2 : 1 5 : 0 5 1 1 / 4 / 2 0 0 6 1 7 : 4 5 : 0 5 1 1 / 4 / 2 0 0 6 2 3 : 1 5 : 0 5 1 1 / 4 / 2 0 0 6 4 : 4 5 : 0 5 1 1 / 5 / 2 0 0 6 1 0 : 1 5 : 0 5 1 1 / 5 / 2 0 0 6 1 5 : 4 5 : 0 5 1 1 / 5 / 2 0 0 6 2 1 : 1 5 : 0 5 1 1 / 5 / 2 0 0 6 2 : 4 5 : 0 5 1 1 / 6 / 2 0 0 6 8 : 1 5 : 0 5 1 1 / 6 / 2 0 0 6 1 3 : 4 5 : 0 5 1 1 / 6 / 2 0 0 6 1 9 : 1 5 : 0 5 1 1 / 6 / 2 0 0 6 0 : 4 5 : 0 5 1 1 / 7 / 2 0 0 6 6 : 1 5 : 0 5 1 1 / 7 / 2 0 0 6 1 1 : 4 5 : 0 5 1 1 / 7 / 2 0 0 6 1 7 : 1 5 : 0 5 1 1 / 7 / 2 0 0 6 2 2 : 4 5 : 0 5 1 1 / 7 / 2 0 0 6 4 : 1 5 : 0 5 1 1 / 8 / 2 0 0 6 9 : 4 5 : 0 5 1 1 / 8 / 2 0 0 6 1 5 : 1 5 : 0 5 1 1 / 8 / 2 0 0 6 2 0 : 4 5 : 0 5 1 1 / 8 / 2 0 0 6 2 : 1 5 : 0 5 1 1 / 9 / 2 0 0 6 7 : 4 5 : 0 5 1 1 / 9 / 2 0 0 6 1 3 : 1 5 : 0 5 1 1 / 9 / 2 0 0 6 1 8 : 4 5 : 0 5 1 1 / 9 / 2 0 0 6 0 : 1 5 : 0 5 1 1 / 1 0 / 2 0 0 6 5 : 4 5 : 0 5 1 1 / 1 0 / 2 0 0 6
1 1 : 1 5 : 0 5 1 1 / 1 0 / 2 0 0 6
1 6 : 4 5 : 0 5 1 1 / 1 0 / 2 0 0 6 2 2 : 1 5 : 0 5 1 1 / 1 0 / 2 0 0 6 3 : 4 5 : 0 5 1 1 / 1 1 / 2 0 0 6 9 : 1 5 : 0 5 1 1 / 1 1 / 2 0 0 6
1 4 : 4 5 : 0 5 1 1 / 1 1 / 2 0 0 6 2 0 : 1 5 : 0 5 1 1 / 1 1 / 2 0 0 6 1 : 4 5 : 0 5 1 1 / 1 2 / 2 0 0 6 7 : 1 5 : 0 5 1 1 / 1 2 / 2 0 0 6
1 2 : 4 5 : 0 5 1 1 / 1 2 / 2 0 0 6
1 8 : 1 5 : 0 5 1 1 / 1 2 / 2 0 0 6 2 3 : 4 5 : 0 5 1 1 / 1 2 / 2 0 0 6 5 : 1 5 : 0 5 1 1 / 1 3 / 2 0 0 6
1 0 : 4 5 : 0 5 1 1 / 1 3 / 2 0 0 6
1 6 : 1 5 : 0 5 1 1 / 1 3 / 2 0 0 6 2 1 : 4 5 : 0 5 1 1 / 1 3 / 2 0 0 6 3 : 1 5 : 0 5 1 1 / 1 4 / 2 0 0 6 8 : 4 5 : 0 5 1 1 / 1 4 / 2 0 0 6
1 4 : 1 5 : 0 5 1 1 / 1 4 / 2 0 0 6 1 9 : 4 5 : 0 5 1 1 / 1 4 / 2 0 0 6 1 : 1 5 : 0 5 1 1 / 1 5 / 2 0 0 6 6 : 4 5 : 0 5 1 1 / 1 5 / 2 0 0 6
1 2 : 1 5 : 0 5 1 1 / 1 5 / 2 0 0 6 1 7 : 4 5 : 0 5 1 1 / 1 5 / 2 0 0 6 2 3 : 1 5 : 0 5 1 1 / 1 5 / 2 0 0 6 4 : 4 5 : 0 5 1 1 / 1 6 / 2 0 0 6 1 0 : 1 5 : 0 5 1 1 / 1 6 / 2 0 0 6 1 5 : 4 5 : 0 5 1 1 / 1 6 / 2 0 0 6 2 1 : 1 5 : 0 5 1 1 / 1 6 / 2 0 0 6 2 : 4 5 : 0 5 1 1 / 1 7 / 2 0 0 6 8 : 1 5 : 0 5 1 1 / 1 7 / 2 0 0 600.020.040.060.080.10.12Pierce Co. OWB 11/3/06 to 11/17/06SSESSNWNNEWESENNENCalmDate & TimePM2.5mg/m3former std.(0.065mg/m3)current std.(0.035mg/m3)Note:This data was collected on the frontporch of the subjects home which isabout 1,100 feet to the NW of the OWB. Wind direction is shownat the top of thechart. Winds out of the E, SE should impact the subject home the most.subjectOWB
#### LANE et al. v. EQUITABLE LIFE ASSUR. SOC. OF UNITED STATES et al.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.

March 24, 1905.)

1. Insurance—Policy—Proceeds — Payment into Court — Discharge—Special Term—Jurisdiction.

Where several parties made claim to the proceeds of a policy, the Special Term of the Supreme Court had jurisdiction to make an order discharging the insurer from all liability on payment of the proceeds of the policy into court.

2. Same—Costs.

Where an order was entered discharging an insurance society from liability for the proceeds of a policy, claimed by several persons, on its payment of such proceeds into court, it was error for the court to award $50 costs to such society, to be deducted from such proceeds.

[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see vol. 29, Cent. Dig. Interpleader, § 76.]

Appeal from Special Term, Kings County.

Action by Lillie Lane and others against the Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States, and W. Morton Garden, individually, and as executor of George W. Kidd, deceased. From an order discharging defendant society from all liability in the action on paying into court a specified sum, with interest, defendant Garden, individually and as executor, etc., appeals. Modified.

Argued before HIRSCHBERG, P. J., and BARTLETT, JENKS, RICH, and MILLER, JJ.

Gilbert W. Minor, for appellant.

Frederick S. Fisher (Abel E. Blackmar, on the brief), for respondents Lane and others.

William C. Diamond (Edward D. Brown, on the brief), for respondent Equitable Life Assur. Soc.

WILLARD BARTLETT, J.

The Court at Special Term had jurisdiction to grant the order appealed from, under the authority of Lane v. New York Life Ins. Co., 56 Hun, 92, 9 N. Y. Supp. 52. It *878does not seem to us that the appellant has any grievance on account of the amount fixed by the court below as payable in order to discharge the liability of the Equitable Life Assurance Society. He presented no affidavit bearing on that question, and we think that the recital in the order to the effect that his counsel appeared and consented “to the said payment into court” implies an assent on his part that the amount offered and admitted to be due by the Equitable Life Assurance Society was all to which any claimant was entitled under the policy of insurance in controversy.

In the brief for the appellant, however, objection is made to the award of $50 costs to the Equitable Life Assurance Society, to be deducted from the proceeds of the policy directed to be paid into court. We can see no propriety in this award of costs, and the order should be modified by striking it therefrom. No reason can be suggested why the claimants to the proceeds of an insurance policy should be compelled to pay anything to the insurance company because it is allowed to withdraw from a litigation by paying into court the sum of money which it concedes to be due to somebody.

Order modified by striking out the award of $50 costs to the Equitable Life Assurance Society, and, as thus modified, affirmed, without costs- of this appeal. All concur.
The Company's Balance Sheet dated September 30, 2010 (unaudited)



  
 Exhibit 10.4

 BIOVEST INTERNATIONAL, INC. 
  

					
	 	  	September 30, 
2010
(Unaudited)	 
	ASSETS	  			
	 Current assets:
	  			
	 Cash
	  	$	206,000	  
	 Accounts receivable, net of $8,000 allowance for doubtful accounts at June 30, 2010 and September 30,
2009
	  	 	398,000	  
	 Costs and estimated earnings in excess of billings on uncompleted contracts
	  	 	106,000	  
	 Inventories
	  	 	417,000	  
	 Prepaid expenses and other current assets
	  	 	141,000	  
		  	 	 	 
		
	 Total current assets
	  	 	1,268,000	  
		
	 Property and equipment, net
	  	 	77,000	  
	 Patents and trademarks, net
	  	 	261,000	  
	 Reorganization value in excess of amounts allocated to identifiable assets
	  	 	2,131,000	  
	 Other assets
	  	 	153,000	  
		  	 	 	 
		
	 Total assets
	  	$	3,890,000	  
		  	 	 	 
		
	LIABILITIES AND STOCKHOLDERS’ DEFICIT	  			
	 Liabilities not subject to compromise:
	  			
	 Current liabilities:
	  			
	 Accounts payable
	  	 	556,000	  
	 Customer deposits
	  	 	85,000	  
	 Accrued liabilities
	  	 	688,000	  
	 Notes payable, related party
	  	 	2,597,000	  
		  	 	 	 
		
	 Total liabilities not subject to compromise
	  	 	3,926,000	  
		
	 Liabilities subject to compromise (Note 8)
	  	 	76,898,000	  
		  	 	 	 
		
	 Total liabilities
	  	 	80,824,000
1 The Honorable Richard G. Kopf, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the District of Nebraska. 

## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 02-1087

___________ United States of America, * * Appellee, * * v. * Appeal from the United States * District Court for the Roberto Arreguin-Rivera, * District of Nebraska. * Appellant. * [UNPUBLISHED]

___________ Submitted: July 16, 2002 Filed: July 23, 2002

___________ Before BOWMAN, FAGG, and RILEY, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM. Roberto Arreguin-Rivera (Arreguin-Rivera) was arrested after police found a large amount of methamphetamine in hidden compartments in a car in which he was a passenger. He pled guilty to conspiring to possess, with intent to distribute, methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) & 846. The district court 1 sentenced Arreguin-Rivera to 97 months imprisonment, based on a Guidelines range of 97-121 months, and 5 years supervised release. Arreguin-Rivera appeals, and we affirm. After reviewing the record for plain error, we find no plain error.-2- In a brief filed under Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967), ArreguinRivera’s counsel concedes Arreguin-Rivera’s sentence is not subject to review, if within a properly calculated Guidelines range and not otherwise in violation of law. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a); United States v. Woodrum , 959 F.2d 100, 101 (8th Cir. 1992) (per curiam). We agree. Arreguin-Rivera's sentence is within a properly calculated range and no violations of law exist. Having independently reviewed the entire record in accordance with Penson v. Ohio , 488 U.S. 75 (1988), we find no plain error affecting Arreguin-Rivera’s substantial rights. SeeUnited States v. Vonn , 122 S. Ct. 1043, 1046 (2002) (standard of review). We do note two issues which warrant comment. First, Arreguin-Rivera received a role in the offense sentencing adjustment based on the plea agreement, which stipulated he was a "minor participant." See United States v. Nguyen , 46 F.3d 781, 783 (8th Cir. 1995) ("A defendant who explicitly and voluntarily exposes himself to a specific sentence may not challenge that punishment on appeal."). Although Arreguin-Rivera argued at the plea hearing and on appeal that his involvement was virtually non-existent, the district court did not err in relying on the plea agreement stipulation. Second, the plea agreement and the statements made at the plea hearing were sufficient to form a factual basis for the conspiracy plea. In the plea agreement, Arreguin-Rivera agreed that he "conspired to deliver methamphetamine to Nebraska." At the plea hearing, Arreguin-Rivera's statements, together with his lawyer's statements, show that he was pleading guilty to a conspiracy because the car driver was prepared to testify and implicate Arreguin-Rivera in the conspiracy. The judgment of the district court is affirmed. Counsel’s motion to withdraw is granted.-3- A true copy.
Attest: CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
### §2771. Repealed. Pub. L. 97–35, title VI, §683(a), Aug. 13, 1981, 95 Stat. 519

Section, Pub. L. 88–452, title I, §171, formerly §141, as added Pub. L. 89–794, title I, §114, Nov. 8, 1966, 80 Stat. 1456; renumbered §161, Pub. L. 90–222, title I, §111(b), Dec. 23, 1967, 81 Stat. 726; renumbered §171 and amended Pub. L. 91–177, title I, §101(a), title II, §201, Dec. 30, 1969, 83 Stat. 827, 833; Pub. L. 92–424, §2(a), Sept. 19, 1972, 86 Stat. 688, authorized implementation of programs during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1967, and the eight succeeding fiscal years.

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Effective Date of Repeal

Repeal effective Oct. 1, 1981, see section 9912(a) of this title, prior to the general amendment of chapter 106 (§9901 et seq.) of this title by Pub. L. 105–285.