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68–222 PDF 2011

S. HRG. 112–84 

ADMINISTRATION PRIORITIES FOR 

EUROPE IN THE 112TH CONGRESS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN AFFAIRS 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

MAY 18, 2011 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman

BARBARA BOXER, California 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., Pennsylvania 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

MIKE LEE, Utah 

FRANK G. LOWENSTEIN, Staff Director

KENNETH A. MYERS, JR., Republican Staff Director

——————

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire, Chairman

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., Pennsylvania 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina 

(II)

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Alexander, Hon. Paige E., Assistant Administrator for Europe and Eurasia, 

U.S. Agency for International Development, Washington, DC ........................ 14 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 16 

Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator James E. 

Risch ............................................................................................................... 37 

Gordon, Hon. Philip H., Assistant Secretary of State for Europe and Eurasian 

Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC ......................................... 8 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 10 

Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator James E. 

Risch ............................................................................................................... 34 

Shaheen, Hon. Jeanne, U.S. Senator from New Hampshire, opening statement ...................................................................................................................... 1 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 3 

(III)

(1) 

ADMINISTRATION PRIORITIES FOR EUROPE 

IN THE 112TH CONGRESS 

WEDNESDAY, MAY 18, 2011 

U.S. SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN AFFAIRS, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:47 p.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Jeanne Shaheen 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Shaheen and Cardin. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JEANNE SHAHEEN, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW HAMPSHIRE 

Senator SHAHEEN. Good afternoon, everyone. I apologize for 

being late. I can always count on a vote being called as soon as we 

have scheduled a hearing. So today was no exception. 

But I am pleased to be here. I expect that we may be joined by 

one or two other Senators. Ranking Member Barrasso is not going 

to be able to be here today. 

Today the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on European 

Affairs meets to discuss the state of transatlantic relations and to 

examine and assess the administration’s priorities for Europe and 

Eurasia in the coming years. 

Before we actually begin the hearing, I wanted to share some 

good news that we have gotten today. Just a few hours ago, we received reports that journalist, James Foley, and the three other 

journalists who were being held in captivity in Tripoli had been released. I am particularly excited about James Foley because he is 

a native of Rochester, NH. James had been covering the conflict in 

Tripoli for Global Post when he was captured and imprisoned in 

April. It is a relief to know that his release has been secured, and 

I am hopeful that he will soon be reunited with his family and 

friends. And I urge any and all parties to assist James in making 

sure that he gets home safe and sound. 

I spoke a few minutes ago with his mother, Diane, just to let her 

know how pleased we were to hear the news, and she had heard 

from her son earlier this morning and said that James is very 

excited to return home. 

I also want to just thank everyone who has helped secure his release from Libyan captivity. I know that our State Department has 

been working tirelessly on this effort, and that has been in spite 

of the challenges of communicating directly with the Libyan government. The State Department has done great work through our 

2 

allies and intermediaries to secure his release and that of his 

colleagues. 

I also want to thank the governments of Turkey and Hungary for 

all of the work they did on the ground in Tripoli to assist in this 

effort. Your embassies and staff have been extremely helpful in getting us information and assistance, and I am not sure if anyone is 

here from either Hungary or Turkey at this hearing, but thank you 

very much. Please relay our thanks to everybody in the Embassy. 

There are still several U.S. citizens being held prisoner by the 

government in Libya, and I urge the Qadhafi regime to release 

them as well. I know the State Department continues to work on 

their behalf. 

But again, today I am very grateful that James and the other 

journalists at least have been released, and I’m hopeful that they 

will soon be home with their families and friends. 

I do have a short statement that I would like to read for the 

record. 

This hearing will be our second hearing this year in what we 

hope will be an extremely active and constructive subcommittee 

agenda. We have two excellent witnesses this afternoon: Phil Gordon, the Assistant Secretary of State for Europe and Eurasia—we 

are delighted that you are here, Phil—and Paige Alexander, the 

Assistant Administrator for Europe and Eurasia, USAID. Very nice 

to have you here too, Paige. As you pointed out, this is your first 

opportunity to testify before the subcommittee. So thank you. 

I am also very pleased that we have a new ranking member, 

Senator John Barrasso from Wyoming. Even though he is not able 

to be here today, I look forward to working closely with him. 

I do want to recognize the many members of European foreign 

embassies who are here today. Thank you all for joining us. 

Too often in today’s media environment, we hear pundits decry 

the decline of the West or disparage the sustainability of the transatlantic partnership. I could not disagree more with those assessments. 

There is no doubt that we are facing one of the most uncertain 

security environments in recent history, and it is true that the 

daunting challenges facing the United States and Europe have 

grown much more complex since the fall of the Soviet Union. There 

is no doubt that the developing world has taken on new significance to world events. 

However, I think it is wrong to suggest that these shifting 

dynamics come at the expense of transatlantic influence. In fact, I 

would argue that this uncertain environment calls for an even 

stronger, more focused relationship across the Atlantic and more 

engagements with our allies, partners, and competitors throughout 

Europe and Eurasia. 

Europe remains America’s indispensable partner. We need 

Europe and Europe needs us. Nearly every challenge we face will 

require the U.S. and Europe to work hand in hand, whether we are 

navigating the global economic recovery or the ongoing Arab 

Spring. From climate change to the threats posed by Iran, international terrorism, or nuclear proliferation, America’s close partnership and coordination with Europe remains fundamental to U.S. 

security interests across a wide spectrum of challenges. 

3 

Yesterday I had the opportunity to meet with Catherine Ashton, 

the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs, to discuss a wide 

range of security issues. I always appreciate the opportunity to 

hear her insights and perspective. 

Next week, the President will make his eighth trip to Europe 

since his inauguration. He will travel to Ireland, the U.K., France, 

and Poland. The subcommittee looks forward to hearing some of 

the goals and objectives of this trip from our panelists today, as 

well as the administration’s engagement strategy moving forward. 

In addition, as the Congress has finally put fiscal year 2011 behind us, we will have a chance today to hear the administration’s 

budget plans for FY 2012. In an extremely tight fiscal environment, 

we need to ensure that our plans and strategies for engaging 

Europe and Eurasia are meeting our security interests in an effective and efficient way, and I look forward to hearing from the administration on some of its creative ideas and strategies for doing 

more with less. 

I do have a more extensive set of remarks that provides an outline of my views on the transatlantic agenda and lays out a brief 

summary of the subcommittee’s interests for the 112th Congress. 

But in the interest of time, I will submit it for the record and go 

ahead and introduce our panelists. 

Philip Gordon has served as Assistant Secretary of State for 

European and Eurasian Affairs at the State Department since May 

2009 and is a friend of this subcommittee, testifying on a number 

of occasions in the last Congress. He previously served as Director 

for European Affairs at the National Security Council and was at 

The Brookings Institution. 

Paige Alexander is the Assistant Administrator of the Bureau for 

Europe and Eurasia at the U.S. Agency for International Development. She has over 20 years’ experience working in international 

development both here in D.C. and in the field. 

We are happy to have you both here today and we look forward 

to your testimony, and I will ask you to begin, Mr. Gordon. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Shaheen follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JEANNE SHAHEEN, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW HAMPSHIRE

Good afternoon. Before we begin today, I wanted to share some initial good news. 

Just hours ago, we received reports that journalist James Foley—a Rochester, 

New Hampshire native—has been released from his imprisonment in Libya. James 

had been covering the conflict in Libya for GlobalPost when he was captured and 

imprisoned in Tripoli in April. 

It is a relief to know that his release has been secured. I remain hopeful that he 

will soon be reunited with family and friends, and I would urge any and all parties 

to assist James in making sure he gets home safe and sound. 

I just spoke minutes ago with his mother, Dianne, who heard from her son earlier 

this morning. She said that James is excited to come home. 

I am thankful to all those who have helped secure his release from Libyan captivity. Our State Department has been working tirelessly on this effort. Direct 

communication with Libya has been difficult, and the State Department has done 

great work through allies and intermediaries to secure the release of James and his 

colleagues. 

I would also like to thank the Governments of Turkey and Hungary for all of the 

work they did on the ground in Tripoli to assist this effort. Your embassies and staff 

have been extremely helpful in getting us information and assistance. 

4 

There are still several U.S. citizens being held prisoner by the Government in 

Libya. I urge the Qaddafi regime to release them as well, and I know the State 

Department continues to work on their behalf. 

But today I am grateful that James, at least, has been released and I remain 

hopeful that he will return home as soon and as safely as possible. 

Today, the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on European Affairs meets to 

discuss the state of transatlantic relations and to examine and assess the administration’s priorities for Europe and Eurasia in the coming years. This hearing will 

be our second hearing this year in what we hope will be an extremely active and 

constructive subcommittee agenda. 

We have an excellent panel of administration witnesses, including Phil Gordon, 

the Assistant Secretary of State for Europe and Eurasia, and Paige Alexander, the 

Assistant Administrator for Europe and Eurasia at USAID. 

I am also very pleased to be joined by our new subcommittee ranking member, 

Senator John Barrasso from Wyoming. I have worked closely with Senator Barrasso 

on a number of issues in the Senate, and I am really looking forward to his leadership on this subcommittee. 

I also want to recognize the many members of European foreign embassies here 

today. Thank you for joining us. 

Too often in today’s media environment, we hear pundits decry the decline of the 

West or disparage the sustainability of the transatlantic partnership. I could not 

disagree more with these inaccurate assessments. 

There is no doubt that we are facing one of the most uncertain security environments in recent history. It is true that the daunting challenges facing the United 

States and Europe have grown much more complex since the fall of the Soviet 

Union, and there is no doubt that the developing world has taken on new significance to world events. However, it is wrong to suggest that these shifting dynamics 

come at the expense of transatlantic influence. 

In fact, I would argue that this uncertain environment calls for an even stronger, 

more focused relationship across the Atlantic and more engagements with our allies, 

partners, and competitors throughout Europe and Eurasia. 

Europe remains America’s indispensible partner. We need Europe and Europe 

needs us. Nearly every challenge we face will require the United States and Europe 

to work hand in hand. Whether we are navigating the global economic recovery or 

the ongoing Arab Spring . . . From climate change to the threats posed by Iran, 

international terrorism, or nuclear proliferation . . . America’s close partnership 

and coordination with Europe remains fundamental to U.S. security interests across 

a wide spectrum of challenges. 

In addition, it would be wrong to underestimate the transatlantic influence in the 

international community. NATO still represents the most successful, most capable 

military alliance in the history of the world. Europe and the United States still 

make up more than 54 percent of world GDP and over 90 percent of global foreign 

exchange holdings. And, as the most open, transparent, and democratic societies in 

the world today, the United States and Europe still represent a model for citizens 

everywhere who support the rule of law and want their voices heard and their legitimate needs met. 

Yesterday, I had the opportunity to meet with Catherine Ashton, the EU’s High 

Representative for Foreign Affairs, to discuss a wide range of security issues. I 

always appreciate the opportunity to hear her insight and perspective. It is obvious 

from her travel and meeting schedule that she and the EU remain incredibly engaged on a number of pressing issues—including in Europe’s own backyard. 

Next week, the President will make his eighth trip to Europe since his inauguration. He will travel to Ireland, the United Kingdom, France, and Poland. He will 

also have the opportunity to meet with Russian President Medvedev on the sidelines 

of the G8 Summit in France. The subcommittee looks forward to hearing some of 

the goals and objectives of this trip, as well as the administration’s engagement 

strategy moving forward. 

In addition, as the Congress has finally put the fiscal year 2011 budget behind 

us, we will have a chance today to hear the administration’s budget plans for FY12. 

In an extremely tight fiscal environment, we need to ensure that our plans and 

strategies for engaging Europe and Eurasia are meeting our security interests in an 

effective and efficient way. I look forward to hearing from the administration on 

some of its creative ideas and strategies for doing more with less. 

Our discussion today will help provide a brief overview on a number of important 

transatlantic issues, including the ongoing debt crisis, next steps in United StatesRussian relations, U.S. engagement in the Caucasus and Southeast Europe and any 

remaining obstacles to a Europe that is whole, free, and at peace. 

5 

I have an extensive set of remarks that provides an outline of my views on the 

transatlantic agenda and lays out a brief summary of the subcommittee’s interests 

for the 112th Congress. In the interests of time, I will submit those remarks for the 

record and introduce our panelists. 

Philip Gordon has served as Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs at the State Department since May 2009 and is a friend of this subcommittee—testifying on a number of occasions in the last Congress. He previously 

served as Director for European Affairs at the National Security Council and for a 

long time at the Brookings Institution. 

Paige Alexander is the Assistant Administrator of the Bureau for Europe and 

Eurasia at the U.S. Agency for International Development. She has over 20 years 

experience working in international development—both here in D.C. and in the 

field. This is the first time we have had her before the subcommittee. Welcome. 

We are happy to have you both here today and look forward to your testimony. 

EXTENDED REMARKS (FOR THE RECORD) 

NATO

Despite the fall of the Soviet Union and the progress in forging a united Europe, 

NATO still remains fundamentally critical to transatlantic security interests around 

the globe. The alliance finds itself engaged in ‘‘out-of-area’’ military operations in 

Afghanistan and Libya, as well as taking on new challenges like missile defense, 

cyber security, energy security, piracy, counterterrorism, and proliferation. 

At the Lisbon summit in November 2010, NATO adopted a new Strategic Concept 

for the alliance, which more fully defines NATO’s role in today’s world. In the coming year, NATO will also undertake a new Defense and Deterrence Posture Review, 

which will attempt to answer some difficult questions on the future structure of 

NATO’s nuclear forces as well as its missile defense plans. 

Some challenges remain for NATO as we move forward. The issue of burdensharing remains a consistent area of concern for this subcommittee. Only three 

NATO countries met the defense spending targets of 2 percent of GDP in 2010. 

Declining European defense budgets could continue to undermine support and credibility for NATO and could lead to a two-tiered alliance. 

NATO and the European Union must do more to work together on transatlantic 

security issues. NATO enlargement and its open-door policy, which has served the 

alliance so well for so long, is now unfortunately a contentious issue. In addition, 

NATO’s proposed missile defense cooperation with Russia is an intriguing possibility, but the alliance should be under no illusion about the difficulty of this undertaking. 

TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMY

The value of U.S. economic ties with Europe cannot be overstated. The numbers 

speak for themselves. Our economies represent over 800 million people, 54 percent 

of world GDP, 75 percent of global financial services, and over 66 percent of foreign 

direct investment movement around the globe. However, like any partnership that 

wants to maintain its leadership in a rapidly changing global environment, we need 

to adapt to meet shifting realities. 

The ongoing financial and sovereign debt problems in Europe and sluggish recovery rates remain significant causes for concern on both sides of the atlantic. We will 

need to work together and learn from each others’ mistakes if we are to climb out 

of the economic and financial holes we find ourselves in. 

We should be doing more to try to harmonize differences in regulatory policies 

across the atlantic, which could lead to higher incomes, wages, exports and GDP in 

the United States and Europe. We should do a better job of utilizing cooperative efforts like the Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC) and incorporating high level 

buy-in from the U.S. Congress and the European Parliament. In addition, we need 

to do more to build a common approach to addressing third country markets, like 

India and China. 

As we move forward, I think it will be important to have a U.S. Congress that 

is more fully engaged on the transatlantic economic agenda. We should be doing 

more to work together with the European Union and the European Parliament. In 

the coming year, we will explore new ways to utilize this subcommittee in order to 

develop ties between the U.S. Senate and these two important European institutions. 

6 

RUSSIA

The Obama administration’s ‘‘reset’’ with Russia has been an attempt to move the 

relationship ‘‘from confrontation to cooperation.’’ Russia and the United States continue to share a wide range of mutual interests, including nuclear nonproliferation, 

arms control, cooperation on Iran, counterterrorism, Afghanistan, antipiracy and 

trade. 

The reset has led to some significant benefits for both countries, the region, and 

the world. The New START Treaty is perhaps the most high-profile success. Because of New START, the United States and Russia will have the fewest deployed 

warheads aimed at each other since the 1950s. 

We have seen the successful implementation of the Northern Distribution Network into Afghanistan through Russia, which becomes even more important as 

United States-Pakistan relations remain complex. We have also seen Russian cooperation on the threat posed by Iran, and other less high-profile joint efforts, like 

science and technology, space travel and the International Space Station, nuclear 

security, counterterrorism, health initiatives, and human trafficking. 

Despite all of this progress on areas of mutual interest, we need to remember that 

we disagree with the Russians on a number of critical security issues. The reset 

does not mean that we give up pressing the Russians on issues like the ongoing violation of Georgia’s territorial integrity, the development of human rights, democratic 

freedoms and the rule of law, or NATO enlargement. The real test of the sustainability of the reset will come in the next several years as we work with Russia on 

more difficult and complex issues and as we continue to emphasize that progress 

will not come at the expense of U.S. relations with allies and partners around the 

globe. 

CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

As relatively new, yet prominent members of NATO and the European Union, the 

majority of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have made impressive and 

rapid transitions to democratic rule since they first shed the authoritarian control 

of the former Soviet Union. 

Though a number of countries still struggle with corruption and rule of law 

issues, the countries in this region remain important allies for the United States. 

They were integral to the ratification of the New START Treaty, and they will be 

essential to any future missile defense plans. In addition, the impressive Visegrad4 effort of Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Poland demonstrates that 

Central Europe is prepared to be a leader in engaging the region’s eastern neighborhood. Finally, the unique experiences of this region in democratic transitions should 

provide some important lessons learned for the United States and our allies as we 

navigate the ongoing upheaval in the Middle East and North Africa. 

Belarus 

One of the major obstacles to a Europe that is whole, free, and at peace remains 

Belarus and its dictator Aleksandr Lukashenko. Following the highly disputed December elections, the repressive Lukashenko regime has once again revealed its true 

nature. Over the weekend, a Minsk court sentenced the runner-up in the Presidential elections to jail time for his role in the peaceful protests. Five Presidential 

candidates have been put on trial in connection with the demonstrations, and more 

than 20 opposition activists have been imprisoned. These convictions are politically 

motivated, and the United States and Europe should consider an expansion of sanctions against Belarus. This subcommittee stands behind the United States and 

Europe in calling for the release of all political prisoners immediately and without 

preconditions. 

Ukraine 

In its annual Freedom in the World report, Freedom House downgraded Ukraine 

from ‘‘Free’’ to ‘‘Partly Free’’ and warned of a country headed ‘‘down a path toward 

autocracy and kleptocracy.’’ Key opposition figures are now under investigation, and 

the U.S. Embassy in Kiev has raised concerns about selective prosecution of corruption cases. Ukraine is too important a country to let slide down this path. The goals 

and objectives of the Orange Revolution remain unfulfilled. The United States needs 

to stay more fully engaged with the Government in Ukraine as well as its stillvibrant civil society if we are to strengthen Ukraine’s democracy. America should 

press our EU partners to do the same. 

Moldova 

Moldova has made some impressive progress on democratic and political reform 

over the last few years. Vice President Biden’s historic trip to the country in March 

7 

demonstrates the U.S. commitment to Moldova. The United States should continue 

to strongly support the government’s reform agenda and assist the country in dealing with corruption and human trafficking within its borders. 

TURKEY

Turkey remains a valuable NATO ally with a predominantly Muslim population 

in a dangerous and geopolitically strategic region of the world. How we define our 

relationship with Turkey over the next decade will have significant repercussions 

for our long-term interests abroad. The recent events throughout the Middle East 

and North Africa have increased Turkey’s strategic importance as a center of power 

in this complex region. 

Turkey has been a constructive and influential ally for the United States in Iraq, 

Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Libya. If the United States is to meet the challenges posed 

by Iran’s nuclear program, the Middle East peace process, diversification of European energy resources, European missile defense, or ongoing disputes in Cyprus and 

in the Caucasus, America will need to have a constructive relationship with the 

Turkish people and its government. 

We should maintain strong support for a deep and robust bilateral relationship 

with Turkey and its continued integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions. It is also 

important to recognize where we have had our differences. The Turkish-Israeli relationship—so critical to stability in the region—is not as robust as it should be. The 

United States and Turkey also do not share the same threat assessment with respect to the danger of Iran’s nuclear program. Turkey’s vote against a fourth round 

of sanctions on Iran in the U.N. Security Council raised additional concerns. 

BALKANS

We’ve seen much progress in the Western Balkans, but we still have a lot of work 

to do if we are to fulfill the vision of a Southeast Europe fully integrated into the 

EU and NATO. It was only 15 years ago that the Dayton Peace Agreement brought 

an end to the war in Bosnia. Today, Slovenia is a thriving member of the European 

Union and NATO. Croatia, already a NATO member, is on the doorstep of EU membership. Montenegro has been recognized as a candidate for EU Membership. Serbia’s current government has shown impressive leadership in anchoring Belgrade’s 

future to the West. The trends are positive throughout the region, and many countries should be commended for their commitment to tackling political, economic, and 

military reforms. 

Bosnia 

Bosnia remains perhaps the most difficult challenge and a major obstacle to a 

Europe that is whole, free, and at peace. Despite the need for significant political 

and constitutional reforms, Bosnia’s politicians continue to use fear and division as 

a tool for consolidating political power. The international community has made 

strong efforts to help Bosnia with political reforms, and the Euro-Atlantic community made an important commitment by offering a conditioned NATO Membership 

Action Plan. Since the October 2010 elections, however, we have seen little progress 

in Bosnia, and the country remains without a government. In recent weeks, 

unconstructive calls for a referendum in Republika Srpska have led to reports of the 

worst crisis since the Dayton agreement in 1995. If we want to keep Bosnia from 

falling behind, we will need creative new ideas and stronger regional support on an 

active political reform agenda. 

Kosovo-Serbia 

Another critical challenge for the region is the situation between Kosovo and Serbia. There is no question that the dream of a united Europe will not be realized 

without Serbia. To its great credit, the leadership in Belgrade has demonstrated 

their commitment to western institutions and has made EU membership its top foreign policy priority. Earlier this year, Kosovo and Serbia engaged in direct EUbrokered talks on technical issues. This is an important step, and both countries 

should be commended for the courageous decision. Such discussions will be necessary to eventually pave the way for a more creative, pragmatic, and sustainable 

solution that best protects and improves the lives of all ethnicities throughout the 

region. This is a critical opportunity for the people of Kosovo and Serbia to begin 

to turn the page on a troubled and divisive past and start a new chapter in their 

shared history. 

8 

CAUCASUS

As an important corridor for energy transit into Europe, the South Caucasus is 

an incredibly important geo-strategic region to American interests, and we should 

work to ensure deeper, more robust U.S. relations with Azerbaijan, Armenia, and 

Georgia. The region continues to struggle with the conflict over Nagorno Karabakh, 

and U.S. influence—under the auspices of the Minsk Group—will be key to a peaceful and sustainable resolution that turns the page on the violence of the past. In 

addition, the United States has an interest in helping the region to achieve a more 

free, transparent, and democratic environment, and we should deepen our support 

for media freedom and political reforms in these countries. Long-term peace and stability in this strategically important region is vital to American economic, security, 

and diplomatic interests. 

Georgia 

Georgia remains a critical U.S. ally in a tough and important neighborhood. It has 

been nearly 3 years since war broke out in South Ossetia and the Russian invasion, 

yet Russia still remains in violation of Georgia’s territorial integrity. The United 

States should continue to strongly support Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and to reject any claims of spheres of influence in the region. Georgia has 

made an impressive military commitment to the NATO fight in Afghanistan, and 

the United States should support a robust defense relationship with the country. In 

addition, it has made notable progress on rule of law issues and corruption. The 

United States will need to continue to help Georgia continue down the reform path 

if it is to strengthen its democracy, economy, and its vibrant civil society. 

STATEMENT OF HON. PHILIP H. GORDON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EUROPE AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS, 

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. GORDON. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. It really 

is a pleasure to be back before this committee, and I look forward 

to the opportunity to talk about our priorities in Europe and Eurasia for the coming year. 

Let me also begin by applauding the good news that you began 

with about the captured journalists’ release and also to second our 

thanks to the governments of Hungary and Turkey who have both 

helped us on a number of occasions in Libya looking after our interests and working on freeing captive journalists. So we join you 

in thanking them very sincerely. 

I have also submitted a longer testimony for the record. So with 

your permission, I will just make a few opening remarks on our 

priorities. 

And I will begin by underscoring that our engagement with 

Europe really begins with the notion that the United States faces— 

and I think, Madam Chairman, you used this expression yourself— 

a daunting international agenda. And our view is we cannot 

possibly deal with that agenda alone. As we look to meet those 

challenges, we have no better partner than Europe where we work 

with democratic, prosperous, militarily capable allies who share our 

values and our interests. 

To take just the most recent example in the case of Libya, it was 

to Europe and to NATO that the United States instinctively 

reached out to as a partner in this critical mission. As President 

Obama put it most recently, Europe is the ‘‘cornerstone of our 

engagement with the world.’’ 

There are three basic objectives that stand out when we think 

about our relationship with Europe, very briefly. 

The first is we work with Europe as a partner in meeting these 

global challenges. No matter what the issue is, whether it is the 

9 

war in Afghanistan, the Iranian nuclear challenge, or the most 

recent operation in Libya, Europe is a critical partner. 

Second, we are still working with Europe on Europe, that is to 

say working to complete the historic project of helping to extend 

stability, security, prosperity, and democracy to the entire continent. Our work in promoting European integration is not done, 

and the effort continues in the Balkans, in Europe’s east, and in 

the Caucasus. 

Finally, we have sought to set relations with Russia on a more 

constructive course. Our goal has been to cooperate with Russia 

where we have common interests—and we have many—but not at 

the expense of our principles or our friends. 

And I think looking back on the past 2 years, the first 2 of this 

administration, we can point to significant progress in each area. 

When it comes to working with Europe on global challenges, we 

have pulled together, as never before, with our partners, and I will 

give you just a few specific examples. In Afghanistan, European 

nations now have almost 40,000 troops, and the total European 

financial contribution to Afghanistan since 2001 comes to $14 billion. 

On Iran, we have maintained unity in our efforts to engage and 

have, at the same time, seen the strongest-ever set of sanctions 

adopted by the U.N. Security Council and an even more robust set 

of follow-on sanctions adopted by the European Union. 

On missile defense, NATO allies have decided to develop a missile defense capability that will provide full coverage and protection 

from ballistic missile threats for all NATO European territory, population, and forces. 

Finally, in Libya, we consulted and cooperated very closely with 

our European allies to pass the U.N. Security Council resolutions 

1970 and 1973, and then NATO took over enforcement of Resolution 1973 on March 31. Now Europe has over 7,000 personnel in 

Operation Unified Protector, over 200 aircraft, and 20 naval ships. 

In the second area, extending the European zone of peace, prosperity, and democracy, we have had some important successes but, 

obviously, some important challenges remain. 

In the Balkans, the United States—and I think I can say the 

European—view is that Europe will not be complete until all of the 

countries of the Western Balkans are full EU members. On all regional issues, including on the dialogue between Serbia and 

Kosovo, on the future of Bosnia, and on Croatia’s path to the European Union, we have consulted closely with Europe. 

In recent days, we stood together to oppose illegal measures 

taken by Republika Srpska that would undermine the Dayton 

Peace Agreement, which we believe must remain the framework for 

governance and the basis for reforms to enable Bosnia and 

Herzegovina to achieve its Euro-Atlantic aspirations. 

Another recent example is Belarus where we had, with the European Union, a joint response to the recent arrests and sentencing 

of Presidential candidates and others, and together we made very 

clear that our relationship with Belarus cannot improve so long as 

the repression of civil society, opposition, and independent media 

continue. 

10 

In the Caucasus, our efforts with the European Union and the 

region have resulted in progress, but disputes over territory and in 

some cases the need for further political and economic reform remain serious obstacles. In Georgia, steadfast engagement and generous assistance have aided in transforming Georgia into an aspiring democracy and important partner to NATO in Afghanistan. 

Together we will maintain our support for Georgia’s territorial integrity and sovereignty within its internationally recognized 

borders. 

Finally, Madam Chairman, we believe that our reset with Russia 

has paid significant dividends. Challenges remain but we think the 

results already speak for themselves. We have concluded a new 

START treaty which will significantly reduce the number of 

nuclear weapons and launchers deployed by the United States and 

Russia, while also putting in place a strong verification regime. 

We signed an agreement for the transit of troops and materiel 

across Russia that has allowed for more than 1,000 flights, carrying 170,000 U.S. military personnel en route to Afghanistan. 

We have secured Russia’s cooperation in dealing with Iran’s and 

North Korea’s nuclear programs. 

And we have done all of this without compromising our principles—in particular, our steadfast commitment and respect for 

human values and human rights and the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all the nations of Europe. 

Clearly there is much work that remains to be done on all of 

these issues and while none of them is easy, particularly at a time 

of budgetary austerity, I am confident that the partnership between the United States and Europe, which has achieved so much 

in the last 60 years, will continue to achieve great things in the 

years and decades to come. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gordon follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE PHILIP H. GORDON

Chairman Shaheen, Ranking Member Barrasso, members of the committee, 

watching the wave of democracy protests in the Arab world reminds us inevitably 

of the last time dictatorships across an entire region suddenly shook and collapsed 

under the weight of the people’s desire for freedom. In 1989, Europe changed suddenly and immeasurably. Because of those events and because of the wise bipartisan policies in the years that followed, Europe, and our relationship with Europe, 

has changed vastly in the last 20 years. In those days, the major preoccupation in 

the transatlantic relationship was the defense of Europe against the Soviet threat. 

Today, Europe is almost fully democratic, largely unified, and is America’s essential 

global partner. When the Libya crisis erupted, for example, we worked closely with 

our European allies to pass UNSCRs 1970 and 1973, and we looked to NATO to 

lead the effort to enforce the no-fly zone and arms embargo and to protect civilians. 

Beyond Libya, the United States and Europe work together on an extraordinarily 

wide range of issues, from Afghanistan to Iran to the tumultuous events in North 

Africa and the Middle East. On both sides of the Atlantic we are working hard to 

recover from the worst financial crisis since The Great Depression. Because our 

economies are intertwined, and we are working together so closely on problems 

around the globe, policy decisions taken in Europe to address the Eurozone crisis 

will have an impact here in the United States. There is a common thread that runs 

through all our engagement with Europe: United States-European cooperation is 

and remains essential to achieving our strategic objectives. 

Our engagement with Europe begins with the idea that the United States faces 

a daunting international agenda and that our ability to deal with it is immeasurably 

increased by working with strong allies and partners. In meeting these challenges, 

we have no better partner than Europe, where we work with democratic, prosVerDate Nov 24 2008 20:45 Sep 15, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARING FILES\112TH CONGRESS, 1ST\2011 ISSUE TEXT HEARINGS\051811-T.TXT
11 

perous, militarily capable allies who share our values and share our interests. In 

the words of President Obama, Europe is ‘‘the cornerstone of our engagement with 

the world.’’ 

To help you understand the breadth and depth of that engagement, I’ll describe 

the strategic objectives that drive our approach toward Europe. Then, I’d like to 

offer you an assessment of our record over the past 2 years on these objectives. 

When I think about this administration’s priorities in Europe, there are three 

basic objectives that stand out in our engagement with the continent: 

1. First, we work with Europe as a partner in meeting global challenges. On every 

issue of global importance, Europe’s contributions are crucial to solving major international challenges. No matter what the issue is—from the war in Afghanistan, to 

the Iranian nuclear challenge, to the new operation in Libya—Europe is indispensable. We are vastly stronger—in terms of legitimacy, resources, and ideas—when 

we join forces with Europe on the global agenda. 

2. Second, we are still working with Europe on Europe, that is to say working 

to complete the historic project of helping to extend stability, security, prosperity 

and democracy to the entire continent. The extraordinary success that the United 

States and Europe have had together in promoting European integration, in consolidating and supporting the new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe and 

integrating them into Euro-Atlantic institutions demonstrates the promise of this 

enterprise. But our work is not done. And so the effort continues in the Balkans, 

in Europe’s east, and in the Caucasus. 

3. Finally, we have sought to set relations with Russia on a more constructive 

course. President Obama recognized that he had inherited a relationship that was 

in a difficult place and that this situation did not serve the interests of the United 

States. Therefore, our goal has been to cooperate with Russia where we have common interests, but not at the expense of our principles or our friends. As such, 

where we have concerns, such as on Russia’s human rights record, or on Georgia, 

we will continue to raise concerns with government and foster connections with civil 

society. 

Looking back on the past 2 years, we can point to significant progress in each area. First, we have worked together as never before with our European partners on 

global issues, including Afghanistan, Iran, missile defense, and the momentous developments in North Africa and the Middle East. Specifically: 

• In Afghanistan, following the President’s West Point speech in November 2009, 

Europe contributed about 7,000 additional troops, over 100 training teams for 

the Afghan Army and police, and nearly $300 million for the Afghan National 

Army trust fund. European nations now have almost 40,000 troops in Afghanistan and the total European contribution to Afghanistan since 2001 comes to 

over $14 billion. • On Iran, we maintained unity in our efforts to engage, and we have at the same 

time seen the strongest-ever set of sanctions adopted by the U.N. Security 

Council and an even more robust set of follow-on sanctions adopted by the European Union. These additional measures taken by the EU cover a variety of 

areas critical to the regime including trade, finance, banking and insurance, 

transport, and the gas and oil sectors, in addition to new visa bans and asset 

freezes. These steps have raised the price of Iran’s failure to meet its obligations 

and we hope will serve to bring them back to the negotiating table. • On Missile Defense, NATO allies recognized at the Lisbon summit in November 

2010 that the defense of Europe can no longer be achieved just by tanks or 

bombers. Now, we need defenses against a new and grave set of threats, in particular ballistic missiles in the hands of dangerous regimes. Our aim as an alliance is to develop a missile defense capability that will provide full coverage 

and protection from ballistic missile threats for all NATO European territory, 

populations, and forces. This capability will be a tangible expression of NATO’s 

core mission of collective defense. At the summit, allies also welcomed the U.S. 

missile defense system in Europe, known as the European Phased Adaptive 

Approach, as a valuable national contribution to the overall effort, and we hope 

to see additional voluntary contributions from other allies. We are now exploring further ways to cooperate with Russia on missile defense, without in any 

way prejudicing NATO’s ability to independently defend its territory from missile threats. 

• In Libya, we consulted and cooperated closely with our European allies to pass 

UNSCRs 1970 and 1973, which levied sanctions against the Qadhafi regime, established a no-fly zone over Libya, and gave us the authority to protect Libyan 

civilians from the regime’s attacks. NATO took over enforcement of UNSCR 

1973 on March 31 and now has over 7,000 personnel in Operation Unified ProVerDate Nov 24 2008 20:45 Sep 15, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARING FILES\112TH CONGRESS, 1ST\2011 ISSUE TEXT HEARINGS\051811-T.TXT
12 

tector, over 200 aircraft and 20 ships. OUP has maintained a consistently high 

operational tempo across a vast country. NATO has flown over 6,000 sorties— 

almost half of them strike sorties—and hit hundreds of critical targets. And this 

is primarily a European operation. Over 60 percent of the aircraft come from 

our allies and our partners, including from the region. All 20 naval ships are 

contributed by Canada and European allies. 

In the second area, extending the European zone of peace, prosperity, and democracy, we have had some important successes, but equally important challenges remain. As I said at the outset, the work of ‘‘completing’’ Europe is not finished. What 

I think is most notable about our current efforts under the Obama administration 

is how closely—as part of a deliberate strategy—we are working together with 

Europe to achieve this goal. 

Take, for instance, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia. 

These are the countries of the EU’s Eastern Partnership, an initiative that the 

United States strongly supports and works with to advance democracy, stability, 

and security in this part of the world. We share with our European counterparts 

a similar approach to these countries because of our common goals. As the situation 

has deteriorated in Belarus, including with the conviction of former Presidential 

candidate Sannikov, we have coordinated very closely with the EU including on possible additional sanctions. 

The same can be said of the Balkans: the U.S. and European view is that Europe 

will not be complete until all of the countries of the Western Balkans are full EU 

members. On the dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo, on the future of Bosnia, on 

Croatia’s path to the EU, we have consulted closely with Europe. We also welcomed 

Albania and Croatia into NATO, extended Membership Action Plans to Bosnia and 

Montenegro, and Macedonia will join once the dispute over its name is resolved. 

This degree of accord on the Balkans is the foundation of our success—we work together every step of the way. The intensive joint diplomacy of recent months has 

shown how closely our visions are aligned, something which is essential for progress 

in the region. 

U.S. and European unity is particularly critical in Bosnia, where nationalist politicians are irresponsibly challenging the very core of the Dayton Accords and threatening the functioning and integrity of the Bosnian state. Bosnian leaders are often 

privileging their own interests above their populations. Bosnia cannot take its rightful place in Europe unless it has a state functional enough to meet NATO and EU 

accession requirements. We are, together with our European allies, committed to 

helping Bosnia meet those requirements. 

Another example of the decisive impact that United States-European cooperation 

can have in the region is our joint response to events in Belarus. The Government 

of Belarus’s crackdown on civil society and the opposition following the flawed election in December has been sharply condemned on both sides of the Atlantic. We 

have made very clear that our relationship with Belarus cannot improve in the context of continued repression of civil society, the opposition, and independent media. 

The United States and the EU have called for the immediate and unconditional release of all detainees and an end to the continue human rights violations against 

critics of the government. We consider the five Presidential candidates and other 

democratic activists who are being tried after being arrested in conjunction with the 

December 19 Presidential election to be political prisoners; the latest convictions 

and ongoing trials are clearly politically motivated. Both we and Europe have targeted measures against those officials responsible for the crackdown even as we and 

Europe support the aspirations of the people of Belarus for a modern open society. 

To that end, the United States is providing an additional $4 million in democracyrelated assistance to help Belarusians create space for the free expression of political views, the development of a civil society, freedom of the media, and empowerment of independent entrepreneurs. Both we and Europe want a better, more 

productive relationship with Belarus; unfortunately, the country’s leadership is following a policy that will only further isolate Belarus and its people. 

Turning to the Caucasus, our joint efforts with the European Union and other 

international partners in the region have resulted in progress, but disputes over territory and a need for further meaningful political and economic reforms remain serious obstacles to greater stability. In Georgia, our steadfast engagement and generous assistance have aided in transforming Georgia into an aspiring democracy and 

important partner to NATO in Afghanistan. Together with our European partners, 

we will maintain our support for Georgia’s territorial integrity and sovereignty within its internationally recognized borders and will continue to support international 

efforts to find a peaceful resolution to the dispute over Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 

Elsewhere in the region, we will continue to press for democratic reforms and an 

opening of the political space such that human rights and fundamental freedoms are 

13 

fully respected, to encourage normalization between Turkey and Armenia, and to increase our engagement through the Minsk Group with Russia and France to help 

Armenia and Azerbaijan find a peaceful settlement to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. In that regard, we strongly believe that the time has come to finalize and endorse the Basic Principles and move to the drafting of a peace agreement. We believe that the United States and Europe must work together to avoid further conflict 

in Europe and help the countries in the region move toward democracy, peace, and 

greater prosperity. 

Our foreign assistance investments remain an important instrument in advancing 

the European zone of peace, prosperity, and democracy. There have been reductions 

to the region’s assistance budget in the administration’s FY 2012 request. They are 

the result of the achievement of some assistance goals in the region and of the particularly difficult budget climate in which we find ourselves. In future decisions on 

resource allocations, we will continue to take account of vital long-term U.S. interests in this region. 

Finally, what has arguably been the most challenging part of our European 

agenda—our reset with Russia—has paid significant dividends. Challenges remain. 

However, we can now say that our engagement with Russia can help with America’s 

security and our global priorities. The results speak for themselves: 

• Most significantly, we have concluded a New START treaty and following the 

recent approval by both Congress and the Russian State Duma, it has entered 

into force. The agreement is the most comprehensive arms control agreement 

in nearly two decades and significantly reduces the number of nuclear weapons 

and launchers deployed by the United States and Russia while also putting in 

place a strong verification regime. 

• We signed an agreement for the transit of troops and materiel across Russia 

in support of efforts in Afghanistan. Under our bilateral agreements, more than 

1,100 flights carrying over 170,000 U.S. military personnel have transited Russia en route to Afghanistan. Under a NATO-Russia agreement, nearly 27,000 

containers have transited Russia for use in Afghanistan. At this time, 50 percent of U.S. sustainment cargo for Afghanistan goes through the Northern Distribution Network and 60 percent of supplies transiting that network go 

through Russia. This is a significant benefit for the United States. 

• We have secured cooperation with Russia on Iran and North Korea’s nuclear 

programs, both in terms of U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1929 and 1874 

respectively, and Russia’s decision to cancel a contract for the delivery of the 

S–300 air defense system to Iran. 

We have done all of this without compromising our principles—in particular our 

steadfast commitment to respect for universal values, the sovereignty, and territorial integrity of all of the nations of Europe. We firmly believe that the security 

and prosperity of Europe also rests in adhering to commitments to advance human 

rights and democracy. Where human rights problems exist, we will continue to 

speak out and strongly support the rights of Russian citizens and others throughout 

the region to peacefully exercise freedom of expression and assembly as guaranteed 

under the constitution and enshrined in the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human 

Rights and the Helsinki accords. 

And thanks to the work of the Bilateral Presidential Commission and its 18 working groups, our engagement with Russian society is paying important dividends as 

well. Polling now indicates 60 percent of Russians have a positive view of the United 

States, a figure not seen in nearly a decade. 

This brief overview of the U.S. agenda with Europe demonstrates that we work 

together closely with Europe on nearly every major issue, both internationally and 

within Europe. Whether the issue is promoting democracy in Europe’s east or south, 

advancing energy security for the whole continent, or contributing to the NATO 

effort to secure Afghanistan, the energy, ideas, and commitment of Europe is something we look to and rely upon in pursuing our common goals. 

As you can see, our transatlantic partners have been very busy. But appropriately 

so—we have an extremely full United States-Europe agenda because we have so 

many pressing challenges in the world today, and close transatlantic cooperation is 

the indispensable starting point in addressing all of them. 

There is much work to be done to translate this agenda into concrete steps toward 

the security and prosperity of both Europe and the United States. This is not easy, 

particularly at a time of budgetary austerity all across the industrialized world. We 

will have to adapt creatively to this new reality by finding ways to make our collective defense spending smarter and more efficient. We will need to reform NATO and 

streamline its operations, as we and our NATO allies pledged in the recent NATO 

Strategic Concept. We will have to find ways to advance NATO–EU cooperation so 

14 

that the full resources of both institutions can be harnessed most effectively. We 

must continue to build on the momentum of the OSCE Astana summit last December to reinvigorate efforts to ensure comprehensive security in Europe. We have to 

create a more seamless and market-based flow of energy into Europe and within 

Europe. If we can do these things, I am confident that the partnership between the 

United States and Europe—which has achieved so much in the last 60 years—will 

achieve even greater things in the decades to come. 

With that, I look forward to your questions. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Ms. Alexander. 

STATEMENT OF HON. PAIGE E. ALEXANDER, ASSISTANT 

ADMINISTRATOR FOR EUROPE AND EURASIA, U.S. AGENCY 

FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, WASHINGTON, DC 

Ms. ALEXANDER. Chairwoman Shaheen, thank you for inviting 

me to appear before you today. I appreciate the opportunity to discuss USAID’s development priorities in Europe and Eurasia as we 

aim to achieve a Europe that is whole, free, and at peace. The President has requested just under $535 million for fiscal 

year 2012 to build upon the momentum for reform, seek to entrench the stability, and address key challenges that inhibit the 

full democratic and economic transitions in the region. 

We have five primary goals in Europe and Eurasia. 

First, we seek to address the most difficult challenges to democracy and human rights. As Phil has mentioned, the recent example 

of the government crackdown in Belarus on independent parties, 

civic groups, and media. 

Second, AID’s programs aim to enhance stability in the Caucasus 

through assistance for economic growth and democracy. In Georgia, 

our priority is to build on post-conflict gains by assisting the reform-minded administration to entrench democratic, economic, and 

social reforms. 

Third, we are assisting countries in South Central Europe to 

reach their goal of Euro-Atlantic integration by improving economic 

opportunities, strengthening viable democratic institutions and accountable governance, and promoting tolerance and reconciliation. 

Fourth, we are promoting new cooperation with Russia to address development challenges, such as our joint efforts to eradicate 

polio, while continuing to support the development of a more robust 

and resilient civil society, the strengthening of democratic institutions and processes, and the protection and promotion of human 

rights. 

Finally, USAID programs are promoting democratic and economic reform in Ukraine and supporting Moldova’s progress toward 

European integration by strengthening democratic institutions and 

promoting economic growth. 

Twenty years of USAID engagement in Europe and Eurasia have 

produced sustainable democratic and economic transitions in 11 out 

of the 24 countries where assistance originally was received. Seventeen countries have joined WTO, 10 have acceded to the EU, and 

12 have joined NATO. Once our opponents in the cold war, the 

former Eastern Bloc countries that have graduated from USAID 

assistance, are now among the strongest supporters of U.S. foreign 

policy objectives. 

USAID ensures that Europe’s poorest citizens have the tools to 

thrive. By strengthening civil society and increasing government 

15 

accountability, defending universal values, enhancing energy independence and security, our programs have helped to promote 

broad-based economic growth to create the American markets of 

tomorrow. 

The U.S. assistance helps to prevent the spread of HIV/AIDS in 

the only region in the world where the prevalence is increasing. 

We seek to uphold universal values in a region that still counts 

some of the world’s least democratic states as its members and promotes economic growth in all countries like Kosovo where unemployment rates among youth reach over 50 percent and where 30 

percent of the population lives below the poverty line. 

We are confident that the resources the United States invests in 

this region will continue to provide a strong return on that investment and help to achieve our core policy objectives. By building 

sustainable partnerships and addressing key development challenges, U.S. assistance prevents instability and fosters emerging 

markets in this region. 

Recognizing the tight budget environment, success in key areas, 

and a need to fund other global priorities, the President’s budget 

proposes a significant savings from the Europe and Eurasia region. 

AID will work with increased efficiency and creativity to address 

these key challenges and advance democratic and economic transitions in this region. 

AID is fundamentally transforming the way that we work by 

strategically realigning Foreign Service officer positions, empowering local staff, increasing reliance on cost-effective D.C.-based 

staff, restructuring our field presence, and ending AID funding 

assistance programs in Montenegro, a middle-income country that 

is on a sustainable path to becoming a fully democratic, marketbased economy. 

Through USAID Forward reforms, we are redoubling our efforts 

to increase donor coordination, enhance sustainability through local 

partnerships and capacity-building, and use science and technology 

to leapfrog global development challenges. After 20 years in this region, we can share lessons learned from our experiences with transitions, better utilize our talented human resources, and better 

measure our progress along the development continuum. 

To further improve efficiency and effectiveness to meet continuing challenges, we are leveraging funding to maximize the impact achieved with every American tax dollar spent in Europe and 

Eurasia. We are partnering with international donors, host countries, and the private sector to amplify our results and achieve 

positive development outcomes. 

Each of these partnerships with local institutions builds sustainability so that our assistance continues to achieve results beyond 

our presence. It improves the effectiveness of our programs and it 

enhances the endurance of these alliances. 

I look forward to working with you as we transform the way that 

we work to advance U.S. interests by meeting the 21st century 

development challenges and building strong partnerships for the 

future with stable, sustainable, market-oriented democracies in 

Europe and Eurasia. 

Thank you for your leadership in making sure that Europe 

remains fully engaged on Europe. 

16 

And I welcome any questions from the committee. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Alexander follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR PAIGE E. ALEXANDER

Chairwoman Shaheen, Senator Barrasso, and members of the subcommittee, 

thank you for inviting me to appear before you today. I appreciate the opportunity 

to discuss USAID’s priorities in Europe and Eurasia, our successes, and the region’s 

persistent development challenges in a period of declining U.S. assistance resources. 

The President’s fiscal year 2012 budget request for Europe and Eurasia builds on 

momentum for reform, seeks to entrench stability, and addresses key challenges 

that inhibit the full democratic and economic transitions of the region. To accomplish these objectives, the President’s request includes $513.9 million for Assistance 

to Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia; $14.5 million for Global Health and Child 

Survival (USAID); and $6 million for the Economic Support Fund. 

Our primary goals are to: 

• Address the most difficult challenges to democracy and human rights—for example, the recent government crackdown on independent political parties, civic 

groups, and media in Belarus. With the $4 million U.S. Government pledge at 

the Warsaw donors’ conference in February 2011, we will increase support to 

Belarusian civil society leaders, democratic activists, human rights defenders, 

independent media, and entrepreneurs to promote a freer, more open, and pluralistic society. 

• Enhance stability in the Caucasus through assistance for economic growth and 

democracy. In Georgia, our priority is to build on post-conflict gains by assisting 

the reform-minded administration to entrench economic and social reforms and 

to promote further political liberalization and democratic consolidation. Our assistance has gone to internally displaced persons (IDPs) and families and prevented a new wave of IDPs, improved education and health care in rural and 

urban centers, improved transparency in media ownership, improved electoral 

processes, and enhanced energy security. 

• Help countries in South Central Europe reach their goal of Euro-Atlantic 

integration, by improving economic opportunities, strengthening viable democratic institutions and accountable governance, and promoting tolerance and 

reconciliation. 

• Promote new cooperation with Russia to address challenges that pose a global 

threat, such as our joint efforts to eradicate polio, while continuing to support 

the development of a more robust and resilient civil society, the strengthening 

of democratic institutions and processes, and the protection and promotion of 

human rights. 

• Promote democratic and economic reform in Ukraine. 

• And support Moldova’s progress toward European integration. 

We are confident that the resources the United States invests in this region will 

continue to provide a strong return on investment and help achieve our core policy 

objectives. 

Twenty years of USAID engagement in Europe and Eurasia have produced sustainable democratic and economic transitions in 11 of the 24 countries that originally received our assistance. Seventeen countries have joined the World Trade 

Organization; 10 have acceded to the European Union; and 12 have joined the North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization. Once our opponents in the cold war, the former Eastern Bloc states that have graduated from USAID assistance are now among the 

strongest supporters of U.S. foreign policy objectives. 

Our experiences, successes, and lessons learned through the social, political, and 

economic transitions of European and Eurasian countries are particularly relevant 

as the Middle East faces democratic transitions of its own. We have learned that 

these transitions are neither quick nor smooth—they require time and continued 

commitment. Democracy cannot be created overnight nor can democratic principles 

become adopted throughout the region in just a few years. 

In Europe and Eurasia, we are advancing these transitions by actively building 

sustainable partnerships and addressing key challenges that further U.S. national 

security and economic interests. USAID assistance prevents instability and fosters 

emerging markets. We have seen that the ability of other countries to weather 

global economic crises directly affects U.S. economic stability in a globalized market. 

An authoritarian regime that does not enjoy democratic legitimacy is ultimately 

prone to instability and political upheaval. An individual carrying multidrug resistant TB has the potential to infect Americans both here and abroad. High unemployVerDate Nov 24 2008 20:45 Sep 15, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARING FILES\112TH CONGRESS, 1ST\2011 ISSUE TEXT HEARINGS\051811-T.TXT
17 

ment, sharp ethnic divisions, frozen conflicts, and spreading epidemics pose significant development challenges in Europe and Eurasia. 

Assistance from the American people combats the spread of HIV and AIDS in the 

Europe and Eurasia region, the only region in the world where HIV prevalence is 

increasing—with an estimated 130,000 new cases in 2009 alone. 

Assistance from the American people advances government accountability, confronts democratic backsliding, and upholds universal rights in a region that still 

counts some of the world’s least democratic states as its members. 

Assistance from the American people supports human rights activists and 

strengthens civil society to defend those who peacefully advocate for increased liberties and accountability. This support is still vitally needed. The case of Natalya 

Estemirova, a journalist who was abducted and killed while reporting on human 

rights in the North Caucasus, shows why. 

Assistance from the American people promotes entrepreneurship and helps to 

combat poverty, critical factors in countries such as Kosovo, where unemployment 

rates among youth reach over 50 percent and where 30 percent of the population 

lives below the poverty line, thereby threatening stability in the region. 

Assistance from the American people seeks to protect victims of human trafficking 

in the region of the world where it is growing the fastest, indeed where an estimated 175,000 to 500,000 people are trafficked annually. 

USAID ensures that Europe’s poorest citizens have the tools to maintain social 

and economic stability and stem global disease threats through core investments in 

health and education. 

USAID works to bolster government accountability by strengthening civil society, 

supporting free and independent media, increasing transparency, and defending universal values. 

USAID enhances global energy independence and security by diversifying resources and fostering new distribution networks to link markets together. 

USAID assistance is aimed at creating the American markets of tomorrow by 

building local entrepreneurship and innovation and strengthening rule of law, public 

institutions, and investment environments. 

Recognizing the tight budget environment, successes in key areas, and a need to 

fund other global priorities, the President’s budget proposes significant savings from 

the Europe and Eurasia region. Compared to FY 2010 enacted levels, the request 

reduces funding for Europe and Eurasia by $97 million (16 percent) for AEECA and 

$27 million (82 percent) for the Economic Support Fund. 

We will work with increased efficiency and creativity to address these key challenges and advance the democratic and economic transitions of the region. We are 

fundamentally transforming the way that we work by strategically realigning our 

Foreign Service officer positions, empowering local staff, increasing reliance on costeffective D.C.-based staff, and restructuring our field presence. 

By the end of FY 2012, we will reduce our permanent American Foreign Service 

officer positions in the region by roughly 25 percent. 

By FY 2012, we will move to a model endorsed in the Quadrennial Diplomacy and 

Development Review that will utilize USAID technical expertise on a regional basis. 

By FY 2012, we will end USAID funding for assistance programs to Montenegro— 

a middle-income country that is on a sustainable path to becoming a fully democratic, market-based economy. While USG funding will continue to address remaining issues primarily in the area of rule of law, ending USAID’s presence in 

Montenegro will allow us to focus on other global priorities. Eleven countries in Central and Eastern Europe have already graduated entirely from U.S. nonsecurity assistance. The administration will look at the possibility of further phaseouts consistent with the needs of recipient countries in the region, the advancement of U.S. 

interests, and the availability of resources. 

Through the USAID Forward reforms, we are redoubling our efforts to increase 

donor coordination, enhance sustainability through local capacity building, use 

science to leapfrog global development challenges, share lessons learned from our 

experiences with transitions, better utilize our talented human resources, and better 

measure our progress along the development continuum. 

To improve our efficiency and effectiveness further in meeting these challenges, 

we are leveraging funding to maximize the impact achieved with every American 

taxpayer dollar spent in Europe and Eurasia. We are partnering with international 

donors, host countries, and the private sector to amplify our results and achieve 

positive development outcomes. 

In Bosnia-Herzegovina, USAID has leveraged over $60 million of additional funding from other international donors, including the launch of the first ever jointly 

funded Development Credit Authority loan guarantee program, which generated $40 

18 

million to spur local entrepreneurship by combining capital with the Swedish International Development Agency. 

In Azerbaijan, USAID has nearly doubled the size of its economic growth programs through host government cofinancing. 

Throughout the region, USAID has leveraged over $350 million from the private 

sector through Global Development Alliances. 

With congressional support, USAID has financed 10 enterprise funds, covering 18 

countries, which have leveraged over $9 billion in additional financing to strengthen 

private sector growth. Profits from these funds have been reinvested in the target 

countries to propel economic development further, and these funds have already returned a total of $180 million to American taxpayers through the U.S. Treasury. 

We are also working to forge new partnerships with emerging donors to overcome 

development challenges across the globe. For instance, Administrator Shah signed 

a Protocol to cooperate on the global eradication of polio, which brings together Russian and American experts to work side by side in third countries to rid the world 

of this disease once and for all. 

Each of these partnerships with local institutions builds sustainability so that our 

assistance continues to achieve results beyond our presence, improves the effectiveness of our programs, and enhances the endurance of our alliances. 

I look forward to working with you as we transform the way that we work to advance U.S. interests by meeting 21st century development challenges to build a 

strong base of partnerships for the future with stable and sustainable marketoriented democracies of Europe and Eurasia. 

Thank you and I would welcome any questions from the committee. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you both very much. 

I want to talk broadly about some of the economic issues in 

Europe, but before I do that, we got a report today that Georgian 

civilians have been wounded by gunfire along the South Ossetia 

Administrative Boundary line, and it would be the first incident 

since March 2009. 

Last week, Senator Lindsay Graham and I introduced a resolution supporting the territorial integrity of Georgia and calling on 

the Government of Russia to fulfill its cease-fire agreement and 

return its military forces to prewar positions. 

Can you tell us what you know about this incident and what 

more we can do to emphasize the need for monitoring missions on 

the ground and how we can continue to work to address the territorial integrity of Georgia? 

Mr. GORDON. Thank you for raising what is, indeed, an issue of 

great concern to us. 

I do not have all of the details on the incident and so prefer not 

to focus on the specifics, but rather to take the opportunity to say 

that it is precisely this sort of incident that happened today that 

underscores why we are so concerned about the unresolved situation in Georgia. 

You are right to underscore in your resolution and just now Russia’s lack of full compliance with the 2008 cease-fire. As you know, 

our strong view, like that of pretty much every country in the 

world, with a very tiny number of exceptions, is to recognize Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. 

And the Russian military presence there, about which the Russians are not fully transparent, is a problem, and it can lead to just 

the sort of incident that you mentioned, as can the lack of international observation, which is something we have pushed for for a 

long time. It existed prior to the August 2008 war and now no 

longer do you have U.N. and OSCE observers on the ground which 

leads to questions. And frankly, again without getting into the 

19 

details of today’s events, we may never know precisely because we 

do not have full transparency. 

In the undisputed parts of Georgia, the European Union has a 

monitoring mission. So we know very well what is going on in undisputed Georgia. In the rest of Georgia, we have very little idea, 

and that is a problem and it leads to the sort of thing that we saw 

today. 

So we are very focused on this issue. As you know, I regularly 

lead our delegation to the Geneva talks which are focused on this. 

We have made some progress in those talks in the incident prevention and response mechanisms but, frankly, not enough. And we 

are going to remain focused on that because we really need to see 

Russia fully implement all of the points in the 2008 cease-fire and 

then start tackling the broader and more fundamental point of 

Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

As I said, I really wanted to start with something that we do not 

have a lot of leverage over and that is the ongoing debt crisis in 

Europe. It has been pushed off the front pages because of what has 

happened across the Middle East and Libya recently. But I assume 

that this is going to be a major topic of conversation at the G8 during the President’s upcoming visit. I wonder, Mr. Gordon, what 

your thoughts are about how this is affecting Europe’s focus on 

other issues. 

Mr. GORDON. Thank you, Madam Chairman, again, a very important issue and one we are following very closely and, yes, no doubt, 

will be addressed by the President not just at the G8, but of course, 

he starts in Ireland, which has been one of the countries most 

touched by the debt crisis and it will no doubt come up there as 

well. 

It is, of course, primarily an issue for the Europeans, for the 

European Union, for the European Central Bank, and for the IMF. 

And so in that sense, there is not a direct American role. But as 

you suggest, the importance of our trade and investment relationship with Europe, which creates millions of jobs in the United 

States and opportunities, and the importance of Europe for the 

global economy makes this a profound interest of the United 

States. 

Our Treasury is in very close touch with counterparts in Europe, 

even while acknowledging that this is primarily an issue for the 

European institutions and the IMF. 

The one thing I would say is that we are impressed with the way 

that a number of these governments are handling what is a very 

difficult situation. I mentioned Ireland, Portugal, Greece. All of 

these governments have recognized the need for reforms, the need 

for very tough austerity measures, and I think we can say they 

have been quite courageous in addressing these, and that is the 

deal on which further money has been lent to them. They would 

acknowledge the need for reforms, undertake those reforms, including structural reforms, and the European Union’s Central Bank 

and IMF would provide additional financing. And we support those 

efforts and will continue to follow it closely because we have such 

a stake in the outcome. 

20 

Senator SHAHEEN. So perhaps they could model what we need to 

do here. 

Mr. GORDON. I will leave that without comment. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Yes. You do not need to comment. 

But that is a segue into what I referred to in my opening comments about the extent to which the fiscal crisis we are having in 

the United States drives what our spending looks like and our 

budget priorities. You both referred to this somewhat, but could 

you talk about how the administration views Europe within the 

prioritization of all of the challenges around the globe and how we 

see the budget unfolding and what that means for our commitments in Europe? 

Mr. GORDON. Paige will want to talk about the assistance part 

of that ledger, but maybe I can say two brief things about it first. 

I failed to answer the part of your question on the European debt 

crisis about the degree to which that might be affecting their role 

in the world and their cooperation with us. But I wanted to because I think it is important to note that despite their economic 

challenges, we have actually not seen a dropping off in their willingness to engage and be the global partner that I began by saying 

we need. And I think that is true across the board. 

There is, no doubt, belt-tightening going on and it is even more 

difficult than it was before to come up with the troops and money 

for the challenges we face together. But in Afghanistan, we have 

seen no dropoff on their willingness to commit to the common strategy that we are implementing. I mentioned the 40,000 troops that 

they continue to maintain. We are very closely in touch through 

NATO on the process of transition that we have agreed on starting 

this summer, and we expect by 2014 leading to Afghan lead 

authority throughout the country. But that is going to be a process 

that will depend on conditions on the ground, and we are going to 

have to uphold our commitments in the meantime. 

And we have not seen the economic crisis really diminish 

Europe’s willingness to do that, which is very important to us, nor 

has it limited their willingness to engage and continue to do what 

we are doing together in Libya which is something none of us had 

been able to plan for or budget but all of us felt was something that 

was absolutely necessary for our values and our interests. And as 

you know, Europeans have actually taken the lead in that effort 

and have provided the bulk of the effort to enforce the no-fly zone, 

enforce the arms embargo, and are leading in terms of strike 

assets, as well, on the military side. And there, too, we know how 

difficult it is for them, but we know that we all signed up for this 

common endeavor, and as hard as it is for all of us on the financial 

side, we know we have these important priorities and we have to 

stand by what we are committed to. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

Ms. Alexander, do you want to speak to that? 

Ms. ALEXANDER. Thank you, Chairwoman Shaheen. 

We are studying ways to work efficiently and effectively to meet 

the remaining challenges in this region. I think, as I previously 

mentioned, looking at different indicators and analysis, we decided 

that USAID assistance to Montenegro is no longer necessary. It 

does not mean that there are not going to be assistance programs 

21 

in Montenegro, but from AID’s perspective, we have had to look at 

the budget decline and decide where we want to focus our efforts. 

I think there are persistent challenges and, in the places that we 

are in now, we have to address them, like MDR/XDR TB and some 

of the health care programs, we will continue to do that work. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Why do you not explain what MDR/XTR TB 

is? 

Ms. ALEXANDER. Sure. Multi-drug-resistant TB is a dangerous, 

hard to treat strain of the disease. Baku, Azerbaijan, has the highest level of multidrug resistant TB in the world. And so there are 

areas that we are having to look at where we can afford to make 

a difference at this point. 

But more importantly, we have found a lot of good partners in 

Europe, both as Phil mentioned on the global stage for policy, and 

for the exercise of political will for reform in Georgia, for example. 

I was just there last week and met with the President and with 

nonprofit leaders, and you can see that there is a real will among 

the administration to find ways to work successfully on legal and 

economic reforms and regulatory reforms. And so in places like 

that, we are able to leverage that assistance where there is political will. 

Also in Bosnia, with the European Union and with other donors who are very active, we found ways to leverage $60 million for one 

of our government accountability programs. And those are the type 

of indicators that we look at before USAID decides if we are ready 

to move on. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

Do you want to expand a little bit more on the comments you 

made in your opening statement about doing more with less? I 

mean, you talked just now about the ability to leverage other programs. Can you give us some examples of programs that you feel 

have been particularly effective or ways in which you have been 

able to do better with the resources that you have available? 

Ms. ALEXANDER. Sure, I would be happy to. 

In this region, we have leveraged over $350 million in global development alliances and public/private partnerships, and those are 

the places where you see the European market opening up and you 

see Americans interested in being involved. In that respect, USAID 

has spent a lot of time with our public/private partnership activities. So we have been able to do more. In Azerbaijan, for example, 

our economic growth portfolio is probably twice the size of the 

amount that is actually given to us each year because we have 

agreements with the Government of Azerbaijan. We have agreements with the private sector and other donors. 

In Bosnia, we have a development credit authority lending program that, for the first time ever, we have had other donors put 

money into, so that USAID is managing funds from Sweden to be 

able to do additional programming there. 

And so when you have spent this much time in a region and you 

have the ability to have the embassies on the ground and the AID 

missions, you can design programs that are attractive not only for 

U.S. Government funding but for other funders to come in and pick 

it up. And that is where we are trying to focus our efforts right 

now, as well as working with graduated countries, for example 

22 

with the Poles, to talk to them about how we can work together 

more successfully in other countries as a part of the Eastern Partnership Initiative. So those areas are where we are trying to make 

the linkages. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

Mr. Gordon, one of the things that I heard last year in traveling 

through the Balkans was concern from some of the countries in the 

Western Balkans who were looking toward the West and hoping to 

join the EU, that they were getting concerns about enlargement 

fatigue from the EU, from NATO. I wonder if we have also gotten 

those concerns from our European allies, and if so, are there ways 

in which we can help address that? As you both point out, as we 

look at developing a Europe that is whole and free and at peace, 

clearly making sure we incorporate those countries in the Balkans 

as we look at the Caucasus and other parts of Europe, it is an unfinished agenda. So how can we avoid people being left out because 

of that fatigue? 

Mr. GORDON. Indeed. We have long believed, as I said in my 

opening remarks, that Europe will not be complete until these 

countries are in Euro-Atlantic institutions. That applies to the 

European Union and NATO. Obviously, we are only a member of 

one of those organizations, and where that is concerned, NATO’s 

open door is a core principle. Countries that are interested in joining and meet the criteria should be allowed in. 

We think the same about the European Union. Your perception, 

I think, is right. There is a feeling or a fear in the region that the 

door is closing, that the European Union has already taken in a 

number of countries in the past decade, and publics, especially in 

a time of economic austerity, are more skeptical about more. 

But we think the European Union and its leadership is committed to this process. They do have strict criteria and so it is a 

two-way street. The EU needs to be consistent with its pledge to 

keep that door open for the countries that meet the criteria, but the 

countries who are applying have to do certain things as well. And 

both sides need to live up to those principles. 

There are countries making progress on the path to European 

Union membership that we would like to see cross the finish line. 

We believe Croatia is very close and is in the final stages of what 

should be an accession, and it would be a very positive signal to 

the region to see a country like Croatia that has come so far over 

the past decade-15 years demonstrate to its neighbors that when 

you do meet the criteria, you are allowed in. 

Again, we think that historically the incentive of joining the 

European Union has been one of the most powerful tools for democratization and economic liberalization that exists. And that is why 

the door needs to remain open so that other countries in the region, 

Serbia, Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Albania, all of 

them, see that if they make peace with their neighbors, reform 

their economies and maintain open and transparent democracies 

that they too will one day gain the benefits of European integration, and we strongly support that process. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Well, you mentioned Serbia. Obviously, that 

raises a question about Kosovo and relations between Serbia and 

23 

Kosovo. I think it is very encouraging that they are beginning to 

talk, and I think both countries deserve credit for that. 

Are there ways that we can help with those discussions, and 

what is your assessment of the current status of those? I know 

when I was there, one of the concerns that was raised—and that 

is an area of disagreement—has to do with the northern region of 

Kosovo. Are there more creative ways in which we can address that 

so that we do not have another area where there is an ongoing 

stalemate? 

Mr. GORDON. It is, indeed, encouraging that they have started to 

talk. Indeed, they are talking as we are talking. As we speak, I 

think the fourth round of the EU-facilitated dialogue is going 

ahead in Brussels. And just the fact that these two countries are 

sitting down at a table—we do not underestimate the differences 

between them and they are very real, but they are talking about 

those differences. And we appreciate all the EU is doing in full 

transparency and cooperation with us to try to move that process 

forward. 

Ultimately it is our view that—our view of Kosovo is clear. We 

recognize Kosovo. It is a sovereign, independent country. Seventyfour other countries have recognized it as well, including most of 

the critical neighbors and partners and those that invested so 

much in Kosovo over the years, and in just 3 short years, it has 

really made a lot of progress as an independent country. It most 

recently went through some constitutional issues and challenges to 

the Presidency that it successfully navigated and came out on the 

other end with its institutions intact and its democracy having 

taken a further step forward. And that, for a country just a few 

years old, is very impressive. So our view of Kosovo and its sovereignty and territorial integrity is clear. 

Obviously, Serbia has a different view, but we hope that through 

this dialogue, which is really meant not to focus on the issue of status, which the two parties disagree on, but to make practical 

progress on issues that affect people’s daily lives like electricity distribution and telecommunications and customs and law and order, 

rule of law, having a functioning courthouse. If they can just make 

some progress on those issues—and many of them, I have to say, 

are win-win, they can both benefit, it is not zero sum—then Serbia 

should move down the path to European Union membership. 

And we believe that Serbia has taken the strategic position to do 

so. The Serbs know it is in their interest. I met with the Kosovo 

Foreign Minister just this week, and I think the Kosovars recognize 

that it is in their mutual interest for both of them to be moving 

down the path to European Union membership. 

The bottom line, though, is that Serbia has to recognize that the 

European Union is not going to be interested in taking in a country 

whose borders are unclear. And in that sense, Serbia is going to 

have to come to terms with the reality of Kosovo so that both countries can continue down the path to European Union membership. 

Senator SHAHEEN. And do we have any idea of a timetable for 

progress there? I mean, I assume we can look for the indefinite 

future in terms of the talks? 

Mr. GORDON. It is always difficult to put a timetable on these 

developments. What is clear is that in the course of this year, the 

24 

EU will make some critical decisions about Serbia’s membership 

path, candidacy status, the beginning of accession negotiations. 

That is something that we know is before us now. We would like 

to see that move forward. 

We would like to see Serbia become a candidate for European 

Union membership because that, to go back to your first question, 

Madam Chairman, would help combat the notion that there is enlargement fatigue and it is basically over. That is the last thing we 

need, to discourage the countries of this region and give them the 

impression that the door is closed, they are on their own. That is 

why we support this process, and the closer they get, arguably the 

more real membership would seem to them and the more they 

might be willing to do some of the difficult things they need to to 

get in. 

That said, in the case of Serbia, again, we think that we would 

like to see the talks demonstrate seriousness and a willingness to 

reach genuine compromise. You talked about creativity. Yes, it will 

maybe require some creativity on both sides because it is in their 

mutual interest, and if they do that, then they should be rewarded 

with a further step down the path to EU membership. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Well, I certainly agree with what you have 

said about the importance of reinforcing for Kosovo and Serbia and 

the other countries in the western Balkans that are looking at the 

potential for EU membership down the road, to see that as a real 

possibility and to be able to see the path for how to get there, that 

that is critical. 

So while we are on the region, let me go back to your comments 

and your opening remarks about Bosnia. And I think it was very 

positive news to hear that the Republika Srpska is not going to 

hold a referendum. 

I guess the question is, Do we see a path to formation of a government there and are there additional ways in which we can 

encourage that? 

Mr. GORDON. We certainly hope so because like Serbia and 

Kosovo and the others, we believe that Bosnia too should be on the 

path to Euro-Atlantic institutions which would help strengthen its 

democracy, unity, and peace in the region. 

Unfortunately, there has not been progress on that score in recent years. Indeed, arguably there has been not just stagnation but 

regression on the path, and we are doing all we can to try to help 

them turn that around. And I think you mentioned two of the most 

critical aspects of it. Government formation is one and the other is 

the challenge from Republika Srpska to the Dayton settlement. 

On government formation, we are frankly disappointed. Elections 

took place last October. We had hoped that would put in place a 

government that could get on with the business of the country and 

dealing with unemployment and making the government more 

functional and even tackling some of the constitutional issues that 

hold Bosnia back. And instead, parties have been unable to agree 

on coalitions. And here we are 6 months later and they still do not 

have a government at the state level, and at the Federation level 

between the Bosniaks and the Croats, the government is narrower, 

on a narrower base than it should be, and seen as illegitimate by 

some of the parties. 

25 

So we are disappointed at the pace of government formation. 

Without forming a government at the state level, Bosnia really cannot move forward on the path to the European Union. It cannot 

move forward with its IMF arrangements which are critical to the 

economy. 

At the same time, we have the challenge that you mentioned 

from the Republika Srpska President who in April challenged 

essentially the authorities of the Dayton settlement and the state 

judicial institutions in a way that we, frankly, found and publicly 

said was illegal and inconsistent with Dayton. 

And you referred to an agreement to stand down on the referendum that he proposed to hold on the authorities of the High 

Representative. We hope that is the case, and we have seen references to his agreement to do so, but until it is actually done, 

until the referendum is finally and formally and fully canceled and 

the other conclusions reached by the Republika Srpska on April 13, 

we will need to watch it very closely because, again, we cannot 

stand by and see such fundamental challenges to the basic settlement at the heart of the Bosnian state. And we will give our full 

backing to the Office of the High Representative to use all of the 

authorities at his disposal to make sure that such fundamental 

challenges cannot move forward. And we are considering our own 

measures as well in the case that the conclusions and the referendum of April 13 are not withdrawn. 

Senator SHAHEEN. And can you elaborate on any of those measures? 

Mr. GORDON. For the moment, I would just say we are looking 

at different ways that would ensure that no one in the Republika 

Srpska or anywhere else is able to fundamentally mount a challenge to the state without consequences. 

And I would add that we are doing that together with the European Union which I think feels the same way that we do. The 

European Union, in addition to reviewing its own representation in 

Bosnia, recently gave itself the authority to put in place visa bans 

and asset freezes to individuals who might be challenging the Dayton structures, and I think that is the sort of thing that we would 

be looking at together with the EU if such challenges continue. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Good. Thank you. 

You mentioned Russia’s reset. Can you talk about the administration’s next steps with respect to the reset? 

Mr. GORDON. Sure, and President Obama will have a chance 

with President Medvedev when they meet in the margins of the G8 

Deauville to talk about some of this agenda. 

I noted that in the first 2 years, we are very satisfied with the 

progress we made on arms control and the issue of Iran and 

Afghanistan and even building up the trust between the two countries, which was one of the issues on the agenda. The relationship 

with Russia that we inherited was really one with a total absence 

of trust, and we think we have made significant progress. 

We are not naive about it. There are still real differences between us and Russia. We have already discussed some of them, including Georgia. We have expressed concern about the human 

rights situation in Russia in a number of prominent cases, unresolved murders of journalists, and other incidents that show that 

26 

Russia still has a long way to go in terms of its democratic development and human rights. 

So no one would claim that the relationship or the situation in 

Russia is perfect, but we are satisfied that in 2 years we have 

made a lot of progress in building on the better relationship between the two countries in the pursuit of our common interests. 

In the 2 years to come, as we continue to pursue this, we want 

to continue to build trust and cooperation. We want to further our 

cooperation on missile defense. That was one of the things that we 

made progress on most recently at the Lisbon summit, agreed to 

resume theater missile defense cooperation, agreed to resume missile defense cooperation in general. We have consistently explained 

to our Russian counterparts that the missile defense that we plan 

for Europe is not targeted at Russia. It is designed to deal with 

threats from outside of Europe that are very real, and it is designed to protect all of NATO and we would look forward to cooperating with Russia. And it is not about, in any way, undermining 

strategic stability between the two sides. So that is one area that 

we hope to build on in the coming period. 

We hope to continue our cooperation on external issues like 

Afghanistan where I mentioned lethal transit is an area where 

Russia has contributed. There are other ways Russia is helping as 

well, including helicopters and helicopter maintenance, Iran and 

the sanctions. 

And then there is the whole economic sphere. President Obama 

has been quite clear we would like to see Russia join the WTO, and 

they have made significant progress in that area as well. And we 

look forward to working with them on that because we think it is 

not just in their interest but clearly in ours to get them in a rulebased economic framework so that our investors can feel more comfortable investing in Russia and trade can expand. 

So there is still plenty to do in the relationship with Russia, and 

obviously, the regional issues, frozen conflicts, Georgia. I mentioned 

our efforts which have so far not been as fruitful as we might like, 

but we are going to continue to work on that. On NagornoKarabakh, we have actually worked closely with the Russians to 

try to come up with a settlement there. There is plenty to do in 

the relationship with Russia. 

Senator SHAHEEN. There have been a number of reports recently 

about the relationship between Putin and Medvedev. Is there any 

reason to think that that relationship is affecting our ability to deal 

with Russia in any way? 

Mr. GORDON. I do not think it would be fruitful for me to speculate on domestic Russian politics or differences between two potential candidates. We do and will deal with the leaders that Russia 

chooses. At present, President Medvedev is our President’s main 

interlocutor. We have worked very well with him on the full agenda 

that I just discussed, and we will assume that after the Russian 

election, we will be able to continue on the basis of our mutual 

national interests of working together. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

Ms. Alexander, you talked about some of AID’s programs in Russia. Can you describe some of those in a little more detail? 

27 

Ms. ALEXANDER. Certainly. The engagement with Russia is vital 

to encourage them to become a global partner in these development 

challenges. I had mentioned that Administrator Shah signed a protocol to eradicate polio, and that is just one example of where we 

have been trying to work collectively with the Russians on some of 

these health issues, including sending some Russian doctors to 

Africa to work on best practices. 

At the same time, we have clear challenges with our engagement 

with Russia. The majority of our portfolio, almost 70 percent, is in 

democracy and governance programming. And we work primarily 

in the nonprofit sector and with independent media and civil society groups to help enlarge the space for a free press and free political thought. So in the areas that we find ways we can work together, we have been doing that under the bilateral Presidential 

commission. We have worked on a number of working groups— 

USAID has—with a lot of our partners, and there is a parallel activity for civil society groups that have been doing civil society to 

civil society programs. And we have been supportive of that because I think that there is need for us not to just have a government-to-government relationship, but direct civil society to civil 

society. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Is there any reason to believe that there has 

been any progress on the free media issue and getting Russia to 

recognize and allow reporters to operate in a freer way? 

Ms. ALEXANDER. There are always reasons to be optimistic. I 

think in this case the legal reforms that are in place and some of 

the Freedom of Information Act laws are challenges to how the government is treating the independent media. And we will continue 

to focus on that and we have a very active program in that area 

to do so. Print, broadcast, using social media, these are all elements that I think help encourage citizens’ voices to be out in the 

public sector. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

We have been joined by Senator Cardin. Senator, would you like 

to begin or do you want me to continue for a little while? 

Senator CARDIN. Senator Shaheen, first of all, thank you very 

much for conducting this hearing and let me thank both of our witnesses for their incredible service. 

As I think both of you know, I have the distinction of being the 

Senate chair of the Helsinki Commission. So what I am going to 

do is ask some questions about countries. There are so many countries in Europe that are of interest right now. 

I also chair the International Development Subcommittee for this 

committee. So I am interested also as to whether we are effectively 

using all the tools that we have available in the most efficient way. 

So let me talk about some countries first where we are not participating in foreign assistance but are of great interest. 

Belarus. The reaction of Lukashenko from the December 19 elections is still being felt in that country. I was in Belarus, I guess 

a little over a year ago, and we thought we were making some 

progress. We see now that whatever progress we were making, it 

looks like we are moving in the wrong direction. 

28 

Can you just update us as to the current status in Belarus as it 

relates to safety of people generally and whether we are getting 

good information of what is happening on the ground? 

Mr. GORDON. Thank you, Senator, and thank you for continuing 

to focus on that country which is all too often overlooked. 

The situation on the ground is that the government continues to 

proceed with sentencing of a number of individuals, including primarily Presidential candidates that it arrested at the time of the 

December 19 crackdown. And we made clear at the time that we 

did not believe there was a basis for these arrests or sentencing, 

and we said in advance of the trials that were these people to receive sentences and be put in prison essentially for running for 

President, we would be obliged to consider them as political prisoners. And that is the situation we are in because a number of 

them have, indeed, been sentenced in some cases to long terms. All 

of the trials have not yet concluded, but just this week, Mr. 

Sannikov, one of the most prominent Presidential candidates received a prison sentence. And we have told them privately and publicly that we would be obliged to consider these people political 

prisoners and take measures accordingly. 

As you know, Senator, already last January, we announced 

measures in response to the December crackdown that included extending asset freezes on a number of Belarusian officials, travel 

bans on those officials, and we reimposed sanctions on some 

Belarusian subsidiaries that we had listed precisely because, as 

you said, we had thought we had seen some progress. We put those 

sanctions on in the context of the measures that they had taken 

against democracy, civil society, and freedom, and as they gradually lifted those and released the last political prisoner, I think 

with your involvement, we lifted sanctions on two subsidiaries. We 

put them back on on January 31 because of this crackdown, and 

we said if inappropriate sentences continue, we will continue to 

look at further measures. And that is exactly where we are now. 

We are looking at what else we can do. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you. And if you would keep us informed 

on that, obviously we are interested. 

We noticed today that the administration announced sanctions 

against specific individuals in regards to Syria. I mention that because there are several of us requesting you to do the same as it 

relates to Russia in regards to the Magnitsky case and other 

human rights—just raw human rights abuses of that country. We 

are working on filing legislation similar to the legislation that was 

filed in the last Congress as it relates to those who have been identified and clearly involved in the corruption from the death of 

Magnitsky in prison to the public corruption that he was trying to 

uncover. 

Will you continue to look at this issue to see whether we cannot 

find a common area? I recently have met with some people from 

Russia, and they also brought out the Magnitsky case as outrageous to a lot of the people in Russia itself. 

It seems to me this is an area where we will be doing a favor 

to the people of Russia and their future by trying to fit our response appropriate to what has happened within Russia. Otherwise, we tend to take it out on other issues that are not directly 

29 

related and they are not as effective, and sometimes they have consequences that were really never intended. Here we are trying to 

tailor this to the specific problem that was created by the corruption in Russia. 

Mr. GORDON. Thank you, Senator. 

We very much share your and all of Congress’ concerns about the 

Magnitsky case which was a terrible tragedy and crime, really 

outrageous, and we have raised that consistently and at the highest levels with Russian authorities. I can tell you it comes up in 

the majority of our meetings at every level, and they know how 

strongly we feel about it. They know that Congress is looking at 

it. And senior Russians have accepted that there is a real problem 

there, and they tell us they are investigating it. 

We continue to review it, as you have asked, and are looking at 

possible policy measures, including the consideration of sanctions. 

We want to make sure that any step taken would be effective. For 

now, as I say, the Russian Government is telling us that they are 

conducting a full investigation and will take measures, and we are 

watching very closely to see if they actually do that. 

Senator CARDIN. That is our objective, for Russia to take action. 

The problem is they have been saying this for a long time. In fact, 

it is just counterproductive. They have been promoting the people 

that are involved rather than holding them accountable. It seems 

like they have been rewarded for their corruption. Our patience is 

running thin here. I just would make that observation. 

I have time for one more country, so let me move to Bosnia for 

one second. 

Our annual meeting is going to be in Serbia this year. So we are 

going to be close by and we might want to spend a little bit of time. 

It seems to me that Bosnia is not making the progress that we 

wanted. Here is a country that has been a friend, and the surrounding countries appear to be making more progress than they 

are. 

What can we do to accelerate their constitutional reforms that 

everyone knows are needed so that all the ethnic communities are 

protected, but you have a country with a united government that 

can integrate into the institutions of Europe? 

Mr. GORDON. That is an excellent question and one we ask ourselves all the time because we acknowledge that Bosnia has not 

been moving in the right direction. They have failed, let alone to 

address the constitutional reform issues that you mentioned, but 

even to put together a government since their elections last October that would enable them to do so. 

We are working very closely with the European Union. Senator 

Shaheen mentioned High Representative Ashton’s visit to Washington, and we spent some time with her just this week on how we 

together can underscore that the door to European institutions remains open so that they have an incentive to move forward and engage with them to try to help them put together a government and 

alter the shape of our international presence so that we can help 

them along the path. Ultimately, it is up to the Bosnians and the 

Bosnian leadership to put their country’s interests above petty and 

ethnic and partisan interests which they have failed to do so far. 

30 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you. I think we really need to keep a 

spotlight on this. They have made a lot of progress, but they really 

need to figure out how to get a united government. It is in their 

interest again to move forward to the next plateau. 

My time is up. I will just mention by subject the Roma issue, 

which has really exploded in a lot of countries as far as—— 

Senator SHAHEEN. You should go ahead, Senator Cardin. 

Senator CARDIN. Oh, thank you. Appreciate that, Madam Chair. 

What has happened of late is so discouraging to see so-called 

mature democracies take steps that are so punitive against a population that has been in their country for a long period of time and 

denied basic opportunities of the citizens of their country. And it 

seems to me that this is an area that the United States must maintain the highest priority. Without the United States putting a spotlight on it, it is going to be a secondary issue in Europe. 

There are some countries that have made some progress. Most 

have not. And we really need to develop a strategy. I know there 

are a lot of conferences going on, a lot of people talking about it, 

but it really cries out for an action plan. 

I see you are shaking your head. I cannot get that on the record. 

Mr. GORDON. I will confirm that I was nodding positively because 

I could not agree more. We appreciate that the Helsinki Commission and you are focused on this. I was recently in Hungary and 

had extensive discussions of the issue with the government there 

which I think takes it very seriously. And Bulgaria. Secretary Clinton is personally very focused on this and my nodding was to say 

that we agree and are trying to continue to get the governments 

of the region to focus and do what they need to do. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you. 

And thank you for your patience, Madam Chairman. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

I do not want to cover every country in Europe, but I do have 

a couple more that I would like to go back to. 

First, I want to follow up on Senator Cardin’s questions about 

the sanctions in Belarus. Do we have any reason to believe that the 

sanctions have had any impact there? 

Mr. GORDON. I think it is too soon to say. Our support for the 

sanctions is not just as a matter of principle and the desire to do 

something, but we believe that previous sanctions had an impact 

and that one of the reasons that a few years ago the government 

started to do the right thing in terms of political prisoners is that 

they felt the bite of the sanctions. And so in that spirit, it was important for us to show that when you do the right things, the sanctions get lifted. When you do the wrong things, further sanctions 

will come. 

And I think that is important not just vis-a-vis Belarus but more 

generally around the world to send a message that you cannot just 

crack down on peaceful protesters and arrest Presidential candidates and expect us to say that is fine and we will just carry on 

with business as usual. 

So that is why we are moving forward with these sanctions and 

that is why they are as targeted as possible on the people responsible for it. And our sense is that the people of Belarus support 

what we are doing. 

31 

Senator SHAHEEN. Is there any reason to think that Russia could 

be helpful in this regard? 

Mr. GORDON. I think the Russians are torn on Belarus. I do not 

think they have been unhelpful. I think Belarus’ desire to be free 

of Russian influence was one of the reasons that it started to do 

the right thing in some ways in the first place. And that is what 

we had hoped. We were trying to show Belarus not that we need 

to be competing with Russia for Belarus but that if it wanted to 

be an independent country, then the path was there and it required 

a minimum of effort on democracy and human rights or it just 

would not be possible. That was the roadmap that I personally laid 

out for them in the summer of 2009 when they had started to do 

the right thing. 

I think just before that, that same summer, after Senator Cardin 

and others engaged, they released the last of the political prisoners, 

and I was able to say on behalf of the administration carry on moving in that direction. The path is there. Look what some of your 

neighbors have done in terms of joining Europe, democracy, prosperity. And we thought that they got that until December 19 when 

it became, unfortunately, clear that they did not, and now we think 

it is necessary for them to see that there is a negative consequence 

if that is what they are going to do. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

I also want to address Ukraine because Freedom House just 

downgraded Ukraine from free to partly free and warned that the 

country is headed down a path toward autocracy and kleptocracy. 

Ukraine, obviously, a very important country for the region and as 

we think about the future of Europe. 

So what can we do in Ukraine to help divert its current path? 

Mr. GORDON. Well, in a similar spirit, but making clear that 

Ukraine is not in any sense in the same category as Belarus, 

Ukraine actually last year had a free and fair Presidential election, 

a transition of power. We went to the inauguration and applauded 

that development and hoped that it would continue for the same 

reasons we have just been talking about, that these countries really 

have an opportunity. If they develop their democracy at home and 

respect human rights and have a free market economy, they have 

really genuinely a chance to join Europe as free, independent sovereign countries, partners of the United States. 

And Ukraine has taken some steps in that direction, but on the 

question of democracy, there has been some backsliding as well and 

a failure to appropriately reform the electoral code. The municipal 

elections did not meet the same standards that the previous Presidential election had met. There has been a perception of political 

prosecutions. Obviously, Ukraine not only has every right but a 

duty to investigate corruption and malfeasance. But when such a 

majority of the cases investigated and prosecuted are against political figures from the previous regime, it is impossible for friends 

not to ask the question about perceived selective prosecutions. And 

those have been highlighted in our own human rights report and 

Freedom House reports. 

And there all we can do is continue to be consistent. But there 

is a path toward the partnership with us and toward membership 

32 

in European institutions, but it requires action on these important 

domestic fronts. 

And just to underscore, we have been very clear about that with 

our Ukrainian friends. Secretary Clinton recently chaired the U.S.- 

Ukraine Strategic Partnership Commission here in Washington, 

and we talked about our common strategic interests and the very 

positive things Ukraine is doing on nonproliferation and its agreement to get rid of its highly enriched uranium, which is an important priority for President Obama. So there are some positive 

things. But she was also very frank about our concerns on the 

democracy front, and it is something we will continue to work with 

them on. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

And disappointing, after such progress, to see the change. 

Finally, I want to address Turkey because, as I say in my remarks that I entered into the record, Turkey is a valuable NATO 

ally. It has a predominantly Muslim population in a very important 

region of the world. So many of the challenges we face today in 

Europe and in the Middle East involve Turkey. And yet Pew 

Research Center released a poll recently about how the Turks feel 

about us here in America, and our approval ratings are at a dismal 

10 percent, which is actually lower than in Pakistan. Obviously, I 

think this has implications for the future if nothing is done to reverse that sentiment. 

So can you talk about why America is viewed that way in Turkey 

and what we can do in terms of our current relations to begin to 

reverse that? 

Mr. GORDON. Sure. It is, indeed, a very serious issue. You have 

a country of such strategic importance and historical partnership 

with the United States. It is disconcerting to hear that only 1 in 

10 have a favorable opinion of the United States. That number is 

something we have followed closely over the years. Actually at the 

time of the Iraq war is when it first took a real dive, and we have 

failed, despite significant efforts, to bring it back up to where it 

used to be. 

That has not prevented important cooperation between the 

United States and Turkey which is still a valued NATO ally. And 

we have had our differences with Turkey and we have talked about 

some of them in this committee. We were very disappointed about 

Turkey’s vote on Iran in the Security Council last year, and we 

made that clear to Turkey while, at the same time, noting that 

there are a number of other things we work well together on and 

that is also the case. 

I would note on Libya, Turkey has been very helpful in standing 

with us and making clear that Mr. Qadhafi has to go and, as a 

NATO ally, is participating in the enforcement of the no-fly zone 

and arms embargo. 

On Syria, we think Turkey is a critical neighbor of Syria, has 

been sending all the right messages about the need for a forum and 

about the unacceptability of the crackdown. And I could give many 

other examples of how we are very closely cooperating with Turkey 

as well. 

So, yes, clearly on the public opinion side, we have work to do. 

We are doing the work and we are so deeply engaged with Turkey 

33 

there is not a—I mean, you mentioned the vast number of countries we could talk about. There are not many that we are more 

closely engaged with than Turkey because it is such a player on so 

many big interests, and all we can do is keep those lines going 

because we need Turkey and they need us. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

Senator Cardin. 

Senator CARDIN. Just a followup on Turkey. The flotilla episode, 

obviously, challenged that relationship, and of course, we think 

that Turkey was very provocative and insensitive in the manner in 

which it handled the flotilla. 

There is talk that there is going to be another flotilla. Do we 

have any information as to how we can avoid another major international incident? 

Mr. GORDON. Well, you are certainly right, and I should have 

mentioned that when I mentioned the Iran vote as another of the 

issues that caused tensions and differences in the relationship. 

That, in turn, contributed to the low public opinion scores because 

we had very different perceptions of what happened then, while 

agreeing on the simple fact that it was a terrible tragedy what happened last May in the flotilla. 

Yes, we have heard, like you, that there is thought of another flotilla actually not just from Turkey, but different countries are 

thinking about sending a flotilla. In some cases in May I think the 

Turkish group that was behind the flotilla that led to the tragedy 

in May has talked about a flotilla sometime in June. So we are 

paying very close attention to that. 

One of the casualties, in addition to the tragic human casualties 

of the flotilla incident, was the relationship between Turkey and 

Israel. At a time of such turbulence throughout the Middle East, 

the close Turkey-Israel partnership was one positive thing, a majority Muslim country with a Jewish state cooperating militarily on 

intelligence and tourism and economically. That has really been 

undermined by a number of things going on in the region, but the 

flotilla really set it back with Turkey withdrawing its ambassador 

and the relationship has yet to be repaired. We are doing all we 

can to get them to put that behind them. 

They have very different views of what happened over the flotilla. The Turkish perception was a humanitarian intervention 

against a naval blockade that they do not accept, whereas the 

Israeli perception was that in order to defend themselves against 

rockets and weapons coming into Gaza, they have to watch their 

coastline. And those two divergent views among two close allies of 

the United States is a real problem for us. 

Senator CARDIN. Well, it seems to me that if they instigate on 

the 1-year anniversary or close to the 1-year anniversary a similar 

effort, it is meant as a provocation. 

Mr. GORDON. Well, I would say two things. The Turkish Government says that this organization, the IHH, is an NGO. The government did not sponsor the previous one and would tell you now that 

it would not sponsor a future one. This is a private organization 

taking its—— 

34 

Senator CARDIN. But they clearly supported the efforts both from 

a political point of view as well as where the origins started. So 

they were clearly involved. 

Mr. GORDON. Well, they certainly did not stop it. 

And what I would say, which is a counterpart to that, is we have 

been very clear with them that a new flotilla would in no way be 

helpful. In the year since the last flotilla episode, Israel has 

changed the humanitarian regime for Gaza, made very clear that 

there are alternative ways to get humanitarian assistance to Gaza. 

So any government or NGO that wants to send genuinely humanitarian goods to Gaza has a way of doing it that is uncontested. And 

we very much believe that and have been very clear with the Turkish Government that that is the case, and we have asked them to 

make clear to any Turkish NGO’s that might want to send a ship 

that they should really find this other path. We think that was 

already the case to a degree last year, but it is certainly the case 

now. 

Senator CARDIN. Well, I just point out that if there is a similar 

effort and it has the tacit or direct support of Turkey, it is not 

going to help not just Israel-Turkey and the whole situation in the 

Middle East, it is not going to help the United States relationship 

with Turkey either. It is two ways, as you know. 

Mr. GORDON. We agree with that, Senator, absolutely. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you. 

Senator SHAHEEN. I have no further questions. So let me just end 

by thanking both of you very much for being here, for your service, 

and we look forward to continuing to work with you. Thank you all 

very much. 

The hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:04 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY PHILIP H. GORDON TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR JAMES E. RISCH

Question. Can you please describe the U.S. contribution to the air policing mission 

for our Baltic allies? How long will the United States maintain this commitment in 

the region? 

Answer. We are committed to supporting the NATO Baltic air policing mission 

and encouraging allied participants to fulfill their pledged contributions. The current mandate for the air policing mission runs through 2014, and the United States 

supports extending this mission past the 2014 mandate. 

Question. The British have requested U.S. P–3 Maritime surveillance aircraft to 

fly patrols for British Navy Vessels. Are the British fully reimbursing the United 

States for the use of these aircraft? 

Answer. The answer to this question is not within the purview of the Department 

of State. The Department defers to the Department of the Defense. 

Question. Ever since the death of Bin Laden we have seen announcements from 

a number of European capitals declaring they either will withdraw forces from 

Afghanistan earlier than anticipated or are considering doing so. What is the administration’s plan to ensure the NATO mission is not underresourced? 

Answer. Osama bin Laden’s death sent an unmistakable message about the resolve of the United States and the international community to stand against violent 

extremism and those who perpetuate it. But we cannot forget that the battle to stop 

al-Qaida and its affiliates does not end with bin Laden’s death. 

Forty-eight NATO and non-NATO nations contribute troops to ISAF. Their contributions have been critical to our recent progress in Afghanistan, and are critical 

35 

to ensuring security gains are permanent and that the transition of security responsibility to the Afghans is irreversible. In recognition of this fact, ISAF nations 

reached consensus at the Lisbon NATO summit in November 2010 on a framework 

of transition to Afghan security responsibility beginning in early 2011 and to be 

completed across Afghanistan by the end of 2014. At the same time, Heads of State 

and Government committed to provide the necessary resources to accomplish that 

mission. 

Subsequently, at the meeting of ISAF Defense Ministers in March, ministers 

agreed to transition implementing principles which will guide troop disposition decisions, and include the need to consult and coordinate troop reductions within the 

alliance, and to reinvest transition dividend troops where possible to support further 

transition progress. These principles make clear that while we are transitioning, we 

are not leaving. As the President noted in his December 2009 speech at West Point, 

we will begin a responsible reduction of our forces in Afghanistan beginning in July 

2011 based on conditions on the ground. Allies will no doubt look to our example 

in formulating their own troop decisions. 

Question. Can you please describe in detail the level of consultations we have had 

with our Baltic allies during the ‘‘Russian Reset’’? Were they brought in during policy formulation? Did State keep them informed before decisions were finalized? Or 

did they learn about U.S. policy decisions after Russia was informed? 

Answer. The President and his administration have worked intensively—through 

public engagement and quiet diplomacy—to engage with all our European allies on 

our vision of a strong and secure Europe working globally in partnership with the 

United States. The President had a productive discussion on European security with 

Central European and Baltic leaders in April 2010 in Prague and again in Warsaw 

on May 27, meetings in which he reiterated in the strongest terms the U.S. commitment to Europe. As part of our robust engagement on security matters, we have consulted closely and repeatedly with our Baltic allies on issues such as changes to U.S. 

force posture in Europe, the CFE treaty, and missile defense. We also are working 

to ensure that NATO has the contingency plans and capabilities it needs to address 

21st century challenges. 

One of the fundamental principles underlying the ‘‘reset’’ has been that our efforts 

to improve relations with Russia should not come at the expense of our allies or 

efforts to promote respect for human rights, media freedom, and other civil liberties 

within Russia. Indeed, all three Baltic nations have acknowledged more positive 

relations with Russia following the United States-Russia ‘‘reset.’’ 

Question. Earlier this week Russian President Medvedev criticized U.S. missile 

defense plans in Europe and threatened to withdraw Russia from the New START 

Treaty. During New START Treaty hearings, administration witnesses testified repeatedly that U.S. missile defense plans would not constitute the grounds for Russian withdrawal. Why do Russian leaders continue to insist that Russia has the 

right to withdraw? 

Answer. As Secretary Clinton explained during the Senate’s hearings on the subject, as with other arms control treaties, the New START Treaty allows a party to 

withdraw from the treaty if that party decides that ‘‘its supreme interests are jeopardized by extraordinary events’’ related to the subject matter of the treaty. Each 

party must determine, based on its own criteria, if or when its ‘‘supreme interests’’ 

have been jeopardized to the point that it believes it must withdraw from the treaty. 

U.S. officials have engaged in a series of consultations with Russian counterparts 

to provide policy and technical explanations that illustrate that the European 

Phased and Adaptive Approach (EPAA) missile defense system is not directed at 

Russia and will not pose a threat to Russia’s strategic deterrent. The United States 

has also offered to engage in transparency and confidence-building activities that 

would demonstrate that U.S. missile defense programs are not directed against 

Russia. 

Following their May 26 meeting in Deauville, Presidents Obama and Medvedev 

committed to continue working together to lay the foundation for future cooperation 

in missile defense. President Medvedev noted the importance of maintaining the 

strategic balance of forces, and praised the New START Treaty for helping to improve this balance. 

Question. You mentioned the flow of cargo through Russia in support of coalition 

forces in Afghanistan—specifically you stated that 27,000 containers have transited 

Russia. Please provide the amount of money that has been paid to Russian contractors to move this cargo and any money that has gone directly to the Russian Government in support of the GLOC? 

36 

Answer. The U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) oversees the flow of 

cargo in support of coalition forces in Afghanistan. USTRANSCOM does not contract 

for container movement directly with Russian contractors or pay directly to the Russian Government. USTRANSCOM contracts with USG-approved contractors to 

transport cargo from CONUS to Afghanistan at competitive rates. When contractors 

transport containers through the Northern Distribution Network to Afghanistan, 

they may subcontract with various companies for surface transportation or pay fees 

to transit the countries. USTRANSCOM does not have privity to costs which are 

imbedded in the competitive rate, to include costs for subcontracts or fees paid to 

a country. 

The overland flow of cargo through Russia in support of coalition forces in Afghanistan is complemented by the flow of military personnel and equipment under the 

United States-Russia air transit agreement concluded in 2009. This agreement has 

resulted in over 1,100 flights transferring over 177,000 personnel in support of 

international efforts in Afghanistan to date. The bilateral air transit agreement is 

cost-free to U.S. Air Force aircraft; Charter flights are responsible for the payment 

of air transit fees. 

Question. Will U.S. forces continue to support the NATO mission in Libya after 

Friday, May 20, 2011? 

Answer. As the President informed Congress on March 21, the United States, pursuant to a request from the Arab League and authorization by the United Nations 

Security Council, had acted 2 days earlier to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe 

by deploying U.S. forces to protect the people of Libya from the Qaddafi regime. 

Over the last 2 months, the U.S. role in this operation to enforce U.N. Security 

Council Resolution 1973 has become more limited, yet remains important. We support the bipartisan resolution drafted by Senators Kerry, McCain, Levin, Feinstein, 

Graham, Chambliss, and Lieberman, which would confirm that the Congress supports the U.S. mission in Libya and that both branches are united in their commitment to supporting the aspirations of the Libyan people for political reform and selfgovernment. 

The initial phase of U.S. military involvement in Libya was conducted under the 

command of the United States Africa Command. By April 4, however, the United 

States had transferred responsibility for the military operations in Libya to the 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the U.S. involvement has assumed 

a supporting role in the coalition’s efforts. Since April 4, U.S. participation has consisted of: (1) nonkinetic support to the NATO-led operation, including intelligence, 

logistical support, and search and rescue assistance; (2) aircraft that have assisted 

in the suppression and destruction of air defenses in support of the no-fly zone; and 

(3) since April 23, precision strikes by unmanned aerial vehicles against a limited 

set of clearly defined targets in support of the NATO-led coalition’s efforts. 

Question. In your testimony you said that ‘‘Macedonia will join [NATO] once the 

dispute over its name is resolved.’’ Is it the position of the administration that a 

bilateral disagreement should be elevated to a condition of membership inside 

NATO? What is the administration doing to help Greece and Macedonia resolve this 

dispute? 

Answer. The United States strongly supports the full integration of all Western 

Balkans countries into Euro-Atlantic institutions, a critical step toward continued 

peace and stability in the region. NATO members concluded during the 2008 Bucharest NATO summit that Macedonia would receive a membership invitation once a 

‘‘mutually acceptable solution to the name issue has been reached.’’ NATO members 

reiterated this same commitment at the 2010 Lisbon summit. 

The United States continues to support the U.N. process led by Matthew Nimetz 

to reach a mutually acceptable solution to the name issue and we actively encourage 

both countries to resolve the issue as soon as possible. A lasting solution to this dispute is in the interest of both countries. 

Question. What is the administration’s plan to enhance the security of Georgia? 

Outside of Georgia, can you please identify the other cases where the United States 

has refused to sell arms to a country that the United States has supported for entry 

into NATO? Will we see an arms sales package offered to Georgia? 

Answer. The United States continues to have a broad and deepening relationship 

with Georgia in a number of sectors and remains fully committed to supporting 

Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Our security assistance and military 

engagement with Georgia is focused in two main areas. 

First, we are providing comprehensive defense assistance covering doctrine, personnel management, education, and training to support Georgia’s defense reform 

and modernization efforts along Euro-Atlantic lines. This approach supports GeorVerDate Nov 24 2008 20:45 Sep 15, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00040 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARING FILES\112TH CONGRESS, 1ST\2011 ISSUE TEXT HEARINGS\051811-T.TXT
37 

gia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations as well as security and stability in the region. Second, we continue to train and equip Georgian troops for deployment as part of the 

International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. This training will ultimately develop four infantry Georgian battalions to conduct distributed operations 

in a counterinsurgency environment. The first U.S. trained-and-equipped battalion 

deployed to Afghanistan in March 2010. Georgian troops are currently fighting 

without caveats alongside U.S. Marines as part of ISAF operations in Regional 

Command-South, Helmand Province. 

Question. Will the administration recognize the bilateral dispute between Russia 

and Georgia and support a similar condition on Russia respecting Georgia’s territorial integrity before Russia enters the World Trade Organization? 

Answer. Russia’s membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) is a step 

that will benefit U.S. economic interests directly not only by increasing market access for U.S. exports, but also by integrating Russia into a system of fixed rules governing trade behavior and providing the means to enforce those rules and Russia’s 

market access commitments. 

Russia is the largest economy that has yet to join the WTO. The operation of one 

of the world’s most important economies outside of the rules and disciplines that 

apply to 153 other countries leaves U.S. companies, workers, farmers, ranchers, and 

investors vulnerable to erratic Russian trade and protectionist measures. 

The WTO operates using consensus-based decisionmaking. Thus, for Russia to be 

able to join, all Members, including Georgia, will need to permit a consensus approving the terms of its accession. Russia and Georgia have been meeting under Swiss 

auspices in an effort to reach a bilateral agreement that would resolve their trade 

issues and result in Georgia allowing Russia’s accession to proceed. The United 

States is not a party to those negotiations, but we are encouraging both sides to 

engage constructively and flexibly to reach a workable outcome. 

The United States strongly supports Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and continues to urge the Russians to fulfill their commitments under the 

August 2008 cease-fire mediated by President Sarkozy, including a withdrawal of 

forces to preconflict positions. 

RESPONSES OF PAIGE ALEXANDER TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR JAMES E. RISCH

LIST OF RECIPIENTS OF USAID FUNDS IN RUSSIA, 2009–2011

Question. Can you provide a list of all the recipients in the last 3 years of USAID 

funds in Russia, and how much each entity has received? 

Answer. The requested information is provided in the attached Excel spreadsheet. 

38 

39 

USAID DISCRETION IN SELECTING RUSSIAN NGO’S

Question. Does USAID have sole discretion in selecting which organizations receive USAID funds in Russia, and do you ensure that the organizations are independent of the Russian Government and political influence before providing funds? 

Answer. USAID has sole discretion in selecting organizations for USAID funding 

by regulation and policy. Oversight of this process and ultimate selection is the reVerDate Nov 24 2008 20:45 Sep 15, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00043 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARING FILES\112TH CONGRESS, 1ST\2011 ISSUE TEXT HEARINGS\051811-T.TXT usaid6.eps
40 

sponsibility of the USAID/Russia Contracting Officer. The Russian Government does 

not exert pressure or influence USAID’s selection of organizations for USAID funding. 

Promoting independent civil society in Russia is a major USAID/Russia objective 

and we are sensitive to the need to avoid working with Russian organizations that 

are unduly influenced by the Russian Government. To that end, USAID/Russia has 

a variety of methods of ensuring such independence. 

Although many Russian NGOs are subject to some degree of political influence 

in Russia, the processes we use for reviewing potential partners, selecting recipients 

for USAID funding, and monitoring performance of our partners reduce the chance 

that selected partners will be unduly influenced by the Russian Government in implementing their USAID-funded programs. USAID would not select an organization 

for USAID funding that is dominated or controlled by the Russian Government. 

Many USAID/Russia awards are competitive, open to both U.S. and Russian organizations, with contractors and grantees selected largely on the merits of their technical applications as reviewed by evaluation committees composed of USAID/Russia 

staff. As part of the evaluation process, past performance reference checks are conducted on both potential recipients and key personnel, which could reveal excessive 

political influence. In addition, as part of the Contracting Officer’s due diligence in 

making a preaward responsibility determination, a review of an organization’s business integrity, management capacity, and performance record is conducted. In the 

case of organizations new to USAID, a thorough financial, legal, and management 

survey of each organization’s policies, procedures, internal controls and management, and financial structure is carried out by USAID staff, and links to the government, in corporate structure or governance, would be identified. USAID/Russia also 

has a number of noncompetitive grants, mainly to longstanding Russian partner organizations, several of which were created with USAID funds over the past two decades. Performance under all awards is monitored by a USAID technical officer 

through site visits and performance reporting. 

Many of our partners work primarily with regional and municipal governments 

rather than the federal government, further reducing the opportunities for central 

government influence. Some of our partners who offer policy analysis and other 

services in Russia are in fact highly regarded, including by the Russian Government, for their independent, objective analysis. 

While there is no litmus test for an organization’s relationship with the Russian 

Government, given the processes outlined above and the close working relationships 

between USAID/Russia and its partners, we are comfortable that USAID’s partners 

are independent from the Government of Russia. 

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