alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Aurora URBINA-RODRIGUEZ, Petitioner, v. Alberto R. GONZALES, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 05-74662.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted March 12, 2007.*

Filed March 15, 2007.

Jonathan M. Kaufman, Esq., San Francisco, CA, for Petitioner.

Ronald E. Lefevre, Chief Counsel, Office of the District Counsel Department of Homeland Security, John S. Hogan, Esq., San Francisco, CA, William C. Peachey, *520U.S. Department of Justice Civil Div./0ffíce of Immigration Lit., Washington, DC, for Respondent.

Before: KOZINSKI, LEAVY, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P.34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Aurora Urbina-Rodriguez, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order denying her motion to reconsider its order adopting and affirming the Immigration Judge’s order denying her applications for asylum, withholding of removal, relief under the Convention Against Torture, and cancellation of removal. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for an abuse of discretion, *see Lara-Torres v. Ashcroft,*383 F.3d 968, 972 (9th Cir.2004), *amended by*404 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir.2005), and we deny the petition for review.

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in construing the motion as a motion to reconsider where Urbina-Rodriguez alleged that the BIA overlooked her briefs in dismissing her appeal but did not introduce any new evidence or argue a change in factual circumstances. *See Iturribarria v. INS,*321 F.3d 889, 895-96 (9th Cir.2003) (holding that a motion to reconsider is a request that the BIA “reexamine its decision in light of additional legal arguments, a change of law, or perhaps an argument or aspect of a case which was overlooked, while [a] motion to reopen is usually based upon new evidence or a change in factual circumstances.”) (internal quotations omitted); *compare*8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1) *with*8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion as untimely because it was filed more than 30 days after the BIA’s March 14, 2005 order. *See*8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
§ 513.225 Failure to adhere to restrictions. ( a ) Except as permitted under § 513.215 or § 513.220, a participant shall not knowingly do business under a covered transaction with a person who is— ( 1 ) Debarred or suspended;
( 2 ) Proposed for debarment under 48 CFR part 9, subpart 9.4; or
( 3 ) Ineligible for or voluntarily excluded from the covered transaction.
( b ) Violation of the restriction under paragraph (a) of this section may result in disallowance of costs, annulment or termination of award, issuance of a stop work order, debarment or suspension, or other remedies as appropriate.
( c ) A participant may rely upon the certification of a prospective participant in a lower tier covered transaction that it and its principals are not debarred, suspended, proposed for debarment under 48 CFR part 9, subpart 9.4, ineligible, or voluntarily excluded from the covered transaction (See appendix B of these regulations), unless it knows that the certification is erroneous. An agency has the burden of proof that a participant did knowingly do business with a person that filed an erroneous certification.
[60 FR 33041, 33045, June 26, 1995]
§ 100.144 Scope of privilege. The report or results of a self-test may not be obtained or used by an aggrieved person, complainant, department or agency in any: ( a ) Proceeding or civil action in which a violation of the Fair Housing Act is alleged; or
( b ) Examination or investigation relating to compliance with the Fair Housing Act.
[62 FR 66432, Dec. 18, 1997]
###### Editorial Note on Part 713

#### Editorial Note:

Nomenclature changes to part 713 appear at 84 FR 37752, Aug. 2, 2019.

#### § 713.5 When should I make my request?

Submit your request at least 45 days before the date you need the records or testimony. If you want your request processed in a shorter time, you must explain why you could not submit the request earlier and why you need such expedited processing. DFC retains full discretion to grant, deny, or propose a new completion date on any request for expedited processing. If you are requesting the testimony of an DFC employee, DFC expects you to anticipate your need for the testimony in sufficient time to obtain it by deposition. The Vice-President/General Counsel may well deny a request for testimony at a legal proceeding unless you explain why you could not have used deposition testimony instead. The Vice-President/General Counsel will determine the location of a deposition, taking into consideration DFC's interest in minimizing the disruption for an DFC employee's work schedule and the costs and convenience of other persons attending the deposition.

[79 FR 8619, Feb. 13, 2014]
132 STAT. 4434 PUBLIC LAW 115–317—DEC. 14, 2018 

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY—H.R. 5238: 

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. 164 (2018): 

July 16, considered and passed House. 

Dec. 6, considered and passed Senate. 

Æ 

Public Law 115–317 

115th Congress 

An Act 

To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located at 1234 Saint 

Johns Place in Brooklyn, New York, as the ‘‘Major Robert Odell Owens Post Office’’. 

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 

the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

SECTION 1. MAJOR ROBERT ODELL OWENS POST OFFICE. 

(a) DESIGNATION.—The facility of the United States Postal 

Service located at 1234 Saint Johns Place in Brooklyn, New York, 

shall be known and designated as the ‘‘Major Robert Odell Owens 

Post Office’’. 

(b) REFERENCES.—Any reference in a law, map, regulation, 

document, paper, or other record of the United States to the facility 

referred to in subsection (a) shall be deemed to be a reference 

to the ‘‘Major Robert Odell Owens Post Office’’. 

Approved December 14, 2018. 

Dec. 14, 2018 

[H.R. 5238] 


smartinez on DSK30VT082PROD with PUBLAWS
### §3907. Omitted

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Codification

Section, Pub. L. 90–448, title IV, §408, Aug. 1, 1968, 82 Stat. 516; Pub. L. 91–609, title III, §303(c), Dec. 31, 1970, 84 Stat. 1780, which related to incontestability of guarantees was omitted pursuant to section 4528 of this title, which terminated authority to guarantee bonds, debentures, notes, or other obligations under this chapter after Dec. 31, 1970, with exceptions now inapplicable.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MICHAEL SATTARI,

 Plaintiff - Appellant,

 v.

WASHINGTON MUTUAL, a

Washington corporation,

 Defendant - Appellee.

No. 10-17433

D.C. No. 2:09-cv-00768-KJD-PAL

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Nevada

Kent J. Dawson, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submission Deferred August 10, 2011

Submitted December 23, 2011

San Francisco, California

Before: KOZINSKI, Chief Judge, O’SCANNLAIN and GRABER, Circuit 

Judges.

Sattari mistakenly referenced California statutes rather than Nevada statutes

throughout his complaint. Because Sattari was a pro se litigant when he wrote the

complaint, we construe it liberally to infer that he meant to reference Nevada law. 

FILED

DEC 23 2011

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
page 2

See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (“[A] pro se

complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than

formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Sattari claims the bank engaged in unfair business practices. Under the

Nevada Deceptive Trade Practices Act (NDTPA), “[a]n action may be brought by

any person who is a victim of consumer fraud.” Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.600(1). A

claim under the NDTPA requires a “victim of consumer fraud to prove that (1) an

act of consumer fraud by the defendant (2) caused (3) damage to the plaintiff.” 

Picus v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 256 F.R.D. 651, 658 (D. Nev. 2009) (order). 

Consumer fraud encompasses deceptive practices, such as “[k]nowingly mak[ing

a] . . . false representation in a transaction.” Nev. Rev. Stat. § 598.0915(15). 

Sattari does not raise a genuine issue of material fact that would show that the bank

made a false representation, so this claim fails. 

Sattari mentions wrongful foreclosure and emotional distress in his brief, but

doesn’t “specifically and distinctly” argue these claims. Miller v. Fairchild Indus.,

Inc., 797 F.2d 727, 738 (9th Cir. 1986) (“The Court of Appeals will not ordinarily

consider matters on appeal that are not specifically and distinctly argued in

appellant’s opening brief.”). We require a brief to contain “appellant’s contentions

and the reasons for them, with citations to the authorities and parts of the record on
page 3

which the appellant relies.” Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(9)(A). Sattari provides neither

any argument nor supporting authority. Therefore, he has waived any claims based

on wrongful foreclosure and emotional distress. 

AFFIRMED.
§ 51.53 Refunds. ( a ) The Department will refund the passport application fee and the security surcharge to any person exempt from payment of passport fees under 22 CFR 51.52 from whom the fee was erroneously collected.
( b ) The Department will refund an expedited passport processing fee if the Department fails to provide expedited passport processing as provided in 22 CFR 51.56.
( c ) For procedures on refunds of $5.00 or less, see 22 CFR 22.6(b).
#### State of New York, Respondent, v Hudson Home for the Aged, Appellant.

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court at Special Term, entered August 18, 1976 in Albany County, which granted plaintiff’s application for a permanent injunction prohibiting defendant from operating a voluntary home for the aged in violation of certain rules and regulations promulgated by the State Board of Social Welfare pursuant to former section 759 of the Executive Law and denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment on its counterclaim seeking a declaration that section 759 of the Executive Law and rules and regulations promulgated thereunder are unconstitutional. The facts are not in dispute. Defendant is a private not-for-profit corporation which operates a home for the aged and is in receipt of no public funds. It refused to accept and conspicuously post an operating certificate forwarded to it by the Board of Social Welfare as required by section 759 of the Executive Law. The instant action was commenced to restrain defendant from operating without the required certificate and defendant counterclaimed seeking a determination that the regulations promulgated pursuant to the statute and the statute itself violated the State Constitution. Both parties moved for summary judgment. Special Term granted plaintiffs motion and denied defendant’s cross motion. This appeal ensued. Basically, defendant maintains that section 759 and the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder authorizing the State Board of Social Welfare to regulate homes for the aged not in receipt of public funds, are in violation of section 2 of article XVII of the New York State Constitution which restricts plaintiff to a limited inspection of such a facility. We disagree. In considering a similar attack on former section 758 of the Executive Law this court concluded that section 2 of article XVII of the State Constitution did not limit the power of the Legislature to enact broader legislation concerning health, safety and welfare of residents of such facilities *(Matter of Katz v Shapiro,*62 AD2d 231). Consequently, we must reject defendant’s argument since the requiring of an operating certificate can readily be justified pursuant to the police power of the State. The judgment, therefore, must be affirmed. Judgment affirmed, without costs. Greenblott, J. P., Sweeney, Staley, Jr., Larkin and Mikoll, JJ., concur.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Morrell Walker, Appellant.

Appeal by defendant from an order of the County Court, Kings County, dated July 11, 1960, which denied, without a hearing, his *comm nobis*application to vacate a judgment of said court, rendered November 7, 1945, convicting him, after a jury trial, of assault in the second degree and sentencing him to serve a term of two to five years. The indictment had charged defendant with attempted robbery in the first degree, attempted grand larceny in the second degree, and assault in the second degree with intent to commit the felonies of robbery or grand larceny. The *comm nobis*application was made upon the ground that the jury’s verdict was inconsistent, since defendant was acquitted on the attempted robbery and the attempted grand larceny counts. Order affirmed. The alleged error is a matter of record which could have been raised on an appeal from the judgment of conviction and, under the circumstances, the remedy of *coram nobis*may not be invoked. (Cf. *People*v. *Balsamo,*11 A D 2d 1040,) In any event, it may not be held, on the record presented, that the verdict was so inconsistent as to require the setting aside of the judgment of conviction. (Cf. *People*v. Steffens, 12 A D 2d 962, and eases cited therein.) Nolan, P. J., Ughetta, Kleinfeld, Christ and Pette, JJ., concur.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM BALANCE SHEET,
STATEMENT OF OPERATIONS, STATEMENT OF CASH FLOW AND NOTES THERETO INCORPORATED
IN PART I, ITEM I OF THIS FORM 10-QSB AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY
REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>

<S>                             <C>
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<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1999
<CASH>                                      31,519,000
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  565,000
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            32,558,000
<PP&E>                                       1,246,000
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              62,925,000
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        2,406,000
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<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                      1,000
<COMMON>                                        54,000
<OTHER-SE>                                 141,489,000
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                59,052,000
<SALES>                                        165,000
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               165,000
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                            51,224,000
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                           (51,224,000)
<INCOME-TAX>                                   133,000
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                              (51,774,000)
<EPS-BASIC>                                     (1.38)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (1.38)


</TABLE>
### §§2833 to 2837. Repealed. Pub. L. 97–35, title VI, §683(a), Aug. 13, 1981, 95 Stat. 519

Section 2833, Pub. L. 88–452, title II, §241, as added Pub. L. 90–222, title I, §104, Dec. 23, 1967, 81 Stat. 705; amended Pub. L. 95–568, §17(a)(13), Nov. 2, 1978, 92 Stat. 2440, related to extension of benefits to rural areas.

Section 2834, Pub. L. 88–452, title II, §242, as added Pub. L. 90–222, title I, §104, Dec. 23, 1967, 81 Stat. 706; amended Pub. L. 91–177, title I, §107(a), Dec. 30, 1969, 83 Stat. 830; Pub. L. 95–568, §17(a)(14), Nov. 2, 1978, 92 Stat. 2440, set forth provisions respecting submission of plans to governors.

Section 2835, Pub. L. 88–452, title II, §243, as added Pub. L. 90–222, title I, §104, Dec. 23, 1967, 81 Stat. 706; amended Pub. L. 95–568, §17(a)(15), Nov. 2, 1978, 92 Stat. 2440, related to fiscal responsibility and audits.

Section 2836, Pub. L. 88–452, title II, §244, as added Pub. L. 90–222, title I, §104, Dec. 23, 1967, 81 Stat. 707; amended 1970 Reorg. Plan No. 2, eff. July 1, 1970, 35 F.R. 7959, 84 Stat. 2085; Pub. L. 92–424, §17, Sept. 19, 1972, 86 Stat. 695; Pub. L. 93–644, §9(a), Jan. 4, 1975, 88 Stat. 2310; Pub. L. 95–568, §§7(b), 17(a)(16), Nov. 2, 1978, 92 Stat. 2428, 2440, set forth special limitations applicable to programs.

Section 2837, Pub. L. 88–452, title II, §245, as added Pub. L. 90–222, title I, §104, Dec. 23, 1967, 81 Stat. 709; amended Pub. L. 91–177, title I, §101(b), Dec. 30, 1969, 83 Stat. 827; Pub. L. 92–424, §2(a), Sept. 19, 1972, 86 Stat. 688; Pub. L. 93–644, §14(a), Jan. 4, 1975, 88 Stat. 2329; Pub. L. 95–568, §7(c), Nov. 2, 1978, 92 Stat. 2428, set forth provisions for program duration.

Provisions similar to section 2837 were contained in section 2831 of this title.

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Effective Date of Repeal

Repeal effective Oct. 1, 1981, see section 9912(a) of this title, prior to the general amendment of chapter 106 (§9901 et seq.) of this title by Pub. L. 105–285.
§ 97.2 Application for a Hague Adoption Certificate or a Hague Custody Declaration (outgoing Convention case). ( a ) Once the Convention has entered into force for the United States, any party to an outgoing Convention adoption or custody proceeding may apply to the Secretary for a Hague Adoption Certificate or a Hague Custody Declaration. Any other interested person may also make such application, but such application will not be processed unless such applicant demonstrates that a Hague Adoption Certificate or Hague Custody Declaration is needed to obtain a legal benefit or for purposes of a legal proceeding, as determined by the Secretary in the Secretary's discretion.
( b ) Applicants for a Hague Adoption Certificate or Hague Custody Declaration shall submit to the Secretary: ( 1 ) A completed application form in such form as the Secretary may prescribe, with any required fee;
( 2 ) An official copy of the order of the adoption court finding that the child is eligible for adoption and that the adoption or proposed adoption is in the child's best interests and granting the adoption or custody for purposes of adoption;
( 3 ) An official copy of the adoption court's findings (either in the order granting the adoption or custody for purposes of adoption or separately) verifying, in substance, that each of the requirements of § 97.3 has been complied with or, if the adoption court has not verified compliance with a particular requirement in § 97.3, authenticated documentation showing that such requirement nevertheless has been met and a written explanation of why the adoption court's verification of compliance with the requirement cannot be submitted; and
( 4 ) Such additional documentation and information as the Secretary may request at the Secretary's discretion.
( c ) If the applicant fails to submit all of the documentation and information required pursuant to paragraph (b)(4) of this section within 120 days of the Secretary's request, the Secretary may consider the application abandoned.
I 

109TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 2556

To suspend temporarily the duty on air freshener electric devices with warmer 

units. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MAY 23, 2005

Mr. RYAN of Wisconsin introduced the following bill; which was referred to 

the Committee on Ways and Means 

A BILL

To suspend temporarily the duty on air freshener electric 

devices with warmer units.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. AIR FRESHENER ELECTRIC DEVICES WITH 

4 WARMER UNITS. 

5 (a) IN GENERAL.—Subchapter II of chapter 99 of 

6 the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States is 

7 amended by inserting in numerical sequence the following:
2

•HR 2556 IH 

‘‘ 9902.98.09 Air freshener electric devices 

that contain a warmer unit 

that plugs into an electrical 

outlet, diffuse an adjustable 

amount of heated, scented 

oil throughout a room, and 

provide two additional builtin electrical outlets for other 

devices (provided for in subheading 8516.79.00) ............ Free No Change No Change On or Before 

12/31/2008 ’’. 

1 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by 

2 subsection (a) applies to goods entered, or withdrawn from 

3 warehouse for consumption, on or after the 15th day after 

4 the date of the enactment of this Act.

Æ
#### § 18.20 Appeal to the Board of Appellate Review.

Within 30 days from the date of the hearing examiner's decision, either party may appeal to the Board of Appellate Review. The appeal shall be taken by filing notice of appeal, in triplicate, with the Board of Appellate Review, which shall state with particularity exceptions to the decision of the hearing examiner and reasons for such exceptions. If an appeal is by the Director General, he/she shall transmit a copy thereof to the respondent. Within 30 days after receipt of an appeal or copy thereof, the other party may file a reply brief, in triplicate, with the Board of Appellate Review. If the reply brief is filed by the Director General, he/she shall transmit a copy of it to the respondent. The Director General shall transmit the entire case record to the Board of Appellate Review within 30 days after an appeal has been taken.
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<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUN-30-1996
<PERIOD-START>                             JUL-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1996
<CASH>                                       3,460,000
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                4,398,000
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            36,743,000
<PP&E>                                       6,176,000
<DEPRECIATION>                               1,733,000
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              42,175,000
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                       58,122,000
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                       20,889,000
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        59,000
<OTHER-SE>                                (38,304,000)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                42,175,000
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            17,196,000
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               18,802,000
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             (8,000)
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (1,598,000)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                        (1,598,000)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (1,598,000)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (.13)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

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