2009 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

12-8-2009

William Davis, III v. Raphael Williams

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 09-2602

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Recommended Citation

"William Davis, III v. Raphael Williams" (2009). 2009 Decisions. Paper 128.

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BLD-015 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 09-2602

___________

WILLIAM F. DAVIS, III, 

 Appellant

v.

RAPHAEL WILLIAMS, Warden; FIRST CORRECTIONAL MEDICAL; 

DR. BOSTON; BRIAN CASEY; CORRECTIONAL OFFICER DAVIES; 

CAPTAIN EMMIT; CORRECTIONAL OFFICER REGINALD MAYES;

DEBRA MUSCARELLA; NURSE JEREMEY; OFFICER FRED WAY

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Delaware

(D.C. Civ. No. 05-cv-00067)

District Judge: Honorable Sue L. Robinson

____________________________________

Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or Possible

Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6

October 16, 2009

Before: MCKEE, RENDELL AND CHAGARES, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: December 8, 2009)

_________

OPINION

_________

PER CURIAM.

William F. Davis, III, a Delaware inmate, appeals from the District Court’s final

judgment in this pro se action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For the reasons that follow, we
2

will summarily affirm. 

I.

Davis filed this suit in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware

asserting violations of his Eighth Amendment rights while incarcerated on the mental

health tier, or “1D Pod,” at the Howard R. Young Correctional Institution (“HRYCI”). In

May 2004, an inmate on the same unit, Brian Casey, pushed or shoved Davis in the face

on two occasions during basketball games played with numerous other inmates in the

yard. Davis asserts that two Corrections Officers witnessed these incidents but failed to

report them and took no action against Casey. Davis alleges that he had on several

occasions told defendant Deborah Muscarella, his counselor on the mental health tier, that

Casey had been falsely calling Davis a “child molester.” On May 31, 2004, about two

weeks after the basketball shoving incidents, Casey and Davis were in the dining hall

waiting in the breakfast line for second servings. Casey tried to get ahead of Davis in line

and once again called Davis a child molester. After the two argued, Davis turned away, at

which time Casey punched Davis in the face, fracturing his jaw. In this suit, Davis claims

that certain of the named defendants failed to protect him from Casey’s assault, and that

certain defendants were indifferent to his medical needs by delaying treatment for his

broken jaw.

The District Court granted a motion to dismiss filed by defendant First

Correctional Medical (“FCM”), explaining that Davis never mentions FCM in his
 The names of defendants Emig and Mays are misspelled in the case caption as 1

“Emmit” and “Mayes.” 

 Nurse Jeremy’s name is misspelled in the case caption as “Jeremey.” The docket 2

also reflects that the United States Marshal’s service of process on Jeremy was returned

unexecuted because Jeremy no longer worked at HRYCI. 

3

complaint or amended complaint, and that there is no allegation even suggesting that

FCM violated Davis’s rights. The District Court also dismissed defendants Dr. Boston

and Brian Casey (the alleged inmate assailant) because Davis failed to respond to an order

to show cause as to why these defendants should not be dismissed for failure to provide

information to allow timely service of process.

Defendants Williams, Davies, Emig, and Mays filed a motion for summary 1

judgment, in which defendant Way joined. The District Court entered summary judgment

in favor of these defendants, holding as follows: (i) claims against these prison officials

in their official capacities are barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity; (ii) Warden

Williams was not personally involved in the alleged wrongs and cannot be held liable

under § 1983 on a theory of respondeat superior; (iii) Davies and Mays, the Corrections

Officers who allegedly witnessed the basketball shoving incidents in the yard, cannot be

said to have known of or disregarded an excessive risk to Davis’s safety; (iv) Davis fails

to show that any defendant, including Nurse Jeremy and Corrections Officer Way, acted 2

with deliberate indifference based on the eleven-day gap between the date of injury and

the date surgery was performed to repair his broken jaw; and (v) the claim against Emig, a

Captain/Facility Investigator charged with investigating serious incidents at HRYCI, for
 We have fully considered Davis’s “Informal Brief” in reaching this disposition. 

3

4

allegedly failing to ask the Attorney General to prosecute Casey fails given the absence of

a duty to seek prosecution of an inmate who injures a fellow inmate. The District Court

granted Davis’s motion for leave to file an amended complaint against the lone remaining

defendant, Muscarella.

Rather than amend, Davis moved for summary judgment on his failure to protect

claim. Muscarella also moved for summary judgment. The District Court granted

Muscarella’s motion, concluding that her alleged failure to protect Davis amounts, at

most, to negligence, not a deliberate indifference to a serious risk to Davis’s safety. 

Davis timely filed this appeal.

II.

We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review is plenary of

the District Court’s orders entering summary judgment. See Fed. Home Loan Mortgage

Corp. v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 316 F.3d 431, 443 (3d Cir. 2003). We view the underlying

facts, and all reasonable inferences therefrom, in a light most favorable to the

non-movant. Fasold v. Justice, 409 F.3d 178, 180 (3d Cir. 2005). After a careful review

of the record, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment in accordance with

Third Circuit Internal Operating Procedure Chapter 10.6.3

III.

a. Failure-to-protect claim
5

As the District Court fully explained, “[a] prison official’s deliberate indifference

to a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate violates the Eighth Amendment.” 

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994). “Deliberate indifference can be shown

when a prison official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or

safety.” Hamilton v. Leavy, 117 F.3d 742, 747 (3d Cir. 1997) (quotation marks omitted). 

“[T]o survive summary judgment on an Eighth Amendment claim asserted under 42

U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff is required to produce sufficient evidence of (1) a substantial

risk of serious harm; (2) the defendants’ deliberate indifference to that risk; and (3)

causation.” Id. at 746. 

Davis failed to produce sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment on his

claims that Mays, Davies, and Muscarella acted with deliberate indifference to his safety. 

Davis alleges that Mays supervised the first basketball game in which Casey shoved

Davis’s face, and that Davies supervised the second game. Davis’s claims against these

two defendants are based on their having witnessed the alleged shoving incidents. Davis

concedes that both basketball games were aggressively played by all involved, and Davis

himself considered the pushing incident in the first game to be inconsequential. Davis

suffered no injury in either incident, and, clearly, any alleged fear of harm from Casey

was not such that it prevented Davis from voluntarily participating in basketball games

with Casey. There is no evidence that Casey called Davis a child molester during either

game, and no evidence that Mays or Davies knew prior to the basketball games that Casey
 Although Davis asserted at deposition that Mays was aware that Casey had been

4

calling Davis a child molester, Davis could not recall when he told Mays, and there is no

evidence of record that he told Mays prior to the first basketball shoving incident. 

 Davis contends that he suffers from learning disabilities, depression, and bipolar 5

disorder, but he testified that he was taking medication for his mental heath issues at the

time of the incidents at issue in this case. 

6

had called Davis a child molester. On this record, viewing the evidence in a light most 4

favorable to Davis, a reasonable jury could not conclude that Mays or Davies knew of, or

consciously disregarded, an excessive risk to Davis’s safety.

As to defendant Muscarella, a mental health counselor at HRYCI, Davis contends

that he told Muscarella on several occasions prior to the basketball shoving incidents that

Casey had accused him of being a child molester. According to Davis, Muscarella

advised that “she was basically going to take care of it ... don’t worry about it.” There is,

however, no evidence that Davis ever complained to Muscarella about a specific threat of

harm, and it is undisputed that Davis never requested protection. Further, despite Casey’s

presence, Davis chose to remain housed in the 1D Pod for mental health treatment when

he could have sought a transfer from the unit at any time. In addition, Davis does not 5

dispute that he had a history of horseplay and altercations with other inmates, and that in

the past he had displayed an ability to defend himself, not a vulnerability to attack. 

Muscarella had counseled Davis on ways to avoid confrontation. 

We agree with the District Court that, at most, Muscarella’s actions might reflect

negligence in failing to protect Davis from an environment in which he had been falsely
7

labeled a child molester and had encountered an inmate (Casey) who had displayed

hostility toward Davis. But this evidence does not reflect that Muscarella knew of and

disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm to Davis. See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S.

312, 319 (1986) (“It is obduracy and wantonness, not inadvertence or error in good faith,

that characterize the conduct prohibited by the Cruel and Unusual Punishments

Clause[.]”). Muscarella flatly denies ever being aware of a substantial risk of harm to

Davis, or of being indifferent to his need for protection, and the evidence of record does

not support a reasonable inference to the contrary. Accordingly, summary judgment was

appropriately entered.

b. Claim based on medical needs

After the altercation with Casey in the dining hall, defendant Way took Davis to

the infirmary, where he was examined by Nurse Jeremy. Davis was given gauze for his

bleeding, as well as Motrin and ice, and returned to his unit. Davis was again examined

by a nurse later the same day. At the time, Davis remained able to open his mouth and

talk. The next day, when Davis was again examined, he was unable to open his mouth

and his jaw was swollen. Davis was taken that day to a hospital for an x-ray, which

revealed a “bilateral mandibular fracture.”

Davis was returned to HRYCI and housed in the infirmary for three days before

returning to his cell. After five days in his cell, Davis returned to the infirmary, and, after

a total of eleven days following the assault, he was taken to an outside hospital where
 We note that defendants also argued before the District Court that Davis failed to 6

exhaust his administrative remedies, as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Although the

District Court expressly declined to address this issue, we find the defendants’ argument

well-taken. The record is undisputed that Davis filed a single grievance regarding the

altercations with Casey, indicating that he “would like someone to look into this matter

to see why Officer Daves [sic] and Maze [sic] didn’t do anything to Mr. Casey and why

this Incident wasn’t documented.” Davis also stated that he “would like to press charges

8

surgery was performed to repair his jaw. Davis spent the night at the hospital, and then

another three weeks in the prison infirmary upon his return.

At bottom, Davis complains about the length of time between the date of injury

and the date of the surgery on his jaw. “To act with deliberate indifference to serious

medical needs is to recklessly disregard a substantial risk of serious harm.” Giles v.

Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 330 (3d Cir. 2009). “Deliberate indifference may be shown by

intentionally denying or delaying medical care.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). “Where a

prisoner has received some medical attention and the dispute is over the adequacy of the

treatment, federal courts are generally reluctant to second guess medical judgments and to

constitutionalize claims which sound in state tort law.” United States ex rel. Walker v.

Fayette County, 599 F.2d 573, 575 n.2 (3d Cir. 1979) (quotation marks omitted). We

agree with the District Court that, as a matter of law, Davis failed to raise a claim that

defendants intentionally delayed appropriate care, or that a reasonable jury could

conclude that defendants’ actions amounted to deliberate indifference to Davis’s medical

needs. Consequently, the District Court properly entered summary judgment on this

claim.6
on Casey.” Davis raised no claim that the medical treatment for his broken jaw was

inadequate. His grievance was denied at the first level of review by the Institutional

Grievance Chair, who advised that Davis could not seek disciplinary action against staff

and should direct his complaint to the staff member’s supervisor. Davis was also told

that the action he requested was inappropriate or not complete, and that he must make an

actual request. Davis did not file a new grievance or appeal the ruling given because, he

testified, he was “satisfied with the answer they gave me.” Because Davis clearly did not

exhaust administrative review on the claims raised in this suit, his suit was subject to

dismissal for that reason, as well. 

9

IV.

Davis’s remaining claims were properly dismissed for the reasons fully explained

by the District Court. Because we conclude that this appeal presents “no substantial

question,” 3d Cir. IOP Ch. 10.6, the District Court’s judgment will be affirmed.