Learning from the

attack on the

USS COLE...

implications for

protecting transiting

U.S. forces from

terrorist attack

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

D

DoD USS COLE

COMMISSION

USS COLE

Commission

Report
INTERNET AVAILABILITY: This document is available on DefenseLINK, a World Wide Web Server on the 

Internet, at: http://www.defenselink.mil 

DoD USS COLE COMMISSION REPORT 

9 January 2001 

Since the attack on Khobar Towers in June 1996, the Department of Defense (DoD) has made 

significant improvements in protecting its service members, mainly in deterring, disrupting and 

mitigating terrorist attacks on installations. The attack on USS COLE (DDG 67), in the port of 

Aden, Yemen, on 12 October 2000, demonstrated a seam in the fabric of efforts to protect our 

forces, namely in-transit forces. Our review was focused on finding ways to improve the US 

policies and practices for deterring, disrupting and mitigating terrorist attack on US forces in 

transit. 

1. Overseas Presence since the End of the Cold War 

Our review was based on the premise that worldwide presence and continuous transit of ships, 

aircraft and units of the United States military support the engagement elements of both the 

National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy and are in the nation’s best 

interest. The US military is conducting overseas operations in a new post-Cold War world 

environment characterized by unconventional and transnational threats. Operating in this new 

world exposes US forces to terrorist attacks and requires a major effort in force protection. This 

major effort will require more resources and, in some cases, a better use of existing resources for 

protecting transiting units. The net result of our recommendations is a form of operational risk 

management applied at both the national and operational levels to balance the benefits with the 

risks of overseas operations. We determined that the “fulcrum” of this balance is usually the 

Unified Commander-in-Chief’s (CINC) Service Component Commander; therefore, a significant 

number of our recommendations are designed to improve that commander’s antiterrorism/force 

protection (AT/FP) capabilities. 

We organized our findings at both the national and operational levels into the five functional 

areas of organization, antiterrorism/force protection, intelligence, logistics and training. 

2. National Level Policies and Practices 

Conducting engagement activities (including those by transiting forces) in higher threat areas in 

support of the National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy requires completely 

coordinated priorities, policies and oversight at all levels. The pervasive and enduring threat calls 

for some adjustments to national level policies and procedures. 

a. Organization 

Unity of effort among the offices and agencies in DoD providing resources, policy, oversight and 

direction is critical to truly gain the initiative over a very adaptive, persistent, patient and 

tenacious terrorist. This unity of effort extends also to the coordination of engagement activities 

across US Government agencies, including developing the security capabilities of host nations to 

help protect US forces and balancing the range and frequency of activities among all agencies. 
2 

b. Antiterrorism/Force Protection 

In force protection, we identified seven national level policy and procedural improvements to 

better support AT/FP for transiting units. Five of the seven address additional resources and two 

address procedural changes. They are covered in the findings. 

c. Intelligence 

Intelligence priorities and resources have shifted from Cold War focus to new and emerging 

threats only at the margins. We, like other commissions before us, recommend the 

reprioritization of resources for collection and analysis, including human intelligence and signal 

intelligence, against the terrorist. Intelligence production must be refocused and tailored to 

overwatch transiting units to mitigate the terrorist threat. Furthermore, an increase in 

counterintelligence (CI) resources dedicated to combating terrorism and development of clearer 

CI assessment standards is required. 

d. Logistics 

Logistics practices and policies can impact force protection if imaginatively applied. We believe 

the current level of Combat Logistics Force oilers is sufficient to support the refueling and 

logistics requirements of the national strategy. The regional logistics support structure must 

provide the Component Commander the opportunity and flexibility to adapt operational patterns 

to minimize exposure to threats. 

e. Training 

We believe most firmly that the US military must create an integrated system of training that 

produces a unit that is clearly and visibly ready, alert and capable. To achieve this level of 

AT/FP proficiency, AT/FP training must be elevated to the same priority as primary mission 

training. The level of competence with which units execute force protection must be the same 

level for which primary combat skills are executed; and we must develop and resource credible 

deterrence standards; deterrence specific tactics, techniques and procedures; and defensive 

equipment packages. 

3. Operational Level Lessons Learned 

The links between national policies/resources and individual transiting units are the Unified 

CINCs and their Component Commanders. Transiting units do not have time or resources to 

focus on a series of locations while in transit, requiring these units to rely on others to support 

their efforts to deter, disrupt and mitigate terrorist attacks. We think it is the Component 

Commander who has the operational war-fighting mindset for the region and is capable of 

controlling the resources to fight the fight and tailor specific AT/FP measures to protect 

transiting units. Below we identify operational level recommendations in the areas of 

antiterrorism/force protection, intelligence, logistics, and training for improving AT/FP support 

to transiting units. 
3 

a. Antiterrorism/Force Protection 

First, we must get out of the purely defensive mode by proactively applying AT/FP techniques 

and assets to detect and deter terrorists. Second, transfer of transiting units between and within 

theaters must be better coordinated. Third, a discrete operation risk management model should 

be adopted and utilized in AT/FP planning and execution. 

b. Intelligence 

Independent transiting units must be better trained and resourced to provide appropriate requests 

for information to force intelligence organizations to be responsive to the transiter’s AT/FP 

requirements. 

c. Logistics 

While classifying the logistics request and diplomatic clearance request processes is not 

practical, implementation of the recommendations in this Report is required to mitigate the 

AT/FP effects of public knowledge of movements. 

d. Training 

Predeployment training regimes must include deterrence tactics, techniques and procedures; 

deterrence AT/FP measures specific to the area of operation; and equipment rehearsals. 

The AT/FP training provided to unit commanding officers and force protection officers and the 

tools necessary to sustain an AT/FP training program need increased attention. 

In summary, we found Component Commanders are the fulcrum of a balance with the benefits of 

engagement on one side and the associated risks/costs on the other side. Our review suggests 

there is much we can do to help the field commander reach the proper balance. Taken as a whole, 

the Commission’s recommendations are intended to enhance the tools available to commanders 

in making this balance. 
4 

Unclassified Findings and Recommendations Summary 

Organization

Finding: Combating terrorism is so important that it demands complete unity of effort at the 

level of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. 

• Recommendation: Secretary of Defense develop an organization that more cohesively aligns 

policy and resources within DoD to combat terrorism and designate an Assistant Secretary of 

Defense (ASD) to oversee these functions. 

Finding: The execution of the engagement element of the National Security Strategy lacks an 

effective, coordinated interagency process, which results in a fragmented engagement program 

that may not provide optimal support to in-transit units. 

• Recommendation: Secretary of Defense support an interagency process to provide overall 

coordination of US engagement. 

Finding: DoD needs to spearhead an interagency, coordinated approach to developing nonmilitary host nation security efforts in order to enhance force protection for transiting US 

forces. 

• Recommendation: Secretary of Defense coordinate with Secretary of State to develop an 

approach with shared responsibility to enhance host nation security capabilities that result in 

increased security for transiting US forces. 

Antiterrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP) 

Finding: Service manning policies and procedures that establish requirements for full-time 

Force Protection Officers and staff billets at the Service Component level and above will 

reduce the vulnerability of in-transit forces to terrorist attacks. 

• Recommendation: Secretary of Defense direct the Services to provide Component Commanders 

with full-time force protection officers and staffs that are capable of supporting the force 

protection requirements of transiting units. 

Finding: Component Commanders need the resources to provide in-transit units with 

temporary security augmentation of various kinds. 

• Recommendation: Secretary of Defense direct the Services to resource Component Commanders 

to adequately augment units transiting through higher-threat areas. 
5 

Finding: Service AT/FP programs must be adequately manned and funded to support threat 

and physical vulnerability assessments of ports, airfields and inland movement routes that may 

be used by transiting forces. 

• Recommendation: Secretary of Defense direct the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the 

CINCs and the Services to identify and resource manning and funding requirements to perform 

quality assessments of routes and sites used by transiting forces in support of Component 

Commanders. 

Finding: The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Combating Terrorism Readiness Initiative 

Fund is a responsive and relevant program designed to fund execution-year emergent and 

emergency antiterrorism/force protection physical security requirements. To optimize the 

program, Combating Terrorism Readiness Initiative Fund initiatives must be coordinated with 

Service programming for a commitment of life-cycle costs, and the Combating Terrorism 

Readiness Initiative Fund must fund the transition period. 

Recommendations: 

• The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Combating Terrorism Readiness Initiative Fund should 

be increased to cover the period prior to which a Service program can fund the remaining lifecycle costs. 

• Secretary of Defense direct the Services to establish a formal link to the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff Combating Terrorism Readiness Initiative Fund to ensure that initiatives receive a 

commitment for follow-on programming. 

Finding: More responsive application of currently available military equipment, commercial 

technologies, and aggressive research and development can enhance the AT/FP and deterrence 

posture of transiting forces. 

• Recommendation: Secretary of Defense direct the Services to initiate a major unified effort to 

identify near-term AT/FP equipment and technology requirements, field existing solutions from 

either military or commercial sources, and develop new technologies for remaining 

requirements. 

Finding: The Geographic Commander in Chief should have the sole authority for assigning the 

threat level for a country within his area of responsibility. 

Recommendations: 

• Secretary of Defense direct that the Geographic CINCs be solely responsible for establishing the 

threat level within the appropriate area of responsibility with input from DIA. 

• Secretary of Defense coordinate with Secretary of State, where possible, to minimize conflicting 

threat levels between the Department of Defense and the Department of State. 

• Secretary of Defense designate an office or agency responsible for setting the threat level for 

Canada, Mexico, Russia, and the United States. 
6 

Finding: AT/FP will be enhanced by improvements to the THREATCON system. 

Recommendations: 

• Secretary of Defense change the term “THREATCONs” to “Alert States,” “FP Conditions,” or 

some other term. 

• Secretary of Defense direct the CINCs and Services to give Component Commanders the 

responsibility and resources to direct tailored force protection measures to be implemented at 

specific sites for in-transit units. 

• Secretary of Defense direct that the AT/FP plan and the particular measures that are triggered 

by a specific THREATCON be classified. 

Finding: The CJCS Standing Rules of Engagement for US forces are adequate against the 

terrorist threat.

• Recommendation: Make no changes to the SROE. 

Finding: We need to shift transiting units from an entirely reactive posture to a posture that 

more effectively deters terrorist attacks. 

• Recommendation: Secretary of Defense direct the CINCs and Services to have Component 

Commanders identify proactive techniques and assets to deter terrorists. 

Finding: The amount of AT/FP emphasis that units in-transit receive prior to or during 

transfer between CINCs can be improved. 

• Recommendation: Secretary of Defense direct the CINCs and Services to have Component 

Commanders ensure unit situational awareness by providing AT/FP briefings to transiting units 

prior to entry into higher threat level areas in the gaining Geographic CINC’s AOR. 

Finding: Intra-theater transiting units require the same degree of attention as other transiting 

units to deter, disrupt and mitigate acts of terrorism. 

• Recommendation: Secretary of Defense direct Geographic CINCs and Component Commanders 

to reassess current procedures to ensure that AT/FP principles enumerated in this Report are 

applied to intra-theater transiting units. 

Finding: Using operational risk management standards as a tool to measure engagement 

activities against risk to in-transit forces will enable commanders to determine whether to 

suspend or continue engagement activities. 

• Recommendation: Secretary of Defense direct the CINCs to adopt and institutionalize a discrete 

operational risk management model to be used in AT/FP planning and execution. 

Finding: Incident response must be an integral element of AT/FP planning. 

• Recommendation: Secretary of Defense direct the Geographic CINCs to identify theater rapid 

incident response team requirements and integrate their utilization in contingency planning for 

in-transit units, and the Services to organize, train, and equip such forces. 
7 

Intelligence 

Finding: In-transit units require intelligence support tailored to the terrorist threat in their 

immediate area of operations. This support must be dedicated from a higher echelon (tailored 

production and analysis). 

• Recommendation: Secretary of Defense reprioritize intelligence production to ensure that intransit units are given tailored, focused intelligence support for independent missions. 

Finding: If the Department of Defense is to execute engagement activities related to the 

National Security Strategy with the least possible level of risk, then Services must reprioritize 

time, emphasis, and resources to prepare the transiting units to perform intelligence 

preparation of the battlespace–like processes and formulate intelligence requests for 

information to support operational decision points. 

• Recommendation: Secretary of Defense direct the Services to ensure forces are adequately 

resourced and trained to make maximum use of intelligence processes and procedures, including 

priority information requests and requests for information to support intelligence preparation of 

the battlespace for in-transit unit antiterrorism/force protection. 

Finding: DoD does not allocate sufficient resources or all-source intelligence analysis and 

collection in support of combating terrorism. 

Recommendations: 

• Secretary of Defense reprioritize all-source intelligence collection and analysis personnel and 

resources so that sufficient emphasis is applied to combating terrorism. Analytical expertise must 

be imbedded, from the national, CINC, and Component Command levels, to the joint task force 

level. 

• Secretary of Defense reprioritize terrorism-related human intelligence and signals intelligence 

resources. 

• Secretary of Defense reprioritize resources for the development of language skills that support 

combating terrorism analysis and collection. 

Finding: Service counterintelligence programs are integral to force protection and must be 

adequately manned and funded to meet the dynamic demands of supporting in-transit forces. 

• Recommendation: Secretary of Defense ensure DoD counterintelligence organizations are 

adequately staffed and funded to meet counterintelligence force protection requirements. 
8 

Finding: Clearer DoD standards for threat and vulnerability assessments must be developed at 

the joint level and be common across Services and commands. 

Recommendations: 

• Secretary of Defense standardize counterintelligence assessments and increase 

counterintelligence resources. 

• Secretary of Defense direct DoD-standard requirements for the conduct of threat and 

vulnerability assessments for combating terrorism. 

• Secretary of Defense direct the production of a DoD-standard Counterintelligence Collection 

Manual for combating terrorism. 

Logistics 

Finding: While classifying the diplomatic clearance and logistics requirement process may 

improve the operational security of transiting units, it is not practical due to the commercial 

nature of the process. 

• Recommendation: None. Implementing proactive AT/FP measures identified in this report 

mitigate the effect of public knowledge of US military ship and aircraft visits. 

Finding: The combination of the Combat Logistics Force and the Department of Defense 

worldwide logistics network is sufficient to meet current operations and has the collateral 

benefit of supporting the engagement component of the National Security Strategy and 

National Military Strategy. 

• Recommendation: None. The current level of Combat Logistics Force oilers is sufficient to 

support the refueling and logistics requirements of the national strategy. 

Finding: CINCs/Component Commanders can enhance force protection for transiting forces 

when the Component Commanders are included in the logistics planning and contract award 

process. 

• Recommendation: Secretary of Defense direct the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the 

Services to update respective logistics doctrine to incorporate AT/FP considerations for 

transiting units. 

Finding: Local providers of goods, services, and transportation must be employed and 

evaluated in ways that enhance the AT/FP posture of the in-transit unit. 

• Recommendation: Secretary of Defense direct the Defense Logistics Agency and the Services to 

incorporate AT/FP concerns into the entire fabric of logistics support. 
9 

Training 

Finding: Military Services must accomplish AT/FP training with a degree of rigor that equates 

to the unit’s primary mission areas. 

Recommendations: 

• Secretary of Defense direct the Services to develop rigorous tactics, techniques, and procedures 

with measurable standards for AT/FP training and develop training regimens that will integrate 

AT/FP into unit-level training plans and pre-deployment exercises. 

• Secretary of Defense direct the Services to elevate AT/FP training to the equivalent of a primary 

mission area and provide the same emphasis afforded combat tasks in order to instill a force 

protection mindset into each Service. 

Finding: Better force protection is achieved if forces in transit are trained to demonstrate 

preparedness to deter acts of terrorism. 

Recommendations: 

• Secretary of Defense direct the Services to develop and resource credible deterrence standards, 

deterrence-specific tactics, techniques, and procedures and defensive equipment packages for all 

forms of transiting forces. 

• Secretary of Defense direct the Services to ensure that pre-deployment training regimes include 

deterrence tactics, techniques, and procedures and AT/FP measures specific to the area of 

operation and equipment rehearsals. 

Finding: DoD must better support commanders’ ability to sustain their antiterrorism/force 

protection program and training regimens. 

Recommendations: 

• Secretary of Defense direct the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to publish a single source 

document that categorizes all of the existing AT/FP training literature, plans and tactics, 

techniques, and procedures for use by the Services (on both classified and unclassified versions) 

(short term). 

• Secretary of Defense direct the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to consolidate and develop a 

single repository for all AT/FP lessons learned. This database should be accessible to unit 

commanders in the classified and unclassified mode (long term). 

• Secretary of Defense direct the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to continually update 

training tools, capture lessons and trends and aid Commanders in sustaining meaningful AT/FP 

training programs. 

Finding: DoD and Service guidance on the content of AT/FP Level III training must be more 

definitive if commanders at the O-5 and O-6 levels are to execute their AT/FP responsibilities. 

• Recommendation: Secretary of Defense direct more rigorous Level III AT/FP training 

requirements for each Service. 
10 

Finding: Service Level II AT/FP Training must produce a force protection officer capable of 

supervising unit training and acting as the subject matter expert for the commander in transit. 

Recommendations: 

• Secretary of Defense direct the Services to establish more rigorous training standards for unitlevel Force Protection Officers. 

• Secretary of Defense direct the Services to increase the emphasis and resources devoted to 

producing qualified Force Protection Officers through Level II training. 

-END-
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DoD USS COLE

COMMISSION

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED