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KENOSIA COMMONS, INC. v. CYNTHIA

DACOSTA ET AL.

(AC 37396)

Lavine, Mullins and Schaller, Js.

Argued October 8—officially released December 15, 2015

(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of

Danbury, Housing Session, Russo, J.)

Colin P. Mahon, with whom, on the brief, was

Thomas T. Lonardo, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Opinion

LAVINE, J. The plaintiff, Kenosia Commons, Inc.,

appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered

in favor of the defendants, Cynthia DaCosta and Candra

DaCosta, in this summary process action. On appeal,

the plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly concluded that by virtue of Cynthia DaCosta’s ownership

of shares of stock in the plaintiff corporation she is not

subject to summary process proceedings pursuant to

General Statutes § 21-80. We reverse the judgment of

the trial court.1

We glean the following facts and procedural history

from the court file and trial transcript. On June 30, 2014,

the plaintiff had a complaint served on the defendants.

The complaint alleged that the plaintiff, as the lessor,

and the defendants, as the lessees, had entered into an

oral lease for the use and occupancy of 46 Kenosia

Avenue lot 10 (lot 10) in Danbury. The initial monthly

rent of $425 was payable on the first day of May, 2014,

and on the first day of each month thereafter. The defendants took possession of lot 10 pursuant to the oral

lease and still occupy it, but they have failed to pay the

rent due under the lease for May, 2014. The plaintiff

caused a notice to quit to be served on the defendants

on or about May 12, 2014.2 The complaint further alleged

thatthe defendants have failed to tenderthe total arrearage due the plaintiff within the time stated in the notice

to quit. Moreover, although the time designated for the

defendants to quit the premises has passed, the defendants continue in possession. In its prayer for relief,

the plaintiff sought a judgment of possession. The

defendants responded to the complaint by filing Judicial

Branch Form JD-HM-5, pleading that they ‘‘do not

know’’ with respect to each paragraph of the complaint.

Following a series of continuances requested by the

defendants, the matter was tried to the court on October

6, 2014. The plaintiff presented evidence that it is a

mixed-use mobile home or manufactured housing community in Danbury; it has twenty-nine lots, a house,

and several apartments. It is the only manufactured

housing community cooperative in the state. Although

the plaintiff does not own the mobile manufactured

home occupied by the defendants, it owns the land

beneath it. The monthly rent per lot is $425. As of May

1, 2014, the defendants were delinquent in paying rent

for lot 10 in the amount of $2297.78. The defendants

have not paid the plaintiff rent since they were served

with the notice to quit.

Cynthia DaCosta testified that she moved onto lot 10

in early 2011 after purchasing a home from Plaza Modular and Mobile Homes. She received and signed a lease

for lot 10 in February, 2011. She testified that ‘‘we’re a

co-op, so you buy shares to be in the park, I paid $2500

for twelve shares.’’ (Emphasis added.) She also testified
that she and her family encountered difficult circumstances that prevented her from being able to pay rent

forlot 10. At the conclusion of evidence, the court heard

the parties’ arguments.

Counsel for the plaintiff stated that § 21-80 is the

summary process statute applicable to mobile homes.

Specifically, he argued that the statute provides that

‘‘for a nonpayment of rent by a resident, you must give

them thirty days notice and must include the arrearage,

and if the arrearage is tendered in full prior to the

expiration of the thirty days on the notice to quit, then

the park owner must accept it and reinstate the person.’’

Cynthia DaCosta argued that the defendants are not

trying ‘‘to shirk anything’’ or get out of paying their

bills. The plaintiff has refused to accept her plan to pay

the arrearage, demanding, instead, full payment.

The court took the matter on the papers, but later

ordered the parties to appear for a posttrial hearing on

November 3, 2014. When the case was called, the court

stated: ‘‘[W]e had a—a trial on the merits of the complaint filed by [the plaintiff] and testimony was received.

And, in reviewing the file, the court found other matters

that had been pending here in Danbury Superior Court

involving [the plaintiff]. And it came to the court’s attention that this could be set up where a person could be

a tenant and an owner at the same time, which was

never addressed at the trial, and I need to hear whether

Ms. DaCosta is a tenant or a tenant-owner. If she’s a

tenant-owner, the court—[I] don’t know if it even has

the ability to rule against her, because, in effect, she

would be an owner displacing herself. That’s the concern of the court. And I don’t know how it’s set up with

her and her tenantship with respect to [the plaintiff].’’

The plaintiff’s counsel presented the court with the

plaintiff’s certificate of incorporation, bylaws, and rules

and regulations, and directed the court to article 13 of

the bylaws. Counsel argued, pursuant to article 13, that

the homeowner loses the right to own shares under

certain circumstances, including eviction. Cynthia

DaCosta argued that she purchased shares of stock in

the plaintiff for $2500 when she moved in. The court

found that Cynthia DaCosta owns twelve shares of

stock in the plaintiff. The court took the matter on

the papers.

On November 7, 2014, the court issued the following

order, which constituted the judgment of the court.

‘‘The court heard the matter on its merits and, additionally, scheduled a hearing to entertain argument on a

posttrial issue that had come to the court’s attention

in connection with a companion matter involving [the

plaintiff]. That hearing was held on November 3, 2014.

After hearing additional argument, the court rules as

follows: The tenant, Cynthia DaCosta, by virtue of her

ownership shares in [the plaintiff], is equal part owner

and tenant and therefore falls outside of the strict statu-
tory guidelines for a summary process action. The court

has reviewed the [plaintiff’s] bylaws in their entirety

and finds no language that would reduce tenant/owner

[Cynthia] DaCosta’s status to that of tenant only, which

would then allow her to be the proper target of a summary process action. The motion for judgment of possession is denied.’’ Thereafter the plaintiff appealed

from the court’s judgment.

On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court

improperly concluded that the defendants are not subject to a judgment of possession pursuant to § 21-80.

The trial court determined that the plaintiff was not

entitled to possession of lot 10 because there was no

language in the plaintiff’s bylaws that would reduce

‘‘tenant/owner [Cynthia] DaCosta’s status to that of tenant only . . . .’’3 However, the present summary process action is controlled by the relevant General

Statutes, not the plaintiff’s bylaws.

‘‘The ultimate issue in a summary process action is

the right to possession.’’ Southland Corp. v. Vernon, 1

Conn. App. 439, 443, 473 A.2d 318 (1984). Summary

process is a statutory proceeding that is ‘‘intended to

be summary and is designed to provide an expeditious

remedy to the landlord seeking possession.’’ Prevedini

v. Mobil Oil Corp., 164 Conn. 287, 292, 320 A.2d 797

(1973). We therefore examine the statutes applicable to

summary process actions and to mobile manufactured

home parks.

‘‘[I]ssues of statutory construction raise questions of

law, over which we exercise plenary review. . . . The

process of statutory interpretation involves the determination of the meaning of the statutory language as

applied to the facts of the case, including the question

of whetherthe language does so apply.’’(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Williams v. Housing Authority,

159 Conn. App. 679, 689, A.3d (2015).

‘‘When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent

of the legislature. . . . In other words, we seek to

determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the

statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case,

including the question of whether the language actually

does apply. . . . In seeking to determine the meaning,

General Statutes § 1-2z directs us first to consider the

text of the statute itself and its relationship to other

statutes. If, after examining such text and considering

such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and

unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable

results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the

statute shall not be considered. . . . When a statute is

not plain and unambiguous, we also look for interpretive guidance to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative

policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles
governing the same general subject matter . . . . A

statute is ambiguous if, when read in context, it is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.’’

(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

Wilton Meadows Ltd. Partnership v. Coratolo, 299

Conn. 819, 825, 14 A.3d 982 (2011).

Chapter 412 of our General Statutes is entitled

‘‘Mobile Manufactured Homes and Mobile Manufactured Home Parks. Park Owners and Residents.’’ Section 21-80 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) An action for

summary process may be maintained by the owner of

a mobile manufactured home park against a mobile

manufactured home resident . . . . (b) (1) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 47a-23, an owner

may . . . maintain a summary process action against

a resident who owns a mobile manufactured home only

for one or more of the following reasons: (A) Nonpayment of rent, utility charges or reasonable incidental

services charges . . . .’’

Chapter 412 of the General Statutes provides definitions for the terms used therein. General Statutes § 21-

64 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(5) ‘[r]esident’ means a

person who owns, or rents and occupies, a mobile manufactured home in a mobile manufactured home park

. . . (7) ‘[o]wner’ means a licensee or permittee or

any person who owns, operates or maintains a mobile

manufactured home park . . . (9) ‘[p]erson’ means an

individual, corporation, limited liability company, the

state or any political subdivision thereof, agency, business trust, estate, trust partnership or association, two

or more persons having a joint or common interest,

and any other legal or commercial entity . . . .’’

The parties agree that the defendants are residents

of lot 10 in the subject mobile manufactured home park

and that they have failed to pay rent pursuant to an oral

lease. Cynthia DaCosta owns the mobile manufactured

home situated on lot 10, and she owns twelve shares

of stock in the plaintiff corporation. The question is

whether such stock ownership makes her an owner of

the mobile manufactured home park. We conclude that

it does not.

The plain language of § 21-64 (7) provides that an

owner is a person who owns, operates or maintains

a mobile manufactured home park. Section 21-64 (9)

defines person as a corporation, among other things.

Section 21-64 (9) does not define owner as a shareholder

of a corporation. ‘‘[I]t is the duty of the court to interpret

statutes as they are written . . . and not by construction read into statutes provisions which are not clearly

stated.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Athena

Holdings, LLC v. Marcus, 160 Conn. App. 470, 478,

A.3d (2015). For this reason, we conclude that the

defendants are subject to summary process for failing

to pay rent.
Our conclusion that the defendants are subject to

summary process proceedings pursuant to the plain

language of §§ 21-64 and 21-80 is further supported by

our summary process statutes. General Statutes § 47a23 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘When the owner . . .

desires to obtain possession . . . of any land . . . (1)

when a rental agreement or lease of such property,

whether in writing or by parol, terminates for any of

the following reasons . . . (D) nonpayment of rent

within the grace period . . . such owner or lessor . . .

shall give notice to each lessee or occupant to quit

possession or occupancy of such land . . . before the

time specified in the notice for the lessee or occupant

to quit possession or occupancy.’’ (Emphasis added.)

The plaintiff is the owner of the land where lot 10 is

situated. The defendants are lessees of the land.

General Statutes § 47a-24 provides: ‘‘As used in this

chapter, (1) ‘lessee or occupant’ includes a member or

shareholder of a cooperative housing corporation who

occupies a dwelling unit in such corporation’s premises

pursuant to an agreement of occupancy, whether or

not it is designated as a lease orrental agreement, which

agreement provides that, for breach by a member or

shareholder of any provision of such agreement, the

corporation shall have the legal remedies available to

a landlord for breach by a tenant of a provision of a

lease or rental agreement; and (2) ‘owner or lessor’

includes any such cooperative housing corporation.’’4

(Emphasis added.) Pursuant to § 47a-24, Cynthia

DaCosta, a shareholder in the plaintiff cooperative

housing corporation, is subject to summary process as

a lessee of the plaintiff.

We construe the statutes pertaining to mobile manufactured home parks and summary process ‘‘in accordance with the overriding principle that statutes should

be construed, where possible, so as to create a rational,

coherent and consistent body of law. See, e.g., Doe v.

Doe, 244 Conn. 403, 428, 710 A.2d 1297 (1998) (we read

related statutes to form a consistent, rational whole,

rather than to create irrational distinctions); In re Valerie D., 223 Conn. 492, 524, 613 A.2d 748 (1992) ([s]tatutes are to be interpreted with regard to other relevant

statutes because the legislature presumed to have created a consistent body of law).’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Broadnax v. New Haven, 284 Conn.

237, 249, 932 A.2d 1063 (2007). Moreover, this court

previously has stated that summary process proceedings include ‘‘actions for possession by cooperative

housing corporations against their members or shareholders, based on the breach of a lease by the members

or shareholders . . . § 47a-24 . . . .’’ (Emphasis

added.) Southland Corp. v. Vernon, supra, 1 Conn.

App. 447.

We therefore conclude, as a matter of law, that the

plaintiff is entitled to possession of lot 10 if the defen-
dants failed to pay rent in accordance with the parties’

oral lease agreement. The trial court, however, failed

to make factual findings on the basis of the evidence

presented as to whetherthe defendants failed to comply

with the terms of the subject lease. The matter, therefore, must be remanded to the trial court forfurther proceedings.

The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded

for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 On April 23, 2015, this court ordered the defendants to file their briefs

on or before May 7, 2015. The defendants failed to file briefs as ordered.

We, therefore, have considered this appeal on the basis of the brief, appendix,

and oral argument of the plaintiff alone.

2 The notice to quit was attached to the complaint as exhibit A. It was

served on the defendants on May 16, 2014. The notice to quit stated, in

relevant part, that on or before June 20, 2014, the defendants were to quit

possession and occupancy of 46 Kenosia Avenue, lot 10, in Danbury for

nonpayment of rent: ‘‘May 2014, in the amount of $425.00 (plus balance of

rent for the month of January 2014, in the amount of $172.78, plus rent for

the months of February, March and April 2014, in the amount of $425.00

each) for a total arrearage of $1,872.78.’’ The notice to quit also stated: ‘‘Any

partial payments tendered will be accepted for use and occupancy only and

not for rent, with full reservation of rights to continue with the eviction

action if the total of all partial payments made within 30 days of receipt of

this notice does not equal the total arrearage stated above. All payments

should be made to the attorney’s office and not to the landlord.’’

3 The trial court did not address the claims against Candra DaCosta.

4 General Statutes § 47-202 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(9)‘Common interest

community’ means real property described in a declaration with respect to

which a person, by virtue of his ownership of a unit, is obligated to pay for

a share of (A) real property taxes on, (B) insurance premiums on, (C)

maintenance of, (D) improvement of, or (E) services or other expenses

related to common elements, other units or any other real property other

than that unit described in the declaration. . . .

‘‘(12) ‘Cooperative’ means a common interest community in which real

property is owned by an association, each of whose members is entitled

by virtue of his ownership interest in the association to exclusive possession

of a unit.’’