alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Omar Williams, Appellant.

[716 NYS2d 241]

—Judgment unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: Defendant was convicted of criminal possession and criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree (Penal Law § 220.16 [1]; § 220.39 [1]) in connection with the sale of cocaine to an undercover officer. The officer testified at trial that he purchased the cocaine at 364 Weaver Street, and he identified defendant as the person who handed him two plastic bags containing cocaine. Defendant testified that, although he was at the premises, he was unaware that the officer had purchased cocaine, and he denied that he had any contact with the officer. During deliberations, the jury sent a note to Supreme Court asking, “[I]f there was no physical evidence the defendant did actually passing [sic] from his hands to [the officer’s] hands, should we then make our decision based on the credibility of those two people?” The court denied defendant’s request to reinstruct the jury that it was the People’s burden to prove defendant’s guilt. The court instructed the jury that, “[i]f the jury finds there is no physical evidence, you, of course, must base your decision upon the testimony evidence that will involve a finding of credibility of the witnesses by the jury.”

Contrary to defendant’s contention, the court’s supplemental instruction did not improperly shift the burden of proof from the People to defendant. The court has discretion to respond as it deems proper to an inquiry by a deliberating jury *(see,*CPL 310.30), provided that the supplemental instruction is a meaningful response to the jury’s inquiry *(see, People v Malloy,*55 NY2d 296, 302, *cert denied*459 US 847; *see also, People v Weinberg,*83 NY2d 262, 267-268). Although it may have been preferable for the court to remind the jury that the People had the burden of proof, the court’s failure to do so was not an abuse of discretion. In any event, the court’s initial charge provided complete instructions with respect to the burden of proof and reasonable doubt and, considering the charge as a whole, we conclude that the jury “would have understood the correct rule to be applied in reaching its verdict” *(People v Simmons,*203 AD2d 925, *lv denied*83 NY2d 971; *see, People v Canty,*60 NY2d 830, 831-832). (Appeal from Judgment of Supreme Court, Monroe County, Mark, J. — Criminal Sale Controlled Substance, 3rd Degree.) Present — Green, J. P., Pine, Hayes, Scudder and Lawton, JJ.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
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<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1998
<CASH>                                             690
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   65,026
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                      6,467
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                85,894
<PP&E>                                          37,189
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 279,304
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           30,716
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           117
<OTHER-SE>                                     141,486
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   279,304
<SALES>                                        109,202
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               109,302
<CGS>                                           70,325
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   70,325
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                24,957
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               2,176
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 11,744
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<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              7,306
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</TABLE>
§ 214.42 Uniform pay guidelines. ( a ) A.I.D. follows OMB/CSC guidelines in section 11 of OMB Circular A-63 in establishing rates of pay for advisory committee members, staffs, and consultants.
( b ) In summary, A.I.D. policy regarding compensation for advisory committee members is as follows: ( 1 ) Advisory committee members who are not employed by the U.S. Government ordinarily serve without compensation. However, they may be reimbursed for travel and related expenses of invitational travel under the provisions of A.I.D. travel regulations.
( 2 ) If committee members are appointed as A.I.D. consultants or experts, their compensation shall be fixed in accordance with CSC guidelines and regulations, and the general agreement between CSC and A.I.D.
( 3 ) Expenses of committee members are charged to the allotments of the A.I.D. office or bureau through which the advisory committee reports.
### §6906. Financial disclosure

#### (a) Statement

Each officer or employee of the Administrator who—

(1) performs any function or duty under this chapter; and

(2) has any known financial interest in any person who applies for or receives financial assistance under this chapter

shall, beginning on February 1, 1977, annually file with the Administrator a written statement concerning all such interests held by such officer or employee during the preceding calendar year. Such statement shall be available to the public.

#### (b) Action by Administrator

The Administrator shall—

(1) act within ninety days after October 21, 1976—

(A) to define the term "known financial interest" for purposes of subsection (a) of this section; and

(B) to establish the methods by which the requirement to file written statements specified in subsection (a) of this section will be monitored and enforced, including appropriate provision for the filing by such officers and employees of such statements and the review by the Administrator of such statements; and

(2) report to the Congress on June 1, 1978, and of each succeeding calendar year with respect to such disclosures and the actions taken in regard thereto during the preceding calendar year.

#### (c) Exemption

In the rules prescribed under subsection (b) of this section, the Administrator may identify specific positions within the Environmental Protection Agency which are of a nonpolicy-making nature and provide that officers or employees occupying such positions shall be exempt from the requirements of this section.

#### (d) Penalty

Any officer or employee who is subject to, and knowingly violates, this section shall be fined not more than $2,500 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.

(Pub. L. 89–272, title II, §1007, as added Pub. L. 94–580, §2, Oct. 21, 1976, 90 Stat. 2802.)

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Termination of Reporting Requirements

For termination, effective May 15, 2000, of reporting provisions in subsec. (b)(2) of this section, see section 3003 of Pub. L. 104–66, as amended, set out as a note under section 1113 of Title 31, Money and Finance, and the 14th item on page 164 of House Document No. 103–7.

#### **Executive Documents**

#### Transfer of Functions

For transfer of certain enforcement functions of Administrator or other official of Environmental Protection Agency under this chapter to Federal Inspector, Office of Federal Inspector for the Alaska Natural Gas Transportation System, and subsequent transfer to Secretary of Energy, then to Federal Coordinator for Alaska Natural Gas Transportation Projects, see note set out under section 6903 of this title.
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NUANCE COMMUNICATIONS, INC.,

Plaintiff,

 v.

ECOPY, INC.,

Defendant. /

No. C 08-04227 JSW

ORDER RE INTENT TO

APPOINT A SPECIAL MASTER

As set forth in the Court’s oral ruling on Friday, April 9, 2010, the Court shall appoint a

Special Master for the initial purpose of preparing a Report and Recommendation regarding the

order of the patents, claims and terms to be adjudicated in this, and all related, matters. 

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53(a)(1)(C), this Order shall constitute notice to the

parties of the Court’s intention to appoint a Special Master. As the case progresses, the Special

Master may take on further involvement as appropriate.

By no later than April 30, 2010, the parties shall submit a stipulation setting forth their

designated Special Master or by no later than April 23, 2010, the parties shall submit a list of

three potential candidates who are acceptable to the parties for the Court’s final determination. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 12, 2010 

JEFFREY S. WHITE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:08-cv-04227-JSW Document 153 Filed 04/12/10 Page 1 of 1
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Carlos MONTES-GARCIA, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 06-51702

Conference Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

May 2, 2007.

Joseph H. Gay, Jr., Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office Western District of Texas, San Antonio, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Federal Public Defender’s Office, Western District of Texas, San Antonio, TX, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, WIENER, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Appealing the Judgment in a Criminal Case, Carlos Montes-Garcia raises arguments that are foreclosed by *Almendarez-Torres v. United States,*523 U.S. 224, 235, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998), which held that 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) is a penalty provision and not a separate criminal offense. The Government’s motion for summary affirmance is GRANTED, and the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

*

**Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cm. R. 47.5.4.
#### Adkins *et al. v.*Bennett.

April 12, 1912.

Mandamus. Before Judge Hammond. Biehmond superior court. August *12,*1911.

*M. 0. Banuiclc*'and *W. Inman Gurry,*for plaintiffs.

*G. E. Dunbar,*for defendant.

Fish, C. J.

1. In order to entitle one to the writ of mandamus, it must appear that he has a clear legal right to have the particular act performed, the doing of which he seeks to have enforced. Civil Code, § 5440; *State*v. *Georgia Medical Society,*38 *Ga.*628 (5) (95 Am. D. 408); *Jackson*v. *Cochran,*134 *Ga.*396 (67 S. E. 825, 20 Ann. Cas. 219); 26 Cyc. 151.

2. An appeal from a justice’s court to the superior court lies in a claim case only when the amount of the execution or the value of the property claimed exceeds the sum of fifty dollars. Acts 1874, p. 85; Civil Code, § 4998; *Napier*v. *Woodall,*118 *Ga.*830 (45 S. E. 684), and cases cited.

3. From the principles announced in the foregoing notes it follows that a petition for mandamus was open to general demurrer, where the alleged ofiicial duty which it was sought to have performed was the acceptance by a justice of the peace of a pauper affidavit offered by the claimant, after a judgment had been rendered against him by the justice in a claim case, and refused by the justice, the affidavit having been presented in connection with proceedings to appeal the case to the superior court, and where it did not appear from the petition for mandamus that either the amount of the execution or the value of the property claimed amounted to more than fifty dollars.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*All the Justices concur.*
### §3056g. Employment assistance and Federal housing and supplemental nutrition assistance programs

Funds received by eligible individuals from projects carried out under the program established under this subchapter shall not be considered to be income of such individuals for purposes of determining the eligibility of such individuals, or of any other individuals, to participate in any housing program for which Federal funds may be available or for any income determination under the Food and Nutrition Act of 2008 (7 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.).

(Pub. L. 89–73, title V, §509, as added Pub. L. 109–365, title V, §501, Oct. 17, 2006, 120 Stat. 2579; amended Pub. L. 110–234, title IV, §4002(b)(1)(B), (2)(BB), May 22, 2008, 122 Stat. 1096, 1097; Pub. L. 110–246, §4(a), title IV, §4002(b)(1)(B), (2)(BB), June 18, 2008, 122 Stat. 1664, 1857, 1859; Pub. L. 113–79, title IV, §4030(s), Feb. 7, 2014, 128 Stat. 815.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### References in Text

The Food and Nutrition Act of 2008, referred to in text, is Pub. L. 88–525, Aug. 31, 1964, 78 Stat. 703, which is classified generally to chapter 51 (§2011 et seq.) of Title 7, Agriculture. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Short Title note set out under section 2011 of Title 7 and Tables.

#### Codification

Pub. L. 110–234 and Pub. L. 110–246 made identical amendments to this section. The amendments by Pub. L. 110–234 were repealed by section 4(a) of Pub. L. 110–246.

#### Prior Provisions

A prior section 3056g, Pub. L. 89–73, title V, §509, as added Pub. L. 106–501, title V, §501, Nov. 13, 2000, 114 Stat. 2280, related to employment assistance and Federal housing and food stamp programs, prior to the general amendment of this subchapter by Pub. L. 109–365.

Another prior section 3056g, Pub. L. 89–73, title V, §509, as added Pub. L. 100–175, title I, §166, Nov. 29, 1987, 101 Stat. 958, related to employment assistance and Federal housing and food stamp programs, prior to the general amendment of this subchapter by Pub. L. 106–501.

#### Amendments

2014—Pub. L. 113–79 substituted "supplemental nutrition assistance programs" for "food stamp programs" in section catchline.

2008—Pub. L. 110–246, §4002(b)(1)(B), (2)(BB), substituted "Food and Nutrition Act of 2008" for "Food Stamp Act of 1977".

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Effective Date of 2008 Amendment

Amendment of this section and repeal of Pub. L. 110–234 by Pub. L. 110–246 effective May 22, 2008, the date of enactment of Pub. L. 110–234, except as otherwise provided, see section 4 of Pub. L. 110–246, set out as an Effective Date note under section 8701 of Title 7, Agriculture.

Amendment by section 4002(b)(1)(B), (2)(BB) of Pub. L. 110–246 effective Oct. 1, 2008, see section 4407 of Pub. L. 110–246, set out as a note under section 1161 of Title 2, The Congress.
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HALSEY MINOR, an individual,

Plaintiff,

 v.

CHRISTIE’S INC., a New York corporation,

and DOES 1 through 20, inclusive,

Defendants. /

AND RELATED COUNTERCLAIMS.

 /

No. C 08-05445 WHA (Lead Case)

Consolidated with:

No. C 09-00471 WHA

ORDER REGARDING 

ONE-PAGE ILLUSTRATIVE

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED

TO THE JURY

For the sake of completeness of the record, counsel from both sides shall file copies of

their respective one-page illustrative timelines and damages estimates that were provided to the

jury prior to deliberation BY NOON ON MONDAY, MAY 24, 2010.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 21, 2010. 

WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:08-cv-05445-WHA Document 134 Filed 05/21/10 Page 1 of 1
1 

### Medina, Dayana

From: Reitter, Annabeth <Annabeth.Reitter@domtar.com>

Sent: Friday, August 22, 2014 3:18 PM

To: Medina, Dayana

Subject: RE: Webinar Slides and Request for a list of items

Attachments: removed.txt; Domtar Webinar Presentation for EPA 08-21-2014.pdf

Hi Dayana,

Attached are the slides from yesterday’s webinar. Please forward the slides to your team since I do not have everyone’s

email address.

Thanks,

Annabeth

From: Reitter, Annabeth

Sent: Thursday, August 21, 2014 5:21 PM

To: medina.dayana@epa.gov

Subject: Webinar Slides and Request for a list of items

Hi Dayana,

I tried sending the slides from today’s webinar but I received a bounce back due to the file size being too

large. Tomorrow I will work with my IT staff tomorrow to see about compressing the file, etc.

We hope you found the webinar to be helpful and informative. Please let me know if there are any additional follow

‐ up

questions.

To avoid any confusion, would you please forward a list of the data items being requested of the three year period of

2011, 2012 and 2013. We want to ensure we are providing all of the information that is need on your end. We also

understand a list of the items requested for the SO2 scrubber internals will also be provided. If you could provide these

lists yet this week, that would be very helpful and gives us time to gather the information.

Thank you,

Annabeth

Annabeth Reitter

Corporate Manager, Environmental Regulation

T 715-886-7785 | C 715-459-9257

The linked image cannot be displayed. The file may have been moved, renamed, or deleted. Verify that the link points to the co rrect file and location.

Domta r

301 Point Basse Avenue

Nekoosa, WI 54457

Domtar reminds you to print responsibly. Learn more about paper as a sustainable choice at paperbecause.com

This email is for the exclusive us e of the addressee and is subject to Domtar Confidentiality Notice.
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Uni

ted 

Stat

es D

istr

ict C

ourt

For t

he N

orth

ern 

Dis

trict

 of C

alifo

rnia

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FORD MOTOR CREDIT COMPANY LLC, aDelaware Limited Liability Company,

Plaintiff,

    v.

MARCO VENTURES, INC., a CaliforniaCorporation, dba FORD OF MARIN,

Defendants                                                                      /

No. C-08-4906 MMC

ORDER VACATING APRIL 2, 2010 CASEMANAGEMENT CONFERENCE;SETTING DEADLINE FOR PLAINTIFFTO FILE MOTION FOR DEFAULTJUDGMENT

The above-titled matter is scheduled to come before the Court on April 2, 2010 for a

Further Status Conference.

In light of plaintiff’s pending motion for summary judgment on defendants’

counterclaims, which motion is unopposed, and the Clerk’s entry of defendants’ default on

plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, the Further Status Conference is hereby VACATED.

Plaintiff is hereby DIRECTED to file a motion for default judgment, or a statement

indicating why it should not be required to file such motion, no later than April 30, 2010.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:  March 30, 2010                                                   MAXINE M. CHESNEYUnited States District Judge

Case 3:08-cv-04906-MMC   Document 49   Filed 03/30/10   Page 1 of 1
<PAGE>   1



EXHIBIT 10.1



                              Termination Agreement

This Termination Agreement sets forth the terms and conditions upon which
Boehringer Ingelheim International GmbH ("BII") and Transcend Therapeutics, Inc.
("TTI") have agreed to terminate their collaboration with respect to Procysteine
i.v.

On February 28, 1997, BII and TTI entered into a Development and License
Agreement (the "Agreement"). In August 1998, TTI and BII jointly announced
results from the unblinding of the Phase III Clinical Trial evaluating the
intravenous administration of Procysteine for the treatment of ARDS. BI and TTI
have agreed that these results showed Procysteine i.v. is not effective in the
treatment of ARDS. Accordingly, BII and TTI have agreed as follows:

1. BII and TTI agree that the Agreement shall terminate and be of no further
force or effect.

2. Upon termination of the Agreement, (a) all of the rights and obligations of
each party under the Agreement, including the rights and licenses granted to
BII, shall terminate, (b) BII shall have unrestricted access to the data from
the Phase III Clinical Trial of Procysteine i.v. for ARDS, and (c) BII may use
and publish the data from the Phase III Clinical Trial of Procysteine i.v. for
ARDS without the consent of TTI and without obligation to involve, contact or
work with TTI or any of TTI's principal investigators.

3. BII releases TTI from any and all obligation under, or liability arising from
its performance under, the Agreement, and TTI releases BII from any and all
obligation under, or liability arising from its performance under, the
Agreement.

4. Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, BI waives any and all right
to claim, and acknowledges TTI's sole ownership of, (i) the license fee paid to
TTI under section 7.1 of the Agreement and (ii) the proceeds to TTI from the
equity investment made by BI under Section 7.2 of the Agreement. Notwithstanding
the foregoing, BII retain full rights for its shares in TTI.

5. TTI may disclose the terms and conditions of this Termination Agreement in
order to comply with applicable law.



 

Ingelheim, 02 March 1999                         Waltham,

Boehringer Ingelheim International GmbH             Transcend Therapeutics, Inc.

ppa.                      ppa.


/s/ Dr. Christian Hauke   /s/ Dr. David Mitchard    /s/ B. Nicholas Harvey

Dr. Christian Hauke       Dr. David Mitchard        B. Nicholas Harvey
                                                    President

Authorised Signatories












                                       12
#### In the Matter of Michael Mays, Petitioner, v Leonard Portuondo, as Superintendent of Shawangunk Correctional Facility, et al., Respondents.

[716 NYS2d 624]

—Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to this Court by order of the Supreme Court, entered in Ulster County) to review a determination of respondent Superintendent of Shawangunk Correctional Facility which found petitioner guilty of violating a prison disciplinary rule.

The Attorney General has advised this Court by letter that the determination at issue has been administratively reversed and that all references to the disciplinary hearing have been expunged from petitioner’s institutional record. Inasmuch as petitioner has received all the relief to which he is entitled and is no longer aggrieved, the matter is dismissed as moot *(see, Matter of Witherspoon v Goord,*243 AD2d 931).

Crew III, J. P., Peters, Spain, Carpinello and Lahtinen, JJ., concur. Adjudged that the petition is dismissed, as moot, without costs.