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67–601PDF 2011

REASSESSING AMERICAN GRAND STRATEGY IN

SOUTH ASIA

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND 

INVESTIGATIONS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JULY 26, 2011

Serial No. 112–54

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

RON PAUL, Texas 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

BILL JOHNSON, Ohio 

DAVID RIVERA, Florida 

MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York 

RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina 

VACANT 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

DENNIS CARDOZA, California 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut 

FREDERICA WILSON, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

YLEEM D.S. POBLETE, Staff Director 

RICHARD J. KESSLER, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS

DANA ROHRABACHER, California, Chairman 

MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania 

RON PAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

DAVID RIVERA, Florida 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

KAREN BASS, California 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Aparna Pande, Ph.D., resident fellow, Hudson Institute ..................................... 6

Mr. John Tkacik, Jr., president, China Business Intelligence (former Chief 

of China Analysis in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, U.S. Department of State) ....................................................................................................... 15

Mr. Sadanand Dhume, research fellow, American Enterprise Institute ............. 29

Mr. Shuja Nawaz, director of the South Asia Center, The Atlantic Council 

of the United States ............................................................................................. 37

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Dana Rohrabacher, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of California, and chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations: Prepared statement ............................................................................. 3

Aparna Pande, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ........................................................... 9

Mr. John Tkacik, Jr.: Prepared statement ............................................................ 17

Mr. Sadanand Dhume: Prepared statement .......................................................... 31

Mr. Shuja Nawaz: Prepared statement ................................................................. 39

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 62

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 63

(1)

REASSESSING AMERICAN GRAND STRATEGY 

IN SOUTH ASIA 

TUESDAY, JULY 26, 2011

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m., in room 

2200 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Dana Rohrabacher 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. On the record. I’m not going to repeat what 

I just said. So anyway, I want to welcome all of you, welcome our 

witnesses and thank our witnesses for joining us today. 

U.S. policy in Southwest Asia needs to be changed and changed 

quickly because we are currently funding people who are directly 

responsible for killing Americans. The purpose of today’s hearing is 

to explore how we get out of this particular mess. 

The main powers in Southwest Asia are Democratic India, Bankrupt Pakistan and Communist China. The latter is not located in 

the region but is always there stirring the pot due to its alliance 

perhaps with Pakistan and its rivalry, mutual rivalry, with India. 

Afghanistan, which has been the focus of U.S. involvement, is 

part of a larger regional contest. This is a truism that has failed 

to be apparent to many Americans over the years. The India-Soviet 

alignment alienated the United States during the Cold War, resulting in what was clearly an adversarial relationship between the 

United States and India. 

China’s occupation of Tibet and invasion of the Himalayan India 

certainly escalated tensions in that part of the world, and when the 

Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979, the U.S. and Pakistan 

worked together to support Afghan insurgents against the Soviet 

occupation. 

Following the Russian withdrawal in 1989 the U.S. shifted its 

focus away from Southwest Asia. The Pakistan-China friendship, 

however, as we begin to focus away, deepened and became more intense as both parties targeted India as their major enemy. China 

now is a natural ally of Pakistan which, of course, has manifested 

a gut hostility toward India since the founding of that country. 

That is the power dynamic that is at work in Southwest Asia. 

China arms Sri Lanka, Burma, Bangladesh and pours money 

into these states to influence their alignment. Nepal on India’s 

northeast border has recently been taken over by a malice movement which has ties to Beijing. 

2

All of this is a dangerous rivalry, one that the United States was 

unfortunately drawn into when devising a Cold War strategy, but 

that strategy must be dramatically and immediately changed because the times have changed. The Cold War is over and we have 

been on a pathway that was directed by those policies established 

during the Cold War for far too long. 

With U.S. support, Pakistan has played a major role in creating 

the Taliban. Islamabad independent of U.S. interest hoped to use 

this radical element of the Taliban as a vanguard, its own vanguard, to gain control of Afghanistan and to strengthen their position against India. 

After 9/11 the United States used both carrots and sticks in an 

attempt to focus Pakistan to break with these terrorists. In the latter category, the carrots and sticks, basically we moved to improve 

relations with India as we saw Pakistan conducting themselves in 

a way that was totally unacceptable to our interests. So we moved 

to improve our relations with India and also, for example, sought 

a role for India in Afghanistan’s reconstruction. Ties were further 

advanced with the ratification of the United States-India Agreement for Cooperation on the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy in 

2008 which China, of course, denounced. 

The Mumbai attack on 2010 which was linked to a Pakistanbased terrorist group with links to the ISI—that’s the Inter-Services Intelligence system there in Pakistan—reminded both India 

and the United States that they had a common enemy. So did the 

continued and close military cooperation between Pakistan and 

China remind us that perhaps Pakistan was slipping away from 

being a friend into being an adversary. 

Pakistan has acquired Chinese fighters, frigates, submarines, armored vehicles. Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles 

are based on Chinese technology which was provided by Beijing as 

an explicit act of proliferation. China is building more nuclear reactors in Pakistan along with military air fields, ports and other strategic infrastructure. 

As far as relations with Pakistan, they have been getting worse 

rather than getting better, and in the wake of the discovery that 

Osama bin Laden had been living in a Pakistani garrison town for 

5 years, the Obama administration has rightfully withheld $800 

million in aid to Islamabad. 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen has 

confirmed, and it is well-known, that the ISI has a longstanding relationship with a number of terrorist groups, and it is funding and 

training these terrorists who are at this moment killing Americans 

and coalition partners in Afghanistan. 

Pakistani officials have called on the Afghan Government to 

expel U.S. forces and to join a Pakistani-Chinese alliance. So, 

friends, our Pakistani friends are there asking the Afghans just to 

drop us and join the Chinese and Pakistanis. 

I have proposed legislation H.R. 1792 to end all aid to Pakistan, 

and have also offered amendments to both the Defense and State 

Department authorization bills to do so, but what needs to be seriously discussed is a fundamental shift in America’s Southwest Asia 

strategy, a break with the Cold War policies that no longer apply. 

3

What is the best way for the United States to protect its security, 

its interests, and its values in Southwest Asia? Well, these are 

questions that we hope to answer today, and that’s what this hearing is about. 

I will be introducing the witnesses for their testimony in a moment. But, first, open remarks from Ranking Member Carnahan. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rohrabacher follows:]


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Mr. CARNAHAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for organizing this 

hearing on this key topic, particularly at this time. And thank you 

for our panel of witnesses for being here to lend us your expertise 

and your knowledge on this issue. 

Obviously, relations between the U.S. and Pakistan are clearly 

strained right now. Many folks in this county still find it hard to 

believe that top government officials or military leaders in Pakistan were not being straightforward during the time we were trying to find Osama bin Laden. 

We’ve seen the latest sign of tension was the administration’s de- cision to suspend nearly $800 million in counterterrorism funding 

to Pakistan. And the chairman has rightly stated that that was the 

correct action of the administration. 

Given the mounting concerns over a series of decisions made by 

the Pakistani Government and the military, suspension of a portion 

of the U.S. military aid was the right thing to do. 

We need to ensure that every dollar of the U.S. taxpayer funded 

assistance is being used properly. This vigorous oversight role for 

all of U.S. foreign aid is critical to the success of our programs 

there. It’s a key component to building infrastructure and capacity 

in Pakistan. 

Officials throughout the country have to do better from rooting 

out corruption to vigilantly pursuing terrorists. The government 

and military absolutely have to step up and do a better job. 

Pakistan faces enormous economic, security, development and political challenges. And I believe that it’s critical that the U.S. and 

the international communities stay engaged and our people stay 

engaged in Pakistan. As we look toward the post 2014 draw-down 

of U.S. troops in Afghan, we need to ensure that we are making 

decisions that move Pakistan, Afghanistan and the region toward 

more stability and not less. 

Diplomacy and development are key. They’re going to continue to 

be key compounds of our policy in the region especially after 2014. 

I’m very interested to hear what our witnesses have to say as to 

the best way forward and how our strategy in Pakistan and the region should unfold in the months and years ahead. 

Thank you for being here today to testify. And I want to give a 

little bit of a disclaimer here. I have a second hearing going on 

right around the corner. I may have to step out briefly. But I’m 

going to do my best to juggle both hearings today. So again thank 

you. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. We will now proceed 

with our witnesses, the first of which is—and you all will forgive 

me—my better talent is something to do with surfing in California. 

My worst talent has something to do with pronouncing names, and 

please forgive me if I—and you might correct me to the right way. 

Shuja Nawaz. Is that the right pronunciation? 

Mr. NAWAZ. Shuja Nawaz. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right. Then he’s a native of Pakistan, now 

a U.S. citizen. First director of South Asia Center at the Atlantic 

Council in Washington. He has worked for Rand Corporation and 

U.S. Institute of Peace and the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and we also have with us over at this side—

please tell me how to pronounce your first name. 

6

Mr. PANDE. Aparna. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Aparna. Okay. Aparna Pande, a research fellow with the Hudson Institute Center on Islam, Democracy, and 

the Future of the muslim World. A 1993 graduate of Delhi University. You hold a master’s degree in history from St. Stephen’s College, Delhi University and then a master’s in international relations as well, and you’ve received a doctorate in political science 

from Boston University, and you have a book explaining Pakistan’s 

foreign policy. Boy, we’ll be interested to hear that, and escaping 

India I might add. It was published in March 2011 by Routledge, 

and then John Tkacik. 

Mr. TKACIK. That’s correct. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right. Retired Foreign Service officer, 

businessman, policy commentator with over 35 years experience in 

China, Taiwan and Mongolia, he spent 24 years in the Department 

of State and in diplomatic and counselor offices in Taiwan and 

China, and was the Chief of China Analysts in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research before he retired in 1994. 

He joined the Heritage Foundation in 2001 where he was a senior fellow in Asian studies. He has edited two books, Reshaping the 

Taiwan Strait and Rethinking One China. He is fluent in Chinese 

and has degrees from Harvard and Georgetown Universities. He’s 

currently president of the China Business Intelligence, and then 

Sadanand Dhume, got it, is a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. He is also a South Asian columnist for the Wall 

Street Journal. He has worked as a foreign correspondent for the 

Far Eastern Economic Review and my friend, Bertil Lintner. Is he 

still there? 

Mr. DHUME. Bertil’s still there, but the magazine isn’t though. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. But the magazine isn’t. Bertil is there, but 

the magazine folded. Okay, and was a fellow at the Asian Society 

here in Washington, DC. He has a political travelogue about the 

rise of radical Islam in Indonesia, My Friend, The Fanatic, travels 

with a radical Islamist, has been published in four countries, has 

a B.A. from Delhi University and a master’s degree from Columbia 

and Princeton, and we should go from right to left. Which right? 

This right. Okay. From her, she’d be on the lefthand side. 

Why don’t we start with you. If you could try to condense it down 

to 5 minutes that would be helpful and then we’ll go to questions 

and answers after that. So you may proceed. 

STATEMENT OF APARNA PANDE, PH.D., RESIDENT FELLOW, 

HUDSON INSTITUTE 

Mr. PANDE. Good afternoon, I would like to start by thanking the 

chairman and the committee for having me here today. 

Any attempt at a certain American grand strategy will face some 

difficulty in South Asia. This is because it will be difficult to place 

either India or Pakistan into set categories or strategies. During 

the Cold War, Pakistan was more interested in being part of a 

grand strategy, but India adopted the policy of nonalignment. 

Today, while India may appear more interested in partnering 

with the United States, Pakistan will resist being part of any 

grand strategy. Therefore, instead of a grand strategy, it might be 

better if they were country and region specific strategies. 

7

The U.S.-Pakistan relationship has been one of differing expectations and that is often why both sides feel let down. Pakistan’s 

leaders have always feared an existential threat from India and believe that the aim of India’s foreign policy is to undo the creation 

of Pakistan. Pakistan has always seen the United States as the 

ally who would provide assistance to help Pakistan gain parity 

with India and ensure its safety and integrity against any Indian 

attack. In return for supporting some American policies, Pakistan 

has sought U.S. aid and support against India especially in the 

context of Kashmir and Afghanistan. 

For the United States, however, Pakistan was just one part of its 

larger containment strategy during the Cold War era. Post 9/11 

Pakistan was invaluable for the war in Afghanistan and against 

terrorism. For the United States, the relationship has been tactical 

and transactional, not strategic and long term. Further while desirous of peace in South Asia, the U.S. has never seen India as an 

enemy or threat. 

Pakistan seeks in China a strong ally who would build Pakistan’s 

economic and military resources, to help achieve parity with India 

and a country that has an antagonistic relationship with India and 

hence would support Pakistan in any conflict with India. While 

China has been a close Pakistani ally since the 1950s, Chinese assistance has been limited to the military-nuclear area, in facilitative development and trade related investment. The investment 

has been targeted in such a way as would benefit China in the long 

run. For decades, Indian policymakers viewed American policy as 

that of an offshore balancer to counter so-called Indian hegemony 

in South Asia. 

Starting with the Bush administration, there was a change in 

policy beginning with a desire to treat India and Pakistan differently. Economic, security and defense ties have grown in the last 

decade. 

Over the years, the U.S. has provided vast amounts of aid to 

Pakistan. However, most of this aid has been military in nature. 

It is only in 2009 that with the Kerry-Lugar-Berman Act a significant amount of nonmilitary aid was offered to Pakistan. 

If the United States withdraws all its assistance, especially nonmilitary aid, and walks away from Pakistan, there will be further 

destabilization of the country and the region. This move will negatively affect American operations in Afghanistan. 

Without an American presence or assistance, Pakistan will be 

even less reluctant to act against terror groups operating from its 

territory. This means that if any future attacks in India are traced 

back to Pakistan, then without an American stake in the region, 

it will be difficult to dissuade either country from taking military 

action. 

The threat of nuclear proliferation to terrorists is another issue 

that directly threatens U.S. foreign and domestic interests. Further, Pakistan’s economy is weak and has yet to recover from the 

devastating floods of 2010 and the massive refugee crisis. Pakistan’s depends on outside support both from U.S. and multi-lateral 

institutions like IMF, World Bank and others. 

Pakistan’s foreign and security policies have traditionally been 

and continue to remain the domain of the military bureaucratic esVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:28 Sep 09, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\OI\072611\67601 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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tablishment. Civilian politicians have rarely had any say and have 

been unwilling or unable to change the direction of these policies. 

While the Pakistani security establishment’s world view does not 

match that of the American, boosting the civilian side of the Pakistani state which shares the American world view is critical. In the 

long run, U.S. policy would benefit by weaning Pakistan away from 

its fundamental orientation and ideological driven identity and 

world view by helping the civilian, secular and liberal elements in 

the country. In this context non-military aid that furthers the 

growth of a modern middle class and civil society is well worth the 

investment. Non-military aid less thinly spread that is targeted to 

impact the lives of large numbers of people is also going to have 

a higher payoff. 

Moving ahead, the relationship with Pakistan is going to be difficult. But it will be beneficial to both parties concerned if one tried 

to find areas of agreement. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Pande follows:]

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Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, and we will have some 

questions for you later on. 

John, would you like to proceed? 

STATEMENT OF MR. JOHN TKACIK, JR., PRESIDENT, CHINA 

BUSINESS INTELLIGENCE (FORMER CHIEF OF CHINA ANALYSIS IN THE BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE) 

Mr. TKACIK. Thank you, Chairman Rohrabacher and members of 

the committee. I am honored to be here to testify before you on 

what may be the most important dimension of America’s grand 

strategy in South Asia which is the strategic relationship between 

China and Pakistan. 

I’ve entitled my presentation ‘‘The Enemy of Hegemony is My 

Friend’’ because China views the United States as the hegemon in 

the world and Pakistan views India as the hegemon in South Asia. 

At the outset let me say that in the 21st century there can be 

no more profound a strategic alliance than one in which the members exchange nuclear weapons, materials, technology and delivery 

systems between themselves and aid each other in their development. 

This is the kind of relationship that China and Pakistan have. 

In fact, the United States only has one such relationship and that’s 

the so-called special relationship with the United Kingdom. China 

and Pakistan’s relationship although it appears that China’s far 

more tolerant and abetting of Pakistan’s further proliferation of nuclear weapons and delivery systems to third parties such as North 

Korea and Libya. These are only two examples of the peculiar strategic relationship that China and Pakistan have. 

Recently there has been considerable speculation in the news 

that somehow China recently has come to eclipse the United States 

as Pakistan’s most important ally. But this is unfounded. It’s unrealistic. It betrays an misunderstanding of Pakistan’s strategic relationship with China. 

China has always been Pakistan’s most important strategic ally. 

And the intensity of Pakistan’s relationship with the United States 

has always been a subfunction of Pakistan’s all-consuming strategic calculus about India. 

The relationship between China and Pakistan goes back, of 

course, to the 1962 war between China and India which was rooted 

in China’s occupation of the Aksai Chin portion of the Indiaclaimed portion of Kashmir 6 years earlier. 

Mr. Chairman, as you’re aware, the United States cooperated 

with India in the 50s and 60s to support a large Tibetan exile nation based in India. China came to regard Pakistan as a strategic 

ally to India’s geographical rear and Pakistan for its part had likewise come to see China as a counterweight to India. 

In the 1965 First Indo-Pakistani War after Pakistan was soundly 

defeated, China immediately provided Pakistan with a considerable 

amount of war materiel including at least an armored division’s 

worth of T–59 medium tanks and two air wings of MiG–19 jet 

fighters. This was weaponry that China at the time was not in a 

position to give away. But China could not tolerate strategically InVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:28 Sep 09, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\OI\072611\67601 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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dia’s preeminence in the subcontinent if China were to consolidate 

its legitimacy in its occupation of Tibet. 

From that time on, China-Pakistan alliance has been the single 

most important military relationship that either of the two nations 

has had since the 1950s. I won’t go through the history of it, but 

I will say, before my time is up, that China’s complicity in providing Pakistan with nuclear weapons technology, nuclear weapons 

materials, including fissile materials, China’s provision to Pakistan 

of ballistic missile technology and when the United States put pressure on China to stop, China managed a very subtle but quite apparent trade between North Korea and Pakistan. 

North Korea gave Pakistan ballistic missile technology in return 

for which Pakistan gave North Korea uranium separation technology and weapons technology. This was all revealed by former 

Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto to a friend of hers before she 

passed away. And the Washington Post had two articles on it that 

I thought were quite revealing. We can discuss it if you wish when 

the time comes. 

Let me move right to my conclusion. For the United States to 

achieve a true strategic partnership with Pakistan, the United 

States must then share Pakistan’s posture toward India. It follows 

that subduing India also demands acquiescing in China’s ultimate 

hegemony in Asia. 

In reassessing America’s grand strategy in South Asia, the 

United States must first reassess its total global grand strategy. If 

the United States can live with an Asia under Chinese hegemony 

and with a crippled India, then America can have Pakistan’s enthusiastic partnership against the Taliban or whomever else it 

wants. 

But decisions like this are, as they say, above my pay grade. Instead they are the proper focus of the Congress and the Executive. 

I would only say that both the Congress and the Executive should 

look at South Asia’s strategy in the context of its broader global 

strategy. And I’ll leave the rest of my presentation to the questions. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statemeent of Mr. Tkacik follows:]

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Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Dhume. 

STATEMENT OF MR. SADANAND DHUME, RESEARCH FELLOW, 

AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE 

Mr. DHUME. Thank you. Mr. Chairman Rohrabacher and Mr. 

Ranking Member Carnahan and all of the committee members. It’s 

an honor to be here. 

I would argue that there is in fact—we do have the contours of 

U.S. grant strategy in South Asia and I would say that pillars of 

that sort of to understand what U.S. policy should be in the region 

we could actually look back at another part of Asia where U.S. policy was very successful which is Southeast Asia from I’d say between 1966 until about the late 90s. And just as the U.S. in Southeast Asia was instrumental in prevailing over Indonesia and Malaysia, for example, to end their squabbles and presiding over three 

decades of outstanding economic growth, rising prosperity, opening 

market economies and so on, I think that ought to be—that provides a kind of template for what should be U.S. grant strategy in 

South Asia where the U.S. has been arguably much less successful. 

So I’d say that this grant strategy has four pillars as I see it. The 

first, of course, is to take a leaf out of successful U.S. strategy in 

Southeast Asia to preside over a period of peace and prosperity. 

The second key factor here is that India is naturally the fulcrum 

of U.S. policy in South Asia quite simply because of its size, because of its economy, because of the fact that its economy is increasingly open and it has private sector companies that are driving it, because of very close people to people ties between the U.S. 

and India, particularly the large Indian American community from 

whom you have two members over here. For all these reasons, 

democratic India as you said is a natural American partner in the 

region which acts against both the hegemony of authoritarian 

China and also acts as a kind of firebreak against a rise of radical 

Islam as an ideology unfortunately much of which is emanating 

from Pakistan. 

The third leg of this grant strategy apart from taking a leaf from 

Southeast Asia and using India as a fulcrum would be making sure 

that Pakistan stops spreading terrorism both in its neighborhood 

and beyond and making sure that Pakistan nuclear weapons do not 

fall in the hands of any terrorist group. 

And finally, the fourth leg would be greater economic integration. 

Now when I look at these sort of pillars the one that seems most 

problematic which you alluded to also, Mr. Chairman, is Pakistan 

and the current state of that state. I’d say if you were to sum up 

what the U.S. needs to achieve in Pakistan very simply it is to 

change the nature of the Pakistani state. And by this I mean it has 

to go from being a state where the Army and the Army’s intelligence agency, the ISI, play a disproportionate role that destabilizes its neighbors, both Afghanistan and India, to one where 

Pakistan’s legitimate security interests are respected such as its 

borders. But its capacity to destabilize its neighbors and effectively 

keep India hobbled which plays into Chinese ambition is restricted. 

And that has to be the central goal of U.S. policy in South Asia. 

30

For the foreseeable future, it has to be changing the course of Pakistan. 

Now you spoke of carrots and sticks and I agree wholeheartedly 

that American carrots have not entirely been successful, $20 billion 

of aid, and you still find Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad, Pakistan, a garrison town. So I agree that the method has not been entirely successful. 

But I would add that instead of taking away all the carrots 

which would be shortsighted, we need a combination of targeted 

carrots and bigger sticks. You can’t take the sticks off the table. 

But you can’t take the carrots away either because the alternative 

which would be a Pakistan that is disengaged from the U.S. would 

hurt their elements in Pakistani society. And they do exist. Liberal 

secular elements in Pakistani society who want their country to 

focus on development and the betterment of its citizens. And those 

people need to have the support of the United States even while 

the Army is turned into something that we would recognize as resembling a more ‘‘normal’’ military, one that is concerned with 

guarding its own borders and less with destabilizing its neighbors. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Dhume follows:]

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Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. Exactly 5 minutes. 

Very impressive. 

Mr. Nawaz. 

STATEMENT OF MR. SHUJA NAWAZ, DIRECTOR OF THE SOUTH 

ASIA CENTER, THE ATLANTIC COUNCIL OF THE UNITED 

STATES 

Mr. NAWAZ. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Carnahan, members of the committee, I’m honored to be invited to speak to you 

today. With due respect, Mr. Chairman, I cannot see any signs of 

a ‘‘grand strategy’’ of the United States in South Asia. In my view, 

we’ve been improvising all along and now as we approach the end 

of military operations in Afghanistan, we seem to be trying to do 

too much in too short a time. 

I’m reminded of Lewis Carroll’s sentence in Alice’s Adventures in 

Wonderland: ‘‘When you don’t know where you are going, any road 

will take you there.’’ It is sad and regrettable that today after expending billions of dollars in the region and losing thousands of 

American lives and many multiples in Afghan and Pakistani lives 

in the ensuing conflicts we are still grasping for a ‘‘grand strategy.’’ 

Our local alliances have been marked by expediency. It is time to 

change that situation. 

In my detailed testimony I’ve examined the genesis of the U.S.-

Pakistan relationship in the past decade or so and identified the 

causes of our current problems in the region. In the interest of 

time, let me identify now some practicable suggestions as we move 

ahead. 

First, the United States must stop seeing everything through the 

military lens alone and stop aligning with corrupt leaders who will 

use aid to line their own pockets at the expense of their citizens 

and who dissemble with us and lie to their own people even after 

agreeing to certain courses of action with the United States. 

The United States must put its interactions with civilian leaders 

and civil society on a much higher plane than it has to date. And 

it must increase its effort to help Pakistan rebuild its civil society 

and institutions so they can reclaim the space that’s been taken 

away by long military rule. 

Despite the occasional contretemps, the Pakistan military still 

values its ties to the United States. But this relationship must be 

based on respect and a very frank assessment of needs on both 

sides. Stopping the Coalition Support Funds will be a good start. 

Replacing it with an agreed military aid program with clearly identified and defined objectives and expectations will change this from 

a transactional relationship to a consistent and a sustainable one. 

The military IMET program, the International Military Education and Training Program, must be deepened to extend to attachments with U.S. forces of the ‘‘lost generation’’ of junior Pakistani officers who were cut off from the world at the time that 

Pakistan was under sanctions. 

The United States’ private negotiations with Pakistani interlocutors have to be frank and tough but rest on honesty and mutual 

respect. Influencing local leaders via leaks and public statements 

via the news media produces an unintended consequence: Support 

for an ever present and widening net of conspiracy theories. 

38

The Kerry-Lugar-Berman bill is a strong signal of a change in 

the U.S. view of this relationship. But it needs to be refocused on 

economic development and longer-term sustainable signature 

projects along the lines of development financing from the United 

Kingdom. We must build civil institutions through a civilian equivalent of The IMET program. 

Economics lies at the heart of potential interdependence within 

the region, as one of my colleagues here has said. The United 

States can and should encourage opening of borders to trade people. The trade dividends for India and Pakistan alone could rise 

from a current level of $2 billion a year to $100 billion a year: 

Much more than any potential U.S. aid to the region. 

Seven out of ten persons polled in India and Pakistan want to 

have better relations with the other country. The United States can 

and must leverage this latent goodwill as suggested recently by 

Secretary Clinton in her speech at Chennai. Once the people can 

move across borders freely, the ability of interested parties to foment conflict will be reduced considerably. 

As we prepare to exit Afghanistan, both India and Pakistan 

could be persuaded to work together to ensure that Afghan territory will not become a battleground for their narrow interests. A 

radical Taliban regime in Kabul would allow the Pakistani Taliban 

to use sanctuaries to attack the Pakistani state from across the Afghan border. Let us try and build on that common understanding 

of The Taliban threat. 

Finally, we should also consider widening the aperture to see 

how we can engage China and even Iran to use their respective influence and economic ties with Afghanistan and Pakistan to create 

stability. China has a huge economic stake in the stability of the 

region and also fears radical extremists contaminating its own border region. 

Mr. Chairman, I’m grateful that this committee is focusing on 

this issue and thank you for allowing me to share some of my 

views with you. 

The prepared statement of Mr. Nawaz follows:]

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Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much to our witnesses, and 

what we will do is I’ll start off with a few questions. We’ll go to 

our other members of the committee and then the ranking member 

will be rushing back from his hearing right across the hall and we 

appreciate his diligence in doing just that. 

Now I’m trying to—Did you say that China and Pakistan have 

always been—Or was that you? Okay. So you believe that China 

and Pakistan have always been best friends. 

Mr. TKACIK. Well, I think since the 1962 Indo-Pakistani, I mean, 

Sino-Indian War. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. Sixty-six. 

Mr. TKACIK. 1962. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. 62, okay. 

Mr. TKACIK. China has viewed India as an enemy as an adversary. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right. 

Mr. TKACIK. In the 1950s, India and China were sort of on the 

same ideological sheet of music. They were both supported by the 

Soviet Union. They both considered themselves socialistic states. 

But in 1957 when China began to build roads through The Aksai 

Chin Territory of Kashmir, which is I’m not even sure if the Chinese even knew they were in Kashmir at that time, India began 

to get a little bit upset. And by 1962 when the Sino-Soviet ideological split burst open, India decided to side with the Soviet Union. 

And that was sort of when the——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right. So you’re suggesting that the ChinesePakistani relationship is longstanding and not something new. 

Mr. TKACIK. Yes. At least a half century. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I guess what Americans don’t understand is 

that we’ve had military bases in Pakistan. Did we not have an Air 

Force base up there? And we have been—And I think you also testified that or one of you testified that the Indian Army or, excuse 

me, the Pakistani Army had been equipped by China with all their 

tanks and such, but we were providing Pakistan with arms at that 

same time. 

Mr. TKACIK. I believe. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Now if my memory serves me correctly, 

Nixon didn’t turn around our relationship with China until the 

early 70s. So there was a time period in the past when China was 

America’s worst nightmare and Pakistan was China’s best friend? 

Mr. TKACIK. Yes. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And we were friends of Pakistan? 

Mr. TKACIK. Well, you recall that Francis Gary Powers I believe 

took off in his U–2 from an airbase near Peshawar to go over the 

Soviet Union. And at that time, yes, we had a very close strategic 

relationship with Pakistan. However, in the 1960s, our relationship 

with Pakistan was a bit strained because the two—primarily because of the first Indo-Pakistani War in 1965. 

And by 1969 when Henry Kissinger first and President Nixon 

first looked at the possibility of a Soviet nuclear strike on China 

the United States then and only then began to look at India as a 

Soviet ally and Pakistan as a conduit to China. And you’ll recall 

that Henry Kissinger who made his famous secret trip to China in 

1971——

45

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I see. 

Mr. TKACIK [continuing]. Exactly 40 years ago went through 

Pakistan. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So the actual change in relationship with 

China which is something I—this is a new revelation to me and I’m 

glad that we have these hearings for that purpose. So you’re suggesting that it was our relationship with Pakistan that helped open 

the door to a more positive relationship with China, and now that 

China is becoming more adversarial and appears to be less friendly 

to the United States and our interests, what does that mean about 

the Pakistani relationship? 

Mr. TKACIK. Well, I would simply reiterate that Pakistan and 

China are very close, natural allies. I do not think that it’s going 

to be possible to have a strategic cooperative relationship with 

Pakistan unless we basically decide that we are going to have an 

equally strong and cooperative relationship with China. 

When you look at the South Asian subcontinent in order to have 

a strong, cooperative relationship with China and Pakistan you basically have to sacrifice India. Now it’s up to you all to decide. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes. Well, let me just note that I as the 

chair—the chair believes that we face the two major enemies that 

are faced with the United States. The two major threats are radical 

Islam which we know which is murdering our citizens, murdering 

other people as well, and China which is emerging as not a friendly 

power but instead actually a hostile power to the United States, 

and if that is the case, does that not mean that if Pakistan has this 

being tied at the hip to China should we not then suggest that it’s 

time to become more acquainted with India than with Pakistan? 

Yes, sir. 

Mr. NAWAZ. Mr. Chairman, I think it’s a little more complex than 

that. It’s not a linear equation. The United States and China certainly have a lot of co-dependence particularly on the economic 

side. And we must not ignore that in the relationship. 

Secondly, China, as I mentioned in my remarks, is equally scared 

of Islamic extremism in the region, in the neighborhood, as well as 

in its western territories in Xinjiang. And the last thing that the 

Chinese would be interested in is having a strong basis of Islamic 

extremism anywhere close to their borders. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. But Pakistan—But is that not what Pakistan 

is all about now? I mean this is—Let’s be fair about it. The ISI and 

the military we thought were forces in Pakistan that were moderate forces actually have been allied with radical Islam all along, 

and it has actually been the more moderate forces in Pakistan represented by The Bhuttos and others that were not oriented toward 

radical Islam. But they were enemies of the military. 

Mr. NAWAZ. Mr. Chairman, the Chinese have a strong interest 

in a stable, moderate Pakistan on their borders precisely for that 

reason that it would eliminate the possibility of radical extremist 

taking over that state. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I’m sure they’re willing to pay for it because 

I think we’re done, willing to pay for it ourselves. 

Yes, madam. You have one. 

Mr. PANDE. I would like to say that Pakistan has more of a 

mythical notion of the Chinese-Pakistani relationship than China 

46

does. That’s the point I want to make that Pakistan seeks a lot 

more in China. China has never been as ‘‘good’’ an ally or as faithful an ally as the Pakistani narrative makes it out to be. 

China has provided economic aid, some military and nuclear aid. 

But from the 1990s China has also started stepping back a bit. 

China and India ties, especially the economic ties with India, have 

improved. And China has been reluctant to walk into any IndiaPakistan disputes purely on the Pakistani side. So China has 

nuanced its relationship in the last two decades. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Can I ask you a question before Mr. Rivera? 

But we’ll go back and forth in this. But does China give a significant amount of nonmilitary aid to Pakistan and, if so, what is it? 

Mr. PANDE. Very limited. It is infrastructure development like 

highways and ports, The Gwadar Port, Karakoram Highway. About 

$300 million for grant and loan assistance between 2004 and 2009 

but not much more. So it’s very, very limited nonmilitary. It’s 

mainly infrastructure and trade. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. But a limited amount. 

Mr. PANDE. Very limited. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. That’s compared to the United States. 

Mr. PANDE. Minuscule compared to the United States. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Oh my. Okay. 

Mr. DHUME. I’d just like to respectfully disagree with Mr. Nawaz 

on China and how much it’s willing to live with radical Islam. 

Whereas I agree that it’s not in Chinese interest to have its western regions such as in Xinjiang destabilized, China has been quite 

happy to live with Pakistan whose government has in fact aided 

and abetted Islamist groups for decades. And this has not been 

something that the Chinese have not used their influence to end 

this. And in fact at the United Nations they have been more than 

happy to use their influence in the other direction to protect some 

of these groups that the United States and India would like to see 

proscribed. 

So I think the Chinese at a conceptual level, yes, they don’t want 

to have radical Islam in their territory. But they’re willing to play 

a sophisticated game that tolerates these elements of Pakistan. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. They’re willing to give a nuclear weapons capability to someone who is a radical nutcase. 

Mr. Rivera. 

Mr. RIVERA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have just a few questions. I know how important this issue is given recent events in the 

world and given the state of relations between Pakistan and India 

in particular. 

If we were to say that Pakistan’s relationship with China on a 

scale of one to ten was a ten—whatever that means ten—how 

would you rate on a scale of one to ten the importance of Pakistan’s 

relationship with the United States from Pakistan’s perspective? 

I’ll start over here on a scale of one to ten. 

Mr. PANDE. I’d like to differentiate a bit between the civilian elements and the military within Pakistan. 

Mr. RIVERA. From the government’s perspective, if you were sitting here as the prime minister, what would be—Your relationship 

with China is a ten. You’re now Pakistan. How important is your 

relationship with the United States on a scale on one to ten? 

47

Mr. PANDE. Between a five and seven. 

Mr. RIVERA. A five and seven. 

Mr. Tkacik. 

Mr. TKACIK. I would say about a five. 

Mr. RIVERA. About a five. 

Mr. Dhume. 

Mr. DHUME. I would say about an eight. They’re both very important. 

Mr. RIVERA. About an eight. 

Mr. Nawaz. 

Mr. NAWAZ. I would say about eight and heading toward five. 

Mr. RIVERA. Okay. So between five and eight. So then my question is if obviously the relationship with China could be as much 

as twice as important to them as the relationship with us what 

then given that fact that their relationship is twice as important 

with China than it is with us what then are the pressure points 

that we have at our disposal if our relationship is about half as important to them as China. Where are our pressure points? Is it foreign aid? Is it trade? Is it perhaps U.S. aid to India, however that 

might manifest itself? Is it military aid? Where are our pressure 

points given that reality vis-a`-vis China? 

Mr. Nawaz. 

Mr. NAWAZ. I think it’s not just a question of pressure points. It’s 

also a question of leverage. 

Mr. RIVERA. Where is our leverage? 

Mr. NAWAZ. The leverage is economic to a very large extent 

and——

Mr. RIVERA. Trade? 

Mr. NAWAZ [continuing]. Increasing military to a large extent. 

Mr. RIVERA. When you say economic, you mean our trade relations with Pakistan? 

Mr. NAWAZ. If the U.S. opens up trade access for Pakistani 

goods, it means we have to give them much less aid. And they can 

make the money on their own and profit from it. That’s number 

one. 

Number two, on the economic side, it’s not just the U.S. assistance. The U.S. has tremendous leverage through the international 

financial institutions, so the IMF, the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank. It works both ways. We can shut off that spigot 

or we can——

Mr. RIVERA. So financial institutions and trade. 

Mr. NAWAZ. Yes. 

Mr. RIVERA. Mr. Dhume. 

Mr. DHUME. I’d say the U.S. has tremendous leverage and in essence if the U.S. were to turn its back on Pakistan I think not only 

would Pakistan’s economy which is already hurting, not only Pakistan’s economy——

Mr. RIVERA. Turn its back how? Withdrawal of what? 

Mr. DHUME. If it were to decide that it—with a cutoff date. If it 

were to cut off support for Pakistan in the international financial 

institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank. It were to publicly call Pakistan out on past actions of both nuclear and nonproliferation and support for terrorism. 

48

I think the U.S. has a tremendous ability to threaten Pakistan’s 

economic well-being and also its legitimacy. 

Mr. RIVERA. So cut off aid and international financial institutions. 

Mr. DHUME. And legitimacy in the international system. 

Mr. RIVERA. I don’t know how concerned they are about that. But 

certainly money I’m sure they’re concerned about. 

Mr. Tkacik. 

Mr. TKACIK. Well, I think we’re in a bit of a difficult situation 

because frankly we’re extremely exposed in Afghanistan and my 

understanding is about 80–90 percent of our logistics supporting 

our troops in Afghanistan go through Pakistan. So if you were to 

put pressure on Pakistan, I can imagine what kind of pressure 

Pakistan could put on us. 

So if you want to avoid or if you want to have leverage on Pakistan you’ve got to remove the Pakistani leverage on us. And I 

worry then how we’re going to do that. This is a very complex, strategic game that we have before us and you have to——

Mr. RIVERA. So as long as the troops are there, we have no leverage. 

Ms. Pande. 

Mr. PANDE. It’s economic, both nonmilitary aid. That means what 

U.S. provides and international institutions like IMF. It’s military 

aid. It’s also trade and it’s leverage with the India-Pakistan relationship in Afghanistan. 

Mr. RIVERA. Okay. My next question, what is the state of bilateral relations between Pakistan and Iran and its southern quadrant? 

Mr. Nawaz. 

Mr. NAWAZ. This has always been a very interesting and problematic relationship. 

Mr. RIVERA. What is the state today? 

Mr. NAWAZ. It is problematic and still very interesting because 

of conflicting interests in the border region between Iran and Pakistan. There is an insurgency asking for an independent Greater 

Balochistan and it has found support inside Pakistan allowing a 

group called Jundallah from operating from Pakistani bases. 

Mr. RIVERA. So it’s not a close relationship. 

Mr. NAWAZ. It’s close in some areas but not close on others. 

Mr. RIVERA. Okay. So problematic he said, would that be accurate? Would everyone agree with a problematic relationship between Iran and Pakistan? 

Mr. Dhume. 

Mr. DHUME. I’d say that traditionally it has not been. I mean it’s 

been warm. But I’d say that one of the big problems has been that 

since the Iranian revolution you’ve seen the rise of an extreme kind 

of Sunni fundamentalism in Pakistan which specifically targets 

Pakistan’s Shia minority and that has created sort of a bit of tensions between them. 

Mr. RIVERA. Tensions. My light is on. Sorry, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you so much for your indulgence. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And Judge Poe. 

Mr. POE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for being here. 

49

To me, Pakistan has proven itself, has proven itself, to be an untrustworthy ally of the United States. After $20 billion of aid 

over the last 10 years, I’m not sure we have a whole lot to show 

for it. Pakistan has still not gone after key targets like Al Qaeda. 

Pakistan was either unwilling or unable to hand over Osama bin 

Laden. That was in plain sight to everybody in that area. 

If Pakistan was truly on our side in the fight against terrorists, 

that it should have commended our work and taken out the Number One Terrorist in the world. Instead the Pakistanis arrested 

CIA informants that helped us get him. Some kind of friends they 

are. 

In June, Pakistan tipped off terrorists making IEDs not once but 

twice after we gave them information and told them where the terrorists were so they could go capture them. And all of a sudden the 

terrorists disappeared. 

The latest Pakistani show of friendship came over the weekend 

at the World Without Terrorism conference hosted by the world’s 

leading terrorist state, Iran. And the Pakistanis told the Iranians 

that they wanted to be an ally and pledged their work toward 

working and expanding relations with Iran. 

It’s time for us to take a look at the money we’re giving away 

to Pakistan. Over the last 10 years, Pakistan has not helped us get 

any closer today in eliminating terrorists. It’s possible that our aid 

to Pakistan is actually hurting more than it is doing good. 

And not all the problems can be solved by throwing money at 

people especially Pakistan. The billions of dollars that we give 

them, what do we have to show for it? I believe it’s time we reevaluate all aid, military and foreign aid, to Pakistan. Pakistan has 

become the Benedict Arnold nation in its relationship with the 

United States. 

I have a couple of questions and if I mispronounce your name I 

apologize. My name is Ted Poe. I’ve been called Tadpole and the 

whole thing, a lot of things worst than that. 

But, Mr. Tkacik, I have a couple of questions about China, Pakistan, North Korea on the development of nuclear weapons. Do you 

see that train or line going to North Korean nuclear development 

coming from Pakistan? There have been accusations for years that 

that’s where they got their start or help. 

Mr. TKACIK. Well, I think that relationship has been very, very 

clearly documented not just in the intelligence that the United 

States has collected but also in basically the public record. 

There is no question in my mind that China has been the 

facilitator of the exchange of nuclear weapons technology from 

Pakistan to North Korea in exchange for North Korean ballistic 

missile technology to Pakistan. I can say that people that have had 

direct knowledge of the intelligence have confirmed that to me. 

It’s been in the newspapers. And again as I mentioned and I’ve 

documented in my presentation here when Mrs. Bhutto, when 

former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, made her comments to a 

journalist friend of hers she couched it in terms of—and I should 

find it here—she said, ‘‘I have done more for my country than all 

of the members of the Pakistani Armed Forces. I was the one that 

went to North Korea and exchanged nuclear weapons technology 

for the ballistic missiles.’’

50

And then she——

Mr. POE. I’m sorry to cut you off. I only have a few minutes. But 

I just wanted to hear that from you once again to clarify the information. 

Military aid, foreign aid, two separate types of aid we give to the 

Pakistanis. There have been reports that some of the military aid 

we give to the Pakistanis to help fight the bad guys actually turns 

out to go into the hands of the military for other purposes, maybe 

even to reinforce the military along the border with India. 

Any one of you want to weigh in on that accusation against the 

Pakistani military? Mr. Tkacik. 

Mr. TKACIK. I mean I look back at right after 9/11. The biggest, 

most prominent terrorist attack was by Pakistanis against the Indian Parliament in New Delhi in December 2001. This could have 

started a nuclear war between these two countries. 

Now China was involved in this and China had made an arrangement with Pakistan to get Pakistani nuclear weapons. In the 

overall strategic context of this, why would China want Pakistan 

to have nuclear weapons in this kind of a situation? 

Well, we were the ones. The United States were the ones that 

immediately after 9/11 had to broker the peace between Pakistan 

and India after the New Delhi attacks. This was the Pakistani 

military I believe that was behind this. And one has to ask oneself 

what is the strategic game going on here. 

Mr. POE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. If you have any other questions, you’re welcome to go right ahead. The chairman took a few extra minutes. 

Mr. POE. That’s it for now. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right. Got it. Let me ask some things 

here. Are there any documented cases where India attacked Pakistan in these last five decades? I mean we know about Mumbai and 

we know that the terrorists actually had a connection with the 

military in Pakistan, and we know that in Kashmir there have 

been weapons and such shipped into Kashmir. Now, by the way, 

I personally believe that the Kashmirian people deserve to have a 

referendum and to determine their own destiny, and I think that 

we could deflate that situation if India would permit that. 

So I’m not siding. I’m not just forgetting anything wrong, but by 

and large I can’t remember any time when the Indians were attacking the Pakistanis. Can you enlighten me to that? 

Mr. NAWAZ. Mr. Chairman, strictly speaking and technically 

speaking, in 1971 the Indian army invaded what was then Pakistan and what was then East Pakistan in support of the independence movement of the Bangladeshis. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. But we know now that that wasn’t an 

invasion because government is what the people of the country 

want. 

Mr. NAWAZ. Right. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And obviously the people there did not want 

to be under Pakistan. 

Mr. NAWAZ. That’s quite correct. But technically since it was still 

the state of Pakistan. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Were there any other examples? 

Mr. NAWAZ. Apart from that, there are no known examples. 

51

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. So this is pretty clear cut, who’s committing violence against whom in that part of the world. I don’t 

know why it’s taken the United States—Well, I was in my Cold 

War mentality all that time. So it seems to me that it’s very clear 

now that the Government of Pakistan and its intense belligerence 

toward India is willing to commit acts of violence and be part of—

actually support acts of violence against India. 

What would we expect of any other country except to defend 

itself? Is there anything that India can do that would bring down 

this level of intense belligerence on the part of Pakistan? 

I don’t find that same intensity of belligerence by Indians against 

Pakistan, but they are justifiably outraged when their people are 

killed. 

Mr. DHUME. Mr. Chairman, India is a status quo power in the 

region. India still has many problems. It’s still a poor country. But 

it has a rapidly growing economy and it’s a fairly stable democratic 

policy. And India does not seek an inch of Pakistani territory. 

I think India’s view on this is essentially defensive. And if you 

go back and look at some of the most startling terrorist attacks 

over the past decade, including the one on Parliament and including The Mumbai attacks, India has shown restraint in this regard. 

I think what India could do and which Mr. Nawaz also alluded 

to to lower the temperature in the region is frankly use economic, 

people-to-people and using their soft power in India leads in publishing movies, music and so on which are vastly popular in Pakistan. And many Pakistani writers, musicians, actors and so on are 

vastly popular in India. So there is a positive side to their relationship between the two countries. And I think that India has had a 

fairly good record on this and could be encouraged to continue in 

that regard. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Ms. Pande, you wanted to add. 

Mr. PANDE. I want to add onto to what Mr. Dhume said that we 

need better economic ties and more trade. If Pakistan and India 

open or give each other Most Favored Nation status, especially 

from the Pakistani side, that would build a constituency in Pakistan which would no longer see India as an enemy but would see 

India as being trustworthy. This would build more trust between 

the two countries. And that would hopefully spread from the middle class to other sections of society especially the establishment 

and the government. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well—Yes, go right ahead. 

Mr. NAWAZ. Mr. Chairman. If I could add, Mr. Chairman. I think 

the United States has a very key potential role to create an enabling environment for the current dialogue between India and 

Pakistan and also to reprise a role that it played when it created 

an institution that nobody talks about but which has been one of 

the abiding treaties between India and Pakistan, the Indus Water 

Treaty, that the U.S. helped underwrite and that the World Bank 

underwrote in the end. And that still exists to this day under; 

which they stopped fighting over the rivers that came through Indian territory into Pakistan. And that conversation continues. The 

trade talks are continuing. Talks in counterterrorism have begun. 

The foreign secretaries are meeting today and tomorrow the foreign 

ministers will meet. 

52

The U.S. can play a huge role in helping underwrite this level 

of confidence among each other. And echoing what Mr. Dhume 

said, India being the superior power, the economic and military 

power, in the region can show what my friend, Peter Jones from 

the University of Ottawa, calls ‘‘strategic altruism.’’ I think that 

would be one way of undercutting the extremism point of view inside Pakistan of India as an enemy. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I hope that’s more than what I would call unrealistic idealism. Benevolence I don’t know where benevolence has 

really worked to change belligerence in the past. I know that when 

you help friends you do cement that friendship and that bond. 

But I don’t know about—I don’t know examples in history where 

acts of a benevolence to one’s adversary and one who hates that 

person has actually been able to calm that hatred. And in retrospect I think we need to take a look again at what’s been going on 

and some mistaken impressions that we have in the United States. 

The first mistaken impression was that the Pakistani army and the 

Pakistan Government were a bulwark against radical Islam. 

Is there any one of you that believes that now? I mean I can’t 

see how anybody in their right mind could now accept that. And 

we’ve been fed that for two decades and we’ve accepted it. And obviously the Pakistani military has been part of the radical Islamic 

movement and a facilitator of violence by the radical Islamic movement. And we need to make sure that that is part of our decision 

making process and how we deal with that. 

I also would suggest that if we—during this time period would 

none of us here—you’re the experts—have been able to come up 

with an example where India was engaged in a military action that 

it was initiating an act of aggression of Pakistan as compared to 

the multiple instances that you can see where the Paks have gone 

out and let their people go into Mumbai and slaughter people, et 

cetera. 

And, by the way, it wouldn’t surprise me if we know now that 

The ISI was harboring Osama bin Laden all of these years. Would 

it surprise anybody to think that maybe The ISI knew that he was 

planning to attack the United States and slaughter thousands of 

our people? I don’t think it would surprise anybody. 

Well, we have been acting like fools then, haven’t we? We’ve been 

acting like fools. A fool is someone who does something to aid someone who is trying to do something that will harm you and harm 

that person. If they had been guilty of all of these acts of military 

aggression or terrorist aggression during that same time period the 

United States has been providing them military support, billions of 

dollars of military support. 

Now that’s got to be stupid in anybody’s book. And I would hope 

that it’s about time, number one, to end that altogether and perhaps to start easing toward a relationship with India which seems 

to be more of a benevolent soul in all of this rather than a belligerent force. 

And I think it behooves the United States to be more inside with 

people like that rather than thinking we’re going to buy them off 

and make them nicer by giving money to a bunch of gangsters. 

Mr. Carnahan, go right ahead. 

53

Mr. CARNAHAN. Thank you, Mr Chairman. And again my apologies for having to go back and forth between hearings. But I wanted to start with Mr. Nawaz and again thank you for being here. 

You wrote last month about Pakistani-U.S. relations and the 

need for the Pakistani Parliament and the military to work together, not separately and the need for the government to own the 

plans so that it can be shared with the people of Pakistan. Your 

statement really underscores the complexity of the internal challenges in Pakistan. 

I wanted to ask. What are the prospects for achieving security 

and diplomatic progress in Pakistan given these many challenges? 

Mr. NAWAZ. Congressman, it’s not going to be a one-shot deal. 

There’s no silver bullet answer. This really demands a very consistent, longer-term approach which I believe has already been 

begun with the U.S. through the Kerry-Lugar-Berman initiative. 

I think a longer term consistent relationship is the way to influence and change particularly if we’re going to stop looking at Pakistan through the security lens. And if we want to strengthen the 

civilian side so that all the things that the United States sees as 

positive in the relationship with India we can then see as positive 

in the relationship with Pakistan. I think that’s really going to be 

key. 

The counterfactual as my colleagues on the panel have also alluded is really not very acceptable because you cannot contain such 

a vast population and particularly a country that has nuclear 

weapons and particularly a country that is home to many homegrown insurgencies and radical elements that are fighting each 

other as well as the state. So you cannot expect to innoculate the 

rest of the world from that if we were to cut ties and say, ‘‘We are 

done. Thank you very much.’’

Mr. CARNAHAN. Which really gets to my next question. I’ll start 

with you, Mr. Nawaz, but I want to ask the rest of the panelists. 

Because some have advocated increasing our disengagement with 

Pakistan, I wanted to ask your opinion about that, the effects that 

would have in Afghanistan. 

Let’s start with you, Mr. Nawaz. 

Mr. NAWAZ. Congressman, Mr. Tkacik had already alluded to 

that. There is not just for dependence for the next few years while 

we are engaged in kinetic operations in Afghanistan for both the 

air line of communication and the ground line of communication 

but in the longer run, too, for stability in the region. 

I think it’s very critical that we not end this relationship abruptly which would also further strengthen the hands of those in Pakistan who believe that this is what the U.S. does all the time. And 

that’s rhetoric that has been used against this relationship within 

the country. And it would give them strength. 

Mr. CARNAHAN. Mr. Dhume. 

Mr. DHUME. Thanks. I think that the single most important 

thing in Afghanistan, the stabilization of Afghanistan, is for Pakistani strategic elites to recognize that they cannot think of Afghanistan as a colony, that Afghanistan is an independent country and 

that though Pakistan would have legitimate interest and would 

have a stake in having a peaceful and friendly neighboring country, 

it cannot go back to post Pakistani policy in the mid 90s until 9/11 

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which was backing this brutal Islamist regime, The Taliban, in 

order to subjugate Afghanistan and turn it into a client state. 

My worry is that unless the U.S. is able to show, resolve and 

show, that it’s in Afghanistan for the long haul the natural temptation in Pakistan would be to feel that history can be rolled back 

and Afghanistan can once again be turned into a kind of puppet 

like it was in the past. 

Mr. CARNAHAN. Mr. Tkacik. 

Mr. TKACIK. Well, I mean, as I said earlier, this is a very complicated situation and as long as we are exposed in the massive 

way that we are in Afghanistan we are vulnerable in our relationship with Pakistan. I have my own ideas in how to get out of it. 

But I’m afraid it’s too complex to go through in just a 5-minute 

sound byte. 

Mr. CARNAHAN. Dr. Pande. 

Mr. PANDE. A couple of points. One, the logistic relationship: U.S. 

is still dependent about 35 percent on Pakistan. Safe havens: A 

number of the terrorists have safe havens in the Pakistani northwest tribal area and disengagement or walking away would cause 

problems for American operations and American troops both in Afghanistan and outside. A destabilization of Afghanistan actually 

would also cause a destabilization in Pakistan and the broader regions who are strategically important to us. 

And then economic reasons which would destabilize Pakistan. 

Any reduction in the nonmilitary aid or trade with Pakistan would 

cause instibility. 

Mr. CARNAHAN. One additional question. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Feel free to ask as many as you’d like. 

Mr. CARNAHAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Leon Panetta told members of the Senate Armed Services Committee during his confirmation hearing last month, ‘‘This is a difficult challenge. The relationship with Pakistan is at the same time 

one of the most critical and yet one of the most complicated and 

frustrating relationships that we have.’’

What do you feel needs to be the primary areas we need to focus 

on between these two countries to mend some of this anger and 

distrustfulness between them? Dr. Pande. 

Mr. PANDE. The nonmilitary aid which the United States provides actually helps to build a modern middle class, a more civilian 

liberal elements. And those elements actually are in favor of the 

U.S.-Pakistan relationship as well as in favor of better ties with 

India and do not view the U.S.-India relationship as being antithetical to Pakistan. So I believe that nonmilitary aid which is targeted, which is visible, which helps build this middle class and civil 

society will actually benefit United States and benefit the region 

and build a different Pakistan as compared to today. 

Mr. CARNAHAN. And one of the other concerns that I think a lot 

of folks have heard here and in Washington is that where Pakistan 

is among the largest recipients of aid from the U.S., yet the view 

toward the—the positive view of the U.S. is among the lowest of 

any country that we’re dealing with. Again as to that complicated 

nature of how we break through to the public. Could you comment 

on that? 

55

Mr. PANDE. Actually building the middle class that I talk about 

or the civil society, those sections actually have a positive view of 

the United States. And it’s that section which I believe the nonmilitary aid if it’s focused and targeted would help change that perspective. But it’s a long-term process. 

Mr. DHUME. I would say that we should not be terribly unrealistic about changing Pakistani mass public opinion in favor of the 

U.S. If you look back on the figures it was about—the U.S. had a 

favorability rating of about between 10 and 12 percent in 2002 and 

even now it’s between 10 and 12 percent which is among the lowest 

in the world. So that’s $20 billion later The favorability rating is 

the same. 

So I think that if we sort of look at it in terms of getting the average man on the street to stop thinking in terms of the U.S. being 

this scary, crusading power out to grab Pakistan’s nuclear weapons 

and the conspiracy theories that Mr. Nawaz alluded I think that 

may be based on the evidence we have so far. Pretty unrealistic. 

But what we can do and what we ought to do is try and strengthen the hands of Pakistan’s democrats so that this military—I mean 

even if they hate the U.S. or even if they hate India why had it 

become a problem? It becomes a problem because then they train 

and equip and send people across to blow up cities and slaughter 

civilians. 

The problem is that we have to remove that capacity. It will only 

happen over time if democrats are allowed to run the country. And 

the army has its normal role which is a role of defending its borders and ceases to be a destabilizing force in the region. 

Mr. CARNAHAN. Any others want to comment on that? 

Mr. NAWAZ. If I may. 

Mr. CARNAHAN. We’ll go to Mr. Tkacik and we’ll close with you. 

Mr. NAWAZ. If I may, I want to refer to the Pew Global Attitude 

polls on Pakistan. There is consistently in all the polls a paradox, 

one, something like 59 or 60 percent Pakistanis that consider the 

U.S. an adversary. But there is also a much under reported section 

of the same poll that identifies six out of ten Pakistanis that want 

improved relations with the United States. And that’s the group 

that Mr. Dhume is referring to. There’s a 35-million middle class 

in Pakistan which is a potential ally because they want the same 

things that we want, a better life, improved prospects for themselves and their kids. 

The India-Pakistan polls have almost the same kind of range. 

Seventy percent of Pakistanis polled by a joint poll conducted by 

Indian and Pakistani newspapers said they want improved relations with India. Seventy percent of Indian—72 percent of Pakistanis. Seventy percent of Indians said they want improved relations with Pakistan. 

So there is a reservoir that can be tapped, but it’s not going to 

be done overnight. And I don’t think it’s a function of money alone. 

It’s a function of consistency, honesty, respect. 

Over the last 10 years, the Government of Pakistan has been 

feeding its own people an anti-American point of view on the 

Drones, complaining about the Drones while they privately approve 

the U.S. Drone attacks. That needs to come up into the open. If the 

U.S. goes open with the Drone weapon system and acknowledges 

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it and shares information about it, then that will not happen in 

Pakistan. The people will know why the Drones are operating and 

against whom. 

So that’s just one illustration of how you build respect and honesty. Ten years the government has been feeding something to the 

people in Pakistan that has fed their anger against the U.S. Now 

we have to maybe take not 10 years but 5 years at least to try and 

change that direction. 

Mr. CARNAHAN. Thank you. 

And Mr. Tkacik. 

Mr. TKACIK. I think I agree with my fellow panelists. I would 

just point out that my impression was that there was a rather 

strong blip in support of the United States during the floods when 

the United States aid to Pakistan was more than everybody else 

combined. It was surprising to me. 

I recall that China’s aid was less than 10 percent of what the 

United States gave. But it’s interesting to me that China focused 

its aid and its benevolence not on the people of Pakistan but on the 

military and on parts of the government. 

And over the last 50 years when you have a situation where the 

military and The ISI have some place else to turn to from the 

United States which is to say China you have very little leverage 

over them and how they behave. And I have to think that in considering any kind of grant strategy for Eurasia much less a strategy for South Asia you have to deal with the pernicious impact of 

China’s involvement. 

Let me just add one thing that I meant to add earlier on. I take 

some exception to Mr. Nawaz’s statement that the Chinese are very 

worried about Islamic fundamentalism in their far western territories. I would have to say that the Chinese have figured this out 

already. The Chinese have bought off the Pakistanis. They’ve 

bought off the Afghans. They have bought off the Iranians. 

This is not news, but it’s something that’s been going on for the 

last 20 years. The Chinese are not stupid in this regard. 

Virtually all the unrest that you see in Chinese Muslim areas, 

primarily in Xinjiang, are ad hoc demonstrations by locals. You 

never see an instance in China where Muslim separatists, Muslim 

activists, have been armed by the Iranians or armed by The 

Hezbollah or armed by Pakistani ISI. You never see it. 

You do see cases where American troops have been killed by 

weapons that are supplied by the Chinese. But you never see a situation in China where Chinese Muslim separatists are armed by 

what you would think would be the logical choice, Pakistan, Iran 

and fundamentalist Islam around the world. 

What I mean to say is that in Pakistan if you cannot offer the 

military an attractive alternative to Chinese support you’re not 

going to have much leverage with them. And in this case I’m afraid 

that the military has their interests. They will pursue those interests without hesitation. And if they can’t get support from the 

Americans on that they will get it from some place else, which is 

to say—where they’ve always gotten it from—the Chinese. 

Mr. CARNAHAN. Thank you all very much. You’ve given really 

broad perspectives to this conversation, this debate, that’s obviVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:28 Sep 09, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00060 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\OI\072611\67601 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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ously going to continue. But we really appreciate you being here 

and lending your time and your expertise today. Thank you. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. I’ll just have a few 

more questions and a few more pieces of information that we’ll 

share with each other. I do appreciate all of you and I’m going to 

give each one of you 1 minute to summarize what you think is an 

important point for us to leave this hearing with, so you might be 

thinking about that as I go on with whatever I’m going to say here. 

Let me just note that I have learned. Thank you for coming 

today. I have learned from each of you information that has broadened my understanding of South Asia. 

The idea of the depth of China’s involvement with Pakistan even 

before, meaning even back as early as the 60s, was something I 

was not fully aware of, and I would just have to say that what’s 

fascinating, however, if we have a bad image in Pakistan and the 

Chinese don’t, yet they give a minuscule amount of support compared to what we’re providing in the tens of billions of dollars, 

maybe that might suggest that the strategy of winning over someone with—winning over a belligerent government by being benevolent to their people is not necessarily a strategy that works. 

I know that there’s a lot of people who felt that’s what we should 

do with China and that all we have to do is make China prosperous, and China will then become part of the family of nations 

and a nonthreatening part of the family. And, in fact, people have 

always heard me earlier say that that it was the theory of hug a 

Nazi and you’ll make a liberal. 

Well, that didn’t work with China, and clearly China has become 

ever more belligerent as it becomes ever more powerful, and it is 

using its influence again interestingly enough. China is not only 

Pakistan’s ally. But am I inaccurate when I say they are Iran’s 

ally? 

So what does that mean? The Chinese have allied themselves 

with the most virile and anti-Western elements in Islam, and 

maybe they see it as being their way of flanking us and destabilizing the United States’ position in the world. 

The one thing for sure is that we cannot afford to be a dominant 

force in the world in the far-off reaches if what it means is that 

we must have our military in action in those parts of the world. 

Our own bank is going bankrupt. 

One thing that I’ve learned here is that if there is a change in 

Pakistan it means that we must have a change in Afghanistan as 

well. Having spent considerable time in Afghanistan and knowing 

the Afghan people the way I do, I would suggest that if we’re waiting to change them or if we’re waiting to change Pakistan, that’s 

a strategy that won’t work. 

What we’ve got to do is realize we’ve got to change our policy, 

not change their way of governing and their way of life, and in 

Pakistan or in Afghanistan at least we have attempted to force a 

tribal society and a village society to accept central power over 

their lives—the same thing the Russian were trying to do, only we 

have replaced the Russians now. 

We will not succeed as they will not succeed, and maybe it is 

time for us to pull out of Afghanistan immediately so that our peoVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:28 Sep 09, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00061 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\OI\072611\67601 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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ple will quit losing their lives and losing their limbs, and that we 

will quit spending billions of dollars for a strategy that cannot 

work. 

Maybe that’s the same way we should think about Pakistan. 

We’ve tried our best, and maybe it’s time to play Alexander the 

Great here with the Gordian knot that he was supposed to untie. 

And how did he untie it? All the other leaders around the world 

had come there and been unable to untie the knot because they 

tried to work out the intricacies as you say how complicated it really is, and Alexander the Great took his sword and cut the knot in 

two and it fell apart. Maybe we have to be as decisive as that or 

we will be relegated to history. 

Our policy toward Asia is going to determine the position of the 

United States, and it seems to me from what I’ve learned today 

and what we’ve been talking about in terms of the anti-Western reality in Pakistan’s Government, military, and actions, is that it is 

time perhaps for us to have a policy that is based on embracing a 

democratic party, meaning India, rather than a belligerent, hostile, 

anti-democratic force which is what we see working in Pakistan 

today, meaning radical Islam. 

So that’s just a thought. I wonder if there’s anything more. I 

came out with a lot of knowledge. Thank you for testifying, and 

what we’ll do is we’ll—did we start with you at the beginning? 

We’ll end up with you at the end. So why don’t we start over here. 

Each will have a 1-minute summary of what you would like to 

leave, the most important idea you’d like to leave today. 

Mr. NAWAZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and again thank you for 

inviting me here today. 

I would only go back to reiterate that I share your concerns and 

can understand the anger not just in this House but in the American people at a time when we are facing serious economic difficulties at home, when assistance is not used the way it ought to be. 

But I should warn also that the solution is really not to withdraw from the scene. The U.S. has an international role. The role 

has to be one of creating an environment and a relationship with 

people, not with a group or an individual or single institution in 

a country that we need to be allied with for whatever reason. 

And our mistake in the region was that when we wanted an ally 

that could deliver what we needed over the short run which was 

invariably a military or an autocratic ruler in Pakistan. And I 

think that shouldn’t color our relationship with the people of Pakistan or the people of the region. 

As I indicated in my comments to you, the people of the region 

whether they are in Afghanistan, Pakistan, or India want a better 

life. They want the same thing that I find when I travel in the 

heartland of the U.S. And we should try and look to see how we 

can serve their aspirations so that they can become partners, our 

partners, in the global stage rather than cutting them loose. Thank 

you. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. 

Mr. DHUME. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity. 

To sum up I’d like to say that I think it’s crystal clear that the 

policies of the past 10 years have been disappointing and the reVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:28 Sep 09, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00062 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\OI\072611\67601 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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sults have not been what we should have expected. In short, $20 

billion has not got us what it should have. 

That said I’d say that what we face in Pakistan is really a case 

of two bad choices, one worst than the other. And at this stage I 

would say that simply walking away is a worse option. Instead 

what I would encourage is more targeted engagement and engagement that all takes place under the overarching goal of changing 

the nature of the Pakistani state which means getting rid of the 

influence or diminishing the influence of the army and The ISI on 

national life, focusing on that, and being willing to use military 

force such as Drone strikes to go off to targets in Pakistan where 

the Pakistani military appears unwilling to do so itself. Thank you. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you. 

Mr. TKACIK. I mean I would add a point that maybe nobody has 

mentioned before which is the key point of leverage in both Pakistan and I think China in a global strategy is attaching the legitimacy of the people who have power in those countries. 

The military in Pakistan uses nationalism rooted in the ancient, 

well, ancient, 60-year-old dispute over Kashmir to legitimate its authority in Pakistan. It does not use the consent of the governed as 

a root of its legitimacy. 

Likewise in China, decision makes root their legitimacy in nationalism. The Chinese Communist Party’s legitimacy is rooted in 

making China a global super power again. Insofar as they can do 

that, they say we have the right to rule China. There’s no question 

of the consent of the governed. 

I think in any broad national strategy that the United States is 

going to come up and here I agree with Mr. Nawaz who says, ‘‘If 

you don’t know what you want then it doesn’t matter what strategy 

because whatever if you don’t know where you’re going any road 

will get you there.’’

But if you have a broad national strategy of saying, ‘‘We want 

this kind of regime, Pakistan, China, to be weakened and to more 

responsive or indeed completely responsive to the needs of the people you have to attack their legitimacy.’’ And this is not a matter 

of weapons. It’s not a matter of aid. It’s a matter of propaganda 

and I think it’s something that we can use. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right. 

Mr. PANDE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I’d like to state two 

points: One that the U.S.-India relationship will be the defining 

partnership of the 21st century and you mentioned that; and second that the U.S.-Pakistan is a complicated relationship. But moving forward maybe one needs to look at—take a more realistic aspect of the relationship and try and see where there are some strategic or shared interests and work on those and also help build as 

I stated earlier the secular liberal middle class which actually is in 

favor of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship. Thank you. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I want to thank all the witnesses. Thank you, 

Mr. Carnahan. This hearing was meant to expand our knowledge 

base and our understanding and open up a dialogue that hopefully 

will filter out into the decision making offices throughout this city 

and maybe throughout the world. I think we’ve come up with some 

ideas that will benefit people. 

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So, with that said, I thank you all. This hearing is adjourned. Off 

the record. 

[Whereupon, at 4 o’clock p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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