UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.  No. 99-4643

LAMONT JONES-BEY,

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.

Marvin J. Garbis, District Judge.

(CR-98-121-MJG)

Submitted: July 25, 2002

Decided: August 22, 2002

Before WILKINS, WILLIAMS, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

COUNSEL

Howard B. Katzoff, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Thomas M.

DiBiagio, United States Attorney, Craig M. Wolff, Assistant United

States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c). 
OPINION

PER CURIAM: 

Lamont Jones-Bey appeals his conviction and sentence for being a

felon-in-possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(g)

(West 2000). Pursuant to the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984

(ACCA), codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(e)(1) (West 2000), Jones-Bey

was sentenced to a mandatory minimum 15 year term of imprisonment. Jones-Bey raises three issues on appeal. First, he challenges the

district court’s denial of his motion to suppress, claiming the officers

who arrested him had no reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle in

which he was traveling and were unjustified in their warrantless entry

and search of his home. Second, he claims insufficient evidence was

presented at trial to sustain his conviction. Finally, he contests the district court’s calculation of the predicate felonies necessary to sentence

him as an armed career criminal. 

We review the district court’s factual findings underlying a motion

to suppress for clear error and its legal determinations de novo. See

Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996); United States v.

Rusher, 966 F.2d 868, 873 (4th Cir. 1992). When a suppression

motion has been denied, we review the evidence in the light most

favorable to the Government. See United States v. Seidman, 156 F.3d

542, 547 (4th Cir. 1998). We find the district court correctly ruled that

the law enforcement officers’ decision to stop Jones-Bey’s vehicle

was supported by reasonable suspicion and that the officers were justified in conducting a warrantless search of Jones-Bey’s home. See

United States v. Jones, 204 F.3d 541, 543 (4th Cir. 2000). 

Jones-Bey’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence likewise

fails. In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we sustain a

guilty verdict if there is substantial evidence, taking the view most

favorable to the government, to support the finding of guilt. See

Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942); United States v.

Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 862 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc). In this case, substantial evidence existed to support a jury determination that JonesBey possessed a handgun only moments before police officers discovered it. 

2 UNITED STATES v. JONES-BEY
Finally, Jones-Bey’s sentencing contentions are without merit. We

review legal issues concerning sentences de novo, United States v.

Daughtrey, 874 F.2d 213, 217 (4th Cir. 1989), as well as the legal

determinations attendant to the application of the ACCA. We find the

district court correctly determined that Jones-Bey committed the three

predicate felonies necessary to trigger application of the ACCA and

sentenced him appropriately. See United States v. Letterlough, 63

F.3d 332, 335 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v. Custis, 988 F.2d 1355,

1363-64 (4th Cir. 1993). 

Accordingly, we affirm both Jones-Bey’s conviction and sentence.

We dispense with oral argument, because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and

argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

UNITED STATES v. JONES-BEY 3