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65–052PDF 2011

OVERVIEW OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 

PROGRAMS AND PRIORITIES AT THE 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION 

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND 

TECHNOLOGY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

MARCH 15, 2011 

Serial No. 112–7 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://science.house.gov 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY 

HON. RALPH M. HALL, Texas, Chair 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland 

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma 

JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

SANDY ADAMS, Florida 

BENJAMIN QUAYLE, Arizona 

CHARLES J. ‘‘CHUCK’’ FLEISCHMANN, 

Tennessee 

E. SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

ANDY HARRIS, Maryland 

RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois 

CHIP CRAVAACK, Minnesota 

LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana 

DAN BENISHEK, Michigan 

VACANCY 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois 

LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

DAVID WU, Oregon 

BRAD MILLER, North Carolina 

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland 

MARCIA L. FUDGE, Ohio 

BEN R. LUJA ́ N, New Mexico 

PAUL D. TONKO, New York 

JERRY MCNERNEY, California 

JOHN P. SARBANES, Maryland 

TERRI A. SEWELL, Alabama 

FREDERICA S. WILSON, Florida 

HANSEN CLARKE, Michigan 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION

HON. BENJAMIN QUAYLE, Arizona, Chair 

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas 

JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois 

RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

CHARLES J. ‘‘CHUCK’’ FLEISCHMANN, 

Tennessee 

E. SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois 

CHIP CRAVAACK, Minnesota 

RALPH M. HALL, Texas 

DAVID WU, Oregon 

JOHN P. SARBANES, Maryland 

FREDERICA S. WILSON, Florida 

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

BEN R. LUJA ́ N, New Mexico 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Hearing Date 

Page 

Witness List ............................................................................................................. 2 

Hearing Charter ...................................................................................................... 3 

Opening Statements 

Statement by Representative Benjamin Quayle, Chairman, Subcommittee on 

Technology and Innovation, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, 

U.S. House of Representatives ............................................................................ 7 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 8 

Statement by Representative David Wu, Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Technology and Innovation, Committee on Science, Space, 

and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives ............................................... 9 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 10 

Panel I: 

Dr. Tara O’Toole, Under Secretary of Science and Technology, Department 

of Homeland Security 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 11 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 13 

Biography .......................................................................................................... 19 

Mr. Warren Stern, Director of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, Department of Homeland Security 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 20 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 22 

Biography .......................................................................................................... 28 

Panel II: 

Dr. James Carafano, Director of the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for 

Foreign Policy Studies at the Heritage Foundation 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 43 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 44 

Biography .......................................................................................................... 50 

Mr. Marc Pearl, President and Chief Executive Officer, Homeland Security 

and Defense Business Council 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 51 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 53 

Biography .......................................................................................................... 57 

Mr. David Maurer, Director of the Homeland Security and Justice Team 

at the U.S. Government Accountability Office 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 57 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 59 

Biography .......................................................................................................... 68 

Appendix I: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions 

Dr. Tara O’Toole, Under Secretary of Science and Technology, Department 

of Homeland Security .......................................................................................... 78 
Page

IV 

Mr. Warren Stern, Director of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, Department of Homeland Security ................................................................................. 84 

Mr. Marc Pearl, President and Chief Executive Officer, Homeland Security 

and Defense Business Council ............................................................................ 86 

Appendix II: Additional Material for the Record 

Testimony From Dr. Michael B. Silevitch, Robert D. Black Professor, Department of Electrical & Computer Engineering and Co-Director, Awareness 

and Localization of Explosives Related Threats (ALERT), A Dept. Of Homeland Security Center Of Excellence, Northeastern University ........................ 90 
(1) 

OVERVIEW OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS 

AND PRIORITIES AT THE DEPARTMENT OF 

HOMELAND SECURITY 

Tuesday, March 15, 2011 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION, 

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY, 

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:08 a.m., in Room 

2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Benjamin Quayle 

[Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding. 
2 
3 

HEARING CHARTER

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

An Overview of Science and Technology Research 

and Development Programs and Priorities at 

the Department of Homeland Security 

TUESDAY, MARCH 15, 2011

10:00 A.M.–12:00 P.M. 

2318 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING

Purpose 

On Tuesday, March 15, 2011 the Subcommittee on Technology and Innovation of 

the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology will hold a hearing to review activities at the Science and Technology Directorate of the Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS S&T) and the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office at the Department 

of Homeland Security (DNDO). There will be two panels; one panel will include Administration witnesses from DHS S&T and DNDO providing testimony for each 

agency, and the other panel will include stakeholders of the DHS enterprise. 

Witnesses 

Panel I 

• Dr. Tara O’Toole, Under Secretary of Science and Technology, Department 

of Homeland Security. 

• Mr. Warren Stern, Director of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, Department of Homeland Security. 

Panel II 

• Dr. James Carafano, Director of the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for 

Foreign Policy Studies at the Heritage Foundation. 

• Mr. Marc Pearl, President and Chief Executive Officer, Homeland Security 

and Defense Business Council. 

• Mr. David Maurer, Director of the Homeland Security and Justice Team at 

the U.S. Government Accountability Office. 

Brief Overview 

The hearing will examine various elements of DHS S&T including the recent reorganization of the Directorate, the strategic planning process, stakeholder involvement in setting research priorities, and the role of research and development in the 

DHS S&T portfolio. Many of the areas reflect ongoing interest from Members of the 

Technology and Innovation Subcommittee. 

Background 

The Department of Homeland Security’s research and development portfolio is 

concentrated in DHS S&T and DNDO. DHS S&T is responsible for carrying out research on behalf of federal homeland security needs and coordinating this research 

with other federal research entities. 
4 
5 

The FY 12 budget request for DHS S&T is $1.2 billion and would increase by 

$170 million or 16.9 percent from the FY 10 enacted. Most of this increase reflects 

the transfer of research and development programs from DNDO to DHS S&T, which 

will consolidate all DHS basic research within DHS S&T. The FY 12 budget request 

for DNDO is $331.7 million, an overall reduction of $51.3 million or 13.4 percent. 

This includes a transfer of $108.5 million from the Transformational Research and 

Development account to DHS S&T. This transfer was also proposed in FY 11. If the 

DNDO transfer and funding for the construction of the NBAF is removed, the DHS 

S&T budget request represents an 11 percent decrease from FY 10 enacted. 

Organization of the Science and Technology Directorate 

DHS S&T is currently comprised of four groups that address basic research 

through advanced technology development and transition. An organizational realignment took place effective in late 2010. 
6 

2 Department of Homeland Security, Science and Technology Directorate, Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report: A Strategic Framework for a Secure Homeland, February 2010, 3Department of Homeland Security, Science and Technology Directorate, Bottom-Up Review 

Report, July 2010, http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/bur—bottom—up—review.pdf. 4 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11318sp.pdf 

Issues and Concerns 

Science and Technology Research and Development Prioritization 

Witnesses will discuss the methods and criteria used to develop long-term basic 

research and development priorities at DHS S&T and how these methods and criteria may be improved. Concerns continue to emerge in the current budget environment that in responding to immediate needs, DHS has experienced challenges in 

pursuing basic research and development that could potentially help aid the development of the innovative long-term capabilities needed to protect the homeland 

years down the road. In addition, witnesses will assess how research priorities align 

with the needs of DHS stakeholders, and how the Department coordinates its efforts 

with other federal research entities. 

Reorganization Impacts and Implications 

The Subcommittee has requested that witnesses address the impact of the 

changes that have occurred at DHS S&T following the Quadrennial Review 2 and 

the Bottom-Up Review 3, including the 2010 realignment of DHS S&T, and the recent portfolio analysis. 

Stakeholder and Private Sector Engagement 

DHS S&T has cited an increased emphasis on partnerships to increase the efficiency and timeliness of delivering needed capabilities. Witnesses will address the 

manner in which DHS S&T and DNDO collaborates throughout the various DHS 

offices, as well as the relationship and interaction between DHS science and technology programs and the private sector. Also, the Subcommittee has asked witnesses to discuss the manner in which DHS responds to customer and stakeholder 

needs through collaborative agency partnerships. 

Science and Technology Informing DHS Program Decisions 

The Subcommittee has requested that witnesses address the DHS research and 

development information provided in the recent GAO report: ‘‘Opportunities to Reduce Potential Duplication in Government Programs, Save Tax Dollars, and Enhance Revenue’’. 4 The GAO has identified concerns regarding the manner in which 

DHS completes testing and cost-benefit analyses in the acquisition process. One of 

S&T’s FY 12 strategic initiatives is focused on acquisition support. Specifically, DHS 

S&T has established an Acquisition Support and Operations Analysis group. The 

Subcommittee has asked witnesses to discuss the current and potential role of 

science and technology research and development programs at DHS in supporting 

the technology acquisition programs of the Department and whether a more active 

role for DHS S&T could assist with reducing costs affiliated with acquisition programs. 
7 

Chairman QUAYLE. The Subcommittee on Technology and Innovation will come to order. 

Good morning, everybody. Welcome to today’s hearing entitled 

‘‘An Overview of Science and Technology Research and Development Programs and Priorities at the Department of Homeland Security.’’ In front of you are packets containing the written testimony, biographies and truth in testimony disclosures from today’s 

witnesses. 

Before we get started, this being the first meeting of the Technology and Innovation Subcommittee for the 112th Congress, I 

would like to ask the Subcommittee’s indulgence to introduce myself and welcome Members. It is an honor and a pleasure for me 

to chair the Technology and Innovation Subcommittee for this Congress and it is a position that I do not take lightly. I want all Members of this Subcommittee to know that my door is always open 

and that I will endeavor to serve all Members fairly and impartially. I will also work to serve the best interests of all Americans 

and this Congress to ensure that the agencies and programs under 

our jurisdiction are worthy of the public’s support. 

Today’s hearing includes two panels. Our first panel will feature 

Department of Homeland Security Under Secretary for Science and 

Technology Dr. Tara O’Toole, and Mr. Warren Stern, Director at 

the Department’s Domestic Nuclear Detection Office. Our second 

panel will feature Dr. James Carafano from the Heritage Foundation, Mr. Marc Pearl from the Homeland Security and Defense 

Business Council, and Mr. David Maurer, Director of the Homeland 

Security and Justice Team at the U.S. Government Accountability 

Office. 

I now recognize myself for five minutes for an opening statement. 

I would like to welcome everyone to today’s hearing, my first as 

chairman of the Subcommittee on Technology and Innovation. I 

look forward to working with you. We have a distinguished panel 

of witnesses before us who will discuss the Department of Homeland Security’s research and development programs. At the outset, 

I wish to extend my appreciation to each of our witnesses for taking the time and effort to be here and appear before us today. 

Please know that your testimony will help the Members of this 

Subcommittee understand the strategic direction of research and 

development at the department, and determine how Congress can 

support efforts to ensure the security of our homeland. 

I am pleased to discuss activities at the Science and Technology 

Directorate and the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office at the Department of Homeland Security. The hearing will examine the recent reorganization of the Science and Technology Directorate, the 

strategic planning process, stakeholder involvement in setting research priorities and the role of research and development in the 

DHS S&T portfolio. Many of these areas reflect ongoing interest 

from Members of the Subcommittee. There will be two panels. The 

first panel will include Administration witnesses from DHS S&T 

and DNDO, and the second panel will include stakeholders of the 

DHS enterprise. 

This Subcommittee has always encouraged Administration witnesses to testify on panels with non-governmental witnesses, allowing for a beneficial interaction amongst stakeholders. While it is 
8 

unfortunate that the two panels couldn’t have served together this 

morning to provide a more cohesive conversation, the Subcommittee appreciates the opportunity to hear from both industry 

experts and senior agency officials. 

I note that the budget requests for DHS S&T and the DNDO in 

fiscal year 2012 cumulatively represent more than $1.3 billion. 

DHS S&T’s budget would increase by 17 percent, however, most of 

this increase reflects the transfer of research and development programs from DNDO to DHS S&T. Excluding the DNDO transfer 

and new funding for the construction of a National Bio and AgroDefense Facility, the DHS S&T budget request represents an 11 

percent decrease. 

In the current budget environment, there continue to be concerns 

that DHS is having difficulty responding to immediate needs, while 

also pursuing basic research and development that can help with 

the long-term capabilities needed to protect the homeland in the future. 

In my home State of Arizona, violence and security issues along 

the border are, tragically, a regular occurrence. In a recent study 

conducted by the Government Accountability Office, the Border Patrol reported that only 44 percent of the border was under operational control. This has to be improved. I am particularly interested in learning about the research and development activities 

conducted by the DHS components before us today that support 

border security, as well as border crossing efficiency. How can we 

find ways to reduce the cost of maintaining our safe borders? Are 

technologies being developed to help support safe and secure crossings? 

Thanks again to our witnesses, and I look forward to a productive conversation. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Quayle follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN BEN QUAYLE

Good morning. I’d like to welcome everyone to today’s hearing, my first as Chairman of the Subcommittee on Technology and Innovation. I look forward to working 

with you all. 

We have a distinguished panel of witnesses before us who will discuss the Department of Homeland Security’s research and development programs. At the outset, I 

wish to extend my appreciation to each of our witnesses for taking the time and 

effort to appear before us today. Please know that your testimony and wisdom will 

help the Members of this Subcommittee understand the strategic direction of research and development at the Department, and determine how Congress can support efforts to ensure the security of our homeland. 

I am pleased to discuss activities at the Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) 

and the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) at the Department of Homeland 

Security. The hearing will examine the recent reorganization of the Science and 

Technology Directorate, the strategic planning process, stakeholder involvement in 

setting research priorities and the role of research and development in the DHS 

S&T portfolio. Many of these areas reflect ongoing interest from Members of the 

Subcommittee. There will be two panels; the first panel will include Administration 

witnesses from DHS S&T and DNDO; and the second panel will include stakeholders of the DHS enterprise. This Subcommittee has always encouraged Administration witnesses to testify on panels with non–governmental witnesses, allowing for 

a beneficial interaction amongst stakeholders. While it is unfortunate that the two 

panels couldn’t have served together this morning to provide a more cohesive conversation, the Subcommittee appreciates the opportunity to hear from both industry 

experts and senior agency officials. 

I note that the budget requests for DHS S&T and the DNDO in fiscal year 2012 

cumulatively represent more than $1.3 billion. DHS S&T’s budget would increase 
9 

by 17 percent; however, most of this increase reflects the transfer of research and 

development programs from DNDO to DHS S&T. Excluding the DNDO transfer and 

new funding for the construction of a National Bio and Agro–Defense Facility, the 

DHS S&T budget request represents an 11 percent decrease. 

In the current budget environment, there continue to be concerns that DHS is 

having difficulty responding to immediate needs, while also pursuing basic research 

and development that can help with the long–term capabilities needed to protect the 

homeland in the future. 

In my home state of Arizona, violence and security issues along the border are, 

tragically, a regular occurrence. In a recent study conducted by the Government Accountability Office, the Border Patrol reported that only 44 percent of the border 

was under operational control—this has to be improved. I am particularly interested 

in learning about the research and development activities conducted by the DHS 

components before us today that support border security, as well as border crossing 

efficiency. How can we find ways to reduce the cost of maintaining our safe borders? 

Are technologies being developed to help support safe and secure crossings? 

Thanks again to our witnesses, and I look forward to a productive discussion. 

With that, I now recognize the gentleman from Oregon, Mr. Wu, for his opening 

statement. 

Chairman QUAYLE. With that, I now recognize the gentleman 

from Oregon, Mr. Wu, for his opening statement. 

Mr. WU. Thank you very much, Chairman Quayle. 

As this is our first hearing of this Congress of this Subcommittee, 

I want to take a moment to welcome you to the Full Committee 

and to this Subcommittee. We have already had a fruitful private 

meeting. I look forward to working with you and to find common 

ground on many of the important issues that fall within this Subcommittee’s jurisdiction. 

I want to thank also Mr. Lujan, who will be the ranking member 

for the second half of this meeting. Here in the Congress, March 

Madness refers not only to basketball, but also to this pressing period when so many of our constituents come to Washington, D.C., 

for about a month-and-a-half to two-month period. 

And finally, I want to thank our first panel, Under Secretary 

O’Toole and Director Stern, for appearing before us today. I do believe that this marks the first time that either one of you has appeared before this Subcommittee, so welcome. I look forward to 

hearing your testimony. 

In fact, I couldn’t be more pleased that our first hearing is on research and development at the Department of Homeland Security. 

The work that you do is critically important, literally life and 

death. It is work to keep the American people and our first responders safe. Precisely because the work you do is so important, 

we hold you to the highest of standards. We can’t and should not 

ignore the problems that have plagued both the Science and Technology Directorate and the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office in 

past years. However, I do believe that both of you are taking energetic steps to get the components of your programs on the right 

track and I commend each of you for that. 

That being said, we need to do everything we can to make sure 

that things continue to improve. When I was chairman of this Subcommittee, I repeatedly expressed concern that the S&T Directorate did not effectively prioritize its research activities and I 

questioned whether its investments were targeted first to the most 

critical threats. I also criticized the Directorate for not being sufficiently responsive to the needs of its customers, its end users, par-
10 

ticularly first responders, when developing new technologies, making research decisions and taking deployment issues into account. 

I recognize that efforts are well underway to address these problems, including the reorganization that was implemented late last 

year and the creation of the first responder IPT. I want to know 

when we can expect the rubber to hit the road with respect to these 

efforts and start seeing results. I also want to get an update on the 

status of your strategic planning efforts. When the Directorate last 

testified in front of this Subcommittee in 2009, we were told that 

a new and improved strategic plan was under development to supplement or replace the 2007 plan, which really wasn’t of a longterm strategic nature, but here we are a year and a half later and 

we do not have an updated strategic plan in hand. I also want to 

learn about any new efforts including those reflected in the fiscal 

year 2012 budget request to carry our your responsibilities more efficiently and, more importantly more effectively. 

I also look forward to hearing from our second panel of witnesses 

about additional steps that the Directorate can take. In the past, 

I have also made my concerns clear over the testing and evaluation 

of technologies at DHS within the S&T Directorate, DNDO and 

other DHS components and the extent to which the results of those 

tests are guiding acquisition decisions. Is the testing rigorous 

enough? Is DHS evaluating the likelihood that a new technology 

will be accepted by those who will use it? 

Today I hope that we can get a good sense of what, if anything, 

S&T and DNDO are doing to help ensure that DHS’s testing and 

evaluation shortcomings are indeed a thing of the past. 

Thank you again for being here and I look forward to your testimony. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wu follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER DAVID WU

Thank you, Chairman Quayle. As this is our first hearing of the Congress, I want 

to take a moment to welcome you. I am confident that we will find common ground 

on many of the important issues that fall within this subcommittee’s jurisdiction, 

and look forward to working with you. 

I also want to thank our first panel, Under Secretary O’Toole and Director Stern, 

for appearing before us today. I believe this marks the first time that either of you 

have appeared before this subcommittee, so welcome. I look forward to hearing your 

testimony. In fact, I couldn’t be more pleased that our first hearing is on research 

and development at the Department of Homeland Security. The work that you do 

is critically important—literally, life and death. It is work to keep us, our constituents, and our first responders safe. 

Precisely because the work you do is so important, we hold you to the highest of 

standards. We can’t—and shouldn’t—ignore the problems that have plagued both 

the Science & Technology Directorate and the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office in 

the past. However, I believe that both of you are taking the steps that need to be 

taken to get your components on the right track, and I commend each of you for 

that. 

That being said, we need to do everything we can to make sure that things continue to improve. When I was chairman of this subcommittee, I repeatedly expressed concern that the S&T Directorate did not effectively prioritize its research 

activities and questioned whether its investments were targeted to the most critical 

threats. I also criticized the Directorate for not being sufficiently responsive to the 

needs of its customers, particularly first responders, when developing new technologies and making research decisions. 

I recognize that efforts, are well underway to address these problems, including 

the reorganization that was implemented late last year and the creation of the First 

Responder IPT. I want to know when we can expect the rubber to hit the road with 

respect to these efforts and start seeing results. I also want to get an update on 
11 

the status of your strategic planning efforts. When the Directorate last testified in 

front of this Subcommittee in 2009, we were told that a new and improved strategic 

plan was under development, but here we are—a year and a half later—without an 

updated strategic plan in hand. I also want to learn about any new efforts, including 

those reflected in the FY 2012 budget request, to carry out your responsibilities 

more efficiently and more importantly—more effectively. I also look forward to hearing from our second panel of witnesses about additional steps that the Directorate 

can take. 

In the past, I have also made clear my concern over the testing and evaluation 

of technologies at DHS—within the S&T Directorate, DNDO, and other DHS components—and the extent to which the results of those tests are guiding acquisition decisions. Is the testing rigorous enough? Is DHS evaluating the likelihood that a new 

technology will be accepted by those who will use it? Today, I hope that we can get 

a good sense of what, if anything, S&T and DNDO are doing to help ensure that 

DHS’s testing and evaluation shortcomings are a thing of the past. 

Thank you again for being here. I look forward to your testimony. 

Chairman QUAYLE. Thank you, Mr. Wu. 

If there are Members who wish to submit additional opening 

statements, your statements will be added to the record at this 

point. 

At this time I would like to introduce our first panel of witnesses 

and then we will proceed to hear from each of them in order. Our 

first witness is Department of Homeland Security Under Secretary 

for Science and Technology Dr. Tara O’Toole. Prior to serving at 

DHS S&T, Dr. O’Toole was the CEO and Director of the Center for 

Biosecurity at the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center and 

Professor of Medicine and of Public Health at the University of 

Pittsburgh. Next we will hear from Mr. Warren Stern, the Director 

at the department’s Domestic Nuclear Detection Office. Prior to 

joining DNDO, Mr. Stern served as the head of the International 

Atomic Energy Agency’s Incident and Emergency Centre, where he 

led international efforts to prepare for and respond to nuclear and 

radiation emergencies. 

Thanks again to our panel for being here this morning. As our 

witnesses should know, spoken testimony is limited to five minutes 

each. After all witnesses have spoken, Members of the Committee 

will have five minutes each to ask questions. 

I now recognize our first witness, Dr. Tara O’Toole, Under Secretary for Science and Technology at the U.S. Department of 

Homeland Security. 

STATEMENTS OF DR. TARA O’TOOLE, 

UNDER SECRETARY, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Ms. O’TOOLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, distinguished Members of the Committee. It is a pleasure to be here 

today to talk to you on behalf of the Department of Homeland Security about the Science and Technology Directorate of which I became Under Secretary November 2009. 

S&T, as we refer to the Directorate, was one of the few pieces 

of the Department of Homeland Security to be created de novo in 

2002 by an act of Congress, and it was given a huge task, that is 

providing research and development for all of the activities of this 

enormously broad set of missions which is the Department of 

Homeland Security. So we remain a young organization but I think 
12 

we have evolved considerably over the past nine years and continue 

to do so. 

With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I would ask that my written testimony be entered into the record and I will summarize 

briefly some of the highlights. 

S&T is responsible for conducting all of the research and development, both basic and applied, needed by the components, the operating components, of the Department. We also have a statutory responsibility to serve the science and technology needs of the larger 

Homeland Security enterprise including first responders and other 

State and local entities who have to respond to disasters, intercept 

illegal aliens, et cetera, et cetera. 

I want to make clear that although we do a lot of work in developing or adapting technologies for use by Homeland Security, we 

also have a big responsibility to do assessments, analyses and develop knowledge products such as the bio threat risk assessment 

for the Department and for the entire Federal Government. 

S&T acts as the technical core of the Department of Homeland 

Security. Many of our operating components do not have rich R&D 

histories or experience bringing technology available in the public 

sector or in the private sector or being developed by universities 

into use, and we are their principal advisor in that endeavor and 

we hope to become ever more useful to the operating components 

in that capacity. 

We also maintain fundamental research investments in S&T in 

Homeland Security-related endeavors, particularly through our 

maintenance and funding of the Centers of Excellence, which now 

comprise over 200 universities across the country. 

This exceptional breadth of the Homeland Security mission 

which we are charged to serve and the urgency of the operational 

needs in DHS which we are trying to meet not only by increasing 

the capabilities of DHS components through new technologies but 

also by making their operations more effective, more cost efficient 

and safer requires us to be very clear about our priorities, to constantly reevaluate where we are investing and how we are doing 

and to be as efficient as we can within S&T as is feasible. We have 

R&D projects ongoing now in all five DHS mission areas: 

counterterrorism, border security, immigration, cybersecurity and 

disaster resilience. We have undertaken a strategic planning process and a realignment of the structural organization of S&T to help 

us deliver products and technologies to use in the field. Our first 

priority in that strategic planning was to deliver products to use 

in the field. 

There is, as is well known in R&D worlds, a very difficult transition, often referred as the valley of death that occurs after you have 

developed a successful prototype of a new technology that has been 

proven to work in an operationally realistic setting and deployment 

of that technology on a wide scale for routine use. Crossing that 

valley of death has many aspects to it, and we are very mindful 

of these different facets of transition in S&T but we have done a 

number of things to try and make that transition faster and more 

likely. 

First of all, we know from lots of experience in the R&D world 

generally that it is critically important to understand your user’s 
13 

1The Homeland Security Enterprise is defined in the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review 

(QHSR) as ‘‘the Federal, State, local, tribal, territorial, nongovernmental, and private–sector entities, as well as individuals, families, and communities who share a common national interest 

in the safety and security of America and the American population’’. 

needs in detail and with fidelity. We are making several moves to 

make sure that we understand what the components’ mission 

needs are. Translating those needs into testable requirements 

against which you can build technologies is another critical step, 

and we have reorganized to create an office of operational analysis 

and acquisition support to help the components do just that: develop clear, testable requirements. 

Secondly, we are instituting a much more far-reaching and disciplined process of what we call technology foraging. We want technologies very quickly within a year or two but the usual R&D process to go from an idea developed on a laboratory bench to use in 

the world is about a decade, on average. So we want S&T to become extremely disciplined and very efficient at scanning the whole 

environment of available technologies in the commercial sector, in 

universities and other uses in the federal agencies and so forth to 

make sure that there isn’t something out there that we can go and 

get and adapt to DHS uses. We do technology foraging now. We are 

going to become more disciplined, more effective and more farreaching at it. An example of this is our new partnership with InQ–Tel, which I would be happy to talk more about, but I want to 

end with a note on first responders. 

I am very focused on meeting their needs as required by the 

Homeland Security Act. I think we all recognize that their needs 

are different from those of the DHS components. Being a firefighter 

in a small town in Arizona is very different from meeting the requirements implicit in firefighters in New York City. So we have 

stood up a component office that is specifically focused on understanding the first responders’ needs and delivering to them the 

knowledge products and the technologies that they most require, 

again in a timely and efficient way, and the head of that office is 

himself a former fire chief of Loudon County with a Ph.D.. 

Mr. Chairman, I would be happy to answer further questions but 

I think I will stop there for now. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. O’Toole follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. TARA O’TOOLE

Strategy and Goals of the DHS Science and Technology Directorate 

Good afternoon, Chairman Quayle, Ranking Member Wu, and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee. I am honored to appear before you today on behalf of the 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Science and Technology Directorate (S&T). 

My testimony will describe the Directorate’s strategic direction and top priorities, 

as well as some of the challenges facing our comparatively modest research and development (R&D) organization in our efforts to support the third largest federal 

agency. 

Mission of the DHS S&T is Broad, Varied and Serves Many Partners 

The mission of the S&T Directorate is to: 

Strengthen America’s security and resiliency by providing knowledge products and 

innovative technology solutions/or the Homeland Security Enterprisel. 1

Congress created S&T as part of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to ‘‘conduct 

basic and applied research, development, demonstration, testing, and evaluation ac-
14 

tivities relevant to any or all elements of the Department’’. S&T also has a statutory 

responsibility to transfer useful technologies and information to state and local governments, the first responder community and the private sector. During the past 

eight years, S&T has undergone many changes and continues to mature. Because 

DHS’s mission is so broad, S&T’s work must address a wide and varied range of 

programs. DHS is primarily an operational agency, and its components need analyses and technologies that provide near-term improvements in operational effectiveness; our staff serves as the technical core of the Department. Moreover, some of 

S&T’s most important contributions are not technologies alone, but knowledge products-assessments of technical problems or feasible solutions; analyses of complex 

issues; objective tests of proposed technologies; and the creation of consensus standards which enable cost-effective progress across many fields. 

S&T Strategic Planning Process and Key Goals 

Shortly after I was confirmed as Under Secretary, S&T instituted an inclusive 

and comprehensive strategic planning process. All S&T employees were invited to 

participate in a questionnaire, and interviews were held with Congressional staff, 

first responder representatives, and leaders of the DHS components. We also held 

two off-site meetings to have more in-depth conversations with S&T senior executives and project managers. We heard similar messages from many directions, and 

used this input to establish our key goals for the next year. These are described 

below: 

S&T Goal #1 – Rapidly develop and deliver knowledge, analyses, and 

innovative solutions that advance the mission of the Department. 

This first goal is intended to place a strong emphasis on transitioning products 

to use in the field -a goal which is in keeping with the intense operational focus 

of the Department and the need for near-term improvements in operational capabilities, efficiencies and security. Research and development efforts are notoriously unpredictable. Research is inherently about discovery -but this path is rarely linear 

or straightforward. By its very nature, R&D takes a long time. The usual estimate 

of the time required for a ‘‘new idea’’–a novel understanding of how nature works– 

to be translated into effective technologies is about a decade, which is longer than 

S&T has been around. To implement the goal of transitioning products to use in the 

field, S&T must do three things well: 

• We must become ‘‘best in class’’ at technology foraging. 

• We must invest more resources on the ‘‘back end’’ of R&D projects, i.e. on 

transitioning projects through operational testing and pilots to adoption by 

the customer. 

• We must closely manage individual projects and continuously review our entire R&D portfolio to ensure projects are making clear progress and that we 

are investing in high impact projects for DHS. 

Becoming Best-in-Class at Technology Foraging 

Technology foraging refers to a complex process of scanning the horizon for technologies that are already in use or being developed, and adopting these technologies 

for new purposes, new environmental conditions, or at new scales. Technology foraging leverages the work being done in other federal agencies, at universities, by 

our international partners, and in industry against possible applications to DHS 

needs. The breadth and scope of DHS’s mission, requires us to look at the good ideas 

and investments being made by others, to forage for solutions among existing ideas 

and technologies, and harvest them in the most cost-effective way possible. It is an 

extremely challenging task because of the vast and continuously shifting body of 

R&D unfolding in public and private sectors around the world. However, when done 

correctly, technology foraging can have a large impact on S&T’s efficiency and effectiveness. 

Technology foraging has always been a part of S&T and has yielded some significant successes in the past year. For example, through our Integrated Product Team 

(IPT) Process, the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) identified a need to be able to track 

small vessels approaching a seaport. While most large vessels have tagging systems 

for identification, there is a gap in our capability to track small vessels with no tag. 

Drug running and other illicit activities will use craft that lack the required communication and tracking devices. These ‘‘dark boats’’ represent a significant security 

and law enforcement challenge. S&T, in partnership with the National Oceanic and 

Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and USCG, has developed software that can 
15 

use currently deployed coastal NOAA weather radar systems to process the radar 

signal differently, enabling the USCG to identify and track small vessels. This is 

a new capability for the USCG that was realized with a relatively small S&T investment and leverages the already-deployed NOAA radar infrastructure. 

Another example is the investment in software by the Department of Defense 

(DOD) to predict high threat areas in Iraq where improvised explosive devices may 

be placed. S&T has worked with DOD to alter those computer programs so they can 

identify commercial aviation routes most at risk to a potential attack by analyzing 

flight information data, suspicious activity and other intelligence indicators. This information is used to help determine on which flights Federal Air Marshals should 

be deployed. 

We plan to institutionalize technology foraging best practices to ensure we harvest 

the best technologies, at the lowest cost, and in the timeliest manner possible. 

Leveraging the Private Sector to Maximize Efficiency 

S&T has also begun engaging with the private sector through its investments in 

In-Q–Tel. In 1999, the CIA supp0l1ed the establishment of In-Q–Tel as a not-forprofit strategic investment firm designed to bridge the gap between new advances 

in commercial technology and the technology needs of the U.S. intelligence and security communities. Most In-Q–Tel investments combine funds from more than one 

partner agency, allowing S&T to leverage significant investments from the Intelligence Community. According to In-Q–Tel’s figures, $1 of government investment 

can attract over $10 in private-sector funding. In addition to rapidly delivering innovative technologies to their government customers, In-Q–Tel also supports small 

businesses that may not normally work with the government. In-Q–Tel estimates 

that following investments via In-Q–Tel, companies have created more than 10,000 

jobs. 

Overcoming Hurdles in Project Management 

Research and development efforts often confront difficulties when crossing the 

‘‘valley of death’’-the phase of technology development between the creation of a successful prototype and the routine use of the technology in operational environments. 

There are many reasons for this gap. Successfully transitioning projects demands 

a close working relationship with the customer and a deep understanding of the 

operational needs and constraints associated with the problem to be solved. To better bridge this gap, it may be necessary on a case-by-case basis for S&T to bear 

some of the costs of operational testing and piloting of new technologies. This could 

shift S&T spending to fewer projects as well as a continuous assessment of projects’ 

progress. 

Apex Projects Solve Strategic Component Needs 

S&T must also ensure that R&D investments meet the longer-term strategic 

needs of DHS and first responders. This is a challenging task in an environment 

where urgent operational needs are constantly pressing. To this end, and to provide 

DHS Component leaders with an understanding of S&T capabilities, we have instituted ‘‘Apex’’ projects, which are intended to collaboratively solve a problem of strategic operational importance. Each Apex project is a joint agreement between the 

head of a DHS operational component and me. Together, we must approve the 

project’s goals and approach, providing a leadership imprimatur which energizes 

both S&T and the partner organization. Apex programs are team-based and interdisciplinary. Best practices learned in these projects will be documented and infused 

throughout the rest of our activities. S&T already has one Apex project underway, 

focused on improving the protective mission of the U.S. Secret Service. Another 

under development is a partnership with U.S. Customs and Border Protection to develop a secure transit corridor for goods shipped between Mexico, the U.S., and Canada. 

Ongoing Review of the R&D Portfolio 

To ensure that individual R&D projects are meeting the goals established by our 

partners in the operating components and the broader homeland security enterprise 

(HSE), S&T has committed to an annual review of our portfolio of basic and applied 

R&D and all proposed ‘‘new start’’ projects. The review process consists of written 

materials, an oral presentation by the project manager, and careful analysis of the 

project’s likely impact and feasibility (or ‘‘riskiness’’) as judged against specific 

metrics determined by S&T with input from the operating components. These 
16 

metrics are designed to address elements essential to programmatic success in the 

context of the DHS’s QHSR missions, namely: 

• Impact: Is our portfolio making a significant impact on our customer’s mission? 

• Transition: Are we transitioning relevant products to the field? 

• Technical Positioning: Is our investment positioning the organization for the 

future? 

• Customer Alignment: Are our projects aligned with well-understood customer 

requirements? 

• Customer Involvement: Do we have the appropriate level of customer interaction? 

• Innovation: Are we sufficiently innovative in the way we approach our challenges? 

A review panel of S&T leaders, the DHS Component representatives, and outside 

experts evaluates and rates each project. By measuring all of our projects against 

this framework, we will: provide a transparent and ‘‘shareable’’ view of all R&D 

within S&T; enable more strategic, longer-term budget decisions; ensure efficient 

delivery to the component or end user; and nurture effective communication 

throughout the process. This particular review model has been used by both federal 

and private R&D organizations, including the prize-winning Army Engineering, Research and Development Laboratory. 

S&T Goal #2 – Leverage technical expertise to assist DHS Components’ 

efforts to establish operational requirements, and select and acquire 

needed technologies 

A critical part of successfully transitioning technology is gaining an accurate understanding of the customer needs at the beginning of the project. This is true not 

only for the technology products that S&T develops, but also for more near-term 

technologies that components may acquire from the commercial sector. In both 

cases, the specification of operational requirements is critical. While S&T has been 

statutorily designated the important role of independent Test and Evaluation authority within the DHS, this role addresses the ‘‘back end’’ of acquisition programs. 

S&T is currently working with the DHS Under Secretary for Management on a plan 

to use our collective expertise and resources to better address the ‘‘front end’’ of the 

acquisition cycle, namely, the translation of mission needs into testable requirements. To focus efforts in this area, S&T has established an Acquisition Support 

and Operations Analysis (ASOA) Group to provide a full range of coordinated operations analysis, systems engineering, test and evaluation, and standards development support to the DHS Components. 

S&T Goal #3 – Strengthen the Homeland Security Enterprise and First 

Responders’ capabilities to protect the homeland and respond to disasters 

In addition to serving the technical needs of the DHS Components, S&T is also 

committed to addressing the needs of the larger HSE–especially first responders– 

for technologies and knowledge based on the best science. The nation’s first responder community incorporates a range of organizations, including law enforcement, fire suppression, emergency management, search and rescue, emergency medicine and public safety communications. Despite a wide array of defined responsibilities, their job descriptions vary dramatically based on geography, population, and 

climate. Above all, they are the groups we call upon to tackle unexpected events as 

they occur in real time, and must therefore maintain a wide breadth of expertise, 

adapt at a moment’s notice, and protect citizens’ lives. Additionally, communication 

poses significant challenges with first responder groups because of varying local, 

state, and national levels of hierarchy. Realizing this, S&T has made serving the 

homeland security needs of first responders a top priority. To this end, we have created an organization dedicated to understanding first responders’ operational needs 

and delivering technologies, knowledge products, and services to the first responder 

community. Many of these technologies target improved interoperability, such as 

Virtual USA for federal, state, and local data sharing and multi-band radios for 

voice interoperability. They also range from everyday technologies, such as a lightweight self-contained breathing apparatus for firefighters, to standards that many 

local agencies may only need occasionally, such as white-powder response standards. 
17 

S&T Goal #4 – Conduct, catalyze, and survey scientific discoveries and 

inventions relevant to existing and emerging homeland security challenges 

Supporting 12 University Centers of Excellence 

S&T relies upon the University Centers of Excellence (COEs) -a consortium of 

universities and colleges -to tap the expertise and resources of academia to provide 

critical homeland security tools, technologies, training, and talent. The COEs maximize S&T’s investment by working closely with academia, industry, the DHS components, and first responders to develop customer-driven research solutions. Their collective portfolio is a mix of basic and applied research addressing both short-and 

long-term needs. To better tackle urgent needs, the DHS components can directly 

engage the COEs for specific research. To date, these DHS offices have invested a 

total of $22.6 million in targeted research programs, resulting in over 70 technologies for use across the HSE. 

Investing in the Homeland Security Workforce of the Future 

S&T’s university-based educational programs develop essential scientific and technical expertise through a suite of scholarship, fellowship, and research opportunities. These programs prepare the next generation of scientific and engineering leaders to work in the homeland security arena. 

S&T’s Minority–Serving Institution (MSI) programs engage traditionally underserved universities in research and education to confront homeland security challenges and ensure that the face of America is reflected in the future homeland security science and engineering workforce. Our MSI Scientific Leadership Awards are 

designed to incorporate select MSIs into the fabric of the COEs and provide a path 

to technological employment for MSI students. 

S&T Goal #5 9 Foster a culture of innovation and learning in S&T and 

across DHS that addresses challenges with scientific, analytic, and 

technical rigor 

Build a Culture of Innovation and Learning 

The development and translation of science and technology from ideas to products 

requires technical competence, creativity, agility, sustained effort and strong teamwork. To maintain a high level of success, S&T needs to constantly evolve. We have 

to approach R&D problems from a multidisciplinary and collaborative perspective 

that can only be achieved by having experts from all fields working at close proximity in an open environment. 

S&T is working to truly achieve an ecosystem of innovation. We encourage collaboration through Apex projects that bring together teams of experts from all of 

our groups to focus on a single critical problem highlighted by our DHS partners. 

S&T is increasing the interaction between our program managers and Component 

operations to better understand operational constraints and conditions and deliver 

cross-cutting products. 

We have recently expanded our access to online scientific journals, which are the 

lifeblood of scientific discourse. And we are reworking offices and collaborative 

spaces to create a more open environment while introducing new technologies that 

can help us communicate ideas and viewpoints. Our staff is highly educated and 

technical; however, that high level of technical knowledge is perishable. Scientists 

must constantly stay in tune with new developments in the field. We are starting 

new programs at our COEs to encourage our employees to pursue advanced degrees, 

increasing S&T’s expertise and effectiveness. 

Realignment of S&T 

New Structure Emphasizes Cross–S&T Communications and Teamwork 

The structural realignment of S&T provides the organizational framework needed 

to implement our top strategic goals. The number of direct reports to the Under Secretary was reduced from 21 to 10, streamlining the chain of command. This structure allows for efficient interaction among four ‘‘Group Leads,’’ and creates a leadership cadre that spans the extent of S&T’s work. 

The four Group Leads are: 

Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency (HSARPA) 

The HSARPA Office includes seven technical divisions: 
18 

• Borders and Maritime Security 

• Chemical/Biological Defense 

• Cybersecurity 

• Explosives 

• Human Factors/Behavioral Sciences 

• Infrastructure Protection & Disaster Management 

• Special Projects (Classified and Intelligence-related programs) 

The former office of cybersecurity has been elevated to a division within HSARP 

A. Uniting all of the technical divisions will encourage collaboration across divisions, 

and enable the interdisciplinary work that is required for today’s R&D. 

Homeland Security Enterprise and First Responders Group 

As discussed in our goal to strengthen first responders’ capabilities, S&T realizes 

that it takes a unique mindset, direct experience and an operating structure different from traditional R&D to understand and serve first responders. The first responder community is broad and varied and their challenges and opportunities differ from those of federal agencies. 

By establishing this Group, S&T will be able to respond to the different needs, 

acquisition methods, implementation requirements, and management structure of 

first responders. This group will put particular focus on improved best practices, 

standards for equipment and interoperability, and information sharing. Finally, the 

Group includes a leader and staff who have first responder backgrounds, including 

some who work or volunteer part-time in the field when not working at S&T. This 

Group consists of: 

• Office for Interoperability and Compatibility 

• Office of First Responder Technology Clearinghouse 

Acquisition Support and Operations Analysis (ASOA) Group 

Establishing the ASOA Group is part of the next evolution of S&T. My predecessor performed an invaluable service by connecting S&T projects to the operational DHS Components, developing the IPT process to identify component technology needs, and linking S&T investments to those needs. The ASOA Group will 

leverage S&T’s critical mass of technical capability within DHS and will work with 

the Under Secretary for Management to: aid the components in developing high-fidelity, testable operational requirements for their acquisitions; aid in executing an 

analysis of alternatives to ensure that the most appropriate technical approach is 

taken; and partner with the components throughout an acquisition so that user 

needs are translated into real capabilities that can be validated upon delivery and 

deployed without delay. To do this, we’ve established three elements within ASOA: 

• Capstone Analysis and Requirements Office 

• Systems Engineering Office 

• Test and Evaluation and Standards Division 

• Research and Development Partnerships Group (RDP) 

The Research and Development Partnerships Group is comprised of: 

• Interagency Office 

• International Cooperative Programs Office 

• Office of National Labs 

• Office of Public-Private Partnerships 

• Office of University Programs 

The RDP was created to ensure that S&T has a rich ‘‘situational awareness’’ ofand is able to use and leverage–the scientific research and technology development 

occurring in the public and private sectors, across federal agencies, and in the international sphere. Furthermore, through RDP, S&T is fostering an openness to work 

collaboratively with these partners on challenges facing the Department. 

The Office of Public-Private Partnerships continues to increase its outreach to the 

private sector, gathering a growing repository of capabilities from over 500 small 

businesses potentially aligned to DHS technology needs. S&T’s Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program and Long Range Broad Agency Announcement contracting vehicle are open solicitations designed to seek private sector ideas and technologies. Responses are reviewed by the S&T technical divisions seeking technologies that may be further developed with S&T funding. 
19 

This outreach has already been a success. This year, an S&T staffer was awarded 

one of the eight Small Business Administration’s 2011 Tibbetts Award for outstanding service to small businesses in the SBIR program. 

The RDP acts as a critical portal to S&T, providing commercial entities with easy 

access to the information on DHS needs, while enabling S&T program managers to 

make connections across the entire horizon of R&D. RDP also allows S&T to leverage the investments and innovations of other federal agencies, foreign governments, 

universities and the private sector through mutually beneficial partnerships. 

Conclusion 

S&T strives to provide cutting edge scientific knowledge, technical analysis, and 

innovative technologies to the third largest federal agency, to first responders, and 

to the HSE. The missions and technical needs of homeland security are broad in 

scope, varied, and constantly evolving. To meet the challenges of this mission, S&T 

must also evolve. I believe that the implementation of the strategic plan and our 

organizational realignment are important steps toward realizing the technical needs 

of homeland security. 

Thank you for inviting me to appear before you today. I look forward to answering 

your questions and to working with you on S&T’s evolving strategic direction and 

other homeland security issues. 

BIOGRAPHY FOR DR. TARA O’TOOLE

Dr. O’Toole was sworn in as Under Secretary of the Science and Technology (S&T) 

Directorate at the Department of Homeland Security on November 12, 2009. 

Created at the same time as the Department, S&T’s mission is to strengthen 

America’s security and resiliency by providing knowledge products and innovative 

technology solutions for the Homeland Security Enterprise. S&T’s partners comprise 

the Department of Homeland Security’s operational components; first responders; 

the private sector and other members of the Homeland Security Enterprise. As 

Under Secretary for S&T, Dr. O’Toole oversees the Directorate and serves as the 

science advisor to the Secretary of Homeland Security. 
20 

Dr. O’Toole is internationally known for her work on biosecurity and on health 

and safety issues related to the U.S. nuclear weapons complex. Prior to serving at 

S&T, Dr. O’Toole was the CEO and director of the Center for Biosecurity at the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center (UPMC) and Professor of Medicine and of Public Health at the University of Pittsburgh from 2003 to 2009. Prior to founding the 

UPMC Center, Dr. O’Toole was one of the original members of the Johns Hopkins 

Center for Civilian Biodefense Strategies, serving as its director from 2001 to 2003. 

At both centers, she created independent organizations dedicated to improving the 

country’s resilience to major biological threats. 

Dr. O’Toole was a founding coeditor-in-chief of the journal Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science. She was a principal author and 

producer of Dark Winter, an influential exercise conducted in June 2001 to alert national leaders to the dangers of bioterrorist attacks. She was also a principal writer 

and producer of Atlantic Storm, an international ministerial-level biosecurity exercise held in 2005. She is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and served 

as chair of the board of the Federation of American Scientists. 

From 1993 to 1997, Dr. O’Toole served as Assistant Secretary of Energy for Environment, Safety and Health. In this position, she was principal advisor to the Secretary of Energy on environmental protection and on the health and safety of the 

approximately 100,000 workers in the U.S. nuclear weapons complex and Department of Energy (DOE) laboratories. She developed the first overall management and 

safety plan for dealing with the highly enriched uranium, plutonium, spent fuel, and 

radioactive waste that had been left in place when nuclear weapons production was 

stopped in the early 1990s. She ran the multi-agency, multimillion-dollar task force 

that oversaw the government’s investigations into human radiation experiments 

conducted during the Cold War. And she led the U.S. delegation to Russia to establish the U.S./Russia cooperative effort to study radiation exposure and environmental hazards of the Russian nuclear weapons complex. 

Prior to her work at DOE, Dr. O’Toole was a senior analyst at the Congressional 

Office of Technology Assessment (OTA). Dr. O’Toole also practiced general internal 

medicine in community health centers in Baltimore from 1984 to 1988. She is board 

certified in internal medicine and in occupational and environmental health. 

Dr. O’Toole holds a Bachelor’s of Science from Vassar College, an MD from the 

George Washington University, and a Master of Public Health degree from Johns 

Hopkins University. She completed internal medicine residency training at Yale and 

a fellowship in Occupational and Environmental Medicine at Johns Hopkins University. 

Chairman QUAYLE. Thank you, Dr. O’Toole. 

Now I would like to recognize Mr. Warren Stern, Director of the 

Domestic Nuclear Detection Office at the U.S. Department of 

Homeland Security, to present his testimony. 

STATEMENT OF WARREN STERN, DIRECTOR OF 

THE DOMESTIC NUCLEAR DETECTION OFFICE, 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. STERN. Thank you, Chairman Quayle. Good morning, Ranking Member Wu and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee. 

I have submitted written testimony and I would like to now highlight some of the main points of that testimony. 

I have been at DNDO now for a little more than six months and 

I have tried to bring three basic principles: discipline, transparency 

and intellectual rigor. In terms of discipline, I am encouraging 

DNDO to focus on our legislative mandates and our Presidential directives. We also are going to be disciplined in our utilization of resources. We have developed a solutions development process which 

I believe we have provided to your staff which ensures that for any 

activity we undertake, material or non-material, we follow a process that ensures that there is proper coordination within DNDO 

and outside DNDO and at each transition point there is a stage 

gate to make sure that the basic requirements have been met be-
21 

fore proceeding to the next part of the process, but this discipline 

I think will help ensure that some of the problems we faced in the 

past we won’t face in the future. 

In terms of transparency, I fundamentally believe that we need 

to make sure that Congress is aware of all of our activities, and 

I will do my best to make sure that your staff is aware of our 

projects currently and planned and we try our best to be transparent with the public too. 

In terms of intellectual rigor, I am trying very hard to ensure 

that all of our activities have the intellectual rigor that will allow 

outsiders to examine what we do and to defend what we have done 

in an intellectually honest way. 

Within the context of these three principles, one of the first 

things we did when I arrived at DNDO was to develop a GNDA 

strategic plan. Congress had pressed for such a strategic plan for 

several years. We worked hard with seven different agencies and 

within four months delivered to Congress this strategic plan, which 

you should have. I think that plan and the effort involved reflected 

those three principles: the discipline to deliver something to you on 

time, the transparency which the plan gives to you, and the intellectual rigor which was necessary to go into the plan. 

In terms of strategic changes I am working within DNDO to 

bring is the way we look at the architecture. We have looked at the 

architecture in a very static way, which has the problem in terms 

of intellectual rigor in that looking at the architecture this way 

doesn’t reflect physical reality. It is extremely hard to detect certain types of nuclear material and it is quite likely that in the case 

of some sort of illicit trafficking of nuclear material or weapons or 

radiological material or weapons, there will be some intelligence information, so the new way we are trying to look at the architecture 

is intelligence-informed architecture and we are developing scenarios with the intelligence community and we are going to try our 

best to develop an architecture that can respond to the information 

that may be available. I believe this is the most intellectually rigorous way we can approach the architecture, and I also believe this 

approach will allow us to develop metrics to deliver to Congress 

that will help ensure that you are able to judge our degree of success in developing the architecture. 

In terms of technology development testing and evaluation, there 

are two key changes we hope to implement and are beginning to 

implement at DNDO. First, in terms of testing, as you may know, 

the National Academy of Sciences has recommended that we move 

to what is called the model test model approach for examining new 

technology, and we are in fact doing that. Historically, we have 

done actual testing to examine different systems, physical testing. 

By moving to a model test model approach, we can in a sense make 

a model or have industry make a model, test to the model and then 

examine a number of scenarios with the model so we fully endorse 

the National Academy recommendation for testing and we are moving very quickly in that direction. 

In addition, we are looking outside in terms of transitioning detector technology that exists outside to a greater extent than we 

have before. We find ourselves now six years after the creation of 

DNDO in a situation where a lot of technology that didn’t exist in 
22 

the commercial sector six years ago does exist now and so we are 

going to enhance our focusing in developing standards and testing 

and modeling to those standards based on technology that is available in the commercial world. Now, that doesn’t mean we won’t be 

doing internal development. There are certain elements, certain 

technologies that just don’t exist in the commercial world, and 

through our various parts of DNDO we will be developing new 

technologies and both pushing out to users and trying to ensure 

that users can pull technologies out from us. One of the good examples is this long-range radiation detector system which to me is 

really the first new piece of technology I have seen in a long time 

and we are pushing out this to engineers in a demonstration in a 

few weeks, first responders, the military, others, so they can examine and see if there are applications for this. 

With that, I would just like to conclude. Again, thank you again 

for the opportunity to talk before you and answer your questions. 

Chairman Quayle, Ranking Member Wu, I am happy to answer 

any questions that you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Warren M. Stern follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. WARREN M. STERN

Introduction 

Good morning Chairman Quayle, Ranking Member Wu, and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today 

with my colleague Dr. O’Toole to discuss research and development (R&D) programs 

at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). In order to fully express the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office’s (DNDO) R&D efforts, I would first like to share 

my strategic vision for DNDO and provide insights into our programs. 

The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office’s (DNDO) mandate is to improve the nation’s capability to detect and report unauthorized attempts to import, possess, 

store, develop, or transport nuclear or radiological material for use against the nation, and to further enhance this capability over time. With assistance and participation from a wide variety of U.S. government departments and agencies, DNDO 

synchronizes and integrates inter-agency efforts to develop technical nuclear detection capabilities, characterizes detector system performance, ensures effective response to detection alarms, integrates nuclear forensics efforts, coordinates the global detection architecture and conducts a transformational research and development 

program for advanced technology to detect nuclear and radiological materials. Countering nuclear terrorism is a whole-of-government challenge and DNDO must work 

with federal, state, local, international, and private sector partners to develop and 

implement the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture (GNDA). 

Three Principles 

My strategic vision for DNDO is based on three key principles that I think will 

help shape the office and all our activities: discipline, intellectual rigor, and transparency. 

One of the first things I would like to build upon at DNDO is the discipline with 

which we approach our work. In DNDO’s nearly six years of existence, the office 

has embarked on many efforts to enhance the GNDA, but in order to ensure that 

we address the most pressing and impactful needs, we must carefully review all our 

plans and expenditures so that we exercise discipline in utilization of resources. 

While we have implemented a range of measures designed to provide oversight and 

instill appropriate processes for administrative, management, and program activities within DNDO, we must find ways to be more efficient, especially in the current 

budget climate. 

Building upon a disciplined approach to executing our mission, we must also ensure that there is intellectual rigor behind our analyses, strategies, and programs. 

Our decision making and planning must be supported by strong methodologies and 

analyses. This includes making use of available expertise and tools, like peer review, 

that can assist us in developing the best strategies and solutions. We must make 
23 

sure that our assumptions, strategies, and solutions reflect thoughtful and deliberate analyses and defensible conclusions. 

Finally, I support increased transparency at DNDO. Transparency is essential in 

providing an understanding of our mission and receiving the necessary oversight 

and feedback to improve our operations. I pledge that DNDO will work with all relevant stakeholders and provide as much insight as possible into our programs and 

planning for our partners, including Congress, the Government Accountability Office 

(GAO), and the American public. Working within all applicable laws and classification regulations, we will provide as much information as possible about our programs. 

GNDA Strategic Plan 

As you may know, National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-43/Homeland 

Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-14 and the Security and Accountability For 

Every (SAFE) Port Act of 2006 (P.L. 109–347) require that DNDO be the lead federal agency for coordinating the and implementing the domestic portion of the 

GNDA. We worked with federal partners to define the GNDA and the necessary 

roles, responsibilities, and objectives. Completion of this strategic plan was a priority when I took the lead at DNDO. 

The GNDA is an interagency product that represents the inputs of: the departments of Defense, State, Energy, and Justice; the Office of the Director of National 

Intelligence; Intelligence Community members; the Nuclear Regulatory Commission; 

and the National Security Staff. The completion of the GNDA Strategic Plan represents a high degree of cooperation and coordination among the interagency to create a document that will guide multiple U.S. government efforts to fulfill the objectives and goals set forth in the plan. I am proud to say that we were able to deliver 

the GNDA Strategic Plan to Congress in December 2010, as promised. 

Implementation of the GNDA is an ongoing process. Currently, there are many 

existing programs and initiatives that fall under the GNDA and many more programs that support these efforts. Using the Strategic Plan as a framework, DNDO 

will continue to work with interagency partners on GNDA implementation. DNDO’s 

forthcoming domestic implementation plan will outline programs, technologies, execution, and timelines in greater detail. 

DNDO will also complement the GNDA Strategic Plan with a revised GNDA annual review report. The annual report, required by Congress under the ‘‘Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007’’ (Pub. L. 110–53), 

will provide a means to evaluate, document and track progress to assist in refining 

the GNDA. It will also link the U.S. government’s organizational roles and responsibilities to the GNDA’s goals, and identify the analyses and investments necessary 

to achieve those objectives. Like the Strategic Plan, the GNDA annual report will 

be jointly produced and approved by all relevant USG stakeholders. 

Within DNDO we will place much greater emphasis on defining the GNDA, both 

as it exists now and as we determine it should exist in the future. The responsibility 

to define the architecture is DNDO’s greatest challenge and its greatest opportunity. 

Over the next years, our long-term architectural vision can be characterized by several common themes that apply across all layers. In every layer and pathway we 

will seek to increase detection coverage and capability and deter terrorists from 

planning or attempting nuclear terrorism. The architecture will also introduce uncertainty for adversaries with regard to the risk of interdiction, and take maximum 

advantage of existing activities that can contribute to the overall capability to prevent nuclear terrorism. 

Strategic Emphasis 

Our future enhancements to the domestic architecture will focus on situations 

where there is some intelligence information available, but where information may 

not be precise. Future implementations of the GNDA will emphasize mobile or agile 

detection components, which will increase our capability to respond to escalated 

threat levels by focusing detection assets to interdict these threats. These threats 

will impact the way we move forward with deployments and systems development, 

as well as how we provide support and training to build effective operational concepts. We will use existing capabilities and assets, on a federal, State, and local 

level, to surge our radiological and nuclear detection abilities in a coordinated fashion to respond to suspected threats or radiological/nuclear detection scenarios. This 

will not be one specific program, rather a concept of operations that will bring together multiple capabilities and rely on a breadth of assets. 

We need to utilize the integrated efforts of federal, state, and local responders to 

perform radiological and nuclear detection in concentrated regions or areas when in-
24 

1Security and Accountability For Every Port Act of 2006 (SAFE Port Act, P.L. 109–347, Sec. 

1802) 

formation indicates there may be a need for responsive search operations for preventive detection. We have many programs, assets, and capabilities that contribute to 

radiological and nuclear detection response activities, and we must work to enhance 

coordination and implementation mechanisms to ensure that we make the best use 

of all available personnel, equipment, and knowledge. A more flexible architecture 

will strategically bring together the assets and capabilities for detection and search 

operations into a unified effort for the domestic prevention of radiological and nuclear terrorism. Some current programs have begun to establish more randomized 

and mobile capabilities with broad applications, including the radiological and nuclear detection equipment and training DNDO has provided for all U.S. Coast Guard 

boarding teams and Transportation Security Administration Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response teams. We have recently reached an important milestone for 

the development of advanced handheld systems, which were developed through 

DNDO and approved for production and deployment in September 2010. This system is the first of DNDO’s next generation human–portable systems and will be acquired for U.S. Customs and Border Protection and other users in support of their 

operations. Following the success of our advanced handheld, the small area search 

handheld system, RadSeeker, will be ready for a production and deployment system 

this year. Our work will continue to enhance our federal capabilities and build on 

these efforts in a strategic way so that the pieces are linked together and can respond as needed. 

DNDO also has a number of separate state and local pilot programs and training 

efforts that can contribute to distributed, agile capabilities to develop an effective 

domestic architecture. My objective for 2011 is to increase our focus on DNDO state 

and local support programs and consolidate the efforts into an integrated program. 

One element for doing that is the Securing the Cities (STC) initiative. The current 

STC pilot was initiated in the New York City region and has resulted in unprecedented regional cooperation among federal, state, county, and city agencies in the 

Tri-state region. The STC program provides assistance to state and local jurisdictions, which enable these entities to build and sustain capabilities by: deploying current technologies regionally in a coordinated manner; designing, acquiring, and deploying a regional architecture for radiological/nuclear detection focused on state 

and local jurisdictions; developing and implementing a common, multi-agency concept of operations (CONOPS) for sharing sensor data and resolving alarms; and instituting training and exercising by the regional agencies to execute the CONOPS 

at a high level of proficiency. STC partners in the New York region use commercially available radiological and nuclear detection equipment and work with DNDO 

to establish requirements and conduct operational assessments of equipment in the 

development stages. The President’s FY 2012 budget request outlines a transition 

from the STC pilot to a three-phased program that will continue in NYC and commence in another UASI Tier I region. DNDO will assist regional partners in implementing self-supported sustainment of capabilities and real-time sharing of data 

from fixed, mobile, maritime and human-portable radiation detection systems. 

New Approach for Technology Development, Test, and Evaluation 

As we develop solutions that support flexible, coordinated capabilities and a deeper understanding of an effective architecture, we need to continue to improve our 

technological capability. DNDO is mandated to serve as ‘‘the primary entity in the 

U.S. Government to further develop, acquire, and support the deployment of an enhanced domestic system to detect and report on attempts to import, posses, store, 

transport, develop . . . ’’1A1 nuclear weapons or materials. Historically, we have focused on developing technology and detection systems to address identified needs. 

We are now transitioning to a new approach, focusing on commercially developed 

devices, developing government standards, and testing to those standards. Because 

industry has repeatedly demonstrated the ability to rapidly improve detection technologies, we have an opportunity to shift our approach to one that is more flexible 

and adaptable and relies on the private sector—as well as other DHS components— 

to enhance existing products and develop new devices. This technical transition will 

also include a new approach at the systems level, which defines strategic interfaces 

at various points in the detector/system architecture, allowing improvements without wholesale changes to the entire system. 

DNDO will place greater emphasis on developing standards for radiological/nuclear detection equipment and testing to those standards, while taking advantage 

of the technological advancements made by the private sector and building upon 
25 

those efforts. In addition, we will enhance our approach to testing to reflect the recommendations of the recent report from the National Academies of Sciences, which 

encouraged us to more heavily integrate detector modeling. Data collected in the 

field can then be used with the models to understand system behavior instead of 

relying on new testing alone. 

Testing and evaluating systems to achieve technical and operational standards is 

crucial in developing and delivering the necessary equipment to our stakeholders. 

DNDO is required by the SAFE Port Act ‘‘to carry out a program to test and evaluate technology for detecting a nuclear explosive device and fissile or radiological material, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy, 

as appropriate.’’ In response, DNDO has conducted more than 50 separate test and 

evaluation campaigns at more than 20 experimental and operational venues. These 

test campaigns were planned and executed with the interagency using rigorous, reproducible, peer-reviewed processes. Tested detection systems include pagers, 

handhelds, portals, backpacks, mobiles, boat- and spreader bar-mounted detectors, 

and next-generation radiography technologies. The results from DNDO’s test campaigns have informed federal, state, local and tribal operational users on the technical and operational performance of radiological and nuclear detection systems to 

select the most suitable equipment and effective CONOPs as we work to keep the 

nation safe from nuclear terrorist threats. 

DNDO is also required by the SAFE Port Act, in collaboration with the National 

Institute of Standards and Technology, to publish technical capability standards and 

recommended standard operating procedures for the use of nonintrusive imaging 

and radiation detection equipment in the United States. In executing its T&E and 

Standards responsibilities, DNDO collaborates with the Test & Evaluation and 

Standards Division of DHS S&T. This collaboration includes coordination of American National Standards Institute (ANSI) N42 consensus standards, major systems 

operational testing and evaluation, including large programs like the Advanced 

Spectroscopic Portal (ASP) program, the implementation of DHS T&E guidance in 

smaller systems development efforts, and coordination of T&E facilities. The DNDO 

T&E lead participates on the DHS T&E Council, and DNDO T&E staff has made 

good use of T&E training and certification capabilities developed by S&T. 

We also have supported the development, publication and adoption of national 

consensus standards for radiation detection equipment. Several such standards now 

exist for use in homeland security. The DNDO Graduated RN Detector Evaluation 

and Reporting (GRaDERSM) Program is using these standards to test and evaluate 

both commercially developed systems. GRaDER is a conformity assessment program 

that provides independent standards compliance information for selected radiation 

detection equipment. The program has created the infrastructure for vendor voluntary testing of commercial off-the-shelf radiological/nuclear detection equipment 

by independent accredited laboratories against national consensus standards and 

government-unique Technical Capability Standards. Final test results for our initial 

GRaDER testing are expected beginning this month. We anticipate that the GRaDER Evaluated Equipment List—which is supported by the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s guidance for compliance in relation to their grants program—will 

enable federal, state, local, tribal and territorial agencies to make more informed radiological/nuclear detector procurement decisions by ensuring they are buying equipment that has demonstrated compliance with published standards. 

Beyond our work with Component partners, DNDO’s testing expertise and experience is sought by interagency partners, such as the departments of Energy and Defense, and international partners such as the United Kingdom, Canada, Israel, the 

European Union, and the International Atomic Energy Agency. DNDO has an active 

partnership with the European Commission’s Joint Research Center to conduct the 

Illicit Trafficking Radioactive Assessment Program+10, an ambitious three-year test 

program to evaluate nine classes of radiological/nuclear detection systems in U.S. 

and European test facilities. 

Research and Development: Programs and Coordination 

The Transformational and Applied Research (TAR) programs at DNDO support 

basic and applied research of systems with increased capabilities. I will describe the 

TAR portfolio as it currently exists within DNDO. Our research and development 

contributes to advances in nuclear detection and technical nuclear forensics. TAR 

projects feed into the DNDO Solutions Development process and shape our work on 

systems development. Within DNDO, these programs address advanced compact 

high-performance handheld systems; advanced passive standoff detection technologies; improved detection through networked and distributed detection systems; 

better detector materials; and improved material characterization and 

radiochemistry. Additionally, DNDO is pursuing targeted technologies for the detec-
26 

tion of shielded special nuclear material through passive, active, and radiographic 

interrogation programs, and the development of key supporting systems for varied 

deployment schemes. TAR divides projects between the Exploratory Research Program (ERP) and the Near Term Research Program (NTRP). Underlying these efforts 

is our work to ensure a continued pipeline for human capital development and basic 

research, executed through DNDO’s partnership with the National Science Foundation for the Academic Research Initiative. Currently, the Academic Research Initiative has awards with 30 universities through 36 grants supporting 118 students. 

The ERP explores innovative, high–risk, early–stage technologies, concepts and 

ideas that can make transformational contributions to support the GNDA and reduce the risk of nuclear terrorism. Specifically, the ERP researches technology and 

techniques that: 1) address capability gaps and weaknesses in the GNDA, with an 

emphasis on radiological and nuclear detection; 2) provide substantial performance 

improvement or cost reductions of radiological/nuclear detection capabilities; and 3) 

improve nuclear forensics capabilities. Efforts under the ERP are intended to transform the basic building blocks of nuclear detection technology and supporting fields 

for dramatic improvements in technical capabilities, with the research generally culminating in a proof of concept or proof of feasibility demonstration in a laboratory 

setting. Successful ERP technologies and concepts may then transition to support 

a subsequent near-term research project or spur commercial development. ERP also 

provides performance modeling, improved algorithm development, and other support 

capabilities for the broader DNDO mission. 

Additionally, our ERP work began exploring options for alternative neutron detection, years before the recent helium-3 shortage was identified. Helium–3 is commonly used as a neutron detector material in radiation detection equipment. Our 

exploratory research projects have been developing near and long-term alternatives 

to helium–3 neutron detectors for different applications, including portals, 

backpacks, handhelds, and pagers. These technologies are aimed at achieving efficiencies and discrimination capabilities that are equivalent to or better than helium3 detectors, as well as examining detector cost–competitiveness. Approximately 15 

different technology approaches are being pursued, including those based on boron 

or lithium. 

Some of these technologies have advanced to a point where they could be tested 

with other alternative neutron detection technologies. We have completed a test 

campaign for neutron detection at Los Alamos National Laboratory that evaluated 

11 units in three application spaces, which helped us to identify and verify the performance of several very promising technologies and effectively target funding. 

The second program within TAR is the NTRP, which performs accelerated development, characterization, and demonstration of leading-edge technologies to address 

critical gaps in nuclear detection capabilities. The NTRP was started in 2006 and 

was formerly called the Advanced Technology Demonstration (ATD) Program. 

Contracts awarded under the NTRP are typically executed in four distinct phases: 

preliminary design review, critical design review, characterization readiness review, 

and characterization assessment. The NTRP characterization results form the basis 

for a subsequent initial cost benefit analysis to determine if the technology should 

transition to system development and eventual production and deployment. 

Our basic and applied research efforts push the envelope by identifying gaps in 

current technologies and architectural needs and selecting R&D programs that can 

begin the early stage work necessary to address these challenges. Our programs 

must be able to reach out to operators for user requirements and to balance both 

‘‘technology push’’ and ‘‘technology pull’’ efforts, as appropriate. For technology push 

efforts, the developer of a technology is pushing a new concept out for examination 

by the operator. These are often new or advanced concept detectors that could improve threat detection or allow for altered or simplified CONOPS. These technology 

push systems are often state-of-the-art with enhanced or dramatically improved capabilities that might be otherwise unknown to operators. Technology pull refers to 

equipment and programs where operators have identified CONOPS and features 

that they need in order to achieve their missions. The operators are pulling the 

technologies in directions that guide development for industry and the government. 

Many of our important research and development successes highlight the necessity of integrating architectural analyses with R&D efforts. One example of DNDO’s 

R&D work that is transitioning through technology push efforts is our Long Range 

Radiation Detection (LRRD) program. The LRRD program is the follow-on program 

to the Stand-Off Radiation Detection Systems (SORDS) ATD program, completed in 

FY 2010. The overarching goal of the LRRD program is to determine if a passive, 

long-range, radiological/nuclear detection system with localization capability should 

be developed and fielded. To achieve this goal, the LRRD program will allow systems developers to determine if there is a need, identify that need with a gap in 
27 

the GNDA, and evaluate whether that need can be met in a cost effective manner. 

Next, we must collect user requirements and perform an analysis of alternatives, 

the result of which helps us determine if we will field one or more systems. 

The LRRD systems are undergoing a series of activities that engage federal, state, 

and local partners in utilizing and assessing the technology. Participating in these 

activities are two SORDS prototypes and the Roadside Tracker (RST), which were 

developed through the ERP. The SORDS technologies are designed to detect and 

identify sources from 100 meters away on a mobile platform, and the RST is designed to detect and identify sources in vehicles over five lanes of traffic at speeds 

of up to 70 mph. An operational demonstration will evaluate the potential utility 

of these systems in a simulated urban environment, and follows the technology demonstration that was conducted at Fort Belvoir in November 2010. Next week, the 

operational demonstration will include the cooperative efforts of DNDO, Fort 

Indiantown Gap Military Reservation, the 3rd Civil Support Team, Nassau & Suffolk County Police Departments, the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration, and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. Following the 

completion of the operational demonstration, we will work with the Nassau & Suffolk County Police Departments to provide a live demonstration of the LRRD systems for radiological/nuclear scanning at a real event. The live demonstration will 

allow operators to use the systems and provide feedback for future technology and 

CONOPS development. This project is illustrative of the important interplay between R&D efforts, technical and operational evaluation activities, and operators in 

the field, which all together lead to the best solutions. 

As Under Secretary O’Toole mentioned, the FY 2011 and FY 2012 President’s 

Budget Requests transfer our TAR activities to DHS S&T, pending Congressional 

approval of the budget. In order to maintain and improve the current levels of integration for transformational research and development activities and transitions of 

technologies for use by operators, my office will work closely with S&T to ensure 

that the pipeline for technological advancements remains coordinated to address 

gaps in the GNDA and operational needs. 

Nuclear Forensics 

DNDO has an additional mandate, codified last year in the ‘‘Nuclear Forensics 

and Attribution Act’’ (P.L. 111–140), to provide stewardship and integration for U.S. 

government technical nuclear forensics efforts. Nuclear forensics is a key supporting 

element to the GNDA and must be closely linked in order to receive relevant information and provide data and analyses that can impact detector development, tuning, and deployment. Established in 2007, DNDO’s National Technical Nuclear 

Forensics Center (NTNFC) serves as a national-level ‘‘system integrator’’ for joint 

planning, exercising and evaluating our national capabilities, while also investing 

in technical capability advancement. Last year, the NTNFC led the interagency effort to develop the ‘‘National Strategic Five-Year Plan for Improving the Nuclear 

Forensics and Attribution Capabilities of the United States,’’ which was signed by 

the President and submitted to Congress. NTNFC also has the responsibility to develop the U.S. government’s capability to rapidly, accurately and credibly identify 

the origin and history of radiological and nuclear materials intercepted before a detonation. We work with laboratory experts to develop standard reference materials 

for the validation of analytical methodologies; develop validated methodologies to be 

employed in nuclear forensics activities; and develop and validate predictive models 

and techniques to improve the understanding of how material signatures. 

Conclusion 

My vision of DNDO is for us to continue to improve our work developing a broad 

spectrum of capabilities, including nuclear detection, reporting and analysis, and 

nuclear forensics. Our responsibilities include coordinating the development of the 

GNDA and implementing the domestic portion of that architecture. We also must 

provide the analyses and integration mechanisms for detection and reporting that 

will link technical elements like research, systems development, testing and evaluation to operational solutions for mitigating the threat of nuclear terrorism. Our research and development work will consistently be matched with needs in the GNDA 

and the operational requirements of our end users. My hope and expectation is that, 

over time, we will develop a reputation that allows us greater leverage in defining 

detection architecture throughout the world. 

Other U.S. government agencies and Congress make important contributions in 

accomplishing the mission to prevent nuclear terrorism, and I am committed to 

working in coordination with all parties to develop effective strategies, capabilities, 

and technologies. 
28 

Chairman Quayle, Ranking Member Wu, I thank you for this opportunity to discuss DNDO’s strategic direction and my vision for its future. I am happy to answer 

any questions the Subcommittee may have. 

BIOGRAPHY FOR MR. WARREN M. STERN

Mr. Stern is the Director of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), a position he has held since August 2010. Prior to joining DNDO, Mr. Stern served as 

the Head of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Incident and Emergency Centre from August 2006 to March 2010-where he led international efforts 

to prepare for and respond to nuclear and radiation emergencies and helped create 

the IAEA’s Response Assistance Network. 

Mr. Stern began his career in 1985 at the Central Intelligence Agency, then 

served as the Senior Technical Advisor in the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament 

Agency-where he advised senior U.S. officials on nonproliferation and nuclear security issues-from July 1990 until May 1999. 

He later served as a Fellow in Senator Hillary Clinton’s office in 2003-providing 

guidance on nuclear energy, waste, safety and security issues and helping to write 

the Dirty Bomb Prevention Act-and went on to serve as the Department of State’s 

Senior Coordinator for Nuclear Safety and Deputy Director of the Office of Nuclear 

Energy, Safety and Security. 

Mr. Stern received his M.S. in National Security Studies from the National War 

College, his M.S. in Nuclear Engineering from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and his B.A. in Physics from Brandeis University. 
29 

Chairman QUAYLE. Thank you, Mr. Stern. We are going to move 

into the question portion. I want to remind Members that committee rules limit questioning to five minutes, and at this point I 

will open up the questions and recognize myself for five minutes. 

My first question is to you, Mr. Stern. Much of the DNDO R&D 

has been proposed to be transferred from your office to the S&T Directorate. What R&D will be housed at DNDO after that transfer 

to the Directorate? 

Mr. STERN. Sure. I appreciate the question. Within the DNDO, 

we are structured in a way that goes from long-range research, 

very basic research, to the actual production and acquisition of 

equipment. What is proposed to be moved is the transformational 

and applied research Directorate within TAR that does what you 

might call more basic research. Even within TAR, there are subdivisions but it is that part of the R&D that is proposed to be 

moved to S&T. 

Chairman QUAYLE. You are now focusing more along the lines of 

commercially developed devices and establishing government 

standards. Is that the appropriate role for DNDO given the challenges of commercialization, and because of NIST’s involvement 

with establishing government standards? 

Mr. STERN. An excellent question. I mean, the first point is, we 

work extremely closely with NIST and ANSI in developing standards, so together we develop standards. I believe it is one of our 

statutory and explicit responsibilities, actually, so we have clear 

roles and responsibilities and I don’t think there is really a conflict 

in the things that we do with NIST to establish roles and standards. 

Chairman QUAYLE. Thank you. 

Dr. O’Toole, when they canceled SBInet recently, was there some 

technological consideration in making that decision, and what was 

your role in that decision–making process? 

Ms. O’TOOLE. When Commissioner Bersinn and Secretary 

Napolitano started considering whether to proceed with SBInet as 

originally planned or altered that plan, S&T served on the executive board for the analysis of alternatives, which looked at various 

suites of technology that we could use to substitute for what was 

then being developed by the Boeing Corporation, and we also 

served on the executive board for the Southwest Border Technology 

Initiative and CBP. 

Chairman QUAYLE. Will S&T be involved in that process going 

forward as DHS looks for a replacement for virtual fence or whatever technological advances DHS puts down at the border? Will 

S&T be involved in that process? 

Ms. O’TOOLE. Yes. I continue to serve on the executive board that 

the chairman has put together and S&T is, for example, evaluating 

five different radars to understand the state-of-the-art technologies 

that are available right now that we might want to deploy to the 

border and we continue to do a lot of research in border-applicable 

technologies for detecting illicit use, crossing of people, movement 

of illicit cargo, et cetera, but yes, we will remain involved in border 

technology decisions. 

Chairman QUAYLE. Okay. Great. I have another question; I have 

noticed that you have been taking some steps to really improve ac-
30 

quisition efforts and I think those are good steps to make, but I 

have also heard from some stakeholders that end users who do not 

incorporate technical or economic feasibility are sometimes allowed 

to define the security needs. How do we ensure that we get costeffective and innovative solutions? 

Ms. O’TOOLE. Well, Mr. Chairman, that is a good question. I 

wish I had a succinct answer to that. It is very important to identify the requirements very carefully, and that, any technology developer will tell you, is not easy. We need to get S&T’s technical 

heft more engaged in that, and we are. We are already engaged in 

doing the oversight of testing and evaluation of new technologies 

in DHS. That is by statute. Bu we need to get S&T more involved 

in the front end of deciding what is the mission need we are trying 

to serve and how might technology fill that gap and then how do 

we develop the technology. 

If you don’t really understand the users’ needs, and this has to 

be an ongoing process in the course of the entire development process because users’ needs change over time, everything is changing, 

then you are not going to come up with the right answer. So the 

users themselves in addition to the policymakers and the components need to be involved in developing these technologies. At the 

same time, as was mentioned earlier, you need to have a strategic 

view of where are we going to be in five years in ten years and how 

do we serve those far-off needs. So it is an ongoing set of parallel 

processes that have to be kept in motion. 

Chairman QUAYLE. So you keep the end users involved in the 

process by setting R&D priorities as well? 

Ms. O’TOOLE. The users are certainly part of how we set R&D 

priorities but the priorities mostly have to do with what are the 

top-level needs of the department. That comes since I have been 

here first of all with conversations between me and the component 

heads and an ongoing process that my predecessor developed called 

the Integrated Project Team process, which identifies needs that 

the operators have come up with and then prioritizes them, and 

then we take those needs in S&T and try and see what we can 

meet through either knowledge products or technology assessment 

via technology foraging, original R&D, et cetera, et cetera. 

Chairman QUAYLE. Okay. Great. Thanks. 

The chair now recognizes Mr. Wu for five minutes. 

Mr. WU. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would like to get in two questions, if I may, and the first is a 

question related to the horrendous earthquake and then the subsequent tsunami that occurred in Japan last week, and I want to ask 

about the Directorate’s work in the area of natural-disaster detection, and I understand that in the fiscal year 2012 budget, some 

of the Directorate’s natural-disaster detection program funding will 

be used for the design and development of models that will provide 

earlier prediction of seismic activity and will help integrate these 

predictive capabilities with emergency management alert and 

warning systems, and can you tell me a little bit more about the 

work that the Directorate is doing in this area, what it expects to 

do in 2012, and also involving you, Mr. Stern, particularly there a 

$19 million item in the Directorate’s Natural Disaster Resiliency 

program to help respond to and recover from large-scale natural 
31 

disasters, and some of this funding will be to address the resiliency 

of critical infrastructure qua large and expressly nuclear reactors? 

And we do have a situation with nuclear reactors in Japan, and if 

both of you could address that as my first set of questions, if you 

will. 

Ms. O’TOOLE. Okay. We do have a project going on. It is a very 

basic science fundamental research project to try and get advanced 

prediction of the occurrence of earthquakes. It involves studying 

the offgassing from the earth’s crust to see if we can detect that 

and improve the time in which we have to get prepared for an 

earthquake. I emphasize, this is fundamental science. There is a 

reason we call it discovery. It may not work but it looks quite 

promising, certainly promising enough for us to invest in it. 

Secondly, we do a lot of work in S&T trying to improve the resilience of critical infrastructures, so we have done a great deal of 

work, for example, in material science. There is something called 

ultra-high-performance concrete, which if used would make our 

buildings much more earthquake-proof. Getting that into commercial use is going to require a series of steps that S&T may be able 

to help with involving certification and so on and so forth. We also 

do a lot of different kinds of work involving disaster response generally. For example, situational awareness becomes extremely important as we are seeing played out in Japan in these complex, 

chaotic times after a calamity whether it is natural or manmade 

or a terrorist attack. We are doing a great deal of work, particularly on the ground with first responders, to bring together various 

communication systems in ways of moving and visualizing data so 

everybody has a common operating picture. 

In terms of nuclear response, there is a budget line in TAR which 

we expect to come to S&T for response to nuclear events. This is 

work that is just beginning so we have a sketch or a roadmap for 

how we would spend those monies but have not begun that work 

yet. 

Mr. WU. Terrific. Thank you. 

And my second question is an arena in which I have had a longterm interest in which the Subcommittee over the last four years 

has held a series of hearings and it is on 9/11 interoperability and 

interoperability of systems, not only voice communications but all 

the different factors that make a system fully interoperable in voice 

and data and other factors, and I note that in the fiscal year 2012 

budget request, there is $23.7 million for the Directorate’s information sharing analysis and interoperability program, and according 

to the budget, some of this funding will be used to fully incorporate 

conformance testing into the P25 compliance assessment program, 

and these compliance tests and the P25 interfaces have been the 

subject of—it is very complex. We have had multiple hearings on 

this topic and I look forward to an update if you can give me a partial update at this hearing today. 

Ms. O’TOOLE. Sure. We are doing a number of things and actually making real progress in interoperability of voice, data and visualization. I would be happy to come in and tell you about those 

products, three in particular which are being used on the ground 

in real time right now. 
32 

In terms of P25, this was a standard that was meant to and 

would in fact make interoperable all different kinds of handheld radios used by first responders who were using legacy systems that 

did not talk to each other. The problem, frankly, is that the two 

biggest manufacturers of these radios aren’t particularly interested 

in complying with the standard. So the other manufacturers who 

do want to build a P25-standard radio have told us—actually this 

happened just in January at a meeting out in Arizona—that they 

cannot create the testing necessary to certify compliance, so S&T 

is working with these manufacturers to see if we can devise the 

tests that would affirm compliance, but it has been a long and frustrating road. 

I would also mention, Congressman, that new technologies are 

basically overtaking the P25 standard and will be increasingly 

interoperable so as first responders buy new technologies, this 

problem will not be as germane but we still have to deal with the 

legacy which are a majority of what is in the field, and that will 

remain the case for some time because of the cost of replacing old 

systems. 

Mr. WU. Well, I think it is terrific that S&T Directorate is moving forward in this arena, and as you know, NIST, one of the agencies under this Subcommittee’s jurisdiction, has had a long-term interest in this and has a lab, I believe, in Boulder, Colorado, that 

is dedicated to this and I think that this Subcommittee will appropriately take continuing interest. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman QUAYLE. Thank you. 

The chair now recognizes Mr. Rohrabacher for 5 minutes. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, and congratulations to 

you, Mr. Chairman. When I came here, we didn’t become chairmen 

when we were freshmen, but you do have an old hand to rely on 

there next to you as the ranking member so the old hands sort of 

welcome you today. 

This is a very significant issue at hand because it covers things 

that are so important to our constituents. 

I just want to get one bit of housekeeping out of the way. Apparently the American Institute for Research was supposed to conduct 

a validation of the TSA’s Screening of Passengers by Observation 

Techniques, the SPOT program. Supposedly that report was due 

earlier this year. When is it going to happen? When are we going 

to see it? Ms. O’Toole? 

Ms. O’TOOLE. Well, there are several evaluations of SPOT going 

on, Congressman Rohrabacher. I am not sure which is which. S&T 

has been trying to validate and working with TSA to validate the 

SPOT program and our preliminary results are available or almost 

available. I think the report that you have mentioned is going to 

be available in April. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. In April? Okay. Thank you very much. 

You know, we go through these detectors every week, and I think 

frankly it is disgusting that we have seniors and people in wheelchairs and families that are having to go through the type of 

machinations that they have to go through to get onto an airplane 

in this country. It seems to me that with our technological capa-
33 

bility, we could be doing something better that wouldn’t create this 

roadmap. 

Let me ask you about fingerprints. I took my family to Marine 

Land—not Marine Land, it was the Ocean World or whatever down 

in San Diego, and we have season passes for that, and have three 

little kids; God blessed us with triplets seven years ago. Thank God 

and modern science, I might add. But as we were going in, you actually just put your finger on the little thing and they were able 

to oh, okay, go right on in, you are obviously the person with this 

pass. How come we can’t do that at the airports? 

Ms. O’TOOLE. Well, I flew out of Boston yesterday and left a 

water bottle in my bag and had to go through again and also went 

through the AIT. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Uh-oh. Oh, boy. You must have had to go 

through a strip search after that. 

Ms. O’TOOLE. I did experience a pat-down. We all share your 

frustration. Here is the problem, and this might be worth a classified threat briefing for you so we can talk in more detail. But it 

is clear that al Qaeda, both al Qaeda core and the spin-offs, are 

targeting aviation, and they are probing our systems to find out 

how sensitive they are and where the seams are that they might 

exploit. So I can’t go into sensitive intelligence but there is a reason that we are looking at everybody including babies and people 

with casts and so forth. It is not arbitrary. It is a real bother. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, couldn’t there be a technological, like I 

say, could you put your finger in something, could that—— 

Ms. O’TOOLE. We are working on it. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. —take the place of a pat-down? 

Ms. O’TOOLE. Here is what we are working on. After the Christmas bombing, the Christmas attempted bombing, I should say, we 

started working with TSA to do a systems analysis of the entire 

checkpoint to see what works, what doesn’t, how we could make 

that much more efficient either though combining technologies or 

making technologies faster and less intrusive. We are working on 

that. We are also working on upgrades, for example, to the AIT 

machine. One would be a software package that would automatically identify targets and lead to fewer false alarms. My watch 

alarmed the AIT yesterday, okay? So I had to go through the patdown. If we had fewer false alarms, there will be fewer pat-downs 

and that will be less intrusive. That is just one of the things that 

we are working on to build a less-intrusive checkpoint. I could go 

on forever. I won’t now. But yes, there is hope. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, thank you very much, and that is one 

thing I think all of our constituents are very concerned about. 

Ms. O’TOOLE. Yes. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. But safety of our country and of our families 

is important as well and that this what you are trying to do. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman QUAYLE. Thank you, and the chair now recognizes Mr. 

Lujan for five minutes. 

Mr. LUJAN. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. 

Dr. O’Toole, I want to thank you for being here as well as Mr. 

Stern and the other staff that you have with you. 
34 

Dr. O’Toole, just to follow up on that last line of questioning, 

after we are looking at capabilities that other agencies have come 

up with that could integrate into the system to find our 

vulnerabilities, doesn’t it make sense that if we can identify molecular footprints of materials that are attempting to be brought on 

so that when you have that bottle of water, if it indeed is water, 

you could bring it on? Or we have all these taste tests that sometimes we see competing interests like Coke and Pepsi on television 

where they have people taste one the other and see if you can tell 

the difference or which one tastes better or new Coke versus old 

Coke, if we had a technology that you could put that liquid in a 

machine and they could tell you the difference between Coke and 

Pepsi even though they look the same and may be in different cans. 

What are your thoughts with being able to use technologies that 

will be able to identify these areas as opposed to having some of 

these false positives that we are trying to prevent? 

Ms. O’TOOLE. Congressman, I think you are referring to the 

MagViz project. 

Mr. LUJAN. Dr. O’Toole, MagViz, Bottle Viz, probably what can 

be sized up to if there is a client that can be brought in, a People 

Viz as well. 

Ms. O’TOOLE. We are working on a lot of technologies to try to 

make detection of explosives and other illicit cargo on passengers 

or even in passengers more available. We can do a lot of things on 

the bench but making it portable, able to sit in the footprints which 

are very limited in airports that we have to use, keeping throughput fast—even a minute, as we have all experienced, extra time in 

that line counts, and in cargo screening, for example, seconds are 

actually measured at ports. So the operational realities of making 

these very fascinating and capable technologies useful in actual 

practice are very difficult to comb through. We are going through 

a process of evaluation and testing and development with MagViz 

and other technologies now. That is a fairly lengthy process. You 

can make it shorter but then you are faced with more surprises 

usually in the end. It doesn’t work, doesn’t work the way you hoped 

it worked, you have to diddle with it a little bit more, so there are 

new technologies coming but nothing is going to be simple or a onesize-fits-all solution to our many needs, I am afraid. MagViz is 

promising. 

Mr. LUJAN. I appreciate that, Dr. O’Toole, but as we look to technologies that we order up on large scale that failed with the bomber attempt on Christmas Day, there are other technologies that I 

have seen put to work and tested where we have been able to see 

these put to use. There are other technologies that appear to have 

received some tests that could have prevented some of these efforts 

and I certainly hope that going forward that with the new Directorate to be able to create the testable requirements that there are 

some areas that we can improve along those lines, and I hope we 

get a second round of questioning because I would like to pursue 

that a little bit. 

One area that I would like to bring up as well, Dr. O’Toole, what 

are the responsibilities with the Science and Tech Directorate 

under DHS with drugs, with narcotics and countertrafficking? 
35 

Ms. O’TOOLE. We have been working with both Customs and 

Border Protection and with ICE to help them detect people coming 

across the border with illicit materials, and we are also doing a lot 

on air cargo security, mostly with TSA. We have developed algorithms, for example, for use by CBP, software that helps them better target cargo and people that should be given a second look 

based upon manifests and so on and so forth, and I can go into a 

whole list of technologies if you wish, but we are doing a lot of 

things in that regard to try and get a better look at vehicles passing border points, for example. 

Mr. LUJAN. Thank you very much, O’Toole. 

Mr. Chairman, I have some other questions but I will wait until 

the second round. 

Thank you, Dr. O’Toole. 

Chairman HALL. [Presiding] At this time I would like to recognize myself for about five minutes or four minutes. 

Mr. Stern, in light of the damage that was sustained at three 

separate reactors after the very powerful earthquake and tsunami 

in Japan, and release of radioactive material, I guess everybody 

who is stuck to the television today wants to ask the same question. What kinds of technologies would be useful or are already 

available to respond to, detect or mitigate the effects of a radiological nuclear disaster here? They indicate that Japan was ready 

for a disaster as much as you can be ready for anything like that, 

and I wonder if we are. 

Mr. STERN. Thank you for the question, Chairman. 

You know, my background is actually in emergency response, 

and one of the key lessons of any emergency but in particular a nuclear emergency is that there is conflicting information streaming 

from all over the place, and one of the most important things that 

emergency responders can do is to use a very disciplined approach 

to ensuring that a single message goes out, and within the United 

States it is actually Department of Energy, NRC and the EPA that 

have responsibility for this, and given that DNDO doesn’t, I am 

very reluctant to make any comment on this. I apologize. 

Chairman HALL. Would you like to make any comment on it Dr 

O’Toole? 

Dr. O’TOOLE. I think we can and should learn from every disaster. I think one of the things that is very impressive about Japan 

is their preparedness efforts involving all of the community, not 

just the emergency responders, and I think that is the kind of preparedness that we need to start thinking about and taking seriously in the United States, not just for nuclear reactors. That 

would be at the top of my list, given what I know about those technologies, but certainly we are going to have natural disasters like 

earthquakes and we need to think in advance about how we would 

respond. I am a physician by training, and I can tell you it is always very difficult to get people to take preventive steps until after 

the heart attack, and this is one of those periods after the heart 

attack. Hopefully Japan will be fine and the worst nightmares will 

not come to pass but this is a time when we should look to our own 

preparedness efforts and make sure we are as resilient as possible 

against the likely natural disasters we may face. 

Chairman HALL. I thank you. 
36 

Now I recognize Mr. Wilson, the gentleman from Florida, if he 

is still here. The lady from Florida. With that hat on, I have been 

wondering what I was going to do when I saw you in here with a 

hat on, and I tell you, I am not one that going to complain about 

it. That is for the Speaker to do. I am glad to recognize you. 

Ms. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it. 

Chairman HALL. Pardon me, all I saw was the hat. 

Ms. WILSON. You weren’t sure if it was a man or woman. Thank 

you, Mr. Chair. 

My question has to do with the technologies that have been deployed in our system, and I am wondering about the testing and 

making sure that they will work and what kind of challenges do 

you face by making sure that these technologies are operable before 

we put them into play. We see many times in the newspaper where 

people have come through playing some sort of joke where they can 

bring scissors on, they can bring all sorts of things on, yet and still 

they have come through a screening. So what do you propose that 

we do to make sure that before we deploy any kind of system that 

it has been tested and vetted? 

Ms. O’TOOLE. Well, thank you, Congresswoman. It is very important that we do testing and evaluation of technologies, not just at 

the end of development. That is a process that has to go on 

throughout the development process of a new technology. I think 

you are referring to the screening devices in airports. Those were 

developed by commercial sector, and S&T, for example, helped develop the testing process, what it is that we need to test, and we 

did a lot of the testing according to those criteria at the Transportation Security Lab in New Jersey. We also have a responsibility 

by statute to oversee operational testing and evaluation towards 

the end of the process of R&D just before we are getting to put 

something in the field. You test against requirements that get established at the very beginning of the R&D process. So the rigor 

and appropriateness of those requirements is very important. If the 

requirements aren’t right, the T&E, the testing and evaluation, 

may not give you the full view that you need to understand how 

that machinery will operate in practice. So one of the things that 

we are doing in S&T with our realignment and strategic plan is 

placing a lot more emphasis on having our technical people advise 

the operating components on what they might do to create rigorous 

requirements at the beginning of the R&D process. 

Ms. WILSON. Thank you very much. In light of what has happened in Japan in the nuclear power plant, this is sort of like a 

personal question. In Miami, Florida, we have a nuclear power 

plant called Turkey Point, and we have hurricanes, huge hurricanes, and near Turkey Point is a charter school and the charter 

school was established for the people who work at Turkey Point so 

that their children could be near them when they are at school and 

they can have lunch with them. In light of what has happened in 

Japan, I am going to ask, and I know you probably can’t answer 

this openly but I am going to ask someone to take a look at Turkey 

Point and the relationship of Turkey Point and that charter school 

and try to figure out if a catastrophic hurricane comes—we haven’t 

had one since the school has been built—what kind of impact if 

that Turkey Point explodes the way it exploded in Japan, what 
37 

kind of impact would that have on that charter school. Someone 

needs to investigate that and do something about warnings or moving or something because it is dangerous. 

Mr. STERN. Thank you for the question. I think there are important lessons to be learned from any event such as this. The proper 

authority to answer the question of the potential damage or likelihood of an event at that reactor is of course the Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission, and they continuously look at these issues, and I 

think it would be probably a good idea to direct the question to 

NRC and in coordination with FEMA I think will come up with a 

complete answer. 

Ms. O’TOOLE. I would add, Congresswoman, that FEMA regularly works with the NRC to devise disaster plans around all of the 

domestic nuclear power plants and they work with the plant management and with the local first responders. So there, I am sure 

is a plan in place. There is a plan in place around every U.S. power 

plant but FEMA would also be a source to question. 

Ms. WILSON. Thank you. But I am sure they questioned it, I am 

sure they looked at it, I am sure they have a plan, but I am sure 

no one expected what happened in Japan and so that just adds a 

new height to my uneasiness, and thank you very much. 

Chairman HALL. I thank the lady. Her time is expired. 

Mr. Wu, did you want to be recognized for a unanimous consent 

request? 

Mr. WU. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, yes. Mr. Chairman, I ask 

unanimous consent to include in the hearing record a written statement from the Center for Excellence for Awareness and Localization of Explosives and Related Threats. 

Chairman HALL. And it has been read by our side, has it not? 

Mr. WU. That is my understanding, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HALL. Without objection, it will be admitted. 

Mr. WU. Thank you very much. I yield back. 

[The information appears in Apendix II] 

Chairman HALL. Okay, yields back, so at this time I could recognize Mr. Rohrabacher again if he wants to be recognized. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman, as long as everyone on the 

other side has gone first, I am—— 

Chairman HALL. Mr. Lujan expressed some indication that he 

had further questions. I recognize you for another 5 minutes. 

Mr. LUJAN. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate that very much, sir. 

Dr. O’Toole, just picking up on that last line of questioning regarding DHS’s responsibility associated with combating narcotics 

trafficking, and if I remember the Directorate correctly, one of the 

elements is to be able to take away resources from those that are 

engaging in trafficking, especially when those drugs are targeting 

the United States. Can you talk about the importance of the 

screening and detection technologies that DHS currently has access 

to or is looking to strengthen? 

Ms. O’TOOLE. We are working right now on new technologies 

that might be able to detect bulk cash, for example. One of the real 

problems with these narcotics smugglers is that they bring drugs 

in and then they have to get cash out of the country. The estimates 

from ICE are—and this is thought to be a conservative estimate— 

as much as $40 billion might be flooding out of the country in bulk, 
38 

and it is very difficult to see using traditional techniques at the 

border, so we are developing technologies, which I don’t want to describe in detail in open session, that might be able to detect those 

efforts. 

For example, we have a lot of work underway in biometrics to 

better identify people coming through the points of embarkation 

and entry to the United States who might need a second look. 

Those include a number of technologies, and of course, we are 

working with CBP at ports to make sure that illicit cargo including 

drugs doesn’t make it into the country, again using a variety of 

technologies. 

Mr. LUJAN. And I have a question for Mr. Stern as well. Thank 

you, Dr. O’Toole. 

One concern that I have, and it may be the Science and Tech Directorate, but it is in the reporting of what happens when those 

drugs are coming in. There was a GAO study that was conducted 

in 2009 that said when drugs are found between ports, they go to 

the DEA, but when drugs are found at the ports, they go to ICE, 

and there is a problem between those folks talking to each other, 

and I look forward to visiting more on what we could to talk about 

that. 

Mr. Stern, just quickly, because time is limited and I apologize 

and I would be happy to visit with you more about this, if there 

was fissionable material identified in the United States that was 

in the hands of some people that shouldn’t have it, are we able to 

identify where those folks are and do our capabilities allow us to 

go back and identify how those fissionable materials entered the 

country and how we could stop it or who even brought them to that 

point? 

Mr. STERN. Thank you for the question. It really depends on the 

circumstances. There are real physical limitations in being able to 

detect material, and I think you are referring to forensics being 

able to identify where it ultimately came from. We would need to 

sit down as an interagency using whatever intelligence information 

was available as well as the technical information we have from 

our detectors and our forensics to do our best, but it is certainly 

not an easy task to achieve. 

Mr. LUJAN. Thank you. 

And Mr. Chairman, my concern is this, is that in different parts 

of the country we have narcotics problems where there is heroin 

coming in from other parts of the world, there is drugs coming in 

from all parts of the world. Granted, I know that we have to stop 

use in the country, and if we can eliminate the demand here, we 

certainly won’t see the supply entering. Nonetheless, those drugs 

are entering the country. How safe should we feel if heroin can’t 

be stopped and identified from entering the United States that nuclear materials are going to be stopped and identified as entering 

the United States? We need to do a better job on both fronts, and 

especially looking at how resources are being used within DHS outside of Science and Tech Directorate where I think there is other 

tools that are out there to be able to work with our scientists, 

physicists and engineers at our national labs, maybe our NNSA facilities, who are coming up with technologies and techniques every 

day based on federal agencies that are working with them to be 
39 

able to stop problems that are identified. There is a lot of tools and 

resources that are out there, and I appreciate very much the fact 

that there is an attempt for an inventory process to begin, if you 

will, of the tools and resources that other clients have ordered so 

that way we can see how they can be applied to homeland security 

safety. This is something that worries me every day, and we have 

people dying in my district every day from overdoses with heroin, 

and I know there are other problems that we have to combat, but 

if we can’t stop one, how do we stop the other? And I think we need 

to make sure that we support the necessary screening and detection technologies to be able to combat that. 

Thank you very much and I look forward to visiting more with 

you, and Mr. Chairman, thank you for your indulgence. 

Chairman HALL. Thank you. It is my understanding Mrs. Wilson 

does not have other questions. If you do, I recognize you. 

I recognize Mr. Rohrabacher if you have further questions, sir. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me 

just note that earlier Dr. O’Toole mentioned some fundamental research going into trying to detect whether or not there is a means 

of determining if an earthquake was well on the way. I want to 

suggest that that is a very good use of taxpayer money. In California, we are very conscious of the fact that we could suffer exactly what happened, if not even worse than what happened in 

Japan, and we also know, I have read accounts of the San Francisco earthquake that animals seemed to know that there is going 

to be something happening, and if animals can sense that, there is 

something in nature that could tip us off and so as that progresses, 

I would like to make sure that we are kept informed on that because that sounds like a very good use of taxpayers’ money to try 

to discover that type of thing. 

In terms of discovering techniques of discovering large amounts 

of cash, well, you don’t necessarily have to come to California for 

that because we don’t have any more cash in California. We are 

going out of business. 

About nuclear detection, let me ask you, Mr. Stern, do we now 

have the means technologically to detect what would be a dirty 

bomb or even a nuclear weapon that was not a dirty bomb in a container that is coming to the United States? Do we have something 

in place overseas that would make sure that those containers were 

screened for that type of threat and do we have the technology to 

actually do that screening? 

Mr. STERN. Yeah. I mean, essentially all of our C1 cargo is 

scanned at U.S. ports. It is course an incredibly challenging task 

technically to have high confidence if certain material were very 

heavily shielded that we would find it, which again is why I think 

the approach that we could take at DNDO is in essence an intelligence informed approach. We will develop scenarios so we can in 

essence conceptually—— 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So actually your tests find today that overseas intelligence and a more proactive approach is much better 

than a meet them at the door and pat them down approach? 

Mr. STERN. In fact, the U.S. approach to nuclear terrorism is a 

layered approach, and in each of those approaches we don’t want 

to assume that everything else fails because that is not a reflection 
40 

of reality. So it makes more sense to assume that there will be 

some level of success in some of the other layers including intelligence and then build our scenarios around that, and that is the 

most efficient way to use taxpayers’ money. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Do you have technology that is currently 

under—we just mentioned earthquake fundamental research that 

is going on. Is there research going on that will directly affect the 

safety of our country in terms of this type of nuclear smuggling? 

Mr. STERN. Yes, there is a broad range of technologies being examined both in the early stages by our transformational research 

Directorate and the more later stages by our production and acquisition Directorate of technologies that will improve our detection 

capabilities. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. For the record, I represent both the 

ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach, where I believe 40 percent 

of all foreign trade to our country goes through those ports. We 

have tens of thousands of containers a day coming through these 

ports. It is insane. I don’t see how, unless with technology, we do 

that per–person type of situation. We have to have technology to 

help us achieve that goal. And I think that if I had to guess, I am 

guessing that narcotics and I don’t know about cash going the 

other way but I know narcotics and other types of things that 

threaten the well–being of the American people are coming through 

that port every day and anything we can do technologically to 

strengthen our ability to cope with that will certainly be a benefit 

to our country. So we will be grateful to hear about your efforts as 

time goes on, and thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HALL. The gentleman yields back. The chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Neugebauer, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. NEUGEBAUER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This is kind of a 

little bit different twist but I think a real relevant subject, and I 

am sorry, I have been in two other hearings this morning, but with 

the events that are going on in Japan right now, obviously we are 

all very concerned as to what some of the problems with these reactors are, and I think there are reports today that one of the containment areas of one of the reactors possibly could have some 

issues. I guess the question that I have, from your perspective, do 

we have modeling capability that would allow us then to once we 

get some data from Japan and if in fact there is a discharge in the 

atmosphere of what the potential impact would be down range 

from those spills, and do we have a way to model and the levels 

that we might impact and then how does that translate into what 

kind of—if we think there are significant amounts, what kinds of 

actions that we would take domestically down range from those 

areas based on the levels of activity? I will let you both take a stab 

at that. 

Mr. STERN. Yeah, I want to try in the middle of this crisis not 

to create any conflicting information, so I think it is best to point 

out that yes, there are models that exist but the appropriate agencies are the Department of Energy and the Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission, who are both looking very carefully at this issue. 

Ms. O’TOOLE. Yes, we have been modeling radiation for a long 

time. Weather is difficult to model, as we know, but it is—the situation is being monitored, not just modeled, and I think Mr. Stern 
41 

is right, we have to wait until we have some actual data but it is 

a very big ocean. There is a long distance between us and the besieged people of Japan. A lot of people are very carefully watching 

the situation, Congressman. 

Mr. NEUGEBAUER. And you may have already outlined this but 

what would be some of the mechanisms for measuring, for example, 

if there is a plume or a movement in the atmosphere? Do we have 

technology to monitor the levels in the atmosphere by flying those 

areas? I mean, I don’t know how you—— 

Ms. O’TOOLE. Yes. 

Mr. NEUGEBAUER. —do that but—— 

Ms. O’TOOLE. Yes. 

Mr. NEUGEBAUER. —what would be the procedure for that? 

Ms. O’TOOLE. Do you want to take that? 

Mr. STERN. Again, I have to apologize because in the middle of 

this, I am very cautious about saying things that are outside of my 

line of my responsibility, and this is primarily an EPA, NRC, DOE 

responsibility and I think it is best to get the answer from them, 

again to avoid any new confusion in the middle of this crisis. 

Chairman HALL. You are not under oath, and we do all the time 

up here. We will give you a chance if you have some suggestions 

or anything that you think might help Mr. Neugebauer, or you can 

decline, whatever you want to do. 

Mr. STERN. I mean, again, there are detectors but again, they are 

under the authority, responsibility, operation of other agencies and 

the best answer is to get it from those agencies. 

Mr. NEUGEBAUER. Well, I guess with those answers, I will yield 

back my time, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LUJAN. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman would just yield 

quickly? One thing that I would be interested in doing maybe jointly, Mr. Chairman, is if we could engage the NNSA national laboratories under Mr. Tom D’Agostino, and I know that they do have 

modeling capacity and capabilities not only with oceans but with— 

that there may be some answers that we could you directly from 

them. Maybe we could work together on that. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Chairman HALL. Thank you. 

Ms. Biggert, we recognize you at this time for five minutes. 

Mrs. BIGGERT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I am from Illinois and have one of the national labs in my district, Argonne, and Dr. O’Toole, I have a question about how you 

would characterize how the university Centers of Excellence and 

the Department of Energy’s labs support the research and development of DHS and how their work is integral to the development 

and demonstration and testing of technology. I know that right 

after 9/11, Argonne had several, I don’t want to call them products 

but several things that were very helpful for our national security 

and were developed before we ever thought that they would be 

needed. How is that integrated to work together and how does DHS 

internal laboratories work with the national labs to avoid duplication of efforts? 

Ms. O’TOOLE. We work very closely with the DOE national labs. 

Forty percent of our R&D budget goes to the DOE national labs. 

That may be a little high. It may be perfect. It may be a little low. 
42 

But they are obviously very close partners of ours, and we have 

various mechanisms to maintain close relationships so that they 

know what our needs are and we know what capabilities that they 

are developing. There is a national level effort going on at the level 

of the deputy and under secretaries in which Mr. D’Agostino from 

NNSA is included to make sure that critical capabilities in the national labs which are needed by the country on a long-term strategic basis, whether by the intelligence community or needed by 

DHS or needed by other elements of the government get maintained, and we have robust working relationships down at the 

project-manager level as well. 

The Centers of Excellence are also critical to our R&D effort. 

They of course as is the case with most university work, work on 

a more fundamental science basis than does the commercial sector 

or some of the labs but they are both critical partners in our R&D 

effort. 

Mrs. BIGGERT. Well, the research activities at the university Centers of Excellence are managed by administrative staff at each of 

the centers and not directly by DHS, so how do these activities 

align with the S&T enterprise? 

Ms. O’TOOLE. Well, we have an ongoing dialog with them, both 

the administrative staff and the faculty, about what is in their 

charter. First of all, these Centers of Excellence are focused on certain areas. STAR in Maryland, for example, is looking at the sociological and criminological science behind terrorism. Others are 

more statistics-oriented. Others are focused on transportation and 

so forth. So they start with the focus area and a set of objectives 

which we work out mutually between the partners and the COEs 

and DHS. 

Furthermore, we are making great strides in making the resources of the universities directly available to the DHS components, and I think the success of that is evidenced in the fact that 

the DHS components have directed more than $22 million go the 

COEs outside of the money that comes from S&T in order to do 

particular projects the components want done. So I think we have 

an ongoing dialog, tight connections and I think we are getting better and better over time as we get to know each other. 

Mrs. BIGGERT. Thank you. I yield back. 

Chairman QUAYLE. Thank you, and if there is nobody else who 

wants to be recognized, I thank the witnesses for their valuable 

testimony and to the Members for their questions. The Members of 

the Subcommittee may have additional questions for the witnesses, 

and we will ask for you to respond to those in writing. The record 

will remain open for two weeks for additional comments and statements from Members and also, because we are trying to keep this 

in a timely fashion and we thank the patience of the second panel, 

if we could make the transition into the second panel as quickly as 

possible, that would be great. The witnesses are excused. Thank 

you very much. 

We now move to our second panel, and as a reminder, spoken 

testimony is limited to five minutes after which Members of the 

Committee will have five minutes each to ask questions. 

Our first witness is the Director of the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies at the Heritage Foundation, 
43 

Dr. James Carafano. Prior to joining the Heritage Foundation, Dr. 

Carafano had been a Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and 

Budgetary Assessments. Next we will hear from Mr. Marc Pearl, 

the President and Chief Executive Officer of the Homeland Security and Defense Business Council. Before joining the Council, Mr. 

Pearl was the Principal and Chairman of IT Policy Solutions. Our 

final witness is Mr. David Maurer, the Director of the Homeland 

Security and Justice Team at the U.S. Government Accountability 

Office. Mr. Maurer served in many capacities at the GAO, previously as Acting Director in GAO’s Natural Resource Environment 

Team, where he managed the work assessing U.S. global nuclear 

detection programs. 

Dr. Carafano, we will begin with you, and I recognize you for five 

minutes. 

STATEMENTS OF JAMES CARAFANO, DIRECTOR, DOUGLAS 

AND SARAH ALLISON CENTER FOR FOREIGN POLICY 

STUDIES, HERITAGE FOUNDATION 

Mr. CARAFANO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have three quick 

comments: the good, the bad and the future. 

You know, first I would say I think everybody on the panel would 

agree that we have come a long way since a few years ago. A center 

report characterized the S&T Directorate as a rudderless ship. I 

think no matter how you look at it, you can see that there has been 

a real progress but I would point to two areas very quickly. 

The first is the reorganization, which I think has had a lot of 

positive benefits. I think particularly creating the analysis and 

operational office is a tremendous step in the right direction. The 

other thing I would really like to compliment the Directorate on is 

their increasingly and more efficient use of the Centers of Excellence and the federally funded Research and Development Centers. 

One particular program that I have worked with is called the Community Processions of Technology program where they bring in 

stakeholders and they evaluate technologies for policy implications. 

It is a model program that really ought to be emulated by other 

parts of the Federal Government. 

There are long-term concerns, and I will just raise the three that 

are raised most often. The first is that DHS still lacks a fully integrated acquisition process, and I think that is a real issue, and 

they need to learn not to repeat the mistakes of the Department 

of Defense in that you need both the formal acquisition, long-term 

acquisition process and you need the rapid acquisition for crisis 

needs and new opportunities. DOD often ad hocs the second, and 

I think that is a big mistake. Both processes need to be formal and 

structured and built so they are non-competitive, and acquisition is 

integrated. It is not—it is everything from R&D to T&E and to 

buying the equipment but it also includes the integration with all 

the other elements which include training and human capital and 

operational practices, and unless you have that full spectrum of acquisition and it is integrated, you are not really getting your bang 

for the buck. 

The second issue is transition. I think we would all acknowledge 

that there is still significant issues in terms of transitioning tech-
44 

nologies, I think particularly in the first-responder area, and I really think that calls for a rethinking of priorities. 

The third one I will mention very quickly is the lack of a really 

overall strategic plan. I mean, having a plan and writing ‘‘strategy’’ 

on the front page is not strategic. Strategic plans make hard decisions, and I don’t honestly think that the department really has a 

portfolio that makes hard decisions, I think particularly if you look 

in the area of the money we have invested in scanning and detection technologies. 

The two areas that I would recommend to the Committee to look 

into and for the Directorate to look at is I think international partnerships, public-private partnerships are vastly important, I would 

argue maybe the most important part of the scenario or the portfolio. I think a key element of that is the SAFETY Act. I think the 

SAFETY Act has been great at fostering the development of new 

technologies. An idea that we would suggest would be to internationalize the SAFETY Act, which is the United States should go 

out and proactively seek to engage other global partner countries 

to develop similar regimes that are comparable to the SAFETY Act 

and then we could have reciprocity where something could be developed in Israel, for example, and if they got the Israeli SAFETY 

Act qualification and it was comparable to U.S. SAFETY Act qualification that we would grant them reciprocal status here and vice 

versa. I would think this would really help the proliferation of 

homeland security technologies and I think it would be great in 

terms of encouraging the development of new technologies that all 

the allies could use. 

The other area I will just mention very, very briefly and then 

conclude is nanotechnology. I think nanotechnology is one of the 

breakthrough technologies that is going to have wide application 

across the Federal Government. There is almost no area of technology that you can’t see where it could have dramatic applications. 

In homeland security, for example, in the target delivery of drugs, 

which can be very important for therapeutics, for bio response, materials, I mean, it just goes on, and power generation. It just goes 

on and on and on. And I think DHS should partner with other federal agencies in creating something similar to what we did with 

fostering the semiconductor industry to create the public-private 

partnership that would really begin to set up the prototype industrial base so we could really leverage this going forward. I mean, 

right now we basically have a lot of individual nanotechnology research programs proliferated throughout the Federal Government 

and we need to start thinking corporately on how the Federal Government is going to be a good customer for these nanotechnologies 

as they evolve. Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. James Carafano follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. JAMES CARAFANO

My name is James Jay Carafano. I am the Deputy Director of the Kathryn and 

Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies and the Director of the 

Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies at The Heritage Foundation. The views I express in this testimony are my own, and should not be construed as representing any official position of The Heritage Foundation. 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before the committee today and address 

this vital subject. In my testimony I will address: (1) the progress the Department 

of Homeland Security (DHS) has made in improving the organization and processes 
45 

1L. Paul Bremer III and Edwin Meese III, Defending the American Homeland: A Report of 

the Heritage Foundation Homeland Security Task Force (Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 2002). 2 I testified on the results of the QHSR before the House Homeland Security Committee. See 

James Jay Carafano, ?What Comes After Quadrennial Homeland Security Review?? Testimony 

before the Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Management, Investigations, 

and Oversight, United States House of Representatives, April 29, 2010, at http:// 

www.heritage.org/Research/Testimony/What-Comes-After-Quadrennial-Homeland-SecurityReview#—ftn2. 3 James Jay Carafano and David Heyman, ‘‘DHS 2.0: Rethinking the Department of Homeland 

Security,’’ Heritage Foundation Special Report No. SR–02, December 13, 2004, at http:// 

www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2004/12/DHS–20–Rethinking-the-Department-of-Homeland-Security. 4 James Jay Carafano and Richard Weitz, ‘‘Rethinking Research, Development, and Acquisition for Homeland Security,’’ Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 2000, January 22, 2007, 

at http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/11911.pdf . 

for homeland security research; (2) remaining concerns; (3) vital steps to improving 

the organization of these activities; and (4) priorities for future research. 

My responsibilities at The Heritage Foundation comprise supervising all the foundation’s research on public policy concerning foreign policy and national security. 

Homeland security has been a particular Heritage research priority. The foundation 

produced the first major assessment of domestic security after 9/11. 1 Over the past 

nine years we have assembled a robust, talented, and dedicated research team. I 

have had the honor and privilege of leading this team for many years. Heritage analysts have studied and written authoritatively on virtually every aspect of homeland 

security and homeland defense. The results of all our research are publicly available 

on the Heritage Web site at www.heritage.org. We collaborate frequently with the 

homeland security research community, including the Center for Strategic and 

International Studies (CSIS), the Aspen Institute, the Center for National Policy, 

the Hudson Institute, the George Washington University Homeland Security Policy 

Institute, and the Strategic Studies Institute and Center for Strategic Leadership 

at the Army War College. Heritage analysts also serve on a variety of government 

advisory efforts, including task forces under the Homeland Security Advisory Council and Advisory Panel on Department of Defense Capabilities for Support of Civil 

Authorities. I also am a member of the National Academies Board on Army Science 

and Technology and served on the DHS advisory board for the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR). 2 Heritage’s research programs are strictly non-partisan, dedicated to developing policy proposals that will keep the nation safe, free, 

and prosperous. 

Call to Action 

From the outset our research has focused on ensuring that the organization and 

activities of the Department of Homeland Security are as efficient and effective as 

possible. In 2004 David Heyman, who headed the Homeland Security program at 

CSIS (and who now is Assistant Secretary for Policy at the U.S. Department of 

Homeland Security), and I led a research project that produced ‘‘DHS 2.0: Rethinking the Department of Homeland Security,’’ the first comprehensive review of the 

newly established Department of Homeland Security. 3 When we wrote this initial 

report, the Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) did not have enough of a 

‘‘track record’’ for the task force to make a detailed assessment. In 2007, however, 

my colleague at the Hudson Institute, Dr. Richard Weitz, and I published ‘‘Rethinking Research, Development, and Acquisition for Homeland Security,’’ the results of 

a follow-on research project that specifically focused on the activities of the S&T Directorate. 4 The major concerns we identified were: 

• Lack of response to customer needs. From the beginning, agencies within the 

DHS have complained that the Directorate’s portfolios do not adequately reflect their requirements and are not sufficiently responsive to operational 

needs. 

• Inability to manage complex programs. The Directorate’s most prominent accelerated R&D effort-the attempt to rapidly deploy new technologies to defend 

against smuggled nuclear and radiological weapons-failed so badly that in 

April 2005 the Administration established the separate Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) to manage these programs. 

• Limited success in partnering with other federal agencies and international 

partners. The S&T Directorate faced significant challenges in sharing homeland security responsibilities and resources with other federal departments 

and agencies that are not incorporated within the DHS. These entities retain 
46 

5See, Office of the Inspector General, ‘‘The Science and Technology Directorate’s Process for 

Funding Research and Development Programs, Department of Homeland Security,’’ OIG–09–88, 

July 2009, pp. 24–25. 6Office Inspector General, DHS’ Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Progress in Integrating 

Detection Capabilities and Response Protocols, OIG–08–19, December 2007, p. 1. 

key roles in researching and developing scientific, engineering, and medical 

technologies relevant to homeland security. 

• Failure to convert technologies for use by non-federal customers. Of particular 

note, the S&T Directorate had yet to develop a clear strategy for acquiring 

and converting technologies for use by the state and local governments and 

the private sector. 

In response to these challenges among our key recommendations were: 

• Putting First Things First. The Directorate needed to tighten its focus on its 

primary customer base-the agencies within the department. We recommended 

that DHS should get out of the business of brokering and developing technologies and supporting research for state and local responders and the private sector. Rather, government should limit its support to these other users 

to setting national standards in coordination with established government 

agencies such as the National Institute of Standards and Technology and nongovernmental organizations such as the American National Standards Institute. 

• Getting a Bigger Bang for the Buck. Rather than treating collaborative research with other federal agencies and international partners as an afterthought, we concluded the Directorate should give first priority to establishing effective partnerships and leveraging the capabilities of these other efforts. 

• Reorganizing and Reprioritizing. We recommended restructuring R&D programs to best serve the operating agencies within the DHS, and concluded 

the S&T Directorate should provide the DHS with overall acquisition guidance as well as basic science and technology. 

• Rethinking Acquisition. In many cases, R&D was not linked to acquisition or 

there was a failure to recognize that a new technology was not the best answer to the department’s needs. Furthermore, the department lacked an integrated program that matches acquisition with training, human capital development, and improving operational practices. 

Present Assessment 

I would like to credit the current leadership of the DHS and the S&T Directorate 

for making a sincere effort to address these shortfalls. In particular: 

• The current organization of the S&T Directorate represents a significant improvement in aligning research portfolios; establishing effective representation of stakeholder interests; and improving the capacity of S&T to contribute 

to acquisition and operational analysis. Furthermore, the department has announced plans to expand S&T’s role in test and evaluation, as well as involving S&T in ‘‘life cycle’’ assessment of acquisition programs. The role of the director of the office of Acquisition and Operational Analysis should probably 

be expanded. 

• S&T has made a more concerted effort to leverage the Centers of Excellence 

and its Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDC). Developing homeland security technologies and expertise requires years of intense effort by an integrated team of scientists, engineers, and managers. Repeated reorganizations only disrupt this challenging effort and should be 

avoided. Specifically, not curtailing or further limiting the terms of the Centers of Excellence is important. Likewise, the FFRDCs and their expanding 

capacity to provide operational research, systems engineering, and complex 

systems analysis have demonstrated real value added. They should be sustained and further exploited. 

• The Directorate has also made a sincere and significant effort to establish federal research partnerships and to improve the oversight process for interagency agreements. 5 Likewise, DNDO was cited by the department’s Inspector General in 2007 for improving coordination between federal and state 

agencies on domestic protocols for detection and response. 6
47 

7Senate Report. 109–273, p. 88. 

8 National Academy for Public Administration, ‘‘Department of Homeland Security Science and 

Technology Directorate: Developing Technology to Protect America,’’ June 2009, p. ix. 9See, for example, U.S. Government Accountability Office, ‘‘Nuclear Detection: Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Should Improve Planning to Better Address Gaps and Vulnerabilities,’’ 

GAO–09–257, January 2009. 10 Ibid., pp. 42–53. 11For the challenges faced by the DNDO, see, for example, Gene Aloise and Stephen L. 

Caldwell, ‘‘Combating Nuclear Smuggling,’’ U.S. Government Accountability Office, GAO–10– 

1041T, September 15, 2010. 

What has been accomplished is noteworthy, especially for a Directorate that in 

2006 was criticized in Congress for being a ‘‘rudderless ship without a clear way to 

get back on course.’’ 7 In contrast, a 2009 report by the National Academy of Public 

Administration concluded, ‘‘S&T has made strides towards becoming a mature and 

productive research and development organization, particularly during the last 

three years.’’ 8

Yet, despite this leadership team’s hard work, significant concerns remain. 

• DHS still lacks an integrated requirements and acquisition process and a 

means for integrated development of human capital, operational, training, 

education, and sustainment programs. DHS needs an integrated end-to-end 

process. This system needs to be formal and robust and include both a ‘‘deliberate’’ process for developing long-term needs as well as a ‘‘crisis-action’’ process for meeting unanticipated requirements and ensuring rapid acquisition to 

meet challenges such as those faced during the 2010 Gulf oil spill. 

• The DNDO model remains a concern. In 2007, we expressed concern about establishing organizational activities that tried to do too much-overseeing everything from concept development to testing and evaluation, acquisition and deployment. We were also concerned that creating a ‘‘stovepipe’’ activity to manage the nuclear detection portfolio, as a separate activity made sense. Those 

concerns still remain. 9

• S&T still lacks a solid track record for transitioning technologies, particularly 

for partners outside the department. S&T has improved stakeholder input 

primarily through its Integrated Product Teams. 10 Particularly noteworthy is 

the Directorate’s Community Perceptions of Technology Program managed by 

the Homeland Security Studies and Analysis Institute, which provides early 

stakeholder input on the policy implications of fielding new technologies. I 

have participated in several of the roundtables organized under this program. 

It is an exceptional initiative, one that should serve as a model for other government R&D efforts. Nevertheless, transitioning technology is still a significant challenge. 

• The department still lacks a truly strategic approach to research and innovation that would allow appropriately prioritizing and focusing its efforts. 

HSARPA (the Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency) has 

been a disappointment. 

Moving Forward-The Organization 

Organizational and process restructuring bring costs and as well as benefits. That 

reality is often forgotten when attention is turned to improving the efficiency and 

effectiveness of an organization. Opportunity costs matter. This truism is nowhere 

more important to remember than when considering the DHS and S&T, which have 

seen a tsunami of reorganization and restructuring over the department’s short tenure of existence. 

That said, while tinkering ought to be kept to a minimum, there are some critical 

changes that might to be considered. 

• The time has probably come to give S&T a more defined statutory mission that 

clearly outlines its role in acquisition, life-cycle management, and the integration with other enablers for the department, such as training, human capital 

management, and sustainment. This step should be taken through a reauthorization bill. 

• It might be time to rethink the mission, structure, and purpose of the DNDO 

and whether these activities would not be better managed under major department activities rather than as a stand-alone activity. 11 It might make 

sense, for example, to transfer the office’s transformational and applied R&D 

portfolios to S&T. 

• Congress and the department need to decide-whither the Homeland Security 

Advanced Research Projects Agency? The act establishing the DHS created 
48 

12See, National Academy for Public Administration, ‘‘Department of Homeland Security 

Science and Technology Directorate,’’ pp. 11–13. 13 As a 2007 Computer Science and Telecommunications Board research report concluded, 

however, the national research and development program is wholly inadequate. Homeland Security is a vital component of this program. See, James Jay Carafano and Eric Sayers, ‘‘Building 

Cyber Security Leadership for the 21st Century,’’ Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 2281, 

December 16, 2008, at http://www.carlisle.army.mil/DIME/documents/bg— 

2218%5B1%5D.pdf,. 14The resilience of the U.S.-Canadian electrical grid and telecommunications systems, including developing limited redundancy and identifying means for the timely replacement of essential 

damaged parts or their rapid substitution is vital to ensure national resiliency in the face of 

catastrophic disasters. See, James Jay Carafano and Richard Weitz, ‘‘EMP Attacks-What the 

U.S. Must Do Now,’’ Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 2491, November 17, 2010, at 

http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/11/emp-attacks-what-the-us-must-do-now. 15 James Carafano, ‘‘Homeland Security’s blind spot’’ The Examiner, September 14, 2009, at 

http://washingtonexaminer.com/op-eds/2009/09/james-carafano-homeland-securitys-blind-spot. 

HSARPA. At the time, legislators assumed its mission would parallel the 

function that DARPA serves for the Department of Defense. That vision has 

never been fully realized and it is an open question whether a DARPA-like 

activity is truly essential for DHS or whether DHS would not be better off 

putting the overwhelming majority of its resources on its present operational 

needs and leveraging existing organizations, like DARPA, for the rare occasion it needs to look at truly futuristic or ‘‘out of the box’’ solutions. 

Today, HSARPA primarily provides an additional layer of management for a 

broad portfolio of programs and projects. While it is important to reduce the overwhelming number of direct reports to the undersecretary, it is an open question 

whether HSARPA best fills this role. 12

Moving Forward-The Mission 

It is time for a serious strategic debate on the direction of the department’s homeland security research. We know an awful lot about the competitive environment of 

ensuring our nation’s Transitioning technology outside the department is extremely 

difficult. Given that reality and all the serious competing priorities for resources 

(with a very few ‘‘strategic’’ exceptions) it is time for the department to make the 

tough call and dramatically scale back its efforts in this area. 

S&T should 

• Focus laser-like on getting close to its ‘‘internal’’ department customers. 

• Limit itself to a coordinating and standards-setting role on technologies for 

state and local governments, first responders, and the private sector. 

• Acknowledge there may be exceptions to the general rule of doing less, particularly in the areas of cybersecurity, 13 exceptionally vital infrastructure 

(such as the national electrical grid) 14 and technologies that might impact on 

the resiliency of small and medium business. These areas are the true Achilles’ heel of the U.S. economy. Small and medium businesses, for example, 

make up over half of the American work force. The workers and the companies they serve are the backbone of the U.S. economy. On average, they create 

about two-thirds of all new jobs each year. Yet, they are most susceptible to 

interruptions from attacks and disruptions-and there is dearth of research 

supporting their particular needs. 15

The department continues to have difficulty putting dollars where they can make 

a difference. The S&T agenda is still driven too much by stakeholders rather than 

real strategy. S&T should: 

• Dramatically scale back on screening and detection technologies. The needs 

for these technologies should be driven real assessments of the most efficacious means to achieve risk reduction; the costs and benefits of measures, and 

limits of current technology rather than legislative fiats of Congress and 

whims of government officials. 

• Step-up cyber-research. Cyber-research must be a high priority for the whole 

of government and DHS must play an important part. There is no area of 

homeland security threats, including our knowledge of the dangers of weapons of mass destruction, where government’s basic knowledge of the challenge 

is more deficient. A 2007 Computer Science and Telecommunications Board 

research report concluded: 

[B]oth traditional and unorthodox approaches will be necessary. Traditional research is problem-specific, and there are many cybersecurity prob-
49 

16 Computer Science and Telecommunications Board, Toward A Safer and More Secure Cyberspace (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2007), p. 61. 17 Adapted from James Carafano, ‘‘U.S. must gird for war in very small places,’’ The Examiner, December 12, 2010, at http://washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/columnists/2010/12/ 

james-jay-carafano-us-must-gird-war-very-small-places#ixzz1GViM4F10. 18 Recommendations are adopted from James Jay Carafano, ‘‘Fighting Terrorism, Addressing 

Liability: A Global Proposal,’’ Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 2138, May 21, 2008, at 

http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2008/05/Fighting-Terrorism-Addressing-LiabilityA–Global-Proposal. 

lems for which good solutions are not known.. Research is and will be needed to address these problems. But problem-by-problem solutions, or even 

problem-class by problem-class solutions, are highly unlikely to be sufficient to close the gap by themselves. Unorthodox, clean-slate approaches 

will also be needed to deal with what might be called a structural problem 

in cybersecurity research now, and these approaches will entail the development of new ideas and new points of view that revisit the basic foundations and implicit assumptions of security research. Addressing both of 

these reasons for the lack of security in cyberspace is important, but it is 

the second-closing the knowledge gap-that is the primary goal of 

cybersecurity research...’’ 16

Today, that goal (though admittedly the S&T agenda in this area is much 

improved) is still not being met. 

Finally, while much has been to done to improve ‘‘partnerships,’’ these activities 

must be further stressed as the highest priority. Some specific initiatives that S&T 

might consider include: 

• Become a full partner in the federal nanotechnology effort. DHS, as do many 

federal agencies, has some nano-related programs, but these disparate research efforts are inadequate for what could be the greatest ‘‘game-changing’’ 

technology of the next decade. Today, the United States leads the world in 

nano-science, but that lead is narrowing fast. Our private sector can’t plunge 

much further into nano-industries, given the current economic climate. But 

that could change rapidly, with a little help from Washington. In high-tech 

manufacturing, the main cost issue is tech investment-something quite sensitive to tax and regulatory policy. If federal policymakers lowered the cost 

of capital-by reducing taxes on capital gains and dividends, as well as corporate income taxes-it would stimulate capital investment in a variety of 

promising technologies. And few, if any, are more promising than 

nanotechnology. DHS, along with the rest of the government, should rethink 

its nanotechnology investment strategy. They should pivot right now to help 

foster the development of nanotechnology manufacturing infrastructure. That 

way, DHS and other federal agencies can incorporate innovations into its 

equipment-quickly and cheaply-as soon as the innovations emerge. The Pentagon has done this before. In the 1980s, the Defense Research Projects Agency helped set up Sematech, a consortium of U.S. semiconductor companies 

called to resolve common manufacturing challenges. DHS and other partner 

agencies should do the same for nanotechnology manufacturing. 17

• Internationalize the SAFETY Act. 18 After 9/11, the U.S. Congress established 

one potential instrument: The Support Anti-Terrorism by Fostering Effective 

Technologies (SAFETY) Act. The SAFETY Act lowered the liability risks of 

manufacturers that provide products and services used in combating terrorism. The act, passed in 2002, protects the incentive to produce products 

that the Secretary of Homeland Security designates as ‘‘Qualified Anti-Terrorism Technologies.’’ The Department of Homeland Security has made a concerted effort to implement the program, and, as of 2009, about 200 companies 

have obtained SAFETY Act certification. This program should be used to accelerate the fielding of commercial products and services for cybersecurity. 

• If other nations adopted similar liability protection regimes they could form 

a network to promote innovation. One potential source of outreach might be 

the Technical Cooperation Program (TTCP), an international organization 

that collaborates in defense-related scientific and technical information exchange and shared research activities with Australia, Canada, New Zealand, 

the United Kingdom, and the United States. TTCP is one of the world’s largest collaborative science and technology forums. Outreach might focus initially on U.S. partners in Asia including Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Taiwan, South Korea, India, Hong Kong, and Singapore. Singapore is the United 

States’ 15th-largest trading partner and ninth-largest export market. Foreign 
50 

direct investment in Singapore is concentrated largely in technical service 

sectors; manufacturing; information; and professional scientific knowledge, 

skills, and processes. 

As national liability protection proliferates, new opportunities for international cooperation will emerge. Countries that adopt verifiably similar liability protections 

should extend reciprocal privileges to one another. An expanding global web of liability protection will facilitate the proliferation of homeland security technologies.. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. 

BIOGRAPHY FOR DR. JAMES CARAFANO

James Jay Carafano, Ph.D. Deputy Director, Kathryn and Shelby Cullom 

Davis Institute for International Studies and Director, Douglas and Sarah 

Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies 

Areas of Expertise: 

Homeland Security, Defense, Military Affairs, Interagency (whole-of-government) 

Operations, Counterterrorism 

Summary: 

James Carafano, one of the nation’s leading experts in defense and homeland security, directs Heritage’s Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies. 

Carafano is an accomplished historian and teacher as well as a prolific writer and 

researcher on a fundamental constitutional duty of the federal government: to provide for the common defense. 

His research focuses on developing the national security required to secure the 

long-term interests of the United States—protecting the public, providing for economic growth and preserving civil liberties. 

In this capacity, Carafano is one of the principal policy experts who appear in 

Heritage’s gripping documentary on the case for missile defense, ′′33 Minutes: Protecting America in the New Missile Age.’’ 

In August 2009, Carafano was promoted to director of the Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies as well as to deputy director of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom 

Davis Institute for International Studies. 

Carafano, a 25-year veteran of the Army, manages day-to-day research and program activities of the Allison Center. He also serves as deputy to Kim R. Holmes, 

vice president for defense and foreign policy studies, in overseeing the centers and 

projects of Davis Institute, where Carafano had been assistant director since 2006. 

He is a weekly columnist on national security affairs for the Washington Examiner newspapers. 

Carafano’s most recent book is Private Sector/Public Wars: Contracting in Combat-Iraq, Afghanistan and Future Conflicts (Praeger, 2008), a rigorous study of contractors’ role on the battlefield and their impact on military effectiveness and civil 

society. 

Carafano’s current book project is a history of the modern military. He is editing 

a new book series, ‘‘The Changing Face of War,’’ which examines how emerging political, social, economic and cultural trends will affect the nature of armed conflict. 

Carafano joined Heritage as a senior research fellow in 2003. He had been a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, a Washington policy institute dedicated to defense issues. 

In his Army career, Carafano rose to the rank of lieutenant colonel. He served 

in Europe, Korea and the United States. His assignments included head speechwriter for the Army Chief of Staff, the service’s highest-ranking officer. Before retiring, Carafano was executive editor of Joint Force Quarterly, the Defense Department’s premiere professional military journal. 

A graduate of West Point, Carafano holds a master’s degree and a doctorate from 

Georgetown University as well as a master’s degree in strategy from the U.S. Army 

War College. 

He is a visiting professor at National Defense University and Georgetown University. He previously served as an assistant professor at the U.S. Military Academy 

in West Point, N.Y., and as director of military studies at the Army’s Center of Military History. He taught at Mount Saint Mary College in New York and was a fleet 

professor at the U.S. Naval War College. 

Carafano is the co-author with Paul Rosenzweig of Winning the Long War: Lessons from the Cold War for Defeating Terrorism and Preserving Freedom (2005). The 

authors, first to coin the term ‘‘the long war,’’ argued that a successful strategy requires a balance of prudent military and security measures, continued economic 
51 

growth, zealous protection of civil liberties and prevailing in the ‘‘war of ideas’’ 

against terrorist ideologies. 

Carafano also co-authored a textbook, Homeland Security (McGraw-Hill), designed 

as a practical introduction to everyday life in the era of terrorism. The textbook addresses such key details as the roles of first responders and volunteers, family preparedness techniques and in-depth looks at weapons of mass destruction. 

His other works include G.I. Ingenuity: Improvisation, Technology and Winning 

World War II (2006); Waltzing Into the Cold War (2002); and After D–Day (2000), 

a Military Book Club main selection. 

As an expert on defense, intelligence and homeland security issues, Carafano has 

testified many times before Congress. 

He is a regular guest analyst for all the major U.S. network and cable television 

news organizations, from ABC to FOX to MSNBC to PBS, as well as such outlets 

as National Public Radio, Pajamas TV, Voice of America and the History Channel. 

From SkyNews to Al Jazeera, he also has appeared on TV news programs originating in Australia, Austria, Canada, France, Great Britain, Greece, Hong Kong, 

Ireland, Iran, Japan, Portugal, Spain and Sweden. 

Carafano’s op-ed columns and commentary are published widely, including the 

Baltimore Sun, Boston Globe, New York Post, Philadelphia Inquirer, USA Today 

and Washington Times in addition to the Washington Examiner. 

He is a member of the National Academy’s Board on Army Science and Technology and the Department of the Army Historical Advisory Committee. He is a senior fellow at George Washington University’s Homeland Security Policy Institute. 

In 2005, Carafano received Heritage’s prestigious W. Glenn and Rita Ricardo 

Campbell Award. The honor goes to the staff member determined to have made ‘‘an 

outstanding contribution to the analysis and promotion of the free society.’’ 

Chairman QUAYLE. Thank you, Dr. Carafano. 

Mr. Pearl, you are now recognized for five minutes. 

STATEMENT OF MARC PEARL, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF 

EXECUTIVE OFFICER, HOMELAND SECURITY 

AND DEFENSE BUSINESS COUNCIL 

Mr. PEARL. Thank you, Chairman Quayle, and welcome to you 

first hearing of the Subcommittee. There is going to be many more, 

and I hope that they are just as substantive at this first one is. I 

want to thank you and the Members of the Committee for giving 

the Homeland Security and Defense Business Council an opportunity to testify before you today. 

The Council, just for background, is a not-for-profit, non-partisan 

organization of the leading companies that deliver homeland security solutions to the marketplace. Our organization works to ensure 

that the perspective, the innovations, the expertise and the capabilities of the private sector are fully utilized in our Nation’s security as well recognized and integrated with the public sector at the 

same time. We appreciate, I want to say at the outset, the leadership of this Subcommittee and the Full Committee on the critical 

issues associated with improving R&D within government as well 

as your continued support for successful partnerships between government and the private sector in order to fulfill our collective mission, which is to keep our Nation safer and more secure. These 

partnerships, as has been talked about today, are key to the government’s ability to deliver high-quality solutions to citizens effectively, efficiently and fiscally responsibly. 

The Committee asked us to discuss any observable changes that 

have occurred following the QHSR and the reorganization of the 

Directorate and to provide as well the industry’s collective perspective on the relationship between and interaction between DHS S&T 

programs, and my written testimony also goes into some sugges-
52 

tions that the private sector has on recommendations for success. 

I ask that my full written testimony be included in the hearing 

record. 

With respect to the QHSR, let me briefly comment that we applaud the department’s efforts to collect and input and all of the 

things that came out of it last year. It is the hope of the Council 

and all of our members that the policy compilation leads to a successful strategic plan that all of the members discussed in their 

questions this morning that includes priorities, budgets and operational requirements as well as program alignments that will help 

achieve cost efficiencies and mission success. This process should 

serve to inform the business sector of the department’s long-range 

priorities and long-term needs in a timely manner as well as giving 

industry solution providers and opportunity to engage the government, to help identify any gaps that may exist in technology, capabilities and reasonable expectations about timeliness and the cost 

of delivery. 

While the Council fully supports the continued efforts to improve 

the S&T Directorate, reorganization as such is not as important as 

establishing an operational philosophy that includes more effective 

engagement across entire department components to better solicit 

and understand its requirements as well as with the private sector 

to solicit the most effective and efficient solutions to those requirements. 

My written testimony outlines some of the examples of reorganization that might assist in improving mission success including 

the creation of an acquisition and operational analysis division to 

improve the writing of the necessary requirements and the overall 

strengthening of the individual components acquisition programs 

as well as we discuss the enhancement of the Homeland Security 

Advanced Research Projects Agency by combining all of the S&T 

divisions, thereby strengthening and gaining better alignment 

across the disciplines and needs. 

The Council members, in reiterating what Dr. Carafano was saying, also believe that the acquisition process itself is a critical part 

of a lifecycle that must begin much earlier than contracting activities. Long before a blueprint is drawn up or before RFIs and RFPs 

are proffered, there must be a collective cooperation with and in 

substantive engagement between experts on the ground and practitioners in the field. The Council’s continuing efforts to identify and 

develop successful interactions with the S&T Directorate we believe 

have paid dividends both for government and industry. We have 

historically worked closely with the Directorate since its inception 

and have developed and nurtured substantive engagements. We 

need to continue those discussions. 

But even amidst the establishment of that effective relationship, 

the business sector as a whole is currently struggling to comprehend long-term strategic needs and goals of the department, especially within the Directorate. This has made our long-term investments towards innovative technologies that could become effective solutions challenging at best. Broad and interactive communications to inform strategic planning and developing a national 

technology framework are absolutely necessary in order to achieve 

a level playing field and spur innovative efforts. As I said, greater 
53 

long-term strategic planning and more opportunities to engage the 

department earlier in the planning process will also result in our 

fulfilling the needs of the Directorate and delivering innovative and 

successful solutions our Nation needs. 

Lastly, my written testimony outlines a number of recommendations for consideration by the Subcommittee in addition to what I 

previously mentioned. Allow me to briefly highlight a couple of 

those. The S&T Directorate must have greater access across government and greater authority over Homeland Security R&D efforts. The S&T Directorate with Congressional support and encouragement to in essence couple on to what Dr. Carafano said must 

actively demonstrate a continued commitment to the SAFETY Act 

forgetting about international also within the country itself. This is 

one of the Directorate’s best and most tangible methods for working with the private sector. And continued and adequate Congressional funding of technological R&D homeland security solutions is 

a worthy and a necessary investment. Without it, the department’s 

ability to deliver solutions to protect our Nation and potentially extinguish technology advantages over an ever-evolving adversary 

will be compromised. 

In conclusion, the Council once again expresses our appreciation 

for the opportunity to testify before you this morning. We pledge, 

the Council and its members, an opportunity to provide this committee and the department with appropriate support, expertise and 

input needed to achieve mission success, and we look forward to 

meeting with you and working with you as deliberations continue. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Marc Pearl follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. MARC PEARL

Introduction 

Chairman Quayle, Ranking Member Wu and Members of the Committee, I thank 

you for giving the Homeland Security & Defense Business Council an opportunity 

to appear before you today. At the outset, we want to express our appreciation to 

this Subcommittee and to the full Science, Space and Technology Committee for its 

continued leadership on the full range of critical issues associated with improving 

research and development (R&D) within government and encouraging even greater 

involvement of industry. We also want to recognize, in particular, your guidance on 

initiatives to enhance the partnership and recognition of the importance of substantive engagement between the government and the private sector when it comes 

to fulfilling our collective mission—to keep our nation safer and more secure. That 

partnership is essential to our government’s ability to deliver high quality solutions 

to citizens effectively, efficiently, and fiscally responsibly. 

I am Marc Pearl, President and CEO of the Homeland Security & Defense Business Council, a not-for-profit, non-partisan organization of the leading companies 

that deliver homeland security solutions to the marketplace. The Council works to 

ensure that the perspective, innovation, expertise and capabilities of the private sector are fully utilized in our nation’s security, as well as recognized and integrated 

with the public sector. 

The Council and its members, first and foremost, support fairness and openness 

in the Federal contracting process; inclusion of the private sectors’ perspective in 

major legislative and administrative initiatives; and the effective use of resources 

and adoption of the most advanced security solutions to protect our citizens, economy and critical assets. Council members employ over 3 million Americans in all 

50 states. We are honored and proud to work alongside leaders from civilian, defense and Intel agencies in support of their strategic initiatives, through our individual and collective expertise in technology, facility and networks design and construction, human capital, financial management, technology integration, and program management. 
54 

This focus of the Council’s testimony is to provide the subcommittee with industry’s collective perspective on the relationship and interaction between DHS science 

and technology programs and the private sector’s recommendations for success. It 

will also address any observable changes that have occurred following the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review and reorganization of the Science and Technology 

Directorate. 

Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR) 

The Council applauds the Department’s effort in collecting input and developing 

the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review published last year. The Council and 

all of our members hope the QHSR will lead to a strategic plan that would include 

priorities, budgets, operational requirements, and programmatic alignments that 

will help to achieve cost efficiencies and mission success. This process could serve 

to inform the business sector of the Department’s long-range priorities and longterm needs in a timely manner. In addition, this process could give industry solution 

providers an opportunity to engage the government and help identify any gaps in 

technology, capabilities, and reasonable expectations about timeliness and cost of 

delivery. 

The QHSR—in and of itself—has been an important policy guidance document, 

but it and the entire process need practical, identifiable and operational linkages 

to budget and a long-term strategic needs assessment with corresponding goals, priorities and budget. 

Any strategic planning review and ‘head-of-curve’ discussions should focus on answering three basic, but crucial questions with respect to the specific linkage between the policy and the implementation: 

1. Is the plan economically reasonable? 

2. Is it technologically feasible? 

3. Does it take into account any significant unintended consequences? 

These fundamental questions should guide all future development, deployment, 

and implementation. When addressed—whether by program managers, senior officials and/or, even Members of Congress—we all will be able to successfully move 

forward to ensure industry’s ability to align its business lines and strategies to meet 

the Directorate’s and our nation’s needs. 

Science & Technology Directorate Reorganization 

The Council supports the continued efforts to improve the Science and Technology 

Directorate. However, reorganization, as such, is not as important as establishing 

an operating philosophy that includes more effective engagement with Department’s 

components to better solicit and understand its requirements; and with the private 

sector to better solicit the most effective and efficient solutions to those requirements. The Council’s believes that the following examples of reorganization might 

assist it in improving mission success. 

• The creation of an ‘‘Acquisition and Operational Analysis Division’’ to improve 

the writing of the necessary requirements and the overall strengthening of 

the individual components’ acquisition programs can be of great benefit. Existing efforts to link R&D to operational requirements are a positive step forward, but there remains ambiguity over the requirements. 

• Enhance the Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency 

(HSARPA) by combining all the S&T divisions, thereby strengthening and 

gaining better alignment across the disciplines and needs. This process also 

has potential to improve consistency with the way DoD & DoE use DARPA 

and ARPA–E to leverage science. We recognize, of course, that there are still 

a lot of cultural changes required to ensure cooperation, but working towards 

such a goal will promote greater science, provide more effective and efficient 

solutions, and lead to practical applications that serve our nation’s security 

needs. 

Real mission success in R&D can be achieved through the establishment of policies and procedures that advance the movement of critical technologies from the laboratory, and early research and development to the field in a manner that supports 

successfully transition of these technologies for homeland security application. 

Acquisition Process 

The Council believes that the acquisition process is part of a lifecycle that must 

begin much earlier than contracting activity itself. Long before the ‘blueprint’ is 

drawn up, and before the RFIs or RFPs are proffered, there must be collective co-
55 

1GAO report GAO–08–263 entitled ’Department of Homeland Security: Better Planning and 

Assessment Needed to Improve Outcomes for Complex Service Acquisitions’—released on May 

8, 2008. 

operation with and substantive engagement between experts on the ground and 

practitioners in the field. A successful process should also require equipping the entire team with an understanding of the challenges and risks in place during the entire lifecycle of the project to ensure success. This process could successfully address 

a project’s economic reasonability, technological feasibility, and unintended consequences. 

A GAO Report that has been cited by the House and Senate leadership on countless occasions found that ‘‘contracts with well-defined requirements linked to measurable performance standards delivered results within budget and provided quality 

service.’’ 1

This process must be properly managed and communicated to ensure the necessary solutions are developed with ‘‘man on the ground’’ requirements development, 

including input from the private sector to meet the goals of the ‘‘final customer.’’ 

We would very much like to see a functioning process that identifies and tracks requirements generated at any level through validation, budgeting, acquisition, and 

success or effect. The development of a clear DHS-wide process would not only serve 

to enhance efficiency, but would provide needed transparency so that end-users— 

acquisition and operations officials—and industry can work in concert, rather than 

exist in a seemingly disconnected and stove-piped environment. 

The Relationship And Interaction Between DHS Science And Technology 

Programs and the Private Sector 

We are very grateful that the subcommittee has also asked us to address this 

issue. The work and mission of the Council is primarily focused on how industry 

can be more successful in building trusting, cooperative, and substantive engagements with our counterparts in the public sector. There is no question that our continuing efforts in striving to identify and develop successful interaction with the Directorate have paid dividends for both government and industry. The Council and 

its members have successfully worked closely and nurtured a substantive relationship with the Directorate since its inception to discuss and develop innovative solutions to protect our country. But even amidst the establishment of an effective relationship, the business sector, as a whole, has struggled to comprehend the long-term 

strategic needs and goals of the Department, especially within the Directorate. This 

has made our long-term investments toward innovative technologies that might become effective solutions, challenging at best. 

Similar to the Federal sector, industry has limited resources to devote to developing homeland security solutions. They cannot devote these resources to building 

speculative technologies. We want to deliver the solutions that the Department and 

our nation needs. 

The Council’s overarching mission is to work with DHS officials to improve its engagement with the private sector long before a crisis or even the development of a 

program. Ultimately, the private sector will provide the innovation needed to develop the appropriate solutions as demonstrated time over time in our nation’s history. In order to pursue a level playing field across industry and to spur innovation 

efforts, broad and interactive communications to inform strategic planning and a national technology framework are needed. The business sector is willing to devote resources and take risks in order to help provide homeland security solutions, but we 

are looking to DHS to further improve its requirements development and definition. 

Large amounts of guidelines, forms, databases and other documents must be reviewed and produced to initiate dialogue in some parts of the agency. Focusing less 

on documentation and process and more on interaction and partnership could substantially free up bottlenecks. In addition, identifying private sector SMEs in relevant scientific disciplines could enable partnerships more quickly and effectively. 

The Council is hopeful that the future will include greater long-term strategic 

planning and more opportunities to engage the Department earlier in the planning 

process. Through early engagement in the process we can better understand and deliver the innovative solutions that will protect our country and its people. 

Recommendations 

The Council submits the following recommendations for consideration by the subcommittee: 

• Increased Cooperation and Visibility: The private sector brings more 

than a ‘vendor’ mentality to the table. We have our own R&D projects ready 
56 

to respond to stated needs of our nation, but we cannot develop them in a 

vacuum. We want to continue meeting the needs of the Department, the Directorate, and the nation as a whole. Government and its industry partners 

share the same goals. Projects completed on time and on target are a winwin. Programs that meet their objectives are a win-win. We understand the 

needs are complex and challenging, but our common goal is to find the most 

appropriate, effective, and efficient routes to mission success. The public and 

private sectors—working from previous recommendations and developing new 

ones if necessary—must be able to work from the same strategy. 

• Greater Authority and Planning for Science and Technology Directorate: The Council supports greater authority for the Science and Technology Directorate. Currently homeland security R&D efforts are spread 

among many governmental organizations. The Directorate is highly dependent on other federal agencies to achieve its mission. However, there does not 

appear to be a clear strategy for how to do that effectively, and collaboration 

with DoD, DoE, NIST and other scientific organizations is not clearly organized, resulting in duplicate and potentially unleveraged efforts. It must be 

recognized that there are significant cultural challenges within the Department, and it remains a challenge to effectively bring new technologies to maturity, and concurrently, to gain broad acceptance in the operational communities. In order to succeed, the S&T Directorate must be able to direct the 

government-wide homeland security R&D agenda, not compete against numerous organizations inside and outside the Department. 

• Innovative Solutions vs. ‘‘Gadgets’’: The Council believes there is a need 

to improve the way the Directorate thinks about and pursues innovation. 

‘‘Needs’’ are typically defined by end-user practitioners and frequently fail to 

incorporate scientific perspectives and commercially available technologies effectively. As a result, requirements frequently end up defining a point source 

technology, product or service (‘‘gadget’’) that may or may not successfully address the true need. Additionally, ineffective requirements processes result in 

increased or lost cost of development, commercialization delays across the 

board, and potential duplication of effort. Industry expertise in commercial 

technology development is also not leveraged to the extent it could be. 

• SAFETY Act Commitment: The Council supports continued commitment to 

the SAFETY Act—one the Directorate’s best and most tangible methods for 

working with the private sector. The SAFETY Act is the most reliable way 

DHS can learn about and encourage the deployment of critical security tools 

and services. The Council hopes for continued commitment from S&T leadership, starting with the Under Secretary and her personal staff, to implement 

the SAFETY Act in a full and complete fashion. Ideally, complete implementation would create a clear application process and establish standards that 

promote the full utilization of the law. 

• Continued Congressional Funding: The Council also believes continued 

congressional funding of the research and development of technological homeland security solutions is a worthy and necessary investment. Without adequate funding, the Department will have a diminished ability to deliver solutions to protect our nation, have a devastating effect on the overall homeland 

security R&D enterprise, and potentially extinguish technology advantages 

over an ever-evolving adversary. HR–1 proposes to eliminate more than $500 

million from the Department of Homeland Security’s Science and Technology 

budget—effectively cutting it by half. The Council hopes that the legitimate 

desire on the part of Congress to curtail unnecessary spending will not result 

in the reduction of our nation’s ability to develop tools to counter the threats 

it faces and spur its global competitiveness. 

Conclusion 

On behalf of the Homeland Security & Defense Business Council, I once again express our appreciation for the opportunity to provide our comments on the important issues before the Subcommittee. The Council and its members pledge to provide 

this Committee and the Department with the appropriate support, expertise and 

input needed to achieve mission success. We are prepared to work with the subcommittee not just as a neutral conduit between the public and private sectors, as 

a very interested actor and trusted advisor to mutually achieve the following goals: 

• Identify and find real world solutions to our homeland security challenges; 

• Work towards a strategic plan with visibility and cooperation in the research 

and development of homeland security solutions; and 
57 

• Ensure a sound, fair and responsible acquisition process. 

We believe the achievement of these goals will help get our nation where it needs 

to be—where this Committee, the administration, the Department, and the private 

sector want us to go—and ensuring that we get there together. 

We look forward to working with the Subcommittee as it continues its deliberations. 

BIOGRAPHY FOR MR. MARC PEARL

Marc Pearl has served as President and CEO of the Homeland Security & Defense 

Business Council since March 2008. The seven-year old Council’s membership consists of the leading companies that provide homeland security solutions for our nation, and actively involves their senior executives in developing substantive highlevel thought leadership peer-to-peer interaction with their government counterparts. The Council’s programs and initiatives focus on ensuring that the perspective, 

innovation, expertise and capabilities of the private sector are fully utilized in our 

nation’s security. 

Prior to joining the Council, Marc was the principal and chairman of IT Policy 

Solutions, which he founded to counsel private sector organizations in meeting their 

public policy challenges. He concurrently served as executive director of the Consumer Electronics Retailers Coalition. Pearl had previously been a partner at the 

international law firm, Shaw Pittman and led their e-commerce policy practice; 

served as general counsel and senior vice president at ITAA (now TechAmerica); 

and was chief of staff and legislative counsel to U.S. Representative Dan Glickman, 

when the former congressman chaired the House Intelligence Committee. 

Marc has lived and worked in DC for more than three decades, focusing his work 

on technology and cyber security policy issues since the mid-1990s. Pearl’s grasp of 

the federal, state/local and global policy issues important to industry, together with 

his non-partisan, substantive approach to policymaking have made him an invaluable resource to clients and a trusted advisor to numerous decision makers. He 

helped form and led broad-based coalitions on Y2K liability legislation, e-commerce 

transaction jurisdiction laws, digital authentication and the DTV ‘‘transition.’’ Marc 

was also privileged to represent the private sector on U.S. government delegations 

at the Hague Conference on Private International Law, the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). 

Born and raised in Detroit, Marc graduated with honors from Case Western Reserve University and received his law degree from Emory University’s School of 

Law. 

For more information on the programs, initiatives and mission of the Homeland 

Security & Defense Business Council visit: http://www.homelandcouncil.org. 

Chairman QUAYLE. Thank you, Mr. Pearl. 

Mr. Maurer, you are recognized for five minutes. 

STATEMENT OF DAVID MAURER, DIRECTOR OF THE 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND JUSTICE TEAM AT THE 

U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Mr. MAURER. Thank you. Good morning, Chairman Quayle and 

Members of the Committee. I am pleased to be here today to discuss the recent findings from past work looking at research and development at the Department of Homeland Security. 

Two weeks ago, GAO issued its first mandated review of potential duplication, overlap and cost savings within federal programs. 

In that review, we identified research and development at DHS as 

a potential area for cost savings. Drawing on years of work at DHS, 

we found that the department has the potential to reap important 

cost savings by taking two commonsense actions. First, test systems to make sure they meet requirements before deciding to buy 

them. Second, conduct cost-benefit analysis to ensure that taxpayer 

dollars are buying systems that improve Homeland Security capabilities. 
58 

In recent years, we found that DHS has not always taken these 

actions. As a result, DHS ends up taking risks that multi-billiondollar programs may not deliver their expected results. In some 

cases, DHS spent millions on systems that did not work and that 

did not enhance security. 

For example, in 2006, the Transportation Security Administration began deploying explosive trace portals, or ETP, in airports. 

These so-called puffer machines blow air on passengers and check 

for residue of explosives. Unfortunately, TSA deployed ETPs knowing that operational testing had not been completed, that the system’s functional requirements had not been fully tested and that 

ETPs had not performed well on the tests that had been completed. 

TSA ended up spending millions on a system that had a lower capability, broke down more frequently, and cost more to install than 

initially planned. As a result, TSA stopped buying new systems 

and pulled what they had deployed out of service. 

We have also previously reported significant problems with 

DHS’s efforts to deploy and develop the advanced spectroscopic portal monitor, or ASP. Within DHS, the Domestic Nuclear Detection 

Office, or DNDO, wanted to develop and deploy improved radiation 

detection equipment. DNDO believed ASPs would better perform 

than the equipment currently being used on the Nation’s borders. 

However, DNDO did not conduct a meaningful cost-benefit analysis 

comparing ASPs to existing systems. Our work found that DNDO 

overestimated the capabilities of the ASPs, underestimated the capabilities of the current systems, and underestimated the costs to 

develop and deploy ASPs. In short, it was not clear that spending 

taxpayer dollars on this program would deliver improvements in 

primary radiation screening capabilities. As a result, in February 

of last year, the Secretary of Homeland Security scaled back plans 

for the number of ASPs DHS would purchase and how they would 

be used. 

Now, when you hear examples like this, it is important to remember why DHS presses the envelope. The department faces a 

constant balancing act between immediate mission needs and the 

need to make sound, informed choices, following processes that are 

not always designed for speed. Within this context, DHS needs to 

make difficult decisions on when and how to develop, deploy and 

purchase new technologies. However, as our work has found, there 

have been too many cases of DHS rushing to failure. Failure to 

adequately test or conduct meaningful cost-benefit analysis can end 

up wasting taxpayer dollars and not enhancing our security. 

The good news is that DHS has taken actions to address these 

problems. In the past several months, DHS has issued new policies 

for acquisition and testing and evaluation. It has implemented a 

reorganization of the Science and Technology Directorate and has 

developed plans to revamp how DHS approaches overall investment decision-making. Taken together, these changes indicate an 

important commitment from department leadership to take these 

problems head on. That is encouraging. But it is still too early to 

tell the impact of these actions. The hope is that DHS will leverage 

these relatively new changes and turn plans into actions to ensure 

that, among other things, it adequately tests new systems and conducts cost-benefit analysis before making multi-million or multi-bil-
59 

lion-dollar decisions. By doing so, DHS makes it more likely that 

systems will be delivered on time, within budget and capable of 

meeting critical mission needs. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I 

look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Maurer follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. DAVID C. MAURER
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BIOGRAPHY FOR MR. DAVID C. MAURER

David Maurer is a Director in the U.S. Government Accountability Office’s (GAO) 

Homeland Security and Justice team, where he leads GAO’s work reviewing DHS 

and DOJ management issues. His recent work in these areas includes DHS management integration, the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, Secret Service financial management, DOJ grant management, the federal prison system, and an assessment of technologies for detecting explosives in the passenger rail environment. 

From 2008–9, Mr. Maurer worked as an Acting Director in GAO’s Natural Resource and Environment team, where he managed work assessing U.S. global nuclear detection programs, and enforcement of federal environmental law. Mr. 

Maurer was also detailed to the House Committee on Appropriations, Surveys and 
69 

Investigations staff. From 1993–2007, Mr. Maurer managed and led work in GAO’s 

International Affairs and Trade team, where he reviewed U.S. efforts to combat 

international terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, U.S. assistance to the former Soviet Union, peacekeeping in the Balkans, and several other 

international issues. He also served as the team’s manager for staffing and human 

capital issues. In recognition of his contributions to audit work, training, and operational responsibilities, Mr. Maurer has received several GAO awards during his career. 

From August 2005 through June 2006, Mr. Maurer was a student at the National 

Defense University where he was recognized as a Distinguished Graduate of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces and received an M.S. in national resource 

strategy. Mr. Maurer also has an M.P.P in international public policy from the University of Michigan and a B.A. in international relations from Michigan State University. 

Chairman QUAYLE. Thank you very much, Mr. Maurer, and 

thanks to the whole panel for your testimony. We are going to start 

the questioning, and I want to remind members that committee 

rules limit questioning to five minutes. I will now recognize myself 

for the first five minutes. 

Mr. Maurer, I was just listening to your testimony. You expressed a lot of concerns with the Directorate and DNDO including 

the need to improve R&D efforts by ensuring that testing and the 

cost-benefit analysis happens prior to making any acquisition decisions. Now, does the creation of the acquisition support and operations analysis group fully address this issue or is it just another 

layer of bureaucracy within the agency? 

Mr. MAURER. I really think that remains to be seen. If you look 

at it on paper, it definitely shows promise, and our hope is that it 

is implemented in a way to address the deficiencies we found in the 

past, and one thing I would caution everyone on that there has 

never been a shortage of plans coming out of the Department of 

Homeland Security, so we really want to see the transition from 

plans into reality and implementation in the real world. 

Chairman QUAYLE. So this is a wait-and-see approach to see if 

it actually has some benefit with actually making sure that it is 

on time, on budget and is actually making the acquisitions based 

on looking at efficiencies and cost-benefit analysis? 

Mr. MAURER. Absolutely. We have work underway for the Homeland Security Committee currently looking at S&T’s role in testing 

and evaluation within the department so we will be able to report 

on that later this year. We are also taking a careful look at how 

DHS is revamping its acquisition approach as part of our high-risk 

update. 

Chairman QUAYLE. Dr. Carafano, do you have any thoughts 

about that new portion of the agency that is going to be developed? 

Mr. CARAFANO. Yes. It can’t solve the problem. It is going to 

help—if it is done right, it will help with the requirements process. 

That is for sure. It may help in terms of the guidance, the testing 

and evaluation, but it doesn’t manage the entire acquisition process 

so there is still lots of places where things can run off the rails. 

So I think fundamentally what has to be addressed is DHS has to 

create an established acquisition process that does the end-the-end 

management from requirements to testing and evaluation to fielding to integrating with the other department needs. The question 

I think is what is the role of S&T in that, how much of that does 

it bite, and I think for a starter, I mean, we ought to revisit the 
70 

legislative language of S&T’s mission and that ought to be part of 

that, and I really do look to—we have never had an authorization 

bill, reauthorization bill for the Department of Homeland Security. 

This would be the perfect thing for the Congress to address, is to 

at least establish its formal expectations across the department for 

how it is going to do that. And again, I am not saying S&T should 

be in charge of everything to do with acquisition but it is going to 

definitely be a big player in that, and all the other pieces have to 

be established. 

Chairman QUAYLE. On that, if we are looking at it to address the 

immediate needs and also take into account the long-term R&D 

goals, you have been critical about the lack of a strategic approach 

for that. Could you just give some suggestions on how to develop 

that strategic approach and what would you actually put into 

place, just off the top of your head? 

Mr. CARAFANO. Well that is two different—there is a lot of questions. Let me just address the question of acquisition. So one is the 

formal acquisition process. The other one is rapid acquisition, and 

the rapid acquisition one is actually the one that is more difficult 

and problematic, and this is—I mean, we have seen this in DOD 

over and over again. They get into a war. They see something they 

never thought of before. They scramble around and figure out how 

to fix it. They eventually figure out how to fix it. Sometimes it costs 

a lot. Sometimes they get lucky. But the point is, is it is an—the 

rapid acquisition is an ad hoc process and then as soon as the war 

is done, they dissemble that process and reinvent it the next time. 

Because people don’t like rapid acquisition because it is a competitor with long–term acquisition, right? Because somebody comes up 

with a great idea, I have been working on this for ten years you 

are not going to kill my program because you just found a better 

idea, right? So for those things not in a sense to be in competition, 

the lanes have to be designed and they have to be specified in a 

formal way ahead of time. 

So I was just making a note that if you want to have a rapid acquisition process, you have to have a couple of things. First of all, 

you have to have a feedback loop that identifies a need. Second, 

you have to have an operational research capability so you can 

evaluate that need and determine if you need a technology fix or 

if you should do something else. If it is a technology fix, you have 

to have a horizon scanning, the kind of thing Tara talked about, 

the ability to go out and look and see what is out there, to grab 

the technology. Then you have to have a way to test and evaluate 

it and safety-certify it. And then most importantly, and this is 

where DOD fails again and again, you have to have a way to field 

it, train people in how to use it, and then sustain it. So all those 

pieces have to be part of a rapid acquisition process. Otherwise it 

doesn’t work. And for DHS, the penultimate example was the response to the oil spill when they had a dramatic need for new technologies to deal with the oil spill and they had absolutely no system in place to acquire those technologies and everything was done 

ad hoc, and I would go back now and say it would be a great question for the next time the Secretary comes to testify before you is, 

tell me what you have done to formalize the lessons that you 

learned in the Gulf oil spill to rapidly acquire technology. 
71 

Chairman QUAYLE. Thank you. The chair now recognizes Mr. 

Lujan for five minutes. 

Mr. LUJAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. Carafano, in your prepared testimony, you stated that—you 

called on the S&T Directorate to dramatically scale back on screening and detection technologies and to put those efforts straight into 

cybertechnology development. What is the rationale behind that? 

Mr. CARAFANO. Well, cybertechnology among others would be my 

priority, and the reason why I think screening and detection technologies are a bit of a sinkhole is that we live in a country with 

almost infinite vulnerabilities. You know, if you spend infinity 

minus one, you have infinity vulnerabilities, right? I mean, this 

would be as if we approached the Prohibition with let us be able 

to detect alcohol. I mean at the end of the day, even lifting Prohibition didn’t stop the Mafia. What stopped the Mafia was you went 

in and you identified the network and you attacked the network. 

So the question really is, where do you get the best bang for the 

buck. Screening and detection technologies, I mean, we all know 

the problems with false positives and false negatives, and sure, everybody can find a technology, but then you go to operationalizing 

the technology and this is the essence of what I would hope that 

this operational analysis would get to is, for all the money we are 

going to invest in technology, are we getting the best bang for the 

buck. Do I get more money from finding another technology to find 

a fistful of money in a Buick at the border or would I be better off 

investing in something that is going to enable the integrated border 

enforcement team to go and find the network that is moving that 

money and take that network down. 

Mr. LUJAN. I appreciate that very much. 

Mr. Maurer, that would lead to a natural question, I believe, to 

yourself. In 2009, I believe it was the Justice Department that said 

that drug cartels are now the largest organized threat to the 

United States. We talked about drug trafficking, human trafficking. Based on the response from Dr. Carafano, what more can 

we be doing or how can we improve what we are doing with DHS 

and working with other entities to be able to better protect our 

homeland? 

Mr. MAURER. Well, GAO has done a lot of work looking at U.S. 

efforts to combat drug smuggling and securing the border. I think 

as a general proposition, one of the key things that we found over 

the years is the importance of finding ways to have the different 

federal agencies work more closely together. We have ongoing 

work, for example, looking at the extent to which DEA and ICE are 

trying to operate under a new memorandum of understanding and 

are trying to do a better job of crafting a more integrated approach 

to the problem. 

I think the bottom line is, there are a lot of different federal, 

state and local agencies that sort of play in this broader sandbox 

of addressing the problem of drugs being smuggled into this country, and if we can figure out ways to leverage the different capabilities of all these different agencies and apply them to the problem, 

we would be better off in the long run. 

Mr. LUJAN. I appreciate that. And just going back to Dr. 

Carafano’s response, Mr. Chairman, I think that what we see here 
72 

is that we need to identify that common purpose, and if MOUs are 

trying to be worked out, they need to be required to be worked out 

and that we have to find those networks to be able to combat them, 

and I appreciate that very much. 

Mr. Pearl and Mr. Carafano, in your testimony and your responses to us here and not just your prepared testimony but in 

what you shared with us as a committee, I very much appreciate 

the fact that you are calling for clear projections or outlines or requests that are going to be coming from federal partners to give 

more certainty associated with the R&D efforts on the private side. 

My question is, we have an area when we have tech transfer sometimes is not making its way into the private arm and into the private sector because there is a need for maturation or seed support. 

What role do you see where there can be access to the engineers, 

physicists, scientists to be able to work closer with our private sector or to be able to develop that sector of the Federal Government 

where there is an emphasis on pushing that technology over the 

top so it makes its way into the private sector so that private sector 

then takes it over and takes it full steam ahead? 

Mr. CARAFANO. Well, I think that trying to transition technology 

for users outside the department is really a very, very difficult 

process, and I would just question with everything the department 

has to go on and all of its priorities, is that the gorilla you really 

want to take on right now? I would really recommend that the 

DHS focus on technologies that it needs and push that other challenge later off down the road. There are some areas where I think 

partnerships are supremely important, and I raised the issue of 

nanotechnology and I would be pleased to talk about the Semitech 

model and how I think that model really is a model that we need 

in nanotechnology. Semitech is doing some work in nanotechnology 

but it is a very, very different field, and you almost need—you really need a new organization to deal with that. 

And I will just point to four advantages of doing this. The first 

is in efficiencies. What these groups do is, they do basically noncompetitive research R&D, so it is the things that everybody is 

going to get in common so nobody gets a competitive advantage and 

it benefits everybody, and what that does is, it helps lay the baseline for the industrial base to then support and make products that 

are affordable and workable. And what that does is, it creates an— 

not necessarily more R&D spending but it creates an efficiency in 

R&D spending that allows people to spend the rest of their R&D 

money on other things. The most important thing is really does is 

it strengths the partnership between potential customers and potential suppliers. The success of these largely depends on the quality of the research agenda, and I would not—there is no magic bullet in a sense. This is, I think, the kind of complementary activity 

that government could do in public-private partnership but it 

doesn’t necessarily replace all the other kind of research and R&D. 

But again, I think there are some niche areas like nanotechnology 

where the payoffs are so enormously unbelievable across not just 

for DHS but across the Federal Government, that these are the 

kinds of things that are worth our effort. 

What we actually did to create Sematech is we actually took 

money out of DARPA and made DARPA do it. You know, I would 
73 

actually vote for that day. I would defund something else and I 

would make the Federal Government do this because I think in the 

long end, the federal consumer is going to really benefit. But I 

mean, I think it will have an enormous benefit across our economy. 

Mr. LUJAN. Thank you very much. 

And Mr. Pearl, maybe we will get a chance to follow up. I know 

the time we have gone over a little bit there. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman QUAYLE. Thank you. 

Mr. LUJAN. And Mr. Chairman, with that, I was looking down 

there, I thought Mr. Neugebauer was still with us. I would like to 

ask unanimous consent for some additional time to ask a question 

for our colleague, Congresswoman Giffords. 

Chairman QUAYLE. Without objection. 

Mr. LUJAN. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for that, and we 

know that Congresswoman Giffords is a leader on border security, 

and if she were here today, I know that she would be very engaged 

in this hearing. 

Dr. Carafano, as you know, Congresswoman Giffords is deeply 

concerned about border security, which is why she is proud of the 

BORDERS Department of Homeland Security Center of Excellence 

at the University of Arizona. BORDERS singular focus is to provide 

government agencies and stakeholders with scientifically informed 

knowledge to expedite the development of innovative, practical and 

cost-effective solutions to meet the ever-changing operational demands at the northern and southern borders. This sounds like exactly the sort of thing that we need now. BORDERS is currently 

working with Customs and Border Patrol on a number of innovative projects to protect the Arizona border by, for example, developing new tunnel detection and container security technology. In 

your written testimony, you wrote that not curtailing or further 

limiting the terms of the Centers of Excellence is important. Can 

you comment further on the importance of funding these centers? 

Mr. CARAFANO. Yeah, absolutely. So the centers do more what we 

talk of as really science and technology in the DOD world which 

is more of the six-one type which is a basic research, and if you 

want to build an effective basic research team, it takes time and 

facilities, and so if you are moving these things every couple of 

years, I mean, you might as well not even bother to do it. It really 

does take a long-term commitment and ten years or some time of 

renewable term that is much, much—is really, really important. 

And I think the borders center is a good example. I think they do 

some excellent work and you would want to keep them doing that. 

And just in terms of border technology, I just would mention very 

quickly, one area where I do think there should be a lot more emphasis is small UAVs and there is a couple of reasons for that. 

First of all, the bag guys have a lot of eyes on the border and they 

track everything we do, and so anything that has kind of a big 

operational picture gets picked up. So small UAVs are important 

because you don’t really need the infrastructure to set them up. It 

is not like the helicopter taking off. The other reason is, is that you 

can put a variety of sensor payloads on there very cost-effectively. 

You can look for tunnels. You can look for all kinds of things. And 

they are very cheap to operate, which is very good for state and 
74 

locals because they can’t support an expensive thing or long training. It is a really, I think, a very, very dynamic and important 

field, and I think the limiting thing right now is actually getting 

FAA to authorize people to fly small UAVs at the border. But I 

think the small UAV at the border, it could be an enormous force 

multiplier for federal, state and local, and that would be a primary 

to look into. 

Chairman QUAYLE. Thank you, Mr. Lujan. 

Is there anybody else to be recognized? No? With that, I will just 

recognize myself for one additional question, and I am going to address this to Mr. Pearl, but if either of the other witnesses wants 

to address this as well and answer this question. The Homeland 

Security Science and Technology Advisory committee, also known 

as Haystack, has not been active for an extended period of time. 

With the Directorate’s increased focus on stakeholder participation, 

do you feel that an independent advisory body on science and technology is an important component of S&T at DHS? 

Mr. PEARL. I think it is an interesting way of going about it. I 

think it is absolutely necessary. What we have seen over the last 

few years in terms of the advisory committees is that it has made 

up in a very vertical way on government officials public sector. The 

private sector has not necessarily—and not to take anything away 

from think tanks and others or academics but the reality of the foot 

soldiers on the ground in terms of what the private sector brings 

and industry brings to the discussion in terms of people who have 

either been in these capacities before and they are now in the private sector or who are in researchers and developers and engineers 

onto themselves and the private sector have not been as involved 

for fear that there would be a best picking of winners with respect 

to identifying individual private sector organizations. That is something that we have tried to with the department on industry days 

that were very strong two, three, four years ago and have been in 

fact in touch with Dr. O’Toole and her team to try to encourage 

greater concentration of communication and cooperation between 

the private sector. Whether it is done formally or informally, Mr. 

Chairman, I think there has to be greater coordination of communication between those, the innovations and capabilities that exist 

in the private sector and that which exists and the desire in the 

long term. 

We are fighting the last war in every single way, and whether 

that is a rapid acquisition process that Dr. Carafano is talking 

about or a long term, we have to think beyond the corner. We have 

to think beyond the curve. We have to start thinking ahead of what 

is going on, and that is before, I said, the RFP is offered up or before the acquisition process even starts, whether that is through a 

formal advisory process or whether that is through an informal 

process, we need to move forward on that and certainly the Council 

and the members that are providing homeland security solutions 

that are members of the Council want to take part in those discussions as quickly as possible. 

Chairman QUAYLE. Dr. Carafano? 

Mr. CARAFANO. I would—I serve on the Board of Army Science 

and Technology, which is sponsored by the National Academies, 

which I think is a terrific model that S&T and DHS should look 
75 

at so the board includes technical experts, scientists, operational 

experts and people with business experience, people with bench experience. I think the BAST is a really, really good model for that 

kind of support that S&T might need. 

Mr. MAURER. I think going forward, and given where the country 

is right now and this overall fiscal condition is going to be important set of mechanisms like this to leverage expertise and knowledge and insight outside the department. I mean, for the past several years we have been able to throw a lot of money at the Department of Homeland Security and I just don’t see that continuing in 

the near term, so having some kind of mechanism to build better 

bridges between private sector and public sector is going to become 

increasingly important. 

Chairman QUAYLE. Thank you very much. I want to thank all of 

you for your valuable testimony today and for being very patient 

and the members for their questions. The members of the subcommittee may have additional questions for the witnesses, and we 

will ask you to respond to those in writing. The record will remain 

open for two weeks for additional comments and statements from 

members. The witnesses are excused. 

Thank you all for coming. This hearing is now adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:04 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(77) 

Appendix I: 

ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS
78 

ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS

Responses by Dr. Tara O’Toole, Under Secretary, Science and Technology, Department of Homeland Security 

Questions submitted by Chairman Ben Quayle 

Q1. DHS manages laboratories in multiple states, as well as FFRDCs and University Centers across the nation. Could you characterize how the University Centers of Excellence and the Department of Energy’s National Laboratories support 

the research and development of DHS, and how their work is integrated into development, demonstration, and testing of technologies? 

A1. The Science and Technology Directorate’s (S&T) Office of National Laboratories 

(ONL) provides the Nation with a coordinated, enduring core of productive science, 

technology and engineering laboratories, organizations and institutions, which can 

provide the knowledge and technology required to secure our homeland. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 assigns ONL ‘‘the coordination and utilization of the Department of Energy (DOE) national laboratories and other sites under Section 309 

in a manner to create a networked laboratory system for the purpose of supporting 

the missions of the Homeland Security Department.’’ In addition to oversight of the 

S&T laboratory operations, ONL coordinates homeland security-related activities 

and laboratory-directed research conducted within the DOE’s national laboratories. 

The National Laboratories support of S&T focuses on development, demonstration, and testing of technologies in critical mission areas such as first responder 

technology needs, advanced passenger screening, explosive detection technologies, 

human factors and biometrics, and chemical and biological forensics. Examples of 

capabilities produced by S&T and National Laboratory cooperation include an early 

warning system for biological attacks; a chemical agent detection system for mass 

transit; a wireless communications system and data network to connect responders 

in the field; and a next generation liquid and gel-scanning system for airline passenger screening that distinguishes potential threat liquids from harmless ones. 

S&T’s Office of University Programs (OUP) conducts multi-disciplinary research 

and development in priority DHS mission areas at approximately 200 colleges and 

universities through 12 Centers of Excellence (COEs). The COEs align to S&T divisions and offices, to the DHS components, and to state and local first responders. 

For example, the National Center for Border Security and Immigration (NCBSI) 

aligns with the S&T Borders and Maritime Security Division whose partners include Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

(ICE), U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS), and the U.S. Coast Guard 

(USCG). COEs improve understanding of the causes, elements, and consequences of 

a range of threats from terrorists and natural disasters. They also support countermeasure, mitigation, prevention, and resilience approaches based on both technologies and human behavior. The COEs work with and through the S&T divisions 

and complement other DHS research and development programs including those of 

federal laboratories and federally funded research and development centers 

(FFRDCs). They take advantage of other relevant Federal agency-sponsored research and provide outcomes useful to federal, state, and local government, private 

sector, and international partners. The selection process for the COEs is highly competitive, rigorously peer-reviewed, and merit-based. 

Q2. Given the geographic distribution of these units, how do various S&T units work 

together? 

A2. The Science and Technology Directorate’s Office of National Laboratories coordinates the work of S&T’s laboratories and organizes annual laboratory directors 

meetings and regular conference calls. Frequent site visits by S&T leadership and 

staff all assure the S&T laboratories are properly coordinated and integrated into 

S&T and DHS. 

S&T’s Office of University Programs (OUP) manages the COEs as a network. The 

COEs share resources, jointly fund projects and take advantage of each others’ 

strengths. For example, there are approximately 35 projects that involve the participation of two or more COEs. This approach has led to a robust network of academic 

capabilities, including laboratories, experts, models and data that DHS and its partners can access at any time to address a wide array of difficult issues.S&T also 

leverages communication tools such as teleconferencing and online collaboration to 

minimize the effects of geographic distribution. 

Q3. How do the DHS internal laboratories work with the National Laboratories to 

avoid duplication of efforts? 
79 

A3. The Department of Energy’s (DOE) National Laboratories have very different 

missions than the Science and Technology Directorate’s (S&T) laboratories which inherently limits duplication of efforts. DHS internal laboratories are single-focused 

research, development, testing and evaluation (RDT&E) facilities in the fields of 

aviation security, biodefense analysis, chemical security analysis and technologies to 

detect nuclear and radiological threats. The DOE National Laboratories provide distinctive, powerful research facilities across a multitude of disciplines that include 

neutron scattering facilities, accelerators for nuclear and high energy physics research, large-scale field sites for investigating the effects of atmospherics and structures on radiation, chemical plumes, and other airborne hazards, and highest-end 

computing facilities. 

S&T collaborates closely with the DOE National Laboratories in pursuit of technologies supporting the operational needs of DHS. DHS’s Office of National Laboratories (ONL) coordinates the efforts of both the DHS and DOE National Laboratories to maximize how DHS leverages their respective capabilities and minimizes 

potential duplication of effort. DHS also encourages partnerships among the laboratories to complement each other’s core competencies while leveraging R&D investments made by others. For example, in December 2009, DHS and DOE agreed to 

create the Aviation Security Enhancement Partnership (ASEP) to extend and leverage this relationship with a focus on improving aviation security. The role of the 

National Laboratories is more research oriented and includes introduction of the 

basic science behind explosives, including Homemade Explosives (HME). S&T’s 

Transportation Security Laboratory (TSL) also works collaboratively with the National Laboratories and will incorporate the HME research into its explosives detection testing program, specifically certification testing. 

Q4. Question: You have identified international cooperation as a priority, yet some 

have criticized the Directorate as having limited success working with our international partners. What do you see as the challenges in working with our international partners? 

A4. The Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) conducts international joint research projects, technical demonstrations, scientific workshops, and exchanges of 

scientific and technological information and personnel. S&T has several established, 

formal international partnerships with Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, 

Singapore, Sweden, Mexico, Israel, France, Germany, New Zealand, and the European Commission. Although S&T’s international outreach has met with some success, challenges remain. 

The initial challenge has been in identifying international counterparts with complementary science and technology programs. Not all governments have an equivalent or single counterpart to S&T. Science and technology programs for some governments can span more than one ministry or government agency, requiring DHS 

S&T to rely heavily on briefings to the new and potential partners, fact-finding visits and program planning at both the leadership and programmatic levels. Once contacts have been established with the appropriate counterparts, S&T must undertake 

a series of steps in order to begin joint collaboration. These include work-planning 

sessions; negotiations of the terms and conditions to implement arrangements of 

mutual benefit, and establishing a model of practice for bilateral project monitoring. 

Furthermore, maintaining continuity with foreign governments that undergo significant changes in staff, re-organization, or policy more frequently than the U.S. can 

also slow down the process of engagement and implementation. A key factor in the 

strategic development of joint collaborations is conducting periodic reviews of each 

country’s portfolio’s interests/priorities and gaps to determine leveraging opportunities that can be addressed in the current or upcoming S&T fiscal year. Finally, another challenge to building international collaborations can stem from differences 

between the domestic laws and practices, restrictions, or standards of foreign countries and the U.S., such as in the case of procurement, intellectual property rights, 

export controls, government fiscal cycles, and currency fluctuations. 

Q5. Question: How can this cooperation be improved? 

A5. International cooperation requires regular outreach for new collaborations, 

partnership engagement, and leveraging programs and investment. The Science and 

Technology Directorate has successfully advanced its relationships with its international partners through its bilateral agreements and international research program. Ongoing efforts by the Administration to reform export controls are anticipated to facilitate new and ongoing international cooperation. Further, improvements will be made as relationships grow with both our longstanding and newer 

partners, not simply in terms of numbers of collaborations, but in moving towards 
80 

increased returns on investment and in advancing science and technology innovations that meet global security needs. 

Q6. What are other countries doing with homeland security research and development funding? 

A6. Some of the Science and Technology Directorate’s international partnerships 

have resulted in foreign investment in science and technology innovations to expand 

or accelerate programs that are serving DHS mission needs. Such foreign investment has included test and evaluation of x-ray systems for aviation checked baggage, development of a hybrid composite container for maritime cargo security, and 

an assessment of violent extremist incidents. S&T plans to invest internationally in 

the test and evaluation of x-ray systems for aviation checked baggage; research to 

develop a technological capability for standoff detection of explosives in a mass transit environment; and sequencing and characterization of unique strains of select 

agents which are high-priority biological threats and are otherwise unavailable to 

U.S. researchers. S&T also plans to invest internationally in the test and evaluation 

of x-ray systems for aviation checked baggage; research to develop a technological 

capability for standoff detection of explosives in a mass transit environment; and sequencing and characterization of unique strains of select agents which are high-priority biological threats and are otherwise unavailable to U.S. researchers. 

Q7. Are investments in other countries seen as a priority? 

A7. Cooperative activity of mutual benefit with other countries is a priority if it 

meets DHS mission needs, S&Tprogram requirements, and augments or enhances 

S&T’s ability to serve the Department. Such cooperative activities may or may not 

involve direct investments in other countries. 

‘‘International partners are critical to the effort to secure the homeland against 

threats that transcend jurisdictional and geographic boundaries,’’ according to the 

first Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, published in February 2010. ‘‘International engagement enhances the transparency of threat trajectories and increases 

our capacity to understand, investigate, and interdict threats at the earliest possible 

point, ideally before they become manifest, reach our shores, or disrupt the critical 

networks on which we depend. The United States must work with its international 

partners to increase global security against terrorism and violent extremism, the 

spread of infectious diseases, and the consequences of natural disasters.’’ By acting 

together with a shared vision, collaborations that lead to improved or major security 

accomplishments in each country are a collective achievement of mutual interest towards global security. 

Q8. What is your view on the state U.S.-Israel Homeland Security cooperation? 

A8. Since signing the Memorandum of Agreement between the U.S. and the Government of the State of Israel on Cooperation in Science and Technology for Homeland Security Matters on May 29, 2008, the Science and Technology Directorate has 

worked with the Israeli government on a variety of programs and projects. DHS 

S&T is actively engaged with Israeli science and technology offices within a multitude of Israeli government ministries and agencies including the Ministry of Public 

Security, Bureau of the Chief Scientist (MOPS/BCS), the Israeli National Security 

Council, the Israeli Security Agency (ISA), the Israeli National Police (INP), and the 

Israeli Home Front Command (HFC), a regional command with homeland security 

responsibilities within the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). DHS S&T has also engaged 

several top researchers in Israel and has awarded grants and invited them to speak 

at DHS S&T sponsored events. During our last University Summit (March 30— 

April 1, 2011), Israel was one of two countries invited to speak. Dr. Boaz Ganor, 

founder and Executive Director of the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism 

(ICT), and the Head of the Homeland Security Studies Programs at the Interdisciplinary Center (IDC), Herzliya, Israel, presented his work on the threat of suicide bombers on mass transportation. 

DHS S&T is also actively engaged with the DOD’s Combating Terrorism Technology Support Office (CTTSO) and Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) bilateral cooperation activities with Israel. DHS S&T and CTTSO/TSWG work closely 

to ensure synergy and prevent duplication of effort and resources by participating 

in each other’s regularly scheduled meetings and bilateral conferences. 

DHS S&T and MOPS/BCS held the second U.S.-Israel Homeland Security Science 

and Technology Bilateral Conference on November 9–11, 2010 in Jerusalem to discuss and report on bilateral cooperative activities. This meeting included working 

level meetings and presentations on planned and proposed activities within common 

areas of interests, including the Explosives, Human Factors and Behavioral 

Sciences, Cyber Security, and the Infrastructure Protection and Disaster Manage-
81 

ment domains. It also included site visits to several locations with the following 

themes: Aviation Security; Community Resilience; Explosive Device Testing; and 

Command, Control, and Interoperability. 

DHS S&T finds the collaboration with Israel extremely beneficial and is encouraged by the progress that has already been made. We look forward to continuing 

and expanding upon thechannels of cooperation and engagement under our Agreement that have been successfully built over the past three years. 

Questions submitted by Representative David Wu 

Q1. The Science and Technology Directorate last published a strategic plan in June 

of 2007. In October of 2009, in testimony before the Technology and Innovation 

Subcommittee, the Acting Under Secretary for Science and Technology noted 

that the Science and Technology Directorate was updating its strategic plan to 

support the strategic goals and objectives determined by the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review. In your written testimony, you state that the Directorate 

has instituted an inclusive and comprehensive strategic planning process. When 

can we expect to see an updated strategic plan that reflects the goals and objectives of the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review? 

A1. The Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) plans to issue its strategic plan 

in May 2011. As soon as it is issued, S&T will provide copies to the Subcommittee. 

Q2. Can you please describe the strategic planning process that the Directorate undertook after you were confirmed as Under Secretary? 

A2. In February of 2010, the Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) began the 

process of developing its new five-year strategic plan. The process involved careful 

analysis of the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR) and DHS priorities; 

review of past and current S&T planning documents and external evaluations; and 

extensive input from internal and external stakeholders. In addition, S&T leadership set forth four principles—inclusivity, transparency, open-mindedness to change, 

and responsiveness—to guide the process. 

S&T established an internal steering committee to manage an extensive outreach 

effort that included external stakeholder interviews, a staff questionnaire, and two 

retreats comprised of differing S&T staff groups. 

S&T sought input from the DHS components and their federal, state, and local 

partners regarding how S&T could improve its effectiveness over the next five years. 

On behalf of S&T, the Homeland Security Studies and Analysis Institute (HSSAI) 

conducted 20 interviews with external stakeholders. In addition, S&T senior staff 

conducted a series of external interviews with key stakeholders including congressional staff. Interviews captured information on stakeholder perceptions of S&T 

service and performance; effectiveness of S&T outreach and communication; and 

how well S&T priorities aligned with its customers. 

S&T conducted an online employee questionnaire to provide leadership with an 

understanding of employee priorities and concerns. Questionnaire results helped 

leadership identify areas of both strong and variable performance as well as gain 

insight about future S&T priorities and employee reaction to proposed S&T goals. 

HSSAI supported the effort by conducting and analyzing the results of the employee 

questionnaire. 

S&T conducted two offsite retreats (referred to as Forum One and Forum Two) 

to further harness the breadth of perspectives and expertise at S&T. Forum One 

convened managers from across S&T divisions and office units. Over the course of 

two days, participants engaged in lively plenary discussions and worked within 

small breakout groups to generate input on potential S&T mission, vision, goals and 

strategies. The group also provided a baseline understanding of organizational 

strengths and weaknesses, as well as internal and external forces likely to shape 

the current and future homeland security environment. 

Forum Two gathered senior management and leadership in a two-day engagement. To open this discussion, representatives from Forum One debriefed senior 

management on Forum One findings and recommendations for action. Taking into 

account Forum One input, the Forum Two participants further refined S&T’s mission, goals, and key strategies. S&T leadership reviewed Forum Two findings for 

final agreement and a detailed final report summarized and assessed both Forum 

results. 

The collective contribution of staff, external stakeholders and DHS guidance, 

taken together has resulted in a five-year strategy that frames the priorities for 

achieving the S&T mission and ensures that S&T resources are aligned to efficiently 

attain plan goals. 
82 

Q3. The FY 2012 budget includes $19 million for the Science and Technology Directorate’s natural disaster resiliency program to help respond to and recover from 

large-scale natural disasters. To what extent are these natural disaster-related 

efforts being coordinated with other agencies working in this area, including 

agencies such as the National Institute of Standards and Technology, the National Science Foundation, the U.S. Geological Survey, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency which make up the National Earthquake Hazards 

Reduction Program? 

A3. The Science and Technology Directorate’s (S&&) FY 2012 budget request for 

natural disaster resilience includes projects such as the National Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) Research and Development (R&D) Plan, Standard Unified 

Modeling Mapping Integrated Toolkit (SUMMIT), Resilient Electric Grid (REG), and 

Recovery Transformer. S&T works closely with the appropriate agencies to assure 

a coordinated approach to natural disaster resiliency. For example, the National CIP 

R&D Plan is coordinated primarily with DHS Office of Infrastructure Protection 

(OIP) National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD). To prepare the Plan, 

S&T annually invites the National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST), 

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and National Science Foundation 

(NSF) to participate in its development through the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) Infrastructure Subcommittee. 

As a second example, the Integrated Modeling Mapping Simulation (IMMS) 

Standard Unified Modeling Mapping Integrated Toolkit (SUMMIT) is an integrated 

modeling and simulation based exercise and analysis system in direct response to 

FEMA’s requirements for an efficient, economic, repeatable, and science based capability to conduct National Level Exercises (NLE). IMMS/SUMMIT also supports 

state, local, and regional preparedness exercises and provides interoperability with 

the federal agencies. S&T works closely with FEMA as the source of requirements 

and the users of the IMMS system. FEMA participates in all program reviews and 

provides guidance on the direction of the program. Additionally, the IMMS/SUMMIT 

team works with the Department of Energy (DOE) National Laboratories and other 

agencies such as the Technical Support Working Group, National Interagency Research and Development Program for Combating Terrorism Requirements at Home 

and Abroad, to share and leverage technologies to stay up to date on the state of 

new technologies. For the NLE 2011 activities, the IMMS/SUMMIT Team has 

worked very closely with USGS to integrate earthquake models into SUMMIT. 

S&T coordinates additional efforts, such as the Resilient Electric Grid and Recovery Programs, DOE, Electric Research Institute (EPRI), Edison Electric Institute 

(EEI), North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) and Federal Energy 

Regulatory Commission (FERC). These efforts also participate with FEMA via meetings/conferences such as at the NERC Table Top Exercises and Space Weather Enterprise Forum. 

Questions submitted by Representative Lamar Smith 

Q1. Given the concerns raised about border security during the hearing, if one were 

to look at the entire $1.176 DHS S&T budget request approximately, how much 

is directed toward those efforts? 

A1. Approximately $43 million of the Science and Technology Directorate’s (S&T) 

FY 2012 Budget Request is directed to developing border security technologies. S&T 

is also developing technologies with multiple applications, which include use in border security. An example is S&T’s work to improve biometric technology, an approximately $12.2 million planned investment in FY 2012. 

Q2. In the strategic planning and goal setting discussions you described in your testimony, how did you set funding priorities for the seven HSARPA technical divisions? 

A2. The Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) has implemented a process of 

portfolio assessment and balancing. S&T has unified the project evaluation and selection process so that it takes into account project characteristics, strengths, weaknesses and performance including measuring impact, transition, technical positioning, clarity of purpose, customer involvement, and innovation. S&T will use the 

portfolio assessment and balancing process each year to confirm priorities and make 

necessary adjustments. 

Q3. Can you rank-order the seven technical areas for funding priorities through established criteria for cost-benefit/bang-for-the-buck? For example, if you had additional dollar to spend in only one of the seven HSARPA technical divisions, 
83 

where would you spend it? If you had one less dollar, where would you propose 

to cut spending? 

A3. The Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) has implemented a portfolio assessment and balancing process. The process allows the application of objective, repeatable evaluation criteria across all S&T projects. S&T will use this process to 

identify projects with the greatest likelihood of success that meet DHS priorities and 

component mission requirements. 

S&T is currently using its portfolio assessment process to assess S&T projects and 

identify projects with the most likelihood of success. Any increase in funding would 

first be applied those projects. Conversely, any project with a low likelihood of success would be the most likely to experience reduced funding. 
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ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS

Responses by Mr. Warren Stern, Director, Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, Department of Homeland Security 

Questions submitted by Chairman Ben Quayle 

Q1. How does DNDO prioritize and administer basic R&D activities? How is the 

balance between conducting basic and applied research, development, demonstration, testing, and evaluation decided? 

A1. DNDO’s research and development (R&D) activities for detection systems focuses on addressing gaps in the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture (GNDA); improving performance, cost, and operational ease of use of detectors and systems; and 

transitioning successful technologies to system development, acquisition, and deployment, or commercialization. Our approach includes working with industry, national 

laboratories, and academia, while encouraging teaming and coordination with intra/ 

interagency organizations (e.g., DHS/S&T, DOE, DOD, DNI). 

The GNDA gaps are identified in the GNDA Annual Report. These gaps are then 

integrated with strategic needs as part of the DNDO Solution Development Process 

(SDP) to develop a prioritized list of GNDA gaps that DNDO will address. Through 

the SDP, DNDO determines which gaps have technical or operational solutions and 

which gaps have no immediate solutions. For prioritized gaps with immediate (<2 

year) solutions, DNDO defines and executes programs, within budgetary constraints, to fill these gaps. These programs may have engineering development, test 

and evaluation, and acquisition components. For prioritized gaps with no immediate 

solutions, DNDO defines and executes basic and applied R&D project to address 

these gaps. The balance between basic and applied research depends on how the 

gaps are prioritized and the technology readiness of potential solutions. In addition, 

it is important to maintain the proper balance between near-term and longer term 

research so that investment in basic (long-term) research today can feed future applied (near-term) research, which in turn can feed future engineering development 

and acquisition. 

Q2. The President’s FY 2012 budget request for the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office includes $27 million for the Securing the Cities Initiative. The request appears to be primarily for acquiring and deploying technologies and capabilities 

to the New York City Region, but the budget request also mentions that a funding opportunity will be announced for one additional USAI Tier I region. Can 

you please clarify how much of the fiscal year 2012 request would be allocated 

to other cities or regions? 

A2. As stated in the FY 12 DHS Congressional Justification, up to $7,000,000 of 

the $27,000,000 requested is planned for allocation to an additional Urban Areas 

Security Initiative Tier I region. What criteria will be used to evaluate regions for 

Securing the Cities funding and will a particular threat area (chemical, biological, 

or radiological/nuclear) be prioritized? 

The STC mission is to design and implement a layered architecture for coordinated and integrated detection and interdiction of illicit radiological and nuclear 

materials that may be used as a weapon within the highest threat metropolitan 

areas. This program deals exclusively with radiological/nuclear materials. Once FY 

12 funding is appropriated, DHS will issue a competitive funding opportunity announcement detailing eligible applicants and the evaluation criteria for selection. A 

number of factors will be considered in the competition, including threat 

vulnerabilities, consequences to nation in the event of a successful attack, region’s 

existing PRND capabilities, and region’s proximity to existing STC implementations, 

extending the security benefits of multiple UASIs to form a more comprehensive security layer. 

Q3. Additionally, how is the Directorate interacting with U.S. manufacturers to ensure that technologies being developed under the STC initiative as well as other 

Directorate programs results in U.S. jobs? 

A3. The STC program office is not directly involved in technology development or 

equipment purchases with manufacturers. The program grants money to S&L government agencies that then contract with vendors to purchase commercial off-theshelf equipment. Per 44 CFR 13, S&L grantees follow S&L procurement rules in determining whether equipment is purchased from a U.S. or foreign vendor. In addition, the STC grant authorizes S&L agencies to hire full- or part-time staff or con-
85 

tract/consultants using grant funds to assist with planning activities associated with 

this program. 
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ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS

Responses by Mr. Marc Pearl President and Chief Executive Officer, Homeland Security and Defense Business Council 

Questions submitted by Chairman Ben Quayle 

Q1. ′′In your written testimony, you state that it can sometimes be challenging for 

the business community to comprehend the needs and goals of DHS, making it 

difficult for your members to make decisions about their own long-term business 

and technology investments. How can this be improved? What are some ways 

that greater coordination of communication can occur between DHS and the private sector? What do you see as the mutually beneficial role for R&D in both 

the private sector and DHS?′′ 

A1. The Council and its members have a great interest in providing the technology, 

services and products—the ‘solutions’—our nation needs and deserves to respond effectively and efficiently to our nation’s homeland security needs. Unfortunately, due 

to a number of extenuating circumstances, it is difficult for the homeland security 

market to accurately predict and/or ‘build-to’ the needs and long-term goals of the 

Department. This, unfortunately, makes timely and proper business certainty decisions regarding long-term business strategy, research and development, and technology investments challenging. 

As my testimony pointed out, while we recognize and very much appreciate the 

great strides the Department has made over the past few years in this area, the 

Council and its members continually hope for even more improvements. The Council 

believes greater coordination of communication between industry and government 

can mitigate this challenge and improve the private sector’s ability to meet the 

needs, priorities and goals of the Department of Homeland Security. 

The Council recommends multiple actions that could improve this engagement: 

First and foremost, Congress must pass a comprehensive DHS Authorization Bill. 

We can no longer exist in an environment that is devoid of a strategic blueprint that 

provides guidance from Congress to the Department, and, in turn, gives those who 

provide the tools a clear idea on the needs, priorities and goals. We cannot build 

an effective and efficient homeland security foundation solely off an appropriating 

structure. The relevant and active authorizing committees in the House and Senate 

should, once and for all, work through their jurisdictional issues that have contributed to hampering the Department’s ability to develop long-term strategies to match 

congressional policies. Without a blueprint, policies and priorities are diluted across 

multiple committees and agendas. 

• The Council recommends that passage of a comprehensive DHS Authorization 

bill led through the U.S. House Committee on Homeland Security with consultation from other overlapping Committees, including this subcommittee. 

Once such legislation is passed, the Department and the private sector will 

have the information (and business certainty) they need to better approach 

appropriate and necessary research and development to effectively and efficiently meet the homeland security needs and goals of the Department and 

the nation. 

Second, the Congress should increase and provide necessary enforcement tools to 

the Department’s authority, specifically the Science and Technology Directorate, to 

direct and coordinate homeland security research and development efforts within 

the component parts of DHS and across the Federal government. Currently the 

funding and authority is spread across multiple operating components within DHS 

and other Federal agencies. This results in dilution and duplication, and equates to 

inefficiencies and waste that the government can ill afford. There must be a concerted effort to insure that there is an institutional system is in place—unaffected 

by whomever is currently occupying a given leadership or implementation position— 

to assist the private sector’s need to know who to talk to at S&T in order to develop 

the needed solutions. 

• The Council recommends the formation of a homeland security research and 

development advisory council across the government that could coordinate the 

consolidation of goals and requirements development, and encourage greater 

communication and identification of needs. This advisory council must include 

expert representation from relevant Federal agencies, state/local/tribal leaders 

and the private sector—led by the Under Secretary of the Science and Technology Directorate. The Under Secretary would be able to request homeland 
87 

security research and development funding from Congress, allocate funding 

according to a long-term strategy and report to Congress and the advisory 

council on progress. This process would ensure the necessary linkage between 

the policy requirements and the funding. This level of planning and visibility 

would significantly improve the private sector’s ability to forecast the technology goals and needs of the Department. 

Third, the Department should be encouraged by Congress to take the steps to improve the direct relationship with the private sector. The current level of engagement can best be described as ‘‘hands off.’’ Homeland security solutions providers 

are generally viewed as merely ‘contractors’ and ‘vendors’ though a wealth of 

thought leadership and a desire to invest huge amounts of time and dollars in developing and having those solutions deployed and implemented is critical. Either because of ethical concerns (that can be easily taken care of with appropriate oversight) or a lack of appreciation for the thought leadership the private sector can contribute, not including this level of substantive engagement works against the Department’s ability to have its needs and goals be met by the private sector in a timely, efficient and/or effective way. 

• The Council recommends clear pronouncements of the long term technology 

goals linked to funding streams and points of contact, as mentioned above. 

In addition, ‘‘mission area conferences/forums’’ coordinated by the Department 

would allow experts and decision makers to discuss long term strategy and 

assist everyone in providing an effective strategic platform allowing the best 

and the brightest to focus on key mission areas such as aviation security, 

weapons of mass destruction, pandemics, etc., and allow the engagement of 

all the critical players in an iterative process to define, identify, develop and 

implement a process that meets the goals and needs of specific mission areas. 

• The Council additionally recommends an innovative approach in research 

such as a public private partnership that brings together the universities, national laboratories, industry partners, and the Department. 

We applaud your leadership in this area that will assist our nation become safer 

and more secure while ensuring the innovative thought leadership the Department 

needs to meet its goals are communicated. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to provide you and the members of Committee our views. Please contact me if the Council can provide more information. 

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Appendix II: 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL FOR THE RECORD
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TESTIMONY FROM DR. MICHAEL B. SILEVITCH, ROBERT D. PROFESSOR, DEPARTMENT

OF ELECTRICAL & COMPUTER ENGINEERING AND CO-DIRECTOR AWARENESS AND

LOCALIZATION OF EXPLOSIVES RELATED THREATS (ALERT), A DEPT. OF HOMELAND

SECURITY CENTER OF EXCELLENCE, NORTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY
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