alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
INTERMEDIA CAPITAL PARTNERS IV, L.P.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
<CURRENCY> U.S. DOLLARS
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1997
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                      1
<CASH>                                           6,654
<SECURITIES>                                    74,828
<RECEIVABLES>                                   18,723
<ALLOWANCES>                                   (1,990)
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                58,801
<PP&E>                                         233,640<F1>
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 964,263
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           47,506
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                           12,571
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                      52,094
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   964,263
<SALES>                                         60,819
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                60,819
<CGS>                                           13,025<F2>
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   65,760
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                   170
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              19,263
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (22,996)
<INCOME-TAX>                                   (1,488)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (21,722)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (21,722)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
<FN>
<F1>PP&E IS SHOWN NET OF ACCUMULATED DEPRECIATION.
<F2>INCLUDES PROGRAM FEES AND OTHER DIRECT EXPENSES
</FN>
        

</TABLE>
§ 35.22 Exchange of witness lists, statements and exhibits. ( a ) At least 15 days before the hearing or at such other time as may be ordered by the ALJ, the parties shall exchange witness lists, copies of prior statements of proposed witnesses, and copies of proposed hearing exhibits, including copies of any written statements that the party intends to offer in lieu of live testimony in accordance with § 35.33(b). At the time the above documents are exchanged, any party that intends to rely on the transcript of deposition testimony in lieu of live testimony at the hearing, if permitted by the ALJ, shall provide each party with a copy of the specific pages of the transcript it intends to introduce into evidence.
( b ) If a party objects, the ALJ shall not admit into evidence the testimony of any witness whose name does not appear on the witness list or any exhibit not provided to the opposing party as provided above unless the ALJ finds good cause for the failure or that there is no prejudice to the objecting party.
( c ) Unless another party objects within the time set by the ALJ, documents exchanged in accordance with paragraph (a) of this section shall be deemed to be authentic for the purpose of admissibility at the hearing.
### §6992. Scope of demonstration program for medical waste

#### (a) Covered States

The States within the demonstration program established under this subchapter for tracking medical wastes shall be New York, New Jersey, Connecticut, the States contiguous to the Great Lakes and any State included in the program through the petition procedure described in subsection (c), except for any of such States in which the Governor notifies the Administrator under subsection (b) that such State shall not be covered by the program.

#### (b) Opt out

(1) If the Governor of any State covered under subsection (a) which is not contiguous to the Atlantic Ocean notifies the Administrator that such State elects not to participate in the demonstration program, the Administrator shall remove such State from the program.

(2) If the Governor of any other State covered under subsection (a) notifies the Administrator that such State has implemented a medical waste tracking program that is no less stringent than the demonstration program under this subchapter and that such State elects not to participate in the demonstration program, the Administrator shall, if the Administrator determines that such State program is no less stringent than the demonstration program under this subchapter, remove such State from the demonstration program.

(3) Notifications under paragraphs (1) or (2) shall be submitted to the Administrator no later than 30 days after the promulgation of regulations implementing the demonstration program under this subchapter.

#### (c) Petition in

The Governor of any State may petition the Administrator to be included in the demonstration program and the Administrator may, in his discretion, include any such State. Such petition may not be made later than 30 days after promulgation of regulations establishing the demonstration program under this subchapter, and the Administrator shall determine whether to include the State within 30 days after receipt of the State's petition.

#### (d) Expiration of demonstration program

The demonstration program shall expire on the date 24 months after the effective date of the regulations under this subchapter.

(Pub. L. 89–272, title II, §11001, as added Pub. L. 100–582, §2(a), Nov. 1, 1988, 102 Stat. 2950.)
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Third Department,

October, 1977

(October 17, 1977)*

#### In the Matter of the Claim of Eugene Pellac, Respondent, v Atlantic Beach Club et al., Appellants. Workmen’s Compensation Board, Respondent.

*

 Not published with other decisions of October, 1977, 59 AD2d 790. [Rep.

Motion for order settling record on appeal from board decision dated March 7, 1973, and for other relief denied, without costs. Appellants’ remedy is to prosecute the appeal from the board decision dated March 24, 1977, which settled the record on the 1973 appeal. This appeal may be prosecuted upon the board’s original files in the cases listed in the full record list dated April 30, 1976, together with a brief and appendix thereto which shall contain the papers relating to appellants’ application for a shortened record. Appellants’ brief and appendix shall be filed and served on or before December 2, 1977. Koreman, P. J., Sweeney, Mahoney, Larkin and Mikoll, JJ., concur.
§ 72.6 Report of presumptive death. ( a ) *Local finding.* When there is a local finding of presumptive death by a competent local authority, a consular officer should prepare a consular report of presumptive death on the form prescribed by the Department.
( b ) *No local finding.* ( 1 ) A United States citizen or non-citizen national may disappear or be missing in circumstances where it appears likely that the individual has died, but there is no local authority able or willing to issue a death certificate or a judicial finding of death. This may include, for example, death in a plane crash where there are no identifiable remains, death in a plane crash beyond the territory of any country, death in an avalanche, disappearance/death at sea, or other sudden disaster where the body is not immediately (or perhaps ever) recoverable.
( 2 ) *Authorization of issuance.* The Department may authorize the issuance of a consular report of presumptive death in such circumstances. A consular report of presumptive death may not be issued without the Department's authorization.
( 3 ) *Considerations in determining whether the Department will authorize issuance of a Report of Presumptive Death.* The Department's decision whether to issue a Report of Presumptive Death is discretionary, and will be based on the totality of circumstances in each particular case. Although no one factor is conclusive or determinative, the Department will consider the factors cited below, among other relevant considerations, when deciding whether to authorize issuance in a particular case: ( i ) Whether the death is believed to have occurred within a geographic area where no sovereign government exercises jurisdiction;
( ii ) Whether the government exercising jurisdiction over the place where the death is believed to have occurred lacks laws or procedures for making findings of presumptive death;
( iii ) Whether the government exercising jurisdiction over the place where the death is believed to have occurred requires a waiting period exceeding five years before findings of presumptive death may be made;
( iv ) Whether the person who is believed to have died was seen to be in imminent peril by credible witnesses;
( v ) Whether the person who is believed to have died is reliably known to have been in a place which experienced a natural disaster, or catastrophic event, that was capable of causing death;
( vi ) Whether the person believed to have died was listed on the certified manifest of, and was confirmed to have boarded, an aircraft, or vessel, which was destroyed and, despite diligent search by competent authorities, some or all of the remains were not recovered or could not be identified;
( vii ) Whether there is evidence of fraud, deception, or malicious intent.
( c ) Consular reports of presumptive death should be processed and issued in accordance with § 72.5.
( d ) The Department may revoke a report of presumptive death if it determines in its sole discretion that the report was issued in error.
§ 100.500 Discriminatory effect prohibited. Liability may be established under the Fair Housing Act based on a practice's discriminatory effect, as defined in paragraph (a) of this section, even if the practice was not motivated by a discriminatory intent. The practice may still be lawful if supported by a legally sufficient justification, as defined in paragraph (b) of this section. The burdens of proof for establishing a violation under this subpart are set forth in paragraph (c) of this section. ( a ) *Discriminatory effect.* A practice has a discriminatory effect where it actually or predictably results in a disparate impact on a group of persons or creates, increases, reinforces, or perpetuates segregated housing patterns because of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin.
( b ) *Legally sufficient justification.* ( 1 ) A legally sufficient justification exists where the challenged practice: ( i ) Is necessary to achieve one or more substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests of the respondent, with respect to claims brought under 42 U.S.C. 3612, or defendant, with respect to claims brought under 42 U.S.C. 3613 or 3614; and
( ii ) Those interests could not be served by another practice that has a less discriminatory effect.
( 2 ) A legally sufficient justification must be supported by evidence and may not be hypothetical or speculative. The burdens of proof for establishing each of the two elements of a legally sufficient justification are set forth in paragraphs (c)(2) and (3) of this section.
( c ) *Burdens of proof in discriminatory effects cases.* ( 1 ) The charging party, with respect to a claim brought under 42 U.S.C. 3612, or the plaintiff, with respect to a claim brought under 42 U.S.C. 3613 or 3614, has the burden of proving that a challenged practice caused or predictably will cause a discriminatory effect.
( 2 ) Once the charging party or plaintiff satisfies the burden of proof set forth in paragraph (c)(1) of this section, the respondent or defendant has the burden of proving that the challenged practice is necessary to achieve one or more substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests of the respondent or defendant.
( 3 ) If the respondent or defendant satisfies the burden of proof set forth in paragraph (c)(2) of this section, the charging party or plaintiff may still prevail upon proving that the substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests supporting the challenged practice could be served by another practice that has a less discriminatory effect.
( d ) *Relationship to discriminatory intent.* A demonstration that a practice is supported by a legally sufficient justification, as defined in paragraph (b) of this section, may not be used as a defense against a claim of intentional discrimination.
[88 FR 19500, Mar. 31, 2023]
#### H. R. Wilson & Associates, Respondent-Appellant, v Town of Genoa, Appellant-Respondent.

Order unanimously modified to grant plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and otherwise order affirmed, with costs to plaintiff. Memorandum: Plaintiff contracted with the defendant to render *1175professional engineering services in connection with the defendant’s development and construction of a water supply system. Plaintiffs fee under the contract was set at 8% of the cost of construction. The contract required plaintiff to approve or disapprove the contractor’s requests for payments, and by the time of the completion of the construction, plaintiff had disapproved certain requests for payments amounting to $62,590.23. Plaintiff was of the opinion that the disapproved claims were for performance which was included within the terms of the construction contract and for which the contractor had already been paid. The contractor brought an action against the defendant and obtained a judgment upon a finding that the disapproved claims related to work performed beyond that required in the basic construction contract. Plaintiff then commenced this action to recover additional fees based upon the cost of construction as established in the lawsuit between the contractor and the defendant. In resisting plaintiffs motion for summary judgment, the defendant erroneously contends that the judgment obtained against it by the contractor is inadmissible. The prior action was tried by the court without a jury and defendant makes no claim that it was denied a full and fair opportunity to litigate the action or that the issue as to the amount of the cost of construction is not identical to the issue presented here. In accordance with the prior adjudication, therefore, we find that the cost of construction was increased by $62,590.23 (see *Schwartz v Public Administrator of County of Bronx,*24 NY2d 65, 71). The defendant’s further argument that plaintiff is estopped by its own determination of the cost of construction is equally without merit. Plaintiffs evaluation of the cost of construction simply represented an erroneous opinion which may not be viewed as the basis of an estoppel *(McAleenan v Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co.,*232 NY 199, 206; *London v Hammel,*32 AD2d 639, revd on other grounds 27 NY2d 630; 21 NY Jur, Estoppel, § 28). Accordingly, plaintiff is awarded summary judgment on its cause of action. Finally, in the absence of any indication that plaintiff violated the terms of its agreement with the defendant or that it was guilty of malpractice, plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment dismissing the counterclaim (see CPLR 3212, subd [b]). (Appeals from order of Cayuga Supreme Court—summary judgment.) Present—Marsh, P. J., Moule, Cardamone, Dillon and Witmer, JJ.
§ 502.5 Media or organization requests for ongoing subscriptions to broadcast quality agency program materials ( a ) Upon request, the Agency may make program materials available on an ongoing basis to Media entities, or other organizations, through a subscription agreement, provided that the Agency determines that entering into a subscription agreement to make program materials available on an ongoing basis would be consistent with the Agency's mission and authorities. Requested, ongoing subscription agreements must be consistent with the Agency's Policy for domestic distribution which incorporates the Broadcasting principles and standards and other requirements, found in 22 U.S.C. 1461, 1461-1a, 1462, 6201, 6202, 6203, 6204, 6205, 6206; Pub. L. 112-239, section 1078(b), 126 Stat. 1632, 1958; agreements with third-parties that hold a copyright in Agency program materials; and Terms of Use on Agency Web sites. Requestors shall secure all necessary licenses from all persons or organizations that hold a copyright in any portion of program materials before making any use of those program materials, except uses of program materials permitted by the Copyright Act of 1976, as amended.
( b ) Media entities or other organizations may request ongoing subscriptions by filling out an application form found on the Web site for the Direct System, the Agency's professional distribution system.
[78 FR 67026, Nov. 8, 2013]
Editorial Note on Part 42
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to part 42 appear at 71 FR 34522, June 15, 2006.

§ 42.12 Rules of chargeability. ( a ) *Applicability.* An immigrant shall be charged to the numerical limitation for the foreign state or dependent area of birth, unless the case falls within one of the exceptions to the general rule of chargeability provided by INA 202(b) and paragraphs (b) through (e) of this section to prevent the separation of families or the alien is classifiable under: ( 1 ) INA 201(b);
( 2 ) INA 101(a)(27) (A) or (B);
( 3 ) Section 112 of Public Law 101-649;
( 4 ) Section 124 of Public Law 101-649;
( 5 ) Section 132 of Public Law 101-649;
( 6 ) Section 134 of Public Law 101-649; or
( 7 ) Section 584(b)(1) as contained in section 101(e) of Public Law 100-202.
( b ) *Exception for child.* If necessary to prevent the separation of a child from the alien parent or parents, an immigrant child, including a child born in a dependent area, may be charged to the same foreign state to which a parent is chargeable if the child is accompanying or following to join the parent, in accordance with INA 202(b)(1).
( c ) *Exception for spouse.* If necessary to prevent the separation of husband and wife, an immigrant spouse, including a spouse born in a dependent area, may be charged to a foreign state to which a spouse is chargeable if accompanying or following to join the spouse, in accordance with INA 202(b)(2).
( d ) *Exception for alien born in the United States.* An immigrant who was born in the United States shall be charged to the foreign state of which the immigrant is a citizen or subject. If not a citizen or subject of any country, the alien shall be charged to the foreign state of last residence as determined by the consular officer, in accordance with INA 202(b)(3).
( e ) *Exception for alien born in foreign state in which neither parent was born or had residence at time of alien's birth.* An alien who was born in a foreign state, as defined in § 40.1, in which neither parent was born, and in which neither parent had a residence at the time of the applicant's birth, may be charged to the foreign state of either parent as provided in INA 202(b)(4). The parents of such an alien are not considered as having acquired a residence within the meaning of INA 202(b)(4), if, at the time of the alien's birth within the foreign state, the parents were visiting temporarily or were stationed there in connection with the business or profession and under orders or instructions of an employer, principal, or superior authority foreign to such foreign state.
[52 FR 42613, Nov. 5, 1987, as amended at 56 FR 49681, Oct. 1, 1991]
§ 92.11 Preparation of legal documents. ( a ) *By attorneys.* When a document has been prepared by an attorney for signature, a notarizing officer should not question the form of document unless it is obviously incorrect.
( b ) *By notarizing officers.* A notarizing officer should not usually prepare for private persons legal documents for signature and notarization. (However, see the provisions in § 92.24 regarding the preparation of affidavits.) When asked to perform such a service, the notarizing officer should explain that the preparation of legal forms is normally the task of an attorney, that the forms used and the purposes for which they are used vary widely from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and that he could not guarantee the legal effectiveness of any document which he might prepare. The person desiring the preparation of a legal document should be referred to such publications as Jones Legal Forms and The Lawyers Directory with the suggestion that he select or adapt the form which appears best suited to his needs. The notarizing officer may, in his discretion, arrange to have a member of his office staff type the document. If the document is typed in the Foreign Service office, the fee for copying shall be collected as prescribed under the caption “Copying and Recording” of the Tariff of Fees, Foreign Service of the United States of America (§ 22.1 of this chapter).
[22 FR 10858, Dec. 27, 1957, as amended at 60 FR 51723, Oct. 3, 1995]
#### § 150.2 Determination by the Department of State.

The question of whether any particular person enjoys diplomatic agent-level immunity and is therefore not subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, or whether they enjoy lesser status-based immunity, on any particular date entails both factual and legal analysis, and is determined by the Department of State, in accordance with relevant international and domestic law.
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[PROPOSED] ORDER RE ENTRY OF JUDGMENT FOR PLAINTIFF 

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SUSAN SHER (SBN WA 14210) 

Law Offices of Susan Sher 

116 S. State Street 

Ukiah, California 95482 

Telephone: (707) 463-1196 

Facsimile: (707) 462-6258 

STEPHEN M. MURPHY (SBN 103768) 

Law Offices of Stephen M. Murphy 

180 Montgomery Street, Suite 940 

San Francisco, CA 94104 

Telephone: (415) 986-1338 

Facsimile: (415) 986-1231 

Attorneys for Plaintiff, ELLEN M. PALMER 

 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

 

 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

ELLEN M. PALMER ) CASE NO. NO. C 08-3385 JSW 

 )

 Plaintiff, ) [PROPOSED] ORDER RE ENTRY

 ) OF FINAL JUDGMENT FOR ) PLAINTIFF 

 vs. ) ) )

SANTA ROSA MEMORIAL HOSPITAL ) 

 ) 

 Defendant. ) 

 ) 

 ) 

 ) 

 On September 10, 2009, the parties participated in a mediated settlement of the damage 

claims of plaintiff Ellen M. Palmer in the amount of $43,000. See Docket No. 45-1. In 

accordance with that settlement, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that judgment is entered in favor of 

plaintiff Palmer for that amount. This is a final judgment. 

 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

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[PROPOSED] ORDER RE ENTRY OF JUDGMENT FOR PLAINTIFF 

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Dated: ___________ _______________

 Hon. Jeffrey S. White 

 United States District Court Judge 

Case3:08-cv-03385-JSW Document45-2 Filed12/23/09 Page2 of 2

January 4, 2010

Case 3:08-cv-03385-JSW Document 46 Filed 01/04/10 Page 2 of 2
### §3789h. Repealed. Pub. L. 98–473, title II, §609B(e), (l), Oct. 12, 1984, 98 Stat. 2093, 2096

Section, Pub. L. 90–351, title I, §819, as added Pub. L. 96–157, §2, Dec. 27, 1979, 93 Stat. 1213, authorized acceptance of voluntary services. See section 10226(g) of Title 34, Crime Control and Law Enforcement.

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Effective Date of Repeal

Repeal effective Oct. 12, 1984, see section 609AA(a) of Pub. L. 98–473, set out as an Effective Date note under section 10101 of Title 34, Crime Control and Law Enforcement.
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