alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
### §3791. Transferred

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Codification

Section 3791 was editorially reclassified as section 10251 of Title 34, Crime Control and Law Enforcement.

#### Prior Provisions

A prior section 3791 of this title, Pub. L. 90–351, title I, §651, as added Pub. L. 91–644, title I, §10, Jan. 2, 1971, 84 Stat. 1889; amended Pub. L. 93–83, §2, Aug. 6, 1973, 87 Stat. 218, related to embezzlement, theft, and fraud, prior to the general amendment of title I of Pub. L. 90–351 by Pub. L. 96–157. See section 10271 of this title.

A prior section 3792 of this title, Pub. L. 90–351, title I, §652, as added Pub. L. 91–644, title I, §10, Jan. 2, 1971, 84 Stat. 1889; amended Pub. L. 93–83, §2, Aug. 6, 1973, 87 Stat. 218, related to fraudulent and false statements or entries, prior to the general amendment of title I of Pub. L. 90–351 by Pub. L. 96–157. See section 10272 of this title.
#### § 401.20 Interested persons and counsel.

Governments and persons interested in the subject matter of an application, whether in favor of or opposed to is, are entitled to be heard in person or by counsel at any hearing thereof held by the Commission.
§ 192.31 Applicable benefits. A person eligible for benefits under this part shall be eligible for authorized physical and mental health care at U.S. Government expense (through either or advancement or reimbursement), and for payment of other authorized expenses related to such care or for obtaining such care for any illness or injury, to the extent, as determined by the Secretary of State or Agency Head, that such care is incident to an individual being held captive and is not covered by— ( a ) Any other Government health or medical program, including, but not limited to, the programs administered by the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Labor and the Secretary of Veteran Affairs; or
( b ) Reimbursement by any private or Government health insurance or comparable plan. In the case of coverage by a private or Government health insurance plan, that carrier will be designated as the primary carrier, and benefits under this subpart will serve only to supplement expenses not paid by the primary carrier.
I 

109TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 2507

To suspend temporarily the duty on Benzoic acid, 2-(((((4-methoxy-6-methyl1,3,5-triazin-2-yl)amino)- carbonyl)amino)sulfonyl)-, methyl ester. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MAY 19, 2005

Mr. MCCRERY introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on Ways and Means 

A BILL

To suspend temporarily the duty on Benzoic acid, 2-(((((4-

methoxy-6-methyl-1,3,5-triazin-2-yl)amino)- carbonyl)amino)sulfonyl)-, methyl ester.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. BENZOIC ACID, 2-(((((4-METHOXY-6-METHYL4 1,3,5-TRIAZIN-2-YL)AMINO)- CAR5 BONYL)AMINO)SULFONYL)-, METHYL ESTER. 

6 (a) IN GENERAL.—Subchapter II of chapter 99 of 

7 the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States is 

8 amended by inserting in numerical sequence the following 

9 new heading:
2

•HR 2507 IH 

‘‘ 9902.08.17 Benzoic acid, 2-(((((4-

methoxy-6-methyl-1,3,5-

triazin-2-yl)amino)- carbonyl)amino)sulfonyl)-, 

methyl ester (CAS No. 

74223–64–6) (provided in 

subheading 3808.30.15) ...... Free No change No change On or before 

12/31/2008 ’’. 

1 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by 

2 subsection (a) applies to goods entered, or withdrawn from 

3 warehouse for consumption, on or after the 15th day after 

4 the date of the enactment of this Act.

Æ
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-1-

 08-MC-80106-SI

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Alamo Rent A Car LLC, National Car

Rental Systems, Inc., and ANC Rental

Corporation

Plaintiff,

vs.

BRIXTON AUTO BODY & PAINT

Defendant.

 

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CASE NO. 08-MC-80106 SI

[PROPOSED] ORDER FOR

APPEARANCE OF GABRIEL

SEVILLA, PRESIDENT OF

JUDGMENT DEBTOR BRIXTON

AUTO BODY & PAINT AT

JUDGMENT DEBTOR’S

EXAMINATION

Date: 

Time: 

Dept.:

The Application for Order for Appearance of Gabriel Sevilla, principal of

Judgment Debtor BRIXTON AUTO BODY & PAINT, having been received and

reviewed by this Court, and 

GOOD CAUSE appearing from the Declaration of John D. Guerrini, the

attorney for Alamo Rent A Car LLC, National Car Rental Systems, Inc., and ANC

Rental Corporation, Judgment Creditor (hereinafter “Judgment Creditor”), it is hereby

ordered that GABRIEL SEVILLA, President of BRIXTON AUTO BODY & PAINT,

INC.,(hereinafter “Judgment Debtor”) appear at the United States District Court,

Northern District of California, 450 Golden Gate Avenue, San Francisco, California

94102 on ........................ at ...........a.m.

Case 3:08-mc-80106-SI Document 7 Filed 06/02/10 Page 1 of 2
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-2-

 08-MC-80106-SI

TO: GABRIEL SEVILLA. YOU ARE ORDERED TO APPEAR personally before

this court, or before a referee appointed by the court, to furnish information to aid in

enforcement of a money judgment against BRIXTON AUTO BODY & PAINT

This Order is to be served by a Sheriff, Constable, Marshal, or by any

registered process server.

NOTICE TO JUDGMENT DEBTOR

If you fail to appear at the time and place specified in this Order, you may be

subject to arrest and punishment for contempt of Court, and the Court may make an

order requiring you to pay the reasonable fees incurred by Judgment Creditor in this

proceeding.

DATED: _________________________

________________________________

JUDGE OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Case 3:08-mc-80106-SI Document 7 Filed 06/02/10 Page 2 of 2
#### § 312.625 Criminal drug statute.

*Criminal drug statute* means a Federal or non-Federal criminal statute involving the manufacture, distribution, dispensing, use, or possession of any controlled substance.
§ 1000.134 When may a recipient (or entity funded by a recipient) demolish or dispose of current assisted stock? ( a ) A recipient (or entity funded by a recipient) may undertake a planned demolition or disposal of current assisted stock owned by the recipient or an entity funded by the recipient when: ( 1 ) A financial analysis demonstrates that it is more cost-effective or housing program-effective for the recipient to demolish or dispose of the unit than to continue to operate or own it; or
( 2 ) The housing unit has been condemned by the government which has authority over the unit; or
( 3 ) The housing unit is an imminent threat to the health and safety of housing residents; or
( 4 ) Continued habitation of a housing unit is inadvisable due to cultural or historical considerations.
( b ) No action to demolish or dispose of the property other than performing the analysis cited in paragraph (a) of this section can be taken until HUD has been notified in writing of the recipient's intent to demolish or dispose of the housing units consistent with section 102(c)(4)(H) of NAHASDA. The written notification must set out the analysis used to arrive at the decision to demolish or dispose of the property and may be set out in a recipient's IHP or in a separate submission to HUD.
( c ) In any disposition sale of a housing unit, a sale process designed to maximize the sale price will be used. However, where the sale is to a low-income Indian family, the home may be disposed of without maximizing the sale price so long as such price is consistent with a recipient's IHP. The sale proceeds from the disposition of any housing unit are program income under NAHASDA and must be used in accordance with the requirements of NAHASDA and these regulations.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUN-30-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             JUL-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1999
<CASH>                                          31,652
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   45,136
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                      9,142
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                85,324
<PP&E>                                       1,059,198
<DEPRECIATION>                                  62,513
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               1,301,061
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          148,432
<BONDS>                                        340,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           409
<OTHER-SE>                                     462,946
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 1,301,061
<SALES>                                        168,736
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               169,653
<CGS>                                           98,997
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   70,774
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                27,383
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             (27,501)
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                      0
<INCOME-TAX>                                    27,383
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (27,501)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (27,501)
<EPS-BASIC>                                      (0.67)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (0.67)


</TABLE>
MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-11-00883-CV

IN RE THE HUFF ENERGY FUND, L.P., WRH Energy Partners, LLC, 

W.R. Huff Asset Management Co., LLC, William R. “Bill” Huff, Rick D’Angelo, Ed Dartley, 

Bryan Bloom, and Riley-Huff Energy Group, LLC

Original Mandamus Proceeding1

PER CURIAM

Sitting: Catherine Stone, Chief Justice

Rebecca Simmons, Justice

Steven C. Hilbig, Justice

Delivered and Filed: December 21, 2011

PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS DENIED

The court has considered relators’ petition for writ of mandamus and motion for 

temporary relief. The court is of the opinion that relief should be denied. Accordingly, relators’

petition for writ of mandamus and motion for temporary relief are denied. See TEX. R. APP. P. 

52.8(a). Relators shall pay all costs incurred in this proceeding.

PER CURIAM

 1 This proceeding arises out of Cause No. 11-09-12583-ZCVAJA, styled Longview Energy Company v. The Huff 

Energy Fund, L.P., et al., pending in the 365th Judicial District Court, Zavala County, Texas, the Honorable Amado 

J. Abascal, III presiding.
### §5778. Repealed. Pub. L. 104–235, title II, §231(b), Oct. 3, 1996, 110 Stat. 3092

Section, Pub. L. 93–415, title IV, §409, formerly §408, as added Pub. L. 100–690, title VII, §7291, Nov. 18, 1988, 102 Stat. 4461; renumbered §409, Pub. L. 103–322, title XVII, §170303(1), Sept. 13, 1994, 108 Stat. 2043, related to special study and report to determine obstacles that prevent or impede individuals who have legal custody of children from recovering children from parents who have removed children from such individuals in violation of law.
Editorial Note on Part 42
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to part 42 appear at 71 FR 34522, June 15, 2006.

§ 42.55 Reports on numbers and priority dates of applications on record. ( a ) Consular officers shall report periodically, as the Department may direct, the number and priority dates of all applicants subject to the numerical limitations prescribed in INA 201, 202, and 203 whose immigrant visa applications have been recorded in accordance with § 42.52(c).
( b ) *Documentarily qualified applicants.* Consular officers shall also report periodically, as the Department may direct, the number and priority dates of all applicants described in paragraph (a) of this section who have informed the consular office that they have obtained the documents required under INA 222(b), for whom the necessary clearance procedures have been completed.
[56 FR 51174, Oct. 10, 1991, as amended at 61 FR 1836, Jan. 24, 1996]
Case 3:08-cv-05782-BZ Document 57 Filed 02/08/10 Page 1 of 1
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Gerardo LUEVANO-DIAZ, also known as Juan Manuel Trujillo, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 06-51486

Conference Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

May 2, 2007.

Joseph H. Gay, Jr., Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Western District of Texas, San Antonio, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Judy Fulmer Madewell, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Western District of Texas, San Antonio, TX, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, WIENER, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Appealing the Judgment in a Criminal Case, Gerardo Luevano-Diaz raises arguments that are foreclosed by *Almendarez-Torres v. United States,*523 U.S. 224, 235, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998), which held that 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) is a penalty provision and not a separate criminal offense. The Government’s motion for summary affirmance is GRANTED, and the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under *328the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Gerard Parra, Appellant.

Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County, rendered February 4, 1976, convicting him of attempted robbery in the third degree, upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence. Judgment affirmed as to the conviction; judgment reversed as to the sentence, on the law,, and case remanded to the Criminal Term for *965resentence in accordance herewith. Defendant-appellant’s plea of guilty was entered upon the court’s promise that it would impose a sentence identical to, and to run concurrent with, the sentence which would be imposed upon unrelated charges pending against the appellant in another county. At the time of sentence the court stated that it could not fulfill that promise and .the appellant’s attorney immediately moved to withdraw the guilty plea. The court denied the application and imposed a sentence different from the one imposed upon the unrelated charges. The People concede that the appellant should have been afforded an opportunity to withdraw his plea (see *People v Selikoff,*35 NY2d 227, cert den 419 US 1122). Since the indictment under which this prosecution arose is now six years old, it would prejudice the People to allow the appellant to withdraw his plea and go to trial (see *People v Selikoff,*35 NY2d 227, 239-240, *supra; People v Esposito,*32 NY2d 921). Therefore, the case is remanded for resentencing in accordance with the promise made to the appellant at the time he entered his guilty plea. Cohalan, J. P., Damiani, Rabin and Titone, JJ., concur.
§ 215.7 Request for correction or amendment of record. ( a ) An individual may request the Agency to correct or amend a record pertaining to him or her which the individual believes is not accurate, relevant, timely or complete.
( b ) Such request must be in writing and must be presented, in person or by mail to the addresses listed in § 215.3(a).
( c ) Such requests must set forth the following information: ( 1 ) Identification of the system of records in which the particular record is maintained;
( 2 ) The portion(s) of the record to be amended or corrected;
( 3 ) The desired amendment or correction; and
( 4 ) The reasons for the amendment or correction. The request must be accompanied by evidence, documentation, or other information in support of the request.
( d ) Assistance in preparing a request to amend a record may be obtained from the officials listed in § 215.3(a).
DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORPORATION,

Plaintiff,

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant.

Slip Op. 05-128

UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE

Before: Jane A. Restani

 Chief Judge

Court No. 99-00668

JUDGMENT

[Judgment for plaintiff on Tariff Classification of U.S. made truck parts painted and assembled

in Mexico free of duties.]

 Dated: September 26, 2005

Barnes, Richardson & Colburn, (Lawrence M. Friedman and Ilya A. Bakke) for plaintiff. 

Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney General, Barbara S. Williams, Attorney-in-Charge,

International Trade Field Office, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States

Department of Justice (Saul Davis), Michael Heydrich, Office of Assistant Chief Counsel,

International Trade Litigation, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, of counsel, for defendant.

Restani, Chief Judge: The merchandise at issue is identical in all material respects to that

in DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. United States, 361 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2004), wherein defendant’s

classification failed.

The parties do not request a new trial. Accordingly, the court is bound by precedent, and

judgment is entered for plaintiff requiring duty free treatment under Harmonized Tariff Schedule of

the United States (“HTSUS”) item 9802.00.80 for the U.S. made truck parts painted and assembled
Court No. 03-00442 Page 2

in Mexico, re-entered into the United States on May 5, 1993, under entry numbers 228-0107083-4

and 228-0107085-9.

Defendant shall refund the duties erroneously collected together with interest as provided by

law.

 /s/ Jane A. Restani 

Jane A. Restani

Chief Judge

Dated: New York, New York

 This 26th day of September, 2005.
§ 309.14 Coordinating offset with another Federal agency. ( a ) When Peace Corps is owed a debt by an employee of another agency, the other agency shall not initiate the requested offset until Peace Corps provides the agency with a written certification that the debtor owes Peace Corps a debt (including the amount and basis of the debt and the due date of payment) and that Peace Corps has complied with these regulations.
( b ) When another agency is owed the debt, Peace Corps may use salary offset against one of its employees who is indebted to another agency, if requested to do so by that agency. Such request must be accompanied by a certification that the person owes the debt (including the amount and basis of the debt and the due date of payment) and that the agency has complied with its regulations as required by 5 U.S.C. 5514 and 5 CFR part 550, subpart K.
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CLINTON LEE JACKSON,

Petitioner, 

 v.

DARYL G. ADAMS, Warden,

Respondent. /

No. C 08-5057 WHA (PR) 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR

VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL

(Docket No. 12)

Good cause appearing, petitioner’s request to voluntarily “abandon” this case (docket

number 12) is GRANTED, and the case is DISMISSED. See Fed. R. Civ P. 41(a)(2) (after service

of an answer, plaintiff must obtain court approval to voluntarily dismiss). 

The clerk shall close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 8 , 2010. 

WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

G:\PRO-SE\WHA\HC.08\JACKSON5057.VOL-DSM.wpd 

Case 3:08-cv-05057-WHA Document 13 Filed 01/08/10 Page 1 of 1
### §5064. Review of project renewals

If the executive authority of any State or local government submits to the Director, not later than 30 days before the expiration of any contract or grant to carry out any project under this chapter, a statement which objects to the renewal of such contract or grant, then the Director shall (1) review such statement and take it into account in determining whether to renew such contract or grant; and (2) submit to such executive authority a written statement of reasons regarding the Director's determination with respect to such renewal and specifically with respect to any objection so submitted.

(Pub. L. 93–113, title IV, §424, as added Pub. L. 96–143, §14(a), Dec. 13, 1979, 93 Stat. 1081.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### References in Text

This chapter, referred to in text, was in the original "this Act", meaning Pub. L. 93–113, Oct. 1, 1973, 87 Stat. 394, known as the Domestic Volunteer Service Act of 1973, which is classified principally to this chapter. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Short Title note set out under section 4950 of this title and Tables.
§ 213.30 Standards for suspension of collection action. ( a ) The CFO may suspend collection action on a debt when: ( 1 ) The debtor cannot be located;
( 2 ) The debtor's financial condition is expected to improve; or
( 3 ) The debtor has requested a waiver or review of the debt.
( b ) Based on the current financial condition of the debtor, the CFO may suspend collection activity on a debt when the debtor's future prospects justify retention of the claim for periodic review, and: ( 1 ) The applicable statute of limitations has not expired; or
( 2 ) Future collection can be effected by offset, notwithstanding the 10-year statute of limitations for administrative offsets; or
( 3 ) The debtor agrees to pay interest on the debt and suspension is likely to enhance the debtor's ability to fully pay the principal amount of the debt with interest at a later date.
( c ) The CFO will suspend collection activity during the time required for waiver consideration or administrative review prior to agency collection of a debt if the statute under which the request is sought prohibits USAID from collecting the debt during that time. The CFO will ordinarily suspend collection action during the pendency of his or her consideration of a waiver request or administrative review where statute and regulation preclude refund of amounts collected by the Agency should the debtor prevail.
( d ) The CFO may suspend collection activities on debts of $100,000 or less during the pendency of a permissive waiver or administrative review when there is no statutory requirement and he or she determines that: ( 1 ) There is a reasonable possibility that waiver will be granted and the debtor may be found not owing the debt (in whole or in part);
( 2 ) The Government's interest is protected, if suspension is granted, by the reasonable assurance that the debt can be recovered if the debtor does not prevail; or
( 3 ) Collection of the debt will cause undue hardship to the debtor.
( e ) The CFO will decline to suspend collection when he or she determines that the request for waiver or administrative review is frivolous, or that the debtor made it primarily to delay collection.
[67 FR 47258, July 18, 2002, as amended at 86 FR 31145, June 11, 2021]