STIP AND [PROPOSED] ORDER FOR EXTENSION OF DEADLINES AND FILING OF FOURTH AMENDED COMPLAINT; DECL. OF WHITNEY HUSTON

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JAMES C. STURDEVANT (SBN 94551) (jsturdevant@sturdevantlaw.com)

MONIQUE OLIVIER (SBN 190385) (molivier@sturdevantlaw.com)

WHITNEY HUSTON (SBN 234863) (whuston@sturdevantlaw.com) 

THE STURDEVANT LAW FIRM 

A Professional Corporation 

354 Pine Street, Fourth Floor 

San Francisco, California 94104 

Telephone:(415) 477-2410 

Facsimile: (415) 477-2420 

ARTHUR D. LEVY (SBN 95659) (arthur@yesquire.com) 

STRATEGIC LEGAL REPRESENTATION 

Three Embarcadero Center, Suite 1650 

San Francisco, CA 94111 

Telephone: (415) 702-4550 

Facsimile: (415) 814-4080 

Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Counterdefendant 

Krista O’Donovan and Eduardo de la Torre 

BRAD W. SEILING (Bar No. CA 143515) (bseiling@manatt.com)

NOEL S. COHEN (Bar No. CA 219645) (ncohen@manatt.com)

LYDIA M. MENDOZA (Bar No. 247916) (lmendoza@manatt.com)

MANATT, PHELPS & PHILLIPS, LLP 

11355 West Olympic Boulevard 

Los Angeles, CA 90064-1614 

Telephone:(310) 312-4000 

Facsimile: (310) 312-4224 

Attorneys for Defendant and Counterclaimant 

CashCall, Inc. 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

KRISTA O’DONOVAN, an individual, 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

CASHCALL, INC., a California corporation, and 

DOES 1 through DOE 50, inclusive, 

 Defendants. 

Case No.: C 08-03174 MEJ 

STIPULATION AND [proposed] ORDER 

FOR EXTENSION OF DEADLINES AND 

FILING OF FOURTH AMENDED 

COMPLAINT; DECLARATION OF 

WHITNEY HUSTON 

Magistrate Judge: Maria-Elena James 

Complaint filed: June 1, 2008 

CASHCALL, INC., a California corporation, 

 Counterclaimant, 

 v. 

EDUARDO DE LA TORRE, individually and 

on behalf of all others similarly situated, 

 Counterdefendant. 

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 WHEREAS on September 11, 2008, the parties, through their respective counsel, filed a 

Stipulation and [proposed] Order for Extension of Deadlines [Dkt. # 6], in which the parties 

requested extension to the deadlines set forth in the June 1, 2008 Order Setting Initial Case 

Management Conference and ADR Deadlines (“CMC Order”) [Docket # 4]. The Court granted this 

request on September 9, 2008 [Dkt. # 8] and issued a corrected Order at the parties stipulated request 

due to an inadvertent error in the original request [Dkt. # 9] on September 26, 2008 [Dkt. 10]. 

 WHEREAS, the Court issued its Case Management Order on September 16, 2009 [Dkt. 

# 44], which set the Class Certification Motion briefing and hearing schedule as follows: 

Class Certification Motion to be filed March 4, 2009 

Opposition to Class Certification to be filed March 25, 2009 

Reply in Support of Class Certification to be filed April 8, 2009 

Class Certification Hearing April 22, 2009 at 10:00 am in Ctrm B 

WHEREAS on December 1, 2009, the parties, through their respective counsel, filed a 

Stipulation to Extend ADR Compliance for a Period of 120 Days in Light of Class Certification 

Motion Scheduling requesting that the Court extend the date for completing mediation to a date after 

the hearing on Class Certification, i.e., April 23, 2010 [Dkt. # 50], which the Court granted on 

December 2, 2010 [Dkt. # 51]. 

 WHEREAS the parties have diligently and actively engaged in discovery. Due to scheduling 

conflicts, however, the parties are unable to complete discovery necessary and related to class 

certification prior to the date upon which the Class Certification Motion is due to be filed. 

Additionally, Plaintiffs are concurrently filing herein an amended complaint, which will require 

additional discovery related to class certification to be conducted prior to the date upon which the 

Class Certification Motion is due to be filed. 

 WHEREAS on July 14, 2009, Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint [Dkt. # 35] and 

on July 30, 2009 Plaintiffs filed a Third Amended Complaint [Dkt. # 38], both in response to this 

Court’s Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. The parties met 

and conferred and agreed that Plaintiffs will file a Fourth Amended Complaint adding a new named 

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Plaintiff and related allegations regarding the additional Plaintiff. The proposed Fourth Amended 

Complaint will not add or change any allegations related to the causes of action, other than as 

necessary or related to the addition of the new Plaintiff. 

 NOW, THEREFORE, Plaintiffs and Defendant, through their respective counsel, hereby 

stipulate, subject to the approval of this Court, that case deadlines below shall be modified as 

follows: 

Class Certification Motion to be filed June 3, 2010 

Opposition to Class Certification to be filed June 24, 2010 

Reply in Support of Class Certification to be filed July 8, 2010 

Class Certification Hearing July 22, 2010 at 10:00 am in Ctrm B 

ADR Compliance Deadline September 24, 2010 

The Parties also stipulate to the following, subject to the approval of this Court: 

Plaintiffs’ proposed Fourth Amended Complaint is attached to this stipulation as Exhibit A 

and is deemed filed as of the date of the signed order. Defendant shall file a responsive pleading by 

no later than March 19, 2010. 

DATED: February 24, 2010 THE STURDEVANT LAW FIRM 

 A Professional Corporation 

 STRATEGIC LEGAL REPRESENTATION 

 By: /s/ Whitney Huston WHITNEY HUSTON 

 Attorneys for Plaintiff 

DATED: February 24, 2010 MANATT, PHELPS & PHILLIPS, LLP 

 By: /s/ Brad W. Seiling BRAD W. SEILING 

 Attorneys for Defendant 

// 

// 

// 

// 

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PURSUANT TO STIPULATION, IT IS SO ORDERED. 

The Court hereby VACATES the Class Certification hearing date of April 22, 2010 and sets 

the hearing for June 17, 2010. The case deadlines below shall be modified as follows: 

Class Certification Motion to be filed June 3, 2010 

Opposition to Class Certification to be filed June 24, 2010 

Reply in Support of Class Certification to be filed July 8, 2010 

Class Certification Hearing July 22, 2010 at 10:00 am in Ctrm B 

ADR Compliance Deadline September 24, 2010 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amended Complaint, attached hereto as 

Exhibit A, is deemed filed as of the date of this Order. Defendant shall file a responsive pleading by 

no later than March 19, 2010. 

DATED: __________________, 2010 _______________________________________ 

 MARIA-ELENA JAMES 

 United States Magistrate Judge 

ATTESTATION UNDER GENERAL ORDER 45

 I, Whitney Huston, am the ECF User whose ID and password are being used to file the 

within document: 

STIPULATION AND [proposed] ORDER FOR EXTENSION OF DEADLINES AND FILING 

OF FOURTH AMENDED COMPLAINT; DECLARATION OF WHITNEY HUSTON 

Pursuant to General Order 45, I hereby attest that Brad W. Seiling has concurred in this filing 

and that I have on file all holograph signatures for any signatures indicated by a “conformed” 

signature (/S/) within this efiled document. 

 By: /s/ Whitney Huston WHITNEY HUSTON 

February 25

Plaintiff shall separately file the Fourth Amended Complaint via efiling.

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DECLARATION OF WHITNEY HUSTON 

I, Whitney Huston, declare as follows: 

1. I am a member of the State Bar of California and admitted to practice law in all the 

courts of the State of California and in the United States District Court for the Northern District of 

California. I am in good standing with the Bar and with this Court. I am employed by The 

Sturdevant Law Firm, counsel for plaintiffs in the above-entitled action. 

2. I make this declaration of my own personal knowledge, and if called as a witness, 

could and would testify competently to the matters stated herein. 

3. On September 11, 2008, the parties, through their respective counsel, filed a 

Stipulation and [proposed] Order for Extension of Deadlines [Dkt. # 6], in which the parties 

requested extension to the deadlines set forth in the June 1, 2008 Order Setting Initial Case 

Management Conference and ADR Deadlines (“CMC Order”) [Docket # 4]. The Court granted this 

request on September 9, 2008 [Dkt. # 8] and issued a corrected Order at the parties stipulated request 

due to an inadvertent error in the original request [Dkt. # 9] on September 26, 2008 [Dkt. 10]. 

4. On December 1, 2009, the parties, through their respective counsel, filed a Stipulation 

to Extend ADR Compliance for a Period of 120 Days in Light of Class Certification Motion 

Scheduling requesting that the Court extend the date for completing mediation to a date after the 

hearing on Class Certification, i.e., April 23, 2010 [Dkt. # 50], which the Court granted on December 

2, 2010 [Dkt. # 51]. 

5. The parties have diligently and actively engaged in discovery. Due to scheduling 

conflicts, however, the parties are unable to complete discovery necessary and related to class 

certification prior to the date upon which the Class Certification Motion is due to be filed. 

Additionally, Plaintiffs are concurrently filing herein an amended complaint, which will require 

additional discovery related to class certification to be conducted prior to the date upon which the 

Class Certification Motion is due to be filed. 

6. On July 14, 2009, Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint [Dkt. # 35] and on 

July 30, 2009 Plaintiffs filed a Third Amended Complaint [Dkt. # 38], both in response to this 

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Court’s Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. The parties met 

and conferred and agreed that Plaintiffs will file a Fourth Amended Complaint adding a new named 

Plaintiff and related allegations regarding the additional Plaintiff. The proposed Fourth Amended 

Complaint will not add or change any allegations related to the causes of action, other than as 

necessary or related to the addition of the new Plaintiff. 

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. 

 Executed this 24th day of February, 2010, at San Francisco, California. 

 

 

 By: /s/ Whitney Huston WHITNEY HUSTON 

Z:\434 - O'Donovan v CashCall, Inc\Pleadings\Stip re Extension of class cert deadlines.doc 

Case 3:08-cv-03174-TSH Document 53 Filed 02/25/10 Page 6 of 27
EXHIBIT A

Case 3:08-cv-03174-TSH Document 53 Filed 02/25/10 Page 7 of 27
FOURTH AMENDED COMPLAINT CASE NO. C 08-03174 MEJ

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JAMES C. STURDEVANT (SBN 94551) 

(jsturdevant@sturdevantlaw.com) 

MONIQUE OLIVIER (SBN 190385) 

(molivier@sturdevantlaw.com) 

WHITNEY HUSTON (SBN 234863) 

(whuston@sturdevantlaw.com) 

THE STURDEVANT LAW FIRM 

A Professional Corporation 

354 Pine Street, Fourth Floor 

San Francisco, California 94104 

Telephone:(415) 477-2410 

Facsimile: (415) 477-2420 

ARTHUR D. LEVY (SBN 95659) (arthur@yesquire.com) 

STRATEGIC LEGAL REPRESENTATION 

Three Embarcadero Center, Suite 1650 

San Francisco, CA 94111 

Telephone: (415) 702-4550 

Facsimile: (415) 814-4080 

Attorneys for Plaintiffs 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

KRISTA O’DONOVAN, and EDUARDO DE 

LA TORRE, and LORI SAYSOURIVONG 

individually and on behalf of all others 

similarly situated, 

 Plaintiffs, 

 v. 

CASHCALL, INC., a California corporation, and 

DOE 1 through DOE 50, inclusive, 

 Defendants. 

Case No.: C 08-03174 MEJ 

CLASS ACTION

FOURTH AMENDED COMPLAINT 

FOR VIOLATIONS OF ELECTRONIC 

FUND TRANSFER ACT, CONSUMER 

LEGAL REMEDIES ACT, ROSENTHAL 

FAIR DEBT COLLECTION 

PRACTICES ACT, AND UNFAIR 

COMPETITION LAW 

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 

Case 3:08-cv-03174-TSH Document 53 Filed 02/25/10 Page 8 of 27
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INTRODUCTION

1. Plaintiffs Krista O’Donovan, Eduardo De La Torre, and Lori Saysourivong bring this 

case as a class action to challenge the unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent lending practices of CashCall, 

Inc. (“CashCall”). 

2. This is a case of significant impact on thousands of consumers who find themselves 

caught in the grip of a CashCall loan. As specified in detail below, CashCall’s business practices 

violate numerous consumer protection and debt collection laws. 

3. CashCall’s website advertises its loan interest rates in California as follows: 

 Loan amount APR (Annual Percentage Rate) 

 $2,600 Loan 99.25% 

 $5,075 Loan 70.08% 

 $10,000 Loan 59.46% 

CashCall website, Rates for State of California, http://www.cashcall.com/General/Rates.aspx (as of 

June 18, 2008). 

4. CashCall makes millions of dollars in unsecured personal loans to consumers every 

year at exorbitantly high and unconscionable interest rates, the majority of which are in excess of 

90% interest per year. In the year 2005, CashCall reported income of over $68 million. CashCall’s 

income included $26,588,635 in interest income alone. In that same year, CashCall reported 

additional income of $5,508,532 from fees on loans. 

5. CashCall engages in widespread TV broadcast advertising statewide aimed at 

financially strapped and financially desperate consumers. CashCall targets consumers in distress 

who have limited credit alternatives and are financially unable to repay CashCall’s loans as the loan 

terms require. CashCall structures its loans so that they are effectively interest-only over much of 

the loan term. CashCall therefore requires consumers to pay its extremely high interest charges for 

several years, without any significant reduction in their loan balances. 

6. CashCall’s high interest rates, oppressive loan terms, and protracted repayment time 

make it impossible for most consumers who fall prey to CashCall’s advertisements to pay off their 

loans within any reasonable time period, even to pay their loans according to a schedule without 

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defaulting. As the loan term drags on, CashCall secures its profit by collecting high interest 

payments, while the outstanding principal balance is barely reduced. CashCall pumps its customers’ 

loan balances up by adding on late fees and insufficient fund charges. Once a customer falls behind 

in payments, CashCall turns to coercive collection practices to keep the customer paying and 

CashCall collecting. 

7. A significant percentage of consumers, which CashCall estimates to be 20%, default 

on CashCall loans, and the percentage of customers CashCall pursues with collectors is extremely 

high. 

8. In collecting its loans, CashCall has engaged and continues to engage in the uniform 

business practice of making frequent and repeated harassing telephone calls to a consumer’s 

residence, place of employment, and/or cellular phone, up to multiple times a day, for days or weeks 

in a row, demanding payment of outstanding debt. During these phone calls, CashCall uniformly 

employs aggressive tactics, including abusive tone and language, harassing tone and language, and 

providing incorrect or misrepresentative information to convince consumers to make payments. 

9. CashCall has also engaged and continues to engage in the uniform business practice 

of contacting third parties, including employers, co-workers, neighbors, family members, friends, 

and other individuals, and communicates specific information about the debt owed, including private 

personal, and financial information. 

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

10. Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1331 in that 

the claims alleged herein arise under the laws of the United States. This Court has supplemental 

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1367 to hear and determine Plaintiffs’ state law claims 

because those claims are related to Plaintiffs’ federal claims and arise out of a common nucleus of 

operative facts and form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States 

Constitution. 

11. This Court has personal jurisdiction over CashCall, as it is a California corporation. 

12. Venue is proper in the Northern District of California pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 

1391(b)(2) in that the Defendant is domiciled in California and the unlawful conduct that gave rise to 

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these claims occurred within the Northern District of California. 

INTRA-DISTRICT ASSIGNMENT

13. Intra-district assignment in San Francisco/Oakland, California is proper because the 

unlawful conduct that gives rise to the alleged claims occurred in Alameda County. 

PARTIES

14. Plaintiff Krista O’Donovan (“O’Donovan”) is a natural person and a resident of 

Pleasanton, California. She borrowed money from Defendant CashCall, Inc. in Alameda County, 

California for personal, family, or household purposes. 

15. Plaintiff Eduardo De La Torre (“De La Torre”) is a natural person domiciled in 

Redwood City, California. He borrowed money from Defendant CashCall, Inc. in Yolo County, 

California for personal, family or household purposes. 

16. Plaintiff Lori Saysourivong (“Saysourivong”) is a natural person and a resident of 

Sacramento, California. She borrowed money from Defendant CashCall, Inc. in San Diego County 

for personal, family or household purposes. 

17. Defendant CashCall, Inc. (“CashCall”) is a California corporation and has its 

principal place of business located in California. As such, CashCall is legally obligated to all of its 

customers to comply with the laws of this state, including all California consumer protection laws 

CashCall violated, as more specifically alleged below. 

18. CashCall is and at all relevant times was engaged in making consumer loans in 

Alameda County, Yolo County, and throughout California, and either was or should have been 

licensed by the California Department of Corporations as a California Finance Lender subject to the 

California Finance Lenders Law, California Financial Code section 22000 et seq. 

19. Defendants Does 1 through 50 are persons or entities whose true names and identities 

are now unknown to Plaintiffs, and who therefore are sued by such fictitious names. Plaintiffs will 

amend this complaint to allege the true names and capacities of these fictitiously named Defendants 

when they are ascertained. Each of the fictitiously named Defendants is responsible for the conduct 

alleged in this complaint, and Plaintiffs’ damages and the damages of the Plaintiff Class were 

actually and proximately caused by the conduct of the fictitiously named Defendants. 

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FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff Krista O’Donovan 

20. In or about October 2005, Plaintiff Krista O’Donovan borrowed $5,075 from 

CashCall based on an annual percentage rate of interest (“APR”) of 59.83%, according to CashCall’s 

Promissory Note and Disclosure Statement. The stated total of payments to amortize this debt is 

$30,161.86, or six times the principal. The interest carry alone is over $25,000, more than five times 

the principal. A true and correct copy of the CashCall Promissory Note and Disclosure Statement 

applicable to Plaintiff’s CashCall transaction is attached as Exhibit “A” to this Complaint. 

21. CashCall made loans to Plaintiff O’Donovan beyond her financial ability to repay in 

the time and manner provided in the CashCall Promissory Note and Disclosure Statement. For 

example, at the time she took out the loan from CashCall, O’Donovan was working on a commission 

basis and thus her monthly income was not definite. Additionally, O’Donovan had essential 

monthly expenses that exceeded her guaranteed income, including student loan payments, a car 

payment, credit card debt, daycare costs for her three children, rent, and monthly living expenses, 

such as groceries, for a family of five. 

22. In light of the monthly expenses she was required to pay in order to care for her 

family and maintain their basic living conditions, O’Donovan could not afford her CashCall loan 

payment each month. Paying CashCall back for the loan in the time and manner required by 

CashCall was especially difficult because repayment demanded several years of regular payments, 

which was not feasible due to O’Donovan and her husband’s inconsistent income. 

23. On information and belief, CashCall did not conduct any assessment of O’Donovan’s 

employment, earnings capacity, her job security, her monthly expenses or her outstanding debt when 

it approved her for the loan. 

Plaintiff Eduardo De La Torre 

24. In or about February 2006, Plaintiff Eduardo De La Torre borrowed $2,600 from 

CashCall based on an APR of approximately 98%. Upon information and belief, the stated total of 

payments to amortize this debt is over $9,000. 

25. CashCall made loans to Plaintiff De La Torre beyond his financial ability to repay in 

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the time and manner provided in the CashCall Promissory Note and Disclosure Statement. For 

example, at the time he took out the loan from CashCall, De La Torre was working only part-time, 

approximately 15 hours per week. De La Torre’s monthly expenses exceeded his income, as his 

expenses included rent, utilities, credit card debt and groceries. 

26. As De La Torre was a student at University of California at Davis, his income for the 

near future would consist only of student loans and income from his part-time work. De La Torre 

thus could not afford his CashCall loan payment each month. Paying CashCall back for the loan in 

the time and manner required by CashCall was especially difficult because repayment would require 

several years of regular payments, which was not realistic given De La Torre’s status as a student 

without significant earned income. 

27. On information and belief, CashCall did not conduct any assessment of De La Torre’s 

employment, earnings capacity, monthly expenses or outstanding debt when it approved him for the 

loan. 

Plaintiff Lori Saysourivong 

28. In or about May 2006, Plaintiff Lori Saysourivong borrowed $2,525 from CashCall 

based on an annual percentage rate of interest (“APR”) of 99.07%, according to CashCall’s 

Promissory Note and Disclosure Statement. The stated total of payments to amortize this debt is 

$9,149.51. 

29. CashCall made loans to Plaintiff Saysourivong beyond her financial ability to repay 

in the time and manner provided in the CashCall Promissory Note and Disclosure Statement. For 

example, at the time she took out the loan from CashCall, Saysourivong had essential monthly 

expenses that exceeded her guaranteed income, including credit card debt, commuting expenses, 

rent, and monthly living expenses. 

30. In light of the monthly expenses she was required to pay, Saysourivong could not 

afford her CashCall loan payment each month. Paying CashCall back for the loan in the time and 

manner required by CashCall was especially difficult because repayment demanded several years of 

regular payments, which was not feasible due to Saysourivong’s expenses and her husband’s 

inconsistent income. 

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31. On information and belief, CashCall did not conduct any assessment of 

Saysourivong’s earnings capacity, her job security, her monthly expenses or her outstanding debt 

when it approved her for the loan. 

CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS

32. Pursuant to California Civil Code section 1781 and Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure, Plaintiffs bring this action as a class action on behalf of themselves and all others 

similarly situated as members of a proposed class. This putative class (hereinafter the “Plaintiff 

Class”) is defined as follows: 

All individuals who borrowed money from CashCall, Inc. for personal, 

family, or household use at any time from June 30, 2004 to the present. 

33. This action may properly be maintained as a class action pursuant to California Civil 

Code section 1781 and Rule 23. 

34. CashCall’s loans to Plaintiffs and the members of the Plaintiff Class are all 

“consumer loans” as defined by California Financial Code section 22203. 

35. The Promissory Note and Disclosure Statements that CashCall issued for Plaintiffs 

and the members of the Plaintiff Class were all prepared on form loan agreements that are the same 

or substantially similar to the Promissory Note and Disclosure Statements CashCall issued for 

Plaintiffs. 

36. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and on that basis allege that the Plaintiff Class is 

so numerous that joinder of their individual claims is impracticable. The precise number of the 

Plaintiff Class, and the identities of the members, are ascertainable from the business records of 

CashCall. 

37. Questions of law and fact common to the Plaintiff Class exist and predominate over 

questions affecting only individual class members. These common legal and factual questions 

include, but are not limited to: 

a. Whether CashCall’s practices violate the Electronic Fund Transfer Act, 15 

U.S.C. section 1693 et seq. (“EFTA”), including Regulation E, 12 C.F.R. section 205 et seq., 

promulgated by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; 

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b. Whether CashCall’s uniform lending and collection practices are unlawful, 

unfair, and deceptive business practices in violation of the Unfair Competition Law, California 

Business and Professions Code section 17200 et seq. (“UCL”) and the California Finance Lenders 

Law, California Financial Code section 22000 et seq.; 

c. Whether CashCall’s uniform lending and collection practices have violated 

the Consumer Legal Remedies Act, Civil Code section 1750 et seq. (“CLRA”), by uniformly 

representing that the service they provide has characteristics and benefits which it does not have; 

d. Whether CashCall’s uniform practice of employing abusive and harassing 

debt collection tactics and relying on misrepresentations to collect debts violates the Rosenthal Fair 

Debt Collection Practices Act, California Civil Code section 1788 et seq. (“Rosenthal Act”); and 

e. The nature and extent of relief to Plaintiffs and the Plaintiff Class, including 

declaratory judgment, accounting, injunctive relief, restitution, and other remedies to which 

Plaintiffs and the other members of the Plaintiff Class are entitled. 

38. Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the Plaintiff Class. Each of the members 

of the Plaintiff Class borrowed money from CashCall and was issued a Promissory Note and 

Disclosure Statement on forms that are the same or substantially similar to the Promissory Note and 

Disclosure Statement form issued to Plaintiffs. Each of the members of the Plaintiff Class was 

subject to the same or substantially similar uniform lending practices followed by CashCall. Each of 

the members of the Plaintiff Class has the same or substantially similar claims to Plaintiffs for relief 

against these practices under the CLRA; the EFTA; the Rosenthal Act; the California Finance 

Lenders Law; and the UCL. As described above and below, the claims arise from the same course 

of conduct by CashCall, and the relief sought is common. 

39. Plaintiffs are adequate representatives of the Plaintiff Class because: (a) their 

interests do not conflict with the interests of the individual members of the Plaintiff Class they seek 

to represent; (b) they have retained counsel who are competent and experienced in complex class 

action litigation; and (c) they intend to prosecute this action vigorously. The interests of the 

members of the Plaintiff Class will be fairly and adequately protected by Plaintiffs and their counsel. 

40. The Plaintiff Class action device is superior to other available means for the fair and 

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efficient adjudication of the claims of Plaintiffs and the Plaintiff Class. Furthermore, because the 

economic damages suffered by the individual class members may be relatively modest, albeit 

significant, compared to the expense and burden of individual litigation, it would be impracticable 

for members of the Plaintiff Class to seek redress individually for the wrongful conduct alleged 

herein. There will be no undue difficulty in the management of this litigation as a class action. 

Plaintiffs’ and the Plaintiff Class members’ common claims can be economically adjudicated only in 

a class action proceeding, thus promoting judicial efficiency and avoiding multiple trials and 

inconsistent judgments. 

FIRST CLAIM

For violation of the Electronic Fund Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1693 et seq. and 

Federal Reserve Regulation E, 12 C.F.R. § 205 et seq. 

41. Plaintiffs individually, and on behalf of the Plaintiff Class, reallege each and every 

allegation above as if fully set forth in this Claim. 

42. CashCall has initiated and/or effected electronic fund transfers of loan installments 

from the accounts of Plaintiffs on multiple days during a single month. 

43. The Promissory Note and Disclosure Statements relating to the CashCall loan 

transactions of Plaintiffs and the members of the Plaintiff Class uniformly specify a particular day of 

the month when CashCall is allowed to initiate and affect electronic fund transfers from customer 

accounts to collect installment payments and other amounts from Plaintiffs and the Plaintiff Class. 

44. CashCall has engaged and continues to engage in the business practice of initiating 

and effecting electronic fund transfers from customer accounts to collect payments on days of the 

month other than those agreed to and specified in the Promissory Note and Disclosure Statement. 

When CashCall fails to collect a loan installment payment or other charge through electronic fund 

transfer on the day agreed to and specified in a Promissory Note and Disclosure Statement, CashCall 

thereafter attempts to collect the installment payment and other charges on later days during the 

same installment cycle that were not agreed to or authorized by the customer. 

45. These practices violate the Electronic Fund Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. section 1693 et 

seq. (“EFTA”), including 15 U.S.C. section 1693e and Regulation E, 12 C.F.R. section 205 et seq., 

promulgated by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 

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46. Section 1693e(a) provides in relevant part: “A preauthorized electronic fund transfer 

from a consumer’s account may be authorized by the consumer only in writing, and a copy of such 

authorization shall be provided to the consumer when made.” Plaintiffs gave CashCall written 

preauthorization to initiate and effect electronic transfers on a particular day of the month. 

CashCall’s initiation of electronic fund transfers from Plaintiffs’ accounts on days of the month other 

than those so specified violates section 1693e(a) and Regulation E because transfers on multiple 

days during a single month are not in compliance with section 1693e(a) when the customer has only 

authorized a transfer a single date during the month. 

47. These practices violate the EFTA, including 15 U.S.C. section 1693e and 

Regulation E promulgated by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and constitute 

systematic breaches of the CashCall Promissory Note and Disclosure Statement in violation of 15 

U.S.C. section 45(n) and the Federal Trade Commission Policy Statement on Unfairness, Letter 

from Wendell H. Ford & John C. Danforth to Senate members of the Consumer Subcommittee of the 

U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation (Dec. 17, 1980), appended to 

International Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949, 1070 (1984). 

48. Further, CashCall has engaged and continues to engage in the business practice of 

conditioning the extension of credit on the customer’s repayment by means of preauthorized 

electronic fund transfers. CashCall requires all customers to agree to a provision that permits 

CashCall to make electronic debits from their bank account. 

49. These practices violate the EFTA, including 15 U.S.C. section 1693k and 

Regulation E promulgated by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Section 

1693k(1) states in pertinent part: “No person may . . . condition the extension of credit to a 

consumer on such consumer’s repayment by means of preauthorized electronic fund transfers; . . .” 

50. Further, CashCall has engaged and continues to engage in the business practice of 

limiting consumers’ rights to cancel or stop payment of a preauthorized electronic fund transfer by 

requiring all customers to agree to the following provision as a condition of a CashCall loan, “I 

understand that I can cancel this authorization at any time (including prior to my first payment due 

date) by sending written notification to CashCall. Cancellations must be received at least seven days 

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prior to the applicable due date.” 

51. These practices violate the EFTA, including 15 U.S.C. section 1693e(a) and 

Regulation E promulgated by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, which permit a 

consumer to stop payment of a preauthorized electronic fund transfer by notifying either orally or in 

writing up to three business days prior to the scheduled date of the transfer. 

52. As a direct and proximate result of these violations, Plaintiffs and the Plaintiff Class 

were and continue to be damaged in an amount according to proof, including, without limitation, 

statutory damages and actual damages, such as payments of interest and other charges collected by 

CashCall and emotional distress damages. 

53. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. section 1693 et seq., Plaintiffs and the Plaintiff Class are 

entitled to recover actual damages sustained as a result of CashCall’s violations of EFTA, in an 

amount to be determined at trial, statutory damages, and attorney fees and costs in accordance with 

15 U.S.C. section1693m. 

SECOND CLAIM

Violation of Consumer Legal Remedies Act, California Civil Code § 1750 et seq. 

54. Plaintiffs individually, and on behalf of the Plaintiff Class, reallege each and every 

allegation above as if fully set forth in this Claim. 

55. The Consumer Legal Remedies Act, California Civil Code section 1750 et seq. 

(“CLRA”), specifically provides that “[a]ny waiver by a consumer of the provisions of this title is 

contrary to public policy and shall be unenforceable and void.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1751. 

56. CashCall has violated section 1770(a)(5) of the Act by representing that the services 

CashCall provides have characteristics and benefits which they do not have, including without 

limitation, failing to adequately disclose the terms of loans and promising loans benefits which are 

not accurate or realistic based on the terms of the loans. 

57. CashCall has violated section 1770(a)(14) of the CLRA by representing that they 

have rights and remedies that are prohibited by law, specifically that they have the right to collect 

debts without providing notices required by law, and that they have the right to collect debts in a 

manner prohibited by the EFTA and the Rosenthal Act. 

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58. CashCall has violated section 1770(a)(19) of the Act by including unfair and 

unconscionable loan terms, including unconscionable usury rates and an unconscionable Internet 

presentation of the loans, in its loan agreements. CashCall possesses bargaining strength and power 

far superior to that of Plaintiffs and other customers. Without discussion or negotiation, CashCall 

offers standardized form contracts, drafted by CashCall, which are contracts of adhesion because 

they are offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. The loan agreements are substantially one-sided in 

favor of CashCall. They are, therefore, unlawful, unfair, fraudulent, and unconscionable. 

59. As a result of the unfair and deceptive acts and practices of CashCall herein above 

described, Plaintiffs and members of the Plaintiff Class have been harmed. 

60. On August 8, 2008, Plaintiff O’Donovan, through her counsel, sent a notice and 

demand letter, on behalf of herself and all other similarly situated, by certified mail, return receipt, to 

CashCall, Inc., pursuant to California Civil Code section 1782. As of October 10, 2008, Plaintiffs 

had not received a response from CashCall. 

61. As a result of the unfair and deceptive acts and practices of CashCall herein above 

described, members of the Plaintiff Class who are senior citizens or disabled individuals have 

suffered substantial economic or emotional harm, and are entitled to special statutory damages in 

accordance with California Civil Code section 1780(b). 

62. Pursuant to California Civil Code sections 1770 and 1780, Plaintiffs and each 

member of the Plaintiff Class they seeks to represent are entitled to recover actual damages against 

CashCall sustained as a result of CashCall’s violations of the CLRA. In addition, Plaintiffs are 

entitled to recover and seek to recover for themselves any other resulting monetary losses and 

damages and for emotional distress, which damages are in an amount to be proven at trial. 

63. Pursuant to California Civil Code section 1780, Plaintiffs and each member of the 

Plaintiff Class they seek to represent are entitled to recover punitive damages against CashCall 

because CashCall acted with malice, oppression, or fraud. 

64. Pursuant to California Civil Code sections 1780 and 1781, Plaintiffs and the Plaintiff 

Class hereby request certification of the Plaintiff Class, injunctive relief, and attorney’s fees, costs 

and expenses pursuant to California Civil Code section 1780(d) and California Code of Civil 

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Procedure section 1021.5. 

THIRD CLAIM

Violation of the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 1788 et seq. 

65. Plaintiffs individually, and on behalf of the Plaintiff Class, reallege each and every 

allegation above as if fully set forth in this Claim. 

66. The Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, California Civil Code section 1788 

et seq. (“Rosenthal Act”), prohibits unfair and deceptive acts and practices in the collection of 

consumer debts. 

67. CashCall, in the regular course of business, engages in debt collection and is a “debt 

collector” as defined by California Civil Code section 1788.2(c). 

68. When Plaintiff O’Donovan’s, De La Torre’s or Saysourivong’s payment on their 

CashCall loan was late, even by one day, they received phone calls from CashCall employees 

attempting to collect their debt. The callers contacted both Plaintiffs multiple times each day, 

aggressively demanded they make payments on their CashCall loan, and made misrepresentations. 

Plaintiffs were yelled at and threatened by these callers. Additionally, CashCall contacted third 

parties in an attempt to collect Plaintiffs’ debts, including family members, friends, and employers. 

69. By their acts and practices as hereinabove described, CashCall has violated the 

Rosenthal Act and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. (“FDCPA”), as 

incorporated by California Civil Code section 1788.17, as follows, without limitation: 

a. Systematically harassing Plaintiffs and the members of the Plaintiff Class by 

excessive and unnecessary telephone calls in order to coerce and intimidate 

customers into paying and continuing to pay CashCall, in the absence of any 

legitimate reason for the continuation of such calls. 

b. Systematically and unlawfully communicating with third parties regarding the 

loans of Plaintiffs and the members of the Plaintiff Class, including, without 

limitation, employers, friends, and family members, and communicating 

information in regards to the debt owed by the consumer to third parties. 

c. Using deceit and misrepresentation in communications in collecting loans 

from Plaintiffs and the members of the Plaintiff Class. 

d. Claiming and collecting amounts not authorized by agreement with the 

Plaintiffs and the members of the Plaintiff Class, including but not limited to 

insufficient fund fees on electronic debit transactions made on unauthorized 

days of the month. 

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e. Failing to include certain debt collection notices required by law in collecting 

loans to Plaintiffs and the members of the Plaintiff Class. 

70. Pursuant to California Civil Code sections 1788.30 and 1788.17 (incorporating 

15 U.S.C. section 1692 et seq.), Plaintiffs and the Plaintiff Class are entitled to recover actual 

damages sustained as a result of CashCall’s violations of the Rosenthal Act. Such damages include, 

without limitation, resulting monetary losses and damages, which damages are in an amount to be 

proven at trial. In addition, Plaintiffs are entitled to recover and seeks to recover for themselves any 

other resulting monetary losses and damages and for their emotional distress, which damages are in 

an amount to be proven at trial. 

71. In addition, pursuant to California Civil Code sections 1788.30 and 1788.17 

(incorporating 15 U.S.C. section 1692 et seq.), because CashCall’s violations of the Rosenthal Act 

were committed willingly and knowingly, Plaintiffs and the Plaintiff Class are entitled to recover, in 

addition to actual damages, penalties of at least $1,000 per violation as provided for in the Act. 

72. Pursuant to California Civil Code sections 1788.30 and 1788.17 (incorporating 

15 U.S.C. section 1692 et seq.), Plaintiffs and the Plaintiff Class are entitled to recover all attorneys’ 

fees, costs, and expenses incurred in the bringing of this action. 

FOURTH CLAIM

For Unlawful Business Practices in Violation of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 et seq. 

73. Plaintiffs individually, and on behalf of the Plaintiff Class, reallege each and every 

allegation above as if fully set forth in this Claim. 

74. The California Unfair Competition Law, California Business and Profession Code 

section 17200 et seq. (“UCL”), defines unfair competition to include any “unlawful,” “unfair,” or 

“deceptive” business act or practice. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. 

75. CashCall has engaged and continues to engage in the illegal and unfair business 

practice of making loans on terms that are unconscionable under the circumstances at the time they 

are made and which fail to accurately and fairly represent the characteristics and benefits of the 

loans. CashCall violated and continues to violate the UCL, California Financial Code section 22302, 

and California Civil Code section 1670.5, by making loans at rates of interest and on other terms that 

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are unconscionable in light of the financial circumstances of the borrowers. 

76. The CashCall Promissory Note and Disclosure Statement relating to Plaintiffs and the 

Plaintiff Class is a form document prepared exclusively by CashCall and presented to Plaintiffs and 

the members of the public on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. CashCall has grossly disproportionate 

bargaining power vis-à-vis consumers and dictates the terms of its loans and loan documents. 

CashCall allows no opportunity for negotiation. The customer must consent to all terms proposed by 

CashCall in order to obtain a loan from CashCall. 

77. The CashCall Promissory Note and Disclosure Statement relating to each of the 

Plaintiffs and each member of the Plaintiff Class is a consumer contract of adhesion. 

78. CashCall lends to consumers over the Internet, with the customer at a personal 

computer, using electronic signatures, document transmittals, and disclosures. CashCall uniformly 

requires consumers to apply for and execute loan documents electronically. A customer must have 

access to a personal computer in order to fill out and transmit the loan application and 

documentation forms required by CashCall in order to obtain a CashCall loan. CashCall does not 

lend money based on paper transactions. 

79. CashCall’s Internet presentation to consumers of the CashCall loan application and 

documentation forms required to obtain a CashCall loan, including the CashCall Promissory Note 

and Disclosure Statement, does not allow the consumer a fair opportunity to review the documents, 

as a borrower would ordinarily have if presented with a loan application and documentation forms in 

a paper format. Because the forms are presented in a constricted Internet browser window format, 

consumers do not have a fair opportunity to review the application forms and loan documentation 

before completing the loan application process. To the extent that CashCall may allow consumers to 

print these forms out before completing the application process, CashCall does not conspicuously 

disclose that option, or require that consumers do so and read the documents before completing the 

process. 

80. Plaintiffs and the Plaintiff Class were presented with the CashCall Promissory Note 

and Disclosure Statement in small bits and pieces on a computer screen. This presentation does not 

clearly and conspicuously present the rate of interest, the APR, the required Truth in Lending 

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Disclosures, or the term of the loan. A reasonable consumer would not see, register, and understand 

these provisions due to the limitations of presentation on a computer screen. Plaintiffs and the 

Plaintiff Class did not see, register, and/or understand these features of CashCall loans. 

81. As a result of CashCall’s Internet presentation, Plaintiffs did not register or 

understand the loan terms and disclosures. 

82. The Internet presentation of the CashCall Promissory Note and Disclosure Statement 

to Plaintiffs and the Plaintiff Class is markedly one-sided and presents a distorted picture of the loans 

CashCall offers. CashCall’s Internet presentation does not bring home to consumers: (a) the length 

of time that CashCall loans are effectively interest only, that is, two to four years before there is any 

appreciable principal reduction, or (b) that the interest the consumer must pay typically costs three to 

five times the amount that the consumer receives from CashCall. 

83. CashCall’s business practices are unfair because they deceive and mislead consumers 

by inducing them to sign a Promissory Note and Disclosure Statement through an Internet 

presentation which is one sided and does not effectively communicate to a reasonable consumer the 

critical terms of the loan. 

84. Plaintiffs and the members of the Plaintiff Class were unable to understand the 

ramifications of CashCall’s amortization of the loans, and to realize the full cost and unfairness of 

the financial obligation CashCall’s loans purport to impose on Plaintiffs and the members of the 

Plaintiff Class. As a result of a presentation of loan terms and disclosures in an unconscionable 

format, CashCall violated California Financial Code section 22302. 

85. CashCall’s practices are further illegal, unfair, and unconscionable business practices 

because they involve making and collecting loans at exorbitant interest rates on amortization 

schedules that require borrowers to repay CashCall at least twice the amount borrowed before 

reducing substantial principal, requiring borrowers to repay CashCall from three to five times the 

amount of the loan, and requiring repayment over an inordinate amount of time. These practices 

offend public policy, are unconscionable, oppressive and unscrupulous, and cause substantial injury 

to consumers. 

86. CashCall targets consumers experiencing serious, if not altogether desperate, 

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financial challenges. Plaintiffs and the Plaintiff Class have obtained CashCall loans at exorbitantly 

high interest rates and on such unfavorable loan terms because, in their financial circumstances, 

credit alternatives on more favorable terms are not practically available to them in the marketplace. 

A significant percentage of consumers default on CashCall loans, and the percentage of customers 

CashCall pursues with collectors is extremely high. 

87. The harm suffered by Plaintiffs and the Plaintiff Class as a result of the 

extraordinarily oppressive nature of CashCall loan terms greatly outweighs what value, if any, they 

receive as a result of the initial CashCall loan. 

88. CashCall’s practices are further illegal, unfair, and unconscionable because CashCall 

engages in predatory lending practices including, but not limited to, the use of high pressure sales 

tactics and failing to consider a consumer’s ability to repay a loan. 

89. The loans made to Plaintiffs and the Plaintiff Class are void and not enforceable 

because they are unlawful, unfair, and unconscionable in violation of California Financial Code 

section 22302 and California Civil Code section 1670.5, as well as the UCL. 

90. In making and administering their loans to Plaintiffs and the Plaintiff Class, CashCall 

willfully violated California Financial Code section 22302 and California Civil Code section 1670.5. 

91. Further, in making loans to Plaintiffs and the Plaintiff Class, CashCall made loans 

beyond their financial ability to pay in the time and manner provided in the Promissory Note and 

Disclosure Statement, in violation of 10 C.C.R. section 1452, a regulation promulgated under the 

California Finance Lenders Law, pursuant to California Financial Code section 22150, which states, 

“When making or negotiating loans, a finance company shall take into consideration, in determining 

the size and duration thereof, the financial ability of the borrowers to repay the same, to the end that 

the borrowers should be reasonably to repay said loans in the time and manner provided in the loan 

contracts.” 10 C.C.R. § 1452. 

92. In making and administering their loans to Plaintiffs and the Plaintiff Class, CashCall 

willfully violated California Financial Code section 22150 and 10 C.C.R. section 1452. 

93. As a result of these violations and unfair business practices, Plaintiffs suffered injury 

in fact and lost money and property, including but not limited to payments of interest and other 

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charges collected by CashCall on loans made in violation of these laws. 

94. Pursuant to California Business and Professions Code section 17200 et seq., Plaintiffs 

and the Plaintiff Class are entitled to enjoin the practice of making unconscionable loans and of 

harassing debt collection, and to obtain restitution of all funds obtained by CashCall by reason of 

and through the use of these unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent acts and practices. 

FIFTH CLAIM

For Unlawful and Unfair Business Practices in Violation of 

Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 et seq. 

95. Plaintiffs individually, and on behalf of the Plaintiff Class, reallege each and every 

allegation above as if fully set forth in this Claim. 

96. CashCall’s business practices in making and collecting loans are unlawful business 

practices in violation of the UCL because they violate, without limitation, EFTA, the Rosenthal Act, 

and the CLRA, as described above. 

97. As a result of these violations and unlawful business practices, Plaintiffs suffered 

injury in fact and lost money and property, including but not limited to payments of interest and 

other charges collected by CashCall on loans made in violation of these laws. 

98. Pursuant to California Business and Professions Code section 17203, Plaintiffs, 

individually, and on behalf of all members of the Plaintiff Class, and the general public who are, 

have been or may be, subjected to the practices of CashCall in violation of section 17200, hereby 

request injunctive relief prohibiting these practices in the future, and such other orders as may be 

necessary to restore to any person in interest, any money or property, real or personal, which may 

have been acquired by CashCall by means of this unlawful, unfair and fraudulent business practice, 

or to disgorge profits CashCall have earned thereby. 

SIXTH CLAIM

For Unlawful Fraudulent and Unfair Business Practices in Violation of 

Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 et seq. 

99. Plaintiffs individually, and on behalf of the Plaintiff Class, reallege each and every 

allegation above as if fully set forth in this Claim. 

100. CashCall’s marketing, sale, and collection of its loans are fraught with material 

misrepresentations and omissions that are likely to deceive consumers and violate the UCL. 

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101. In its dealings with Plaintiffs and members of the Plaintiff Class, CashCall failed and 

continues to fail to accurately represent the characteristics and benefits of the loans they provide. 

Among other things, CashCall promotes its loans as short term loans and fails to disclose adequately 

the fact that consumers will have to pay back more than three times what they borrow. 

102. CashCall’s agreements with consumers also misrepresent that CashCall has rights 

with respect to collection of debts that are in fact prohibited by law. In particular, CashCall 

misrepresents that it has a right to condition its loans on consumers’ authorization to direct debits 

from their bank accounts to repay the loans. On information and belief, CashCall also routinely 

makes misrepresentations to consumers in its attempts to make consumers pay the usurious terms of 

the loans. 

103. These are material misrepresentations and omissions that are likely to deceive 

consumers, likely to induce consumers to misunderstand the material loan terms, and/or likely to 

induce a consumer to agree to a loan. 

104. As a result of these unlawful and fraudulent business practices, Plaintiffs suffered 

injury in fact and lost money and property, including but not limited to payments of interest and 

other charges collected by CashCall on loans made in violation of these laws. 

105. Pursuant to California Business and Professions Code section 17200 et seq., Plaintiffs 

are entitled to enjoin the practice of making unconscionable loans, of harassing debt collection and 

to obtain restitution of all funds obtained by CashCall by reason of and through the use of these 

unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent acts and practices. 

106. Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, Plaintiffs are entitled to recover 

their reasonable attorney’s fees, costs, and expenses incurred in bringing this action. 

RELIEF SOUGHT

 Plaintiffs request the following relief for themselves and on behalf of the Plaintiff Class: 

1. An order certifying the Plaintiff Class under California Code of Civil Procedure 

section 382 and California Civil Code section 1781, and appointing Plaintiffs and their counsel to 

represent the Plaintiff Class; 

2. A declaration of the rights of Plaintiffs and of the Plaintiff Class with respect to 

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CashCall under the California Finance Lenders Law and its regulations, an accounting to bring their 

loans into compliance with the California Finance Lenders Law and its regulations, restitution of all 

monies collected and/or charged by CashCall from Plaintiffs and the Plaintiff Class in violation of 

the California Finance Lenders Law and its regulations with prejudgment interest to date, and 

injunctive relief against CashCall threatened and ongoing violations of the California Finance 

Lenders Law and its regulations, as more particularly set forth above; 

3. Restitution of all monies wrongfully charged to and/or collected from Plaintiffs and 

the Plaintiff Class in violation of the UCL with prejudgment interest to date, and injunctive relief 

against CashCall for violation of the UCL, as more particularly set forth above; 

4. Actual and statutory damages to Plaintiffs and the Plaintiff Class for violations of 

EFTA, the Rosenthal Act, and the CLRA. 

5. Punitive damages to Plaintiffs and the Plaintiff Class according to proof at trial; 

6. Attorneys fees and expenses of litigation to the extent provided by law; 

7. Costs of suit; and 

8. Such other and further legal and equitable relief as this Court may deem proper. 

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

 Plaintiffs hereby demand a trial by jury of each and every cause of action so triable. 

Respectfully submitted, 

DATED: February 24, 2010 

THE STURDEVANT LAW FIRM 

 A Professional Corporation 

 STRATEIC LEGAL REPRESENTATION 

 By: /s/ Whitney Huston WHITNEY HUSTON 

 Attorneys for Plaintiffs 

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