alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
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In its Order of May 14, 2010, the Court afforded defendants leave to file, no later

than June 1, 2010, a response to any factual showing made in plaintiff’s supplemental

memorandum. Plaintiff’s supplemental memorandum, however, did not make any further

showing.

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FORD MOTOR CREDIT COMPANY LLC, a

Delaware Limited Liability Company,

Plaintiff,

 v.

MARCO VENTURES, INC., a California

Corporation, dba FORD OF MARIN, and

ROBERT A. BRUTYN,

Defendants.

 /

No. C-08-4906 MMC

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT;

VACATING JUNE 11, 2010 HEARING;

DIRECTIONS TO CLERK

Before the Court is plaintiff’s Motion for Entry of Default Judgment, filed April 8,

2010, which motion defendants have not opposed. Also before the Court is plaintiff’s

supplemental memorandum, filed May 17, 2010 with leave of court.

Having read and considered the papers filed in support of and in opposition to the

motion, the Court finds the matter suitable for decision on plaintiff’s written submissions,1

VACATES the hearing scheduled for June 11, 2010, and hereby GRANTS the motion, as

follows:

Case 3:08-cv-04906-MMC Document 64 Filed 05/25/10 Page 1 of 2
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1. Plaintiff is entitled to recover from defendants, jointly and severally, principal in

the amount sought, specifically, $1,045,214.94. (See Bascio Decl. ¶¶ 28, 32.)

2. Plaintiff is entitled to recover from defendants, jointly and severally, the attorney’s

fees incurred herein, which the Court finds were reasonably incurred, specifically, fees in

the total amount of $27,930.00. (See Cram Decl. ¶ 12, Ex. G.)

3. Plaintiff is entitled to recover from defendants, jointly and severally, its costs

incurred herein, which the Court finds were reasonably incurred, specifically, costs in the

total amount of $2295.53. (See id. ¶ 13, Ex. H.)

4. Plaintiff’s requests for prejudgment interest and for additional sums identified in

the motion as “charges” and “expenses” are deemed withdrawn. (See Pl.’s Supp. Mem. at

1:9-17.)

The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of plaintiff and against

defendants, jointly and severally, in the total amount of $1,075,440.47.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 25, 2010 

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

Case 3:08-cv-04906-MMC Document 64 Filed 05/25/10 Page 2 of 2
§ 46.6 Departure from the Canal Zone, the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, or outlying possessions of the United States. ( a ) In addition to the restrictions and prohibitions imposed by the provisions of this part upon the departure of aliens from the United States, any alien who seeks to depart from the Canal Zone, the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, or an outlying possession of the United States shall comply with such other restrictions and prohibitions as may be imposed by regulations prescribed, with the concurrence of the Administrator of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs and the Commissioner, by the Governor of the Canal Zone, the High Commissioner of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, or by the governor of an outlying possession of the United States, respectively. No alien shall be prevented from departing from such zone, territory, or possession without first being accorded a hearing as provided in §§ 46.4 and 46.5.
( b ) The Governor of the Canal Zone, the High Commissioner of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, or the governor of any outlying possession of the United States shall have the authority to designate any employee or class of employees of the United States as hearing officers for the purpose of conducting the hearing referred to in paragraph (a) of this section. The hearing officer so designated shall exercise the same powers, duties, and functions as are conferred upon special inquiry officers under the provisions of this part. The chief executive officer of such zone, territory, or possession shall, in lieu of the regional commissioner, review the recommended decision of the hearing officer, and shall render a decision in any case referred to him, basing it on evidence in the record and on any evidence or information of a confidential or a security nature which he deems pertinent.
[22 FR 10829, Dec. 27, 1957, as amended at 26 FR 3069, Apr. 11, 1961]
§ 213.35 Discharging indebtedness— general. ( a ) Before discharging a delinquent debt (also referred to as a close out of the debt), the CFO must take all appropriate steps to collect such debt, including (as applicable), the following: ( 1 ) Administrative offset;
( 2 ) Tax-refund offset;
( 3 ) Offset of Federal salary;
( 4 ) Referral to private collection contractors;
( 5 ) Referral to Federal Departments or Agencies that are operating a debt-collection center;
( 6 ) Reporting delinquencies to credit-reporting bureaus;
( 7 ) Garnishing the wages of a delinquent debtor; and
( 8 ) Litigation or foreclosure.
( b ) The CFO will make a determination that collection action is no longer warranted and request that litigation counsel release any liens of record that are securing the debt. Discharge of indebtedness is distinct from the termination or suspension of collection activity, and the Internal Revenue Code might apply. When the CFO suspends or terminates collection action on a debt, the debt remains delinquent, and USAID may pursue further collection action at a later date in accordance with the standards set forth in this part. When a debt is discharged in full or in part, further collection action is prohibited, and USAID must terminate debt-collection action.
[86 FR 31146, June 11, 2021]
§ 712.200 Agency and legislative liaison. ( a ) The prohibition on the use of appropriated funds, in § 712.100 (a), does not apply in the case of a payment of reasonable compensation made to an officer or employee of a person requesting or receiving a Federal contract, grant, loan, or cooperative agreement if the payment is for agency and legislative liaison activities not directly related to a covered Federal action.
( b ) For purposes of paragraph (a) of this section, providing any information specifically requested by an agency or Congress is allowable at any time.
( c ) For purposes of paragraph (a) of this section, the following agency and legislative liaison activities are allowable at any time only where they are not related to a specific solicitation for any covered Federal action: ( 1 ) Discussing with an agency (including individual demonstrations) the qualities and characteristics of the person's products or services, conditions or terms of sale, and service capabilities; and,
( 2 ) Technical discussions and other activities regarding the application or adaptation of the person's products or services for an agency's use.
( d ) For purposes of paragraph (a) of this section, the following agencies and legislative liaison activities are allowable only where they are prior to formal solicitation of any covered Federal action: ( 1 ) Providing any information not specifically requested but necessary for an agency to make an informed decision about initiation of a covered Federal action;
( 2 ) Technical discussions regarding the preparation of an unsolicited proposal prior to its official submission; and,
( 3 ) Capability presentations by persons seeking awards from an agency pursuant to the provisions of the Small Business Act, as amended by Public Law 95-507 and other subsequent amendments.
( e ) Only those activities expressly authorized by this section are allowable under this section.
#### Nancy Waldbaum Nimkoff, Respondent, v Ronald A. Nimkoff, Appellant.

[835 NYS2d 31]

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Laura VisitaciónLewis, J.), entered February 14, 2006, which, to the extent appealed from as limited by the briefs, denied defendant husband’s motion for an order holding plaintiff wife in civil contempt for her failure to return his personal property in accordance with a prior order of this Court, unanimously affirmed, with costs.

In May 2005 this Court directed a mutual return of personal property between the parties (18 AD3d 344 [2005]). The argument that defendant has been prejudiced by plaintiffs failure to return his personalty is unpersuasive. In a partial inventory provided to plaintiff in April 2003, defendant listed an Oriental rug, desk lamps, various items of jewelry, a facsimile machine, neckties and unspecified compact discs. In response, plaintiff offered to have their attorneys “deal with the logistics of the exchange.” Apparently there was no follow-up in that regard. Responding to the contempt motion, plaintiff stated, in October 2005, she remained willing to facilitate such retrieval as soon as defendant could work out the logistics of the transfer.

The property in question was either left behind by defendant in the parties’ vacant marital apartment, or was in storage at the time of their separation. At this late date, any delay in returning the property appears to be due more to lack of communication than to plaintiffs conduct. On this record, plaintiffs *293challenged conduct, standing alone, could not be found to have defeated, impaired, impeded or prejudiced defendant’s rights to his personal property, so as to justify an order of contempt (see Judiciary Law § 753 [A]). Concur—Tom, J.P., Marlow, Nardelli, Gonzalez and Kavanagh, JJ.
§ 3a.2 Requirement for approval of foreign government employment. ( a ) The United States Constitution (Article I, section 9, clause 8) prohibits the acceptance of civil employment with a foreign government by an officer of the United States without the consent of Congress. Congress has consented to the acceptance of civil employment (and compensation therefor) by any person described in § 3a.1(b) subject to the approval of the Secretary concerned and the Secretary of State (37 U.S.C. 801, Note). Civil employment with a foreign government may not be accepted without such approval by any person so described.
( b ) The Secretary of State has no authority to approve employment with a foreign government by any officer of the United States other than a person described in § 3a.1(a). The acceptance of employment with a foreign government by any other officer of the United States remains subject to the constitutional prohibition described in paragraph (a) of this section.
( c ) Any person described in § 3a.1(a) who accepts employment with a foreign government without the approval required by this section or otherwise obtaining the consent of Congress is subject to forfeiture of retired pay to the extent of his or her compensation from the foreign government, according to the Comptroller General of the United States (44 Comp. Gen. 139 (1964)). This forfeiture is in addition to any other penalty which may be imposed under law or regulation.[1]
Footnotes -
3a.2
[1] Approval under this part does not constitute an exception to the provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act concerning loss of United States citizenship, for example, by becoming a citizen of or taking an oath of allegiance to another country. See 8 U.S.C. 1481 *et seq.*
#### Vincent D. O’Connor, Respondent, v. Liza Blacktop Corp. et al., Appellants.

Motion for a stay granted on condition that appellants he ready to argue or submit the appeal at the October I960 Term, beginning October 3, 1960-, fo-r which term the appeal is ordered to be placed on the calendar. The record and appellants’ brief must be served and filed on or before September 3, 3960. Nolan, P. J., Beldoek, Ughetta, Christ and Pette, JJ., concur.
### §3796aa–6. Transferred

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Codification

Section 3796aa–6 was editorially reclassified as section 10336 of Title 34, Crime Control and Law Enforcement.
§ 96.47 Preparation of home studies in incoming cases. ( a ) The agency or person ensures that a home study on the prospective adoptive parent(s) (which for purposes of this section includes the initial report and any supplemental statement submitted to DHS) is completed that includes the following: ( 1 ) Information about the prospective adoptive parent(s)' identity, eligibility and suitability to adopt, background, family and medical history, social environment, reasons for adoption, ability to undertake an intercountry adoption, and the characteristics of the children for whom the prospective adoptive parent(s) would be qualified to care (specifying in particular whether they are willing and able to care for a child with special needs);
( 2 ) A determination whether the prospective adoptive parent(s) are eligible and suited to adopt;
( 3 ) A statement describing the counseling and training provided to the prospective adoptive parent(s);
( 4 ) The results of a criminal background check on the prospective adoptive parent(s) and any other individual for whom a check is required by 8 CFR 204.311;
( 5 ) A full and complete statement of all facts relevant to the eligibility and suitability of the prospective adoptive parent(s) to adopt a child under any specific requirements identified to the Secretary by the Central Authority of the child's country of origin; and
( 6 ) A statement in each copy of the home study that it is a true and accurate copy of the home study that was provided to the prospective adoptive parent(s) or DHS.
( b ) The agency or person ensures that the home study is performed in accordance with 8 CFR 204.311, and any applicable State law.
( c ) Where the home study is not performed in the first instance by an accredited agency, the agency or person ensures that the home study is reviewed and approved in writing by an accredited agency. The written approval must include a determination that the home study: ( 1 ) Includes all of the information required by paragraph (a) of this section and is performed in accordance with 8 CFR 204.311, and applicable State law; and
( 2 ) Was performed by an individual who meets the requirements in § 96.37(f), or, if the individual is an exempted provider, ensures that the individual meets the requirements for home study providers established by 8 CFR 204.301.
( d ) The agency or person takes all appropriate measures to ensure the timely transmission of the same home study that was provided to the prospective adoptive parent(s) or to DHS to the Central Authority of the child's country of origin (or to an alternative authority designated by that Central Authority).
[71 FR 8131, Feb. 15, 2006, as amended at 79 FR 40635, July 14, 2014]
EXHIBIT 32.1




CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER PURSUANT


TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906


OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002




Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, the undersigned Officer of ERF Wireless, Inc. (the "Company"), hereby certifies, that the Company's Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March 31, 2010, (the "Report") fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or Section 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.




May 17, 2010








/s/H. Dean Cubley


H. Dean Cubley


Chief Executive Officer
Allonge to the Common Stock Purchase Warrant (Warrant No. NS2007-2)



 Exhibit 4.6 
 ALLONGE TO COMMON STOCK PURCHASE WARRANT 
 (Warrant No. NS2007-2) 
 This Allonge dated and entered into this 30th
 day of May, 2007 to the Common Stock Purchase Warrant, Warrant No. NS2007-1, to Purchase 6,375,000 Shares of Common Stock of Transmeridian Exploration Incorporated (the “Warrant”)
is made by Transmeridian Exploration Incorporated, a Delaware corporation (the “Company”) for the benefit of North Sound Legacy International Ltd., the current holder of the Warrant, for itself and its registered assigns (the
“Holder”). 
 WHEREAS, on May 30, 2007, the Holder pre-paid (the “Prepayment”)
the Company $1.99 of the Current Warrant Price of $2.00 per share for 1,500,000 shares of Warrant Stock (the “Prepayment Warrant Stock”), the receipt of which the Company desires to acknowledge; and 
 WHEREAS, in order to evidence receipt of the Prepayment and the effect thereof on the Current Warrant Price applicable to the Prepayment Warrant Stock,
the Company desires to acknowledge the decrease in the Current Warrant Price applicable to the Prepayment Warrant Stock from $2.00 to $0.01 per share, while leaving all other terms of the Warrant unaffected thereby. 
 NOW, THEREFORE, for good and valuable consideration (including the Prepayment) and intending to be legally bound hereby, the Company agrees as follows:

  

	 	(1)	The Company by its execution hereof hereby acknowledges receipt of the full amount of the Prepayment. 

  

	 	(2)	Giving effect to the Prepayment, the Company acknowledges and agrees that the Current Warrant Price applicable to the Prepayment Warrant Stock is $0.01 per share, until the Current
Warrant Price is adjusted pursuant to the terms of the Warrant. 

  

	 	(3)	Capitalized terms used and not otherwise defined herein are used with the meanings ascribed thereto in the Warrant. 

  

	 	(4)	Except as expressly reflected herein, the Warrant shall be unamended and remain in full force and effect. 








 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Transmeridian Exploration Incorporated has caused this Allonge to Common Stock
Purchase Warrant to be executed by its duly authorized officer and attested by its Secretary. 
 Dated: May 30, 2007 
  

											
		  		  		 	TRANSMERIDIAN EXPLORATION INCORPORATED	 	
						
		  		  		 	By:	 	 /s/ Earl W. McNiel
	 	
		  		  		 		 	Earl W. McNiel	 	
		  		  		 		 	Vice President and Chief Financial Officer	 	
					
	Attest:	  		 		 		 	
						
	By:	  	 /s/ Nicolas J. Evanoff
	  		 		 		 	
		  	Nicolas J. Evanoff	  		 		 		 	
		  	Secretary	  		 		 		 	

 [Signature Page to Allonge to Common Stock Purchase Warrant]
Case3:08-cv-05175-EMC Document56 Filed03/09/10 Page1 of 3Case 3:08-cv-05175-EMC Document 58 Filed 03/10/10 Page 1 of 3Case3:08-cv-05175-EMC Document56 Filed03/09/10 Page2 of 3Case 3:08-cv-05175-EMC Document 58 Filed 03/10/10 Page 2 of 3Case3:08-cv-05175-EMC Document56 Filed03/09/10 Page3 of 3Case 3:08-cv-05175-EMC Document 58 Filed 03/10/10 Page 3 of 3
#### § 219.151 Program accessibility: New construction and alterations.

Each building or part of a building that is constructed or altered by, on behalf of, or for the use of the agency shall be designed, constructed, or altered so as to be readily accessible to and usable by handicapped persons. The definitions, requirements, and standards of the Architectural Barriers Act (42 U.S.C. 4151-4157), as established in 41 CFR 101-19.600 to 101-19.607, apply to buildings covered by this section.
## F IRST 

## D ISTRICT 

## C OURT OF 

## A PPEAL 

## S TATE OF 

## F LORIDA

_____________________________
No. 1D 18

- 432

_____________________________ G ARY M C C ALLA , Appellant,

v.

E. C. K ENYON C ONSTRUCTION C OMPANY , I NC ., D OUGLAS H ERRING , A ND T IMOTHY Y OUNG , Appellee s

.

_____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County

. Adrian G. Soud , Judge

. December 27, 2018

P ER C URIAM

.
A FFIRMED

.
L EWIS , R AY , and M.K. T HOMAS , JJ., concur

.

_____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331

.

_____________________________2 Peter A. Robertson, William Douglas Stanford, J r., and Thomas J. Tollefsen of T he Robertson Firm, St. Augustine
, for Appellant.

S. Grier Wells, GrayRobinson, P.A., Jacksonville , and Kristie Hatcher

- B olin, G rayRobinson , P.A., Lakeland
, for Appellee s

.
UN PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 17

- 2280

WILLIAM CARL YORK
,
Plaintiff

- Appellant
,

v.
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, US
,
Defendant

- Appellee

.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina , at Wilmington

. James C. Dever III
, Chief District Judge. ( 7:17

- cv

- 00023

- D )

Submitted : December 19, 2017 Decided: December 21, 2017

Before SHEDD, AGEE, and DIAZ , Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by un published per curiam opinion

.

William C. York, Appellant Pro Se. Rud y E. Renfer, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinion s are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM:

William C. York appeals the district court’s order dismissing his civil complaint
without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to exhaust

administrative remedies . On appea l, we confine our review to the issues raised in the
Appellant’s brief. See 4th Cir. R. 34(b). Because York ’ s informal brief does not
challenge the basis for the district court’s disposition, York has forfeited appellate review

of the court’s order. See Williams v. Giant Food Inc. , 370 F.3d 423, 430 n.4 (4th Cir.
2004). Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the

materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
(April 24, 1978)

#### Modesto Diaz, Appellant, v Ellerman Bucknall S. S. Co., Ltd., et al., Defendants and Third-Party Plaintiffs-Respondents. International Terminal Operating Co., Inc., Third-Party Defendant-Respondent.

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County, entered March 25, 1976, unanimously reversed, on the law and in the exercise of discretion, vacated, the third-*962party complaint reinstated, and the matter remanded for a new trial, with $60 costs and disbursements of this appeal to abide the event. It was error to direct a verdict for defendants. The complaint asserted causes of action in both unseaworthiness and negligence. The use of the "chocks” in the manner testified to was sufficient to create an issue of fact as to the existence of an unseaworthy condition. (See *Edynak v Atlantic Shipping Inc. Cíe. Chambon (Maclovia S. A.,*562 F2d 215, 224-225.) As for the sufficiency of the proof offered on negligence, there was evidence from which the trier of the fact could have found actual or constructive notice of a hazardous condition. A shipowner may be held liable for an unsafe condition even where the notice with which it is charged is only constructive. (See *Albanese v Nederl. Amerik Maats.,*382 US 283; *Rice v Atlantic Gulf & Paciñc Co.,*484 F2d 1318; *Ferrante v Swedish Amer. Lines,*331 F2d 571, 575, cert dsmd 379 US 801.) Although no appeal was taken from that portion of the judgment which dismissed defendants’ third-party complaint the interests of justice dictate that the entire judgment should be reversed in order to afford the trial court the opportunity of a full exploration of all the issues, including the right to indemnification by the shipowner against the stevedore, (see *Rome Cable Corp. v Tanney,*21 AD2d 342) and to avoid a proliferation of litigation. Concur—Murphy, P. J., Fein, Lane, Sandler and Sullivan, JJ.