COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Willis, Lemons and Frank 

Argued at Norfolk, Virginia 

VONDA KAY WILSON 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 2683-98-1 JUDGE JERE M. H. WILLIS, JR. 

 DECEMBER 28, 1999 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF SOUTHAMPTON COUNTY 

Rodham T. Delk, Jr., Judge 

 S. Jane Chittom, Appellate Counsel (Elwood 

Earl Sanders, Jr., Appellate Defender; Public 

Defender Commission, on briefs), for 

appellant. 

 Eugene Murphy, Assistant Attorney General 

(Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on brief), 

for appellee. 

 On appeal from the revocation of her suspension of 

sentence, Vonda Kay Wilson contends that the trial court erred 

in sentencing her to prison, rather than ordering her admission 

to a community-based detention center. She argues that her 

sentence violates the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 

§ 12101 et seq. (ADA). We disagree and affirm the judgment of 

the trial court. 

 On September 2, 1993, Wilson was convicted of unlawful 

wounding and was sentenced to five years imprisonment, suspended 

on conditions including probation. On March 10, 1998, the trial 

court determined that Wilson had violated the conditions of her 
probation for the third time. At that time, three years and 

four months remained to be served under her original sentence. 

The trial court ordered: 

That the defendant shall be screened and 

evaluated for the Detention Center Program. 

The court further ordered that the defendant 

shall enroll into and successfully complete 

the said program with an emphasis on Drug 

Abuse Treatment. If the defendant is not 

accepted into said program, or if she does 

not enroll into and successfully complete 

said program, she shall be brought back 

before the Court and ordered to serve the 

imposed sentence of three (3) years and four 

(4) months. 

See Code §§ 19.2-316.2, 53.1-67.8. 

 After a psychiatric examination of Wilson, the Department 

of Corrections reported that she was ineligible for the 

Detention Center Program, an alternative "boot camp" facility, 

due to her schizophrenic condition. Based upon this report, the 

trial court sentenced Wilson to serve the remainder of her 

sentence according to the March 10, 1998 order. 

 Defense counsel argued that denying Wilson admission to the 

Detention Center Program due to her mental condition violated 

the ADA. The trial court stated, "if she's not eligible for 

detention center I'm not going to ram it down their throats." 

Defense counsel replied, "Nobody's asked you to." Defense 

counsel did not move for an order requiring the Detention Center 

to admit Wilson. Thus, we do not address whether such an order 

would have been proper or within the trial court's authority. 

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 The trial court then examined other options for Wilson, 

including a community-based "diversion center." See Code 

§§ 19.2-316.3 and 53.1-67.7. The Commonwealth argued that the 

March 10, 1998 order sentenced Wilson to incarceration, with 

suspension only upon condition that she successfully complete 

the Detention Center Program and drug treatment. Defense 

counsel did not argue that the diversion center was an 

acceptable alternative. Defense counsel stated, "The [trial] 

court can emasculate me through giving her the diversion center 

or it can frame the issue very precisely for [Penn. Dept. of 

Corrections v.] Yeskey[, 524 U.S. 206 (1998)], or dare I say 

Wilson, for the future." 

 Wilson contends that the trial court erred in committing 

her to prison rather than ordering her admission to the 

Detention Center. She argues that by doing so, the trial court 

violated the ADA. We disagree. 

 The purpose of the ADA is to ensure that "no qualified 

individual with a disability shall, by reason of such 

disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the 

benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public 

entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity." 

42 U.S.C. § 12132. Citing Yeskey, Wilson argues that the ADA 

prohibits the Detention Center from rejecting her on the basis 

of her mental condition. Yeskey proclaims no such holding. 

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 Yeskey was sentenced to a boot camp facility, which refused 

his admission due to his history of hypertension. The Supreme 

Court held that a state prison is a "public entity" as an 

"instrumentality of a State . . . or local government." 42 

U.S.C. § 12131(1)(B). Thus, action by prison officials may 

violate the requirements of the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132. 

That is the full extent of the Yeskey holding. The holding 

addressed that issue alone because the trial court in Yeskey had 

not addressed the merits of Yeskey's claim, but had dismissed 

his original suit for failure to state a claim. 

 Wilson fails to recognize that Yeskey was a civil suit, 

filed in accordance with the provisions of the ADA. 

The remedies, procedures, and rights set 

forth in section 794a of Title 29 shall be 

the remedies, procedures, and rights this 

subchapter provides to any person alleging 

discrimination on the basis of disability in 

violation of section 12132 of this title. 

42 U.S.C. § 12133. That section provides specific civil and 

administrative remedies. Nowhere in the ADA does it appear that 

Congress intended the Act to provide rights that could be 

asserted in a criminal proceeding or at a probation revocation 

hearing. Assuming, without deciding, that the Detention Center 

violated the ADA in rejecting Wilson, a probation revocation 

hearing in a criminal court is not the proper forum in which to 

attack that violation. The Detention Center is not a party to 

this case. 

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 The March 10, 1998 sentencing order directed that Wilson be 

incarcerated to serve her remaining sentence if she were 

ineligible for the Detention Center. 

A trial court has broad discretion to revoke 

a suspended sentence and probation based on 

Code § 19.2-306, which allows a court to do 

so "for any cause deemed by it sufficient." 

. . . The court's findings of fact and 

judgment will not be reversed unless there 

is a clear abuse of discretion. 

Davis v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 81, 86, 402 S.E.2d 684, 687 

(1991) (citation omitted). Having found that Wilson had 

violated her probation, the trial court had discretionary 

authority to order her to serve her original sentence. 

 The issue before us is whether revocation of Wilson's 

probation and the imposition of her remaining sentence was an 

abuse of discretion. Considering her previous probation 

violations and her unsuitability for alternative programs, we 

find no such abuse. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the 

trial court. 

 The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 

 Affirmed.

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