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PROPOSAL TO CREATE A DEPARTMENT OF

HOMELAND SECURITY

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME, TERRORISM, 

AND HOMELAND SECURITY

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JULY 9, 2002

Serial No. 94

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/judiciary 

(II)

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., WISCONSIN, Chairman 

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois 

GEORGE W. GEKAS, Pennsylvania 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

BOB BARR, Georgia 

WILLIAM L. JENKINS, Tennessee 

CHRIS CANNON, Utah 

LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina 

SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama 

JOHN N. HOSTETTLER, Indiana 

MARK GREEN, Wisconsin 

RIC KELLER, Florida 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

MELISSA A. HART, Pennsylvania 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

JOHN CONYERS, JR., Michigan 

BARNEY FRANK, Massachusetts 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

RICK BOUCHER, Virginia 

JERROLD NADLER, New York 

ROBERT C. SCOTT, Virginia 

MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

MAXINE WATERS, California 

MARTIN T. MEEHAN, Massachusetts 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin 

ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California

PHILIP G. KIKO, Chief of Staff-General Counsel 

PERRY H. APELBAUM, Minority Chief Counsel 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME, TERRORISM, AND HOMELAND SECURITY

LAMAR SMITH, Texas, Chairman

MARK GREEN, Wisconsin, Vice Chair

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

BOB BARR, Georgia 

RIC KELLER, Florida 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

ROBERT C. SCOTT, Virginia 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

MARTIN T. MEEHAN, Massachusetts 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California

JAY APPERSON, Chief Counsel 

SEAN MCLAUGHLIN, Counsel 

ELIZABETH SOKUL, Counsel 

KATY CROOKS, Counsel 

ERIC HULTMAN, Full Committee Counsel 

BOBBY VASSAR, Minority Counsel 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

JULY 9, 2002

OPENING STATEMENT 

Page 

The Honorable Lamar Smith, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Texas, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security ........................................................................................................ 1

The Honorable Robert C. Scott, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Virginia, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, 

and Homeland Security ....................................................................................... 2

The Honorable Mark Green, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Wisconsin .......................................................................................................... 3

The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Texas ....................................................................................................... 3

The Honorable Howard Coble, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of North Carolina ................................................................................................. 5

The Honorable Steve Chabot, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Ohio ................................................................................................................... 6

The Honorable Adam B. Schiff, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of California .......................................................................................................... 6

The Honorable Bob Barr, a Representative in Congress From the State of 

Georgia .................................................................................................................. 7

The Honorable Ric Keller, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Florida ............................................................................................................... 8

WITNESSES 

Mr. Robert C. Bonner, Commissioner, United States Customs Service 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 9

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 11

Admiral Thomas H. Collins, Commandant, United States Coast Guard 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 13

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 15

Honorable John W. Magaw, Undersecretary of Transportation for Security, 

Transportation Security Administration 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 16

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 18

Mr. Brian L. Stafford, Director, United States Secret Service 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 20

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 22

APPENDIX 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

Prepared Statement of the Honorable Lamar Smith, a Representative in 

Congress From the State of Texas, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Crime, 

Terrorism, and Homeland Security .................................................................... 51

Additional Views of the Honorable Lamar Smith, a Representative in Congress From the State of Texas, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Crime, 

Terrorism, and Homeland Security, on H.R. 5005, the ‘‘Homeland Security 

Act of 2002’’ .......................................................................................................... 52

Page

IV

Views and Estimates Concerning Programs Within the Jurisdiction of the 

Committee on the Judiciary for Fiscal Year 2003 Budget, section on Homeland Security ........................................................................................................ 54

Letter from the Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., a Representative 

in Congress From the State of Wisconsin, and Chairman, Committee on 

the Judiciary, to the Honorable C. W. Bill Young, a Representative in 

Congress From the State of Florida, and Chairman, Committee on Appropriations, regarding funding of the Office of Domestic Preparedness at 

the Department of Justice ................................................................................... 56

Chronology of Contacts Between the Federal Emergency Management Agency 

(FEMA) and the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, regarding the Subcommittee hearing on H.R. 5005, the ‘‘Homeland 

Security Act of 2002’’ ........................................................................................... 62

Witness Invitation Letter to the Honorable Joe M. Allbaugh, Director of 

the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) ..................................... 63

July 5, 2002 Letter to the Honorable Joe M. Allbaugh, Director of the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) ......................................................... 65

(1)

PROPOSAL TO CREATE A DEPARTMENT OF 

HOMELAND SECURITY 

TUESDAY, JULY 9, 2002

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME, TERRORISM, AND HOMELAND SECURITY

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:15 a.m., in Room 

2141, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Lamar Smith [Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding. 

Mr. SMITH. [Presiding.] The Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, 

and Homeland Security will come to order. I just want to say at 

the outset that I am pleased by the attendance we have by Members of the Subcommittee this morning. This is an early hour, there 

are many conflicts, and yet this is, I think, the best attendance we 

have had in a number of hearings. 

The procedure this morning will be that I’ll recognize Members, 

including myself, for opening statements. And after that, we’ll 

move very quickly to hearing testimony from our witnesses today. 

On June 6, 2002, the President addressed the Nation to request 

support for the creation of a Homeland Security Department. He 

stated, ‘‘We face an urgent need, and we must move quickly this 

year, before the end of the congressional session.’’ This Committee and Congress are responding to that request. We 

understand the importance of H.R. 5005, the Homeland Security 

Act of 2002. This hearing focuses on the proposed transfer of the 

Coast Guard, Customs, Secret Service, and Transportation Security 

Administration to the Department of Homeland Security. 

The Administration’s goal for the creation of a Homeland Security Department is to improve the country’s ability to prevent, prepare for, detect, and disrupt terrorist attacks within the United 

States. As the Gilmore commission noted in 2000, ‘‘The national 

strategy against terrorism should be geographically and functionally comprehensive. To be functionally comprehensive, the national 

strategy should address the full spectrum of the Nation’s threats 

against terrorism: intelligence, deterrence, prevention, preemption, 

crisis management, and consequence management.’’ This can only happen with the successful integration and coordination of officials involved. 

This hearing will examine how each of the agency’s missions and 

functions fit within the proposed Department of Homeland Security. While the proposed department will have a strong law enforcement role, this role is distinct from that of the Federal Bureau of 

2

Investigation, which is the principal investigative arm of the 

United States. The law enforcement role of the Department of 

Homeland Security will focus on border security and the training 

of State and local officials to prepare for and respond to terrorist 

attacks. 

The mission of this new department cannot be accomplished 

without the successful coordination of various Federal agencies and 

law enforcement units. We will hear testimony today from four of 

five invited witnesses, who will discuss H.R. 5005 and how each of 

their agencies improves the strategic framework and coordination 

of the Department of Homeland Security. 

One witness, the Hon. Joe Allbaugh, Director of the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency, was invited but apparently decided that this hearing was not a priority. I am disappointed by the 

Director’s absence, as this was an opportunity for the Director to 

explain how FEMA plans to provide training for law enforcement 

and other emergency responders in crisis and consequence management at the new Department of Homeland Security. 

I assume we have representatives of FEMA in the audience. If 

so, will they stand and identify themselves? 

How about raising your hand? Is anyone here from FEMA? 

Okay, that’s a double disappointment, because we understand 

that it was possible for the Director to attend; he chose not to. I 

don’t consider that a personal affront against Members of Congress; 

I do consider it a personal affront against the American people, 

who have every reason and need and desire to want to know how 

FEMA would respond to terrorist attacks. 

So I am disappointed that Mr. Allbaugh did not attend, and, if 

FEMA individuals are here, that they did not recognize themselves 

or attend at all. 

That concludes my opening statement. The gentleman from Virginia, the Ranking Member of the Subcommittee, Mr. Scott, is recognized for his. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am pleased to join you 

in convening this hearing concerning law enforcement agencies and 

operations affected by H.R. 5005, the Homeland Security Act of 

2002. 

There are a considerable number of unanswered questions and 

concerns regarding how these agencies will operate with a new setting of the Department of Homeland Security, especially the question of what problem are we solving and how will DHS solve it, and 

what money will be spent in transition and new responsibilities. I 

would like to hear from the agencies we’ve invited as to their understanding of what their role will be with DHS. 

I would also like to know any concerns or problems they foresee 

in providing greater security for our Nation while preserving at 

least the current level of law enforcement services traditionally 

provided by their agencies. I am particularly concerned to know 

how any impact they foresee from the proposed changes on the 

ability of—the effect on law enforcement entities to maintain their 

traditional law enforcement capabilities while doing their part to 

enhance overall security. 

Most localities are already hard hit by the cost of increased demands on what they’ve had to do by prudence, as well as the FedVerDate Jan 17 2002 13:25 Oct 07, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 G:\WORK\CRIME\070902\80551.000 HJUD1 PsN: 80551
3

eral Government, to increase their vigilance. Of course, any disaster is ultimately the local and first responders’ responsibility, so 

I want to see how the local responders will be incorporated into 

DHS’s responsibilities. 

In this regard, I join the concerns of the Chairman, that we’re 

not hearing from FEMA. As the Chairman noted, the bill calls for 

the Office of Domestic Preparedness at Justice to go to FEMA. This 

is a vital piece of the law enforcement resource network, because 

it provides for the training, equipment, and other assistance they’ll 

need in learning how to operate and cooperate under the new department. 

I’m also concerned that in our rush to establish the structure for 

Homeland Security, which the bill provides, we don’t run the risk 

of trampling over well-established civil rights and civil liberties, 

sunshine government and civil service protections, and would like 

the witnesses to give us assurances in these areas as well. 

So, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to hearing from the witnesses, 

and I appreciate you convening the hearing. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Scott. 

Are there other Members who wish to make opening statements? 

The gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. Green, is recognized for his 

opening statement. 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Very briefly, first off, I want to express that I share your concerns and disappointment about FEMA not testifying, given that 

FEMA’s role in the newly proposed agency is so very important, 

and I think one of the sets of issues that we wanted to explore. I 

am also greatly disappointed that FEMA has chosen not to be 

present here today or be represented here today. 

From the perspective of northeastern Wisconsin, I think one of 

the great concerns we have is with respect to the Coast Guard. And 

while I support the Coast Guard’s inclusion in the new agency, Admiral Collins, I am hoping that you will be able to address for us 

today specifically how the Coast Guard will be able to continue and 

maintain its current operations and its current mission, especially 

with maritime safety in mind, given this transfer. That I think is 

the great concern that I have. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Green. 

Other Members who wish to have opening statements? The gentlewoman from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee, is recognized for an opening statement. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for 

holding this very important hearing this morning. 

I believe that as we celebrated our Nation’s Independence Day, 

the incident that occurred in LAX exposed additional 

vulnerabilities of this Nation. Though we have not designated that 

particular act in any particular category, certainly it suggests that 

we need all of our agencies and all of our wits about us as we attempt to pursue and define what homeland security is. 

I am very grateful for the presence of these witnesses. And, Mr. 

Chairman, in order to keep our refrain on one page, let me also express the disappointment that I have in the lack of presence of 

FEMA. Let me also acknowledge, of course, coming from Texas, 

4

that certainly we are appreciative, as I believe all Americans are, 

in the immediate response that FEMA already shows as it relates 

to disasters. We are facing one in Texas again, and certainly FEMA 

will play a very large role. 

That may be why it is even more important to have an understanding of how they would match those very important responsibilities, immediately responding to disasters. My 16-year-old 

asked, ‘‘How does FEMA get everywhere?’’ as it will relate to issues 

dealing with homeland security. 

I would also like to acknowledge that we will have several questions on how the agencies will synergize under a new department. 

Surely there will be many conflicts within Congress as to how this 

new department should work. I think that, structurally, the offered 

Homeland Security Department will need much work. Though 

many of the organizations included in the bill focus on the similar 

principles of the Homeland Security Department, it is clear that 

their overall goals are not in sync with the department itself. 

One of my most central concerns again lies in the Federal Emergency Management Agency. This agency has played a pivotal role 

in assisting my fellow Texans deal with the terrible floods that 

have besieged Texas. According to information supplied by FEMA, 

approximately 75 percent to 95 percent of the agency’s budget constituted disaster relief assistance. In the encounters that I have 

had with them, they have indicated that, in many instances, it’s 

not been enough. 

With such a significant portion going to this effort, how will 

FEMA be recognized or reorganized within a Department of Homeland Security, and will this mean a decrease in the disaster relief 

operations? Texans, Americans, and others want to know this answer. 

Another area that raises concern for me is the role of the Secret 

Service in the Department of Homeland Security. The mission of 

the U.S. Secret Service is twofold. First, it is charged with the protection of the President, Vice President, their families, and heads 

of state. Second is the enforcement of laws related to counterfeiting 

of obligations and securities. 

However, the Secret Service strives to prevent counterfeiters and 

presidential assassinations, not terrorists or other things. Though 

an assassination attempt could be construed as an act of terrorism, 

it is clearly of a different flavor. 

The Secret Service does not appear to have a close nexus to the 

investigation of terrorist threats, nor does it appear that their primary mission is being given to another agency. 

The Coast Guard as well I know played an enormous—or, had 

an enormous impact as related to staffing up our various ports 

right after September 11, and we thank you for that, as I might 

thank all of the agencies present. 

We realize, as Admiral Collins said, that nearly 40 percent of the 

Coast Guard’s current operating budget is directly related to the 

core missions of the proposed department. Well, what about the remaining 60 percent? Admiral Collins claims that the rest contribute indirectly, but I fail to see—though I appreciate it, coming 

from waterways, your help in drunken boaters; that’s important 

5

work—how we can ensure that we use you in the best and most 

effective way. 

As I close, Mr. Chairman, let me mention several key issues that 

I think we should be concerned about: border and transportation 

security; Mr. Magaw, you will note that I will be talking about 

whether or not we should have a distinct area for border security. 

I have a special interest in it and will be probing that question. 

The real question is, how do we secure or ensure the work of the 

Transportation Security Administration and how do we secure the 

border and the border patrol responsibilities. 

Lastly, we know that this plan has good intentions. We appreciate the President presenting this plan, and we know the importance of congressional oversight. We intend to participate and to 

seriously look at our work, and to present to the American people 

what works. But I want to put on the record my concern about Miranda rights; whistleblower protection; utilization of employees; 

and as well, are we talking about crime-fighting or something else? 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to the testimony of the 

witnesses, for the job that we have to do this morning. I yield back. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Ms. Jackson Lee. 

To my right, the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Coble, is 

recognized for an opening statement. 

Mr. COBLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to think aloud for 

a moment or two, and perhaps get the witnesses’ response as we 

hear from them. 

I apologize for sounding like a broken record, but I want to echo 

what you said. I think FEMA’s conspicuous absence is glaring, indeed. 

I see the glass half-filled, Mr. Chairman, always, so I believe this 

homeland security operation will work. I think elevating it to Cabinet status was the right idea. I can see the elimination of duplication, hopefully, by bringing these different agencies under one umbrella. 

Now, maybe I’m too optimistic when I say this, Mr. Chairman, 

but it ought to be, if properly implemented and executed, it ought 

to be close to revenue-neutral, it seems to me. I realize in this town 

revenue-neutral oftentimes doesn’t play harmoniously, but I can 

see that merging these different agencies together, I think it is a 

sound proposal. 

Mr. Chairman, I want to be sure that it is clearly defined, as we 

move along, as to what constitutes an emergency. And I’m not convinced that that has been clearly defined. Perhaps when I hear 

from the witnesses, it will illuminate to that end. But I think that 

is essential, that that must be clearly laid out, not just for the benefit of the agencies involved, but for the populace as well. 

The gentleman from Wisconsin mentioned a situation that I have 

heard discussed on the Hill, and that is some fear, Admiral Collins, 

that the Coast Guard may be put in a position of compromising 

your other duties: search and rescue, aid in navigation, drug interdiction, port security. The U.S. Coast Guard has managed to juggle 

various assignments since 1790, and you’ve done it pretty well. I 

think you pulled a couple from a sister service out of the drink yesterday, down in Virginia, in record time. So I think you can do it, 

but I do think that is a problem that needs to be on the screen, 

6

Mr. Chairman, and we don’t want to put the Coast Guard or the 

other agencies, for that matter, in a position of compromising duties that they now perform, and at which they are indeed adept. 

Thank you all for being with us. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you, sir. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Coble. 

I want to note that Mr. Coble is the only Member of the Committee who is a veteran of the Coast Guard, which might have been 

clear from his comments as well. 

I’ve also noticed the presence of the Ranking Member of the full 

Judiciary Committee, Mr. Conyers of Michigan. 

And, Mr. Schiff, if it’s all right, I’ll recognize Mr. Conyers for an 

opening statement, if he has one. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I don’t have an opening 

statement right now, but could I reserve my time? I don’t know 

how long this is going to be this morning. 

Mr. SMITH. Absolutely, Mr. Conyers. We’ll be happy to recognize 

you whenever you want to be recognized. 

Mr. CONYERS. I appreciate that very much. 

Mr. SMITH. To my right, any other Members who wish to be recognized? The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Chabot, is recognized for 

an opening statement. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I’ll be brief, because I know we want to get on with the witnesses here, so we actually have an opportunity to hear from them and question. 

My principal and particular concern—and I’ll be able to question 

the Undersecretary, Mr. Magaw, and so I appreciate his presence 

here today—and that’s the recent undercover tests, particularly 

those at the Greater Cincinnati-Northern Kentucky Airport, in 

which only in 42 percent of the cases were weapons able to be detected, which the reverse of that means that 58 percent of the time, 

the weapons were not detected. 

And there was no great effort made to conceal these weapons. 

And I think it’s safe to assume that terrorists would not be so accommodating, that they would make every effort to conceal, to hide 

weapons or bombs or other items which could do harm to the public. 

And this does not instill a great deal of confidence in the traveling public. To be quite frank, it’s absolutely miserable and should 

be an embarrassment. And something has to be done to make sure 

that the people who travel the skies of this Nation are safe. 

And that’s just totally unacceptable, and I’ll be interested to hear 

some details relative to that. 

And with that, I’ll yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chabot. 

The gentleman from California, Mr. Schiff, is recognized for an 

opening statement. 

Mr. SCHIFF. I thank the Chairman for yielding, and I want to 

join the Committee in welcoming the witnesses here today and extend a special welcome to Commissioner Bonner, who not only was 

the former head of the DEA and a former Federal judge, but was 

also a former U.S. attorney who had the ill judgment to hire me 

in 1987, and I’m very grateful you showed that poor judgment back 

then. [Laughter.] 

7

But I did want to add, beyond that welcome, what a dramatic 

task that you all have before you and just reinforce the idea that 

the job that we have to do won’t end this year, won’t end with the 

passage of this bill, won’t end with the formation of a new department. It really will only begin then. 

And the challenge will be to have this new entity develop the capability of talking to each other, both over the phone and technologically; have the ability to integrate functions to the degree that 

they’ll be efficient, to a degree that we have not been able to get 

our agencies to work together in the past. 

We will have, under one roof, almost 75,000 armed agents, which 

is an extraordinary number. It is, in some respects, the size of a 

national police force, although it is not intended to act as such. But 

the challenge I think will be twofold. It will be to have an entity 

that large at the same time be efficient and work together and root 

out the problem of terrorism as it’s intended to do and secure the 

homeland. At the same time, it will have the equal challenge of not 

intruding on the rights of the American people in the process. And 

that challenge will be all the greater because of the size and the 

power of this new department. 

So I know the Committee will continue its job long after the passage of this bill, and I look forward to continuing to hear from you 

over the months and years to come about how that responsibility 

is being undertaken. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Schiff. 

The gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Barr, is recognized for an 

opening statement. 

Mr. BARR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

FEMA’s absence notwithstanding, we have a very, very distinguished panel today. I look forward to hearing from them and reviewing their written statements. I’m confident that what we’ll 

hear are very substantive and appropriate responses, not bureaucratic responses, and I appreciate that very much, the gentlemen 

looking at these issues with the professionalism that has characterized their careers. 

The threat that this Nation faces, of course, is many faceted. Tomorrow, I believe, on the floor of the House, we’ll be taking up the 

issue of arming airline pilots, or at least providing some authority. 

I know Mr. Magaw disagrees with us on that. For the life of me, 

I cannot understand why we would not want to have an appropriate mechanism to protect passengers and airplanes and those on 

the ground by appropriately providing authority for arming pilots, 

but hopefully the Congress will do that. 

But there are many, many aspects of this. But ultimately, Mr. 

Chairman, as you know, and as these gentlemen and others know, 

the mechanism itself is not as important as the people who are administering the system. And we can set in motion very, very sophisticated mechanisms, we can change bureaucracies and change 

legal authorities, we can appropriate billions of dollars, but if the 

people on the ground carrying out those missions and expending 

those dollars on the ground don’t care about what they are doing, 

are not properly trained, are not properly motivated, and are not 

held accountable, then it’s all for naught. 

8

I would recommend to each of the witnesses a study and a hearing that we held in Atlanta a couple of months ago, pursuant to 

an undercover investigation by GAO to determine whether or not 

security at several Federal facilities in Atlanta, which, as you gentlemen know, has one of the largest presences of Federal offices 

outside of the Washington, D.C., area, was adequate or not. What 

these undercover investigators found was absolutely startling in 

the lack of appropriate security and accountability and concern for 

even minimal standards of security. Undercover agents were able 

to falsify, with off-the-shelf technology, a number of badges, where 

were never appropriately or even cursorily scanned. They were 

never required to go through metal detectors. They were given security codes without authorization, enabling them to get into any 

Federal building that they attempted to secure entrance to in the 

Atlanta area, including the Federal judiciary, the building that 

houses DEA, FBI, IRS, virtually any agency that they wanted. 

And this is why I think that the new department has to have 

sufficient flexibility to address security lapses and security concerns like that. I know none of these gentlemen would tolerate such 

security lapses in their agency, and we have to make sure that, 

likewise, we set up a mechanism so that they are not tolerated in 

the new department. 

But I would recommend that study and the hearing that we held 

in Atlanta a couple of months ago to the witnesses. I intend to 

refer to it not only in this hearing but others considering different 

aspects of homeland security. 

I would like to echo the statements of other Members, again 

thanking these very distinguished Members of the executive 

branch for their presence here today, their careers, and for caring 

enough about these issues, unlike FEMA, to be here today to share 

their thoughts and answer questions. 

Thank you. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Barr. 

The gentleman from Florida, Mr. Keller, is recognized. 

Mr. KELLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Yesterday, the President of the United States gave an important 

speech, and he outlined three things he wants the Congress to do 

right away. First, he wanted the emergency supplemental appropriation bill passed; second, the defense appropriation bill passed 

to help us win the war on terrorism and fund our troops; and third, 

establish this Department of Homeland Security. 

The House has already acted to pass the first two of his requests, 

and so this becomes our top priority now, establishing this Department of Homeland Security. And with that in mind, I am very appreciative of all the witnesses who are here. 

I know sometimes it’s human nature to complain about who is 

not here, instead of appreciate those who are here. I can remember 

in my first campaign, I had to have 20 volunteers show up to help 

me distribute signs. And 18 people showed up, and I spent the 

whole time complaining about the two guys who told they’d be 

there but weren’t there, instead of thanking the 18 who were there. 

So thank you so much for being here today. And I understand 

you recognize the importance of what President Bush said yesterday. 

9

With that in mind, one of the things I would like to here from 

the witnesses about, and particularly Mr. Magaw, is so much has 

been said about the efficiencies that will be created by eliminating 

overlap here and having one-stop shopping with respect to homeland security, which is certainly a critical element of establishing 

this department, and that’s why I’m a co-sponsor of this legislation. 

There hasn’t been a lot of talk about, once the left hand knows 

what the right hand is doing, in terms of the Government agencies—for example, INS, FBI, and CIA, and your agencies communicating, then taking that information and distributing it to private 

transportation entities. And that certainly is a weak link in our 

system. 

Just to give you one example, we have the two terrorists, AlMidhar and Al-Hamzi, who the CIA had information about, the 

FBI did, the INS did at certain points. And all three collectively, 

even though these men were on a watch list, never shared this information with American Airlines. And so these two bad guys got 

on American Airlines Flight 77, and the plane slammed into the 

Pentagon. 

That is certainly a weak link that needs to be fixed. And I’m curious as to what, if anything, this Government reorganization will 

do to impact that weak link. 

Again, thank you so much for the witnesses who are here, and 

we welcome your testimony. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Keller. 

Let me introduce the witnesses, and they are, in alphabetical 

order, the Hon. Robert C. Bonner, Commissioner, United States 

Customs Service; Admiral Thomas H. Collins, Commandant, 

United States Coast Guard; the Hon. John W. Magaw, Undersecretary of Transportation for Security, Transportation Security Administration; and Mr. Brian L. Stafford, Director, United States Secret Service. 

Again, we welcome you all, and we will begin, Mr. Bonner, with 

your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF ROBERT C. BONNER, COMMISSIONER,

UNITED STATES CUSTOMS SERVICE 

Mr. BONNER. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and Members of the 

Subcommittee. 

Mr. SMITH. Is your microphone on? 

Mr. BONNER. Yes, now I have it on. I think I’m ready to go. 

Good morning to all of you. I want to thank you for this opportunity to testify and appear this morning before the Committee to 

discuss President Bush’s proposal to create a new Department of 

Homeland Security. As you know, President Bush’s proposal is to 

transfer the entire U.S. Customs Service to the new department. 

I believe that the adoption of the President’s proposal will result 

in a more effective, a more focused—I believe it will result in a better-coordinated and linked, and even a more efficient defense of 

America and the American people against the very real and continuing terrorist threat posed by international terrorist organizations, such as the al Qaeda. 

10

It will also, by the way, establish something that’s very important in Government, and sometimes we don’t see, and that is clear 

responsibility and accountability in one Secretary in one department. 

Since September 11, I can tell this Committee, that the number 

one priority of United States Customs Service has been 

counterterrorism. It has been protecting the Nation against the terrorist threat at all 301 ports of entry into the United States. These 

are ports of entry at our land borders, at our international airports, 

and at our seaports. 

The Customs Service is and has been doing everything possible 

to keep both terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering our 

country. But we have been doing so, I might say, without choking 

off the flow of trade that is so vital to the economy of our country. 

I would like to just briefly describe to you a few key initiatives 

that the United States Customs Service has developed and implemented since September 11. 

First of all, in October, within a few weeks of the attacks on our 

country, we formed, at the U.S. Customs Service, Operation Green 

Quest, which is a Customs-led but a multi-agency task force that 

targets terrorist financing. Operation Green Quest has already 

opened several hundred investigations into terrorist financing and 

has aggressively moved against terrorist funding sources. These efforts, through Operation Green Quest, have already led to the seizure of millions of dollars in suspected terrorist assets. 

We have also established Project Shield America, and this is 

using Customs’ unique investigative jurisdiction, where Customs 

agents are monitoring exports of strategic weapons and materials 

from the U.S., to prevent international terrorist organizations like 

al Qaeda from obtaining sensitive U.S. technology, weapons, and 

equipment that could be used in a terrorist attack on our Nation. 

With another initiative, the Container Security Initiative, which 

we began implementing earlier this year, U.S. Customs is entering 

into partnerships with other governments, with foreign governments, to identify high-risk cargo containers and pre-screen those 

cargo containers at foreign ports before they are shipped to the 

United States. 

I recently returned from a very productive trip to Europe, just 

the week before last, during which the governments of the Netherlands, Belgium, and France signed agreements with United States 

Customs to participate in the Container Security Initiative. Singapore, one of the largest ports in Asia—and also, actually, the largest port in the world, in terms of the transshipment of cargo containers to the United States, principally to the West Coast—has 

also indicated that it will participate with U.S. Customs in the 

Container Security Initiative. So, very soon, for shipments of cargo 

containers from these countries, and specifically from the ports of 

Rotterdam, Antwerp, LeHavre, Singapore—four of, by the way, the 

top 20 ports, in terms of shipments of containers, cargo containers 

to the United States by container vessel—very soon U.S. Customs 

and host governments will be pre-screening those containers headed to the United States. 

11

And I can also tell you that I’m very optimistic that agreements 

with other governments covering more of the major ports of the 

world will be entered into very soon. 

Let me say that I believe that any effort to improve our border 

security must include the direct involvement and input from the 

trade community. And in that connection, last April, Governor 

Ridge, Secretary O’Neill, and I stood with many CEOs of major 

U.S. importers, and announced the Customs-Trade Partnership 

Against Terrorism. We did that in Detroit. 

Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism is a unique partnership with U.S. importers, with carriers, customs brokers, and 

others in the trade community to substantially improve security 

along the entire supply chain, while expediting the flow of legitimate commerce into the United States. 

To date, I am pleased to advise this Subcommittee that we have 

over 250 companies participating in the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism. 

The success of programs like CSI, the Container Security Initiative, and the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism demonstrates how Customs balances its dual role, its dual missions, if 

you will, between security on the one hand, security and enforcement on the one hand, and trade facilitation on the other. We have 

to maintain that balance. 

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Bonner, if you could bring your testimony to a 

conclusion, we’d like to be able to fit everybody in the 5-minute 

time. 

Mr. BONNER. I’ll do that, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. 

Just to make the final point that the trade functions of Customs 

and the functions of security and enforcement are interlinked in 

many ways. And let me just say to the Subcommittee that I am 

very, very proud of the men and women of the Customs Service for 

the role they’ve played since 9–11 in protecting our Nation, and the 

role that they’ll continue to play in defending our homeland. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bonner follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBERT C. BONNER

Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee. Thank you for 

this opportunity to testify. 

I am pleased to be here on behalf of the U.S. Customs Service to discuss President 

Bush’s proposal to create a new Department of Homeland Security. As you know, 

President Bush’s proposal is to include the entire U.S. Customs Service and all of 

its functions in the new Department. The U.S. Customs Service is proud of its long 

history as a bureau within the Department of the Treasury, but we fully and unequivocally support the President’s proposal and strongly believe that the new Department of Homeland Security will play a key role in safeguarding the American 

people. Secretary O’Neill also fully supports the President’s proposal. 

For over 200 years, the U.S. Customs Service has defended our country’s borders 

and facilitated legitimate international trade and travel. Since September 11th, at 

the direction of the President, the top priority of Customs has been responding to 

the continuing terrorist threat at our land borders, seaports, and airports. The Customs Service is doing everything possible to keep terrorists and terrorist weapons 

from entering the United States, while still moving goods and people efficiently 

across the border. I would like to briefly describe for you a few of the key programs 

the Customs Service has implemented since September 11th that respond to the 

new threat our country faces. 

In October, we formed Operation Green Quest, a Customs-led multi-agency initiative that targets terrorist financing. Operation Green Quest has already opened 

12

hundreds of investigations, aggressively moved against terrorist funding sources, 

and led to the seizure of millions of dollars in suspected terrorist assets. 

Under Project Shield America, Customs agents are monitoring exports of strategic 

weapons and materials from the U.S., to prevent international terrorist groups from 

obtaining sensitive U.S. technology, weapons, and equipment that could be used in 

a terrorist attack on our nation. 

With the Container Security Initiative (‘‘CSI’’), which we began implementing earlier this year, U.S. Customs is entering into partnerships with other governments 

to identify high-risk cargo containers and to pre-screen those containers at foreign 

ports, before they are shipped to our ports. I recently returned from a very productive trip to Europe, during which the governments in the Netherlands, Belgium, and 

France signed agreements with U.S. Customs to participate in CSI. Singapore, one 

of the largest ports in Asia, has also indicated it will participate in CSI. Soon, for 

shipments of cargo containers from the ports of Rotterdam, Antwerp, LeHavre, and 

Singapore, four of the top 20 mega-ports, U.S. Customs and the host government 

will be pre-screening containers headed to the United States. Agreements with other 

governments covering more of the mega-ports are imminent. 

Customs also strongly believes that any effort to improve our border security must 

include the direct involvement and input of the trade community. On April 16th of 

this year, Governor Ridge, Secretary O’Neill, and I stood with many CEOs of major 

U.S. importers, as we launched the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism 

(‘‘C-TPAT’’) in Detroit. C-TPAT is a unique partnership with U.S. importers, carriers, brokers, and others to improve security along the entire supply chain, while 

expediting the flow of legitimate commerce into the United States. To date, we have 

over 150 companies participating in C-TPAT, and we continue to roll out C-TPAT 

to new constituencies every month, including carriers, brokers, and ports. 

The success of programs like CSI and C-TPAT demonstrates how Customs effectively and efficiently balances its dual missions of security enforcement and trade 

facilitation, dual missions that are inextricably linked. With C-TPAT, for example, 

Customs has been successful in inducing companies to join the program and make 

additional investments in supply chain security solely because Customs can offer 

those companies the benefit of expedited clearance at the borders. The same is also 

true for CSI, which offers expedited processing at U.S. ports for pre-screened cargo 

from CSI ports. These programs underscore how Customs is capable of meaningfully 

increasing security at the borders without choking off the critical flow of trade into 

and out of the United States. 

Another example of how Customs’ functions are intertwined comes from looking 

at the synergies that exist between Customs inspectors and special agents, who 

work closely with each other to enforce our anti-smuggling and trade laws. When 

Customs inspectors make a substantial drug seizure at the border using resources 

such as canine enforcement teams and non-intrusive inspection equipment, they 

hand the case over to Customs special agents, who can then conduct a follow-up investigation, including, for example, a controlled delivery to find the source of the 

drugs and to broaden the investigation. This cooperative effort between inspectors 

and special agents is a seamless one precisely because of Customs’ dual missions. 

The same is true with other border-related enforcement matters, such as intellectual 

property piracy. The close cooperation between inspectors and special agents enables 

an infringement identification to quickly and efficiently become an investigative effort. 

I would like to mention at least two additional points that further illustrate how 

Customs’ functions are intertwined. First, is the fact that the personnel who perform trade enforcement and compliance activities at the border are the same personnel who perform inspections for security and other enforcement purposes. Second, is the fact that the information Customs receives from trade compliance examinations and manifests is the same information used to assess security risks for shipments. This information is the cornerstone of many of Customs’ anti-terrorist efforts. 

Recognizing the synergies and efficiencies that exist from the way Customs currently carries out its dual missions, the President has proposed that the entire Customs Service move in its entirety to the new Department of Homeland Security. 

Under the President’s plan, Customs will continue to administer and enforce our 

Customs laws, protect our borders against terrorists and terrorist weapons, and facilitate the flow of legitimate commerce. 

Mr. Chairman, I am proud of the vital role the men and women of the Customs 

Service have played, and will continue to play, under the President’s plan in defending our nation’s homeland. Thank you again, Mr. Chairman and the members of the 

subcommittee, for this opportunity to testify. I would be happy to answer any questions you may have.

13

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Commissioner Bonner. 

Admiral Collins? 

STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL THOMAS COLLINS, COMMANDANT, 

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD 

Admiral COLLINS. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, distinguished 

Members of the Subcommittee. It is a honor to join you today to 

discuss the particulars of the President’s proposal to establish a 

Department of Homeland Security. 

The events of September 11 changed everyone’s world of work. 

It changed our perspective on how we look at security issues. And 

the threat remains today and into the future. Our maritime transportation system, in particular, remains both critical to our economic prosperity—— Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Chairman, could you ask the witness to pull 

the mike a little closer so that everyone can hear? 

Mr. SMITH. I don’t think I need to ask him. I think he heard you. 

[Laughter.] 

Admiral COLLINS. How about that? 

Mr. SMITH. That’s much better. Thank you. 

Admiral COLLINS. Our maritime transportation system, in particular, is both very valuable to our economic prosperity and remains very vulnerable to the acts of terrorism. 

Under the leadership of President Bush, I think we’ve all leaned 

forward to increase our vigilance, and we’ve stiffened our resolve 

and allocated our resources to the greatest risk areas. And I think 

much has been accomplished, as summed up particularly by Commissioner Bonner. And the same type of activities have been pursued throughout each one of our organizations. 

From the Coast Guard’s perspective, the President is taking the 

next logical step, the next necessary change. And we think the time 

has come to put the reorganization issues on the table, in addition 

to resource and authority issues and policy issues. 

Clearly, from our perspective, the reorganization will bring unity 

of effort, unity of command, to homeland security efforts; clear lines 

of authority to get the job done. It will enhance the awareness of 

threats and vulnerabilities, so effective preventative actions can be 

instituted. It will minimize the impact of a terrorist act, should a 

response be required. And I think the key word is alignment; it will 

ensure alignment of personnel, strategy, policy, and resources to 

the very highest priority areas in the area of homeland security. 

As the lead agency for maritime homeland security, as both a 

military and law enforcement service, the Coast Guard is both a 

logical and a necessary component of the proposed department. Almost 15 percent of our current operating budget is directly related 

to the core missions of the proposed department. The bulk of the 

remaining missions contribute indirectly to the overall security interests of the Nation. And as I have detailed in my written statement, we also have a unique set of competencies, capabilities, and 

authorities that will add considerable value to the department. 

I think the time is now. I think there are some critical stipulations, from the Coast Guard perspective, that have to be met, to 

define success here as we reorganize. One is that we remain intact 

as an organization; that we retain our essential attributes as a 

14

maritime, military, and multimission service; and that all range of 

our missions are supported robustly, actively in the new department. 

I think that last stipulation may need a few explanatory notes. 

I know it’s of interest to many of the Subcommittee Members. 

From a system’s perspective, the threats to the security of our 

homeland extend well beyond overt terrorism: countering illegal 

drug smuggling and other contraband in the transit zones and in 

the source countries; preventing illegal migration through maritime 

routes; preserving living marine resources from foreign encroachment. These are all included in critical elements of homeland security, from our perspective. They are all responsibilities of the 

United States Coast Guard. And this mission set was recognized 

and validated by a recent interagency task force on Coast Guard 

Roles and Missions in 1999. 

I think our full range of missions, all critical in nature, will continue to be supported under the President’s proposal in a very robust way. 

Again, I am aware that it’s stated in some quarters here in the 

Committee and on other areas of the Hill—there is concern of our 

ability to attend to all the missions if we are moved to the new department; that we will not be attentive to our efforts against drug 

smuggling or fisheries violators as we were before September 11; 

and others even worry about us not being responsive in our search 

and rescue missions in the future years as we’ve been in the past. 

I understand those concerns, and let me attempt to put at ease 

some of those that are skeptical. First of all, I can assure you that 

we will continue to save lives every single day. We saved two yesterday off Virginia Beach, as a F–14 plane went down and pilots 

ditched. 

In fact, we have increased our efforts with regard to protecting 

life and property at sea. This year we are adding 100 billets, new 

positions, to our small-boat stations, and these new people will also 

have new boats and new equipment to use, and very soon. SAR 

(Search and Rescue) is and will remain a priority for us. 

Second, we have seized more cocaine on the high seas already 

this year than we did last year at this time, despite the events of 

last fall. We are using new technology, tactics, and intelligence in 

very creative ways to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of 

our patrols. And that goes for fisheries enforcement as well. 

Third, and most importantly, I believe with absolute confidence 

that the improvements that we are about to make to our inventory 

of ships, boats, aircraft, command and control systems will 

strengthen, not weaken, our capabilities in every mission. In the 

final analysis, we will emerge as a more capable and more responsive service than ever before. 

At the heart of the matter, maritime homeland security is about 

preventing harm to the American public. Primarily, it is done best 

by firmly and diligently enforcing the laws of the United States. 

That is what we began to do in 1790, and that is what we will continue to do as long as the Coast Guard flies its ensign. 

I’ll be glad to answer any questions at the appropriate time, Mr. 

Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Collins follows:]

15

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL THOMAS COLLINS

Good afternoon Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the Subcommittee. 

It is a pleasure to appear before you today to discuss the President’s proposal to 

create the Department of Homeland Security. 

The events of September 11 clearly changed our security focus as a nation. Today 

we face a substantial threat of terrorism, a reality that will continue well into the 

future. 

With his plan to create a Department of Homeland Security, the President has 

taken the next logical step to ensure an effective posture of readiness for our nation. 

From the Coast Guard’s perspective it is a necessary change, whose time has come. 

The proposed organization will bring unity of effort and unity of command to homeland security, with clear lines of authority to get the job done. It will serve to enhance awareness of threats and vulnerabilities so that effective preventative actions 

can be instituted. It will minimize the impact of a terrorist act and help align strategy, resources, and personnel to the highest priority. The Coast Guard is a logical 

component of the proposed Department. To maximize the Coast Guard’s effectiveness in the new Department, it is essential that the Coast Guard:

• Remain intact.

• Retain essential attributes as a military, multi-mission, and maritime service.

• Retain the full range of Coast Guard missions.

Nearly forty percent of the Coast Guard’s current operating budget is directly related to the core missions of the proposed Department and the remainder of our 

missions contribute indirectly to the overall security and economic viability of the 

nation. The Coast Guard is the lead federal agency for Maritime Homeland Security 

and we have a game plan to protect America’s waterways and ports. The Coast 

Guard’s multi-mission assets, military role as an Armed Force, and maritime presence and authorities bridge security, safety, and response capabilities between federal, state, local and private organizations as well as other military services. We 

have been the leader for non-DOD maritime security needs of our nation since 1790 

. . . it was the reason we were formed 212 years ago. 

The Coast Guard possesses extensive regulatory and law enforcement authorities 

governing ships, boats, personnel, and associated activities in our ports, waterways, 

and offshore maritime regions. We are a military service with 7x24 command, communication, and response capability. We maintain, ‘‘at the ready’’, a network of 

coastal small boats, aircraft, and blue water cutters, and expert personnel to prevent and respond to safety and security incidents; and we have geographic presence 

throughout the country, coasts, rivers, and lakes, both in large ports and small harbors. Although the President’s proposal does not authorize the new Secretary any 

additional authority to engage in military activities, it does not change the Coast 

Guard’s status as a military service and branch of the armed forces of the United 

States or the Secretary’s role as a military service chief. The Coast Guard would 

continue its traditional operations, including using Coast Guard forces to safeguard 

U.S. ports throughout the country. 

We are also a formal member of the national foreign intelligence community. We 

partner with other government agencies and the private sector to multiply the effectiveness of our services. The Coast Guard remains the recognized leader in the 

world regarding maritime safety, security, mobility, and environmental protection 

issues. These multi-mission, military, and maritime attributes form the core of our 

organization and maximize our ability to prevent and respond to incidents. 

It is also important to recognize the threats to the security of our homeland extend beyond overt terrorism. Countering illegal drug and contraband smuggling, 

preventing illegal immigration via maritime routes, preserving living marine resources from foreign encroachment, preventing environmental damage and responding to spills of oil and hazardous substances can all be included as critical elements 

of national and economic security and they are all Coast Guard responsibilities. This 

mission set was recognized and validated as recently as 1999 by the Presidential 

Interagency Task Force on Coast Guard Roles and Missions. Our full range of missions, all critical to the nation, would continue to serve America in a robust way 

under President Bush’s proposal. 

The Coast Guard is well positioned to move into the new Department and respond 

to the nation’s future maritime needs. The Integrated Deepwater System contract 

has been awarded. This program will re-capitalize the Coast Guard’s cutters, aircraft, and offshore Command and Control network to help push out the U.S. borders 

and increase our Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA). It is a scaleable and flexible 

program, able to meet emerging requirements for maritime security. The National 

Distress and Response System Modernization Project contract will be awarded in 

16

September. The maritime 911 system not only provides a distress network, but also 

provides an integrated Coastal command and control system breaking down communication barriers experienced between cooperating agencies when responding jointly 

to emergencies. We will award Response Boat small and medium contracts this year 

to replace our multi-mission station boats with more effective assets. These programs are at the heart of providing a ready Coast Guard with the competencies and 

capabilities to respond to a multitude of future threats and missions. 

The greatest danger to any Coast Guard mission would be to fracture the Coast 

Guard. Our multi-mission assets are critical to each of our five fundamental roles: 

Maritime Security, Maritime Safety, Maritime Mobility, Protection of Natural Resources, and National Defense. These roles overlap, as Maritime Security and Maritime Safety are two sides to the same coin of protecting Americans. The same cutters, boats, aircrafts, and personnel that maintain Maritime Mobility also provide 

Maritime Safety and Security as well as Protect our Natural Resources. The Coast 

Guard has always met its full set of responsibilities, regardless of Departmental location. Whether in war, national crises or ‘‘peacetime steaming’’ we will answer the 

call. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. I will be happy to answer any questions you may have.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Admiral Collins. 

Secretary Magaw? 

STATEMENT OF JOHN W. MAGAW, UNDERSECRETARY OF 

TRANSPORTATION FOR SECURITY, TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION 

Mr. MAGAW. Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, 

I am pleased to appear before you today on a matter of critical importance to our Nation. The logical consolidation of Government resources by the way of the President’s proposed Department of 

Homeland Security is the proper way to go, I believe. 

Due to time restraints, I have submitted a more detailed written 

statement for the record. I acknowledge that I am in good company 

as a member of this panel, indeed, highly professional company 

that I have been privileged to work with on a continuing basis for 

over 33 years as a team with the Coast Guard, Customs Service, 

and the Secret Service, all working together to protect our great 

Nation from harm in so many very different ways. 

But this new proposal, the proposal by the President, as already 

stated by Commissioner Bonner, gives clear accountability for the 

entire effort. I fully support the President’s proposal to create a Department of Homeland Security and to include the Transportation 

Security Administration within this new department. I see the 

President’s plan as an effective and efficient fusion of resources and 

allies. With a mission to ensure the freedom of movement for our 

people and commerce in all modes of transportation, TSA is a logical and critical component of the proposed department. 

TSA’s mission involves security in-depth, a balance of regulatory 

compliance, intelligence, law enforcement, and security operations. 

Every TSA dollar and every TSA employee directly supports the 

core missions of the new Department of Homeland Security. We are 

a sure fit in this new organization. 

To ensure TSA continues to meet its date-specific congressional 

mandates, and continues to serve its customers with excellence, 

TSA must be transferred to the new department in its entirety, 

with all its parts and functions. I am convinced that it will happen 

just that way and with very little disruption in meeting our specific 

goals in the next few months. 

17

May I clearly emphasize, though, that the personnel of the Department of Transportation, and in particular Secretary Norman 

Mineta, have continually embraced the TSA challenges, provided 

us outstanding leadership, and supported our needs every step of 

the way. 

In addition to hiring and deploying thousands of security screeners nationwide, we’re also in the midst of an ambitious program to 

hire and train uniformed Federal law enforcement officers and Federal Air Marshals. This team will enhance aviation security laws 

and the regulations through detection, deterrence, arrest, civil enforcement, and prosecution. 

We will continue to work closely with State and local law enforcement agencies, as well as the Department of Justice, the 

United States Attorneys, and all Federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies. 

The horrific events of September 11 and the use of commercial 

airplanes as deadly weapons set the high priority that we must 

give to protecting our airways, but also our waterways, our railways, our transit systems, and our pipelines. 

Although TSA is aggressively addressing the aviation-related 

mandates of the Aviation Transportation Security Act, we are also 

pressing forward on our statutory responsibility to secure all modes 

of transportation. We are working closely with our partners in 

Homeland Security and the executives represented on this panel. 

Some terrorist threats originate overseas and cross our borders 

using the transportation systems that connect our cities and communities. With the united efforts of the proposed new department’s 

complementary agencies, we can build a seamless transportation 

security infrastructure to protect people and commerce from their 

point of origin, prior to entry into the United States, all their travel 

throughout the United States, and to their exit points, and everything in between. 

Linking TSA with all agencies involved in both securing our borders and gathering intelligence information enhances our ability to 

dismantle terrorism plots in their planning stage, and that’s really 

what we’re all working toward, rather than react and respond to 

a terrorist attack. And I say protection through prevention. 

One area where TSA needs immediate assistance is funding. I realize that this Committee does not appropriate funds, but as we all 

know, you vote on the appropriations. And I urge the distinguished 

Members of the United States House of Representatives to support 

President Bush’s full request for emergency funding, in order to 

carry out our statutory obligations, the success of which is based 

on our ability to continue to fund operations already in high gear. 

I echo the President’s words of yesterday: Any further delay for us 

becomes intolerable. 

I cannot close without mentioning the tragic shooting at Los Angeles International Airport on Independence Day. This incident 

clearly demonstrates that TSA’s scope goes beyond the checkpoint 

and the aircraft. We are responsible for securing throughout the 

airport. We intend to work with local and State law enforcement 

to coordinate the best security for each airport. TSA will retain the 

flexibility, the capability, and the vision to adapt to new threats. 

18

We will continue to raise the security bar as we federalize airport 

security in 429 airports nationwide. 

And I also would like to pay my respects to our TSA personnel. 

They have come out of the woodwork since this house passed the 

bill and the President signed it. They’ve come from retired ranks. 

They’ve come from other agencies. They’ve come from the private 

sector. They’ve come from every entity of transportation which 

we’re dealing with, so that we have experts who have grown up in 

those areas. And I congratulate all of them and thank them for 

their patriotic duty. 

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my statement, my personal remarks, and I’m happy to join the panel for answers as you deem 

appropriate. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Magaw follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN W. MAGAW

Good morning Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the Subcommittee. It 

is a pleasure to appear before you today to discuss the President’s proposal to create 

the Department of Homeland Security, to briefly discuss the responsibilities of the 

Transportation Security Administration (TSA) 

The events of September 11 clearly changed our security focus as a nation. Today 

we face a substantial threat of terrorism, a reality that will continue well into the 

future. 

With his plan to create a Department of Homeland Security, the President has 

taken the next logical step to ensure an effective posture of readiness for our nation. 

From the TSA’s perspective it is a necessary change. The proposed organization will 

bring unity of effort and unity of command to homeland security, with clear lines 

of authority to get the job done. It will serve to enhance awareness of threats and 

vulnerabilities so that effective preventative actions can be instituted. It will minimize the impact of a terrorist act and help align strategy, resources, and personnel 

to the highest priority. TSA is a logical component of the proposed Department, as 

part of a Division of Border and Transportation Security. To maximize TSA’s effectiveness in the new Department, it is essential that all missions and functions that 

are assigned to TSA be transferred to the Department of Homeland Security. 

The entirety of TSA’s budget, personnel, and focus is directly related to the core 

missions of the proposed Department—protecting the security of our air, land, and 

sea borders and the security of our inter-connected transportation systems. TSA has 

the statutory responsibility for security of all modes of transportation and TSA directly employs transportation security personnel. TSA uses various tools to execute 

its assigned missions including intelligence, regulations, enforcement, inspection, 

screening and education of carriers, passengers, and shippers. TSA’s present focus 

on aviation security will not slow the government’s pace in addressing the security 

needs of other transportation modes. The incorporation of TSA into the new Department will not slow the pace of addressing the security needs of America’s transportation systems. It will also allow the Department of Transportation to remain focused on its core mandates of safety and ensuring that the nation has a robust and 

efficient transportation infrastructure that keeps pace with modern technology and 

the nation’s demographic and economic growth. 

The attacks on September 11, which used components of the transportation system as weapons, demonstrated the high priority that must be given to protecting 

the nation’s transportation sector. The task can best be accomplished within the Department whose principal mission is protecting Americans from terrorist attacks. 

As part of the Department of Homeland Security, TSA will have ready access to 

the Department’s intelligence architecture to support our efforts to prevent terrorists from using the transportation system as a target, or using the transportation 

system to deliver or use a weapon, such as by aircraft, railroad train or tanker. 

Combining TSA with established organizations brings mature services to our fledgling agency, allowing us to focus on accomplishing mandated goals. Also, combining 

TSA with fully staffed agencies, the new Department will allow the leveraging of 

staff, research capabilities, resources and facilities to address critical vulnerabilities. 

By including TSA as an important component of the Department of Homeland Security, we will be better able to support standardized practices and reporting requirements and integrated information technology systems, the control and direction of 

19

investigative resources, the coverage of National Special Security Events (NSSE) 

and responses to heightened alert levels and critical events. 

The security of our borders is intertwined with transportation security. The nation’s air, land, and seaports are critical nodes of the national transportation system. They interconnect international transportation systems with our expansive domestic transportation system. The continuity of security from our borders throughout our transportation system is essential. The protection of these modes and the 

passengers, cargo, and conveyances traveling through them is a responsibility that 

must be shared by border-management agencies and TSA. TSA’s ability to coordinate with border-management agencies will be enhanced if it is part of the same 

organization and has access to shared systems. The ports of entry are not limited 

to our continental borders. They include international airports throughout the country. The coordination of effort between TSA, INS, Customs and other DHS elements 

is critical to insure the comparability of security across all entry sites, whether internal or on the boundaries of our country. 

I would now like to turn to a brief discussion of TSA’s functions and its law enforcement responsibilities. 

First, I would like to provide a brief overview of TSA’s missions and functions. 

The Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) that Congress passed and the 

President signed into law last November created TSA. ATSA established my position as the Under Secretary of Transportation for Security and gave me the immense responsibility to ensure the security of the transportation of people and property throughout the United States transportation system. Specifically, in the area 

of aviation security, Congress established ambitious mandates and standards that 

we are implementing in federalizing all passenger and baggage screening at 429 airports in the United States. 

To give you an idea of the enormity of this task, when the Senate confirmed me 

on January 28 of this year, we had approximately 15 employees in TSA. By the end 

of December, when we will have federalized passenger and baggage screening at all 

U.S. commercial airports, we expect to have between 60-65,000 employees. We are 

working hard, under enormous pressure, to federalize passenger-screening functions 

by November 19 of this year, and to federalize checked baggage screening by December 31 of this year. We will ensure that there is no disruption in this schedule as 

a result of a transfer to the Department of Homeland Security. 

We are also in the midst of an ambitious program to hire and train Law Enforcement Officers (LEOs), and Federal Air Marshals (FAM). Together, these law enforcement team members will give us an effective capability to enforce aviation security laws and regulations through a combination of deterrence, arrest, civil enforcement, and prosecution. We will work closely with state and local law enforcement, 

the FBI, Department of Justice, the United States Attorneys, and other federal law 

enforcement and intelligence agencies to prevent criminal acts against the transportation system and ensure the prosecution of those that occur. 

Notwithstanding our understandable focus on aviation security because of ATSA 

requirements, TSA is also actively engaged in ensuring the security of transportation over land and sea. We are focusing on the inter-modal aspects of moving people and goods, such as transportation from truck to rail to ship, for example. We 

are developing procedures, and will seek to implement them, to prevent any mode 

of transportation from being exploited by terrorists. We are working closely with our 

partners in homeland security, especially the Coast Guard and the Customs Service 

to protect against such exploitation. 

TSA will utilize existing modal relationships and infrastructure to implement unified, national standards for national transportation security. These standards and 

initiatives will range from:

• Credentialing of transportation workers;

• Qualification and certification of transportation security workers;

• Expansion of the Coast Guard Sea Marshal program;

• Establishing Transportation Security Conditions as the link between the Office of Homeland Security threat conditions and the national transportation 

system;

• Shipping container security;

• Hazardous material transportation security;

• Operational and other intelligence fusion for risk assessment;

• Grant awards to mitigate the vulnerabilities; and

• National exercise program for response capability for security incidents and 

terrorism prevention evaluations.

20

TSA’s ability to leverage requirements and resources across different transportation modes accommodates modern intermodal transportation, reduces redundancy, 

and improves the effectiveness of the security measures that we are developing. 

In cooperation with many other agencies within the Federal Government, TSA is 

working with international organizations such as the International Civil Aviation 

Organization (ICAO) and the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to develop 

an international consensus to combat terrorism. The White House announced in a 

press release on June 26, 2002 an agreement among the Kananaskis Summit participants regarding transportation security. President Bush secured G–8 agreement 

on a major new U.S.-proposed Transport Security Initiative designed to enhance our 

security while growing our economies. G–8 countries account for over 50 percent of 

the world’s trade, approximately two-thirds of the world’s passenger aircraft fleet, 

and 13 of the world’s 25 busiest international airports. The U.S. proposed in March 

that the G–8 cooperate in addressing these challenges by advancing key transport 

security initiatives within G–8 countries, and in multilateral bodies such as ICAO, 

the IMO, and the World Customs Organization. The initiative will lead to more effective screening of people and cargo before transit; increased security for ships, airplanes, and trucks while in transit; and enhanced security at airports and seaports. 

By deploying modern technology, the initiative will push the security perimeter beyond physical borders, strengthen security, and expedite the movement of legitimate 

cargo and travelers. 

When Congress created TSA, it vested it with security functions that are preventive in nature, and with law enforcement responsibilities. The security related functions occur through a variety of methods including the development and use of intelligence databases; clear and well-communicated rules on prohibited items for passengers, carry-on baggage, and checked baggage; training and deploying a force of 

federal screeners of passengers and checked baggage; the purchase, installation and 

use of explosives detection systems; credentialing of airport and other transportation 

workers; securing the perimeters around ports and airports; and the installation of 

secure cockpit doors on aircraft. 

On the law enforcement side, TSA has staffed every airport-screening checkpoint 

with a uniformed Law Enforcement Officer (LEO) from State, local and airport authority police and security forces. These officers have a two-fold purpose—to deter 

any threat to the secure zone beyond the checkpoint and to enforce federal laws 

with respect to aviation security. Hiring, training, and deploying Federal LEOs to 

replace the state and local law officers is on going, but remains a challenging task. 

TSA is also responsible for the Federal Air Marshal (FAM) program. The program 

has expanded vastly over that which existed before September 11. Our FAMs are 

highly skilled individuals who are willing to put their lives on the line to stop a 

highjacking and prevent the use of a commercial airliner as a weapon of mass destruction. They are critical in assuring the zone of safety that we are building 

around the cockpit. We have increased our FAM training at our facility in Atlantic 

City, New Jersey so that we can place more FAMs on flights. We are on target with 

our goals of hiring, training and deploying FAMs. 

One area where TSA does need assistance from Congress is funding. I realize that 

this Committee does not appropriate funds, but all of you do vote on appropriations. 

TSA needs $6.8 billion this fiscal year to carry out its statutory obligations. Over 

half of this amount is contained in the President’s request for emergency supplemental appropriations. The House version of this bill not only drastically cut this 

funding request but also earmarked a substantial amount of the remainder in a 

manner that would make it extremely difficult for TSA to meet its statutory requirements for airport conversion. I urge the House to support the President’s full request for emergency TSA funding, and to remove any earmarks that would inhibit 

our ability to effectively spend those funds in accordance with the Administration’s 

priorities and meet the demands of our already active airport rollout plan. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. I will be happy to answer any questions you may have.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Secretary Magaw. 

Director Stafford? 

STATEMENT OF BRIAN L. STAFFORD, DIRECTOR,

UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE 

Mr. STAFFORD. Good morning, Mr. Chairman. I would like to 

thank you and the Ranking Member, Mr. Scott, and other Members. 

21

Mr. SMITH. Pull your mike up a little bit, if you would. 

Mr. STAFFORD. How about that? 

Mr. SMITH. Much better. 

Mr. STAFFORD. Good morning. I would like to thank you, Mr. 

Chairman, the Ranking Member, Mr. Scott, and other Members of 

the Subcommittee for giving me this opportunity to discuss the Administration’s reorganization proposal, including the future of the 

Secret Service. 

While the Secret Service is proud of its 137-year legacy as a bureau of the Department of Treasury, we strongly support the Administration’s plan to transfer our agency to the new Department 

of Homeland Security. The proposal envisions a prominent role for 

the Secret Service in fortifying both our Nation’s homeland and 

economic security. 

For over a century, the Secret Service has maintained investigative and protective missions. They are the cornerstones of our agency. Since 1901, our mandate to protect the President has expanded 

to include the Vice President, other Government and foreign officials, and, in recent years, national events, such as the Winter 

Olympics and the Super Bowl. 

But our investigative mission to protect our financial payment 

system and critical infrastructure predates our protective responsibilities by nearly 4 decades. Today, these dual missions are inseparable and complementary, and each is a multitude of connections to the objectives of homeland security. 

The bedrock principle of the Secret Service’s dual missions is our 

focus on prevention. The theme of prevention is ingrained in our 

culture, and it is infused into the minds of our employees from the 

day they enter our training facility. 

When the Secret Service was created by Abraham Lincoln, our 

charter was to prevent the production of counterfeit currency before 

it could be circulated and create economic chaos in our country. 

Today, our methods detect incidents before they occur, through intelligence analysis, meticulous advance work, and 

countersurveillance tactics. Our electronic crimes task forces provide training to hundreds of local law enforcement and private sector partners, aiding them in efforts to shield critical systems from 

cybercriminals and cyberterrorists. These capabilities are accomplished through our 135 domestic field offices and additional 19 offices overseas. We believe that the core philosophy of the Secret 

Service prevention mirrors that of the new department. Our common goal is to anticipate and prepare, through clear threat assessments and analysis of the intelligence information that is consumed by our intelligence division and our field offices. 

Since 1865, the Secret Service had developed a unique capacity 

to build strong and trusted partnerships with local, county, and 

State law enforcement, in furtherance of our dual missions. These 

partnerships involve information-sharing, open communication, and 

perhaps most critical, mutual trust. It is clear the Department of 

Homeland Security will be built on the pillars of prevention and 

protection. These are the very words found throughout our strategic plan. They define the mission and culture of the United 

States Secret Service. 

22

On behalf of the men and women of the Secret Service, we stand 

ready to continue our mission of protecting our leaders, our critical 

infrastructure, and the American people. Our personnel have dedicated their careers and their lives to making a safer America. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for this opportunity. And I also will be 

happy to answer any of your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Stafford follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF BRIAN L. STAFFORD

Good morning, Mr. Chairman. I would like to thank you, as well as the distinguished Ranking Member, Mr. Scott, and the other members of the subcommittee 

for providing a forum to discuss the Administration’s legislative proposal, including 

the future of the Secret Service and the other agencies represented here today. 

On June 6, 2002, President Bush announced his proposal to create a new Department of Homeland Security. Included in that plan is the transfer of our agency and 

all of its functions and assets to the new department. While the Secret Service is 

proud of its 137-year legacy as a bureau of the Department of the Treasury, we 

strongly support the President’s proposal to transfer the Secret Service to the new 

department. 

The role of the Secret Service, as envisioned under the Administration’s plan, will 

allow us to draw upon our unique experience and expertise to fortify both our homeland security, including the protection of our elected leaders and national events, 

and our economic security, vital to the stability and strength of our nation. 

Should Congress enact the Administration’s proposal and transfer the Secret 

Service to the Department of Homeland Security, it will become a watershed moment in our agency’s storied history. As you know, Mr. Chairman, the Secret Service 

was created in 1865 as a small bureau within the Treasury Department to stem the 

flow of counterfeit currency that had saturated our nation’s monetary system. 

It was not until 1901, following the assassination of President McKinley, that the 

Secret Service began the mission that we are best known for today, protecting the 

President of the United States. This mission was expanded in subsequent years to 

include other government and foreign officials, and, most recently, events of national 

significance. 

For over a century, the Secret Service has maintained investigative and protective 

missions; the cornerstones of our agency. They are inseparable and complementary, 

and each has a multitude of connections to the mission of homeland security and 

the objectives of the new department. 

HOMELAND SECURITY: A PREVENTION-ORIENTED MISSION

In considering the potential transfer of the Secret Service to the Department of 

Homeland Security, it is important to understand the basic philosophy of our agency. The bedrock principle of the Secret Service’s dual protective and investigative 

missions is our focus on prevention. 

This core philosophy is prevalent throughout our agency’s history. The theme of 

prevention is ingrained in our culture and pierces every facet of the Secret Service. 

It is infused into the minds of our agents from the day they enter our training facility. It is the undercurrent of our daily investigative and protective work, and is 

truly what makes the Secret Service different from all other law enforcement entities. 

Our preventative focus is rooted in our investigative mission, yet it is also a core 

of our protective mission. That focus began with our original mandate to suppress 

counterfeiting, when the Secret Service adopted the goal of preventing the production of counterfeit currency before it was circulated. Over 137 years later, we are 

still conducting what we refer to as supply house canvases, where our field personnel work closely with paper and ink manufacturers and suppliers to determine 

if there is any inordinate demand for the materials used to produce quality counterfeit currency. 

Prevention has also become an integral part of our efforts today to work with local 

law enforcement, other federal agencies, and the private sector to protect our critical 

infrastructure and financial payment systems from intrusion and compromise. 

Our protective agents are trained to detect incidents before they occur through 

meticulous advance work and countersurveillance tactics. Threat assessments developed by our Intelligence Division identify any existing dangers to the officials we 

are protecting. Our Technical Security Division analyzes and addresses any 

vulnerabilities in a physical security plan. Our electronic crime task forces provide 

23

training to hundreds of our local law enforcement and private sector partners, aiding them in efforts to shield critical systems and networks from cyber criminals and 

terrorists. 

We believe that our core philosophy mirrors that of the new Department of Homeland Security. Like our agency, the new department will be prepared to respond to 

incidents and infiltration. Our common goal is to anticipate and prepare, through 

robust threat assessments and analyses of the intelligence information that is made 

available to us. We are a consumer of the intelligence community. Continuing that 

role in the new department will allow us to take the necessary steps and precautions to minimize opportunities for our adversaries, and to prevent any loss of 

life or the destruction or disruption of the institutions we depend on. 

PROTECTING OUR ELECTED LEADERS AND NATIONAL EVENTS

Mr. Chairman, most Americans have some knowledge of our protective responsibilities. In recent decades, this mission has expanded beyond the protection of the 

President, the Vice President and their immediate families. Today, in addition to 

those officials, we are mandated to provide personal protection to the Presidentelect, the Vice President-elect and their immediate families; major Presidential and 

Vice Presidential candidates and their spouses; visiting foreign heads of state or 

governments; former Presidents, their spouses and children under the age of 16; and 

other government officials as designated by the President. Authorization for this 

protection can be found in our core statute, Section 3056 of Title 18 of the United 

States Code. 

A significant component was added to our protective mission in 1999, when Congress further amended Section 3056 to authorize the Secret Service to plan, coordinate and implement security operations at events of national significance, as designated by the President. This authority was a natural evolution for the Secret Service, as we have led security operations at large events involving the President dating back to our first protective mandate in 1901. Our longstanding expertise at 

planning these events and coordinating security with our local, state and federal law 

enforcement partners provides a platform for the Secret Service to perform this mission. Since 1999, the Secret Service has led security operations at 13 of the National 

Special Security Events (NSSEs) designated by the President, including the 2000 

Republican and Democratic National Conventions, the 2000 IMF/World Bank Meeting, the 2001 United Nations General Assembly, and, most recently, the 2002 Winter Olympics and Super Bowl XXXVI. 

The actual planning and coordination of these events requires an intensive, sustained effort, sometimes taking months or years. The volume of both financial and 

human resources required to develop and execute a sound physical security plan for 

a NSSE can be immense. The 2002 Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City, for example, 

involved an unprecedented interagency collaboration between federal, state, and 

local law enforcement, as well as the military, working with the Salt Lake Organizing Committee, the Utah Olympic Public Safety Command, the International 

Olympic Committee, the State of Utah, and other entities. Security for the competition and ceremonies was provided for a four-week period, 24 hours a day, for an estimated 65,000 daily spectators, including 2,500 athletes in 15 protected venues. 

These venues stretched over an area covering 900 square miles, slightly smaller 

than the state of Rhode Island. It was the largest and most comprehensive coordinated security event in the history of American law enforcement. 

Advances in technology and the world’s reliance on interdependent network systems have also changed our protective responsibilities. No longer can we rely solely 

on human resources and physical barriers in designing a security plan; we must 

also address the role and inherent vulnerabilities of critical infrastructures upon 

which security plans are built. When a protectee visits a hotel, for example, we can 

assume that the utilities, ventilation and elevators on site are all controlled electronically. That is why the Secret Service has specialists, stationed in our field offices across the country, who have the experience and expertise to secure critical infrastructures that are part of our security plan. It is precisely these skilled personnel in our field offices who can be of enormous value and benefit to the municipalities, private companies and local law enforcement agencies in the cities and regions we serve. 

INVESTIGATIONS—HOMELAND SECURITY AND ECONOMIC SECURITY

Beyond our protective responsibilities, the Secret Service is a major contributor 

to other aspects of our homeland security. For 137 years, the Secret Service has 

been safeguarding our currency and financial infrastructure, pre-dating our mission 

to protect the President by nearly four decades. And while today the Secret Service 

24

remains the sole federal investigative agency responsible for enforcing our counterfeiting statutes, our investigative mission has broadened to include all aspects of the 

nation’s financial infrastructure. As financial payment methods and systems have 

evolved, from paper to plastic to digital, so has our investigative jurisdiction. Since 

1984, our investigative responsibilities have expanded to include crimes that involve 

identity theft, access device (credit card) fraud, false identification documents, computer fraud and cyber crime, and financial institution fraud. 

In recent years, financial crimes have targeted both American industry and American consumers. Thousands of Americans are victimized each month as they learn 

their identities have been stolen, Social Security numbers compromised, and bank 

accounts emptied. The private sector, most notably the financial services industry, 

has also fallen prey to these criminal elements, as fraudulent credit and debit cards 

and counterfeit checks have become more and more prevalent in the marketplace. 

Even more troubling, stolen identities, false identification documents, and fraudulent credit cards have become the tools of the 21st century terrorist, typically operating in cyberspace and often outside the physical boundaries of the United States. 

Our currency and financial payment systems are primary targets for terrorists 

and other criminal enterprises, yet our critical infrastructure is equally vulnerable. 

A serious compromise of these electronic networks could wreak havoc on our economy, law enforcement, military, health care, transportation and emergency services. 

The Secret Service is a leader of federal law enforcement efforts to investigate 

electronic crimes and safeguard our financial and critical infrastructure. This is accomplished through our vast network of field offices, including 135 throughout the 

United States and 19 additional offices overseas. 

Our field offices have developed strong, information-sharing partnerships with the 

multitude of local police organizations and private companies they work with on a 

daily basis. These field offices are leading criminal investigations and task force initiatives, but they are also resources for the communities they are serving. Because 

of the availability of our skilled personnel and the relationships already established 

with municipalities and state governments, these field offices can take a lead role 

in protecting critical infrastructure on a local level, assessing vulnerabilities and 

training our local partners how to protect their networks and systems. 

As with our protective mission, we continue to focus on preventative measures to 

shield the American people and these essential networks from terrorists, cyber 

criminals, and other attackers. We have committed ourselves as an agency to developing new tools to combat the growth of cyber terrorism, financial crime and computer fraud. 

First, the Secret Service began its highly regarded Electronic Crimes Special 

Agent Program (ECSAP). This program provides specialized training to select 

agents in all areas of electronic crimes, and qualifies these personnel as experts in 

the forensic examination and preservation of electronic evidence and in the protection of critical infrastructure. We have placed these trained agents in each of our 

field offices across the country, and they have become invaluable resources, both for 

our own investigations, as well as for our local and federal law enforcement partners. From coast to coast, the demand among our local law enforcement and private 

sector partners for investigative or prevention-based assistance from our ECSAP 

agents is overwhelming, and we are striving to expand this program and training 

within our agency as resources allow. 

Another important effort to secure our financial and critical infrastructure is the 

development of the Secret Service’s electronic crime task forces. Several years ago, 

the Secret Service recognized the need for law enforcement, private industry and 

academia to pool their resources, skills and vision to effectively combat criminal elements in cyberspace and protect our nation’s critical infrastructure. In New York 

alone, our task force is composed of over 250 individual members, including 50 different federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies, 200 private companies and 

9 universities. The innovative approach our task forces have adopted allows various 

local, state and federal law enforcement agencies to combine their resources and experience with that of others, particularly private industry, to detect and prevent 

electronic crimes. 

The Secret Service applauds the leadership of the House and Senate Judiciary 

Committees, who recognized the value of this initiative and included language last 

year in the USA/PATRIOT Act to authorize our agency to expand these task forces 

to cities and regions across the country. We have received strong and enthusiastic 

support for this program from the scores of local law enforcement agencies we work 

with, as well as our private sector partners, who are all excited about the potential 

of this exciting new endeavor. 

Again, these ECSAP agents and electronic crime task forces are stationed 

throughout our field operations. From physical to financial to critical infrastructure 

25

protection, these field offices have the expertise to extend the preventative mission 

of the Department of Homeland Security to communities across the country. 

The prevalence of counterfeiting, network intrusions, identity theft, credit card 

fraud, and other such crimes leaves little question that the mission of protecting our 

financial and critical infrastructure is central to the mission of homeland security. 

Consequently, the Secret Service’s dual protective and investigative missions, as 

well as our skills and expertise, will reinforce the primary mission of the new department. 

THE DUAL MISSIONS OF THE SECRET SERVICE

Mr. Chairman, the coexistence and interrelationship between our protective and 

investigative responsibilities will be of tremendous value to the new Department of 

Homeland Security. 

Our protective and investigative missions strengthen and complement each other. 

Since 1865, the Secret Service has developed a unique capacity to build strong and 

trusted partnerships with local, county and state law enforcement in furtherance of 

our investigative mission. It is important to note that these are partnerships in 

their truest form. They involve information sharing, open communication, and, perhaps most critical, mutual trust. These relationships are built over time, on the 

premise that our agency, by itself, cannot complete its mission without the cooperation and contributions of our local partners. 

Building an atmosphere of trust and cooperation with local police is not only central to our criminal investigations and prevention-oriented partnerships, it is also 

the keystone to fulfilling our protective mission. The importance of these partnerships, developed entirely through our field offices, to our protective responsibilities 

cannot be overstated. When any of our protectees travels outside of Washington, 

D.C., the Secret Service executes our security plan with the cooperation and resources of the local police in the area, as coordinated by our field office. 

The cooperative atmosphere that has already been established between our field 

office and local law enforcement with regard to our investigative duties breeds successful interagency collaboration during presidential and other protectee visits. Simply put, there is already a relationship in place between the parties that need to 

cooperate and coordinate their efforts, and the Secret Service builds on that relationship to prepare for and provide a seamless, safe and secure environment for our 

protectee. 

Moreover, the associations we have established with our local law enforcement 

counterparts have provided a blueprint for our agency to follow in building private 

sector partnerships as well. We have learned that developing relationships with private industry, particularly those in the financial services, telecommunications and 

online industries, provides the Secret Service with additional expertise and ideas in 

preventing electronic crimes and protecting our critical infrastructure. The contributions of private industry, as well as academia, have become essential to our electronic crime task forces. Their expertise and knowledge in many ways surpasses 

that which we possess in law enforcement. 

Mr. Chairman, our investigative mission is essential to our protective mission. 

Not only is there a connection between our investigative responsibilities and the 

protection of the President, but the strength of our protective capabilities is dependent on our investigative mission. 

Every agent who is assigned today on a protective detail began their career in the 

Secret Service as a criminal investigator attached to a field office, where they spent 

considerable time developing their skills and expertise by working counterfeit cases, 

financial crime investigations, protective intelligence cases or protecting critical infrastructure. 

A Secret Service agent is among the most skilled law enforcement operatives in 

the world, and this is due in large part to their investigative training and experience. This experience provides an opportunity to develop analytical skills, investigative expertise, maturity and judgment. These are the building blocks necessary for 

the transition of our agents into the next phase of their careers—protecting our nation’s highest elected leaders. 

Because of this investigative experience, our protective agents are multi-dimensional, relying on an array of skills and instincts to protect our nation’s highest 

elected leaders. We draw upon those individuals who have years of experience in 

the field, who not only have acquired the requisite skills, but have been tried and 

tested under difficult circumstances, and have proven decision-making and other 

abilities that are crucial to protective missions. 

As you can see, Mr. Chairman, our protective and investigative responsibilities 

are thoroughly intertwined and interdependent. They are the heart and soul of the 

26

Secret Service, and complement each other in a manner that is truly unique among 

law enforcement today. 

Under the Administration’s proposal, the Secret Service would fall under the direct oversight and management of the Office of the Secretary and Office of the Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security. The Secret Service strongly supports this element of the Administration’s proposal, which recognizes that the Secret Service has 

protective and investigative responsibilities that transcend all operational parameters. 

A principal objective of homeland security is to ensure our highest elected leaders 

and events of national significance are protected from terrorist and other threats. 

In support of our responsibility for protecting the President, Vice President, visiting 

world leaders and NSSEs, the Administration’s proposal provides maximum operational flexibility and direct communication to the Secretary. Moreover, the Administration’s proposal allows the Secret Service to draw on the expertise and resources 

of each departmental division in support of our protective mission. 

The Secret Service has a proud tradition of serving in the Department of the 

Treasury. However, our support for transferring the Secret Service to the new department is grounded in the capabilities, expertise and resources our agency can 

bring to the homeland security table. 

For example, our National Threat Assessment Center (NTAC) has perfected models for identifying potential assassins, attackers and others capable of violence. Beyond their contribution to our mission to protect our highest leaders, NTAC has produced groundbreaking studies and provided prevention-based training on such 

issues as school violence and workplace violence. Under the Administration’s proposal, the methodologies used by the National Threat Assessment Center can now 

be used for all homeland defense vulnerability assessments. 

The Secret Service’s world-class Forensic Services Division (FSD) has proven to 

be an invaluable resource for our local law enforcement partners and others, such 

as the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, in investigations involving handwriting analysis, ink analysis, polygraph examinations, fingerprint analysis 

and similar services. Our FSD could be used in the future to provide forensic examinations for either the department as a whole or to smaller entities within the department. 

In announcing his proposal to create a Department of Homeland Security, the 

President said the following:

‘‘America needs a unified homeland security structure that will improve protection against today’s threats and be flexible enough to help meet the unknown 

threats of the future. The mission of the new Department would be to prevent 

terrorist attacks within the United States, to reduce America’s vulnerability to 

terrorism, and to minimize the damage and recover from attacks that may 

occur.’’

It is clear the Department of Homeland Security will be built on the pillars of prevention and protection. These are the very words found throughout our own strategic plan. They define the mission and culture of the United States Secret Service. 

On behalf of the men and women of the Secret Service, we stand ready to continue our mission of protecting our leaders, our infrastructure and the American 

people. We know this is a daunting mission. We are up against criminals and terrorists who have committed themselves to disrupting that which we depend on, destroying that which we have built, and taking the lives of those that we love. But 

I assure this subcommittee that the Secret Service can and will meet this challenge. 

Our people have the skills, the experience and the training to rise to any occasion. 

They have dedicated their careers and their lives to making a safer America. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you again for the opportunity to appear before the subcommittee. This concludes my prepared statement. I will be pleased to answer any 

questions you or the other members of the subcommittee may have.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Director Stafford. 

Commissioner Bonner, let me address my first question to you, 

and this is really a question that could be asked in similar form 

to all witnesses today, and it is this, that in many instances when 

we are talking about transferring a service or an agency or department to the new Department of Homeland Security, not all functions of that service or agency or department are necessarily directly connected to homeland security. For example, in the case of 

Customs, you have both responsibility for border security, but you 

27

also have responsibility for trade. So my question really is, I can 

understand the need for enforcement to be transferred to the new 

department, but what is the need for trade to be transferred to the 

new department? 

Mr. BONNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for that question. I 

think it would be a serious mistake if the trade function, so to 

speak, of the U.S. Customs Service were split out, or there was an 

attempt to split them out or carve them out of the rest of the Customs Service. First of all, we’re not organized in a way that easily 

lends itself to doing that. And the reality is, particularly in the 

field, it’s the same personnel that are involved in doing inspections 

for enforcement purposes and security purposes that do the trade 

function, that review goods to determine whether they’re admissible and dutiable and the like. So it’s the same people. 

But more fundamentally, it seems to me that it would be very 

unwise to try to separate out these two functions because the security function and the trade function, let’s call it the trade facilitation function of U.S. Customs Service, are not only interlinked, but 

I think it would be a terribly bad idea to, let’s say, send over to 

a new Department of Homeland Security a Customs Service that 

no longer had a trade function. It’s the fact that we have a trade 

function and a function to look at trade and trade facilitation that 

requires the U.S. Customs Service to balance security with trade 

facilitation. If you remove the trade function from Customs, you 

simply now have a security agency whose only responsibility is border security. 

That would be a mistake because of this: It’s really pretty easy, 

in a way, to provide security at all our ports of entry. If you want 

absolute security, you just shut them down. We don’t want that. 

We want an agency—the U.S. Customs Service is such an agency, 

because it has these dual roles and missions—that will be mindful 

of and balance the need to make sure that we provide the security 

that’s necessary against the terrorist threat, but we do so without 

choking off the flow of trade. And we’ve done that through the partnership against terrorism with the trade and some other programs 

we’ve initiated. 

So for that reason, it seems to me it would be terribly unwise to 

split out or carve up the Customs Service. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Commissioner. 

Admiral Collins, in your written testimony, you make the point 

that the threats to the security of our homeland extend to countering illegal drug and contraband smuggling, preventing illegal 

immigration via maritime routes, and so on. My question is this, 

are those very important missions of the Coast Guard going to be 

in any way diminished or reduced as a result of your emphasis on 

homeland security? 

Admiral COLLINS. Let me answer it this way, Mr. Chairman, 

clearly in the immediate aftermath of 9–11, we did in fact allocate 

resources, multimission resources, multitask resources, the capability to do the wide range of our missions away from fisheries, 

away from counterdrugs in the Caribbean, into our ports and waterways and coastal areas, to deal with what at that time was an 

unknown magnitude of threat. 

28

We have since reallocated those longer range resources, our larger ships and aircraft, back into those missions. And we are within 

about 5 percent or so of the pre 9–11 resource allocation, in terms 

of fisheries and counterdrugs. 

I think that, on steady state, we will, thanks to Congress’ support, the President’s support, Secretary Mineta’s support, our ’03 

budget is the largest increase—now under consideration on the 

Hill. It’s the largest increase in recent history for the Coast Guard, 

recognizing this wide range of missions. 

Mr. SMITH. So in other words, your resources that are dedicated, 

say, to stopping drug smuggling are actually going to increase as 

far as personnel, as far as funding goes? 

Admiral COLLINS. We’re not at the same level right now as pre 

9–11. We’re probably within 5 to 10 percent of the resources allocated to the counterdrug mission. 

Mr. SMITH. You anticipate getting back to at least where you 

were if not increasing? 

Admiral COLLINS. That will be done over a multiyear basis, Mr. 

Chairman. And the first installation, of course, is within the ’03 

budget. It represents the——

Mr. SMITH. So in that case, you’re really saying that there is a 

reduction in the number of personnel and the amount of funds 

dedicated to some of these other missions, like stopping drug smuggling. 

Admiral COLLINS. Sir, there is definitely a capacity issue here. 

Mr. SMITH. My concern is that there’s a reduction in the resources that you’re dedicating to these other missions. That’s a real 

concern, that that is occurring, that you’re not going to be spending 

as much, not assigning as many personnel to, say, drug smuggling 

as you had been. 

Doesn’t that concern you? 

Admiral COLLINS. I think in terms of the missions that had to 

be reduced, in our fisheries mission, in our counterdrug mission—

and now that’s around 5 to 8 percent of pre 9–11 levels. 

The search and rescue mission in our waterways and ports, waterways and coastal areas, remains a priority. And in fact, the investments that we’re making through the ’02 supplemental and the 

’03 budget actually puts a greater presence in those areas than before. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. 

Admiral COLLINS. Drove by 2,000 people, the vast preponderance 

of that increase goes to our ports and the coastal areas just where 

the greatest degree of search and rescue demand is. 

So I think when you invest in security through what we’re doing 

in our initiatives in our ’03 budget and our supplemental, you’re investing in safety at the same time. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay, thank you, Admiral Collins. 

The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Scott, is recognized for his 

questions. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I wanted to follow up. You said 5 to 8 percent of pre 9–11 levels? 

Admiral COLLINS. That’s correct. 

Mr. SCOTT. Are you talking about 95 percent drop? 

29

Admiral COLLINS. No, no, no. No, we’re within 5 percent to 8 percent of——

Mr. SCOTT. Of the level. 

Admiral COLLINS [continuing]. The allocation of resources, in aircraft hours and ship hours that we allocated prior to 9–11. 

Mr. SCOTT. Okay. When Mr. Ridge was here, I submitted several 

questions in writing. I’m not aware that we’ve gotten a response 

yet. Let me just ask if anyone can express any need for sabotaging 

civil service provisions, undermining whistleblower protections, significant changes in Freedom of Information or Federal Advisory 

Committee Act legislation, or significant changes in the way inspector generals generally work? Is there any reason that we need to 

change the law in those areas? Can anybody articulate a reason? 

Mr. BONNER. I know that—I think it’s very important, Mr. Scott, 

that the new Secretary have a significant amount of management 

flexibility in terms of organizing this. But I can’t really address the 

specific issues that you’re raising. 

Mr. SCOTT. Well, every manager needs some flexibility. But we’ve 

had civil service protection for at least decades if not centuries. I 

just wanted to know whether or not we’re going to use this as an 

excuse to make fundamental changes in that law, and I don’t hear 

any articulated reason why we need that or undermining the whistleblower protection that’s so important. 

Let me ask another question, pretty much the same lines as the 

Chairman, because after all is said and done, you’re going to have 

the same people doing the same job, just doing it under another 

Secretary. 

Mr. Magaw, where is your office now, physically? 

Mr. MAGAW. TSA’s office, now mine, is in the Transportation 

building. 

Mr. SCOTT. And how far are you from Secretary Mineta? 

Mr. MAGAW. Fifty yards. We’re on the same floor. 

Mr. SCOTT. Okay. 

Mr. MAGAW. Just about 50 yards from the Secretary’s part of 

that area. But the rest of my personnel, or most of the rest of them, 

are in three or four buildings close by. And that is something we 

are struggling with now, in terms of space. 

Mr. SCOTT. Okay, now, after the reorganization, are you going to 

have to pick up your office and move it somewhere? 

Mr. MAGAW. Well, I’m going to have to pick it up and move it 

before then, because we have sometimes offices that are supposed 

to house two people that have six in them. So I am just busting 

at the seams, and I can’t find any more building space close by. So 

I’ve been conferring with the Secretary, and also will confer with 

homeland——

Mr. SCOTT. After this reorganization, you will be reporting to a 

different Secretary? 

Mr. MAGAW. That’s correct. 

Mr. SCOTT. What will that do to things like airport screening? 

Which Secretary will be doing that? 

Mr. MAGAW. We would still be doing airport screening. TSA——

Mr. SCOTT. And you’re going to be doing that in another secretariat? 

30

Mr. MAGAW. That’s correct. All of TSA’s responsibilities today 

would move in total, as a block, nothing left behind at Transportation, as I understand it now. 

Mr. SCOTT. Well, yes, but there’s a lot—airport security, a lot of 

that is going to be airport management. The management of the 

airport is going to be in one secretariat; security of the airport is 

going to be in another secretariat. 

Mr. MAGAW. Management of the airports are independent. That’s 

not under—— Mr. SCOTT. Well, I mean—— Mr. MAGAW. But we will be coordinating with FAA, as we have 

been from the very beginning, to make sure we’re working—— Mr. SCOTT. Where is FAA going to be, after all of this is done? 

Mr. MAGAW. FAA has one building of its own and is refurbishing 

another one. And so they’re side-by-side within a block of the 

Transportation building. 

Mr. SCOTT. And they’re going to still be in Transportation or are 

they——

Mr. MAGAW. They’ll still be in Transportation. The only——

Mr. SCOTT. So FAA would be in Transportation, and you’re going 

to be in another secretariat. 

Mr. MAGAW. Right. The only part of FAA that would not continue 

to be in FAA is the security group, which is 1,400 that are stationed virtually all over the country, some here in Washington. 

They move to Transportation. 

Mr. SCOTT. Let me ask another question, Mr. Bonner, following 

up the Chairman, part of the problem with Customs is that you are 

dealing with trade, and the better job you do on security, the more 

problems occur in trade. After all is said and done, how is that balance going to work out? 

Mr. BONNER. Well, first of all, it’s very important that we maintain that balance. And the legislation that’s before the Congress 

that the President proposed, as I think you know, Mr. Scott, includes a specific provision that provides that not only is the border 

security function to maintain security at the border, but that it will 

also have a responsibility—a priority of the new department will be 

that we move legitimate commerce and trade efficiently. 

So that’s a role that I’ve had to balance since September 11. I 

can tell you, on September 12 and 13 and 14, I had this exact problem, and the problem was that we had gone to Level 1 Alert at 

U.S. Customs, at all the border ports of entry into the United 

States, which is a much higher level of security. And within about 

a day or two, we had 10- or 12-hour wait times for commercial 

trucks trying to get across the border into the U.S., but principally 

our northern border. 

So one of the things that I’ve had to grapple with is how do we 

maintain a very high level of security, which we are and we will, 

but to do that in a way that doesn’t choke off trade, that allows 

the commerce to flow smoothly or relatively smoothly into the U.S. 

And we achieved that in about a week. 

But the reason I was able to do that is that I had both roles. I 

had a role of security, but I also had a role of trade facilitation. 

And my point is, the worst thing we could do, trade’s worst nightmare, is that if you take out the trade functions from Customs and 

31

leave them behind someplace, and now you have somebody that’s 

in charge of securing our borders that is only interested in security. 

So we have to maintain this balance. And the President’s own 

proposed bill, by the way, suggests that these are both priorities, 

that they need to be balanced, they need to be harmonized. And 

we’ve done a pretty good job of that, so far, at U.S. Customs, I 

would submit to you. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Scott. 

The gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. Green, is recognized for his 

questions. 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral Collins, in your written testimony, you state that the 

Coast Guard remains the recognized leader in the world regarding 

maritime safety, security, mobility, and environmental protection 

issues. I agree with you. 

Your office is probably aware that I have some concerns and 

some suggestions on the search and rescue mission portion of your 

responsibility. What I would like to do is, if you would be willing 

to contact my office directly in the next day or so—I won’t distract 

the Committee with some of those questions. So if you would be 

willing to do that, I’d appreciate it very much. 

Admiral COLLINS. Glad to do that. 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you. 

A couple of questions that I have—I agree with what you have 

stated as to the importance of the Coast Guard remaining flexible 

and multitasked. Will that cause you to consider new design types 

in your vessel requests, in your vessel programs going forward into 

the future? 

Admiral COLLINS. We have already initiated a procurement 

that’s underway right now to purchase additional small boats for 

our search and rescue stations and a new unit that we’re just creating, a maritime safety and security team. The first one was commissioned in Seattle on the 3rd of July. It’s a 70-person team. We 

have six of those funded through the ’03 budget. They will be dispersed around the country, and they’re to provide search capability 

in our ports and coastal areas. 

That is another plus for safety, by the way, and search and rescue, because it’s additional presence. It takes the heat off, or the 

pressure off, some of our stations and their assets. 

In terms of the larger assets that we’re requiring, our Integrated 

Deepwater Systems project has just been awarded. It was awarded 

on the 25th of June. It’s going to recapitalize our major—our major 

fixed-wing and helicopters. 

And most of the capability gap that we envision post 9–11 we envisioned in the pre 9–11, quite frankly. And that was C4ISR. It 

was sensors, communications, secure communications, interoperability and connectivity, which is the absolute centerpiece to the 

deepwater project. That will give us much, much needed capability 

to have the awareness in the maritime environment we need to ferret out threats and push our borders out, so that we don’t—we’re 

not caught in this linear view of border security, where we’re only 

inspecting at a port of entry or a linear type concept of a border. 

32

Pushing the borders out, having a layered, in-depth strategy is 

a fundamental ingredient, I think, of the future of our homeland 

security, and these acquisitions give us that. 

Mr. GREEN. How about having to go back and retool some of your 

existing vessels? Will you have to do that, bolster their equipment 

and capabilities? 

Admiral COLLINS. Part of the Integrated Deepwater System 

project is, again, a recapitalization over a number of years. And 

that contract, the acquisition strategy calls for the contracting 

team, which is Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman, in this 

case, in a joint venture, to not only manage the acquisition of new 

assets in this system, but also develop a migration plan from the 

legacy assets to the new, and invest in the legacy systems as appropriate as part of this migration plan. So that will be an inherent 

part of the contract strategy that unfolds as we speak. 

Mr. GREEN. In your written testimony, you state that the Coast 

Guard is a formal member of the national foreign intelligence community. Could you help me understand that, and that relationship 

and how you work with other——

Admiral COLLINS. That’s a fairly recent development. It was a 

piece of legislation that was enacted last fall. It puts us at the seat 

at the formal intel community, at the table in terms of collection 

requirements and priorities and the like. So we’re a member along 

with the CIA, the FBI, NSA, Department of Defense intelligence 

apparatus. 

And it builds off of prior relationships, particularly with the Office of Naval Intelligence in the United States Navy, and sharing 

information and setting priorities. We are in many places, far-flung 

from our coast as well as on our coast. We do have collection capability and so forth to add value to that community. And it provides 

us the interplay, exchange of information interplay in the setting 

of priorities that is so very, very important to us to function across 

the wide range of our missions. 

I think that’s a very distinct—it’s one of those value propositions 

that we bring to the new department, that we in fact are a member 

of the intel community. 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Green. 

The gentlewoman from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee, is recognized for 

her questions. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you very much. 

Let me, again, for the record, acknowledge both my appreciation 

for the presence of the witnesses, but also my appreciation for their 

service. 

Mr. Magaw, your service is in previous responsibilities, but it is 

to be or ongoing at this point. And I thank you for taking on the 

challenge. 

And certainly Mr. Stafford knows—we’ve worked together in the 

past, and appreciate very much the work of the Secret Service and 

the Coast Guard and, of course, the U.S. Customs. 

And might I just say as well that my interest in FEMA’s presence is because it does have such a vital role. And I do want to say 

for the record that I know Joe Allbaugh, and I know he’s a good 

man, and that he has done good work. And I hope that he will acVerDate Jan 17 2002 13:25 Oct 07, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00036 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 G:\WORK\CRIME\070902\80551.000 HJUD1 PsN: 80551
33

cept the Chairman’s invitation to come before us, even though our 

time is short, maybe in the near future. But I do respect the fact 

that we in the State of Texas have had our share and our needs 

as it’s related to FEMA, and they’ve always been very prompt and 

appropriate in serving us. And I do want to state that for the 

record. 

Let me try to pose my questions in the frame of the dilemma 

that I foresee us trying to attempt to respond to, and that is that 

the group that is before today have both civil and criminal responsibilities, if you will, or security and civil responsibilities that you 

have had previously. And now you’re being put under a department 

called Homeland Security. And I think that is a dilemma that we 

will face even with the President’s proposal, as we make our way 

through trying to formulate a department that will work. 

Let me raise some initial questions, if you’ll take some notes and 

want to respond to—I’ll want to have a response to. 

First of all, Mr. Bonner, let me just say that in traveling during 

the summer, you’re doing an able job, but there are lines that are 

lengthy as it relates to the intake or the points of entrance that 

you have to check on individuals coming into this country. And 

we’ve heard, I’m sure, from airports around the country, long lines. 

The other point that I want you to be able to comment on is, of 

course, we’ve had some concerns previously with U.S. Customs regarding allegations of racial profiling and issues that have been either resolved or litigated. And those are not diminished by putting 

you under the U.S. Homeland Security Department, and how will 

you comport those issues as we move forward? And that’s the conflict between this new heightened security and law enforcement. 

The Coast Guard, I will not make light of the fact that we who 

are in States with waterways are certainly very cognizant of the 

excellent work that you do as it relates to protecting those ports 

and making sure that there are not drunken boaters. How do we 

comport or mix that responsibility with the enormous responsibility 

that you’re going to have or that we’ll be looking to you to enhance 

with the security issues? I think they’re extremely important. 

And then, Mr. Magaw, I would hope that you would look at—

being a new department, I hope that you would look at a proposal 

that I have that takes from the border and transportation security 

some of these what I consider straight immigration services and 

have a new division called ‘‘immigration, security and services’’

that talks about immigration, security—includes immigration security and immigration services. 

One of my concerns, as it relates to immigration, that I constantly include, is that immigration does not equate to terrorism, 

and we should be very cognizant that there are people coming here, 

accessing—attempting to access legalization, contributing taxes, 

trying to work and be part of the American process. And so I think 

that there should be a fifth division. I’d like your consideration of 

that. 

And as well, I’d like your consideration of making sure that your 

TSA department is enormously—or, diverse, these front-line individuals. And let me compliment the staff or the security people 

that we’ve had preceding you at Houston Intercontinental Airport 

and Hobby Airport. These are fine people. I hope that they will be 

34

able to be hired or have the opportunity to be hired. And I hope 

you will be concerned about diversity in the hiring of them. 

And finally, Mr. Stafford, I am confused as to how you will 

stretch your responsibilities to deal with the new instructions that 

you will be getting under homeland security and hope that you will 

be answer these questions. 

It’s been a mouthful, of course, but I think this is so important 

as to how America will see these departments move into each other 

and balance civil and criminal responsibilities. Would you be kind 

enough to answer those questions for me? 

Mr. BONNER. Let me just start very quickly by telling you that, 

first of all, I am concerned about wait times. Actually, on the 13th 

or 14th of September, for the first time, I asked U.S. Customs Service to post the wait times at all ports of entry into the United 

States, at our land border ports of entry, and we’ve been doing so. 

The good news is that—this is a generalization, but I think we’ve 

been able to provide a high level of security without significantly 

increasing wait times at our land border ports of entry. And we’ve 

been able to do that by doing things like partnering with the trade 

and, as Admiral Collins said, pushing the border, our zone of security, outward, so that our physical border is the last line of defense, 

not the first line of defense. 

On the other hand, there undoubtedly are going to be some wait 

times that will be encountered because of security requirements, 

and I think that we have to understand that. But we are trying to 

do everything possible to manage that issue. 

The second thing you asked me about was the racial profiling 

issue. And I think you know that I can’t claim credit for it; it was 

my predecessor that instituted I think a very good policy with respect to personal searches that addressed this issue head-on. And 

I fully expect that the personal search policy that was instituted 

at the U.S. Customs Service is going to continue, whether we’re in 

the Department of the Treasury or we’re moved to a new Department of Homeland Security. 

Admiral COLLINS. The question was posed about the safety and 

security mix of missions in the Coast Guard. I might submit that 

mixing safety and security is not like mixing oil and water. They 

are very synergistic. I see them as flip sides of the same coin. And 

when you invest in security, you invest in safety. When you invest 

in safety, you invest in security. 

Security is not a new mission for the United States Coast Guard. 

We were formed for that very reason in 1790, and we’ve been doing 

it for 212 years, both as a military organization and as a civil law 

enforcement organization, and that makes us unique in the Federal 

Government. 

It’s very synergistic. When we invest in our search and rescue—

they’re called search and rescue stations, but they’re multimission 

stations. Every member of those stations has law enforcement authorities, every petty officer in those stations. 

So when we invest in, under homeland security urgency, when 

we invest in new boats for our coastal ports and waterways for security purposes, we’re also providing increased presence for safety 

at the very same time. 

35

As I mentioned earlier, we’re creating maritime safety and security teams 70 people strong, active duty, augmented by 30 Reserve 

personnel, and we have about 8,500 Selected Reserve in the United 

States Coast Guard. They provide increased presence in our ports 

and waterways for the very purpose—and it is safety as well as security. 

And it’s very consciously done in their name. They’re called maritime safety and security teams. They have the competencies and 

the skill sets to do both safety and security, as do all our platforms. 

All our ships, all our aircraft, are all multimission since 1790. And 

they have the competencies and the skill sets to do both. 

So I think all our missions are going to be enhanced by the attention on security and our waterways. I think it’s going to be a 

positive across all our missions. 

Mr. SMITH. Secretary Magaw and Director Stafford, if you would 

respond very briefly to the question? 

Mr. MAGAW. In terms of the question on immigration services, I 

know that the Office of Homeland Security is very concerned that 

the—in setting this homeland security up, that the good people are 

not delayed from getting their due process. 

And the TSA diverse workforce, this is the first opportunity that 

I’ve had in almost 40 years now of public service to start an organization. And I guarantee you, it’s going to be diverse. If you look at 

my top staff, if they walked in here today, you would be pleased. 

There’s Asians, there’s African-Americans, there’s Hispanics. I 

could go through the whole thing. 

But we will do that throughout the ranks, throughout the whole 

organization. And I guarantee you that. 

And the good people of Hobby and Bush International Airport, 

every airport in the country, those people who are performing well 

and can pass the screening and the testing and the training will 

be hired into the new organization. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you. 

Mr. STAFFORD. We’ve always been too small to do our job alone. 

That’s why we form partnerships. Every day the President leaves 

the White House, we’re too small to do that, and we form partnerships with local, State, county police departments. 

Should this department materialize, it’s 170,000 strong, so I 

would envision not only imparting our methods and our methodology within the department, of prevention, but also looking to the 

rest of the department for human resource needs and also for any 

other needs the Secret Service may have. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you. 

I thank the Chairman. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Ms. Jackson Lee. 

The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Coble, is recognized for 

his questions. 

Mr. COBLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me try to get my questions in before that red light illuminates. 

Admiral, the bill before us has deemed the Coast Guard as a distinct entity, with the commandant reporting directly to the Secretary. Yet the legislation also provides for the transfer of Coast 

36

Guard functions to the Undersecretary of Border and Transportation Security. How will this play out logistically? 

Admiral COLLINS. Clearly, the devils are in the details there, and 

the details—one of the reasons for putting together agencies that 

have common purpose, as we do, is to drive through some of those 

issues and resolve those issues. So it would be really preliminary 

at this point to be able to have a crystal ball on that. 

Mr. COBLE. I was going to say, my question may be premature 

right now. 

Admiral COLLINS. I think that, clearly, as the wiring diagram 

has us now, we are part of the transportation-border division of the 

new department, reporting through the undersecretary. That’s the 

proposal on the table. 

And, again, exactly how the mechanics of interrelationships and 

all that is going to play out is—I think will play out. And that’s 

one of the roles of the new Secretary, to figure all that out. 

Clearly, the intent of the proposal going forward is to move the 

Coast Guard intact, as a separate entity. Those words are used— distinct entity. Those words are used. And that implies that our 

current functions, our current authorities, our current responsibilities, and our current structure will remain intact as an entity, distinct entity, within the new department. 

Mr. COBLE. And you can probably answer that better, Admiral, 

5 or 6 weeks down the road, and I’ll talk to you again subsequently. 

Mr. Bonner, in my opening statement, you recall, I indicated the 

desire to eliminate duplication. With that in mind, what are the 

distinction and similarities between Customs and INS? And are 

there any areas where you would consider them identical, or nearly 

identical, within the two agencies? 

Mr. BONNER. Well, that’s sort of a big question, but let me just 

start off by saying that the distinctions are that U.S. Customs 

Service is responsible for enforcing many different laws, not only 

Customs laws and trade laws, but actually about 400 different statutes on behalf of 40 Federal agencies. So we have a huge responsibility in terms of people, goods, commerce, vehicles crossing the 

border. 

The Immigration Service obviously has very significant responsibilities that are quite distinct, and that is the determination as 

to who can legally enter, I mean, the admissibility issue, particularly if you’re a noncitizen. 

So the actual responsibilities, I would say, of the two agencies 

are distinct in many ways. 

Where they overlap is not the responsibilities or functions, per 

se. I think where you see—you do see two agencies clearly. Every 

American knows this. You see two agencies that are generally at 

every border port of entry into the United States, whether that’s 

an international airport, where you go through Immigration and 

then Customs, or whether that’s at our land borders, where you’re 

going through, in many instances, U.S. Customs or you may be 

going through Immigration. 

So I think they’re distinct in terms of the laws they’re enforcing. 

Immigration obviously is enforcing Title 8 of the United States 

Code, which is the immigration code. Customs is enforcing Title 19 

37

and a lot of other provisions and a lot of other laws that Customs 

has responsibility for enforcing. 

Mr. COBLE. I got you. 

Mr. Magaw, the same question could apply with the Coast Guard 

and TSA. Do you want to insert your oars into these waters, on 

where there may be identical duties or distinctions? 

Mr. MAGAW. Well, it’s clear in my discussions with the Office of 

Homeland Security that as these units are brought together and 

working in one secretariat, that any duplication will be worked out. 

So I’m one that wants to be very careful in duplication, and will 

continue to be very observant as I go along, so that the TSA is not 

doing things that are duplicative. 

Mr. COBLE. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Chairman, I’m told that you may have another question, and 

I will yield the balance of my time to you. 

Mr. SMITH. How nice, Mr. Coble. I didn’t know you were going 

to do that. Thank you for yielding. 

Mr. Magaw, I am going to squeeze a question in here, just to follow up on what you’ve been talking about. You mentioned in your 

testimony that your intent to place more of the Federal Air Marshals on flights, and you say: We are on target with our goals of 

hiring, training, and deploying FAMs. 

I’m not sure lightening is going to strike twice. I’m not sure terrorists are going to use commercial airlines again. However, what 

are the goals that you’re talking about, as far as deploying the Federal Air Marshals? What percentage of commercial flights to you 

expect or intend to have the Air Marshals on? 

Mr. MAGAW. If I could answer that question for you—— Mr. SMITH. Just real quickly, if you could. 

Mr. MAGAW [continuing]. In a classified—if I talk the number, 

I’m playing right into the hands of those terrorists. So, Mr. Chairman, I’d like to discuss that with you, but do it in a private session, 

or with any Member. 

Mr. SMITH. Fair enough. And I’ll comment on another subject in 

passing that strikes me as worthy of note. I notice that you say you 

had 15 employees as of last January; you expect to have 60,000 to 

65,000 employees by the end of the year. I think that’s a new 

record for growth in a Federal agency or department. And by my 

reckoning, that’s a 400,000 percent increase. [Laughter.] 

I think it’s justified because you’re talking about the baggage 

screeners, but even people who want to increase the size of the 

Government might be impressed with that magnitude of increase. 

You don’t need to comment. That was just an aside, because I 

haven’t seen those figures before. 

Again, Mr. Coble, thank you for yielding. 

And the gentleman from California, Mr. Schiff, is recognized for 

his questions. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

It seems to me that the challenge of this new department is 

going to be to provide seamless security for the country, in the 

sense that if you had a terrorist plot involving the conveyance of 

weapons material, whether chemical, biological, radiological, or, 

God forbid, nuclear in a cargo container of a ship, and you had a 

timing mechanism conveyed in a pleasure craft, and you had some 

38

of the terrorists applying for a visa to come into the country, you 

would want a seamless web where each of your respective agencies 

can play its part, can communicate with each other, can identify 

the threats, and prevent or deter the threats. 

This I think will require a very strong level of authority for the 

new Secretary, to have the ability to allocate resources among your 

various agencies, to reallocate them. And that raises two questions 

for me. One is whether you anticipate and are prepared to have a 

Secretary that can tell you, ‘‘Here’s where the weak link is. We 

need greater staffing in Customs, and we’re going to move people 

from the Coast Guard to Customs.’’ Or, ‘‘We need greater assistance in the INS, and we’re going to have to cut the budget in one 

of the agencies to raise the budget of INS.’’

Do you anticipate that the Secretary will have that authority and 

use it, notwithstanding the fact that some of your agencies are 

being moved into this department in their current form, in their 

current structure? 

And a further question is, what will the budgetary impact be? 

Now the Administration is proposing, I think at least for the short 

term, that this proposition, this new department, be budget-neutral. I think that while that is theoretically possible in this calendar year, in future calendar years that is highly, highly unlikely. 

And the costs could be enormous. 

How would it be even possible for this new department to function in a budget-neutral way? How would your agencies be able to 

talk with each other? Won’t this necessitate the development of 

completely new information systems, so that your computers can 

talk with each other, and your personnel can as well? Where are 

the likely additional new costs going to be for your respective agencies? 

Mr. BONNER. It’s a huge question. I’m going to let Director 

Magaw answer it. I just wanted to say, though, for the record, that 

Congressman Schiff actually was one of my best hires as a U.S. attorney. [Laughter.] 

And I wanted the record to reflect that. 

Now, I’ll defer to Undersecretary Magaw. 

Mr. MAGAW. I believe it’s clearly the intention to make sure that 

this Secretary does in fact have that authority. And I would support that. You cannot have a national homeland security if he or 

she can’t take assets from me and give them to somebody else as 

situations arise. 

So I see that as a very important position, and I am under the 

full understanding, without specifically asking that question, that 

that person would have that authority, because that’s the bottom 

line of this. If they don’t have the full authority to do that—and 

that’s why you sometimes haven’t had the cooperation that we’ve 

wanted in the past. They have to have that authority. And I suspect that this Secretary would be given that authority. 

In terms of information systems, in terms of those kinds of 

things, for TSA, we’re right in the process of trying to find space 

and communication equipment, so we’re going to be, without getting ahead of Congress, we’re going to work very closely with 

Homeland Security and Secretary Mineta, in terms of these assets 

39

as we move forward, so that we don’t have a bunch of new systems 

that won’t be compatible. 

Mr. BONNER. If I could just join in that and say that it is absolutely necessary for the Secretary to have this authority. It will 

give him the authority to rationalize the process by which budget 

requests are made. And the Secretary ought to make decisions. If 

that means moving resources out of Customs to Coast Guard or 

TSA, that’s what should be done if that’s where the resources are 

necessary to protect America and protect the American people. 

And that’s true of even IT systems, which are enormously expensive systems, but this will give an opportunity for a Secretary to 

look and make sure that we have the right information technology 

platforms so that we can link up our databases. 

And I would suggest to you this, that if this is done right—and 

I’m not saying this is easy—but if this is done right, I think we will 

produce efficiencies. And I think we will produce efficiencies that 

lead to cost savings that can be plowed back into homeland security, I hope, or some other area. 

But I think we actually can do this in a revenue-neutral way, if 

the Secretary has the appropriate powers and authorities, because 

you’ll eliminate some duplicative overhead and that sort of thing, 

as you consolidate agencies and move them under one Department 

of Homeland Security. 

Admiral COLLINS. Just a few comments to add to that. Clearly, 

the ’03 budget that’s now before Congress reflects the Office of 

Homeland Security imprint and review. And that was part of the 

process. I would suspect that the ’04 budget, particularly, will be 

viewed through the lens of an integrated department. And those 

are all good things. 

We mentioned one of the real advantages of this new department 

was unity of purpose, and I think unity of purpose goes to policy, 

strategy, resources, and structure. And we’ll get that I think with 

the new department. 

As far as IT is concerned, as Governor Ridge articulated last fall, 

he had four major first things he wanted to focus on, and it was 

bioterrorism, and first responders, and so forth. One of them was 

IT, and clearly that has been an imperative within the policy Committees, within the Office of Homeland Security. I think it will be 

carried forth in a very robust way into the new department, to consider how IT is used effectively in an integrated way. 

And I might submit that we are partnering very, very closely 

with Customs on sharing information and developing and contributing—you know, ‘‘What data elements do we need as you develop 

your system, Customs?’’ And it’s done in a very collaborative, cooperative way, and making a great deal of progress. 

And I see that just carrying on, twofold, threefold, fourfold, as we 

get into the new integrated department. 

Mr. STAFFORD. Just a few quick things. We currently have IT 

projects underway with Customs and with TSA, even before this 

announcement. So if it does materialize, I think those projects will 

transfer very well. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Schiff. 

The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Chabot, is recognized for his questions. 

40

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

As I mentioned before my opening statement, I’d like to direct 

my questions to Undersecretary Magaw. 

Mr. Magaw, as you may know, 3 weeks ago, security screeners 

at the Greater Cincinnati-Northern Kentucky Airport failed to detect fake guns or real handguns enclosed in plastic four out of six 

times in undercover tests performed by the Transportation Security 

Administration. I’ve been concerned about security at the Cincinnati airport even prior to September 11 and have previously 

written to the Department of Transportation, expressing my concerns. 

With passage of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, 

there’s a greater responsibility and accountability on the part of 

the Government. I’d like to know why the Cincinnati airport fared 

so much worse than other areas around the country. And what 

steps does the Transportation Security Administration plan on taking to improve security at the airport? And how long do you anticipate that this process will take? And finally, if the security problems are not resolved, what specific actions will be taken? And 

what assurances can you give to the people flying into and out of 

the Cincinnati airport that they are safe? 

Mr. MAGAW. The concern that I had a number of months ago, in 

first coming on board to undertake this task, was: What is getting 

through the airports, and why? Why is it getting through these 

checkpoints? What does it look like? Can you position a weapon in 

a certain place, in a certain way, that’s very difficult to be picked 

up? And if so, we need to make sure, in our training, we teach 

them to look for those kinds of things. 

So in terms of finding the weaknesses throughout the country, 

it’s now provided the basis for the training that we’re giving the 

Federal force as we’re bringing them on board. 

The concern that I have is that I want to continue, as soon as 

that Federal force is in, or even while these other units are in, 

we’re calling their attention to the shortfall. We have people on 

board there now from TSA, who are giving them extra training if 

necessary, discharging them if necessary, doing the discipline that 

you’re referring to here. 

But my concern was, early on, what is the problem out there? 

And we’ve identified them. I’m sorry that that report got out, because it also identifies them to the terrorists. But by identifying 

them, we’re going to eliminate them. We’re going to stay ahead of 

trying to—in Europe last week, the week before last, discussion 

with the authorities over there about how to position weapons, how 

to position knives, how to position explosives in baggage. All of that 

is a huge concern to me. And I want to know where the problems 

are. I want to know what is being done, so that we can circumvent 

it in our training. 

We have people now in Cincinnati. We are recruiting in Cincinnati. We are looking at the checkpoints in Cincinnati, as we are 

in virtually all the airports in the country now—I think over 300 

of them we’re in by next week, and 429 by a few weeks after that. 

And the Federal force is going to start arriving in these airports, 

so that we are going to meet that November deadline. But in the 

meantime, this Federal force coming in, I want them trained. And 

41

we’re not going to stop there. We have not only our inspector general, which I’ve had discussions with, but also an inspection team 

that I have set up since arriving there, that is going to do continuous screening throughout the country to see how we’re doing. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. It just seems to me that the performance of the security at the airport, according to these tests, it’s just 

pitiful. With only a 42 percent success rate, I mean, you ought to 

do at least that well by accident. 

Mr. MAGAW. Well, and almost by accident—sometimes they only 

have 8 or 10 hours of training before they’re put on that line. 

Now, we have changed that. And we have caused them—even 

though some of them are still contractors, we have caused them to 

upgrade their training, and we’re doing observation at these checkpoints every day. 

Within a few weeks now, and certainly within those couple of 

months, we are going to have a Federal force at virtually every airport. 

Mr. CHABOT. And I can see my time is running out here, but, 

again, it just seems to me—and I appreciate your responses—but 

your agency just has to do a better job. And when you consider 

that—I’ve often heard it said that, in the war against international 

terrorism, we have to be successful every time. 

Mr. MAGAW. Every time. 

Mr. CHABOT. The terrorists, particularly when you could be dealing with weapons of mass destruction or God only knows what 

could be used against this country, they only have to be right once. 

So we have to do a lot better job than we have thus far. 

Thank you. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chabot. 

The gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Barr, is recognized for his 

questions. 

Mr. BARR. Thank you. 

Undersecretary Magaw, with regard to the incident, I believe it 

was on July 4th at Los Angeles International, that perpetrator—

terrorist, very likely—was taken out by an El Al security agent 

who was armed. Is that correct? 

Mr. MAGAW. Yes, that’s correct. 

Mr. BARR. The last line of defense at a ticket counter for somebody coming in are the people behind that ticket counter. Is that 

correct? 

Mr. MAGAW. And some local law enforcement is there in some 

cases, but no TSA personnel. 

Mr. BARR. You certainly don’t have any problem with the last 

line of defense being appropriately protected by trained, armed personnel, do you? 

Mr. MAGAW. The responsibility of TSA is to secure that entire 

airport. 

Mr. BARR. He was killed and stopped from killing or harming additional people, which he apparently would have done, very clearly 

would have done had that El Al agent not been armed and shot 

him to death. Is that correct? 

Mr. MAGAW. That’s correct. Yes, sir. 

Mr. BARR. So given the fact that that last line of defense, the 

person behind the point to which the terrorist is attempting to go 

42

or from which he’s operating—in this case, the ticket counter— there’s nothing wrong with having people there that are armed, is 

there? 

Mr. MAGAW. There’s nothing wrong with having people there 

that are armed, and that’s what we are going to do with the airport 

family at every airport—the general manager of the airport, the security people—is do a complete survey: Where are the weaknesses? 

Is it in the sewer system—— Mr. BARR. What I’m trying to do—and I think you know where 

I’m going. I’m trying to draw an analogy to the cockpit of an airplane. 

Why are you so adamantly opposed to providing pilots, who operate in essentially the same way as that agent there, that security 

agent, in a position where they have an opportunity, a unique opportunity, to stop somebody from continuing to kill people? Why 

don’t you want that person to be armed? Why are you so adamantly opposed to that? 

Mr. MAGAW. Well, that, to me, is an altogether different circumstance. I spent an awful lot of time looking at the pros and the 

cons of arming the pilots in the cockpit, and I came to the conclusion that they need to maintain control of the aircraft, regardless 

of what happens in the back. So in order to do that, I’m moving 

forward to secure that cockpit with the doors and making it secure. 

Give them rearview mirrors, so to speak—— Mr. BARR. Well, the pilot—there are two people in that cockpit. 

Mr. MAGAW. Can I finish? 

Mr. BARR. If they’re faced with the following scenario, either they 

allow the terrorists to take over the plane and crash it into a building or the ground, or to divert their attention from crashing the 

plane for a few minutes to shoot that terrorist, why wouldn’t you 

want them to shoot the terrorist? 

Mr. MAGAW. I propose that won’t happen, because if your cockpit 

is secure, and we put cameras back in the aircraft so that that pilot 

has a rearview mirror, they very quickly need to control the aircraft and get it on the ground. 

And what also was told to me by very many pilots, that safely, 

as they’re moving, they can see what’s going on back there and 

safely——

Mr. BARR. Doesn’t that take away their attention from flying the 

plane? 

Mr. MAGAW. As they’re flying that plane with control, they can 

tip a wing to the right or to the left, very safely, stick the nose up 

or down. And the person or persons who are trying to do harm back 

there, or trying to get in the cockpit, they won’t be able to find, excuse my expression, their bottom with both hands, let alone get a 

handle on that and open that door. 

And then the Air Marshals—so the screening outside the aircraft, making the cockpit safe, giving them rearview mirrors, and—

but I am looking very hard now and trying to consider all the possibilities in terms of giving them a less than lethal weapon. And I 

hope that that—— Mr. BARR. So we hurt the terrorist while he’s taking over the aircraft. 

Mr. MAGAW. He’s not going to——

43

Mr. BARR. All I’m saying is—and I know you obviously have absolute faith that there will never be a situation like September 11. 

I don’t think that we can tell the American people that we can absolutely guarantee that there will never be a situation where the 

terrorist makes his or her way to the cockpit. 

Obviously, we have a difference of opinion on this. I think there 

is a very clear analogy to what happened on July 4th, in terms of 

that final perimeter and having the people behind that final perimeter armed and ready to take these people out. 

Mr. MAGAW. See, the airlines’ procedure and the procedures before 9–11 were to cooperate with the terrorists, because ‘‘they’re 

only going to take the plan someplace,’’ ‘‘they only want to make 

a statement,’’ even ‘‘allow them in the cockpit, if necessary.’’ That 

whole philosophy now has—— Mr. BARR. The time has expired. Can I just ask one final question? 

Mr. SMITH. Please proceed, Mr. Barr. 

Mr. BARR. Okay, thank you very much. 

Mr. SMITH. If it’s a brief question and a brief answer, I should 

say. 

Mr. BARR. Thank you. 

I’d like to give you an opportunity to clear up something for the 

American people and something that I hear on a regular basis, and 

it has to do with checking people before they get on the planes. We 

may have a lot to fear from Members of Congress, but hijacking an 

airplane I don’t think is one of them, yet you see Members of Congress, you see airline pilots searched, you see military uniforms— military officers in uniforms searched and so forth. Yet you see 

other people that get on that seem to fit a profile, a legitimate 

criminal profile, perhaps, not. 

Is your agency and are the airport security personnel refusing or 

not taking proper steps to identify people that really do potentially 

post a threat? Not an airline pilot, not a military or four-star general—I’ve seen that—not a Member of Congress, but somebody that 

might seem to fit a profile. 

Mr. MAGAW. Well, profiling is a subject that we’re working with, 

with the Department of Justice, now. 

But let me just mention to you, if you remember the United Airlines flight that was coming back from South America before we 

got the doors totally reinforced, that stuck his head through there. 

You know, that person would have been able to qualify for a frequent flyer pass. 

The pilots the other day, if they had had a quick pass, and that 

person hadn’t stopped and talked to them, they never would have 

smelled the alcohol. 

I’d have to be exactly sure, but it’s somewhere between five and 

seven pilots have been stopped and had weapons loaded on them 

as they went on that plane to fly it. 

As I’ve talked to people around the country, all through Europe 

and Asia, who have worked with these issues, you have to search 

everyone; you have to treat everyone as equal as they go through. 

Otherwise, the terrorists are going to watch this incident; they’re 

going to place things in handbags as people set them down; they’re 

going to find all kinds of ways to circumvent your system. 

44

So I’m trying to do the best job I can in that area. 

And I’m sorry I was so long. 

Mr. SMITH. That’s fine. 

Thank you, Mr. Barr. 

The gentleman from Florida, Mr. Keller, is recognized. 

Mr. KELLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Magaw, let me ask you a question relating to the sharing of 

intelligence information that a person is on a Federal terrorist 

watch list with the airlines. And my concern is, as I mentioned in 

my opening statement, we had these two guys, Al-Midhar and AlHamzi, who were on the Federal watch list, known by the FBI, 

CIA, and INS, as of at least August 23, right before September 11. 

And this information was not shared with American Airlines. 

So you have two guys who were on the Federal terrorist watch 

list with known links to Osama bin Laden who go up to the ticket 

counter, use their real names, real IDs, guys had their names in 

the phonebooks. They say welcome aboard, and then the plane 

slams into the Pentagon and kills 190 people. 

So much of what we’ve talked about is sharing information 

among the Government agencies. I’m concerned about sharing the 

information that people are on a Federal terrorist watch list with 

the airlines. And so when we passed the PATRIOT Act, the 

antiterrorism bill in October, we required that the FBI report back 

to us within 120 days on the feasibility of allowing airlines to do 

some sort of computer check to see if they’re on a terrorist watch 

list. 

El Al does that using information from Israeli intelligence 

sources already, so we know it’s feasible. 

The time period expired in February, and we haven’t heard back 

from them. And when I ask Justice and FBI why, they say, ‘‘Well, 

we’re working with TSA to gather the information, and we’re just 

not ready yet, for your report.’’ Can you tell me now, as we sit here, are we checking for people 

on the Federal terrorist watch lists before they get on our airplanes? 

Mr. MAGAW. What the Justice said is that they’re still working 

on the watch lists. There are two lists. There is a no-fly list, what 

we call a no-fly list. That’s a list of people that, for one reason or 

another, this country, either the FBI or one of the other agencies—

or they are a terrorist threat. If they’re on that last, then that list 

is—when their name is punched in at an airline now, that will 

show up. And they then are given numbers to call and information. 

We have to do a better job, though, of getting the information to 

the airline personnel themselves. Part of it, in the past, has been 

clearance problems. Part of it has been communication problems. 

That’s the biggest one, being able to communicate to them in a 

quickly and a timely manner. 

Homeland Security, as it’s proposed and in the structure, you 

will see a section there which does just that in terms of intelligence. It collects it from everywhere. It then has the responsibility 

to get it so the people who need to know it, to include small general 

aviation. 

So that is a huge problem. Clearly you’ve identified it. We are 

working on it. I expect to get that corrected, sir. 

45

Mr. KELLER. All right, let’s take the example you gave, the Federal no-fly watch list. Evidently, that wasn’t being done before September 11, because these guys’ names presumably would have 

come up when you punched in their names. 

Mr. MAGAW. To my knowledge—again, that’s before my time. But 

to my knowledge, they were not on the no-fly list. 

Mr. KELLER. Okay. When you say put their names into the system, are you talking about the CAPS system? 

Mr. MAGAW. No, it’s a no-fly list. And it’s available—as soon as 

a name comes in there that’s on that list, it will alert both the airline and FAA. And we had that happen just a few weeks ago, and 

that’s why the individual was arrested in Chicago when he arrived. 

And so still much work to be done, but it’s clear that all the loopholes have to be closed. And Homeland Security does that with 

that fifth part of the organization. 

Mr. KELLER. Okay. Mr. Stafford, let me ask you a question. 

Today, President Bush is in New York, announcing, appropriately, 

how our country is going to get tough on cracking down on whitecollar financial crimes. Many people think of the Secret Service as 

the folks who protect the President and the Vice President, and of 

course they do that. And it’s the most important thing, I think. But 

they do a lot more, such as investigating counterfeiting and other 

white-collar financial crimes. 

How will putting the Secret Service under the umbrella of the 

Department of Homeland Security change the role that the Secret 

Service has in investigating counterfeiting and other white-collar 

financial crimes? 

Mr. STAFFORD. Well, I hope it doesn’t change the role at all. As 

you know, we were created in 1865 specifically for investigative 

reasons. And at that time in our history, a third to a half of all the 

money in circulation was counterfeit and there was financial chaos 

in our country. That’s why the Secret Service was created. 

We’ve done a tremendous job throughout the 137 years. In 1990, 

when we recognized that technology-based crime was driving just 

about everything we did—whether it be counterfeiting or identify 

fraud or credit card fraud, telecommunications fraud, cybercrime—

we developed a program called the Electronic Crimes Special 

Agents Program, and we have specially trained forensic agents in 

every one of our field offices. That’s an effort that we’re very proud 

of. It’s one that served us well, not only on the investigative side, 

but on the protective side. 

We now not only have to safeguard the President physically, setting up barriers and human resources, but we also have to safeguard him from cyberattack. Any hotel, as you know, is driven by 

electronics, whether it be the ventilation system, the elevators, the 

escalators, or the rooms. So that’s a huge component for us, and 

it’s crosscutting for us. 

Mr. KELLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Keller. 

Mr. Stafford, I just want to thank you for addressing the subject 

of cybercrime in your testimony and you just alluded to it right 

there. I think that’s an important subject. We’ve had more hearings 

on that subject than any other, as a Subcommittee. And I appreciate your mentioning that in your testimony. 

46

The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Goodlatte, is recognized for his 

questions. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Director Stafford, recently one of the major national news magazines did an investigative report on the Secret Service that skewered the agency pretty severely. It cited literally dozens of various 

types of problems within the agency, everything from security 

lapses to embezzlement or theft, sex scandals, barroom brawls, morale problems. 

I don’t want to turn the hearing into a review of all the allegations that are made in that story. I do want to give you an opportunity to tell us how the agency is responding to that, whether 

you’re addressing any of the concerns raised in that article, and, 

most importantly, how you think this transfer of the Secret Service 

from the Treasury Department to the Department of Homeland Security will affect any efforts that you are undertaking to reform the 

agency. 

Mr. STAFFORD. That article was yellow journalism. I think anytime you go back in any agency’s history over 30 years, which is 

what they did—it wasn’t an investigative report. It was taken directly from——

Mr. COBLE. Can you pull that a little closer? I’m having difficulty 

hearing. 

Mr. STAFFORD. It wasn’t an investigative report on the part of 

that magazine. It was taken directly from a 28-page document that 

was submitted anonymously, I might add, by people who may have 

been fired by the Secret Service, by people who may be suing the 

Secret Service, by people who are sinister and have motives of revenge. 

The Secret Service today is stronger than it’s ever been. It’s an 

outstanding organization. We have tremendous people. Our people 

are there for the right reasons. They work extremely hard. They 

have character. They have integrity. 

That article, they took some truths, again, going back over 30 

years, mixed that with some distortions and a number of untruths. 

I can’t explain to you why they did that. You’d have to ask that 

media outlet. But I can tell you that they came to us 3 months ago, 

saying that they wanted to do a very positive article about the Secret Service, all along having that document and all along going a 

very different direction. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Let me ask you this, one of the things that has 

been alleged is that there has been a significant loss of personnel 

to other Government agencies, particularly to the agency represented by the gentleman sitting next to you, the Transportation 

Security Administration, and there’ve problems with maintaining 

the staffing levels that you need to maintain as a result of Secret 

Service agents leaving to do work for TSA. 

Now, I certainly respect the need of TSA to have good, qualified 

people. I would argue that what the Secret Service agency does is, 

in some respects and at some points, a higher level, requiring, in 

many instances, very sophisticated and talented people. And I’d 

like to know what effect this has had. And again, I’d like to know 

what effect having you both within the same department will have. 

47

Will it be a positive influence, if you are not in two different Cabinet departments, the raiding that’s been going on? 

Mr. STAFFORD. I look to Mr. Magaw to draw on those former Secret Service employees whenever we can. 

But, again, if you’re referring to that article, it’s untrue. They 

didn’t do their homework. Our attrition rate is about 2.5 percent 

for the agents. I think any company in America would like a 2.5 

percent attrition rate. And if you add the retirements in, it about 

doubles to a little over 4 percent for the agents. The retirements 

we had planned for. The demographics really spoke to those numbers retiring in the last year to 18 months. 

We have lost a number—in fact, we’ve lost about 131 of our 1,100 

Uniform Division officers to TSA. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. That’s substantially higher than 2.5 percent. 

Mr. STAFFORD. Well, I was speaking to the agent ranks, which 

I thought you were referring to initially. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. I was. 

Mr. STAFFORD. That was 2.5 percent. 

The Uniform Division officers are up about 13 percent right now, 

the attrition rate, and it’s going to go higher. Many of them find 

the TSA Federal Air Marshal position attractive. And many of 

them are moving in that direction. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Are there things that need to be done to make 

you more competitive and able to retain officers, as opposed to losing them to other Government agencies or the private sector? 

Mr. STAFFORD. In the Uniform Division ranks, there is. We can’t 

compete pay-wise right now with Federal Air Marshals. I think 

that may change in the near future and slow down, that migration 

in that direction. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Thank you. 

Mr. Magaw, would you like to say anything in regard to that? 

Mr. MAGAW. Well, thank you for asking. I spent 26 years in this 

organization, in the Secret Service, and I sat in the same position 

that Brian is today. Not only do I know him to have great integrity, 

the whole organization has great integrity. And I would agree and 

not repeat what he has just said about the article, about the way 

they went about it. It’s not an investigative report. You see it’s had 

no legs. And I am personally offended by it. 

And while I hope I’m not stepping on ground that I’m not welcome, I support the Director in every comment that he’s made. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Thank you, Mr. Magaw. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Goodlatte. 

The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Pence, is recognized for his 

questions. 

Mr. PENCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for holding 

this very informative hearing on issues that we will all be wrestling with this month. 

I want to address a question to Mr. Magaw, largely based on 

your testimony a few moments ago, in response to the gentleman 

from Georgia. You said that in the aftermath of the July 4th incident at LAX, that there was—and I don’t want to put words in 

your mouth, Mr. Magaw, but you said there was a review underway right not that the charge of the TSA is to secure the entire 

48

airport. I came in from having done a series of parades on a very 

hot day in Indiana, and, like every other American coming in from 

a picnic, was deeply concerned about what we saw on television 

that day. But to the extent to at least the evidence now continues 

to support a conclusion that this was not a coordinated attack, this 

may well have been an isolated incident—perhaps a person motivated by terrorist intent but not coordinated by terrorist resources. 

My question to you is, what should the public, what should Congress anticipate in the way of changes to airport security in the 

wake of LAX, if any? 

Mr. MAGAW. While it is true that TSA, by authority that this 

body has given us, has the responsibility for the security of the entire airport, we intend to work with the entire airport family, in 

that we look at our key responsibility as the checkpoints in terms 

of the Federal force and also the baggage examination. 

Having said that, with the assets that are there at the airport, 

coordinating with the local law enforcement, with airport manager, 

we want to do a survey of every airport—in fact, some of them have 

started—to include the sewer system, to include every possible way 

that security can be—that there’s a loophole in security. 

And with all of those entities, figure out, at each airport—you’ve 

seen one airport, you’ve seen one airport; they’re all different. And 

so we want to figure out at each airport—and that Federal security 

director, along with the airport manager, along with the local law 

enforcement, we’ll go through that entire survey and together they 

will figure out how to close these loopholes. 

We don’t intend to put a Federal force throughout the airport. 

We do expect to have a few of our law enforcement personnel assisting the State and locals in observation, in maybe some interviews of people that don’t appear to be acting correctly, those kinds 

of things. But it’s going to be a team effort. It is not a case, though, 

where we’re going to put a Federal force at these ticket counters. 

Mr. PENCE. A question for Director Stafford. I am a great admirer of the Secret Service and of your work, in particular. And I 

appreciate your comments about the magazine article. My question 

has to do more with structure. 

I’m a limited Government conservative. I, frankly, think it’s a 

good thing when police agencies and investigative agencies of the 

Federal Government are not particularly coordinated, in some instances, in terms of the survival of our liberties. Does it make any 

sense to you or anyone at the Secret Service, does it make more 

sense for the Secret Service to move into the Justice Department 

as opposed to moving into the Department of Homeland Security? 

Is the Justice Department perhaps a better fit than either Treasury was or Homeland Security would be, in your judgment? And 

if not, why not? 

Mr. STAFFORD. The Justice Department move really has never 

been proposed. As you know, we’ve been in Treasury since 1865. I 

think it made sense in 1865, for the reasons I mentioned earlier, 

for counterfeiting. And we were the only game in town for law enforcement—an investigative law enforcement agency in 1865. 

Now it does make sense to make some moves. Homeland security 

for us, our mantra, what we teach our agents: prevention. We can 

tactically respond to just about anything. Our people are wellVerDate Jan 17 2002 13:25 Oct 07, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00052 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 G:\WORK\CRIME\070902\80551.000 HJUD1 PsN: 80551
49

trained. But that’s not a place we want to be. We want to prevent 

things from happening, whether that’s an attack on the President, 

whether that’s an attack on the Vice President, whether that’s attack at the Super Bowl or the Olympics, both of which are the first 

two athletic events that the President assigned the Secret Service 

to safeguard this past year. 

So we focus on prevention. We do a tremendous job in the intelligence division in consuming intelligence information. Our analysts do a tremendous job analyzing it and putting together threat 

assessments that are clear and threat assessments that we can respond to and we can put countermeasures in place to safeguard 

those we’re charged with safeguarding. 

You can take that same methodology that we have and do the 

same thing on any level. Right now, we’re traveling around the 

country with Secretary Paige, the Secretary of Education, imparting our research and our knowledge, through our national threat 

assessment center, of what we’ve studied on school violence. And 

we’re the only ones that have ever done an operational study on 

school violence and how to prevent shootings at schools. And we 

found some very interesting things that have already helped 

schools prevent violence and shooting at schools. 

We think we can do that same thing for the Nation in the Department of Homeland Security. 

Mr. PENCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Pence. 

The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Scott, is recognized for a quick 

question to Mr. Magaw. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Magaw, in response to the question on arming pilots, has 

your office done an analysis of the pros and cons of arming pilots, 

that we could have the benefit of? 

Mr. MAGAW. We’ll put pros and cons together for you, yes, sir. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay, thank you, Mr. Scott. 

That concludes our hearing. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman? 

Mr. SMITH. The gentlewoman from Texas? 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. May I ask a question to get back in writing? 

Mr. SMITH. If you would submit your question in writing, as I 

have questions and other Members have questions. We’d appreciate 

the witnesses responding to us within a week, if at all possible. 

Let me say to Members——

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you. 

Mr. SMITH [continuing]. That we cannot have another round of 

questions because this room needs to be vacated so another Subcommittee can have a markup that actually begins in 6 minutes. 

We were supposed to have vacated the room about 10 minutes ago. 

But that does conclude our hearing. And I want to thank our witnesses for their testimony, which has been very, very helpful. I also 

want to say again that I regret that Mr. Allbaugh, the Director of 

FEMA, did not find the time to testify today, because I think the 

American people would have greatly benefited from hearing what 

FEMA would do to both respond to a terrorist attack or anticipate 

a terrorist attack. 

50

But, gentlemen, we certainly appreciate your testimony, which 

was very informative and benefited us and those who are watching 

as well. So thank you very much. 

And the Subcommittee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:26 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(51)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE LAMAR SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS

On June 6, 2002, the President addressed the Nation to request support for the 

creation of a Homeland Security Department. He stated ‘‘[we] face an urgent need, 

and we must move quickly, this year, before the end of the congressional session.’’

This Committee and Congress is responding to that request. 

We understand the importance of H.R. 5005, the ‘‘Homeland Security Act of 

2002.’’ This hearing focuses on the proposed transfer of the Coast Guard, Customs, 

Secret Service and Transportation Security Agency to the Department of Homeland 

Security. 

The Administration’s goal for the creation of a Homeland Security Department is 

to improve the country’s ability to prevent, prepare, detect, and disrupt terrorist attacks within the United States. 

As the Gilmore Commission noted in 2000, ‘‘The national strategy [against terrorism] should be geographically and functionally comprehensive. [. . .] To be functionally comprehensive, the national strategy should address the full spectrum of 

the nation’s threats against terrorism; intelligence, deterrence, prevention, preemption, crisis management, and consequence management.’’ This can only happen with 

the successful integration and coordination of officials involved. 

This hearing will examine how each of the agencies missions and functions fit 

within the proposed Department of Homeland Security. 

While the proposed Department while have a strong law enforcement role, this 

role is distinct from that of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which is the principal investigative arm of the United States. The law enforcement role of the Department of Homeland Security will focus on border security and the training of 

state and local officials to prepare for and respond to terrorist attacks. 

The mission of this new Department cannot be accomplished without the successful coordination of various Federal agencies and law enforcement units. 

We will hear the testimony of four of five invited witnesses who will discuss H.R. 

5005 and how each of their agencies improves the strategic framework and coordination of the Department of Homeland Security. One witness, the Honorable Joe M. 

Albaugh, Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, was invited but 

apparently decided that this hearing was not a priority. 

I am disappointed by the Director’s absence as this was an opportunity for the 

Director to explain how FEMA plans to provide training for law enforcement and 

other emergency responders in crisis and consequence management at the new Department of Homeland Security.

52


Smith1.eps
53


Smith2.eps
54

VIEWS AND ESTIMATES CONCERNING PROGRAMS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY FOR FISCAL YEAR 2003 BUDGET, SECTION ON

HOMELAND SECURITY


HS1.eps
55


HS2X.eps
56


Chair1.eps
57


Chair2.eps
58


Chair3.eps
59


Chair4.eps
60


Chair5.eps
61


Chair6.eps
62

CHRONOLOGY OF CONTACTS BETWEEN THE FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

AGENCY (FEMA) AND THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME, TERRORISM, AND HOMELAND

SECURITY

1) June 21, 2002—Witness invitation letter was faxed to FEMA Office of the Director and a Full Committee intern made a phone call to FEMA to let them know 

an invite letter was being sent. 

2) June 24, 2002—Signed invitation letter was mailed to FEMA. 

3) June 24 or 25, 2002—Subcommittee clerk received a phone call from FEMA 

Congressional Affairs on either that Monday or Tuesday, looking for a witness 

list. 

4) June 24, 2002—Followup phone calls made to the agencies to ensure the invitation letter was received 

5) June 26, 2002—The witness list was faxed to FEMA Congressional Affairs. 

6) June 27 and 28, 2002—Subcommittee Clerk called once each day to find out if 

FEMA would be attending. 

7) July 1, 2002—Subcommittee Clerk called FEMA Congressional Affairs Monday 

morning to find out if FEMA would be attending. Subcommittee Counsel also 

called in the afternoon because the Subcommittee still had not received a response. 

8) July 2, 2002—Subcommittee Counsel left two messages for FEMA Congressional Affairs on Tuesday with no response. 

9) July 2, 2002—Subcommittee Counsel called Director Allbaugh’s office and left 

a message for his Executive Assistant late Tuesday. 

10) July 3, 2002—Subcommittee Counsel called back to FEMA Wednesday morning 

and was transferred to Legislative Affairs—left a message. Legislative Affairs 

called back Wednesday afternoon and spoke to Subcommittee Counsel with 

questions regarding why the Subcommittee needed the Director Allbaugh to testify. In that conversation, FEMA Legislative Affairs told the Counsel she would 

let Counsel know by the end of the day whether the Director would agree to 

testify. This conversation was relayed to the Subcommittee Chief Counsel. Subcommittee Counsel never received a response. 

11) July 5, 2002—Followup letter from Chairman Smith was faxed to the FEMA 

Director’s office, the Office of Legislative Affairs, and the White House Office 

of Legislative Affairs. This letter was also mailed. 

12) July 8, 2002—FEMA informs the Committee on the Judiciary that the Director 

will not attend the Subcommittee hearing.

63


Chair7.eps
64


Chair8.eps
65


Smith3.eps
66

Æ


Smith4.eps