TRADOC Historical Study Series

TRANSFORMING THE ARMY

TRADOC’s First Thirty Years

1973 - 2003

with a foreword

by General Kevin P. Byrnes

TRADOC 30th Anniversary Commemoration

Military History Office

United States Army Training and Doctrine Command

Fort Monroe, Virginia

2003
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Commander’s Foreword

One of the U.S. Army’s greatest traditions is seen in the framework

of the lineage and honors which link soldiers and their units. Organizations

such as U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) usually do

not acquire much in the way of history or heritage. But in an era of seemingly endless reorganization, TRADOC has proven to be an anomaly. It has

maintained its original mission, almost completely intact, and kept the same

name for 30 years. I am pleased to introduce this survey of TRADOC’s first

three decades.

Credit for the solid character of the command and its continued

relevance to The Army goes first and foremost to TRADOC’s founder,

General William DePuy. His vision of an organization dedicated to providing training excellence, guidance on how to fight the country’s wars, and

insights on the organization and materiel necessary to support the soldier and

execute doctrine proved exactly right. From the outset, General DePuy put

the soldier at the center of the command’s work, avoiding the temptation to

allow technology to dictate the present or the future of warfare. No single

decision could have been more important for the success of America’s Army

on battlefields since TRADOC’s founding in 1973.

TRADOC still “lives” General DePuy’s vision in its mission to train

the Army’s soldiers and develop its leaders, support training in units, develop

doctrine, establish standards, recruit the force, and build the future Army.

TRADOC is still built around training the individual soldier—training is our

primary mission, our baseplate. We should remain mindful of this as we look

back over the past 30 years and as we accomplish our current work of

establishing the standards and requirements for training and developments

for The Army, and of developing competent and adaptive leaders while

ensuring currency in our doctrine.

TRADOC remains an adaptable organization, open-minded to new

ideas, innovation, and collaboration. We embrace jointness in our component command-like relationship with Joint Forces Command, helping define

the contribution of land forces to the joint and coalition battle and serving as

The Army’s component for joint developments in training, doctrine, concept

development, and experimentation.

Looking from the vantage point of the past, we build The Army of

the future. We recruit young Americans as soldiers who serve as the centerpiece of The Army’s formation and readiness. We take these new recruits,
try to ensure a smooth transition into our ranks, imbue Army values, the

warrior ethos, and discipline into them, and provide them the necessary skills

needed to immediately contribute to their first unit of assignment. Then we

train them through-out their careers, as quality forces must have quality

training as well as quality equipment.

Just as TRADOC has “touched” every member of today’s Transforming Army, TRADOC itself must transform. Transforming the Army, and

achieving irreversible momentum toward that end, is imperative. By

TRADOC’s Transformation, we strive to place the best capabilities and

equipment into the hands of the quality force we have recruited. There, the

circle of TRADOC’s mission becomes complete.

Through Transformation, TRADOC remains committed to soldiers,

civilians, and families. We remain committed to ensuring their well-being

and the workforce’s competency. For the continuing evolution of

TRADOC’s mission, I thank the soldiers and civilians—the bedrock upon

which our Army is built—who have served with intelligence, creativity,

insight, and loyalty. I’m honored to stand at the forefront of not only those

dedicated men and women who serve in 2003, but also all of those who have

contributed for the past 30 years. May future soldiers and civilians of

TRADOC learn from the successes captured in these pages.

Kevin P. Byrnes

General, U.S. Army

Commanding
Preface

“Transformation” became a buzzword for governmental reorganization in the

first years of the 21st Century, especially in the military services. The

Training and Doctrine Command, however, has been transforming the Army,

and itself, since its establishment in July 1973. Born of frustration with the

service’s response to war in Southeast Asia, TRADOC’s charter from the

became through time the intertwined missions of preparing the Army for war

and being the architect of the Army’s future. The command’s “founding

father,” General William DePuy, knew that a struggling Army required sound

training, coherent organization, modern weapons systems, and relevant

doctrine. His successors built on that foundation and addressed the need for

future planning.

This brief history provides an overview of the first thirty years of

TRADOC’s service to the Army and to the nation. Although shortened and

carrying a new title, Transforming the Army owes a great debt to Prepare the

Army for War, two editions of which commemorated TRADOC’s 20th and

25th anniversaries. We hope that the volume’s easier transportability makes

up in some measure for the loss of material that fell to the cutting room floor

during the process of condensation. Contributors to the 1993 edition,

including primary author and editor John L. Romjue and Susan Canedy,

deserve continuing thanks. For this volume, new primary author and editor

Anne Chapman, Benjamin King, and Carol Lilly have worked diligently to

slim and update Prepare the Army for War and its useful appendices. Text of

the original work remains accessible through our web page. The former

appendices now stand on their own for ease of updating, but remain linked to

the text of both this history and Prepare the Army for War at their on-line

locations. The TRADOC Military History Office accepts all responsibility

for errors and will gratefully accept corrections.

Readers will not have gone far into the text before they find our belief that

TRADOC’s story is generally one of success. Army operations since 1973

provide the historical evidence upon which this conclusion is based. As

noted in the preface to Prepare the Army for War, the Army’s hierarchical

nature focuses any study upon its leaders, and this overview is no different.

All of the elements that have constituted TRADOC through the years have

reflected the intent of its commanding generals. Nevertheless, it remains for
the soldiers and civilians making up the command to execute and shape the

commander’s intent. Therefore, the first dedication of this overview still

rightly belongs to General DePuy. His command produced the single most

far-reaching transformation of the Army until the efforts at the beginning of

the 21st Century. But because neither he nor his ten successors who have

served up until the time of this writing could accomplish their intent alone,

we have also dedicated Transforming the Army to the multitude of anonymous laborers who have made the vision work. I ask all Tradocians whose

names appear in the text to accept that fact with humility, knowing that they

represent so many others who cannot be named.

James T. Stensvaag

June 2003
CHAPTER l

TRADOC:

A Historical Summary

CHAPTER I

TRADOC: A HISTORICAL SUMMARY

The Department of the Army established TRADOC on 1 July 1973 at Fort

Monroe, Virginia, as part of the major STEADFAST Reorganization of the

Army in the United States, brought to completion that year. The STEADFAST initiatives, directed by General Creighton Abrams, Chief of Staff of the

Army, attempted to solve difficult command and control problems in the

Army establishment evident in the early 1970s. The span of control of

TRADOC’s predecessor, the Continental Army Command, or CONARC,

reached through the headquarters of the numbered armies to the corps and

divisions and included most of the major Army installations in the United

States. Given such a wide control span, together with responsibilities for

both the training and education establishment and for unit readiness,

CONARC obligations were too broad for efficient focus..

General Creighton Abrams, Chief of Staff of the Army, October 1972-September 1974,

directed the STEADFAST initiative that created TRADOC.
Chapter l

TRADOC: A Historical Summary

STEADFAST functionally realigned the major Army commands in the

continental United States. Headquarters CONARC, situated at Fort Monroe,

and Headquarters U.S. Army Combat Developments Command, or CDC,

based at Fort Belvoir, Va., ceased to exist, with TRADOC and the new U.S.

Army Forces Command at Fort McPherson, Ga., assuming the realigned

missions. TRADOC assumed the combat developments mission from CDC,

took over the CONARC individual training mission, and assumed command

from CONARC of the major Army installations in the United States housing

Army training centers and Army branch schools. FORSCOM assumed

CONARC’s operational mission: the command and readiness of all divisions

and corps in the continental United States and the installations where they

were based.

Carried through under General Abrams’

Assistant Vice Chief of Staff and chief

reorganization planner Lt. Gen. William

E. DePuy, the STEADFAST drew together under TRADOC the closely related

Army development activities which

trained and instructed troops and leaders,

formulated fighting doctrine, built tactical

units, and defined weapon requirements.

The STEADFAST Reorganization put

Fort Monroe, VA, was the

headquarters of the

Continental Army

Command beginning in

1946. In 1973 it became

headquarters to the new

United States Army

Training and Doctrine

Command.

General William E. DePuy, General Creighton

Abrams Assistant Chief of Staff carried through the

STEADFAST reorganization. He became TRADOC’s

first commander and can with ample justification be

termed the founder of the command.
Chapter l

TRADOC: A Historical Summary

combat developments back into the branch schools. After 1973, the formulation and the teaching of tactical doctrine was an organically united effort in

each TRADOC school. Beginning that year, the Army had a major four-star

command focused specifically and exclusively on training, teaching, and

developing the Army.

From its headquarters, TRADOC carried out its assigned individual training

and combat developments missions through command of subordinate elements and installations throughout the continental United States. In brief,

they included the Army’s initial entry training centers; intermediate-level

integrating centers to draw together developments in combined arms, logistics, and soldier support; branch schools, specialist schools and military

schools and colleges; Army ROTC; together with mission-related test,

experimentation, and analytical activities. The TRADOC organizations were

mostly situated on the major installations that the headquarters commanded.

The TRADOC-FORSCOM arrangement solved the span-of-control problem,

put combat developments back into the schools, and focused the development of the Army’s tactical organizations, weapons and equipment, doctrine,

and the training of soldiers in that

doctrine, in one command. Making

the better alignment work was the

first task facing TRADOC in 1973.

The second task was to assist in the

designing, shaping, and training of

an Army dispirited by its experiences in Southeast Asia. Facing it

was not only a situation of psychological and institutional uncertainty, but a dangerous and growing strategic threat to the North Atlantic

Alliance. The situation was exacerbated by what military observers in the

United States and Europe described as a lost decade of weapons development

by the U.S. Army, stemming from a ten-year concentration on fighting and

equipping for the Vietnam conflict.

TRADOC came into existence in the period of American defense policy

reorientation from Vietnam to NATO Europe and the challenge of the

Warsaw Pact buildup. In the 1970s and 1980s the command sustained

programs of training reform; weapon, equipment, and force modernization;

and doctrine revision. Those efforts fundamentally transformed the Army

into a modernized, trained and ready force, a significant component of the

successful political-military challenge against which Communist power

TRADOC focused the development of the Army’s

weapons and equipment. Here the M1A1 “Abrams”

tank is shown in the Gulf War.
shattered and the Cold War ended in the years 1989-1991. It was the highly

trained, professional Army of Excellence whose combat units helped restore

democratic government to Panama in Operation Just Cause of 1989-1990 and

to expel the armies of Iraq from Kuwait in Operation Desert Storm in 1991.

It was this same Army that increasingly provided peace operations and

humanitarian relief in places such as Somalia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Haiti,

and Rwanda, and aid to victims following natural disasters and the terrorist

attack on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center in September 2001.

Early in the 1970s the United States found itself in a new strategic situation

in which a shift of power in favor of the political dynamic of revolutionary

socialism was advancing worldwide. The United States’ strategic reversal in

Southeast Asia seemed to call into question the continued validity of its long

and hard-contested policy of communist containment, with the bitter past and

recent sacrifices of that historic effort. The gains of worldwide Communist

revolution in the 1970s, funded and supplied by the Soviet Union, and, to a

lesser degree, by China, were dramatic and alarming. Revolutionary power

seizures and military coups in Africa, South and Southwest Asia, and Latin

America went forward largely uncontested by American policy makers of the

middle and late decade.

The stunning reversal and sudden termination of that revolutionary impulse

in the world-changing events of 1989-1991 created a new strategic world. By

the early 1990s, the collapse of communism and the disintegration of the

Soviet Union had ushered in a new world of power. The United States

remained as the single superpower in an international order in which it could

act with greater freedom to support national independence and democratic

and free-market institutions.

The imperatives of that situation seemed to dictate a smaller Army, and one

whose readiness was assured by the transit of new technological thresholds.

In the mid-1990s, TRADOC institutionalized these new directions as midfuture Army XXI. Army XXI included Force XXI, the TRADOC-led effort

to determine future force structure based on digitally equipped forces.

Beginning in late 1999, a number of major Department of the Army initiatives—collectively termed “Transformation”—looked to the weapons, force

structure, training, and doctrine of the Army well into the 21st century.

TRADOC was in the vanguard of that effort. The advances in technology

indicated an evolution to a battlefield on which time, distance, movement,

and firepower existed in new relationships arising from the evidence of the

extended reach and pinpoint accuracy of weapons brought to effect by nearChapter l

TRADOC: A Historical Summary
real-time intelligence, detection, target acquisition, and communications technology.

This advent of a new strategic world and the

emergence of a new higher level of technological warfare took place in the context of a U.S.

military establishment sharply drawing down in

the wake of the retrenchment of Soviet power.

Against this background of radically altered

strategic assumptions, TRADOC reached the

thirty-year mark challenged to lead the Army of

the post-Cold War era through the intellectual

change needed to transform it from a larger,

forward-deployed force into a smaller, power

projection force based primarily in the United

States. The command continued to meet its

thirty-year-old responsibility to the Department

of the Army to prepare the Army for war and to

act as the architect of the future Army. What

follows is a concise historical overview of the

TRADOC role and contribution to a significant era in U.S. Army institutional

and developmental history.

Chapter l

TRADOC: A Historical Summary

TRADOC institutionalized new

directions for the Army organized

around information and digital

communications. Here a soldier

trains at Fort Hood as part of

Force XXI.
CHAPTER II

TRADOC LEADERSHIP

At the thirty-year mark, eleven commanders had served the U.S. Army

Training and Doctrine Command. Each led the command from a perspective

based on personal and professional experience, the evolving international

situation, national priorities, and the defense fiscal environment. Each

impressed upon the organization his own vision and style of management,

within the framework of his commander’s intent.

DePuy

In July 1973, the first commander, General William E. DePuy, initially

addressed TRADOC’s mission to get the Army ready to fight the next war.

Consequently, his primary concerns were improvements in individual training, better support for training in units, new training doctrine and a new

emphasis and direction for combat developments activities.

CHAPTER ll

TRADOC

Leadership

Five former TRADOC Commanders gather at Fort Monroe.
Many aspects of the Vietnam experience had contributed to a degradation of

training within CONARC. To address these difficulties, DePuy adopted a

“back to basics” approach: Officer training courses were to prepare officers

for their next assignment, the physical aspects of basic combat training were

toughened, and advanced individual training was made more performanceoriented. Another of DePuy’s major projects was the production of “howto-fight” manuals and films which set forth Army doctrine in simple language. In addition, the Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP)

brought standardization to Army training.

While seeking solutions to the problems noted during the war in Southeast

Asia, DePuy and the TRADOC staff also made combat developments a

prime concern. It was clear that the combat developments approach needed

to be harnessed to the present and near future. Heavily influenced by the

1973 Yom Kipper War with its increased lethality in tank warfare, antitank

guided missiles, and artillery, DePuy adjusted his emphasis from training the

Army to win on the next battlefield to winning the first battle of the next

war. Because of the small size of the headquarters staff, the functional

centers and the schools undertook a major portion of the combat developments mission and the systems acquisition process.

Management of the TRADOC structure and the revision of doctrine were

also of special concern. DePuy instituted the installation contract system as a

major innovation for improving installation management. That document

provided a medium for agreement between each installation commander and

the TRADOC commander, specifying the tasks to be performed by the

installation and the resources to be provided by the headquarters. Concurrently, believing that doctrine should emanate from the highest levels of

leadership, DePuy created a Tactical Doctrine Office separate from both

combat developments and training functions and reporting directly to him.

During his tenure, the capstone document, Field Manual FM 100-5, “Operations,” was significantly revised to provide the basis for the aforementioned

“how to fight” series, and came to play a more central role in defining Army

doctrine.

Starry

General Donn A. Starry assumed command of TRADOC from General

DePuy on 1 July 1977. The key concept for internal affairs during his tenure

was “decentralization.” Accordingly, he began a pronounced decentralization of major projects to the integrating centers and schools. Also in line

Chapter ll

TRADOC Leadership
with that approach was his decision to move

the 3-star TRADOC deputy commander

position from the headquarters to Fort

Leavenworth.

With regard to doctrine, Starry sought to

answer what had come to be substantial

discussion and controversy over the “active

defense” concept of the 1976 version of FM

100-5. He brought with him to TRADOC the

idea of an integrated and extended battlefield—the “central battle”—to engage the

enemy not only at the point of attack but also

in depth. Another revision of FM 100-5

began almost immediately. The concept

required extension of the combat developments period out eight to ten years, departing

from Depuy’s focus on near-term problems. Following this approach, Starry

hoped to harness the combat power of the oncoming generation of weapons

and other modernization efforts.

Starry inherited from DePuy a process already underway to restructure

divisions. Accordingly, he redefined division restructuring within a larger

context, which would result in the first Battle Development Plan in 1978.

Conceptualization of what came to be termed “Division 86” and subsequent

studies of corps and echelons above corps defined “Army 86,” the framework for force development that replaced the DePuy division restructuring.

The doctrinal premises grounding the studies became known as Airland

Battle.

In addition, he assumed and expanded DePuy initiatives on training in a

program dubbed Army 1990. Of special concern was TRADOC’s promotion

of the need for a Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS3) for

captains. Subsequently, the findings of a Panel known as the Review of

Education and Training for Officers (RETO) revolutionized both organization and execution in TRADOC Schools.

Otis

General Glenn K. Otis followed General Starry as TRADOC commander in

August 1981. Internal to the command were his “3Ms” management goals of

mobilization planning, maintaining the force, and modernization of the force.

Chapter ll

TRADOC Leadership

General Donn A. Starry, TRADOC

Commanding General, 1 July 1977-

30 June 1981
In all three areas training stood first in his list of priorities. Mobilization

planning involved development of programs of instruction, training base

expansion capacity, and equipment requirements. Maintenance of the force

concentrated on training and maintaining

the momentum of the previous command.

The challenges of force modernization

included managing the period of time

when interim and new organizations

would be phased in and the development

of support packages for training, (spare

parts, maintenance, and field manuals).

Given the recommendations of the RETO

Study, ongoing changes in enlisted

training, and the implications of AirLand

Battle doctrine, Otis tended to look ahead

for approximately ten years. At his last

TRADOC Commanders Conference in

the Fall of 1982, Otis added a “fourth

M”—military history.

Over the course of 1982, TRADOC headquarters, at General Otis’ behest,

developed a set of command goals in line with the recently promulgated

seven Army Goals. The purpose was to identify clearly each of the roles

TRADOC would play in support of the Army goals. The seven Army goals

addressed the areas of readiness, the human element, leadership, materiel,

future development, strategic deployment, and management. With

TRADOC’s declared purpose to prepare the Army for war, its attendant

missions as stated were to develop doctrine, to conduct and guide Army

combat developments, to develop and maintain the Army training system,

and to command installations and organizations. The development of a set of

specific goals for TRADOC prioritized TRADOC’s activities, and served as

a tool for the application of resources, a touchstone for defining future roles

of the command, a resource for the development of a formal document which

would come out during his successor’s tenure, and a measure for progress.

The new version of FM 100-5 codifying AirLand Battle, begun under Starry,

also appeared in 1982.

Many substantial initiatives came to the fore during Otis’ year and a half

term as commander of TRADOC. Late in 1981, he determined that the time

had come to step back and evaluate what had been accomplished in the area

of training and to plan for what would take place in the following decade.

Chapter ll

TRADOC Leadership

General Glenn K. Otis, Commanding

General, 1 August 1981-10 March 1983
That initiative developed into the Army Training 1990 concept. In addition,

a much greater use of simulators and simulations quickly developed. Significant also was the establishment, during this time, of the School for

Advanced Military Studies, a postgraduate extension of the Command and

General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, focusing on the operational level of war. In the force design arena, “light versus heavy” debates

intensified as the Army established a High Technology Test Bed (HTTB) at

Fort Lewis, Washington, to experiment with lightening the infantry Division

86.

Richardson

General William R. Richardson followed General Otis as TRADOC commander in March 1983. In accordance with Secretary of the Army Marsh’s

“Year of Excellence,” he introduced the watchword for his tenure, “Excellence Starts Here.” Early in his command he spelled out his priorities:

Better training; implementation of new doctrine; force modernization and

integration; and mobilization (Reserve component). With regard to training,

he expected to spend much time tying up the loose ends of Army 1990 and

overseeing a new initiative termed School

Model 86. The former focused on performance-oriented training while the latter was

an effort to give back to the Director of

Training and the academic departments of

the TRADOC schools the importance to

resident instruction and doctrine writing he

believed had been usurped over time.

Richardson was commander at a time when

much of the work of his predecessors was

coming to fruition across the Army. FM

100-5 had been written and promulgated,

and the derivative manuals were being

written in the schools; the training program

was solidly emplaced; the development of

the organizational designs of the Army of

Excellence was undertaken; and weapons systems were coming on line. One

of the biggest challenges Richardson noted for TRADOC was the recruitment and retention of good people within the command. Perhaps his first

priority was to change the attitudes of officers and soldiers who considered

assignment to TRADOC to be a dead end.

Chapter ll

TRADOC Leadership

General William R. Richardson,

Commanding General, 11 March 1983-

29 June 1986
Richardson was responsible for the establishment of several new agencies

and departments at Fort Leavenworth. Believing that the heart of the Army

was TRADOC, and the heart of TRADOC was Fort Leavenworth, he continued development of the School for Advanced Military Studies, created the

School for Professional Development, the Center for Army Leadership,

Combined Arms Training Activity, the Center for Army Lessons Learned,

and the Combined Arms Operational Research Activity. A final significant

reorganization was the transformation of the Deputy Chief of Staff for ROTC

into the ROTC Cadet Command as a major subordinate command of

TRADOC.

Vuono

General Carl E. Vuono succeeded General Richardson in June 1986. He

announced that his mission focus would have two aspects. Taking a somewhat more restricted view of the concept of preparing the Army for war than

had Richardson, Vuono stressed that TRADOC had to not only prepare the

Army for war in the present, but it must look farther ahead in time as the

architect of the future. He stressed that TRADOC must consider the whole

spectrum of war, and while addressing current challenges, not neglect the

design of the force ten to fifteen years out. He reoriented the ten TRADOC

goals into six major “imperatives: Doctrine, organization, training, leader

development, materiel, and soldiers

(DTLOMS). TRADOC’s responsibility was

to insure understanding of what the Army

must be to win on the future battlefield.

That understanding would provide vision

and direction for the Army.

Vuono instituted guidelines for doctrinal

development and developed the concept of

the advanced collective training facilities,

which led to the opening of the Joint

Readiness Training Center at Fort Chaffee,

Arkansas, and the Combat Maneuver

Training Center at Hohenfels, Germany,

and the initiation of the Battle Command

Training Program at Fort Leavenworth.

Efforts in force modernization concentrated on improved application of the

Concept Based Requirements System and a new emphasis on a system of

systems approach to equipment modernization. Leader development was

Chapter ll

TRADOC Leadership

General Carl E. Vuono, Commanding

General, 30 June 1986-11 June 1987
concentrated in the development of small group instruction and the invigoration of the noncommissioned officer education system. His program of

“leading and caring” stressed excellence both in individuals and installations

of which they were a vital part.

The TRADOC Long Range Plan, published in May 1987, was perhaps

Vuono’s most ambitious effort. Designed to support TRADOC’s mission as

the “architect of the future,” the plan constructed a vision of the command

ten years out based on Army long-term planning, the program objective

memorandum (POM), and TRADOC goals.

Thurman

After replacing General Vuono as TRADOC commander in June 1987,

General Maxwell R. Thurman stressed the command’s role as the key player

in shaping the “azimuth for the Army of the future.” As set forth in a program known as Vision 91, Thurman’s stated objective was to serve the Army

in the field. That would be accomplished by writing the doctrine by which it

would fight; testing that doctrine for soundness; designing well-balanced and

capable forces; articulating the equipment requirements of the commandersin-chief in the field; providing combatready soldiers to units around the world;

and developing future leaders.

Vision 91 examined the central question of

how the command should position itself to

meet the challenges of 1991 and beyond.

That period would be a time of substantial

manpower and funding constraints. Vision

91 sought to address the evolution of

doctrine, especially in the joint arena; a

more focused force design; a system-ofsystems approach to materiel development;

full service leader development; tough,

realistic training; and well-developed

mission support capability.

While Vision 91 addressed the immediate period, Thurman developed a

thirty-year TRADOC Long-Range Planning Vision which solicited the

thoughts of the subordinate commanders toward the further development of a

new TRADOC long-range plan.

Chapter ll

TRADOC Leadership

General Maxwell R. Thurman,

Commanding General, 29 June

1987-1 August 1989
Foss

General John W. Foss assumed the leadership of TRADOC in 1989, as the

Army began a period of downsizing and strategic reorientation. A variety of

factors, international, national, political, and economic, had combined to

compel the Army to change into a more flexible, smaller force. The concept

of the three TRADOC integrating centers,

which had traditionally been part of the

organization, gave way in 1990 to two

major subordinate commands: the Combined Arms Command and the Combined

Arms Support Command. Also in October

1990, TRADOC eliminated the installation

contract by which the TRADOC commanding generals had managed the outlays of the

installations since the mid-1970s.

As the effects of geopolitical change were

felt during the course of 1990, the primary

focus of the Army began to shift to the

projection of land combat power from the

continental United States, as well as from

forward-deployed forces where possible.

That had implications across the force, from warfighting doctrine to organizational structure to equipment to training.

Foss addressed doctrinal challenges and changes through AirLand BattleFuture studies, doctrinal discussions, and map exercises, focusing on the

nonlinear battlefield and the doctrine, organization, and logistics it would

require. AirLand Battle-Future, later termed AirLand Operations, became the

driving concept for TRADOC. Further, Foss directed the beginning of a

revision of FM 100-5 to expand the doctrine into the strategic realm, although

Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm in 1990-91 interrupted the effort.

Franks

General Frederick M. Franks, Jr. became the eighth TRADOC commander in

August 1991. Franks set down his ideas regarding TRADOC’s future in five

points of main effort: Lead the Army through intellectual change, sustain

excellence and relevance in training and leader development, propose modernization alternatives to maintain the technological edge for soldiers on future

battlefields, foster organizational excellence, and focus on soldiers.

Chapter ll

TRADOC Leadership

General John W. Foss, Command

General, 2 August 1989-22 August 1991
The new TRADOC commander began

anew the doctrinal revision of FM 100-5.

Convinced that doctrine was the basis of

change and had to be a centerpiece of

TRADOC activity, revision of FM 100-5

became a top priority to lead the Army

through the intellectual readjustment from

the Cold War to the post Cold War Army.

In addition, he instituted “battle laboratories” as means to develop the capabilities

for a force projection Army. The battle

laboratories focused on the areas where the

battle appeared to be changing and encouraged experimentation using simulations,

prototypes, real soldiers, and real units to

make the best use of technology and new

requirements.

In his long-range planning guide for TRADOC, Franks interpreted

TRADOC’s missions specifically. They were to set training standards and

run the Army Schoolhouse, provide modernization alternatives while representing the user in order to allow the Army to retain the battlefield edge, help

the Army look to the future in war fighting,

and foster organizational excellence.

Hartzog

General William W. Hartzog became the

ninth commanding general of the Training

and Doctrine command in October 1994.

As with Franks, his efforts to meet the

challenges of being TRADOC commander

took place against a background of a new

global reality in which the primary concern

was no longer a classic European air and

ground war, but rather the possibility of

many small operations. Further, the dramatic downsizing of forces to levels not

seen since the pre-World War II era also

shaped Hartzog’s and the command’s thinking and policy. Another factor that

he had to consider in shaping the force of the future was the Army’s increasChapter ll

TRADOC Leadership

General Frederick M. Franks, Jr.,

Commanding General, 23 August

1991-26 October 1994

General William W. Hartzog,

Commanding General, 27

October 1994-13 September

1998.
ing involvement in peace operations, nation-building, and humanitarian

relief.

Hartzog’s thinking about the twenty-first century Army was set down in the

Force XXI Operational Concept. The key to the developmental work on

Force XXI was a digitized, experimental Task Force (EXFOR) that stood up

at Fort Hood, Texas in 1994. Central to the shape of future forces were a

series of Advanced Warfighting Experiments (AWE) beginning in April 1994,

prior to Hartzog’s arrival at TRADOC, and continuing through March 1998.

Looking even further into the future was an Army After Next project that

sought to establish criteria for the Army by the year 2020.

Hartzog’s tenure saw the publication of two versions of TRADOC Pam 525-5

based on the Force XXI concept and leading to the publication of a new FM

100-5, Operations. The concept also guided the development of tactics,

techniques, and procedures (TTP) to be employed by the experimental force

in executing the various AWE. In turn, TTP supported further doctrine

development for the execution of operations across the seven battlefield

operating systems and at each echelon of operations.

Abrams

General John N. Abrams began his four-year command of TRADOC in the

fall of 1998. His vision for the command was to prepare the Army for

decisive victory in the full range of required joint and combined operations.

This focus meant providing soldiers and leaders with disciplined training

based on fully developed doctrine, leader development, organizations, and

materiel. It also meant providing a readiness infrastructure for training and

projecting Army forces. Coupling that determination with the requirement to

transform the Army’s education and training, Abrams led the Army’s effort to

rethink the entire leader development process including resident training,

advanced distance learning, and individual study.

During Abrams’ command, two forces of change were propelling the Army in

new directions: The ongoing efforts to make the Army more deployable; and

the revolution in computer and communications technology that had the

potential of increasing battlefield awareness at all levels. In an address on 12

October 1999, Chief of Staff of the Army Eric Shinseki made the case for

“Transformation” of the Army, specifying he need for both doctrinal and

materiel change. A large portion of the challenges posed fell on TRADOC as

the Army’s “Architect of the Future.” Responsibility of a Brigade CoordinaChapter ll

TRADOC Leadership
tion Cell for designing two Interim Brigade Combat Teams (IBCT) at Fort

Lewis, Washington, also fell to TRADOC.

To further the understanding of possible

future warfare, General Abrams instituted a

series of Seminar War Games (SWG) beginning in July 2001. The SWG simulated the

long-range deployment of an interim force and

looked to define the objective force of the

future and future combat systems (FCS).

Transformation also called for a revision of

the Army’s capstone doctrine in Field Manual

(FM) 100-5, Operations. A new version,

renamed and carrying the joint services

number of FM 3.0, was published in the

summer of 2001. The new doctrine was

clearly cognizant of the changes in the

nation’s geo-strategic position and addressed

the problems of deployment, asymmetric

warfare and the need for joint operations

from major theaters of war to humanitarian

relief.

Byrnes

Beginning in early November 2002, TRADOC’s new commander, General

Kevin P. Byrnes prepared to reassess the command’s missions. He strongly

reaffirmed that institutionalized training would be the number one priority,

especially at the IET and NCOES levels. Especially important would be

quality instructors and exported training to reach soldiers wherever they

served. Byrnes also emphasized a “sense of urgency” in helping the Army

accelerate the Transformation process and in enhancing the credibility of

current Transformation initiatives, especially by soliciting ideas and proposals from industry. Perhaps even more important was the necessity to demonstrate the links between Army Transformation and Department of Defense

joint initiatives, to include joint exercises. Byrnes planned for TRADOC to

become a “futures command” that would serve the Army well upon the

fielding of the Objective Force and be a link to Joint Forces Command and

the other services.

Chapter ll

TRADOC Leadership

On 7 November 2001, General

Kevin R. Byrnes assumed command

of TRADOC from General John N.

Abrams who had become

Commanding General on 14

September 1998.
CHAPTER III

FORCE DESIGN AND WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT

TRADOC designed the “TOE Army,” the division, corps, and theater elements and all the 1,200-odd various tables of organization and equipment for

“type” units, platoon through corps and above that made up the Army in the

field. Design and adjustment of the organizations of the tactical Army was a

continuous process, as new or upgraded weapons or equipment were introduced or when doctrine forced changes to tank platoons, mechanized infantry

battalions, or cavalry troops. But

doctrinal, weapon, and policy

changes periodically created the

necessity for larger division

reorganizations. In the thirty

years since TRADOC’s establishment in 1973, the command

had designed and implemented

the major division reorganization known as Army of Excellence and had begun to define

the nature of the force twenty or

more years into the 21st century.

This “objective force” and a

weapons and equipment “system of systems” known as the Future Combat

Systems (FCS) were major components of a larger set of Department of the

Army initiatives known as Transformation.

Army of Excellence

The Army of Excellence (AOE), designed by TRADOC and implemented by

the Department of the Army in 1984-1986, was the first major reorganization

of the tactical army since the ROAD (Reorganization Objective, Army

Divisions) changes of the early 1960s. The tables of organization and

equipment (TOE) of the Army of Excellence gave organizational structure to

AirLand Battle doctrine and to the new generation of weaponry introduced in

the later 1970s and the 1980s. The structure of the Army of Excellence owed

Chapter lll

Force Design and

Weapons Development

In the mid 1970s, action at TRADOC focused on the

development of a new generation of weapons such as

the Bradley Fighting Vehicles and the M1 Abrams

tanks shown here at the NTC.
much to two earlier TRADOC studies of division design, the Division

Restructuring Study (DRS) of 1976 under the direction of General DePuy

and the Division 86 project and the Army 86 studies that followed, directed

by General Starry. Both studies focused on heavy armor and mechanized

infantry divisions. Both studies also were influenced by the lessons of the

Yom Kipper War of 1973 and the questions it raised. Did the ROAD division

have the structural strength and the proper design to meet heavily armed

modernized forces? When the bold and innovative changes in the DRS did

not survive, General Starry began anew to study the heavy division as critical

to the prime strategic theater of central Europe.

Studies of the Army 86 elements of Infantry Division 86 (non-mechanized),

Corps 86, and Echelons Above Corps 86 were completed at TRADOC in

1980. Meanwhile, crises had occurred in Afghanistan and Iran. In August

1980, Army 86 planners began further studies of light forces, a reflection of

their concern that however serious the challenge in NATO Europe, U.S.

Army forces had to be equally prepared for rapid deployment to meet contingencies in the non-NATO world. The national and defense leadership

became increasingly convinced that such flexible contingency forces had to

include more rapidly deployable light divisions.

In 1980 the design dilemma of the infantry division moved the Chief of Staff

of the Army to establish a “High Technology Test Bed” in the 9th Infantry

Division at Fort Lewis. He thought to test concepts toward development of a

lighter “high technology light division.” TRADOC and Army Materiel

Command planners cooperated with the division’s parent commands — I

Corps and the Army Forces Command — in that effort. Though valuable

ideas emerged from the test bed, such as new command post concepts and

palletized loading procedures, no high technology light division eventuated.

In the midst of the major modernization and buildup of the 1980s, the significant funding requirements for the equipment needed to realize the basic

concept proved unobtainable.

The infantry division dilemma was part of the larger problem of the whole

Army 86 design effort. The heaviness of its major structures, needed to meet

the armored and mechanized infantry threat posed by the Warsaw Pact, ran

aground on an inflexibly capped Active Army end strength of 780,000

personnel that prevailed in the early 1980s.

The design dilemma which the Training and Doctrine Command faced in the

straight infantry division was remedied in June 1983 when General John A.

Wickham, Jr., then Army Chief of Staff, directed the TRADOC commander,

Chapter lll

Force Design and Weapons Development
General Richardson, to design a new, strategically deployable light infantry

division limited in strength to approximately 10,000 personnel and globally

deployable in approximately 500 airlift sorties. To achieve this end,

Wickham gave Richardson the authority to review and redesign the entire

TOE Army. Undertaken by the Combined Arms Center with support from the

TRADOC branch schools, the Army of Excellence effort developed and put

in place the force designs of the 1980s Army. All elements of the tactical

Army and all division types were reexamined. The Army of Excellence

organizations resulting did not supplant, but modified the previous Army 86

designs, with the notable exception of the new light infantry division.

The centerpiece of the reorganization, the light infantry division was a 3-

brigade organization with 9 battalions of straight foot-infantry, with a

strength eventually set at 10,800 men. By concept, an early-arriving light

division could buy time for heavier forces to follow and reinforce heavy

forces in scenarios and terrain where it could be more effective than those

forces — in cities, forests, and mountain areas. The design went through a

successful certification process in the 7th

Infantry Division (Light) at Fort Ord, supported

by the TRADOC test organizations, during

1984-1986.

In the newly destined Army of Excellence,

TRADOC force designers reduced the heavy

divisions to structures of approximately 17,000.

Significant transfers from division to corps in

field artillery, air defense artillery, and combat

aviation left the divisions smaller with less

organic combat power. The redesigned corps

thus provided a more powerful fighting organization at the operational level of war. The Army

of Excellence design of heavy divisions and

corps moved Army tactical organization more

fully into consonance with doctrine at the most

significant level of organization.

Although to a degree open to criticism that it had overemphasized combat

power at the expense of support units, was too light, and lacked tactical

mobility, the Army of Excellence met the twin challenges for which it was

fashioned: The deterrent defense of NATO Europe in the final period and last

challenge of the Cold War; and the provision of rapidly deployable light

infantry forces for force packages needed to defend U.S. interests worldwide.

Chapter lll

Force Design and Weapons Development

A significant aspect of the Army

of Excellence was the

strengthening of Ranger and

Special Forces units. In April

1987, the Special Forces were

established as a separate Army

branch.
Whatever the insufficiency in support units, the Army of Excellence that

emerged was—in its training, advanced weaponry, war fighting doctrine, and

organization—a professional Army of a high order.

Force XXI

By the mid-1990s, design activity for the Army force of the early 21st century

centered around a project titled Force XXI. The project began on 8 March

1994 when Chief of Staff of the Army, General Gordon R. Sullivan, directed

the start of a major campaign effort to lead to the future Army in the early

years of the next century. Progressing toward incremental realization at the

year 2000, the Force XXI redesign was designed to be the last of the major

operational Army reorganizations of the 20th century that would supersede

the Army of Excellence. That initiative would, however, generally give way

beginning in late 1999 to the Transformation effort designed by Army Chief

of Staff Eric Shinseki.

The Force XXI project was a methodological departure from all previous

such efforts in two revolutionary ways. It was the first force redesign effort

in which a full panoply of newly-emergent, computer-driven constructive and

virtual simulation methods, equipment, and software were joined to actual

live field simulation to test and analyze new military unit designs. In addition, the multiyear Force XXI design effort was the first to invent and

embody for those heavy fighting units a linked, instantaneous, and common

picture and awareness of the close and distant events of the unfolding battle

of which they were part. “Digitization” was the rubric given this revolutionary emerging capability.

In support of Force XXI, TRADOC began several major projects. First, the

capstone “how-to-fight” doctrine was brought up to date in 1993 in FM 100-

5, Operations. A year later the command published TRADOC Pamphlet 525-

5, Force XXI Operations, a concept for the Army of the 21st century. Also in

1994, TRADOC accepted a project known as “Joint Venture,” and designed

to redesign the operational Army on a new information-or-knowledge basis.

Concurrently, a modern Louisiana Maneuvers Task Force (begun in 1992)

developed scenarios for the Army of the future.

From 1993-1995, TRADOC developed the concept for a key development

vehicle for Force XXI, a division-sized Experimental Force (EXFOR). Late

in 1994, the Army established the 4th Mechanized Infantry Division at Fort

Hood, TX, as a test bed for Force XXI. In addition, beginning in 1992 and

continuing into 1997, TRADOC fielded several “advanced warfighting

Chapter lll

Force Design and Weapons Development
experiments” (AWE) to carry through a sequence

of experiments and simulations to examine the

emerging digitization concept. Bearing names

such as Desert Hammer VI, Roving Sands, Prairie

Warrior, Mobile Strike Force, Focused Dispatch,

and Warrior Focus, these exercises and experiments—from platoon to theater levels—were

variously directed by the TRADOC Battle Laboratories and the National Simulation Center at CAC.

Transformation

As TRADOC looked forward to the next century,

the Force XXI operational concept was not a

finished product. The developmental work to lead

to an Army capable of executing Force XXI

concepts, remained to be done. Then, twelve days into FY 2000, the new

Army Chief of staff led the service in a radically different direction. As

noted above, Army Chief of Staff General Eric K. Shinseki announced on 12

October 1999 his plans for “Transformation” or for an Army transformed

into one that was more “responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, lethal,

survivable, and sustainable.” Transformation was seen as a sweeping

program to enhance the Army’s capabilities and change how it would fight in

the post-Cold War world. Combat-ready brigades in the target Army would

be deployable anywhere in the world in 96 hours.

The transformed Army would be comprised of three key elements: The

legacy force; the interim force; and the objective force. The legacy force

centered on the major weapons systems that the Army currently had in its

inventory. The interim force would provide crossover capabilities between

the legacy force and the objective force during the development of the latter.

The objective force was envisioned as a totally revamped Army with regard

to equipment, organization, and training. The backbone of the interim force

would be six to eight Interim Brigade Combat Teams (IBCT), the first two of

which were established at Fort Lewis beginning in 2000. These experimental

units operated under the direction of TRADOC’s Deputy Commanding

General for Transformation and a Brigade Coordination Cell at Fort Lewis.

The Future Combat System (FCS) would be the primary weapons and troopcarrying platform for the objective force. The FCS was envisioned as a

“system of systems” employing a common vehicle platform. For the IBCT in

the interim period, the Army chose a wheeled light armored vehicle known as

Chapter lll

Force Design and Weapons Development

A radio telephone operator at

Fort Lewis, WA, uses the

dismounted Soldier System unit

during an AWE in March 1997.
the LAV III, later renamed Stryker. (The FCS and the Stryker are discussed in

more detail below.) In July 2001, to help design a force projection Army that

was decisive across the full spectrum of conflict in the 21st century, TRADOC

commander General John N. Abrams established Seminar War Games (SWG)

at the headquarters. Those fora brought together senior leaders, representing

all the Army’s functions and responsibilities, to play out scenarios involving

“Units of Action” and “Units of Employment.” Transformation initiatives

represented an all-encompassing effort to accomplish the Army’s vision and

to change the way the Army thought, trained, and fought.

Weapons and Equipment

A major mission assigned to the new U.S. Army Training and Doctrine

command on 1 July 1973 was combat developments—the systematic development of new and improved organization, equipment, weaponry, and

doctrine. Combat developments had come to TRADOC from the former

Combat Developments Command. The merger of combat developments with

the training mission in one command guided the 1973 Army reorganization to

reorient combat developments to the present and near future, and to apply

new and improved materiel, organization, and doctrine to field units quickly.

The reorganization decentralized the combat developments mission to the

Army’s branch and service schools and placed the function with training.

Four basic elements constituted the TRADOC combat developments structure

— the Deputy Chief of Staff for Combat Developments at the headquarters;

the functional centers (renamed “integrating centers” in 1976); the schools;

and the test and evaluation agencies. TRADOC directed its combat developments responsibilities through the Deputy Chief of Staff for Combat Developments, which was established as the focal point for assigning projects and

allocating and accounting for resources. Until 1990, the three functional

centers directly subordinate and reporting to TRADOC headquarters—the

Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, the Logistics Center at Fort

Lee, and the Administration (after 1980, Soldier Support) Center at Fort

Benjamin Harrison—directed, coordinated, and integrated the combat

developments work of the Army schools with which each was functionally

associated. At the next level were the branch and specialist schools where the

commandants had responsibility for both combat developments and the

training education missions. The fourth aspect of the combat developments

system within TRADOC were agencies designed to provide data and reports

from tests and experiments keyed to specific concepts and projects. Two of

the most influential were the Combat Developments Experimentation Command (CDEC) at Fort Ord, California and the Modern Army Selected SysChapter lll

Force Design and Weapons Development
tems Test Evaluation and

Review (MASSTER) at Fort

Hood, Texas.

The three major combat

developments concerns were

materiel, organization, and

doctrine. Materiel development was a joint effort of

TRADOC as the primary

combat developer and the

Army Materiel Command

(AMC) as primary materiel

developer. TRADOC played

three essential parts in the

effort. The first was to

formulate and document requirements for specific materiel. The second was

to monitor the AMC development continuously, undertaking operational tests

and analyses at critical points. The third role was to redraw organizations and

refashion tactics as necessary to accommodate the new item. The combat

developer determined a weapon’s need and operational specifications,

monitored its development, and determined its ultimate issue to and use by

the Army in the field.

As significant to the evolving process of combat developments as the

STEADFAST reorganization was the Mideast War of October 1973.

TRADOC studied the war intensively, paying particular attention to the

tremendous attrition of materiel and unparalleled lethality of modern weaponry. Those lessons greatly shaped the vision of modern war. Reform of the

tactical force was recognition that

modern armies in the 1970s were

crossing a technological threshold. The

lethality of fire, the tempo of battle, and

the immense attrition of the Mideast

War had demonstrated a quantum leap in

weapons technology.

TRADOC took a “total systems”

approach to weapons development,

bringing trainers, logisticians, and

personnel managers into the process

early. The total systems methodology

Chapter lll

Force Design and Weapons Development

These vehicles, visually modified to resemble Soviet

vehicles, were used by the “opposing force” to provide

opposition for Task Force XXI during AWE exercises.

A significant development for TRADOC was

the fielding of the air defense system known

as the Patriot.
spawned the concept of the TRADOC System Managers (TSM), formally

approved in March 1977. The TSM would represent all major weapon and

materiel systems in development and would function with the power and

authority comparable to the project managers of the Army Materiel Command. The TSM was charged with integrating and organizing the development process. Introduction of a new Concept Based Requirements System

(CBRS) in 1980 provided a development schematic, the goal of which was to

place fighting concepts at the beginning of all TRADOC’s products across

the board—doctrine, materiel requirements, organizations, and training

developments.

As management techniques and strategies were being devised and emplaced,

the 1970s and 1980s witnessed the

launching of one of the most massive

modernization programs in the history

of the Army. The Big Five systems of

greatly increased combat power included the M1 Abrams main battle tank,

the M2 and M3 Bradley fighting

vehicles, the Black Hawk and Apache

helicopters, and the Patriot air defense missile. The Multiple Launch Rocket

System was also developed and fielded as were individual soldier’ equipment

and electronic warfare protection equipment. Anticipating a smaller force

after the Vietnam drawdown, the ability to catch and keep the technological

edge in weapons and equipment was deemed imperative.

The modernization wave that had begun in the

immediate post-Vietnam era crested in 1983.

From that point in time development would be

slower and more sporadic. By the late 1980s,

modernization planning was less dramatic and

more aimed at coordinated effort and overall

reduced budgets and available resources. For

instance, in 1986, the Department of the Army

commissioned the Armored Family of Vehicles

Task Force to examine the next phase of

modernization. The emerging concept was that

of an armored family of vehicles to be built

around two common chassis. A total, phased

replacement of the tracked and wheeled fleet

Chapter lll

Force Design and Weapons Development

The M1A1 Abrams main battle tank was one

of the big 5 weapons systems that TRADOC

helped to develop.

The Apache was the Army’s day/

night, adverse weather, attack

helicopter.
would ensure compatibility, commonality, and survivability. Simultaneously

block improvements were projected for the Abrams main battle tank and the

Bradley fighting vehicle. Upgrades were also planned for the A-64 Apache.

The success of the total modernization effort was demonstrated in Operation

Desert Storm over 1990 and 1991. All of the “Big Five” systems were

deployed and performed beyond expectations. The Apache attack helicopter,

the Black Hawk transport and utility helicopter, the Abrams main battle tank,

the Bradley fighting vehicle, and the Patriot missile system validated the

combat developments process and product. The Army helicopter improvement program (AHIP) had resulted in the OH-58D armed Kiowa Warrior,

which flew close reconnaissance and attack support for the Apache. Likewise

deployed and successful were the Army tactical missile system (ATACMS),

the longest range surface-to-surface missile in the Army inventory, along

with its companion multiple-launch rocket system (MLRS). Additionally,

unmanned aerial vehicles, the joint surveillance target acquisition radar

system (JSTARS), and the XM40 series protective mask were success stories

of Desert Storm.

TRADOC’s first twenty years marked a high ground for combat developments. The opening two decades witnessed a massive modernization program

that was justified by a serious security threat, adequate resourcing, and

enlightened leadership. The major systems still in service in 2003 were

developed during this time. With the opening of the 1990s, however, several

external factors influenced that path. The demise of the unified Soviet threat

and resulting downsizing of American forces and resources seriously affected

weapon development and acquisition. As cost of equipment went up,

amounts procured would have to be reduced. As numbers went down,

systems would have to be more accurate and lethal. Technology had to be

harnessed to assure success on the nonlinear battlefield.

With decremented funding levels, equipment requirements shifted to focus

on long-term development and acquisition. Weapons systems had to provide

broad coverage in low, mid, and high intensity conflicts as well as contingency and special operations. Department of the Army proposed four principles to guide modernization decisions. Simply put, they were: Key future

modernization programs would be protected; some current major weapons

systems would be terminated; investment in product improvements and

systems modifications would be restricted; and new technologies would be

advanced.

Chapter lll

Force Design and Weapons Development
On the management side, the concept of battle laboratories located at key

TRADOC centers and schools evolved over the winter of 1991 and the spring

of 1992 as TRADOC reassessed requirements for the post-Cold War Army.

Without a clear external threat driving requirements, concepts of warfare and

the associated equipment needed to be evaluated. The battle laboratories

were designed to be the institutional means to determine, develop, and

experiment with equipment and technology, organizational design, and

training. The trend in combat developments, with battle laboratories assisting, would be for fewer starts and dollars, higher technology, better integration, and more focus on combined efforts.

The U.S. Army’s modernization objectives as TRADOC reached its 25th

anniversary in 1998 were to project, sustain, and protect the force; win the

information war; conduct precision strikes; and dominate the maneuver

battle. Those objectives were formally set forth in the Army Modernization

Plan update, published in May 1994. The Modernization Plan and the Force

XXI process were designed to move the service to Army XXI, beginning with

a conceptual base and continuing forward to post-fielding improvements.

Declining defense resources and downsizing of the force made it necessary

for the Army to analyze future warfighting capabilities with an eye to development and fielding of battlefield systems that best supported the Army

envisioned in the next century. TRADOC, as the architect of the future Army,

continued to fulfill that role. But as the command reached its 30th year, the

road to the Army of the 21st century had taken some sharp turns as the

Transformation initiatives looked to a lighter, more deployable force by about

2020.

The Transformation effort had not displaced all of the tenets of Force XXI.

Indeed, it had built on many of them. The importance of projection and

sustainment of the force could not be overstated. The Army of tomorrow

would be a smaller, continental United States (CONUS)-based force which

would require a greater ability to project and sustain its power anywhere in

the world. To realize that objective, Army systems needed to be light, lethal,

and modular, in order that more capability could be achieved with fewer

resources. The Army also needed to have sufficient strategic and tactical lift

assets to move its forces around the globe. The Army had to project forces

efficiently by taking advantage of new technologies to move only what was

absolutely necessary. Improved logistical information systems and a new

emphasis on split-based operations were designed to allow the Army to

sustain its forces while projecting fewer support elements. Finally, plans had

to be designed to support other missions such as humanitarian relief and

Chapter lll

Force Design and Weapons Development
peace operations.

Modernization for the Army of the twenty-first century included denying

information to the enemy through secure communications and direct attack

against enemy command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4) assets. Joint efforts to expand their own C4I assets were designed

to give U.S. forces a complete picture of the battlefield that could be transmitted to all units. The Army Battle Command System with its many components would link commanders at all echelons. Global Positioning System

(GPS) receivers provided precise targeting and navigation data. A new

information architecture also included communications systems to securely

and rapidly move data from point to point.

As TRADOC commemorated its 30th anniversary, a number of weapons and

equipment projects underway promised to support the transforming Army

deep into the 21st century. Of special importance was a vehicle for the

interim force and a

Future Combat System

(FCS) that would

provide an integrated

“system of systems” for

the soldier of the future.

On 15 April 2002, the

Army accepted early

editions of its new

interim armored vehicle

for the Interim Brigade

Combat Teams and

known as the LAV (light armored vehicle) III (renamed “Stryker” in February

2002). The Stryker was a 19-ton eight-wheel armored vehicle that would

provide the Army with ten different variations from infantry carrier vehicles

to reconnaissance and medical evacuation vehicles. The new vehicles had

robust armor protection, could travel at speeds of about 60 mph, possessed

common parts and a self-recovery capability. The Stryker also was designed

to be deployed by C-130 aircraft and to be combat-capable upon arrival in

any contingency area.

The FCS program was a collaborative DARPA (Defense Advanced Research

Projects Agency)/U.S. Army project to design and demonstrate combat

systems that could be the centerpiece of the Army’s future Objective Force.

TRADOC’s role as the Army’s combat developer placed the command at the

Chapter lll

Force Design and Weapons Development

The Stryker interim armored vehicle rolls off a C-130 during

exercises in 2002
forefront of defining what was needed and how systems should be integrated.

Transformation planners envisioned FCS as a networked force consisting of

separate robotic direct fire, indirect fire, and sensor platforms controlled by a

manned command and control platform. The FCS was intended to involve

both ground and air systems, connected through a sophisticated sensor and

communication network.

Also under development for the objective force

was the RAH-66 Comanche helicopter. More

than 20 years in development, the Comanche was

expected to operate either as a stealthy reconnaissance system or as a highly lethal attack platform. Concurrently, the Army was testing a

tactical unmanned aerial vehicle (TUAV) known

as “Shadow.” Shadow was meant to accompany

initial entry ground forces to transmit pictures of

a battlefield back to a ground station.. Resembling a radio-controlled aircraft, the newest

TUAV had a 13-foot wingspan and could stay

aloft over a target for five to six hours. Also

being tested were prototypes of a High Mobility

Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS), the Army’s

new light artillery system. Transportable in a C130 aircraft, the early-entry artillery platform could launch the entire family

of Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) and Army Tactical Missile

System (ATACMS) munitions to a range of 300 km. HIMARS was designed

to engage tube and rocket artillery, air defense concentrations, trucks, and

light-armor personnel carriers.

By TRADOC’s 30th year it was clear that Transformation and its weapons

development initiatives were a process and not an end state. How rapidly the

various programs moved was a function of the world situation, available

resources, and advancing technology. By the year 2020, it was likely that

there would be some FCS-equipped organizations, some Stryker units, and

still some “legacy” formations.

Chapter lll

Force Design and Weapons Development

The new RAH-66 Comanche was

the Army’s most advanced

helicopter and the cornerstone of

the Aviation Modernization

Program. The aircraft featured

“stealth” which had previously

been confined to airplanes.

The Shadow was an unmanned

aerial vehicle still under

development and testing as

TRADOC reached its 30th year.
CHAPTER IV

DOCTRINE

TRADOC came into existence in July 1973, the year that saw the end of the United

States Army’s involvement in the Vietnam War and the end of the Arab-Israeli War.

The former event marked the close of a decade-long struggle, which had focused the

Army’s attention on counterinsurgency warfare against an elusive foe. Conversely, the Arab-Israeli War was a conflict unprecedented in tempo, lethality, and consumption of resources. Significant in themselves, these events

occurred against a background of concerns over increasing Soviet power

across the globe. It was obvious to General DePuy, Commanding General of

TRADOC, that existing Army doctrine was outdated. Thus, in 1974, he

began the process of change by sending letters to some of the TRADOC

school commandants and by initiating a series of conferences to discuss the

Middle East War and changes in Soviet doctrine. Not satisfied with a long

process of developing new Army doctrine, TRADOC schools developed new

circulars on “how to fight.” Traditionally, the Combined Arms Center

(CAC) at Fort Leavenworth was the agency assigned to write “capstone”

doctrine such as field manuals (FM), but after several conferences concerning the issue, the task of writing a new FM on operations was transferred

from CAC to the Concepts Branch of Headquarters TRADOC in 1975. The

new FM 100-5, Operations, was published in June 1976.

 The new FM principally focused on potential conflict against the Soviets in

Europe. It recognized the reality of the modern battlefield with its increased

operational tempo and its increased lethality and the fact that U.S. forces

needed to “fight outnumbered and win.” There was also emphasis on winning the first battle, something the United States had seldom done. The

overall doctrine was called “active defense.” Despite its acknowledgment of

a new strategic situation and the enhanced lethality of the modern battlefield, the 1976 edition of FM 100-5 was not universally. Within a short time

it created considerable controversy. Broadly, the criticism centered on three

issues. The doctrine was defensive in nature and perceived by some to be an

all or nothing defense without a substantial reserve. The preoccupation with

the first battle was often considered to be a commitment to fight that battle

without consideration of subsequent operations. Third, and perhaps most

significantly, the active defense was seen as tied too specifically to one

Chapter lV

Doctrine
Soviet operational maneuver that called for a massive armored breakthrough

that was typical of World War II. However, Soviet doctrine had also

changed. Because of concerns about the vulnerability of their armored

personnel carriers to modern anti-armor weapons, new Soviet doctrine called

for multi-pronged attacks across the front seeking to exploit a weak point.

 As early as 1976-1977, there were efforts underway to redefine the battlefield of the near future. Lt. General Donn A. Starry spearheaded these efforts

while he was V Corps commander in Europe. Earlier as Chief of Armor he

had contributed greatly to the 1976 edition of FM 100-5 and its Active

Defense approach. However, as V Corps commander he had gained a new

appreciation of up-to-date Soviet doctrine and capabilities. In V Corps, the

aspects of what Starry referred to as the Central Battle such as ranges and

numbers involved were fully analyzed. He realized that the commander’s

view of the battlefield had to be wider and deeper than that indicated by the

active defense. When General Starry became TRADOC commander, these

considerations became paramount in revising the doctrine according to FM

100-5. During the same period, General Edward C. Meyer, Chief of Staff of

the Army, recognized a need for the Army to be more responsive to global

needs, hence, more “deployable,” and also the need to revise doctrine to

reflect the more current Soviet threat. A major

influence on Starry’s concept of the Central

Battle was a study at the Field Artillery School

in Fort Sill, OK, begun at his request. The study

suggested interdicting targets deep in the enemy

rear to disrupt the Soviet second echelon during

an assault. That study also projected cooperation with the U.S. Air Force, which led to the

need for an integrated battle across a wider,

deeper battlefield. By 1980, the central battle

idea had become known as AirLand Battle and

the draft of a new FM 100-5 had begun. In

addition to the recognized principles and

fundamentals of war, AirLand Battle called for

depth, initiative, agility, and synchronization, as

well as an insistence on initiative on the part of

leaders at all levels. Published in August 1982,

the new FM 100-5 became the cornerstone of U.S. Army doctrine. It was

revised in 1986, but AirLand Battle remained doctrine through the Gulf War

of 1990-91.

Chapter lV

Doctrine

The Army’s “capstone” AirLand

Battle doctrine as originally

defined in the 1982 version of

Field Manual (FM) 100-5,

Operations, was revised in 1986.
With the demise of the Soviet Union, the strategic position of the United

States changed drastically. Although U.S. and allied divisions smashed Iraqi

military power using AirLand Battle doctrine, a philosophy that centered on

fighting a major land power on the continent of Europe was no longer

relevant. At the end of the Cold War, the United States emerged as the

world’s only super power. But that did not mean peace. In the last decade of

the 20th century, nearly half the countries in the world faced some sort of

armed conflict, which included ethnic strife; political insurgencies; terrorism

from political or transnational entities; or criminal elements, which often

masqueraded as political movements. The fall of the Soviet Union revealed

challenges that were far more complex than were evident during the Cold

War. The danger of facing a potential adversary in a land war that might turn

nuclear was lessened, only to reveal multiple threats to the United States that

did not originate in Moscow. This complex situation became known as

“asymmetric warfare,” which included threats from diverse sources such as

conventional forces, terrorists, and criminals. TRADOC commander General

John W. Foss began the revision of Army doctrine in 1989. The Gulf War,

however, delayed further developments.

On taking command of TRADOC in August 1991, General Frederick M.

Franks, Jr. Franks set as his primary goal the complete revision of FM 100-5

and its publication by early 1993. In addition, he envisioned it moving in a

different direction than had his predecessor. Thus, the writing team at Fort

Leavenworth was changed and the new team worked to produce a new

manual that was less a tactical treatise than the

two preceding editions and more a statement of

the Army’s position in world that required

deployment from CONUS rather than a forwardbased army. It stressed the numerous missions the

Army faced in the new strategic environment and

took a realistic view of joint requirements in

future operations. General Franks was careful to

insure Army-wide consensus prior to publication

and made sure that the other U.S. services were

privy to the elements of the new FM 100-5. In

this way it was a public document from its early

stages and most of the criticism had been met

prior to publication. FM 100-5 was released in

June 1993. The designation “AirLand Battle” was

scrapped; Franks did not want to focus attention

solely on Army-Air Force cooperation.

Chapter lV

Doctrine

The 1993 edition of FM 100-5,

Operations, reflected the new

world situation in the Post-Cold

War period and the focused on

deployment from CONUS rather

than a forward based Army.
During his tenure as TRADOC commander, Franks worked closely with

Chief of Staff of the Army General Gordon R. Sullivan to change doctrine. In

exercise Desert Hammer new versions of the M1 tank were tested at the

National Training Center in what would come to be considered the first

Army Warfighting Experiment (AWE). Franks also looked for a way to test

the concept of Army XXI. Another aspect of the change in doctrine was the

effort of the Battle Laboratories to explore the various aspects of the future

battlefield. Their focus included maneuver, maneuver support, fire support,

combat service support and the new electronics aspects that included computers as well as more traditional electronic equipment on the battlefield. All

of these fell loosely under the auspices of General Sullivan’s concept referred to as the Modern Louisiana Maneuvers (LAM), a referent to the

Army’s famous training maneuvers in 1940 that led to significant reorganization. The Modern Louisiana Maneuvers was a process that “brainstormed”

new ideas. Although a Department of the Army initiative, the Louisiana

Maneuvers Task Force was headquartered at Fort Monroe, VA, in part

because of Sullivan’s heavy reliance on then TRADOC commander Franks.

For the next decade, the changing

international situation demonstrated

the need for another update of FM

100-5. However, the plan for a

modified version of the manual

tentatively scheduled for 1996 was

put on hold. In 1999 Chief of Staff

of the Army General Eric K.

Shinseki made the case for both

doctrinal and materiel changes in the

Army, initiatives that became known

collectively as Transformation. A

large portion of the challenges posed fell on TRADOC as the Army’s “architect of the future.” At the same time TRADOC was undergoing serious

reductions in resources and personnel, which impacted both training and

doctrinal development capabilities.

In order to further the understanding of possible future warfare, General

Abrams instituted a series of Seminar Wargames (SWG) in July 2001, and

revitalized a class of planning documents referred to as “O&O” for organization and operations. The SWG, enabled the review process for O&O and

simulated long-range planning for an interim, and then an objective force.

The initial purpose of the SWG was to help design a force projection army

Chapter lV

Doctrine

At TRADOC Headquarters, the Commanding

General sponsored a series of “Seminar War

Games,” beginning in July 2001, to test concepts

for the future force. The games employed

scenarios like this one.
that was decisive across the full spectrum of conflict

on the 21st century battlefield. The SWG particularly

addressed the challenges raised by the revolution in

computer and graphics technology. A TRADOC

brigade cell at Fort Lewis cell tracked and analyzed

two Interim Brigade Combat Teams (IBCT) at Ft.

Lewis, WA as they tried new concepts for the future

battlefield. The new vision resulted in a complete

revision of the 1993 edition of FM 100-5. To

emphasize the break with the past, the joint numbering system of 3.0 was adopted for the new manual,

which was cognizant of the changes in the nation’s

geo-strategic position. It clearly addressed the

problems of deployment and asymmetric warfare and

the need for joint operations in nearly every aspect of

operations, from major theaters of war to humanitarian relief. The “Transformation” FM 3-0 was published in June 2001.

After the attacks of September 11, 2001 on the World Trade Center and the

Pentagon, TRADOC also had to support the war on terrorism. The command

produced O&O for the Army on force protection, and assessed the impact on

the changed world situation on all other aspects of doctrine development.

Especially critical was the development of joint doctrine which had in the

past proceeded slowly and without the desired integration. TRADOC’s

leadership expected that the command would become the Army element in

the new U.S. Joint Forces Command.

Chapter lV

Doctrine

FM 3.0, Operations,

published in June 2001,

reflected in both its joint

numbering scheme and its

guidance, the increasing

need for joint doctrine.

The largest joint military experiment ever held, Millennium Challenge 2002 combined field forces

and computer simulations to test and validate joint and service-specific warfighting doctrine.
CHAPTER V

TRAINING AND LEADER DEVELOPMENT

Following the establishment of TRADOC in 1973, the Army’s training

system had undergone a measured but major transformation. While the

changes were for the most part evolutionary, a comparison of the system that

had existed in the immediate post-Vietnam period with that of 2003 revealed

a true revolution. The masterminds of that revolution were TRADOC’s first

commander, General William E. DePuy, and his Deputy Chief of Staff for

Training, Maj. Gen. Paul F. Gorman. Gorman brought with him to TRADOC

a new concept of performance-oriented training and a concept of a systematic way to go about the setting of training objectives through the careful

determination of tasks to be trained, conditions under which certain training

would be required, and the setting of standards. Maj. Gen. Gorman and his

“apostles and disciples” as General DePuy would later call them, also

brought to training development an appreciation of rapidly advancing

technology and an understanding of how it might be applied to training.

When DePuy and Gorman came to TRADOC, soldiers and officers were

being trained according to the Army Training Program (ATP), which had

been in use since World War I. The ATP was a time-oriented process that

prescribed how many hours would be devoted to each subject and task. The

ATP was based on the availability of conscripts and on the assumption that

the United States with its ocean barriers would have sufficient time to raise,

equip, and train a combat force, if necessary. After January 1973, the U.S.

military services no longer could depend on the draft to meet their manpower

needs. Other factors TRADOC had to consider in building a new training

system was the post-Vietnam downsizing of the Army and the shrinking

defense budgets of the 1970s. The Army not only needed better training, it

also needed efficient and cost-effective training.

The philosophy DePuy and Gorman brought to TRADOC was influenced by

revelations during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War of the lethality and range of

modern weapons and of the tremendous importance of well-trained crews

and tactical commanders. Gorman and DePuy agreed that what the Army

needed was a “train-evaluate-train” program that would require soldiers to

perform to established standards. That program, too, should be progressive

Chapter V

Training

and Leader Development
and sequential so that each level built on the next lower level. Gorman and

DePuy believed that individual training in units was much neglected, and

focused much of TRADOC’s effort there. Gorman’s idea was that the

TRADOC school system should be reoriented so that it had a larger training,

as opposed to educational, aspect. And finally, both men believed a solid link

had to be established between doctrine and training. Thus the revision of Field

Manual 100-5, Operations, in 1976 recognized the service schools as the

“Army’s source of combat developments and doctrine.”

Basic to the process of change was the adoption of a “systems approach to

training,” or SAT. The SAT consisted of five interrelated phases: Analysis,

design, development, implementation, and evaluation. All issues involved in

systems training, unit training, individual training, and training support were

studied following the SAT model. In the face of increasingly lean budgets, it

was obvious to TRADOC’s leaders that much individual training would have

to be conducted in units. As a result, TRADOC training developers began to

create and field several programs to bring the training to the soldier. The

Army Training and Evaluation System

(ARTEP) was a new performance-oriented

program for collective training that placed

responsibility for the training program

directly on the unit. New Skill Qualification

Tests (SQT) were designed to provide an

indicator of a soldier’s proficiency in his

military occupational specialty (MOS). (A

follow-on program to the SQT was the SelfDevelopment Test which was eliminated in

1995.) An updated and revised training and

doctrinal literature program included soldiers’ manuals that set forth what the

Army expected a soldier to know and be able to perform at each skill level.

The new program also included commanders’ manuals, field manuals, “how to

fight” manuals, technical manuals, and training circulars. To meet increasing

shortages in manpower, DePuy and Gorman greatly expanded a training

extension course program begun under CONARC and designed to export

training to the field.

The DePuy and Gorman years also saw changes in the Initial Entry Training

Program (IET) and the Noncommissioned Officer Education System

(NCOES). In July 1974, a new basic combat training (BCT) program was

implemented that stressed discipline, decentralization to the lowest possible

level, and the teaching of basic combat skills. TRADOC also made a major

Chapter V

Training and Leader Development

Reserved Officer’s Training Corps

(ROTC), Fourth Region, Capstone

Exercise in July 1985.
change in the structure of BCT. A new one-station unit training (OSUT) plan

integrated some BCT and advanced individual training (AIT) programs into

cohesive programs. That action also meant that fewer soldiers undergoing

IET would have to take the two phases at two different locations. With regard

to NCOES, TRADOC began to establish a progressive and sequential system

in line with Gorman’s philosophy and with the officer education system.

Generals DePuy and Gorman would later

agree that the aforementioned programs

represented the basic tenets of the new

training system they hoped to establish for

TRADOC. Both officers left TRADOC

headquarters in June 1977. Over the years

their reforms to the training system would

provide the basis for a continuing training

revolution. Those programs would be

revised, added to, and in some cases

deleted. But, on balance, the changes from

1977 to 2003, would be more in degree than in substance.

During the command’s 30-year existence, TRADOC employed a number of

“school models” and long -range training plans to guide the command in

fulfilling its mission to train the Army’s soldiers and officers. The first

TRADOC school model, School Model 76, adopted to replace the one that

predated the STEADFAST reorganization in 1973, clearly bore marks of

DePuy’s interest in training, as opposed to education, and of Maj. Gen.

Gorman’s interest in advanced technology. General DePuy directed his staff

to develop new organizational concepts that would modernize and bring

greater efficiency to the schools. School Model 76 was based on the premise

that the commandants would be responsible for the interface between combat

developments and training developments. The combat developments portion

of the school would create new weapons requirements, tactics, and tactical

and support organizations, based on approved doctrine. Training development

personnel would be responsible for resident training and extension training,

simulation devices and simulators, and training literature, to ensure the

optimum employment of the combat developers’ products. General DePuy

intended that the schools become less “instructor intensive” and that they

take advantage of existing technologies.

Another initiative that would affect the TRADOC schools was the establishment, in 1982, of a Military History Education Program, designed by the new

Chapter V

Training and Leader Development

Recruits at Fort Bliss, TX, learn hand-tohand combat skills.
Combat Studies Institute at Fort Leavenworth, KS. TRADOC Regulation

350-13, Military History Education (MHEP), first published in January 1982,

vested proponency for MHEP with the Chief of Staff, TRADOC, and established command policy for the study of military history in the TRADOC

service schools and in senior ROTC detachments. The TRADOC Military

History Education Program was intended to foster a sense of historicalmindedness in the Army community, resulting in a sensitivity to the intellectual and functional values of military history as a necessary component of

professional education and development.

In 1983, proponency for MHEP management was moved to Commander,

CAC, with executive agency given to the Director of the Combat Studies

Institute. A 1983 version of TRADOC Regulation 350-13 placed the requirement for instruction in military history with uniformed officers outside the

command history program, and made no provision for utilizing civilian

branch historians in MHEP. However, as the TRADOC history program grew

in the field, commandants began to use the branch historians to coordinate

MHEP in their commands. By 2003, a majority of branch historians served as

adjunct instructors of military history. In August 1992, proponency for

TRADOC’s military history education program was moved once again, back

to TRADOC headquarters. At the 30-year point, TRADOC 350-13 encompassed heritage instruction in BCT as well, and was once again being revised

to reflect visions of a transforming Army.

By the summer of 1982, problems inherent in School Model 76 had become

evident, the most notable of which was that instructors in the academic

departments were barred from participation in the training development and

combat development processes. Almost immediately after the model’s

adoption, the schools had begun to request exception to that policy, a practice

that resulted in each school becoming, in essence, a separate organization. A

working group established by TRADOC commander General Glenn K. Otis

recommended the adoption of a new school model that would integrate the

future direction of the Army with the school model. It was expected that

abandoning a reactive approach would put TRADOC in a posture to actively

participate in designing the way it operated in the future. The new model

combined combat developments and training developments in the same

directorate, thereby bringing training developments and evaluation into the

system acquisition process earlier. Thus evaluation could serve to provide

information on the potential successes or failures associated with total

system fielding. In 1983, TRADOC commander Richardson approved

School Model 83, giving back to the schools’ Directors of Training and the

Chapter V

Training and Leader Development
academic departments, much of the responsibility for training developments

they had lost in School Model 76.

As TRADOC planners continued to examine how the command’s schools

should be organized and managed, then TRADOC commander General Carl

E. Vuono, directed the development of a long-range plan to guide the command for ten years into the future. TRADOC published its Long Range Plan

in May 1987. Meanwhile TRADOC training planners began writing “Army

Training 1997” in support of the command’s long-range plan. Army Training

1997 was heavily based on an earlier but unsuccessful effort known as Army

Training 1990. Specific guidance included the integration of reserve component training throughout the document under a “Total Army” concept.

Additional emphasis was given to developing joint and combined operations

and to the distributed training system. Army Training 1997 was published in

September 1987. Major changes included in the final version dealt with

leader development, future technology strategy, the connection between

training developments and combat developments within the Concept Based

Requirements System (CBRS), combat training centers, embedded training,

and small group instruction. The long range strategy provided for a new

training system for warrant officers and a strong emphasis on civilian leadership training. The plan also included the results of an important Initial Entry

Training (IET) study, undertaken to draft a set of standards to improve

training effectiveness and guide the evolution of IET.

In the fall of 1988, TRADOC commander General Maxwell R. Thurman

called for a reassessment of TRADOC’s status and the command’s short-term

priorities. In a concept termed “Vision 91” he outlined how the command

should fulfill its mission through 1991 with regard to doctrine, force design,

equipment requirements, leader development, training, and mission support.

Training had to be consistent with doctrine, “embedded” into the development of new equipment, and made an integral part of force modernization.

Institutional, unit, and individual training had to focus on the teaching of

warfighting skills in a tactical field environment to produce soldiers who

understood the specific tasks of their jobs and could perform them to established standards. Training would, according to Vision 91 plans, make heavy

use of technological advances—especially computer-based teaching and

testing and the simulation of force-on-force maneuvers.

Concurrently, an Army Training 21 (not to be confused with Army Training

XXI) concept was being developed. That plan laid down the specifics for

developing a long-range “umbrella” training strategy for the late 1990s and

Chapter V

Training and Leader Development
the first twenty years of the 21st century. It included such training strategies

as distributed training, strategies based on the technical requirements of each

MOS, civilian vocational and technical training for appropriate MOS,

training in colleges and universities, recruiting by ability instead of aptitude,

and reconfiguring the TRADOC school system to be more responsive to

projected training requirements in the year 2020. For several years, suggested solutions to problems were tried, studied, and revised. In the end,

however, the demands first of Army XXI and then of the Transformation

efforts changed many of the parameters of the earlier initiatives.

As General Thurman looked at how the command could best meet its responsibilities down to 1991, TRADOC’s training managers were examining

School Model 83 for needed changes. School Model 89 eliminated the

School Secretary organizations at schools located on TRADOC installations,

aligned the threat support office under the assistant commandant, and limited

the number of training departments to four. Because of the number of requests for exemption, which had to be considered on a case-by-case basis,

School Model 89 was not implemented until 1990.

Meanwhile, it had become clear that the Army needed a new capstone

training manual in order to keep pace with evolving training plans and

doctrine. TRADOC’s new training philosophy was contained in FM 25-100,

Training the Force, published in 1988 to take its place alongside FM 100-5,

Operations, and FM 22-100, Military Leadership, as part of a trilogy of

“train, fight, lead” manuals. FM 25-100, however, focused primarily on

senior active and reserve commanders above battalion level. It became clear

that there was a need for additional guidance to better apply the concepts of

FM 25-100 at battalion and company level. Accordingly, FM 25-101, Battle

Focused Training—published in 1990— was developed to fill the void and

serve as a “how to” manual for units in the field. In October 2002, the Army

distributed FM 7-0, Training the Force, as an update to FM 25-100, although

it now carried a joint number. FM 7-1, Battle Focused Training, was expected soon to update the 1990 version. The new training doctrine was

designed to bring training doctrine more in line with the emerging operational environment.

An important facet of the TRADOC training story was the command’s efforts

to take advantage of ever more sophisticated technology that could be

applied to training. This would be increasingly evident in the Transformation

efforts of the late 20th and 21st centuries. During the DePuy-Gorman years,

several tactical engagement simulation systems were in use to support unit

Chapter V

Training and Leader Development
training in the field. One of these was

known as SCOPES, for Squad Combat

Operations Exercise Simulation. SCOPES

was designed to eliminate the judgment of

umpires that was highly subjective, and

featured a 6-power telescope mounted on a

rifle with numbers affixed to each individual soldier for the identification of

casualties. A similar system for training

tank crews called REALTRAIN had a 10-

power scope. In the early-to-mid 1970s,

TRADOC began developing a more

sophisticated tactical engagement simulator

for use in force-on-force field training exercises. That system, the Multiple

Integrated Laser Engagement System, always known as MILES, revolutionized collective training in the Army. In 2003, the system—after several

upgrades—continued to be the Army’s most innovative and effective training

device.

Since its establishment, TRADOC had been responsible for the development

of dozens of systems and non-systems training aids and devices. Most of

those were computer-based and designed to allow training, when space,

safety, cost, or environmental considerations might have prevented it.

Simulators and simulations such as the Simulation Network (SIMNET), that

joined more than 200 simulators, allowed units to participate in simulated

battles without leaving home station. In the early years of the 21st century,

SIMNET technology was being applied to development of a family of

Combined Tactical Trainers (CATT). A family of simulators (FAMSIM),

allowed for training in command and control from platoon level to echelons

above corps. DePuy’s and Gorman’s faith in the value of advanced technology applied to training, and the imagination

and support of their successors, had by

TRADOC’s 30th anniversary placed the

Army first among the services in the field

of training technology. It was rapidly

advancing technology, too, that allowed for

the establishment of the Army’s Combat

Training Center (CTC) Program. In 1976,

Maj. Gen. Gorman began developing a

concept for a national training center where

Chapter V

Training and Leader Development

M1 Abrams equipped with the Multiple

Integrated Laser Engagement System,

always known as MILES, is shown here

training at the National Training

Center, Fort Irwin, CA

Opposing Force (OPFOR) prepare to

move forward during an exercise at the

NTC. TRADOC began to develop the

concept for the training center in 1976.
heavy armored and mechanized infantry units could train in force-on-force

and live-fire exercises and where data could be collected to support doctrine

development, combat developments, and a “lessons learned” system. The first

force-on-force maneuvers were conducted at the U.S. Army National Training

Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, Calif. In January 1982.

The NTC was a joint TRADOC-FORSCOM project. The major features of

the training center were the employment of MILES for casualty assessment; a

sophisticated data collection system for exercise control and data collection;

a TRADOC Operations Group; a superbly trained opposing force (OPFOR);

expert exercise observer-controllers; after action reviews of unit performance; and take home packages designed to aid units in correcting deficiencies while training at home station. The success of the NTC in training heavy

mechanized forces led the Army to establish a similar facility for the training

of light forces. The Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) opened, on a

temporary basis, at Fort Chaffee in October 1987. Like the NTC, it featured a

TRADOC Operations Group and an OPFOR. Unlike the NTC, the JRTC was

completely a TRADOC project in its early days and until the light training

center moved to a permanent home at Fort Polk in 1993. At that time the

JRTC became a TRADOC-FORSCOM effort like the NTC. In 1988, the

Army began to plan for a Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) at

Hohenfels, Germany, to provide for

troops in Europe the same realistic

combined arms training exercises as

those at the NTC. Meanwhile in early

1987, the Chief of Staff of the Army

approved the concept of the Battle

Command Training Program (BCTP) to

train active and reserve division and

corps commanders, their staffs, and

major subordinate commanders in

warfighting skills.

In May 1987, the four aforementioned programs were brought under a single

training “umbrella” and became known as the Combat Training Centers, or

CTC. Collectively, the CTC projects focused on integrating all elements of

combat power, and were designed to provide tough, realistic combined arms

and services training in accordance with AirLand Battle doctrine, for units

from squad through corps. The CTC, in short, provided the Army the capability to train heavy, light, and special operations forces across the spectrum of

conflict.

Chapter V

Training and Leader Development

Soldiers arrive via a C-130 aircraft for

training at the Joint Readiness Training

Center at Fort Polk, LA
In the summer of 2002, the NTC became the focus of the U.S. Army’s

participation in Millennium Challenge (MC/ATEx 02), the first major joint

“experiment” ever conducted. The Army conducted exercises with the new

Stryker interim armored vehicle to test its deployability, especially when

airlifted by a C-130 aircraft. The TRADOC battle labs at Forts Gordon,

Benning, and Leonard Wood also conducted experiments in satellite communications, intelligence, command and

control, and terrain mapping. Lessons

learned from Millennium Challenge would

develop a new joint training transformation project known as Joint National

Training Capability (JNTC) which would

focus on the upgrading and certification of

service training ranges for joint training.

One of General DePuy’s requirements in

the design of an integrated training system

for the Army was that training programs

were to be progressive and sequential. He also required that standards of

performance be set and met at each level. As TRADOC reached the 30-year

mark, the Officer Education System (OES) and the Noncommissioned

Officer Education System met both those criteria. After completing the

officer basic and advanced courses, captains were required to attend the

Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS3) that trained officers to

function as staff officers with the Army in the field. After attending the

Command and General Staff Officer’s Course, majors and lieutenant colonels could be selected to attend the School of Advanced Military Studies

(SAMS).

At TRADOC’s 30-year point, the command was considering how to transform the OES to train the leaders who would command the Objective Force

of the future. Many of the initiatives were the result of an Army Training and

Leader Development Panel study which had revealed a number of weaknesses in the pre-commissioning through majors training programs. Changes

were also designed to address Transformation issues, a doubling in the

number of deployments, and a smaller Army. Under consideration was a

more integrated, three-level Basic Officer Leader Course (BOLC) for lieutenants, a two-part course for captains that included both staff training and

company command. Finally, an Intermediate Level Education model prescribed both a core curriculum and electives. All courses would be timed to

Chapter V

Training and Leader Development

An observer/controller (OC) team at the

Combat Maneuver Training Center at

Hohenfelds, Germany, assists the BCT

commander with training through

observation, control of the simulated

battlefield, and after action reviews (AAR).
officer assignments. At this writing, TRADOC planned full implementation

in FY 2006.

The Noncommissioned Officer Education System (NCOES) served as the

cornerstone of the “train the trainer” emphasis that guided TRADOC’s

approach to its overall training responsibilities. DePuy and Gorman’s efforts

to establish a sequential and progressive education program for noncommissioned officers had evolved slowly over the 30 years of TRADOC’s existence. NCOES featured four vertically integrated levels of training—primary,

basic, advanced, and senior. Those levels had, over a period of years, been

tied to promotion in accordance with TRADOC’s long-range goals. Similar

to training for NCOs was that for warrant officers. A Warrant Officer Leader

Development Action Plan of February 1992 had established a six-level

program beginning with the Warrant Officer Candidate Course.

The Army’s Initial Entry Training program included basic combat training

(BCT), advanced individual training (AIT), in which soldiers were trained in

their military occupational specialties (MOS), and one station unit training

(OSUT) which combined BCT and AIT for some career fields, primarily

combat arms. On 1 October 1998, Army basic combat training (BCT) had

been expanded from eight weeks to nine weeks so that new soldiers could be

immersed in the Army’s heritage and its seven core values: Loyalty, duty,

respect, selfless service, honor, integrity, and personal courage. The directive

for the additional week of BCT had come from the Army Chief of Staff, in

the wake of allegations of sexual harassment during initial entry training at

several Army installations. The revamped program also included human

relations, rape prevention, and financial management. In addition, a threeday field training exercise reinforced training given during BCT. Valuesbased training would not end when soldiers graduated from BCT, but would

continue into AIT to reinforce the type of instruction being given in basic

training—values, heritage, and tradition–to keep those principles fresh.

Almost from the beginning of the all-volunteer force in 1973 and into the 21st

century there were important developments and much controversy concerning the training of men and women recruits together in basic combat training.

In the absence of a pool of draftees, women enlistees were necessary to meet

manpower requirements. As a result, the numbers and percentages of women

in the enlisted ranks increased dramatically from the late 1970s through the

beginning of the 21st century. That situation and the strong feminist movement, beginning in the late 1960s and strengthening until the early 1980s,

came together to indicate that the Army could no longer resist a program to

integrate the sexes during basic combat training. From 1978 to late in 1981,

Chapter V

Training and Leader Development
men and women were trained together in BCT at the company level (for

example, a company of 3 all-male platoons and 1 all-female platoon.) That

experiment encountered numerous difficulties, especially with physical

training, and was terminated when the Jimmy Carter White House was

replaced by the Reagan administration.

From 1982 until 1994, men and women were trained at separate locations.

The Persian Gulf War of 1990-1991 changed that arrangement when 41,000

women deployed, some serving on the front lines. As a result, the Secretary

of Defense declared that women could fly combat aircraft and serve on

combat ships. Faced with such competition in recruiting, the Army once

again established a “gender-integrated” BCT program. This time the companies were totally integrated. There were fewer problems with the new

program and increasingly more military occupational specialties (MOS) were

opened to women. However, criticism remained and increased dramatically

after allegations of sexual harassment and rape during training at Aberdeen

Proving Ground and other sites in 1996. The program remained but in the

shadow of numerous studies and investigations by the Congress and other

agencies. As TRADOC observed its 30th anniversary, questions concerning

women in combat brought renewed doubts about mixed-gender training.

Leader development had been a concern of the Army for many years. However, TRADOC brought that concern into sharper focus and institutionalized

leader development programs on several levels. Since 1973, a number of

studies had been conducted to investigate the status of leader development in

the Army. In the fall of 1987, General Vuono, Army Chief of Staff, tasked

Maj. Gen. Gordon R. Sullivan to conduct a formal study of leader development in the Army and to develop a leader development action plan to provide

specific recommendations as to the changes needed in the Army leader

development process. The action plan, submitted in April 1988, envisioned a

program that rested on three doctrinal “pillars”—institutional training;

operational assignments; and self-development.

Another major initiative of the 1990s was the Future Army Schools Twentyone (FAST) effort. It was the mission of a FAST Task Force to “establish an

effective and efficient Total Army School System of fully accredited and

integrated AC/ARNG/USAR schools that would provide standard individual

training and education for the Total Army.” One of the Task Force’s recommendations was the establishment of TRADOC as sole accrediting authority

for the schools, effective January 1993. The major thrust of FAST was the

establishment of a regionally-based reserve component school system under

the auspices of TRADOC headquarters.

Chapter V

Training and Leader Development
Looking to the Army of the 21st century, TRADOC trainers considered their

challenge to be maintaining the essence of the Army’s education and training

system and the utilization of the best combinations of live, virtual, and

constructive simulations and simulators. That strategy was designed to unite

the many ongoing training efforts into a clear, coherent vision to produce

trained and ready units into the next century. To achieve the Army’s objectives in Force XXI to transform the force from an Industrial Age Army into a

knowledge and capabilities based power projection Army, TRADOC had

concurrently to develop the means and methods to train and sustain the force.

To support efforts to have Force XXI reach

its maximum potential and to ensure that

training was included in every phase of

Force XXI development, the TRADOC

training community developed Army

Training XXI (AT XXI). TRADOC’s AT

XXI concept incorporated strategic plans

for unit training and an integrated plan for

the training of battle staff and collective

tasks.

In late 1999, the AT XXI concepts began to

transition into the body of initiatives known

as Transformation. While the new effort

built on many of the ongoing AT XXI

concepts and projects, some Transformation

training initiatives were new. TRADOC

developed both Senior and Tactical Leadership Courses to address the transition from

a Cold War focus to a full-spectrum focus

for the new IBCT at Fort Lewis. The Senior Course, held at Forts Lee,

Huachuca, Knox, Benning, and Leavenworth, for key leaders was built on an

“adaptive thinking methodology” and included a constructive simulation

exercise. The Tactical Leaders Course at Fort Lewis featured training

executed relative to the IBCT Organization and Operational concept and was

based on the unique differences of how the IBCT would fight.

As TRADOC observed its 30th anniversary, the command’s training community remained dedicated to the development of “competent soldiers, capable

leaders, and relevant products” and to the shaping of “future Army training in

units and institutions utilizing information based technology to support the

objective force.”

Chapter V

Training and Leader Development

An Interim Brigade Combat Team

(IBCT, later renamed Stryker BCT, or

SBCT) trains at Fort Lewis. The IBCT

provided the “test bed” for many of the

Transformation initiatives and would

form a bridge from the legacy force to

the objective force.
CHAPTER VI

TRADOC IN THE JOINT SERVICE ARENA

TRADOC participated in the

joint service arena from its

beginnings, part of a long history

of cooperation in wartime

operations and peacetime planning among U.S. ground, air, and

sea services. TRADOC’s joint

service work with Air Force

agencies was a continuation of

efforts begun shortly after World

War II. TRADOC, with its

training, doctrinal, and combat

developments missions, was the

successor to Continental Army Command and worked closely with Headquarters Tactical Air Command (TAC) at Langley Air Force Base until the

latter was disestablished in 1992. TRADOC continued its joint work with

Headquarters Air Combat Command, responsible for all Air Force combat

forces, both tactical and strategic. Beginning in 1973 and developing steadily

through the 1970s, cooperation widened in the 1980s to yield important

procedural and doctrinal results. The command’s cooperative work with the

U.S. Marine Corps Combat Development Command, begun in the early

1980s, found points of common interest and agreement. In the post-Desert

Storm period, cooperative ventures began with U.S. Navy agencies.

Work with TAC began soon after TRADOC’s establishment. General

Creighton Abrams, Jr., Chief of Staff of the Army (October 1972-September

1974), and his Air Force counterpart General George S. Brown (August

1973-July 1974) especially promoted cooperation between the Air Force and

the Army. Cooperation grew out of the increased interservice cooperation at

the operational level during the Vietnam War. Post-Vietnam force reductions

and the need to concentrate on war fighting in central Europe also played a

role. General DePuy, at Abrams’ request, worked to further Air Force-Army

dialogue at his own level. A concomitant TAC initiative helped set up the

first meeting of the “TAC-TRADOC dialogue” between DePuy and TAC

Chapter Vl

TRADOC

in the Joint Service Area

Positioning of

weapons,

equipment and

personnel has

long been an

important

function for all

the services.

Here the Army is

loading a navy

Military Sealift

Command ship.
commander General Robert

J. Dixon in October 1973.

Early discussions involving

joint working groups

centered on airspace management, reconnaissance

and surveillance, and

electronic warfare. The

early focus was on procedures to improve joint

combat capabilities and

implement existing doctrine,

rather than creating new

doctrine. The 1973 Mideast War encouraged greater cooperation because of

increased lethality in the air as well as on the ground. In July 1975,

TRADOC and TAC established an Air-Land Forces Application Agency

(ALFA) dedicated to managing the working groups and mutual projects. In

November 1976, a TAC-TRADOC working group produced a joint manual

on airspace management, which provided guidance to permit development of

appropriate air control procedures on battlefields that promised to be more

lethal and complex in the future.

ALFA work was also incorporated

into the NATO doctrine of battlefield

air interdiction. TAC-TRADOC work

resulted in a November 1984 agreement on joint procedures for offensive air support. Joint suppression of

enemy air defenses (J-SEAD) was

another significant project in cooperation with U.S. Readiness Command; a joint concept was published

in April 1981. In December 1982,

the three headquarters published the

Joint Attack of the Second Echelon,

or J-SAK, which delineated attack procedures by level of command for the

identification and attack of the enemy follow-on echelons. The project lay at

the heart of TAC contributions to the deep attack aspect of the Army’s

AirLand Battle doctrine published in August 1982. TAC-TRADOC projects

expanded in the late 1970s to joint tactical training projects, tests, and

Chapter Vl

TRADOC in the Joint Service Area

As both the Air Force and the Army embarked on ambitious

new weapons development efforts in the 1970s and 1980s,

joint concepts became increasingly important. Here new F15s sit on the airstrip at nearby Langley AFB in 1977.

TRADOC’s participation in joint Army/Air

Force initiatives such as the ALFA, ACRA,

and CLIC was, in part, because of the

proximity of Langley Air Force Base, seen

here in a 1985 aerial photo.
evaluations and led logically to joint doctrine endeavors invaluable to the

development of Army doctrine.

Joint agreements did not have the authority of doctrine. Close air support

issues were complex and other Air Force missions competed with the Army

for air resources. In addition, theater needs and concerns were paramount in

any resource decision and could overrule the agreements. Nonetheless, the

requirement for ever closer joint cooperation was clear. Operation Urgent

Fury, the 1982 joint action by which U.S. forces reversed a communist

takeover in the Caribbean island-nation of Grenada, dramatized the inadequacy of U.S interservice communication links.

In April 1983, General Charles A. Gabriel, the Air Force chief, and General

Edward C. Meyer, Chief of Staff of the Army, signed a memorandum of

understanding in which both services agreed to engage in joint training and

exercises based on AirLand Battle doctrine and to continue other interservice

efforts. Subsequently this led to inauguration of a major force development

process by General Gabriel and General John A. Wickham, Jr., Meyer’s

successor. That program, “The 31 Initiatives,” was heralded as a means to

design and field the best affordable AirLand combat force.

The 31 Initiatives program, which

addressed seven basic areas of AirLand

combat, included a number of joint

projects already under way. Extending

to 1988, the program furnished a highlevel forum and focus for the solution of

difficult bi-service issues. An initiative

on intratheater airlift led to the establishment in 1984 of the Airlift Concepts

and Requirements Agency (ACRA) at

Scott Air Force Base, IL. In January

1986, the two services established the Army - Air Force Center for Low

Intensity Conflict, or CLIC, at Langley AFB, VA.

Numbered initiatives included the air defense of U.S. forces; rear area

operations and closer integration of rear area defenders; and joint suppression of enemy air defenses. Several initiatives dealt with special operations

forces and search and rescue. Other groups of initiatives addressed joint

munitions development; combat techniques and procedures for the combined

arms battlefield, including battlefield air interdiction, joint target assessment,

close air support, and the link between air liaison officers and forward air

Chapter Vl

TRADOC in the Joint Service Area

Airlift considerations formed a large part of

joint USAF/US Army joint doctrine efforts.

Here An Air Force C-5 unloads the Army’s

Apache attack helicopter.
controllers. A final group of original initiatives focused on the acquisition of

aircraft to meet joint targeting and reconnaissance needs. Among these was

the Joint Surveillance and Target Acquisition Radar System (J-STARS), that

figured significantly in the Gulf War. Other initiatives were subsequently

added, notably including agreement reaffirming Army primacy for rotarywing combat support and Air Force for fixed-wing support.

An important program element was uniformed service-chief agreement to a

combined budgetary submission package for priority programs and establishment of a Joint Assessments and Initiatives Office to institutionalize the joint

force development process. In June 1986, U.S. Navy representation was

added to that office. Ultimately numbering thirty-eight in all, the initiatives

were substantially completed by 1987.

TRADOC’s work in joint doctrine proceeded along two tracks. The first was

multiservice doctrinal literature published as field manuals together with one

or more of the other services. The second was publication of multiservice

doctrine. The Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986

assigned to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the responsibility to

develop doctrine for joint employment of the armed forces. The newly

established Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate (J7), was

responsible to the chairman of the JCS for the management of the joint

doctrine development process. Along with the regional commanders-in-chief

and the services, the J7 developed a Joint Doctrine Master Plan. TRADOC

was a key player in the Army’s contribution to the whole JCS development

effort.

In 1988, the JCS issued the Joint Publication System, Joint Doctrine and

Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures Development Program, JCS Pub

1-01. This master regulation specified publications in the major categories of

reference, intelligence, operations, logistics, plans, and command, control,

and communications (C3) systems. Each had a capstone manual which

brought all joint doctrine approved by the four services together.

TRADOC reviewed JP 1, Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces, for the

Army and it was published in November 1990 to aid the ongoing operations

in the Persian Gulf. This significant manual proceeded from the belief that

warfare in the modern era was, in fact, joint warfare. The manual provided

the basis for the future joint strategic view in discussions of American

military power. For the warfighting level, TRADOC completed JCS Pub 3-0,

Doctrine for Unified and Joint Operations, a capstone operational manual

which was issued by the Joint Staff in 1990.

Chapter Vl

TRADOC in the Joint Service Area
Cooperative work by TAC and TRADOC during 1989-1990 produced a

White Paper, titled Air Attack on the Modern Battlefield. Approved by the

two uniformed service chiefs, the paper led to a five-part Air Attack Action

Plan, which the Army and Air Force Chiefs of Staff signed to synchronize

joint air attack combat planning and procedures. This led to a modernized Air

Force tactical air control system - Army air ground system, or TACS-AAGS

which was tested and validated in exercises during 1990.

 In 1984 TRADOC prosecuted important joint work through ACRA covering

multiservice employment of the C-17 aircraft and its related activities which

were subjects of cooperative doctrinal and procedural effort between

TRADOC, the Military Airlift Command, and the Marine Corps Combat

Development Command.

By the late 1990s, doctrine was increasingly joint and Army doctrine manuals reflected that reality. Force projection from the continental United States,

which constituted the prime deployment trend of the post-Cold War, was

innately joint. Such operations were indeed the purview of the regional

commanders-in-chiefs (CINC) of joint forces.

Low intensity conflict (LIC) was a category

of engagement short of all out war and

consisted of diverse and unconventional

military operations. The 1993 edition of FM

100-5, Operations, characterized LIC as

Operations Other Than War (OOTW). For

most of the 1970s and 1980s, low intensity

conflict defined the whole realm of operations below high- and mid-intensity conflict.

It received considerable attention by

TRADOC doctrinal developers from the

early 1980s on, as defense policy turned

increasingly to that sector of military operations. Increasingly through the decade, low

intensity conflict, or LIC, emerged as a

major concern. In July 1985, TRADOC

joined the Air Force and other agencies in

the major Joint Low Intensity Conflict Study

that was released in 1986. It summarized

previous efforts and became a springboard for subsequent Army and joint

doctrinal formulation and further work. The study revealed the definition of

LIC was too broad to accurately quantify the problem.

Chapter Vl

TRADOC in the Joint Service Area

Casualty evacuation often demanded

the efforts of more than one service.

Here an Air Force C-17 cargo plane

unloads an Army ambulance
Planners recognized the major categories of insurgency-counterinsurgency,

combating terrorism, peacekeeping operations, and peacetime contingency

operations, as well as a host of subcategories, such as counterdrug efforts and

disaster relief. The crucial question was when the use of force was appropriate and under what circumstances. In 1986, the Office of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff promulgated an official definition of LIC, recognizing its diversity in

general terms. But general definitions were only useful in a limited way for

the formulation of such multifaceted doctrine. A bi-service LIC manual,

Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, FM 100-20/AF Pam 3-20, was

published in December 1990. The manual opened the way for effort on the

JCS equivalent, JCS Pub 3-07, Doctrine for Joint Operations in LIC, shortly

to be retitled Military Operations Short of War.

Army oversight of CLIC resided with Headquarters TRADOC until 1990

when it was transferred to the Department of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff

for Operations and Plans. TRADOC retained, however, a close relationship

with CLIC for assistance in LIC concepts, doctrine, and training matters. In

1996 CLIC was inactivated and its missions dispersed.

Air Force and Army planners believed that low intensity conflict had been a

predominant form of engagement for U.S. forces since World War II and that

the trend was likely to continue. The LIC doctrine of 1990 spelled out critical

differences between low intensity conflict and other conventional operations

in such activities as foreign assistance. The doctrine also provided an analysis of insurgencies.

In the ambiguous environment of low intensity conflict, the contribution of

military force to settling the strategic aim was supportive and indirect.

Political, economic, and psychological objectives shaped the way such

operations were executed. What was important was understanding that

military force had to be closely coordinated with other responses. One of the

most perplexing issues was joint counterdrug operations. Doctrine, procedures, and training to assist the interdiction of the illegal drug flow into the

United States were some of the many challenges and projects in which

TRADOC, the joint agencies, and subordinate elements of the command

were active.

The Mobility and Concepts Agency, or MCA, located at Fort Monroe since

1994, drew together doctrine and other developments for airlift and joint

mobility for all the services including a C-17 multiservice employment

concept, a study of early-entry deployability, and a study of joint theater

airlift capabilities. Other studies of the period dealt with mobile offshore

Chapter Vl

TRADOC in the Joint Service Area
basing and the deployment sequence of joint reception, staging, onward

movement and integration.

The Commander-in-Chiefs Support Program, dating from August 1991, was

a tool by which TRADOC-led teams visited annually the headquarters of the

regional CINCs to determine their key and pressing developmental demands.

The program responded comprehensively to the commander-in-chief in all

military development areas. In January 1996, the CINC, U.S. Central Command requested that TRADOC shift the program’s emphasis from specifically Army areas of interest to one more joint in nature. Other unified

headquarters concurred. Consequently TRADOC restructured the program,

redesignating it the CINC Joint Warfighting Support Program. On 1 October

1996, the program was transferred to the Joint Warfighting Center at Fort

Monroe.

In October 1999, Atlantic Command, which had been established in 1993 as

a regional command with joint authority, was re-designated United States

Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM). In addition to its other responsibilities,

JFCOM was given the mission of joint training and transformation as

outlined in the Department of Defense’s Unified Command Plan. As the

Army’s trainer, TRADOC coordinated closely with JFCOM. In 1999,

JFCOM absorbed the Joint Warfighting Center into its Joint Training Center

at Suffolk, VA. In 2002 TRADOC participated in Millennium Challenge, the

U.S. military’s largest joint peacetime exercise to date, which was controlled

by JFCOM. TRADOC had the Army lead for Millennium Challenge 02 and

coordinated with JFCOM to provide management oversight for the overall

Chapter Vl

TRADOC in the Joint Service Area

Soldiers prepare for ATEx02, Army Transformation Experiment, part of the Army’s participation

in Millennium Challenge 2002. MC02 was the largest joint peacetime exercise ever held.
experiment and achieve both joint and Army objectives. TRADOC was also

the lead for Army Transformation Experiment 02 in which the Stryker

armored vehicle was tested at the National Training Center.

The emphasis on joint operations called for a substantial revision of U.S.

Army doctrine in the form of FM 100-5 Operations. In a clear break with the

past, the Army manual numbering system was dropped and the joint numbering system was adopted so that the new manual became FM 3.0. The new

manual recognized the changes in the nation’s geo-strategic position since

the end of the Cold War. It clearly addressed the problems of deployment and

asymmetric warfare as well as the need for joint cooperation in nearly every

aspect of operations, from major theaters of war to humanitarian relief.

As TRADOC commemorated its 30th year, the new commander, General

Kevin Byrnes, announced that he was establishing a special relationship with

the Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) because “the Army is built to support a

joint forces commander.” TRADOC, he believed, should operate as the

Army’s component command with JFCOM. In addition, JFCOM would be a

co-sponsor of the Annual Transformation Wargame to be held at the Army

War College in April 2003. That wargame would be followed by JFCOM’s

wargame Pinnacle Impact, scheduled for later in the month. Byrnes emphasized that TRADOC had to increase the command’s insistence on joint

exercises in the future.

Chapter Vl

TRADOC in the Joint Service Area
CHAPTER VII

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

As a major Army command, TRADOC commanded subordinate elements at

installations throughout the continental United States. For most of its first

thirty years, TRADOC also commanded most of the installations where its

components were located, specifically those whose major mission elements

had a training and doctrinal focus. The headquarters span of control reached

out to a considerable variety of subordinate commands, many with complex

command and support relationships. In 1973, TRADOC headquarters commanded, separately, its own installations, certain TRADOC tenants on those

installations, and TRADOC tenants on non-TRADOC installations. In the

year of its origin, TRADOC directly commanded 20 major installations,

exercising its command through the commanders of the centers resident on

18 of the installations and through the post commanders of 2 installations

that were not centers of one kind or another, Fort Monroe, and Carlisle

Barracks, Pa. By the summer of 2003, with installation command having

passed to the Installation Management Activity (see below), TRADOC

consisted of the headquarters, three major subordinate commands, 18 branch

schools, 8 military schools and colleges, 4 specialist schools, and a variety of

special activities. Support agreements (intra-Army, interservice, interagency)

together with memoranda of understanding internal and external to

TRADOC, helped smooth the complex administrative, logistical, and funding

relationships.

Initial Subordinate Organization

Initially organized on the STEADFAST principles of centralized management and decentralized operations, TRADOC executed its individual training

mission through its Army training centers, service schools, ROTC regions

and subordinate detachments, and through U.S. Army Reserve schools,

training divisions, and brigades under its operational control. The STEADFAST Reorganization had divided and assigned the parts of the Army field

establishment in the United States not by geography but by function. In

1973, TRADOC also monitored individual training in Army-operated Department of Defense schools, the Army War College, logistics-related schools

operated by the Army Materiel Command, and other non-TRADOC schools

Chapter Vll

Organizational

Structure
and training centers. The headquarters accomplished its combat developments mission in 1973 through three mid-level functional centers, later

designated integrating centers, as well as through the service schools and

other combat developments activities.

The 18 installations with centers were actually of three different types. Three

functional centers — the Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, the

Administration Center and Fort Benjamin Harrison, and the Logistics Center

at Fort Lee — drew together the training and combat developments tasks in

their respective functional areas of combat and combat support, personnel

administration, and logistics or combat service support. Two of the three

functional center headquarters oversaw separate school and combat developments activities. The Combined Arms Center commanded the Command and

General Staff College, the Combined Arms Combat Developments Activity,

and the installation garrison. The Administration Center commanded the

Institute of Administration, the Personnel and Administration Combat

Developments Activity, and the garrison. The third functional center, the

Logistics Center, was initially a combat developments-oriented organization,

operating as a tenant on Fort Lee.

Ten more of the initial 18 center-type installations of TRADOC were Army

branch or specialist school centers: the Engineer Center and Fort Belvoir, the

Infantry Center and Fort Benning, the Air Defense Center and Fort Bliss, the

Transportation Center and Fort Eustis, the Signal Center and Fort Gordon,

the Armor Center and Fort Knox, the Quartermaster Center and Fort Lee, the

Aviation Center and Fort Rucker, the Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill, and

the Primary Helicopter Center/School and Fort Wolters.

The six remaining TRADOC center installations were training centers

devoted primarily to basic combat and advanced individual training or, at

Fort McClellan, to Women’s Army Corps basic training. These were the

Training Center and Fort Dix; the Training Center and Fort Jackson; the

Chapter Vll

Organizational Structure

The Combined Arms Center (CAC)at Fort

Leavenworth served over time as a

“functional” center, an integrating center,

and a subcommand. One of the

Transformation priorities of the TRADOC

commander in 2003 was to move some

headquarters functions to CAC.
Training Center and Fort Ord; the Training Center, Engineer and Fort

Leonard Wood; the School/Training Center and Fort McClellan; and the

Training Center, Infantry and Fort

Polk. The commander of the Armor

Center and Fort Knox also administered basic combat training.

In 1973, TRADOC had 16 Army

branch schools. Eight schools — the

Air Defense, Armor, Engineer, Field

Artillery, Infantry, Quartermaster,

Southeast Signal, and Transportation

Schools — were components of their

respective branch centers, at which

they were located. Three other branch

schools were situated on TRADOC installations. The Institute of Administration was subordinate to the Administration Center and Fort Benjamin

Harrison and commanded the resident Army Finance School and Army

Adjutant General School. The Women’s Army Corps Center and School was

subordinate to the School/Training Center and Fort McClellan. And the

Military Police School was subordinate to the Signal Center and Fort Gordon. The five remaining TRADOC branch schools were tenants on nonTRADOC posts — the Chaplain Center and School at Fort Hamilton, N.Y.;

the Intelligence Center and School at Fort Huachuca, Ariz.; the Missile and

Munitions Center and School at Redstone Arsenal, Ala.; the Ordnance Center

and School at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md.; and the Signal School at Fort

Monmouth, NJ.

Besides the 16 branch schools, TRADOC commanded, in 1973, four schools

then designated as specialist — the Aviation School, part of the Aviation

Center and Fort Rucker; the Primary Helicopter School and Fort Wolters; the

U.S. Army Element, School of Music, Norfolk, Va.; and the U.S. Army

Institute for Military Assistance at Fort Bragg, N.C. TRADOC also commanded, through the installations involved, the Command and General Staff

College at Fort Leavenworth and the U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy at

Fort Bliss. Department of Defense schools operated by TRADOC were the

Defense Information School at Fort Benjamin Harrison, and the Defense

Language Institute at the Presidio of Monterey, CA. Initially, TRADOC

administered the Army Reserve Officers’ Training Corps, or ROTC, program

through four ROTC Regions established under the STEADFAST Reorganization.

Chapter Vll

Organizational Structure

As with a number of TRADOC Scbools, the

Field Artillery School at Fort Sill was a

component of the branch center at which it was

located.
Headquarters Organization and Reorganizations

Command of TRADOC resided with the commanding general, assisted at his

headquarters at Fort Monroe initially by a single deputy commander also

resident, a chief of staff, and general and special staff. The general staff

consisted of seven deputy chiefs of staff who managed the major elements of

the headquarters and exercised staff responsibility for the commanding

general to the installations, centers, schools, and other subordinate elements.

The seven deputy chiefs of staff (DCS) established in Headquarters

TRADOC in 1973 were responsible for Training and Schools, ROTC,

Combat Developments, Resource Management, Personnel, Logistics, and

Operations and Intelligence. In January 1974 the last named general staff

agency was restructured as DCS for Operations, Readiness, and Intelligence.

In 1974, “schools” was dropped from the title but not from the purview of the

DCS for Training.

TRADOC headquarters saw three significant reorganizations during its first

thirty years, exclusive of individual functional adjustments. The major staff

reorganizations occurred in 1979, 1990, and 2002-03.

The 1979 TRADOC headquarters reorganization, implemented provisionally

in April and formally on 1 October that year, was prompted by the decision of

the TRADOC commander, General Starry to shift resources to the main

mission components, the deputies for training, combat developments, and

ROTC. Another impelling cause was General Starry’s decision to involve

TRADOC more emphatically in doctrine development. The new structure

retained Deputy Chiefs of Staff (DCS) for Training, Combat Developments,

ROTC, and Resource Management. It disestablished DCS for Personnel;

Logistics; and Operations, Readiness, and Intelligence. The 1979 action

established new DCS for Doctrine, Personnel and Logistics, and Engineer.

In 1990, the headquarters carried out a major staff reorganization in line with

general downsizing and consolidation principles following from the reduction trends of the era. A principal change was merger of the offices of the

Chapter Vll

Organizational Structure

During the 1990’s the Deputy Chief of Staff

for Base Operations operated from Building 5.

Located within the walls of Fort Monroe, this

structure was built in 1879 as a barracks for

soldiers assigned to coast artillery units.
Deputy Chiefs of Staff for Personnel, Administration, and Logistics; Contracting; and Engineer, together with Surgeon, Chaplain, and other selected

staff offices, into a DCS for Base Operations Support. A second principal

merger brought the DCS for Doctrine, Intelligence, and Combat Developments together into a DCS for Concepts, Doctrine, and Developments, with

transfer of some functions to Headquarters Combined Arms Center. A third

major change was establishment of the TRAC commander situated at Fort

Leavenworth as DCS for Analysis on the headquarters staff, albeit with a

local staff representative. The 1990 reorganization left the offices of the DCS

for Information Management, Resource Management, and Training substantially unchanged; the office of the DCS for Training had undergone internal

realignments during 1989.

The 1990 recombination of the doctrine office with combat developments did

not prove long lasting. Actually most of the former doctrine directorates had

remained intact in the larger organization. On 1 October 1992, the office of

the DCS for Doctrine was again made separate. The short-lived DCS for

Concepts, Doctrine, and Developments was again designated the DCS for

Combat Developments.

The effort to transform TRADOC in line with changes to the entire Army

began to bear fruit in 2002 (see “TRADOC Organization in 2003,” below).

Although the command did not anticipate that all of the changes would be

complete until 2006, after Congress initiated a new round of Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) actions, TRADOC’s leaders anticipated that the

command would look significantly different by the end of 2003.

Installations and Changes, 1973-2003

TRADOC commanded twenty major installations on the day it was established. The command lost one installation with the inactivation of Fort

Wolters in June 1974, when its basic tenant, the U.S. Army Primary Helicopter School, was discontinued, eliminating one of TRADOC’s specialist

schools. Two more TRADOC installations were transferred the following

year. In keeping with the Army’s mid-1970s goal to rebuild to a 16-division

Active Army force, the Department of the Army took steps to activate

divisions at Forts Ord and Polk. That move changed the primary mission of

those installations from individual training to unit stationing. Departmental

orders transferred both posts to the Forces Command on 1 July 1975, though

initial entry training continued at both posts through 1976. Thereafter until

the late 1980s, TRADOC commanded 17 major installations.

Chapter Vll

Organizational Structure
Consolidations in the late 1980s resulted in the loss of two TRADOC posts

and the gain of one. All engineer training was consolidated at Fort Leonard

Wood, Mo. on 1 June 1988, when the U.S. Army Engineer Center and

School was relocated there from Fort Belvoir, Va. On 2 October 1988, the

Missouri post was redesignated the U.S. Army Engineer Center and Fort

Leonard Wood. Late in the period, plans to move and consolidate

TRADOC’s Intelligence School, Fort Devens, Mass. with the Intelligence

Center at Fort Huachuca, Ariz. by 1994 led to transfer to TRADOC of Fort

Huachuca from the U.S. Army Information Systems Command on 1 October

1990. As diminishing Cold War pressures prompted overall Army reductions

beginning in the late 1980s, consolidation planning resulted in the phase-out

of training at Fort Dix, N.J. in 1992. On 1 October 1992, command of that

TRADOC installation passed to the Forces Command, reducing TRADOC

posts to sixteen.

TRADOC also continued to follow through on the recommendations of three

commissions to close military installations around the country and to consolidate functions at remaining facilities. Chief among these Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) actions were the closure of Fort Ord, CA and

transfer of base operations support to the Presidio of Monterey; the transfer

of the Soldier Support Center (SSC) from Fort Benjamin Harrison, IN to

Fort Jackson, SC; and relocation of the Chaplin Center and School from Fort

Monmouth, NJ to Fort Jackson. Fort McClellan, Alabama, was closed in

1999, necessitating the move of the Military Police and Chemical Schools to

Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, and the WAC Museum (redesignated the

Army Women’s Museum) to Fort Lee, Virginia. . The US Army Engineer,

Chemical, and Military Police Schools became major mission elements of

the new U.S. Army Maneuver Support Center (MANSCEN) in 1999. The

Commanding General (CG), MANSCEN is dual-hatted as the Commandant,

U.S. Army Engineer School. As such, all primary MANSCEN organizations

reported directly to him within his role as CG.

On October 1, 2003, nominal garrison command of all Army installations

passed to the Installation Management Activity, a new major Army command

reporting to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management. Nevertheless, TRADOC commanders on formerly TRADOC installations remained centrally involved in installation management, particularly as it

related to support for TRADOC organizations and activities. Many of the

details of installation management had yet to be sorted out as TRADOC

approached its thirtieth anniversary.

Chapter Vll

Organizational Structure
Intermediate Level Changes, 1973-2003

In September 1977, TRADOC’s intermediate-level structure was strengthened to give the three functional centers a stronger integrating role vis-a-vis

their associated TRADOC schools. The three-star TRADOC deputy commanding general position moved from Fort Monroe to Fort Leavenworth, and

was dual-hatted upon the Combined Arms Center commander. Beyond his

local command duties, the deputy commander was to execute specific

TRADOC missions. He was to direct, coordinate, and integrate combined

arms doctrine, organization, and combat and training development programs

for the Army.

In 1980, TRADOC reorganized and redesignated the Fort Benjamin Harrison

agency as the U.S. Army Soldier Support Center with much stronger doctrinal and training responsibilities in the personnel, administration, finance, and

automatic data processing areas. The action also included replacement of the

center’s Institute of Administration by a newly renamed U.S. Army Institute

of Personnel and Resource Management. Under the new institute were

aligned two branch schools, the Finance and Adjutant General Schools, along

with two new specialist-type schools, the Computer Science School and the

Personnel Management School. The institute was subsequently redesignated,

in 1984, the Soldier Support Institute.

In April 1983, the Logistics Center commander at Fort Lee was redesignated

the TRADOC Deputy Commanding General for Logistics, with the upgrading of the position to a three-star billet. The Logistics Center remained in

tenant status on the installation, which was commanded by one of its subordinate organizations, the U.S. Army Quartermaster Center and Fort Lee. That

anomaly was rectified on 3 January 1989 when the TRADOC commander

brought the Fort Lee structure in line with that existing at Fort Leavenworth

and Fort Benjamin Harrison by establishing the U.S. Army Logistics Center

and Fort Lee, with the U.S. Army Quartermaster Center and School becoming the tenant.

The integrating center structure remained in place up to the period of Army

drawdown and consolidation in the waning Cold War. On 1 October 1990,

TRADOC replaced the integrating-center structure with two major subordinate commands. The Combined Arms Command (CAC) took the place of the

Combined Arms Center, with internal reductions and realignments recasting

the commanders of the Combined Arms Combat Developments Activity and

the Combined Arms Training Activity at that center as deputy CAC commanders for combat developments and for training. The second major action

Chapter Vll

Organizational Structure
merged the Soldier Support Center with the Logistics Center as the Combined Arms Support Command (CASCOM) headquartered at Fort Lee. At

that time, the Soldier Support Center’s Soldier Support Institute was eliminated as an administrative organization layered between the center and the

resident schools.

In 1993, as a result of budget reductions and a changed world situation,

TRADOC launched a “reengineering” initiative intended to meet these

challenges. Part of the reengineering effort involved TRADOC headquarters

assuming the integration function traditionally held by the Combined Arms

Command (CAC) and the Combined Arms Support Command (CASCOM).

That action necessitated several organizational and functional changes in

both CAC and CASCOM, most of which were completed by the end of 1994.

The reorganization shifted some functions and personnel from Fort

Leavenworth to other TRADOC installations. In addition, CAC’s combat

development, doctrinal concepts, and integration functions moved to

TRADOC headquarters. The CASCOM reorganization included the centralization of combat developments, training developments, proponency and

evaluation and standardization at Headquarters CASCOM.

Schools

Under the STEADFAST reorganization, and including branch and specialist

schools, TRADOC commanded 24 schools. As previously noted, the Primary Helicopter School at Fort Wolters, Tex. was discontinued on 30 June

1974. TRADOC had inherited two signal schools from CONARC, the Signal

School at Fort Monmouth, N.J., and the Southeastern Signal School at Fort

Gordon, Ga. On 1 July 1974 those schools were redesignated, the Monmouth

organization becoming the Communications-Electronics School, and the

Gordon organization redesignated the Signal School, a step in the consolidation of all signal training at the southern post. That occurred two years later

when, on 31 October 1976, the Communications-Electronics School was

discontinued. The Chaplain School, located at Fort Hamilton, moved to

larger facilities at Fort Wadsworth, N.Y., a subpost under the jurisdiction of

Chapter Vll

Organizational Structure

TRADOC’s Chaplain’s School had been located at

a number of sites. Starting at Fort Hamilton, NY,

the school moved to Fort Wadsworth, NY, in 1974,

to Fort Monmouth, NJ, in 1979, and finally, in

1995 to Fort Jackson, SC.
Fort Dix, on 15 August 1974, where it was situated until Army planning to

close that station prompted its relocation to Fort Monmouth, N.J. on 1

August 1979. The Military Police School, initially at Fort Gordon, was

relocated to Fort McClellan, Ala. on 1 July 1975, a move necessitated by the

pending consolidation of signal training at Fort Gordon noted earlier.

A new school, established on 1 July 1975 at Fort Ord, Calif., to inculcate and

teach organizational skills, was the Organizational Effectiveness Training

Center. That school was redesignated the Organizational Effectiveness

Center and School on 2 April 1979. After ten years in existence, the school

was closed on 1 October 1985. On 1 October 1976, Department of the Army

planning was executed for transfer of the U.S. Army Security Agency

Training Center and School at Fort Devens, Mass. into the TRADOC school

system. The new TRADOC school was titled the Intelligence School, Fort

Devens, subordinate to the commandant of the Intelligence Center and

School at Fort Huachuca.

Of historic moment was the discontinuance of the Women’s Army Corps

Center and School at Fort McClellan.

That event, carried out in 1978, was a

step in the Army’s move toward

integrating the training and schooling

of women soldiers into the standard

system. The first post-Vietnam move

in the direction of a larger chemical

training program occurred with the

redesignation on 30 November 1976 of the Ordnance Center and School at

Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md. as the Ordnance and Chemical Center and

School. As plans unfolded, the Chemical School was moved and established

as a separate school at Fort McClellan on 14 September 1979.

 Changes continued in the 1980s. The Aviation School, historically a specialist school, became a branch school following designation of Army aviation as

a branch by the Secretary of the Army on 12 April 1983. Concomitant

expansion of the aviation logistics mission prompted TRADOC to establish

an Aviation Logistics School, co-located with the Transportation School, at

Fort Eustis on 1 October 1983. Shortly thereafter, on 10 January 1984, those

two schools were merged as the Transportation and Aviation Logistics

Schools. That arrangement continued until 1988 when, on 1 October of that

year, TRADOC brought the Aviation Logistics School under the direct

authority of the Commander, U.S. Army Aviation Center, while leaving it in

Chapter Vll

Organizational Structure

After the Women’s

Army Corp School

at Fort McClellan

closed in 1977, male

and female soldiers

began to train

together in noncombat Advanced

Individual Training.
place at Fort Eustis. A similar realignment occurred with placement of the

Missile and Munitions Center and School at Redstone Arsenal, Ala. under

the commander of the Ordnance Center and School at Aberdeen Proving

Ground. On 3 August 1984, the Redstone facility was realigned and retitled

the Ordnance Missile and Munitions Center and School.

The Institute for Military Assistance at Fort Bragg, N.C. was, on 1 October

1983, redesignated the JFK Special Warfare Center, as a result of a special

operations forces (SOF) realignment of that year. The JFK Special Warfare

Center was in essence a branch school, but was categorized as a TRADOC

special activity. Further SOF realignments in 1990 transferred the TRADOC

school to the U.S. Army Special Operations Command at Fort Bragg, by

orders of 20 June. TRADOC gained the U.S. Army School of the Americas

(SOA) when provisions of the Panama Canal Treaty of 1977 necessitated the

transfer of that U.S. Army Security Assistance Agency component, located at

Fort Gulick, Panama, to the continental United States. The school was

relocated to Fort Benning and transferred provisionally to TRADOC on 16

December 1985 and formally on 16 April 1986. On 17 January 2001, the

SOA was inactivated and became the Western Hemisphere Institute for

Security Cooperation aligned directly under the Secretary of Defense with

TRADOC as its executive agent. Movement of the Engineer School from

Fort Belvoir to Fort Leonard Wood on 1 June 1988, coincident with consolidation of engineer training, has been noted. In 1988, following earlier

designation of the Signal Center as proponent for the information mission

area, the Computer Science School, a component of the Soldier Support

Institute at Fort Benjamin Harrison, was transferred to Fort Gordon.

TRADOC acquired an additional college when, following Department of the

Army decisions to develop advanced training for Army civilians, the Army

Management Staff College opened initial courses in July 1986 in Baltimore,

Md. TRADOC assumed proponency for the college, and in August 1987 the

Under Secretary of the Army selected Fort Belvoir as the school site. Following assignment of a full-time commandant, classes were convened at the

new site in 1990. A second college institution acquired—from the Army

Materiel Command—on 1 October 1991, was the Army Logistics Management College at Fort Lee. In July 2002, the two schools subordinate to the

Ordnance Center and Schools one at Redstone Arsenal, AL and the other at

Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD were renamed, respectively, the Ordnance

Munitions and Electronics School and the Ordnance Mechanical Maintenance School.

Chapter Vll

Organizational Structure
Training Organizations

TRADOC organizations dedicated to initial entry training and to training

support to the troop commands saw considerable evolution. Throughout most

of the period, a large portion of basic combat and advanced individual

training was conducted by the Army training centers, or ATC, at the 3

installations devoted specifically to that mission, Forts Dix, Jackson, and

Leonard Wood. But initial entry training was also conducted at ATC at some

school installations, including WAC training at Fort McClellan, and male

soldier training at Forts Knox, Benning, Gordon, Sill, and Bliss. Through its

installations, TRADOC commanded 7 ATC in 1973, a number that rose to 11

in 1976 when one station unit training was phased in at several posts. One

station training enabled trainees to pass directly from basic to branch-related

advanced individual training, saving both time and travel. Transfer of Forts

Ord and Polk to the Forces Command in July 1975 led to phase-out of the

ATC there by the end of 1976. The number of ATC dropped to 8 in the early

1980s and was maintained at that level until the closeout of training at Fort

Dix in 1992.

TRADOC also commanded noncommissioned officer academies and drill

sergeant schools through several of its installations, as well as an officer

candidate school at Fort Benning.

The two specialized training agencies under TRADOC jurisdiction in 1973,

the Combat Arms Training Board at Fort Benning and the Training Aids

Management Agency at Fort Eustis, were joined on 1 August 1974 by a new

Training Devices Requirements Office at Fort Benning, responsible for

Army-wide training device requirements. The Fort Eustis agency was

redesignated the Army Training Support Activity on 1 July 1975. The

training support pro-gram at Fort Eustis was expanded and consolidated in a

retitled Army Training Support Center on 1 July 1976.

A Training Management Institute was also established at Fort Eustis, on 16

July 1975, to further training improvements through workshops and special

projects. That institute was redesignated the Training Developments Institute

on 2 May 1977. A further change was the combination of the Logistics

Training Board at Fort Lee and the Combat Arms Training Board at Fort

Benning into a redesignated Army Training Board on 1 October 1977,

situated at Fort Eustis. Both the Training Developments Institute (to be

retitled the Training Technology Agency) and the Army Training Board

eventually moved to Fort Monroe. The former was inactivated in 1988 and

the latter in 1989.

Chapter Vll

Organizational Structure
Test Organizations

There were important early additions to TRADOC’s experiment and test

capability that served the command in prosecution of its combat developments mission into the late 1980s. In August 1974, the major test facility at

Fort Hood known as MASSTER was transferred to TRADOC from

FORSCOM. Also transferred to TRADOC were five test boards of the

Army Materiel Command’s subordinate Test and Evaluation Command. The

test boards gave TRADOC, as the user representative, control over the means

for early-stage conceptual and experimental work in the fields of airborne,

communications, electronics, field artillery, infantry, armor, engineer, and air

defense. These boards were subsequently joined by an aviation Board and an

intelligence and security board. As the testing mission grew, TRADOC

established a headquarters Deputy Chief of Staff for Test and Evaluation

(DCSTE) in December 1980. That position was eliminated in March 1985

and the function returned to the deputy Chief of Staff for Combat Developments.

TRADOC Organization in 2003

As the command celebrated its thirtieth anniversary, TRADOC continued as

a major command, commanded by General Kevin Byrnes, a four-star general

officer. Byrnes’ senior staff included seven deputy commanding generals (

including CAC and CASCOM but not IET) and the command sergeant

major. One of the deputy commanders—the Deputy Commanding General,

TRADOC—was a re-established position. As

noted above, the position had existed from 1981

to 1989, with its incumbent being the Commanding General’s primary assistant in executing the training mission. In 1989 the functions

of the position were transferred to the Office of

the Chief of Staff. In 1995, the position was reestablished as a DCG for Futures. The

TRADOC DCG-Futures’ primary role was to

develop and integrate future concepts and

requirements for doctrine, training, and combat

developments for Army XXI and later for

Transformation, and to operate with joint,

combined, multinational, and interagency

organizations. In the fall of 2002, that position

became the dual-hatted TRADOC DCG/Chief

of Staff.

Chapter Vll

Organizational Structure

General Eric Shinseki with

General John N. Abrams at the

change of command to General

Kevin Byrnes, 7 November 2002.
Late in 2002, the position of Deputy Commanding General-IET created in

1997, became dual-hatted with the Army’s new Accessions Command. The

mission for the DCG-IET was to ensure that initial entry training remained

challenging, safe, relevant, realistic, and executed to Army standards. Originally, he had oversight for IET policies and programs encompassing the

entire process of bringing soldiers into the force from recruitment to the

completion of AIT. With the establishment of Accessions Command the

recruitment function became the responsibility of the new command. Another major change was the establishment of a TRADOC DCG-Transformation at Fort Lewis as commander of the Brigade Coordination Cell of the

Interim Brigade Combat Teams established there as a “test bed” for Transformation initiatives.

The Deputy Commanding General, Combined Arms, physically located at

Fort Leavenworth, Kan., and the DCG, Combat Service Support, located at

Fort Lee, Va., had oversight for near-term and mid-term training in their

respective realms. The Deputy Commanding Generals for the Army National

Guard and for the Army Reserve, both headquartered at Fort Monroe, were

responsible for integrating doctrine, training and combat development

throughout the reserve components.

Also in 2002 the Deputy Chiefs of Staff (DCS) for Doctrine, for Combat

Developments, for Training and for Intelligence received new titles. The

DCSDOC became the Deputy Chief of Staff for Doctrine, Concepts, and

Strategy. Training now fell under the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations

and Training. The DCS for Combat Developments became the DCS for

Developments to bring the title more in line with Transformation efforts.

The Directorate of Information Management came under the purview of the

DCS for Command, Control, Communications and Computers (DCSC4).

Ongoing in 2003 was the establishment of Fort Monroe as a regional headquarters of the Department of the Army Transformation Installation Management program. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Base Operations Support was

Chapter Vll

Organizational Structure

Beginning in 1973, TRADOC administered

the Army Reserve Officers’ Training Corps

(ROTC) with headquarters at Fort Monroe.

In 1986, the ROTC became the U.S. Army

ROTC Cadet Command as a subcommand

under TRADOC. In 2002, the Cadet

Command became part of the new U.S. Army

Accessions Command.
disestablished and replaced by the DCS for Personnel, Infrastructure, and

Logistics. As noted above, TRADOC Transformation continued apace as the

Thirtieth Anniversary Commemoration approached. In addition to the

headquarters organization, by the spring of 2003 TRADOC had 18 branch

schools, 8 military schools and colleges, and 4 specialist schools.

In 2003, TRADOC restated its mission: TRADOC trains the Army’s soldiers

and develops leaders, supports training in units, develops doctrine, establishes the Army’s standards, recruits the force, and builds the future Army.

Thus the central missions of TRADOC—training, doctrine, combat developments—would continue. Meanwhile the command’s internal organization

had changed and would continue to change. The intermediate headquarters

(CAC and CASCOM) would assume a larger role, including their original

function of integration. TRADOC headquarters would serve as a “superintegrator” or umbrella organization. The distribution of missions continued,

but it was clear that some form of consolidation of functions and responsibilities lay in the future.

Chapter Vll

Organizational Structure
CHAPTER VIII

INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITIES

Since its establishment in 1973, TRADOC’S program of international

relations had greatly expanded. Included in the command’s responsibilities

was the coordination of a quadripartite, or ABCA (America, Britain, Canada,

and Australia) forum, and NATO standardization and interoperability programs. In addition, beginning in 1975 with the German Army, TRADOC

began a series of bilateral army-to-army staff talks with other countries. By

2003 there were staff talks with eleven nations on a regular basis. In addition, TRADOC represented the U.S. Army in more informal discussions with

the Israeli Defense Force. International activities, including work with

selected armies of Latin American nations, increased greatly. As part of the

TRADOC liaison network, TRADOC officers served abroad in Germany, the

United Kingdom, France, Spain, Italy, Turkey, Israel, Korea, Japan, and

Canada. At the same time, 15 nations sent liaison officers to TRADOC

headquarters. Of long-standing were the liaison arrangements with Australia,

Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, the Netherlands,

Spain, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. More recent additions were representatives from the Czech Republic and Greece.

Chapter Vlll

International

Activities

COL James Rosenblatt

represents TRADOC as the

British, French, and German

liaison officers lay wreaths at

the Victory monument at

Yorktown, VA.
Standardization and Interoperability

Upon its establishment, TRADOC continued CONARC’s coordination of the

service schools’ participation in international standardization programs held

under the auspices of NATO and ABCA. NATO meetings included separate

panel and working party conferences relating to a wide variety of military

topics including weapons, interservice tactical air operations, mobility, NBC

defense, and intelligence. ABCA meetings—more doctrinally oriented than

the NATO meetings—related, among other things, to standardization in the

fields of command and control, aviation, air defense, communications, and

quality assurance.

In 1976, TRADOC assumed Department of the Army planning and coordination responsibilities for four NATO and four ABCA “working parties.” The

new ABCA responsibilities included the air defense, armor, infantry, and

surface-to-surface working groups. The NATO responsibilities were for the

movements and transport, and rail movement and transport working parties;

for the land based air defense weapons panel; and for the NATO helicopter

interservice working party. TRADOC provided delegates and data to the subgroups of both those forums. Actions in TRADOC’s purview that were

agreed to by the national parties and cleared by the review bodies were

implemented by TRADOC upon Department of the Army approval.

During FY 1977, a new Defense Department emphasis on developing standardized equipment with the NATO allies began to be felt at TRADOC.

Prompted as part of that defense policy was the related notion of seeking

“interoperability” between like weapons or pieces of equipment that were

being developed separately by the United States and an allied nation. The

issue of a “two-way” street in weapons development was sensitive, and

usually meant that the United States would have to adopt more allied-built

weapons into its own arsenal if the principles of standardization and

interoperability were to have any meaning. The Nunn-Culver Amendment to

the 1977 Department of Defense appropriation formally committed the U.S.

to standardization, or at least interoperability, with its allies.

During the 1980s, it became evident that doctrine to guide U.S. Army operations with allied forces was an important need. Though the writing of up-todate Army doctrine and joint doctrine were priority efforts by necessity, it

was also true that future wars of any larger dimension would likely be allied

enterprises. Some alliance-specific doctrine existed, such as the land force

tactical doctrine manual (ATP-35A) for NATO, and in the current U.S. Army

Chapter Vlll

International Activities
FM 100-5, Operations, some chapters were devoted to combined army

operations. Also already published in a test version was JCS Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations. But there was no formal and general combined

armies operations field manual in the U.S. Army inventory. Beginning in

early 1989, TRADOC undertook the development of FM 100-8, Combined

Army Operations. Doctrine writers completed the preliminary draft of FM

100-8 in September 1992 and sent it to the TRADOC Deputy Chief of Staff

for Doctrine for approval. After some revision, it was resubmitted in December. Over the next five years, the draft manual underwent significant revision,

and its name was changed to The Army in Multilateral Operations. FM 100-8

was finally published on 24 November 1997.

Bilateral Staff Talks

By virtue of its Army-wide doctrinal, combat developments, and training

missions, TRADOC acted as the U.S. Army’s executive agent for bilateral

staff talks and exercised multilateral contacts with allied and friendly armies

around the world. Those significant activities were carried out from the

headquarters at Fort Monroe. Beginning in 1975, with the first formal staff

talks with the army of the Federal Republic of Germany, the level of activity

in bilateral army-to-army dialogue increased to include staff talks with

armies of the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Spain, Canada, Brazil, Korea,

Australia, Israel, and Japan. The primary objective for talks among formally

allied armies was the enhancement of the ability to operate together with

common understanding of the battlefield and interoperable equipment with

which to fight. Further, in discussions with friendly countries, TRADOC

aimed at developing instructive exchange on broader areas of interest. In

addition, over the thirty year period, TRADOC increasingly carried out

cooperative activities with the armies of several Latin American countries. In

the absence of formal talks, informal bilateral exchanges were common, as

were visits by senior officers of the allied, and by some non-allied armies to

TRADOC headquarters, centers, and schools, and numerous visits by senior

TRADOC officials to other armies.

Germany

Agreement between the two major land armies of NATO on tactical concerns

was not a new idea, though before 1975 it had received little emphasis. Every

eighteen months, the two armies conducted a tactical concepts symposium,

held at the Department of the Army staff and German operations staff level.

Specific results, however, had been few. In 1974, officials of both armies

Chapter Vlll

International Activities
came to believe that more intensive cooperation in the areas of equipment

and tactics, by means of regular staff level discussions, was needed. As a

result, TRADOC commander DePuy recommended that annual meetings be

established between the U.S. Army Chief of Staff and the German Inspector

of the Army.

A more formal apparatus for the talks began to take shape in the spring of

1975. Agreed to were regular formal discussions to promote a common

understanding of concepts, tactics, and system requirements in selected areas

and the review of weapons and equipment toward the goal of interdependent

development. Between formal talks, a bilateral steering committee would

support the major talks. TRADOC’s Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for

Combat Developments headed the U.S. steering committee. The exchanges

were inaugurated at Bonn in October 1975 and at Fort Monroe the following

June. As the personal representative of the Chief of Staff of the Army, the

TRADOC commander led the U.S. delegations. The discussions rapidly

established a solid and productive exchange that set in motion a mechanism

of basic conceptual agreements that brought agreement on the first five

concept papers. Brought into harmony, too, by the exchange were the keystone U.S. and German tactical manuals, FM 100-5, Operations, and the

German Army Service Regulation 100-100, Command in Battle.

By that time, the exchange was aided by a comprehensive TRADOC-German

Army liaison network. Besides TRADOC liaison officers at the German

Army Office at Cologne and German officers at TRADOC headquarters,

each stationed liaison officers at the other’s equivalent major schools—

armor, aviation, air defense, field artillery, engineer, infantry, signal, ordnance-maintenance, NBC, and staff colleges. In addition, TRADOC had a

liaison officer at the German Transportation-Quartermaster School, and

German officers were assigned to the U.S. Army Missile and Munitions

School, the U.S. Army Intelligence School, and U.S. Marine Corps and Army

Materiel Command headquarters. TRADOC had liaison officers at

USAREUR headquarters in Heidelberg as well.

United Kingdom

In February 1978, the U.S. Army inaugurated formal bilateral talks with

another of its NATO allies—the United Kingdom. During a visit to that

country in April 1977, General DePuy’s discussions with the British Directors of Army Training and Combat Developments established a clear British

interest in staff talks, and the groundwork was laid. As with the Germans,

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materiel and tactical doctrinal concepts were the focus of British interest.

The British also showed an early interest in training issues. The British

preference for a combat developments framework resulted in a link between

the British Army Combat Developments Directorate and the TRADOC

Deputy Chief of Staff for Combat Developments. The two sides anticipated

discussions on scientific-technological trends, materiel requirements, the

forward defense, the corps and the air-land battle, division restructuring, and

training developments. As the U.S.-United Kingdom exchange matured,

training topics were increasingly added to the agendas. The goal was to

exchange information on training concepts, methods, and technology to

enhance training and to promote the goal of coordinated operations between

the two armies. Unlike the German talks, the British talks would be semiannual rather than annual.

France

In September 1979 the first staff talks with France, another NATO ally, took

place at Fort Monroe. The U.S.-French talks were to take place every six to

nine months.. Because the French representatives objected to a structure as

formal as that of the German exchange, the U.S.-French talks were based on

two themes commonly agreed upon in advance, with each side choosing its

own topics within the theme. It was also understood by both parties that,

unlike the German and British exchanges, the talks with the French were for

informational purposes only. The U.S.-French talks held in the United States

were usually held away from TRADOC headquarters in order to give the

U.S. delegation an opportunity to demonstrate its rapidly advancing technology. TRADOC considered the French talks to be particularly important,

since France remained pivotal in the defense structure for Western Europe,

while remaining outside the NATO military structure.

Italy

In December 1984, the Italian government proposed initiation of formal staff

talks between the armies of Italy and the United States, and initial discussions were held in Rome the following year. The talks with the Italians were

structured much like those with the Germans and British, with a steering

committee and expert working group arrangements. The topics and issues

were many of the same as those discussed with the other allies. Of particular

interest to the TRADOC delegation were the Italian briefings on mountain

training and warfare.

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Spain

Annual talks with the Spanish Army began in 1987. Each side stood to gain

from formal talks. For the Spanish Army, the forum brought accessibility to

its U.S. counterpart. Because of the presence of United States Air Force and

Navy units in Spain, the Spanish Air Force and Navy enjoyed much more

direct access to information on U.S. doctrinal, weapons, and interoperability

issues than had the Spanish Army. The U.S., for its part, sought to underscore

the strategic importance of Spain and to bring exchanges into balance with

other NATO nations. Before the initial talks in Madrid in September 1987,

the Spanish had agreed to include the widest range of topics possible, placing

no restrictions on the focus of discussion.

Canada

Beginning in 1978, the armies of the United States and Canada had begun a

series of programs to exchange information and viewpoints on doctrinal

questions. The program was not considered to be on a par with the staff talks

with other armies, which were regarded as vehicles to promote concerted

action of interoperability. It was not until November 1986 that formal staff

talks between the two countries began. The Canadian-U.S. talks complemented Canada’s many defense links to the United States through NATO and

the ABCA forum. Concern with the defense of North America, the NATO

mission, and a traditional participation by Canada in global peacekeeping

operations gave the two armies many common outlooks and mutual interests.

Though a small army, the Canadian force was focused not only on territorial

defense and peacekeeping, but on commonwealth contingencies, and more

recently on Latin America.

Brazil

The first staff talks with the Brazilian Army were held in March 1984. Over

the next years, the talks focused primarily on doctrinal and organizational

issues, including U.S. assistance in force development, to include incorporation of a rotary wing aviation arm and introduction of electronic warfare into

force structure and training. The Brazilians were also intensely interested in

low intensity conflict, given current political instabilities in Central and

South America. TRADOC regarded the bilateral talks with the Brazilian

Army as having potential for cooperative work in all functional areas and as

the cornerstone of a maturing relationship.

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Republic of Korea

In July 1983, the Korean Army proposed direct talks on doctrine, weapons

and materiel development, and training with the U.S. Army. The first talks

were held in Taejon, Korea at the Korean Army Training and Doctrine

Command headquarters in April 1984. The commonality of interests of the

two armies, partners in a specifically bi-national defensive alliance, was of

long standing. The 1984 talks and subsequent discussions resulted in expanded opportunities for training the Korean Army in areas such as electronic warfare and hazardous munitions handling, and increased cooperation

on doctrinal and force development issues.

Japan

Relatively low level exchanges with the Japanese Self Defense Forces had

been occurring with some regularity since the late 1970s, but it was not until

1986 that formal talks were begun. Most of the other allied staff talks had

focused on organizational issues in initial discussions, but because the

Japanese and U.S. armies were well familiar with each other’s organization,

the first talks with the Japanese focused on training issues. Notwithstanding

Japan’s enforced limited military role since 1945, few military relationships

were potentially more critical than that between the world’s two largest

industrial powers.

Australia

The newest of the formal staff talks were those with the Australian Army,

approved by the Army Chief of Staff in mid-2001. The Head of Delegation

for the Australian talks was the TRADOC Deputy Commanding General for

Transformation, in part because the Australian Army has a medium weight

brigade similar to those at Fort Lewis. The U.S. Army hosted the first talks

in November 2001 at Fort Lewis; the Australian Army hosted the second

round of talks at Sydney in November 2002. More talks were scheduled for

November 2003. Talks addressed homeland security, battle command

systems, logistics, and joint exercises, among other topics.

Israel

As noted, informal talks between the senior leaders of the U.S. Army and the

Israeli Defence Force had been conducted since the establishment of

TRADOC in 1973. In the mid-1980s those talks became more institutionalChapter Vlll

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ized if less formal than those with the NATO allies. Over time, the most

prominent topics were the conduct of military operations in an urban environment and maneuver tactics and strategy.

Latin America

In addition to formal staff talks, TRADOC also carried out less formal

“subject matter expert” exchanges with several Latin American countries

beginning in the mid 1980s.

The first Peruvian exchange in December 1985 was the first formal contact

between the armies since 1965. First exchanges with the Chilean and

Argentinean armies occurred in October 1986. Late in 1988, General Maxwell R. Thurman, TRADOC commander, laid the groundwork for wider

TRADOC subject matter expert activity in Latin America during a trip to

Panama, Peru, and Colombia, as well as to Brazil. The Thurman visit resulted in agreement with the Guatamalan army for subject matter expert

exchanges in the future. In addition during 1990, TRADOC added the

Venezuelan Army to its list of SME exchanges.

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International Activities

 U.S, Chilean, and Argentine

soldiers train together in South

America. TRADOC relations

with South and Central

American armies has

strengthened since the

command’s founding in 1973.
SUGGESTIONS FOR ADDITIONAL READING

Army Green Books (October issues of Army magazine, 1973-2002. These issues

include articles by all the TRADOC commanders,as well as information on the

command’s personnel.

DePuy, William E. Changing an Army: An Oral History of General William E.

DePuy, USA Retired. Conducted by Romie L. Brownlee and William J. Mullen III.

United States Army Military History Institute and United States Army Center of

Military History. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.

Chapman, Anne W. The Army’s Training Revolution 1973-1990: An Overview.

TRADOC Historical Study Series. Office of the Command Historian. United States

Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1991.

________. The National Training Center Matures 1985-1993. TRADOC Historical

Monograph Series. Military History Office. United States Army Training and

Doctrine Command, 1997.

________. The Origins and Development of the National Training Center 1976-

1984. TRADOC Historical Monograph Series.Office of the Command Historian.

United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1992

Dastrup, Boyd L. King of Battle: A Branch History of the U.S. Army’s Field Artillery.

TRADOC Branch History Series. Office of the Command Historian. United States

Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1992.

________. The US Army Command and General Staff College: A Centennial

History. Leavenworth, Kansas: J.H. Johnston III and Manhattan, Kansas: Sunflower

University Press, 1982.

Gorman, Paul F. The Secret of Future Victories. Institute for Defense Analyses Paper

P-2653, February 1992. Contains asection focused on DePuy’s vision of the future

Army.

Herbert, Paul H. Deciding What has to be Done: General William E. DePuy and the

1976 Edition of FM 100-5, Operations . Leavenworth Papers No. 16. Fort

Leavenworth, Kan.: Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General

Staff College, 1988.

Hofmann George F., and Donn A. Starry, Eds., Camp Colt to Desert Storm: The

History of U.S. Armored Forces (University Press of Kentucky, 1999).

King, Benjamin, Richard C. Biggs, and Eric R. Criner. Spearhead of Logistics: A

History of the U.S. Army Transportation Corps. U.S. Army Transportation Center,

Fort Eustis, Virginia, 1994.

Suggested

Reading
Moenk, Jean R. Operation Steadfast Historical Summary: A History of the Reorganization of the U.S. Continental Army Command (1972-1973) . Head quarters, U.S.

Army Forces Command, Fort McPherson, Ga. and Headquarters, U.S. Army Training

and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Va., 1974.

Office of the Command Historian, United States Army Training and Doctrine

Command. TRADOC Support to Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm: A

Preliminary Study. TRADOC Historical Study Series, 1992.Raines, Rebecca

Robbins. Getting the Message Through: A Branch History of the U.S. Army Signal

Corps. Center of Military History, United States Army, Washington, D.C, 1996.

Richardson, William R. “FM 100-5: The AirLand Battle in 1986,” Military Review,

March 1986, pp. 4-11.

Romjue, John L. The Army of Excellence: The Development of the 1980s Army.

TRADOC Historical Monograph Series. Office of the Command Historian. United

States Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1993.

________. American Army Doctrine for the Post-Cold War. TRADOC Historical

Monograph Series. Military History Office. United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1996.

________. From Active Defense to AirLand Battle: The Development of Army

Doctrine 1973-1982. TRADOC Historical Monograph Series. Historical Office.

United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, June 1984.

________. A History of Army 86, Vol. I, Division 86: The Development of the Heavy

Division, and Vol. II, The Development of the Light Division, The Corps and

Echelons Above Corps.Fort Monroe: Va.: Historical Office, HQ TRADOC, 1982.

________, Susan Canedy, and Anne W. Chapman. Prepare the Army for War: A

Historical Overview of the Army Training and Doctrine Command,1973-1993 .

TRADOC 20th Anniversary Commemoration. Office of the Command Historian.

United States Army Training and Doctrine Command.

Weigley, Russell F. History of the United States Army. Enlarged edition.

Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press,1984.

Weinert, Richard P. and Robert Arthur. Defender of the Chesapeake: The Story of

Fort Monroe. Shippenburg, Penn.: White Mane Publishing Co., third revised edition,

1989.

Suggested Reading