110th CONGRESS Printed for the use of the 

1st Session Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe 

THE UKRAINIAN ELECTIONS: 

IMPLICATIONS FOR UKRAINE’S 

FUTURE DIRECTION 

October 25, 2007 

Briefing of the 

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe 

Washington: 2010 


LOGO-BIG.EPS
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Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe 

234 Ford House Office Building 

Washington, DC 20515 

202–225–1901 

csce@mail.house.gov 

http://www.csce.gov 

Legislative Branch Commissioners 

HOUSE 

ALCEE L. HASTINGS, FLORIDA, 

Chairman 

LOUISE MCINTOSH SLAUGHTER, 

NEW YORK

MIKE MCINTYRE, NORTH CAROLINA

HILDA L. SOLIS, CALIFORNIA

G.K. BUTTERFIELD, NORTH CAROLINA

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, NEW JERSEY

ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, ALABAMA

JOSEPH R. PITTS, PENNSYLVANIA

MIKE PENCE, INDIANA

SENATE 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, MARYLAND, 

Co-Chairman 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, WISCONSIN

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONNECTICUT

HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, NEW YORK

JOHN F. KERRY, MASSACHUSETTS

SAM BROWNBACK, KANSAS

GORDON SMITH, OREGON

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, GEORGIA

RICHARD BURR, NORTH CAROLINA

Executive Branch Commissioners 

VACANT, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

VACANT, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

VACANT, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

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ABOUT THE ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

The Helsinki process, formally titled the Conference on Security and Cooperation in 

Europe, traces its origin to the signing of the Helsinki Final Act in Finland on August 

1, 1975, by the leaders of 33 European countries, the United States and Canada. As of 

January 1, 1995, the Helsinki process was renamed the Organization for Security and 

Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The membership of the OSCE has expanded to 56 participating States, reflecting the breakup of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia. 

The OSCE Secretariat is in Vienna, Austria, where weekly meetings of the participating States’ permanent representatives are held. In addition, specialized seminars and 

meetings are convened in various locations. Periodic consultations are held among Senior 

Officials, Ministers and Heads of State or Government. 

Although the OSCE continues to engage in standard setting in the fields of military 

security, economic and environmental cooperation, and human rights and humanitarian 

concerns, the Organization is primarily focused on initiatives designed to prevent, manage 

and resolve conflict within and among the participating States. The Organization deploys 

numerous missions and field activities located in Southeastern and Eastern Europe, the 

Caucasus, and Central Asia. The website of the OSCE is: <www.osce.org>. 

ABOUT THE COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, also known as the Helsinki 

Commission, is a U.S. Government agency created in 1976 to monitor and encourage 

compliance by the participating States with their OSCE commitments, with a particular 

emphasis on human rights. 

The Commission consists of nine members from the United States Senate, nine members from the House of Representatives, and one member each from the Departments of 

State, Defense and Commerce. The positions of Chair and Co-Chair rotate between the 

Senate and House every two years, when a new Congress convenes. A professional staff 

assists the Commissioners in their work. 

In fulfilling its mandate, the Commission gathers and disseminates relevant information to the U.S. Congress and the public by convening hearings, issuing reports that 

reflect the views of Members of the Commission and/or its staff, and providing details 

about the activities of the Helsinki process and developments in OSCE participating 

States. 

The Commission also contributes to the formulation and execution of U.S. policy 

regarding the OSCE, including through Member and staff participation on U.S. Delegations to OSCE meetings. Members of the Commission have regular contact with 

parliamentarians, government officials, representatives of non-governmental organizations, and private individuals from participating States. The website of the Commission 

is: <www.csce.gov>. 

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THE UKRAINIAN ELECTIONS: IMPLICATIONS FOR 

UKRAINE’S FUTURE DIRECTION 

OCTOBER 25, 2007 

PARTICIPANTS 

Page 

Orest Deychakiwsky, Policy Advisor, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe .... 1 

H.E. Oleh Shamshur, Ambassador of Ukraine to the United States ......................................... 2 

William Miller, Former U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine ................................................................. 4 

Stephen Nix, Director of the Eurasian Division, International Republican Institute (IRI) ..... 7 

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THE UKRAINIAN ELECTIONS: IMPLICATIONS FOR 

UKRAINE’S FUTURE DIRECTION 

OCTOBER 25, 2007 

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe

Washington, DC

The briefing was held at 2 p.m. in room 1539 Longworth House Office Building, 

Washington, DC, Orest Deychakiwsky, Policy Advisor, Commission on Security and 

Cooperation in Europe, moderating. 

Panelists present: Orest Deychakiwsky, Policy Advisor, Commission on Security and 

Cooperation in Europe; Oleh Shamshur, Ambassador of Ukraine to the United States; William Miller, Former U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine; and Stephen Nix, Director of the Eurasian Division, International Republican Institute (IRI). 

Mr. DEYCHAKIWSKY. Unfortunately, Chairman Hastings is unable to make it at the 

present time due to very urgent business on the floor of the House. Apparently, four votes 

have been called all in a row. So hopefully he’ll be able to make it a little bit later. 

I’d like to welcome you all to today’s briefing on Ukraine’s elections and their implications for Ukraine’s future. I’d particularly like to thank the members of our distinguished 

panel for taking the time to share their perspectives and insights with us. 

I’m pleased that Ambassador Oleh Shamshur, Ukraine’s Ambassador to the United 

States, has joined us today. 

I’m also very pleased to have with us Ambassador William Miller, former U.S. 

Ambassador to Ukraine, who was in Ukraine for the elections as an observer recently with 

a delegation of the National Democratic Institute, NDI, and Stephen Nix, who is Director 

of the Eurasian Division at the International Republican Institute, IRI, and was also in 

Ukraine for the elections. 

If you have not already done so, please pick up a copy of our speakers’ biographies, 

which are on the tables outside in the corridor. 

A few weeks ago, Chairman Alcee Hastings, Chairman of the Helsinki Commission, 

introduced a bipartisan resolution congratulating the Ukrainian people for holding free, 

fair, and transparent parliamentary elections on September 30, 2007. 

The resolution was based on the findings of the OSCE-led international observation 

mission, which concluded that the elections were, and I quote, ‘‘mostly in line with OSCE 

commitments and other international standards for democratic elections.’’ 

2 

The OSCE observers, including many OSCE parliamentarians, as well as Helsinki 

Commission staff, assessed both the voting and counting process as good or very good in 

nearly all of the 3,000 polling stations that were visited. 

These pre-term elections stem from a dispute rooted in weak constitutional delineations of powers of the President and Prime Minister. Now that the elections are over, it’s 

our hope that Ukraine’s political leaders will form a government reflecting the will of the 

Ukrainian people, as expressed by the results of the elections, a government that 

advances political stability and democratic development and will further undertake the 

hard work of strengthening the rule of law and an independent judiciary, and fight 

corruption and increase transparency, especially in the energy, more specifically, in the 

gas sector. 

Now, this past July, Chairman Hastings led a delegation of 13 Members of Congress 

to the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly in Kiev and the delegation met with President 

Yushchenko, who assured the delegation that Ukraine would keep moving forward on the 

path to political reforms and good governance. 

The conduct of these elections is a testament to the Ukrainian people’s determined 

path toward the consolidation of democracy as Ukraine advances its integration with the 

Euro-Atlantic community. 

As such, Ukraine serves as the model for the post Soviet countries, too many of which 

have, sadly, retreated to heavy-handed authoritarianism. 

These elections represent a golden opportunity for Ukraine to regain the momentum 

from the Orange Revolution and continue to build on the democratic, economic, and security progress that has already been made. 

We look forward to hearing from our distinguished speakers and, Ambassador 

Shamshur, you have the floor. 

Amb. SHAMSHUR. Thank you. Thanks a lot. 

Ambassador Miller, Mr. Nix, Mr. Deychakiwsky, ladies and gentlemen, first of all, I 

would like to thank you all for your interest in the latest political developments in 

Ukraine. 

It is quite clear that the latest election constituted an important step on Ukraine’s 

role of further consolidation of its democratic institutions and procedures. 

I would like to use this opportunity to thank those Americans who were part of the 

international monitoring effort. 

I would also like to extend our gratitude to the Co-Chairs of the Commission, Alcee 

Hastings and Ben Cardin, for organizing this briefing, as well as to the staff of the 

Commission, and I would like to underscore that the Commission earned a solid reputation as the champion of liberty and human rights on the international stage. 

We highly appreciate our level of cooperation with the Commission and the U.S. Congress. 

This electoral campaign in Ukraine officially commenced on the 2nd of August. It was 

a brief one. But it would be safe to say it was one of the most intense in Ukraine and 

U.S. history. 

Forty-one parties, partly united in blocs, participated in the election. Nine thousand 

people were running on the party lists and they were competing for 450 seats in the 

Ukrainian parliament. 

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According to Ukraine’s electoral system, these 450 seats are to be divided among the 

parties who overcame or passed a 3-percent threshold. 

Remember, in the election of 2004, the international community was watching the 

election with the utmost attention and definitely everyone remembers the parliamentary 

elections of 2006 that were extremely important for Ukraine’s development, as well. And 

despite some initial concerns, the general assessment was that for the second time in a 

row and after 2006, Ukraine succeeded in avoiding most of the electoral pitfalls. 

Aside from minor deficiencies, there was no harassment of political opponents, no 

media oppression, no so-called creative counting or use of forged absentee ballots. 

The notorious administrative resource, the intrusion in the electoral process by the 

state officials, found its final rest in the dustbin of Ukrainian history. 

Ukraine has once again confirmed its democratic credentials. That’s the 

irreversibility of the democratic change spurred by the Orange Revolution. 

On election day, 63 percent of the registered voters came to the polling stations. It 

is required by Ukrainian law that over 50 percent, we need 50 percent plus one, turn out 

for the election necessary to make the ballot. 

There was another report on incomplete votes. There were other procedural malfunctions, but aside from that, the international observers didn’t register any systematic violations. 

Ukraine was commended for making another important step in the way of democratic 

reforms. The United States, the European Union, other countries congratulated President 

Yushchenko on holding a free and transparent election. 

I am not going to repeat what was said by Chairman Hastings, but I can tell you 

that we were extremely pleased by this statement and the high appreciation of the way 

the election, and it’s important to stress not only the election itself on election day, but 

how the whole election process was conducted. 

So just to remind you, on October 17, the Central Electoral Commission announced 

the final results; 33.37 percent of votes for the Party of the Regions, that gives them 175 

seats; 30.71 percent for Yulia Tymoshenko bloc, it means 156 seats; 14.15 percent to Our 

Ukraine National Self-Defense bloc, giving them 72 seats; 5.39 percent for the Communist 

Party, giving them 27 seats; and 3.96 percent for the Lytvyn bloc, giving them 20 seats. 

These results mean a win for two electoral blocs associated with the Orange Revolution, the Yulia Tymoshenko bloc and Our Ukraine, who, combined, will command 228 

seats out of 450. 

On the same day, leaders of the Yulia Tymoshenko bloc and Our Ukraine National 

People’s Self-Defense, it’s better just to say People’s Self-Defense, signed a coalition agreement. It’s a big document, over 100 pages, and it formulates the program concerning main 

goals of the future, plus future coalition priorities and distribution of chairs in the cabinet. 

I would like to stress here that one of the key points of coalition agreement is 

development of the strategic partnership with the United States. The document also 

declares NATO membership as Ukraine’s imperative and unconditional goal. 

For the second time in a row, we held a free and transparent election and one should 

acknowledge an instrumental role played in this process by President Yushchenko, who 

was deeply committed to the democratic transformations of this country. 

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Once the polling stations were closed, he called upon political parties to put aside 

their ideological differences and to start working on country consolidation around national 

priorities—fighting poverty, moving toward Europe, and enhance the energy independence 

and the others. 

According to him, the new coalition should focus on five priorities. First, adopting a 

comprehensive program of country economic development, curbing inflation, stabilizing 

and optimizing incomes, creating a new policy of the social security in Ukraine. 

Second, lift the legal immunity of members of the parliament. Until now, members 

of parliament have been accountable during their tenure only to the parliament itself and 

not liable under national judiciary, which created sometimes, I would say, unnatural 

incentives for entering the parliament. 

The general perception in Ukraine is that with the immunity lifted, it would bring 

about a major shift in the way Ukrainian politics function and make our political system 

more results oriented and much more transparent. 

Third, deliberate and pass the new budgets for 2008 that would include the President’s social initiatives. 

Fourth, adopt and pass a package of anticorruption legislation, create a national 

anticorruption bureau. 

And last, enhance the energy security of Ukraine. In fact, from that, the President 

stressed that the primary goals of the 2000 political crisis in Ukraine was the poorly 

devised constitutional reform of 2004. He asked the parliament to support his efforts in 

amending the existing constitution in a way that would prevent similar political deadlocks 

in the future. 

And only yesterday, the president announced that he expects Our Ukraine People’s 

Self-Defense and Yulia Tymoshenko blocs to form a coalition government during the first 

10 days of November. 

Let me conclude and definitely I would be ready, if time permits, to answer your 

questions. 

I would simply like to state at the end that I am satisfied and proud and, once again, 

while assessing Ukraine’s election day outcome, we speak and assess them, I would say, 

almost exclusively in positive terms. 

The last election showed that political processes in Ukraine are further developing 

in the manner that solidly anchors Ukraine in a community of countries with shared 

democratic values and this all is extremely good for the development of our bilateral relations with the United States. 

Thank you. 

Mr. DEYCHAKIWSKY. Thank you very much, Ambassador Shamshur. There will be an 

opportunity to ask questions after all of our speakers have finished. Ambassador Miller. 

Amb. MILLER. Thank you. Ambassador Shamshur, Steve. I was very fortunate to be 

able to attend the parliamentary elections that were held in Ukraine on September 30 

as an invited guest of the Government of Ukraine to be an international observer. 

As a member of the NDI delegation, I had the chance to visit eight polling stations 

on election day and night. Four of them were in Kiev and the other four were outside, 

two to the north and two to the south, and they ranged from districts where the major 

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group of inhabitants were intellectuals, to workers, regions, to the village, and to small 

towns. 

Even though 8 is not the same as 34,000, which is the total of polling stations in 

Ukraine, it’s a chance to see a little bit of what’s going on. 

I also was in Ukraine in June and then again in July, first, a conference on Ukraine’s 

future as a member of NATO and, second, a study on corruption in Ukraine. And during 

that time, I was able to meet with the candidates of all the parties, including their 

leaders, the key election commission officials, present members of the government and the 

major funders in Ukraine for the locomotives, as they’re called by Ukrainians, and, of 

course, press and media, and politically aware citizens. 

I’ve also had the chance to witness elections from 1994 on. So I have a little sense 

of the path of the electoral process since independence. 

In my view, the September 30 elections were relatively free and fair. There were, of 

course, some violations of election law. There were some incidents of fraud and, certainly, 

procedural incompetence, but on the whole, the 64 percent of the electorate who voted 

were able to cast votes that were counted properly. 

Indeed, it was clear to me that the electorate gave its judgment that the incumbent 

government should be replaced. It was an election with a purpose and a result that came 

from a sense of public outrage. 

For the first time in Ukraine since independence was declared in 1991, there’s a 

democratic majority in the parliament, Verkhovna Rada. The winning democratic coalition, led by Yulia Tymoshenko in BYUT and the Nasha Ukrayina forces led by Viktor 

Yushchenko, have cobbled together a bare majority of two votes, but it’s enough to begin 

the process. 

The Regions Party more or less held their own and they are going to be a formidable 

minority group in the new Rada. The Communists somehow survived and received enough 

votes to play a role in key issues as they arise. 

And Lytvyn crossed the threshold and his 20 seats are described as a ‘‘golden share.’’ 

Whether that’s the case will be determined. 

With such a small majority of 228 seats out of 450, the ability to govern effectively 

will depend upon coalition discipline and the degree to which the democratic coalition can 

get support from the Lytvyn bloc and from some Regions deputies on particular issues. 

Party discipline in the past was not a significant issue, certainly, from the beginning 

in 1991, when Ukraine declared its independence, until 2002, when Viktor Yushchenko’s 

democratic coalition produced what many have described as a sea change in Ukrainian 

political attitudes. 

Until, then, in 2002, the so-called ‘‘party of power,’’ that is, the inherited vertical 

structure of governance from the Soviet Union, maintained political control, despite a free 

political landscape which allowed for a multiplication of personality groups and factions, 

which numbered as many as 154 registered parties at its highest point. 

Over 20 parties were registered for the September 30 elections, but only four parties 

crossed the 3-percent threshold. The once significant Socialist Party, led by the former 

speaker of the Rada, Alexander Moroz, for example, did not cross the threshold. 

The Orange Revolution, which was triggered by a massive citizen public outrage at 

election fraud, manipulation and the illegal use of government and administrative 

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resources, set a standard for measuring government performance which was applied in 

the recently concluded September 30, 2007 elections. 

These standards, those political goals were developed over the several months of the 

three rounds of the Orange Revolution. The demands made by the millions who stood in 

the cold day and night, night after night, day after day, from September until Christmas, 

when, finally, the last vote was taken and decisively resulted in Viktor Yushchenko’s election as president. 

Those demands were, among others, free and fair elections, with no administrative 

resources used as pressures on the voters, a call for clean government, free of bribery, 

manipulation and self-enrichment, lawbreakers to jail, a reformed judiciary, a reformed 

law enforcement system, a reformed parliament, and a reformed government. 

There was developed an agenda for what was called by Ukrainians a ‘‘normal civil 

society’’ based on the rule of law, care for the less fortunate, and attention to the social 

infrastructure. 

However, as we all know, both the Yanukovich government, which came to power by 

an unfortunate breakup of the democratic coalition due to a failure of leadership and 

rivalry between the inner circle around the president, and the presidency of the hero of 

the Orange Revolution, Viktor Yushchenko, both Yanukovich and Yushchenko were seen 

by the electorate as failures and betrayers of the promises made on the midan of 2004. 

The electorate, on September 30, expressed its will and the new mandate was given 

to a new democratic coalition, led by Yulia Tymoshenko and some younger leaders of the 

Nasha Ukrayina bloc, Kyrylenko, Lutsenko, Katerynchuk, among others. 

The old party of power, that is what existed certainly before 2002, used the powers 

of the state to maintain power, including electoral power. The party in power controlled 

politics from top to bottom, from the president’s office down to the desk in the village and 

farm leaders. 

In Soviet times, force, that is, the KGB and police, were used to keep discipline, while 

perks of power, that is, housing, cars, vacations, privileges for children, food, clothes, 

travel, and so on, were inducements and rewards for loyalty to the regime. 

Money was not then an instrument of power. Since 1991, with the breakup of the 

Soviet Union, money has become the chief instrument of power in Ukraine, as in Russia. 

The first generation of leaders, those who had, in fact, been the leaders at the end of the 

Soviet Union, became the first to realize that money, both as an instrument of power and 

its symbol, was the key new power. 

In an economy totally owned by the state, money would have to come from somewhere, that is, from the sale of assets, state assets. As in Russia, in Ukraine, the first 

generation oligarchs were allowed to obtain or were given, with the expectation of generous kickbacks, state assets in order to start banks, new businesses, barter for cash and 

to amass fortunes. 

There was no egalitarian distribution of state assets beyond the personal realm of 

apartments actually lived in or plots of land actually worked upon. 

The pattern of ‘‘red directors,’’ that is, the Soviet managers of industries and enterprises, becoming businessmen, as they were called some years ago, and now oligarchs, is 

well understood by ordinary Ukrainians. The ordinary Ukrainian sees this process as corrupt and criminal and they are victimized. 

7 

Until the Orange Revolution, the electorate, that is, the general public, was unable 

to do anything about the rampant corruption that surrounded them and corrupted everything. The democratic coalition victory of September 30 offers a second chance to break 

the cycle of corruption, to break the power of the oligarchs, but the chance is seen as a 

small one. 

Money has corrupted the electoral process, even the successful September 30, even 

the Orange Revolution, to some extent. There are no effective limits to campaign contributions. It is well understood there is no present way to avoid the necessary use of locomotives, that is, oligarchs who pay for power and position, and, up to now, seats in the 

parliament for all parties can be bought, positions in the government purchased, more 

control votes purchased on key issues, judges bought, investigative and judicial outcomes 

determined by money rather than by merit or justice. 

Yulia Tymoshenko and all of the current leadership rose in wealth and power in this 

first generation of oligarchs, this first generation of so-called free market and the inequitable distribution of assets. 

Whether any of those leaders who come from this legacy can break the hold on politics of money and those who use massive amounts of money to further enrich themselves 

at the expense of the Nation and its people is the key question of this election. 

A good portion of the politically aware public do not think real reform can come from 

the present generation of leaders. They are deeply skeptical and are looking to the future 

for the needed reforms to take place. 

But there is a chance, and this is a view that I share, a hopeful possibility that Yulia 

and Viktor and the democrats will fulfill finally the promises they made with their hands 

on their hearts on the Maidan. As the election outcome showed, a slim majority thinks 

it could happen. 

Thank you. 

Mr. DEYCHAKIWSKY. Thank you very much, Ambassador Miller. 

Steve? 

Mr. NIX. Thank you, Orest. And on behalf of the International Republican Institute, 

our thanks go out to Chairman Hastings and the members of this Commission for hosting 

this important event for a country that’s critical to U.S. interests. 

My remarks today will focus in three areas. I’ll comment first on the actual conduct 

and administration of the recent parliamentary elections. Second, I’ll discuss the implications of the results of those elections for the future of party building and elections in 

Ukraine. And then, third, I’d like to discuss, in brief, the issue of constitutional reform 

in the post-election period. 

Ukraine has conducted five elections in the last 3 years and IRI has deployed 

observation missions to monitor each of them. IRI’s election observation delegation found 

that Ukraine’s recent parliamentary elections broadly met international standards. 

Election officials at polling stations, territorial commissions, district commissions 

should be commended for providing a calm, peaceful environment on election day. The 

major political parties should be commended for their efforts in the process. Party activists served as members of polling station commissions, election commissions, and as party 

observers. 

IRI found that during the campaign period, parties and candidates were allowed to 

campaign freely and had access to media outlets. Journalists were allowed to cover the 

8 

campaign without undue interference. Parties were able to purchase time on television, 

radio and in newspapers without restriction. 

Importantly, as was such a key issue in previous elections, the use of administrative 

resources during the campaign was de minimis. 

While Ukraine continues to demonstrate improvements in various aspects of election 

administration, problems with the voter lists do continue to undermine public confidence 

in the elections, with reports of inaccuracies persisting. 

Last minute regulations by the CEC, the central election commission of Ukraine, did 

create confusion along the electorate and possibly led to the disenfranchisement of thousands of voters. After conducting five electoral events in less than 3 years, Ukraine should 

be beyond the problems seen in these elections. 

IRI urges the Ukrainian parliament and election officials to address the quality of 

the voter lists to ensure their accuracy for the next national election. 

This effort will require the commitment of Ukraine’s political parties and IRI urges 

them to take a positive role in reaching a solution. 

The ability of their judicial system to act as an equal and independent branch of 

government during the election campaign was called into question. Doubts of the 

judiciary’s impartiality and ability to make decisions in a timely fashion called into question its ability to resolve election disputes. 

However, overall, the conclusion of these elections is that they did meet international 

standards and I was very pleased to underline the fact that those issues that we outlined 

and made recommendations for improvement revolve around technical and legal aspects 

of election administration and don’t speak to systemic fraud. 

The implications for party building from this election are great. They have profound 

implications for the future. Since independence, Ukraine’s electorate has been divided 

between east and west, Russian-speaking and Ukrainian, respectively. This divide dates 

back centuries. 

The third round of voting in the 2004 Presidential election demonstrated the strength 

of the Party Regions in the east and the dominance of the Orange forces in the west. 

In 2004, Viktor Yanukovich received 44 percent of the national vote, while Viktor 

Yushchenko received nearly 52. 

In 2006, during the parliamentary election, this divide was reinforced. The Orange 

forces were unable to break out of their regional base and the same could be said for 

Regions. 

Combined, the Orange side won 36 percent of the vote, where Regions earned 41. 

However, the 2007 parliamentary election marked a subtle, yet fundamental change that 

the geographical split for one party in particular, that of the bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko 

or BYUT. 

The results demonstrate the striking returns for BYUT, while the Party of Regions 

and the Our Ukraine bloc remained relatively unchanged in their percentages. 

In general, BYUT increased its national vote total by over 8 percent, from 22 percent 

to over 30 percent in 2007. BYUT made inroads in the east by aggressively reaching out 

to eastern voters. Ms. Tymoshenko made appearances in the densely populated Russianspeaking cities across the east. 

9 

The party established efficient campaign headquarters throughout the east and 

worked diligently to break through the geographic divide. In addition, the BYUT Party 

fashioned issued-based messages which resonated with voters in the east. 

In the blue-dominated densely populated oblasts of Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and 

Zaporizhia, BYUT was able to gain roughly 4 percentage points on its 2006 results. This 

is significant, as BYUT was able to also increase its base in the west. 

What does this portend for political parties and their respective futures? IRI is 

engaged in an effort to build strong national political parties using national appeals to 

a broad spectrum of the electorate. 

The 2007 results demonstrated that BYUT is growing into a truly national party, 

capable of bridging the regional divide and turning out voters outside of its historical 

base. 

In my view, BYUT has fundamentally changed the voting trends of the electorate and 

broken through regional barriers that some believed impenetrable. This is a significant 

achievement for party building in Ukraine. 

The Our Ukraine bloc is also contemplating new ways to appeal to a broader segment 

of the voting population. Conversely, the Party of Regions has been largely unable to 

expand upon its electorate and continues to rely primarily on its base. 

In order to remain viable, the Party of Regions must take steps to reach out to 

western voters. One of the ways that Regions might achieve this is by refraining from 

making language a key issue in its platform and by more openly embracing Euro-Atlantic 

integration. 

Presidential elections are scheduled for 2010. The ability of the elected parties to 

form a governing coalition in the parliament, the success of that ruling coalition and the 

implementation of lessons learned from the 2007 campaign will all play major factors in 

who is elected the next President of Ukraine. 

With regard to constitutional reform, with the successful conduct of elections and 

upon the formation of a new government, Ukraine must take steps to resolve the constitutional issues that were the very reason these elections were called. 

It’s clear that this constitutional conflict between the President and the Prime Minister, which I would liken to an inter-executive branch separation of powers issue, has 

dominated Ukraine. It has distracted Ukraine and prevented it from building institutions 

that would strengthen its democratic standing, institutions such as an independent 

judiciary based upon the rule of law, a functional legislative branch, and continued economic reforms. 

In addition to the foregoing, the constitutional crisis distracted Ukraine from playing 

the critical role of serving as a model for democratic transition, a role played so well after 

the Presidential election of 2005. 

Like it or not, civil society organizations and political actors throughout the Eurasia 

region look to Ukraine as an example. It is imperative that Ukraine reenergize its efforts 

in this area and reclaim its role as an exporter of democracy. 

In conclusion, I would note that in addition to successfully conducting two consecutive 

parliamentary elections, the Yushchenko government has made significant achievements 

since taking power. First, it’s improved the state of civil liberties in Ukraine. Religious 

pluralism is flourishing. 

10 

Press freedoms have improved. Print and electronic media are reporting events without censorship. Journalists are able to practice their profession freely. The media are independent. 

Commitment to democracy has been evident not only in the internal policies of the 

Yushchenko government, but has also become a new focus of Ukrainian foreign policy. 

Ukraine took on a leadership role in reviving the Georgia-Ukraine-AzerbaijanMoldova organization, or GUAM, with the goal of becoming a full value regional organization for democracy and economic development. 

In this post-election phase, Ukraine must take further steps to solidify its democratic 

orientation. The new government is obligated to utilize this opportunity post-elections to 

build and strengthen democratic institutions, which have suffered in the midst of political 

instability. 

In addition, it must exercise its newfound political capital to undertake robust constitutional, political and economic reforms and cultivate a democratic consensus within 

society to advance further down the path to Euro-Atlantic integration. 

Thank you. 

Mr. DEYCHAKIWSKY. Thank you, Steve. 

Now, before going to questions from the audience, I first want to give the opportunity 

for any of our panelists to either comment or ask each other questions. 

Mr. NIX. I always agree with what Ambassador—— 

Mr. DEYCHAKIWSKY. You agree with what the others say. All right. 

If you could please come up to the podium on my left, your right, and ask questions 

from there, because there’s a mike there and that helps the transcriber. The podium is 

right here. 

Well, while you’re thinking of your questions and coming up, I’ll maybe ask the first 

one. 

That is, differences over the separation of powers were a factor that clearly precipitated the political crisis that led to these preterm parliamentary elections. 

Taking into consideration the election results, where do you see the prospects for 

reforms to address the role of the President and the parliament? 

Anyone is welcome to take this. 

Amb. SHAMSHUR. Actually, I presume everyone who was discussing the outcome of 

the elections, they were mentioning constitutional reform. And I would say that—well, 

actually, there is a common understanding among all political parties that there should 

be a reform of power structure. 

Mostly what will be happening would be, I presume, a very intense discussion on how 

it should be done, but there is a common understanding that there should be a reform 

of the government, meaning government in the larger sense of this world, so that we are 

going to see change, and that was happening in 2006 and especially 2007. 

And what is really at stake is to form a working government. At the same time, there 

is a common understanding that it should be done on a democratic basis. So definitely 

there would be absolutely no backsliding on democratic reform. 

And what is important is to find the right balance of power between different 

branches of power. The current crisis demonstrated that when one part of the government 

11 

tries to reserve power, you have an excess of power, so to say, then it might create a major 

crisis. 

And coming back to the initial question, I would claim that there is a large consensus 

on the need to reform the way the government and the state’s mission works and that 

presumably would be one of the major tasks that the new government will be confronted 

with. 

But definitely it’s not going to be just the government, it will be the joint effort of 

the government, of the parliament, of the president and civil society. 

Mr. DEYCHAKIWSKY. Thank you. I just want to acknowledge we’re joined here by Congressman Aderholt, who is a Helsinki Commissioner and who also attended the OSCE 

Parliamentary Assembly session in Kyiv in early July. 

Next question, please? 

QUESTIONER. Thank you. I happened to be in Ukraine the week of the election and 

on Sunday, September 30, and I wonder if Mr. Nix and others could elaborate a little bit 

on religious pluralism. 

It seemed anecdotal that the Russian Orthodox Church is undergoing a renewal and 

revival perhaps. But what are the other denominations? I mean, it also seems completely 

dominant. 

What are other denominations that are emerging in Ukraine? 

Mr. NIX. Sure, thank you for that. Again, religion is an issue in Ukraine and it gets 

caught up in politics. 

In terms of pluralism, there are divides within the Orthodox church that I think 

everyone here is cognizant of. Many of the parishes of the churches in Ukraine, Orthodox 

churches, belong to the Moscow patriarchy. Others belong to the Ukrainian patriarchate. 

So there is certainly a divide there and, again, this is consistent somewhat with the 

east-west divisions that we alluded to earlier. There was evidence that there were a 

number of rallies that the church, the Orthodox church, the Moscow patriarch did organize in favor of one side and took clear sides during the campaign. 

But political issues aside, pluralism is thriving. In western Ukraine, you have an 

altogether different situation and you have Catholic churches, Roman Catholic churches, 

Ukrainian Catholic churches, Orthodox churches, all seeming to be working together very 

well. 

Again, as we form national political parties and Ukraine forms a national identity, 

I think that these problems will subside over time. They are an issue now, but I think, 

overall, religious pluralism is thriving. 

Amb. SHAMSHUR. If I may add a couple of words. First of all, the issue of tolerance 

of the freedom of religious expression. From the very outset, since 1991, one of the major 

issues and the major, I would say, principle that was adhered by all political forces in 

Ukraine and this, I would say, is our common asset. 

Definitely it’s very important and it’s not limited to the Orthodox church, but actually 

we have a sizable Muslim population, Roman Catholic, whatever, and so anyone is free 

to express their beliefs and preach, as long as it doesn’t contradict existing legislation. 

That’s firstly. And actually all communities are thriving. 

12 

Second, the basic principle is a separation of the state from the church and it’s very 

important and I think it’s a major factor that makes relations between the church and 

the state, the church and the larger society as healthy as we see it in Ukraine. 

As far as the internal developments in the church are concerned, that’s a church 

matter and actually it’s not a state matter, although, of course, we are conscious of the 

divisions existing in the Orthodox community of Ukraine. 

I think it’s extremely important and it’s an important factor defining the development 

of Ukraine as a whole. 

Thank you. 

Amb. MILLER. I would agree with what Ambassador Shamshur and Mr. Nix had to 

say. 

It’s a paradox, a paradox that we share that we have the separation of church and 

state, and, yet, it’s a nation of believers. And Ukraine has had a resurgence since the end 

of the Soviet Union of belief. The belief was always there, but certainly the rebuilding 

of churches and the very vibrant religious life that is evident throughout Ukraine is a 

testament to a civil society in which you can have a separation between church and state. 

But it’s a difficult one and as we know from our own history, the election of 1800 

not being one of the least examples, these issues come up of what the proper distance 

between religious expression and the affairs of state should be. 

But I would say that my experience in Ukraine from the beginning of independence 

to now is that it’s an extraordinarily tolerant society. It welcomes any kind of belief or 

non-belief. It has a huge variety of belief systems and it has a very complicated religious 

history, certainly in the hierarchical sense, and some of these problems devolve to questions of property and churches and who owns them and so on. 

But everyone is free to worship as they please, to express themselves as they please, 

and it’s a great testament to the strength of the Ukrainian nation. 

Mr. DEYCHAKIWSKY. Questions? Katie? 

QUESTIONER. I’m Katie Fox from NDI. I was very interested in what you said, 

Ambassador Miller, about Ukrainians hoping in this election that they had given a mandate to new leaders who would actually take on some of the issues of corruption in its 

many forms. 

My question is, given the realities of Ukraine, as you said, it’s pretty much impossible 

to break the lock of the so-called locomotives and a number of other things, what realistically could the new government do to restore people’s faith? 

And is there anything that folks like NDI could do to help? This is for everybody, 

not just for Ambassador Miller. 

Amb. MILLER. You go right to the heart of the matter, don’t you? It’s going to be very 

difficult to put the bandits in jail. One of the most ringing slogans of the Orange Revolution was send thieves to jail. 

That didn’t happen and, in fact, some of those on the platform became thieves themselves and the people understood that. 

That’s the overriding cloud that hangs over Ukraine, Ukrainian politics, and it’s the 

great doubt that’s expressed particularly by youth, but by all generations and all sectors 

of society. 

13 

The basic unfairness of what has happened since 1991 and independence, in the evolution of state assets, the power to acquire wealth and position and respect unjustly in 

the view of the majority, I would say, these are the issues. 

It’s quite possible that the new leadership will send a few malefactors to jail. It could 

happen. There are enough instances of criminality to deal with and if it can be put into 

an investigative and judicial framework that had integrity itself—that’s the problem, is 

that it’s affected everything. 

You may have a case, but you can’t pursue it. You may get a conviction, but it will 

be appealed. It may never get to that because of interventions of those who are higher 

up or who have great piles of disposable income. 

It’s a grievous problem for the country and it’s the No. 1 issue politically of reform. 

All of the reforms that are spoken about, the issues between the prime minister and the 

president, really revolve around this issue of who is going to control the assets and 

whether the assets that have been taken over the last 17 years are going to remain free 

of inquiry, whether there will be amnesty for the first generation, whether there will be 

a fresh start growing along and then saying, ‘‘Whatever happened then we understand 

is a result of transition, that we’re going to be clean now.’’ 

It’s a very tough issue and it’s the one that will—for people like Yulia Tymoshenko 

and Viktor Yushchenko and all those who were up on the midan platform who pledged 

solemnly and with prayers and with the full panoply of making an oath to the Nation 

may have to produce. That’s their legacy. 

I can’t tell you how many Ukrainians I’ve talked to about this and in every part of 

the society from the top to the bottom about this issue of can they do it, but it’s the key 

question. 

Amb. SHAMSHUR. Actually, I definitely have a much less pessimistic assessment, not 

only because I am supposed to have it as Ambassador, but also while thinking over what 

has been happening in Ukraine since I’ve been here and before. 

So I would like to say that—well, the question I would like to start with, I’ve been 

posed quite often since my arrival, the question related to lost opportunities since 2004, 

in 2005, and what’s happening. 

Actually, yes, of course, if you look at the evolution since 2005, early 2005, you will 

see a lot of lost opportunities and mistakes which might have been avoided. 

But my usual answer to those curious is very simple. So definitely that was a painful 

educational period for Ukraine to learn or, to some extent, to understand how to act 

within the new configuration of power and new type of society emerging in Ukraine. 

So in this sense, it would be extremely incorrect, I think, and Bill actually mentioned 

that in his expose, that if you look at what has been achieved in 2005–2006 as far as 

the economy is concerned, even the issues related to corruption, issues related to the 

development of civil society, issues related to reforms in many sectors of Ukraine, actually, you will see that there was progress. 

The progress might have been much more rapid and more profound. And when we 

were thinking about what might have happened after the election, I had a chance to speak 

at the Heritage Foundation, so my point was actually before the election and now I can 

now reconfirm. 

So it was a very important election for Ukraine. Many things were at stake. But, 

actually, it’s important and an important change since 2004, now speaking about since 

14 

1991, was that the question was not whether democracy would survive, but what kind 

of democracy it will be, how profound, how mature. 

It was not about whether we will have reform, definitely we will have, but how deep 

the reforms will be and how rapid they will be. And I think what is really important now 

is the effects of time. Unfortunately, we lost a lot of time since 2004. But it’s not about 

backsliding. 

So even if you’re speaking about configuration of the government, I can say in my 

present capacity, definitely, the democratic government would send a much more coherent 

message and I’m convinced the reforms would be much more consistent. 

But if we can imagine other configurations of the government, definitely it will be 

an improvement compared to what we had recently. So it, again, will be more consistent 

and I also hope more rapid. 

Also, what is important is that we have consensus on a number of issues, no matter 

which party we are speaking about. Of course, the Cabinet is difficult. The Ukrainian parliament is still there, a difficult case, but if you’re speaking about the other parties and 

if you look at the most important issues, judicial reform, and every one should be done, 

the economy cannot function normally, corruption can be fought, constitutional reform, 

call it constitutional reform or do it the other way, there should be balance of power. 

Even foreign policy, if we speak about the major choice, pro-European choice, is definitely great for everyone, including Communists, and it’s understood that it’s not only 

about joining EU formally, maybe that’s the most difficult part of it, but it’s about transformation of the country according to European standards. 

So in this sense, understanding all the challenges, I think they’ll be on the right 

track. And if you look at our development since 1991, maybe with the exception of the 

late Kuchma era, it was a steady upward movement and they have no reason to doubt 

that it would continue this way. 

The critical question is how quickly and how profound the reform will be. 

Thank you. 

Amb. MILLER. What you just expressed and the passion that you used to express it 

is why people believe so fervently in Ukraine’s future. I didn’t mean to be pessimistic. I 

was being descriptive. 

And I think the remedies will be taken, I have that confidence. And the very fact 

that these are issues and that they’re issues that are raised without fear of being killed 

or put in jail, which certainly would have been the case before 1991, is a virtue. 

The agenda is there and the people believe in this agenda. They don’t like what has 

been done to them. They don’t like the travails and they have a right to expect that they 

will get their will. 

Mr. NIX. In answer to your first question, I would say, very simply, that Ukraine has 

to clarify these constitutional issues, the separation of powers issues that have plagued 

them. 

Whether Ukraine does that by overturning the constitutional reform in the constitutional court, whether it changes or amends its current constitution or adopts a new constitution is up to Ukraine, but very clearly, they’ve got to delineate power that is understood so the government can function. 

15 

Second, as Ambassador Miller puts it, they have to deliver on promises. And I would 

note in the 2002 parliamentary election campaign when Viktor Yushchenko was thrust 

into the national spotlight, people had forgotten his campaign slogan was, not words, but 

deeds. And a lot of the people have heard the words and are still waiting for the deeds. 

And then in response to your second question, NDI and IRI and others who are 

working in the democracy promotion area, don’t give up. It’s easy to get discouraged. Lots 

of people became discouraged when the reforms didn’t happen, the scope and the pace of 

the reforms didn’t take place, didn’t meet expectations. 

But unfortunately, we don’t have the luxury of being disappointed and giving up. We 

have to continue our work and I know NDI will join us and we’re going to be around for 

a long time, I hope, continue building national political parties, as I said, and further 

Ukraine’s democratic development. 

QUESTIONER. I’m Ihor Gawdiak, Ukrainian American Coordinating Committee. President Yushchenko has consistently championed a government that is an inclusive one, a 

government that represents the many interests of the entire nation, and since the last 

election, he’s clearly called for a government in which the opposition, the Party of Regions, 

would be given important positions. 

Now, Yulia Tymoshenko I don’t think shares exactly this point of view. My question 

to you, gentlemen, is what kind of government do you anticipate, one in which the Party 

of Regions will play an important role or one in which the Party of Regions would simply 

act as an opposition? 

Thank you. 

Amb. SHAMSHUR. Actually, it’s the most difficult question which might be posed at 

this stage. Looking at how the situation develops, again, in my personal capacity, I’m not 

supposed to make any projections, but it looks like the possibility of Our Ukraine plus 

Tymoshenko working are plausible. 

Coming back to what this president—I think it’s also important to understand how 

the whole process works. I think he was absolutely correct, after the election, sending the 

message to all parties who were in parliament, just get into consultation and we shall 

see what government can come out of that. 

Recently, as I mentioned in my presentation, only yesterday, looking at how the 

situation develops, he sent the message that he expects Tymoshenko plus Our Ukraine 

to form a coalition government early enough in November. 

What is important, on the other hand, is that actually all parties, and the biggest 

party, Party of Regions, are part of the political process and, in this case, if they become— 

they are the opposition, they should be a stronger position, the opposition that can be a 

constructive force, to the extent opposition can be a constructive force anywhere, understandably. 

But he would like to—and as I understand, that’s the common understanding, that 

one of the changes that should be coming, that opposition should be empowered especially 

with controlling functions. That’s at least my understanding of what is happening now 

in Ukraine. 

Amb. MILLER. It seems to me that the government is or rather the system that exists 

is inclusive by de facto. They have to deal with each other. They have to deal with each 

other in the Rada. They have to deal with each other because of the close divisions that 

exist. 

16 

There are no dominant single leaders. There are, at a minimum, three that are vying 

for the leading power or political power, political leadership, and it came from no one person, neither Yulia or Viktor Andreyevich or Yanukovich can run away with it. 

The feel in this past year was that by the buying of votes, one group could run away 

with it and one of the driving reasons for the election was to stop that process of purchasing votes in the Rada, you get a new mandate and try again. 

I would say that in order to succeed, given the divisions in the country, political divisions, that the three major leaders will have to work together on most of the major issues 

and that, as in our system of government, where we have parties that are bitterly divided 

on many issues, but come together on many other issues, so, too, that’ll be the case and 

is the case in Ukraine now. 

I’ve been reading this marvelous book on the elections of 1800, the struggle between 

Adams and Jefferson, and you know it took, I guess, 39 votes in the electoral college 

before Jefferson was elected and a lot of shady business went on surrounding the election. 

And if you remember Jefferson’s inaugural address, we’re all members of the same 

nation was basically his message, not the one party or the other, we are Americans. 

And I would say that that is happening in Ukraine, too, that despite the divisions, 

which are marked, that the system of government that’s been devised in the process of 

developing a democratic independent nation, that it’s the handling of the disparity of 

views, the diversity of views by vote, by vote, rather than diktat, rather than by ukaz . 

Mr. DEYCHAKIWSKY. Thank you. Next question? 

QUESTIONER. Martha Matselioukh, Chemonics International. I want to commend the 

Helsinki Commission for organizing this excellent event. And my question is now that the 

elections have taken place, what do each of the panelists foresee as the next steps in 

bilateral U.S.-Ukraine relations? 

What challenges, what issues, if you can please answer the question. Thank you. 

Amb. SHAMSHUR. I think the most important thing we should achieve in our relationship is definitely to break what they call the election cycle. So when people are waiting 

before election, looking at the run-up and then waiting, the way elections are conducted, 

and what will come out of the election. 

I think one of the most important lessons of the last election is any election is going 

to be democratic and I don’t think that we should be put to any new democratic or election 

test anymore. I think that was very convincing proof. 

Any government which will come out of the election will be a legitimate government 

and I’m quite sure that any government will have a reform agenda of sorts, but definitely 

that would be the most important thing. 

So in this sense, I think that we should really be trying to pick up speed in the 

bilateral relations. In my priorities, I see a couple of things. First of all, to enhance our 

trade and economic agenda. 

Second, to intensify our political dialogue and, first of all, that we should definitely 

have the visits on both sides that were not taking place exactly for the reasons of schedules on both sides. 

Definitely, we should be working out the new, as we call it, roadmap that would substitute the previous statement as actually it was fulfilled. Definitely, we should have more 

intense consultations and a consultative mechanism should be working more productively. 

17 

And, third, what they call people-to-people diplomacy, just to encourage and to 

enhance the changes at all levels, at local levels, between young people, students, 

teachers, all those things. 

Actually, I think that our relations are in very good shape, but we should really pick 

up after the formation of the government to add more substance and more, if you wish, 

efficiency to the relations. 

Thank you. 

Amb. MILLER. I agree with what the Ambassador had to say. I would hope that the 

next administration, our next administration will return to intensive engagement as a 

diplomatic approach to be used certainly in Ukraine. 

There’s no substitute for the leaders of nations to work with each other, to know each 

other. During the time that I was Ambassador, President Clinton came to Ukraine four 

times, which meant there were at least eight meetings between the leaders. Vice President Gore and the Secretary of Defense came eight times and this was true throughout 

the government down the line. 

There’s no substitute for knowledge, direct knowledge of leaders with one another. 

Particularly, for us, Americans, the importance of Ukraine’s future for the stability of the 

former Soviet Union is critical in a very important way, as many here fully subscribe to 

the idea that a strong Ukraine will help Russia’s development, as well, that it’s the stability of a critically important part of the world can be enhanced by assisting Ukrainian 

democratic development. 

Mr. NIX. Again, not speaking on behalf of the U.S. Government here, but just some 

comments. I’m very optimistic about bilateral relations in the post-election period and I 

would just say I agree that a stronger level of communications between two governments 

is necessary. 

I’d remind the audience that this administration was discussing a possible Presidential visit to Ukraine after the 2006 parliamentary elections, but one of the conditions 

for such a visit, as I understand it, was the formation of government in a timely fashion 

and that did not happen. 

So if, in fact, the government is formed in a timely fashion after this election, perhaps 

those negotiations could resume and if not a Presidential visit, certainly high level visits 

between the two countries. 

Mr. DEYCHAKIWSKY. Any further questions? 

QUESTIONER. I think you’d all agree, I’m sure, that elections are a necessary part of 

democracy, but obviously at a basic level. And you’ve discussed some of the deeper issues, 

the corruption and so forth. 

And I was wondering what you thought, any of you, about the issue of the rule of 

law and where that might be going and where that might be going vis-a-vis Russia. Obviously, two different paths might be in the future, but thinking of certain basic promises 

that Yushchenko made in the past regarding the Gongadze case and so forth. 

For me, I’m also interested in that and the issue of public trust, because that could 

be a lingering area where people might not have trust in the government. 

Thank you. 

Mr. NIX. In terms of judicial reform, I think all of us had high hopes after the 

Supreme Court took jurisdiction of and rendered the decision that it did with regard to 

18 

the Presidential election of 2004 and, again, I think our hopes were dashed by performance after that. 

As I alluded to in my remarks with regard to the elections, I think public confidence 

in the judicial system is very low at the moment and the causes are many, but I would 

point to a couple of key ones. 

First and foremost, the elections, actually, the dissolution of parliament and calling 

these elections was questioned by one side and there was a petition filed with the constitutional court challenging the constitutionality of the President’s action. 

And fair and good legal minds on both sides had different opinions and in a democracy, that’s the way it should work. And the fact of the matter is that that constitutional 

court took the case, but has never rendered a decision, and this certainly doesn’t help 

ensure or promote public confidence in the judicial system. 

I think this is an area that Ukraine really, really has to devote a significant amount 

of time to. I think it’s an area that the United States can be of particular help with, as 

well as its European allies. 

But judicial reform is really of the essence and it goes to all things beyond elections, 

honoring contracts, enforcement of contracts, implementation of judicial decisions by the 

administrative branch, a host of legal issues. 

It’s going to take time and effort and political will and, again, it’s going to be up to 

this new government when it is formed to take on reform of the courts of general jurisdiction of Ukraine. 

Amb. SHAMSHUR. I can simply say actually what I said before, that’s the major central issue to any reform and the area is very well understood. So now action is needed. 

That’s it. Very simple. 

Mr. DEYCHAKIWSKY. All right. If there are no further questions. 

I’d like to first say that there will be a transcript of this briefing and it will be available on our Web site as early, I believe, as tomorrow. Our Web site is ‘‘WWW.CSCE.GOV’’. 

I’d like to thank Ambassador Shamshur, Ambassador Miller, and Steve Nix for a very 

insightful, interesting and informative presentation and discussion. I’d like to thank you 

all for coming. 

And the briefing is concluded. 

[Whereupon the briefing ended at 3:20 p.m.] 

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