## In The Court of Appeals Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

No. 06

- 21

- 00119

- CV

JERRY LEE SANDERS , Appellant

V. CHERYL VAUGHAN, AS INDEPENDENT EXECUTRIX OF THE ESTATE OF DOLLIE BARRETT, DECEASED App ellee

On Appeal from the County Cou r t at Law No. 2

Hunt County, Texas Trial Court No. CC2100382

Before Morriss, C.J., Stevens and van Cleef , JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice van Cleef2 

### ME MORANDUM OPINION Jerry Lee Sanders appeals his eviction from property located at 205 Vancevill e Drive in West Tawakoni, Texas 75474 (the Property ). Because we find that the judgment evicting Sanders was entered in the absence of jurisdiction to do so, we va cate it. I. Background Sanders’s mother, Dollie Barrett , died on November 25, 2020

. On th e d a te of her death,
Barrett owned several parcels of real estate , including the Property in question

. Barrett also

o wned a manufactured home located on the Property, which Sanders had occupied for twenty
years . Barrett’s l ast w ill and t est ament devi sed al l of her estate to her deceased husband’s two daughters and her own children , i ncluding her daughter Cher yl Vaughan , and sons, Sanders , Bobby Keith Sanders, and James Scott Sanders “in equal shares.” Barrett’s w ill , which also appointed Vaug han “t o serve a s Independent Executrix , ” was admitted to probate. On December 16 , 2020, the C ounty Court at Law Number 2 of Hunt County qualified Vaughan as the independent executrix of Barrett’s e state and issued letters testamentary. 1
In her ca pacity as e xecutrix o f Barrett’s e st ate, Vaughan sought to sell the Property , but Sanders refuse d to vacate it

. In response to Sanders’s refusal to move, Vaughan filed an action seeking to evict Sanders in the Justice Court, Precinct 4, Place 1, of Hunt County, Te xas , in Octo b er 20 21

. Vaughan’ s petition alleged that Sanders violated a lease by fa iling to pay rent

. A lthough duly cited, Sanders fai led to appear at trial. As a result, the j ustice c ourt issued a writ

1 Unless otherwise stated, all rema i n ing r eferences to Vaughan refer to her status as independent executrix of Barret t’s e state.3

of possession in favor of Vaughan. San ders appealed, request i ng a trial de novo before the

c ount y c ourt at l aw . See T EX
. R. C IV
. P . 510.10 (c)

. At the trial, Vaughan testified that she needed to sell the Property so that proceeds from the sale could bene fit all of Barrett’s devisees an d that, despite r eceiving Va ug h an’ s notic es, Sanders refused to vacate the Property. Amy Ivy, a local realtor, testified that she had entered into a listing agreement for the Property with Vaughan, that buyers were interest ed in the Property, but that she could not gain a cc ess to th e m anufact ure d home because “Sanders prefer[red her] not to be inside the home to show it.” Because Ivy believed it impossible to sell the Property without showing the interior of the manufacture d home, she opined that Sanders
was pre venting he r from ef fe ct i vely marke ting the Property for sale. Bobby Keith Sanders testified that he was a “one

- fifth” beneficiary of Barrett’s e state , and he supported Vaughan’s application to sell the Property

. S anders testified that he had lived on the Property fo r twenty y e a rs and had no other home. He claimed that Barrett had orally given him an ownership interest in the Property in exchange for work completed on the Property and his agreement to “[t]ake care of the bills .” In support, Sanders i ntroduced a “Tex as Manufac t u red Home Appl ication” for insurance that listed Barrett as the “Applicant

— Titled Owner” and him as a “Co

- Applicant

— Titled Owner.” According to Sanders, Vaughan and Bobby agreed “ [ t ] h at if an ything

. . . happ en [ ed ] to [Barrett], that [Sanders] could stay t here until [h e] died.” 2 Sanders also claimed that he paid the taxes on

2 Vaughan testified th at t

he current insurance policy listed her as the owner of the Property and denied that she had eve r agreed to allow Sanders to remain there. Howev er, Sander s’ s daughter, Stormy Brown, supported Sanders’s testimony th at Barrett gave him the Property and t hat Vaughan had agreed to let him li ve there.4

the Property. As a result, Sanders testified that he had filed suit in the 196th Judicial District Court of Hunt Coun ty seeking t o partition in kind Barrett’s real property , i nclud i n g t he Property in question, and he introduce d his petition seeking title to the Property into evidence. After hearing tha t evidence, the c ounty c ourt at l aw declared that the man ufactured home was realty, found Sanders to be a tenant of Barrett’s e st at e , entered judgment in f avo r of Vaughan for possession of the Property , and authorized a writ of possession to the Property. II. The Justice Court Did Not Have Jurisdic tion t o Evict Sanders We must first address the threshold issue of subject

- matte r jur i s diction. “The authori ty of a court to hear a particular case is a systemic requirement that cannot be waived or conferred by consent and which may be considered at any time.” Geldard v. Watson , 214 S.W. 3d 202, 206 (Tex. App.

— Texarkana 2007, no pet

. ) ( q u o ting Jaco bs v. State , 181 S.W.3d 487, 488

– 89 (Tex. App.

— Texarkana 2005, pet. ref’d). “The issue of the subject

- matter jurisdiction of the lower court(s) may be raised s ua sponte by an appellate court.” I d. Under the T exas Estates Code, t he term “ p roba t e proceedi ng ” includes “(5) a claim arising from an estate administration a nd any action brought on the claim; [and] (6) the settling of a personal representative ’ s acco unt of an estate and any other matter related to th e settlement, partition, or di strib u t ion of a n estate.” T EX
. E ST
. C ODE A NN . § 31.001. Also, “a matter relate d to a probate proceeding inc ludes” “a claim brought by a personal representative on behalf of an estate.” T EX
. E ST
. C ODE A NN . § 3 1.002(a)(3), (b )(1). Because Vaughan brought a cl a i m agains t Sanders on behalf of Barrett’s e state, the claim was, at the ver y least, a matter related t o a probate proceeding.5

Section 32.001 states : (a) All probate p roceedings must be filed and heard in a court exerc ising original probate jurisd i ction

. The cou rt exercising original probate jurisdiction also has jurisdiction of all matters related to t he probate proceeding as specified in Section 31.002 for that type of court.

. . . . (d) The administration of the estate of a decedent, from t h e fil i n g of the application for probate and administration, or for administration, until the decree of final distribution and the discharge of the last personal representative, shall be considered as one proceeding for purpose s of jurisdiction. The entir e proc e e ding is a proceeding in rem.
T EX
. E ST
. C ODE A NN . § 32.001. The record establishes that a probat e proceeding was separately pending in a different cause number with the c ounty c ourt at l aw . Instead of fili ng the matter related to a probate
pro ceedi n g in the pendi ng probate action, Vaughan filed a forcible detainer proceeding with the j ustice c ourt

. While justice courts have jurisdiction of cases of forcible entr y and detainer, “ [a] justice court does not have jurisdiction of

. . . a suit for tria l of title to l and.” T EX
. G OV ’ T C ODE A NN
. § 27.031(b)(4) (Supp.) . A s we explain below, because the question of possession and title were inextricably intertwined in this case , th e j ustice c ourt and the c ounty c ourt at l aw lacked jurisdic tion to evic t San d e rs. See Murray v . U.S. Bank Nat ’ l Ass ’ n , 411 S.W.3d 926, 929 (Tex. App.

— El Paso 2013, no pet.) ( quoting Rice v. Pinney , 51 S.W.3d 705, 708 (Tex. App.

— Dallas 2001, no pet.) ( “[W]hen sitting as appellate courts, the county courts ’ jurisdi ction is lim ited t o tha t of the just ice courts.”) )

.6

“An action for forcible detainer is co nsidered a special proceeding; its purpose is to determine quickly and inexpensively who has a right to possess ion of real property.” Gober v

. Bulkley Prop s. , LLC , No. 06

- 18

- 00 031

- C V , 201 9 WL 321326, at *2 (Tex. App

. — Texarkana Jan. 25, 2019, pet. deni ed) (mem. op.) (citing Tehuti v. Bank of New York Mellon Tr. Co., Nat’l Ass’n , 517 S.W.3d 270, 273 (Tex. App.

— Texarkana 20 17, no pet.)). “ I n a forcible detainer action, a plaintiff need n ot p rove title, b ut only a super ior right to immediate possession. ” Id

. (citin g Tehuti , 517 S.W.3d at 274) (quoting Rice , 51 S.W.3d at 709) )

. “ If the issue of possession requires a ruling on a title dispute, t he justice court may not deci de the right to p o s sess ion. ” Id

. (c iting T ehuti , 5 17 S.W.3d at 274) (quoting Borunda v. Fed. Nat ’ l Mortg. Ass ’ n , 511 S.W.3d 731, 734 (T ex. App.

— El Paso 2015 , no pet.)) ). “One indication that a justice court, and county
court on appeal , is called on to ad judicate tit le t o r eal estate in a f orcible detaine r case

— and, thus exceed its jurisdiction

— is when a landlord

- tenant relationship is lacking.” Id. at *3 (quoting Yarto v. Gilli land , 287 S.W.3d 83, 89 (Tex. App.

— Corpus Christi 2009, no pet.) (quoting War d v. Malone , 115 S

. W .3d 267, 270 (Te x. App.

— Corpus Christi 2003, pet. denied)) ) ; see Garza v

. Est. of Olivarez , No. 13

- 17

- 00265

- CV, 2018 WL 3768505, at *5 (Tex. App.

— Corpus Christi Aug. 9, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.)

. Here, alth ough Vaughan’s forcible deta iner petition all e g e d th at she sought to evict Sand ers because he failed to pay rent, there was never a ny landlord

- tenant relationship , and it was undisputed that Sanders lived on the Property with Barrett’s permission for twenty years . In fact, it appears that Vaughan ’s su i t was im proper und er the forcibl e entry and detainer statutes

. Forcible entry and d etainer cases are governed by Chapter 24 of the Texas Property Code.7

Section 24.001 of the Texas Property C ode, wh ich provid es for forcible entry and de tainer cases , st at e s : (a) A person com mits a forcib le entry and detainer if the person enters the real property of another without legal authority or by force and refuses to surrender possession on demand. (b) For the purposes of this chapter, a forcible en try is: (1) an en t r y wit hout the cons ent of the pe rson in actual possession of the property; (2) an en try without the consent of a tenant at will or by sufferance; or (3) an entry without the consent of a person who acquired pos session by forcible entry.
T EX
. P ROP
. C O DE A N N
. § 24 .001. Sectio n 24.002 prov ides,

(a) A person who refuses to surrender p ossession of real property on demand commits a forcible detainer if the person:

(1) is a tenant or a subtenant willfully and witho ut force holding over after the terminat ion o f the t enant’s right of possessio n; (2) is a tenant at will or by sufferance, inc luding an occupant at the time of foreclosure of a lien superior to the tenant ’ s lease; or (3) is a tenant of a person who acqui red possession by forcible e ntry. T EX
. P RO P
. C ODE A NN
. § 24.002 ( a). Section 24.0061 states, “ A landlord who prevails i n an evic tion suit is entitled to a judgment for possession of the premises and a writ of possession .”
T EX
. P ROP
. C ODE A NN
. § 24 .0061 (a) (Supp.)

. And the term “ ‘ premises ’ mea ns th e unit that i s occupied o r rented and any outside area or facility that the tenant is entitled to use under a written le ase or or al rental agreement, or that is held out for the use of tenants generally .” Id.8

“ [ W ] ithout a landlord

- tenant relationship , a j u s tice court c annot deter mine the issue of immediate possession without first determining who has t itle to the property.” Anderson v. Chandler , No. 12

- 16

- 00299

- CV, 2017 WL 2829329, at *3 (Tex. App.

— Tyler June 30, 2017, no pet.) (q uoting Goodman

- Delan ey v. G rantham , 484 S.W.3d 171 , 174 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.) ) ; see Boehl v. Richar dson , No. 13

- 19

- 00021

- CV, 2019 WL 6769876, at *3 (Tex. App.

— Corpus Chr isti Dec. 12, 2019, pet. denied) (m em. op.)

. N othing showed that Sanders was eve r su bj e c t to any landlor d

- tenant agreement. The undisputed evidenc e instead showed that Sanders h ad acquired an undivided one

- fifth interest in Barrett’s e state under her

w ill

. Since Sanders was a dev isee under Barrett’s w ill , the Texas Estates Code pro v isi on s shed light on the issue of possession and ownership. Section 101.001 of the Texas Estates Code
states , “ S ubject to Section 101.051, if a person dies lea ving a lawful will:

. . . all of the pers on’s estate that i s devised by the will vests immediat ely i n th e devisees.” T EX
. E ST
. C ODE A NN
. § 101.001 (a) ; see Smith v. Hodges , 294 S.W.3d 774, 777 (Tex. App.

— Eastland 2009 , no pet. ) (“Property devised under a will, duly probated, is deemed to vest tit le in the devisee as of the moment of death of the tes tat or . ” )

. In relevant part, Section 101.051 specifies , “ A decedent’s estate vests in accor dance w ith Section 101.001(a) subject to the payment of: (a) t he debts of the decedent, except as exempted by law. ” T EX
. E ST
. C ODE A NN . § 101.051(a). Because Vau g h an

n e i ther alleged nor showed that there were any debts of the E state, Sanders argued that he became a tenant in common along with the other devisees und er Barrett’s w ill.9

“Before partition, the joint owners or tenants in common have the e qual right to
pos se s s ion and the estates of all of them are of equal dignity.” Lane v. Hughes , 228 S.W.2d 9 86, 988 ( Tex. App.

— Amarillo 1950, no writ ). As a result, “ a tenant in common is entitled to possessio n of the entire premises agai nst all pers o ns except the othe r t en a n ts in common[.]” In re Beeler , 394 S.W.3d 800, 806 (Tex. App.

— Beaumo nt 2013 , orig. proceeding ) (quoting Steddum v. Kirby Lumber Co

. , 110 Tex. 513 ( 1920 ) ); see Byrom v. P endley , 717 S.W.2d 602 , 605 (Tex. 19 86) (“ [E] ach cotenant has a right to enter upo n t h e common estate and a corollary right to possession.”)

. Vaugh an ’s pl eading argues that Barrett’ s e state owned title to the Property. She also alleged that Sanders was p reventing the sale of t he Property an d that, as the e xecutrix, she had the duty to po s s ess the P roperty and sell it. Yet, the power of sale grante d by Section 402.052 of th e Texas Estates Code 3 to an independent executrix “ does not address an independent
executor ’ s authority to obt ain the evic ti on of a cotenant. ” In re Raynes , No s . 0 4

- 15

- 0 0717

- CV , 04

- 15

- 00787

- C V , 2016 WL 4208111, at *4 (Tex. App.

— San Antonio Aug. 10, 2016, n o pet.) (me m. op.)

. Sanders argued , among other things, that he h ad a superior right to possess the
P roperty as cotenant d evisee under Barrett’s w ill. This argu m en t, c oupled with the lack of any evidence showing that there were debts owed by Barrett’s e state, estab lished the existence of a genuine title dispute. 4

3 Barrett ’ s will did not expressly give Vaughan the power of sale

. 4 We expressly distinguish t h is case fro m all c ases wh ere (1) a matter related to a probate proc eedin g was properly before a probate court, (2) the re were outstanding debt s of an estate, or (3) an actual landlord

- t enant relationship was shown.10

A justice court lacks jurisdiction whe re there is “specific e vidence of a title dispute that is dete r mi nat i ve regarding the possession dispute.” Gober , 2019 WL 321326, at *2. “ ‘ [S]pecific evidence’ of a title dispute exi sts when

. . . [ a defendant] has ass erted a basis for title ownership th at is not patently in ef

fective under the law and is intertwine d w ith the issue of immediate possession.” Yarto v. Gilli land , 287 S.W.3d 83, 9 3 (Tex. App.

— Corpus Christi 2009, no pet.)

. The appellate record shows that t he majo rity of Sanders’s trial testi mony was spent attemp ti ng to prove the issue of title. Here, u nd er t he facts of this case, the resolution of title was a prerequisite to dete rmination of the right to immediate possession. See Tellez v. Rodriguez , 612 S.W.3d 707, 710 (Tex. Ap p.

— Houston [ 14th Dist .] 2020 , no pe t. ) ; Boehl , 2019 WL 6769876 , at *3; And e rs on , 2017 WL 2829329, at *4 ; Goodman

- Delaney , 484 S.W.3d at 175; Geldard , 214 S .W.3d at 209 ; see also Raynes , 2016 WL 4208111, at *4 ; Bynum v. Lewis , 393 S.W .3d 916 , 919 (Tex. App.

— Tyler 2013 , no pet. ) ; Pina v. Pin a , 371 S.W.3d 361, 365 (Tex. App.

— Housto n [ 1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.)

. As a result, we conclude that the j us tice c ourt

— and , therefore , the c ounty

c ourt at l aw

— lacked jurisdiction to evict Sande rs from the Property. III. Conclusion
We vacate the j ud gment and dismiss the cause for want of jurisdicti on .

Charles van Cleef Justice
Da te Subm itted: August 15, 2022 Date Decided: September 2 , 2022