alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
```

[Congressional Bills 109th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 266 Introduced in House (IH)]

109th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 266

    To amend the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 to protect Social 
       Security beneficiaries against any reduction in benefits.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            January 6, 2005

 Ms. Ginny Brown-Waite of Florida introduced the following bill; which 
    was referred to the Committee on Rules, and in addition to the 
Committee on the Budget, for a period to be subsequently determined by 
the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall 
           within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
    To amend the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 to protect Social 
       Security beneficiaries against any reduction in benefits.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Social Security Protection Act of 
2005''.

SEC. 2. PROTECTION OF SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFICIARI.

     Section 312 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 is amended by 
adding at the end the following new subsection:
    ``(g) Point of Order to Protect Social Security Benefits.--(1) It 
shall not be in order in the House of Representatives or the Senate to 
consider any bill or joint resolution, or amendment thereto or 
conference report thereon, that--
            ``(A) reduces or has the effect of reducing any current 
        benefits under the old-age, survivors, and disability insurance 
        programs under title II of the Social Security Act; or
            ``(B) provides for or has the effect of providing for cost-
        of-living increases of benefits under the old-age, survivors, 
        and disability insurance programs under title II of the Social 
        Security Act that are less than what would be provided under 
        title II of the Social Security Act as of the day of 
        consideration of the applicable measure.
    ``(2) As used in paragraph (1), the term `current', when referring 
to benefits, means benefits payable as of the day of consideration of 
the applicable measure.''.

SEC. 3. SUPER-MAJORITY REQUIREMENT IN THE SENATE.

     Section 904 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 is amended--
            (1) in subsection (c)(2), by striking ``and 312(c)'' and 
        inserting ``312(c), and 312(g)''; and
            (2) in subsection (d)(3), by striking ``and 312(c)'' and by 
        inserting ``312(c), and 312(g)''.
                                 <all>
```
UNITED 

STATES 

DISTRICT 

COURT

For the Northern District of California

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UNITED 

STATES 

DISTRICT 

COURT

U

For the Northern District of California

NITED 

STATES 

DISTRICT 

COURT

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Northern District of California

FAITH MUNN,

Plaintiff,

v.

HERTZ LONG-TERM DISABILITY PLAN,

et al.,

Defendant(s).

_____________________________________/

No. C 08-01942 VRW (MEJ)

NOTICE OF REFERENCE

This matter has been referred to the undersigned magistrate judge to prepare proposed

findings of fact and recommendations for all outstanding matters. Accordingly, the Court shall

conduct a hearing on June 17, 2010 at 10:00 a.m. in Courtroom B, 15th Floor, 450 Golden Gate

Avenue, San Francisco, California. Any further briefing shall be completed in compliance with

Civil Local Rule 7.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 4, 2010 _______________________________

Maria-Elena James 

Chief United States Magistrate Judge 

Case 3:08-cv-01942-VRW Document 75 Filed 05/04/10 Page 1 of 1
§ 502.6 Terms of use for accessing program materials available on agency Web sites. ( a ) By accessing Agency Web sites, Requestors agree to all the Terms of Use available on those Web sites.
( b ) All Requestors are advised that Agency program materials may contain third-party copyrighted material, unless the Agency specifically informs the Requestor otherwise. Accordingly, and as further explained in the Terms of Use mentioned above, by using Agency Web sites to access program materials: ( 1 ) The Requestor agrees that he or she is solely responsible for his or her use of program materials provided by the Agency and any copyrighted portion(s) of those materials;
( 2 ) The Requestor agrees that he or she shall secure all necessary licenses from all persons or organizations that hold a copyright in any portion of requested program materials before making any use of those program materials, except uses of program materials permitted by the Copyright Act of 1976, as amended.
[78 FR 39585, July 2, 2013, as amended at 78 FR 67026, Nov. 8, 2013]
Exhibit 32(ii)



Certification



STATEMENT OF CHIEF ACCOUNTING OFFICER

OF TICE TECHNOLOGY, INC.

PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

§ 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Quarterly Report of Tice Technology, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-QSB for the period ended December 31, 2003 as amended and restated and as filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (the Report), I, Sharon Draper, Chief Accounting Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to my knowledge:



| | 1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | -- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | -- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



Date: February 11, 2004



/s/    SHARON DRAPERSharon Draper, Chief Accounting Officer
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VINCENT ROSENBALM,

Petitioner,

v.

ED FOULK, 

CEO of Napa State Hospital,

Respondent. /

No. C 08-3436 SI (pr)

ORDER 

This action was dismissed and judgment was entered on December 15, 2008. 

Nonetheless, petitioner has continued to file documents in this action, including statements

about events in his state court criminal case and his conditions of confinement at the Napa

State Hospital, as well as about disputes he has with the Ukiah police department and

Mendocino County Sheriff's Department. The court already explained to petitioner that the

claims were deficient for the reasons explained in the Order of Dismissal in this action, as

well as in the Order of Dismissal in Rosenbalm v. Foulk, No. C 07-4197 SI. 

Petitioner also requested restitution and victim's services under 18 U.S.C. § 3771,

urging that what happened to him – in his state court criminal case, in his dealings with

police and sheriff's deputies, in his dispute with his landlord, and in his commitment to Napa

State Hospital – was downright criminal. The request is DENIED because he does not come

within the scope of the statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 3771(e) (defining a "crime victim" for

purposes of the statute as "a person directly and proximately harmed as a result of the

Case 3:08-cv-03436-SI Document 46 Filed 07/13/10 Page 1 of 2
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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commission of a Federal offense"). (Docket #32, # 38, # 42.) 

Petitioner should not file any more documents in this long-closed action. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 13, 2010 

 SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

Case 3:08-cv-03436-SI Document 46 Filed 07/13/10 Page 2 of 2
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Department of Justice

###### Antitrust Division

                    Notice is hereby given that, on September 17, 2004, pursuant to Section 6(a) of the National Cooperative Research and Production Act of 1993, 15 U.S.C. 4301*et seq.*                     (“the Act”), International Electrotechnical Commission Technical Committee Subcommittee 15C (“IEC TC SC 15C”), by its Secretariat, National Electrical Manufacturers Association (“NEMA”), has filed written notifications simultaneously with the Attorney General and the Federal Trade Commission disclosing (1) the name and principal place of business of the standards development organization and (2) the nature and scope of its standards development activities. The notifications were filed for the purpose of invoking the Act's provisions limiting the recovery of antitrust plaintiffs to actual damages under specified circumstances.                

Pursuant to Section 6(b) of the Act, the name and principal place of business of the standards development organization is: International Electrotechnical Commission Technical Committee Subcommittee 15C, Rosslyn, VA. The nature and scope of IEC TC SC 15C's standards development activities are: Related to international specifications for electrical insulation. The standards of IEC TC SC 15C are IEC Standards developed pursuant to “ISO/IEC Directives Part 1: Procedures for the Technical Work” and are published by NEMA.

Dorothy B. Fountain,

Deputy Director of Operations, Antitrust Division.

[FR Doc. 04-27548 Filed 12-15-04; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4410-11-M
§ 92.58 Examination on basis of written interrogatories. Written interrogatories are usually divided into three parts: ( a ) The direct interrogatories or interrogatories in chief;
( b ) The cross-interrogatories; and
( c ) The redirect interrogatories.
Recross-interrogatories sometimes follow redirect interrogatories. The notarizing officer should not furnish the witness with a copy of the interrogatories in advance of the questioning, nor should he allow the witness to examine the interrogatories in advance of the questioning. Although it may be necessary for the officer, when communicating with the witness for the purpose of asking him to appear to testify, to indicate in general terms the nature of the evidence which is being sought, this information should not be given in such detail as to permit the witness to formulate his answers to the interrogatories prior to his appearance before the notarizing officer. The officer taking the deposition should put the interrogatories to the witness separately and in order. The written interrogatories should not be repeated in the record (unless special instructions to that effect are given), but an appropriate reference should be made thereto. These references should, of course, be followed by the witness' answers. All of the written interrogatories must be put to the witness, even though at some point during the examination the witness disclaims further knowledge of the subject. When counsel for all of the parties attend an examination conducted on written interrogatories, the notarizing officer may, all counsel having consented thereto, permit oral examination of the witness following the close of the examination upon written interrogatories. The oral examination should be conducted in the same manner and order as if not preceded by an examination upon written interrogatories. [22 FR 10858, Dec. 27, 1957, as amended at 60 FR 51723, Oct. 3, 1995; 61 FR 14375, Apr. 1, 1996]
#### In the Matter of Longwood Associates, Respondent, v Board of Assessors and/or The Assessor of the Village of Massapequa Park and the Board of Assessment Review, Respondent. Morton Haves, as Receiver in Foreclosure for the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., Appellant.

In a consolidated proceeding to review certain real property tax assessments, Morton Haves, as receiver in foreclosure, appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County, entered October 18, 1976, as denied, without prejudice, his motion to vacate and set aside a stipulation entered into between the petitioner and the respondent, dated November 19, 1975, which discontinued, with prejudice, the assessment review proceeding involving the 1975/1976 real property tax assessment review proceeding. Order affirmed insofar as appealed from, with $50 costs and disbursements (see *Matter of Longwood Assoc. v Board of Assessors,*58 AD2d 581). Martuscello, J. P., Latham and Shapiro, JJ., concur; O’Connor, J. dissents and votes to reverse the order appealed from and to remand the proceeding to Special Term for a trial of the issues raised, pursuant to CPLR 2218, with the following memorandum: I respectfully dissent (see my dissenting memorandum in *Matter of Longwood Assoc. v Board of Assessors,*58 AD2d 581). [88 Misc 2d 35.]
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 9
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE FORM
10-Q AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1997
<CASH>                                          20,169
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                               0
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                                20,800
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                     0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                  2,253,060
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                         225,133
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                           225,893
<LOANS>                                        920,072
<ALLOWANCE>                                     23,945
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               3,474,150
<DEPOSITS>                                   1,875,990
<SHORT-TERM>                                   646,480
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                             66,728
<LONG-TERM>                                    272,139
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           436
<OTHER-SE>                                     612,377
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>               3,474,150
<INTEREST-LOAN>                                 42,427
<INTEREST-INVEST>                              116,454
<INTEREST-OTHER>                                 3,704
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                               162,585
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                              65,547
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              88,619
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                           73,966
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                      450
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                               1,266
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                                 46,091
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 35,452
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                      35,452
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    23,965
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.60
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.60
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                    7.34
<LOANS-NON>                                      8,652
<LOANS-PAST>                                         4
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                                     0
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                  2,472
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                                23,320
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                       24
<RECOVERIES>                                       200
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                               23,945
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                                 0
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                  0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                         23,945
        

</TABLE>
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 02-7413

RICKEY BERNARD ROBERTS, Petitioner - Appellant,

versus
J. JOSEPH CURRAN, JR., Attorney General, State of Maryland, Respondent - Appellee, and
HARRY K. SINGLETARY, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, Respondent.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. Andre M. Davis, District Judge. (CA-96- 478-AMD)
Submitted: April 24, 2003 Decided: May 15, 2003
Before WILLIAMS and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.2 Martin J. McClain, OFFICE OF THE CAPITAL COLLATERAL REGIONAL COUNSEL, Ft. Lauderdale, Florida; H. Mark Stichel, Benjamin D. Hinceman, GOHN, HANKEY & STICHEL, L.L.P., Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General of Maryland, Ann N. Bosse, Assistant Attorney General, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).* The district court granted Roberts’ motion for a certificate of appealabi lity on September 21, 2002. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) (requiring certificate as prerequisite to appeal from denial of writ). We need not decide whether Roberts properly should have requested a certificate of probable cause to appeal because the standard for both are the same. See Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 483 (2000) (“Except for substituting the word ‘constitutional’ for the word ‘federal,’ § 2253 is a codification of the [certificate of probable cause] standard.”).

3 PER CURIAM: Rickey Bernard Roberts appeals the district court’s order denying relief on his petition filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1994) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000)). * We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court. See Roberts v. Curran , No. CA-96- 478-AMD (D. Md. Aug. 21, 2002); see also Lindh v. Murphy , 521 U.S. 320, 336-37 (1997). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
### §3939. Applicability of antitrust laws

Nothing contained herein shall affect the applicability of the Federal antitrust laws to the activities of the corporation and the partnership created under this chapter and of the persons participating therein or in partnerships, limited partnerships, or joint ventures with either of them.

(Pub. L. 90–448, title IX, §909, Aug. 1, 1968, 82 Stat. 550.)
#### Amanda L. Miller, Respondent, v Mark Isacoff et al., Appellants.

[833 NYS2d 246]—

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants appeal from (1) an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (LaMarca, J.), dated January 3, 2006, which denied their motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, and (2) a judgment of the same court (Spinola, J), dated June 28, 2006, which, upon a jury verdict, is in favor of the plaintiff and against them in the principal sum of $145,000.

Ordered that the appeal from the order is dismissed; and it is further,

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed; and it is further,

Ordered that one bill of costs is awarded to the plaintiff.

The appeal from the intermediate order must be dismissed because the right of direct appeal therefrom terminated with the entry of judgment in the action *(see Matter of Aho,*39 NY2d 241, 248 [1976]). The issues raised on the appeal from the order are brought up for review and have been considered on the appeal from the judgment *(see*CPLR 5501 [a] [1]).

The defendant Mark Isacoff owned a German Shepherd/ Husky dog, who bit the plaintiff while she was attending a Labor Day barbecue at the defendants’ house. After the plaintiff commenced the present action, the defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that they did not know or have reason to know that the dog possessed a vicious propensity. In support of the motion, the defendants submitted Isacoff s deposition testimony in which he acknowledged that the dog would growl whenever the doorbell rang and that he had posted “Beware of Dog” signs on gates located on *719both sides of the defendants’ home. Isacoff explained at his deposition that he did not “want strangers walking in to [sic] [the dog] when he was alone in the backyard.” This testimony raised triable issues of fact as to whether the defendants knew or should have known that the dog had vicious propensities (see *Collier v Zambito,*1 NY3d 444, 447 [2004]; *Parente v Chavez,*17 AD3d 648, 649 [2005]). Accordingly, the defendants failed to establish a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law (see *Alvarez v Prospect Hosp.,*68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]). Since the defendants failed to meet their burden, it is not necessary to consider whether the papers in opposition to the motion were sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact (see *Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., supra).*Schmidt, J.E, Mastro, Garni and Dickerson, JJ., concur.
#### § 51.45 Department discretion to require evidence of U.S. citizenship or non-citizen nationality.

The Department may require an applicant to provide any evidence that it deems necessary to establish that he or she is a U.S. citizen or non-citizen national, including evidence in addition to the evidence specified in 22 CFR 51.42 through 51.44.
§ 908.2 Attorney fees. ( a ) If the Board finds that a grievance is meritorious or that an Agency has not established the cause for separation of a charged employee in a hearing before the Board pursuant to section 610 of the Act, the Board shall have the authority to direct the Agency to pay reasonable attorney fees to the same extent and in the same manner as such fees may be required by the Merit Systems Protection Board under 5 U.S.C. 7701(g).
( b ) Requests for attorney fees, accompanied by supporting documentation, must be filed with the Board within thirty (30) days of the date of the Board's decision.
[56 FR 55459, Oct. 28, 1991]