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56–092PDF 2010

STOPPING THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS,

COUNTERING NUCLEAR TERRORISM:

THE NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE AND THE

NUCLEAR SECURITY SUMMIT

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

APRIL 21, 2010

Serial No. 111–90

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California, Chairman 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BILL DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

MICHAEL E. MCMAHON, New York 

JOHN S. TANNER, Tennessee 

GENE GREEN, Texas 

LYNN WOOLSEY, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

BARBARA LEE, California 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

MIKE ROSS, Arkansas 

BRAD MILLER, North Carolina 

DAVID SCOTT, Georgia 

JIM COSTA, California 

KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

RON KLEIN, Florida 

VACANT 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

RON PAUL, Texas 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

BOB INGLIS, South Carolina 

GUS BILIRAKIS, Florida 

RICHARD J. KESSLER, Staff Director 

YLEEM POBLETE, Republican Staff Director 

DAVID FITE, Senior Professional Staff Member 

GENELL BROWN, Senior Staff Associate/Hearing Coordinator

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Susan F. Burk, Special Representative of the President, for 

Nuclear Nonproliferation, U.S. Department of State ........................................ 8

The Honorable Bonnie D. Jenkins, Coordinator, Threat Reduction Programs, 

U.S. Department of State .................................................................................... 17

Mr. David Albright, President, Institute for Science and International Security ......................................................................................................................... 45

Mr. Kenneth N. Luongo, President, Partnership for Global Security ................. 54

Christopher Ford, Ph.D., Director, Center for Technology and Global Security, 

Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute ......................................................................... 68

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Susan F. Burk: Prepared statement ............................................ 11

The Honorable Bonnie D. Jenkins: Prepared statement ...................................... 19

Mr. David Albright: Prepared statement ............................................................... 48

Mr. Kenneth N. Luongo: Prepared statement ....................................................... 57

Christopher Ford, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ...................................................... 71

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 96

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 97

The Honorable Howard L. Berman, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of California, and Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs: Prepared 

statement .............................................................................................................. 99

The Honorable Mike Pence, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Indiana: Prepared statement .......................................................................... 101

The Honorable Eni F.H. Faleomavaega, a Representative in Congress from 

American Samoa: Prepared statement ............................................................... 103

The Honorable Ted Poe, a Representative in Congress from the State of 

Texas: Prepared statement .................................................................................. 108

The Honorable Russ Carnahan, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Missouri: Prepared statement ......................................................................... 110

The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress from the 

Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement .............................................. 111

The Honorable Keith Ellison, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Minnesota: Prepared statement ...................................................................... 113

Written responses from the Honorable Susan F. Burk and the Honorable 

Bonnie D. Jenkins to questions submitted for the record by the Honorable 

Russ Carnahan ..................................................................................................... 114

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STOPPING THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, COUNTERING NUCLEAR TERRORISM: 

THE NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE AND THE 

NUCLEAR SECURITY SUMMIT 

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 21, 2010

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m. in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard L. Berman 

(chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Chairman BERMAN. The committee will come to order. In a moment I will recognize myself and the ranking member for up to 7 

minutes each for purposes of making an opening statement, and 

then I will recognize the chairman and ranking member of the Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Trade Subcommittee for 3 minutes 

each to make opening remarks. 

Without objection, all other members may submit opening statements for the record. We have two panels today, so I think we 

should do it that way. 

We are all very fortunate that nuclear weapons have not been 

used for nearly 65 years. For most of that time, these fearsome 

weapons were confined to a handful of states. Their use was limited, although sometimes just barely, by the Cold War doctrines of 

deterrence and Mutual Assured Destruction. 

But the world has changed dramatically over those six decades. 

As President Obama noted in his Prague speech last spring, I 

quote:

‘‘Today, the Cold War has disappeared, but thousands of 

those weapons have not. In a strange turn of history, the 

threat of global nuclear war has gone down, but the risk of a 

nuclear attack has gone up. More nations have acquired these 

weapons. Testing has continued. Black market trade in nuclear 

secrets and nuclear materials abound. The technology to build 

a bomb has spread. Terrorists are determined to buy, build or 

steal one. Our efforts to contain these dangers are centered on 

a global nonproliferation regime, but as more people and nations break the rules, we could reach the point where the center cannot hold.’’

In short, the global nuclear nonproliferation regime faces three 

fundamental challenges: Enforcement; a crisis of confidence; and 

the three ‘‘T’s’’—theft, trafficking and terrorism. 

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To be effective, the regime’s obligations and norms must be enforceable with swift and sure punishment for serious sanctions. 

As we all know, North Korea was able to accumulate several 

bombs worth of plutonium and build crude nuclear devices and 

likely began a uranium enrichment program aided by A.Q. Khan’s 

nuclear trafficking network. 

And Iran secretly built multiple uranium enrichment facilities—

also with assistance from Khan. According to official estimates, 

Iran could produce enough weapons-grade uranium for one bomb 

within 1 year of expelling IAEA inspectors—assuming Iran does 

not have a covert enrichment program. 

Both nations pursued these clandestine activities while they 

were members of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 

Weapons, the cornerstone of the global nuclear nonproliferation regime. If these states are able to escape significant punishment—in 

the form of crippling sanctions, international isolation, or other decisive action—until their nuclear weapons capabilities and ambitions are halted and reversed, the result could well be a cascade 

of new nuclear aspirants, and the collapse of the NPT and the entire regime. 

The second challenge springs, in part, from the first; the NPT 

and the nuclear nonproliferation regime are facing a ‘‘crisis of confidence’’ on many fronts. Both developed and developing states, especially those threatened by North Korea and Iran, question 

whether the regime can really prevent, punish or roll back nuclear 

proliferators. And developing countries wonder if the regime really 

will promote their access to civil nuclear applications, while fostering the eventual disarmament of the five NPT-recognized ‘‘Nuclear Weapon States.’’

The third challenge to the regime is one it was never designed 

to counter: The actions of criminals and terrorists to steal or traffic 

in the means to produce and to use a nuclear or radiological weapon. Unsecured or poorly-secured nuclear-weapons-related material 

and radioactive material are abundant worldwide. 

Today’s hearing is intended to assess how the United States and 

the international community can counter these threats through 

multilateral cooperation. We will focus on two events: The just-concluded Nuclear Security Summit and the NPT Review Conference 

to come next month. 

At last week’s global Nuclear Security Summit, 47 countries committed to securing all sensitive nuclear materials from theft and 

use by terrorists in 4 short years. The communique ́ and work plan 

issued at the conclusion of the summit constitute a necessary first 

step—but only the first step—in accomplishing this ambitious goal. 

There will be a formal follow-up meeting 6 months from now, and 

a second summit in 2 years. 

Some have dismissed the Nuclear Security Summit for accomplishing too little in 2 days. But these critics confuse the first step 

with the journey itself. 

The second major focus of this hearing will be the NPT Review 

Conference that begins in less than 2 weeks. 

This convocation of all 189 members of the NPT happens once 

every 5 years. As often as not, these meetings have been riven by 

controversy, deepening the crisis of confidence in the efficacy of the 

3

nuclear nonproliferation regime as a whole. A successful conference—particularly one united in its condemnation of Iran’s nuclear programs—is absolutely essential. 

To accomplish this requires leadership, especially from the 

United States. And an essential part of credible leadership is practicing what one preaches. 

For many years, other states have been able to duck their own 

responsibilities in sustaining the nonproliferation regime by claiming that the United States has not done enough to reduce its own 

nuclear weapons arsenal to fulfill its commitment under the NPT 

toward disarmament. These states will have a tougher case to 

make after the other events of the last 2 weeks. 

We have witnessed the long-anticipated signature of a new 

United States-Russia strategic arms reduction treaty that cuts the 

arsenals of both countries by about 30 percent, and reestablishes 

and streamlines the crucial monitoring and verification regime that 

terminated when the START I treaty expired in December. 

We have also seen the issuance of a new U.S. Nuclear Posture 

Review Report that, for the first time, elevates halting the spread 

of nuclear weapons and preventing nuclear terrorism to a core mission of U.S. nuclear strategy. The NPR also strengthened the U.S. 

assurance not to use or threaten use of nuclear weapons against 

NPT countries that were compliant with their obligations under 

that treaty. 

Critics have complained that the ‘‘New START’’ treaty does too 

much or too little; that the Russians got more from it than we 

did—although many Russians claim the reverse; and that it will 

limit our ballistic missile defenses—except that it doesn’t. 

Critics of the Nuclear Posture Review have also complained that 

it does too much or too little, although the respected Democrat and 

Republican statesmen who led the Congressional Commission on 

the Strategic Posture of the United States, former Secretaries of 

Defense James Schlesinger and William Perry, have pronounced it, 

‘‘just right.’’

We have taken these steps because it is in the U.S. national security interest to do so. The United States, and Russia, are better 

off with fewer nuclear weapons—a position strongly supported by 

Defense Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff. And the United States, Russia, France, the 

U.K. and China—have all pledged not to use nuclear weapons 

against non-nuclear states because these ‘‘negative security assurances’’ helps us build the international support to strengthen the 

nonproliferation regime. 

I am going to cut short the rest of my opening statement and include it all in the record and turn to the ranking member, Ileana 

Ros-Lehtinen, for any opening remarks that she might wish to 

make. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. As usual, Mr. Chairman, thank you so much 

for the opportunity. Welcome to our two panels. 

Mr. Chairman, the words threshold and crossroads are used so 

frequently in this town that we can barely take a step without 

being told that we are once again on one or at the other, but now 

it is indisputable that we have reached one of the most momentous 

decision points in our history. The nuclear dam is giving way beVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:11 Jun 18, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\042110\56092 HFA PsN: SHIRL
4

fore our eyes in many aspects from North Korea’s increasing arsenal to the continuing attempts by al-Qaeda and other extremist 

groups to secure a radiological bomb or a dirty nuke. 

The greatest threat that we face, however, is Iran’s acquisition 

of a nuclear weapons capability. Iran’s leaders are getting away 

with this stunning assault on U.S. and global security while we 

and our allies appear to be doing nothing but huffing and puffing. 

And the world is watching. 

In January of last year, the new administration argued that the 

lack of progress on curtailing the nuclear ambition of Iran was due 

to the Bush administration’s refusal to sit down and negotiate with 

the Iranian regime. We were told that more carrots and fewer 

sticks would do the trick. 

But after months of generous offers and repeated rejections with 

one deadline after another passing without action, nothing of substance has been accomplished and Iran continues to relentlessly 

move forward. As it does, the U.S. and others place their hopes in 

yet another new U.N. Security Council resolution. 

Day after day we wait for Russia and China to come around to 

a watered down version of the U.S. position even after they have 

made it clear that they will do whatever they can to prevent us or 

anyone else from putting any significant pressure on Iran, particularly by cutting off Iran’s access to refined petroleum products. 

We in Congress must not sit idly by. We must press ahead with 

our efforts to apply pressure on Iran before it is too late. H.R. 2194, 

the Iran Refined Petroleum Sanctions Act, also known as IRPSA, 

was introduced by Chairman Berman and me, along with several 

other members of this committee and the House. It strikes that a 

key weakness on the Iranian regime, namely its dependence on imported petroleum products, especially gasoline. 

The House passed our version on December 15 by a vote of 412 

to 12, and the Senate has adopted its own version. It is my hope 

that conference discussions will move quickly, that the bill will not 

be watered down and that we can send the strongest version of 

IRPSA to the President’s desk for his signature. 

Lieutenant General Burgess, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, and General Cartwright, the vice chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified last week that Iran could produce 

enough bomb grade fuel for at least one nuclear weapon within a 

year. The New York Times reported yesterday that according to the 

Pentagon, Iran may be able to build a missile capable of striking 

the United States by 2015. 

Yet despite this obvious urgency, the administration refuses to 

come into compliance with its legal obligations to inform the Congress on those assisting Iran’s nuclear, biological, chemical and 

missile programs. The State Department is ignoring current mandates in the Iran Sanctions Act requiring sanctions on those who 

again are assisting Iranian proliferation activities. 

And despite the obvious urgency, Iran was not on the agenda of 

last week’s Nuclear Security Summit. All so-called controversial 

items were set aside to ensure that the summit was a success. The 

President did find time to go after our ally, Israel, lecturing it on 

the need to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, a demand 

5

which has been at the centerpiece of the longstanding strategy by 

Arab states to distract attention from their own nuclear plans. 

No mention was made, however, of Israel’s unwavering stand 

against Iran, nor of Israel’s support of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, the International Convention 

of the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, the Global Initiative to 

Combat Nuclear Terrorism, the U.S.-led Megaport Initiative, as 

well as Israel’s financial and technical assistance to and its active 

participation in the Illicit Trafficking Database reporting system of 

the International Atomic Energy Agency. 

In the end, virtually nothing emerged from the summit but unenforceable promises by the heads of state to do good things that they 

should have done long ago. I do not expect any greater success at 

the upcoming NPT Review Conference. The last meeting, in 2005, 

ended in gridlock because several countries could not bring themselves to tell Iran that it shouldn’t develop nuclear weapons nor engage in activities that could be used for that purpose. 

The problem stems from the prevailing interpretation of Article 

IV as guaranteeing each signatory nation an absolute right to enrich and reprocess nuclear fuel as long as they claim that it is for 

peaceful purposes, but a fair reading of Article IV reveals no such 

grant. Instead, Article IV places far-reaching conditions on the exercise of this supposed right, namely conformity with the overarching purpose of the entire document, which is to prevent the 

spread of nuclear weapons. 

If we are to secure our survival and to effectively prevent the 

world’s most dangerous weapons from falling into the hands of 

rogue regimes like Iran, the United States must state clearly and 

repeatedly our position on Article IV of the NPT that contains no 

guarantee of an absolute right to such technology. 

Due to time, Mr. Chairman, I will refrain from addressing other 

issues relating to the topic of today’s hearing, including the recent 

START agreement and the Nuclear Posture Review. Many aspects 

of these are troubling and some are dangerous. 

I look forward to discussing these, Mr. Chairman, at a future 

hearing. Thank you for the time, sir. 

Chairman BERMAN. I thank you. And now Mr. Sherman, the gentleman from California, chairman of the Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Trade Subcommittee, is recognized for 3 minutes. 

Mr. SHERMAN. President Obama should be commended for putting importance and focus on nonproliferation for our successes at 

the Nuclear Security Summit and with the START Treaty. 

We have done a lot to cause responsible countries to act responsibly with regard to their nuclear materials. However, there is a bipartisan foreign policy embraced by our media, academia and the 

State Department under the last three administrations which can 

only be viewed as a megaton of failure when it comes to preventing 

irresponsible states from developing nuclear weapons. 

We are told that missile defense will be the answer, but you can 

smuggle a weapon into the United States inside a bale of marijuana. You can thereby have pinpoint accuracy as to where you deliver it plus plausible deniability. If an American city is destroyed, 

it will probably not be a missile that delivers the bomb. 

6

And we were told that deterrence will be enough because, after 

all, we survived the Cuban Missile Crisis with luck and with cool 

heads. But how many more times dare we roll the dice when we 

go eyeball to eyeball with other hostile nuclear states, and do we 

really think that Ahmadinejad or Kim Jong-Il will be as responsible in the future as Khrushchev was during the Cuban Missile 

Crisis. 

Two illustrations of the failure of our policy. The first is the continuing illegality at the State Department where they violate the 

Iran Sanctions Act every day for over 10 years. CRS and the State 

of Florida have each identified well over 30 action investments in 

the Iran oil sector that should have triggered, at minimum, identification by the State Department. That is not optional. You can 

waive sanctions. You cannot waive naming and shaming, and yet 

three administrations have decided to violate U.S. law to protect 

Tehran’s business partners. 

Likewise, the State Department unfortunately seems to interpret 

Article IV of the NPT as saying that any nation in compliance with 

NPT has an inalienable right to the full fuel cycle. That renders 

the NPT a virtual nullity as a practical matter. 

But the greatest problem is that we have a policy of begging and 

persuading Russia and China to help us with sanctions, but we 

refuse to threaten or bargain. As a result, China is told they will 

have full access to American markets, even though they subsidize 

North Korea, invest in Iran and protect Iran from international 

sanctions. 

Russia is told that our policies toward South Ossetia or TransDniester Moldova will not be affected by their policies toward Iran. 

No wonder we have failure. It is surprising that such a broad array 

of the foreign policy establishment embraces this policy of failure. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. The 

gentleman from California, Mr. Royce, ranking member of the subcommittee, is recognized for 3 minutes. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be brief. As a subcommittee chairman, I held a hearing in 2005 previewing the last 

NPT Review Conference. Not much was accomplished in New York 

back then at the conference. That wasn’t because the past administration was involved, as we are likely to hear, but because the treaty has some fundamental problems. 

For one, the zero nuclear weapons world that it is premised upon 

appears in the back mirror. China and Pakistan and others are bolstering their arsenals. These countries remain unimpressed by the 

New START, and unfortunately the majority of countries have 

shown little interest in taking meaningful action against those 

exiting the treaty, such as nuclear North Korea, or those racing toward nuclear weapons, mainly Iran. 

Another big problem is that the NPT Treaty has been twisted to 

permit countries to develop the technology to enrich uranium, leaving them essentially nuclear weapon states without violating the 

NPT. Now, I think it is an NPT violation, but that is the way it 

has been twisted. 

As the New York Times reported on Secretary Gates’ wake up 

memo, and I will use the New York Times’ words here, ‘‘Iran could 

assemble all the major parts it needed for a nuclear weapon—fuel, 

7

designs and detonators—but stop just short of assembling a fully 

operational weapon and remain a signatory of the NPT.’’ Neither 

this nor past administrations have challenged this misinterpretation, deeply wounding the treaty. 

The NPT Review Conference operates on consensus, which 

assures lowest common denominator results. One hundred and 

eighty-nine countries will be there, including Iran. That makes the 

15 member Security Council look efficient and look virtuous. The 

unfortunate fact is that many countries are sympathetic to Iran’s 

nuclear program. One administration witness will testify that the 

conference will not solve all the problems or answer all the tough 

questions. Now, that is an understatement. 

The NPT is a norm against nuclear nonproliferation. Strengthen 

it if we can, but in trying, let us not sacrifice critical actions for 

the sake of perceived goodwill as the administration is doing with 

important Iran sanctions legislation, and let us not pretend that 

this treaty is giving us security. It is not. 

Remember, an illusion of progress can be more dangerous than 

obvious conference failure when the stakes are so high. Let us pass 

the Iran sanctions bill. I mean a vigorous bill, not a watered down 

bill, because 2015 and the capacity for an Iranian leader to hit the 

United States if the urge to be a martyr hits him will come soon 

enough. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

I am now pleased to introduce our two panels. Ambassador 

Susan Burk plays a lead role in preparing for the NPT Review 

Conference. She previously served as first deputy coordinator for 

homeland security in the State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism. 

She has served as acting assistant secretary of state for nonproliferation, chief of the International Nuclear Affairs Division of 

ACDA, the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and director of the Office of Regional Affairs and State. While at ACDA, she 

was the chief of the Non-Proliferation Treaty Extension Division, 

leading U.S. preparations for the 1995 NPT Review and Extension 

Conference. 

Ambassador Bonnie Jenkins currently serves as the State Department’s coordinator for threat reduction programs in the Bureau 

of International Security and Nonproliferation. Previously she 

served as counsel to the 9–11 Commission, a consultant to the 2000 

National Commission on Terrorism and general counsel to the U.S. 

Commission to Access the Organization of the Federal Government 

to Combat Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. A retired 

Naval Reserve officer, she recently completed a year-long deployment to the U.S. Central Command in CENTCOM. 

I think I will wait and introduce the second panel when they 

come forward. Ambassador Burk, your entire statement will be 

part of the record. You are free to summarize it and make the 

points you want. Why don’t you go ahead and lead off? 

8

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE SUSAN F. BURK, SPECIAL 

REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PRESIDENT, FOR NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Ambassador BURK. Well, thank you very much, Chairman Berman, Congresswoman Ros-Lehtinen and members of the committee 

for giving me the chance to be here today to talk about our preparations for the NPT Review Conference, which will start in less 

than 2 weeks, as someone pointed out. 

Let me just offer some brief highlights or lowlights of my remarks, and then I will look forward to your questions. You mentioned the President’s Prague speech, and I would just note that at 

that time he called the basic bargain of the NPT, what we call the 

three pillars, he called it sound. 

Countries with nuclear weapons will move toward disarmament, 

countries without nuclear weapons will not acquire them, and all 

countries can access peaceful nuclear energy. There are, as has 

been pointed out, nearly 190 parties to the treaty, and that puts 

a premium on cooperation as we work with others to achieve common goals. 

The NPT and the global nonproliferation regime have been under 

great stress, as we have heard already. This has been a result of 

the growing availability of sensitive nuclear technology, A.Q. Khan 

that we are all very concerned about, the continued defiance by 

North Korea and Iran of efforts to bring them into compliance with 

their international nonproliferation obligations and the limitations 

that some states continue to impose on the verification role of the 

International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards program, the 

IAEA. 

As a result, the United States is not approaching the upcoming 

NPT Review Conference in any business as usual spirit. President 

Obama has put a strengthened NPT at the center of American nonproliferation diplomacy, and the United States has taken a series 

of steps to help achieve that goal. 

But I use the world help here very deliberately. The U.S. cannot 

realize the NPT vision on its own. It will take all parties working 

together, setting aside stale debates and perspectives that have too 

often led to gridlock, if we are to accomplish the balanced review 

of all three pillars of the treaty that most parties are insisting that 

they want. 

I have spent the last 10 months engaging scores of NPT parties 

from all regions to gauge how best to do that, and these consultations have revealed a broad range of views on the treaty and on 

the review conference, but all the states that I have consulted 

share the firm conviction that the NPT is critical to the maintenance of regional and international peace and security, and this 

certainly is the U.S. view. We are encouraging these parties to approach the review conference as a real opportunity to focus on common goals and renew the collective commitment to the principles 

and basic bargain of the treaty. 

So what are the issues that we want the review conference to address and the outcomes that we seek? The NPT is first and foremost a treaty aimed at preventing the further spread of nuclear 

weapons while ensuring that the peaceful benefits of nuclear enVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:11 Jun 18, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\042110\56092 HFA PsN: SHIRL
9

ergy are made available to states fulfilling their nonproliferation 

commitments. 

But the treaty’s negotiators understood that non-nuclear weapon 

states would be more likely to foreswear nuclear weapons permanently if the five states that possessed them at that time pledged 

in good faith to seek to eliminate them, and this understanding 

holds today. 

We are making clear that we take our obligations under the NPT 

seriously and we are fulfilling them. We are emphasizing first that 

recent actions, including the signing of the New START treaty, the 

release of the Nuclear Posture Review and our commitment to 

starting FMCT negotiations and seeking ratification of the CTBT, 

clearly demonstrate the U.S. commitment to fulfilling its disarmament responsibilities under Article VI of the NPT. 

But, secondly, we are emphasizing that a robust and reliable 

nonproliferation regime is a necessary condition for progress on disarmament, and we are working to leverage international support 

for our own efforts to gain broad support for the treaty’s nonproliferation goals. 

And, finally, we are emphasizing that all parties, nuclear weapon 

states and non-nuclear weapon states alike, have responsibility for 

supporting the treaty’s nonproliferation goals, including by 

strengthening the IAEA and its safeguard system and by dealing 

honestly and seriously with cases of noncompliance. 

The review conference is an opportunity to reaffirm the IAEA’s 

central role in NPT verification and the goal of universal adherence 

to the additional safeguards protocol, which we believe, together 

with comprehensive safeguard agreements, should be considered an 

essential standard for verification. 

It is not enough to detect violations, however. Noncompliance 

with nonproliferation obligations erodes confidence in the treaty 

and in the global regime and must be met with real consequences 

including, as necessary, actions by the U.N. Security Council. 

The U.S., together with a number of other countries, has been 

considering how the treaty parties might address the issue of abuse 

of the NPT’s withdrawal provision. This is specifically how to dissuade and respond to the possibility of an NPT party withdrawing 

from the treaty while in violation of its NPT obligations, an effort 

to evade its sins. We will work with partners to address this issue 

fully at the review conference. 

Finally, we are looking forward to contributing to a constructive 

discussion about international cooperation in the peaceful uses of 

nuclear energy that is consistent with the NPT’s fundamental nonproliferation undertaking and with international standards of safety and security. Taking steps to strengthen the peaceful uses pillar 

is especially important today in view of the renewed interest in 

civil nuclear power, which has grown worldwide in response to concerns about climate change and energy security. 

Here too a strong and reliable nonproliferation regime is essential for the fullest possible access to nuclear energy for peaceful 

purposes. We know too well—I know too well—the challenges of 

reaching agreement on a final report or other document when so 

many countries are involved, when the agenda is so broad and consensus, as has been pointed out, is the order of the day. 

10

We expect, however, that the large majority of NPT parties will 

participate at this meeting in good faith and share our interest in 

revalidating the treaty’s indispensable contribution to global security, but the United States is not approaching the review conference as an end in itself. It is a critical milestone in the broader 

international effort to strengthen the regime, but it will not solve 

all the problems or answer all the tough questions. 

The hard work of maintaining and reinforcing the international 

nonproliferation regime will continue for years to come, and the 

discussions that take place in New York in 2 weeks and the ideas 

that are put forward there can contribute valuable momentum to 

our efforts at the IAEA in Vienna, the Conference on Disarmament 

in Geneva and the United Nations, and that will remain a key U.S. 

objective for the review conference 

Thank you again, Chairman Berman and members, and I look 

forward to answering your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Burk follows:]

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Chairman BERMAN. Thank you very much, Ambassador. Ambassador Jenkins, we look forward to hearing from you. Your entire 

statement will be part of the record as well. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE BONNIE D. JENKINS, COORDINATOR, THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAMS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Ambassador JENKINS. Thank you, Chairman Berman and Ranking Member Ros-Lehtinen and esteemed members of the committee, for the opportunity to report on the strides and the efforts 

that the Department of State is making to reduce the chances of 

an attack by terrorists armed with nuclear weapons. 

I would like to request that my prepared testimony be included 

in the record of today’s hearing, and I will present a shorter 

version here in my oral statement. 

Last spring, President Obama called for international cooperation and pledged American leadership in the effort to prevent 

nonstate actors from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. As Coordinator for Threat Reduction Programs, I am pleased to share 

with you the underlying goals of the Nuclear Security Summit, 

some results from the summit, including commitments made by the 

participants, and thoughts for initial steps following the summit to 

meet the President’s vision to secure all vulnerable nuclear material in 4 years. 

At the largest gathering of world leaders ever convened in Washington, 50 leaders representing various nations and international 

bodies came together to recognize the following: It is increasingly 

clear that the danger of nuclear terrorism is one of the greatest 

threats to our collective security; terrorist networks such as alQaeda have tried to acquire the material for a nuclear weapon, and 

if they ever succeeded they would surely use it; and were they to 

do so it would be a catastrophe for the world, causing extraordinary 

loss of life and striking a major blow to global peace and stability. 

The consensus on these topics was the impetus for the joint 

communique ́ and work plan agreed upon at the summit. To present 

such catastrophic consequences, the solution is to keep the essenVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:11 Jun 18, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\042110\56092 HFA PsN: SHIRL

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tial ingredients of nuclear bombs—plutonium and highly enriched 

uranium—out of the hands of those with a level of intent. 

The communique ́ commits leaders to principles of nuclear security and if implemented would lead to efforts to improve security 

and accounting of nuclear materials and strengthened regulations. 

The communique ́ also launches a summit work plan issued as guidance for national and international actions that carry out the 

pledges of the communique ́. 

In addition to the communique ́ work plan, several nations made 

significant commitments, which will strengthen the global effort to 

maintain nuclear security and nonproliferation. For example, 

Ukraine agreed to get rid of all of its highly enriched uranium 

within 2 years, and Canada has agreed to return a large amount 

of spent highly enriched uranium fuel from their medical isotope 

production reactor to the United States. The United States and 

Russia reached an agreement on plutonium disposal which commits both countries to eliminate enough total plutonium for approximately 17,000 nuclear weapons. 

This summit was intended to lay the groundwork for activities 

to improve security for vulnerable nuclear materials by 2013. We 

anticipate and welcome working with as many nations as possible 

on this critical effort, and this international initiative will continue 

in the future. South Korea has already pledged to hold the next security summit in 2012. The summit shepherds will consult on the 

precise timing of follow on events at their next meeting later this 

year. 

Overall, the summit was a call to action for countries around the 

world. It provided an unprecedented forum to raise awareness of 

the threat of nuclear terrorism to the highest levels of foreign government. It reinforced the importance of existing nuclear security 

mechanisms and urged additional participation in mechanisms that 

already exist. 

The summit emphasized the need for the strongest possible political commitments by each state to take responsibility for the security of the nuclear materials under its control, to continue to evaluate the threat environment and strengthen security measures as 

changing conditions may require and to exchange best practices 

and practical solutions for doing so. 

The summit also stressed the principles that all states are responsible for ensuring the best security of their own nuclear materials, for seeking assistance to do so if necessary and providing assistance if asked. 

We must work urgently to reduce the risk of terrorist criminal 

organizations or extremists getting their hands on nuclear weapons 

or all the materials, expertise and technology necessary to build 

them. We cannot afford to be divided in this endeavor. By bringing 

together our allies and other states around the globe at the summit 

and in other future forums, we will ensure that we bring every resource to bear on meeting this important challenge. 

Thank you for the opportunity to speak today, and I look forward 

to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Jenkins follows:]

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Chairman BERMAN. Thank you both very much, and I will now 

yield myself 5 minutes to begin the questioning. 


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Ambassador Burk, you mentioned the Additional Protocol, and 

you talked of making more serious consequences for breaking out 

of the treaty. You did not describe what you thought the consequences should be, but could you address those two issues in the 

context of why this review conference matters? 

It does not amend the treaty. What is our hope in terms of success from this conference, and how does it execute itself or how 

does what comes out of that conference get implemented in terms 

of the real world? I mean, Iran, I believe, at one point accepted the 

Additional Protocol and never ratified it and doesn’t allow it to be 

utilized. 

What makes this conference a meaningful conference, and where 

does the conduct of both North Korea and Iran stand in the context 

of this conference? How is that going to be addressed? 

Ambassador BURK. Do I have 15 minutes? 

Chairman BERMAN. 3 minutes and 30 seconds. 

Ambassador BURK. Those are the $64,000 questions. Why does it 

matter? I think it matters. You know, it is a review conference. It 

happens every 5 years, and we keep reminding people that there 

is no operational consequence. It is not taking a decision, as it did 

in 1995, to extend the treaty. 

But it matters I think this year because the regime, as I said, 

is under such challenge and there are so many questions about the 

viability of the treaty, whether it is overtaken by events, has it outlived its usefulness. 

I think our view is that it is more important than ever because 

you need that fundamental rule of law as a platform in order to 

move forward on a lot of these other activities. So it matters because it comes at a time when the regime is under siege. It comes 

at a time——

Chairman BERMAN. But why does what they do become the rule 

of law, as opposed to the Young Democrats passing a resolution? 

Ambassador BURK. Okay. Well, I am not the lawyer. I am just 

saying the treaty itself has almost universally adhered to sets of 

certain international legal standards. You have international lawyers who can speak to that. 

Chairman BERMAN. Okay. 

Ambassador BURK. I think it is the barrier. So it matters because 

it provides an opportunity for states collectively to reaffirm their 

support for the treaty, which is an important political signal. 

It provides an opportunity to discuss steps that could be taken 

in other fora, in the IAEA and elsewhere, to strengthen implementation. It provides an opportunity to talk about the importance of 

compliance and the damage that noncompliance does. They can 

have that sort of discussion. 

On success, I think what we are looking for is broad affirmation 

of the treaty by most parties, if not all parties. We are looking for 

a discussion that will identify steps that could be taken, commitments that states are prepared to take. That may not be a unanimous commitment, but if the vast majority of states make it clear 

that they are prepared to accept certain commitments, strengthen 

safeguards and so forth that is important and we will take that 

and we will take it to the IAEA. 

27

And on North Korea and Iran, I think the issue there is just to 

continue to draw attention to the very debilitating effects of noncompliance on the regime and to encourage the parties to see it for 

what it is and to make a strong commitment to deal with noncompliance, and I think that is where we have come up. 

We have been talking to other partners about how do we deal 

with the problem of a state that violates the treaty and then announces it is withdrawing as a way to evade penalties. We think 

that the parties could agree to take some steps in that regard that 

would signal clearly that a state will remain accountable for those 

violations, even if it chooses to withdraw. 

Chairman BERMAN. A number of people left government service 

from the arms control nonproliferation bureaus on the shakeup 

during the previous administration. Are you at a point now where 

you feel adequately staffed to both do your review conference obligations, and all the other charges you have, in terms of nonproliferation? 

Ambassador BURK. For the review conference we have gotten 

ourselves staffed up, and I am feeling comfortable about that now. 

I think it is a rebuilding process that will take some time, but we 

are well on the way. 

Chairman BERMAN. Okay. I am going to cut myself short by 7 

seconds and recognize the ranking member for 5 minutes. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. A few 

questions. Number one, very few people believe that a new U.N. 

Security Council resolution will be strong enough to even deter 

Iran, so regardless of whether or not there is a new resolution what 

else is the administration planning to do next to apply pressure on 

Iran? 

Secondly, in his speech in Prague in April 2009, President 

Obama said, ‘‘We will support Iran’s right to peaceful nuclear energy with rigorous inspections.’’ So on that, is the U.S. position that 

Article IV of the NPT that Iran and other countries claim give 

them an absolute right to all aspects of a nuclear program actually 

conditioned on their agreeing to rigorous inspections? 

Thirdly, related to that, does that mean that the U.S. believes 

that the exercise of any right under Article IV is contingent upon 

the ratification and implementation of the Additional Protocol by 

Iran and other countries? Thank you, Ambassadors. 

Ambassador BURK. On the issue of Iran sanctions, I am not in 

the position to address that question. I would be happy to take it 

back and provide an answer. I just don’t know what more we are 

doing. We are clearly pursuing a dual pressure track and consulting with the P5-plus-1 on sanctions, but I don’t have insight 

into any of the specifics there, so if I could take that back and respond, please? 

On Article IV, I think we have made it very clear that Iran has 

essentially forfeited its rights to technical assistance and nuclear 

cooperation because it is in violation of its NPT obligations, and 

there are a number of Security Council resolutions that pertain, 

and it is not accepting rigorous inspections. 

As you mentioned, it has suspended or reverted back to an earlier form of the Additional Protocol and so I think that takes it off 

the table on that issue. Our view is that we do not encourage or 

28

promote development of sensitive technologies. As a matter of policy, I think from the beginning of the nonproliferation era we 

haven’t encouraged or promoted or provided assistance in sensitive 

technologies. 

Any such assistance that would be undertaken would have to be 

undertaken under the strictest nonproliferation conditions, and I 

think at this point we are working with many of our partner and 

our nuclear supplier partners to encourage the adoption of the Additional Protocol as the new standard of verification and ultimately 

a condition of supply, but we are not there yet. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Ambassador Jenkins? I don’t know if you 

wanted to add anything to that. 

Ambassador JENKINS. Thank you. No. I probably would just back 

what Ambassador Burk has said about taking it back and getting 

some more information to you and getting a response as fast as 

possible. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. That would be welcome. Thank you. And 

then lastly, the Nuclear Posture Review’s limitations on U.S. deterrence policy undermine the U.S. nuclear umbrella that defends 

many of our allies from attacks. 

Are you concerned that calling that protection into question will 

persuade these countries to develop their own nuclear arsenal to 

provide for their own defense? 

Ambassador BURK. Congresswoman, my understanding is that 

we consulted extensively and very closely with our allies and partners throughout the development of the Nuclear Posture Review. 

I was not personally involved. I believe that it was made clear 

in the statements when this was rolled out that our extended deterrent guarantees continued to be intact and remain in effect. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. And then since I still have some time, the 

Russian Government is adamant that the recently signed START 

agreement links reductions in strategic nuclear forces to restrictions on strategic missile defense. The Obama administration says 

this is not so. 

Are the Russians lying? Why would they repeatedly say this and 

the Obama administration to believe it to be true, our good partners? Why haven’t we insisted that they stop saying it if it is not 

true, as the Obama administration believes it is not true? 

Ambassador BURK. I don’t know the answer to that, but I believe 

what the administration is saying about this issue. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BERMAN. The gentleman from California, Mr. Sherman, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. SHERMAN. One last sentence from my opening statement, 

and that is that smart sanctions are dumb. The idea that we are 

going to get Iran to abandon its nuclear program by adopting sanctions that don’t affect the Iranian economy, but somehow a few of 

the leadership, is absurd. Ahmadinejad isn’t going to give up nuclear weapons just so he can visit Disney World. 

Now, Ambassador Burk, you have a difficult job. You use all your 

persuasive abilities to try to get countries to treat these issues the 

way we would like them to, but sometimes persuasion isn’t enough. 

Have you been able to tell any country that American aid to that 

country or trade with that country will be affected even slightly by 

29

how they behave at the review conference and on nonproliferation 

issues in general? 

Ambassador BURK. Thank you. That is a great question. I have 

to say that although we can invite who we want to the review conference because we have been pretty successful in gaining broad 

international membership, I have been pretty selective in who I 

have talked to, and I would have to say that I have found a tremendous amount of support for the U.S. posture and U.S. proposals 

in my consultations. 

Mr. SHERMAN. You have complimented me on my question, but 

you are evading it. Have you been able to tell any country that aid 

or trade is conditioned at least in some part on their behavior at 

the review conference? 

Ambassador BURK. I have not because I haven’t had to. 

Mr. SHERMAN. So every nation coming to the review conference 

is going to agree with us on all the important issues? 

Ambassador BURK. No, not every nation, but I am only talking 

about the nations that I have personally engaged with. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Speak on behalf of the administration in general. 

Has the administration secured the cooperation and agreement of 

every nation to all of our policies? Obviously not. Has anyone with 

the administration told those companies that have not fully embraced our positions on important issues that aid or trade could be 

affected? 

Ambassador BURK. I am not personally aware that we have done 

that. No. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I think you are absolutely assured that we are 

going to fail to achieve all of our important objectives at this conference, and you have just identified the reason. 

Now, let me see. The ranking member has brought up the issue 

of whether the administration is trying to pressure Israel to sign 

the NPT. I would just say that friends don’t ask friends to commit 

suicide and so I hope you are not doing so. 

As long as there are countries in the world calling for the destruction of a state, it is hard to ask that state not to develop whatever it thinks it might need to do to protect itself from total annihilation. Nobody is threatening the total annihilation of China or 

Russia or Britain or France, and yet they have nuclear weapons. 

The final concern I have is do you in the foreign policy establishment—I will ask this to Ms. Jenkins—have an obligation to report 

to this country that our nonproliferation efforts are failing and that 

we should develop a robust civil defense program? 

I believe that a firefighter does great damage if he or she gives 

the illusion that they are going to put out the fire and so the adjoining neighbors don’t evacuate or take protective action. Is that 

in effect what you are doing, giving us the illusion that you may 

be able to prevent proliferation and thereby lulling us into not having effective civil defense? 

Ambassador JENKINS. Thank you for that question. I will just 

speak just in terms of what I have been working on, which is securing nuclear material. 

I think that having the summit, which had 47 nations and three 

international organizations, was in fact a call to the community, to 

the United States and the world that there is a problem that we 

30

need to address and that there is a problem with 2,000 tons of 

highly nitrated plutonium that we have to ensure is secure. 

It is a call saying that there is something that has to be fixed, 

and by having this summit we actually showed an effort, an international effort and a multilateral effort, to try to do something 

about that issue. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I thank you for your answer, and it is long past 

time that we start bargaining, offering concessions and/or threatening other nations with loss of trade in order to achieve our objectives here. I yield back. 

Chairman BERMAN. Speaking of time, the gentleman’s time has 

expired and the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Smith, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ambassador Jenkins and 

Ambassador Burk, as we all know weapons of mass destruction are 

by definition unthinkable and unconscionable, but since Hiroshima 

and Nagasaki and the addition of several nuclear states, including 

the PRC, Russia, Pakistan, India, Britain and France, efforts to responsibly mitigate the threat, including a myriad of treaties like 

the NPT, are among the strategies that successive administrations 

have pursued. Provided we can assist on adequate verification, it 

seems to me those treaties are extremely useful. 

In the 1980s I voted against, and I am sure Mr. Berman remembers this very well, the U.S. binary weapons efforts that were 

made. Ed Bethune offered the amendments, and I, like so many 

others, unalterably opposed the creation, stockpiling and use of biological weapons. 

It is worth noting that the U.S. gave up its bioweapons program 

in 1969, and the United States has some 31,000 tons of chemical 

weapons and is currently destroying stocks of mustard gas, Sarin 

DX and blister agents, and current policy is to destroy all of it, 100 

percent, by 2012. 

As we all know, during the Cold War the Soviet war planners 

knew that even a massive conventional attack against Western Europe would likely provoke a nuclear response from the West, especially with the use of tactical nukes. That policy, coupled with Mutual Assured Destruction or MAD, the use of a triad of delivery 

means—bombers, subs and ICBNs—frustrated Soviet planners and 

therefore deterrents worked. 

That said, I am concerned that the President may be substantially weakening U.S. deterrents from biological and chemical attack. Policy and words do matter. On January 12, 1950, Dean Acheson said that he did not include South Korea within our defensive 

perimeter. Kim Il-Sung took note, and historians have debated this 

thereafter, but many think that that gave the green light for North 

Korea to invade South Korea. 

Now, in looking over the President’s new policy is it true that if 

we are attacked by biological or chemical weapons, but those states 

happen to be in compliance with the NPT, U.S. will not use nuclear 

weapons against that state? 

I thought Charles Krauthammer did an excellent job in his op ed 

in The Washington Post on the 9th of April, and it was headlined 

‘‘Obama administration’s Nuclear Doctrine Bizarre, Insane.’’ He 

31

points out—imagine this scenario—hundreds of thousands are 

lying dead in the streets of Boston after a massive anthrax or 

nerve gas attack. The President immediately calls in the lawyers 

to determine whether the attacking state is in compliance with the 

NPT. 

If it turns out that the attacker is up to date with its latest IAEA 

inspections, well, it gets immunity from nuclear retaliation. Our response is then restricted to bullets, bombs and other conventional 

munitions. However, if the lawyers tell the President that the attacking state is NPT noncompliant, we are free to blow the bastards to nuclear kingdom come. This is quite insane. 

So my question would be, is that really the policy? Are we talking about since we don’t have a credible biological or chemical capability, and again I absolutely renounce and I am sure everybody 

on this panel wouldn’t want that ever used. I remember the talk 

about what the plume would actually look like if chemical munitions were used and the huge amount of suffering and death that 

would be visited upon people. 

But if you take away all legs of our deterrence capability and say 

that is off limits, is that really what the administration is saying? 

Ambassador Burk or Ambassador Jenkins? 

Ambassador BURK. Yes. I think what Secretary Gates said when 

I watched the roll out was that we were making this assurance not 

to use nuclear weapons, but in the event of a chemical or biological 

attack we reserve the right to respond with overwhelming conventional force, and I believe——

Mr. SMITH. Shock and awe? I mean, we had that in Iran. 

Ambassador BURK. No. No. I am just repeating to you what the 

senior Defense Department have said, what I heard them say publicly. But there was also, my understanding, a provision that they 

reserved the right to revisit this policy in the event that the biological problem, if that developed in ways that had not been foreseen. 

Mr. SMITH. But to a rogue state or to a group of individuals, terrorist organizations who might be holed up in Afghanistan or somewhere else, a nuance policy does not clearly convey massive retaliation in my opinion, and I would appreciate your opinion, not necessarily what senior staff says or what Gates says. Doesn’t that 

make us more susceptible to that kind of attack, and does that take 

away the deterrence capability or at least weaken it in any way? 

Ambassador BURK. My opinion isn’t——

Chairman BERMAN. One sentence. 

Ambassador BURK [continuing]. Worth a whole lot compared to 

Secretary Gates, but no. I would have to say I don’t believe so, and 

I do believe that he made a very clear statement about what the 

U.S. would do, what its options were as a response in that event, 

and I think he was quite clear. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. The 

gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Scott, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I think in response to Congressman Smith’s point, which is a very good point, 

and my hope is that that position will be clarified, but I would 

think that if we recall the administration has that caveat of revisVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:11 Jun 18, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00035 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\042110\56092 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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iting that situation and with the clear understanding that in no 

way would our policies ever put this country at any risk. 

I also think that in many respects as you are moving on this 

issue and when you are in the position of leadership that it is important that we lead from a point of nonproliferation, from a position of where we want to be. But certainly it has been clear time 

and time again with this administration that we reserve the right 

to revisit this issue based upon the circumstances that present 

themselves and that no way does the Obama administration stand 

on any position other than to move with all means to make sure 

that the United States of America is protected. 

Let me ask you this. In your knowledge, do either of you know 

of anybody anywhere that does not think that Iran is after nuclear 

weapons? 

[No response.] 

Mr. SCOTT. So then the answer to this question is that everybody——

Chairman BERMAN. Are you saying yes or no? 

Ambassador BURK. I don’t know anybody who doesn’t think that 

that is something they aspire to. 

Mr. SCOTT. Right. So that certainly includes Russia big time. The 

issue is that Russia is the only declared nation that has been the 

ultimate sponsor of Iran’s nuclear program. This is especially true 

in the 14 years that they have been working with the Bushehr 

plant. 

Wouldn’t it be a good starting point to hold Russia to a tight area 

of responsibility to make sure that the spent nuclear fuel from that 

plant that could be used to move toward the development of a 

weapon is disposed of? 

The other point that I wanted to ask is given the fact that we 

know this—that, as you said, you know of no one that does not believe they are after a weapon—and we are saying the world cannot 

be secured if they get it and runs directly counter to our whole efforts of nonproliferation that this ought to merit a move to dramatically move to boycott on an international basis the importation 

of refined gasoline into this country. 

I don’t care what kind of sanctions we put on for everything else. 

That is the one issue in my estimation. That is the last resort on 

a peaceful means of stopping them from acquiring this nuclear 

weapon because if they do that is going to throw the entire balance 

of that region and the world into a very precarious position. 

What is the hesitancy here of moving with that kind of effort and 

sanction on that entity—they produce all this, but they have to 

bring this refined gasoline in—and especially given the internal 

dissent that is going on in Iran? 

That would be a very significant way of capitalizing it because 

I am convinced that the only way that we are going to solve this 

problem is by causing an emergence of revolution as maybe we say 

within the country of Iran to recapture its sanity from these extremists that are controlling the country. 

So I guess what I am trying to say is that since you say everybody knows this is happening—3 seconds maybe? 

Chairman BERMAN. Well, I think the time of the gentleman has 

expired. I think I would just intervene here to point out on the 

33

issue of Iran and Iran sanctions, I take it that is not Ambassador 

Burk’s portfolio. Undersecretary Burns, several officials in the 

NFC, are sort of leading that particular effort. 

Ambassador BURK. That is correct, but I am happy to—we will 

take back these comments and these questions as well. I am sorry. 

We will make sure to pass this back to let the appropriate people 

who are seized with this on a day to day basis know of the concerns 

and the proposals, and I will faithfully report that back. 

Mr. SCOTT. I didn’t know my time went so fast. I am sorry. I just 

wanted to make the point. 

Chairman BERMAN. The gentleman from California, Mr. Rohrabacher, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. This 

is of course a very complex and very significant hearing today, and 

I appreciate your leadership, Mr. Chairman, and I would pledge to 

work together with you to make sure that we are all doing the 

right thing. 

Let me note that maintaining a large nuclear arsenal and the delivery systems for those weapons, that is a very expensive proposition and it consumes limited resources which prevents us then 

from actually investing our limited resources in other weapons that 

we need and we expect to be used. 

We would hope that nuclear weapons would never be used, and 

it costs a certain amount of money to maintain those weapons, and 

if we spend that money that way we don’t have the money for the 

weapons that our troops depend on every day, so it behooves all of 

us to take this very seriously as to what level of nuclear weapons 

is sufficient for the security of the United States. 

In the past, large arsenals of nuclear weapons were totally necessary because during the Cold War we depended on mutually assured destruction, which means we needed a level of nuclear weapons not only to strike at an enemy, but to have a counterstrike 

after we had already absorbed a nuclear attack. 

Well, the Cold War is over, the Soviet Union no longer exists, 

and the need for a counterattack of that magnitude is no longer 

necessary. Thus, we can reduce our nuclear arsenals on both sides 

further down and still have security, and if we don’t we are wasting money that should go to other national security interests. 

So it will take a lot of work on our part to make sure we are very 

serious about the issue, but what makes this issue not serious and 

dangerous is this talk of nuclear disarmament. What is that all 

about? 

I mean, we can reduce the number of nuclear weapons clearly, 

but for us to even hint that we are willing to some day go to zero 

nuclear weapons and as if that is going to impress leaders in North 

Korea and Iran and other rogue states that this is the reason that 

we have to reaffirm that our goal is total disarmament. 

Chairman BERMAN. Will the gentleman yield? 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. As long as I get it off my time, sure. 

Chairman BERMAN. Well, it won’t be. It will be on your time, so 

maybe you don’t want to yield. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BERMAN. But it will just be 10 seconds. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Go for it. 

34

Chairman BERMAN. Number one, in the second panel it will be 

drawn out more clearly. There is a belief that the nonproliferation 

and disarmament goals are connected, but, secondly, there is this 

matter of this treaty that President Nixon led us into that we 

signed where we committed to that as the goal. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, I would suggest reaffirming that that 

is a legitimate goal and is dangerous to our national security. It 

does not convince rogue nations whatsoever that they shouldn’t develop their nuclear weapons. In fact, it encourages them to do so. 

Just as I would say the talk that we have heard recently from 

the administration that Mr. Smith brought up that calls into question our willingness to use a nuclear weapon and leaves that very 

vague is actually dangerous to our national security as well. 

Now, if we are going to take care of the security interests of the 

United States of America, we have to do it seriously. I will have 

to say that this talk from the administration about disarmament 

and this talk about being very vague about when we would use nuclear weapons is damaging rather than helping our national security. 

One last note. Mr. Sherman was correct when he said that a nuclear weapon could well be smuggled into another country. Yes, 

that is true. That does not negate, however, missile defense. At a 

time when we are lowering our arsenals, our nuclear arsenals, missile defense becomes even more important because countries like 

North Korea or Iran may well at a time of crisis or a time of chaos 

put their nuclear weapon on a missile and could actually use it in 

a time of crisis rather than smuggling it into Israel or smuggling 

it into another country. 

Yes. We need to take care of the smuggling potential by having 

a very aggressive intelligence community and a well funded intelligence effort that will permit us to uncover those kinds of plots, 

but, Mr. Chairman, we also need a missile defense system that will 

protect us in time of crisis from these type of monstrous rogue 

states that could launch a missile toward Israel or toward the 

United States or any other country. Thank you. 

Chairman BERMAN. The gentlelady from California, Ms. Woolsey, 

is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Ms. WOOLSEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Like almost probably 

every member of this committee, I strongly oppose a nuclear Iran. 

Nuclear weapons I believe can only serve to destabilize this already 

delicate balance of the Middle East. So knowing that, we have to 

hold all nations in the region to nonproliferation standards. 

So my question is how does Israel’s possession of nuclear weapons affect the security of the region and the stability of nonproliferation regime, and how does this affect our ability to negotiate for a stronger NPT presence in the Middle East? I mean, 

probably both of you I would like to have answer that. 

Ambassador BURK. That is an important question. I think, first 

of all, Israel has always said it won’t be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East, and I just have to make that 

point. 

But there has not been the concern in the Middle East about this 

issue for decades until Iran’s program came out into the open, and 

you could argue that that is what has gotten the countries in the 

35

region very, very anxious is Iran’s activities, which have now been 

discussed in great detail at the IAEA. 

And clearly there is a point we hear all the time about universal 

adherence to the NPT and all parties need to be in the treaty. 

There are three that have never joined—Israel, India and Pakistan. 

Clearly, universality in the Middle East has been severely complicated by lack of compliance by the states who are in the region, 

and I think the compliance issue now has made universality a 

much more far distant goal I would say, and that is something we 

continue to emphasize here. 

Ambassador JENKINS. Thank you. Ambassador Burk really pretty 

much talked to the issue of the NPT, which is her expertise, but 

I guess in relation to the work that I do, which is security of nuclear material, what I can say in that respect is that, as you know, 

Israel did attend the Nuclear Security Summit and they agreed 

with the other participants on the intent to work domestically and 

work internationally to ensure that nuclear material are secure. 

They were at the summit, and they expressed a concern that was 

expressed by the other countries about the global issue of securing 

these nuclear weapons. I mean nuclear material. So in terms of my 

area and working on security it is important, the materials, and 

ensuring they do not get into the hands of nonstate actors and terrorists. They were very much on board with that, and that is what 

I can add about that issue. 

Ms. WOOLSEY. Okay. Thank you. In 2008, Congress approved a 

nuclear deal with India, and I was part of the Minority opinion—

we were in the Minority as Democrats at that time—and opposed 

this deal because I thought it clearly violated the intent, if not the 

letter of the law, of the NPT. 

So I just question how can the United States stand up to other 

nations demanding that they comply with the NPT after we did an 

end run around it, and what can we do to gain back our credibility? 

Ambassador JENKINS. Well, on the matter of the United StatesIndia deal I wasn’t involved in nonproliferation at the time it was 

negotiated, but I do understand that it was negotiated very, very 

carefully with a very close eye to ensuring that it did not in any 

way violate U.S. obligations under the NPT, so that is the fact as 

I understand it. 

I think the way we explain this issue is that it was an attempt 

to recognize a fact here, expand safeguards on a program, on the 

India nuclear program, and in fact bring them closer to the nonproliferation regime than they had been before, and that was the 

goal and I think that is what we are achieving through that arrangement. 

Ms. WOOLSEY. But isn’t it true that when you have to explain 

what you have done you kind of undermine what you are doing in 

the first place? I mean, explaining why we went end run around 

something that we thought was important. 

Ambassador JENKINS. That is how I explain it when I am asked 

about it. 

Ms. WOOLSEY. All right. Thank you very much. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentlelady has expired. The 

gentleman from California, Mr. Royce, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

36

Mr. ROYCE. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think just to begin 

with the basic premise here, I think much of the conversation—I 

think a lot of the administration’s thinking—is premised on the assumption that other countries are positively impressed by our reducing our weaponry. That is probably true in many cases. Canada 

probably is. 

But the reality is that too many parts of the world have a different set of premises, and in those parts of the world what the administration sees as leadership and what a lot of people applaud 

as their leadership is read as a sign of weakness. 

I would like to ask Ambassador Jenkins a question. The administration points to China’s attendance at last week’s Nuclear Security 

Summit as a diplomatic coup. How so? Because China ‘‘announced 

cooperation on a Nuclear Security Center of Excellence.’’ Now, I 

wasn’t sure what that was. I see if you Google it that according to 

the Chinese party paper Hu Jintao is considering this center in 

order to play a bigger role in regional nuclear security. 

Now, I don’t think I have to remind the members here that have 

been here while we have watched China proliferate, while we 

watched China send the ring magnets to Pakistan, while we 

watched China help Pakistan develop its nuclear arsenal, while we 

watched China play interference for North Korea, something that 

they could have shut down, but did not, but instead decided to run 

interference. 

I have been in meetings in Beijing where this has been discussed 

ad nauseam. It is just phenomenal. I mean, the members here 

don’t have to be reminded that China has assisted Iran’s missile 

program, and continues to do so, by the way. So is this Center of 

Excellence all we have to show for our diplomacy with China? 

Ambassador JENKINS. Thank you for your question. The Center 

of Excellence idea is one that is still in development. It is one that 

has been launched where DOE and DOD are working right now 

with developing what the Center of Excellence will be doing specifically, but it will be working in the area of nuclear security. What 

is positive about it is it is going to be a regional center and so it 

will work with countries in the region and focusing on the importance of nuclear security. 

What is positive again is not only that we are able to—it took 

a lot of diplomacy to actually work with China to begin this center. 

And what we are trying to do is have countries who attended the 

summit be regional players and be regional leaders on the issue of 

nuclear security so that after the summit and years after even the 

second summit these countries can continue to promote the goal of 

ensuring that nuclear material remains secure and not vulnerable 

to nonstate actors. 

So in a very real sense this is an important step in ensuring not 

only that we have something that follows the summit that can actually take it forward and be real after 11⁄2 days of meetings or 2 

days of meetings, but that we have an important part, like China, 

that is actually engaged in this issue and that we stay engaged 

with China in the next few years as we develop this center and for 

many years after that. 

Mr. ROYCE. Well, we are engaged with China, but, as I said in 

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37

operation from China and others is to think you are getting it when 

you are not. 

I am looking through your list of promises made at the Nuclear 

Security Summit, and I don’t see any mention of countries contributing or bolstering their proliferation security initiative contribution, and I was just going to ask. Am I mistaken on that? Was anyone asked? 

Was anybody asked to financially bolster their contribution or to 

step up to the plate on the Proliferation Security Initiative, for instance, or any of the programs, the hard programs that we try to 

use to interdict weaponry and proliferation? 

Ambassador JENKINS. Thank you. 

Mr. ROYCE. I am glad that Finland invited some international 

bureaucrats from the IAEA to Helsinki. As I go down the list I see 

they have done that, but again to the point at hand. I am just looking for the success where somebody was asked to step up to the 

plate, put money in to help on this. Go ahead. 

Ambassador JENKINS. Thank you. 

Chairman BERMAN. I am sorry, but the time of the gentleman 

has expired. You will have to keep looking. I am sorry. The 

gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Sheila Jackson Lee, is recognized for 5 

minutes. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you for this hearing, and thank you for 

the witnesses that are present. We are always grateful for our 

chairman and our ranking member for being timely. 

Across the street is a hearing that I am also engaged in in Homeland Security that involves a report by former Senator Graham and 

former Senator Talent—you may be aware of that—that speaks 

about the risks in terms of nuclear utilization, so I would like to 

just simply start by saying when you have a meeting that was held 

last week that focuses on the crisis of nuclear materials getting 

into hands of terrorists, I think that is an important step. 

I think it is an important step when you sign a new arms treaty 

with Russia, who has for a long period of time obviously through 

the Cold War with the Soviet Union, been our nemesis as it relates 

to these issues. 

But there is no doubt that we should be cognizant that nuclear 

powers such as Russia, China and France have not moved behind 

the issue of global disarmament. But who is to say that we are not 

supposed to be the leader, and I would hope the Senate will approve the new Strategic Arms Treaty with Russia because I believe 

it is important, and I would like to be able to assume that we made 

sufficient progress even in spite of Iran and North Korea last week. 

So let me pose questions regarding the meeting that I believe is 

forthcoming, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which is credited with 

keeping the lid on the spread of nuclear weapons for decades and 

what we perceive our goals are and are we going to achieve our 

goals. I would hope as well, just for the record, that we look at this 

in a bipartisan manner. 

There is no one with common sense that does not view Iran, for 

example, as a threat to the world, not just to the United States, 

and I cannot imagine that the administration is not doing everything it can to assess how we address the question of Iran, but we 

38

must do that provocatively, but also with diplomacy, so that in addition to what we do the United Nations can also be part of it. 

Ambassador Burk, if you would, tell me what progress you think 

you made. I think you are the expert on last week. Okay. Tell me 

what progress you expect to make on the conference next week, because you are on the NPT. Yes. 

Ambassador BURK. Next week? 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Next week, yes. I got it. I know. So I just decided to stay with Ambassador Burk. 

Ambassador BURK. Yes. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. My time is rolling because I did want to put 

comments on the record, but if you could quickly answer that, 

please? 

Ambassador BURK. All right. What progress we are going to 

make next week? 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Yes. Your goals. 

Ambassador BURK. Well, our goals are to see if we can’t get a 

strong reaffirmation of support for the treaty by as many parties 

as possible, the vast majority we would hope, and we are looking 

to have a serious and constructive review of all the issues on the 

disarmament piece and operation piece and the peaceful use of——

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Are you going to seek some consensus on Iran 

and North Korea? 

Ambassador BURK. I think what we are seeking is consensus on 

the importance of compliance and the need to deal seriously with 

noncompliance. I think the difficulty in getting consensus on Iran 

per se is that this is a consensus body. The meeting rule operates 

by consensus, and Iran is in the room. 

If we can get Iran to agree to language like that we will have 

consensus, but otherwise I think we will have to find some 

other——

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Well, then I will take the word consensus 

away and just have an instruction and say I think we should be 

enormously forceful, detailed and not hesitant in calling on our 

other allies in the room to focus on a strong statement and strong 

action. 

I am going to move to Ambassador Jenkins on last week’s, which 

I think was an enormous step, as a member of the Homeland Security Committee, in protecting loose materials. Can you just give me 

your thought on what we got done last week? 

Ambassador JENKINS. Very briefly. Thank you for the question. 

Very briefly, I think one of the most important things that we were 

able to achieve was to get an agreement by the participants, all 47 

nations and the three IOs, international organizations, on the 

threat and the fact that there is a threat of multiple nuclear materials being taken or illicitly taken by nonstate actors. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Do you think any area is more vulnerable 

than the next, such as the Africa and Pakistan border or Israel, 

Palestine, on these potential transfers of loose materials? 

Ambassador JENKINS. I think the vulnerability areas differ because of the type of situations. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Do you have any in mind that have been 

made public? 

39

Ambassador JENKINS. Well, I mean, I think if you look, for example, at the African region the issues there are going to be border 

issues. They are going to be coastlines and trying to deal with export controls and making sure that the weapons are not elicited 

through those kind of border areas. 

If you look at other areas that don’t have that, you are more concerned about actually the facilities themselves. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentlelady has expired. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BERMAN. The gentleman from Virginia. No. I am 

sorry. The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Burton, is recognized for 

5 minutes. 

Mr. BURTON. You know, unless we have an embargo that blocks 

Iran completely and puts so much pressure on the regime things 

aren’t going to change. We have been talking about this for 5 or 

6 years. 

I have been in Congress 27 years. I am going to tell you. We just 

talk and talk and talk and nothing happens, and they just thumb 

their nose at us and keep going on. It is absolutely insane for the 

United States to rule out any kind of a weapon in the event we go 

to war. War is conducted to protect America and to win. That is 

it. 

You know, one of the things that is very interesting is when the 

first Gulf War took place there was a great deal of concern that 

Saddam Hussein was going to use biological or chemical weapons 

because he did on the Kurds. He killed tens of thousands of Kurds 

using chemical weapons. 

I was on a television show and they asked me about tactical enhanced nuclear weapons, and I said we shouldn’t rule those out. I 

was criticized about it, and about 2 weeks later President Bush I 

said we are not ruling anything in or out. They said does that include tactical nukes, and he said yes. 

As a result, there was no chemical or biological weapons used, 

and we won the war in a short period of time. Now, those things 

have very little radioactive fallout so there wouldn’t have been a 

holocaust like you saw at Hiroshima or Nagasaki, but nevertheless 

it let Saddam Hussein know there was a terrible price to pay. 

If you want to go to the major nuclear weapons, if we had invaded Japan in World War II, and I don’t know if you know much 

about history. The estimate was we would have lost 500,000 Americans. Because we used the bombs at Hiroshima and Nagasaki we 

stopped the war and we saved 500,000 American lives. It was a 

horrible thing to do, but war is hell anyhow. 

For Secretary Gates, for whom I have a great deal of respect, to 

say we are going to rule out nuclear weapons, that is crazy. You 

don’t know what Iran is going to do. They are developing nuclear 

weapons right now and a delivery system. What if they use them? 

You know you use whatever you have to. And what if they don’t 

use them? Let us just say they start using biological weapons or 

some other enemy does. We have to have the ability to retaliate in 

any way possible to protect America. 

The number one responsibility of the Congress of the United 

States and the administration is to protect this country against enemies, both domestic and foreign, and that means doing whatever 

40

is necessary to protect this country. To allow somebody to have immunity as far as nuclear weapons are concerned really bothers me. 

Now, I have a couple other things I would like to just say here. 

Iran has been thumbing its nose at the rest of the world. They are 

not stopping their nuclear program. All these meetings aren’t going 

to cut it. The only thing that is going to stop them is to put so 

much pressure on them as far as energy is concerned, not getting 

any gasoline or whatever it takes to kill that economy and force the 

people to force them out of office. That is the only thing that is 

going to work because they are going to go ahead. 

Their number one objective is to destroy the state of Israel. I 

haven’t heard that mentioned here at all today, but we have BBnet 

and Yahoo coming into this country, and it is virtually ignored by 

the President. I think that is terrible. They are our strongest ally 

in the Middle East, and Iran is going about its merry way developing nuclear capability and their number one objective, stated objective, is to destroy Israel. And so we need to be saying very clearly we are going to support Israel in any way possible and we are 

going to do everything we can to stop Iran from developing nuclear 

weapons. 

Let me just say a couple of other things here. Iran is a terrorist 

state. They are a terrorist state. The President has indicated for 

peaceful purposes we would allow Iran to have nuclear material. 

They don’t need it. Iran has got plenty of energy right there in oil, 

and since they are a terrorist state we ought to do everything we 

can do to stop them from getting any nuclear material for any purpose that might be able to be converted into a nuclear weapon. 

Now, the other thing I want to talk to you about real quickly is 

I have talked to a lot of the Gulf States. I am the senior Republican 

on the Middle East Subcommittee, and I have talked to a lot of the 

people there and they say two things will happen if there are nuclear weapons developed in Iran. 

Number one, all the states around them will be concerned and 

they will be intimidated and they will start moving toward Iran because they don’t want to be at odds with a nuclear power in their 

neighborhood. Second, a lot of them are going to want nuclear 

weapons. 

These are things that we ought to be concerned about as Members of Congress and we ought to be talking about them and we 

ought to put the hammer to Iran in every way possible to stop nuclear technology from evolving into nuclear weapons. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. The 

gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Connolly? 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for 

holding this hearing. I thank our panelists. I would ask unanimous 

consent that my full statement be entered into the record. 

Chairman BERMAN. Without objection. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Let me just say I think the whole question of nuclear proliferation and the proliferation of radiological material getting into the hands of the wrong parties is perhaps the single most 

troubling challenge we face in U.S. foreign policy, and that is why 

I think both the summit the President held and this hearing are 

terribly important as we explore the best ways to protect our country and our allies. 

41

Speaking of which, let me ask each of the Ambassadors. Why did 

this summit not cover radiological sources, which some European 

officials believe pose the largest terrorist threat? 

Ambassador JENKINS. Thank you. Yes, that question came up 

often during our discussions, and the majority of states realized—

we made it clear from the very beginning—that we recognize and 

understand that radiological sources are an important issue, a very 

important issue, but for the purposes of the summit we felt it was 

necessary to really address what President Obama has already said 

was the largest threat, which is the nuclear materials getting into 

the hands of nonstate actors and terrorists, which is plutonium and 

highly enriched uranium. 

So that was the focus of what we really wanted to have the summit really address because that is a big task in itself is trying to 

secure all the nuclear material. However, the radiological is important. We mentioned it both in a communique ́, and the work plan 

has issues that could be addressed. 

We also stated at our meetings prior to the summit with the 

Sherpas that countries are more than capable of having summits 

that address the radiological issue. This was addressing nuclear 

material, but radiological sources are something that can be another source, another potential for another summit, so we left that 

open. 

And also just one last thing. The U.S. Department of Energy, for 

example, still does work on radiological, securing those materials 

for——

Mr. CONNOLLY. Right. Because when you look at source points, 

there are so many more source points in terms of radiological material. You are quite right. We have reason to be concerned about fissionable material and stockpiles thereof, spent or unspent, but radiological material in terms of the use for a dirty bomb can keep 

you up at night in terms of nightmares. 

In the 2010 edition of Securing the Bomb, analyst Matthew Bunn 

rates Pakistan and Russia as countries at the highest risk of theft 

of nuclear materials. Would you agree, Ambassador Burk or Ambassador Jenkins? 

Ambassador BURK. I would like to turn that to Ambassador Jenkins because I think that may have been——

Mr. CONNOLLY. Ambassador Jenkins? 

Ambassador JENKINS. I would actually like to refrain from actually naming any particular countries as the most vulnerable. I 

would just like to just focus on the fact that this is a global problem, and we really want all countries to really play a role in this. 

I think that is what we were really trying to promote at the summit. It is a global issue, and all countries need to work on it together and we need to assist each other in assuring that everyone 

has what they need, the resources or whatever, in order to secure 

all of the nuclear material. 

At the summit we refrained from and all during the process we 

refrained from pointing fingers at any one country and saying this 

country is more vulnerable than another because it really is a global problem, and that is what we think the attention should be focused on. 

42

Mr. CONNOLLY. A diplomatic answer if there ever was one. Will 

there or should there be anything in the RevCon final document on 

the issue of stopping the spread of enrichment and reprocessing 

technology in facilities? 

Ambassador BURK. I will take that one. I don’t know whether we 

are going to have a RevCon final document or not because again 

it is consensus, but we think we will be prepared certainly to discuss and we know other countries will discuss as well the need to 

constrain the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technologies, 

the sensitive technologies, and assure that any pursuit of enrichment of technology—I mean, we have a number of our allies that 

have enrichment and reprocessing technologies—is only done under 

the strictest safeguards conditions. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I am going to yield 

back my time, but I do want to add my voice to praise the Obama 

administration and President personally for showing leadership on 

this very important issue and bringing together many in the world 

community to make sure it gets addressed. I thank the chairman. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time is yielded back. The gentleman 

from Texas, Mr. McCaul, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize for being 

late. I was at a Homeland Security Committee hearing on this 

exact same topic. 

Chairman BERMAN. Did you see Sheila? 

Mr. MCCAUL. I did. I did. That is where she is right now, but 

she may be on her way. 

Thanks to the witnesses for being here. This is an issue that has 

been of grave concern for a long time, certainly since 9/11. My concern has always been Pakistan, where terrorism meets the nuclear 

weapons, and how that is being safeguarded and what we are doing 

to safeguard their nuclear arsenal; Iran, which according to most 

reports is maybe a year away from having a nuclear weapon. 

Time is running out, and I hope we have a sanctions Act that 

passes, but I am concerned that the clock is going to run out. As 

Prime Minister Netanyahu told us that once they have the bomb 

they have it and you can’t really take it back like when Pakistan 

got it. So that is a real concern. 

What I am also concerned about, though, is the nexus between 

Iran and its alliance in our own hemisphere with Hugo Chavez and 

Venezuela. So when we talk about proliferation or the smuggling 

of nuclear materials, we are obviously concerned not only over in 

that part of the world, but the connection it could have to this part 

of the world. We have a border—I am from the State of Texas—

that is very porous, and we are very concerned about that kind of 

material crossing into the United States. 

So if either one of you would like to comment on those points and 

tell me what your plan is specifically to address that, realizing I 

have thrown quite a bit out at you, but I would like to get your 

response. 

Ambassador JENKINS. Just very briefly because I am not as familiar. I am getting more familiar now with all of the work that 

DHS is doing domestically on that, but I do know that DHS, and 

you just sat through the hearing, is very engaged in that issue and 

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43

ders and what can be brought into the porous borders into the 

United States. 

You make a very good point about the global nature of the issue 

and being concerned about what can happen far away, but even 

closer to us in Venezuela or wherever and so I just have to reiterate what I have been saying this morning already about the global nature of this and the fact that it really is a global issue that 

all countries must be engaged in trying to prevent because it really 

does have no borders. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Ambassador Burk? 

Ambassador BURK. Well, all I would say is that you have hit on 

some really important issues and some big concerns, and I think 

from my narrow focus on the NPT part of the effort through me 

is to try again globally to get as many countries to understand that 

these things are problems and do whatever they can regionally, 

globally to contribute to steps that will address these kinds of 

issues. 

I think that is the idea. We have to all be on the same page, and 

there has to be broad agreement on what the problems are. 

Mr. MCCAUL. And my understanding is that Iran is a signatory? 

Ambassador BURK. They are a party and they will be in New 

York——

Mr. MCCAUL. Okay. 

Ambassador BURK [continuing]. Yes, at the review conference. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Okay. That will be a very interesting discussion. 

Tell me about your efforts with China and Russia to get them on 

board with sanctions. 

Ambassador BURK. I can’t give you any specific details, Congressman, because I am not personally involved in that. I know that we 

are working with the P5-plus-1—I keep getting the sixth party in; 

I am trying to get all these groups—and that we are working very 

closely with Russia and China, and any Security Council action 

would be contingent upon their support. 

Mr. MCCAUL. I agree. We are going to hopefully pass this in the 

Congress that applies to the United States, but the U.N. is going 

to have to come forward with a sanctions bill that would have 

teeth, and I am concerned to get Russia and China on board. 

It probably won’t have that necessary enforcement, and therefore 

we are going to be faced with a nuclear Iran, which can be a very 

I think dangerous scenario. They are a signatory, but under the 

President’s policy he will not use nuclear force if someone is a signatory to the NPT, but they also have to be in compliance with 

that. Is that correct? 

Ambassador BURK. No. It was very clearly stated that what we 

call the negative security assurance was only granted to countries 

who were in compliance. 

Mr. MCCAUL. In compliance. 

Ambassador BURK. And I think Secretary Gates said quite explicitly again, as I watched him on the roll out, that the countries who 

were not in compliance—Iran and North Korea—this assurance 

would not apply to them. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Right. 

Ambassador BURK. So I think it was quite clear. 

44

Mr. MCCAUL. I think it is good to make that very clear that that 

policy would not affect what we do with Iran. With that, I think 

my time has expired. 

Chairman BERMAN. Your time is expired. I won’t ask whether he 

included Syria as a noncompliant party. I am not going to ask that. 

I want to thank both of you very much. We appreciate it. We 

have a second panel that is going to follow on. Good luck next 

week. Good luck with the follow on to last week. 

Ambassador JENKINS. Thank you. 

Chairman BERMAN. While the panels are coming up, Mr. Rohrabacher, I just wanted to read one paragraph from what George 

Shultz, Henry Kissinger and a few other guys wrote: ‘‘Ronald 

Reagan called for the abolishment of all nuclear weapons, which he 

considered to be’’—all nuclear weapons is his quote—‘‘totally irrational, totally inhumane, good for nothing but killing, possibly destructive of life on earth and civilization.’’

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman, if I could, just one retort to 

that is that would be the one thing I disagreed with President 

Reagan on. 

Mr. BURTON. Would the gentleman yield real quickly while we 

are having the other panel come up? 

Chairman BERMAN. You didn’t work for Reagan. 

Mr. BURTON. You know, if every person in the world, every country, did away with nuclear weapons that would be one thing, but 

you don’t disarm yourself if there is any possibility that you are 

going to be retaliated against and be attacked. 

Chairman BERMAN. As our panelists are sitting down, I will just 

say there is nothing I know in anything in that Nuclear Posture 

Review or what President Obama said at Prague that would indicate we have intention—any intention—of disarming ourselves of 

nuclear weapons without knowing that all other nuclear weapons 

have been disarmed and that a system is in place to ensure that 

is true. 

Mr. BURTON. If the gentleman would yield one more time real 

quickly? And that is this. Let us say a country has complied, saying 

it will never use nuclear weapons and they have disarmed, but 

they use chemical and biological weapons to a large degree and 

blow up Boston and kill hundreds of thousands of people. We don’t 

retaliate with nuclear weapons? 

Chairman BERMAN. That is why I was addressing Mr. Rohrabacher and not you. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Couldn’t the gentleman have picked a city in Indiana? 

Chairman BERMAN. We are very pleased to have our next panel, 

and I will now introduce them. David Albright is president of the 

Institute for Science and International Security in Washington, 

DC. In case you want to know, if you remember that attack on the 

Syrian reactor and we saw these vivid pictures in the paper before, 

after and then this plowed field like it was going to the bread basket of the world? Those were his pictures. 

He regularly publishes and conducts scientific research, is frequently mentioned in major print and broadcast outlets and has 

written numerous assessments on secret nuclear weapons proVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:11 Jun 18, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00048 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\042110\56092 HFA PsN: SHIRL
45

grams throughout the world. His most recent book is Peddling 

Peril: How the Secret Nuclear Trade Arms America’s Enemies. 

Kenneth Luongo is president of the Partnership for Global Security. Mr. Luongo previously served as senior advisor to the Secretary of Energy for Nonproliferation Policy, director of the Office 

of Arms Control and Nonproliferation at the U.S. Department of 

Energy and as a staffer for the House Armed Services Committee. 

He also serves on the Steering Committee for the Fissile Materials Working Group, a coalition of more than 40 leading experts 

and NGOs in nuclear security and nonproliferation, which held its 

own nuclear security summit last week. That was not the one in 

Tehran. No. Okay. 

Christopher Ford is the director of the Center for Technology and 

Global Security and Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute. Mr. 

Ford served, until September 2008, as United States special representative for nuclear nonproliferation and prior to that as principal deputy assistant secretary of state responsible for arms control, nonproliferation and disarmament verification and compliance 

policy. 

Prior to joining the Bush administration, Dr. Ford served as minority counsel and then general counsel to the U.S. Select Committee on Intelligence. He is also a lieutenant commander in the 

U.S. Navy Reserve. 

Mr. Albright, why don’t you start off? 

STATEMENT OF MR. DAVID ALBRIGHT, PRESIDENT, 

INSTITUTE FOR SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Mr. Chairman Berman and Ranking Member 

Burton, thank you very much for holding this hearing. I think we 

all agree just how important the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review 

Conference can be and kind of a road or pathway to strengthening 

the nonproliferation regime. I think it has been clear from the discussion so far we recognize just how profound the challenges are 

to the Non-Proliferation Treaty today. Iran’s and North Korea’s nuclear programs, if not reversed, could severely damage this treaty. 

The treaty’s effectiveness is also haunted by Syria’s secret construction of a nuclear reactor and its bombing by Israel in September 2007. Likewise, the A.Q. Khan network’s proliferation to 

Iran, Libya and North Korea highlighted the ease with which dangerous nuclear technology spreads largely undetected. Currently 

Iranian and North Korean smuggling networks actively seek, often 

illegally, nuclear dual use goods for their nuclear programs. Their 

smuggling operations indicate an intended or actual violation of the 

Non-Proliferation Treaty or U.N. Security Council resolutions. 

In addition to these proliferation concerns, many non-nuclear 

weapon states are frustrated by the lack of progress on key nuclear 

disarmament steps that are intrinsic to the NPT. It is the only 

treaty where the United States has committed itself to achieving 

nuclear disarmament, but I think it is clear that that is a long 

road, but nonetheless it remains a goal of that treaty. 

However, the commitment of the nuclear weapons states to disarmament is not seen by the non-nuclear weapons states despite 

President Obama’s much lauded 2009 speech in Prague and agreement on a New START treaty. Nonetheless, many countries have 

46

a strong interest in the success of the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, and that success, I think as Ambassador Burk 

noted, is by no means certain and will typically be judged whether 

there is a final document, after essentially what will be 4 weeks 

of negotiation. 

As she noted, consensus makes it a very difficult problem. With 

almost 200 nations there, which include Iran, Cuba, Venezuela, 

and well known members of the NAM or the Non-Aligned Movement, any consensus is difficult to reach. However, it is important 

to remember that this conference is just one step in the process of 

strengthening the nonproliferation regime. If it succeeds, and there 

is a document, many efforts will gain momentum, and the treaty 

will be further legitimized. 

If it doesn’t succeed and there is no document, these same efforts 

that are going to be discussed at the conference will continue. The 

United States and other states will certainly have to work harder, 

but in the end the ways to strengthen the nonproliferation pillar 

of the treaty will be achieved through a variety of unilateral, bilateral and multilateral initiatives, many of which are quite far along. 

Despite these difficulties, I think the United States is right to 

prioritize the strengthening of the nonproliferation pillar of the 

NPT. Clearly it is going to be a major challenge. I would say disarmament is an easier challenge in the present climate, but the real 

work has to concern the nonproliferation pillar. 

Ambassador Burk pointed out that making withdrawal from the 

treaty more costly has to be a primary goal. North Korea essentially withdrew from the treaty, not in compliance with its obligations, and essentially got away with it. The treaty has no mechanism to deal with that. We unfortunately expect Iran will try the 

same thing. 

IAEA safeguards need strengthening. Syria avoided signing the 

Additional Protocol in order to build its secret reactor. Libya, to 

protect its secret effort with the A.Q. Khan network, did not sign 

the Additional Protocol. Iran withdrew from implementing the Additional Protocol or acting as if it was in force. 

For too long we have not demanded that it be a condition of any 

nuclear assistance or supply. I think it is clear it should be a condition in the Nuclear Suppliers Group that the supply of nuclear 

items require it. But it needs to be broader than that. It is how 

countries cheat. They simply refuse to sign the Additional Protocol 

or bring it into force and then are relatively free to pursue secret 

programs. 

Another item for the conference, which is even less popular, is 

that the conference should explore agreements to thwart illicit nuclear trade. It should recognize that the danger posed by illicit nuclear trade is a fundamental threat to the NPT because unfortunately that is the way countries are getting nuclear weapons and 

that has been going on for several decades. They are not building 

them on their own. They are depending in essence on the profit motive and secret help from irresponsible countries or people. 

I mentioned the disarmament pillar of the treaty. Certainly the 

United States is going to have to be creative in finding a compromise at the conference on the obligations of the nuclear weapons 

states to meet their Article VI commitments, but, as I said, I think 

47

the prospects for achieving such a compromise appear better today 

because of President Obama’s activities. 

I would also say that the United States should elevate the importance of this treaty. As far as I have heard, President Obama does 

not plan to visit or to address this conference. I would say that I 

think the chances of improving success could be elevated if he did 

attend. He can really work the crowd in a sense to try to build a 

better consensus for the United States. 

He should also be ready to call other leaders. Much of the negotiations happen behind the scenes. There are a lot of land mines 

in this conference, and a lot of that can be addressed by calling on 

other leaders, many of whom he met at the Nuclear Security Summit, to convince them of the need to make strong commitments. So 

I think high level participation would reflect also continued U.S. 

leadership of the nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation agenda. 

And I think we recognize—we, the American public—that the 

Obama administration wants to stop nuclear proliferation, reduce 

the risk posed by nuclear weapons in the hands of states and terrorists and find ways to eventually eliminate all nuclear weapons, 

which I would say is an important goal. Nuclear weapons in essence, if used, kill in many cases what are envisioned tens or hundreds of thousands of people, innocent people, and therefore the use 

of nuclear weapons should be avoided at all costs. 

I think the NPT Review Conference, while not the most important initiative of the Obama administration, is certainly an important opportunity to further all these goals, but succeeding in this 

conference will require more from the United States. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Albright follows:]

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Chairman BERMAN. And Mr. Luongo? 

Mr. LUONGO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BERMAN. Your entire statement will be in the record. 

Mr. LUONGO. Okay. Thanks very much. 

STATEMENT OF MR. KENNETH N. LUONGO, PRESIDENT, 

PARTNERSHIP FOR GLOBAL SECURITY 

Mr. LUONGO. Thank you for the opportunity to testify before your 

committee today. I think this is a very important hearing. It is extremely timely. I am going to focus on the Nuclear Security Summit and its results and where do we go from here. I thank the 

chairman very much for mentioning our Fissile Materials Working 

Group summit last week. It was very successful. We had over 200 

international and domestic experts. It was quite useful. 

I consider the Nuclear Security Summit to be a significant success. It certainly was an unprecedented event. It brought together 

47 nations and three international organizations, and it focused 

high level attention on a very important subject that hasn’t had a 

lot of high level attention focused on it and which requires high 

level attention to move it forward. 

The communique ́ in particular, as your previous witnesses have 

underscored, highlighted the consensus on the threat of nuclear 

terrorism, which had been a difficult issue to get a lot of countries 

to focus on, and it also endorsed the President’s goal of securing all 

vulnerable nuclear materials within 4 years, so that is now an 

international objective, not just a domestic objective. 

In addition, it underscored the importance of maintaining effective security over all nuclear materials on whatever territory it 

may reside, encouraged the conversion of reactors that use highly 

enriched uranium fuel to use low enriched uranium fuel and recognized the importance of a number of different international conventions and agreements. 

And finally, the communique ́ emphasized the need for international cooperation on this agenda and the importance of capacity 

building and responding to requests for assistance in order to make 

sure that these materials are adequately secured wherever they 

may reside. 

Accompanying the communique ́ was a work plan. The work plan 

focused on implementing some of the commitments that were 

made—a number of the commitments that were made—inside of 

the communique ́, including U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540, 

emphasizing support for the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear 

Terrorism, and the G–8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of 

Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. 

It underscored the need for robust independent nuclear regulatory capabilities in all countries, the need to prevent trafficking 

in nuclear materials and technology and the need for improvement 

in nuclear detection and forensics. It further highlighted the fundamental role of the nuclear industry in the nuclear security agenda 

and the importance of sharing best practices and the human dimension of nuclear security. 

And in this regard I would just also note that the nuclear industry held their own meeting the day after the nuclear summit to disVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:11 Jun 18, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00058 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\042110\56092 HFA PsN: SHIRL
55

cuss how the industry could contribute to the nuclear security mission. 

I think that perhaps the most far-reaching objectives of the work 

plan focused on three items. One was the consolidation of sites 

where nuclear materials are stored within the borders of individual 

countries, the removal and disposal of nuclear materials no longer 

needed for operational activities and the conversion of HEU fuel reactors to LEU fuels. Of course, as others in the hearing so far have 

mentioned, all of these objectives were voluntary. There was no 

mandatory implementation. 

Then supplementing the activities of the work plan, individual 

countries, 29 in all, made commitments to improve nuclear security 

at home, and I think the major ones have been well reported on—

the Ukraine, Canada, Russia, India and China—but there also 

were some pledges of funding—$6 million by the United Kingdom 

and $300,000 by Belgium—for the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Fund, 

$100 million from Canada for security cooperation with Russia, and 

then the President called for $10 billion more for the G–8 Global 

Partnership over the next 10 years. 

In my opinion, there were three areas where the summit could 

have done more. The first was on funding. I really had hoped for 

more international funding for the nuclear security mission. The 

IAEA was focused on as an institution that needs to do more in 

this area, and their Nuclear Security Office is really underfunded. 

What they get from the actual budget of the IAEA is quite small 

and then it is supplemented with voluntary contributions. So funding would have been one area. 

The second is—I understand why the focus was on nuclear materials—but radiological materials are prevalent, estimated at hundred of thousands to millions around the globe, and I know that 

a number of countries raised this question. I hope that in the lead 

up to the 2012 summit in the Republic of Korea that the radiological issue will get a lot more attention because while the impact 

of its use is lower than the nuclear weapon, its probability of being 

used is higher. 

And finally, there were no new initiatives that were announced 

at this summit, and I think part of the reason is that there is international fatigue with the current set of activities, but when combined, I find that the current set of activities and programs and initiatives that we have in play right now are inadequate to the task 

of effectively preventing nuclear terrorism, and I have a number of 

suggestions for improvement in my testimony. 

I consider 2010 to be a particularly critical year for this agenda, 

and I really would hope that both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue 

will take this seriously. The nuclear summit, obviously bolstered by 

the START treaty and also by the Nuclear Posture Review, was 

one major opportunity. The NPT Review Conference is the second. 

The third is coming up in June, which is the meeting of the G–

8 and the G–20 in Canada, and I would hope that the G–20 nations 

would become more involved in these issues and that we could get 

more contributors to the G–8 Global Partnership. 

And then the final issue in 2010 that I consider to be quite important is the budget that the President submitted for this set of 

activities, which is roughly $3.1 billion and represented an increase 

56

of about $320 million for this agenda. I think if the Congress could 

act positively on that request it would make itself a very strong 

partner in the process of preventing nuclear terrorism. 

So where do we go from here? I mean, obviously we will have a 

lot of activity in the lead up to the next summit in 2012, and I have 

outlined a number of different post-summit activities and initiatives for the Congress and others to consider, but one thing I would 

just like to underscore is I think we have a lot of disconnected 

pieces of the puzzle that need to be packaged together in some kind 

of a framework that talks about what the danger is to mankind 

from nuclear material, recognizes all the existing conventions and 

agreements and Security Council resolutions and ad hoc activities 

that are going on and then legitimizes all of that in a package that 

countries can’t pick and choose from. 

In other words, this would be the set of activities which is considered to be standard, a standardized checklist, if you will, for countries to be serious about nuclear security. I would add to that the 

inclusion of a minimum standard for nuclear and radiological security. A lot of people have talked about a ′′gold standard,′′ but I 

think if we have a minimum standard that everyone could understand that would be very useful. 

And then I would like to see it encourage public/private partnerships. I think last week in addition to what the President accomplished really did bring the nongovernmental expert community 

and the industry into the discussion in a more serious way and an 

integrated way. And finally, I think that this kind of a framework 

agreement, while it needs to be universal, could be initiated by a 

coalition of the committed to begin with. 

Chairman BERMAN. I think we are going to have to wind up. 

Mr. LUONGO. I am sorry. That is fine. I can end there. 

Chairman BERMAN. Okay. 

Mr. LUONGO. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Luongo follows:]

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Chairman BERMAN. Dr. Ford? 

STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER FORD, PH.D., DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR TECHNOLOGY AND GLOBAL SECURITY, SENIOR 

FELLOW, HUDSON INSTITUTE 

Mr. FORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee. 

It is a pleasure to be here, and I thank you for the opportunity. 

I would like to ask that my longer remarks be put into the record 

if that is possible. 

Chairman BERMAN. They will be included in their entirety. 

Mr. FORD. Thank you, sir. I will keep my oral remarks as short 

as I can. 

The upcoming NPT Review Conference I think needs to be seen 

against the backdrop of a general failure of nonproliferation compliance enforcement. Without fully appreciating those dynamics, it is 

hard to see where a lot of the initiatives that one hears talked 

about in the RevCon come from. 

Simply put, the international community’s response to present 

day challenges in Iran, places such as Iran and the DPRK, hasn’t 

been terribly impressive. No one seems to disagree with that here 

today. Even where multilateral steps have been taken, they have 

done too little and they have come to look to have the desired impact on the cost/benefit calculations and the strategic decision making of their intended targets. 

Some in the disarmament movement have argued for years that 

a critical reason for such problems in the NPT is that we have not 

moved fast enough in getting rid of our nuclear weapons. The way 

to turn around today’s crises of nonproliferation and noncompliance, it has been claimed, is for the U.S. to disarm faster, and if 

we do so the rest of the world will heave a great sigh of relief and 

finally rally to the flag of nonproliferation in ways that they have 

been reluctant to do hitherto. 

I have been very skeptical of this credibility thesis, but it is not, 

and I should emphasize this. It is not because I think that nonproliferation and disarmament are entirely unconnected. Indeed, in 

my view the coherence of the disarmament enterprise really requires some kind of linkage to nonproliferation insofar as I think 

that nuclear weapons elimination by today’s possessors would 

make no sense as a policy choice if they could not be assured that 

the international community could keep newcomers out of that line 

of work. 

With regard to the RevCon though, I think it is significant to 

note that the Obama administration seems to believe that there is 

a further linkage as well, a linkage in the other direction between 

disarmament on the one hand and the possibility of nonproliferation on the other. This is the linkage of what I call the credibility 

thesis, and it presumes a causal connection between movement on 

disarmament and nonproliferation success in the diplomatic arena 

One window into the credibility of this credibility thesis as it 

were will I think come with this RevCon and we will be able to see 

a little bit the degree to which this theory plays out in practice. My 

suspicion is that Washington is going to have a hard time capitalizing upon the very public disarmament friendly position that the 

President has been taking. 

69

Part of this is a problem of expectations. After a year of playing 

to the disarmament grandstands with Prague and the Nobel Prize 

and all that sort of thing, I think the intended audience for some 

of this credibility thesis disarmament positioning will be struck 

perhaps more powerfully by the degree to which in the current Nuclear Posture Review, for example, many, if not most, of the positions and things articulated represent continuity rather than transformation of U.S. policy and things that from the disarmament 

community’s perspective are entirely unwelcome, although I am 

certainly not complaining about them. 

With regard to the New START treaty, in addition to this in 

terms of its raw numbers it is not, frankly, that much of a change. 

Indeed, it may not be a change at all with regard to deployed warheads. There are problems with it, in my view—linkages to missile 

defense, restrictions upon global strike, the failure to cover Russian 

rail mobile missiles, loss of telemetry data. 

I mean, you can go into the details of it, but in terms of the raw 

numbers, which is all that the disarmament community really 

looks at, this is not something that is terribly easy to sell as a dramatic step forward as it has been billed. 

I think for all of its sort of self-congratulatory media splash, last 

week’s Nuclear Security Summit also represents a policy of general 

continuity. It builds only incrementally, if at all, upon the nuclear 

security policies that were developed by Bill Clinton and George W. 

Bush. 

These are not complaints from my perspective. I think generally 

that incremental, cautious progress is probably a wiser idea in this 

very complicated world than assuming that we can sort of remold 

reality to our whims and good intentions, but this is not something 

that will necessarily be sellable very easily amongst those whom it 

is the ambition of the credibility thesis most to influence. 

Let me say also I think the administration is basically right that 

the modernization focused elements that are stressed in the NPR 

with respect to our nuclear infrastructure, for example, are indeed 

consistent with a sincere commitment to disarmament. 

In my view, during whatever period it is that the Obama administration envisages occurring before some hypothetical future zero, 

and that period is likely to be very long even by their account, we 

will need to rely upon a smaller and ever smaller number of nuclear weapons and rely very much and more intensively upon any 

individual system. 

The alternative to modernization in that context and over that 

period is either de facto disarmament before it is wise or sane to 

take that step or in fact to let our lack of modernization become 

a break upon further progress, so even from the perspective I think 

of the Obama administration’s supporters on the left, it ought to 

be on its substantive merits quite sellable that this position is in 

fact consistent with disarmament. 

My suspicion, however, is that it will be very difficult to make 

that sale. The optics are all wrong from the perspective of the global disarmament community, and my suspicion is that the credibility thesis, even if you accept its logical premises, which I don’t, 

will be very hard to implement in practice. 

70

That said, I think provided that the issue of the Middle East or 

Iran doesn’t in some fashion pop up to preclude consensus that at 

next month’s RevCon I think it is likely they will produce some 

kind of consensus document. Many will take that production alone 

as the index of success. That I think would be a mistake. I don’t 

think anybody here has any illusions that we should be looking to 

something a little bit more serious in order to judge whether the 

conference has been a success. 

I would encourage us of course to look at the underlying issue 

of whether it is in fact contributing to stopping the proliferation of 

nuclear weapons in the world. I was very struck, Mr. Chairman, 

by your comment at the very beginning describing a successful review conference as one that is united in its condemnation of Iran’s 

nuclear program. 

That is a very substantive and very focused criterion for success 

that goes just beyond the sort of anodyne diplomatic production of 

a document that says nothing upon which everyone agrees. I would 

encourage that kind of thinking in how we approach evaluating 

whether or not the review conference has indeed made progress. 

I doubt that the Obama administration’s gamble that our disarmament movement will produce some kind of a nonproliferation 

revolution in international diplomacy will get many results. I 

would, however, be very happy to be proven wrong. 

It is very, very late for countries around the world to start getting serious about nonproliferation compliance enforcement, and 

since we seem to be tying ourself to that credibility thesis train as 

a matter of U.S. policy right now, I dearly hope that it gets some 

results. It would be tragic were the entire thesis to end up being 

as hollow and empty as I fear that it is. Thank you, sir. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Ford follows:]

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Chairman BERMAN. Well, thank you all very much. I will yield 

myself 5 minutes. 

I can’t help but comment on the irony that I have listened to a 

number of my colleagues, on the other side, talk about the massive 

and dramatic change in our nuclear posture and the criticism attendant to that massive change and then to hear Dr. Ford—a member of the previous administration, chosen by the Minority—point 

out, ironically, that there is more continuity than dramatic change 

in the context of the Nuclear Posture Review and the agenda and 

the linkage between the disarmament goal as part of achieving the 

nonproliferation, the strategy basically. 

I would be interested in getting Mr. Albright’s sort of response 

to some of your points, but is it your contention—I mean, you talk 

about betting the store on the credibility thesis. Are we really betting the store? Is it your contention that the administration has bet 

the store on this strategy? 

It has been involved in an arduous process that we don’t know 

how it will end, but at least has Russia and now China negotiating 

the text of a Security Council Resolution, which we hope will lead 

to a much more robust level of sanctions by an EU and coalition 

of like minded countries that might create the kind of economic 

pressure that at least it is plausible to think could change behavior, although certainly not guaranteed. 

In other words, a lot of this stuff wasn’t just done to have a nicer 

consensus statement at a Nuclear Review Conference in the upcoming couple of weeks, so when you talk about the Nuclear Posture 

Review being a continuation of—well, I guess two questions I 

would have is what multilateral successes via-a`-vis Iran did the 

previous administration have? 

And, secondly, based on your notion that this is pretty much a 

continuation of policies of the Clinton and Bush administration 

doesn’t that at least imply that the sort of dramatic criticisms of 

these policies are not accurate? 

Mr. FORD. Well, if I might, sir? With respect to the NPR itself, 

the things that I like about it are things that represent continuity 

and indeed sort of hedging positions against future challenges and 

so forth. 

With regard to the credibility thesis and the belief that we are 

betting the store and particular things, one of the areas of the NPR 

that I think I like least is the new declaratory policy, and we have 

heard some of that talked about today. 

Twice in the NPR document it is stressed that that declaratory 

policy was adopted in order to—one of the two reasons that is given 

for its adoption is in order to persuade other countries to cooperate 

with us more on nonproliferation, so that is sort of the crystallization of the credibility thesis right there. 

With respect to nonproliferation successes, in the past obviously 

no one has——

Chairman BERMAN. Your point is that that is not going to work? 

Mr. FORD. I think that is unlikely to work. Yes, sir. With regard 

to past nonproliferation successes, I am certainly not here to tell 

you that the Bush administration solved the Iran problem. No one 

in their right mind would suggest that. 

79

The international community generally for many years has 

struggled with this unsuccessfully, and one of the things I think 

that has been most frustrating is the degree to which after much 

criticism—I say this as a former Bush administration person. 

After much criticism for taking so-called unilateral approaches 

with regard to Iraq, we regarded ourselves as doing precisely what 

our critics had asked us to do when it came to Iran, trying to pursue it through the IAEA and multilateral fora, take it to the Security Council, which is the institution designed to deal with this, 

and only to find our steps at every point undercut by those who regarded that multilateralism as somehow being offensive simply by 

virtue of the fact that it was the U.S. that was trying it. 

Chairman BERMAN. One could draw two very different conclusions from that failure though. 

Mr. FORD. My conclusion is that I wish we had tried harder earlier, and if we had actually stuck to diplomatic multilateral pressure in mid 2003 instead of letting European enthusiasms to poke 

Uncle Sam’s eye lead to a different approach we might have had 

more results out of Tehran. 

Chairman BERMAN. My time has expired. I may want to get back 

to this if we have a chance to another round. Mr. Burton is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. BURTON. You know, Mr. Chairman, I don’t care who did 

what in the past. It makes no difference to me. What bothers me 

is that Iran and Korea continue down the path toward developing 

nuclear weapons that endanger that entire region and ultimately 

the United States of America. That is all I give a damn about. I 

don’t care who had what for dinner yesterday. It makes no difference to me. 

What I am concerned about is where we are today and where we 

are going, and I think it is extremely important that we adopt a 

policy, whether it is at these summits, and I am not as optimistic 

about the summit that we had. I know they talked about a lot of 

things and that is good, but as far as coming up with some kind 

of a conclusion on how to deal with the terrorist states that are developing nuclear weapons, I didn’t see anything that came out of 

it that was really tangible. 

And so my goal is to have experts like the gentlemen who are 

there at that table to come up with some solutions or recommendations that we can implement that will put so much pressure on 

Iran and North Korea that we will be able to stop their development program and get them to start to comply with nuclear nonproliferation. 

I know that we tried during the Clinton administration. I know 

the President worked very hard to work out some solutions, but 

North Korea thumbed their nose. They took advantage of it and 

thumbed their nose at us. I am not blaming Clinton for that. He 

tried. I think the things that were tried in the Bush administration 

and there has not been a success. 

The thing I wish we would start focusing on is Iran has money 

in banks. Iran has assets around the world. Iran imports all kinds 

of gasoline because they can’t produce it themselves. They produce 

oil, but not the final product. What we ought to do is we ought to 

come up with a plan to block them from getting anything and any 

80

of our allies that aren’t complying with us, we ought to put pressure on them to work with us. We have trade agreements. We have 

all kinds of agreements with them that could be utilized to put additional pressure on them. 

Every day that goes by that these countries continue to develop 

nuclear weaponry the world comes a little closer to a major conflagration. Ahmadinejad is telling all these people that are blowing 

themselves up and he is sending weapons in to Iraq and elsewhere 

and saying that they are going to go to Valhalla or wherever it is 

and get 70 virgins if they blow themselves up and people are doing 

that. Think what is going to happen if they get a briefcase nuke 

and they come within six blocks of this place. We will all be toast. 

And so it is extremely important that we do whatever is necessary quickly to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons, particularly where terrorist states are involved, and I am talking now 

about Iran and Korea and potential other states. 

And so I really appreciate you gentlemen for being here, and I 

am not asking any great questions, but this is what I would like 

to see all of the intellectual experts, and you are among them, to 

focus on. What can we do to really put the hammer down—the 

hammer down—on these people? 

I mean, having a nuclear summit and everybody talking about 

long-term nonproliferation and things that we ought to be doing 

collectively to solve the problem, that is great. That ain’t solving 

the problem. Iran is going down that road. They are thumbing 

their nose at everybody else. They are not changing. 

North Korea, they have been thumbing their nose and they have 

been making agreements and then violating them. I don’t think you 

can trust these people. And so what you have to do with a bully 

in a schoolyard or in a world theater is you have to let them know 

that if they continue down the path their bloody nose is going to 

be worse than what they are going to do to somebody else, and I 

think that is what we have to get across. 

I know I am putting this in very strong laymen’s terms. I am not 

using the hyperbole that our intellectual community is really used 

to, but I grew up in a tough area and I know one thing; that bullies 

only understand one thing and that is the fear of retribution and 

the fear of really getting clobbered, and that is what we need to 

do. 

We need to get down to the nitty-gritty and let Iran know that 

they are going to suffer dramatically economically and every other 

way if they don’t stop this and that they know that if they continue 

there will be retaliation, which will be unthinkable. And that is 

why I say I don’t think we should rule out anything when we are 

talking about dealing with any of these countries. 

I know the President didn’t rule out that with Iran, but I think 

that we ought to keep everything on the table because we don’t 

know what is going to happen in the future. That is the end of Burton’s sermonette for the day. 

Chairman BERMAN. Perfect timing. The gentleman from California, Mr. Sherman? 

Mr. SHERMAN. My sermon will be short. Here in Congress we try 

to find partisan divides so we can yell yea for our team. The fact 

81

is, for the past 10 years, three administrations, we have seen continuity and failure with regard to North Korea and Iran. 

With North Korea we have stopped pretending that we are trying 

to do anything, and with Iran we have shown the capacity to generate big headlines about the modest possibility of enacting tiny 

sanctions, so this is something that both parties are united in, at 

least the administrations of both parties. I am speaking now of proliferation and North Korea and Iran. Obviously the Nuclear Security Summit was an important step that the President deserves 

credit for. 

Mr. Albright, China has apparently agreed to disregard the 

guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and construct two new 

reactors in Pakistan, even though the guidelines prohibit such 

trade with a country without comprehensive safeguards on its nuclear activities with the exception, specifically, of India. 

I understand China claims that these new reactors were grandfathered in the contracts for the first two it built before it joined 

the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Is that even factually accurate? Is it 

legally accurate that you can say well, we are joining the Nuclear 

Suppliers Group, but we get to violate it to the extent we have any 

preexisting contractual relationship, and should this issue come up 

at the NPT RevCon? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. I am sure China can make the argument about 

grandfathering. It has been used many times. Russia has used it. 

I don’t think we have, but it is an unfortunate reality. 

I would actually share your sentiment on China. Let me give you 

an example. Iran and North Korea get many of the things they 

need for their nuclear program—machine tools, materials, all kinds 

of equipment—via China, and the reason is simple. China has export control laws, but they don’t enforce them. 

I think one of the things that certainly is something that should 

be done on Iran is convincing China to just enforce its laws. We 

see over and over again cases of Iran and North Korea buying vital 

things—centrifuge related equipment—in China. If the United 

States was able to, and its allies, convince China to stop that, live 

by its laws, it could seriously impede Iran and North Korea’s ability to expand their nuclear programs. 

Mr. SHERMAN. We will do that right after they adhere to their 

laws on intellectual property. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. But it can be done. 

Mr. SHERMAN. It can be done, except China has learned that it 

has total access to U.S. markets, total domination of the American 

political system and strong alliances with Wall Street and WalMart and so they don’t have to do anything they don’t want to do, 

including enforce their own laws. Let me move on to the next question. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Let me disagree with that. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Let me move on to the next question. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. All right. 

Mr. SHERMAN. What are the prospects for agreement among the 

NPT states that all members should sign and bring into force an 

Additional Protocol for safeguards with the IAEA? Mr. Albright 

and any of the other witnesses as well? 

82

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Yes. It is great disappointment. I mean, we were 

up in New York visiting many delegations a couple weeks ago, and 

it is not good. It is very disturbing because it is a massive loophole 

in the system that allows countries to cheat. 

I think the IAEA actually made a huge mistake by making the 

Additional Protocol a voluntary endeavor, and I think we are going 

to suffer consequences because of that. I am encouraged that the 

United States and many other nations——

Mr. SHERMAN. Is there any feeling among any of those delegations that they could lose any trade or aid with the United States 

if they take a position that is an anathema to the security of people 

in the San Fernando Valley? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. I would hope that as the conference goes on that 

threats will be made. I mean, it is not quite the time. 

Mr. SHERMAN. But so far no. Let me move on to the second witness. 

Mr. LUONGO. I am sorry? 

Mr. SHERMAN. Can you address the question, Mr. Luongo? 

Mr. LUONGO. I am not an expert on the NPT Review Conference. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Okay. 

Mr. LUONGO. I would pass. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Ford? 

Mr. FORD. I think it is very distressing that no further countries 

have accepted the AP. Indeed, there are countries that have yet to 

accept even basic safeguards agreements, which is also depressing 

and indeed required by Article III. There is a very, very long way 

to go on all these points, and I am aware of no threats at all, sir. 

Mr. SHERMAN. It is time for civil defense. I yield back. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Can I? No? 

Chairman BERMAN. We will get back to you. Mr. Rohrabacher? 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I 

would certainly like to identify myself with the remarks of Mr. 

Sherman, who always astonishes me with his very realistic approach to some of these things, and let me just note especially 

about China. Just a few comments on some of the testimony we 

heard today. 

A reduction in raw numbers in terms of the raw numbers of nuclear weapons is a good deal. I mean, actually if it saves us money 

to have raw numbers at a lower level and permits us to use that 

money for perhaps some other things that are important to our national security then the reduction of raw numbers is a good thing 

even if it is not a balanced agreement that leads to that reduction 

of raw numbers, meaning that we have given up more than someone else, as long as what remains among those raw numbers is an 

adequate force to ensure our national security, and that is what it 

is all about. 

In terms of continuity, as was pointed out by our chairman and 

by Mr. Ford, again I agree with Mr. Sherman that continuity 

doesn’t mean a damn thing if it is the continuity of policy that has 

led us to the mess that we are in right now. And the challenges 

especially in Korea and in Iran show that a continuity of that policy is a mistake, is wrong, and we should have the courage to face 

that and try to come at these things with a different approach. 

83

But to that continuity it appears to me, Mr. Chairman, yes, there 

is a continuity of policy of this administration, but now we have 

added idealistic rhetoric about disarmament, reaffirming again 

some things and stating this, which I believe is dangerous because 

it gives people, evil people, the idea that oh, yes, these guys are 

idealistic enough to disarm. 

We have also added ambiguity. This administration has added 

ambiguity about the use of nuclear weapons, which again is dangerous. Idealism is fine, but idealism if it is expressed by people 

in power could very well encourage evil realists, and there are evil 

realistics in this world. 

The evil realists are the ones who murder their own people to 

stay in power. The evil realists of this world could care less about 

agreements that they have or treaties that they sign because they 

are willing to murder their own people to stay in power. Who cares 

whether they are lying or not. They certainly don’t. 

Chairman BERMAN. Would you yield for 1 second on that point? 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I certainly will, sir. 

Chairman BERMAN. Thank you. I thought the criticism of the Nuclear Posture Review is that it went away from ambiguity, that our 

previous posture was what we would do in response to different 

kinds of attack was not clear. We essentially reserved many different options and never indicated our thinking about what we 

might do. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman, the ambiguity I am talking 

about of course is the expressions that we have heard from the administration officials recently about whether or not we would use 

nuclear weapons. 

Chairman BERMAN. But they have gotten clearer. It may not be 

right, but it is clearer. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I think from what we have heard as an answer today indicates that it is not clearer and that there is ambiguity that has been added. 

What we are really talking about, by the way, when we talk 

about nuclear weapons and whether or not the goal should be 

elimination of nuclear weapons, what we are really talking about 

is mass killing. It is not a nuclear weapon in and of itself is an evil, 

an immoral weapon system any more than a machine gun. We are 

talking about mass killing and we need to stop the potential of 

mass killing of Americans in terms of nuclear weapons. 

We need a missile defense system that can deal with a threat 

from an evil person who has power in another country in order to 

conduct mass killings. We also need a robust intelligence system. 

Both of those are prerequisites to dealing with this threat. 

One last note, and that is China. I would suggest that Mr. Sherman is exactly correct and that we have an establishment, a financial and economic establishment, in this country that is making a 

profit from a relationship with China and it has prevented us from 

dealing with those policies that China is following that are harmful 

to our national security. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. The 

gentlelady from California is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Ms. WOOLSEY. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am going to 

have a little different twist on all of this actually talking about unVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:11 Jun 18, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00087 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\042110\56092 HFA PsN: SHIRL
84

less we have more the United States will be at risk. We will be at 

risk if we don’t build up and if we let people know that we are diminishing our nuclear arms, et cetera, et cetera. 

I think the world is at risk. I think humanity is at risk unless 

we find a way to do away with all nuclear weapons period. I believe 

it with all my heart and soul. It may not be—well, it won’t be—

in our lifetime, but it will be in somebody’s, and that will be the 

end of it. 

So for several Congresses now I have introduced resolutions to 

reform our international security policies. One is H. Res. 363, 

which is a resolution calling for the adoption of a smart security 

platform for the 21st century, and the other is H. Res. 333, a resolution recognizing nonproliferation options for nuclear understanding to keep everyone safe. No nukes it is called, so obviously 

you know what that is about. 

These resolutions seek to promote a more effective national strategy focused on nonproliferation, conflict prevention, international 

diplomacy and multilateralism over military and nuclear threat because the way we have been doing it ain’t working. It is not going 

to work. 

Every day it becomes more dangerous, not less dangerous, and 

until we get on the way to think about dealing with humanity in 

a smarter way I just—I mean, we can sit here and work on our little years that we will be on this earth, but I will tell you we are 

not doing anything enough to take care of the future of all of humanity. 

So my question would be to you will the upcoming conference 

and will the treaty ratifications fit into a smarter security platform? Gulp. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. No. I think again the Non-Proliferation Treaty 

Review Conference from an outsider’s perspective——

Ms. WOOLSEY. Yes. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. I mean, we will be observers there. I have gone 

or my organization people have gone since 1985. You are trying to 

build support. I mean, for example, for us the Additional Protocol 

is critical and what we would like to see is more support among 

nations that that is the international norm. 

The next step is to encourage more countries like Australia. They 

just said look, you want our uranium? You better have an Additional Protocol or you don’t get it. So in a sense unilateral initiatives. 

The United States has taken a bilateral initiative that we are 

going to have nuclear cooperation with an NPT party that is a nonweapons state. They have to have an Additional Protocol in place. 

With UAE we insisted no reprocessing or enrichment. Multilaterally, we have to push much more strongly in the IAEA that it is 

a condition or it is a norm to have the Additional Protocol, not just 

some favor——

Ms. WOOLSEY. Right. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT [continuing]. That you are doing the international 

community. I could go into other issues where you can pick up the 

strain. It happens before the conference. Kind of a lot of these 

things converge in the conference and it is a good opportunity to 

85

build support for these things and then you go out into the other 

places and try to implement them. 

Ms. WOOLSEY. Mr. Luongo? 

Mr. LUONGO. Thank you. I would say I think we are building a 

smarter security platform. I mean, this spring we have dealt with 

the issue of nuclear weapons in the United States and Russia in 

the START treaty, which is in part a holdover from the Cold War 

and in part will help us I hope with the NPT Review Conference. 

We have then dealt with this very difficult issue of keeping nuclear material out of the hands of terrorists. I don’t think we have 

dealt with it completely adequately, but we have really raised the 

profile of that issue around the world, and I think that that is really important because that is a 21st century threat. 

And then finally the NPT Review Conference I think is going to 

be, as everyone has said, a very, very difficult lift, but that is really 

about states getting nuclear weapons. I am less worried about 

states getting and using nuclear weapons than I am about terrorists getting and using nuclear material. 

Ms. WOOLSEY. Doctor? 

Mr. FORD. If I might add also, with respect to the utility of the 

review conference sometimes negative information is good to have 

as well. It is fundamentally about building support in a political 

sense, but it is also sometimes very nice to know when there isn’t 

support nonetheless. 

I mean, if we come together after all of this preparation to make 

a big pitch that everyone should now cooperate because we make 

a big show of acting like we are disarming faster and they still 

don’t cooperate, that may actually give us some very useful information about where the shared values really aren’t and perhaps 

lead us to think a little bit more broad mindedly about how to deal 

with building a truly smart security platform in light of that in the 

future too. 

Ms. WOOLSEY. Thank you. 

Chairman BERMAN. I am going to recognize myself for one more 

round if you guys aren’t so hungry that you can’t stay here anymore. 

No one talks about amending the NPT. You are talking about 

strengthening the IAEA hopefully based on something in the conference review file document if that is possible, but in any event 

is the IAEA doing something that will require countries to accept 

the Additional Protocol. What is the IAEA’s power to do that and 

how would they enforce a desire to do that? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. The IAEA would act strictly at the level of the 

Secretariat, the Director General. It would just be saying that 

without it I can’t do much. I mean, you ask me to inspect. Without 

that in place I can’t do anything. 

Chairman BERMAN. All right. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. So you need those kinds of statements and recognitions at the IAEA and I think with Mohammed ElBaradei sort 

of gave up. I mean, he was moving toward that because how many 

times do you have to get burned before you see the inevitable conclusion? We are hoping that with the new DG that there will be 

more support for that. 

86

Chairman BERMAN. All right. So the Secretariat and the new Director General says that. And then what happens? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Well, first of all you would like it at the Nuclear 

Suppliers Group. One thing that happened in the 1990 conference 

was Foreign Minister Genscher came from Germany, representing 

one of the last holdouts said look, if we are going to be supplying 

nuclear items countries have to have full scope or comprehensive 

safeguards. They can’t just pick and choose and get the safeguards 

on what they get and ignore safeguards on the rest. 

And so his statement at the NPT was a recognition that the time 

had come to implement that and then it was implemented at the 

Nuclear Suppliers Group. So, the NPT can serve as a way to solidify consensus and then stimulate action. And certainly as it has 

been pointed out, it has no real power by itself. 

On the Additional Protocol at the IAEA, I don’t know the legal 

mechanisms they could use. They are probably limited, but they 

can start making it tougher, for example, for countries to get technical assistance. They can start raising questions much more aggressively about where they are lacking the ability such as in 

Syria. 

Syria refuses to cooperate with the IAEA. They are not held in 

noncompliance. I personally think the IAEA should be much more 

aggressive with Syria and perhaps threaten them with noncompliance. 

Chairman BERMAN. And I guess the Bush administration got the 

IAEA to go to the Security Council and make referrals to the Security Council. What we got from the Security Council was pretty 

minimal, but there was a process there which——

Mr. ALBRIGHT. For both Iran and North Korea. 

Chairman BERMAN. Right. 

Mr. FORD. If I might add, sir? It is also worth pointing out I 

think that there are ways to make progress that don’t require necessarily going through—on some issues that don’t require going 

through all the procedural formal hoops too. 

I mean, all of what David said I think is quite right, but many 

members this morning mentioned the issue of Article IV and how 

the peaceful uses component of the NPT has sort of been weirdly 

twisted around in recent years to become a weapon against the 

nonproliferation core of that same treaty. 

One can make progress on those issues to a degree without going 

through the difficult and perhaps impossible process of actually 

amending the treaty simply by creating a counter narrative, and so 

far I think to our shame the United States Government has not 

created a counter narrative on Article IV. There are things to be 

said to attack the Iranian inspired interpretation. 

Chairman BERMAN. The conditionality of the right to have nuclear energy. 

Mr. FORD. Right. The fact that this does not entail a right. Everyone in the world can have a full fuel cycle if they wish to. That 

kind of sharing of benefits needs to be understood through the 

prism of proliferation good sense. 

Chairman BERMAN. But the Nuclear Suppliers Group could do 

that in a nanosecond, if they wanted to. 

87

Mr. FORD. The Iranians have made the argument that it is somehow a violation of Article IV for there even to be nuclear export 

controls and yet the developed countries who one would think 

would have a little more good sense on such matters have been 

very much afraid of taking up public positions to contradict the 

narrative that there is an inalienable right to any kind of nuclear 

technology one wishes as long as it is used for peaceful purposes. 

Chairman BERMAN. Do you agree with that? 

Mr. FORD. We don’t have to concede that. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. No. It is a big problem. In fact, one of the reasons 

we started a project a couple years ago which led to this book, Peddling Peril, which thank you for mentioning, was that we really do 

need to think about this differently. 

Iran has gotten to the point internationally, particularly in the 

developing world, where it justifies nuclear smuggling, breaking 

our laws on Article IV. It is just we denied them the right. Therefore, they have the right to steal from us. 

So I think the narrative does have to be changed. I think there 

are two parts to it. One is that we have to recognize that these 

countries don’t build nuclear weapons on their own. They are dependent on us in a sense—our suppliers, our companies—to pull 

this off. And the other is that it is illegal. It is a horrible action. 

It is very dangerous and only worsens our security and the international security for all of us. 

I think that we have to in that sense really change the narrative 

and put it out as in a sense illegal activities that violate Article I 

and Article II of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, or at least show that 

they intend to violate them. 

Chairman BERMAN. Mr. Burton? 

Mr. BURTON. Yes. I just have a couple of questions. If we pass 

a very, very strong Iran sanctions bill that has teeth in it that says 

that there are going to be penalties for people doing business with 

Iran because of their nuclear program do you think it is possible—

I mean, in the final analysis do you think it is possible—for us to 

pass legislation here in the Congress that will be effective enough 

to choke off the materials that they need to develop a nuclear 

weapons program, or does this have to be international in scope? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. It has to be international. They look for gaps. 

Mr. BURTON. Okay. So if it has to be international this is an 

opinion I am asking for. Do you think it is possible that we can put 

enough teeth in there to put pressure on our allies who do business 

with Iran to choke off the materials that they need? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. I think the Europeans are helping quite a bit. I 

mean, there was a recent case of——

Mr. BURTON. I know, but that is not the answer. The answer I 

am looking for is——

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Can we do it? 

Mr. BURTON [continuing]. Do you think it is possible to put 

enough pressure on them to choke——

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Yes. Yes. No. But it has to include countries like 

China too. It can’t just be European allies. But, yes, I think it 

is——

Mr. BURTON. How would you do that with China? 

88

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Well, one is no one has even asked them, as far 

as I can tell. I mean, this isn’t sanctions. This is enforcing the existing laws on nuclear items and nuclear dual use items. There has 

not been much visible——

Mr. BURTON. Well, China in the past——

Mr. ALBRIGHT [continuing]. Requests to them by—I would even 

say by the United States of making it a priority. 

Mr. BURTON. China in the past has not been——

Mr. ALBRIGHT. I guess you are disagreeing, but I——

Mr. BURTON. No. I am saying China in the past has not always 

been ready to acquiesce and work with us on issues of this magnitude, North Korea and so forth, so what can we do or what do 

you think we could do to entice China to change its policy so that 

they wouldn’t be doing business with those countries? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Well, I think one is I would say make it a public 

issue with them and make it an issue that you raise every time you 

meet them. The other is show how they are failing. 

We are engaged in efforts with companies to say look, here is 

Iran trying to get things. You should stop your own company that 

is involved in that. 

Mr. BURTON. In other words, talk to American companies who 

are doing business with China and try and do it that way? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Well, making sure that American companies understand they should be hyper suspicious about some of the orders 

they are getting in China and to make sure that they follow 

through with due diligence so that it doesn’t end up where they 

may see it as a domestic sale that actually it is ending up in North 

Korea or in Iran. 

Mr. BURTON. Well, do you know what I would like to have? If the 

chairman agrees, I would like to have something in writing from 

you on things that you think we can do to put pressure on 

these——

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Sure. 

Mr. BURTON [continuing]. Because we are going to be going——

Mr. ALBRIGHT. I would like the opportunity. 

Mr. BURTON [continuing]. To conference here pretty quick on this 

Iran sanctions bill. 

Chairman BERMAN. Can I just——

Mr. BURTON. Sure. I would yield to my colleague. 

Mr. FORD. Might I add a cautionary note too on this? 

Chairman BERMAN. There are two separate issues that we might 

be conflated here. One is a sanctions regime that is designed to put 

such a squeeze on Iran that it changes its mind. 

The second is what you have now referred to several times, 

which is to this day Iran is getting centrifuge technology and other 

things from other countries, which sound to me like it is illegal in 

terms of——

Mr. ALBRIGHT. It is illegal even under Chinese law in many 

cases. 

Chairman BERMAN. Right. 

Mr. FORD. In that regard, sir——

Chairman BERMAN. Because that latter part, I have to tell you, 

I would like to hear more about that because I have assumed that 

notwithstanding the horrible record China has had on proliferation 

89

recently that has not been the issue with China or Russia recently, 

that whatever they were giving, whoever they were training, whatever in terms of their institutes with technology and know-how 

that that area—you are telling me that that is not so? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Well, it is not a conscious government policy of 

China——

Mr. FORD. That is my precautionary note. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT [continuing]. To provide items. It is that Iran and 

North Korea find it very easy to go to China and acquire the items 

they need, and it could be from a European or U.S. supplier who 

has a subsidiary there, and the Chinese Government is not enforcing its laws. 

Chairman BERMAN. Well, and A.Q. Khan talked about all kinds 

of European companies that were——

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Well, other countries have faced the same problem. 

Chairman BERMAN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. FORD. I don’t think it is a completely foregone conclusion 

that these things are happening entirely without the knowledge or 

at least tacit consent of the governments in question. I don’t know 

the answer, but there is a narrative that says it is just a sort of 

an oops situation with respect to Chinese enforcement. That may 

be true. 

I was always struck, though, when I had some perspective, which 

I don’t today, into the intelligence information on this sort of thing 

and who was actually making these transfers why one didn’t see 

oops moments with regard to proliferation transactions to countries 

that China somehow considered to be a potential or actual strategic 

rival. 

You saw these things with Pakistan and Iran. You didn’t see 

them with India, for example, or American companies, for that 

matter, getting sensitive goods from the Chinese. 

Chairman BERMAN. Because these are patriotic Chinese rogue 

companies? 

Mr. FORD. I don’t know the answer, but I always worried that 

there was an element in this, and I think we ignore the possibility 

at our peril that China and Russia for that matter may somewhere 

in the back of their mind think it is kind of cool to mess with U.S. 

global strategy by in a sense at least turning a blind eye, if not actually facilitating the development of nuclear or near nuclear capabilities by countries that are perceived generally as being a problem for the United States in terms of its global strategy. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Yes. I think that is always worth keeping in 

mind, but I think China several years ago was willing to put the 

pressure on the Chinese suppliers or trading companies to stop 

sales to North Korea and they did it to the point where North 

Korea even in a bilateral, according to a very senior Chinese official I talked to, complained that you were really cutting things off. 

Mr. FORD. It is a policy rheostat of theirs, and the trick is to get 

them to turn it down, but it is not an entirely autonomous——

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Yes. Well, let me give an example. Germany. Germany in the 1980s was a major supplier for proliferant states, and 

their government certainly knew it was happening. They didn’t 

particularly have an interest in Iraq having nuclear weapons or 

90

Libya having chemical weapons, but they knew it was taking place 

and they wouldn’t stop it. 

I would say that to first order right now we are dealing with 

China in that way. I think there is some interest in China that I 

would agree with Dr. Ford would like to see this, but I don’t think 

it is Chinese Government policy at the highest levels to do this, 

and I think it is time that China be held accountable for this and 

press to stop it. 

If then they won’t then we may have exposed a very fundamental 

problem with China, which I think we would have to address, but 

right now I think that to me it is a case of a country turning a 

blind eye and letting suppliers do things that they are not allowed 

to do legally. 

Mr. BURTON. If the chairman would yield me a little extra time? 

Chairman BERMAN. It is your time. 

Mr. BURTON. Well, my time has run out, but if you could just be 

a little lenient I would appreciate it. 

First of all, China is a totalitarian state. For somebody to tell me 

that they don’t know that——

Mr. ALBRIGHT. It is a wild west. 

Mr. BURTON. Come on. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. No. It is. 

Mr. BURTON. Naivete ́ is running rampant sometimes. I don’t believe that. I believe that they know what is going on and that they 

probably have the ability to turn a blind eye and they probably do, 

but here is the thing. I would like to have, and I am sure the chairman would share in this. 

I would like to have any suggestions you have on things that we 

could do to put pressure on Russia, China or any of our allies that 

are doing business with Iran or Korea that is endangering the security of the region and the United States of America. I think it 

would be great because we have gone through this whole hearing, 

and what we are talking about right now is one of the most relevant parts of the hearing. It is how are they getting this stuff and 

how do we stop it and what kind of steps can we take to stop it. 

I have one more question real quick, and then I will let you guys 

go have lunch. It is a little late, but I wish you well. And that is 

I had a number of televised meetings with one of my colleagues 

that used to be close to the Russian Duma, Curt Weldon, who is 

no longer in Congress, and he brought before me a mockup of a 

briefcase nuclear weapon that the Russians had perfected that 

weighed about 40 pounds, and it could destroy eight square 

blocks—make it all a cinder—if it was utilized. 

They have never been able to account for about 50 of those. I just 

wonder if any of those got into the hands of, and you may not be 

able to answer this. If they got into the hands of the Iranians. I 

understand they have to be upgraded and additional materials 

have to be put in them, but are they capable? 

Are they in the process or could they be in the process of developing these nukes that could be put in a backpack or briefcase that 

could get into the United States and do as much damage in the 

short run as a major nuclear weapon? 

Mr. LUONGO. Well, the Russians developed very small, tactical 

nuclear weapons that could be man portable. They had atomic 

91

demolition mines and other things. It is true that the material in 

those weapons, just like in other Russian weapons, deteriorates at 

a more rapid pace than say other countries. I don’t know how many 

have not been accounted for. The Russians have not been particularly transparent. 

Mr. BURTON. Well, we talked to people in the Duma and the 

KGB, Mr. Weldon did, and he assured me there were about 85 to 

100 produced and they can only account for about 35 to 40 of them. 

Mr. LUONGO. Yes. I am familiar with former Congressman 

Weldon’s statements on the subject. The Russians I think have assured the United States Government that they are not floating 

around. That is my understanding at least. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Yes. If I could add? On Iranian capabilities, according to the IAEA reporting both internally, and we have put 

some of the sort of internal documents that were linked out on our 

Web site. They are looking for a warhead that is about .6 meters 

across. It is not that big. It will weigh several hundred kilograms. 

But still, they are shooting for a small warhead and the assessments by the IAEA are that they can do that. It may not be reliable, and they have some work to do to finish that, but essentially 

their focus is on smaller weapons. 

Mr. BURTON. Would that be portable, something that could be 

carried? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Well, sure. It is not going to be carried on someone’s back, but it is not hard to transport that kind of thing. 

If you are talking about unsophisticated delivery systems, you 

have to worry a great deal about Iran having enough highly enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon. We shouldn’t just think of 

it as they have the material and then somehow we have 3 or 4 

years before they could actually mount it on a missile. 

The problems of putting it on the missile are quite a bit more 

than if you just wanted to put together a smaller nuclear weapon 

that would not have to survive the harsh environment that a missile would have to go through, so I think we do have to worry that 

if Iran does make a move to get HEU and it gets it that we have 

to worry a great deal about unsophisticated delivery systems. 

Mr. FORD. If I might add, sir, on the note of Iranian acquisition 

of material, there are some famous problems with sort of the infamous 2007 national intelligence estimate on Iran that the U.S. intelligence community put out, but one of the interesting and much 

overlooked comments in there was the assessment or the suspicion 

with a degree of certainty—I have forgotten how probable they 

thought it was, but it was believed, as I recall, that Iran had indeed acquired through sort of smuggling links or something, had 

acquired some quantity of fissile material. 

Not weapons. That was not the statement, but the idea was that 

they probably had not acquired enough to use that material in a 

weapon, but that there had indeed been essentially smuggling derived acquisition of fissile material by the Iranian regime probably 

from the former Soviet Union, but I don’t think it was explicitly 

said. 

But quite apart from the issue of backpack nukes, I mean, there 

was already stuff out there about Iran having acquired fissile material on presumably international black markets. 

92

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BERMAN. I will close with just this article dated today 

on NPR. It is on their Web site anyway. Algeria, Egypt, Kuwait, 

Libya and Syria and others made it clear at a disarmament meeting at the U.N. General Assembly that they would oppose a series 

of U.S. backed measures, including a proposal to strengthen U.N. 

scrutiny of countries’ nuclear energy programs designed to reign in 

nuclear proliferators like North Korea and Iran. 

There is mistrust, said Egypt’s U.N. Ambassador, chairman of 

the Non-Aligned Movement. Speaking for the General Assembly debate entitled Disarmament of World Security, the Egyptian envoy 

said the five major nuclear powers are seeking to impose new demands on non-nuclear powers while failing to fully live up to their 

own disarmament obligations and permitting a special group of actors—Indian, Israel, Pakistan—a free pass to produce nuclear 

weapons without having to abide by the obligations of signatories. 

The Ambassador thought to turn the tables on the big powers, 

demanding the nuclear states submit themselves to U.N. inspections under their nuclear programs and commit to the total elimination of atomic weapons by a certain date and indicated his opposition to a series of Western-backed initiatives to punish countries 

who withdraw from the NPT and plan to establish a U.N. fuel bank 

to supply nuclear non-nuclear states. 

Maybe an argument for your theory of the credibility issue here 

in terms of what we are doing, but I am curious. Is this just sort 

of ideological and stick your thumb in our eye, or for Egypt, let us 

say, is this a hedge based on what Iran might achieve to give them 

sort of the flexibility to make their own moves in response? 

Mr. FORD. I have made that suggestion publicly myself, what you 

are just suggesting, and I was intrigued to hear it from Ambassador Burk here a little while ago. She chastised me at a conference last fall for having the bad manners to articulate that theory to the Egyptian representative present, but I am glad to see 

that it is in fact an Obama administration concern as well that we 

share that. 

I am very worried about this. The Egyptians in particular, but 

not exclusively, have been laying the groundwork for a diplomatic 

campaign to raise the Israeli issue for some time. We have seen 

that over the past several years with what gives every appearance 

of being a very systematic campaign to prepare for some kind of 

an ultimatum of sorts, whatever you want to call it, in connection 

perhaps with this RevCon. 

What they demand has never been particularly clear to me. 

What they would consider to be resolution of the problem in practical terms, as opposed to pie in the sky terms, has never been very 

clear to me, and it is very possible that the coincidence of all of 

these issues having been raised in the wake of the outing of Iran’s 

secret nuclear work in 2002 is no coincidence at all and that this 

is in fact some kind of a hedge. 

I can’t say that that is the case. I worry about it very much, and 

I am glad that it is actually publicly being talked about. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. I think both are going on. This is the rhetoric you 

run into at this conference, and it is the job of the United States 

93

and its allies to come up with decent language that serves U.S. and 

nonproliferation interests. 

In fact, I can tell you that senior Egyptian officials have said who 

are in the government—they claim they are talking privately, but 

they said look, if this plays out with Iran getting nuclear weapons, 

nothing is done about Israel, then we will probably withdraw. And 

then they add, of course, that of course we won’t build nuclear 

weapons. 

I didn’t think to remind them at the time that when North Korea 

withdrew in 2003 it said we will only do peaceful activities. So, I 

mean, I think we are heading to a very bad time potentially, and 

whether this nonproliferation regime continues is going to be based 

on what we do about Iran. 

Mr. BURTON. I would like the other ideas. 

Chairman BERMAN. Great. We are very receptive to your ideas, 

but try to get them in before they have the nuclear weapon. 

The hearing is adjourned. Thank you all very much for your interest. 

[Whereupon, at 1:02 p.m. the committee was adjourned.] 

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