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“If deradicalization is 

to meet with any success 

in Pakistan, the national 

narrative needs to change.”

September 2015

Deradicalization Programming 

in Pakistan

Selina Adam Khan

E-mail: selina_ak@hotmail.com

PEACEBRIEF193

Introduction

Pakistan has become a hub for local and transnational militant groups adhering to violent and 

radical Islamist ideologies. Thousands of civilians, including politicians and activists, have died in 

the onslaught of terrorism that Pakistan has faced since the mid-2000s. The December 2014 attack 

on a school in Peshawar, which killed 145 people, 132 of whom were students, appears to have 

been a turning point for the Pakistani military and civilian government, strengthening the resolve 

to combat terrorism and antistate actors. 

In January 2015, Pakistan launched a twenty-point National Action Plan (NAP) in response to the 

Peshawar attack.1 The most high-profile aspect of the plan has been the special courts under military 

officers established to facilitate trials and mete out speedy justice in an effort to avoid the pitfalls 

of the Pakistani justice system (overburdened courts, slow processing times, and weak chains of 

evidence). The death penalty, which also pertains to nonterrorism cases, has also been reinstituted. 

The NAP calls for uniform bans on armed militant organizations and new hate speech restrictions to 

limit terrorist access to local television or print media.2 It also stipulates strengthening the National 

Summary

• Over the last fifteen years, Pakistan has become a hub for radical Islamist militant groups.

• Despite the rising militancy and increased terrorist attacks, however, the country has yet to 

implement a comprehensive deradicalization strategy. 

• Lack of access to mainstream education, poverty, and weak legal and political institutions 

are major contributors to a growing league of young jihadi recruits.

• Most deradicalization programming is led by the military, is concentrated in the Swat valley, 

and has little connection to scattered efforts by police and civil administration elsewhere in 

the country. 

• Although the Pakistani army and civil society institutions have taken steps to counter 

violent militant ideologies, the government has yet to step up to the plate. 

• Most deradicalization programming—in Pakistan and elsewhere—emphasizes the importance of economic incentives and alternative livelihoods. 

• Ideological countermessaging and efforts to prevent recruits from reconnecting with 

militant networks are also elements of successful programs.
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Deradicalization Programming in Pakistan

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Counter Terrorism Authority, registering and regulating madrassas, registering Afghan refugees, and 

cracking down on terrorism financing (both domestic and foreign), among other steps.

To effectively deal with a growing culture of militancy and terrorism that cannot be eliminated 

solely through punitive force, Pakistan needs to complement the NAP with a more nuanced approach. A deradicalization program offers opportunities for reintegrating would-be terrorists and 

disengaging them from conflict, rather than the alternative of trying them in military courts and 

subjecting them to capital punishment. Such efforts are a critical missing element in Pakistan’s 

counterterrorism plans. 

Drivers of Militancy

Radicalization and participation in militancy are driven by ideological, economic, social, and 

psychological factors, and efforts must be made to counter each of them. Poverty, deprivation, 

and political pressures push boys toward militancy, and Pakistan has an abundance of idle youth 

who present themselves as ideal recruiting candidates.3 Shazadi Beg and Laila Bokhari report that 

many militants view jihad as an occupation; those able to set up new businesses or find jobs are 

the least likely to go back to militancy.4 

Worldly and psychosocial benefits together play a huge part in radicalizing young people for 

suicide bombing missions, among them the immense honor bestowed on an individual on the eve 

of his departure and the reverence and financial support that the family receives. Militant recruits are 

taught that martyrdom and the call to wage jihad is one of the greatest honors a human being can 

receive.5 The cumulative effect of these processes is to encourage an extremist, maximalist worldview 

that rejects the legitimacy of other political actors and isolates militants from other communities.

Current Deradicalization Efforts

Deradicalization is a process through which individuals abandon extremist worldviews, forswear 

violence to effect social change, and accept more incremental political pluralism.6 Despite some 

efforts in implementing such programs, Pakistan seems to have no comprehensive strategy in place 

and provides little information on current efforts. Current initiatives are randomly dispersed across 

the country, operate under varying frameworks, and have different results. Different approaches are 

understandable given the variety of contexts and grievances, but no central body of reference exists. 

Pakistan runs six main deradicalization programs throughout the country: the Sabaoon Center for 

Rehabilitation (sabaoon is the first ray of light at dawn), Mishal, Sparley, Rastoon, Pythom, and Heila. 

The objective of the first three is to educate detainees in curricula that include formal education, 

including corrective religious education, vocational training, counseling and therapy, and a discussion 

module that addresses social issues and includes sessions with the students’ families.7

 Militants are 

first separated into groups depending on level of indoctrination and age groups, usually between 

eighteen and forty-five.8 Training is then provided accordingly and may last anywhere from six 

months to a year. The three-pronged initiative was instituted in 2009, and Pakistani officials in charge 

report a 99 percent success rate, that more than 2,500 Taliban fighters have been “reformed.”9 In the 

absence of independent evaluation, however, these statistics cannot be corroborated. Numerous civil 

society organizations also conduct their own on-site deradicalization projects that include interfaith 

dialogues and establishing madrassas to counter the existing religious schools that promote violence. 

Project Mishal, which is run by the Pakistan Army in Swat, focuses its efforts on adult detainees; 

Project Sparley extends the initiative to the families of detainees. Limited assistance in finding jobs 

is also provided by the Pakistani authorities. The ultimate aim is to reintegrate former terrorists and 
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Deradicalization Programming in Pakistan

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radicalized individuals back into mainstream civil society. Other programs operate across the country, 

especially in Punjab, but are poorly resourced.10 Many are run by the police and have seen success 

when the police have been able to keep up surveillance after prisoners are released. Some initiatives, 

such as those in Swat, also instruct detainees on vocational skills and include therapy to facilitate 

psychological disengagement. 

Lessons from Other Countries

Although rehabilitation methods may vary from country to country, deradicalization programs 

employed worldwide are rooted in identifying and detaining terrorists. Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, 

Indonesia, and Egypt started their programs after the 9/11 attacks on America but received real 

impetus only after terrorist organizations started targeting the states themselves. The programs all 

use imprisonment to eliminate the option for engagement with violent organizations; resources 

and rehabilitation models vary from then on, as do prisoner treatment and surveillance after 

release. Only Saudi Arabia, however, has segregated its militant population from regular criminals 

in an effort to stop the spread of prison radicalism. 

Many other states—including Singapore, Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Malaysia—have taken steps to keep an eye on released prisoners through police surveillance and family 

cooperation. Resources and commitment levels have generally been the determining factors in the 

success of these initiatives. Rehabilitation efforts in Swat valley have been successful in part because 

of continued Pakistan army presence and surveillance. Although the Pakistani police have also made 

an effort to keep up with postrelease surveillance, efforts have been sporadic, lacking any cohesive 

policy, and therefore lackluster. 

Religious dialogue to counter radical ideologies is a central tenet of the Pakistani, Saudi, British, 

Malaysian, Singaporean, Yemeni, and Saudi initiatives. This is not to say, clearly, that reeducation has 

been without problems in various countries. For example, although the government in Malaysia 

has used clerics to dissuade militants from violence, it is not clear whether any effort has been made 

to locate independent Islamic scholars who might have more credibility with militants.11 Because 

all religious clerics are also state officials, some militants might never accept their authority and or 

accept their credibility. 

The Pakistani, British, Yemeni, Saudi, Singaporean, Indonesian, and Malaysian programs are 

individual-specific programs. In contrast, the Egyptian program takes a collective approach, focusing 

on terrorist groups rather than individuals. The Irish initiative falls somewhere in the middle, taking 

groups as signatories but focusing its efforts on individual militants. 

Ways Forward

Disengaging militants and the general population without violating sacred beliefs is critical.12 This 

can be done by involving moderate religious scholars who can dispel incorrect notions of Islam 

sanctioning violence and terrorism. If deradicalization is to meet with any success in Pakistan, 

the national narrative needs to change from an exclusionary one that considers Sunni Muslims its 

prime citizens to one that embodies pluralism and secularism, based on tolerance and the rights of 

people to make religious, political, and social decisions without fear of state and social persecution. 

The rule of law must be all powerful and protection extended to everyone without prejudice. 

Pakistan’s efforts to date have essentially concentrated on low-risk militants—foot soldiers or 

low-level facilitators. Very little if any effort has been made, unlike in Indonesia, at rehabilitating 

high-risk or high-ranking militants. Steps must be taken to rehabilitate high-risk militants because 
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Deradicalization Programming in Pakistan

Page 4 • PB 193 • September 2015

top-tier leadership will have a greater impact on members than Pakistani authorities, who are seen as 

the enemy. Indonesia uses reformed terrorists to influence militants and terror suspects; Saudi Arabia 

segregates low-risk militants from hard-core terrorists to reduce the risk of such cross-influence.

The Pakistani prison system, by contrast, makes no concerted effort to segregate prisoners, thus 

enabling an environment in which criminals can be influenced and radicalized. Pakistani prisons 

currently maintain lax internal security protocols, allowing criminals and militants to operate from 

jails and keep in contact with collaborators using cell phones.13

Pakistan’s first step should be to adopt a nationwide deradicalization program. Islamabad would 

be well advised to take a page from the Saudi deradicalization book and target the entire political 

and social landscape rather than make do with piecemeal strategies. Furthermore, whereas the Swatbased initiatives focus on defusing antistate tendencies, the political landscape that spawns militancy 

in the rest of the country is much more complex and nuanced; as such, it requires a narrative that can 

combat jihadists involved in international and regional terrorism.14 It requires a shift in the national 

narrative and traditional policymaking tools to incorporate elements of tolerance and pluralism as a 

basic and core tenet.

Notes

1. See Raza Rumi, “Charting Pakistan’s Internal Security Policy,” Special Report no. 368, U.S. Institute of Peace, May 2015, www.usip.org/publications/2015/05/13/charting-pakistan-s-internal

-security-policy.

2. Anup Kaphle, “Pakistan Announces a National Plan to Fight Terrorism, Says Terrorists’ Days Are

 Numbered,” Washington Post, December 24, 2014, www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/12/24/pakistan-announces-a-national-plan-to-fight-terrorism-says-terroristsdays-are-numbered. 

3. “The Challenges of Countering Radicalization in Pakistan,” U.S. Institute of Peace, May 9, 2012, 

www.usip.org/publications/the-challenges-countering-radicalization-in-pakistan. 

4. Shazadi Beg and Laila Bokhari, “Pakistan in Search of a Disengagement Strategy,” in Leaving 

Terrorism Behind: Individual and Collective Disengagement, ed. Tore Bjorgo and John Horgan 

(Oxford: Routledge, 2008).

5. Ibid.

6. Angel Rabasa, Stacie L. Pettyjohn, Jeremy J. Ghez, and Christopher Boucek, Deradicalizing 

Islamist Extremists (Pittsburgh, PA: RAND, 2010), www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/

monographs/2010/RAND_MG1053.pdf. 

7. Shehzad H. Qazi, “A War Without Bombs: Civil Society Initiatives Against Radicalization in Pakistan,” Policy Brief no. 60, Institute for Social Policy and Understanding, February 2013, www.

ispu.org/pdfs/ISPU_Brief_CounterDeradicalization_2_14.pdf. 

8. Jamie Schram, “Pakistani Boot Camps Want to ‘Reprogram’ ISIS Terrorists,” New York Post, 

November 16, 2014, http://nypost.com/2014/11/16/pakistani-boot-camps-want-to-reprogram-isis-terrorists.

9. Muhammad Amir Rana, “Swat De-Radicalization Model: Prospects for Rehabilitating Militants,” 

Conflict and Peace Studies 4, no. 2 (2011): 1–6; Schram, “Pakistani Boot Camps.”

10. Jason Burke, “Fighting Terrorism: Do ‘Deradicalization’ Camps Really Work?” Guardian, June 9, 

2013, www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/09/terrorism-do-deradicalisation-camps-work. 

11. Zachary Abuza, “The Rehabilitation of Jemaah Islamiyah Detainees in South East Asia,” in Bjorgo 

and Horgan, Leaving Terrorism Behind.
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12. Ibid.

13. “Pakistan Minister Exposes Corruption, Weak Security in Lahore Jail,” Economic Times, June 23, 

2013, http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-06-23/news/40147233_1_jailsbribes-prison-guards.

14. Rana, “Swat De-Radicalization Model.”

About This Brief

This Peace Brief looks into the 

deradicalization programs in place 

in Pakistan today, compares what 

little information is available on 

such initiatives with similar ones 

carried out in other countries, and 

suggests a general way forward 

for Pakistan. Funded by the United 

States Institute of Peace (USIP), the 

research and study were undertaken through USIP’s South and 

Central Asia Center. Selina Adam 

Khan is a graduate of the London 

School of Economics and Political 

Science. Her areas of focus include 

terrorism, nuclear issues, and the 

global political economy.