Filed 11/15/22 In re Paris G. CA2/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

Cal ifornia Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

In re PARIS G., a Person

Coming Under the Juvenile 

Court Law.

B313465

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF 

CHILDREN AND FAMILY 

SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JENNIFER G.,

Defendant and Appellant.

Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No.

18CCJP04888B

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Julie Fox Blackshaw, Judge. Affirmed.

Pamela Rae Tripp for Defendant and Appellant.

Dawyn R. Harrison, Acting County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, 

Assistant County Counsel, and Veronica Randazzo, Deputy 

County Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent.

_______________________________________
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INTRODUCTION

Jennifer G. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s 

disposition order declaring her daughter Paris a dependent of the 

court. Mother contends insufficient evidence supports the court’s 

jurisdiction finding that she placed Paris at risk of serious

physical harm when she abducted the child and concealed herself 

and the child for six months. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

1. Family Background and Initiation of Dependency 

Proceedings

Paris was born in January 2014. Mother and Jack Z. 

(father) split up about two years later. Since then, the parents 

have been involved in a contentious custody dispute.

Between June 2016 and September 2019, the Department 

of Children and Family Services (Department) received more 

than 10 referrals alleging father physically, sexually, or 

emotionally abused Paris. All the referrals against father were 

deemed unfounded or inconclusive. The Department suspected 

mother coached Paris to make false allegations against father.

Around late December 2019, the family court issued an 

order granting mother and father shared custody of Paris, with 

the parents to alternate custody every week. That order included 

a provision granting father sole physical custody of Paris should 

mother “fail[ ] to timely exchange [Paris] on any one occasion for 

any reason.”

One day in mid-January 2020, while father had custody of 

Paris, mother removed the child from school. Unbeknownst to 

father, mother had moved out of her home in Redondo Beach. 

Mother didn’t tell father where she took the child, and mother 
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didn’t answer her phone when father and law enforcement tried 

contacting her. 

On January 16, 2020, the court presiding over the parents’ 

family law case awarded father sole physical custody of Paris.

Around the same time, father filed a child abduction report. 

Several days later, the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s 

Office began investigating mother for kidnapping.

Between mid-January and mid-July 2020, father was

unable to contact mother or Paris. During that time, mother 

obtained several temporary restraining orders against father at

the Torrance courthouse. Each restraining order was dissolved, 

however, because mother never appeared at any of the follow-up 

hearings. 

On July 20, 2020, mother surrendered to law enforcement 

at the Torrance courthouse after she obtained another temporary 

restraining order against father. Mother claimed she didn’t know 

Paris had been reported missing or that father had been awarded 

sole custody of the child. Mother was later charged with several 

felonies, including kidnapping, child custody deprivation, and 

eavesdropping on law enforcement officers and social workers. 

The criminal court issued a protective order prohibiting mother 

from contacting Paris and father.

When mother was apprehended, Paris was staying with a 

babysitter in Lawndale. Paris told the Department that she had 

been living with mother and mother’s boyfriend, Frank, but the 

child didn’t disclose where they were living. The Department took

Paris into protective custody because the July 20, 2020

temporary restraining order prevented the child from being 

released to father. 
4

On July 22, 2020, the Department filed a dependency 

petition on Paris’s behalf. The petition, as later sustained, alleged 

mother “abducted and intentionally concealed the child from 

[father] for a six-month period. Such abduction of the child and 

conduct by the mother endangers the child’s physical health, 

safety and wellbeing and places the child at risk of serious 

physical harm” (Welf. & Inst. Code,1 § 300, subd. (b); b-1 

allegation).2

On July 23, 2020, Paris was returned to father’s custody 

after the court presiding over the parents’ family law case

removed the child as a protected party from the July 20, 2020 

temporary restraining order and vacated a temporary custody 

order granting mother custody of the child. The January 16, 2020 

family law order granting father sole custody of Paris remained 

in place. 

On July 27, 2020, the court held the detention hearing. The 

court found the petition alleged a prima facie case, ordered Paris 

detained from mother’s custody, and released the child to father’s 

custody.

1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and 

Institutions Code. 

2 The court dismissed allegations that (1) father physically abused 

Paris (§ 300, subds. (a) & (b); a-1, b-3 allegations); (2) mother failed to 

make an appropriate plan for the child’s care while mother was 

incarcerated (§ 300, subd. (b); b-2 allegation); and (3) the parents’ 

contentious custody battle placed the child at risk of substantial 

emotional harm (§ 300, subd. (b); b-4 allegation).
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2. Jurisdiction and Disposition

In October 2020, the Department interviewed Paris and 

father. Mother refused to be interviewed.

Paris and father appeared comfortable and well-bonded 

with each other. When asked if anyone in father’s home ever hit 

her, Paris stated she “accidentally told a lie. I told everyone that 

[father] hit me” because she “didn’t want to get [mother] mad.” 

According to Paris, mother didn’t want the child to stay with 

father. Although Paris didn’t confirm mother asked her to lie 

about father, the child acknowledged she “had a lot of secrets 

with her mother.”

Paris told the Department that she didn’t see or speak to 

father for a long time after mother picked her up from school in 

January 2020. Paris explained that “[e]very time someone called, 

mom didn’t answer” because she was hiding the child from 

father. According to Paris, mother made the child hide in a closet 

whenever someone came to the home where they were living. 

In February 2021, the criminal court modified the

protective order against mother to allow her monitored virtual 

visits with Paris in a therapeutic setting. Mother did not begin 

visiting Paris until March 2021, however, due to difficulties 

finding a qualified therapist to conduct the visits.

Mother’s visits were going well. Mother engaged in ageappropriate behavior, and Paris appeared happy to see her. 

Mother and Paris often talked about their recent activities and 

how Paris was doing in school, and they made plans for what 

they would do when they could begin visiting each other in 

person.

The court held the jurisdiction hearing over three days in 

early June 2021. Paris testified on the first day of the hearing.
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Mother would sometimes make Paris act like she feared father 

when he picked her up from school, even though Paris wasn’t 

afraid of him. Mother also instructed Paris to tell people that 

father hit the child. According to Paris, however, neither parent 

ever hurt her. After she absconded with Paris, mother sometimes

made the child hide in a garage to conceal her from the police.

The court sustained the b-1 allegation and dismissed the 

petition’s remaining allegations. The court found mother 

endangered Paris’s physical wellbeing and safety and created a 

risk of serious physical harm when she abducted the child. 

The court explained its decision to sustain the b-1 

allegation as follows: “[M]other’s abduction and concealment of 

Paris created a serious risk of harm to the child. In essence, 

mother kept the minor captive in her custody while the mother 

engaged in criminal and dangerous behavior. Mother was on the 

lam for six months and the child was forced to be with her. 

Mother cut off communication between the child and her father. 

Mother was unwilling to surrender the child to authorities or 

permit the child to return to her father, which in turn resulted in 

mother being apprehended by law enforcement finally at the 

courthouse in Torrance. [¶] Law enforcement’s need to apprehend 

mother could very possibly have resulted in an incident of 

violence or danger and put the child at risk of serious harm. 

Involving a child in criminal behavior is never safe. Hiding a 

child in garages and closets is not healthy for a child physically or 

emotionally. A parent who unlawfully abducts a child, subjects a 

child to physical risk of harm, which warrants jurisdiction of the 

courts. ... [¶] ... [T]he court believes also that the child remains 

at risk because the mother has not acknowledged any wrongdoing 

or that she put the child in danger. The court has no confidence 
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that mother understands these risks and, therefore, finds the 

child continuing to be at risk from the mother.”

At the disposition hearing, the court declared Paris a 

dependent of the court. The court removed Paris from mother’s 

custody and placed the child with father. The court maintained 

mother’s schedule of monitored virtual visits with Paris in a 

therapeutic setting and directed mother to attend individual 

counseling and to participate in a parenting program focused on 

high conflict resolution.

Mother appeals.

DISCUSSION

Mother contends insufficient evidence supports the court’s 

finding sustaining the b-1 allegation. Specifically, mother argues 

there is no evidence that she placed Paris at risk of serious 

physical harm when she abducted the child and concealed herself 

and the child from father and law enforcement. Alternatively, 

mother argues she did not pose any risk of harm to the child by

the time of the jurisdiction hearing. Mother doesn’t challenge the 

court’s disposition order removing Paris from her custody or any 

aspect of her court-ordered case plan. As we explain, substantial 

evidence supports the court’s jurisdiction finding.3

3 In the statement of facts in her opening brief, mother suggests the 

court “prejudicially” infringed her constitutional rights by requiring 

her lead counsel, rather than one of the other attorneys representing 

her, to question witnesses at the jurisdiction hearing. Mother fails to

develop any argument, however, explaining how she was prejudiced by 

the court’s decision. (See In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 407 [to 

prevail on appeal, an appellant must demonstrate how she was 

prejudiced by the court’s alleged error]; see also Cal. Const., art. VI, § 

13.) Nor has mother developed this argument in the argument section 
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Section 300, subdivision (b)(1), allows a juvenile court to 

exercise jurisdiction over a child if the “child has suffered, or

there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious 

physical harm or illness, as a result of the failure or inability of 

his or her parent ... to adequately supervise or protect the child.” 

(§ 300, subd. (b)(1).) Subdivision (b)(1) requires only that a parent 

has failed or is unable to adequately supervise or protect her

child. The statute does not require negligent or culpable conduct 

by the parent. (In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 629 (R.T.).)

“The juvenile court need not wait until a child is seriously 

injured to assume jurisdiction if there is evidence that the child is 

at risk of future harm from the parent’s ... conduct. [Citation.]” 

(In re Yolanda L. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 987, 993.) The court may 

consider past events as an indicator of whether the child faces a 

current risk of harm because “[a] parent’s past conduct is a good 

predictor of future behavior.” (In re T.V. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th

126, 133.) A parent’s denial of wrongdoing or failure to recognize 

the negative impact of her conduct is also relevant to determining 

risk under section 300. (In re A.F. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 283, 293.)

Nevertheless, to show the child faces a risk of harm at the time of 

the jurisdiction hearing, there “must be some reason beyond mere 

speculation to believe the alleged conduct will recur. [Citation.]” 

(In re James R. (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 129, 136.)

of her brief, let alone under a separate heading. (See Cal. Rules of 

Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) [each brief must state “each point under a 

separate heading or subheading summarizing the point”].) By failing to 

adequately develop this argument, Mother has forfeited any claim that 

the court erred when it required her lead counsel to question witnesses 

at the jurisdiction hearing. (In re S.C., at pp. 406–407.)
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We review a juvenile court’s jurisdiction finding for 

substantial evidence. (In re E.E. (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 195, 206.) 

We will affirm the finding if it is supported by evidence that is 

reasonable, credible, and of solid value. (In re R.V. (2012) 208 

Cal.App.4th 837, 843.) We review the record in the light most 

favorable to the court’s findings and draw all reasonable 

inferences from the evidence in favor of those findings. (R.T., 

supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 633.) “The appellant has the burden of 

showing there is no evidence of a sufficiently substantial nature 

to support the findings or order.” (In re R.V., at p. 843.) 

Substantial evidence supports the court’s finding 

sustaining the b-1 allegation. By abducting Paris and concealing 

her from father and law enforcement for six months, mother 

created a dangerous living situation for the child. As the court 

acknowledged, making a child hide inside a garage or a closet is 

unsafe, especially when a child is six years old, like Paris was at 

the time of the events leading to this case. A young child could 

hurt herself with tools or other hazardous objects often stored in 

a garage, or the child could wander from the home if left

unattended in a garage. But most importantly, by concealing 

Paris during an active kidnapping investigation, mother created 

a risk that the child would be exposed to a violent confrontation 

with the police. Although such a confrontation fortunately did not 

occur in this case, that does not mean mother’s actions did not 

pose a risk of serious harm to Paris. (See In re Christopher R. 

(2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1210, 1216 [“court need not wait until a 

child is seriously abused or injured to assume jurisdiction and 

take necessary steps to protect the child”].)

It also was reasonable for the court to find mother 

continued to pose a risk of harm to Paris. By the time of the
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jurisdiction hearing, mother had yet to acknowledge she did 

anything wrong when she abducted Paris and concealed the child 

for six months. (In re A.F., supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 293 [a 

parent’s refusal to acknowledge wrong-doing or the impact of her 

conduct on her child is relevant to determining whether there 

exists a current risk of harm].) Mother also has an extensive 

history of coaching Paris to make false claims that father abused 

her, and mother made several unsubstantiated requests for 

restraining orders to prevent father from seeing his child. 

Nothing in the record suggests mother wouldn’t try to conceal 

Paris again and continue to expose the child to the same dangers 

that led to this case if the court did not exercise jurisdiction over 

the child. (In re T.V., supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at p. 133 [a parent’s 

past conduct is relevant in determining whether the child faces a 

current risk of harm].)

Mother argues this case is analogous to In re B.T. (2011) 

193 Cal.App.4th 685 (B.T.), abrogated on other grounds by R.T., 

supra, 3 Cal.5th 622. Mother’s reliance on B.T. is misplaced. In 

that case, a 38-year-old mother had a sexual relationship with 

her 14- or 15-year-old neighbor, which resulted in the mother

becoming pregnant with B.T. (B.T., at pp. 688–689.) The mother 

was criminally prosecuted, and the juvenile court found her affair 

with her minor neighbor placed her children—two teenagers, a 9-

year-old, and infant B.T.—at risk of sexual abuse. (Id. at pp. 689–

691.)

The court of appeal reversed the jurisdiction findings, 

concluding there was no substantial evidence that the mother’s 

consensual sexual relationship with an unrelated minor placed 

her children at a current risk of harm. (B.T., supra, 193 

Cal.App.4th at pp. 694–697.) It was undisputed that the mother’s 
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children were well adjusted and cared for and that the mother 

had never abused them, sexually or in any other manner. (Ibid.)

There also was no evidence, including no expert testimony, 

suggesting the mother’s sexual relationship with an unrelated 

minor created a current risk of harm to B.T. or any of the 

mother’s other children. (Id. at pp. 695, 697.)

This case is distinguishable. Unlike the mother in B.T.,

mother involved her child in criminal conduct, and it was that 

conduct (abducting and concealing a child) that created a risk of 

harm to Paris. Further, mother’s past conduct (her repeated 

attempts to deprive father of custody of Paris without 

justification) and her failure to acknowledge the wrongfulness of 

her conduct that led to this case amply support a finding that 

mother still poses a risk of harm to Paris.

In short, substantial evidence supports the court’s 

jurisdiction finding. 
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DISPOSITION

The juvenile court’s jurisdiction finding and disposition 

order are affirmed. 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

LAVIN, J.

WE CONCUR:

EDMON, P. J.

RICHARDSON (ANNE K.), J.*

* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief 

Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.