UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

 

 )

STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, ) 

 )

Plaintiff, )

 ) Civil Action No. 12-1584 

v. ) (EGS-TBG-RMC)

 )

ERIC HOLDER, in his official )

capacity as Attorney General )

of the United States, et al. )

 )

Defendants. )

 )

MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THREE-JUDGE COURT

This case is before the Court on Proposed Intervenor Peter 

Heilemann’s Motion to Intervene. Movant seeks to intervene as 

of right under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a) or, in the 

alternative, to intervene permissively under Rule 24(b). For 

the reasons explained below, the motion will be DENIED. 

I. BACKGROUND

Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act in 1965 to “rid the 

country of racial discrimination in voting.” South Carolina v. 

Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 315 (1966). Section 5 of the Act 

requires certain “covered jurisdictions” to “preclear” every 

proposed change in their voting procedures with either the 

Attorney General or a three-judge panel of this Court. 42

U.S.C. § 1973c. Certain jurisdictions were deemed “covered” by 

Section 5 because they applied a “test or device” to determine 
2

eligibility for voting and the jurisdiction had fewer than 50 

percent of persons registered to vote or voting in the relevant 

presidential election. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b). At present, nine 

states are covered as a whole by the Section 5 preclearance 

requirement, while individual jurisdictions in seven other 

states, including New Hampshire, are also covered. Attorney 

General’s Opp. to Mot. to Intervene, ECF No. 9, at 2 (citing 28 

C.F.R. Part 51, Appendix); Dep’t of Justice, Section 5 Covered 

Jurisdictions, www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/sec_5/covered.php

(last visited January 28, 2013). 

Section 4(a) of the Act affords covered jurisdictions the 

opportunity to remove themselves from Section 5 preclearance 

requirements by bringing a statutory declaratory judgment action 

and demonstrating that they satisfy certain criteria. 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1973b(a). These actions are commonly referred to as “bailout” 

actions and are statutorily assigned to a three-judge court in 

the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. 

42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(1), (a)(5); 28 U.S.C. § 2284. The Attorney 

General is the statutory defendant in bailout actions, and may 

“consent[] to the entry of judgment if based upon a showing of 

objective and compelling evidence by the plaintiff, and upon 

investigation, he is satisfied that the State or political 

subdivision has complied with the requirements” for bailout. 42 

U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(9). 
3

On November 15, 2012, the State of New Hampshire brought a 

declaratory judgment action on behalf of ten towns within the 

State that are “covered jurisdictions” under Section 5 of the 

Voting Rights Act. Compl. ¶¶ 1-2. The State argued that its 

covered political subdivisions were eligible for a “bailout” 

from the preclearance requirements of Section 5. Compl. ¶¶ 30-

41. The State represented that it and its covered jurisdictions 

had made numerous submissions over the years seeking 

preclearance under Section 5 and none of the submissions had 

ever received an objection from the Attorney General. Compl. 

¶ 30. The State noted, however, that it had inadvertently 

failed to obtain preclearance for certain minor changes in 

voting procedures in the last ten years but that it had now 

submitted those changes to the Attorney General for 

preclearance. Compl. ¶ 31. 

On December 5, 2012, Proposed Intervenor Peter Heilemann 

filed a Motion to Intervene. Movant contends that he is a 

“citizen of, and registered voter in, the State of New 

Hampshire.” Heilemann Statement ¶ 1. He does not allege, 

however, that he is eligible to vote in any of the ten covered 

jurisdictions, nor does he allege that he is a member of any 

racial or other minority group protected by the Voting Rights 

Act. He also has not alleged that any voting practice or change 

in procedure has harmed him in any way. Rather, he contends 
4

that as a voter in the State of New Hampshire, he “receives the 

benefit of the special remedial provisions of the Voting Rights 

Act because every statewide law effecting any change in voting 

in any of the Covered Towns must be ‘precleared’ under Section 

5.” Mot. to Intervene at 2. Movant alleges that he is entitled 

to intervene because he “wants to continue to receive the 

benefit of such review.” Id. The motion is now ripe for the 

Court’s decision.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Supreme Court has held that “[p]rivate parties may 

intervene in Section 5 actions,” and that such intervention is 

controlled by Rule 24. Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 477 

(2003). In this act, Movant seeks to intervene as of right 

pursuant to Rule 24(a) or, in the alternative, permissively 

pursuant to Rule 24(b). 

Rule 24(a)(1) provides that on timely motion, the court 

must permit anyone to intervene who “is given an unconditional 

right to intervene by a federal statute.” Rule 24(a)(2) 

provides that the court must permit anyone to intervene who 

claims an interest relating to the property or 

transaction that is the subject of the action, and is 

so situated that disposing of the action may as a 

practical matter impair or impede the movant’s ability 

to protect its interest, unless existing parties 

adequately represent that interest. 
5

This Circuit has held that intervention as of right under Rule 

24(a)(2) depends on “(1) the timeliness of the motion; (2) 

whether the applicant ‘claims an interest relating to the 

property or transaction which is the subject of the action’; (3) 

whether ‘the applicant is so situated that the disposition of 

the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the 

applicant’s ability to protect that interest’; and (4) whether 

‘the applicant’s interest is adequately represented by the 

existing parties.’” Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Norton, 322 F.3d 

728, 731 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). A movant seeking 

to intervene as of right under Rule 24(a)(2) must additionally 

demonstrate Article III standing. In re Endangered Species Act 

Sec. 4 Deadline Litig., --- F.3d ----, No. 11-5274, 2013 WL 

45871, *6 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 4, 2013) (citing United States v. 

Philip Morris USA, Inc., 566 F.3d 1095, 1146 (D.C. Cir. 2009)). 

Because a Rule 24(a)(2) intervenor seeks to participate on equal 

footing with the original parties to the suit, he must satisfy 

the standing requirements imposed on the parties. Id. at *3

(citing City of Cleveland v. NRC, 17 F.3d 1515, 1517 (D.C. Cir. 

1994)). 

Rule 24(b) sets forth the standard for permissive 

intervention, and states in relevant part that “[o]n timely 

motion, the court may permit anyone to intervene who . . . has a 

claim or defense that shares with the main action a common 
6

question or law or fact.” The grant of a Rule 24(b) motion is 

left to the district court’s sound discretion. E.E.O.C. v. 

Nat’l Children’s Center, Inc., 146 F.3d 1042, 1046 (D.C. Cir. 

1998). “In exercising its discretion, the court must consider 

whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the 

adjudication of the original parties’ rights.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

24(b)(3). 

III. DISCUSSION

A. Rule 24(a)(1): Intervention by Statute

Movant argues that he may intervene as of right pursuant to 

Rule 24(a)(1) and Section 4(a)(4) of the Voting Rights Act, 42 

U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(4), which states that “[a]ny aggrieved party 

may as of right intervene at any stage in such action.”1

 The 

issue, therefore, is whether Movant is an “aggrieved party” 

under the statute. 

The current bailout provisions of the Voting Rights Act 

were revised in the 1982 amendments to the Act, and went into 

effect on August 5, 1984. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, 

Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 2(b). In the amendments, Congress created 

 1 In a parenthetical, Movant also argues that he is entitled to 

intervene under Section 4(a)(9), which states that any aggrieved 

party may intervene as of right at any stage in an action where 

the Attorney General has consented to a declaratory judgment 

permitting bailout. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(9). Neither party 

focuses on this subsection as the basis for Movant’s 

intervention, nor has any party argued that the definition of 

“aggrieved party” under this subsection differs from Section 

4(a)(4). 
7

a statutory right for aggrieved parties to intervene in those 

cases. As amended, Section 4(a)(4) provides that a covered 

State or political subdivision bringing a bailout case “shall 

publicize the intended commencement and any proposed settlement 

of such action in the media,” and further provides that “[a]ny 

aggrieved party may as of right intervene at any such stage in 

such action.” 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(4). The Senate Report 

accompanying the 1982 amendments states that: 

The State [or] political subdivision seeking bailout 

must give reasonable public notice of the commencement 

and any proposed settlement of the bailout suit to 

enable interested persons to intervene. An aggrieved 

party is defined broadly to include any person who 

would have standing under the law. Such persons may 

intervene at any stage, including the appeal. 

S. Rep. No. 97-417, at 74 (1982) (emphasis added). 

Movant argues that he is entitled to intervene as an 

“aggrieved party” because he is a registered voter in the State 

of New Hampshire. Mot. to Intervene at 3 (citing Trafficante v. 

Met. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209 (1972) disagreement 

recognized by Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 131 S.Ct. 863, 

869 (2011); Fed. Elec. Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 19 (1998)). 

In making this argument, Movant appears to allege that the 

“aggrieved party” standard under Section 4(a)(4) goes beyond the 

limits of Article III standing. 

The cases Movant cites in support of his argument that he 

is an “aggrieved party” are easily distinguishable. Movant 
8

cites Trafficante for the proposition that “the definition of 

‘person aggrieved’ contained in the Fair Housing Act is broad.” 

In that case, however, the Supreme Court stated that the 

standard of “aggrieved persons” under the Civil Rights Act of 

1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a), could extend only to the outer limits

of constitutional standing and not beyond it, and is thus not 

helpful to Movant. 409 U.S. at 209. Moreover, the limits of 

“aggrieved persons” under the Civil Rights Act of 1968 have

since been clarified by the Supreme Court to be narrower than 

the outer boundaries of Article III standing. Thompson, 131 S.

Ct. at 869 (2011). 

Movant also cites dicta from Federal Election Commission v. 

Akins for the proposition that “aggrieved” goes beyond the 

traditional limits of standing. In that case, however, the 

Supreme Court made clear that the plaintiff had alleged a 

specific, concrete injury, rather than an abstract injury, in 

seeking redress for the failure to receive certain materials 

under the Federal Election Campaign Act. Moreover, the Supreme 

Court expressly found that the claims satisfied the requirements 

of Article III standing. 

Far more persuasive are the cases cited by the Attorney 

General relating to Section 3 of the Voting Rights Act. In all 

of those cases, the word “aggrieved” has been interpreted to 

require Article III standing. See, e.g., Roberts v. Wamser, 883 
9

F.2d 617, 624 (8th Cir. 1989) (“[S]tanding . . . under th[e] 

[Voting Rights] Act is limited to the Attorney General and to 

‘aggrieved persons,’ a category that we hold to be limited to 

persons whose voting rights have been denied or impaired.”); 

Perry-Bey v. City of Norfolk, 678 F. Supp. 2d 348, 362 (E.D. Va. 

2009) (an “aggrieved person” under the Voting Rights Act is a 

party that satisfies constitutional standing requirements) 

(citing cases). 

Notably, Movant does not allege that he resides in any of 

the covered political subdivisions seeking a bailout, nor does 

he allege that his voting rights have been infringed. Rather, 

Movant argues that he is an aggrieved party because he 

would be deprived of the protection of the remedial 

provisions of the Voting Rights Act were plaintiff 

successful in obtaining the relief it seeks in this 

lawsuit. That suffices to constitute an imminent 

Article III injury, and, a fortiori, constitutes 

sufficient harm to qualify as an aggrieved party for 

purposes of intervention under the statute. 

Mot. to Intervene at 3. In this respect, Movant skips over the 

Article III standing inquiry. For the reasons explained above, 

the Court finds that standing is required for Movant to proceed 

as an “aggrieved party” under Section 4(a)(4) of the Voting 

Rights Act. 

1. Standing

Article III of the Constitution restricts the jurisdiction 

of the federal courts to adjudicating actual “cases” and 
10

“controversies.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2; see also Allen v. 

Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984). This requirement has given 

rise to “several doctrines ... ‘founded in concern about the 

proper—and properly limited—role of the courts in a democratic 

society.’” Allen, 468 U.S. at 750 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 

U.S. 490, 498 (1975)); see also Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. 

Ams. United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 

471 (1982). One aspect of this “case-or-controversy” 

requirement is that plaintiffs must have standing to sue, an 

inquiry that focuses on whether the litigant is entitled to have 

the court decide the merits of the dispute. Allen, 468 U.S. at 

750–51 (quoting Warth, 422 U.S. at 498).

To establish the “irreducible constitutional minimum” of 

Article III standing, a plaintiff must show that: (1) he has 

suffered an “injury in fact” which is (a) concrete and 

particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or 

hypothetical; (2) there is a causal connection between the 

alleged injury and the conduct complained of that is fairly 

traceable to the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to 

merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a 

favorable decision. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 

555, 560–61 (1992) (citations omitted). 
11

a. Procedural Standing

Movant argues that he has standing because he is seeking to

prevent a procedural injury.2 Specifically, he argues that prior 

changes were made to voting laws in covered jurisdictions in New 

Hampshire without obtaining preclearance and that this failure 

to submit a change “deprives those affected of a procedural 

protection regardless of whether the process would have resulted 

in an objection or a denial of declaratory judgment under 

Section 5.” Movant’s Reply, ECF No. 11, at 4. Movant further 

contends that if “New Hampshire is permitted to bail out, [he] 

will be deprived of that procedural protection.” Id. This 

argument fails. 

The Supreme Court has afforded special treatment to 

procedural injuries under Article III, “noting that ‘[t]here is 

much truth to the assertion that “procedural rights” are 

special: The person who has been accorded a procedural right to 

protect his concrete interests can assert that right without 

meeting all the normal standards for redressability and 

immediacy.’” Sec. 4 Deadline Litig., --- F.3d at ----, No. 11-

5274, 2013 WL 45871, at *4 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 4, 2013) (citing 

 2 Movant initially alleged that he had Article III standing, 

without specific reference to procedural standing. In his 

reply, Movant essentially concedes that his voting rights will 

not be impaired by a bailout and he clarifies that he is seeking 

to assert procedural standing, rather than constitutional

standing. Movant’s Reply at 4. 
12

Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7). The doctrine “loosens the 

strictures of the standing inquiry,” relaxing the immediacy and 

redressability requirements. Id. (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 

n.7; Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488 (2009)). As 

this Circuit has recognized, however, “where plaintiffs allege 

injury resulting from violation of a procedural right afforded 

to them by statute and designed to protect their threatened 

concrete interest, the courts relax-while not wholly 

eliminating-the issues of imminence and redressability, but not 

the issues of injury in fact or causation.” Center for Law and 

Educ. v. Dep't of Educ., 396 F.3d 1152, 1157 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 

Thus, the D.C. Circuit has held that a party has procedural 

standing only if, inter alia, (1) the government violated its 

procedural rights designed to protect a threatened, concrete 

interest, and (2) the violation resulted in injury to that 

concrete, particularized interest. Id. However, the procedural 

standing doctrine “does not—and cannot—eliminate any of the 

‘irreducible’ elements of standing[.]” Fla. Audubon Soc'y v. 

Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 664 (D.C. Cir. 1996).3

 3 The cases cited by Movant are not relevant as to whether 

Sections 4 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act were designed to 

protect Movant’s interests or whether the alleged violations of 

those subsections caused Movant injury. See Nat’l Parks 

Conserv. Ass’n v. Manson, 414 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2005) 

(holding that a plaintiff challenging an agency action need not 

demonstrate that 1) the agency action would have been different 

but for the procedural violation or 2) that court-ordered 
13

As to the first element, Movant has failed to demonstrate 

that any alleged procedural right to Section 5 preclearance is 

designed to protect Movant’s particularized, concrete interests. 

As the D.C. Circuit has recognized, not all procedural rights 

violations are sufficient for standing: a plaintiff must show 

that “the procedures in question are designed to protect some 

threatened concrete interest of his that is the ultimate basis 

of his standing.” Center for Law and Educ., 396 F.3d at 1157 

(citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573 n.8); accord Sec. 4 Deadline 

Litig., --- F.3d ----, No. 11-5274, 2013 WL 45871, *12 (D.C. 

Cir. Jan. 4, 2013). “[D]eprivation of a procedural right 

without some concrete interest that is affected by the 

deprivation—a procedural right in vacuo—is insufficient to 

create Article III standing.” Summers, 555 U.S. at 496. 

In Lujan, the Supreme Court offered two examples of 

procedures designed to protect a party's concrete interest: (1) 

the requirement for a hearing prior to a denial of a license 

application is designed to protect the applicant, and (2) the 

requirement that a federal agency prepare an environmental 

impact statement before conducting a major federal action such 

 

compliance with the procedure would alter the final result); 

Lemon v. Geren, 514 F.3d 1312, (D.C. Cir. 2008) (plaintiffs who 

lived in the vicinity of Army base had standing to challenge 

Army’s alleged failure to comply with NEPA impact statement 

procedures even though they could not prove that the preparation 

of the impact statement would have prevented the relocation of 

the Army base). 
14

as constructing a dam is designed to protect neighbors of the 

proposed dam. See 504 U.S. at 572. In a subsequent case, this 

Circuit held that a plaintiff who lived in the vicinity of a 

proposed airport runway had procedural standing to challenge the 

FAA’s alleged failure to authorize the runway without performing 

an environmental assessment because “[t]he procedural 

requirements of NEPA were designed to protect persons . . . who 

might be injured by hasty federal actions taken without 

regarding for possible environmental consequences.” City of 

Dania Beach v. FAA, 485 F.3d 1181, 1186 (D.C. Cir. 2007) 

(citation omitted). The Circuit found that the plaintiff had 

“adequately demonstrated that the FAA’s failure to follow the 

NEPA procedures pose[d] a ‘distinct risk’ to [plaintiff’s] 

‘particularized interests’ [and] given the location of his home, 

he is uniquely susceptible to injury resulting from increased 

use of the secondary runways.” Id. 

Here, Movant generally claims that he receives a benefit 

from the preclearance process, which determines that “statewide 

laws affecting voting . . . do not have the purpose or effect of 

denying or abridging the right to vote on the basis of race or 

color” in the covered communities. Mot. to Intervene at 4. 

Unlike the plaintiff in City of Dania Beach, however, Movant’s 

alleged interests are no different than the benefit conferred 

upon any New Hampshire voter. Movant has thus failed to 
15

establish that Section 5 preclearance was designed to protect 

any threatened concrete interest of his. 

Moreover, Movant has also failed to establish that the 

bailout from the Section 5 preclearance procedures would result 

in any injury to his interests. “[T]he requirement of injury in 

fact is a hard floor of Article III jurisdiction that cannot be 

removed by statute.” Summers, 555 U.S. at 497. Movant’s 

arguments are exceedingly vague as to this point. For example, 

he contends that he is entitled to intervene because he “wants 

to continue to receive the benefit” of Section 5 preclearance in 

New Hampshire. Mot. to Intervene at 2. He does not allege, for 

example, that the bailout would have any negative impact on his 

ability to vote, nor does he allege that he is a member of a 

protected group who might be negatively impacted. Indeed, he 

does not even allege that he is eligible to vote in one of the 

covered jurisdictions.4

 Essentially, the only injury that Movant 

 4 Movant argues that this Court recently permitted intervention 

in a Voting Rights case by a person who did not live in any of 

the relevant covered counties in Florida. Reply Br. at 7 

(citing Florida v. United States, No. 11 Civ. 1428, ECF No. 42 

(D.D.C. Oct. 19, 2011)). In particular, Movant cites the grant 

of permissive intervention under Rule 24(b)(1) to Ion Sancho, 

who was allegedly the Supervisor of Elections of a non-covered 

county in Florida. In that case, however, permissive 

intervention was not opposed by any of the parties. See id. ECF 

No. 26 at 3. Even if permissive intervention had been 

contested, Movant fails to explain how his interests as a voter 

are analogous to those of a Supervisor of Elections. Similarly, 

Movant argues that nonparties were granted intervention in 

Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District v. Gonzales. No. 06 
16

has alleged is that the Attorney General may not apply the law 

in the manner that Movant believes it should be applied. That 

is simply insufficient to allege an injury for standing 

purposes. See Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437, 441-42 (2007) 

(“The only injury that plaintiffs allege is that the law—

specifically the Elections Clause—has not been followed. This 

injury is precisely the kind of undifferentiated, generalized 

grievance about the conduct of government that we have refused 

to countenance in the past.”). 

For the reasons discussed above, the Court finds that 

Movant lacks standing in this action and is therefore not an 

“aggrieved party” under Section 4(a)(4) of the Voting Rights

Act. 

B. Rule 24(a)(2): Intervention as of Right

Intervention as of right under Rule 24(a)(2) depends on 

“(1) the timeliness of the motion; (2) whether the applicant 

‘claims an interest relating to the property or transaction 

which is the subject of the action’; (3) whether ‘the applicant 

is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a 

 

Civ. 01384, ECF No. 33 (D.D.C. Nov. 9, 2006). In that case, the 

Court granted the motions to intervene without indicating 

whether the parties were intervening permissively or as of 

right, and without indicating whether the motions had been by 

consent. See id. The Order also did not indicate—and Movant 

does not allege—that any of the intervenors lived outside the 

covered district. Movant cites this case only for the 

proposition that the Court has permitted intervention in bailout 

cases. 
17

practical matter impair or impede the applicant’s ability to 

protect that interest’; and (4) whether ‘the applicant’s 

interest is adequately represented by the existing parties.’” 

Fund for Animals, Inc., 322 F.3d at 731 (citations omitted). A 

movant seeking to intervene as of right under Rule 24(a)(2) must 

also establish Article III standing. Sec. 4 Deadline Litig., --

- F.3d ----, No. 11-5274, 2013 WL 45871, *6 (citing United 

States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 566 F.3d 1095, 1146 (D.C. 

Cir. 2009)). 

As discussed above, the Court finds that Movant does not 

have standing in this case. For that reason, the Court finds 

that Movant cannot intervene in this action as of right under 

Rule 24(a)(2) and the Court does not reach the four-factor test 

set forth in Fund for Animals. 

C. Rule 24(b)(1): Permissive Intervention

Movant argues in the alternative that he should be allowed 

to intervene permissively under Rule 24(b)(1). Mot. to

Intervene at 9. In order to permissively intervene under Rule 

24(b)(2), the proposed intervenor must ordinarily present: (1) 

an independent ground for subject matter jurisdiction; (2) a 

timely motion; and (3) a claim or defense that has a question of 

law or fact in common with the main action. Nat’l Children's 

Center, Inc., 146 F.3d at 1046. The grant of a Rule 24(b) 

motion is left to the district court’s sound discretion. Id. 
18

“In exercising its discretion, the court must consider whether 

the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication 

of the original parties’ rights.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(3).

The Court finds that permissive intervention under Rule 

24(b) will unduly delay and prejudice the adjudication of the 

original parties’ rights. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(3). Here, 

the parties have proposed a consent decree and requested that 

the Court enter judgment as to that decree. As such, all of the 

disputes between the parties have been resolved and the only 

thing standing between them and the resolution of the case is 

the issue of Movant’s intervention. Because there are no 

remaining issues between the parties, Movant’s intervention will 

only delay the action. Likewise, the Court finds that Movant’s 

intervention would prejudice the adjudication of the parties’ 

rights. Movant does not allege any concrete injury to his 

interests that would result from the bailout of the ten covered 

jurisdictions in New Hampshire. Rather, the only potential 

injury that at issue here is to the parties, in the form of the

delay that would result if the consent decree were not entered. 

As such, the Court finds, in its discretion, that intervention 

should not be permitted under Rule 24(b) because it would unduly 

delay and prejudice the adjudication of the original parties’ 

rights. Accordingly, the Court will deny Movant’s request to 

intervene permissively. 
19

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons explained above, Movant’s motion to 

intervene is DENIED. An appropriate Order accompanies this 

Memorandum Opinion. 

Signed: March 1, 2013

/s/ Thomas B. Griffith

United States Circuit Judge

/s/ Emmet G. Sullivan

United States District Judge

/s/ Rosemary M. Collyer

United States District Judge