HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND

COOPERATION IN EUROPE

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

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(ii)

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS

LORNE W. CRANER, Department of State

VACANT, Department of Defense

WILLIAM HENRY LASH III, Department of Commerce

HOUSE

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey

Chairman

FRANK R. WOLF, Virginia

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania

ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama

ANNE M. NORTHUP, Kentucky

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland

LOUISE MCINTOSH SLAUGHTER, New York

ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina

SENATE

BEN NIGHTHORSE CAMPBELL, Colorado

Co-Chairman

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas

GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon

KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut

BOB GRAHAM, Florida

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin

HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York

LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
(iii)

THE MIDDLE EAST:

WOULD THE HELSINKI PROCESS

APPLY?

JUNE 15, 2004

COMMISSIONERS

PAGE

Hon. Christopher H. Smith, Chairman,

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe ............................... 1

Hon. Steny H. Hoyer, House Minority Whip .................................................. 1

Hon. Benjamin L. Cardin, Ranking Member,

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe ............................... 5

Hon. Mike McIntyre, Commissioner,

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe ............................... 6

WITNESSES

Hon. Max M. Kampelman, Ambassador (ret.),

Chairman Emeritus, Freedom House ........................................................ 8

His Excellency Natan Sharansky, Israeli Minister of Diaspora Affairs ..... 11

Hon. Mark Palmer, Ambassador (ret.), Co-Founder and Board Member,

National Endowment for Democracy ....................................................... 15

Peter Jones, Research Associate, Munk Centre for International

Studies, University of Toronto ................................................................. 23

Hon. Craig Dunkerley, Ambassador (ret.), Distinguished Visiting

Professor, Near East-South Asia Center for Strategic Studies,

National Defense University.................................................................... 30

Professor Michael Yaffe, Academic Dean, Near EastSouth Asia

Center for Strategic Studies, National Defense University ................... 32

APPENDICES

Prepared Statement of Hon. Benjamin L. Cardin ....................................... 42

Materials Submitted for the Record by Hon. Max M. Kampelman

 Prepared Statement of Hon. Max M. Kampelman ............................... 43

° From Helsinki to the Mediterranean and the Gulf: Building a

Democratic, Prosperous and Peaceful Middle East, a Freedom

House Document ..................................................................................... 46

° Overview of the Human Dimension Commitments of the

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, 19752003 ..... 57

Materials Submitted for the Record by Peter Jones

° Prepared Statement of Peter Jones ...................................................... 62

° The Preface and Executive Summary from Towards a Regional

Security Regime for the Middle East: Issues and Options, by

Peter Jones, Published by Stockholm International Peace

Research Institute Stockholm, December 1998 .................................... 70
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APPENDICES (CONTD)

PAGE

Materials Submitted for the Record by Ambassador Craig Dunkerley

° Prepared Statement of Ambassador (ret.) Craig Dunkerley ............... 74

° What the Helsinki-Middle East Analogy Should Say to U.S.

Policymakers, by Craig Dunkerley, Reprinted from In the

National Interest, Vol. III, Issue 17, April 28, 2004 ............................... 77

Prepared Statement of Michael Yaffe .......................................................... 80

Treaty of Peace between the State of Israel and the Hashemite

Kingdom of Jordan, October 26, 1994 ...................................................... 90

Letter to David T. Johnson, Ambassador, U.S. Mission to the OSCE,

from Members of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in

Europe, dated July 15, 1998; and Ambassador Johnsons Response .... 103

Letter from Commission Members to His Excellency Ariel Sharon,

Prime Minister of Israel; His Excellency Hosny Mubarak, President

of Egypt; and His Excellency King Abdullah II of Jordan, dated

April 17, 2001; and Mr. Sharons Response .......................................... 107

Peace premised under the four oughts: Under Proper Conditions,

Middle East Conference Could Work, by Max M. Kampelman,

Reprinted from The Washington Times, August 15, 2002 ..................... 114

Letter to King Abdullah of Jordan from Members of the Commission,

dated October 8, 2003 ............................................................................. 116

The Middle East Needs its Helsinki, by His Excellency Natan

Sharansky, Reprinted from The International Herald Tribune,

Tuesday, March 30, 2004 ....................................................................... 118
THE MIDDLE EAST:

WOULD THE HELSINKI PROCESS APPLY?

JUNE 15, 2004

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

WASHINGTON, DC

The Commission met in Room 334, Cannon House Office Building,

Washington, DC, at 2:37 p.m., Hon. Christopher H. Smith, Chairman,

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, presiding.

Commissioners present: Hon. Christopher H. Smith, Chairman, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe; Hon. Benjamin L. Cardin, Ranking Member, Commission on Security and Cooperation in

Europe; and Hon. Mike McIntyre, Commissioner, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Members of Congress present: Hon. Steny H. Hoyer, House Minority

Whip and former Chairman and Ranking Member, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Witnesses present: Hon. Max M. Kampelman, Ambassador (ret.),

Chairman Emeritus, Freedom House; His Excellency Natan Sharansky, Israeli Minister of Diaspora Affairs; Peter Jones, Research Associate, Munk Centre for International Studies, University of Toronto; Hon.

Craig Dunkerley, Ambassador (ret.), Distinguished Visiting Professor,

Near East-South Asia Center for Strategic Studies, National Defense

University;Professor Michael Yaffe,Ph.D., Near EastSouth Asia Center

for Strategic Studies, National Defense University; Mark Palmer, Ambassador (ret.), Co-founder and Board Member, National Endowment

for Democracy.

HON. CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, CHAIRMAN,

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

Mr. SMITH. The hearing of the Commission on the Security Cooperation in Europe will come to order.

I understand the Minority Whip, Steny Hoyer, a member of this Commission of long standing, a former Chairman and a great friend of the

Commission, of the work of the Commission, does have to leave for another appointment.

So I yield to my good friend and colleague from Maryland for any

opening comments he might have.

HON. STENY H. HOYER, HOUSE MINORITY WHIP

Mr. HOYER. I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I certainly

want to welcome our witnesses.
2

In particular, I want to welcome an extraordinary American, but a

real international citizen, in Ambassador Max Kampelman; and, I suppose, even more an international citizen, a member of the Knesset, Natan

Sharansky, my friend. I want to welcome the other witnesses as well.

Mr. Chairman, I regret thatand I told both Ambassador Kampelman and Mr. SharanskyI will not be able to stay, unfortunately, because of the rescheduling. My schedule was inconsistent with the change.

I apologize for that. But I want to thank you for holding this important

hearing at a critical time in world affairs.

As you probably know, Mr. Sharansky had first appeared before the

Commission in 1986, as well as my friend, Ambassador Kampelman,

who is an architect, of course, of the Helsinki Process. He did an extraordinary job for our country in Vienna, and before thatlong before

that, for decades before that and since thenhas been a real leader.

Mr. Chairman, you may recall this Commission first examined the

possibility of a Helsinki-type process for the Middle East in a hearing

held on October 14, 1993, when Senator DeConcini and I proposed the

possibility of an OSCE-type process for the Middle East. We received

testimony from the late Abba Eban and then-ambassador of Egypt, Ahmad

Maher El-Sayed.

In the intervening years, Mr. Chairman, members of our Commission have continued to raise the possibility of such a process with leaders in the countries of Middle East in our travels to the region. I know

I personally talked about this with at least two Israeli prime ministers

and a number of their foreign ministers. I know that Mr. Cardin has

discussed that as well.

I believe such a process was relevant then, and is perhaps even more

so now. There are those who say these are different times and these are

different countries than those that engaged in the Helsinki Process almost 30 years ago. This is certainly true.

However, it is my strong belief, it was then and now, that there is an

analogy to be made between the very substantial gulf that existed between the Soviet Union and the West and the gulf that exists between

many of the countries in the Middle East, which have existed for long

periods of time.

But as the West and East were, in 1975, bitterly divided, they came

together and agreed on certain principles. Some, perhaps, agreed on

them rhetorically, while some agreed upon them philosophically. But in

any event, we found that agreement had great power. I think that could

apply in the Middle East.

Notwithstanding the deep differences that existed then, the process

established a regional forum in which there was discussion of certain

principles which are now almost universally accepted. They may not be

universally followed, but they have been universally accepted, at least

in international rhetoric.

Clearly, the governments and the peoples of the Middle East must

embrace for themselves such a process in order to achieve lasting peace,

stability and prosperity.

I hope that our distinguished witnesses, Mr. Chairman, will be able

to provide us with some insight into how that may be achieved. Clearly,

while talking together and coming together on a regular basis is not in

and of itself a guarantee of success, without discussion, success is almost impossible.
3

What we found in the Helsinki Process was that when the Soviets

entered into the agreement and achieved their own objective of Basket

I, the security basket, and the agreement that political borders would

not be changed by force, they, in the process, agreed to Basket III, thinking

that Basket III would be much like the Soviet constitutionvery fine

rhetoric and almost no reality.

Having said that, they foundand Mr. Sharansky is probably one of

the strongest witnesses of that realitythey found that those words

and those ideas and those concepts and those commitments had great

power.

And people who then had no power used those words and those concepts and those commitments to attain great power, not of armies or

militias or police, but of the hearts and minds of millions of people, and

openly changed the system. And we are so proud of Mr. Sharansky and

Mr. Kampelman and all of you who have been involved in this process

for so very long.

Mr. Chairman, I apologize for having to leave so soon, but I thank

you for this opportunity. I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your

leadership.

Chris Smith and I have served on this CommissionI am no longer

on this Commissionbut have served on this Commission together for

more than 2 decades. And Mr. Smith, Chairman Smith has always

been a giant on principle and in courage in fighting for the rights articulated in the Helsinki Final Act.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Hoyer. And thank you for

your kind remarks. And let me just noteand I think our distinguished

panelists know thisyou have done so much on behalf of the human

rights in Central and Eastern Europe, especially during the dark days.

I remember our trips to many of the Warsaw Pact nations, our trips

to Lithuania and, of course, the trips to the Soviet Unionwhat was

then the Soviet Union. I think we did make a difference, and you certainly led this Commission very ably and honorably and effectively.

Mr. HOYER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SMITH. Let me begin by saying a few opening comments. The

witnesses at todays hearing will consider how the OSCE principles of

democracy, human rights and security might be applied to the Middle

East region. This area spreads from Morocco in the west to Iran in the

east; from Sudan in the south to Turkey in the north.

Turkey is a participating State in the OSCE. And Algeria, Egypt,

Israel, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia are Mediterranean Partners for

Cooperation with the organization.

One of the consequences of September 11, in addition to our focus on

antiterrorism, was to spark a serious discussion in our country about

the urgent need for democratization and respect for human rights in

that part of the world.

The Middle East is trapped today in a polar opposite of the OSCE

process. Instead of democratic principles pushing democratic progress,

state repression breeds resentment and poverty, both monetary and

intellectual. Instead of dialogue and confidence-building in the region,

we have sullen extremism. The end result too frequently is stagnation

and violence.
4

The considerable success of the Helsinki Process, during and after

the Cold War, should not blind us, however, to the differences and difficulties of applying the OSCE framework in the Middle East.

As National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice said recently, and I

quote,Nobody really believes that democratic development can be somehow forced from the outside. That simply is not the case. To work,

willing partners are necessary.

There has been a Mediterranean dimension, as members of this Commission know, of the Helsinki Process from the outset. The 1975 Final

Act included a separate Mediterranean chapter and extended the status

of non-participating Mediterranean states to numerous states in the

region.

More than a decade ago, this Commission held a hearing which examinedit was mentioned a moment ago by Steny Hoyerthe prospects for collective security in the Middle East.

Israels former minister for foreign affairs, for Israel, testified, and I

quote,In the Middle East, as in Europe,the key to peace lies in institutionalized regional cooperation.

Former Egyptian ambassador to the United States, Ahmed Maher

El-Sayed, expressed support for what he said was, and I quote, a very

active role by the United States and the European countries in this

process in the Middle East.

The 1994 Peace Agreement between Israel and Jordan made the commitment to the creation of the Middle East, of a CSCME, Conference on

Security Cooperation in the Middle East. This commitment entails the

adoption of regional models of security along the lines of the Helsinki

Process, culminating in a regional zone of security and stability.

To enter a series of briefings in 1995, the Helsinki Commission explored the application of the OSCE model to other regions of the world,

including the Middle East.

Interested parties keep asking the question: What have we learned

from history? Could the model of the OSCE institutions and the Helsinki commitments made by the participating States enhance security,

promote cooperation and promote human rights in the Middle East?

There are two important differences between the current situation

and the Cold War, and I hope we can try to address those this afternoon.

The first is the threat of Islamic extremism facing many of the states

in the Middle East. That threat makes Middle Eastern leaders nervous

about liberalization. The second is the question of the role of countries

outside the region, including the United States.

I was hoping we could explore these issues this afternoon, as we go

through the various testimonies.

With that as the background, it is time for us to have an open and

frank discussion on how best to encourage respect for human rights

and promote democratic reforms in the Middle East/North Africa region and the lessons learned that can be applied from the Helsinki Process.

I would like to recognize my good friend and colleague, Ben Cardin,

for any opening comments he might have.
5

HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, RANKING MEMBER,

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

Mr. CARDIN. Well, thank you very much, Chairman Smith. I want to

thank you for your active leadership on our U.S. Commission and the

role that we have played on the OSCE. You have been a true leader on

the human rights dimension, and we very much appreciate the fact

that the Congress participation has been as involved as it has been. I

also want to welcome our witnesses today.

The OSCE is truly unique among the international and regional organizations. It works through voluntary compliance of commitments,

not through treaty obligations. And in some respects, it is a stronger

organization as a result of the fact that it works through a consensus

process, or through a process that requires a good deal of diplomacy in

order to bring about results in a way that we can put spotlights on

troubling issues and make progress on that.

I am reminded of the work that we did last month in Berlin, on antiSemitism. I want to thank Mr. Sharansky for his participation. Your

intervention was one of the most motivating interventions through the

whole conference.

It is interesting, because Israel is not a full member in OSCE. It is

part of our partners in the cooperation, and yet Israel had a major role

to play in our anti-Semitism conference under the OSCE banner, which

just shows, Mr. Chairman, that this hearing is a very important hearing to see how we can expand the opportunity of the OSCE in dealing

with regional problems beyond just the OSCE member states.

I strongly support our effort to expand the OSCE process in the Middle

East. I think it makes abundant sense. Congressman Hoyer pointed

out that it has been the position of our U.S. members that we should

develop a process in the Middle East to use the OSCE framework. Our

original position was for a CSCME, that we have a specific and new

organization that would be focused on the Middle East as its primary

focus.

And I have had a chance, at times, to talk with various ministers in

Israel about that, including Rabin and Perez and Sharon. I have also

had a chance to talk to other world leaders, including King Abdullah

and President Mubarak.

And I must tell you, in each of those conversations, as part of our

official delegation in raising these issues as to whether they would be

supportive of an OSCE process in the Middle East, without any reservation at all, the world leaders in the region thought it was the right

thing to do, that it is the right way to try to resolve the conflicts in the

region by being able to have a forum in which we could talk about it in

an open manner where every state is given equal respect in dealing

with the issues.

Our position has somewhat changed. I want to thank Ambassador

Kampelman for his suggestion that we try not to reinvent the wheel,

that we already have the OSCE and it would take decades, perhaps, for

the different states in the region to develop their own commitments.

Why not just expand the OSCE with stronger participation from the

countries in the Middle East?

I thought that made abundant sense. And we are now looking at

ways in which we can expand our partners for cooperation, our Mediterranean Partners within then OSCE, to use that as a framework to deal

with some of the issues.
6

I know there is every excuse in the world that can be made, that we

do not want to distract from the main purpose of peace in the Middle

East, that there are many other issues. But I must tell you, I am convinced that if you had a mechanism such as the OSCE in the Middle

East, it would give you another dimension for trying to resolve problems and to better understand the people, the region and their right to

live in peace and harmony.

So I look forward to hearing our witnesses today. I look forward to

working with you, Mr. Chairman, in developing a U.S. strategy to expand our influence under the OSCE into the Middle East. Thank you.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much. Commissioner McIntyre?

HON. MIKE MCINTYRE, COMMISSIONER,

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

Mr. MCINTYRE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And, as a

newer member of the Helsinki Commissionthe newest member, I believeI want to thank you for the opportunity just to bring greetings.

Just this morning, I was in a breakfast with His Majesty King

Abdullah II of Jordan, and was quite impressed with his efforts to be a

mediating agent in the Middle East. I am thrilled to see this letter of

October 7, 2003, addressing him about playing that type of role. Indeed,

I believe, he has sought to do that, as evidenced by the meeting he had

this morning with several of us from the House and Senateand also

his understanding that religion is not a divider, that it is a healer and

a reconciler, and that the three Abrahamic faiths, of Judaism, Christianity and Islam, have that common denominator, from Father

Abraham, literally.

And I thought that his perspective on letting religion bring us together, and not being used as an excuse to tear us apart, was very

refreshing and encouraging in a land that has found tough situations.

So I am encouraged about this process and possibility for the Middle

East region. And when we have players like King Abdullah II dealing

with the excellent work he is trying to do from Jordans perspective and

the other countries that are showing their interest, we are very encouraged.

Thank you for letting me be a part of this today.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Commissioner McIntyre. And let

me welcome our first panelist:

Ambassador Kampelman served from 1980 to 1983 as ambassador to

the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and from 1985

to 1989 as counselor of the Department of State and ambassador and

head of the U.S. delegation to negotiations with the Soviet Union on

nuclear and space arms in Geneva.

He subsequently served as ambassador and head of the U.S. delegation to several CSCE conferences, including the Copenhagen conference

on the human dimension.

In the early 1990s, he rejoined the law firm of Fried, Frank, Harris,

Shriver & Jacobson, which he first joined in 1955, and where he is now

of counsel. He served as Chairman emeritus of the American Academy

of Diplomacy, Georgetown Universitys Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, and the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and

Freedom House.
7

He also serves as counselor of the American Bar Association Committee on Law and National Security, an ABA special committee on the

Central and Eastern European law initiative designed to provide assistance to the emerging democracies of Europe.

Ambassador Kampelman received his J.D. from New York University, and his M.A. and Ph.D. in political science from the University of

Minnesota, where he taught from 1946 to 1948.

He also served on the faculties of Bennington College, Claremont College, the University of Wisconsin and Howard University. He served on

the governing boards of a number of universities, and has received 13

honorary doctorate degrees. He now serves on a number of corporate

and nonprofit boards.

Ambassador Kampelman received the Presidential Medal of Freedom,

the highest civilian award in our nation, in 1999 from President Clinton. In 1989, President Reagan awarded him the Presidential Citizens

Medal. In April 2000, he was among those receiving the first Library of

Congress Living Legend award.

We will then hear from Natan Sharansky. In the former Soviet Union,

Natan Sharansky was one of the leaders of the Jewish immigration

movement, and in 1976 was one of the founding members of the Helsinki Monitoring Group, an important element of the human rights movement led by Andrei Sakharov, which reported on Soviet compliance, or

lack of it, with its international commitments to respect in internal

freedoms.

Natan Sharansky was arrested by the KGB in 1977, subjected to

lengthy interrogations and a show trial. Natan Sharansky was sentenced to 13 years of hard labor in prison. After serving nine, Mr. Sharansky was finally released in 1986.

In 1996, just 10 years after arriving in Israel, Natan Sharansky

founded a political party dedicated to accelerating the integration of

new immigrants into Israeli society, and was elected to the Knesset,

Israels Parliament. Mr. Sharansky served, in succeeding governments,

as minister of industry and trade, minister of the interior, minister of

construction and housing, deputy prime minister, and today serves as

minister for Jerusalem in Diaspora affairs.

In his current position, Mr. Sharansky is initiating programs to

strengthen Jewish identity and the ties between Jews and the state of

Israel, and coordinating a renewed worldwide effort to combat the spreading wave of global anti-Semitism.

Mr. Sharansky was born in 1948 and graduated with a degree in

computer science from the prestigious Physical Technical Institute in

Moscow. Before entering politics in Israel, he headed the Zionist forum

and co-founded Peace Watch, an independent nonpartisan group committed to monitoring the compliance of agreements signed by Israel and

the PLO.

His memoir, Fear No Evil, was published in the United States in

1988, and it has been translated into nine languages. I would just note,

parenthetically, that Commissioner Frank Wolf and I traveled to Perm

Camp 36 in the mid-1980s, a couple of years after Mr. Sharansky was

released, and saw firsthand that horrific gulag a thousand miles outside of Moscow, in Perm Oblast, a closed section of the country.

I am not sure I have ever seen anything as bleak and depressing.
8

The holding cell, the shizo, as they called it, was a place of terror

and certainly of isolation. To have spent time there, as Mr. Sharansky

did, and to do so bravely and honorably, is such a credit to his character. We are privileged to have you here today.

Finally, accompanying Ambassador Kampelman is Ambassador Mark

Palmer, who is the president of the Capital Development Company.

Ambassador Palmer, his organization, the company supports local partners in launching new enterprises in Washington and capital cities of

Europe and Asia. He is the founder and co-owner of Central European

Media Enterprises, CME, which is engaged in the development, ownership and cooperation of leading national, commercial television and radio stations from Prague to Kiev.

Mr. Palmer, or Ambassador Palmer, is our former U.S. ambassador

to Hungary, and served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in charge

of U.S. relations with the Soviet Union and East Central Europe, and

Director ofthe State Departments Office of Strategic, Nuclear and Conventional Arms Control.

Ambassador Palmer is a co-founder and sits on the board of the National Endowment for Democracy. He is a member of the board of the

School for Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University,

International Research and Exchange Board, the Institute for the Study

of Diplomacy, Georgetown University and the Association of Diplomatic

Studies and Training.

Ambassador Kampelman, and all three of our gentlemen, welcome to

this Commission. Please proceed as you would like.

AMB. MAX. M. KAMPELMAN,

CHAIRMAN EMERITUS, FREEDOM HOUSE

Amb. KAMPELMAN. It is a privilege, Mr. Chairman, to be sitting next

to Mr. Sharansky, whom I consider to be one of the great heroes of our

age.

Ambassador Palmer and I, on behalf of Freedom House, appreciate

your invitation that we share with you and the members of your Commission a specific proposal designed to advance the Helsinki Process as

a means of strengthening our national objectives to extend democracy

and human dignity where it does not now prevail.

Our specific suggestion is to extend the Helsinki Process to the Mediterranean where it already has an institutional relationship.

My own exposure to the Helsinki Final Act, which created the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, began in 1980 when I

was asked by President Carter to co-chair our American delegation to

its Madrid follow-up meeting. President Reagan asked me to continue

to chair our delegation. The 3-year session contributed significantly to

the spread of democracy throughout Europe.

Your Commission at that time, Mr. Chairman, was led by Dante

Fascell and Millicent Fenwick, whose support was indispensable. We

could not have functioned without the professional assistance of your

staff.

Some years later, in 1990 and 1991 and 1992, Secretary of State Baker

asked me to return to the process for one month during each of those

years, in order to deal with specific CSCE conferences on the human

dimension in Moscow and Copenhagen, and the CSCE conference on

national minorities in Geneva.
9

Once again, your staff was of immense assistance to me. Subsequently,

Secretary of State Christopher asked me to represent the United States

in an OSCE delegation to Serbia. I consistently found my relationship

with this Commission to be an effective and successful partnership,

and I now come to you in that spirit.

The opening paragraph of the Helsinki Final Act, signed in 1975,

includes the following, and I quote: During the meetings of the second

stage of the conference, contributions were received and statements heard

from the following non-participating Mediterranean states on various

agenda items: the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, the Arab

Republic of Egypt, Israel, the Kingdom of Morocco, the Syrian Arab

Republic, Tunisiawere the six states.

The body of the Agreement includes a section entitled, Questions

Relating to Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean, a 13-paragraph statement clearly acknowledging the geographical, historical,

cultural, economic and political relationship between Europe and the

Mediterranean.

When I, as a newcomer to the process, asked about these provisions,

I learned that some of the European states suggested that the six named

Mediterranean countries be invited to sign the Agreement and become

part of the process. But the prevailing view was that the East-West

European relationships were of sufficient complexity and importance

that they should not be then diluted by the addition of those six states.

They were named, but not given the right to vote.

Today, as a result of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Helsinki

Final Act has been formally expanded into Central Asia. The mechanism of the process is now at work to strengthen the Helsinki democratic principles in that area of the world.

The strength of the Helsinki Process, whatever the complexity of its

origin, was that its enunciated principles were democratic, excellent

statements as to how states and governments ought to behave if we

were to achieve international security and cooperation.

In the 29 years since its creation, the details of that ought have

been enlarged and enriched. We in the United States have learned how

important it was to agree, for example, on our own American ought

the Declaration of Independenceand steadily strive to move our isto

thatought. We removed property qualifications for voting, ended slavery and opened the franchise to women.

The Helsinki Final Act, to me, provided an excellent international

ought toward which to reach.

Mr. Chairman, this Commission long ago appreciated the vital importance of the Mediterranean to Europe, as well as to our countrys

welfare. It is true that the OSCE is now hard at work with its limited

resources, undercutting the strong authoritarian tradition in much of

Central Asia.

Under the leadership of this commission, the OSCE is also working

to combat the poisonous message of anti-Semitism which has been tragically renewed in Europe, partially as a result of the movement of a

large number of North Africans, who have not been educated in the

strength and desirability of our ought.

This interrelationship demands recognition. It is long past due for us

formally to extend the OSCE family and the virtues of our ought to

the Mediterranean. That is the essence of a Freedom House proposal
10

which Ambassador Palmer and I have, for three years, been urging the

executive branch to accept, and which we bring to your committee today for support.

We urge that the six non-participating Mediterranean states be invited to full membership as a full step in a steady expansion to a more

democratic world.

We are not alone in this urging. The Prime Minister of Denmark

spoke at the Woodrow Wilson Center here in Washington some months

ago and called for the expansion of the Helsinki Process into the Mediterranean area. More recently, at Davos, the Danish Prime Minister

specifically proposed that the OSCE become the OSCEM.

Our presidents, Democratic and Republican, have appreciated the

need for our government to identify our foreign policy with the spread of

democracy and human dignity to those peoples now living in authoritarian societies.

We know that our security is directly related to that development.

President George W. Bush has identified this goal as central to his

presidency.

We at Freedom House, therefore, believed that the administration

would enthusiastically embrace our suggestion that the six non-participating Mediterranean states be invited to become formal participating

States in the Helsinki Process.

We have discussed this proposal with responsible officials in the White

House and in the State Department, where we have found encouragement and supportas a matter of fact, support at the very high levels

of the White House.

But the skeptics and the short-sighted seem to have temporarily prevailed. Instead of a specific, non-aggressive, constructive program, it

appears as if the administration position as expressed in the Sea Island

G-8 summit last week, calling for a dialogue of willing partnerships,

but in effect proposing that the Arab and Mediterranean states accept

our standards as they work on their own, or form an organization of

their own.

It does not surprise us to have found strong opposition to that proposal.

President Chirac reportedly, according to the press, trashed the

proposal at a lunch with Arab leaders, calling it messianic and humiliating. We had to make changes in it, retreat, and accept the statements that the mother of all conflicts is the Israel-Palestinian conflict,

a convenient justification used by Middle East authoritarians.

In my opinion, Mr. Chairman, the Israel-Palestinian conflict and tension will not be solved through any international conferences.

One experienced international scholar wrote me: The administration seems to have ended up with a much more complicated approach

than your idea of inviting the Mediterranean states to full membership.

It is an approach that has ruffled the feathers of many Europeans and

Arabs and does not seem to promise to lead to the creation of anything

very task-breaking at the summit.

Now, in that connection, let me share with you a conversation I had

with one of the North African ambassadors representing his country in

Washington.

In effect, he said to me: Our neighbors decided to form a country

club. We were of some assistance in preparing the groundwork, but we

were not invited into membership. This exclusive club had a fine golf
11

course, swimming pool, tennis courts. Would we welcome an opportunity to be part of that club, with a requirement that we live by its rules?

Yes. But instead, we are now asked to form a club of our own. We are

not good enough to join the exclusive club, yet we are asked to make

sure that our club confirms to the rules of this exclusive club. That is

insulting, he said to me.

He added that his government would be pleased to join the OSCE,

primarily, in his governments case, because of the economic advantages arising out of Basket II.

Mr. Chairman, our intent at the G-8 summit was noble. Our execution, in my opinion, was poor. Our substance was inadequate. We hope,

however, that it will be a small step forward, but our Freedom House

proposal is still relevant and even more essential.

Mr. Chairman, I believe that part of our problem is the fact that for

many years now, the Helsinki Process has been a stepchild within the

State Department. It has been a major effort and a cause of this Commission.

For example, when I refer to the Copenhagen meeting with people at

the State Department, I am too often met with blank looks.

But a few weeks ago, the U.S. Institute of Peace held a conference of

international law professors. There was general agreement that the

Copenhagen document was the most important international human

rights document since the Magna Carta. But we do not know if this is

familiar to the people in the department.

I had the privilege of helping to create that charter in the month we

spent in Copenhagen. I am disappointed to be met with blank expressions when talking about it with some of our government officials.

Freedom House, Mr. Chairman, is eager to work with your Commission in an effort to elevate the Helsinki Process to the relevance required to advance our national interests.

I have reason to believe that some people key to policy formation in

our government would welcome that initiative on the part of the Commission. Thank you.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Ambassador, thank you very much for your eloquent

testimony. It is precisely because of your advocacy and that of Freedom

House, in general, and others who are concerned about this, that we

are having this hearing to begin building a case. You put it very well in

your testimony, and we are very grateful for that.

Mr. Sharansky?

HIS EXCELLENCY NATAN SHARANSKY,

ISRAELI MINISTER OF DIASPORA AFFAIRS

Min. SHARANSKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and distinguished

members of the committee. For me it is a special pleasure to come back

to this committee, this committee which was called, in my criminal

case,the papers of KGB,the main foreign address for criminal subversive activity for dissidents like myself.

So it is only natural that I am coming now for the third time to this

committee which was home for us former Soviet dissidents. This time I

come not to speak about problems of human rights and relations between the free world and the former Soviet Union, but to speak about

the situation in the Middle East.
12

And I welcome the proposal of Freedom House. I am glad to appear

together with Ambassador Kampelman and Ambassador Palmer. I believe that is a very constructive idea to apply the Helsinki Process to

the Middle East. I have no doubt, it has to be pursued and implemented.

Let me speak about specific aspects of this process which ensured its

success in Europe. In recent months, there has been much talk about

creating a Helsinki strategy for the Middle East.

President Bush, Prime Minister Blair and other world leaders have

spoken about the connection between freedom and security. They have

noted that the lack of freedom in the Middle East breeds fundamentalism, hatred and, ultimately, the terrorism that endangers the region

and our entire world.

Calls for reform have also come from within. Documents produced 2

months ago, at the end of the Alexandria conference, which was attended by representatives of civil society institutions within the Arab

states, pointed to the urgent need for political, economic and social reforms in the Arab world.

These are certainly very positive developments.

I know there are those who argue that the free world has no right to

impose democracy on the other countries. I do not accept the premise

that by helping free societies emerge, that we are imposing anything on

anyone. We must always remember that non-democratic regimes do

not represent their people, and therefore have no right to claim to speak

on their behalf.

Those who argue that Arabs do not want to live in democratic societies should put their ideas to the test. They will find that, like Americans, Britons, Germans, Italians, Japanese, Taiwanese, South Koreans

and all other peoples, Arabs also want to live in free society.

They may not want to live in a Western democracy, but they will

seek to live in free societies that reflect the heritage, culture and tradition of the Arab world.

I will be happy to expand on these ideas further, but the primary

purpose of my testifying here is not to engage in abstract debates, but

rather to discuss how a Helsinki strategy for the Middle East might

work in practice. Fortunately, the democratic world has had some experience with helping free societies emerge, and it is to this experience

that you can turn now for guidance.

Let me start by reminding everyone that many dissidents behind the

Iron Curtain initially saw the Helsinki Agreement as a sell-out. They

were concerned that the Soviets were being granted real political and

economic benefits in exchange for lip service on human rights.

Their concerns were not unjustified. The Soviet leadership surely

believed that they were hoodwinking the West with an empty promise

in a non-binding agreement.

Moreover, just as today many are willing to have reform in the Middle

East take a back seat to various other objectives, a generation ago,

many in the West were fully prepared to sweep human rights under the

rug of detente.

But some dissidents, including myself, saw Helsinki as a potential

watershed. For the first time, the USSRs international standing was

linked to the regimes treatment of its own citizens. The critical question was how to turn that formal linkage into a practical tool for pressuring the Soviets to change their human rights policies. This would

not be easy.
13

Unlike the Jackson Amendment, which set clear standards for compliance and clear penalties for non-compliance, Helsinki was non-binding with no monitoring mechanism.

But we dissidents believed that if we could turn those non-binding

Helsinki commitments into an internationally accepted measure of Soviet intentions, then the agreements could become a catalyst for change.

I remember vividly my meeting with a group of American congressman, and Millicent Fenwick one of them, in Moscow some weeks after

the Helsinki Final Act. Both sides were concerned how not to permit

the Soviet Union to turn these obligations into lip service. That is why

we formed the Helsinki group in Moscow in 1976. That is why

Congressperson Millicent Fenwick initiated the legislation which

brought to the creation of this committee.

Because of your work, because of our work, because of the work of

courageous leaders of the West who insisted the Helsinki commitments

be upheld, the strategy worked. The Soviets soon realized they could

not take one step in the international arena without the spotlight of

world opinion exposing their human rights policies and their treatment

of political dissidents.

Before Helsinki, the Soviets could have it both ways. They could have

the benefits of cooperation ofthe Westlegitimacy,trade, scientific and

technological cooperation and a host of other benefitsand atthe same

time control and repress their own people.

But in the atmosphere that was created after Helsinki, the Soviets

were forced to choose: Respect human rights, or give up all the benefits

of cooperation with the free world. What many had once viewed as lip

service to human rights turned out to be one of the most fateful decisions of the Cold War.

My dear friends, in order to ensure that the free worlds commitment

to democracy in the Middle East becomes more than lip service, as has

unfortunately been the case so many times in the past, non-democratic

regimes in the region must understand that they, too, face a clear choice.

If they continue to repress their people and stifle dissent, then they

will lose all the benefits the free world, led by the United States, has to

offer, from legitimacy and security guarantees, to direct aid and trade

privileges.

The free world does not need to wait for dictatorial regimes to consent

to reform. If there are courageous citizens in the Arab world who are

genuinely willing to democratize and liberalize their countries, then we

should applaud and support them fully. But if we condition reform of

the agreement on non-democratic leaders, it may never come. We must

be prepared to move forward on the policy of linkage, despite their objections.

The non-binding recommendations of the Alexandria conference, that

discuss a number of political, economic and social reforms that should

be made to the Arab world, could be turned into a yard stick to measure

the intentions of different governments and to chart their progress. For

that to happen, governments, the media and human rights activists in

the West must be willing to shine the spotlights on dissidents and other

advocates of democracy within the Arab world.

I want to remind you that only in the last weeks, many dissidents

were arrested in Arab countries. Fathi al-Jahmi in Libya, Aktham

Naisse in Syria and many others were arrested in the last weeks in

their countries for promoting liberty and democracy. Their names, and
14

the name of Saad Eddin Ibrahim, who spent 3 years in a prison in

Egypt, and other dissidents have to be as much in the center of your

attention as the fate of Soviet dissidents, or dissidents from the Eastern

Bloc, the center of your attention in the past.

I am often asked: Where are all the Arab dissidents? Where is the

Arab Sakharov? I have heard it said time and again that the lack of

dissidents in the Arab world is proof that, unlike the people of the Soviet

Union, the Arabs do not want to be free, that they really do not want

democracy.

I would like to remind the skeptics that in the 1930s, there were no

dissidents in the Soviet Union whose voices were heard in the West.

The reason was not that no one in the USSR wanted to be free, but that

the price for dissent was death. In the 1970s, when the price of the

dissent was prison or exile, a few hundred dissidents emerged. But we

dissidents still were only the tip of an iceberg. Beneath the surface were

hundreds of millions who wanted their freedom.

The lack of dissent in the Arab world today is a function of the lack of

international concern for how Arab regimes deal with dissent. I am

certain that the more support we give those fighting for democracy in

the Arab world, the more other Arabs who support them will have the

courage to step forward. International scrutiny over how these regimes

treat their own people will turn the trickle of dissent we see today into

a real flood.

For the Helsinki strategy to work, potential dissidents and civil institutions working for democratic reform in the Middle East must be confident that the free world will not turn a blind eye to the harsh measures of these regimes, which will almost certainly employ against them.

No less important, these dissidents must know that the free worlds

support for their efforts will not be abandoned in the name of achieving

stability or preserving good relations with the non-democratic regime

or some other goal. They must be assured that the free world believes

that the best guarantor of stability and good relations with any country

is for democracy to take root.

The free world must also be willing to link its international policies to

how Arab regimes treat their own people. In many ways, Middle Eastern regimes today are even more dependent on the West than the USSR

was in 1975. If the free world uses this leverage, Arab regimes will no

longer be able to violate human rights with impunity.

The United States, for example, might insist that if the Saudi regime

wants American protection, it will have to change its Draconian immigration policies and improve its record of human rights. The direct aid

and grants that are provided to other countries in the region might be

withheld if the recipient countries imprison dissidents, particularly

advocates for democracy.

European states, for their part, might demand that if the Palestinian

Authority wants to keep receiving financial support, it will have to show

that these monies are being used to improve the lives of the Palestinian

people and not to fund terrorism and corruption.

The lesson of Helsinki is that when demands to uphold human rights

are backed by effective action, the cause of freedom and peace can be

advanced. The danger today is that the commitment to spread human

rights and democracy in the Middle East will remain an empty promise. That would be most unfortunate.
15

Just as Helsinki helped liberate hundreds of millions of people and

defeat an evil empire that threatened the democratic world, the same

approach today can transform the Middle East from a region awash in

terror and tyranny into a place that provides freedom and opportunity

to its own people, as well as peace and security for the rest of the world.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much.

Ambassador Palmer?

AMB. MARK PALMER, CO-FOUNDER AND BOARD MEMBER,

NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY

Amb. PALMER. Ambassador Kampelman really spoke for both of us.

Let me just make two quick points.

One, I was present in Helsinki in 1972 and in 1975. It seems to me

that what made that process really work was that there was a voice

inside the tent, that is there were governments inside the process, who

representedwho were the proxy for the people who were enslaved.

And if we look at the Middle East today, if you had a forum or a

process that includes only the governments of the Middle East, you do

not have a similar structure, you do not have any proxy voice for the

people of the Middle East, because not a single government, as Mr.

Sharansky has just said, not a single government in the region is a

legitimate government. They are all unelected, and they are all dictatorships of one degree or another.

The other point I wanted to make is that I lived as both a student and

a diplomat in communist countries for eleven years. I lived through the

periods that Mr. Sharansky has just mentioned, from great fear to somewhat less fear to final triumph. I have spent quite a bit of time in the

last few years traveling in the Middle East, and it seems to me that we

are seeing that now very visibly.

Mr. Sharansky mentioned the Alexandria Library Declaration. I have

never seen a document, in all my years of studying documents, I have

never seen a document as exciting and as good as that document is. It is

perfect. It is a remarkable document. It was followed just a couple of a

weeks ago by the Doha Document, also by hundreds of Arab intellectuals, business people and others, equally good.

If you compare those two documents, and many other thingspetitions being submitted to the royal family, to Crown Prince Abdullah in

Saudi Arabia, many other documents that are pouring forward now in

the Arab worldif you compare them with the most recent declaration

written by governments of the Arab world, the Sanaa Declaration in

Yemen, which also came out pretty recently, it is nowhere near as good

because it was written by these non-representative governments.

It proves to me, at least, that we have to have a structure that replicates the Helsinki structure. As Ambassador Kampelman mentioned,

he and I have for 2 years tried to persuade people in this town that we

have that structure. It does not have to be invented. Congressman Cardin said, we have this, and there is no reason on Earth to reinvent the

wheel.

Let me just say, as a career foreign service officer, there are times

when you all have to push, and there are people at very high levels in

the White House, and at very high levels in the State Department, who

want you to push and who agree.
16

And then there are people at a level just below that who are resistant,

who think this is going to be a lot of work, it is going to overstretch the

OSCE, that the Arabs would not welcome it. Of course, they have not

bothered to ask the Arabs whether they would welcome it.

So I feel very passionately that this is the right course, that it is an

exciting time now. The ice is clearly breaking in the region. People are

clearly coming forward now, and they need our support.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Palmer, thank you very much.

And thank you all for your very fine statements. I think, as I said at

the outset, this does provide us with a launching pad to make the case

and to entertain any thoughts about what might work, or what might

not work.

You know, one of the things I think Mr. Sharansky saidand it is a

very good point, about the dissidentsnot only, when you are in the

room meeting in a process, rather than just a bilateral meeting that

happens from time to time, it provides an accountability. I mean, one

thing that we always did as a CommissionI remember Secretary

Schultz never went anywhere without a list of dissidents that were

being held.

All the other secretaries of state and everyone else from there on,

including our ambassadors to the OSCE or the CSCE before it, always

had a list. So there is a sense of accountability.

Even our trip to Perm Camp 35, Frank Wolf and I back in the mid1980s, that took 2 years of negotiations, starting with the Procurator

General in the Soviet Union who said, Anybody can come to the Soviet

Union. So we put our hands up and said: We want to come, we want to

visit a camp that is notorious and filled with political prisoners.

But it was the process that made it possible. There is no such process

that even comes close or approximates the OSCE process. So I think

your point is very well taken.

And the OSCE process provides a mirror, so countries can learn from

that reflection, whether it be a reflection they do not like to see or not,

and hopefully take curative action to reform themselves.

You know, I would point out that among the existing OSCE states, 39

are free, according to Freedom House, 11 are partly free, and five are

not free. With the five that are not free, as well the 11 who are partly

free, we work very hard with prisoner lists and other kinds of engagements with them to promote the human rights issue.

I also think it gives those who are being held hope. Hope is an intangible, but it is certainlyyou know, it says in the scriptures, without

hope, the people perish. You have got to have hope, and no one knows

that better than Natan Sharansky, who I remember told a committee

of the International Relations Committee that he mediated on the Psalms

and drew great strength from them.

So, basically, my only question, I guess, would be, because you made

very excellent recommendations, when I look at the countries that are

our partners right now, Mediterranean Partners, according to Freedom

House, only one is free. That is Israel. Algeria, Egypt and Tunisia are

designated as not free. Jordan and Morocco are designated as partly

free.
17

How do we convince those countriesfirst of all, we have got to convince our own OSCE leaders here in Washington and in Europeto

agree to something, a process? What is the carrot that they might see

for them by allowing themselves to be held to account when it comes to

human rights, on which they have a very bad record?

Amb. KAMPELMAN. Mr. Chairman, let me say that we have talked to

a number of ambassadors from that area. I do not think I have found

one negative view.

Now, they were not speaking for their capitals, but I am sure that

they had some basis for what they were saying. Nobody has invited

them to membership. Really the only official announcement has been

that of the Danish Prime Minister.

What we should have done as a country is gotten in touch with the

Danish Prime Minister and said, What a greatidea. Lets gettogether.

How do we do this?

But we did not. But I think you have put your finger on the problem,

but I do not think it is an insoluble problem.

Min. SHARANSKY. Mr. Chairman, let me remind you that when the

Helsinki Process started, if you look at the figures, indexes of Freedom

House, then  [Inaudible.]  I am sure thatthe figures were as disappointing about all these countries as they are today in the Middle East.

And they all  [Inaudible.]  more, if the characteristics of these

countries were different, if they were free, we would not need the Helsinki Process. The idea of the Helsinki Process was to link the interestseconomic, military and cultural interestsof the non-free countries with the question of human rights.

And I believe that in this case, this linkage can be even stronger,

because, as I mentioned, the countries of the Middle East are even more

dependent on the readiness of the free world to cooperate with them

than the countries of the Eastern Bloc.

If you take the Palestinian Authority, for example, 100 percent of its

budget comes from the free worldfrom Israel, from America, from

Europe, from Japan, from Canada. At the same time, the needs are

great. Leaders have made it absolutely clear that the free world is ready

to make some very big efforts, I would call it sometimes the new Marshall

Plan, but this money would have to be used for taking people out of the

refugee camps, for creating jobs, for creating normal systems of education, for giving some basic freedoms to the citizens.

Then, if this linkage will be very strong, then we will finally have a

partner for democratic change in the Palestinians. The same could be

said also about other countries.

The key question is this linkage. What price is paid by Libya, who

arrested the dissidents these last 2 months, or the price that is paid by

Syria? Well, of course, the American Congress made some very tough

and very strong decisions about Syria which is good, but is it linked to

the question of the fate of Syrian dissidents and what is happening with

them?

So I believe that the opportunities for linkage are there. The need for

the assistance to the people, their interests in economic and the cultural development of their countries is there. What is needed is the

determination of the free world led by the United States of America.
18

Mr. SMITH. Let me just ask, Ambassador Kampelman, in your conversations with the administration as well as with foreign leaders in

Europe, have any of thoseI mean, how high did it go? Did it go to the

level of Secretary of State Colin Powell? And are they at liberty to divulge that?

And, talking about the European leaders, were they thinking along

these lines as well? Or were they just waiting for someone to step into

the breach and provide that leadership, or what?

Amb. KAMPELMAN. Let me say that we have not gone higher than

the ambassadors here, because we do not have any authority to do this.

But in a number of cases, the ambassadors here have consulted with

their capitals and have informed their capitals. Certainly that is the

case. I do not want to be too specific because we do not want to embarrass those who have spoken to us within their own country.

As far as the United States is concerned, Ambassador Palmer and I,

and I think he may correct me here, I think we have seen three under

secretaries of state and maybe three assistant secretaries of state, and

I must say, not a single one of them took issue with us, to be perfectly

candid about it.

I have talked to people on the White House staff. I believe Mark has

also talked to people on the White House staff. Well, actually, together,

we have met with one of the assistants in this area at the White House

staff.

So it is not a new idea. As a practical matter, without mentioning

names, I will say I had lunch just about 2 weeks ago with a senior

person on the White House staff and alerted him to the fact that you

were going to hold hearings and that I intended to be critical in my

testimony to you. He nodded his head and understood the issue.

May I use this occasion, Mr. Chairman, to ask you for authority,

which I would leave out during my testimony?

Freedom House has developed a small group of documents that I would

like to be part of the record of this session and submitted.

Mr. SMITH. Without objection, those submissions or any additional

will be made a part of the record.

Amb. KAMPELMAN. One of those documents is a study done by Professor of the Northwestern University Law School, who, with his associates, studied all the materials beginning with 1975 until 1993, and

wrote a memorandum detailing all of the humanitarian requirements

that exist within that context. And I think it would be useful to your

staff, as well.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you.

Before you leave, Mr. Cardin, I do want to thank you for the compliment you paid to the Helsinki staff. We do have a staff, past and present,

that is second-to-none, walking institutional knowledge about the whole

process of Helsinki, and do provide Ambassador Minikes, our current

OSCE ambassador, I think, a very good bit of support here in Washington, and as well as Indiana. So I thank you for that compliment you

paid to them.

And let me also just say in response to your comment about the idea

of stepchild, that the OSCE is not always seen for the very valuable

opportunity it presents: I would agree with you 100 percent. There are

many people at State that do not recognize it as such. They would rather

engage in bilateral diplomacy rather than a multilateral, and I think

the wave of the future increasingly is multilateral.
19

And we can lead or we can follow or say What is happening? And I

hope that we choose to lead. And Mr. Cardin and I will follow up with

the administration. And again, that is why we have held this hearing,

to gather more information and your insights.

Mr. Cardin?

Mr. CARDIN. Well, Mr. Chairman, it is keeping with the tradition of

Helsinki that we raisewe can criticize our friends. So it is perfectly

OK for us to criticize the State Department.

Even though, as you know, this Commission is uniquely situated, in

that we are an independent Commission, we are both executive and

legislative, and we have direct relationships with the State Department,

so it is a unique opportunity for us.

But I could not help but think, Mr. Ambassador, as you were going

through the brilliant documents that have come out of OSCE that have

been somewhat ignored by the State Department at times, that the

crisis that we are currently undergoing in regards to the torture in

Iraq, we only need to look at the Helsinki commitments to know that

there is good information that should have been made available immediately by the State Department and by the Defense Department as to

commitments that we have made that were violated in what happened

in Iraq.

So it is clear that the understanding or acknowledgment that the

OSCE, within the bureaucracy of the State Department, always is a

challenge. And we do have a lot of good friends within the State Department, but I think many of us join in concern that we wish there were

more sensitivity and respect for this process in the State Department

itself.

I want to come back though to theand I said there are exceptions to

that. I particularly want to thank Secretary Powell for his active involvement in what happened in Berlin. We would not have had a successful conference but for the fact that he was actively involved, so I

think we have strong support. And you are right about Ambassador

Minikes. We could not have a stronger representative within the State

Department than our own ambassador.

I want to come back though to the membership. Mr. Ambassador,

you are suggesting that we should invite the six current partners for

full membership in the OSCE. Well, as you know, the Mediterranean

and the Middle East area have many other countries that are absolutely critical to have a critical mass for discussing the sensitive issues

in the Middle East. If we restrict the membership to the six current

partners, then we will be leaving out a lot of other countries.

And then secondly, Mr. Sharansky, I would also like you to respond

to this: If we invite all of the countries in that region to join, Israels the

only democratic country, and you have already addressed that issue,

but are you concerned that Israel could become isolated in this regional

organization since it is only one country among many, and most of the

other countries have a common interest that sometimes is contrary to

Israel?

Amb. KAMPELMAN. Let me try to answer that question, if I may. And

let me also apologize for the fact that I am hard of hearing at my age. I

got the thrust, I think, of what you were saying.
20

The reason we distinguish the six from the rest of the area is because

they have an organic relationship already existing with the Helsinki

Final Act. They are there. That is why I quoted the two places in the

Act in which they are mentioned.

Now, our hope would be that the six would welcome full membership,

whatever their motives may be. Their motives may not be ours  why

did the Soviet Union sign these commitments? They probably thought

nobody would pay attention to it, but they signed. They felt were getting

other advantages out of it. Some of the six may feel nobody will pay

attention to it, and they may look for the economic advantages. That is

why I talked about the importance of an ought. If we agree on an

ought, we have got a standard by which to judge,to interfere,to press.

Now, assuming the six come in or are invited in, my thought and our

thought as we have talked is that we can then expand it further if it is

desirable and appropriate. You have got the option of asking the six

whether they have a seventh in mind that they would like us to invite?

This comes with discourse. This comes with conversation. This comes

with a desire to move. But to break the barrier is what we are trying to

do with this proposal, and that is why we try to make it as simple as

possible, because there is already a relationship existing.

Mr. CARDIN. Thank you.

Amb. KAMPELMAN. I do not know if I have answered . . .

Mr. CARDIN. That is very helpful.

Mr. Minister, do you have a view as to whether Israels going to be

isolated? There are other international organizations that I would argue that Israel is not exactly welcomed, even though they are a member

of.

Do you worry that this could become a similar type of a circumstance?

Min. SHARANSKY. Well, if I understand your question to me correctly, you asked me: Are not you concerned that Israel being involved

in this process will find itself the only democratic country among many

non-democratic countries?

No, we are not concerned. Unfortunately, we are used to being the

only democratic country in that part of the world. The worst thing which

can happen, there will be no process and there will be status quo, which

does not encourage non-democratic regimes to change. This type of status quo is the worst thing which can happen for democracy and also for

security.

I think we will be more than willing to be actively involved in this

Helsinki Process for the Middle East, and I am sure that our partnership with the free world can contribute a lot to this process.

Mr. CARDIN. Mr. Minister, let me try to pin you down a little bit

more. I happen to believe this is the right way to go. So this is a question that I ask knowing that there is some risk involved. I think the

risks are worth taking.

Right now, in the Parliamentary Assembly, next month in the Parliamentary Assembly, we are liable to be confronted with a resolution

concerning the status of Jerusalem because one of the representatives

wants to raise that issue. Quite frankly, the U.S. delegation does not

believe that is an appropriate resolution for what we should be taking

up. But, as you know, Helsinki works through a consensus process

where you do not like to block by one, you would like to work around

your differences.
21

My question is that Israel is perceived to have an agenda that may be

different from the Arab states that surround Israel, and that if you are

in the Helsinki Process with so many other states that have agenda

items that are contrary to what Israel believes is appropriate, are you

concerned that being a member of the Helsinki Process could work to

Israels disadvantage?

Min. SHARANSKY. Well, as you mentioned, the Helsinki Process is

based on consensus. And the Soviet Union, if you remember, thought

that would guarantee the Soviet Unions success there,that despite the

occupation after WWII in Eastern Europe, they would get legitimacy,

and no changes in Basket III would take place without the agreement of

the Soviet Union. And they were wrong.

The fact that there is some consensus mechanism guarantees that it

will be difficult to use the majority of non-democratic regimes to impose

some non-democratic decisions. But, at the same time, what was so

important to the Helsinki Process, it helped to bring moral clarity. It

helped to clarify whether this country absolves human rights or not,

whether this country can be called democratic or not.

And that brought a lot of difference and a very different approach to

the international relations. I think that Israel can only benefit a lot, if

it will be part of the process that will bring this moral clarity to the

Middle East.

Mr. CARDIN. I thank you for that response.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Amb. Kampelman. I will just take a further moment here. The Spanish government was the host government at the Madrid meeting, and

the United States persuaded the Spanish government to invite the six

non-participating Mediterranean states to make presentations at the

opening day of the session. Israel was there. My recollection is that

there were only three of the six that accepted that invitation, but Israel

took advantage of it. I think Egypt took advantage of it. I think Morocco

may have been the third, but I do not in fact remember that. But I do

remember vividly the Israeli presence, because Israel sent its ambassador from Paris there.

And it led ultimately, I must say, to a decision by the Spanish government to recognize Israel for the first time.

Mr. CARDIN. Let me point out that the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly has been moving in this direction, and Israel has been an active

participant to expand the role of our Mediterranean Partners. We have

had meetings, as you know, on the Mediterranean Partnership, wellattended, and Israels been an active participant.

We have not had always the full participation of all the other Mediterranean Partners, but Israel has always been theresome times, even

scheduled at the most inconvenient times, including during a major

Jewish holiday once, in Rome.

But we worked around that. We still had participation. So I agree. I

think you will find that this is an opportunity. And we also need to

know, remember, that the membership in OSCE includes such countries as the United States, and we are not timid in expressing our views

as to what we think is appropriate and not appropriate to be taken up.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Cardin.
22

I want to thank our very distinguished panel for your recommendations. This, like I said, I think can become the launching pad, or to relaunch what you have already launched.

Thank you so much.

We do have three votes, so I would like to introduce our next panel,

and then we will break for those votes and then reconvene to continue

our hearing.

The first will be Mr. Peter Jones, who is a research associate of the

Munk Centre for International Studies at the University of Toronto and

was leader of the Middle East Security and Arms Control Project at the

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute from 1995 to 1999.

He also serves as policy adviser on security issues in the Privy Council

Office in Ottawa, previously having served with Canadas Department

of National Defense and Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade.

Dr. Jones holds a Ph.D. in war studies from Kings College, London,

and an M.A. in war studies from the Royal Military College of Canada.

He is the author of numerous articles and books on arms control, confidence-building, peacekeeping, and regional security in the Middle East,

Europe and Asia.

We will then hear with the next panel Ambassador Craig Dunkerley

who is distinguished visiting professor, Near East-South Asia Center

for Strategic Studies, National Defense University, is a career member

of the Foreign Service, senior Foreign Service. He recently served as

associate dean at the Foreign Service Institute responsible for the senior seminar.

As the Secretary of States Special Envoy for Conventional Armed

Forces in Europe, the CFE, from 1997 through 2001, he led both the

successful U.S. negotiating effort to adapt the CFE Treaty, signed at

the Istanbul OSCE Summit in 1999, and a subsequent diplomatic campaign to facilitate the stage two withdrawal of Russian military forces

from Georgia and Moldova.

He was confirmed by the U.S. Senate with the rank of ambassador in

this capacity. In the early 1990s, he served in Vienna as Deputy Chief

of Mission of the newly formed U.S. mission to the OSCE.

He also served as director of the Office of European Security and Political Affairs and managed one of the Department of States largest

offices with day-to-day responsibility for political-military issues related

to NATOs first round of post-Cold War enlargement, and those associated with NATOs post-Dayton Agreement engagement in Bosnia.

Ambassador Dunkerley is a graduate of Amherst College and the

Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and entered the Foreign Service

in 1971.

Finally, we will hear from Professor Michael Yaffe, who is the academic dean and professor at the Near East-South Asia Center for Strategic Studies. Prior to joining the NESA Centre, Dr. Yaffe was a career

foreign affairs officer in the U.S. Department of State, where he focused

on Middle East security and weapons of the mass destruction nonproliferation.

From 1993 until 2001, he served on the U.S. Delegation to the Middle

East Peace Process, focusing on multilateral negotiations in the arms

control and regional security working group. Additionally, he organized
23

and managed U.S. Governments Middle East regional security Track

Two program, fostering regional security dialogue and promoting confidence-building measures.

As an expert on nonproliferation and arms control, he also served as

the senior adviser and lead U.S. negotiator on Middle East issues in the

Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee and the 2000

review conferences as well as the Annual General Conferences on International Atomic Energy Agency. As a senior action officer, he focused

on the proliferation activities in the Middle East, including in Iran and

Iraq.

In the immediate aftermath of the attack of September 11, 2001, he

served as a coordinator on the counterterrorism task force in support of

Operation Enduring Freedom. During 1992 and 1993, Dr. Yaffe supported Operation Restore Hope by managing a program in Mogadishu

that provided 100 civilian translators for U.S. forces in Somalia.

He was a recipient of two State Department superior honors awards,

a group meritorious honors award and a Department of the Army certificate of appreciation.

In 1989 to 1993, Dr. Yaffe was a post-doctoral fellow at Harvard

Universitys John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, an associate

fellow of the Center for Science and International Affairs at the J.F.

Kennedy School of Government, and a peace scholar at the U.S. Institute of Peace.

Dr. Yaffes undergraduate education was in economics atthe University of Massachusetts at Amherst. He received a Masters degree in

International Relations from the London School of Economics and a

Ph.D. from the University of Pennsylvania. He has published innumerous articles on the Middle East, on security, arms control, diplomatic history and strategic studies.

I regret that we do have to take a brief pause here for these votes, and

then we will reconvene immediately thereafter.

[Recess.]

Mr. SMITH. The hearing will continue its sitting. And, again, I want

to apologize to our witnesses for the delay.

Mr. Jones, if you could begin?

PETER JONES, RESEARCH ASSOCIATE,

MUNK CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, UNIVERSITY

OF TORONTO

Mr. JONES. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. My thanks to

you, sir, and to the Commissions staff for inviting me to be here today

in my personal capacity.

Coming from Canada, let me start by playing to the American desire

for plain-speaking. Let me just address the basic question and answer;

yes, the OSCE does have relevance for the Middle East as an example of

a regional security system in the general sense, and in terms of some of

the ideas and points that have emerged from the experience of the OSCE.

For example, the idea that social, economic, and political reform is an

integral part of security in a region; the concept that emerged of indivisible security; and the idea of a process to stimulate and manage change

based upon a code of conduct and a review mechanism, these are all

extremely important lessons of the OSCE experience. And they do have

relevance in the Middle East.
24

But I would have to say that the OSCE, as such, is not a model that

can be specifically extended or replicated in the Middle East. Let me

give you some background for that statement.

For the past decade or more, both inside the Canadian government

and in academia, I have been intensively examining the question of

creating a regional security system for the Middle East. A key element

of this work has been leading a series of study groups composed of officials and elected representatives and academics from across the Middle

East. Some of the results of that work have been published, and I have

sent the references to the commissions staff.

As part of this work, we have looked at other regional models. We

have looked at the OSCE, which, incidentally, is where I began my

government career. I spent some time in Vienna negotiating European

CSBMs in the late 1980s and early 1990s before moving on to Middle

East efforts in the arms control group of the peace process.

But we also looked at ASEAN and at the Organization of American

States as models, as examples of regional security systems. And we

have concluded that there is much in these experiences for the Middle

East to learn from, especially, as I said, the OSCE.

However, we have also concluded that the Middle East really has to

develop its own model, drawing on these different experiences, but placing them in the context of the Middle Easts history, culture, and its

political needs. And this will be a long-term process; there do not appear

to be any shortcuts which seem acceptable in the region for political

and other reasons.

Let me make some general points, and then move on to try to address

some specific questions. As I say, the general points are based on extensive work and discussions across the region at high levels. I just returned from two months traveling around the Middle East. We visited

16 countries to promote an idea that Canada and Denmark have been

working on for the creation of a regional security system in the Middle

East.

And I must, I am afraid, correct Ambassador Kampelman. The Danish Prime Ministers interest is in creating an indigenous regional security system in the Middle East, not so much in extending the OSCE.

And Canada and Denmark have been working very closely on that for

some time now.

But the first general point that I would make is that one must remember, as has been said here by yourself, sir, and others, that the

idea of creating some kind of a regional system in the Middle East is not

a new one, and neither is it an external idea. There have been various

official proposals and references to it in official documents. And there

are now, as has been mentioned, a number of unofficial civil society

ideas that are circulating, as well.

The second point that I would make is that ideas for change in the

region cannot be, and perhaps even more importantly, cannot be seen

as quick fix proposals which are designed to meet the needs of a particular electoral cycle or political moment. These are proposals which call

for fundamental change.

And just as it was not realistic to expect in the OSCE case that these

changes would happen overnight or that countries would accept them

overnight, it is not realistic to accept that they will do so in the Middle

East, either. It would nice if they would, but it is not realistic.
25

Third, as has been said in many cases, no one-size-fits-all model is

going to work. The Middle East is a vast and diverse region. And just as

there is a need for some kind of region-wide system, we must recognize

that sub-regional and bilateral dynamics will also be important within

the overall.

In the work that we have been doing over the years, the concept of

geometry variable has emerged and has become seen as very attractive by people from the region; the idea that within an overall framework of norms and standards, some countries, some regions, some subregions will move at different speeds but they will all be moving toward

the same goals.

Fourth point: Any system that emerges must be truly a Middle Eastern model of regional security. It will be a unique one which is specifically designed by the peoples of that region for their own historical,

social and political realities. As I said a moment ago, the other regional

experiences can be drawn on.

And, as a general point, I am increasingly convinced that one of the

things that is really required at this point is for the development of a

community of experts, both in government and out, both in our part of

the world and in the Middle East, who know about both regional security systems and the Middle East.

One of the things that I have found over the years is that there are a

great many people who know about how different regional security

mechanisms work, be it the OSCE or ASEAN, but they do not know

much about the Middle East, and vice versa.

So one of the areas where I think this commission and the OSCE

secretariat and other bodies could play a great role is in this process of

dialogue and discussion about how these systems work, but also learning how the Middle East works, as well. I think that is a critical deficiency.

Finally, while I subscribe fully to the idea that the pursuit of some

kind of a cooperative regional system in the Middle East, with the promotion of social and political reform at its heart, is vitally important in

its own right, I am increasingly convinced that it will happen in concert

with progress toward the resolution of the issues of the peace process

and of Iraq.

This does not mean that we should delay the beginning of this process, and I am quite alive to the fact that there are many people in the

region who have used the peace process as an excuse not to embark

upon reform. That is certainly something one sees a great deal.

But I think one also has to recognize that the state of public opinion

in the region is such that steps to begin the creation of a regional security system must go hand in hand with steps to address the issues of

the peace process, which does not mean to say that a discussion cannot

begin or should not begin in the near term, right away, in fact.

Let me now address some specific questions.

First of all, what do we mean by the Middle East?

In the work that we have done over the past several years, the definition of the Middle East that has emerged and proved most acceptable to

the regional participants in these discussions has been the states of the

Arab League, Iran, Israel, with some form of very close association for

Turkey.
26

We recognize, as I say, that within the Middle East, there are subregions, and this concept of geometry variable comes into play. But

the idea of a region-wide system based on a set of norms including those

countries seems to be very important.

But also, the work that we have done has brought forward the idea,

mainly from the people from the region, that there is a critical role for

the extra-regional countries, extra-regional powers, in the development

and the operation of a regional system, a future regional system in the

Middle East.

We have discussed this very intensively. The definition of the sort of

extra-regional countries that should be part of this regional security

system is the overlapping memberships of the states of the G8, the

Permanent Five, plus the E.U. and the U.N. as institutions.

If one is trying to conceive of some kind of an architecture of a system, the idea that seems to garner most acceptance in the region is the

ASEAN architecture, where you have a group of countries at the core,

the ASEAN countries, or in this case the Middle East countries, but

then around it, you have the ASEAN Regional Forum, composed of many

countries from outside the region who have the same rights at the table

and who take part in the discussions.

So you have a regional core and then an extra-regional group of countries who participate. That seems to be, in general terms, the architecture.

Let me speak for a moment, if I may, about the idea that has been

suggested of extending the OSCE in some sense, in some way, to the

region. This has appeal for three reasons:

One, it would be fast if it worked.

Two, it could avoid the region going through a lengthy debate over

what various concepts, such as democracy, mean, which might lead to

definitions of which we do not agree. There is a ready-set group of definitions there.

Three, it would give extra-regional countries automatic membership

in the regime. Although, as I say, I do not think that is a problem,

because the Middle East countries want that in my experience.

I am not immune to this argument, but I do not support this approach. It is not clear to me that the OSCE can, in fact, shift its priorities to accommodate the region, even if it begins, as Ambassador

Kampelman has now said, with the six. And I do not think it would do

the OSCE much good. I think decision-making in Vienna is already

hard enough; adding a new set of countries would be more problematic.

More importantly, as I said, there are no shortcuts to fundamental

change. If we really want the states of the Middle East to develop a true

regional security system which recognizes the critical role of social and

political reform, they have to undertake the process of thinking this

through and developing their own models.

We instinctively understand what such ideas as indivisible security

mean, because we spent many years working them out. They were not

instinctively understood by North Americans and Europeans 25 years

ago. It is not realistic, it seems to me, to expect people in the Middle

East or any other region to just pick these concepts up and really understand what they mean right away.
27

And finally, it may smack of the West, and I have to say primarily

the U.S., trying to rope regional countries into systems where the West

controls the rules, the content, and the membership. It seems highly

unlikely that the Middle East states will agree. Their publics, given the

present mood, are going to be particularly negative about this.

There is also an idea of beginning with sub-regional dynamics, beginning with the Persian Gulf, the Levant, and the Maghreb. That is a

very attractive idea. It may well be the way forward, and I do not say

that we should not be working on that and thinking about that.

But I would draw attention to the fact that there are issues in the

Middle East which span the entire region: weapons of mass destruction,

ballistic missiles, certain aspects of the peace process, the question of

Jerusalem, for example. And so there will also be a need for a set of

region-wide understandings on or, at least, a process to develop understandings on those issues at the same time as one pursues sub-regional

dynamics.

Splitting up the Middle East into sub-regions too firmly may have the

unintended consequence of demonstrating that different standards of

reform and different standards of political progress are acceptable in

different parts of the region. I would invite you to imagine what would

have happened in the CSCEOSCE contextifthe West had accepted the

notion that the standards sought in the three baskets could be developed sub-regionally around Europe rather than as a region-wide set of

norms.

A third question: Which basic assumptions should we take as the

founding principles, if you will, of this new regional security system

that we are working toward? Should they be, for example, the universal

values as enshrined in the human rights documents of the U.N. and

the U.N. charter, the democratic standards as we know them in the

West, for example?

My answer is that the universal values are just that: they are universal. And all of the countries of the Middle East have signed the U.N.

Charter, have signed the universal declaration of human rights and

other key documents, even if some of the governments in the region had

little intention of honoring many of these commitments.

There is now a push, both within the region and without, to make

these commitments stick. But it must be done in a way which comes

from the region. Democracy as we understand and practice it in the

West is not necessarily the only model of representative government,

for example.

And it should be remembered that concepts of democracy and womens

rights and so on are not alien to the Middle East. The Charter of Madinah,

which was signed by the Prophet Muhammad 500 years before the Magna

Carta, contains ideas that are in line with what we now regard as democratic pluralism.

My sense is that what is required now is an effort to develop understandings of what the underlying concepts inherent in these documents

mean in the Middle East context culturally, socially, historically, and

politically, and to reinforce them in the current political regional context.

There is a very important discussion that needs to be held over what

is meant in the Middle East, and in our own cultures, as we approach

the Middle East, when we use words like democracy and secular-
28

ism. We need to go through the process of discussing those ideas, and I

suspect that we may have to develop a set of concepts that bridge some

gaps as we try to understand what these things mean.

A fourth question: how can the West best help this process, particularly after the prison torture scandal and so forth? Have these events

weakened the power that the West needs to push for reforms?

In the short-term, they probably have. But I think we have to be

careful to separate the feelings of the region toward particular governments and policies from its feelings toward the ideals for which the

West stands. As I frequently remind my Middle East friends, just as we

Westerners have to remember that there is no monolithic Middle East,

there is no monolithic West.

And I sense that most in the Middle East, frankly, do not hate the

West at all. They greatly respect much about the West, including much

about the United States. Perhaps many Middle Easterners perceive and

are angered by the fact that they feel that some Western leaders do not

honor their professed beliefs. But then, as I remind my Middle East

friends, that is not a uniquely Western problem, either.

In terms of how the West can help, I think we need to begin with

humility. We do not have the answers, and only the region can define

what they may be. But it is important for the Middle East to be honest

with itself, as well.

When one looks, for example, at the question of ownership, the idea

that this must come from the region, be owned by the region, it is a

very important point. But one has to be frank with people in the Middle

East and point out that they cannot own a region-wide initiative at this

point because many of their governments do not recognize one another.

There is a need for external facilitation.

But it is vital that people on both sides understand what facilitation

is. We need to have a discussion of what we mean by facilitation and

what the boundaries of facilitation are.

And I think we in the West, frankly, should not be embarrassed to

openly state as part of that discussion that we have an interest in reform in the Middle East. It is evident that instability in that region

affects us, and we have a right to say so and to try to mitigate that

instability. And done right, this is not interference; it is facilitation.

What is the result of all this? As I said a moment ago, all this Track

Two work has led to a proposal that the governments of Canada and

Denmark are taking around the region. And I will reflect on that just

for a moment before I conclude.

My sense is that some ideas are emerging around the creation of a

regional system or a regime in the Middle East. They call for the creation of an ongoing process in the region involving the elaboration of

norms of conduct.

And I think these norms of conduct really can be thought of as a set of

three interlocking bargains.

One is a bargain between the regional states, in terms of how they

deal with one another; a set of norms of conduct and standards that

they should adhere to in their relations with one another.

The second is a bargain, if you will, between the regional states and

their peoples, in terms of social, political and economic reform; what

the peoples have a right to expect of the states, and what the states

have a right to expect of the peoples who are going to take part in the

mainstream of change and reform in the region.
29

And the third bargain is between the regional states and the rest of

the world, in terms of the expectations and responsibilities that each

has toward the other.

Ultimately what we seem to be striving toward is some kind of a

charter or document which frames those three interlocking bargains

and lays out a set of norms, which would then be subject to ongoing

implementation and review. The purpose of such a system would be to

give the region a set of tools to help it manage a period of transition and

change.

As we have gone around the region, one of the questions we have had

is: Why should we sign up to such a thing? Why is it in our interest?

The answer back is, simplyand many of them know it anyway

that change is coming. They can either be on the right side of history

and try to manage this change and lead it to some sort of productive

outcome, or they can try and stop it, which they can, perhaps, for a

time, but not forever. And a process which helps them to manage a

period of change is very much necessary.

So in considering the basic ideas on which an indigenous Middle East

regime should be based, I think the following ideas are critical.

First of all, the system must be based on a set of rules of conduct for

the region, and regional states must take the lead in elaborating them

with outside facilitation and participation as required.

Second, the regime should not be thought of a static thing, but rather

as a process which will evolve over time, probably beginning very slowly.

And I think we should not forget the lesson here of the Helsinki process.

It began very slowly and rather modestly, and it evolved over time. And

there is no reason to expect that we can fast-forward 30 years and have

a system in the Middle East today which will contain all of the lessons

of the Helsinki process, as we have understood them for more than 30

years.

Thirdly, such a process must be inclusive and open to all regional

countries, even if not all of them may elect to join at the outset, and to

a group of extra-regional powers who have a role to play in terms of

facilitation and in terms of providing things like security guarantees,

as the process moves forward.

Fourth, a one-size-fits-all approach is not going to work. The idea of

geometry variable,the idea of sub-regional dialogues where appropriate, is very critical.

Fifthly, the process must take a broad definition of security to include

questions of social and political transformation in the region, as well as

traditional security questions.

And finally, governments may lead in some respects, but there is also

a critical role for civil society in developing these ideas. And we are

beginning to see, with things like the Alexandria and Doha documents,

that civil society is beginning to step up to the plate, and that is a very

encouraging development.

Thank you very much.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Jones.

Ambassador Dunkerley?
30

AMB. CRAIG DUNKERLEY (RET.),

DISTINGUISHED VISITING PROFESSOR,

NEAR EAST-SOUTH ASIA CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES,

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

Amb. DUNKERLEY. Thank you, Chairman.

I do want to express appreciation to members of the Commission for

the opportunity to participate in todays discussion. I can think of no

better group to help move debate on this particular topic in an informed

and constructive direction.

I will offer some very brief observations. They represent very much

personal views. They do not reflect any official position or agency assessment. I am a spokesman for no one but myself.

The impetus for todays discussion rests with the positive examples

that the Helsinki Final Act principles and subsequent OSCE experience might be able to provide for other regions. As the chair has noted,

this is not an entirely new idea.

But I think Ambassador Kampelman, Minister Sharansky and Freedom House have once again done good service in underscoring its possible application to the Middle East at this time.

To my mind,the value of Helsinkis lessons will, in the firstinstance,

lie more for U.S. policymakers as to the requirements and possible tactics of crafting a successful, long-term, collaborative strategy for the

United States in the Middle East, and less in any sense of prescribing a

pre-conceived institutional template to be laid down on the region from

the outside.

I will confess I am skeptical of using an immediate focus on organizational models and end-states as the starting point for this particular

discussion. And this is not just because there are many profound differences in the recent histories of Europe and the Middle East.

As previous speakers have noted, right now in the region there are

growing voices for change. But there are also widely held popular sensitivities to any notion of an external formula for change, let alone

misperceptions of an American desire simply to impose our own plans

or structures.

That notwithstanding, we have an important and continuing role to

play in moving these issues forward. And in doing so, we should be alert

to and resist efforts by some regimes to try to invoke resistance to outside ideas and pressures simply as an excuse for inaction.

But I think it would be a serious mistake for us to neglect a critical

political fact of life within the region. To be effective and to be meaningful, genuine reform, regional security dialogue and overall change must

be seen as driven largely from within the region itself.

Therefore, amidst all the factors that members of the Commission

have to consider, I would suggest that the most important question will

be whether any such process of reform and regional dialogue can come

to be perceived as genuinely owned and led by a growing community of

local stakeholders, both governmental and nongovernmental in nature,

and drawn from among the different states and societies of the Middle

East.

Faced with that sort of challenge, a close reading of Helsinkis history over the past 3 decades might give policymakers certain help. And

here, given your role as keeper of that history, I think the Commission

has a special role to play.
31

First of all, Helsinkis history should flag for us the need for a sense

of strategic perspective, political dedication and great patience. Supporting the sort of transformative agenda within a region that is even

more challenging than Cold War Europe is going to require a much

longer-term and sustained commitment of energy and resources than

our political calendars usually allow for. In other words, this should be

seen in terms of a major generational commitment.

It was usefulthat the G-8 summit statement of last week on A Partnership for Progress and a Common Future with the region was beginning to speak in those terms, albeit still at a very high level of generality. Clearly, much still needs to be done.

Second, Helsinkis history would also suggestthe importance oftactical flexibility on our part. As circumstances and expectations evolve

within the region, we should take care not to lock into either a one-sizefits-all pattern, as Mr. Jones has noted, but also not into any single

organization concept too early on.

There will be a variety of ideas coming from within the region. There

will be different opportunities arising within individual countries. And

there may be different possible experiments with individual issues or

sub-regional arrangements which we should be prepared to explore and,

as appropriate, encourage.

Indeed an openness to consider possible sub-regional steps, whether,

for instance, in the Persian Gulf or in the Maghreb, might provide the

best chance for early progress.

Third and not least, the Helsinki Process succeeded in no small part

because its agenda was broad enough to reflect issues seen as important in various and different ways by almost all of its participants, both

in the East and West.

I would suggest that this past strategy of inclusiveness has a direct

relevance for any comparable future effort within the Middle East.

In some circles within the Middle East, the labels Helsinki or OSCE

are perceived, or misperceived, as almost exclusively focused on a U.S.-

driven agenda of Western human rights standards, which in turn is

aimed solely at advancing our own strategic advantage.

That is, of course, a serious misreading. Not least, it is a misreading

of the breadth of the Helsinki Baskets. It especially slights, for example,

the degree to which OSCEs experience in political-military confidencebuilding could offer much to the development of a regional security dialogue, an idea which has been actively explored, as the Chair has noted

previously, during the last decade.

But I fear that Helsinki-inspired efforts in this direction, especially if

cast on a comprehensive or pan-regional basis, will risk being undercut, as they have been in the past, if their sponsors are not seen as

taking account of those security and political questions which many in

the Middle East see as central.

Two examples: Rightly or wrongly, long-standing frustrations, on all

sides, over a lack of progress toward a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian question on terms that might produce a viable Palestinian state, as

well as ensure Israeli security, will inevitably cloud any local debate

over any new initiative.

Similarly, the degree and pace at which security and well-being are

restored within a sovereign Iraq will have a profound influence on local

perceptions of regional stability and the possibility for a regional security dialogue.
32

Mr. Chairman, to cite these various complications is not to deny the

important challenge set by previous speakers, the need for all of us to

think seriously and creatively about Helsinkis potential lessons for the

Middle East. Rather, it is to underscore that any American strategy to

that end would have to be long-term in perspective, collaborative in

nature, broad in substance, sufficient in its resources, and widely seen

as meeting the political needs, both real and perceived, of the region

itself.

Mr. Chairman, in closing, I think that members of this Commission

could have a constructive role in framing any further consideration of

such a long-term strategy by: first, continuing the useful discussion

begun today with a follow-up focus on hearing directly from a greater

number of concerned and appropriate individuals from throughout the

Middle East, especially from the Arab states and societies; secondly,

exploring ways to give both visibility and moral support for those civil

society groups and individuals from within the Middle East who are

seeking the application of Helsinki-type principles and standards within

their own societies; and, finally, by strengthening substantive engagement on these very questions with your own legislative counterparts

from throughout the Middle East, both on a bilateral basis and as opportunities arise through the vehicle of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly.

Thank you, Chairman.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much for your statement and very thoughtful recommendations. Perhaps we should invite some of the ambassadors from the countries in question, as well as some of their academics.

It is a very good idea.

Professor Yaffe, if you would proceed?

PROFESSOR MICHAEL YAFFE, ACADEMIC DEAN,

NEAR EASTSOUTH ASIA CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES,

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

Prof. YAFFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you and the

other members of the Commission for offering me this opportunity to

discuss the Helsinki Process and reforms in the Middle East. With your

permission, I will offer some brief observations, trying not to duplicate

too much my colleagues here. I will offer a longer written statement

elaborating on my points.

For more than a decade, I have been involved at the government-togovernment and civil society level in promoting regional security in the

Middle East, as part of the peace process team, as a coordinator for

Track Two for the U.S. Government, and now as the academic dean at

the Near East-South Asia Center at National Defense University.

As such, I must begin at the outset by saying that what follows are

my views alone, and not those of the U.S. Government, Department of

Defense, Department of State, and National Defense University.

Today there are a host of proposals on the table focusing on a system

in the Middle East to bring about change in the interests of individual

freedom, modernization, prosperity and enhanced security. Many of these

proposals come from the Middle East.

Now, rather than critique this current crop of proposals, I would offer

some insights from previous attempts to bring about change in the region so that future initiatives might avoid the pitfalls that dogged earlier efforts. And then taking this critique a step further, I intend to
33

provide six suggestions the Commission might want to consider as it

proceeds in promoting reform, cooperation and security in the Middle

East.

Efforts to promote change in the Middle East have a long history. The

modern phase of this effort can be traced to the Madrid Peace Process

established in the aftermath of the first Gulf War in October 1991. Of

particular note from this process was the Arms Control and Regional

Security [ACRS] Working Group, which was one of five multilateral

working groups established under the peace process.

And it brought together Israel, 13 Arab states, and Palestinians. Iraq,

Iran and Libya were excluded. Syria and Lebanon refused to attend. It

was chaired by the United States and Russia, and it brought together a

score of countries, mostly the OSCE countries, as well as entities such

as the OSCE.

ACRS met in plenary four times and had 31 expert-level working

group sessions between January 1992 and September 1995. During that

time, the group negotiated some of the same issues that the United

States and Europe addressed in the CSCE and the OSCE process more

than 2 decades earlier.

After long hours in negotiation, agreements were reached on several

key topics, such as communication networks, maritime confidence-building measures, declaratory statements and so on, a major achievement

when you consider that this was the first time that many of these countries concluded any agreement which involved Israel, for which most of

them were still in a state of war, and did not recognize a state of Israel.

Now, the last ACRS meeting occurred in September 1995, basically

to conclude negotiations on a draft mandate to establish a regional security center in Amman, Jordan, and associated centers in Tunis and

Doha. This mandate was to provide the institutional base for regionwide dialogues on security and cooperation, and establish the norms,

principles and framework of the work itself for the center.

It was a uniquely Middle East mandate, borrowing and rejecting ideas

from other regional organizations. Some of the states favored modeling

the mandate after the OSCE, especially Jordan, which had codified its

support for a conference on security and cooperation in the Middle East

in the 1994 treaty between Israel and Jordan. Most of the states rejected this approach when they talked about the region-wide mandate.

Before the regional security center mandate and other agreements

could be fully adopted or implemented, ACRS ended abruptly in the

autumn of 1995. Failure to make progress in the two principal panregional issues, the Arab-Israeli conflict and nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, converged to freeze the activities within ACRS

and later the other multilateral working groups.

Essentially, the bilateral peace and end-of-conflict negotiations between Israel and its neighbors set the pace for the amount of progress

achievable on all region-wide initiatives.

To keep the regional parties engaged in dialogue while ACRS was in

abeyance on hard security and soft security issues, the United States

began sponsoring in 1996 the Middle East Regional Security Track Two

Program.

This program was funded initially by the Department of State, and

now Congress funds the Department of Defense to run it. Several European governments contribute to it.
34

The program sponsors workshops, task forces, online discussion

groups, training courses, and studies that collectively have brought together more than 1,200 official and non-officials from throughout the

Middle East, United States, Europe and Asia.

Some fascinating studies have emerged from this Track Two process,

many of which have direct bearing on the subject of todays hearing,

including some of the ideas which Dr. Jones has raised.

Now, I provide this brief background in order to provide a context for

understanding my critique of current initiatives under way and those

being contemplated.

First, my suggestion is to minimize pan-regional initiatives, charters

and forums. Cooperative pan-regional approaches involving all parties,

from Morocco to Iran, do not work in the Middle East. Treating the

region as a common entity has proven to be a mirage for every initiative

seeking greater interaction and cooperation throughout the region. The

lack of pan-regional organizations in the Middle East is emblematic of

the lack of political, social and economic cohesiveness in the region.

Only 4 percent of all trade in the region is between Arab states. The

rest of it is external.

Given all this, I would counsel, as my colleagues have also done, against

forming a broad institution such as the proposed (at least at one time)

78-member Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the

Mediterranean and the Middle East, as a means to create greater unity

and cohesion. And as such, I would also counsel against an OSCE that

is expanded to include the Mediterranean, and I will underscore this as

I go along here.

One of the negative consequences of the pan-regional approach is that

it permits the hijacking of the political agenda so that the peace process

between Israel and its neighbors becomes the primary issue of concern.

Another consequence is that when the peace process becomes stagnated

or experiences setbacks, it tends to undermine regional cooperative initiatives. But this suggestion of minimizing pan-regional approaches is

not an argument for ignoring those issues that have pan-regional implications.

Second point: Emphasize sub-regional or a three-zonal approach for

security cooperation. I believe that most of the hard and soft security

problems facing the states of the Middle East are best addressed at the

sub-regional level.

New security and cooperative initiatives should be based on taking

action in small groupings with common cultural values, history and

security interests in specific geographic areas. Using this formula, the

Middle East can be divided into nearly three distinct sub-regions: Western Mediterranean, Eastern Mediterranean, and the Gulf.

The Western Mediterranean sub-region encompasses southwest Europe, North Africa, and to some degree, sub-Sahara. The Eastern Mediterranean sub-region covers the Levant and Eastern or Southeastern

Europe. In the Gulf region, or Southwest Asia sub-region, includes the

six Gulf Cooperation Council states, Iraq, Iran, Yemen, and even possibly Pakistan.

Essentially, this approach advocates moving beyond the traditional

connotation of what constitutes the Middle East and, to some degree,

somewhat that of Europe. Indeed, it might even be better to think about

it as a cooperative interaction occurring in security zones, rather than

the confines of continental groupings.
35

We saw this movement toward sub-region actually in the ACRS process when we, as I talked about earlier, had the mandate to establish the

regional security centers. The idea for that was put on the table by

Jordan, and for a long time we expected it to be one center to cover the

entire region in Jordan. And suddenly, Qatar and Tunisia said they

wanted centers because they felt their sub-regions deserved to be adequately addressed.

So already you started to see a split that was taking place. That is

what I am trying to say. Theres this kind of natural occurrence toward

those sub-regions.

Now, that does not mean that the OSCE, even if it does not take a

pan-regional approach, cannot help the sub-regions in helping with the

agenda for the sub-regions.

Now, third point: Actualize bilateral programs for assisting economic,

social and political change. I would argue that in the Middle East the

most successful reform initiatives are tailored for each country, tailored

through bilateral interactions between states of the Middle East and

outside states and organizations.

Many of the most promising ideas coming out of the June summits

are focused on bilateral programs, rather than multi-lateral initiatives.

Where cooperation between regional or zonal states is necessary, this

should occur bilaterally or within sub-regional forms, but not at the

pan-regional level.

Fourth point: Recognize the needs for a comprehensive strategy as a

prerequisite for change. Compartmentalizing the problems in the subregional groupings helps to make the problems more manageable, but

it is important to recognize the pan-regional issues need to be addressed

at the same time.

The Arab-Israeli conflict has a bearing on the success of initiatives

promoting cooperation and reforms throughout the Middle East. What

is needed is a comprehensive strategy that deals with all the problems

facing the region and in the right settings, be it at the bilateral, subregional or the pan-regional.

Ambassador Kampelman talked about that many of the governments

in the Middle East have used the idea of the lack of progress in the

Middle East peace process as an excuse for not producing change and

reform. I would agree that is correct.

But that is no excuse for us not to continue to push in that area. It

does have regional implications. We have seen where people who never

marched on the streets before in very quiet capitals throughout the

Middle East do march on the capital when things go sour in the peace

process.

My fifth point: Maximize Middle East ownership of the security and

development process. Ideas for developing cooperative regional security

regimes, dialogues, codes of conduct, charters, must belong to the region if they are to succeed.

One of the reasons that the Madrid process made as much progress

when it did was because the regional parties believed that they were all

equal parties to the process, able to shape the agenda and have their

security concerns addressed.

Indeed, when I first join the ACRS working group in 1993a year

after it beganI asked many of the regional parties, Whose idea was

this? And it was very interesting. Almost all of them claimed it was

their own.
36

Now, when the regional parties began to feel that the process was not

addressing their security concerns adequately, the process became an

orphan and ultimately failed. Many of the initiatives coming out of the

June summits, I fear, are becoming not orphans, but the sole custody of

Western parents without Middle East partners.

Likewise, it can be expected that many Middle East parties will actually reject the idea of joining Western organizations that expand their

membership to include the Middle East. We have heard at official levels

and at the non-official levels by scholars and so on who have rejected

joining the OSCE, or modeling their security charters after the ARF or

the Africa Regional Security Forums or Latin America. They want their

own model that suits them.

There is very deep suspicion that organizations from the West are

pursuing only what is of interest to them. For example, many of the

regional parties view the Barcelona process, which encompasses some

of the OSCE plus the Med idea, as something that was concocted by the

European Union to keep North Africans out of Europe. North Africans

want the aid that the Europeans offer, but resent the linkages. So it

may be better to start with organizations anew.

My sixth point, and my last: Multilateral types and layers of interactions between governments and civil society should be expanded. There

are many ways to assist states in the Middle East to provide for enhanced security and progress. I believe that the OSCE has a strong role

to play here.

It should not seek, however, again, to set up another mass forum for

dialogue or duplicate other initiatives. Instead, the OSCE should seek

to fill the biggest gap in the programs of the other initiatives; namely,

supporting societal interactions, dialogue, particularly on the issues of

security, cooperation, human rights and freedom.

In particular, OSCE should seek to provide financial and organizational support to ongoing and future Middle East Track Two programs.

Such programs are always in need of funding in order to ensure that

the regional parties have at least some venues where they can meet

regularly. Track Two provides both a safety net, in case the governments fail in their initiatives, and it can serve as an incubator for reformist and security ideas that can be fed to the governments.

No Track Two program for the Middle East to date has financial

security to be assured that it will be in operation from one year to the

next, and the OSCE can provide for that assurance. It can also think

about shifting the region at a functional level in trying to expand what

I would call a culture of change.

Ambassador Dunkerley mentioned the idea of inter-parliamentary

dialogues. One can think of that as something that is very needed. One

can think about having dialogues between doctors between the regions,

between educators, and so on, to build out the society level.

As both my colleagues have said, change is coming to the Middle East

no matter what, no matter if we produce reform initiatives, no matter

how much cooperation. It is changing because of demographics, because

of succession issues, because of a host of other issues within the region

itself.
37

States in the region should work together in appropriate forums to

create a calm and stable security environment in the Middle East so

that the reforms can grab hold and not be swept away by political uncertainties and those who oppose change. And in this, again, I think the

OSCE has a role to play.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Professor Yaffe, and all of you for

your very insightful comments which we will look at, and especially

your written statements which will extend upon the oral statements

you have all made.

And members of the Commission and staff will look at it very carefully, as you know. You have been around long enough to know that

just because the place is not full of members of right now, it does not

mean the information will not be widely disseminated and digested.

And it will.

Just a comment, and you might want to respond to it, but you know,

the issue of ownership was stressed by at least two of you.

Mr. Jones, Dr. Jones, you talked about the ASEAN model. And I have

worked somewhat on the issue of human rights in Asia, particularly in

Vietnam. I have authored a human rights act twice now. It has passed

the House. It is pending in the Senate.

I have been over there a number of times. I worked with China. I

worked with some of the other countries. But with Vietnam in particular, a member of the ASEAN countries, interestingly enough, there are

a group of human rights advocates, Vietnamese, who actually call themselves the Helsinki Group because they are dissatisfied with existing

mechanisms, because of the lack of emphasis that is given to human

rights.

Dissidents and others are not dealt with, whether it be Father Lee or

any of the other people who are mistreated in Vietnam or any other

country, it does not seem like the ASEAN framework provides that

opportunity.

One of the things that struck me in hearing all three of you was that

one reason why there is an attractiveness to the OSCE including, at

least initially, the six states and then, perhaps, expanding it if it proves

itself, is that Israel is sothe balance of population and physical territory, and even military capability, is disproportionate to the side of nations who may not look at Israel in a very positive way, to say the least.

Whereas if there is a partnership and the mentoringand I do not

think that is a lack of humilityfrankly, I think countries that have

not had democracy, or at least anything that resembles it, will be the

first to tell you, particularly those that emerged from Eastern Europe

and the Soviet Union, that they are grateful for the mentoring. They

need to learn this process. It is not something that is a given.

And I think we are seeing now with Iraq, God willing that works and

the transition occurs unimpeded on June 30, and they matriculate into

a full-fledged democracy. They are no less capable of owning a democracy that is second-to-none, but there are stages thatbaby steps, if

you will, that every country needs to take.

That might be provided, especially given the propensity of the European countries to be more likely to be associated with the Arab viewpoint and the United States with the Israel viewpoint. That is a simplistic, perhaps, view. But it seems to pan out over time.
38

How does Israel, given all of these countries that do not always have

their interests at heart, really meld into a framework that might be

indigenous and may actually excludeI mean, many ofthese countries

still do not recognize Israels rightto existin the way that we would like

them to. Certainly, Jordan is an exception, and Egypt is a major exception.

So that is a concern, where if you had an overlay of a process where

you do not talk about definitions again. One of you testified about or

mentioned that the universal declaration of human rights can be the

definition. But that is not a given. I remember the Bangkok declaration

that came out of the East that tried to redefine what human rights

were. We always see a revisionist view thereI mean, the Soviets extolled that. And the Chinese, the PRC, does so today, as do the Vietnamese and others.

So I am wondering whether or not that is not a given. We already

have a clear-cut working definition of human rights that certainly tracks

universal declaration as part of the Copenhagen document and all the

other OSCE accords, including the Helsinki Final Act.

So I just raised that as kind of a response slash question.

Mr. JONES. May I just respond quickly on two points?

First of all, the question of the ASEAN model. I was making a reference there to the architecture, not so much the content; to the idea that

the ASEAN model contains a mechanism whereby the states of the

region own the process, they are at the center of the process, but there

are states from outside the region who are an integral part of it.

I agree with you that the content of the ASEAN model may not be

appropriate, but I would also point out that ASEAN is itself evolving.

The concept that we understand as indivisible security in the European

context was rejected by ASEAN for many years; the idea that one could

comment on the events in another country was rejected.

But with things like the Indonesian forest fires clogging the air over

Kuala Lumpur, they are beginning to realize that they do have a right

to comment on one anothers land-clearing practices. It is a slow process, but nevertheless I very much agree with you that in terms of the

substantive aspect of what might emerge, the OSCE provides some very

important lessons, perhaps rather than ASEAN.

In terms of Israel, I would simply say that your concern is obviously

a very valid one. But I would point out that there are many other issues

in the region.

And one of the things that strikes me when I travel the regionas I

do extensivelyand talk to senior officials is that, particularly as one

gets further and further away from the immediate area of Israel, is

that they will tell you quietly that, frankly, Israel is not their main

concern; it is not really a particular concern that they have. They have

much greater concerns about their immediate neighbors in the Persian

Gulf, or in the Maghreb, or whatever the case may be. Israel is a convenient rhetorical tool.

Now, they do have concerns about the extent to which events in Israel and Palestine inflame their street. That is a concern that they

have. But they do not have a concern for Israel.

So there is a danger, as you say, of Israel being isolated within such

an organization. I do not think it is perhaps so grave as it might appear

at first. Rhetorically, Israel may be isolated, but in terms of real secu-
39

rity issues and concerns, I do not think it would be. And I think that

this is another place where this role of the external powers, who will be

part of this process, would be an important aspect of this.

As to the question of definitions and the universal declaration of human rights; yes, of course, there will be an attempt on many parts to

redefine the commitments contained in such documents. That is a given.

That is part of the give-and-take of politics and diplomacy, and it plays

out over several years. And we will see that happen.

I tend to believe, though, that if some kind of a process is created over

a period of time, one will see, and one is already beginning to see within

the region, the flowering of the kinds of people, such as Mr. Sharansky,

within those countries. They will say, Now, wait a minute. You signed

these things. That is not acceptable.

But that will be part of a normal discourse, the give-and-take. That

will take place over many, many years. Thank you.

Amb. DUNKERLEY. Chairman, I will respond briefly to both your

points.

First of all, and in connection with your reference to ASEAN, I fully

agree that, as we seek to go forward with a variety of experiments and

initiatives in the Middle East region, we have foremost in mind the

need to avoid the trap that so many past ministerial communiques and

summit level initiatives have fallen into, which is, agreement on paper

to high-sounding principles which rapidly fall into neglect.

That means that we have to bring a sensitivity that any future regional dialogue ought to include mechanisms and procedures for a review and debate on the status of implementation of commitments undertaken, and at the same time also, we have a political strategy to

encourage and enable those participants who are most interested to be

able to take full use of that opportunity.

That, in essence, is a very positive lesson from the Helsinki experience. From my conversations, at least, I think a number of the individuals involved in civil society projects within the region have assimilated this lesson, and that is what they will be looking for, as well. So

you are quite right. That has to be one of our desiderata.

On the second question, which relates to the issues of Israel, specifically in the context of an OSCE expanded to include the six Mediterranean Partnersthis is a new idea. It is different from the one earlier

put forward in the Freedom House paper, and it is one I, quite honestly,

would need to think more about.

I can certainly see the utility in, for instance, providing an incentive

and an opportunity for a country like Morocco, again following your

comments, to be encouraged to assume closer ties with the United States

and Europe in a context of Helsinki principles and standards.

But I think there also will be a series of price tags in connection with

this proposal, which we do have to be open and clear about. One is that

it would provide an almost inevitable importation of a whole host of

Arab-Israeli issues into OSCE debate. I think Congressman Cardins

mention of the problem that you may have at the next Parliamentary

Assembly meeting would be there in spades.

What I am afraid is that the dynamic would not simply be one of

Israel having perhaps a slightly better numerical odds, but that you

would end up having a replication of sterile, U.N.type debates, in which

we are supporting Israel, and a number of the Europeans are either inbetween or supporting Arab positions. That would have an unfortunate

affect on the political agenda of the OSCE in this regard.
40

I think that your basic point that at some point there has to be an

end-state where there is a genuine normalization of relations between

Israel and its neighbors, that it has to be seen as a full-fledged member

of a regional community, is the objective that we should be aiming for.

But I am afraid that is not going to be jump-started by simply replicating the U.N. debate within the OSCE. It has to come from within

the region itself with a regional solution that they have to work through

very much on their own. It will be a very tough, long, hard slog.

Prof. YAFFE. Briefly, just to add a couple points and to second much

of what has been said, but particularly with regard to the question of

Israel, my fear is exactly that. If Israel does become a partner along

with the other five, in this case, the agenda of the OSCE plus Med

would be hijacked by the Arab-Israeli conflict.

And I say that not just by speculating. I say that based upon what we

have seen in the Barcelona process, what we have seen in other multilateral institutions, U.N. institutions, the IAEA, all these places where

the Israel-Arab conflict comes up in its own little way, percolates through

the agenda, and it turns into clashes.

In this sense, what happens is, and I understand your desire not to

have Israel isolated, Israel becomes isolated then within those programs.

In this sense, I would argue not against dialogue which involves these

states, but I would argue against membership, because that is a question of who controls the agenda. And if you are a member, you are part

of controlling that agenda.

That would be my biggest concern. I cannot make any predictions,

obviously, when the peace process will come to fruition and there will be

a comprehensive settlement. More likely than not, though, the history

is that it will have its ups and downs. And when it is down, those problems related to the Arab-Israeli conflict will be brought into other fora,

in this case, an expanded OSCE, if that were the case.

But I would also go back to this notion, again, of the sub-regional.

The question of what is of interest to Morocco and Algeria on the one

hand is very different from that of Yemen and other places in the Gulf.

And by going to the sub-regional you contain the security interest immediately to those particular countries of concern.

By my proposal, of course, I am saying that you may be able to make

good progress in the Western Med and maybe good progress in the Gulf,

and maybe not so much in the Levant right away. But, again, to have

one sub-region hold down the rest is a big problem that we have to

grapple with.

And I would say that a lot of entities are trying to grapple with this

question, right down even to our combatant command, which are dealing with these very issues, as well.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much for that.

You know, I remember 24 years or so, I made probably the classic

mistake that many members made when I was talking about the Warsaw Pact. I met with members 2 years later when I was in Bucharest,

and realized immediately that they all thought of themselves, notwithstanding their alliance with the Soviet Union, as individual countries

with very specific issues related to themselves and maybe their immediate neighbors.

So I think your point on the regional focus was very well taken. I

thank you for that.
41

I want to thank all three of you for your very appropriate insights,

your expertise, which I think will help us as we navigate this as a

Commission, and for your time. You have been very generous with your

time, both in preparation for today, and today itself. So I am very grateful for that. Thank you.

The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 5:38 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
42

APPENDICES

PREPARED STATEMENT OF

HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, RANKING MEMBER,

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

Thank you, Chairman Smith, for conducting this hearing at such a

critical and opportune moment. The ongoing development of the Bush

administrations policies for the Middle East plainly show the need for

the Commission to examine the applicability of the Helsinki Process as

a possible model for the region.

Embracing the standards of democracy and human rights embodied

in the OSCEparticularly by the new governments in Afghanistan and

Iraq and elsewhere in the Middle East, could help establish a lasting

peace and prevent the continuous slaughter of innocents. The Helsinki

Process could be instrumental in this context in several respects.

First, by embracing commitments similar to those of the OSCE, Afghanistan and the new Iraqi state can, in a sense, tie themselves to the

mast of reform. If extremist, illiberal domestic elements were to attempt to return to power, this kind of commitment could serve as a

partial buffer, a kind of linchpin for the current democratic momentum. Second, simply put, commitments encourage ordinary citizens in

signatory states to push for government and individual accountability.

Elsewhere in the Middle East, Israels commitmentto democracy and

the rule of law stands in stark contrast to the repressive policies of the

other regimes. In Iran, the legislative elections in February of this year

demonstrated once again the clerics inveterate opposition to a real opening of the political system. In Lebanon, Syrian troops remain in control

ofthe southern part of the country, despite Israels withdrawal in 2000.

And in Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt there are serious restrictions on

the press and opposition groups. The establishment of an OSCE-like

process in these countries, supported by the United States and her allies, would lighten the heavy hand of dictatorship by providing support

for real democrats in the region.

As the Helsinki Watch Monitoring Groups did in Mr. Sharanskys

day, NGOs could garner international recognition as they call for reform.

Regional minorities are in need of protection. In Iran, for example,

there are close to 12,000 Jews who face constant restrictions on the

practice of their religion. The Baháis face similar persecution by Iranian officials. Indeed, one of the keys to the future stability of Iraq will

be adequate protections for the Sunni and Kurdish minorities. The adoption of OSCE-like principles in the Middle East would mark an important starting point for resolving these issues, among others, and bringing peace and stability to the region.

I welcome this opportunity to hear how the region could be encouraged to develop habits of communication and principles of cooperation

that will benefit the security of all.
43

PREPARED STATEMENT OF

HON. MAX M. KAMPELMAN, AMBASSADOR (RET.),

CHAIRMAN EMERITUS, FREEDOM HOUSE

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ambassador Palmer and I, on behalf of

Freedom House, appreciate your invitation that we share with you and

the members of your Commission a specific proposal designed to advance the Helsinki process as a means of strengthening our national

objectives to extend democracy and human dignity where it does not

now prevail. Our specific suggestion is to extend the Helsinki process to

the Mediterranean, where it already has an institutional relationship.

My own exposure to the Helsinki Final Act, which created the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), began in 1980

when I was asked by President Carter to co-chair our American delegation to its Madrid follow-up meeting. President Reagan asked me to

continue to chair our delegation. The three year session contributed

significantly to the spread of democracy throughout Europe. Your commission, at that time, Mr. Chairman, was led by Dante Fascell and

Millicent Fenwick, whose support was indispensable. We could not have

functioned without the professional assistance of your staff. Some years

later, in 1990 and 1991, Secretary of State Baker asked me to return to

the process for one month during each of those years in order to deal

with two CSCE Conferences on the Human Dimension in Moscow and

Copenhagen, and a CSCE Conference on National Minorities in Geneva.

Once again, your staff was of immense assistance to me. Subsequently,

Secretary of State Christopher asked me to represent the United States

in an OSCE delegation to Serbia. I consistently found my relationship

with this Commission and your staff to be an effective and successful

partnership, and I now come to you in that spirit.

The opening paragraph of the Helsinki Final Act, signed in 1975,

includes the following:

During the meetings of the second stage of the Conference, contributions were received, and statements heard,

from the following non-participating Mediterranean

States on various agenda items: the Democratic and

Popular Republic of Algeria, the Arab Republic of Egypt,

Israel, the Kingdom of Morocco, the Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia.

The body of the Agreementincludes a section entitled Questions Relating to Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean, a 13-paragraph statement clearly acknowledging the geographical, historical,

cultural, economic, and political relationship between Europe and the

Mediterranean.

When I, as a newcomer to the process, asked about these provisions,

I learned that some of the European states suggested that the six named

Mediterranean countries be invited to sign the Agreement and become

part of the process, but the prevailing view was that the East-West

European relationships were of sufficient complexity and importance

that they should not be diluted by the addition of these six states. They

were named but not given the right to vote.
44

Today, as a result of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Helsinki

Final Act has been formally expanded into Central Asia, and the mechanism of the process is now at work to strengthen the Helsinki democratic principles in that area of the world.

The strength of the Helsinki process, whatever the complexity of its

origin, was that its enunciated principles were democratic, excellent

statements as to how states oughtto behave if we were to achieve international security and cooperation. In the 29 years since its creation, the

details ofthatought have been enlarged and enriched. We in the United

States had learned how important it was to agree on our oughtthe

Declaration of Independenceand strive to move our isto thatought.

We removed property qualifications for voting, ended slavery, and opened

the franchise to women. The Helsinki Final Act, to me, provided an

excellent international ought toward which to reach.

Mr. Chairman, this Commission long ago appreciated the vital importance of the Mediterranean to Europe as well as to our countrys

welfare. It is true that the OSCE is now hard at work, with its limited

resources, undercutting the strong authoritarian tradition in much of

Central Asia. Under the leadership of this Commission, the OSCE is

also working to combat the renewed poisonous message of anti-Semitism which has been tragically renewed in Europe, partially as a result

of the movement of a large number of North Africans, who have not

been educated in the strength and desirability of our ought, to Europe. This inter-relationship demands recognition. It is long past due

for us to formally extend the OSCE family and the virtues of our ought

to the Mediterranean. That is the essence of the Freedom House proposal which we have for two years been urging the Executive Branch to

accept, and which we bring to your Committee today for support. We

urge thatthe six non-participating Mediterranean states be invited to

full membership as a first step in a steady expansion to a more democratic world.

We are not alone in this urging. The Prime Minister of Denmark

spoke at the Woodrow Wilson Center here in Washington some months

ago and called for the expansion of the Helsinki process into the Mediterranean area. More recently, at Davos, he specifically proposed that

the OSCE become the OSCME.

Our Presidents, Democrat and Republican, have appreciated the need

for our government to identify our foreign policy with the spread of

democracy and human dignity to those peoples now living in authoritarian societies. We know that our security is directly related to that

development. President George W. Bush has identified this goal as central to his presidency. We at Freedom House, therefore, believed that

the Administration would enthusiastically embrace our suggestion that

the six non-participating Mediterranean states be invited to become formal participating States in the Helsinki process.

We have discussed this proposal with responsible officials in the White

House and in the State Department, where we have found encouragement and support. But the skeptics and the short-sighted seem to have

temporarily prevailed. Instead of a specific non-aggressive constructive

program, it appears as if the Administration position is, as expressed in

the Sea Island G8 summit last week, calling for a dialogue of willing

partnership,in effect proposing thatthe Arab and Mediterranean states

accept our standards as they form an organization of their own. It does

not surprise us to find strong opposition to that proposal. President
45

Chirac reportedly trashed the proposal at a lunch with Arab leaders

calling it messianic and humiliating. We had to make changes in it,

retreat and accept the statement that the mother of all conflicts is the

Israel-Palestinian conflict, a convenient justification used by Middle

East authoritarians. One experienced international scholar wrote:

 The Administration seems to have ended up with a much more

complicated approach than your idea of inviting the six Mediterranean

states to have full membership. It is an approach that has ruffled the

feathers of many Europeans and Arabs and does not seem to promise to

lead to the creation of anything very path-breaking at the summit.

In that connection, let me report on a conversation I had with one of

the North African ambassadors representing his country in Washington. In effect, he said to me: Our neighbors decided to form a country

club. We were of some assistance in preparing the ground work, but we

were not invited into membership. This exclusive club has a fine golf

course, swimming pool, and tennis courts. Would we welcome an opportunity to be part of that club, with a requirement that we live by its

rules? Yes. But instead, we are now asked to form a club of our own; we

are not good enough to join the exclusive club. Yet we are asked to make

sure that our club conforms to the rules of the exclusive clubthat is

insulting. He added that his government would be pleased to join the

OSCE, primarily because of its economic advantages arising out of Basket II.

Mr. Chairman, our intent at the G8 summit was noble. Our execution was poor. Our substance was inadequate. We hope that it will be a

small step forward. Our Freedom House proposal is still relevant and

even more essential.

Mr. Chairman, I believe that part of our problem is the fact that for

many years now, the Helsinki process has been a step-child within the

State Department. For example, when I refer to the Copenhagen meeting, I am too often met with blank looks. Yet, a few weeks ago, the U.S.

Institute of Peace held a conference of outstanding international law

professors. There was general agreement that the Copenhagen document was the most important international human rights document

since the Magna Carta. I had the privilege of helping to create that

Charter in the month we spent in Copenhagen. I am disappointed to be

met with blank expressions when talking about it with some of our

government officials.

Freedom House is eager to work with your Commission in an effort to

elevate the Helsinki process to the relevance required to advance our

national interests.
46

FREEDOM HOUSE DOCUMENT SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

BY HON. MAX M. KAMPELMAN

FROM HELSINKI TO THE MEDITERRANEAN AND THE GULF:

BUILDING A DEMOCRATIC, PROSPEROUS AND PEACEFUL

MIDDLE EAST

There is a new focus on human dignity and democracy in the Mediterranean and in the Middle East, as well as a growing awareness of

their relationship to prosperity and peace. Freedom House is actively

engaged in promoting and encouraging that movement.

One of Freedom House's activities is to persuade the United States

and our friends in Europe to appreciate that the economic and political

gains that have benefited our populationsgains that undermine our

terrorist opponentsare readily available to the people of the Mediterranean area adjacent to Europe and the rest of the Middle East. The

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, now OSCE)

came into being as the result of a European conference and an agreement, the Helsinki Final Act of 1975. All European countries, including the Soviet Union, joined the United States and Canada in agreeing

that cooperation and security required a human freedom ingredient alongside vital political, economic and military ingredients. We knew that

democracies do not wage wars against one another. We knew that the

standard of living was far higher in free market democracies than in

closed, controlled dictatorships. This agreement as to what was required

for freedom, security and prosperity became Europe's goal, the ought,

and Europe worked steadily to achieve that goalto make the is closer

to the ought. That effort has spread to Eurasia as 14 countries joined

the OSCE after the demise of the Soviet Union.

Freedom House believes the OSCE message should be extended to the

countries in the Mediterranean and the Middle East that are not now

OSCE membersan area where there is today no agreed-upon ought.

This region extends from Morocco to Iran. Six countries already are

OSCE Mediterranean Partners for Cooperation: Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Israel and Jordan. The region also includes these 17 countries: Iran, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE, Oman,

Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia, and

Libya.

There are strong indications that some in the area are ready for the

OSCE message. The United States and our European partners therefore should call upon the OSCE to organize a conference of those Mediterranean and Middle Eastern states to explore and urge their willingness to endorse the ought of principles arrived atin the Helsinki process

and thus guide the area towards, democracy, prosperity and peace. The

key documents include: the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, the 1983 Concluding Document of Madrid, the 1989 Concluding Document of Vienna and

the 1990 Copenhagen Document on the Human Dimension.

Once the oughtis endorsed,the conference should launch the steady

process required to move the is closer to the ought. This could include membership for those endorsing these documents, potentially expanding the membership from 55 to 78 members and renaming it the

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Mediterranean and the Middle East (OSCEMME). It could, in the alternative,

establish a separate and cooperating entity.
47

New security relationships could emergejust as NATO's Partnership for Peace and eventual expanded membership reached out to the

central and east Europeans and transformed the security environment

in Europe, so NATO's expanding role beyond Europe could include a

dialogue with willing regional nations about another Partnership for

Peace and holding open the possibility of eventual membership in an

expanded NATO for those achieving democracy.

Similarly on the economic front, a region suffering from protectionism, low levels of trade with one another and little foreign investment,

needs a new partnership in this new global era with Europe, the United

States and other leading countries to open and transform their economies.

The OSCEMME should launch a dialogue with each participating

nation about a peaceful path and timeline to achieve democracy and

human rights. Major emphasis must also be placed upon the participation and strengthening of civil society, including through Middle East

Watch groups analogous to the Helsinki Watch groups which played

such a central role in Europe.

We turn now to a more extensive discussion of the Freedom House

proposal:

If there is a positive development to come out of the tragic events

since 9/11, it can be found in the new focus on freedom and democracy

in the Middle East. Today policymakers and academic experts are less

inclined to argue that the promotion of democracy in Arab countries is

antithetical to the American national interest. If there is not yet a consensus on the importance of freedom to the development of a peaceful

Middle Eastern environment, the view is widely accepted that political

repression and the denial of fundamental civil rights has contributed to

an alarming increase in extremism, violence, and terror in the region.

Freedom House has long been on record in voicing its concern about

the lack of freedom in the Middle East. We are concerned about the

impact of repression on the individual citizen: the persecution of political dissidents, a press that functions as a mouthpiece for the elite, discrimination against religious and ethnic minorities, blatant sexual inequality, a failure of independent civic institutions to thrive. Freedom

House is also troubled by the ongoing and escalating cycle of violence

between Israel and the Palestinians, and the inability of the two sides

to find a common ground of mutual trust as the basis of a genuine and

lasting peace could be built. Freedom House is also acutely aware that

more Muslims have died in the region at the hands of other extremists

who falsely claim to act in the name of Islam, and at the hands of

indigenous dictators, than from any other source. This makes us fully

cognizant that achieving regional security requires going well beyond

the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

We are unimpressed by the lingering arguments that in seeking to

advance American interests in the Middle East and to effectively prosecute the war on terrorism, we must put aside issues of human freedom, because, as some still contend, the people of the region do not

value or are not ready for elections, a free press, and other basic rights

that other societies enjoy as a matter of course.

It is worth noting that similar arguments were once advanced about

another part of the world notable for its near-total lack of freedom: the

Soviet Union and the Communist countries of central and eastern Europe. Just recently a number of these countries were formally admitted
48

to membership in NATO as full democracies and a number will soon

join the European Union. Yet during the Cold War many policymakers

and academic experts argued against incorporating human rights criteria into the fabric of American foreign policy on the grounds that

these societies had little or no tradition of freedom and actually preferred strong rule by the state to a government chosen democratically

that is subordinate to the rule-of-law.

Subsequent events have demonstrated that the proposition that the

people of Central and Eastern Europe would chose dictatorship has been

demonstrated to be utterly wrong. Nevertheless, even for those of us

who advocated an American policy to promote freedom in the Communist bloc, the problem of finding an effective vehicle to prod these regimes towards reform represented a serious problem.

That vehicle was found, in part, in what was called the Helsinki

process. This process was initiated in 1972, when the Communist bloc,

Western Europe, and the United States and Canada began a conference

to negotiate, and by 1975 finalized and signed the Helsinki Final Act

and established what is now known as the Organization on Security

and Cooperation in Europe. Implementing meetings, agreements and

on-the-ground programs ensued and continue. Despite considerable skepticism about its potential effectiveness at the time of its creation, the

Helsinki process is now seen as having played an important role in

encouraging the spread of a democratic opposition in the Communist

world and in pushing Communist regimes towards liberalizing changes

that eventually led to the peaceful collapse of totalitarian rule in that

part of the world. The OSCE is still working away in Belarus, Ukraine

and the Central Asian states to bring these countries into compliance

with their OSCE commitments.

We believe that the model established by the Helsinki process and the

OSCE can be effectively used to help propel the Middle East towards

enhanced freedom, peace, cooperation and understanding between the

countries of the region and between the region and the Western world.

It has the virtue of involving Europe, the U.S. and the entire transatlantic community in the process of advancing freedom.

Although the Helsinki process is usually associated with human

rights, it is, in fact, a wide-ranging agreement that touches on a number of critical areas that are pertinent to conditions in the Middle East.

The original agreement has three sections or baskets. Basket I contains a Declaration of Principles Guiding Relations between participating States, including the Principle VII on human rights and fundamental freedoms. It includes such security-related provisions as respect for

borders, confidence building measures, and others aspects of security

and disarmament meant to promote transparency on military matters.

Basket II covers economic, scientific, technological, and environmental

cooperation, as well as such issues as migrant labor, vocational training and tourism. Basket III focuses on such human concerns as the free

movement of people across borders, human contacts, freedom of information including working conditions for journalists, and cultural and

educational exchanges. Subsequent agreements, for example those

reached in Madrid, Vienna and Copenhagen, made even more explicit

commitments, including to the full range of democratic institutions and

practices.
49

Unlike the formal treaties between sovereign states or United Nations' covenants, the Helsinki accords were not binding on the signatories and there was no enforcement mechanism in the agreement. Nonetheless, the OSCE proved uniquely successful in advancing the goals of

freedom and openness in totalitarian countries and was particularly

successful in encouraging the development of democratic opposition

movements in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The Helsinki accords stimulated the creation of Helsinki Monitoring Groups throughout the Soviet bloc, and it was these nascent opposition committees that

formed the nucleus of broader democracy movements that helped bring

down the entire Communist edifice.

Another important aspect of the Helsinki process was the regular

conferences that were convened to review compliance with the

agreement's provisions. Although these conferences were often marked

by long and acrimonious debate, they did serve several important purposes. First, they provided a forum for publicizing the violations of the

accords by dictatorships. These human rights statements took on the

characterization of commitments and promises that delegitimated those

states that did not live up to them. Second, the review conferences were

premised on the superiority of the free values of the democracies, and

forced Communist regimes to acknowledge their failure to fulfill these

values. Finally, the conferences provided a mechanism whereby members of the democratic opposition could air their concerns, if not directly, then indirectly through representatives of the United States and

other democracies.

Finally, the OSCE is a functioning organization with a secretariat,

staff, institutions, structure, and programs. We attach a description at

the end of this paper.

In short, the Helsinki process served and serves the purpose of holding repressive regimes accountable for their misdeeds while at the same

time encouraging the development of nascent civil societies into fullscale democracies, the creation of market economies and a framework

of durable security for its members.

Could something similar to the Helsinki process contribute to peace,

prosperity, and freedom in the Middle East?

We believe that a Helsinki-like process could help move the Mediterranean and the Middle East from its current condition of recurring

cycles of violence, political dictatorship, and economic and cultural stagnation.

Despite the disturbing state of affairs in the region, the Mediterranean and the Middle East might prove at least as open to change through

something akin to the Helsinki process as was the European Communist world. With a few notable exceptions, the countries of the region

are not governed by regimes that are ideologically hostile to the liberal

democracies of Europe and North Americatheir dictators simply want

to remain in power as opposed to trying to spread Communism and

Soviet power. The countries of the Mediterranean and the Middle East

are tied to Europe through economic relations, diplomacy, and increasingly by emigration. There are, to be sure, issues that divide the countries of North Africa and the Arab core from the West. But those differences are no greater than the yawning gap that separated the United

States from the Soviet Union.
50

Furthermore, despite the generally bleak political picture in today's

Middle East, there are hopeful signs of a new interest in breaking out of

the current cycle of stagnation and despotism. There are growing indications of civic activism in several important North African countries

as well as expressions of openness to democratic ideas by government

officials in North Africa and in some of the Gulf kingdoms. In a UN

Arab Development Program report last year, 30 leading Arab intellectuals and scholars identified and deplored three inter-related gaps at

the heart of the region's backwardness: freedom, gender and knowledge. Iranians are in the streets virtually every week calling for democracy. Even the Saudi leadership has met with and welcomed a group of

104 Saudi businessmen and intellectuals who propose a Vision for the

Present and Future of the Homeland which includes freedom of expression, association, assembly, the right to vote and participate, as

well as all other human rights. The Saudi leadership itself has proposed a new Charter for the entire region, which would provide for greater

political participation. If Iraq becomes a democracy, it could serve as a

model for the region as President Bush has suggested. President Bush

also has broken new ground by proclaiming a vision of democracy, prosperity and peace for the entire region, coincides with the vision and

commitments of the Helsinki Accords and process.

However, today there is no forum at which representatives of the

Mediterranean and the Middle East can meet with representatives of

Europe and North America to agree uponwhat anewMiddle Eastought

to be and how to get there. Nor is there a vehicle to facilitate discussion

of issues that most concern democracy advocates or those who seek

justice rooted in the rule of law, minority rights, associational freedoms, and a free press.

What should be the process by which an expanded OSCEMME could

be launched?

Participation. Who should be invited at the outset? The options range

from just six Mediterranean states, to a broader but still selected core

group, to every country from Morocco to the Gulf including Iran.

° There already exists a precedent for incorporating at least some

countries of North Africa and the Middle East in the existing

Helsinki process. In the original 1975 Helsinki Final Act, provision was made for a special status, Mediterranean Partners for

Cooperation, that enabled countries outside Europe to play an

unofficial role in the OSCE. Six countries took advantage of this

opportunity: Algeria, Jordan, Egypt, Israel, Morocco, and Tunisia. The 1975 Final Act contains whatis called a Mediterranean

Chapter that suggests that there is a link between European

and Mediterranean security. Two disadvantages of starting with

just these six countries are that: it is so close to the existing EuroMediterranean Association and process that the Europeans will

just see it as the United States trying to invite itself to their

party; and it does not include some key Gulf and other states in

the region showing interest in reform.

° A somewhat broader core group could be selected to launch the

process and ensure that control of the conference was in the hands

of those inside and outside the region that have demonstrated at

least some genuine interest in building a new Middle East. The

12 nations from the region who qualified either as full participants or observers and were invited to the Community of Democracies meeting in Seoul in November 2002 could form this core
51

group (the six OSCE Mediterranean Partners listed above are all

in this group as are Bahrain, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar,

and Yemen). These 12 nations were selected after careful consideration by the Community of Democracies own core group of 10

liberal democracies as the least repressive and most moderate

governments in the Middle East. Other nations could be added on

a case-by-case basis, as changes dictate. For example, a post-Saddam Iraq could be included. Nations expressing a strong interest

and commitment to the process could be considered, perhaps as

observers, for this initial group even if they did not qualify for the

Community of Democracies meeting.

° Of course eventually all nations in the region should participate

just as all European nations did and do participate in the Helsinki process. A central purpose is to deal with the problem cases.

But the special situation we face in the Middle East is different

from that in pre-Helsinki Europe -- with the exception of Israel,

there is not a single fully Free nation (to use Freedom House's

categories of Free, Partly Free and Not Free) in the region, and a

significant number of truly awful dictators. Getting them all together from the outset might invite an Arab League type of lowest common denominator. The resulting ought document might

look a lot more like the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights of

August 1990 (which legitimizes, even worsens the status quo and

states inter alia that Islamic Shari'ah is the only source of reference for the explanation or clarification of the articles of this Declaration) than the Helsinki Accords or the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

On balance we favor the third option. We believe the OSCE should be

urged by the U.S. to invite all 23 nations in the region to the conference. Some of the most repressive states could well boycott the conference. And if they were to come, work could proceed on an informal basis

with the core group defined above to make progress.

The logic of this approach already was adopted by 110 governments

in the Seoul Plan of Action of the Community of Democracies, including

the Middle Eastern participants. It specifically states Recognizing that

democratic countries are stronger economic, security, and political partners, and that the promotion of democratic ideals strengthens regional

stability and cooperation, we intend to promote regional democratic

progress, individually through regional institutions and through various measures including: in each respective region, developing and fully

implementing regional instruments which call upon regional partners

to build democratic institutions, adhere to democratic principles, and

provide assistance; developing regional human rights and democracy

monitoring mechanisms; and convening regional meetings of representatives ofthe government, political parties and civil society.to develop

or strengthen mechanisms in regional organizations' charters and procedures that promote democracy.

Structure. There are two options worth considering on structure.

One would be to create a new organization. Mediterranean states would

include those on the northSpain and Portugal, France, Italy, Croatia,

Serbia-Montenegro, Albania, Greece, Turkey, Malta and Cyprus. And

as with the existing OSCE, key outside nations would be full members

from the start, including the United States, Canada and other interested European states such as UK and Germany. However, a new orga-
52

nization just covering the Mediterranean and the Middle East increases

the difficulty of making a fresh start, with a new framework. It is much

more likely to get bogged down such divisive issues as the Palestinian

question. The issue of Israeli membership would be present at the outset. There would be huge pressure for Arab participants to act as a bloc.

The other possibly preferred approach would be aimed at expanding

the membership of the existing OSCE. Middle Eastern countries committed to the process would be invited to become full members of the

OSCE. Ultimately this could mean that the membership of the OSCE

would go from its present 55 to 78. The advantage of this approach is

that control would remain firmly in the hands of the democratic majority already in the OSCE. Joining a European organization might have

real appeal to Middle Eastern countries, even though it presumably

would need to be retitled the Organization for Security and Cooperation

in Europe, the Mediterranean and the Middle East (OSCEMME). There

may be resistance on the part of some Europeans to adding further

burdens on an organization still wrestling with the problems in Europe

and Central Asia, but the advantages to Europe from a stable and peaceful

Mediterranean are clear. There would also be the issue of ensuring that

the expanded OSCE has a democratic majority.

On balance we favor expanding the membership of the OSCE, while

working to ensure that it remains majority democratic.

Ought Document(s): Principles, Standards and Objectives. In deciding what to do about an ought document for the Mediterranean and

the Middle East, there are these options.

1. We could strive to negotiate a new document ab initio, or

2. We could seek adherence to the existing Helsinki documents, the

Helsinki Final Act and the key follow-on accords from Madrid,

Vienna and Copenhagen, but also importantly adherence to the

June 2000 Warsaw Declaration of the Community of Democracies, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and others as

providing the exclusive principles and ought documents.

We favor the second option.

Building Consensus. Three constituencies need to be persuaded of

the wisdom of attempting to apply the Helsinki process to the Middle

East: Americans, Europeans and the peoples of the Middle East. Freedom House is encouraged by its initial, very preliminary findings and

discussions.

First, this is not an entirely new idea. As noted earlier, the 1975

Helsinki Final Act itself included a Mediterranean Chapter and Mediterranean Partners. The 1991 Madrid Peace Conference launched a

process of multilateral meetings on security and economic issues in

which 13 Arab nations, Israel and Palestine took part (there was no

democracy dimension). In 1993 Jordan proposed to have OSCE-like meetings of the countries in the Middle East, and the Israel-Jordan peace

treaty of October 1994 stated that they recognize the achievements

ofthe Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and commit

themselves to the creation in the Middle East of a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Middle East(CSCME). During this period,

Turkey also promoted an OSCE-like process in the Middle East.
53

In parallel, the United States in a variety of ways has encouraged a

multilateral process. Congressional members of the Commission on

Security and Cooperation in Europe have supported applying the Helsinki process to the Middle East for over a decade, have held hearings,

encouraging discussions with Israelis, Palestinians, Europeans and others. Freedom House's own discussions in recent months with members

of the Commission and others in Congress indicate that their support

and interest remain strong. In part as a result of Freedom House's

dialogue with them, members and staff of the Commission have had

discussions with their European colleagues as recently as January 2003,

and propose holding hearings this spring. Freedom House's initial conversations with senior members of the Bush Administration have been

positive. We also have consulted with a few key European diplomats

and OSCE officials and received encouragement.

It is clear from the history and recent soundings that two things are

true:

° Without U.S. leadership, nothing will happen.

° Without strong support from Arab opinion leaders and at least a

few Arab and European governments, nothing will happen.

This must ultimately be, and be seen to be, an initiative coming jointly

from the Middle East and Europe as well as the United States. The

Helsinki process had numerous parents. The Soviet Union began calling for an all-European security conference in the early 1950s. In 1969,

the Government of Finland sent a memorandum to all European countries, the United States and Canada offering Helsinki as a venue. In

agreeing to participate, the Western democracies broadened the agenda

beyond just security and economic cooperation to include human rights.

We propose that the President and Secretary Powell in consultation

with the Congress appoint an Ambassador-at-Large with a mandate to

quietly explore the potential for a Helsinki-process in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. She should begin by meeting discretely with

key Europeans and government and civil society figures in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. The OSCE would be in the lead, but we

should also involve the Community of Democracies, the UNDP and

other United Nations' bodies, the World Bank, the IMF and so forth.

Much as the Community of Democracies has its NGO Forum (created

by Freedom House), we need to design a strong role for Western and

NGOs from the Middle East region in this process.

Priority might be given to early discussions with the Spanish Government inter alia as Madrid might be a logical location and host for

the conference itself. It is both a Mediterranean and European country

with a long history in the entire region. Madrid hosted the immensely

productive and symbolically and substantively important OSCE conference of the early 1980s as well as the Middle East peace conference of

the early 1990s.

What are some of the incentives the Ambassador-at-Large could propose to persuade people in the Middle East and Europe to support such

a conference and process. Beyond the already existing ought documents, what is some of the possible content for each of the three baskets?
54

BASKET ISECURITY

The Helsinki process contributed to transforming the security situation in Europe in significant measure because a strong military alliance among the democrats (NATO) made it suicidal for the dictators to

commit aggression. Eventually it became clear to the dictators that

they were even declining in terms of relative military power. The Helsinki accords provided a security framework (non-aggression, recognition of borders, confidence building measures) for the political transition and ultimately led to NATO offering the Partnership for Peace and

eventual NATO membership to former members of the Warsaw Pact.

With Europe now largely secure, NATO is exploring possible out-ofarea mandates, including reaching across the Middle East to assume

leadership of the multinational peace force in Afghanistan. The United

States, NATO's most powerful member, is now militarily present in

large parts of the region, and already providing a security umbrella for

many of the potential initial participants in an OSCE-like process.

Launching a new conference and process now permits a creative look at

ways to transform the region's security, including through new institutional arrangements. By their commitmentto move towards the ought,

including democracy and peaceful relations within the region, the initial participants form a potential core group for a Partnership for Peaceanalogue and eventual military alliance as members of an expanded

NATO. The objective would be to draw in the other countries of the

region as they commit to and move towards the oughts.

An additional advantage would be the discussion of appropriate

counter-terrorism cooperation and a dialogue that would establish appropriate best practices in dealing with terrorist threats. Such efforts

could not only enhance the uprooting of terrorist movements, but could

improve protections for civil liberties in the context of effective counterterrorism initiatives.

BASKET IIPROSPERITY

As former U.S. trade representative Charlene Barshefsky has noted,

the Middle East has more trade barriers than any other part of the

world. Eight of its eleven largest economies remain outside the World

Trade Organization. The Middle East has the world's youngest and fastest

growing population and a shrinking share of its economy job creation

is not keeping up with population increase, which is a lethal trajectory.

As many Arab intellectuals have realized, the region has reached an

economic dead end and needs a new approacheconomic liberalization

as well as improved education, empowerment of women and political

reform.

In discussions of the potential for Basket II, the United States could

offer various initiatives in return for economic liberalization. We could

propose duty free industrial zones, free trade agreements, trade preferences, accelerated World Trade Organization membership, investment

guaranteesa more comprehensive approach to the region similar to

what already exists for Latin America and Africa. Participants in the

OSCE process would be given preference in receiving these economic

benefits as an incentive for performing across all three baskets. Again

as Ambassador Barshefsky has noted, such an approach already has

yielded significant benefits to Jordan. Its comprehensive revision of economic and trade policy, combined with various American trade and

investment initiatives led Jordan's exports to the United States to grow
55

from $16 million in 1998 to $400 million in 2002, with some 40,000

Jordaniansmany of them Palestinian women living in depressed areasfinding jobs in a newly energized economy.

Japan, Republic of Korea and Thailand are OSCE Partners for Cooperation and could play an important role in this economic basket as

well.

BASKET IIIDEMOCRACY

The essential task is to help each country launch a dialogue between

the government and civil society designed to define a peaceful path and

timeline for the achievement of full-scale democracy.

OSCEMME could open a mission in each of the participating countries as OSCE has done in the lagging European and Central Asian

states. This could help coordinate the vast range of opening programs

envisioned under this basketfrom educational exchanges to political

party building.

CONCLUSION

American leadership, working closely with friends in the Middle East

and Europe can take the lead in pulling these ingredients together. An

international conference called to adoptits own series ofoughts(building upon the OSCE process) would create the foundation for democracy,

prosperity and peace in the Mediterranean and Middle East. The result

could well be an atmosphere conducive to the development of a peace

agreement between Israel and the Palestinians in a Mediterranean and

Middle East region committed to human dignity, democracy and peace.
56

ADDENDUM

ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

The OSCE is engaged in standard setting in fields including military

security, economic and environmental cooperation, and human rights

and humanitarian concerns. In addition, the OSCE undertakes, a variety of preventive diplomacy initiatives designed to prevent, manage and

resolve conflict within and among the participating States.

The OSCE has its main office in Vienna, Austria, where weekly meetings of the Permanent Council are held. In addition, specialized seminars and meetings are convened in various locations and periodic consultations among Senior Officials, Ministers and Heads of State or

Government are held.

SELECTED OSCE INSTITUTIONS AND STRUCTURE

Summits. Heads of State or Government of ME OSCE States set

priorities and provide orientation at the highest level.

Review Concerences. Review implementation of all OSCE commitments.

The Ministerial Council. Foreign Ministers of the OSCE States

act as the central decision-making and governing body of the OSCE

activities.

The Senior Council. Responsible for the overview, management

and coordination of the OSCE activities.

The Permanent Council. Responsible for the day-to-day operation of the OSCE.

The Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC). Negotiates and consults on concrete measures aimed at strengthening security and stability throughout Europe.

The Chairman-in-Office (CiO). Vested with overall responsibility for executive action and coordination of current OSCE activities.

The Secretary General and the Secretariat. Consists of the four

permanent administrative departments under die Secretary General.

The Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

(ODIHR). Responsible for furthering human rights, democracy and

the role of law.

The High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM).

Responds at the earliest possible stage to ethnic tensions that have the

potential to develop into a conflict within the OSCE region.

The Representative on Freedom of the Media. Assists governments in the furthering of free, independent and pluralistic media.

The Coordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental

Activities. Addresses economic, social and environmental issues of

security.

OSCE Missions. Serve as instruments of conflict prevention and

crisis management in a number of participating States.

The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE PA). Meets annually to examine issues important to the national legislatures of the OSCE

States.

The Court of Conciliation and Arbitration. Established to settle

disputes submitted to it by OSCE States.
57

FREEDOM HOUSE DOCUMENT SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

BY HON. MAX M. KAMPELMAN

OVERVIEW OF THE HUMAN DIMENSION COMMITMENTS

OF THE ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION

IN EUROPE

1975-20031

GENERAL HUMAN DIMENSION COMMITMENTS

 Government responsibility for human rights: The government

has primary responsibility for the protection and promotion of

civil, political, economic, social, cultural and other rights and freedoms, all of which derive from the inherent dignity of the human

person.

 Universality of human rights: Participating States recognize the

universal significance of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

 Human rights, democracy and rule of law: Participating States

recognize that pluralistic democracy and the rule of law are essential for ensuring respect for all human rights and fundamental freedoms.

 Human dimension as international concern: Participating States

emphasize that issues relating to human rights, fundamental freedoms, democracy and the rule of law are of international concern.

 Obligations under international law: Participating States agree

to fulfill in good faith their obligations under international law,

whether such obligations arise under customary international law

or through treaties.

 Human rights treaties: Participating States will act in conformity with the U.N. Charter and the Universal Declaration of

Human Rights. They will also fulfill their obligations under other

human rights agreements, including the International Covenants

on Human Rights.

 Commitment to implement: Participating States affirm their commitment to implement the U.N. Charter, the Helsinki Final Act,

the Charter of Paris, and all other OSCE documents to which

they have agreed.

 Derogations and states of emergency: Any derogations from obligations relating to human rights and fundamental freedoms during a public emergency must be limited to the extent required by

the situation. The imposition of a state of public emergency must

be proclaimed officially, publicly, and in accordance with the provisions laid down by law.

1 This overview was drawn from a December 2003 paper prepared by

Professor Douglass Cassel of Northwestern University Law School,

which in turn summarized a 2001 OSCE compilation of human dimension commitments through 2000 and added references to OSCE documents from 2001 to 2003. The purpose of this overview is to provide a

rough guide to the substance of the human dimension commitments

made through the Helsinki process. It does not purport to be an exhaustive description of these commitments, which would require many

more pages. Any errors in this document are the sole responsibility of

Freedom House.
58

 Terrorism and human rights: Participating States undertake to

conduct all counter-terrorism measures and cooperation in accordance with the rule of law, the United Nations Charter and relevant provisions of international law, international standards of

human rights and, where applicable, international humanitarian law. Participating States reaffirm their commitment to protect human rights and fundamental freedoms against terrorist

acts.

 International humanitarian law: Participating States will in all

circumstances respect and ensure respect for humanitarian law,

including protection of the civilian population.

DEMOCRACY AND RULE OF LAW

 Rule of Law: Rule of law is not merely a formal legality that

assures regularity and consistency in the achievement and enforcement of democratic order, but justice based on the recognition and full acceptance of the supreme value of the human personality and guaranteed by institutions providing a framework

for its fullest expression. Democracy is an inherent element of the

rule of law.

 Free elections: Participating States should hold elections at regular intervals and through procedures, such as secret ballot, that

ensure in practice that electors may freely elect their representatives. Participating States should guarantee universal and equal

suffrage to adult citizens.

 Representative government: Governments should be representative in character, and the executive should be accountable to the

elected legislature or the electorate. All seats in at least one chamber of the national legislature should be freely contested in a popular

vote.

 Political parties: Participating States should respect the right of

citizens to organize political parties and organizations and provide them with the necessary legal guarantees to compete equally

in elections. There should be a clear separation between political

parties and the state.

 Independence of the judiciary: The impartial operation of the public

judicial service should be assured. In addition, the independence

of legal practitioners should be protected.

 Power of the prosecution: Criminal procedure laws should clearly

define the powers of the prosecutor and prosecutorial procedures.

 Adherence to the law: Government and public authorities, including the judiciary, must adhere to the constitution and the

law.

 Civilian control of military: The military and police should be

controlled by and accountable to civil authorities.

 Human rights institutions: Participating States agree to facilitate the establishment and strengthening of independent national

human rights institutions, such as ombudsmen offices.

 Access to legislation: Legislation and regulations should be published and made accessible to citizens.

 Equality: All persons are entitled to equal protection under the

law.
59

 Remedies: Citizens should have effective means of redress for infringement of their rights by the state, including by law enforcement officials.

 Corruption: Participating States pledge to strengthen their efforts to combat corruption and to promote a positive framework

for good government practices and public integrity.

CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS

 Self-determination of peoples: Participating States will respect

the equal rights of peoples and their right to self-determination.

 Right to life and capital punishment: Participating States note

that capital punishment has been abolished in a number of countries and that in participating States where it has not been abolished, it may be imposed only for the most serious crimes and in

accordance with international law. The participating States agree

to keep the question of capital punishment under consideration.

 Torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment or

treatment: Participating States agree to prohibit torture and other

cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and take

effective legislative, administrative, judicial and other measures

to prevent and punish such practices.

 Trafficking in human beings: Participating States affirm that

trafficking in human beings is an abhorrent human rights abuse

and a serious crime that demands a more comprehensive and

coordinated response from participating States and the international community.

 Arbitrary arrest or detention and pre-trial detention: Participating States will ensure that no one will be subjected to arbitrary

arrest, detention or exile.

 Fair trial: Individuals shall have the right to a fair and public

hearing within a reasonable time before an independent and impartial tribunal, including the right to present legal arguments

and to be represented by the legal counsel of one's choice. No one

shall be tried for any offense not stipulated by law, and everyone

shall be presumed innocent until proven guilty.

 Effective remedies: Participating States should ensure that individuals who claim that the state has violated their human rights

and fundamental freedoms are aware of and have access to effective remedies.

 Freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief: Participating

States agree to respect the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief for all without distinction as to race, sex, language

or religion.

 Freedom of expression, free media and information: Participating States recognize the right of individuals to freedom of expression without state interference. Participating States also affirm

the right of the media to collect, report and disseminate information, news, and opinions.
60

 Freedom of association, including human rights defenders and

nongovernmental organizations: Participating States agree to

ensure that individuals are permitted to exercise the right to association, including the right to form political parties, trade unions,

and nongovernmental organizations. Nongovernmental organizations that seek to promote and protect human rights shall have

unhindered access to similar bodies within and outside their own

countries.

 Right of assembly: Everyone shall have the right of peaceful assembly and demonstration.

 Freedom of movement: Participating States agree to recognize

the rights of individuals to freedom of movement within the borders of each state and to leave any country, including their own,

and to return to their countries.

 Private and family life: Participating States reaffirm the right to

the protection of private and family life, domicile, correspondence

and electronic communications. Searches and seizures of persons

and private premises and property will take place only in accordance with standards that are judicially enforceable.

 Rights of the child: Participating States agree to accord particular attention to the rights of the child.

 Persons with disabilities: Participating States decide to ensure

protection of persons with disabilities and to take steps to ensure

their full participation in society.

 Nationality: Participating States recognize the right to nationality and agree to take measures not to increase statelessness.

 Property rights: No one may be deprived of property except in the

public interest, subject to law, and consistent with international

commitments and obligations.

ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS

 Economic and social rights: Participating States will promote

and encourage the effective exercise of economic and social rights,

paying particular attention to the areas of employment, housing,

social security, and health.

 Workers' rights: Participating States will ensure the right of workers to establish and join trade unions, as well as the right of trade

unions to exercise their rights freely, including the right to strike.

 Cultural rights and heritage: Participating States will promote

the effective exercise of cultural rights.

 Right to education: Participating States will pay special attention to education.

 Human rights education: Participating States agree that human

rights education is essential and will encourage their competent

authorities to design effective human rights related curricula and

courses for students at all levels.
61

TOLERANCE AND NON-DISCRIMINATION

 Equality and non-discrimination, including equal rights of women

and men: Participating States will ensure human rights and fundamental freedoms to everyone within their territory, without

distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property,

birth or other status. Participating States will take all measures

necessary, including legislative measures, to promote equally effective participation of men and women in political, economic,

social and cultural life.

 Aggressive nationalism, racism, chauvinism, xenophobia, antiSemitism and ethnic cleansing: The participating States clearly

and unequivocally condemn these phenomena and declare their

intention to intensify their efforts to combat them. They draw

particular attention to the problems of the Roma and Sinti.

 Migration, refugees, displaced persons and returnees, and migrant workers: Participating States express concern over the problem of refugees and displaced persons and pledge to refrain from

any policy of ethnic cleansing or mass expulsion. Participating

States will allow all refugees who so desire to return safely to

their homelands. Participating States invite host countries and

countries of origin to make efforts to improve further the economic, social, cultural and other conditions of life for migrant

workers and their families legally residing in the host countries.
62

PREPARED STATEMENT OF

PETER JONES, RESEARCH ASSOCIATE,

MUNK CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES,

CANADAS PRIVY COUNCIL

Introduction

Let me begin by thanking the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe for the invitation to speak at this hearing. My remarks

will outline some thoughts and experiences based on almost ten years of

activity on the idea of developing a new approach to security and reform

in the Middle East. Much of this activity has been inspired by the European security model, though, as I shall make clear, I believe that the

European experience goes only so far as a possible model for the Middle

East.

I would like to make six general points. Some of them are self-evident, but they bear repetition as they must underpin any analysis of

the way forward. I will then try to address what strikes me as seven

key questions to be borne in mind in considering this topic. My remarks

will then conclude with some thoughts as to a possible way ahead.

General Points

The first general point is that one must remember that the idea of

creating some kind of a regional system for the Middle East, which has

reform and change at its core, is neither a new nor an external idea.

Rather it is very much a long-standing idea that comes from the region.

The Plan presented by Egyptian President Mubarak for a regional approach to disarmament contains thoughts on a new approach to regional relations, as does the Peace Process proposal presented by the

Saudi Crown Prince to the Arab League meeting in Beirut. Regional

leaders, such as the former Crown Prince of Jordan have mused publicly about the idea of a new regional system for the Middle East. It is

also extremely important to remember that there are reform and change

efforts underway in the Middle East, some of which are official (political

reforms in some countries, for example) and some of which are NGO

based (such as the Alexandria meeting). So there is not a vacuum as

regards regional thinking and action on these issues, as is sometimes

assumed by Westerners.

Second, ideas for change in the region cannot be, or be seen as,quick

fix proposals to meet the requirements of a political moment or electoral cycle. These are proposals which call for fundamental change and

it is not realistic to imagine that this will necessarily come in the Middle

East in months when it took decades for it to do so in Europe and elsewhere. Perhaps we need not necessarily be looking at decades in the

Middle East context, but we are certainly looking at years. However, it

is important to note that, even if it will take time to reach a fully fledged

regime in the Middle East, the initial steps, however modest, may begin to have a positive impact soon.

Third, this must come from the region. To the extent that extraregional states are involved, it must be on the basis of true partnership.

The imposition, or the apparent attempt to impose, outside models will

not work. Nor, no matter how well-intentioned, will attempts to cut

and paste various other models and institutions, or to make progress

largely contingent upon the desires of extra-regional countries or insti-
63

tutions. The regions sense of itself is such that this course will not be

accepted by the people or their governments. However, while the idea of

regional ownership is very important, the region must also be honest

with itself and admit that this ownership will not be accomplished in

absolute terms anytime soon due largely to regions inability to initiate

and sustain truly inclusive dialoguesmore on this subject in a moment.

Fourth, no one size fits all model will work. The Middle East is a

vast and diverse region. Just as there is a need for a region-wide system

of some sort, we must recognise that sub-regional and bilateral dynamics will be important within the overall. In the work that I have done

over the years, the concept of Geometry Variable is critical. Put simply, this idea holds that, within an overall regional framework, different players may advance at different speeds on particular issues. This

will be a dynamic process, and we must recognise that a need will exist

for a degree of flexibility to allow individual players to move towards

agreed goals in their own way.

Fifth, any system that emerges must be a truly Middle Eastern model

of regional security. It may be helpful for Westerners to tone down references to the idea of creating a Middle Eastern OSCE. While such

references may be intended to draw attention to an idea in conceptual

terms, they seem to ring in Middle Eastern ears as statements that the

Middle East has only to adopt a model developed elsewhere for all to be

well. In fact, any model which emerges in the Middle East will have to

be a unique one, which is specifically designed by the peoples of that

region for their own historical, social and political realities. The other

regional experiences which exist (such as the OSCE, ASEAN, the OAS

and others) can be drawn on in developing ideas for a unique Middle

Eastern system and the various projects I have been involved in have

done this. But these models are not things that can simply be transferred to the Middle East. As a more general point, I am increasingly

convinced that a need exists for the development of a community of

experts who know about both Regional Security Regimes and the Middle

East. There are people who know about how regional systems have developed and others who know about the Middle East, but relatively few

who have some grounding in both and can make the required connections between conceptual ideas and regional realities.

Finally, while I subscribe fully to the idea that the pursuit of a cooperative Middle East regime, with the promotion of social and political

reform at its heart is vitally important in its own right, I am increasingly convinced that it will happen in concert with progress towards

the resolution of the issues of the peace process, and, more immediately, the Iraq issue. This does not mean that the development of new

regional co-operation ideas should be held hostage to the MEPP or Iraq.

The security of the Middle East is about more than the Peace Process.

We should never forget that many more have died in the Middle East in

conflicts between and within Muslim countries than in all of the ArabIsraeli wars and that the cases of actual WMD use in the region have

not involved the confrontation with Israel. This is not an attempt to

downplay the importance or centrality of the MEPP, but it is a call to

recognise that there are many issues of regional security that have

nothing to do with the Arab-Israeli conflict and that some regional leaders have hidden behind that conflict as an excuse not to address other

reform issues.
64

But we must face the fact that the states of the region are unlikely to

be prepared to initiate the steps required to develop a new approach to

regional relations unless they can show their publics that the peace

process and Iraq are on their way to some kind of acceptable resolution

and that perceived biases are being corrected.

Questions

Beyond these general points, however, there are some key questions

that need to be considered, amongst which are the following seven. As

you might expect, there are no easy answers. As a wise man said long

ago; if this were easy it would have been done by now.

1. What do we mean by the Middle East?

We must begin by accepting that the term Middle East is itself a

Western construct, going back to early years of the Twentieth Century.

That said, most in the region would agree that, in at least some ways,

one can point to something called the Middle East. But what is it? Political scientists have spent much time trying to define what a region

is, without achieving consensus. In the end, a sense of region is something that develops over time. It involves ethnic, religious, historical,

security and economic factors, in varying degrees. Perhaps the only

way to define a region is to say that it is an area within which events in

one country have a particular resonance for countries around it that

they do not for others further afield. A region can be multi-layered and

multi-faceted.

In the work that we have done, the definition of the Middle East that

has proved most acceptable to regional participants has been: the states

of the Arab League, Iran and Israel, with some form of very close association for Turkey, which will obviously play a critical role in whatever

is constructed. Within the Middle East there are critical sub-regions:

the Persian Gulf; the Levant; and the Maghreb. And there are also

countries which belong to the Middle East and other regions (Africa,

the Caucasus, etc.) simultaneously. Finally, there are some countries

which are not part of this definition, but whose policies and actions

dramatically affectthose who are. Flexibility and the concept of geometry variable come into play. Finally, the work that we have done has

developed the idea that there is a critical role for extra-regional powers

in any future regional system, which we have come to define as being

the overlapping memberships of the states of the G8, the P5 and the

EU and UN as institutions.

2. Are there alternatives to the idea of an indigenous, Middle Eastwide regional system for cooperation?

There are always alternatives. The question: which is the best alternative? My own view is that an indigenous, region-wide cooperation

system must be developed, over time, in the Middle East. But there are

at least two possible alternatives.

The first is to extend in some way an existing institution, or institutions, such as the OSCE or NATO to the region. This has appeal for

three reasons. One, it could be fast. Two, it could avoid the region going

through a lengthy debate over what the various concepts mean that

could lead to definitions the West is not happy with, or just avoiding

topics like democracy. Three, it would give external countries automatic

membership in the regime.
65

While not immune to these arguments, I do not support this approach.

It is not clear that the existing fora such as the OSCE or NATO can

shift to accommodate the region. Moreover, I am not sure this would do

either of these institutions or the region any good. Decision-making in

Brussels and Vienna is already hard enough!

Most importantly, there are no short-cuts to fundamental change. If

we really want the states of the Middle East to develop a true regional

security system, which recognizes the critical role of social and political

reform in regional security, they have to undertake a process of thinking this through and developing their own models. We understand what

such ideas as indivisible security mean because we went through a

process of developing them. The Middle East has to do the same in its

own historical and political context. It will take time, but has to be

done. Just trying to extend our definitions of these concepts risks their

not being accepted as legitimate.

Moreover, it may smack of the West, and primarily the United States,

trying to rope the regional countries into systems where the West controls the rules, the content and the membership. It is highly unlikely

the Middle East states will agree, and their publics will be particularly

negative about this. Indeed, presenting the idea this way may simply

be seen as a thinly veiled attempt to control the agenda and not allow

the region to take a lead in developing its own model of the future. This

is not to say that there are not roles for the OSCE and NATO in terms

of the possible expansion of their existing dialogue projects with certain

countries in the region. But these relationships cannot replace the need

for an integrated vision for the region with the Middle East states themselves at its centre.

The second idea for creating a regional security system is to concentrate on sub-regional issues, particularly in the Persian Gulf. A set of

sub-regional systems, including the Maghreb and the Levant could then

be inter-locked.

Again, there is an attraction in this. Concentrating on sub-regions

may help insulate issues from the Peace Process. But many issues

have both sub-regional and region-wide dimensions. The proliferation

of WMD and ballistic missiles cannot be addressed just in the Gulf as

Israel must also be factored in. Moreover, the push to make social and

political reform a major part of this process will be strengthened if it is

region-wide. Splitting up the overall Middle East may have the unintended consequence of demonstrating that different standards of reform

are acceptable in different parts of the region. Imagine in the CSCE/

OSCE context if the West had accepted the notion that the standards

soughtin the three Baskets (including the democratic reform Basket)

could be developed sub-regionally around Europe, rather than according to standards that applied across the continent as a whole.

Thus, while some issues can and should be addressed on a sub-regional basis, this does not obviate the need for a region-wide approach

as well. The way forward is for the creation of a Regional Security Regime to complement sub-regional institutions and organizations and

bilateral relations. It may be that a region-wide system would, in the

first instance, seek to address those issues that can be tackled at the

region-wide level, while establishing the principle that various sub-regional efforts that are pursued must be undertaken within the framework of an overall set of region-wide norms.
66

3. How can a reform initiative for the Greater Middle East be constructed to guarantee maximum ownership in the region?

There are no guarantees. It should be remembered that there will not

be a single initiative; there will be many, some of which will be official,

some of which will be purely civil society and some of which will be

both. The most effective will probably somehow combine the two and be

capable of evolving over time. We are still at a stage where many flowers will bloom on different levels (official, civil society, etc.) and this is

probably healthy, if a little confusing at times. The key may not be so

much to design a single initiative as to recognise and build on the synergies and opportunities that the different approaches present.

One of the critical points is dialogue within the region and between

the region and the extra-regional countries as to how these projects

should go forward. For all the talk in the region about wanting to own

things, we must remember that no region-wide and fully inclusive dialogue run entirely by the region is yet possible, due to problems with

certain key players refusing to recognise each other. Many of those in

the region who berate any idea for a discussion do so because outsiders would be involved in helping to run it, but those same players

refuse to start a serious discussion themselves if it involves certain

others in the regionan impossible, and all-too-convenient, reason for

not doing anything that might lead to real change. There is thus a role

for outside players as facilitators, if the objective is really to include

everyone in the region, but facilitation is different from ownership. Those

who would put themselves forward for the role of facilitator need to

understand that, and to work very hard to make sure that they and

their regional interlocutors have a common concept of what facilitation

means.

4. Who should own such an initiative: all governments in the region,

only reform countries, democratic civil society or all of the above?

The key question is not this one, but rather who gets to make this

decision anyway? If, as noted above, many ideas are going to be in play

on many levels, the idea of the ownership of a specific initiative may be

moot. At some point, if consideration of the issue begins to gel around

one process, this may become a concern. My advice on a basic level is to

strive for inclusiveness to the extent possibletalking only to those

who share your perceptions may be satisfying, but is not likely to bridge

gaps. Our definition in going forward is that any regional system that

emerges must be inclusive and must leave a seat at the table for all

regional players, even if some of them may not be willing to take it at

first.

5. Which basic assumptions do we take: universal values as enshrined

in the UN Human Rights Charter; democratic standards such as an

independent judiciary, multiparty system, separation of powers, etc.?

The universal values are just that; universal. All of the countries in

the region have signed the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of

Human Rights and other key documents, even if some governments in

the region had little intention of honouring many of the commitments.

There is now a push, both within the region and without, to make these

commitments stick, but it must be done in a way which comes from the

region. Democracy as we understand and practice it in the West is
67

not necessarily the only model of representative government, for example. It should also be remembered that concepts of democracy,womens

rights and so on are not alien to the Middle East. The Charter of Madinah,

signed by the Prophet Muhammad over 500 years before the Magna

Carta, contains ideas that are in line with what we now regard as democratic pluralism.

My sense is that what is required now is an effort to develop understandings of what the underlying concepts inherent in these documents

mean in the Middle East context, culturally, socially, historically and

politically, and to reinforce them in the current regional context. There

is a very important discussion that needs to be held over just what we

mean when we use words like democracy and secularismI suspect

we may find that we have to develop a set of concepts and terms that

bridge some gaps.

6. How can the West best help this process, particularly in an era where

there is growing regional anger? Has Abu Ghraib weakened the soft

power that the West needs to push for those reforms?

In the short term, yes. But we should be careful to separate the feelings of the region towards particular governments and policies from its

feelings towards the ideals for which the West stands. As I frequently

remind my Middle East friends, just as we Westerners have to remember thatthere is no monolithic Middle East,there is no monolithic West

either. I sense that most in the Middle East do not hate the West at

allthey greatly respect much about the West. Perhaps many Middle

Easterners perceive, and are angered by the fact that some Western

leaders do not honour their professed beliefs. But then that is not a

uniquely Western problem either.

In terms of how the West can help, I think we need to begin with

humility; we do not have the answers. Only the region can define what

they may be. But it is important for the Middle East to be honest with

itself as well. As noted a moment ago in discussion of the ownership

question, the Middle East is not in a position to launch discussions over

ideas that are truly inclusive and region-wide. Facilitation is required

but it is vital that people on both sides have a discussion over what they

mean by facilitation.

We in the West should also not be embarrassed to state openly that

we have an interest in reform in the Middle East. It is evident that

instability in that region will affect us and we have a right to say so and

to try to mitigate that instability. Done right, this is not interference

in a negative sense.

7. Whats in it for the United States?

First, the creation of this kind of a Regional Cooperation System in

the Middle East supports basic U.S. policies and objectives. President

Bushs vision of democracy as a key driver of change in the Middle East

is the right one. A system which made social and political transformation a key component of the regions dialogue on security supports this.

Such a transformation does not happen overnight, of course, but the

creation of new region-wide normsbacked by an ongoing process and

by implementation and review mechanisms as part of thathas been

shown to greatly assist the process of change.
68

Second, the creation of a regime which included from the beginning

the states of the region and extra-regional partner states would tend to

regularize the relationship between the region and the United States,

Europe and others. As happened in Europe and Asia, the question of

whether the extra-regional states have a right to be present in the region would be answered. At the same time, as happened with ASEAN

and the associated ASEAN Regional Forum, the region would be able to

take a role in establishing some of the ground rules of its relationship

with the outside world. This bargain would be a healthy thing for both

sides.

Third, as noted above, though not intended to be either part of or to

supplant the peace process, this project would tend to support that process.

Fourth, a multilateral regional security system would provide a place

whereby the United States can talk on a regular basis with countries

like Iran. This is not meant to replace the need for full bilateral relations, of course. But it could be a useful way-station on the road to

eventual full relations.

Finally, this is a process that can support a renewed trans-Atlantic

agenda in the Middle East. There will be differences between the United

States and Europe as this goes forward, but the basics (both in content

and process) are things that we all fundamentally agree on. This will be

a multi-faceted process that would unfold over many years and there

are many opportunities for the trans-Atlantic community to work together in support of it. It will be important as this evolves to avoid a

sense of competition between the United States and Europe.

Conclusion

So what is the result of all this? The way forward remains fuzzy, but

my sense is that some ideas are emerging around the creation of a

regional System or Regime in the Middle East. They call for the

creation of an ongoing processin the region involving the elaboration

of norms of conduct. These norms may be thought of as a set of three

inter-locking bargains: between the regional states in terms of how they

deal with each other; between the regional states and their peoples in

terms of political, social and economic reform; and between the region

and the rest of the world in terms of the expectations and responsibilities each has towards the other. These norms are then subject to ongoing review and implementation. The purpose of such a system will be to

give the region a set of tools to help it manage a period of transition and

change.

In considering the basic ideas on which such a regime must be based,

the following ideas are critical:

 the system must be based on a set of rules of conduct for the

region and regional states must take the lead in elaborating them,

with outside facilitation as required;

 the regime should not be thought of a static thing, but rather as

a process which will evolve over time;

 such a process must be inclusive and be open to all regional countries, even if not all of them may elect to join at the outset, and to

a group of extra-regional Partners (most likely to include the P

5; the G8; and the EU and UN);

 no one size fits all approachgeometry variable is critical;
69

 the process must take a broad definition of security, to include

questions of social and political transformation in the region;

 governments may lead in some respects, but there is a critical

role for civil society in developing these ideas.
70

MATERIALS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY

PETER JONES, RESEARCH ASSOCIATE,

MUNK CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES,

CANADAS PRIVY COUNCIL

The Preface and Executive Summary from

TOWARDS A REGIONAL SECURITY REGIME

FOR THE MIDDLE EAST: ISSUES AND OPTIONS

BY PETER JONES

PUBLISHED BY

STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE

STOCKHOLM, DECEMBER 1998

PREFACE

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) inaugurated a Middle East Security and Arms Control Project in October

1995. As the first major initiative of the project a Middle East Expert

Group was formed to consider how a regional and comprehensive security regime might be developed in the Middle East. The Expert Group

held four meetings between February 1997 and October 1998: in Alexandria, Egypt (February 1997) in association with the Swedish Alexandria Institute; Sigtuna, Sweden (May 1997); Amman, Jordan (November 1997) in association with the Department for Security Studies; and

Rabat, Morocco (October 1998) in association with the Moroccan Centre

for Strategic Studies.

The group members came from Europe, Japan, the Middle East, North

America and Russia.1 All acted in their private capacities and did not

represent any official body or government. The discussions were off the

record. The objective was to identify and explore the issues which the

group members felt would have to be addressed in any future attempt to

create a Middle East security regime and to suggest ideas for further

discussion.

This report is both a synthesis of the Expert Groups discussions and

an attempt by Dr. Peter Jones, Leader of the SIPRI Middle East Security and Arms Control Project and Chairman of the Expert Group, to

develop the wide variety of ideas reviewed. It highlights the areas of

convergence and disagreement which came out in the sessions and suggests possible ways forward which emerged. Dr. Jones is solely responsible for its content. The report was discussed intensively at the final

meeting of the Expert Group. However, not every group member necessarily agrees with every idea expressed in this report.

On behalf of SIPRI, I would like to thank all those who took part in

the work of the Expert Group. Dr Jones and his research assistants,

Gunilla Flodén and Anders Jägerskog, also deserve special thanks. The

editing and preparation of camera-ready copy was carried out with experience, professionalism and thoroughness by Jetta Gilligan Borg and

Connie Wall.

1 A list of participants in the Expert Group is included as appendix 1 to

this report. The agendas of the 4 meetings are summarized in appendix 2.
71

The project was funded by the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs

and the Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development of Canadas

Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. SIPRI was solely

responsible for organizing and conducting the meetings and for the findings.

Adam Daniel Rotfeld

Director of SIPRI
72

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The SIPRI Middle East Expert Group met four times over an 18-

month period to consider how a regional security regime might be developed. The principal points of this report are:

 Further progress in the Middle East peace process would create a

suitable political climate for consideration of a regional security

regime.

 The states ofthe region should begin to explore the ideas inherent

in the creation of a security regime as soon as possible to further

the peace process and address the many security concerns of the

region.

 Cooperative security is the only possible basis for a security regime in the Middle East.

 A set of guiding principles for conduct in the region should be

created.

 Attempts to create a Middle East security regime must stress the

evolutionary process of developing such a regime. The regime

should be flexible, pragmatic and emphasize voluntary participation.

 The Middle East was defined as the states of the Arab League,

Iran and Israel. The importance of proximate states was also

stressed.

 States outside the Middle East will play an important role, particularly the permanent members of the United Nations Security

Council.

 A regional security regime will initially be characterized by informal political arrangements rather than legal, binding commitments. However, institutions, such as a Regional Security Centre, could be created as needed.

 Not all the states ofthe region are likely to take part in the initial

efforts to establish a security regime. The process should start

with the willing states and leave a seat at the table for others to

join when they are ready. Latecomers will have to accept decisions that have already been made.

 Confidence- and security-building measures are necessary to build

such a regime. Among those which should be considered are: openness and transparency measures to reduce the likelihood of surprise attack and lessen the demand for weapons; communication

networks and links to provide exchange of information; declarations of peaceful intent to reduce tension; measures to provide for

cooperation between military authorities in noncombat areas; and

the creation of a Regional Security Centre.

 A weapons of mass destruction-free zone should be created to abolish all weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical and biological) in the Middle East. Such a zone should be a central objective of a regional security regime, and discussion of its

establishment and design should commence as soon as possible.

 The zone would include, at least, the states of the Arab League,

Iran and Israel. The cooperation of proximate states would be

vital, and their role would need to be defined. The permanent

members of the Security Council would be called upon to provide

security guarantees.
73

 A weapons of mass destruction-free zone mustinclude special verification provisions for intrusive and reciprocal regional inspections, including challenge inspections. Many group members also

believed that the states of the region will have to adhere to international regimes as regards the nonproliferation of weapons of

mass destruction.

 As regards conventional arms control, a regional security regime

can create an environment in which states can exercise restraint.

Extra-regional suppliers of weapons must accept this and also

demonstrate restraint in their sales of weapons to the region.

 In contrast to a weapons of mass destruction-free zone, which

must exist region-wide, conventional arms might best be dealt

with subregionally, within the context of a broad overall approach.

 Initially, there should be discussion of threat perceptions, doctrines and the reasons for the acquisition of conventional weapons.

 A regional security regime must seek to eliminate ballistic and

antiballistic missiles from the region, although this will be a longterm goal.

 In the immediate future, the control of ballistic missiles will eral

restraint. Ultimately, binding restraints will be necessary. Measures which would be particularly useful in the meantime include: pre-notification of launches, range limitations and the capping of missile stocks.

 Although official dialogue on many ofthe issues addressed in this

report may not be possible for some time, informal and academic

discussions can proceed, and the governments of the region should

support them.

[Note: This publication in its entirely can be accessed at

<http://projects.sipri.se/mideast/MEreport.pdf>]
74

PREPARED STATEMENT OF

HON. CRAIG DUNKERLEY, AMBASSADOR (RET.),

DISTINGUISHED VISITING PROFESSOR,

NEAR EAST-SOUTH ASIA CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

Mr. Chairman, members of the Commission, thank you for the opportunity to participate in todays discussion. Consideration of Helsinkis

possible lessons for the Middle East is timely and relevant. I can think

of no better group to move debate on this topic in an informed and constructive direction. With your concurrence, I will offer some brief observations. These are very much personal views. They do not reflect any

official position or agency assessment.

The impetus for todays discussion rests with the positive examples

that Helsinki Final Act Principles and the OSCE experience might provide for other regions. Ambassador Kampelman and Minister Sharansky have once again done great service by underscoring their possible

application within the Middle East.

To my mind,the value of Helsinkis lessons will, in the firstinstance,

lie more for U.S. policymakers in the requirements and possible tactics

of shaping a successful long-term collaborative strategy for the United

States in the Middle Eastand less in the sense of prescribing any

preconceived institutional template to be applied to that region from the

outside.

I am skeptical of using an immediate focus on specific organizational

models or transplants as a starting point for this discussion. This is not

just because there are profound differences between the problems and

recent histories of Europe and the Middle East. Even more important

right now are widely-held popular sensitivities throughout the region to

any notion of an external formula for change, let alone misperceptions

of an American desire simply to impose our own plans and structures.

We have, of course, an important role to play in moving these issues

forwardand we should be alert to efforts of some regimes to try to

invoke resistance to external ideas and pressures simply as an excuse

for inaction. But it would be a serious mistake for our policies to neglect

a critical political fact of life: that to be effective, genuine reform and

major change must be seen as driven largely from within the region

itself.

Thus more fundamental and immediate questions relate to how the

United States (and Europe) might support more effectively advocates of

reform from within the Middle East.

How can we best differentiate our bilateral approaches to take account of different problems and diverse opportunities within individual

countries of the region?

Howand under what conditionsshould we try encourage a process of greater multilateral dialogue on issues of regional cooperation,

security and fundamental freedoms? How could any such sort of initially informal dialogue gradually be given both operational focus and

meaningful follow-up?

But the most important question will be whether any such process

can come to be perceived as genuinely owned and led by a growing

community of stakeholders, both governmental and non-governmental

in nature, drawn from among the different states and peoples of the

Middle East.
75

Good answers to those questions will not come quickly or easilyand

our process of developing answers will have to be seen as taking place in

collaborative partnership with governments, groups and individuals of

the region itself.

That sort of broad exchange has begun, evidenced in part by the G8

Summits statementlast week on Partnership for Progress and a Common Future with the Region of the Broader Middle East and North

Africa. But, as the bumpy diplomatic road to the Sea Island meeting

illustrated, moving from generalities to specifics will continue to be very

difficult. The issues themselves are toughand there are persistent

differences of tone, emphasis and vision not just between the United

States and specific governments of the region but among many of those

governments themselves as well as with other G8 members as well.

Faced with this challenge, a close reading of Helsinkis history of the

last three decades might give certain help. First, it would flag the need

for a sense of strategic perspective and great patience: Supporting this

sort of transformative agenda within a region even more challenging

than Cold War Europe will require a much longer-term and sustained

diplomatic commitment than American political calendars usually allow for. This should be seen as a generational project.

Second, Helsinkis history would also suggestthe importance oftactical flexibility on our part, especially as circumstances and expectations

within the region evolve. We should take care not to lock into any single

organizational concept too early on.

There will be a variety of ideas from within the regiondifferent possible experiments with regard to individual issues or sub-regional arrangementswhich we should be prepared to explore and encourage as

appropriate. An openness to consider specific sub-regional steps might

provide the most chance for initial progress.

Third and not least, the Helsinki process succeeded in no small part

because its agenda was cast broadly enough to reflect issues seen as

important, in various and different ways, for almost all of its participants, both in the East and West. This past strategy has direct relevance for any comparable future effort within the Middle East.

In some circles within the Middle East,the labels Helsinki or OSCE

are perceivedor misperceivedas almost exclusively focused on a U.S.-

driven agenda of human rights issues alone which, in turn, is aimed

solely at advancing our own strategic advantage. That is, of course, a

serious misreading of the breadth of the Helsinki Baskets.

In its philosophy and practice, the OSCE reaffirms an equal status

and legitimacy for each of its participants and their respective security

concerns. It stresses reciprocity and continuous engagement. On that

very basis, it has been often noted that the OSCE experience in political-military confidence-building could offer much, for example, in the

development of a multilateral forum on regional security issues within

the whole or parts of the Middle East.

But Helsinki-inspired efforts in this direction, especially on a comprehensive or pan-regional basis, will risk being undercut, as they have

been before, if they are not seen as taking account of those security and

political questions perceived by many who live within the Middle East

as central.

Two examples: Longstanding frustrationson all sidesover lack of

progress towards a meaningful resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian question on terms that produce a viable Palestinian state as well ensure
76

Israeli security will inevitably cloud local debate over any new initiative. Similarly the degree and pace at which security and well-being

come to be restored within a sovereign Iraq will have a profound influence on perceptions of regional stability.

To cite these various complications is not to deny the important challenge for U.S. policy-makers set by the previous speakers: the need to

think creatively about Helsinkis potential lessons and examples for the

Middle East.

Rather this is to underscore that any American strategy to that end

would have to be long-term in perspective, collaborative in nature, broad

in substance, and widely perceived as meeting the political needs, both

real and perceived, of the region itself.

Mr. Chairman, I think that the Commission could have a constructive role in framing any further consideration of such a long-term strategy by:

 continuing the useful discussion begun through todays hearing

with a follow-on focus on hearing directly from a greater number

of concerned and appropriate individuals from throughout the

Middle East;

 exploring ways to provide both visibility and moral support for

those groups and individuals from within the Middle East who

seeking the application of Helsinki-like Principles and standards

within their own societies; and

 strengthening substantive engagement on these very issues with

your legislative counterparts from throughout the Middle East,

both on a bilateral basis and multilaterally through the OSCE

Parliamentary Assembly.
77

MATERIALS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

BY HON. CRAIG DUNKERLEY, AMBASSADOR (RET.),

DISTINGUISHED VISITING PROFESSOR,

NEAR EAST-SOUTH ASIA CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

Reprinted from

In the National Interest, Vol. III, Issue 17, April 28, 2004

WHAT THE HELSINKI-MIDDLE EAST ANALOGY

SHOULD SAY TO U.S. POLICYMAKERS

BY CRAIG DUNKERLEY

The general notion of a Helsinki model for the Middle East has

become a new catch phrase, easily cast out in any debate over U.S.

intentions in the region. As it has come to be associated with discussion

of the Administrations interest in launching a Greater Middle East

Initiative (GMEI) as part of its 2004 summit schedule, the ebb and flow

of Helsinkis invocation suggests its own cautionary lessons for the

states and societies of the Middle East. But these would be insights for

a far longer-term and sustained diplomatic effort than American political calendars usually allow fora broad strategy not just for the next

few months but the coming decade and beyond.

The basic idea is not a new one: to seek to apply among the countries

of the Middle East positive examples drawn from the political process

launched in Europe by the Helsinki Final Act and eventually resulting

in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

Signed largely as a détente set piece in 1975, the Final Act came to

serve as a statement of basic principles for Europe as a whole. These

were to govern not only how the states of a then still-divided Europe

ought to deal with each otherrespecting existing borders and foreswearing the threat or use of force, but no less importantly, how their

governments should treat their respective citizens on the basis of fundamental freedoms and human rights.

It has been the policy emphasis on democratic and economic reform

throughout the region, signaled by the Presidents address to the National Endowment for Democracy in November of last year and reiterated as a Forward Strategy for Freedom in the latest State of the

Union address, which has given the latest special impetus to the Helsinki-Mideast analogy. The Helsinki reference appeared in initial

backgrounding on the Administrations GMEI, itself built upon the previous years Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI). It was readily

picked up as a convenient descriptive tag line among journalists. Despite the subsequent effort of American spokesmen to avoid such labels

and to suggest a more nuanced picture, the notion of a Helsinki model

is now well-established in public commentary, both here and abroad.

The Helsinki process succeeded because its agenda of regional security and cooperation was deliberately cast in terms broad enough to

reflect issues seen as important in various ways for almost all of its

participants, both in East and West. Helsinki proved to be flexible enough

to evolve dramatically in both its rationale and its structure as political

circumstances and expectations changed with time. It succeeded because, although the United States came to be one of its strongest supporters and to exercise great influence in all of the OSCEs activities,
78

the process has not borne the exclusive fingerprints of any one country.

Throughout the years, Helsinki has been able to convey credibly the

sense of a much wider community of stakeholders to be found throughout its area of coverage.

Today, there are an increasing number of voices throughout the Middle

East which, in varying ways, speak of political, economic and social

reform as both necessary and urgent. But in marked contrast with the

Helsinki experience, development of any comparable regional community of supporters of American objectives in this direction will be complicated by a perceived lack of American credibilityeven legitimacy

on these very issues. This may represent the most critical challenge for

any long-term American strategy on behalf of reform in the region, let

alone any new high-profile initiatives.

American diplomatic efforts to promote reform from within the Middle

East will not be judged solely on their own merits. Frustration over a

lack of progress towards a meaningful resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and a viable Palestinian state, and a widespread perception

throughout the region of a persistent U.S. policy imbalance in favor of

Israel, will inevitably color any local debate over U.S. motives in pressing reform.

Nor will any such efforts be seen in isolation from the effectiveness of

continued American engagement in Iraq. At its potential worstincreasing violence, political conflict and a stalemated transitional authoritythe Iraqi situation would provide other regimes with yet further reason to resist the uncertainties which greater liberalization might

engender. Even a far more optimistic prospecta more secure and prospering Iraq able to demonstrate a new definition of political legitimacy

and pluralism to the regionmight have unexpected implications for

its neighbors, especially given longstanding sensitivities between Sunni

and Shiite within these societies.

The very complexity and unpredictability of such outcomes will pose

new challenges for American policymakers. In considering how to stabilize and strengthen a rapidly changing strategic environment, even

as the United States moves to a new force posture within the region and

wrestles with the task of deterring and dissuading Iranian nuclear

ambitions, they may well need to think beyond traditional solutions.

Deterring future threats within the Gulf, for example, will depend in

the first instance on regional diplomatic and defense efforts in which a

continued U.S. role will likely prove critical. But we also might take a

page from Helsinkis book to complement these efforts with expanded

dialogue and cooperative mechanisms designed to promote greater military transparency and predictability and reciprocal reassurance in the

face of longstanding differences found throughout the Gulf. As various

commentators have noted, one such option would be to explore, informally at first, the beginnings of a regional security dialogue among all

of the Gulf states. Such an approach might serve as a useful element in

a comprehensive and multi-faceted strategy for dealing with both Iran

and a post-Saddam security balance within the Gulf over the longer

term.
79

At issue is whether American political leadersboth of the current

Administration and those that followwill be prepared to sustain as

ambitious a goal as transforming the political culture of the Middle

East through more active and consistent support for political, economic

and social reform. If they prove to be, the United States would be entering into a relationship with the region far more extensive and intimate

than has existed previously. It would, in effect, represent an unprecedented effort on our part to engage in seeking change on all levels of

states and societies within this region. But such a new relationship

would also play out against the backdrop of profound differences and

controversiesperhaps a good deal more tenacious than those between

the United States and other regions in the past. The United States

would not enjoy the inherent advantages of its previous diplomatic efforts elsewhere.

And so Helsinkis real lesson for policymakers might well be to convey a proper sense of proportion with regard to the pace and time scale

which such endeavors would require. Neither Helsinkis history nor

popular attitudes now found throughout the region should be read to

deny the importance or validity of the strategic goal of reform and transformation. But they do suggest that, like the slow and crabwise movement of the Helsinki Process as it played out over a number of years,

our strategy would need to prepare for a timeline measured in decades.

Craig Dunkerley, a former Foreign Service officer with extensive OSCE

experience, is currently a Distinguished Adjunct Professor at the Near

East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies of the National Defense

University. The views expressed are his own and do not reflect those

of the National Defense University or U.S. Government.
80

PREPARED STATEMENT OF

MICHAEL YAFFE, PH.D., ACADEMIC DEAN,

NEAR EAST-SOUTH ASIA CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

I want to thank Congressman Smith and other members of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe for offering me this opportunity to discuss the Helsinki Process and Reforms in the Middle

East. The issue of reform and security cooperation in the region is an

important subject that merits constant support, debate, and a full airing of views of how to extend such support. With your permission, I will

offer some brief observations on earlier efforts and six suggestions on

how to support change in the Middle East today, and submit a written

statement elaborating on these points.

For more than a decade, I have been involved at the government-togovernment and civil society levels in the promotion of regional security cooperation and dialogues on creating regional security frameworks

in the Middle East. I have had the privilege of being a member of the

U.S. delegation to the Middle East Peace Process (specifically the multilateral Arms Control and Regional Security Working Group), serving

as the State Department coordinator for the on-going U.S. Governmentsponsored Middle East Regional Security Track Two program, and now

the Academic Dean and Professor of National Security Affairs at the

Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies at National Defense

University. As such, it is important to state at the outset that what

follows are my personal views and not necessarily those of the United

States Government, the Department of Defense, Department of State,

National Defense University or the Near East South Asia Center for

Strategic Studies.

My intention today is to provide some observations on approaches for

assisting the Middle East to bring about change in the interest of individual freedom, modernization, prosperity and enhanced security.

Change is definitely on the minds of many in the Middle East and outside the region. There are a host of proposals on the table, introduced in

many international meetings, summits, academic symposium, joint studies, and workshops. These proposals include, inter alia, establishing a

regional security and cooperation forum for the Middle East; a dialogue

forum for strengthening relations between the Arab World and the outside world; expanding the mission of institutions like the OSCE to encompass the wider Middle East from Morocco to the Gulf; broadening

the focus of enhanced security to address both hard security issues (i.e.,

wars between states and peoples) and soft security issues (i.e., economic

development, social improvement and political freedom) that often lead

to civil unrest, terrorism, arms races, and wars; and a charter of principles governing intra-regional relations and internal government-civil

society relations. The trick with most of these proposals is to establish

mechanisms for implementing them, and then implementing them in

such as way as to achieve positive benefits for the people of the Middle

East without provoking instability and extremism.

This hearing is emblematic of a larger movement that began in 2001

when individuals and governments in the Middle East, Europe, the

United States, and elsewhere started to examine in earnest how they

could cooperate to put an end to terrorism and extremism that threaten

them while promoting human dignity, economic development and enhanced security. The three western-oriented summits being held this

month in the United States, Ireland and Turkeythe G8, USEU,
81

NATOare a culmination of a many working sessions that have been

held since 2003 on this topic. Central to the agendas of the June summits are the reform initiatives now falling under the moniker Partnership for Progress and a Common Future with the Region of the Broader

Middle East and North Africa.

Rather than critique the current crop of proposals and agreements, I

want to offer some broad insights from previous attempts to bring about

change in the region so that future initiatives might avoid the pitfalls

that dogged those earlier efforts. Taking this critique a step further, I

intend to provide concrete, and hopefully, useful advice on measures

the Commission might want to consider as it proceeds with promoting

reform, cooperation and security in the Middle East.

Arms Control and Regional Security Working Group

Efforts to promote security, reform, cooperation and dialogues on democracy and human rights in the Middle East have a long history. The

modern phase of this effort can be traced to the Madrid Middle East

Peace Process, established in the aftermath of the first Gulf War in

October 1991. The main objective of this process was to settle the ArabIsraeli conflict through a series of bilateral negotiations. To support

these negotiations, regional parties agreed to participate in a broader,

multilateral process involving Israel, 13 Arab states and the Palestinians (Iran, Iraq and Libya were excluded and Syria and Lebanon refused to participate). Five working groups were set up to deal with functional issues regarded as vital to long-term security, prosperity and

stability in the region: Economic Development, Water, Environment,

Refugees and the Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS).

ACRS met in four plenary sessions and 31 expert-level meetings between January 1992 and September 1995. During that time the group

negotiated many of the same issues that Europe addressed in the CSCE/

OSCE process two decades earlier. Indeed, input from OSCE representatives was invaluable to the ACRS process. ACRS began by reviewing

a list of OSCE confidence and security building measures and selecting

several areas on which to focus initially: communications, maritime

cooperation, military information exchange, and a conflict prevention

center. Human rights and other human dimensions of the security equation were not accorded prominence at the outset as the process began

with small, less controversial steps. It was noted in several declaratory

measures, however, that respecting human rights would be critical to

enhancing security and peace. Much attention was given to the idea of

broadening the culture of peace in the region needed to provide the

under girding for a comprehensive peace settlement.

The working group produced a declaratory statement on norms, principles, intentions and steps to enhance regional security. After long hours

of negotiations, agreements or significant progress were made on several key topics; a major achievement given that many of the states

were, and continue to be, in a formal state a war with each other and

most do not recognize the state of Israel.

The last ACRS meeting in September 1995 concluded negotiations on

a draft mandate to establish a regional security center in Amman, Jordan, with associated centers in Tunisia and Qatar. This mandate provided both an institutional base for region-wide dialogues on security

and cooperation and established the norms, principles and framework

guiding the work of the center. It was a uniquely Middle East mandate,
82

borrowing and rejecting ideas from other regional organizations. Some

states favored modeling the mandate after the OSCE. Indeed, creating

a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Middle East, based

largely on OSCE Principles, was already enshrined in Article IV of the

1994 Israel-Jordan peace treaty. But many states rejected this approach.

Before the regional security center mandate and other agreements

could be fully adopted or implemented, ACRS ended abruptly in the

autumn of 1995. Failure to make progress in the two principal panregional issues, the Arab-Israeli conflict and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, converged to freeze activities within ACRS and

later the other multilateral working groups too. Essentially, the bilateral peace and end-of-conflict negotiations between Israel and its neighbors set the pace for the amount of progress achievable on all regionwide initiatives.

Regional Security Track Two Programs: Studies, Workshops,

Charters

To keep regional parties engaged in dialogue on hard and soft security issues, the United States began sponsoring in 1996 a Middle East

Regional Security Track Two Program. This program was funded initially by the Department of State, and now Congress funds it through

the Department of Defense. Several European governments contribute

too. The program sponsors workshops, task forces, on-line discussion

groups, training courses, and studies that collectively have brought together more than 1200 officials and non-official security experts from

Middle East, United States, Europe, and Asia. It is not a substitute for

the formal ACRS process, although it continues to address many of the

same issues raised in ACRS.

Some fascinating studies have emerged from the Track Two process,

many of which have direct bearing on the subject of todays hearing.

These include proceedings of workshops focusing on lessons learned and

potentially applied to the Middle East from security and cooperation

regimes in Asia, Africa, Europe and Latin America. It includes reports

from working groups on promoting democracy, investment and economic

development, Gulf security and Mediterranean security. It also includes

semi-annual workshops bringing together senior military leaders. And

it produced a joint study by Israeli and Jordanian experts on how to

bridge the gap and construct a Middle East Cooperative Security

Framework.

One notable experts group in which I was fortunate enough to participate in drafting a report on the issues and options of creating a Middle

East regional security regime in its fullest dimension. Dr. Peter Jones

was the director of that 1998 study. The study led to the formation in

2002 of a new academic group with participants from most Middle East

countries, again under the auspices of the Track Two program, who

reviewed efforts for implementing the proposals presented in the 1998

study. The principal idea is to create a permanent dialogue mechanism

within the region on economical, social and security related issues.

The working group developed a modelCharter of general principles

based on the UN charter (peaceful co-existence, respect for sovereignty,

non-intervention, respect for human rights, etc.). The Charter should

be seen as a template to be adapted by the regional governments to fit

their needs, not as something to be swallowed whole. Mostly, the charter provides a tool for handling development and change by setting norms,
83

standards and a code of conduct for relations between countries in the

region and their populations and between extra-regional parties and

those from Middle East. Advancing the charter to the point that regional parties feel that it is their own initiative will take a long time.

But, as we have seen in Europe and elsewhere, establishing new norms,

standards and codes of conduct are worthy initiatives that should be

pursued with incessant commitment with the long-term in mind. The

road will be bumpy, full of setbacks, and detours.

Applying the Lessons from Previous Efforts to Current Initiatives:

I provide this brief background, first, in order to highlight that many

people have been thinking about and trying to implement dialogues and

programs promoting region-wide security and cooperation in the Middle

East for a long time. The OSCE model has been well studied and many

parts of it have been rejected by those in the Middle East. Second, this

context is useful for understanding my critique of previous efforts and

for discerning lessons from those efforts that might apply to current

initiatives underway or being contemplated.

1. Minimize pan-regional initiatives, charters, and forums

Cooperative pan-regional approachesinvolving all parties from Morocco to Irando not work in the Middle East. Treating the region as a

common entity has proven to be a mirage for every initiative seeking

greater interaction and cooperation throughout the region. This is one

of the dangers when using phrases such as the Wider Middle East,

the Broader Middle East, and the Greater Middle East. It is perceived negatively by many Arabs as a label imposed on the region, conjured up by outsiders who view the Middle East as a unified area with

all parties loyal to the region. The lack of pan-regional organizations in

the Middle East is emblematic of the lack of political, social and economic cohesiveness in the region. And what few exclusive regional organizations that do exist are notable for their ineffectiveness and orientation towards maintaining the status quo. Given all this, I would counsel

against forming broad institutions such as the proposed 78-member

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Mediterranean and the Middle East as a means to create greater unity and cohesion.

The Middle East is a very diverse grouping of states, tribes, nations,

religions, sects, and civilizations and as such should not be treated as a

single geographic block. Its people have multiple and competing identities and loyalties, and those identities are under constant change. There

are fewer bonds holding the region together than those in Europe with

its legalistic and commercial traditions. Only four percent of all trade

by Arab states is with other Arab states. Even the Arab League, an

exclusive pan-national grouping of what seemingly is like-minded states

with a common language, has proven to be relatively ineffective and

fraught with internal disputes that prevent realization of unified actions. High profile issues cannot generate unity in the League. The

Arab states, for example, were unable to hold together as a block when

declaring that their adherence to the Chemical Weapons Convention

would depend on Israels adherence to the Nuclear Nonproliferation

Treaty. During the last few months we witnessed the trouble the Arab
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League faced in arriving at a common position on reform in the region.

Expanding this grouping to include non-Arab League states in some

new forum is a recipe for inaction.

During the last four decades the United States and Western nations

have tended to view the Middle East as a common area, with a large,

relatively homogenous Arab population mixed with two non-Arab states,

namely Israel and Iran. By looking at the Middle East through such a

prism the key to enhanced security and progress in the region has been

relegated to the resolution of the single issue that resonates throughout

the region, namely the Arab-Israeli conflict. This issue dominates the

hard and soft security agenda, and the Levant has become the primary

focus of policy especially in the diplomatic arena. There are and have

been other major issues of concern, of course, such as oil, states with

hegemonic designs, WMD proliferation, water resources, civil wars, and

extremism. But these issues have been largely compartmentalized to

minimize their impact on promoting peace in the Levant.

One of the negative consequences of pursuing the pan-regional approach exclusively is that it hijacks the political agenda so that the

peace process becomes the primary issue of concern. Diplomatic attention to other problems in the region are shunted to the side or relegated

to the military to handle. Some justified this approach by accepting the

proposition that most problems could be better managed only after a

resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Too frequently outrage about gross

human rights violations and infractions are subordinated to the politics

of promoting the peace process between Israel and its neighbors. States

in the region also tend to promote the peace process as a top priority

when dealing with the West, and often use it as a reason or excuse for

delaying the implementation of political, social and economic reforms

at home.

Another consequence is that when the peace process becomes stagnated or experiences set backs it tends to undermine regional cooperation initiatives. This was the fate of the Madrid multilaterals. ACRS

ended just as it appeared to be taking on a life of its own, apart from the

bilateral peace negotiations. Indeed, ACRSs growing independence from

the peace process was one of the reasons for its demise. It was reaching

agreements on pan-regional declarations, confidence-building measures,

and institutions in spite of events at the bilateral negotiating tables.

Ultimately, unhappiness with the state of the bilateral negotiations

manifested itself in the multilaterals. Rather than the multilaterals

supporting the bilaterals as originally intended, the bilaterals held the

multilaterals hostage.

I fear that some of the newly proposed pan-regional initiatives, such

as creating formal institutions on security and democracy dialogues

and regional charters laying out codes of conduct, norms for peaceful

inter-state inactions, principles governing internal affairs, and so on,

will also suffer the fate of the Madrid multilaterals, the Arab League,

and the Barcelona Process. It is not hard to imagine what would happen at the opening meetings of a new, fully-inclusive region-wide organization, such as the proposed Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Mediterranean and the Middle East if there is not

an active peace process. As the only venue in which Arabs and Israelis

are meeting, the agenda will quickly narrow to focus on the Arab-Israeli conflict. Indeed, Arab leaders might be considered politically inept

by their populations should they miss such an opportunity on the world
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stage to raise the issue. Other controversial issues unrelated to economic and political reforms will also hijack the agenda, including Israeli adherence to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), Iranian

non-compliance with its NPT obligations, and Iraq.

This suggestion of minimizing pan-regional approaches is not an argument for ignoring those issues with pan-regional implications. Indeed, the process of encouraging change, reform, and security cooperation throughout the region must include a forthright effort to deal with

the two security issues that have regional overtones, namely the ArabIsraeli conflict and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Addressing these issues in a forthright manner is important for creating a security environment conducive to states to implement reforms

and cooperation. I will elaborate on this point later.

2. Emphasize sub-regional or 3 zonal approaches for security

cooperation

Most of the hard and soft security problems facing the states in the

Middle East are best addressed at the sub-regional level. New security

and cooperation initiatives should be based on taking action in small

groupings with common cultural values, interests, history and security

issues of highest concern to specific geographic areas divided into the

sub-regions. Using this formula, the Middle East can be divided into

nearly three distinct sub-regions: Western Mediterranean, Eastern Mediterranean, and the Gulf. It is important to note that these sub-regions

do not necessarily fit squarely inside the present configuration of what

is generally regarded as the Middle East.

The Western Mediterranean sub-region encompasses Southwest

Europe, North Africa and to some degree Sub-Sahara. The Eastern

Mediterranean sub-region covers the Levant and Southeast Europe.

The Gulf sub-region or Southwest Asia sub-region includes the six

Gulf Cooperation Council states, Iraq, Iran, Yemen, and possibly Pakistan.

Essentially, this approach advocates moving beyond the traditional

connotation of what constitutes the Middle East, and somewhat that of

Europe. Indeed, it might even be better to think about cooperative interactions as occurring in security zones rather than the confines of

continental groupings or sub-regions. Programs, dialogues, and new

institutions created based on this novel delineation should be more cohesive than broader organizations where solutions to problems tend to

be reduced to the common denominator in order to accommodate all

views. This does not negate that countries may have simultaneous allegiance to both sub-regional and pan-regional issues and interactions, or

that some issues need to be dealt with mainly at the pan-regional level.

It simply argues that most dialogues and issues are better dealt with in

smaller sub-groupings.

A workable approach to sub-regional security zones is to deal with the

problems of most interest to those states affected by those problems.

The Western Mediterranean sub-region is mainly concerned about soft

security issues such as immigration, drugs, environmental degradation of the Mediterranean, and crime. The Levant is caught up with the

hard security problems related to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Other hard

security issues are of note such as the Cyprus issue and the PKK and

Turkey. The Gulf is focused on both hard and soft security issues, in-
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cluding political aspirations of Iran, instability in Iraq, religion-motivated terrorism, drug smuggling, immigration, and light arms smuggling.

Each sub-region should approach its security situation according to

the functional nature of the problems they face, and reflect their own

common values, cultures and history. One can imagine creating new

security forums for the Gulf and Western Mediterranean in the near

term. Underpinning Gulf security is a balance of power system mixed

with bilateral security arrangements with the United States. This is

an area where a new forum on security cooperation and dialogue could

prove most beneficial. The Western Mediterranean does not have such

quasi-alliance arrangements. The Levant will have a mixture of security relationships, but the main focus for advancing security, cooperation and reform will take place in concerted peace negotiations.

In most cases, progress in addressing specific issues in one sub-region will not hinge on the status of problems in the other sub-regions. A

corollary of this approach means that lack of progress on the ArabIsraeli in the Levant will have a bearing throughout the Middle East

but it is less likely to hold back progress in addressing problems in the

Gulf and Western Mediterranean sub-regions.

There is evidence that these sub-regional zones are already forming.

The United States and Europe are beginning to view security in Northwest Africa as part of the broader pan-Sahel area. Some participants in

the Barcelona Process are considering the advantages of breaking their

work into two zones, Western Mediterranean and Eastern Mediterranean as it has been ineffective in being a forum for all states bordering

the Mediterranean Sea. Even in the ACRS process back in 1995, we

witnessed the initial idea of a single regional center in Jordan (Levant),

being rejected by the regional parties in favor of two additional subregional centers in Tunisia (Western Mediterranean) and Qatar (the

Gulf).

3. Actualize bilateral programs for assisting economic, social and political

change

It has often been said, including most recently by Egyptian President

Hosni Mubarak, that in the Middle East area one size does not fit all.

I would argue that in the Middle East most successful reform initiatives need to be tailored for each country. Reforms being adopted throughout the Middle East vary greatly from country to country and from subregion to sub-region. Most of the hard work of reform and change will

be experienced within individual states, sometimes in concert with a

few of their neighbors. As such, outside programs dealing with change

and reforms should occur directly between states of the Middle East

and outside states and organizations.

Many of the most promising ideas coming out of the June summits

are focused on bilateral programs, rather than multilateral initiatives.

This is the best approach, especially as bilateral programs tend to be

less divisive and more politically palatable. Receiver states generally

feel like partners and in control. Giver states can moderate assistance

and provide measures to effectively ascertain if the program should continue receiving support. Where cooperation between regional or zonal

states is necessary, this should occur bilaterally or within sub-regional

forums; not at the pan-regional level.
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4. Recognize the need for a comprehensive strategy as a prerequisite for change

The problems facing the Middle East are daunting and fraught with

trouble. Compartmentalizing the problems into sub-regional groupings

helps to make those problems more manageable. But it is important to

recognize that pan-regional issues need to be addressed at the same

time. The Arab-Israeli conflict has a bearing on the success of initiatives promoting cooperation and reforms throughout the Middle East.

The plight of the Palestinians and uncertain status of Jerusalem resonate throughout the Arab world. When progress towards ending the

Israeli-Palestinian conflict looked most promising during the 1992-1996

period, regional cooperative initiatives flourished. Failure at Camp David

in 2000 and the new intifada sent despair throughout the region. Ultimately, it led to Arabs protesting on the street, not for domestic reforms

but for action to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. And this occurred in

places far from the Levant, in Rabat, Muscat, and Sanaa, streets where

protest is generally unheard of.

What is needed is a comprehensive strategy that deals with all the

problems facing the region and in the right settings, be it at the bilateral, sub-regional and the pan-regional levels. Presently, there are three

issues with pan-regional implications: Arab-Israeli conflict (especially

between Israel and Palestinians), weapons of mass destruction proliferation, and Iraq. It has been argued that failure to resolve the ArabIsraeli conflict is used by Arab governments as an excuse for not enacting much needed reforms. On one level this is true. But given the

urgent need for reforms, it is important not to let this argument become an excuse for less than forthright effort in the peace process.

5. Maximize Middle East ownership of the security and development

process

Ideas for developing cooperative regional security regimes, dialogue

forums, or code of conduct charters must belong to those in the region if

they are to succeed. One of the reasons the Madrid process made as

much progress when it did was because the regional parties believed

they were all equal partners to the process, able to shape the agenda

and have their security concerns addressed. Indeed, when I first joined

the ACRS working group in 1993, a year after it began, many of the

regional parties, the United States and other extra-regional parties

claimed that the idea for the multilateral was their own. When the

regional parties began to feel that the process was not addressing their

security concerns adequately, the process became an orphan and ultimately failed.

It is equally important to appreciate that Middle East partiesboth

officials and non-officialsreject modeling Middle East regional security structures after those established in Europe, Asia-Pacific, Latin

America and Africa. They see their own situations as unique. They are

willing to learn from other regions and borrow ideas accordingly, but

they want their own specialized systems appropriate to their circumstance, history, needs, and cultures. That said, they are more inclined

to look favorably at the ASEAN Regional Forum as a model than the

OSCE, largely because the ARF appears to emphasize less internal security matters. We saw this sentiment manifest itself repeatedly in the

ACRS process and in many Track Two workshops.
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Likewise, it can be expected that Middle East parties will reject the

idea of joining Western organizations that expand their membership or

dialogues to include the Middle East. There is deep suspicion that these

organizations are pursuing their initiatives only for the purpose of benefiting the West. For example, many regional parties view the Barcelona

Process as something concocted by the European Union to keep North

Africans out of Europe. North Africans want the aid that the Europeans

proffer, but resent the linkages often tied to it.

Most of the initiatives coming out of the June summits face becoming,not orphans, butthe sole custody ofWestern-parents-without-Middle

East-partners. Despite the lofty titles assigned to the various initiatives emphasizing partnerships and text in communiqués referencing

various statements and declarations from Middle East organizations

favoring change, including the Tunis Arab League Summit, the initiatives are viewed by many Arabs as something being imposed on the

Middle East from outside. Indeed, there has been expression that these

efforts are meant mostly to stop the export of terrorism from the Middle

East rather than for the benefit Middle Easterners.

On the other hand, programs such as Track Two dialogues, which

are organized by U.S. and European NGOs, are flourishing because the

Middle East parties see their thumbprints on the agenda and welcome

the opportunity to engage in dialogue and joint work as equal parties.

Moreover, they reach out to people beyond the elite political sphere and

concentrate on civil society interactions. They also tend to be more inclusive, inviting all parties with interest in security, cooperation and

reform, including from Syria and Iran. These are the types of programs

that should be encouraged and financed permanently and effusively by

all OSCE governments.

6. Multiply types and layers of interactions between governments and

civil societies

There are many ways to assist states in the Middle East to provide for

enhanced security and progress. Most of the current effort is being oriented towards state-to-state interactions. Some are already occurring

at the sub-regional level, such as the GCC, 5+5 talks, the NATO Mediterranean Partnership, and the OSCE Cooperative Partnership. The

Arab League is trying to promote a unified position on reform. Three

new initiatives are being introduced this month in various summits:

the G8s Partnership for Progress and the Common Future in the

Broader Middle East and North Africa,the European Councils Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East, and

NATOs Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. Most of the programs under

these initiatives are being oriented towards bilateral programs between

individual states.

I believe that the OSCE has a strong role to play. It should not seek,

however, to set up another mass forum for dialogue or to duplicate other

initiatives. Instead, the OSCE should seek to fill the biggest gap in the

programs of the other initiatives, namely supporting societal interactions. In particular, OSCE should seek to provide financial and organizational support to on-going and future Middle East Track Two programs. Such programs are always in need of funding in order to ensure

that regional parties have at least some venues where they can meet

regularly. Track Two provides both a safety net in case the government

initiatives fail and can serve as an incubator for reformist and security
89

ideas that can be fed into governments. No Track Two program for the

Middle East to date has financial security to be assured that it will be in

operation from one year to the next. The OSCE can help by providing

such assurance.

The Commission has an important role to play too. It should continue

sponsoring forums on ways the OSCE can maintain political and moral

support for groups and organizations seeking to bring about change

based on the Helsinki Principles.

Conclusion

Change is coming to the Middle East no matter what cooperative or

reform initiatives are pursued. The impetus for this change is coming

from multiple and competing sources, including demographic surges,

political succession, conflicts between modernizers and reformers and

traditionalists and obstructionists, technological change, water shortages, drug abuse, economic stagnation, economic growth, satellite television, internet, educated and non-educated. But change, especially rapid

change and the process of establishing democracy, can be by its very

nature unstable and lead to violence, displacement and greater tyranny.

States in the region and outsiders should work together in appropriate

forums to create a calm and stable security environment in the Middle

East so that reforms can grab hold and not be swept away by political

uncertainties and those opposed to change. Thank you.
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TREATY OF PEACE

BETWEEN THE STATE OF ISRAEL

AND THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN

OCTOBER 26, 1994

PREAMBLE

The Government of the State of Israel and the Government of the

Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan:

Bearing in mind the Washington Declaration, signed by them on 25th

July, 1994, and which they are both committed to honour;

Aiming at the achievement of a just, lasting and comprehensive peace

in the Middle East based on Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 in

all their aspects;

Bearing in mind the importance of maintaining and strengthening

peace based on freedom, equality, justice and respect for fundamental

human rights, thereby overcoming psychological barriers and promoting human dignity;

Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter

of the United Nations and recognising their right and obligation to live

in peace with each other as well as with all states, within secure and

recognised boundaries;

Desiring to develop friendly relations and co-operation between them

in accordance with the principles of international law governing international relations in time of peace;

Desiring as well to ensure lasting security for both their States and in

particular to avoid threats and the use of force between them;

Bearing in mind that in their Washington Declaration of 25th July,

1994, they declared the termination of the state of belligerency between

them;

Deciding to establish peace between them in accordance with this Treaty

of Peace;

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1ESTABLISHMENT OF PEACE

Peace is hereby established between the State of Israel and the Hashemite

Kingdom of Jordan (the Parties) effective from the exchange of the

instruments of ratification of this Treaty.

ARTICLE 2GENERAL PRINCIPLES

The Parties will apply between them the provisions of the Charter of

the United Nations and the principles of international law governing

relations among states in times of peace. In particular:

1. They recognise and will respect each others sovereignty,territorial integrity and political independence;

2. They recognise and will respect each others rightto live in peace

within secure and recognised boundaries;
91

3. They will develop good neighbourly relations of co-operation between them to ensure lasting security, will refrain from the threat

or use of force against each other and will settle all disputes between them by peaceful means;

4. They respect and recognise the sovereignty, territorial integrity

and political independence of every state in the region;

5. They respect and recognise the pivotal role of human development and dignity in regional and bilateral relationships;

6. They further believe that within their control, involuntary movements of persons in such a way as to adversely prejudice the

security of either Party should not be permitted.

ARTICLE 3INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY

1. The international boundary between Israel and Jordan is delimited with reference to the boundary definition under the Mandate

as is shown in Annex on the mapping materials attached thereto

and co-ordinates specified therein.

2. The boundary, as set out in Annex I (a), is the permanent, secure

and recognised international boundary between Israel and Jordan, without prejudice to the status of any territories that came

under Israeli military government control in 1967.

3. The parties recognise the international boundary, as well as each

others territory, territorial waters and airspace, as inviolable,

and will respect and comply with them.

4. The demarcation of the boundary will take place as set forth in

Appendix (I) to Annex I and will be concluded not later than nine

months after the signing of the Treaty.

5. It is agreed that where the boundary follows a river, in the event

of natural changes in the course of the flow of the river as described in Annex I (a), the boundary shall follow the new course

of the flow. In the event of any other changes the boundary shall

not be affected unless otherwise agreed.

6. Immediately upon the exchange of the instruments of ratification of this Treaty, each Party will deploy on its side of the international boundary as defined in Annex I (a).

7. The Parties shall, upon the signature of the Treaty, enter into

negotiations to conclude, within 9 months, an agreement on the

delimitation of their maritime boundary in the Gulf of Aqaba.

8. Taking into account the special circumstances of the Naharayim/

Baqura area, which is under Jordanian sovereignty, with Israeli

private ownership rights, the Parties agreed to apply the provisions set out in Annex I (b).

9. With respect to the Zofar/Al-Ghamr area, the provisions set out

in Annex I (c) will apply.
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ARTICLE 4SECURITY

1.

a. Both Parties, acknowledging that mutual understanding and

co-operation in security-related matters will form a significant part of their relations and will further enhance the security of the region, take upon themselves to base their security relations on mutual trust, advancement of joint interests and co-operation, and to aim towards a regional framework of partnership in peace.

b. Towards that goal the Parties recognise the achievements of

the European Community and European Union in the development of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in

Europe (CSCE) and commit themselves to the creation, in

the Middle East, of a CSCME (Conference on Security and

Co-operation in the Middle East).

This commitment entails the adoption of regional models of

security successfully implemented in the post World War

era (along the lines of the Helsinki process) culminating in a

regional zone of security and stability.

2. The obligations referred to in this Article are without prejudice

to the inherent right of self-defence in accordance with the United

Nations Charter.

3. The Parties undertake, in accordance with the provisions of this

Article, the following:

a. to refrain from the threat or use of force or weapons, conventional, non-conventional or of any other kind, against each

other, or of other actions or activities that adversely affect

the security of the other Party;

b. to refrain from organising, instigating, inciting, assisting or

participating in acts or threats of belligerency, hostility, subversion or violence against the other Party;

c. to take necessary and effective measures to ensure that acts

or threats of belligerency, hostility, subversion or violence

against the other Party do not originate from, and are not

committed within, through or over their territory (hereinafter the term territory includes the airspace and territorial

waters).

4. Consistent with the era of peace and with the efforts to build

regional security and to avoid and prevent aggression and violence, the Parties further agree to refrain from the following:

a. joining or in any way assisting, promoting or co-operating

with any coalition, organisation or alliance with a military

or security character with a third party, the objectives or
93

activities of which include launching aggression or other acts

of military hostility against the other Party, in contravention of the provisions of the present Treaty.

b. allowing the entry, stationing and operating on their territory, or through it, of military forces, personnel or materiel

of a third party, in circumstances which may adversely prejudice the security of the other Party.

5. Both Parties will take necessary and effective measures, and will

co-operate in combating terrorism of all kinds. The Parties undertake:

a. to take necessary and effective measures to prevent acts of

terrorism, subversion or violence from being carried out from

their territory or through it and to take necessary and effective measures to combat such activities and all their perpetrators.

b. without prejudice to the basic rights of freedom of expression

and association, to take necessary and effective measures to

prevent the entry, presence and co-operation in their territory of any group or organisation, and their infrastructure,

which threatens the security of the other Party by the use of

or incitement to the use of, violent means.

c. to co-operate in preventing and combating cross-boundary

infiltrations.

6. Any question as to the implementation of this Article will be

dealt with through a mechanism of consultations which will include a liaison system, verification, supervision, and where necessary, other mechanisms, and higher level consultation. The

details of the mechanism of consultations will be contained in an

agreement to be concluded by the Parties within 3 months of the

exchange of the instruments of ratification of this Treaty.

7. The Parties undertake to work as a matter of priority, and as

soon as possible in the context of the Multilateral Working Group

on Arms Control and Regional Security, and jointly, towards the

following:

a. the creation in the Middle East of a region free from hostile

alliances and coalitions;

b. the creation of a Middle East free from weapons of mass destruction, both conventional and non-conventional, in the context of a comprehensive, lasting and stable peace,

characterised by the renunciation of the use of force, reconciliation and goodwill.

ARTICLE 5DIPLOMATIC AND OTHER BILATERAL RELATIONS

1. The Parties agree to establish full diplomatic and consular relations and to exchange resident ambassadors within one month of

the exchange of the instruments of ratification of this Treaty.
94

2. The Parties agree that the normal relationship between them

will further include economic and cultural relations.

ARTICLE 6WATER

With the view to achieving a comprehensive and lasting settlement of

all the water problems between them:

1. The Parties agree mutually to recognise the rightful allocations

of both of them in Jordan River and Yarmouk River waters and

Araba/Arava ground water in accordance with the agreed acceptable principles, quantities and quality as set out in Annex II,

which shall be fully respected and complied with.

2. The Parties, recognising the necessity to find a practical, just

and agreed solution to their water problems and with the view

that the subject of water can form the basis for the advancement

of co-operation between them, jointly undertake to ensure that

the management and development of their water resources do

not, in any way, harm the water resources of the other Party.

3. The Parties recognise that their water resources are not sufficient to meet their needs. More water should be supplied for their

use through various methods, including projects of regional and

international co-operation.

4. In light of paragraph 3 of this Article, with the understanding

that co-operation in water-related subjects would be to the benefit of both Parties, and will help alleviate their water shortages,

and that water issues along their entire boundary must be dealt

with in their totality, including the possibility of trans-boundary

water transfers, the Parties agree to search for ways to alleviate

water shortage and to co-operate in the following fields:

a. development of existing and new water resources, increasing

the water availability including co-operation on a regional

basis as appropriate, and minimising wastage of water resources through the chain of their uses;

b. prevention of contamination of water resources;

c. mutual assistance in the alleviation of water shortages;

d. transfer of information and joint research and development

in water-related subjects, and review of the potentials for

enhancement of water resources development and use.

5. The implementation of both Parties undertakings under this

Article is detailed in Annex II.

ARTICLE 7ECONOMIC RELATIONS

1. Viewing economic development and prosperity as pillars of peace,

security and harmonious relations between states, peoples and

individual human beings, the Parties, taking note of understand-
95

ings reached between them, affirm their mutual desire to promote economic co-operation between them, as well as within the

framework of wider regional economic co-operation.

2. In order to accomplish this goal, the Parties agree to the following:

a. to remove all discriminatory barriers to normal economic

relations, to terminate economic boycotts directed at each

other, and to co-operate in terminating boycotts against either Party by third parties;

b. recognising that the principle of free and unimpeded flow of

goods and services should guide their relations, the Parties

will enter into negotiations with a view to concluding agreements on economic co-operation, including trade and the establishment of a free trade area, investment, banking, industrial co-operation and labour, for the purpose of promoting beneficial economic relations, based on principles to be

agreed upon, as well as on human development considerations

on a regional basis. These negotiations will be concluded no

later than 6 months from the exchange the instruments of

ratification of this Treaty.

c. to co-operate bilaterally, as well as in multilateral forums,

towards the promotion of their respective economies and of

their neighbourly economic relations with other regional parties.

ARTICLE 8REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS

1. Recognising the massive human problems caused to both Parties by the conflict in the Middle East, as well as the contribution

made by them towards the alleviation of human suffering, the

Parties will seek to further alleviate those problems arising on a

bilateral level.

2. Recognising that the above human problems caused by the conflict in the Middle East cannot be fully resolved on the bilateral

level, the Parties will seek to resolve them in appropriate forums,

in accordance with international law, including the following:

a. in the case of displaced persons, in a quadripartite committee together with Egypt and the Palestinians:

b. in the case of refugees,

i. in the framework of the Multilateral Working Group on

Refugees;

ii. in negotiations, in a framework to be agreed, bilateral or

otherwise, in conjunction with and at the same time as

the permanent status negotiations pertaining to the territories referred to in Article 3 of this Treaty;
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c. through the implementation of agreed United Nations

programmes and other agreed international economic

programmes concerning refugees and displaced persons, including assistance to their settlement.

ARTICLE 9PLACES OF HISTORICAL AND RELIGIOUS

SIGNIFICANCE

1. Each party will provide freedom of access to places of religious

and historical significance.

2. In this regard, in accordance with the Washington Declaration,

Israel respects the present special role of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in Muslim Holy shrines in Jerusalem. When negotiations on the permanent status will take place, Israel will

give high priority to the Jordanian historic role in these shrines.

3. The Parties will act together to promote interfaith relations among

the three monotheistic religions, with the aim of working towards

religious understanding, moral commitment, freedom of religious

worship, and tolerance and peace.

ARTICLE 10CULTURAL AND SCIENTIFIC EXCHANGES

The Parties, wishing to remove biases developed through periods of conflict, recognise the desirability of cultural and scientific exchanges in

all fields, and agree to establish normal cultural relations between them.

Thus, they shall, as soon as possible and not later than 9 months from

the exchange of the instruments of ratification of this Treaty, conclude

the negotiations on cultural and scientific agreements.

ARTICLE 11MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING AND GOOD

NEIGHBOURLY RELATIONS

1. The Parties will seek to foster mutual understanding and tolerance based on shared historic values, and accordingly undertake:

a. to abstain from hostile or discriminatory propaganda against

each other, and to take all possible legal and administrative

measures to prevent the dissemination of such propaganda

by any organisation or individual present in the territory of

either Party;

b. as soon as possible, and not later than 3 months from the

exchange of the instruments of ratification of this Treaty, to

repeal all adverse or discriminatory references and expressions of hostility in their respective legislation;

c. to refrain in all government publications from any such references or expressions;

d. to ensure mutual enjoyment by each others citizens of due

process of law within their respective legal systems and before their courts.
97

2. Paragraph 1 (a) of this Article is without prejudice to the right to

freedom of expression as contained in the International Covenant

on Civil and Political Rights.

3. A joint committee shall be formed to examine incidents where

one Party claims there has been a violation of this Article.

ARTICLE 12COMBATING CRIME AND DRUGS

The Parties will co-operate in combating crime, with an emphasis on

smuggling, and will take all necessary measures to combat and prevent

such activities as the production of, as well as the trafficking in illicit

drugs, and will bring to trial perpetrators of such acts. In this regard,

they take note of the understandings reached between them in the above

spheres, in accordance with Annex III and undertake to conclude all

relevant agreements not later than 9 months from the date of the exchange of the instruments of ratification of this Treaty.

ARTICLE 13TRANSPORTATION AND ROADS

Taking note of the progress already made in the area of transportation,

the Parties recognise the mutuality of interest in good neighbourly relations in the area of transportation and agree to the following means to

promote relations between them in this sphere:

1. Each party will permit the free movement of nationals and vehicles of the other into and within its territory according to the

general rules applicable to nationals and vehicles of other states.

Neither party will impose discriminatory taxes or restrictions on

the free movement of persons and vehicles from its territory to

the territory of the other.

2. The Parties will open and maintain roads and border-crossings

between their countries and will consider further road and rail

links between them.

3. The Parties will continue their negotiations concerning mutual

transportation agreements in the above and other areas, such as

joint projects, traffic safety, transport standards and norms, licensing of vehicles, land passages, shipment of goods and cargo,

and meteorology, to be concluded not later than 6 months from

the exchange of the instruments of ratification of this Treaty.

4. The Parties agree to continue their negotiations for a highway to

be constructed and maintained between Egypt, Israel and Jordan near Eilat.

ARTICLE 14FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION AND ACCESS TO

PORTS

1. Without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 3, each Party

recognises the right of the vessels of the other Party to innocent

passage through its territorial waters in accordance with the

rules of international law.
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2. Each Party will grant normal access to its ports for vessels and

cargoes of the other, as well as vessels and cargoes destined for or

coming from the other Party. Such access will be granted on the

same conditions as generally applicable to vessels and cargoes of

other nations.

3. The Parties consider the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba to

be international waterways open to all nations for unimpeded

and non-suspendable freedom of navigation and overflight. The

Parties will respect each others right to navigation and overflight for access to either Party through the Strait of Tiran and

the Gulf of Aqaba.

ARTICLE 15CIVIL AVIATION

1. The Parties recognise as applicable to each other the rights, privileges and obligations provided for by the multilateral aviation

agreements to which they are both party, particularly by the

1944 Convention on International Civil Aviation (The Chicago

Convention) and the 1944 International Air Services Transit

Agreement.

2. Any declaration of national emergency by a Party under Article

89 of the Chicago Convention will not be applied to the other

Party on a discriminatory basis.

3. The Parties take note of the negotiations on the international air

corridor to be opened between them in accordance with the Washington Declaration. In addition, the Parties shall, upon ratification of this Treaty, enter into negotiations for the purpose of concluding a Civil Aviation Agreement. All the above negotiations

are to be concluded not later than 6 months from the exchange of

the instruments of ratification of this Treaty.

ARTICLE 16POSTS AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS

The Parties take note of the opening between them, in accordance with

the Washington Declaration, of direct telephone and facsimile lines.

Postal links, the negotiations on which having been concluded, will be

activated upon the signature of this Treaty. The Parties further agree

that normal wireless and cable communications and television relay

services by cable, radio and satellite, will be established between them,

in accordance with all relevant international conventions and regulations. The negotiations on these subjects will be concluded not later

than 9 months from the exchange of the instruments of ratification of

this Treaty.

ARTICLE 17TOURISM

The Parties affirm their mutual desire to promote co-operation between

them in the field of tourism. In order to accomplish this goal, the Partiestaking note ofthe understandings reached between them concerning tourismagree to negotiate, as soon as possible, and to conclude

not later than three months from the exchange of the instruments of

ratification of this Treaty, an agreement to facilitate and encourage

mutual tourism and tourism from third countries.
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ARTICLE 18ENVIRONMENT

The Parties will co-operate in matters relating to the environment, a

sphere to which they attach great importance, including conservation

of nature and prevention of pollution, as set forth in Annex IV . They

will negotiate an agreement on the above, to be concluded not later than

6 months from the exchange of the instruments of ratification of this

Treaty.

ARTICLE 19ENERGY

1. The Parties will co-operate in the development of energy resources,

including the development of energy-related projects such as the

utilisation of solar energy.

2. The Parties, having concluded their negotiations on the interconnecting of their electric grids in the Eilat-Aqaba area, will

implement the interconnecting upon the signature of this Treaty.

The Parties view this step as a part of a wider binational and

regional concept. They agree to continue their negotiations as

soon as possible to widen the scope of their interconnected grids.

3. The Parties will conclude the relevant agreements in the field of

energy within 6 months from the date of exchange of the instruments of ratification of this Treaty.

ARTICLE 20RIFT VALLEY DEVELOPMENT

The Parties attach great importance to the integrated development of

the Jordan Rift Valley area, including joint projects in the economic,

environmental, energy-related and tourism fields. Taking note of the

Terms of Reference developed in the framework of the Trilateral IsraelJordan-US Economic Committee towards the Jordan Rift Valley Development Master Plan, they will vigorously continue their efforts towards

the completion of planning and towards implementation.

ARTICLE 21HEALTH

The Parties will co-operate in the area of health and shall negotiate

with a view to the conclusion of an agreement within 9 months of the

exchange of instruments of ratification of this Treaty.

ARTICLE 22AGRICULTURE

The Parties will co-operate in the areas of agriculture, including veterinary services, plant protection, biotechnology and marketing, and shall

negotiate with a view to the conclusion of an agreement within 6 months

from the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification of this Treaty.

ARTICLE 23AQABA AND EILAT

The Parties agree to enter into negotiations, as soon as possible, and

not later than one month from the exchange of the instruments of ratification of this Treaty, on arrangements that would enable the joint

development of the towns of Aqaba and Eilat with regard to such matters, inter alia, as joint tourism development, joint customs, free trade

zone, co-operation in aviation, prevention of pollution, maritime mat-
100

ters, police, customs and health co-operation. The Parties will conclude

all relevant agreements within 9 months from the exchange of instruments of ratification of the Treaty.

ARTICLE 24CLAIMS

The Parties agree to establish a claims commission for the mutual settlement of all financial claims.

ARTICLE 25RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS

1. This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting, in any way, the rights and obligations of the Parties under

the Charter of the United Nations.

2. The Parties undertake to fulfill in good faith their obligations

under this Treaty, without regard to action or inaction of any

other party and independently of any instrument inconsistent

with this Treaty. For the purposes of this paragraph each Party

represents to the other that in its opinion and interpretation there

is no inconsistency between their existing treaty obligations and

this Treaty.

3. They further undertake to take all the necessary measures for

the application in their relations of the provisions of the multilateral conventions to which they are parties, including the submission of appropriate notification to the Secretary General of

the United Nations and other depositories of such conventions.

4. Both Parties will also take all the necessary steps to abolish all

pejorative references to the other Party, in multilateral conventions to which they are parties, to the extent that such references exist.

5. The Parties undertake not to enter into any obligation in conflict

with this Treaty.

6. Subject to Article 103 of the United Nations Charter, in the event

of a conflict between the obligations of the Parties under the

present Treaty and any of their other obligations, the obligations

under this Treaty will be binding and implemented.

ARTICLE 26LEGISLATION

Within 3 months of the exchange of ratifications of this Treaty the Parties undertake to enact any legislation necessary in order to implement

the Treaty, and to terminate any international commitments and to

repeal any legislation that is inconsistent with the Treaty.

ARTICLE 27RATIFICATION

1. This Treaty shall be ratified by both Parties in conformity with

their respective national procedures. It shall enter into force on

the exchange of instruments of ratification.

2. The Annexes, Appendices, and other attachments to this Treaty

shall be considered integral parts thereof.
101

ARTICLE 28INTERIM MEASURES

The Parties will apply, in certain spheres, to be agreed upon, interim

measures pending the conclusion of the relevant agreements in accordance with this Treaty, as stipulated in Annex V .

ARTICLE 29SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

1. Disputes arising out of the application or interpretation of this

Treaty shall be resolved by negotiations.

2. Any such disputes which cannot be settled by negotiations shall

be resolved by conciliation or submitted to arbitration.

ARTICLE 30REGISTRATION

This Treaty shall be transmitted to the Secretary General of the United

Nations for registration in accordance with the provisions of Article 102

of the Charter of the United Nations.

Done at the Arava/Araba Crossing Point this day Heshvan 21st, 5775,

Jumada Al-Ula 21st, 1415 which corresponds to 26th October, 1994 in

the Hebrew, English and Arabic languages, all texts being equally authentic. In case of divergence of interpretation the English text shall

prevail.

For the State of Israel

Yitzhak Rabin, Prime Minister

For the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan

Abdul Salam Majali, Prime Minister

Witnessed by:

William J. Clinton

President of the United States of America

List of Annexes, Appendices and Other Attachments

Annex I:

a. International Boundary

b. Naharayim/Baqura Area

c. Zofar Area

Appendices (27 sheets):

I. Emer Haarava (10 sheets), 1:20,000 orthophoto maps

II. Dead Sea (2 sheets), 1:50,000 orthoimages

III. Jordan and Yarmouk Rivers (12 sheets), 1:10,000 orthophoto maps

IV. Naharayim Area (1 sheet), 1:10,000 orthophoto map

V. Zofar Area (1 sheet), 1:20,000 orthophoto map

VI. Gulf of Eilat (1 sheet), 1:50,000 orthoimage
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Annex II:Water

Annex III: Crime and Drugs

Annex IV: Environment

Annex V: Interim Measures

Agreed Minutes
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July 15, 1998

The Honorable David T. Johnson

Ambassador

U.S. Mission to the Organization for

Security and Cooperation in Europe

Obersteinergasse 11/1

A-1190 Vienna, Austria

Dear Ambassador Johnson:

We write to convey our growing concern over attempts by some participating States to provide the Mediterranean partners for cooperation

an expanded role within the OSCE, including in the human dimension.

We urge you to oppose any proposal that would undermine the human

dimension implementation review process or open the door to a host of

Middle East issues which could quickly overwhelm the OSCE.

Disputes over a role for certain non-European Mediterranean states

in the Helsinki process have consumed a considerable amount of time

since the early 1970s. Over the years, the Mediterranean has become a

major side issue in the Helsinki process through an incremental process of building upon earlier compromises designed to meet the special

interests of a limited number of participating States. In fact, no single

narrow issue before the OSCE has consumed more time than the Mediterranean issues with so little to show for it. (Since 1975, no fewer than

six experts meetings and seminars have been held devoted to Mediterranean issues.)

While we do not oppose efforts to encourage closer cooperation among

Mediterranean littoral states, this objective can be pursued at any of

the numerous fora, institutes, and seminars dedicated to enhancing

cooperation across a wide spectrum of fields. We understand that a series of high-level meetings, including ministerial meetings, have been

held since the adoption of the comprehensive 1995 Barcelona Declaration of the Euro-Mediterranean Conference and are devoted specifically

to this purpose.

More to the point, attempts to alter and expand the role of these states

in the OSCE context would likely have a profound impact on the structure and focus of the OSCE, with serious negative consequences for the

Helsinki process, including the human dimension.

Involving the Mediterranean partners for cooperation in implementation review, including the human dimension, is inappropriate. None of

the countries is bound by the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act or

other OSCE documents; accordingly, it is unclear on what basis their

own performance would be reviewed. The prospect of a one-sided reviewwith the Mediterranean partners entitled to raise questions regarding American or European practices while they remain aloof from

scrutinyis a highly unattractive prospect. We also find it notable that

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104

some of the same participating States which have sought to broaden the

scope of implementation by involving certain Mediterranean countries

have, at the same time, pressed for abbreviated human dimension follow-up and are generally more reticent about raising human dimension

violations. One could conclude that their Mediterranean initiative is

part of an overall effort to misdirect, dilute, and defeat effective human

dimension compliance review within the OSCE.

The association between Mediterranean states and the Helsinki process has expanded on an incremental basis. Allowing for the participation of Mediterranean states in human dimension implementation will

inevitably lead to new pressures for an ever-expanding role for these

countries in a process focused first and foremost on Europe and Central

Asia.

The fact that the OSCE operates on the consensus principle to reach

decisions is central to evaluation of any effort to include Mediterranean

states as participating States. The OSCE already struggles to reach

consensus and engage in concerted action with a membership that has

expanded from 35 to 55 in less than a decade; further expansion would

open the door to a host of Middle East issues and perspectives which

would quickly overwhelm the organization. While consensus is now denied by some states on some decisions for reasons unrelated to the substance of those decisions, it takes no imagination at all to assess the

increased likelihood that denial of consensus for extraneous reasons would

become a routine practice if these Mediterranean states were admitted,

with disastrous consequences for the OSCE as an institution.

Mr. Ambassador, we strongly suspect that, on this issue, the OSCE

totters on the edge of a slippery slope. We hope you will resist the pressure to expand the role of the Mediterranean partners for cooperation.

Sincerely,
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REPRINTED FROM THE WASHINGTON TIMES,

AUGUST 15, 2002

PEACE PREMISED UNDER THE FOUR OUGHTS:

UNDER PROPER CONDITIONS,

MIDDLE EAST CONFERENCE COULD WORK

BY MAX M. KAMPELMAN

The presidents definitive statement of June 24 on the crisis in the

Middle East has set a firm foundation for a constructive, attainable and

stable peace in the area. Our governments policy is that Yasser Arafat

must go; the Palestinians must implement meaningful reforms to reflect democratic processes; and terrorism must be eradicated. And yet

as Secretary of State Colin Powell learned at a recent New York meeting of the Quartet, the European Union, Russia and the United Nations resist our emphasis on Mr. Arafat. An international program for

democracy and human dignity in the Middle East must, therefore, be

placed on the front burner of our diplomacy.

It was my privilege, 20 years ago, to represent the United States in a

unique diplomatic experience that contributed to the ending of our Cold

War with the Soviet Union. It can provide us guidance for the current

Middle East crisis.

The Helsinki Final Act, signed in 1975 by all 33 European countries,

the United States and Canada, created a Conference on Security and

Cooperation in Europe (CSCE-OSCE). Atthe time, President Fords decision to sign it was severely criticized. It seemed to give the Soviet

Union a legitimacy it did not deserve in return for essentially unenforceable language supporting human rights and the rule of law. Over time,

however, and with U.S. diplomatic effort, those human rights statements took on the characterization of commitments and promises that,

if not adhered to, delegitimized those states which did not live up to

them. The Soviet Union was eventually so delegitimized.

Swedish social scientist Gunnar Myrdal, in his ground-breaking study

of racial prejudice in our country, An American Dilemma, described the

prevailing American ethic as the beliefthat human dignity for allought

to prevail. He observed that America historically worked steadily and

consistently to bring the is closer to that ought. CSCE-OSCE declared a detailed universal commitment to human rights and human

dignity as the necessary ought if security, cooperation and peace in

Europe were to be achieved.

With an agreement on the ought, CSCE could legitimately examine

the is within each of the signatory countries and publicly judge and

criticize the sins of omission and commission that were uncovered.

This historical perspective suggests that achieving peace in the Middle

East will require an agreed-upon ought with respect to democracy,

the rule of law and human dignity. Israel is now the only democracy in

the Middle East, and the president has appropriately said that one of

our objectives must be to introduce and strengthen democracy within

Israels neighbors.

Equally vital is the need to replace the refugee camps in the West

Bank and Gaza with bona fide local communities designed to encourage

economic development. The potential for developing the healthy and
115

vibrant democratic environment necessary for democratic elections is

threatened by pervasive hostile and oppressive factors, including an

unemployment rate of 45 percent, the more than two-thirds of Palestinian households that exist below the poverty level and the growing malnutrition of Palestinian children. The regions Arab peoples have every

right to achieve the political, economic and social human dignity they

deserve, and we should encourage the forces within those societies who

yearn for those freedoms. The $4 billion contributed by European and

Arab states to the Palestinian Authority has obviously been used for

other purposes.

Practically speaking, how do we achieve these objectives? An international conference designed to develop a Conference on Security and

Cooperation in the Mediterranean and the Middle East, based on an

agreed-upon civilized human rights ought could be successful if it

incorporates what theologian Michael Novak calls the four universal

liberties rooted in Islamic tradition: liberty to worship; liberty to study,

write and speak; liberty from poverty; and liberty from tyrannythereby

addressing a fundamental flaw in the relationships between Israel and

its neighbors.

The region is ready for this approach. A Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentarian Forum already exists. The Fifth European-Mediterranean

Conference of Foreign Ministers is working on a framework document

based on a commitment to democracy, human rights and the rule of

law. The European Union in 1990 issued a Venice Declaration affirming the right of states in the Mediterranean area, including Israel, to

live within secure and recognized borders, within a democratic framework. The Islamic Institute, the Heritage Foundation and the University of Qatar recently sponsored in Qatar a Second Conference on Democracy and Free Markets.

American leadership can pull these ingredients together. An international conference called to adopt its own series of ought would

create the foundation for democracy and peace in the Middle East. Secretary of State Colin Powell is uniquely qualified to organize such a

conference and establish its tone. The result might well be an atmosphere conducive to the development of a peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians in a Mediterranean and Middle East region

committed to democracy.

Max M. Kampelman was Counselor of the State Department, US.

ambassador to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe;

and ambassador and US. negotiator with the Soviet Union on Nuclear

and Space Arms. He is now chairman emeritus of Freedom House, the

Georgetown University Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, and the

American Academy of Diplomacy.
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LETTER TO KING ABDULLAH OF

JORDAN FROM MEMBERS OF

THE COMMISSION, DATED OCTOBER 8, 2003
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THE MIDDLE EAST NEEDS ITS HELSINKI

BY NATAN SHARANSKY

The cancellation of this weeks Arab Summit is most unfortunate.

Among the items on the agenda was a discussion of the document produced at the Alexandria conference held two weeks ago and attended by

representative of civil society institutions within the Arab states.

The Alexandria document pointed to the urgent need for political,

economic and social reform in the Arab world. No doubt, the non-democratic Arab regimes decided to cancel the summit rather than seriously

address the lack of freedom in their countries. But to those who do want

to build democracy in the Middle East, the Alexandria document still

presents an important opportunity to begin pursuing a Helsinki strategy

for the region.

The Helsinki agreements, signed by the United States, Canada, the

Soviet Union and most European countries in 1975, included three baskets. The first conferred international recognition ofthe Soviet Unions

control over Eastern Europe; the second granted the Soviets various

economic benefits; the third committed the USSR and its puppet governments to respect the human rights of their subjects.

The Soviet leadership believed it was hoodwinking the West with an

empty promise in a non-binding agreement. Moreover, many in the

West were prepared to sweep human rights under the rug of détente.

But some dissidents, including me, saw Helsinki as a potential watershed. For the firsttime,the USSRs international standing was linked

to the regimes treatment of its own citizens. The critical question was

how to turn that linkage into an effective tool for pressuring the Soviets

to change their human rights policies. We believed that if we could turn

the non-binding Helsinki commitments into an internationally accepted

measure of Soviet intentions, the agreements could become a catalyst

for change. Accordingly, we decided to form a human rights monitoring

organization called the Helsinki Group.

While all the members of the Helsinki Group were eventually imprisoned or exiled or both, our strategy succeeded. The Soviets could not

take one step in the international arena without the spotlight of world

opinion exposing its human rights policies and its treatment of political

dissidents.

What many had viewed at the time as an insignificant declaration on

human rights turned out to be one of the most fateful decisions of the

cold war. Within 15 years of Helsinki, the Berlin Wall had crumbled,

East Europe was free and the Soviet Union had collapsed. To be sure,

there were many factors that contributed to the end of the cold war, but

that this chain of events occurred so quickly was due in no small measure to the human-rights provision of Helsinki and to the tremendous

international pressure that it brought.

In order for a Helsinki-like initiative to work in the Middle East today, we must ensure thatthe free worlds commitmentto democracy in

the region becomes more than lip service. The non-binding recommen-
119

dations of the Alexandria conference, which detail the political, economic

and social reforms that should be made in the Arab world, should be

turned into a yardstick to measure the intentions of Arab governments

and to chart their progress.

For that to happen, governments, the media and human rights activists in the West must be willing to shine the spotlight on dissidents

within the Arab world. International scrutiny will give more and more

Arabs who support democracy the courage to step forward.

Second, the free world must be willing to link its international policies to how Arab regimes treat their own people. Middle Eastern regimes today are even more dependent on the West than the USSR was

in 1975. If the free world uses this leverage, Arab regimes will no longer

be able to violate human rights with impunity.

The United States, for example, might insist that if the Saudi regime

wants American protection, it will have to change its draconian emigration polices and improve its record on womens rights. European

states, for their part, might demand that if the Palestinian Authority

wants to keep receiving financial support, it will have to show that this

money is being used to improve the lives of the Palestinian people and

not to fund terrorism and corruption.

The lesson of Helsinki is that when demands to uphold human rights

are backed by effective action, the cause of freedom and peace can be

advanced. The danger today is that the commitment to spread human

rights and democracy in the Middle East will remain an empty promise.

That would be most unfortunate. Just as Helsinki helped liberate

hundreds of millions of people and defeat an evil empire that threatened

the democratic world, the same approach today can transform the Middle

East from a region awash in terror and tyranny into a place that provides freedom and opportunity to its own people as well as peace and

security for the rest of the world.

Natan Sharansky is a minister without portfolio in the Israeli government. He was a founding member of the Helsinki Group and a

political prisoner in the former Soviet Union.