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A REGIONAL OVERVIEW ON THE MIDDLE EAST

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

OCTOBER 28, 2009

Serial No. 111–73

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California, Chairman 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BILL DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

MICHAEL E. MCMAHON, New York 

JOHN S. TANNER, Tennessee 

GENE GREEN, Texas 

LYNN WOOLSEY, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

BARBARA LEE, California 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

MIKE ROSS, Arkansas 

BRAD MILLER, North Carolina 

DAVID SCOTT, Georgia 

JIM COSTA, California 

KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

RON KLEIN, Florida 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

RON PAUL, Texas 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

BOB INGLIS, South Carolina 

GUS BILIRAKIS, Florida 

RICHARD J. KESSLER, Staff Director 

YLEEM POBLETE, Republican Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York, Chairman 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

MICHAEL E. MCMAHON, New York 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

MIKE ROSS, Arkansas 

JIM COSTA, California 

KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota 

RON KLEIN, Florida 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

GENE GREEN, Texas 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

BOB INGLIS, South Carolina 

GUS BILIRAKIS, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

HOWARD DIAMOND, Subcommittee Staff Director 

MARK WALKER, Republican Professional Staff Member 

DALIS ADLER, Staff Associate 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESS 

The Honorable Jeffrey D. Feltman, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Department of State ................................................................ 16

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Gary L. Ackerman, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of New York, and Chairman, Subcommittee on the Middle East 

and South Asia: Prepared statement ................................................................. 3

The Honorable Dan Burton, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Indiana: Prepared statement .......................................................................... 8

The Honorable Jeffrey D. Feltman: Prepared statement ..................................... 19

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 58

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 59

The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of Virginia: Prepared statement ............................................................... 60

Written responses from the Honorable Jeffrey D. Feltman to questions submitted for the record by the Honorable Dan Burton ......................................... 62

(1)

A REGIONAL OVERVIEW ON THE MIDDLE 

EAST 

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 28, 2009

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST

AND SOUTH ASIA, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:06 p.m., in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Gary L. Ackerman 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. The subcommittee will come to order. 

While this hearing is meant to cover the range of issues facing 

the United States and the region stretching from Egypt to the Persian Gulf, in my opening remarks I would like to focus on Iran. 

Like many others, I have been thinking a lot about Iran, and despite my best efforts, I keep coming back to, of all things, the second Reagan administration. It was in the second term that President Reagan and Secretary of State George Shultz negotiated significant convention and nuclear arms control agreements and 

helped thaw out the Cold War with frequent high-level summits. 

Throughout this period of intensive diplomatic engagement, however, President Reagan never stopped speaking powerfully and frequently about dissidents, human rights, and freedom. 

Obviously, the Soviet challenge then and the Iranian challenge 

today are very different. But what really stands out is the way the 

Reagan team in the second term sustained a multifocal, steady and 

comprehensive of pressure on the Soviets. The summitry demonstrated that the problem was in Moscow, not in Washington. The 

consistent focus on human rights and freedom reminded domestic, 

allied and Soviet audiences just how ugly the Soviet regime really 

was. 

Following some terrible strains in the transatlantic alliance in 

the first term, the Reagan administration worked hard on sustaining our relations in both Europe and East Asia to ensure that 

the Soviets had no political escape valve. Following the initial massive spasm of defense spending in the first term, the steady deployment of United States and NATO forces that were technologically 

passing by the Soviets simply couldn’t be ignored. And, of course, 

the Intelligence Community made life in the Kremlin miserable, 

not only by stealing secrets, but organizing and supporting opposition to the Soviets wherever it could take root. 

So in thinking about our Iran policy today, what strikes me is 

how thin it seems to be. We seem to be depending on just one or 

2

two policy elements, when, in fact, many more are possible. President Obama’s support for direct engagement with Iran, as with the 

Reagan-Gorbachev summitry that I have described has already 

helped to heal a variety of political woes, but by itself diplomatic 

engagement still leaves too much initiative in Iranian hands. 

Likewise, with economic sanctions, if the Iranians remain 

calcitrant and sanctions are applied, no matter how crippling—and 

I would want them to be absolutely suffocating to the regime—the 

initiative is still left to the ayatollahs to decide when they have had 

enough. But what seems most puzzling to me is that the administration appears to have absolutely nothing at all to say about Iran’s 

Green Movement. Staying out of the way in June was smart, but 

the complete silence since then is, to me, inexplicable. 

Support within Iran for the nuclear program runs across the 

spectrum, but there is a strong case to be made that the Iranian 

regime went to Geneva and has bargained since then, primarily because of their concern about domestic stability rather than fears 

about international sanctions. 

I have also heard from many leaders in the Middle East who 

complain that the Obama administration doesn’t seem to have any 

better a plan for increasing the multilateral political and security 

coordination in the Persian Gulf than did their predecessors. And 

while the administration has increased American attention to the 

Israeli-Palestinian conflict, at least in part to win broader Arab 

support for pressure against Iran, my question would be, where is 

the support? The Iranians are actively stirring up trouble or developing or maintaining the capacity do so in Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, the Palestinian territories, Egypt, Yemen, Bahrain, Kuwait 

and Morocco. Where is the countervailing United States response? 

Where is the Truman-like policy of committing ourselves to support 

our allies in their struggle to remain free from threats and subversion? 

I am not suggesting another Cold War or holding up Iran as the 

new Soviet Union. My concern is that we are dealing with the Iranians piecemeal and, thus, giving them too much opportunity to 

shape events to their liking. And I am not calling for linkage, 

where success in one area depends on one or more of the others, 

but I do think that we need a comprehensive approach. 

Like Gorbachev’s team, the regime in Tehran is facing an unprecedented challenge from within. Why is it then we seem incapable of taking advantage of this fact and bemoaning for years the 

insufficiency of our leverage? We don’t need to make threats, and 

we certainly shouldn’t allow ourselves to get sucked into yet another conflict. But I can’t help but wonder, why can’t we squeeze 

with five fingers instead of just one or two? 

And with that I will turn to our ranking member, thank you very 

much, Representative Burton. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Ackerman follows:]

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Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I really appreciate you 

calling this important and timely hearing. There are countless 

issues that need to be addressed throughout the Middle East and 

South Asia, and it is very difficult to know where to begin. 

First and foremost on my mind is the threat posed by Iran in its 

suspected pursuit and development of nuclear weapons and missiles capable of carrying those weapons. The Iranian regime has 

shown no signs that it plans to respond positively to any diplomatic 

efforts by the United States or the international community to halt 

uranium enrichment. The alleged deal being negotiated in Geneva, 

which the Iranian regime has yet to accept almost 1 week after the 

deadline, doesn’t require Iran to stop uranium enrichment or even 

ship its entire current stockpile of enriched uranium out of the 

country. In my opinion, that is not a good deal for the United 

States—or Israel, for that matter. 

The current Iranian regime has no regard for the United States, 

the international community or even the Iranian people. After the 

clearly rigged elections, we saw the outrage of the Iranian people 

toward a government that is continually misrepresenting their 

wishes with an appallingly heavy-handed response to protests. The 

time for inaction from the United States has long passed. 

I am pleased that earlier today the full Foreign Affairs Committee finally marked up Chairman Berman’s Iran Refined Petroleum Sanctions Act of 2009. If we truly want to reach an agreement with Iran, then we must put some muscle behind our words; 

and the Iran Refined Petroleum Sanctions Act, in my opinion, is 

the kind of muscle we need. 

And I am very concerned that we have got three other committees that we have got to get this thing through. And we need to 

get it done quickly; I mean, it took 6 months to get this far, and 

I don’t want it to take any longer than that, and I hope the chairman will push as hard as he can. 

While Iran is a net exporter of unrefined petroleum, it is a net 

importer of refined petroleum products like gasoline. In June 2007, 

when the Iranian Government implemented a gasoline rationing 

system, the Iranian public rioted. Giving President Obama the authority to target Iran’s refined petroleum industry is sure to get the 

mullahs’ attention and strengthen the President’s hand in Geneva. 

It is my hope that this bill will move quickly to the floor for a 

vote, as it has already garnered the support of 330 cosponsors. 

However, to do nothing and continue to allow the Iranians to delay 

and stall, their capabilities will grow; and one day we will see on 

the front page headlines an announcement that Iran has tested a 

nuclear bomb, and at that point it will be far too late for the international community to do anything. 

The second major concern on my mind also involves the Middle 

East. I am very concerned about the prospects for peace between 

Israel and Palestine. I believe that prospects for peace have taken 

a giant step backwards in recent weeks, in large part because of 

the Goldstone Report, recently issued by the despot-controlled 

United Nations Human Rights Council. 

This report accused Israel of war crimes, as well as possible 

crimes against humanity during Israel’s defensive operations in 

Gaza last winter. From the beginning, the Council instructed the 

6

Goldstone Commission to focus only on ‘‘aggression against the Palestinian people,’’ a presumption of Israeli guilt before any so-called 

investigation had even taken place. 

Article 51 of the United Nations Charter guarantees all U.N. 

members the right to defend themselves against terrorism and 

other external threats. The Goldstone Report completely ignores 

this fundamental right. It also ignores the steps taken by the 

Israeli defense forces to minimize civilian casualties, steps that 

often put Israeli soldiers at increased risk. And the Goldstone Report completely ignores Hamas’ callous practice of intertwining its 

terrorist infrastructure within civilian population centers, hiding 

behind hospitals, schools, mosques, and even U.N. facilities. 

The Obama administration should completely reject the 

Goldstone Report. The Obama administration should also take 

steps to explicitly link future United States contributions to the 

U.N. with U.N. action to implement concrete act or root out the institutionalized fraud and corruption within the U.N. bureaucracy 

and then, once and for all, the naked, systematic anti-United 

States, anti-Israeli, anti-Semitic bias within the U.N. 

I know that is strong, but I mean it. 

Third, I would like to express my deep, deep concern over the administration’s inaction on implementing General McChrystal’s 

strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan. While I disagree with the 

President on many foreign policy questions—and I don’t think that 

is much of a surprise—I do believe that President Obama was right 

a few months ago when he declared, ‘‘The conflict in Afghanistan 

will not be quick or easy. But we must never forget: This is not a 

war of choice; this is a war of necessity. This is fundamental to the 

defense of our people of the United States.’’

Withdrawal from Afghanistan is not an option. What I have 

heard over and over from witnesses before this committee is that 

if the Taliban is allowed to regain control of the country, the security of the world will be at much higher risk and the reputation of 

the United States and NATO will take years to recover. 

Victory is possible. Our counterinsurgency forces are more experienced and more knowledgeable than they have ever been, and our 

enemy is despised by the great majority of the Afghan people. The 

President’s hand-picked commander, General McChrystal, has presented the President with a strategy to win the conflict, and it is 

inexcusable to delay. 

The President needs to act now before the situation in the region 

deteriorates even further, and General McChrystal must come and 

testify before Congress so that Republicans and Democrats can ask 

him questions the American people want us to ask. How do you 

propose to win the war and get our troops home safely? 

It has already been said 100 times before, but it bears repeating: 

Success in Afghanistan is crucial for success in Pakistan where 

there is a real threat of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of 

terrorists. 

Multiple intelligence estimates have warned that al-Qaeda is actively planning attacks on the United States homeland from its 

safe haven in Pakistan. If either the Afghan of Pakistani Government falls to the Taliban or allows al-Qaeda to go unchallenged, 

that region of the world would once again be a base for terrorists 

7

who want to kill as many of our people as they possibly can. It gets 

no clearer than that. 

The very people who attacked us on 9/11 are plotting future attacks on us in Afghanistan and the border region in Pakistan. We 

must disrupt and neutralize these groups before they strike again. 

This is a war of necessity and, as such, we must commit the necessary effort in order to be victorious. 

And, finally, I would like to briefly touch upon the broad issue 

of religious freedom. Religious freedom is a foundational value of 

the United States and the right to religious freedom is firmly enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 18. 

A nation’s adherence to this principle is now, along with others, an 

indication and standard bearer for good governance that protects 

the rights of minorities and safeguards social peace. The promotion 

of freedom of religion and belief has been a consistent part of the 

U.S. foreign policy for decades. 

I recently introduced House Resolution 840 that condemns violations of religious freedom in the Middle East, calls on President 

Obama to renew the United States’ commitment to promoting religious freedom as a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy, and urges all 

Middle Eastern governments to respect and defend the rights of religious minorities within their borders. I hope all of my colleagues 

will join me in cosponsoring this important bill. 

And, once again, Mr. Chairman, thanks for calling this important 

hearing. I know I talked a long time, but I was trying to cover a 

lot of stuff. So I appreciate your understanding. Thank you very 

much. 

And I want to tell you I look forward to hearing our distinguished witness. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Burton follows:]

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Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you very much. 

The Ambassador has been waiting for over an hour for us because of votes, but I am going to see if we can ask each member 

that wants to make an opening statement if they could do it in 1 

minute or so. 

Mr. Wexler. 

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Just very quickly I want to associate myself with the remarks of 

the chairman and the ranking member regarding Iran. Mr. Burton 

rightfully brings up the Goldstone Report. I think it is important 

to note that, in fact, the administration has opposed in many different avenues and in many different venues the Goldstone Report, 

the conclusions that it reached. And, in fact, the strongest response 

that the administration could provide is happening as we speak. 

In Israel today there is the largest American-Israeli missile defense joint exercise in the history of our two nations—on the 

ground in Israel, 1,300 American troops. Likewise, when our NATO 

ally just recently disinvited the Israelis from a military exercise, a 

joint exercise with the United States and other nations, we unequivocally responded by saying we would not show up as well. 

The level of cooperation between the United States and Israel on 

intelligence and military matters has never been greater, all for the 

purpose of security and peace, but also to maintain Israel’s qualitative military edge. So I think our response from the administration on down to these disturbing events has been quite resolute. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Ms. Berkley. 

Ms. BERKLEY. I am anxious to hear our witness’ statement, so I 

think I will defer my questions until later or at least my statement 

until later. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. McMahon. 

Mr. MCMAHON. I, too, Mr. Chairman, in the interest of time, will 

submit my statement to the record and just associate myself with 

the remarks that have been brought forth so far—especially yours, 

Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Carnahan. 

Mr. CARNAHAN. I, too, will pass and take this up during questioning. So we can get started with the witness. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Costa. 

Mr. COSTA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will take all 5 minutes—no. 

I do appreciate the comments that the chairman and the ranking 

member made, and I, too, am concerned with the challenges we are 

facing in the Middle East today. And I look forward to the testimony of Ambassador Feltman, and let us begin there. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. To have five Members of Congress pass because 

they are anxious to hear you is the greatest sign of respect I have 

seen around here in a long time. 

Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman has appeared before this subcommittee on several occasions, but this will be his first appearance since being sworn in as assistant secretary of state for Near 

Eastern Affairs on August 18 of this year. 

16

Congratulations, Mr. Secretary. 

Ambassador Feltman ascended to his current position having 

been acting assistant secretary of state since February, and since 

December 2008 principal deputy assistant secretary. Previously, 

the Ambassador served as Ambassador to Lebanon, as a senior official in the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq for 14 months, 

as acting principal officer at the U.S. Consul General in Jerusalem. 

A career member of the U.S. Foreign Service since January 1986, 

Ambassador Feltman brings a wealth of hard-won experience to his 

current position. We are fortunate to have him in the service of our 

country. We are delighted to welcome him back to our subcommittee today. 

Mr. Ambassador. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JEFFREY D. FELTMAN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. FELTMAN. Chairman Ackerman, Ranking Member Burton, 

distinguished members of the committee, thank you very much for 

inviting me to appear before you today. My colleagues in the State 

Department’s Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs and I very much appreciate the committee’s abiding interest in and attention to our 

Nation’s priorities in the Middle East. 

I prepared a full statement for the record, so I will make a brief 

oral statement now and then look forward to any questions. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Without objection, your full statement will be in 

the record. 

Mr. FELTMAN. As the committee is well aware, as the opening 

statements certainly indicated, the issues, the opportunities, the 

challenges that we face in the Middle East are among the most 

consequential for our Nation’s security and national interests. They 

are among the most difficult; international peace and stability, nuclear proliferation, energy security, economic growth, and protection of human rights are all affected greatly by developments in 

this region we are discussing today. 

This administration is vigorously pursuing a comprehensive 

peace in the region, which we believe is not only in the interest of 

the parties of the conflict, but in America’s and in the world’s interests. 

The administration recognized from Day One that working to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict is key to fostering stability, to addressing the security needs of our allies and to promoting United 

States interests in the Middle East, South Asia, and the broader 

Muslim world from Morocco all the way to Indonesia. 

Achieving a comprehensive peace will be challenging. The U.S. 

Special Envoy for Middle East Peace, Senator George Mitchell, 

knows all too well that committed, persevering and patient diplomacy will be required. Progress is quietly, but steadily being made, 

and we very much appreciate the support and assistance of this 

committee and Congress more generally for the work that we are 

doing. 

Our commitment to Israel’s security and well-being remains 

unshakable. We believe that our pursuit of comprehensive peace in 

the region will make Israel more secure, the region more secure 

17

and stable, and in doing so, will also help promote American security and interests. 

Resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, of course, will not automatically resolve the other challenges that we face in the region, 

such as those outlined by the opening statements, posed by Iran, 

just as resolving concerns about Iran will not automatically 

produce an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict. But efforts on these 

fronts and on others are mutually reinforcing. 

Like all of you, we are all watching developments with Iran very 

closely. The administration is implementing a strategy of principled 

engagement with Iran, where we deal with the Government of Iran 

directly and work to resolve diplomatically the international concerns about its nuclear program. 

The October 1st P5+1 meeting in Geneva with the Iranians, in 

which we participated actively, was a constructive first step, but it 

must be followed by constructive actions, by tangible steps. We look 

to Iran to respond quickly and positively to efforts by the P5+1 and 

the IAEA to make progress on the commitments on October 1st 

and to build confidence in negotiations. But the P5+1 countries 

have made clear that our approach runs on two tracks, and we are 

prepared to pursue increased pressure if negotiations stall or prove 

fruitless. 

The opportunity for engagement is genuine, but it will not be 

open-ended if Iran continues to refuse to fulfill its obligations. We 

are not going to talk simply for talking’s sake. 

We are also concerned—as your opening statements indicated 

you are as well, Mr. Chairman—about Iran’s other policies, including Iran’s abysmal human rights record: The disturbing aftermath 

of Iranian elections, which saw hundreds arrested and scores 

killed, as well as Iran’s support for terrorist groups across the 

broader region. 

One American citizen, Kian Tajbakhsh, was among those convicted and tried in the summer’s show trial. He was recently sentenced to 15 years for baseless charges. Other Americans, including 

the three American hikers, remain imprisoned in Iran with no 

charges and not even any contact with their families; and we have 

made clear to Iran that they should all immediately be allowed to 

rejoin their families in the United States. We continue to call on 

Iran to resolve the 2-year-plus case of missing American citizen 

Robert Levinson. 

Turning our attention to Iraq, the United States stands by all 

Iraqis at this crucial time leading up to national elections, and we 

pledge to join them in working together to combat all forms of violence and attempts at intimidation. The devastating bombings 

against government targets on October 25 and those on August 19 

were truly horrific, but they do nothing to shake the determination 

of the Iraqi Government to build a peaceful and prosperous country 

or America’s determination to help the Iraqis do just that. 

In fact, violence in Iraq remains at levels significantly lower than 

that of 2006 and 2007, and we will continue to transition from a 

U.S. military- to a U.S. civilian-led mission in Iraq. We also remain 

committed to meeting the withdrawal time line set forth in the security agreement that we concluded at the end of last year. 

18

The United States commitment to Lebanon’s sovereignty and 

independence remains firm and will not be compromised by our engagement with any other party in the region. Mindful of Lebanon’s 

delicate internal situation, we also recognize that there can be no 

lasting solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict reached at Lebanon’s 

expense. We continue to support the efforts of Prime Minister-Designate Hariri to form a government on the basis of Lebanon’s legitimate elections held last June. 

The administration has initiated a strategy of principled engagement with Syria, and I and others have made several trips to Damascus this year, opening lines of communication. But the Syrians 

must realize that our ability to expand our engagement with them 

depends on the level of cooperation they show in areas of concern 

to the United States, including respect for Lebanon’s sovereignty 

and control of foreign fighters seeking to enter Iraq. 

We continue to develop our strategic relationships with other 

partners in the Gulf, North Africa and throughout the region. Our 

friends in the region remain critical to our energy and our defense 

interests, and we consult with them frequently on an array of 

issues of mutual concern. 

The challenges of the region are difficult ones: Persistent conflict 

and insecurity, an acute and impending increase in the youth demographic, and democratic institutions of governance that are often 

absent or weak. President Obama and Secretary Clinton have put 

us on the path of forging a new beginning for United States relations with Muslim communities in the Middle East and around the 

world. With our friends and allies, we are reinvigorating more comprehensive partnerships, reaching beyond governments to touch 

the lives of individuals through economic, educational and scientific 

cooperation. Together, we can forge solutions to shared problems 

and seize the opportunities for progress that exist in the region. 

I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your past and your ongoing support of the efforts of our brave diplomats and our troops 

across the Middle East, often serving in the most difficult and challenging circumstances. 

And now, I look forward to taking your questions. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you very much, Ambassador. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Feltman follows:]

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Mr. ACKERMAN. In your statement you said, with regard to Iran, 

that we are pursuing a two-track approach. Why not a comprehensive approach? Why not all of the things that I mentioned? Why 

is multiple choice not ‘‘all of the above,’’ just ‘‘A and B’’? 

Mr. FELTMAN. The dual-track approach I mentioned is one that 

we are pursuing with the P5+1 partners. And it is focused primarily on the nuclear file that causes so much concern in the region and globally. 

But let me assure you, Mr. Chairman, that we have a pretty 

comprehensive understanding of the problems that Iran’s behavior 

poses, and we are addressing these in different ways. I will just 

mention four problems. 

One is Iran’s nuclear ambition. Big problem. 

A second is Iran’s repression of its own people, its violation of its 

own people’s human rights. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. We will stipulate that you have made those 

points and that they are clear. I am talking about the approach to 

those problems. 

Why not have a policy that we are not only helping, but utilizing 

the fact that they have this Green Movement going on over there? 

Why not utilize the fact that they have all these other countries 

that are living in fear and trepidation of them every single day, 

and work to line them up? 

Why not give an assurance, Truman-like, to as many countries 

as we can there that we are their protector and will protect them 

against any threat by Iran under the following terms and conditions? And put in maybe a word about participating in sanctions 

or anything else that might fit in that? 

Why not all of these things at once? 

Mr. FELTMAN. Mr. Chairman, I believe we are addressing these 

issues that you have mentioned. 

For example, there is much greater international emphasis now. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. With all due respect, I have not heard an utterance about the Green Movement there, so I don’t know how you are 

pursuing it unless—are we sending secret messages to the Green 

Movement or something? 

Mr. FELTMAN. On the Green Movement, per se, of course this 

was an indigenous Iranian movement of the Iranian people very 

heroically going out on the street. It was not anything orchestrated 

by the international community. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Have we said that? 

Mr. FELTMAN. Yes. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. To? 

Mr. FELTMAN. I think that we have been clear. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. We have been saying it to each other. 

Mr. FELTMAN. I think we all recognize that the Iranians very 

courageously have taken to the street after elections, are looking to 

see confirmation of some kind of legitimacy of their governing institutions. 

We now have the opportunity, and we have used it, to speak to 

the Iranians directly about our concerns of what we saw afterwards. That was one of the messages that was delivered to the Iranians directly on October 1. 

34

We continue to provide support to civil society in Iran and across 

the region to create space for civil society voices to be heard, to be 

protected. We continue to look for other international fora in which 

we can highlight the abysmal practices that Iran——

Mr. ACKERMAN. I want to move on in this, but I will just make 

the point one more time. 

It would have been very helpful, I think—certainly not while it 

was occurring, because it would have made the regime’s point that 

the thing is U.S.- or Western-inspired. But afterwards, which includes today and tomorrow, it might not be a bad idea to let people 

know verbally—out loud, for all the world to see, including them, 

the kind of support, at least talk—that we appreciate what they 

are doing and that we are inspired by their courage. 

You know, some statement. It doesn’t have to be what I said, but 

something would certainly be helpful to let them know they are not 

alone. Because, you know, I think everybody understands that that 

is probably in the interest of moving the ball forward except we are 

not going to move the ball forward unless there is somebody there 

that appreciates its being moved forward and these people get 

some kind of encouragement. 

Let me ask you a question about Lebanon, and then we will 

move on. 

In two areas where you are looking to improve our relations with 

Syria—our relations, as well as the Israeli-Syrian peace agreement 

dialogue or whatever—are we going to be willing to pay for that in 

Lebanese coin? 

Mr. FELTMAN. The answer is unequivocal. No. 

Our discussions with the Syrians, our dialogue with the Syrians 

is not going to come at the expense of Lebanon’s sovereignty. We 

are not trading away Lebanese sovereignty in order to gain something with Syria. Absolutely not. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Great. I wanted to hear that on the record. 

Is the administration still committed to the full implementation 

of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701? 

Mr. FELTMAN. 1701 is actually the basis, the foundation stone, of 

our policy with Lebanon. And we saw another violation of 1701 yesterday that just heightens our concern and the need to see that resolution fully implemented. 

The rocket was fired from Lebanon into Israel last night. The 

Israelis responded. It is a reminder that we need to reinvigorate 

this resolution, we need to see this fully implemented by all parties. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Lastly, is the administration going to support 

the Special Tribunal for Lebanon until it finishes its work and 

make no deals with any party that would jeopardize the Tribunal’s 

future? 

Mr. FELTMAN. We are fully committed to supporting the Tribunal 

until it finishes its work. 

We are not involved in the Tribunal, which is as it should be. 

This is not a political tribunal. This is to bring justice to an unsolved assassination case and, hopefully, to bring the end of the era 

of impunity, and we will be fully supportive of that tribunal. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. 

Mr. Burton. 

35

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I guess, first of all, these comments I am going to make are not 

directed at you, Ambassador. You have got a tough job and I appreciate that. 

But the frustration level among a lot of us—and it goes across 

party lines, I think, although people on the other side may not be 

as willing to make some of the statements that I will. 

The Obama administration, to me, really hasn’t taken a strong 

position on Iran. Iran is the one that has got its finger into so 

many pies over in the Middle East it isn’t funny. And while we are 

talking about some kind of a negotiation process, they continue 

down that path, I believe, toward a nuclear weapons program. 

And what really bothers me is that we have said, you know, we 

are going to continue to try to find a path to peace. And it reminds 

me—as I said earlier today in our other hearing about Lord Chamberlain, Munich, Clinton talking to the North Koreans trying to 

work things out—these people who are despots, who have a goal in 

mind in Iran, is to destroy Israel, as well as possibly the United 

States and they are supporting terrorist organizations, Hezbollah, 

Hamas and God only knows who else. 

We ought to be stating in a very, very strong way that while we 

are willing to negotiate with them, there is a limit to our patience, 

and that we are going to move and we are going to support Israel 

in moving to make sure they don’t develop this nuclear weapons 

program. 

What they have said in Geneva and elsewhere, they ring hollow 

to me and they still are kind of backing and vacillating around 

that. They need to know very clearly where the United States and 

our allies stand, and they are not getting the message. 

I mean, you know, I remember back in Lebanon, or in Libya, 

when Muammar Qadhafi was rattling his sabers and everything 

and Reagan kept warning them that this was not right, that we 

weren’t going to allow this to happen. And then we moved, and we 

bombed him, and you didn’t hear any more from Muammar Qadhafi until just recently because he knew the United States was 

resolute of purpose. 

And that is what we need to do now with Iran. We need to let 

them know that if they continue down this path toward a nuclear 

development program that will endanger our ally, Israel, will destabilize Iraq, the whole Middle East, then they have to know that 

we are willing to support Benjamin Netanyahu in Israel and we 

are going to do whatever has to be done to stop them. 

They are a terrorist state, and what bothers me is that there has 

not been any definitive statement made by this administration. 

And, quite frankly, we didn’t do as much in the last administration 

as we should have. We should have been very, very straightforward 

and let them know exactly what the price was going to be if they 

kept—if they were going to keep heading down the path they were 

on. 

So I am not going to ask any questions, except to say that I hope 

that you as the ambassador and a person who has great expertise 

in that area will carry back the message to the administration 

that—let’s send them a direct message: Look, we want to work 

with you. We want to stop this nuclear development program. But 

36

if you don’t move, even though we are talking about sanctions and 

all that sort of thing right now, which may or may not happen, if 

you continue down that path and our intelligence-gathering capability indicates you are going on with this development program, 

you are going to pay a heck of a price. 

And we are not talking about damaging individual citizens over 

there, or killing people who are good friends of the United States 

who live in Iran, people who really like the United States; but 

those people who are in charge, those sites that are developing nuclear capabilities and nuclear weapons, they are going to be our 

targets and we are going to go after them. 

Once they know we mean business, like Muammar Qadhafi did, 

I think you will see a change. But until that time, just this hyperbole and these words ain’t going to cut it. 

And, with that, Mr. Chairman, thank you for yielding me this 

time. 

You can respond if you like, but what I would like to hear is that 

you are going to send them this clear message. 

Mr. FELTMAN. Ranking Member Burton, I will certainly take the 

message back to the administration, as you request, and take your 

views back. 

You know, we do want a diplomatic solution to this. But let me 

make a couple of comments. 

Diplomatic solution doesn’t mean soft. Diplomatic solution 

doesn’t mean that we roll over and play dead. Diplomatic solution 

means we work multilaterally, we work bilaterally, we line up alternatives. So we do want a diplomatic solution. 

But we also agree with you 100 percent: This cannot be an openended process of talking for talking’s sake. 

Mr. BURTON. Let me just say this and I will be quiet. 

As long as they think that we are not going to act, they will just 

keep playing us like a deck of cards. They have to know there is 

a fist there and that fist will be utilized if they don’t stop this nonsense. 

With that, I yield back. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Wexler. 

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I don’t view my station in life as being that where I always have 

to respond to Mr. Burton, as much as I respect him, but yesterday 

the National Security Advisor of the United States of America, I 

think a gentleman we would all agree is a fairly serious man, General Jones, stood in front of a group of people and said with respect 

to Iran, outlining the policy of engagement, at the end said, but understand all options are on the table. 

I think adults understand what General Jones means when he 

says all options are on the table. 

Mr. Ambassador, if I could, in the context of what I hope is an 

understanding that I support 110 percent the efforts that the administration has undergone with respect to the Israelis and the 

Palestinians, I would like to ask you with respect to our position 

with respect to settlements, I don’t understand the rationale of presenting settlements as the central core issue of the Israeli Palestinian dispute when in fact there are issues that equal or are greatVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:17 Apr 14, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00040 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\MESA\102809\53138 HFA PsN: SHIRL
37

er in terms of what is going to be required to resolve this historic 

conflict. 

But to the extent that we do address settlements—and I believe 

that they should be addressed, absolutely—why is it that we are 

not focused mostly on those settlements that in fact pose a significant obstacle to the ultimate creation of a contiguous Palestinian 

state which is prosperous, as opposed to those settlements that I 

believe, at least in private, all responsible parties understand ultimately do not pose that kind of an obstacle to the ultimate creation 

of a Palestinian state? 

I understand the legalities. I understand that, in effect, under 

our law all settlements at this point are treated the same. But the 

truth is, in terms of moving forward at a very difficult process and 

permitting the Israeli Government an opportunity to, in fact, take 

significant risks for peace, if we focused on those settlements that, 

in fact, do pose an obstacle to a contiguous Palestinian state, isn’t 

this a formula that might possibly allow us to get at the heart of 

the issue as to why the question of settlements needs to be addressed as soon as possible? 

Mr. FELTMAN. Congressman Wexler, thanks for the question. 

I need to state from the outset, because everything will be conditional on this, that President Obama stated our policy on settlements clearly in several different fora, including the U.N. General 

Assembly when he said that the United States does not accept the 

legitimacy of ongoing settlement activities. That is the policy. 

What have we been trying to do lately? We have been trying to 

get the parties back to direct negotiations where they deal with the 

big issues and they deal with the permanent status issues. The discussions on settlements that we have been having with the Israelis 

are not some condition that we want to see met before we get to 

negotiations. We want to get to negotiations as quickly as possible. 

We are asking the parties to take steps that would improve the 

atmosphere, that would make it more conducive that these negotiations be successful. And we have also reminded the parties in that 

context, in building the right atmosphere of trust and confidence 

you need for negotiations to succeed, that the parties have made 

certain obligations to each other already. The Israelis have accepted the road map that calls for a settlement freeze, including natural growth, full stop. 

So it is in that context we have been talking to the Israelis about 

a settlement freeze, but it is not a condition for negotiations. We 

want to get back to negotiations quickly. 

In terms of the proposal that you are suggesting, it is something 

that I believe would start to be—come in play as we get back to 

negotiations, as people start to discuss borders, and people start to 

talk about the territorial aspects of these negotiations. It becomes 

much easier to say which settlements are the ones that might be 

looked at a little bit differently, but our goal is to get the parties 

back to direct negotiations where all these issues can be discussed 

as quickly as possible in the best atmosphere. 

Mr. WEXLER. Prime Minister Fayyad’s plan, which I think is the 

most intelligent statement ever put forward by a Palestinian leader 

to push forward with 2 years of institutional building across the 

board, what are we doing to support those efforts, if I may ask? 

38

Mr. FELTMAN. I agree with your statement. It is an excellent 

plan. Prime Minister Fayyad, who I know you know personally, is 

a very serious leader who sees that to have a Palestinian state it 

is not enough. To declare statehood, you have to have the institutions that make that state work, that are accountable, that are answerable to the Palestinian people. 

And we have full confidence in the vision that he has outlined 

in that plan. We stand ready with the international community to 

help Salam Fayyad realize that plan of building those institutions 

the Palestinian state needs in 2 years. But we want to be led by 

the Palestinians themselves. This is a Palestinian effort. It is not 

some kind of international effort. We will be supportive to the extent that they welcome our support. 

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you very much. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Rohrabacher. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Ambassador, I know there have been serious mistakes that 

America has made in foreign policy in the past. There is no doubt 

about that. So my criticism of the Obama administration and my 

negative analysis so far is not just aimed at President Obama. 

There are things that should have been done in the past that 

weren’t done. 

But since the President took over, he had what appears to have 

been a sensitivity or a sincerity offensive in trying to prove to the 

people of the world that the United States, we really are sincere, 

good guys—and I at least interpreted it that way, in trying to be 

as open-minded about it as I could about it at the time. But his 

basically apologies for alleged misdeeds that occurred decades ago 

in Iran, for example, has that in any way worked to alter what we 

would consider the negative policies of Iran, for example, support 

of terrorists or perhaps moving forward on their nuclear program? 

Mr. FELTMAN. Iran is still playing a destabilizing role in the region, without question. Whether we are talking about the nuclear 

file, whether we are talking about its support for terrorism, Iran’s 

rejection of a two-state solution or Iran’s repression of its own people, Iran is still playing a deeply negative role in the region. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So the President reaching out to these people 

in an act of sincerity has actually perhaps resulted in the opposite 

from what he would have wanted? 

Mr. FELTMAN. He—what I—Mr. Congressman, how I would respond would be to note that, by not talking to Iran for 30 years, 

we also were unable to modify Iran’s behavior. So Iran was supporting Hezbollah, building up its nuclear capacity in a time when 

we in fact were refusing to deal with it. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I am exactly not talking about necessarily 

talking with them, but when someone apologizes for an American 

CIA operation back in the 1950s, 60 years ago in another century, 

and takes that approach on trying to win or open up dialogue, it 

looks like to me that that approach failed. 

Mr. FELTMAN. I believe when the President has given his speeches, such as the one in Cairo, he has been essentially putting a challenge before the people of the Middle East. He has said, ‘‘We are 

willing to look at our history, our own stereotypes. We are willing 

to look beyond our own stereotypes, and we are asking you to do 

39

the same.’’ It is a new language that he hopes can be one of our 

tools in order to break through on the impasse, whether we are 

dealing with Iran or any number of other challenges that we have. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. For example——

Mr. FELTMAN. It is not naive or ill considered. It is allowing us 

to use diplomacy and engagement in a way that we might be able 

to make some headway with the other side. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. We will find out if it is ill conceived when we 

look at the results. 

For example, the President—is this perception wrong that the 

President has stepped back from the intense human rights criticism that we were actually focusing and directing toward Iran prior 

to this administration? For example, during the elections and the 

demonstrations after the elections, because of the crooked elections 

there in Iran, there were many demonstrators out; and some of us 

who had been watching the scene noted a lack of intensity over 

America’s, let’s say, support, verbal support for people who were in 

the streets struggling for democracy. 

Mr. FELTMAN. I think you are aware, Congressman, of the attempts by the Iranian Government to say that those demonstrations that took place after the results of the June elections were 

something foreign grown. They were something inspired from the 

outside. We all needed to be very sensitive so that those——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. That seems to be the word. This administration, they are sensitive. 

Let me ask you this. They have arrested—I only have a little bit 

of time left—they arrested some of the leaders, some of the democratic leaders of those demonstrations against crooked elections 

and a mullah dictatorship. They are holding these elections as a facade for their own control. What have we done to challenge the Iranian mullah dictatorship on the lives of these leaders who have 

now been condemned to death? What have we said will happen as 

a result if they do indeed execute these people? 

Mr. FELTMAN. You know there are a number of things, Congressman, that have been happening. I would draw your attention to the 

statements the White House and the State Department have made 

in response to the sentencing of an American citizen, a fellow 

American, Kian Tajbakhsh, an Iranian American scholar. We 

strongly condemned this. This was one of the roundups after the 

elections where this American was arrested. We have condemned 

this strongly and firmly. 

We have addressed our concerns now directly to the Iranians on 

the margins of the October 1st meeting. We have made our statements clear, and we continue to look for other ways to draw attention to Iran’s dismal human rights record. It is appalling treatment 

of its own citizens in the aftermath of the elections. 

Ultimately, the Iranian Government needs to earn the respect of 

its own people, and that will help it gain respect internationally. 

But we have been absolutely clear about our support for democracy, civil society, the fact that the Iranian voices of the people 

need to be heard in Iran. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. It hasn’t been clear to me. 

Thank you very much. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Your time has expired. 

40

Ms. Berkley. 

Ms. BERKLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and thank you so much 

for joining us, Mr. Ambassador. There are a couple of issues that 

I would like to explore with you, if I may. 

I am in favor of a two-state solution, and I am on record for 

many years talking about it. Of course, it has to be a viable Palestinian state with—as you stated, with functioning government institutions, a functioning economy so that the Palestinian people 

could get jobs to support themselves, and with no Hamas living 

side by side with a secured Jewish state of Israel. 

When I met with Mr. Fayyad this summer, we had a most engaging and lively conversation. And I, too, agree that he has done an 

extraordinary job. But when I asked him whether the Palestinians 

were prepared to give up the right of return in order to move forward in the peace process and create a two-state solution, he refused to answer my question. He was very gracious and very 

charming, but he would not give me a definitive answer. And that 

concerned me quite a bit, because there cannot be a democratic 

Jewish state of Israel without the Palestinians giving a right of return. 

But there are two issues that I would like to explore with you. 

One is the settlements; and I am glad that my dear friend who I 

am going to miss terribly in Congress, Mr. Wexler, brought this up. 

I think we made a very large strategic blunder when we publicly 

dressed down the Israelis regarding the settlement issue but 

should have and could have been said behind closed doors I think 

created a problem. 

I don’t think that the settlements are the seminal issue. There 

were no settlements in 1948 or 1956 or 1967, and Israel still managed to get itself attacked. It wasn’t an issue then, and I don’t believe it is an issue now. 

Rather than bring the parties closer to sitting down and negotiating for a comprehensive peace agreement, I think it put the 

Israelis in a very uncomfortable and awkward position. And it gave 

Abu Mazen something else to keep him from sitting down at the 

peace table, saying that now he absolutely will not sit down unless 

all settlement activity ceases, and that may not happen for a while, 

and that is just keeping the two parties further apart. 

Another issue that you brought up that I always—it is the linkage issue. And if only we could resolve this problem between the 

Israelis and the Palestinians that everything else would solve itself 

or we would be much closer to solving the problems that plague the 

Middle East. But I will submit to you that if Israel ceases exist tomorrow, would the plight of the Palestinians be any better than it 

is today? I would suggest to you that it would not be any better 

and their lives would not be improved by the disappearance of the 

state of Israel. 

Would Iran end their nuclear ambitions if Israel ceased to exist? 

I don’t think so. 

Would the Sunnis and Shiites lay down their arms and stop killing each other in Iraq if Israel ceased to exist? I don’t think so. 

Would Taliban stop recruiting and lay down their arms throughout the Middle East and other parts of world? Again, I don’t think 

so. 

41

Would the Saudis move toward democratic institutions and give 

women equal rights in their country? Absolutely not. 

So I am always concerned when I hear members of the administration or my colleagues, who I value very much, creating this linkage which I don’t think truly exists. And I think it gives the Arab 

countries just the excuse they need to do nothing to improve the 

situation in their own countries, just blame it on Israel and we can 

buy more time to continue to do what we already do. 

And, frankly, I think a show of good faith would be—and if we 

are going to put pressure on anybody, rather than on settlements, 

how about the Arab countries and this ridiculous economic boycott 

against the state of Israel? 

And I thank you very much for being here. 

Mr. FELTMAN. Representative Berkley, thank you. 

I will comment on the last one first. Because I am sorry if I 

wasn’t clear. There is no formal linkage between these issues. 

What I said is we would hope the progress on one could lead to mutually reinforcing progress on the other. But there is no formal 

linkage. I couldn’t agree with you more on that. 

What happens is that the Israeli Palestinian conflict becomes a 

pretext. It becomes an ability for Iran to muck around in the region. And so, by addressing that, we perhaps could help address 

the question of Iran’s misbehavior in the region. 

But I agree with you that these things are not formal linkages. 

We need to be working on all of these issues simultaneously on 

their own merits. We are a great power. We should be able to have 

diplomacy focus on Iran and the diplomacy focus on getting to an 

Arab-Israeli comprehensive peace in which Israel can live in peace 

and security in the region. 

So I am sorry if I made it sound as though we are doing formal 

linkages, because that is not in fact what we are doing. 

In terms of Hamas, I think it is worth reiterating—you have 

heard this from us a lot, but it is worth reiterating that Hamas can 

come to the table when Hamas abides by the Quartet Principles: 

Recognition of Israel, renunciation of violence, and adherence to 

the PLO’s past agreements. These shouldn’t be obstacles to some 

kind of Palestinian states. These are the foundation stones, the 

building blocks of what the Palestinians need to build that state. 

That is what we are asking before we have any sort of dealings 

with Hamas on our side. 

Ms. BERKLEY. Thank you. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. The time of the gentlewoman has expired. 

Mr. Carnahan. 

Mr. CARNAHAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and thank you, Ambassador, for being here. 

I wanted to focus I guess on I think we have seen the new administration step up to the plate in an important way in terms of 

their reengagement around the world and especially in the region 

of the Middle East. We have seen I think an improved credibility. 

I believe we have seen an increased priority in what we are doing 

there. 

I want to ask you, with regard to the Arab states in the region, 

what you see as bright spots in terms of those states stepping up 

to help make progress. Certainly we have seen some leadership 

42

from Egypt in the heading talks, but I would like you to explain 

some of the bright spots you see in terms of Arab states stepping 

up to help make progress. 

The other question I have is, we were in Lebanon this past 

spring and got a chance to see some of the refugee camps there, 

and I am especially curious of your opinion of what is going on in 

terms of addressing the issue of refugees and the other Arab states 

stepping up on that issue. 

Mr. FELTMAN. Representative Carnahan, thank you. 

We do see some—you have asked about some bright spots in 

terms of Arab engagement with us in response to our own engagement. I will give you some examples of bright spots, but let me tell 

you from the start we would like to see more bright spots. 

Mr. CARNAHAN. We all would, indeed. 

Mr. FELTMAN. So, just want to be clear, I am not looking at this 

and saying, this is great. We have these bright spots and are finished. No, we want to keep going. 

You mentioned Egypt. Egypt has played a very, very important 

role in sending some pretty clear messages to Hamas about the 

need for Hamas to abide by those Quartet Principles. Egypt has 

taken some very important steps, particularly since the January 

conflict, in preventing smuggling of arms and money to Hamas via 

the tunnels. That is one example. 

Saudi Arabia has just recently given $200 billion to the Palestinian Authority, to the government headed by Prime Minister 

Salam Fayyad. This is an important step, because we need to have 

these Palestinian institutions functioning and healthy for the time 

that we get the Palestinian statehood. 

We are working with a number of states in the Gulf in particular 

on various aspects of military and security issues; and this, of 

course, has to do with in large part the concern that all of us have 

about Iran’s ambitions. 

In the countries of North Africa, where we have a very robust 

counterterrorism with the countries of North Africa to try to interrupt the networks across the Sahel, the al-Qaeda and the Islamic 

Maghreb, as it is called, the terrorist networks that both wreck 

havoc in the Sahel area of Africa and North Africa as well as feed 

into the foreign fighter pipeline that goes to Iraq. 

So we have seen some bright spots in terms of Arab responsiveness to the diplomacy that we are engaged with across the region. 

We certainly would like to see more. 

Mr. CARNAHAN. And in particular about the refugee camps. 

Mr. FELTMAN. Oh, I am sorry. In terms of Lebanon, since you 

visited there, I am sure you are aware of just how sensitive this 

issue is in Lebanon, that the Lebanese are divided in every which 

way on every issue you can imagine, but they are united on the 

issue regarding the Palestinian refugees. 

And I would just repeat what I said in my statement, is that we 

understand that you are not going to have a comprehensive solution to the Arab-Israeli peace conflict without taking these Lebanese sensitivities into account. You are not going to have a solution 

on the back of Lebanon, in essence. 

In terms of the broader issue of Palestinian refugees, this is one 

of the reasons we need to get back to the negotiating table as 

43

quickly as possible. We are not going to be able to have an honest 

discussion on this issue except through the context of direct negotiation between the Israelis and the Palestinians; and the sooner 

we get to that, the better for all the states in the region, certainly 

the better for the poor Palestinian refugees. 

Mr. CARNAHAN. Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. McMahon. 

Mr. MCMAHON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for being 

with us today, Ambassador. 

Ambassador, Turkey is not, by definition, a Middle Eastern country, but it most certainly has a profound influence on the countries 

in the Middle East. What are the implications of Turkey’s evolving 

identity with regards to the Middle East and the issues that we 

have spoken to today? 

Mr. FELTMAN. Representative, I will have to be a little bit careful, since I don’t want my European Bureau colleagues to question 

what I am doing, testifying before Congress about a country that 

falls outside of my region. So I will talk about it a little bit in terms 

of Turkey and my region, rather than Turkey per se. 

Turkey has played, for example, a very constructive role in Iraq. 

Turkey obviously has some security issues in terms of Kurdish terrorists who are located in northern Iraq, but in general Turkey has 

played a very positive role in helping to stabilize Iraq. 

Turkey played a very important role in leading proximity talks 

between Israel and Syria that have fallen apart, unfortunately, for 

a number of reasons—the change of Israeli Government, the war 

in Gaza in December and January. But Turkey was able to use its 

good influence and offices to promote a kind of dialogue that took 

place between Israel and Syria. 

The Syrian-Turkish relationship is one that is evolving. I would 

say evolving in what we would see as sort of a positive healthy direction. A few years ago, Turkey and Syria were hostile to each 

other. Now they have grown closer. To the extent that Syria can 

build ties with others, see its interest linked with others and not 

exclusively to Iran, I think that is inherently good. 

We are concerned about what led to the cancellation of the multilateral exercise that was planned for Turkey, the decision by the 

Turks that one of the partners would not be welcome, so we are 

watching these sorts of elements. But, in general, the role of Turkey in our region, it is strong, it is growing and has basically been 

positive. 

Mr. MCMAHON. And certainly, but for that event with the exercise, certainly probably has a role that could be helpful as a broker 

or as an ally to us toward peace. And it is in that vein that I ask 

my next question. 

I know we have spoken a lot about Iran and the sanctions and 

the bill we voted on today, which we are all very pleased with as 

a good step from the Foreign Affairs Committee here in Congress, 

and what the administration’s focus on that I would like to ask 

about in relation to our allies. 

One of the measures that I was able to put in as an amendment 

was a reporting requirement where the administration tells us how 

the members of the G–20 are dealing with Iran in terms of whether 

or not they are providing equipment or refined petroleum. So I 

44

guess my question is, does the Obama administration support targeted sanctions against the providers of petroleum in Tehran, 

which you have spoken of a little bit? But, also, are we going to 

work with our allies and companies within their countries such as 

with the Swiss, with Vitol and Trust Egora, which are providing 

material and product to Iran. Do we have an approach planned in 

that regard? 

Mr. FELTMAN. You know, actually, Congressman, this is an ongoing process, and it is largely done quietly. But we have used, for 

example, the Iran Sanctions Act as well as the general international desire to see Iran behave like a responsible member of the 

international community in order to effect some business decisions. 

You may remember that, for example, Ambassador Burns had 

testified—Bill Burns had testified expressing some concern about 

Norway’s state oil company plans for investment in Iran. Soon 

thereafter, Norway said publicly that state oil would be relooking 

at its plans, and they have not moved forward with this. So we are 

using this in a variety of ways. 

I haven’t seen the legislation. I know it was marked up this 

morning. So I won’t comment on the legislation that the administration, I am sure, will be looking at. 

But, in general, what we have been trying to do is work multilaterally, where can we get the most people on board to have the 

greatest impact in Iran that we would hope would influence Iranian thinking? So multilaterally. And we have also tried to keep 

the focus on Iran’s misbehavior, on Iran. Using the tools we have 

to build alliances with others and to basically send the message; 

and we have been somewhat successful. I believe that now is not 

the time for normal business operations with Iran. 

Mr. MCMAHON. Thank you Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you, very much. 

Mr. Costa. 

Mr. COSTA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Ambassador, I think we all, to varying degrees, support bilateral and multilateral efforts; and I know this administration is 

about 10 months into that effort. Senator Mitchell has a difficult 

challenge, as you pointed out. He is a patient man, clearly from his 

experience in the Irish peace talks. 

But when we look at the visit here earlier this year by King 

Abdullah from Jordan, when we look at the most recent visit by 

President Mubarak in August, when we look at some of the other 

efforts that are all, I would suppose, to be a part of this multilateral and bilateral effort as it relates to the Israeli Palestinian peace 

process, I think there is a concern, a level of frustration that we 

see a number of the critical peace partners in the area using this 

as a crutch or an excuse. I mean, the cancellation, as you noted, 

with Turkey, the relationship with Turkey and Syria right now 

with the 40 ministers that have been meeting——

I just picked up a quote earlier this month. King Abdullah expressed dismay over a perceived lack of administration focus on the 

Middle East peace process. In an interview with the Italian daily 

la Repubblica, King Abdullah said, ‘‘I heard people in Washington 

talking about Iran and again Iran and always Iran, but I keep on 

insisting on the Palestinian question.’’

45

Clearly, we are concerned about Iran and as you inferred to the 

5+1, but where are the milestones here that are going to show that 

the countries in the neighborhood are focused at the same level 

that we are about achieving the critical steps necessary to achieve 

this peace that we talk about that is always illusive? 

Mr. FELTMAN. You know, I am surprised to hear the quote you 

give. Because, given the amount of diplomacy that Senator Mitchell 

himself as well as the Secretary and the President have devoted to 

Middle East peace, it strikes me as somewhat odd that someone 

would say, well, this administration is not really trying on Middle 

East peace. 

We want to see negotiations start as quickly as possible but also 

in the best possible atmosphere so that those negotiations succeed. 

It is not enough to just have Israelis and Palestinians sit together. 

Mr. COSTA. I know, but sometimes that atmosphere is an excuse 

for doing nothing. 

And I just want to ask you about the question of elections. The 

last administration went headlong into elections, and sometimes be 

careful what you wish for. The elections that are being proposed 

next year, are the Palestinians prepared to move in that—do we 

have any confidence in what the outcomes may bring? 

Mr. FELTMAN. I wouldn’t say that we would have confidence that 

these elections would be taking place. We know what President 

Abbas has said. We also have seen the reactions to that. All I can 

say is that our partner for peace has got to be Palestinians who accept Israel’s right to exist, who agree to negotiations, who reject the 

use of violence in order to try to affect the outcome, who accept 

what has been agreed to already. That is the Palestinian partner 

for peace. I think that we will see a lot more intra-Palestinian debate before we will see any kind of Palestinian elections. 

Mr. COSTA. Two other quick questions. I was saddened to see an 

article this summer of children in Hamas camps, summer camps 

reenacting the capture of Gilad Schalit. The Palestinians could talk 

borders and agreements and talk all the good happy talk that they 

want, but I think this was a deplorable incidence. And I think summer camp events that recognize or glorify this sets the peace process back many steps. 

What is the administration doing about these kinds of efforts in 

the curriculum? It is just not with Palestine. I mean, still some of 

our partners in the Middle East, even though they have indicated 

they are trying to clean up their curriculum about references toward Jews and Christians and others, it still seems to be a problem. 

Mr. FELTMAN. The example you describe is awful. I couldn’t 

agree with you more. Every party in the area has a responsibility 

to help build the atmosphere for peace, to help build the atmosphere for trust and confidence, and the things you describe I agree 

it takes us in absolutely the wrong direction. 

We have a dialogue going with a number of countries, it is quiet, 

about the curriculum; and we have some programs that are done 

to try to improve the curriculum that is being taught. 

In the case of sort of Palestinian schools run by UNRWA, for example, we have funded a tolerance program that is supplemental 

46

material. We are very aware of the issue that you raise. We 

agree——

Mr. COSTA. But do we put these countries on notice? 

Mr. ACKERMAN. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. COSTA. It is unacceptable? 

Mr. ACKERMAN. It is the chair’s intent to offer a quick second 

round. So if the gentleman would hold the additional question for 

that time or ask any other questions then. 

Mr. COSTA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Connolly. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you and welcome, Ambassador Feltman. 

Mr. FELTMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Let me sort of start picking up a little bit on Mr. 

Costa’s questions. 

You made reference earlier to institution building for eventuality 

of a Palestinian state and Saudi investment with respect to that. 

How can there be, however, stable institutions for a Palestinian 

state so long as we have the kind of fracture between the leadership in Gaza and the leadership in the West Bank? 

Mr. FELTMAN. You know, the Egyptians are attempting to bring 

about a Palestinian reconciliation, and we would all support a Palestinian reconciliation that abides by the Quartet conditions, that 

builds a unified Palestinian partner for peace. We are all supportive. But, in the meantime, there is a functioning Palestinian 

Authority on the West Bank. It is actually doing a pretty good job. 

The IMF, the World Bank have given high marks to the accountability of the institutions being set up. When we get to the point 

that we have a unified Palestinian partner for peace, we would assume that those institutions would apply also to Gaza, but we don’t 

want to neglect the ones on the West Bank that are actually working and recognized by the international community as being the 

Palestinian Authority responsible for administration of the Palestinian territories. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Would the United States welcome—pursuing the 

answer to my own question, your hopes notwithstanding, if in fact 

reconciliation cannot occur, would the United States support some 

kind of interim peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinian Authority on the West Bank leaving out Hamas and the 

Gaza? 

Mr. FELTMAN. Forgive me for making a technical point here. The 

negotiating partner is the PLO, which is sort of above the PA. The 

PLO is a unified organization that is recognized by the Arabs to 

be the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. So 

when we get back to negotiations, who is actually sitting there 

would be representatives of the PLO and the Palestinian Authority 

is administering the territories on the ground. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. But you take my point. 

Mr. FELTMAN. We want to get back to negotiations. Implementation of any agreement we would hope would take place within a 

unified authority. But negotiation we believe should start as soon 

as possible, and we would hope those negotiations could help lead 

to a unified authority before we get to the point of implementation. 

47

Mr. CONNOLLY. Are we prepared to go forward even absent a unified authority? 

Mr. FELTMAN. I am—at this point, with all that is going on right 

now, I would prefer not to speculate at this point. We are prepared 

to go forward with negotiations now. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Okay. 

Lebanon, we had some hopeful results in elections earlier this 

year, but the ability to form a government has been stymied. What 

is the current situation from the United States point of view in 

terms of Lebanon, and are we concerned about stability there as 

well? 

Mr. FELTMAN. I think it is natural to be concerned when you 

have elections in June, we are now almost to November, and the 

government hasn’t been formed. There is a Prime Minister designate. He has been nominated twice to form a government, and we 

hope he can do this as quickly as possible. There has been a formula decided by all parties. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Almost as long as waiting for the appointment of 

an USAID administrator, Mr. Feltman. 

Mr. FELTMAN. That is above my pay grade. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I know. I couldn’t resist. 

Mr. FELTMAN. We have seen this several times in Lebanon. 

There was no President for a while, and there was a government 

that was boycotted for a while, and there was fighting on the 

streets. And now there is no government. There is no government 

again. 

And when I look back and say, what is the unifying factor of all 

of these things? It was that Hezbollah and Michel Aoun were blocking the government, blocking the election of the President, blocking 

the government again, going out to the street to protest certain 

policies they didn’t like. But, in the end, the Lebanese were able 

to come together and solve their own problems. 

We hope they do that as quickly as possible. It is time to have 

a government in Lebanon. There is a formula for doing so and a 

constitution that lays out the process. The Lebanese need to be left 

to their own devices to do just that. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you. 

I thank the chair. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Inglis. 

Mr. INGLIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and, Ambassador, thank 

you for being here. 

Recently, I sent a letter to Secretary Clinton asking about funding cuts for organizations that support democracy in Iran; and we 

are awaiting a response. In fairness, it was only October 6th, so I 

guess we will get a response at some point soon. 

So I am interested in what light you might be able to shed on 

the United States policy toward these democracy supporting groups 

in Iran. And what I understand is that the Iranian Human Rights 

Documentation Center, Freedom House, and IRI all are on record 

as saying that their funding has been cut. I wonder if you could 

comment on that and whether you can corroborate that or whether—and, if so, what is the policy of the United States that would 

cause us to want to cut those democracy supporting organizations? 

Mr. FELTMAN. Congressman, thanks. 

48

Let me reiterate, our policy toward our programs in Iran hasn’t 

changed. The fundamentals of what we are trying to do in Iran and 

across the region hasn’t changed. 

What are we trying to do? We are trying to help create space for 

a functioning, healthy civil society, where civil society voices become stronger and where they can be protected. We are trying to 

provide tools for civil society activists to get information to connect 

with each other. We are doing these things across the region. We 

are doing these things in a lot of different places. This has not 

changed from one administration to the other, from this week to 

the last because of elections. We are continuing to work in these 

areas. 

In terms of individual grants of organizations that are working 

in Iran, all I can say is this is pretty competitive. We have resources from Congress. We put out solicitations. We do the evaluation. We do constant evaluation of a program’s effectiveness. 

There is no drop in funding. Quite the contrary. The individual 

cases you mentioned, we will look at your letter. I am not aware 

of the cases, but what I can say is the broad policy objectives, the 

broad thrust of what we are doing has not changed. We are continuing to work to strengthen civil society across the region, including in Iran, using a wide variety of partners who tend to compete 

with each other. 

Mr. INGLIS. So I want to track with you on that, because that 

certainly makes a lot of sense. But, on the other hand, we have 

these reports of what seems to be three significant organizations 

being cut, again, Iran Human Rights Documentation Center, Freedom House, and IRI. As I understand, a fairly significant operation 

is being cut. You don’t have any specific information on those three 

or——

Mr. FELTMAN. You know, we tend not to discuss—we tend to look 

at grant information as proprietary information for a number of 

reasons. If we have information, we will share it with partners, but 

we don’t share it publicly. 

The other thing is that there is a particular sensitivity on the 

funding of organizations that are doing work in Iran for reasons 

that you can probably all understand. And I understand there is, 

in fact, a staff briefing next week where staff from my bureau and 

others will be coming up to talk to some of your staff in more specifics about the programs that we have. And so I will make sure 

that they have any details they can share when they come for the 

staff hearing. 

Mr. INGLIS. I guess the overall concern—I will run out of time 

here shortly—is that in our attempt to engage Iran, which seems 

to me to make sense, to try to talk with them in some way, I sure 

hope, though, that we are not giving concessions and removing ourselves from support of the projects and programs that would spread 

concepts of democracy in constitutional republics in Iran, people 

wanting to emulate the success of the United States and other 

countries that love freedom. And to have us back away from those 

in order to get some kind of engagement seems to me makes no 

sense, because appeasement has never worked before, and it seems 

to me to fly into that danger zone of appeasement which is not wise 

policy. 

49

Mr. FELTMAN. Congressman, we are not backing away. We are 

going full steam ahead with our programs with Iran and across the 

region, again in order to create that space for civil society to actually play the proper role that we would all understand and building 

more accountable democratic governing institutions. 

Mr. INGLIS. Thank you very much. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Sherman. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. I just came by to ask simple questions 

about small amounts of money that are appropriated. I believe we provided recently $2.5 million for democracy in 

Syria; and we will be providing money for democracy in Syria in 

the future, I would suspect. Can we be confident that if we provide 

money to the State Department to promote democracy in Syria that 

none of that money will be handed by the State Department to 

President Assad or to his government or to his family? 

Mr. FELTMAN. Congressman Sherman, I am very aware of the 

reference that you are making there; and I assure you we will be 

transparent with the Congress. We will make sure that we have 

done our due diligence about who the end recipients are so we are 

actually helping civil society and not a family. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Let me at it this way. Assuming you do your due 

diligence—and mistakes can happen, but will you use due diligence 

just to do the due diligence or will you use due diligence to make 

sure that you are doing your best job to make sure that none of 

the money goes to President Assad or to his government or to his 

family? Or are you going to do due diligence——

Mr. FELTMAN. I will say yes, because we want to support civil society in its role. So I will answer your question yes. 

Mr. SHERMAN. So you will not be building the President Assad 

Health Clinic in Allepo——

Mr. FELTMAN. No. 

Mr. SHERMAN [continuing]. Under the control of the Syrian 

Health Ministry? 

Of course, then referencing the congressional notification of Sep- tember 15th dealing with the $2.5 million we provided to promote 

democracy in Libya, I have been told at less formal settings that 

this document is going to be superseded and that no money is going 

to be spent until we get a new document. 

Mr. FELTMAN. You are correct, and we will use the same criteria 

you just outlined for Syria when we submit that new document to 

you on Libya. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. 

The one thing I will point out about the Libyan document is that 

in many cases it is unclear who gets the money. They subdivide it, 

a half million here, a quarter million there. And sometimes they 

specifically identify who gets the money, and sometimes they don’t. 

So I will ask you not only to achieve the aims you stated but to 

achieve a specificity in the congressional notification so that we 

know who gets the money, not just what purposes the money will 

try to serve. 

Mr. FELTMAN. I give you those assurances, Congressman Sherman. We understand the sensitivity. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you very much. I yield back. 

50

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Sherman. 

Mr. Ambassador, the Obama administration has rightfully denounced the Goldstone Report which I want to talk about for a 

minute, which, if taken seriously, would make it legally impossible 

for our country or any other country to defend themselves from terrorists who hide between and among civilians. 

I would suspect that when a country responds to terrorist attacks 

and terrorists, as we know them of recent vintage, have found it 

to their advantage to hide that way among civilian populations. 

And I would suspect that there were probably some given days in 

our response to the terrorist attack against our country that we responded in Afghanistan, maybe today in Pakistan, maybe previously in Iraq, in trying to kill bad guys who hung out among innocent people, that there were probably some of those days where 

in 1 day we killed as many people as who died in the Israeli incursion in Gaza. 

Which, if we were susceptible to any General Assembly resolution that might be passed based on Goldstone, other countries 

might take it into their account to declare the United States and 

the officers thereof as international war criminals, cite international jurisdiction, and prosecute American former soldiers who 

are now tourists, or the Vice President, or you, whoever might venture into their country, and put you on trial for being an international war criminal. 

This would prevent us and any other country from defending 

themselves. Prime Minister Netanyahu has been forcefully arguing 

that the international community can’t possibly expect Israel to exchange land for peace, if, when peace breaks down, Israel effectively is prohibited from defending itself. 

Firstly, I think the Prime Minister is completely right; and, second, there is not even a shred of possibility that the Israeli public 

would agree to any peace agreement under the absurd operational 

restrictions that the Goldstone Report proposes to require of Israel 

and any other countries’ armed forces. 

What is the administration doing both to protect our rights to 

self-defense and to make it clear to the international community 

that they can have the Goldstone view, or they can have peace in 

the Middle East, but they can’t have Goldstone and Middle East 

peace? 

Mr. FELTMAN. Mr. Chairman, you gave a very compelling description of the problem that the Goldstone Report poses for us in 

terms of our own role and in terms of Middle East peace. 

You know, we were opposed to the mandate of the Goldstone Report; and, as you outlined, its conclusions are sweeping. I can tell 

you there is no—we see no role for the Security Council. We see 

no role for Goldstone in the Security Council. We will use our voice, 

our vote, and all organizations where the Goldstone Report might 

appear in order to make it clear what the stakes are here and why 

we have a problem with the sweeping conclusion that the 

Goldstone Report poses. 

You know, you mentioned our own reaction to 9/11 and perhaps 

there were mistakes made now and again. We have internal processes to look at those mistakes. Israel does, too. It is a democratic 

state. And this is the point we are making to everybody, that Israel 

51

has processes that they have and are using to investigate any 

claims of abuses, any claims of—any incidents cited by people as 

being beyond the law of war. So we are working to make sure that, 

to the extent we have this, the Goldstone Report doesn’t become 

sort of enshrined internationally, that people understand the implications of this broadly. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Why would we be more successful down the road 

when we weren’t successful in dissuading the vote from coming up 

in Geneva and being sent to the General Assembly? Why would—

is there a process where we are counting votes in the General Assembly right now to see if we can kill this thing? Because I don’t 

know that the mass goes to our advantage here. 

Mr. FELTMAN. I don’t know. I would agree with you. I would be 

skeptical about our ability to influence a General Assembly vote. I 

am much more confident of our ability to have influence in the Security Council, for all the reasons you know; and the Security 

Council, frankly, on matters of international law figures much 

more prominently than the General Assembly does. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. I have more confidence that you are right here 

than not as far as our influence in the Security Council, looking at 

the lineup, but not completely sure. But, nonetheless, if it passes 

in the General Assembly, that would be sufficient enough in some 

countries to cite the General Assembly passage of a resolution as 

an enabling matter for them to invoke whatever they would want 

to invoke against us or any other country. Do you think that there 

is a mathematical chance of stopping it in the General Assembly? 

Mr. FELTMAN. I——

Mr. ACKERMAN. Your answer—I am rephrasing—to the Security 

Council would be, possibly we can, more likely than—but not in the 

General Assembly. What is going to happen is my concern. 

Mr. FELTMAN. Unfortunately——

Mr. ACKERMAN. In the neighboring countries. 

Mr. FELTMAN. Unfortunately, I think our influence is limited in 

the General Assembly. And it is a problem in many of these U.N. 

bodies that you end up with this inherently anti-Israeli bias that 

comes out in a variety of ways. This is one that could have broader 

implications, unfortunately. I do know that in Geneva the resolution passed the Human Rights Council, but it passed by 25 votes 

out of 47 members. This is the lowest margin of any of these antiIsraeli measures that the U.N. Human Rights Council deals with. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. If the Yankees win the World Series four games 

to three, they are still winners. 

Mr. FELTMAN. But it may be an indication that with U.S. leadership and U.S. partnership with others we can start to steer these 

U.N. organizations away from the number of anti-Israeli resolutions that almost come up in a pro forma basis. And that has got 

to be our ultimate goal as well, do what we can to prevent the enshrining of the Goldstone recommendations and do what we can to 

steer the U.N. bodies away from inherently anti-Israeli bias that 

comes up so often. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Last question, is that your shop that is doing 

that or Senator Mitchell’s shop? 

Mr. FELTMAN. It is a joint effort. Because we have Ambassador 

Rice at US–UN, Cabinet official. She was just in Israel and had 

52

meetings with the Israelis on October 21st where this was discussed. We have the international organizations. We have the 

State Department, the legal office. We have a lot of people who are 

working on these issues. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Rohrabacher. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Just a note on the United Nations. There are some of us here in 

Congress that are skeptical of the United Nations. Period. You 

have an organization set up where it is made——

Mr. ACKERMAN. That means your attitude has gotten more sympathetic. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes. It is an organization who is made up of 

governments, half of which are so authoritarian and corrupt that 

we would think are totally contrary to what the United States is 

all about, at least half of them. I don’t see really any future in basing our national security or anybody else’s security or prosperity on 

that organization. 

I would like to ask you a little bit about our Government policy. 

You basically told us today that there has not been a retreat, even 

though there is a perceived retreat, from a tough stance on human 

rights. And when given the examples of the Human Rights Documentation Center being defunded, the Farsi-English online journal 

for democracy and human rights being defunded, efforts by the 

International Republican Institute, areas that are focusing on 

human rights activities in Iran being defunded, that those are aberrations and not reflective of a broad policy. The broad policy has 

stayed the same. These things are just all little things that don’t 

really reflect the overall commitment to human rights. 

Mr. FELTMAN. Yes, I do say that. I sense your skepticism, Congressman Rohrabacher, but I do say that. 

There is a highly competitive process, as the American taxpayers 

would expect, in order for any organization to receive U.S. Government funding. I am not aware of these individuals’ cases but, as 

I said, there will be a staff briefing next week. I will make sure 

our staff is aware of the individual cases and can share what they 

can share, given proprietary concerns and all of that. 

What I said—I will say it again—is, we are continuing full steam 

ahead with our programs to promote civil society, promote the protection of human rights, to promote democracy, accountable and responsible governments and the rule of law across the region, including in Iran. 

We have received funding from Congress for these programs. We 

have asked for funding for these programs. We want these programs to continue. 

Perhaps the language sounds a little bit different to you now 

than a year ago; I don’t know. But the commitment to work for accountability, for rule of law, for protection of human rights, for protection of minorities, this is all the same. And if you go back and 

you look at President Obama’s speech on July 4 in Cairo, these 

themes were indeed there. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. Let me—I have only got a couple of 

minutes because there is a difference in words and there is a difference in what is perceived as attitudes; and sometimes what we 

perceive as sensitive and honest and reaching out is perceived in 

53

other cultures as weakness and a lack of resolve. And I would suggest if that is perceived in the Middle East, then we will have the 

opposite results from what you were hoping for. 

Let me get another specific. Camp Ashraf in Iraq is—of course, 

there is an encampment of people who are opposing the Iranian 

dictatorship and actually involved in basically efforts to fight the 

mullahs, and to fight the mullah dictatorship. They now are being 

threatened with being returned. Some people are actually talking 

about returning them to Iran, which would probably result in a 

mass execution. 

What is our position on that? And are we solidly suggesting, or 

solidly and not just suggesting, but do we have some penalty for 

the Iraqi Government if they throw these people in Camp Ashraf 

over to the mullah dictatorship? 

Mr. FELTMAN. We are watching the situation with Camp Ashraf 

very, very closely. And unfortunately, there has been a recent example of where violence could have been avoided by both the MEK 

and the Iraqis, and in fact, it wasn’t when the Iraqis, you know, 

went in in a very provocative action to set up a police station and 

the MEK responded with violence. 

We have seen an example, fortunately contained, of what could 

happen. So we are watching this extremely closely. 

I think you are aware that with the turnover of Camp Ashraf to 

Iraqi sovereignty at the beginning of the year, we got assurances 

from the Iraqis that they would not forcibly return, forcibly expel 

the MEK Camp Ashraf residents, MEK members, to countries in 

which they had a reasonable expectation of persecution. So we have 

written assurances. 

Now, in addition, though, we are watching, and we have asked 

the U.N. Assistance Mission in Iraq to also play a role here; and 

the U.N. Assistance Mission in Iraq——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Have we suggested to the Iraqis that there 

would be a consequence, a negative consequence, that we would 

then act in a way and do something today that would be harmful 

to them if, indeed, they moved on Camp Ashraf and threw these 

people over into the mullah dictatorship next door? 

Mr. FELTMAN. Believe me, the Iraqis know how concerned we are 

with this. And we have also sent messages to the MEK. 

We are actually more concerned about an Iraqi desire to move 

Camp Ashraf to someplace else inside Iraq. The expectation is not 

that they are going to expel the MEK, Camp Ashraf residents, but 

that they would to try to move them, forcibly move them, to a different location in Iraq, and that too could lead to bloodshed. 

And so, believe me, Congressman, we are on top of this all the 

time. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. One last note on this, Mr. Chairman, 

and thank you for indulging me. 

I would think that moving that camp is certainly not on a par 

with sending them back to Iran. They need, the Kurds, who have 

a negative history with this group, may be open to accepting them 

and that might be a useful compromise if the Kurds show some 

leadership in this. 

So thank you very much and I appreciate that, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you. Mr. Klein. 

54

Mr. KLEIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ambassador, it is nice to see you. Thank you for your service. We 

appreciate it. 

I would like to focus on sanctions. And as you know, we took up 

a bill today in Foreign Affairs, and I think there is a general recognition that we in the United States need to send strong signals. 

There are certain things that we can do that are symbolic and certain things, including maybe today’s sanctions and others, that can 

have more of a broad effect. 

But ultimately the sanctions will be most effective if we have our 

allies and our interested parties around the world collaborating 

with us to do this. And we have been in constant contact with the 

European Union; and it always comes back to Russia and China, 

in addition to the Union, but China’s influence is quite substantial. 

They sort of operate in a different sphere in many ways. 

There are oil interests, and there have been some efforts to substitute oil or some efforts from reaching out to some of our friends 

in the oil-producing countries to replace United Arab Emirates and, 

I think, others. Can you share with us some of those, or what you 

can talk about, can you share with us the attempts to try to bring 

China more effectively into this process? 

Mr. FELTMAN. Congressman, thanks for the question. You certainly have zeroed in on a very important aspect of the Iran policy. 

We have had a lot of quiet discussions with the Arab states 

about their concerns with Iran because their concerns with Iran 

largely overlap with ours, but they are also somewhat different because they live in the neighborhood. And they have very strong 

concerns about Iran. 

We have talked to them about the need to implement the Security Council resolutions. We have got progress there in terms of the 

sanctions on Iran that are mentioned in three Chapter 7 Security 

Council resolutions. But we have also had the conversations with 

them that, hey, you guys are concerned about Iran; you have relations with China and you have certain assets that you can bring 

to a discussion with China about that. 

So we have encouraged the sort of discussion that you have 

talked about, and I think you have seen publicly some reference to 

results on this. In general, China has played a constructive role 

with us. China has assured us that they are with us on the P5+1 

approach to Iran. 

So we are looking at the question of working internationally in 

a variety of ways; one is the P5+1, one is working to find other 

multilateral alliances, like-minded states that will join with us on 

sanctions that may go beyond what is less specifically in the U.N. 

You may have seen last week, for example, that the United Kingdom has designated the Islamic Republic of Iran shipping lines, 

IRISL, which follows the designation we did a while ago, which 

again adds a multilateral aspect to sanctions that we think is useful. 

Mr. KLEIN. Thank you for those comments. 

I mean, I will share with you—and it is no big revelation here—

that all of us as members of this committee, we receive the ambassadors and representatives of the Arab states regularly, and they 

55

all mention in their talking points about Ahmadinejad and the 

threat that Iran poses to the neighborhood. 

And, in fact, you know, I give full credit to the first President 

Bush, who was able to engage in a much broader way the other 

Arab states, in part because the invasion of Kuwait was a direct 

threat to the neighbors. Again, we need to be building on that. 

And the second question, which you have already gotten into a 

little bit, was what else can our Arab allies do to help facilitate 

changes here in behavior? And part of that is the oil. Are there 

other issues out there besides oil that China is interested in, that 

it deals with with Iran? 

Mr. FELTMAN. Well, the other aspect that we talk to the Arabs 

a lot about are—I mentioned it briefly—are the financial sanctions, 

are the sanctions that are mentioned in three Security Council resolutions. 

Countries like the UAE—UAE have been implementing the regulations needed to put these sanctions into effect. So that is another 

aspect of that is to make sure that all of our allies are complying 

with the Security Council resolutions, in a way that Iran looks out 

of its borders and says, hey, wait a minute, these sanctions are 

starting to hurt and they are starting to be universally applied. 

That is one aspect of it. 

Another aspect, frankly, are security and military cooperation. 

We have a very strong security-military cooperation going with 

each of the Gulf States. I would suspect at some point, Iran is looking across the Gulf and saying, hey, wait a minute. When did that 

happen? When did all these states across the water from us get 

this kind of sophisticated armed forces? 

We are working in a lot of different ways to try to get Iran’s attention and persuade Iran that it is time to alter its behavior and 

become a responsible member of the international community, 

rather than a rogue member of the international community. 

Mr. KLEIN. Mr. Chairman, if I can just follow up, one last question if you would indulge me? 

Part of that whole sanctions process is to—when we pass sanctions, to enforce them. The Iran Sanctions Act that was passed a 

number of years ago, through the last couple of administrations, I 

think that a lot of people feel like we have not enforced enough of 

really what has been identified. And I did a letter recently with 

about 50 Members, which went out to encourage the administration to identify and facilitate the enforcement. And the basis of that 

was from the Congressional Research Service report that we got a 

copy of from October 8, 2009, which identified a number of businesses that are in violation of the Iran Sanctions Act. 

So my purpose in bringing that up in this hearing today is to, 

if we are going to be serious about this, and have both a diplomatic 

effort, which I fully endorse and support, as well as the carrot and 

the stick, the stick has to be viewed as not just symbolic, not just 

a piece of paper, but ready—and we are willing and taking action 

to enforce its terms. 

Mr. FELTMAN. If I may, Mr. Chairman, respond? 

Our approach on sanctions in general has been, let’s work multilaterally. Let’s keep the spotlight on what Iran is doing. Let’s not 

56

have fights among the allies. Let’s bring the allies together in order 

to bring the pressure to bear on Iran. 

But we have heard your message loud and clear about the Iran 

Sanctions Act. We have the message of this committee loud and 

clear about the Iran Sanctions Act. We have the letter that you and 

many others of this committee have signed. 

And I will tell you that we have started a process of looking into 

the 20 companies, the 20 deals that you list in this letter, and we 

expect to have this preliminary review finished in about 45 days, 

in which case we would be able to say which of these need a further investigation as to whether they violate the Iran Sanctions 

Act. 

And we look forward to working with this committee, keeping 

Congress informed as we go forward in this review process of the 

deals listed in your letter. 

I will comment that, in some cases, Iran announces all sorts of 

deals that—they do it for political purposes that, in fact, don’t 

amount to anything. And there are a couple, like with Total in particular that Iran has trumpeted, that we have looked into; and in 

fact, nothing is there. So we have got to start a review process of 

the 20 companies that are on that list. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Well, Mr. Ambassador, it appears that my list is 

exhausted. You have outlasted and endured us. We thank you very 

much for your participation, your excellent testimony and the frank 

discussion we have had and your answering all of our questions. 

Hope to see you soon. 

Mr. FELTMAN. Thank you for inviting me, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. The subcommittee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:55 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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