[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 14-11232

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 1:12-cv-03575-RLV

MARY E. STANSEL, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

CITY OF ATLANTA, 

AFLAC, INC., 

JANE DOE #1-20, 

JOHN DOE #1-20, 

AMERICAN FAMILY LIFE ASSURANCE 

COMPANY OF COLUMBUS, INC., 

d.b.a. Aflac, 

 Defendants-Appellees.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

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(November 18, 2014)

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Before ED CARNES, Chief Judge, JORDAN and FAY, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

Mary Stansel, a licensed Georgia attorney proceeding pro se,

1 appeals the 

district court’s decision to dismiss with prejudice her claims against the City of 

Atlanta, American Family Life Assurance Company of Columbus, Inc. (American 

Family), and Aflac, Inc.

I.

Stansel worked for the City of Atlanta as an Assistant Solicitor from 2002 to 

2010, when she stopped due to severe bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, as well as 

back, neck, and nerve pain.

2

 While working for the City, Stansel purchased an 

American Family insurance policy that had short-term disability benefits. The 

policy’s premiums were to be paid via payroll deduction on a pretax basis. Before 

Stansel stopped working in March 2010, her plan’s premiums were paid with 

pretax dollars through payroll deductions. American Family paid her a total of 

$20,623.34 in short-term disability benefits in 2010 and 2011. It also filed W2

forms with the IRS that reported those disability benefits as income. 

 1 Because Stansel is a licensed attorney, we do not liberally construe her complaint as we 

would with a normal pro se litigant. See Olivares v. Martin, 555 F.2d 1192, 1194 n.1 (5th Cir. 

1977); cf. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (adopting 

as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down before October 1, 

1981).

2 Because this is an appeal from a motion to dismiss, we take the facts as alleged in the 

complaint, construing them in the light most favorable to Stansel. See Timson v. Sampson, 518 

F.3d 870, 872 (11th Cir. 2008).

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Stansel filed suit against the City and Aflac, Inc. in October 2012.3 The 

parties then engaged in a series of procedural skirmishes, during which Stansel 

filed a series of amended complaints. We need not describe the details of those 

skirmishes here, except to note that the district court dismissed Aflac, Inc. (which 

is the parent company of American Life) from the suit. The court did so after

Stansel admitted in her motion to file a first amended complaint that she had 

mistakenly named Aflac, Inc., and that she should have instead named its 

subsidiary American Life, which actually wrote her insurance policy. On July 3, 

2013, Stansel filed a motion seeking leave to file a third amended complaint. The 

proposed complaint she attached to her motion asserted seven claims and named as 

defendants the City, American Life, and Aflac, Inc. It sought to reestablish Aflac, 

Inc. as a defendant in the suit, even though Stansel had already admitted that she 

had improperly named it as a defendant.

The seven counts in the proposed third amended complaint were as follows. 

The first four were against the City and alleged that it had violated: (1) Title I of 

the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.SC. § 12111 et seq.; (2) Title V 

of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12203; (3) the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 

§ 701 et seq.; and (4) the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621

 3 There were also twenty John Does and twenty Jane Does included in the complaint. We 

will not discuss them because they are not at issue in this appeal and including them would 

unnecessarily complicate our account of the proceedings in the district court. 

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et seq. The fifth count brought claims against both the City and the Aflac

defendants under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(2)–(3), 1986, and 1988. It specifically 

asserted that, based on the filing of the W2s and the general administration of 

Stansel’s disability benefits, the City and the Aflac defendants had violated her 

federal rights. The sixth count alleged that the Aflac defendants had “violated both 

federal and state law” without specifying any federal or state laws. The seventh 

count alleged that the Aflac defendants had breached their duty of good faith and 

fair dealing.4

 The Aflac defendants opposed the motion to amend and filed a 

cross-motion to dismiss the claims against them.

The district court entered an order on August 29, 2013, denying Stansel’s 

motion for leave to amend and dismissing with prejudice her claims against the 

Aflac defendants. The court identified several reasons for its decision. Initially, it

explained that the third amended complaint was a shotgun pleading. See generally

Strategic Income Fund, L.L.C. v. Spear, Leeds & Kellogg Corp., 305 F.3d 1293, 

1295–96 (11th Cir. 2002). The court then explained why, for each of the three 

claims against the Aflac defendants, it would be futile to allow Stansel to amend 

her complaint. Regarding the claims under the federal civil rights statutes in the 

fifth count, the court noted that those statutes apply only where the plaintiff has 

 4 Stansel titled this count “Count VIII,” but her amended complaint skips from “Count VI” to 

“Count VIII.” So we will refer to this count as the seventh count.

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alleged state action, and that the Aflac defendants’ allegedly wrongful conduct did

not qualify as state action. See generally Focus on the Family v. Pinellas Suncoast 

Transit Auth., 344 F.3d 1263, 1276–77 (11th Cir. 2003). As for the sixth count, 

the court reiterated that it was a shotgun count that did not meet the requirements 

of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(b) and also noted that it did not meet the 

requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9 insofar as it alleged fraud. 

Finally, the court explained that the seventh count was fatally flawed because 

Stansel had conceded that the Aflac defendants had paid her short-term disability 

benefits, and a cause of action based on bad faith requires “the refusal to pay a loss 

covered by an insurance policy.”

In that same August 29 order, the district court ordered Stansel to file within 

twenty-one days an amended complaint against the City. She failed to file an 

amended complaint by that deadline. The City moved to dismiss the claims 

against it for failure to comply with the court’s order, and the court granted that

motion in February 2014. It deemed Stansel’s claims against the City to have been 

abandoned and dismissed them with prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 41.

II.

We review de novo the district court’s decisions to deny Stansel leave to 

amend her claims against the Aflac defendants due to futility, see Freeman v. First 

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Union Nat’l, 329 F.3d 1231, 1234 (11th Cir. 2003), and we review its decision to 

dismiss Stansel’s claims against the City only for an abuse of discretion, see Anago 

Franchising, Inc. v. Shaz, LLC, 677 F.3d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 2012) (reviewing 

dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2) only for an abuse of discretion). Because of the 

nature of the briefing in this case, we rely on two principles. First, de novo review 

permits this Court to affirm the district court’s judgment “based on any grounds 

supported by the record.” Akanthos Capital Mgmt., LLC v. Atlanticus Holdings 

Corp., 734 F.3d 1269, 1271 (11th Cir. 2013). Second, where the district court’s 

judgment rests on multiple grounds, and the “appellant fails to challenge properly 

on appeal one of the grounds on which the district court based its judgment, he is 

deemed to have abandoned any challenge of that ground, and it follows that the 

judgment is due to be affirmed.” Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 

678, 680 (11th Cir. 2014). We address in order the claims from the third amended 

complaint.

We begin with the five claims against the City, which were contained in the 

first five counts. Stansel does not make any specific arguments explaining how the 

district court abused its discretion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41 when 

it issued its February 14 order dismissing with prejudice those claims against the 

City. See id. at 681. We therefore affirm the judgment insofar as it dismissed

those claims. See id. at 680.

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Regarding the claim against the Aflac defendants in the fifth count, allowing 

amendment would have been futile because Stansel cannot establish one of the

essential elements of that claim. A claim under any of the federal civil rights 

statutes the fifth count cites requires the existence of an individual federal right. 

See Robertson v. Hecksel, 420 F.3d 1254, 1261 (11th Cir. 2005) (“[B]efore § 1983 

and § 1988 can come into play, the plaintiff must still establish the existence of a 

federal right.”); Trawinski v. United Techs., 313 F.3d 1295, 1299 (11th Cir. 2002) 

(“[A] claim under § 1985(3) requires the proof of . . . the violation of a serious 

constitutional right . . . .”); Park v. City of Atlanta, 120 F.3d 1157, 1159–60 (11th 

Cir. 1997) (“Section 1986 claims are . . . derivative of § 1985 violations.”). And 

Stansel offers no authority for the proposition that the right she asserts here — the 

right to have her W2s filed properly — is actually an individual federal right, much 

less a “serious constitutional right.” We therefore affirm the district court’s 

judgment insofar as it dismissed the claim against the Aflac defendants in the fifth 

count. 

The claim in the sixth count that the Aflac defendants had “violated both 

federal and state law” did not state a plausible claim for relief. Rather than attempt 

to describe the allegations that make up the sixth count, we will simply reproduce 

the relevant ones here:

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143. The heretofore-described conduct of both AFLAC Defendants 

constitutes vicarious liability of AFLAC, INC. for the torts of 

Aflac (aka Aflac U.S.) 

144. The heretofore-described conduct of both Defendants AFLAC 

created contractual rights and obligations created for AFLAC, 

INC. by the actions of Aflac (aka Aflac U.S.). 

145. The heretofore-described conduct of both Defendants AFLAC 

constitutes common law Agency and fraud. 

146. At all relevant times, all claims handling procedures, operations 

and initiatives, funding, and other aspects of conducting its 

supplemental accident/disability insurance business were 

independently prescribed, in a unitary and uniform fashion, by 

AFLAC, Inc. 

147. AFLAC, Inc. and Aflac (aka Aflac U.S)., individually and 

collectively, are, and at all relevant times have been, involved 

in the tortious and other acts described herein, affecting pro se

Plaintiff, one of its former policyholders.

None of those allegations identifies a specific action by the Aflac defendants that 

would give rise to a claim for relief. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 

S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must 

contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is 

plausible on its face.”) (quotation marks omitted). Nor do any of them indicate the 

possibility that Stansel could do so. The district court therefore did not err in 

concluding that it would have been futile for Stansel to file her amended sixth 

count.

Finally, we turn to the seventh count (which the complaint misnumbers as 

the eighth count). It claimed that the Aflac defendants acted in bad faith. Stansel 

never contests the district court’s determination that the claim is fatally flawed 

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because she has conceded that the Aflac defendants had paid her short-term 

disability benefits, and a bad faith action requires “the refusal to pay a loss covered 

by an insurance policy.” See Sapuppo, 739 F.3d at 680. We therefore agree with

the district court’s determination that amending the count would have been futile

and affirm that part of the judgment.

The argument section of Stansel’s opening brief raises three challenges to 

the district court’s order dismissing with prejudice her claims against the Aflac

defendants.

5

 Her first contention is a general allegation of error on the part of the 

district court. In Stansel’s words: 

The sum total of the district court’s legal errors and abuses of 

discretion alleged herein had the substantial prejudicial effect of 

forcing pro se appellant Stansel to accept an involuntary dismissal 

with prejudice . . . and final judgment . . . in this action in order to 

hasten her appeal in an effort to halt the incessant onslaught of judicial 

usurpation of power because it was very likely [to] recur.

That opening line is supported only by a page and a half that accuses the district 

court of committing various errors. Such a list of “conclusory assertions,” which 

“makes no argument and cites no authorities,” does not raise a cognizable issue on 

appeal. Sapuppo, 739 F.3d at 682.

 5 Stansel lists twenty-three issues in her opening brief, but discusses just three of them in the 

argument section of her brief. We need not address the twenty issues that are not developed in 

the argument section of her brief. See Sapuppo, 739 F.3d at 682 (explaining that “mentioning a 

claim in the summary of the argument section is not enough to raise the issue for appeal and that 

the claim is deemed abandoned”); Cole v. U.S. Atty. Gen., 712 F.3d 517, 530 (11th Cir. 2013) 

(holding that a party abandons an issue “[i]f the party mentions the issue only in his Statement of 

the Case but does not elaborate further in the Argument section”).

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Next, Stansel contends that the district court erred by permitting both of the

Aflac defendants to file the motion to dismiss because, at the time, Aflac, Inc. had 

been dismissed from the case and was not a party to the litigation. She argues that 

this was error because the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not permit 

nonparties to file motions. We need not delve into the merits of her argument 

because Stansel never explains how her substantial rights were affected by the 

court permitting Aflac, Inc. to join the motion to dismiss. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 61 

(providing that courts “must disregard all errors and defects that do not affect any 

party’s substantial rights”). The arguments against Stansel’s motion to amend 

would have been the same regardless of whether Aflac, Inc. signed onto the brief 

opposing her motion. So even if we assume that the court erred, it was harmless 

error and cannot be grounds for reversal. See Mut. Serv. Cas. Ins. Co. v. 

Henderson, 368 F.3d 1309, 1319 (11th Cir. 2004).

Finally, Stansel challenges the district court’s conclusion that the third 

amended complaint was a shotgun pleading. We need not address this argument

because we have already identified separate bases for the district court to dismiss 

every one of Stansel’s claims.

AFFIRMED.

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