alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM CONSOLIDATED
BALANCE SHEETS, CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF OPERATIONS, CONSOLIDATED STATEMENT OF
SHAREHOLDERS' EQUITY, CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF CASH FLOWS AND IS QUALIFIED IN
ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1998
<CASH>                                          32,859
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   80,791
<ALLOWANCES>                                   (3,295)
<INVENTORY>                                     19,094
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               143,285
<PP&E>                                          38,932
<DEPRECIATION>                                  20,543
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 218,262
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           54,764
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           178
<OTHER-SE>                                     118,746
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   218,262
<SALES>                                        178,943
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               178,943
<CGS>                                          120,100
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  120,100
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                36,860
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               3,322
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 19,201
<INCOME-TAX>                                     7,641
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             11,560
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    11,560
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .74
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .72
        

</TABLE>
STIPULATION TO EXTEND TIME TO RESPOND TO

THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT

CASE NO. C08-02958 TEH

12829031.1

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TODD C. TORAL, State Bar No. 197706

ttoral@nixonpeabody.com

STEPHANIE KARNAVAS, State Bar No. 255596

skarnavas@nixonpeabody.com

NIXON PEABODY LLP

One Embarcadero Center, 18th Floor

San Francisco, California 94111-3600

Telephone: (415) 984-8200

Fax: (415) 984-8300

W. SCOTT O’CONNELL (pro hac vice)

soconnell@nixonpeabody.com

COURTNEY BROOKS, State Bar No. 215127

cbrooks@nixonpeabody.com

NIXON PEABODY LLP

900 Elm Street

Manchester, NH 04101-2031

Telephone: (603) 628-4000

Fax: (603) 628-4040

Attorneys for Defendant

KEYBANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION and

GREAT LAKES EDUCATIONAL SERVICES, INC.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MATTHEW C. KILGORE, individually and on

behalf of all others similarly situated; WILLIAM

BRUCE FULLER, individually and on behalf of

all others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

KEYBANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, a

national banking association organized under the

laws of the United States of America and

successor in interest to KEYBANK USA, N.A.;

KEY EDUCATION RESOURCES, a division of

KEYBANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION;

GREAT LAKES EDUCATIONAL LOAN

SERVICES, INC., a Wisconsin corporation; and

DOES 1-25,

Defendants.

Case No. C08-02958 TEH ADR

STIPULATION TO EXTEND TIME TO

RESPOND TO THIRD AMENDED

COMPLAINT

[Local Rule 6-1(a)]

Case 3:08-cv-02958-TEH Document 131 Filed 01/05/10 Page 1 of 2
STIPULATION TO EXTEND TIME TO RESPOND TO

THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT

CASE NO. C08-02958 TEH

-2- 12829031.1

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IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED by and between the parties hereto, through their

respective counsel of record, pursuant to Local Rule 6-1(a), that Defendants KeyBank,

National Association and Great Lake Educational Loan Services, Inc. shall have up to and

including January 11, 2010 to answer, move, or otherwise respond to Plaintiffs’ Third

Amended Complaint.

DATED: December 30, 2009

Respectfully submitted,

NIXON PEABODY LLP

By: /s/ Courtney Brooks

TODD C. TORAL (SBN 197706)

STEPHANIE KARNAVAS (SBN 255596)

COURTNEY BROOKS (SBN 215127)

Attorneys for Defendants

KEYBANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION and

GREAT LAKES EDUCATIONAL LOAN

SERVICES, INC.

PINNACLE LAW GROUP LLP

By: /s/ Kevin F. Rooney

ANDREW A. AUGUST (SBN 112851)

KEVIN F. ROONEY (SBN 184096)

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

I hereby attest that I have on file all holograph signatures for any signatures indicated by a

“conformed” signature (/s/) within this e-filed document.

/s/ Courtney Brooks

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORN

I

A

IT IS SO ORDERED

Judge Thelton E. Henderson

01/04/2010

Case 3:08-cv-02958-TEH Document 131 Filed 01/05/10 Page 2 of 2
§ 521.5 Review by the reviewing official. ( a ) If, based on the report of the investigating official under § 521.4(b), the reviewing official determines that there is adequate evidence to believe that a person is liable under § 521.3 of this part, the reviewing official shall transmit to the Attorney General a written notice of the reviewing official's intention to issue a complaint under § 521.7.
( b ) Such notice shall include— ( 1 ) A statement of the reviewing official's reasons for issuing a complaint;
( 2 ) A statement specifying the evidence that supports the allegations of liability;
( 3 ) A description of the claims or statements upon which the allegations of liability are based;
( 4 ) An estimate of the amount of money or the value of property, services, or other benefits requested or demanded in violation of § 521.3 of this part;
( 5 ) A statement of any exculpatory or mitigating circumstances that may relate to the claims or statements known by the reviewing official or the investigating official; and
( 6 ) A statement that there is a reasonable prospect of collecting an appropriate amount of penalties and assessments.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM CONDENSED
CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEET, CONSOLIDATED STATEMENT OF EQUITY AND CONDENSED
CONSOLIDATED STATEMENT OF STOCKHOLDER'S EQUITY AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY
BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FORM 10-Q.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1996
<CASH>                                          10,656
<SECURITIES>                                   215,392
<RECEIVABLES>                                  224,858
<ALLOWANCES>                                     4,083
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               554,390
<PP&E>                                       1,176,111
<DEPRECIATION>                                 642,404
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               1,158,334
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          239,408
<BONDS>                                        850,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                    (45,957)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 1,158,334
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             1,245,709
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  856,257
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               103,949
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              20,019
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                269,137
<INCOME-TAX>                                   104,936
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            164,201
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   164,201
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     1.26
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     1.26
        

</TABLE>
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Franklyn Donzella, Appellant.

(Appeal No. 2.)

Judgment unanimously affirmed. Same memorandum as in *People v Donzella*(61 AD2d 1139). (Appeal from judgment of Ontario County Court—criminal sale controlled substance, fifth degree.) Present—Marsh, P. J., Moule, Cardamone, Simons and Dillon, JJ.
Editorial Note on Part 61
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to part 61 appear at 64 FR 54539, Oct. 7, 1999.

§ 61.6 Consultation with subject matter specialists. ( a ) The Department may, in its discretion, solicit the opinion of subject matter specialists for the purpose of assisting the Department in its determination of whether materials for which export certification or import authentication is sought contain widespread and gross misstatements of fact.
( b ) As necessary, the Department may determine eligibility of material for certification or authentication based in part on the opinions obtained from subject matter specialists and the Committee on Attestation.
§ 72.22 Release of personal estate to legal representative. ( a ) If a person or entity claiming to be a legal representative comes forward at any time prior to transmission of the decedent's personal estate to the Secretary of State under 22 CFR 72.25, the consular officer may release the personal estate in his or her custody to the legal representative provided that: ( 1 ) The legal representative presents satisfactory evidence of the legal representative's right to receive the estate;
( 2 ) The legal representative pays any fees prescribed for consular services provided in connection with the disposition of remains or protection of the estate (see 22 CFR 22.1);
( 3 ) The legal representative executes a release in the form prescribed by the Department; and
( 4 ) The Department approves the release of the personal estate.
( b ) Satisfactory evidence of the right to receive the estate may include: ( 1 ) In the case of an executor, a certified copy of letters testamentary or other evidence of legal capacity to act as executor;
( 2 ) In the case of an administrator, a certified copy of letters of administration or other evidence of legal capacity to act as administrator;
( 3 ) In the case of the agent of an executor or administrator, a power of attorney or other document evidencing agency (in addition to evidence of the executor's or administrator's legal capacity to act).
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE O F FLORIDA

FIFTH DISTRICT

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME E XPIRES TO

FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND

DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

JEFFREY SEGARS

,

Appellant

,

v. Case No. 5D 22

- 705

LT Case No. 2020

- CF

- 1016

- A

STATE OF FLORIDA

,

Appellee

. ________________________________/

Decision filed June 6, 2023

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Citrus County

, Richard A. Howard , Judge.

Matthew J. Metz, Public Defender, and Andrew Clayton Mich, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Douglas T. Squire, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

WALLIS

, EISNAUGLE and MACIVER , JJ., conc ur.
#### § 240.10 Payment to USAID of excess amounts received by a Noteholder.

If a Noteholder shall, as a result of USAID paying compensation under this Guarantee, receive an excess payment, it shall refund the excess to USAID.
Editorial Note on Part 42
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to part 42 appear at 71 FR 34522, June 15, 2006.

§ 42.1 Aliens not required to obtain immigrant visas. An immigrant within any of the following categories is not required to obtain an immigrant visa: ( a ) *Aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence.* An alien who has previously been lawfully admitted for permanent residence and who is not required under the regulations of the Department of Homeland Security to present a valid immigrant visa upon returning to the United States.
( b ) *Alien members of U.S. Armed Forces.* An alien member of the U.S. Armed Forces bearing military identification, who has previously been lawfully admitted for permanent residence and is coming to the United States under official orders or permit of those Armed Forces.
( c ) *Aliens entering from Guam, Puerto Rico, or the Virgin Islands.* An alien who has previously been lawfully admitted for permanent residence who seeks to enter the continental United States or any other place under the jurisdiction of the United States directly from Guam, Puerto Rico, or the Virgin Islands of the United States.
( d ) *Child born after issuance of visa to accompanying parent.* An alien child born after the issuance of an immigrant visa to an accompanying parent, who will arrive in the United States with the parent, and apply for admission during the period of validity of the visa issued to the parent.
( e ) *Child born of a national or lawful permanent resident mother during her temporary visit abroad.* An alien child born during the temporary visit abroad of a mother who is a national or lawful permanent resident of the United States if applying for admission within 2 years of birth and accompanied by either parent applying and eligible for readmission as a permanent resident upon that parent's first return to the United States after the child's birth.
( f ) *American Indians born in Canada.* An American Indian born in Canada and having at least 50 per centum of blood of the American Indian race.
§ 519.205 Professional and technical services. ( a ) The prohibition on the use of appropriated funds, in § 519.100 (a), does not apply in the case of a payment of reasonable compensation made to an officer or employee of a person requesting or receiving a Federal contract, grant, loan, or cooperative agreement or an extension, continuation, renewal, amendment, or modification of a Federal contract, grant, loan, or cooperative agreement if payment is for professional or technical services rendered directly in the preparation, submission, or negotiation of any bid, proposal, or application for that Federal contract, grant, loan, or cooperative agreement or for meeting requirements imposed by or pursuant to law as a condition for receiving that Federal contract, grant, loan, or cooperative agreement.
( b ) For purposes of paragraph (a) of this section, “professional and technical services” shall be limited to advice and analysis directly applying any professional or technical discipline. For example, drafting of a legal document accompanying a bid or proposal by a lawyer is allowable. Similarly, technical advice provided by an engineer on the performance or operational capability of a piece of equipment rendered directly in the negotiation of a contract is allowable. However, communications with the intent to influence made by a professional (such as a licensed lawyer) or a technical person (such as a licensed accountant) are not allowable under this section unless they provide advice and analysis directly applying their professional or technical expertise and unless the advice or analysis is rendered directly and solely in the preparation, submission or negotiation of a covered Federal action. Thus, for example, communications with the intent to influence made by a lawyer that do not provide legal advice or analysis directly and solely related to the legal aspects of his or her client's proposal, but generally advocate one proposal over another are not allowable under this section because the lawyer is not providing professional legal services. Similarly, communications with the intent to influence made by an engineer providing an engineering analysis prior to the preparation or submission of a bid or proposal are not allowable under this section since the engineer is providing technical services but not directly in the preparation, submission or negotiation of a covered Federal action.
( c ) Requirements imposed by or pursuant to law as a condition for receiving a covered Federal award include those required by law or regulation, or reasonably expected to be required by law or regulation, and any other requirements in the actual award documents.
( d ) Only those services expressly authorized by this section are allowable under this section.
#### BROWN, Respondent, v. HOSINGTON, Appellant.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.

March 15, 1905.)

Action by Harry Brown against George A. Hosington. No opinion. Order affirmed, with $10 costs and disbursements. •
### §6396. State laws or programs

No State law or State program in effect on December 22, 1975, or which may become effective thereafter, shall be superseded by any provision of title I or II of this Act (other than any provision of such title which amends another law) or any rule, regulation, or order thereunder, except insofar as such State law or State program is in conflict with such provision, rule, regulation, or order.

(Pub. L. 94–163, title V, §526, Dec. 22, 1975, 89 Stat. 964.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### References in Text

Title I of this Act, referred to in par. (1), is title I of Pub. L. 94–163, Dec. 22, 1975, 89 Stat. 875, which is classified principally to subchapter I (§6211 et seq.) of this chapter. For complete classification of title I to the Code, see Tables.

Title II of this Act, referred to in par. (1), is title II of Pub. L. 94–163, Dec. 22, 1975, 89 Stat. 890, which is classified generally to subchapter II (§6271 et seq.) of this chapter. For complete classification of title II to the Code, see Tables.
#### § 92.57 Oral examination of witnesses.

When a witness is examined on the basis of oral interrogatories, the counsel for the party requesting the deposition has the right to conduct a direct examination of the witness without interruption except in the form of objection by opposing counsel. The opposing counsel has the same right on cross-examination. Cross-examination may be followed by redirect and recross-examinations until the interrogation is complete. The notarizing officer taking the deposition should endeavor to restrain counsel from indulging in lengthy colloquies, digressions, or asides, and from attempts to intimidate or mislead the witness. The notarizing officer has no authority to sustain or overrule objections but should have them recorded as provided in § 92.59. Instead of taking part in the oral examination of a witness, the parties notified of the taking of a deposition may transmit written interrogatories to the notarizing officer. The notarizing officer should then question the witness on the basis of the written interrogatories and should record the answers verbatim. (Rules 30 (c) and 31 (b), Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United States.)

[22 FR 10858, Dec. 27, 1957, as amended at 60 FR 51723, Oct. 3, 1995]
#### In the Matter of the Arbitration between Stanley J. Staklinski and Pyramid Electric Company.

Motion for a stay granted on condition that the appellant procures the record on appeal and appellant’s points to be served and filed on or before November 3, 1960, with notice of argument for November 15, 1960, said appeal to be argued or submitted when reached. The stay contained in the order to show cause, dated October 4, 1960, is continued pending the hearing and determination of the appeal. Concur — Botein, P. J., Rabin, Stevens and Eager, JJ.
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NORTHERN CALIFORNIA GLAZIERS, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

AMERICA’S GLASS CENTER, INC., et al.,

Defendants. /

No. C 08-5451 SI; No. C 09-3546 SI

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

MOTIONS TO SET ASIDE DEFAULTS

AND DEFAULT JUDGMENT AND

DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR 

DEFAULT JUDGMENT

On January 15, 2010, the Court held a hearing on defendants’ motions to set aside the defaults

and default judgment that have been entered in these related cases. For the reasons discussed at the

hearing, the Court GRANTS the motions and sets aside the defaults entered in both cases, and the

default judgment entered in 08-5451. Docket Nos. 31 & 35 in 08-5451; Docket Nos. 23 & 27 in 09-

3546. The Court DENIES plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment. Docket No. 31 in 09-3546.

Defendants’ responses to the complaints must be filed no later than February 12, 2010. As

discussed at the hearing, the corporate defendants may not appear in this case without counsel.

The Court will hold a case management conference on March 12, 2010 at 3:00 pm, and at that time will

set an expeditious schedule for re`solving these cases.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 19, 2010 SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

Case 3:08-cv-05451-SI Document 47 Filed 01/19/10 Page 1 of 1
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v William Kane, Appellant.

Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County, rendered September 9, 1974, convicting him of grand larceny in the third degree and assault in the third degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. Judgment reversed, on the law and as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice, and new trial ordered. No questions of fact have been raised or considered. In the course of his summation the prosecutor made three remarks which, taken singly or in the composite, deprived defendant of a fair trial (see *People v Crimmins,*36 NY2d 230). The offending and completely uncalled for remarks were that defense counsel: (1) had money as his sole motive for representing defendant (actually, the defense counsel was a staff attorney for the Legal Aid Society); (2) did not believe in his client’s innocence (we have previously held that *576such a remark constitutes reversible error *[People v Coles,*47 AD2d 905; *People v Fluker,*51 AD2d 1045; see, also, *People v Tassiello,*300 NY 425]); and (3) was a "flat liar”. This last remark, while not objected to, nevertheless, taken together with the others, constitutes prejudicial error (see *People v Shanis,*36 NY 697; *People v Lombardi,*20 NY2d 266, 272-273), and necessitates a new trial. It is high time for overzealous prosecutors to awaken to the realization that invective and insult can neither substitute for nor supplement, good, solid proof. At bar, the evidence of guilt was overwhelming. The thief was literally caught in the act by a police officer parked nearby in an unmarked car. The case was "open and shut”. Nevertheless, and irrespective of the quantum of proof adduced by the prosecution, defendant is entitled to a fair trial, of which he was deprived by the deplorable tactics of the Assistant District Attorney who prosecuted this indictment. Martuscello, Acting P. J., Cohalan, Rabin and Mollen, JJ., concur.