INEFFICIENT,

INEFFECTIVE,

INEQUITABLE:

I N T E R I M S T A F F R E P O R T

The Trump Administration's

Failed Response to the

Coronavirus Crisis

SELECT SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CORONAVIRUS CRISIS

AND

O C T O B E R 2 0 2 0
TABLE OF CONTENTS

01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

07

THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION'S FAILED

RESPONSE TO THE PANDEMIC CAUSED 

A PUBLIC HEALTH CATASTROPHE

7. The President Downplayed the Crisis, Contradicting 

 Internal White House Reports

9. Political Appointees Have Improperly Interfered in the 

 Nation's Public Health Response More Than 60 Times

12. The Trump Administration’s $765 Million Loan to 

 Kodak

13. The Administration Has Failed to Address Conflicts

 of Interest in Vaccine Development

15. The Administration and Some States Have Not Done

 Enough to Help Americans Vote Safely During the 

 Pandemic

22

THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION

PRIORITIZED WALL STREET OVER 

MAIN STREET AND LEFT FEDERAL RELIEF

PROGRAMS VULNERABLE TO FRAUD

22. Treasury and SBA Neglected Underserved 

 Communities and Allowed Billions of Dollars in 

 Potential Fraud in the Paycheck Protection Program

24. Fed and Treasury Lending Facilities Prioritized Big

 Corporations and Investors Over Small Businesses,

 Workers, and States

26. The Administration Weakened the Payroll Support

 Program, Allowing Thousands of Aviation Workers to

 Lose Their Jobs

18

THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION FAILED

TO PROTECT MILLIONS OF AMERICANS

IN FINANCIAL DISTRESS

18. Treasury and IRS Delayed Delivery of Economic 

 Impact Payments to Nine Million Americans

20. The Administration Has Not Provided Critical 

 Housing Protections to Struggling Americans

28

APPENDIX A: KEY SELECT

SUBCOMMITTEE ACTIONS

36

APPENDIX B: THE TRUMP

ADMINISTRATION'S PATTERN 

OF POLITICAL INTERFERENCE

51

ENDNOTES

INEFFICIENT, INEFFECTIVE, AND INEQUITABLE: THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION'S FAILED RESPONSE TO THE CORONAVIRUS CRISIS

CORONAVIRUS.HOUSE.GOV
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis was established by the House of 

Representatives on April 23, 2020. Modeled after the Truman Committee that saved lives and 

taxpayer dollars by preventing waste, fraud, and abuse during World War II, the panel is charged 

with investigating the effectiveness, efficiency, and equity of the nation’s response to the public 

health and economic crises caused by the coronavirus pandemic.1

This report describes some of the Select Subcommittee’s key findings during its first six 

months. In that time, the Subcommittee launched 30 investigations—many of them ongoing—

sent more than 120 letters, and reviewed hundreds of thousands of pages of documents. The 

Subcommittee held 15 public hearings and briefings with senior Administration officials, experts 

in public health and economics, and Americans personally impacted by the pandemic. The 

Subcommittee also published seven staff reports detailing its initial findings. 

The Select Subcommittee’s findings demonstrate that the Trump Administration’s 

response to the coronavirus pandemic is among the worst failures of leadership in American 

history. The virus is a global scourge, but it has been an American fiasco, killing more people in 

the United States than in any other country. President Trump’s decision to mislead the public 

about the severity of the crisis, his failure to listen to scientists about how to keep Americans 

healthy, and his refusal to implement a coordinated national plan to stop the coronavirus have all 

contributed to devastating results: more than 227,000 Americans dead, more than 8.8 million 

Americans infected, and a dangerous virus that continues to spread out of control nine months 

after it reached our nation’s shores. 

The Trump Administration’s failure to contain the coronavirus also exacerbated and 

extended an economic collapse of historic proportions, with tens of millions of Americans losing 

their jobs and at least six million Americans falling into poverty. The Administration’s response 

to this economic crisis has benefited larger companies and wealthy Americans, while leaving 

behind many disadvantaged communities and struggling small businesses. The Administration’s 

implementation of relief programs passed by Congress has also been marred by fraud, waste, and 

abuse. As described below and in Appendix A, the Select Subcommittee’s investigations 

identified more than $4 billion in potential fraud in small business programs, led the 

Administration to halt a potentially wasteful $765 million loan, and returned more than $100 

million in taxpayer dollars to the U.S. Treasury. 

The Trump Administration’s Failed Response to the Pandemic 

Caused a Public Health Catastrophe 

As of October 28, 2020, more than 227,000 Americans have died from the coronavirus, 

and 8.8 million have been infected.2 The coronavirus is set to be the third-highest cause of death 

in the United States this year, behind only heart disease and cancer.3 The country appears to be 

entering a third wave of the crisis, with cases on the rise in 45 states. Hospitalizations are up 

46 percent in the past month, with more than 43,000 Americans currently hospitalized with the 

coronavirus.4

 The nation hit a single-day record of more than 85,000 new cases on October 23, 

1
2020.5

 Experts predict another 90,000 Americans are likely to die from the virus before the end 

of 2020.6

The United States has the highest number of cases and highest number of deaths from the 

coronavirus of any country in the world.7

 It has fared worse than most other countries, even 

when accounting for differences in population size. The United States has the eleventh highest 

per capita coronavirus death rate among 168 countries reporting cases.8

The loss of life from the coronavirus—more American deaths than the battles of World 

War I, the Korean War, Vietnam War, Afghanistan War, and Iraq War combined9

—could have 

been significantly reduced by an effective federal response. Instead, as described in Part I of this 

report, the Select Subcommittee’s investigations show that the Trump Administration 

downplayed the threat of the virus and undermined the nation’s public health: 

• The Trump Administration Refused to Take Responsibility and Implement a

National Plan to Defeat the Virus. At the Select Subcommittee’s first public briefing in

May 2020, top scientific experts—including a former Food and Drug Administration

(FDA) Commissioner appointed by President Trump—urged the Administration to

develop and implement a coordinated national strategy to respond to the crisis.10 Since

then, the Select Subcommittee has held three more public hearings to call on the

Administration to implement a national plan on testing, contact tracing, public health

measures, and protective equipment.11 Yet the Administration has refused to lead,

pushing the burden to state and local governments instead. At a July 31, 2020, Select

Subcommittee hearing, Dr. Anthony Fauci testified that the government’s failed response

led the United States to have a far worse virus outbreak than in Europe.12 On October 2,

2020, Secretary of Health and Human Services Alex Azar shrugged off the

Administration’s failed leadership, telling the Subcommittee, “We wish we didn’t have

this unprecedented coronavirus pandemic but people do die in pandemics,” and saying:

“The disease spreads. It’s dependent on all of us acting with individual responsibility.”13

• The President Downplayed the Crisis, Contradicting Internal White House Reports.

Since June 2020, the White House Coronavirus Task Force has privately sent weekly

reports to states that track the growing outbreak and urge swift action to contain the virus.

These private reports contradict the rosy public statements from the President, Vice

President, and other political appointees. The Select Subcommittee released 14 weeks of

these private reports, which show that the number of states in the “red zone” due to

severe outbreaks grew from seven states on June 23, 2020, to 31 states on October 18,

2020. The reports also show that all 50 states need to do more testing to contain the

virus—contrary to the President’s efforts to “slow the testing down.” 14 The Select

Subcommittee also found that after months of political pressure from President Trump,

the Task Force weakened some public health recommendations, including calls for mask

mandates in certain states.15

• Political Appointees Have Improperly Interfered in the Nation’s Public Health

Response More Than 60 Times. The Select Subcommittee has identified at least 61

instances in which Trump Administration officials injected politics into public health

2
decisions. As shown in Appendix B, President Trump and others in his Administration 

engaged in a persistent pattern of political interference, repeatedly overruling and 

sidelining top scientists and undermining Americans’ health to advance the President’s 

perceived political interests. These incidents degraded efforts to provide Americans 

access to testing and protective equipment, develop treatments and vaccines, and provide 

scientifically sound public health advice. The Subcommittee’s investigations led the 

Administration to reverse some of these actions, including correcting inaccurate Centers 

for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) guidance on testing, removing senior 

appointees from the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) who tried to alter 

accurate scientific reports, and committing to revise CDC school reopening guidance that 

does not reflect the best science.16 

• The Administration Directed Funding for Critical Supplies, Often Without

Competition, to Companies that Have Political Connections, Lack Experience, and

Failed to Perform. The Select Subcommittee is investigating questionable contracts and

loans that may be hindering the nation’s ability to quickly produce and distribute

protective equipment and other supplies needed to contain the virus. In August 2020, the

Subcommittee launched an investigation into a planned $765 million loan to the Eastman

Kodak Company (Kodak) to produce pharmaceutical ingredients—even though the

company lacked any pharmaceutical experience and its executives and directors reaped

huge stock windfalls before the deal was announced.17 The Trump Administration put

the loan on hold after the investigation was announced, potentially saving taxpayers

three-quarters of a billion dollars.18 The Subcommittee is also investigating other

multimillion contracts that four federal agencies issued to seven different contractors that

raise significant red flags.19

• The Administration Has Failed to Address Conflicts of Interest in Vaccine

Development. The Select Subcommittee launched an investigation into potential

conflicts of interest among scientific advisors to Operation Warp Speed (OWS), the

Administration’s program to develop and manufacture coronavirus vaccines and

treatments. The Select Subcommittee’s investigation revealed that top advisors to this

project have potential conflicts of interest—including financial interests in companies

being funded by the federal government to develop vaccines—that do not appear to be

resolved.20

• The Administration and Some States Have Not Done Enough to Help Americans

Vote Safely During the Pandemic. Problems during the 2020 primary elections—

including closed polling places, long lines, and poll worker shortages—highlighted the

risk that some states were not prepared to carry out a free, fair, and safe general election

during the pandemic. The Select Subcommittee investigated impediments to voting

during the pandemic in four states: Florida, Georgia, Texas and Wisconsin. The

Subcommittee found that voters in these states may face long lines and limited polling

places and urged swift state action and federal financial support.21

3
The Trump Administration Failed to Protect Millions of Americans in Financial Distress

The nation’s economic crisis is a direct result of the ongoing public health crisis, and the 

Trump Administration’s failures to contain the coronavirus made the economic crisis more 

severe and protracted. On September 23, 2020, Federal Reserve (Fed) Chairman Jerome Powell 

testified before the Select Subcommittee that “the path of the economy is going to depend on our 

ability to retain control, to get control of the virus and keep control.”22 

The economic contraction has taken a heavy toll on American workers and families. 

Since February 2020, the economy has lost $16 trillion due to lost economic output, premature 

deaths, and health impairments caused by the pandemic.23 More than 60 million unemployment 

claims have been filed—more than at any other time in American history.24 Since May, between 

six and eight million Americans have fallen into poverty.25 In October, 12 percent of households 

with children did not have enough food to eat in the last week.26 At least one-third of adults are 

concerned that “eviction or foreclosure in the next two months is either very likely or somewhat 

likely.”27 The job losses from the coronavirus pandemic have disproportionately impacted 

minority communities and workers earning lower wages, resulting in the most unequal recession 

in modern U.S. history.28

As described in Part II of this report, the Select Subcommittee’s investigations reveal 

how the Trump Administration’s response to this crisis has often failed to help the most 

vulnerable Americans: 

• The Treasury Department and Internal Revenue Service Delayed Delivery of

Economic Impact Payments to Nine Million Americans. In the Coronavirus Aid,

Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act, Congress provided for Economic Impact

Payments (EIPs) of up to $1,200, but nine million disproportionately low-income

Americans were still waiting to receive their checks in September—more than six months

after the CARES Act was enacted. In response to the Select Subcommittee’s

investigation and repeated follow-up efforts, Treasury and IRS admitted these EIPs were

still outstanding,29 sent notices to the nine million Americans waiting for their checks,

and extended the deadline for them to claim their EIPs.30

• The Administration Has Not Provided Critical Housing Protections to Struggling

Americans. Following the expiration of the CARES Act eviction moratorium and

enhanced unemployment benefits in late July 2020, millions of Americans have faced the

danger of losing their homes. The Select Subcommittee obtained data showing that in

August 2020, more than 31,000 homeowners were over 60 days delinquent on their

federally backed mortgage but had not received forbearance and therefore could be at risk

of foreclosure in January 2021. This data also shows lower-income borrowers were less

likely that those with higher incomes to get forbearance. The Subcommittee has urged

the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) to provide automatic forbearance to

homeowners who miss two or more payments.31

• The Administration Refused to Extend Enhanced Unemployment Insurance,

Hurting the Economy. At a Select Subcommittee’s hearing in July 2020, Former Fed

4
Chair Janet Yellen testified that failure to extend the enhanced federal jobless benefits 

from the CARES Act “would be a catastrophe.”32 Yet the Trump Administration refused 

to agree to comprehensive legislation extending the benefits before they expired on July 

26, 2020.33 In October 2020, unemployment remained unacceptably high, and a growing 

number of people have been unemployed for more than six months.34 

The Trump Administration Prioritized Wall Street Over Main Street and 

Left Federal Relief Programs Vulnerable to Fraud

Congress enacted relief programs to support Americans workers and small businesses 

during the pandemic. These programs, many of which have now expired, were critical in 

preventing the economic crisis in Spring and Summer 2020 from getting even worse. Yet, as 

described in Part III of this report, the Select Subcommittee’s investigations show that the Trump 

Administration weakened these programs by prioritizing larger and wealthier businesses over 

truly struggling small businesses, exacerbating inequity in the economic downturn. The 

Administration also failed to institute adequate financial controls, leading to significant fraud, 

waste, and abuse. 

• Treasury and the Small Business Administration Neglected Underserved

Communities and Allowed Billions of Dollars in Potential Fraud in the Paycheck

Protection Program. The Select Subcommittee’s investigation found that Treasury and

SBA ignored the CARES Act’s call to issue guidance to prioritize small businesses in

underserved markets, including minority and women-owned businesses.35 Documents

obtained by the Select Subcommittee show that Treasury privately encouraged banks to

limit their Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) lending to existing customers, thereby

excluding many minority-owned businesses who were less likely to have existing

banking relationships.36 The Administration also failed to implement robust fraud

controls, and a Subcommittee analysis identified more than 22,500 loans worth $4 billion

that may have been subject to fraud.37

• The Fed Bought Corporate Bonds Issued by Large Companies that Laid Off or

Furloughed More Than a Million Workers—and Sent Billions of Dollars to

Shareholders. During the pandemic, the Fed—for the first time in its history—directly

purchased corporate debt.38 This action lowered the cost of raising capital for large

corporations, leading to record bond issuances.39 But the Fed failed to protect workers at

these companies. The Select Subcommittee found the Fed bought bonds issued by

companies that laid off or furloughed more than one million workers between March and

September 2020, and from 383 companies that issued dividends to shareholders during

the pandemic.40

• The Fed’s Programs to Help Smaller Businesses and States Were Not Effective. The

Fed set up the Main Street Lending Program to help small and medium-sized businesses

but set restrictive terms that drastically limited the program’s usefulness. The program

has $600 billion in lending capacity, but the Fed has issued just 252 loans totaling less

than 0.4 percent of available capital.41 The Fed’s Municipal Liquidity Facility failed to

deliver relief to state and local governments, issuing only two notes totaling $1.7 billion

5
out of the available $500 billion,42 largely because of onerous interest rates and a short 

repayment period.43 Large corporations are awash in cheap credit, but cities, states, and 

small businesses—which employ tens of millions of Americans and provide critical 

services—continue to struggle.44 

• The Administration Weakened the Payroll Support Program, Allowing Thousands

of Aviation Workers to Lose their Jobs. Congress created the Payroll Support Program

(PSP) to “preserve aviation jobs,” but the Select Subcommittee’s investigation found that

the Trump Administration weakened the program by delaying funding, allowing

companies to conduct massive layoffs while their applications were pending without

losing any funding, and failing to impose a deadline to spend PSP funds. Treasury

permitted aviation contractors to lay off or furlough more than 16,500 workers before

receiving funding.45 As a result of the Select Subcommittee’s inquiries, four aviation

contractors committed to preserve over 30,000 jobs until their PSP funding is

exhausted.46

This report identifies several recommendations to address the Select Subcommittee’s

preliminary findings and improve the Administration’s failed response to the pandemic. Four 

elements are critical: (1) the federal government needs a coordinated national plan to defeat the 

coronavirus, save American lives, and revive our economy; (2) this plan must be guided by the 

best available science, not political expediency; (3) Americans need Congress to pass and the 

President to sign comprehensive relief legislation to tackle the virus and support workers, 

families, and communities; and (4) economic relief legislation must be implemented in a manner 

consistent with Congress’s intent to target assistance to the most vulnerable Americans rather 

than wealthy corporations. 

6
I. THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION’S FAILED RESPONSE TO THE PANDEMIC

CAUSED A PUBLIC HEALTH CATASTROPHE

1. The President Downplayed the Crisis, Contradicting Internal White House Reports

Since June 23, 2020, the White House Coronavirus Task Force has been privately

sending states weekly reports describing the spread of the coronavirus and making 

recommendations to improve states’ public health responses to the pandemic, including specific 

advice on testing, mask mandates, social distancing, and other measures. These reports—which 

the Select Subcommittee released after the White House refused to share them with the public—

show that the coronavirus outbreak has been far more severe than the White House publicly 

admitted and recommend public health measures far stronger than those the Trump 

Administration has called for in public. The reports also directly contradict rhetoric from 

President Trump on masks, testing, and the growth in infections. Unfortunately, some states 

have chosen to follow the White House’s inaccurate public statements rather than the private 

Task Force recommendations, allowing the virus to spread.47

a. Investigative Steps and Results

On July 29, 2020, the Select Subcommittee sent letters to Vice President Mike Pence and 

Coronavirus Response Coordinator Dr. Deborah Birx requesting a full set of the Task Force 

reports as well as the communications in which these reports or related guidance have been 

transmitted to states. The Subcommittee also sent letters to the governors of Georgia, Florida, 

Oklahoma, and Tennessee, calling on them to comply with science-based protective measures 

recommended by the White House Coronavirus Task Force.48 

On August 31, 2020, the Select Subcommittee released an initial set of eight reports 

obtained in this investigation, covering the period from June 23, 2020, to August 9, 2020.49 The 

reports showed that the White House’s private advice directly contradicted the Administration’s 

public statements downplaying the threat of the virus. For example, on June 16, 2020, Vice 

President Pence claimed in an op-ed that “panic” over a resurgence of coronavirus infections was 

“overblown.” But on June 23, 2020, the Task Force concluded that seven states were in the “red 

zone,” indicating the highest risk of coronavirus spread. Similarly, on July 7, 2020, President 

Trump claimed, “We’ve done a good job. I think we are going to be in two, three, four weeks, 

by the time we next speak, I think we’re going to be in very good shape.” Yet just two days 

earlier, the Task Force found 15 states were in the “red zone.” The July 5, 2020, report said 

Florida “has seen a significant increase in new cases and a significant increase in testing 

positivity over the past week continuing from the previous 4 weeks.”50

On September 16, 2020, Chairman Clyburn wrote to the White House again, calling for 

the Administration to make Task Force reports available to the public or provide them to the 

Select Subcommittee on an ongoing basis. The Chairman’s letter noted that after months of 

political pressure from President Trump, the Task Force appeared to have weakened some of the 

public health recommendations in the reports, including for states that failed to follow prior 

guidance and are now facing severe outbreaks. For example, the Task Force warned Nebraska 

on August 23, 2020, “A mask mandate needs to be implemented statewide.” Following 

7
Nebraska Governor Pete Ricketts’ refusal to implement a statewide mask mandate and attempts 

to block local jurisdictions from enacting mask requirements, cases surged across the state. Yet, 

on September 6, the Task Force dropped its recommendation for a statewide mask mandate and 

instead only recommended requiring masks in “metro areas and counties with COVID-19 cases 

among students or teachers in K-12 schools.”51

On October 20, 2020, the Select Subcommittee released six more weeks of reports 

obtained from the White House, dated from August 16, 2020, to September 20, 2020. The 

reports, along with others leaked in recent weeks, showed that states in the “red zone” had 

increased from seven states in June to 31 states in mid-October, even as the President has 

continued to downplay the threat and hold large, potentially superspreading rallies in states hard 

hit by the virus. Contrary to the President’s claim that the country “has done too good a job” on 

testing, the Task Force reports recommended that all 50 states increase testing to contain the 

coronavirus. The reports also urged some—but not all—states facing severe outbreaks to adopt 

mask mandates.52

b. Recommendations

Instead of privately providing health guidance to governors, the Trump Administration 

should publicly release its weekly reports at the time they are issued so that the American public 

has full transparency into the spread of the virus in each state and recommended public health 

measures. The Administration should clearly and consistently communicate public health advice 

to the public as part of a national plan to contain the virus, and the President should cease 

making contradictory statements that downplay the virus and undermine the public health 

measures recommended by scientists. 

8
2. Political Appointees Have Improperly Interfered in the Nation’s Public Health

Response More Than 60 Times

Trump Administration officials have repeatedly injected election-year politics into public

health decisions over the course of the pandemic—overruling and muzzling top scientists and 

undermining Americans’ health to advance the President’s perceived political interests. The 

Administration’s interference has occurred both in public view and in private, led by President 

Trump, Vice President Pence, White House officials, and political appointees at HHS and other 

agencies. The apparent goal of this unprecedented, coordinated attack on our nation’s public 

health agencies during the pandemic was, in the President’s words, to “play it down.”53 

As detailed in Appendix B, political appointees in the Trump Administration have 

interfered in a wide variety of public health measures, hampering efforts to contain the virus and 

leading to the preventable deaths of tens of thousands of Americans. In June 2020, President 

Trump stated that he had ordered people to “slow the testing down please,” raising concerns that 

the Administration has taken steps to suppress testing.54 In July 2020, political officials removed 

the reporting of hospitalization data from CDC and placed it in the control of HHS, raising 

concerns that data would be altered or suppressed.55 Political appointees have tried to suppress 

the publication of accurate public health information due to its perceived impact on the 

President’s political interests and sought to alter scientific reports published by CDC.56 Rather 

than use public resources to disseminate accurate public health advice, officials planned a public 

relations campaign to “defeat despair” just weeks before the election.57

a. Investigative Steps and Results

The Select Subcommittee has opened ongoing investigations into several instances of 

inappropriate political interference by the Trump Administration and has succeeded in pushing 

the Administration to roll back some of these politically motivated decisions. 

On June 22, 2020, the Select Subcommittee sent letters to the White House, HHS, and 

CDC regarding possible efforts by the Administration to limit coronavirus testing after President 

Trump stated that he had directed people to “slow the testing down.”58 Three days later, 

Chairman Clyburn and Representatives from Texas, Colorado, Illinois, New Jersey, and 

Pennsylvania sent a follow-up letter to Secretary Azar urging him to reverse the Administration’s 

decision to end federal funding and support for 13 coronavirus testing sites across five states.59

Following these letters, the Administration agreed on July 12, 2020, to restore temporary support 

for five Texas testing sites for another month.60 During an October 2, 2020, hearing, Secretary 

Azar refused to say whether the President had directed him to “slow the testing down.”61

On August 26, 2020, Chairman Clyburn demanded that CDC reverse a recent change to 

its coronavirus testing guidelines that claimed—contrary to the scientific consensus—that most 

asymptomatic individuals exposed to a person with the virus do not need to be tested.62 On 

September 19, 2020, CDC reversed this dangerous and overtly political guidance, reaffirming 

that all Americans exposed to a person with the coronavirus should be tested.63

9
On September 11, 2020, the Select Subcommittee, the Oversight and Reform Committee, 

and the Subcommittee on Economic and Consumer Policy sent letters to HHS and a federal 

contractor regarding a $250 million federal contract for an advertising campaign to “defeat 

despair and inspire hope” to be launched just weeks before Election Day. On October 1, 2020, 

the Select Subcommittee sent joint follow-up letters to two other contractors involved in a $15 

million contract related to this effort.64 During his testimony before the Select Subcommittee the 

following day, Secretary Azar announced that he had placed these contracts under “strategic 

review” to “determine whether the campaign serves important public health purposes.”65 

On September 14, 2020, the Select Subcommittee sent a letter to Secretary Azar and 

CDC Director Robert Redfield regarding reports of interference by HHS political appointees in 

CDC’s scientific reports and guidance related to the coronavirus. The letter sought documents 

and transcribed interviews with five CDC employees and two HHS appointees: Assistant 

Secretary for Public Affairs Michael Caputo and senior advisor Paul Alexander.66 Two days 

later, on September 16, 2020, HHS announced that both HHS officials were leaving their roles. 

Dr. Caputo took a leave of absence, while Dr. Alexander left HHS permanently.67 On 

September 22, 2020, and October 22, 2020, the Select Subcommittee sent letters seeking 

compliance with its requests, including documents and interviews with the remaining CDC 

employees.68 

On October 2, 2020, the Select Subcommittee released a staff analysis identifying 47 

instances of political interference in the Administration’s response to the coronavirus pandemic 

from February through September 2020.69 As shown in Appendix B, in October 2020, the 

Subcommittee identified 14 additional examples of interference, for a total of 61. 

The Select Subcommittee’s investigations demonstrate that the Administration engaged 

in a persistent pattern of political interference during the pandemic, repeatedly overruling and

sidelining top scientists and undermining Americans’ health in an attempt to benefit the 

President politically. These incidents have degraded every major facet of the Administration’s 

public health response, including efforts to provide Americans access to testing and personal 

protective equipment (PPE), develop treatments and vaccines, and provide scientifically sound 

advice to the public on masks, social distancing, and other steps to stay safe. 

b. Recommendations

The Trump Administration must cease politicizing the nation’s pandemic response and 

implement a science-based national plan to combat the coronavirus and prevent thousands of 

more needless deaths. Specifically, the Administration should end efforts to silence or punish 

federal employees who insist on following the science; prevent political appointees from 

altering, delaying, or suppressing accurate scientific reports and guidance; and allow public 

health agencies to make independent, transparent decisions on the authorization and approval of 

coronavirus treatments or vaccines based on scientific decision-making processes and guidelines. 

The Administration should also cease its efforts to obstruct legitimate oversight by 

Congress and other watchdogs into the federal response to the coronavirus crisis. This oversight 

is critical to identifying and remedying deficiencies in the government’s response and enhancing 

10
public trust. The Administration should respond promptly and cooperatively to requests for 

documents, information, and witnesses. 

11
3. The Trump Administration’s $765 Million Loan to Kodak

The Select Subcommittee is investigating a $765 million federal loan to Kodak

announced by the Trump Administration to manufacture generic drug ingredients, despite the 

company’s lack of pharmaceutical experience and significant financial windfalls gained by 

company executives due to stock activity prior to the loan’s announcement.70 The loan was put 

on hold after the Select Subcommittee announced its investigation.71

On July 28, 2020, U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) 

announced it had signed a letter of interest to award Kodak a $765 million federal loan to support 

the production of pharmaceutical ingredients. The loan was announced pursuant to a May 14, 

2020, executive order authorizing DFC to exercise authority under the Defense Production Act 

of 1950 in connection with the coronavirus pandemic.72 

Kodak executives and members of the board of directors, including Executive Chairman 

James Continenza, acquired significant amounts of Kodak shares and options in the months prior 

to the loan announcement, including during the period when Kodak was reportedly engaged in 

confidential negotiations for the loan award.73 Following the announcement of the loan, 

Kodak’s stock increased by nearly 1,500 percent, and Mr. Continenza’s holdings reportedly 

gained about $83 million in value in less than two days.74

a. Investigative Steps and Results

On August 4, 2020, the Select Subcommittee launched an investigation into the proposed 

loan agreement and the unusual trading activity by Kodak directors and executives. Along with 

the Committee on Oversight and Reform and Committee on Financial Services, the Select 

Subcommittee sent document requests to Kodak and DFC.75 

On August 7, 2020, Kodak announced it would conduct an internal review of the 

company’s efforts to obtain the loan and associated securities activity.76 The next day, the 

Trump Administration announced it was putting the loan to Kodak on hold, potentially saving 

taxpayers $765 million.77

On September 16, 2020, Kodak’s counsel released a report denying wrongdoing but 

identifying “several flaws in the process” and stating that activities of at least one board member 

raised “significant concerns from a corporate governance perspective.” The report recommended 

enhancements to the legal department and board of directors’ policies and amendments to the 

company’s insider trading policies and processes. The report also highlighted the significant role 

played by the White House, including Assistant to the President Peter Navarro, in promoting this 

loan despite Kodak’s lack of relevant experience. 78 

On September 28, 2020, the Committees sent follow-up letters to Kodak’s outside 

directors, requesting documents and information regarding their involvement in efforts to obtain 

the loan as well as associated securities activity.79 The Select Subcommittee’s investigation is 

continuing. 

12
4. The Administration Has Failed to Address Conflicts of Interest in Vaccine

Development

The Select Subcommittee is investigating potential conflicts of interest among senior

advisors in Operation Warp Speed, the Trump Administration’s program to develop, 

manufacture, and distribute coronavirus vaccines, therapeutics, and diagnostics.80 Addressing 

these potential conflicts of interest is critical to ensuring that the public can trust that the 

development of coronavirus vaccines and treatments is being conducted with the utmost 

integrity. 

On May 15, 2020, the Trump Administration announced OWS, and revealed that it would 

be led by former GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) executive Dr. Moncef Slaoui.81 On the same day, the 

National Institutes of Health (NIH) awarded a contract to Advanced Decision Vectors (ADV) to 

“provide expert advice regarding development and mass production of new COVID-19 vaccine 

candidates, therapeutics, and diagnostics.” On May 29, 2020, this contract was increased from 

$100,000 to $611,000.82 The company also received a related award for $465,000 on July 28, 

2020.83

ADV’s contract was used in part to compensate Dr. Slaoui and at least three other former 

pharmaceutical company executives brought on to advise OWS, including former Teva executive 

Dr. Carlo de Notaristefani and former Pfizer executives Dr. William Erhardt and Dr. Rachel 

Harrigan.84 Because these advisors were hired as independent contractors rather than as federal 

employees, they were able to avoid publicly disclosing their financial holdings and potential 

conflicts of interest.85

a. Investigative Steps and Findings

On August 12, 2020, the Select Subcommittee sent document requests to HHS, ADV, 

and Dr. Slaoui regarding potential conflicts of interest and the selection of vaccine candidates for 

funding through OWS.86 On September 21, 2020, Chairman Clyburn sent a follow-up letter to 

ADV urging compliance with the Select Subcommittee’s requests.87

HHS, ADV, and Dr. Slaoui have produced only a small fraction of responsive 

documents.88 Yet these few documents are enough to raise significant concerns. On September 

22, 2020, the Select Subcommittee released documents revealing that advisors to OWS have 

potential conflicts of interest that could undermine the integrity of the Administration’s process 

for developing coronavirus vaccines.89 

The documents obtained by the Select Subcommittee show that contrary to previous 

assurances, Dr. Slaoui has not resolved a conflict of interest stemming from holdings of 

approximately $10 million of GSK securities, despite the company’s selection by OWS for 

federal investment.90 The Administration claimed that Dr. Slaoui is required to “donate any 

increase in the value” of these holdings to NIH,91 but the documents released by the Select 

Subcommittee showed that Dr. Slaoui is not required to donate any profits from companies 

involved in OWS during his lifetime. Instead, he can postpone his donation until the “last death” 

of Dr. Slaoui or his spouse.92 

13
The documents also revealed several other unresolved conflicts of interest. For example, 

Dr. Slaoui reported holdings in Lonza Group, a biotechnology company that in May 2020 

entered into a ten-year agreement to manufacture Moderna’s experimental coronavirus vaccine.93 

In addition, both Dr. Erhardt and Dr. Harrigan reported holdings in Pfizer, which in July 

2020 received a $1.95 billion order from the federal government for 100 million doses of an 

experimental coronavirus vaccine.94 Dr. Erhardt also listed holdings in Thermo Fisher 

Scientific, Inc., which has received millions of dollars from the federal government for 

coronavirus testing materials;95 PhaseBio Pharmaceuticals, which has initiated two clinical trials 

of drugs that may be used to treat coronavirus patients;96 and Incyte Pharmaceuticals, which is 

working with FDA to study a product for patients with cytokine storm associated with the 

coronavirus.97 Dr. de Notaristefani listed a financial interest in Teva Pharmaceuticals, which has 

been involved in manufacturing hydroxychloroquine, a drug that has been studied as a potential 

treatment for the coronavirus.98

The Administration appears to have allowed these advisors to keep these holdings, along 

with any profits, by certifying that “the Government has determined” the companies “are not 

involved in vaccines, therapeutics and diagnostic products developed to combat pandemic 

COVID-19,” despite clear evidence to the contrary.99

b. Recommendations

For Operation Warp Speed to be worthy of full public confidence, the Trump 

Administration should take steps to ensure that all advisors have disclosed and addressed 

potential conflicts of interest. The Administration and other participants in OWS also must 

cooperate with the Select Subcommittee’s inquiry so Congress and the American people can 

understand the full scope of potential conflicts of interest, the steps that have been taken to 

address them, and whether additional actions are needed. 

14
5. The Administration and Some States Have Not Done Enough to Help Americans

Vote Safely During the Pandemic

The Select Subcommittee investigated states’ efforts to ensure a free, fair, and safe

general election during the coronavirus pandemic, after problems during the 2020 primary 

elections—including closed polling places, long lines, and poll worker shortages—raised 

concerns about whether states would be prepared to accommodate anticipated high voter turnout 

and protect voters’ health in the general election.100 The Select Subcommittee found that several 

states and the federal government must take further steps to address obstacles to voting safely 

during the pandemic.

Although many states removed barriers to absentee voting during the pandemic,101 inperson voting remains critical for many voters.102 In the 2020 primaries, states faced shortages 

of poll workers because of the pandemic, and shortages are expected to occur again during the 

general election. Nearly six in ten poll workers in 2018 were 61 or older, with over a quarter of 

poll workers over 70 years old—putting them at higher risk if exposed to the coronavirus.103 

Some states closed polling places during the primaries because they lacked enough volunteers to 

staff them.104 

To prevent the spread of the coronavirus during the election, CDC issued guidelines 

aimed at helping election officials establish and expand voting options. The guidance states: 

“The more an individual interacts with others, and the longer that interaction, the higher the risk 

of COVID-19 spread. Elections with only in-person voting on a single day are higher risk for 

COVID-19 spread because there will be large crowds and longer wait times.” CDC’s guidance 

calls for “a wide variety of voting options,” including mail-in ballots, early voting, and 

precautions for in-person Election Day voting to protect voters and poll workers.105 

a. Investigative Steps and Results

On August 14, 2020, the Select Subcommittee and the Committee on House

Administration sent letters to the top election officials in four states—Texas, Georgia, Florida 

and Wisconsin—where voters faced serious impediments to voting in the 2020 primary 

elections. The Committees sought information on the states’ efforts to prevent similar problems 

in the general election and to follow CDC recommendations to provide alternatives to in-person 

voting such as voting by mail or dropbox, extended early voting, and safe polling places with 

distancing and sanitization precautions.106

On September 9, 2020, the Select Subcommittee held a remote hearing on “Ensuring a 

Free, Fair, and Safe Election During the Coronavirus Pandemic” with civil rights advocates and 

public health experts. Witnesses urged states to take immediate action to provide options to 

voters for safely casting their ballot.107 

Also on September 9, 2020, the Select Subcommittee released a staff memorandum 

showing that Florida, Georgia, Texas and Wisconsin face the risk of serious problems in the 

general election, including inadequate polling places and shortages of poll workers. In some of 

15
these states, these risks are exacerbated by state policies restricting mail-in voting and early 

voting.108 

• Texas is one of just six states refusing to expand mail-in voting during the pandemic,

forcing most voters to vote in person. Documents obtained by the Select Subcommittee

show many Texas counties may not have enough poll workers or polling locations for the

general election, with county officials warning, “Voters could be waiting in lines for

hours.”

• Before the 2020 primary, Georgia sent absentee ballot applications to all voters. Georgia

reversed this policy for the general election, even though the state’s coronavirus infection

rates have increased dramatically since the primary. Georgia also faced a poll worker

shortage as of September 2020, telling the Select Subcommittee it needed 20,000 poll

workers but had identified just 5,000 possible candidates.

• In Florida, the Governor refused to expand early voting despite long lines and hundreds

of poll closures in the 2020 primaries. The state lacked statewide projections of voter

turnout, absentee ballots, and poll workers needed.

• Wisconsin engaged in recruitment efforts but lacks statewide recruiting data, so it

remains unclear whether Wisconsin will have a sufficient number of poll workers in the

general election.

On October 6, 2020, Chairman Clyburn, along with Rep. Zoe Lofgren, Chairperson of the

Committee on House Administration, and Rep. Carolyn B. Maloney, Chairwoman of the 

Committee on Oversight and Reform, wrote to Texas Governor Greg Abbott urging him to 

rescind a proclamation requiring early vote-by-mail ballots that are returned in-person to be 

delivered to “a single early voting clerk’s office” location in each county.109 Because most 

voters returning their mail-in ballots are over 65 years old or disabled, the burden of traveling 

potentially long distances to one location will fall on those most vulnerable to the health risks of 

the coronavirus. 

b. Recommendations

Chairman Clyburn concluded at the Select Subcommittee’s September 9, 2020, hearing:

“Holding a free, fair, and safe election under these circumstances is a challenge. But let there be 

no doubt: if we all do our part, America is up to the challenge.”110 States and cities have the 

tools to provide adequate voting by mail and dropbox, extended early voting, and safe polling 

places as recommended by CDC. States cannot simply defer to local election officials but must 

move swiftly and proactively to address these problems. 

The federal government also must support cash-strapped states and localities as they seek 

to protect public health during the general election. While the CARES Act provided $400 

million to states to prepare for the 2020 election, experts have estimated that $4 billion is 

needed.111 On May 15, 2020, and again on October 1, 2020, the House of Representatives 

passed bills to provide an additional $3.6 billion.112 

16
In an October 22, 2020, op-ed in the New York Times, Chairman Clyburn urged voters to 

follow CDC’s advice on voting safely during the pandemic by making a plan to vote, casting 

their ballot early, and taking basic health precautions like wearing a mask.113 

17
II. THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION FAILED TO PROTECT MILLIONS OF

AMERICANS IN FINANCIAL DISTRESS

1. Treasury and IRS Delayed Delivery of Economic Impact Payments to Nine Million

Americans

The Select Subcommittee is investigating significant problems with the delivery of EIPs,

and successfully pressed Treasury and IRS to correct several problems, helping up to nine 

million Americans receive desperately needed federal support.

The CARES Act included a provision designed to swiftly put money in the pockets of 

struggling Americans to help them meet their essential needs while supporting the nation’s 

economy. EIPs of up to $1,200 per person were provided automatically to Americans who filed 

tax returns in 2018 or 2019 or participated in certain federal benefit programs. In June 2020, 

Treasury and IRS announced they had distributed 159 million individual payments, worth more 

than $267 billion, through direct deposit, checks, and prepaid debit cards.114

A June 2020 report of the National Taxpayer Advocate—an independent watchdog 

within the IRS—stated that many people had either not received their full EIP amount or had not 

received an EIP at all and may not receive payment until 2021.115 These Americans are 

disproportionately low-income and many face an acute need for financial relief. 

Media reports also indicated some EIP recipients may have thrown away EIP debit cards 

received in the mail because the envelopes resembled junk mail or scams instead of official 

government mail.116 Additionally, some Americans may have unknowingly blocked their 

Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) payment when they claimed their EIP online through the 

IRS’s online tool.117 Fixing the problem required the taxpayer to send in a tax return in hard 

copy and face months-long delays in IRS processing. 

a. Investigative Steps and Results

On July 8, 2020, the Select Subcommittee sent a document request to Treasury and IRS 

and urged them to identify how many people were still waiting to receive their EIP and to 

conduct outreach to instruct them how to claim it.118 On August 3, 2020, the Select 

Subcommittee pressed Treasury and IRS again to identify those who had not received their EIP, 

many of whom are low-income or homeless, and to speed up distribution.119 

On September 8, 2020, IRS announced that it had identified approximately nine million 

non-filers who had not yet received an EIP and planned to notify them and give them until 

October 15, 2020, to apply online to receive their payment this year.120 

On September 11, 2020, Chairman Clyburn pressed the Administration to “send these 

notices out quickly and to extend the deadline to apply online beyond October 15, 2020.”121 On 

September 25, 2020, Treasury staff informed Subcommittee staff that it had expedited the 

notices to those non-filers of their potential EIP eligibility. On October 2, 2020, Chairman 

Clyburn again pressed Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin to extend the deadline following 

18
Secretary Mnuchin’s testimony before the Select Subcommittee.122 Three days later, IRS agreed 

to extend the deadline for non-filers to claim their EIP from October 15 to November 21.123

Following the Select Subcommittee’s inquiry, Treasury and IRS also made improvements 

in other aspects related to EIP distribution. After the Subcommittee pressed to expedite a fix for 

EIP filers who were blocked from making online EITC claims, Treasury and IRS acquiesced, 

announcing those individuals could e-file rather than requiring them to make a hard-copy 

filing.124

Treasury also agreed to make changes to the distribution via debit card of any future EIP 

or similar payment. Consistent with media reports indicating that some recipients mistook their 

EIP debit card for a fraud or scam, Treasury disclosed that months after EIP debit cards had been 

sent, nearly 20 percent had never been activated. Treasury acknowledged that its process 

resulted in some debit cards being “inadvertently discarded” and committed to “take additional 

steps to minimize the possibility that EIP Cards are discarded.”125

b. Recommendations

The Select Subcommittee has called on Treasury and IRS to seek to ensure that every 

American eligible for an EIP receives one. On October 7, 2020, Chairman Clyburn stated: 

“I urge the IRS to ensure that these Americans, who are disproportionately low-income, are 

aware of the extension so they can access the federal relief they are eligible to receive.”126 

19
2. The Administration Has Not Provided Critical Housing Protections to Struggling

Americans

The Select Subcommittee is investigating steps taken by FHFA, Fannie Mae, and Freddie

Mac to prevent Americans from losing their homes during the pandemic and has urged further 

actions to prevent evictions and foreclosures.

In March 2020, Congress passed the CARES Act, which included protections for renters 

and homeowners, such as a prohibition against requiring a tenant to vacate a residential unit until 

30 days after they receive a notice to vacate, a moratorium on eviction, and an expansion of the 

availability of forbearance for homeowners who are behind on their mortgage payments.127 The 

Act’s eviction moratorium expired on July 25, 2020, shortly before the expiration of enhanced 

federal unemployment benefits. In June, according to the Census Bureau, nearly nine million 

homeowners had missed a payment on their mortgage in the prior month.128 Data suggests that 

people of color are at disproportionate risk of losing their homes yet are receiving federal 

housing assistance during the pandemic at the lower rates than white homeowners. 

a. Investigative Steps and Results

On July 27, 2020, Chairman Clyburn sent letters to the chief executive officers of Fannie 

Mae and Freddie Mac urging the government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) to take immediate 

steps to help homeowners and renters in homes with federally-backed mortgages avoid 

foreclosure and eviction.129 To prevent evictions of tenants who are past due on their rent, 

Chairman Clyburn requested that the GSEs direct mortgage servicers to notify borrowers of the 

CARES Act notice requirement prior to evicting a tenant. The Chairman also requested that the 

GSEs direct mortgage servicers to notify all borrowers of the terms and availability of mortgage

forbearance and provide data on financially distressed borrowers. 

On the same day the Chairman sent these letters, the FHFA Inspector General issued a 

report showing that only 10 percent of mortgage servicers provided clear and complete 

information on forbearance and other options.130 Despite this troubling finding, Fannie Mae and 

Freddie Mac insisted there was no need for them to ensure borrowers were informed of 

protections for financially distressed households.131 

On October 16, 2020, Chairman Clyburn sent a letter to Mark Calabria, Director of the 

FHFA, urging FHFA to take action to prevent foreclosures. The letter included new information 

the Select Subcommittee obtained from FHFA showing that more than 31,000 homeowners who 

were over 60 days delinquent on their mortgage in August 2020 did not receive forbearance.132 

Mortgage delinquencies nearly tripled between January and June 2020—from 559,424 in 

January 2020 to 1,579,566 in June 2020. Delinquencies in June exceeded 7 percent in seven 

states, and nearly 20 percent of homeowners were delinquent in Puerto Rico.133 The Select 

Subcommittee is continuing to seek information, including more recent delinquency and 

forbearance data, that FHFA has withheld. 

20
b. Recommendations

On September 1, 2020, CDC imposed a moratorium on evictions for tenants with an 

income of $99,000 or less.134 However, the order does not stop landlords from beginning the 

eviction process,135 and landlords have already filed thousands of eviction complaints in court.136 

The CDC moratorium also does nothing to address the long-term financial challenges for tenants 

who simply do not have enough income to pay their rent. By contrast, the Health and Economic 

Recovery Omnibus Emergency Solutions (Heroes) Act passed by the House of Representatives 

on October 1, 2020, would provide emergency financial assistance for renters, as well as extend 

and expand the eviction moratorium.137

FHFA must take stronger action to address deficiencies in the forbearance programs of 

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Homeowners in financial distress who have not received 

forbearance or other relief could face foreclosure on January 1, 2021, immediately after the 

foreclosure moratorium expires. Forbearance prevents homeowners from losing their home by 

allowing them to pause or reduce their mortgage payments to an amount that reflects their ability 

to pay during the pandemic.138 Making this forbearance automatic for homeowners who are 60 

days behind in their payments would ensure homeowners get the relief they need even if 

servicers fail to accurately inform them of their options. 

The Heroes Act would require any borrower who is 60 days delinquent to automatically 

be granted forbearance.139 It would also provide emergency financial assistance to homeowners 

for mortgage payments and other costs. With this legislation stalled in the Senate and 

homeowners in need of relief, FHFA should take action to ensure that delinquent homeowners 

benefit from the forbearance programs intended to help keep them in their homes. Such action 

would be consistent with FHFA’s earlier actions during the coronavirus crisis, including the 

suspension of foreclosures and the creation of a new payment deferral option for homeowners in 

forbearance.140 

21
III. THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION PRIORITIZED WALL STREET OVER

MAIN STREET AND LEFT FEDERAL RELIEF PROGRAMS VULNERABLE

TO FRAUD

1. Treasury and SBA Neglected Underserved Communities and Allowed Billions of

Dollars in Potential Fraud in the Paycheck Protection Program

Congress established the PPP to help small businesses and non-profit organizations

survive the coronavirus crisis by providing forgivable loans to cover payroll, rent, and utility 

payments. The CARES Act urged SBA to issue guidance “to ensure that the processing and 

disbursement of covered loans prioritizes small business concerns and entities in underserved 

and rural markets,” including businesses owned by veterans, members of the military 

community, socially and economically disadvantaged individuals, and women.141

Despite Congress’s clear intent, the Select Subcommittee found that the Trump 

Administration and many big banks failed to prioritize small businesses in underserved markets, 

including minority and women-owned businesses. As a result, small businesses that were truly 

in need of financial support during the economic crisis often faced longer waits and more 

obstacles to receiving PPP funding than larger, wealthier companies. 

The Select Subcommittee also found that even as the intended recipients struggled to 

access these funds, Treasury and SBA’s failure to institute safeguards may have led to billions of 

dollars being diverted to fraud, waste, and abuse. 

a. Investigative Steps and Results

On June 15, 2020, the Select Subcommittee launched an investigation into the Trump 

Administration’s implementation of the PPP, following reports that the program favored large 

companies over the neediest small businesses.142 The Select Subcommittee sent letters to SBA, 

Treasury, two banking industry associations,143 and eight financial institutions: JPMorgan 

Chase, Citibank, PNC Bank, Bank of America, U.S. Bank, Truist, Wells Fargo, and 

Santander.144 The Subcommittee obtained over 30,000 pages of documents, conducted briefings, 

and interviewed community lenders and other stakeholders. The Subcommittee also obtained 

aggregate loan data from seven financial institutions and detailed data from SBA and Treasury 

on all 5.2 million loans approved by SBA. 

The Select Subcommittee released reports detailing its findings on September 1, 2020, 

and October 16, 2020.145 The Subcommittee found that Treasury, SBA, and several large 

financial institutions failed to implement PPP as Congress intended, resulting in minority and 

women-owned businesses facing obstacles to access PPP loans. Treasury privately encouraged 

banks to limit their PPP lending to existing customers—excluding many minority and womenowned small businesses that are less likely to have a pre-existing banking relationship. SBA and 

Treasury also failed to issue guidance called for by Congress to prioritize underserved markets. 

In addition, several lenders processed bigger PPP loans for wealthy customers at more than twice 

the speed of smaller loans for the neediest small businesses.146

22
The Select Subcommittee’s analysis of nonpublic loan data revealed a total of 22,529 

PPP loans worth more than $4.2 billion issued by the Administration could be subject to fraud, 

waste, or abuse. These loans included: (1) over $1 billion in loans that went to companies that 

received multiple loans; (2) more than 600 loans totaling over $96 million that went to 

companies excluded from doing business with the government and therefore prohibited from 

obtaining a PPP loan; (3) more than 350 loans worth $195 million that went to government 

contractors with significant performance and integrity issues; and (4) more than 11,000 

borrowers and $2.98 billion in loans that raise potential fraud concerns when compared against 

the federal government’s System for Award Management database.147 On September 1, 2020, 

Chairman Clyburn referred these potentially fraudulent loans to the Inspectors General at 

Treasury and SBA for examination and called for the Inspectors General to conduct a review of 

the program’s oversight and accountability mechanisms.148

b. Recommendations

To ensure that relief funds reach those who need them most, the Select Subcommittee 

recommends that, if the PPP is extended as part of a comprehensive coronavirus relief package, 

SBA and Treasury should (1) issue clear and detailed guidance to ensure lenders prioritize 

underserved markets, as well as minority and women-owned business; (2) invest in Community 

Development Financial Institutions and Minority Depository Institutions to fully equip them to 

handle the demand for loan applications; and (3) include a demographic questionnaire on the 

PPP application form. 

To mitigate the risk of fraud, waste, and abuse in the PPP, the Select Subcommittee 

recommends that SBA and Treasury (1) improve the internal controls for loan forgiveness; 

(2) improve the audit plan for PPP borrowers; and (3) cooperate with oversight from Congress,

Inspectors General, and other watchdogs.

23
2. Fed and Treasury Lending Facilities Prioritized Big Corporations and Investors

Over Small Businesses, Workers, and States

Monetary policy can be a critical tool in enabling an equitable economic recovery from

the coronavirus pandemic. Unfortunately, the manner in which Treasury and the Fed have set up 

and administered emergency lending facilities pursuant to the CARES Act has exacerbated 

economic inequality by benefitting big corporations and investors over smaller businesses, 

workers, and state and local governments. 

a. Investigative Steps and Results

To understand the economic impact—particularly the distributional impact—of these 

facilities, the Select Subcommittee held hearings with former Fed Chairs Ben Bernanke and 

Janet Yellen on July 17, 2020, Treasury Secretary Mnuchin on September 1, 2020, and Fed 

Chair Powell on September 23, 2020. On August 6, 2020, the Select Subcommittee launched an 

investigation into the Main Street Lending Program’s failures.149 Staff conducted briefings with 

the Fed and Treasury, consulted with outside experts, and reviewed thousands of pages produced 

by the Fed and Treasury. 

On September 23, 2020, the Select Subcommittee published a staff report documenting 

how the Fed’s corporate bond purchases prioritized Wall Street over workers.150 The report 

found that the Fed responded quickly to bail out the corporate bond market from the pandemicinduced economic crisis, announcing on March 23, 2020, that it would directly purchase 

corporate bonds.151 The Fed’s actions led to record-breaking bond issuances and dramatically 

cheaper credit available to large corporations.152 Yet these facilities provided no assistance to 

the small businesses that employ most Americans. The facilities also lack taxpayer and worker 

protections. The Select Subcommittee found that the Fed has purchased corporate bonds issued 

by 140 companies that laid off or furloughed workers during the pandemic—more than one 

million workers total—and 383 companies that paid dividends to their shareholders during the 

pandemic. Ninety-five of the companies whose bonds the Fed purchased both dismissed workers 

and paid dividends.153

While many large corporations have flourished, the Fed’s facilities for smaller businesses 

and state and local governments have failed to help their intended beneficiaries or support a 

wider economic recovery. The Main Street Lending Program—a $600 billion group of lending 

facilities backstopped by CARES Act funds—has issued only 252 loans totaling less than 

0.4 percent of available capital.154 Public reporting indicates that bureaucratic infighting delayed 

the program’s launch and constrained its ability to reach small and medium-sized businesses in 

need.155 The Select Subcommittee’s investigation confirmed substantial policy disagreements 

between Treasury and the Fed about the program’s risk tolerance, with the Fed advocating for a 

higher level of acceptable loss in order to be able to help more small businesses. As Treasury 

explained during a staff briefing on September 11, 2020, the Department was concerned that they 

would be responsible for “the first dollar” of any loan losses to the program and therefore limited 

the program, placing it out of reach for many small businesses.156 

24
The Municipal Liquidity Facility—a $500 billion lending facility backstopped by 

CARES Act funds—has similarly failed to help state and local governments, with only two notes 

purchased.157 The Fed has imposed onerous interest rates and a short repayment period on loans, 

rendering the facility useless to most jurisdictions.158 

b. Recommendations

The Fed should expand lending to more small and medium-sized businesses and 

municipal governments as Congress intended under the CARES Act. The Fed’s lending 

facilities should, to the extent possible, include protections for taxpayers and workers. But 

expanded loan facilities are no substitute for direct aid. Significant direct assistance—like that 

provided in the Heroes Act—remains critical for small businesses, workers, and state and local 

governments. 

25
3. The Administration Weakened the Payroll Support Program, Allowing Thousands

of Aviation Workers to Lose Their Jobs

Congress created the PSP to “preserve aviation jobs” by providing taxpayer-funded wage

assistance to companies in exchange for keeping workers on the payroll.159 Contrary to 

Congress’s intent, Treasury provided PSP funds to more than a dozen airline industry contractors 

that had engaged in mass layoffs.160 The Select Subcommittee opened an investigation into 

Treasury’s implementation of the PSP to determine how aviation contractors laying off 

thousands of employees nevertheless received hundreds of millions of dollars in payroll 

assistance as part of a program designed to save jobs. 

a. Investigative Steps and Results

The Select Subcommittee launched its investigation into Treasury’s implementation of 

the PSP on July 29, 2020, seeking documents and information from Treasury and four of the top 

aviation contractor recipients of PSP funds.161 Staff reviewed thousands of documents and held 

briefings to determine how the PSP was implemented and how Treasury’s decisions impacted 

contractors’ decision-making. 

The Select Subcommittee released a staff report on October 9, 2020, which identified four 

key decisions by Treasury that undermined the job-retention purpose of the program: 

(1) Treasury’s disregard of the CARES Act mandate to begin distributing payroll assistance

within ten days, and months-long delays in executing PSP agreements; (2) Treasury’s decision to

permit layoffs up to the execution date of a PSP agreement; (3) Treasury’s decision to permit

companies to spend PSP funds without a deadline; and (4) Treasury’s failure to reduce the

amount of funding awarded despite mass layoffs, giving companies payroll support for jobs that

no longer existed.162

As a direct result of Treasury’s delays in executing PSP agreements and permission to 

contractors to conduct layoffs while their applications were pending, the Select Subcommittee 

calculated that more than 16,500 aviation workers, over 15 percent of the aviation contractor 

workforce, lost their jobs.163 Despite the mass layoffs, Treasury provided payroll support to 

these companies calculated based on pre-pandemic workforce numbers, so the companies 

received the same amount they would have if they had not fired a single worker. Treasury also 

removed any incentive to use the funds to rehire workers—as a result, two of the biggest 

contractors did not rehire a single worker upon receipt of hundreds of millions of taxpayer 

dollars. The investigation found that these the contractors are instead slowly spending PSP funds 

to pay a vastly reduced workforce. 

On October 9, 2020, the Select Subcommittee sent follow-up letters to several aviation 

contractors that received PSP funds urging them to halt any further layoffs or furloughs until the 

companies had spent all remaining PSP funds. Four companies agreed to the request. These 

companies collectively employ more than 30,000 workers and received approximately $595 

million in federal payroll support.164 

26
On October 19, 2020, the Select Subcommittee sent letters to four cargo carriers that 

received a total of more than $630 million from Treasury through PSP, despite reports of the 

companies’ financial success during the pandemic.165 The letters request that the carriers return 

the money or demonstrate that they needed the funds to keep workers on the payroll, as Congress 

intended. 

b. Recommendations

To preserve aviation jobs, Congress should pass a second round of payroll support with 

additional protections to prioritize saving jobs as part of a broader, comprehensive response to 

the coronavirus crisis such as the Heroes Act. Congress should also amend the CARES Act to 

prohibit involuntary layoffs and furloughs for as long as contractors still have PSP funds. 

27
Appendix A

Key Select Subcommittee Actions

This appendix highlights key public actions by the Select Subcommittee on the 

Coronavirus Crisis from its establishment on April 23, 2020, through October 2020, including 

taxpayer savings, hearings and briefings, staff reports, and investigations. This list does not 

include every action taken by the Select Subcommittee during this period. Many of the Select 

Subcommittee’s investigations are ongoing. 

Examples of Taxpayer Funds and Jobs Saved 

• $4 billion in potential Paycheck Protection Program fraud identified. On September

1, 2020, the Select Subcommittee identified more than $4 billion in potentially fraudulent

PPP loans, and referred them to the Inspectors General at Treasury and SBA for further

examination.

• 30,000 aviation jobs preserved. On October 21, 2020, the Select Subcommittee secured

commitments from four aviation contractors that collectively received $595 million in

Payroll Support Program funds to retain all current employees until after they have

exhausted remaining program funds.

• $765 million questionable pharmaceutical loan on hold. On August 10, 2020, the

Administration put on hold a $765 million loan to Kodak, after the Select Subcommittee

launched an inquiry into the loan in light of Kodak’s lack of pharmaceutical experience

and stock windfalls received by Kodak executives and directors.

• $109 million in nursing home funds returned to the Treasury. On August 5, 2020,

the Select Subcommittee announced Ensign Group, Inc. returned $109 million it had

received from the HHS Provider Fund after the Select Subcommittee launched an

investigation into nursing homes.

• $10 million in PPP funds returned to the Treasury. On May 11, 2020, MiMedx

Group, Inc. returned $10 million in PPP funds after the Select Subcommittee opened an

investigation into larger, publicly traded companies receiving PPP funds.

Hearings and Briefings

The Select Subcommittee held 15 public hearings and briefings during this period: 

• May 13, 2020: Briefing on “Testing, Tracing, and Targeted Containment.”

• May 21, 2020: Briefing on “Heroes of the Coronavirus Crisis: Protecting Frontline

and Essential Workers During the Pandemic.”

28
• May 29, 2020: Briefing on “Supporting America’s Cities: What Mayors Need to

Safely Reopen.”

• June 4, 2020: Briefing on “An Unequal Burden: Addressing Racial Health

Disparities in the Coronavirus Pandemic.”

• June 11, 2020: Briefing on “The Devastating Impact of the Coronavirus Crisis in

America’s Nursing Homes.”

• June 18, 2020: Hearing on “The Unemployment Pandemic: Addressing America’s

Jobs Crisis.” 

• June 26, 2020: Hearing on “Accountability in Crisis: GAO’s Recommendations to

Improve the Federal Coronavirus Response.”

• July 2, 2020: Hearing on “The Administration’s Efforts to Procure, Stockpile, and

Distribute Critical Supplies.”

• July 17, 2020: Hearing on “Former Federal Reserve Chairs on Responding to Our

Nation’s Economic Crisis.”

• July 31, 2020: Hearing on “The Urgent Need for a National Plan to Contain the

Coronavirus” with National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases Director

Dr. Anthony Fauci, CDC Director Dr. Robert Redfield, and HHS Assistant Secretary for

Health Admiral Brett Giroir.

• August 6, 2020: Hearing on “Challenges to Safely Reopening K-12 Schools.”

• September 1, 2020: Hearing with Treasury Secretary Steven T. Mnuchin.

• September 9, 2020: Hearing on “Ensuring a Free, Fair, and Safe Election During

the Coronavirus Pandemic.”

• September 23, 2020: Hearing with Federal Reserve Chair Jerome H. Powell.

• October 2, 2020: Hearing with Secretary of Health and Human Services Alex M.

Azar II.

Staff Reports and Analyses

• August 6, 2020: A Failure to Lead: The Trump Administration’s Disastrous

Response to the Coronavirus Pandemic (joint staff report).

• September 1, 2020: Preliminary Analysis of Paycheck Protection Program Data

(staff memorandum showing billions of dollars in PPP loans may have been diverted to

fraud, waste, and abuse).

29
• September 9, 2020: Examination of States’ Preparedness for the November Election

(staff memorandum showing Texas, Georgia, Florida, and Wisconsin face risks to free,

fair, and safe voting in the general election).

• September 23, 2020: Prioritizing Wall Street: The Fed’s Corporate Bond

Purchases During the Coronavirus Pandemic (staff analysis showing the Fed bought

corporate bonds from companies that laid off workers and paid dividends during the

pandemic).

• October 2, 2020: The Trump’s Administration Pattern of Political Interference in

the Nation’s Coronavirus Response (staff analysis identifying 47 instances of political

interference in the Administration’s public health response to the pandemic).

• October 9, 2020: Unnecessary Costs: How the Trump Administration Allowed

Thousands of Aviation Workers to Lose Their Jobs (staff analysis showing how

Treasury allowed companies to lay off workers and still receive full funding under the

Payroll Support Program).

• October 16, 2020: Underserved and Unprotected: How the Trump Administration

Neglected the Neediest Small Businesses in the PPP (staff report showing how

Treasury, SBA, and big banks prioritized larger and wealthier companies over truly

struggling small businesses in the PPP).

Investigations

The Select Subcommittee launched 30 investigations during this period, many of which 

are ongoing, related to the coronavirus public health crisis and the economic crisis that it has 

caused. Several of these investigations have already resulted in taxpayer savings and 

improvements in the federal government’s response to the pandemic. For example:

Public Health Matters 

• HHS Vaccine and Treatment Contracts: On June 2, 2020, the Select Subcommittee,

along with the Committee on Oversight and Reform, launched an investigation into

HHS’s use of more than $3.5 billion in taxpayer dollars to fund contracts with private

companies to research and manufacture coronavirus vaccines and therapeutics.

• Nursing Homes: On June 16, 2020, the Select Subcommittee sent letters to the Centers

for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) and the nation’s five largest for-profit

nursing home companies seeking documents and information about how CMS and major

nursing home companies have responded to the coronavirus pandemic. On August 5,

2020, one of the nursing home companies under investigation agreed to return

approximately $109 million in taxpayer funds.

30
• Testing Shortages: On June 22, 2020, Chairman Clyburn sent letters to the White

House, HHS, and CDC regarding possible efforts by the Administration to limit

coronavirus testing after President Trump stated that he told his staff to “slow the testing

down.” The Subcommittee also sought supply and demand projections, but the

Administration did not provide any projections generated by federal agencies. At a

hearing on July 31, 2020, Admiral Giroir conceded that major testing labs are “strained”

and that 40 percent of tests takes three days or more, a length of time that, according to

Dr. Fauci, “obviates the whole purpose of doing it.”

• Closure of Federal Testing Sites: On June 25, 2020, Chairman Clyburn and

Representatives from Texas, Colorado, Illinois, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, sent a

letter to HHS Secretary Azar urging him to reverse the Administration’s decision to end

federal funding and support for 13 coronavirus testing sites across five states. Following

this letter, the Administration agreed to restore temporary support for five Texas testing

sites for another month.

• PPE Shortages and Questionable Contracts: On July 14, 2020, the Select

Subcommittee sent letters to Secretary Azar, Defense Secretary Mark Esper, Acting

Homeland Security Secretary Chad Wolf, and Veterans Affairs Secretary Robert Wilkie,

along with seven private companies seeking documents about contracts to procure PPE

and medical supplies as well as steps the Administration has taken to address supply

shortages. In response, the Administration has not identified any projections of supply

and demand for PPE, consistent with the July 2, 2020, testimony before the Select

Subcommittee by the head of the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s Supply

Chain Stabilization Task Force that he has “no visibility” into “what states, local

municipalities and private institutions have bought” and that, “States at this time are not

reporting on that” to the Administration.

• Diverting Hospital Data Away From CDC: On July 17, 2020, the Select

Subcommittee sent a joint letter to HHS and CDC seeking information regarding the

Administration’s decision to direct hospitals to stop reporting coronavirus data to CDC—

which has collected the information since the beginning of the pandemic—and instead to

send information to a portal run by a private company selected by HHS. On July 28,

2020, the Select Subcommittee sent a request to the contractor, TeleTracking

Technologies.

• Safely Reopening Schools: On July 17, 2020, Chairman Clyburn requested records

from Education Secretary Betsy DeVos about the Administration’s threat to defund

schools that do not immediately reopen for full-time, in-person education. In response,

the Department of Education conceded it does not have the authority to put conditions on

pandemic relief funds.

• Bipartisan Oversight of Vaccine Development: On July 24, 2020, Chairman Clyburn

led a bipartisan letter, along with Rep. Bill Foster and Rep. Mark Green, to Comptroller

General Gene Dodaro calling on the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to

conduct ongoing oversight of Operation Warp Speed and other vaccine-development

31
initiatives. On July 28, 2020, GAO accepted the engagement. On September 15, 2020, 

the Select Subcommittee wrote to HHS and the Department of Defense (DOD) calling for 

the Departments to comply with this review. 

• White House Coronavirus Task Force Reports: On July 29, 2020, the Select

Subcommittee sent letters to Vice President Mike Pence and Dr. Deborah Birx regarding

private reports the White House Coronavirus Task Force sent to states that contradicted

rosy public statements from the President. The Subcommittee also sent letters to the

governors of Georgia, Florida, Oklahoma, and Tennessee, calling on them to comply with

recommendations from the Task Force. On August 31, 2020, the Subcommittee released

eight weeks of reports that the White House did not disclose to the public. On September

16, 2020, the Subcommittee raised concerns that the Task Force had weakened previous

recommendations following political pressure from the President. On October 20, 2020,

the Subcommittee released another six weeks of private reports showing the President

had downplayed the threat and held rallies in “red zone” states while the virus surged

around the country.

• Questionable Loan to Kodak: On August 4, 2020, the Select Subcommittee launched a

joint investigation into the Trump Administration’s planned $765 million federal loan to

Kodak to support the production of ingredients for generic drugs, despite the company’s

lack of pharmaceutical experience and trading activity that resulted in windfalls for

company executives and directors. The Administration put the loan on hold after this

investigation was announced.

• Conflicts of Interest in Operation Warp Speed: On August 12, 2020, the Select

Subcommittee launched an investigation potential conflicts of interest in OWS, as well as

the Administration’s process to select vaccine candidates. On September 22, 2020, the

Select Subcommittee released documents revealing that at least four top advisors to

OWS, including top advisor Dr. Moncef Slaoui, have potentially unresolved conflicts of

interest.

• Holding Elections During a Pandemic: On August 14, 2020, the Select Subcommittee,

along with the House Administration Committee, launched an investigation into

preparations by Florida, Georgia, Texas, and Wisconsin to hold free, fair, and safe

elections. On September 9, 2020, the Subcommittee issued a staff analysis identifying

election risks in all four states. On October 6, 2020, the Subcommittee sent a joint letter

to the Governor of Texas, urging him to reverse his closure of ballot return locations.

• Equitable Vaccine Distribution: On September 8, 2020, the Select Subcommittee sent

a joint letter to Secretary Azar requesting information regarding the process HHS plans to

use to determine the distribution of any coronavirus vaccines and the importance of

achieving fairness and equity in vaccine prioritization and targeting.

• HHS Advertising Campaign to “Defeat Despair”: On September 11, 2020, the Select

Subcommittee launched a joint investigation into a $250 million contract for an

advertising campaign to “defeat despair” just weeks before Election Day. On October 1,

32
2020, the Committees expanded the inquiry to a related contract. On October 2, 2020, 

Secretary Azar testified before the Select Subcommittee that the advertising campaign 

was under review at HHS. 

• Political Interference with Scientists: On September 14, 2020, the Select

Subcommittee sent a letter to Secretary Azar and Dr. Redfield regarding political

interference in CDC’s scientific publications related to the coronavirus. The

Subcommittee sought documents and transcribed interviews with two HHS officials and

five CDC employees. On September 16, 2020, HHS announced that both HHS officials

were leaving their roles. Chairman Clyburn sent additional letters seeking compliance on

September 22, 2020, and October 22, 2020.

• CDC Guidance on School Reopening: On September 30, 2020, the Select

Subcommittee called on the Administration to end its political interference with CDC

guidance on reopening schools during the coronavirus pandemic and revise it to

accurately reflect the science. At a briefing on October 21, 2020, CDC conceded that its

guidance was outdated and confirmed the agency will update the guidance to reflect the

current science on risks to children.

• DOD Use of CARES Funds: On October 2, 2020, the Select Subcommittee launched a

joint investigation into DOD’s diversion of CARES Act funds intended for the

manufacturing and distribution of PPE and medical supplies.

• Misuse of Education CARES Act Funds: On October 5, 2020, the Select

Subcommittee and Committee on Education and Labor launched an investigation into

South Carolina’s misuse of CARES Act education funds to develop a voucher program.

Shortly thereafter, the South Carolina Supreme Court ruled that the state’s planned use of

CARES funds violated state law.

• Herd Immunity: On October 9, 2020, the Select Subcommittee launched an

investigation into whether Trump Administration is pursuing a “herd immunity” strategy

in response to the pandemic, which public health experts have warned could lead to the

death of more than two million Americans.

Economic Matters 

• Paycheck Protection Program – Loans to Larger Companies: On May 8, 2020, the

Select Subcommittee launched an investigation into large, public corporations that

received PPP funds, requesting that they return the funds or produce a range of

documents, which resulted in the return of $10 million.

• Paycheck Protection Program – Equity, Accountability, and Transparency: On June

15, 2020, the Select Subcommittee launched an investigation into whether Treasury and

banks prioritized wealthier small businesses at the expense of truly struggling small

businesses, and called on the Administration to release loan data. Four days later,

Treasury and SBA agreed to release a portion of this loan data publicly and to provide

33
additional data to the Select Subcommittee. On September 1, 2020, the Select 

Subcommittee released a staff memo on more than $4 billion in potential PPP fraud. On 

October 16, 2020, the Select Subcommittee released a staff report finding that the Trump 

Administration and many big banks failed to prioritize small businesses in underserved 

markets, including minority and women-owned businesses.

• Unemployment and Economic Projections: The Select Subcommittee sent letters on

June 18, 2020, and July 1, 2020, seeking the release of key unemployment and economic

projections. In response, the Administration stated that it had not calculated the

projections, stating “the Administration has little or no confidence” in them.

• Paycheck Protection Program - Duplicate Loans: On June 23, 2020, the Select

Subcommittee asked the SBA Inspector General to investigate problems with SBA’s

implementation of PPP that allowed many businesses to receive duplicate loans. On June

29, 2020, the SBA Inspector General agreed to conduct this review as part of its oversight

of the PPP.

• Equitable Distribution of Economic Impact Payments: On July 8, 2020, the Select

Subcommittee launched an investigation into why millions of Americans were still

waiting to receive their EIPs. Following this inquiry, IRS announced on September 8,

2020, that it would mail notices to Americans who had not yet received their stimulus

check. After further pressure from the Subcommittee on August 3, 2020, September 11,

2020, and October 2, 2020, Treasury agreed to extend the deadline for non-filers to claim

their EIP.

• Compliance with Paid Leave Protections: On July 21, 2020, the Select Subcommittee

launched an investigation into the Department of Labor’s implementation of paid leave in

the Families First Coronavirus Response Act (FFCRA).

• Protecting Homeowners and Renters: On July 27, 2020, the Select Subcommittee

launched an investigation into the impact of the pandemic on homeowners and renters

and urged the FHFA, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac to take immediate steps to help

homeowners and renters avoid foreclosure and eviction. On October 16, 2020, the Select

Subcommittee released new data showing the financial distress of homeowners and urged

FHFA to grant automatic forbearance to homeowners who are late on their mortgages.

• Aviation Layoffs: On July 29, 2020, the Select Subcommittee launched an investigation

into the disbursement of federal funds from the Payroll Support Program to aviation

contractors that recently laid off thousands of workers. On October 9, 2020, the Select

Subcommittee issued a reporting finding that, contrary to congressional intent, Treasury

permitted aviation contractors to lay off thousands of workers and receive full payroll

support calculated based on the companies’ pre-pandemic workforce. On October 20,

2020, the Subcommittee sent letters to several cargo carriers that received a total of more

than $630 million in PSP funds despite having financial success during the pandemic.

On October 21, 2020, the Select Subcommittee secured commitments from four aviation

34
contractors that collectively received $595 million in PSP funds to retain all current 

employees until after they have exhausted remaining program funds. 

• SBA Emergency Loan Program: On July 30, 2020, the Select Subcommittee launched

an investigation into a $500 million contract awarded by SBA to process Emergency

Injury Disaster Loan applications.

• Main Street Lending Program: On August 6, 2020, the Select Subcommittee launched

an investigation into the Fed’s Main Street Lending Program, seeking changes to help

workers and businesses as Congress intended.

• Farmers to Families Food Box Program: On August 24, 2020, the Select

Subcommittee launched an investigation into reported mismanagement in the Department

of Agriculture’s pandemic food assistance program.

35
Appendix B

The Trump Administration’s Pattern of Political Interference 

in the Nation’s Coronavirus Response

The Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis examined the Trump 

Administration’s failed public health response to the coronavirus crisis, which has led to the 

deaths of more than 227,000 Americans. On October 2, 2020, the Subcommittee published a list 

of 47 separate instances of political interference by the Administration from February through 

September 2020—including repeatedly overruling and sidelining top scientists and undermining 

Americans’ health to advance the President’s partisan agenda. The apparent goal of this 

unprecedented, coordinated attack on our nation’s public health agencies during the pandemic 

was, in the President’s words, to “play it down.” 

The Select Subcommittee has now documented a total of 61 separate incidents of 

political interference in the Administration’s coronavirus response spanning from February 

through October 2020. These incidents have degraded every major facet of the Administration’s 

public health response, including efforts to provide Americans access to testing and PPE, 

develop treatments and vaccines, and provide scientifically sound advice to the public on masks, 

social distancing, and other steps to stay safe. As Election Day approaches, documented 

examples of political interference have increased, with at least 27 instances in August, 

September, and October alone. 

For example, political appointees have: 

• Pressured health experts to adopt the Administration’s talking points, even when

they conflict with the science;

• Criticized, sidelined, and fired experts who insisted on sharing accurate scientific

information with the public;

• Altered, delayed, and suppressed guidance and scientific reports on testing,

protecting children, reopening schools, voting safely, and other topics;

• Authorized questionable virus treatments over the objections of scientists;

• Resisted efforts to ensure the safe development of a vaccine; and

• Diverted $265 million from CDC and FDA for an ad campaign to “defeat despair

and inspire hope” weeks before Election Day.

The Select Subcommittee’s analysis is based on public reporting and the Subcommittee’s 

investigations. It includes instances where the Administration actively interfered in the nation’s 

public health response through executive action or public or private pressure. It does not capture 

each instance in which President Trump or his appointees downplayed the danger of the virus to 

the public, made false and misleading statements about the science, and misstated key facts about 

the Administration’s response. 

36
Date Political Interference

1. February 20, 

2020 

The Administration Ignores CDC Advice to Separate Infected Cruise 

Ship Passengers. The Washington Post reports that following a 

coronavirus outbreak on the Diamond Princess cruise ship outside of 

Japan, a top Trump Administration official overruled CDC’s 

recommendation to separate infected and non-infected passengers onto 

different flights.166

2. February 25, 

2020 

President Trump Threatens to Fire a CDC Official for Sharing 

Accurate Information. Dr. Nancy Messonnier, Director of CDC’s 

National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, warned that 

the American public should “prepare with the expectation that this could 

be bad.”167 The Wall Street Journal reports the comments prompted 

President Trump to call HHS Secretary Alex Azar threatening to fire 

Dr. Messonnier. Later that day, Secretary Azar tried to walk back 

Dr. Messonnier’s statements.168

3. March – April 

2020 

The White House Blocks a National Testing Plan Because “Blue 

States” Appear Most Impacted. Vanity Fair reports that White House 

senior advisor Jared Kushner convened a working group at the White 

House in March and April that designed a national testing plan, but the 

Administration ultimately dropped the plan because political aides felt it 

was more advantageous to blame Democratic governors.169

4. March 5, 2020 The Administration Delays a CDC Travel Alert. CNN reports that 

CDC planned to post a global travel alert on March 5 that would have 

urged precautions for international travel anywhere in the world, but the 

Trump Administration delayed the alert by nearly a week.170

5. March 7, 2020 The Administration Overrules CDC Officials on a Travel Advisory 

for the Elderly. The Associated Press reports that the White House 

overruled CDC officials who sought to recommend that the elderly and 

others more susceptible to the virus should avoid flying on commercial 

flights during the pandemic. While the Administration later suggested 

that vulnerable populations should consider not traveling, it resisted the 

stricter guidance proposed by CDC.171

6. March 9 –

May 29, 2020 

The White House “Muzzled” CDC Briefings. Following a March 9 

briefing in which Dr. Messonnier accurately warned that coronavirus 

would rapidly spread in the United States, CDC stopped providing public 

briefings about the pandemic for more than two months. CNN reports that 

“CDC officials said they’ve been ‘muzzled’ and that their agency’s efforts 

to mount a coordinated response to the Covid-19 pandemic were 

hamstrung by a White House whose decisions are driven by politics rather 

than science.”172 A senior CDC official told Pro Publica: “The threat is 

clear. If we want to ever be able to talk tomorrow or next week or next 

month—or whatever is being dangled in front of us, you stay inside the 

lines.”173 A former HHS official confirmed to the Wall Street Journal 

that White House officials routinely denied CDC’s requests to brief 

reporters.174

37
Date Political Interference

7. March 17 – 20, 

2020 

The Administration Misrepresents Virus Data to Close Border. The 

New York Times reports that White House senior advisor Stephen Miller 

led an effort to aggressively use public health laws as a pretext to reduce 

immigration.175 Pro Publica reports that on March 17, Mr. Miller urged 

Administration officials to use CDC’s quarantine powers to close the 

border with Mexico and deport unaccompanied children seeking asylum 

even if they tested negative for the coronavirus. The next day, a lawyer at 

HHS circulated a proposed order to close the borders with Mexico and 

Canada, which a CDC official stated relied upon a “misrepresented and 

incomplete piece of data” to overstate the threat noting that cases “are far 

fewer [in Canada and Mexico] than the # of cases in the US now due to 

community spread.” CDC Director of Global Migration and Quarantine 

Martin Cetron refused to sign off on the order, telling a colleague: “I will 

not be a part of this. It’s just morally wrong to use a public authority that 

has never, ever, ever been used this way. It’s to keep Hispanics out of the 

country. And it’s wrong.” Dr. Redfield signed the order over 

Dr. Cetron’s objections on March 20.176

8. March 19 – 21, 

2020 

The White House Refuses to Coordinate Procurement and 

Distribution of PPE to Address Shortages. As HHS’s Strategic 

National Stockpile was depleted of PPE in March,177 calls arose for the 

federal government to take a central role in procuring and distributing 

supplies. President Trump refused, saying on March 19 that the federal 

government is “not a shipping clerk.”178 Vanity Fair reports that, on 

March 21, Mr. Kushner rebuffed offers from private sector groups to help 

address supply problems, stating: “The federal government is not going 

to lead this response. It’s up to the states to figure out what they want to 

do.” Despite widespread concerns that states were bidding against each 

other for PPE and calls to invoke the Defense Production Act, 

Mr. Kushner said: “Free markets will solve this. That is not the role of 

government.”179

9. April 2020 The White House Quashes Plan to Have the Postal Service Send 

Masks to Every U.S. Household. The White House blocked plans to 

send 650 million reusable masks to all U.S. households through the Postal 

Service in April, instead deciding to privately send masks to the private 

sector, schools, and other community organizations. An Administration 

official told the Washington Post this change was due to the “concern 

from some in the White House Domestic Policy Council and the Office of 

the Vice President that households receiving masks might create concern 

or panic.”180

38
Date Political Interference

10. April 2020 The Administration Weakens Cruise Ship Restrictions. USA Today 

reports that the Office of the Vice President instructed CDC to revise its 

guidance for cruise ships to shorten a no-sail order and soften language, 

including removing a warning that the order may be extended.181 

Pro Publica reports that the Department of Homeland Security also 

weakened criticism from CDC of the cruise ship industry’s response to 

the coronavirus pandemic in the draft order.182 

11. April 2020 The Administration Pressures CDC to Reopen Theme Parks and 

Overnight Camps. NBC News reports that White House officials exerted 

pressure on CDC to reopen theme parks and overnight camps in April, 

which CDC officials described as “strange” and premature in light of the 

public health crisis.183 

12. April – May 

2020 

President Trump Contradicted Experts and Pushed to Reopen the 

Economy Without a Plan to Stay Safe. President Trump repeatedly 

pushed to reopen and lift shutdown orders—despite warnings from White 

House Coronavirus Task Force members Dr. Anthony Fauci and 

Dr. Deborah Birx that containment measures were still needed in hot 

spots. The New York Times reports that most states that started to reopen 

in early May did not meet the Task Force’s recommended criteria for 

reopening.184 In pushing to reopen, President Trump downplayed the risk 

from the virus, saying “People die from the flu. But we’ve never closed 

down the country from the flu.”185 Bob Woodward later revealed that 

President Trump acknowledged privately on February 7 that the 

coronavirus was “more deadly than even your strenuous flus” and that 

“You just breathe the air and that’s how it’s passed.”186

13. April 14, 2020 The Administration Halts Funding to the World Health Organization 

(WHO). Politico reports that the Administration halted funding to WHO, 

following President Trump’s criticism of the organization. Defunding 

WHO is counter to the pandemic preparedness plan the Trump 

Administration drafted in 2017, which advocated for “expanded 

international coordination on pandemic preparedness and response” and 

called for “continued support” for WHO.187

14. April 17 – 20, 

2020 

President Trump Removes an HHS Official for Seeking Rigorous 

Vetting of a Potentially Dangerous Drug, Hydroxychloroquine. The 

New York Times reports that Dr. Rick Bright was ousted as Director of the 

Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA) 

for refusing to push hydroxychloroquine. Dr. Bright stated that the 

Administration put “politics and cronyism ahead of science.”188

39
Date Political Interference

15. April 21 – 22, 

2020 

CDC Weakens Safety Protocols for Meat Processing Plants Following 

Intervention by the USDA Secretary. MSNBC reports that following a 

meeting with Agriculture Secretary Sonny Purdue, CDC Director Robert 

Redfield’s office directed CDC staff to revise the language on its own 

coronavirus safety protocols for a South Dakota Smithfield meat 

processing plant to make the public health guidance appear as optional 

suggestions.189 The New York Times reports that Vice President Pence’s 

chief of staff, Marc Short, directed Dr. Redfield to soften the language 

and reduce the agency’s recommendations to suggestions. Dr. Redfield 

reportedly confided to one of the Vice President’s aides immediately 

afterward that he felt that he was in an impossible position.190

16. Early May 

2020 

Administration Officials Shelve CDC Guidance on Safe Reopening. 

The Associated Press reports that CDC intended to release its Guidance 

for Implementing the Opening Up America Again Framework on May 1, 

but the White House blocked them, calling the document “overly 

prescriptive.” CDC scientists were told the guidance “would never see 

the light of day” amid concerns from political appointees about damage to 

the economy.191

17. May 2020 Secretary Azar and Other HHS Officials Seek to Influence CDC 

Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Reports (MMWR). Politico reports 

that Secretary Azar and other HHS political appointees believed an 

accurate CDC report about the spread of the coronavirus was “implying 

that the Trump administration moved too slowly to respond to the 

outbreak.” Around this time, HHS Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs 

Michael Caputo and his advisor, Dr. Paul Alexander, began pushing to 

influence CDC’s MMWRs.192 

18. May 1, 2020 The Administration Cancels NIH Grant for Coronavirus Research 

Due to Conspiracy Theory. ABC News reports this grant existed for 

more than a decade and stems from the researchers’ partnership with 

Wuhan Institute of Virology.193 President Trump has claimed—without 

any evidence—that the coronavirus was created and released by this 

biomedical lab, despite statements to the contrary made by both Dr. Fauci 

and WHO.194

19. May 6, 2020 The White House Council of Economic Advisers Publicize a 

Misleading Projection of Deaths. The New York Times reports the 

White House Council of Economic Advisers publicized a projections 

chart that suggested that Americans will stop dying of the coronavirus by 

the middle of May. Outside experts said the “dotted line in the chart 

could only mislead people into believing it was a forecast for a rapid 

decline in deaths.”195

40
Date Political Interference

20. May 16, 2020 HHS Hires Ex-Pharma Executives with Financial Interests in Vaccine 

Makers to Oversee Vaccine Development Process. Politico reports that 

by hiring Dr. Moncef Slaoui as an independent contractor, HHS let him 

maintain millions of dollars of pharmaceutical company securities. The 

Select Subcommittee’s investigation shows that Dr. Slaoui and other 

Operation Warp Speed advisers maintained stock holdings that pose 

serious, unresolved conflicts of interest that could undermine the integrity 

of the Administration’s vaccine development and review process.196 

21. May 19, 2020 The Administration Ignores Warnings About Mass Outbreaks at ICE 

Detention Centers. CNN reports that the Administration was warned in 

March about the “imminent risk to the health and safety of immigrant 

detainees.”197 A study conducted in late-April found that between 72% 

and 100% of detainees will be infected. However, the Administration 

refused to take recommended measures to protect the health of 

detainees.198

22. May 23, 2020 The White House Alters Guidance to Faith Communities. The Wall 

Street Journal reports that President Trump and top White House officials 

pressured Dr. Redfield to declare houses of worship essential and allow 

them to reopen.199 ProPublica reports that White House officials later 

provided comments on draft CDC guidance for faith communities, but 

CDC rejected revisions that conflicted with science, including a 

suggestion to delete CDC’s recommendation to “consider suspending or 

at least decreasing” choir singing. CDC released the guidance on May 22. 

The following day, the Vice President’s staff communicated to CDC that 

the failure to accept White House comments was insubordinate. CDC 

then replaced the agency’s version of the guidance with the White House 

version.200 The Washington Post reports that despite the evidence 

underlying CDC’s initial recommendations, the White House and some 

members of the Task Force were reportedly “resistant to establishing 

limits on religious institutions” and “did not want to alienate the 

evangelical community.”201

23. June 2020 The Administration Installs Partisans in Nonpolitical CDC Posts. The 

Associated Press reports that the White House installed two political 

operatives—lacking public health backgrounds—to key positions at CDC 

to try to control the information the agency releases about the coronavirus 

pandemic. The positions are typically filled by nonpolitical civil 

servants.202

24. June 15, 2020 The Administration Tells Governors to Repeat Misleading Claims 

About Outbreak. The New York Times reports Vice President Pence 

encouraged governors to adopt the Administration’s inaccurate claim that 

a recent increase in cases was due to increased testing. The Vice 

President went on to “encourage people with the news that we’re safely 

reopening the country.” At this time, many states were experiencing 

surges in cases.203

41
Date Political Interference

25. June 22, 2020 CDC Weakens Its Mail-in Voting Guidance. The New York Times

reports that CDC quietly changed its guidance on voting during the 

pandemic. As of March 9, 2020, CDC’s elections website specifically 

recommended that election officials: “Encourage mail-in methods of 

voting if allowed in the jurisdiction.” Around June 22, CDC updated its 

elections guidance, removing any mention of mail-in voting as a safer 

alternative to in-person voting and instead highlighting risks of mail-in 

voting.204

26. June 22, 2020 The Administration Ends Funding for 13 Testing Sites. After 

President Trump announced his intention to “slow the testing down” at a 

June 20 rally, the Administration announced on June 22 that its funding 

and support for 13 testing centers in Texas, Colorado, Illinois, New 

Jersey, and Pennsylvania would end on June 30. The Administration 

refused requests from local officials to open testing sites in hotspots, but 

later reversed course and kept a few sites in Texas open until the end of 

July.205

27. June 23, 2020 

– Present

The White House Issues Secret Public Health Recommendations to 

States. The Select Subcommittee’s investigation shows that the Task 

Force sent private reports to state and local governments warning about 

surges in new coronavirus infections and making recommendations to 

improve states’ responses to the pandemic. The White House has refused 

to publicly support many of these private recommendations, including 

requiring face masks, closing bars and gyms, and strictly limiting 

gatherings.206 

28. June 28, 2020 The Administration Pressures CDC to Downplay Risks to Pregnant 

Women. The Washington Post reports that Dr. Alexander wrote an email 

to Director Redfield accusing CDC of “undermining the President” by 

putting out an accurate report warning about the potential risks to 

pregnant women from the coronavirus. The email noted that the guidance 

“reads in a way to frighten women ... as if the President and his 

administration can’t fix this and it is getting worse.”207 

29. June 30, 2020 Political Appointees Target Top CDC Scientist Following an 

Interview. The New York Times reports that Dr. Alexander emailed 

Mr. Caputo a scathing critique of scientifically accurate statements about 

the coronavirus made by CDC Principal Deputy Director Anne Schuchat 

during an interview. Dr. Alexander accused Dr. Schuchat of trying to 

“embarrass the President here” and claimed that “It is very false her 

statement that it causes death in children.”208 On October 2, Secretary 

Azar told the Select Subcommittee: “I do not support” Dr. Alexander’s 

statements.209

42
Date Political Interference

30. Early July 

2020 

The Administration Attacks Dr. Fauci for Sharing Contrary Views on 

Reopening. CNN reports that the White House made a concerted effort to 

discredit Dr. Fauci after he expressed concerns over reopening the country 

amid a national surge in coronavirus cases. “One senior administration 

official told CNN that some officials within the White House do not trust 

Fauci. According to the source, those officials think Fauci doesn’t have 

the best interest of the President.”210 After President Trump claimed 

Dr. Fauci “made a lot of mistakes,” Assistant to the President Peter 

Navarro, who has no public health expertise, published an op-ed in USA 

Today stating that Dr. Fauci “has been wrong about everything I have 

interacted with him on.”211

31. July 2020 President Trump Overrules CDC on School Reopening Guidance. 

President Trump pushed for schools to fully reopen, even though CDC 

guidance warned that “Full sized, in-person classes” presented the 

“Highest Risk” of transmitting coronavirus to students, teachers, and 

community members.212 CDC then issued revised guidelines that were 

“substantially edited by White House officials” and included misleading 

language downplaying the risks, over the objection of CDC scientists.213 

Senior White House staff, including Mark Meadows, Mr. Kushner, Larry 

Kudlow, and Mr. Miller, were involved in the review process.214 

32. July – August 

2020 

President Trump Pressures FDA to Review Oleandrin as a Potential 

Coronavirus Treatment. Axios reports that President Trump pressured 

FDA to review the unproven botanical extract as a potential coronavirus 

cure, after a meeting with Phoenix Biotechnology Vice Chairman Andrew 

Whitney arranged by My Pillow founder and CEO Mike Lindrell, a 

supporter of President Trump’s campaign.215 

33. July – August 

2020 

The Administration Installs Partisans in Nonpolitical FDA Posts. Stat 

News reports that President Trump installed a number of political 

operatives—some lacking scientific backgrounds—to key positions at 

FDA that are typically filled by nonpolitical civil servants.216

34. July 10, 2020 The Administration Redirects Hospitalization Data Away from CDC. 

The New York Times reports that the Administration abruptly directed 

hospitals across the country to stop sending data on coronavirus 

hospitalizations to the CDC platform that hospitals had used to report data 

for over a decade, and instead to report the data directly to HHS through a 

new portal maintained by a private company.217 Dr. Redfield testified to 

the Select Subcommittee that he “wasn’t involved in the decision” to 

transfer the data away from CDC and that “the Secretary’s office made 

the decision.”218

35. August 2020 President Trump Criticizes NIH for Moving Too Slowly on Vaccines 

and Therapeutics. The Washington Post reports that the President 

accused NIH of moving too slowly to approve a vaccine or other 

treatments, including convalescent plasma, during an August call with 

NIH Director Francis Collins.219

43
Date Political Interference

36. August –

September 

2020 

Administration Officials Delay Accurate Article on 

Hydroxychloroquine in CDC’s MMWR. Politico reports Mr. Caputo’s 

team tried to halt the release of a CDC report that found “the potential 

benefits of [hydroxychloroquine] do not outweigh their risks.” The article 

was held for about a month after Mr. Caputo’s team raised questions 

about its authors’ political leanings, but it was finally released on 

September 4.220 

37. August –

September 

2020 

The Administration Pressures Dr. Fauci to Echo Administration 

Talking Points on Children and the Coronavirus. Politico reports that 

Dr. Alexander repeatedly attempted to pressure Dr. Fauci and other NIH 

officials to adopt the Administration’s talking points. On August 27, 

Dr. Alexander made clear that he objected to Dr. Fauci’s planned 

interview responses, stating: “I continue to have an issue with kids 

getting tested and repeatedly and even university students in a widespread 

manner...and I disagree with Dr. Fauci on this. Vehemently.” On 

September 8, Dr. Alexander asked, “Can you ensure Dr. Fauci indicates 

masks are for the teachers in schools. Not for children.”221

38. August 2, 2020 The White House Exerts Political Pressure to Finish Vaccine Before 

Election Day. The New York Times reports that Mr. Kushner directly 

pressured Secretary Azar to accelerate the vaccine development process, 

and that the White House insisted on the production of a vaccine by 

October 2020, prior to Election Day.222 

39. August 8, 2020 An HHS Political Appointee Demands CDC Alter or Retract 

Scientific Articles on Children. Politico reports that Dr. Alexander 

demanded that CDC Director Redfield change two published reports that 

Dr. Alexander claimed inflated coronavirus risks to children and 

undermined President Trump’s push to reopen schools. Dr. Alexander 

called on CDC to insert new language in a report or “pull it down and stop 

all reports immediately.” He also wrote: “CDC tried to report as if once 

kids get together, there will be spread and this will impact school reopening. .... Very misleading by CDC and shame on them. Their aim is 

clear. ... This is designed to hurt this President for their reasons which I 

am not interested in.”223 On October 2, Secretary Azar disavowed 

Dr. Alexander’s statements in testimony before the Select 

Subcommittee.224

44
Date Political Interference

40. August 8, 2020 An HHS Political Appointee Demands Changes to MMWR 

Publication Process to Allow for Political Interference. Politico

reports that Dr. Alexander called on CDC Director Redfield to put an 

“immediate stop” to all new MMWR reports, so that the agency could 

change its publication process to allow for Dr. Alexander to personally 

review the report before publication. Dr. Alexander stated, “The reports 

must be read by someone outside of CDC like myself, and we cannot 

allow the reporting to go on as it has been, for it is outrageous. Its lunacy. 

Nothing to go out unless I read and agree with the findings how they 

CDC, wrote it and I tweak it to ensure it is fair and balanced and 

‘complete.’”225

41. August 23, 

2020 

FDA Grants an Emergency Use Authorization (EUA) for Plasma 

Over the Objections of Top Scientists, While Citing Misleading 

Evidence. The New York Times and Washington Post report that the 

EUA for convalescent plasma occurred over the objections of Dr. Fauci 

and Dr. Collins, who believed insufficient data was available to determine 

if convalescent plasma provided a benefit.226 FDA’s EUA qualified the 

preliminary findings regarding convalescent plasma and called for clinical 

trials.227 FDA rushed the EUA over objections to appease President 

Trump, who had expressed frustration that FDA was not moving quickly 

enough to develop coronavirus treatments. FDA Commissioner Stephen 

Hahn was later forced to apologize, and the FDA’s chief spokesperson 

was removed after it became clear that Dr. Hahn, along with President 

Trump and Secretary Azar, cited grossly inaccurate statistics on the 

effectiveness of plasma therapy at a press conference.228

42. August 24, 

2020 

The Administration Alters CDC Testing Guidelines. CDC abruptly 

changed its testing guidelines to assert, contrary to the scientific 

consensus, that most asymptomatic individuals exposed to a person with 

the virus do not need to be tested. CNN asked a senior CDC official 

whether this change was made at the direction of the White House or 

HHS, and the official stated, “It’s coming from the top down.”229 CDC’s 

original guidance was later restored after the Select Subcommittee and 

others objected.

43. August 24, 

2020 

President Trump Accuses the “Deep State” FDA of Slowing Vaccine 

Trials Until After Election. After repeatedly suggesting that a 

coronavirus vaccine may be released before Election Day, President 

Trump pressured FDA Commissioner Hahn to deliver, tweeting: “The 

deep state, or whoever, over at the FDA is making it very difficult for 

drug companies to get people in order to test the vaccines and 

therapeutics. Obviously, they are hoping to delay the answer until after 

November 3rd. Must focus on speed, and saving lives! @SteveFDA”230

45
Date Political Interference

44. August 28, 

2020 

HHS Cancels Contract of Consultant Who Advised FDA to Correct 

Misleading Statements. Politico reports that HHS canceled the contract 

of consultant Wayne Pines after he advised FDA Commissioner Hahn to 

correct misleading statements made regarding the effectiveness of plasma 

therapy. HHS officials were reportedly angered by Dr. Hahn’s apology 

and began the process of severing Mr. Pines’ contract after learning that 

he aided the decision, with one official stating that Mr. Pines’ removal 

was “not routine.”231

45. August 31, 

2020 

The Administration Redirects $265 million from CDC and FDA 

Budgets for a “Boondoggle” PR Campaign to “Defeat Despair” 

Before Election. Politico reports the ad campaign—which Mr. Caputo 

said was directly ordered by President Trump—sought to release an 

ad blitz before Election Day featuring senior Administration officials and 

celebrities and highlighting the Administration’s pandemic response.232 

The New York Times reports that CDC was not been consulted on the 

substance of the campaign.233 HHS directed a subcontract to a former 

business partner of Mr. Caputo. An HHS official called the effort a 

“boondoggle.”234 After the Select Subcommittee launched an 

investigation, Secretary Azar testified before the Select Subcommittee on 

October 2, “I have ordered a strategic review of this public health 

education campaign that will be led by top HHS public health and 

communication experts to determine whether the campaign serves 

important public health purposes.”235

46. Late August 

2020 

HHS Overrides FDA and Increases the Risk of Inaccurate 

Coronavirus Tests Flooding the Market. Politico reports that Secretary 

Azar overruled objections from FDA Commissioner Hahn to revoke the 

FDA’s ability to check the quality of tests developed by labs for their own 

use. The decision removed safeguards designed to prevent inaccurate 

tests from flooding the market during a public health crisis. A former 

HHS official told Politico that, “I’ve never seen such a complete political 

overruling of the agency.”236

47. September 

2020 

White House Blocks Order Requiring Masks on Public and 

Commercial Transit. The New York Times reports that the White House 

Coronavirus Task Force blocked an order drafted by CDC requiring all 

passengers and employees to wear masks on all forms of public and 

commercial transportation, including airplanes, trains, buses, and 

subways, and in transit hubs such as airports, train stations, and bus 

depots.237 CDC ultimately issued guidance on October 19 that strongly 

recommends the use of masks on public transit.238

46
Date Political Interference

48. September –

October 2020 

NIH Sidelines Dr. Bright and Rejects National Coronavirus Testing 

Strategy. The New York Times reports that on October 6, Dr. Bright 

resigned from NIH—where he was transferred following his ouster from 

BARDA—after the Administration sidelined him and refused to give him 

meaningful work. Dr. Bright accused NIH of rejecting his proposal to 

develop a robust national testing infrastructure, including a plan to greatly 

expand testing of asymptomatic people, “because of political 

considerations.”239 In an interview with NBC News, Dr. Bright stated that 

Dr. Collins praised his “great ideas” but told him he could not put them 

forward out of fear of “stepping on the toes of others in the administration 

who may not be ready for that.” Dr. Bright stated: “The political 

interference has not stopped at all. I believe it’s intensified.”240

49. September 2, 

2020 

President Trump Undermines FDA Independence on Vaccine 

Approval. FDA announced guidelines to be followed before authorizing 

a vaccine-related EUA, including a minimum two-month period after a 

clinical trial and five cases of severe coronavirus in the placebo group. 

President Trump rejected the FDA’s attempt to implement a rigorous 

vaccine approval process, asserting without evidence that the plan 

“sounds like a political move” and that it “has to be approved by the 

White House. We may or may not approve it.”241 The New York Times 

reported that top White House officials were blocking the guidelines and 

that, on September 23, Mr. Meadows “questioned the need for two 

months of follow-up data” and “suggested that Dr. Hahn was overly 

influenced by his agency’s career scientists.”242 On October 6, FDA 

released the guidance.243

50. September 6, 

2020 

The White House Weakens Task Force Public Health 

Recommendations. After months of recommending that states with 

active outbreaks implement mask mandates, close bars and gyms, and 

strictly limit gatherings, an analysis by the Select Subcommittee shows 

the Task Force weakened its recommendations in states where the virus is 

still spreading rapidly.244 

51. September 6, 

2020 

OMB Pressures CDC to Alter Guidance for Bars and Restaurants. 

The Wall Street Journal reports that Office of Management and Budget 

(OMB) Director Russell Vought and other OMB officials urged 

Dr. Redfield to remove or change social distancing guidance to bars and 

restaurants. The final version retained a recommendation to social 

distance but removed more specific language advising people to stay six 

feet apart if possible.245

47
Date Political Interference

52. September 11, 

2020 

HHS Pressures CDC to Alter Scientific Article on Mortality Rates in 

Children. Politico reports that Dr. Alexander pressured CDC to alter an 

MMWR article regarding death rates from the coronavirus in children. 

Dr. Alexander wrote to Dr. Charlotte Kent, the editor-in-chief of the 

MMWR, claiming that defining teenagers aged 18 and older as 

“pediatric” was “misleading,” asserting that the document conflated the 

risks of the coronavirus to young children and older adolescents, and 

calling for multiple revisions. The final version published on September 

15 contained revisions in line with those sought by Dr. Alexander.246

53. September 15, 

2020 

Secretary Azar Restricts the Authority of FDA and Other Health 

Agencies. The New York Times reports that Secretary Azar signed a 

memorandum prohibiting FDA and other health agencies from signing 

any new rules regarding medicines, medical devices, and other products, 

writing that the power to do so “is reserved to the Secretary.” It is unclear 

what Secretary Azar intends to do with this power, but experts have raised 

alarm that the change could impact vaccines and therapeutics.247 

54. September 16, 

2020 

President Trump Publicly Rebukes Dr. Redfield on Mask and 

Vaccine Effectiveness. The New York Times reports that President 

Trump publicly rebuked Dr. Redfield after he provided scientifically 

accurate testimony that a vaccine would not be widely available until 

Summer 2021 or later and that face masks are “more guaranteed” to 

protect against the coronavirus than a vaccine. President Trump stated 

that Dr. Redfield’s comments contained “incorrect information.” 

Subsequently, Dr. Redfield and CDC issued statements walking back 

Dr. Redfield’s testimony to more closely align with the President’s 

views.248

55. September 21, 

2020 

The Administration Removed a Report on Airborne Transmission 

from the CDC Website. On Friday, September 18, new guidance 

appeared on CDC’s website concluding that the coronavirus is transmitted 

through small particles in the air. By Monday, September 21, this 

guidance was removed. The sudden appearance and disappearance of 

scientific information has raised concerns that officials may have found 

the conclusions politically inconvenient.249 On October 5, CDC published 

a statement on its website citing new evidence that the virus can 

“sometimes be spread by airborne transmission” beyond six feet indoors. 

However, the new guidance softened a previous statement referring to the 

coronavirus as “an airborne virus” and states that it is much more 

common for the virus to spread through close contact with an infected 

person than through airborne transmission.250

48
Date Political Interference

56. September 29, 

2020 

The Vice President Overrules the CDC Director on Extending Cruise 

Ship Ban. Axios reports that CDC Director Redfield was overruled by 

Vice President Pence when he pushed to extend a no-sail order on 

passenger cruises until February 2021: “Public health officials have 

privately complained that the thwarting of Redfield on the cruise ship ban 

is politically motivated because the industry is a major economic presence 

in Florida—a key battleground state where the polls are statistically 

tied.”251

57. Early October 

2020 

President Trump Pressures FDA to Grant EUAs for Antibody 

Treatments. The Washington Post reports that President Trump and 

Mr. Meadows have pushed FDA Commissioner Hahn to accelerate the 

agency’s review and grant EUAs for monoclonal antibody treatments 

made by Regeneron and Eli Lilly & Co. A senior official told the 

Washington Post that Dr. Hahn received multiple calls from the White 

House in early October, saying: “The message is clear. Let’s get it 

done.” On October 8, President Trump claimed that the Regeneron drug 

is a “cure” and “a gift from heaven” and stated, “We’re going to make 

them available immediately; we have an emergency use authorization that 

I want to get signed immediately.”252

58. October 2020 The Trump Administration Pressures FDA to Call a Vaccine EUA 

“Pre-Licensure.” Politico reports that officials at HHS pressured FDA 

to alter the agency’s terminology to refer to an emergency use 

authorization of a vaccine as a “pre-licensure”—despite concerns that 

such terminology might mislead the public into believing that the shot 

was fully licensed by the FDA and had met significantly higher standards 

for safety and effectiveness. FDA Commissioner Hahn reportedly 

resisted the change in terminology, but Politico reported that “some 

believe the White House could still get involved and demand changes.”253

59. October 2020 White House Aides Press Dr. Slaoui to Echo Administration Talking 

Points on Vaccines. The Washington Post reports that White House 

aides pressured Dr. Slaoui to speak more positively about vaccines. Two 

officials told the Washington Post that Dr. Slaoui sometimes has pushed 

back on the Administration’s talking points.254

60. October 2020 The Administration Pressures CDC to Endorse the Use of Border 

Hotels to Hold Migrant Children. The Washington Post reports that the 

Trump Administration pressured career CDC officials to sign a legal 

declaration affirming that the use of hotels to detain migrant children is 

the best way to protect them from the spread of the coronavirus—even 

though experts say this is inaccurate. According to the Washington Post, 

CDC officials in several different offices have declined to sign the 

declaration, and the request was sent to Dr. Redfield. It is not clear 

whether Dr. Redfield signed it.255

49
Date Political Interference

61. October 11, 

2020 

White House Blocks Task Force Members from Television 

Appearances. Huffington Post reports that the White House blocked 

Dr. Fauci and other Task Force members from appearing on multiple 

television news programs.256 These rejections came shortly after Dr. 

Fauci stated, “We had a superspreader event in the White House,”257 and 

amid reports that he did not consent to being featured in a new Trump 

campaign ad touting the President’s response to the coronavirus crisis.258 

On October 13, President Trump publicly disparaged Dr. Fauci, tweeting, 

“Actually, Tony’s pitching arm is far more accurate than his 

prognostications.”259

50
ENDNOTES

1 H. Res. 935.

2 Covid in the U.S.: Latest Map and Case Count, New York Times (Oct. 28, 2020) (online at 

www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/us/coronavirus-us-cases.html).

3 COVID-19 Is Likely to Be the Third-Leading Cause of Death in the U.S. This Year, Healthline (Aug. 3, 

2020) (online at www.healthline.com/health-news/covid-19-third-leading-cause-of-death-in-the-united-states-thisyear).

4 Hospitals Are Reeling Under a 46 Percent Spike in Covid-19 Patients, New York Times (Oct. 27, 2020) 

(online at www.nytimes.com/2020/10/27/us/coronavirus-hospitals-capacity.html); U.S. Coronavirus Infections Hit 

Record Levels, with Hospitalizations and Deaths on the Rise, Washington Post (Oct. 27, 2020) (online at 

www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/10/27/coronavirus-covid-live-updates-us/).

5 Covid in the U.S.: Latest Map and Case Count, New York Times (Oct. 28, 2020) (online at 

www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/us/coronavirus-us-cases.html).

6 University of Washington, Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation, Total Deaths, United States of 

America (online at covid19.healthdata.org/united-states-of-america?view=total-deaths&tab=trend) (accessed Oct. 

28, 2020).

7 Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine, COVID-19 Dashboard (online at 

coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html) (accessed Oct. 28, 2020).

8 Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine, Mortality Analyses (online at 

coronavirus.jhu.edu/data/mortality) (accessed Oct. 28, 2020).

9 Coronavirus Has Killed More Americans than Vietnam, Korea, Iraq, Afghanistan and World War I 

Combined, Newsweek (Oct. 6, 2020) (online at www.newsweek.com/coronavirus-has-killed-more-americansvietnam-korea-iraq-afghanistan-world-war-i-combined-1536883).

10 Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Briefing on “Coronavirus Testing, Tracing, and 

Targeted Containment: Steps to Reopen the Country” (May 13, 2020) (online at 

coronavirus.house.gov/subcommittee-activity/briefings/member-briefing-testing-tracing-and-targeted-containment).

11 Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Press Release: At Hearing on Supply Shortages, Top 

Officials Acknowledge Country Is Failing to Control Coronavirus (July 2, 2020) (online at 

coronavirus.house.gov/news/press-releases/hearing-supply-shortages-top-officials-acknowledge-country-failingcontrol); Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Press Release: At Hearing, White House Task Force 

Members Confirm Failed U.S. Response Made Coronavirus Crisis Worse (July 31, 2020) (online at 

coronavirus.house.gov/news/press-releases/hearing-white-house-task-force-members-confirm-failed-us-responsemade); Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Press Release: At Hearing, Secretary Azar Refuses to 

Accept Trump Administration Responsibility for Deaths of Over 200,000 Americans (Oct. 2, 2020) (online at 

coronavirus.house.gov/news/press-releases/hearing-secretary-azar-refuses-accept-trump-administrationresponsibility-deaths).

12 Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Press Release: At Hearing, White House Task Force 

Members Confirm Failed U.S. Response Made Coronavirus Crisis Worse (July 31, 2020) (online at 

coronavirus.house.gov/news/press-releases/hearing-white-house-task-force-members-confirm-failed-us-responsemade). 

13 Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Press Release: At Hearing, Secretary Azar Refuses to 

Accept Trump Administration Responsibility for Deaths of Over 200,000 Americans (Oct. 2, 2020) (online at 

coronavirus.house.gov/news/press-releases/hearing-secretary-azar-refuses-accept-trump-administrationresponsibility-deaths).

14 Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Press Release: As Coronavirus Surges, Select 

Subcommittee Releases White House Reports Contradicting President Trump on Testing, Masks (Oct. 20, 2020) 

(online at coronavirus.house.gov/news/press-releases/coronavirus-surges-select-subcommittee-releases-white-house51
reports); Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Press Release: Select Subcommittee Releases Eight Weeks 

of Coronavirus Task Force Reports Kept Secret by the White House (Aug. 31, 2020) (online at 

coronavirus.house.gov/news/press-releases/select-subcommittee-releases-eight-weeks-coronavirus-task-forcereports-kept).

15 Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Press Release: Select Subcommittee Finds White House 

Task Force Weakened Recommendations as Infection Rates Rose (Sept. 16, 2020) (online at 

coronavirus.house.gov/news/press-releases/select-subcommittee-finds-white-house-task-force-weakenedrecommendations).

16 See, e.g., Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Press Release: Following Committee Action, 

CDC Reverses Course on Dangerously Inaccurate Coronavirus Testing Guidelines (Sept. 19, 2020) (online at 

coronavirus.house.gov/news/press-releases/following-committee-action-cdc-reverses-course-dangerouslyinaccurate); Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Press Release: Chair Clyburn Issues Statement on 

Senior Trump Administration Officials Leaving Roles at HHS (Sept. 16, 2020) (online at 

coronavirus.house.gov/news/press-releases/chair-clyburn-issues-statement-senior-trump-administration-officialsleaving); Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Press Release: At Briefing, CDC Official Acknowledges 

School Guidance Fails to Capture Accurate Science on Coronavirus Risks to Children (Oct. 22, 2020) (online at 

coronavirus.house.gov/news/press-releases/briefing-cdc-official-acknowledges-school-guidance-fails-captureaccurate). 

17 Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Press Release: Chairs Clyburn, Waters, Maloney Seek 

Documents on Kodak Loan and Windfall for Executives (Aug. 5, 2020) (online at coronavirus.house.gov/news/pressreleases/chairs-clyburn-waters-maloney-seek-documents-kodak-loan-and-windfall-executives).

18 Eastman Kodak’s $765 Million U.S. Loan Agreement on Hold After Recent Allegations, Reuters (Aug. 8, 

2020) (online at www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-eastman-kodak-deals/eastman-kodaks-765-million-u-s-loanagreement-on-hold-after-recent-allegations-idUSKCN2540XV).

19 Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Press Release: As Coronavirus Cases Rise, Panel 

Launches Investigation into Problematic Contracts for Critical Supplies (July 15, 2020) (online at 

coronavirus.house.gov/news/press-releases/coronavirus-cases-rise-panel-launches-investigation-problematiccontracts).

20 Letter from Chairman James E. Clyburn, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, to Secretary of 

Health and Human Services Alex M. Azar II (Aug. 12, 2020) (online at 

coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2020-08-

12.Clyburn%20to%20Azar%20re%20Operation%20Warp%20Speed.pdf); Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus

Crisis, Press Release: Select Subcommittee Seeks Transparency on Conflicts of Interest and Vaccine Selection in

Operation Warp Speed (Aug. 13, 2020) (online at coronavirus.house.gov/news/press-releases/select-subcommitteeseeks-transparency-conflicts-interest-and-vaccine-selection).

21 Memorandum from Majority Staff to Members of the Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, 

Examination of States’ Preparedness for the November Election (Sept. 9, 2020) (online at 

coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/20200909%20Select%20Subcmte%20Staff%20

Memo_Examination%20of%20States%27%20Preparedness%20for%20the%20November%20Election.pdf). 

22 Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Hearing with Federal Reserve Chairman Jerome Powell

(Sept. 23, 2020) (online at coronavirus.house.gov/news/press-releases/fed-chair-powell-hearing-grow-economy-wemust-get-control-virus). 

23 David M. Cutler and Lawrence H. Summers, The COVID-19 Pandemic and the $16 Trillion Virus, 

JAMA (Oct. 12, 2020) (online at jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/fullarticle/2771764). 

24 Economic Strain Persists Even as Businesses Reopen, New York Times (June 4, 2020) (online at 

www.nytimes.com/2020/06/04/business/economy/coronavirus-unemployment-claims.html); US Weekly Jobless 

Claims Hit 884,000, More Filings than Economists Expected, Business Insider (Sept. 10, 2020) (online at 

www.businessinsider.com/us-weekly-jobless-claims-unemployment-insurance-coronavirus-labor-impact-layoffs2020-9).

52
25 8 Million Have Slipped into Poverty Since May as Federal Aid Has Dried Up, New York Times (Oct. 15, 

2020) (online at www.nytimes.com/2020/10/15/us/politics/federal-aid-poverty-levels.html) (citing Zachary Polin, 

et al., Monthly Poverty Rates in the United States During the COVID-19 Pandemic, Poverty and Social Policy (Oct. 

15, 2020) (online at 

static1.squarespace.com/static/5743308460b5e922a25a6dc7/t/5f87c59e4cd0011fabd38973/1602733471158/COVID

-Projecting-Poverty-Monthly-CPSP-2020.pdf)).

26 Census Bureau, Household Pulse Survey Interactive Tool (online at www2.census.gov/programssurveys/demo/tables/hhp/2020/wk16/food3b_week16.xlsx) (accessed Oct. 26, 2020). 

27 Census Bureau, Household Pulse Survey (Oct. 7, 2020) (online at 

www.census.gov/datatools/demo/hhp/#/?measures=EVR&mapPeriodSelector=14&barChartPeriodSelector=14).

28 The Covid-19 Recession Is the Most Unequal in Modern U.S. History, Washington Post (Sept. 30, 2020) 

(online at www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/business/coronavirus-recession-equality/). 

29 Internal Revenue Service, News Release: IRS to Mail Special Letter to Estimated 9 Million Non-Filers, 

Urging Them to Claim Economic Impact Payment by Oct. 15 at IRS.gov (Sept. 8, 2020) (online at 

www.irs.gov/newsroom/irs-to-mail-special-letter-to-estimated-9-million-non-filers-urging-them-to-claim-economicimpact-payment-by-oct-15-at-irsgov).

30 Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Press Release: Following Select Subcommittee 

Investigation, IRS Gives 9 Million Americans More Time to Claim Stimulus Checks (Oct. 7, 2020) (online at 

coronavirus.house.gov/news/press-releases/following-select-subcommittee-investigation-irs-gives-9-millionamericans-more).

31 Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Press Release: Select Subcommittee Investigation 

Reveals Homeowners Face Deepening Financial Distress (Oct. 16, 2020) (online at 

coronavirus.house.gov/news/press-releases/select-subcommittee-investigation-reveals-homeowners-face-deepeningfinancial). 

32 Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Press Release: Former Fed Chairs Testify Congress 

Must Act Boldly to Prevent Economic “Catastrophe” (July 17, 2020) (online at coronavirus.house.gov/news/pressreleases/former-fed-chairs-testify-congress-must-act-boldly-prevent-economic-catastrophe). 

33 The $600 Weekly Unemployment Benefit Likely Ends Next Week—Here’s How Some Are Bracing for the 

Drop in Aid, CNBC (July 15, 2020) (online at cnbc.com/2020/07/14/how-people-are-preparing-for-end-of-600-

weekly-unemployment-pay.html).

34 New Unemployment Claims Dip Slightly as Economic Strains Persist, Washington Post (Oct. 22, 2020) 

(online at www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/10/22/october-unemployment-claims-election/).

35 Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, §§ 1102, 1106 (2020).

36 Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Press Release: New PPP Report Shows Trump 

Administration and Big Banks Left Behind Struggling Small Businesses (Oct. 16, 2020) (online at 

coronavirus.house.gov/news/press-releases/new-ppp-report-shows-trump-administration-and-big-banks-left-behindstruggling).

37 Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Press Release: Select Subcommittee Releases 

Preliminary Analysis of Paycheck Protection Program Data (Sept. 1, 2020) (online at 

coronavirus.house.gov/news/press-releases/select-subcommittee-releases-preliminary-analysis-paycheck-protectionprogram).

38 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Press Release: Federal Reserve Announces 

Extensive New Measures to Support the Economy (Mar. 23, 2020) (online at 

www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20200323b.htm); Fed Makes Initial Purchases in Its 

First Corporate Debt Buying Program, New York Times (May 12, 2020) (online at 

www.nytimes.com/2020/05/12/business/economy/fed-corporate-debt-coronavirus.html). 

39 National Bureau of Economic Research, The Fed Takes on Corporate Credit Risk: An Analysis of the 

Efficacy of the SMCCF (Sept. 2020) (online at www.nber.org/papers/w27809.pdf); S&P Global Ratings, Credit 

Trends: Global Financing Conditions: Bond Issuance Is Expected to Finish 2020 Up 6% After a Strong Second 

53
Quarter (July 27, 2020) (online at www.spglobal.com/ratings/en/research/articles/200727-credit-trends-globalfinancing-conditions-bond-issuance-is-expected-to-finish-2020-up-6-after-a-strong-sec-11584612). 

40 Staff, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Prioritizing Wall Street: The Fed’s Corporate 

Bond Purchases During the Coronavirus Pandemic (Sept. 23, 2020) (online at 

coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/Staff%20Report%20%289-23-

2020%29_FINAL.pdf).

41 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Periodic Report: Update on Outstanding Lending 

Facilities Authorized by the Board Under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act (PDF), MSNLF TransactionSpecific Disclosures (XLSX) (Oct. 8, 2020) (online at 

www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/mainstreetlending.htm); Federal Reserve Data Show Little Appetite So Far 

for Its $600 Billion Main Street Lending Program, Washington Post (Aug. 6, 2020) (online at 

www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/08/06/federal-reserve-main-street-program/). 

42 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, MLF Transaction-Specific Disclosure (XLSX) (Oct. 

8, 2020) (online at www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/mlf-transaction-specific-disclosures-10-8-20.xlsx); 

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Municipal Liquidity Facility (online at 

www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/muni.htm) (accessed Oct. 26, 2020).

43 Clash over Municipal Loan Program Delays Stimulus Report, New York Times (Oct. 12, 2020) (online 

at www.nytimes.com/2020/10/09/business/congress-municipal-loan-oversight-coronavirus.html); Center on Budget 

and Policy Priorities, State Borrowing No Substitute for Additional Direct Aid to Help States Weather COVID 

Downturn (June 29, 2020) (online at www.cbpp.org/research/state-budget-and-tax/state-borrowing-no-substitutefor-additional-direct-aid-to-help-states).

44 Much of America Is Shut Out of the Greatest Borrowing Binge Ever, Bloomberg (Aug. 13, 2020) (online 

at www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-08-13/a-2-trillion-credit-boom-leaves-america-s-smaller-firms-behind).

45 Staff, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, “Unnecessary Costs”: How the Trump 

Administration Allowed Thousands of Aviation Workers to Lose Their Jobs (Oct. 9, 2020) (online at 

coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/PSP%20Report%20Final.pdf).

46 Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Press Release: Clyburn Secures Commitment from 

Aviation Contractors to Preserve over 30,000 Jobs (Oct. 21, 2020) (online at coronavirus.house.gov/news/pressreleases/clyburn-secures-commitment-aviation-contractors-preserve-over-30000-jobs).

47 Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Press Release: Select Subcommittee Calls on White 

House, Governors to Comply with Unpublished Recommendations to Contain Virus (July 29, 2020) (online at 

coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2020-07-

29.Clyburn%20to%20WH%20re%20State%20Task%20Force%20Recommendations.pdf).

48 Id. 

49 Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Press Release: Select Subcommittee Releases Eight 

Weeks of Coronavirus Task Force Reports Kept Secret by the White House (Aug. 31, 2020) (online at 

coronavirus.house.gov/news/press-releases/select-subcommittee-releases-eight-weeks-coronavirus-task-forcereports-kept).

50 Id. 

51 Letter from Chairman James E. Clyburn, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, to Vice 

President Michael R. Pence and Dr. Deborah Birx (Sept. 16, 2020) (online at 

coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2020-09-

16.Clyburn%20to%20Birx%20and%20Pence%20re%20Task%20Force%20Reports%20.pdf).

52 Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Press Release: As Coronavirus Surges, Select 

Subcommittee Releases White House Reports Contradicting President Trump on Testing, Masks (Oct. 20, 2020) 

(online at coronavirus.house.gov/news/press-releases/coronavirus-surges-select-subcommittee-releases-white-housereports).

53 Woodward Book: Trump Says He Knew Coronavirus Was ‘Deadly’ and Worse than the Flu While 

Intentionally Misleading Americans, Washington Post (Sept. 9, 2020) (online at 

54
www.washingtonpost.com/politics/bob-woodward-rage-book-trump/2020/09/09/0368fe3c-efd2-11ea-b4bc3a2098fc73d4_story.html).

54 Trump’s ‘Kidding’ on Testing Exposes His Negligence as Virus Spikes, CNN (June 22, 2020) (online at 

www.cnn.com/2020/06/22/politics/donald-trump-coronavirus-testing-tulsa-rally/index.html).

55 Trump Administration Strips C.D.C. of Control of Coronavirus Data, New York Times (July 14, 2020) 

(online at www.nytimes.com/2020/07/14/us/politics/trump-cdc-coronavirus.html).

56 Emails Detail Effort to Silence C.D.C. and Question Its Science, New York Times (Sept. 18, 2020) 

(online at www.nytimes.com/2020/09/18/us/politics/trump-cdc-coronavirus.html).

57 HHS Bids $250 Million Contract Meant to ‘Defeat Despair and Inspire Hope’ on Coronavirus, Politico 

(Aug. 31, 2020) (online at www.politico.com/news/2020/08/31/hhs-contract-coronavirus-despair-hope-406361).

58 Letter from Chairman James E. Clyburn, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, to Vice 

President Michael R. Pence, Health and Human Services Secretary Alex M. Azar II, and Centers for Disease Control 

and Prevention Director Robert R. Redfield (June 22, 2020) (online at 

coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2020-06-

22.Clyburn%20to%20Task%20Force%20re%20Testing.pdf).

59 Letter from Chairman James E. Clyburn, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, et al. to 

Secretary Alex M. Azar II, Department of Health and Human Services (June 25, 2020) (online at 

coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2020-06-

25.Clyburn%20Foster%20Kim%20et%20al.%20to%20Azar%20II-HHS%20re%20Federal%20Testing.pdf).

60 Federal Support for COVID-19 Test Sites in Harris Co, Houston Extended, ABC13 (July 12, 2020) 

(online at abc13.com/covid-19-testing-texas-houston-covid-test-sites-free/6314116).

61 Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Press Release: At Hearing, Secretary Azar Refuses to 

Accept Trump Administration Responsibility for Deaths of Over 200,000 Americans (Oct. 2, 2020) (online at 

coronavirus.house.gov/news/press-releases/hearing-secretary-azar-refuses-accept-trump-administrationresponsibility-deaths).

62 Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Press Release: Chairman Clyburn Questions Updated 

CDC Guidelines on Coronavirus Testing (Aug. 26, 2020) (online at coronavirus.house.gov/news/pressreleases/chairman-clyburn-questions-updated-cdc-guidelines-coronavirus-testing).

63 Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Press Release: Following Committee Action, CDC 

Reverses Course on Dangerously Inaccurate Coronavirus Testing Guidelines (Sept. 19, 2020) (online at 

coronavirus.house.gov/news/press-releases/following-committee-action-cdc-reverses-course-dangerouslyinaccurate).

64 Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Press Release: Committee Chairs Expand Investigation 

into Trump Administration’s “Boondoggle” PR Contracts to Tout Coronavirus Response Before Election (online at 

coronavirus.house.gov/news/press-releases/committee-chairs-expand-investigation-trump-administration-sboondoggle-pr).

65 Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Press Release: At Hearing, Secretary Azar Refuses to 

Accept Trump Administration Responsibility for Deaths of Over 200,000 Americans (Oct. 2, 2020) (online at 

coronavirus.house.gov/news/press-releases/hearing-secretary-azar-refuses-accept-trump-administrationresponsibility-deaths).

66 Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Press Release: Select Subcommittee Launches 

Investigation into Political Interference in CDC Scientific Reports on Coronavirus (Sept. 14, 2020) (online at 

coronavirus.house.gov/news/press-releases/select-subcommittee-launches-investigation-political-interference-cdcscientific). 

67 Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Press Release: Chair Clyburn Issues Statement on 

Senior Trump Administration Officials Leaving Roles at HHS (Sept. 16, 2020) (online at 

coronavirus.house.gov/news/press-releases/chair-clyburn-issues-statement-senior-trump-administration-officialsleaving).

55
68 Letter from Chairman James E. Clyburn, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, to Secretary of 

Health and Human Services Alex M. Azar II (Sept. 22, 2020) (online at 

coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2020-09-

22.Clyburn%20to%20Azar%20re%20HHS%20TIs%20.pdf); Letter from Chairman James E. Clyburn, Select

Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, to Secretary of Health and Human Services Alex M. Azar II (Oct. 22,

2020) (online at coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2020-10-

22.Clyburn%20to%20Azar%20re%20TIs%20.pdf).

69 Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Press Release: Select Subcommittee Analysis Shows 

Pattern of Political Interference by the Trump Administration in Coronavirus Response (Oct. 2, 2020) (online at 

coronavirus.house.gov/news/press-releases/select-subcommittee-analysis-shows-pattern-political-interferencetrump).

70 Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Press Release: Chairs Clyburn, Waters, Maloney Seek 

Documents on Kodak Loan and Windfall for Executives (Aug. 5, 2020) (online at coronavirus.house.gov/news/pressreleases/chairs-clyburn-waters-maloney-seek-documents-kodak-loan-and-windfall-executives).

71 Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Press Release: Following Committees’ Inquiry, Trump 

Administration Puts $765 Million Kodak Loan on Hold (Aug. 10, 2020) (online at 

coronavirus.house.gov/news/press-releases/following-committees-inquiry-trump-administration-puts-765-millionkodak-loan).

72 U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, Press Release: DFC to Sign Letter of Interest for 

Investment in Kodak’s Expansion into Pharmaceuticals (July 28, 2020) (online at www.dfc.gov/media/pressreleases/dfc-sign-letter-interest-investment-kodaks-expansion-pharmaceuticals).

73 Kodak C.E.O. Got Stock Options Day Before News of Loan Sent Stock Soaring, New York Times (July 

31, 2020) (online at www.nytimes.com/2020/07/31/business/kodak-ceo-stock-options.html); A Closer Look at the

Kodak Chairman’s Stock Purchases as Shares Rally 1,500%, Benzinga (July 29, 2020) (online at 

www.benzinga.com/news/20/07/16833683/a-closer-look-at-the-kodak-chairmans-stock-purchases-as-shares-rally-1- 

500). 

74 Eastman Kodak’s Top Executive Reportedly Got Trump Deal Windfall on an ‘Understanding’, CNBC 

(Aug. 3, 2020) (online at www.cnbc.com/2020/08/01/eastman-kodaks-top-executive-reportedly-got-trump-dealwindfall-on-an-understanding.html).

75 Letter from Chairman James E. Clyburn, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Chairwoman 

Carolyn B. Maloney, Committee on Oversight and Reform, and Chairwoman Maxine Waters, Committee on 

Financial Services to James Continenza, Executive Chairman, Eastman Kodak Company (Aug. 4, 2020) (online at 

coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2020-08-

04.Clyburn%20CBM%20Waters%20to%20Kodak%20re%20Loan%201.pdf); Letter from Chairwoman Maxine

Waters, Committee on Financial Services, et al., to Chief Executive Officer Adam Boehler, U.S. International

Development Finance Corporation (Aug. 4, 2020) (online at

financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/2020.08.04_h_cmtes_ltr_to_dfc.pdf).

76 Eastman Kodak Company, Press Release: Kodak Appoints Special Committee to Conduct Review (Aug. 

7. 2020) (online at www.kodak.com/en/company/press-release/special-committee-to-conduct-review).

77 Eastman Kodak’s $765 Million U.S. Loan Agreement on Hold After Recent Allegations, Reuters (Aug. 8, 

2020) (online at www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-eastman-kodak-deals/eastman-kodaks-765-million-u-s-loanagreement-on-hold-after-recent-allegations-idUSKCN2540XV).

78 Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, Report to the Special Committee of the Board of Directors of 

Eastman Kodak Company Regarding the Events Surrounding the U.S. International Development Finance 

Corporation Letter of Interest Announcement (Sept. 15, 2020) (online at www.kodak.com/content/productsbrochures/Company/Report-to-the-Special-Committee-09.15.2020.pdf).

79 Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Press Release: Chairs Clyburn, Maloney and Waters 

Press Kodak Directors on $765 Million Loan and Windfall for Executives and Board Members (Sept. 28, 2020) 

(online at coronavirus.house.gov/news/press-releases/chairs-clyburn-maloney-and-waters-press-kodak-directors765-million-loan-and).

56
80 Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Press Release: Select Subcommittee Seeks 

Transparency on Conflicts of Interest and Vaccine Selection in Operation Warp Speed (Aug. 13, 2020) (online at 

coronavirus.house.gov/news/press-releases/select-subcommittee-seeks-transparency-conflicts-interest-and-vaccineselection).

81 Department of Health and Human Services, Trump Administration Announces Framework and 

Leadership for ‘Operation Warp Speed’ (May 15, 2020) (online at www.hhs.gov/about/news/2020/05/15/trumpadministration-announces-framework-and-leadership-for-operation-warp-speed.html).

82 USASpending.gov, Delivery Order No. 75N98020F00001 (May 15, 2020) (online at 

www.usaspending.gov/#/award/CONT_AWD_75N98020F00001_7529_75N98019D00020_7529).

83 USASpending.gov, Delivery Order No. 75N98020F00002 (July 28, 2020) (online at 

www.usaspending.gov/#/award/CONT_AWD_75N98020F00002_7529_75N98019D00020_7529).

84 Vaccine Project Contract Raises Transparency Questions, Politico (July 31, 2020) (online at 

www.politico.com/news/2020/07/31/vaccine-project-contract-raises-transparency-questions-389822).

85 Ethics Groups Call on Coronavirus ‘Vaccine Czar’ to Disclose Potential Conflicts, ABC News (May 29, 

2020) (online at abcnews.go.com/Politics/ethics-groups-call-coronavirus-vaccine-czar-disclosepotential/story?id=70935155).

86 Letter from Chairman James E. Clyburn, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, to Secretary of 

Health and Human Services Alex M. Azar II (Aug. 12, 2020) (online at 

coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2020-08-

12.Clyburn%20to%20Azar%20re%20Operation%20Warp%20Speed.pdf).

87 Letter from Chairman James E. Clyburn, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, to David S. 

Harris, President and Chief Executive Officer, Advanced Decision Vectors LLC (Sept. 21, 2020) (online at 

coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2020-09-

21.Clyburn%20to%20Harris%20Letter%20to%20ADV%20re%20Subpoena%20%20%281%29.pdf).

88 HHS responded on behalf of Dr. Slaoui.

89 Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Press Release: Documents Reveal Potential Unresolved 

Conflicts of Interest Among Top Operation Warp Speed Advisors (Sept. 22, 2020) (online at 

coronavirus.house.gov/news/press-releases/documents-reveal-potential-unresolved-conflicts-interest-among-topoperation).

90 Id.; Sanofi and GlaxoSmithKline Snag Biggest Coronavirus Vaccine Deal Yet, New York Times (July 31, 

2020) (online at www.nytimes.com/2020/07/31/health/covid-19-vaccine-sanofi-gsk.html).

91 Letter from Sarah Arbes, Assistant Secretary for Legislation, Department of Health and Human Services, 

to Senator Elizabeth Warren (July 30, 2020) (online at 

www.warren.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/July%2030%20HHS%20Letter%20to%20Sen%20Warren.pdf).

92 Department of Health and Human Services, Financial Holdings and Non-Disclosure Statement of 

Dr. Moncef Slaoui (May 16, 2020) (online at 

coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/HHS%20NDA_FE_Dr.%20Slaoui_05.18.2020.p

df).

93 Id. 

94 Department of Health and Human Services, Financial Holdings and Non-Disclosure Statement of 

Dr. William Erhardt (May 28, 2020) (online at 

coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/NDA_FE_HHS_ERHARDT_05.28.20.pdf); 

Department of Health and Human Services, Financial Holdings and Non-Disclosure Statement of Dr. Rachel 

Harrigan (May 28, 2020) (online at 

coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/NDA_FE_HHS_Harrigan_05.28.20.pdf); Pfizer, 

Press Release: Pfizer and BioNTech Announce an Agreement with U.S. Government for up to 600 Million Doses of 

MRNA-Based Vaccine Candidate Against SARS-COV-2 (July 22, 2020) (online at investors.pfizer.com/investornews/press-release-details/2020/Pfizer-and-BioNTech-Announce-an-Agreement-with-U.S.-Government-for-up-to600-Million-Doses-of-mRNA-based-Vaccine-Candidate-Against-SARS-CoV-2/default.aspx).

57
95 Thermo Fisher Builds $40M Coronavirus Test Tube Manufacturing Facility in 6 Weeks, Fierce Biotech 

(Aug. 31, 2020) (online at www.fiercebiotech.com/medtech/thermo-fisher-builds-40m-coronavirus-test-tubemanufacturing-facility-6-weeks); Department of Health and Human Services, Press Release: HHS Invests in 

Diagnostic Labs to Expand COVID-19 Testing Capacity in the United States (Aug. 13, 2020) (online at 

www.hhs.gov/about/news/2020/08/13/hhs-invests-in-diagnostic-labs-to-expand-covid-19-testing-capacity-in-theunited-states.html).

96 PhaseBio Pharmaceuticals, Press Release: PhaseBio Launches Clinical Trial to Evaluate PB1046 as a 

Treatment for Hospitalized COVID-19 Patients (May 27, 2020) (online at investors.phasebio.com/newsreleases/news-release-details/phasebio-launches-clinical-trial-evaluate-pb1046-treatment); PhaseBio 

Pharmaceuticals, Press Release: PhaseBio Doses First Patient in VANGARD Phase 2 Clinical Trial to Evaluate 

PB1046 for Hospitalized COVID-19 Patients (July 16, 2020) (online at investors.phasebio.com/news-releases/newsrelease-details/phasebio-doses-first-patient-vangard-phase-2-clinical-trial).

97 Wilmington-Based Incyte Looking to Repurpose Flagship Drug as COVID-19 Treatment, Philadelphia 

Business Journal (Apr. 3, 2020) (online at www.bizjournals.com/philadelphia/news/2020/04/03/wilmington-basedincyte-looking-to-repurpose.html).

98 Department of Health and Human Services, Financial Holdings and Non-Disclosure Statement of 

Dr. Carlo de Notaristefani (May 28, 2020) (online at 

coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/NDA_FE_HHS_Dr.%20de%20Notaristefani_05.

28.20.pdf); Teva Pharmaceuticals, Press Release: Teva to Donate Potential COVID-19 Treatment, 

Hydroxychloroquine Sulfate Tablets to Hospitals Nationwide (Mar. 20, 2020) (online at 

www.tevapharm.com/newsand-media/latest-news/teva-to-donate-potential-covid-19-treatment-hydroxychloroquinesulfate-tablets-to-hospitalsnationwide).

99 Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Press Release: Documents Reveal Potential Unresolved 

Conflicts of Interest Among Top Operation Warp Speed Advisors (Sept. 22, 2020) (online at 

coronavirus.house.gov/news/press-releases/documents-reveal-potential-unresolved-conflicts-interest-among-topoperation).

100 Major Problems with Voting in Atlanta as 5 States Hold Primaries, New York Times (June 9, 2020) 

(online at www.nytimes.com/2020/06/09/us/politics/georgia-primary-voting-atlanta.html); Wisconsin Voters Are 

Waiting in 5-hour Lines in the Middle of a Deadly Pandemic, Vox (Apr. 7, 2020) (online at www.vox.com/policyand-politics/2020/4/7/21211879/wisconsin-voters-lines-election-primary); Palm Beach County Voters Deal with 

Closed Polls, Late Openings, Broken Machines, Long Lines, Palm Beach Post (Mar. 17, 2020) (online at 

www.palmbeachpost.com/news/20200317/palm-beach-county-voters-deal-with-closed-polls-late-openings-brokenmachines-long-lines); Why Did It Take So Long to Vote in Texas and California?, New York Times (Mar. 4, 2020) 

(online at www.nytimes.com/2020/03/04/us/california-texas-voting-lines.html).

101 Center for American Progress, Local Governments Can Lead on Vote by Mail (July 9, 2020) (online at 

www.americanprogress.org/issues/democracy/news/2020/07/09/487462/local-governments-can-lead-vote-mail/); 

Georgia to Mail Absentee Ballot Applications to All Voters, Associated Press (Mar. 24, 2020) (online at 

apnews.com/a873d5985cd0e42cd2748c7512fdb64a); Wisconsin Election Commission Encouraging Absentee Voting 

Due to COVID-19, Wisconsin Public Radio (Mar. 14, 2020) (online at www.wpr.org/wisconsin-electioncommission-encouraging-absentee-voting-due-covid-19).

102 ‘Voter Suppression at Its Finest,’ Wisconsin Citizens Say Missing Ballots, Lines and Coronavirus Kept 

Them from Being Counted in Election, Frontline (Apr. 13, 2020) (online at 

www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/voter-suppression-wisconsin-election-missing-ballots-lines-coronavirus-covid19/); Long Lines, Anger and Fear of Infection: Wisconsin Proceeds with Elections Under Court Order, Washington 

Post (Apr. 7, 2020) (online at www.washingtonpost.com/politics/long-lines-form-in-milwaukee-as-wisconsinproceeds-with-elections-under-court-order/2020/04/07/93727b34-78c7-11ea-b6ff-597f170df8f8_story.html);

Wisconsin Primary Recap: Voters Forced to Choose Between Their Health and Their Civic Duty, New York Times 

(Apr. 7, 2020) (online at www.nytimes.com/2020/04/07/us/politics/wisconsin-primary-election.html).

103 Older People Account for Large Shares of Poll Workers and Voters in U.S. General Elections, Pew 

Research Center (Apr. 6, 2020) (online at www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/04/06/older-people-account-forlarge-shares-of-poll-workers-and-voters-in-u-s-general-elections/).

58
104 From 47 Primaries, 4 Warning Signs About the 2020 Vote, New York Times (June 30, 2020) (online at 

www.nytimes.com/2020/06/27/us/2020-primary-election-voting.html); see also, e.g., Pandemic Among Reasons for 

Nearly 200 Fewer Voting Centers in Dallas County for Primary Runoff, CBS News Dallas-Ft. Worth (July 13, 

2020) (online at dfw.cbslocal.com/2020/07/13/coronavirus-pandemic-fewer-voting-centers-dallas-county-primaryrunoff/); Two Major Texas Counties Are Trimming Polling Locations as Workers Pull Out over Coronavirus, Texas 

Tribune (July 9, 2020) (online at www.texastribune.org/2020/07/09/texas-voting-coronavirus/); Georgia’s Election 

Problems Blasted as November Vote Looms, Atlanta Journal-Constitution (June 11, 2020) (online at 

www.ajc.com/news/state--regional-govt--politics/georgia-election-problems-blasted-november-electionlooms/m7JraAaY5E4hsHc4mFvLHI/); Some Wisconsin Sites Lack Workers for In-Person Voting, Associated Press 

(Mar. 31, 2020) (online at www.apnews.com/40095ba144ca14c82bf98dec2909684b); Coronavirus Upends Primary 

Elections in Florida, Illinois And Arizona; Vote Postponed in Ohio, Los Angeles Times (Mar. 17, 2020) (online at 

www.latimes.com/politics/story/2020-03-17/coronavirus-primary-election-confusion-florida-ohio-polling).

105 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Considerations for Election Polling Locations and Voters, 

(June 22, 2020) (online at web.archive.org/web/20201022140624/www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-

ncov/community/election-polling-locations.html) (updated as Polling Locations and Voters: Interim Guidance to 

Prevent Spread of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) (Oct. 23, 2020) (online at 

www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/election-polling-locations.html)).

106 Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Press Release: Clyburn, Lofgren Launch Investigation 

into States’ Preparations to Hold Free, Fair, and Safe Elections (Aug. 14, 2020) (online at

coronavirus.house.gov/news/press-releases/clyburn-lofgren-launch-investigation-states-preparations-hold-free-fairand-safe). 

107 Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Hearing on “Ensuring a Free, Fair, and Safe Election 

During the Coronavirus Pandemic” (Sept. 9, 2020) (online at coronavirus.house.gov/subcommitteeactivity/hearings/remote-hearing-ensuring-free-fair-and-safe-election-during); Select Subcommittee on the 

Coronavirus Crisis, Press Release: At Hearing, Witnesses Warn Failure to Provide Safe Voting Options Could 

Disenfranchise Voters (Sept. 9, 2020) (online at coronavirus.house.gov/news/press-releases/hearing-witnesses-warnfailure-provide-safe-voting-options-could-disenfranchise). 

108 Memorandum from Majority Staff to Members of the Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, 

Examination of States’ Preparedness for the November Election (Sept. 9, 2020) (online at 

coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/20200909%20Select%20Subcmte%20Staff%20

Memo_Examination%20of%20States%27%20Preparedness%20for%20the%20November%20Election.pdf). 

109 Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Press Release: Chairs Clyburn, Lofgren, and Maloney 

Challenge Voter Suppression by Texas Governor (Oct. 6, 2020) (online at coronavirus.house.gov/news/pressreleases/chairs-clyburn-lofgren-and-maloney-challenge-voter-suppression-texas-governor). 

110 Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Remote Hearing on “Ensuring a Free, Fair, and Safe 

Election During the Coronavirus Pandemic” (Sept. 9, 2020) (online at coronavirus.house.gov/subcommitteeactivity/hearings/remote-hearing-ensuring-free-fair-and-safe-election-during); Select Subcommittee on the 

Coronavirus Crisis, Press Release: At Hearing, Witnesses Warn Failure to Provide Safe Voting Options Could 

Disenfranchise Voters (Sept. 9, 2020) (online at coronavirus.house.gov/news/press-releases/hearing-witnesses-warnfailure-provide-safe-voting-options-could-disenfranchise). 

111 Committee on House Administration, Subcommittee on Elections, Testimony of Lawrence D. Norden, 

Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law, Hearing on “The Impact of COVID-19 on Voting Rights and 

Election Administration: Ensuring Safe and Fair Elections” (June 11, 2020) (online at 

docs.house.gov/meetings/HA/HA08/20200611/110770/HHRG-116-HA08-Wstate-NordenL-20200611.pdf).

112 H.R. 6800; H.R. 925. 

113 Rep. James E. Clyburn and Dr. Krutika Kuppalli, Op-ed: Three Steps for Safe Pandemic Voting, New 

York Times (Oct. 22, 2020) (online at www.nytimes.com/2020/10/22/opinion/covid-voting-safety.amp.html).

114 Department of the Treasury, Press Release: Treasury, IRS Announce Delivery of 159 Million Economic 

Impact Payments, (June 3, 2020) (online at home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm1025).

59
115 Taxpayer Advocate Service, Reducing Burden Resulting from the Implementation of the Coronavirus 

Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act (June 2020) (online at 

taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/Media/Default/Documents/2021-JRC/JRC21_SAO_03.pdf).

116 People Are Mistaking Stimulus Payments for Junk Mail or a Scam, Washington Post (May 28, 2020) 

(online at www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/05/28/people-are-mistaking-stimulus-payments-junk-mail-orscam/). 

117 Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Press Release: Clyburn Urges Treasury and IRS to 

Heed “Lessons Learned” and Ensure Fast, Equitable Distribution of Stimulus Checks (Aug. 3, 2020) (online at 

coronavirus.house.gov/news/press-releases/clyburn-urges-treasury-and-irs-heed-lessons-learned-and-ensure-fastequitable). 

118 Letter from Chairman James E. Clyburn, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, to Secretary 

Steven T. Mnuchin, Department of the Treasury, and Commissioner Charles P. Rettig, Internal Revenue Service 

(July 8, 2020) (online coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2020-07-

08.Clyburn%20to%20Treasury%20IRS%20re%20Stimulus%20Checks.pdf).

119 Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Press Release: Clyburn Urges Treasury and IRS to 

Heed “Lessons Learned” and Ensure Fast, Equitable Distribution of Stimulus Checks (Aug. 3, 2020) (online at 

coronavirus.house.gov/news/press-releases/clyburn-urges-treasury-and-irs-heed-lessons-learned-and-ensure-fastequitable). 

120 Internal Revenue Service, News Release: IRS to Mail Special Letter to Estimated 9 Million Non-Filers, 

Urging Them to Claim Economic Impact Payment by Oct. 15 at IRS.gov (Sept. 8, 2020) (online at 

www.irs.gov/newsroom/irs-to-mail-special-letter-to-estimated-9-million-non-filers-urging-them-to-claim-economicimpact-payment-by-oct-15-at-irsgov). 

121 Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Press Release: Clyburn to Treasury and IRS: Give 9 

Million Americans More Time to Claim Stimulus Checks (Sept. 11, 2020) (online at 

coronavirus.house.gov/news/press-releases/clyburn-treasury-and-irs-give-9-million-americans-more-time-claimstimulus). 

122 Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Press Release: Following Select Subcommittee 

Investigation, IRS Gives 9 Million Americans More Time to Claim Stimulus Checks (Oct. 7, 2020) (online at 

coronavirus.house.gov/news/press-releases/following-select-subcommittee-investigation-irs-gives-9-millionamericans-more).

123 Internal Revenue Service, News Release: IRS Extends Economic Impact Payment Deadline to Nov. 21 

to Help Non-filers (Oct. 5, 2020) (online at www.irs.gov/newsroom/irs-extends-economic-impact-paymentdeadline-to-nov-21-to-help-non-filers). 

124 Internal Revenue Service, News Release: Now Available: IRS Form 1040-X Electronic Filing (Aug. 

17, 2020) (online at www.irs.gov/newsroom/now-available-irs-form-1040-x-electronic-filing).

125 Letter from Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs Frederick W. Vaughan, 

Department of the Treasury, to Chairman James E. Clyburn, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis (July 

22, 2020) (online at coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2020-07-

22%20UST%20Reply%20to%20Clyburn.pdf).

126 Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Press Release: Following Select Subcommittee 

Investigation, IRS Gives 9 Million Americans More Time to Claim Stimulus Checks (Oct. 7, 2020) (online at 

coronavirus.house.gov/news/press-releases/following-select-subcommittee-investigation-irs-gives-9-millionamericans-more).

127 Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, §§ 4022, 4024 (2020).

128 Census Bureau, Week 11 Household Pulse Survey: July 9–July 14 (July 22, 2020) (online at 

www.census.gov/data/tables/2020/demo/hhp/hhp11.html).

129 Letter from Chairman James E. Clyburn, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, to Chief 

Executive Officer Hugh Frater, Fannie Mae (July 27, 2020) (online at 

coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2020-07-

60
27.Clyburn%20to%20Fannie%20Mae%20re%20CARES%20Act.pdf); Letter from Chairman James E. Clyburn,

Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, to Chief Executive Officer David Brickman, Freddie Mac (July 27,

2020) (online at coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2020-07-

27.Clyburn%20to%20Freddie%20Mac%20re%20CARES%20Act.pdf).

130 Federal Housing Finance Agency, Office of Inspector General, Oversight by Fannie Mae and Freddie 

Mac of Compliance with Forbearance Requirements Under the CARES Act and Implementing Guidance by 

Mortgage Servicers (July 27, 2020) (online at www.fhfaoig.gov/sites/default/files/OIG-2020-004.pdf).

131 Letter from Chairman James E. Clyburn, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, to Director 

Mark A. Calabria, Federal Housing Finance Agency (October 16, 2020) (online at 

coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2020-10-

16.Clyburn%20to%20Calabria%20re%20FHFA%20MEKC.pdf).

132 Id. (including homeowners with federally-backed mortgages who missed at least one monthly payment).

133 Id. 

134 U.S. Orders Eviction Moratorium for Most Through Year’s End, New York Times (Sept. 1, 2020) 

(online at www.nytimes.com/2020/09/01/business/eviction-moratorium-order.html).

135 Centers for Disease Control, HHS/CDC Temporary Halt in Residential Evictions to Prevent the Further 

Spread of COVID-19: Frequently Asked Questions (Oct. 9, 2020) (online at www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-

ncov/downloads/eviction-moratoria-order-faqs.pdf).

136 Corporate Landlords Are Still Filing Eviction Cases After CDC Order, Data Show, Vice News (Sept. 

28, 2020) (online at www.vice.com/en/article/m7jz43/corporate-landlords-are-still-filing-eviction-cases-after-cdcorder-data-show); Pittsburgh-Area Apartment Complex the Alden South Hills Seeking Large-Scale Evictions, 

Pittsburgh City Paper (Oct. 21, 2020) (online at www.pghcitypaper.com/pittsburgh/pittsburgh-area-apartmentcomplex-the-alden-south-hills-seeking-large-scale-evictions/Content?oid=18223682).

137 H.R. 6800; H.R. 925. 

138 See National Community Reinvestment Coalition, NCRC Joins with over 50 Groups in Support of 

Mortgage Relief in Next Covid-19 Relief Package (July 30, 2020) (online at ncrc.org/letter-to-congress-letter-fromover-50-groups-in-support-of-mortgage-relief-in-next-covid-19-relief-package/).

139 H.R. 925. 

140 Federal Housing Finance Agency, News Release: FHFA Suspends Foreclosures and Evictions for 

Enterprise-Backed Mortgages (Mar. 18, 2020) (online at www.fhfa.gov/Media/PublicAffairs/Pages/FHFASuspends-Foreclosures-and-Evictions-for-Enterprise-Backed-Mortgages.aspx); Federal Housing Finance Agency, 

News Release: FHFA Announces Payment Deferral as New Repayment Option for Homeowners in COVID-19 

Forbearance Plans (May 13, 2020) (online at www.fhfa.gov/Media/PublicAffairs/Pages/FHFA-AnnouncesPayment-Deferral-as-New-Repayment-Option-for-Homeowners-in-COVID-19-Forbearance-Plans.aspx). 

141 Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, §§ 1102, 1106 (2020).

142 Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Press Release: Select Subcommittee Launches 

Investigation into Disbursement of PPP Funds (June 15, 2020) (online at coronavirus.house.gov/news/pressreleases/select-subcommittee-launches-investigation-disbursement-ppp-funds).

143 Letter from Chairman James E. Clyburn, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, to Greg Baer, 

President and Chief Executive Officer, Bank Policy Institute (Sept. 10, 2020) (online at 

coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2020-09-

10.Clyburn%20to%20Baer%20re%20BPI_.pdf ); Letter from Chairman James E. Clyburn, Select Subcommittee on

the Coronavirus Crisis, to Richard Hunt, President and Chief Executive Officer, Consumer Bankers Association

(Sept. 10, 2020) (online at coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2020-09-

10.Clyburn%20to%20Hunt%20re%20CBA_.pdf).

144 The Select Subcommittee sent letters to the largest PPP lenders as well as lenders that were the subject 

of public reporting indicating that they created a two-tier system for processing PPP loan applications.

61
145 See Staff, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Preliminary Analysis of Paycheck Protection 

Program Data (Sept. 1, 2020) (online at coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2020-

09-01.PPP%20Interim%20Report.pdf); Staff, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Underserved and

Unprotected: How the Trump Administration Neglected the Neediest Small Businesses in the PPP (Oct. 16, 2020)

(online at

coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/PPP%20Report%20Final%20%283%29.pdf).

146 See Staff, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Underserved and Unprotected: How the 

Trump Administration Neglected the Neediest Small Businesses in the PPP (Oct. 16, 2020) (online at 

coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/PPP%20Report%20Final%20%283%29.pdf).

147 See Staff, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Preliminary Analysis of Paycheck Protection 

Program Data (Sept. 1, 2020) (online at coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2020-

09-01.PPP%20Interim%20Report.pdf). The total number and value of potentially fraudulent identified include all

loans referenced in this report, excluding any duplicate loans.

148 Letter from Chairman James E. Clyburn, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, to Inspector 

General Hannibal “Mike” Ware, Small Business Administration, and Acting Inspector General Richard K. Delmar, 

Department of the Treasury (Sept. 1, 2020) (online at 

coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2020-09-

01.Clyburn%20to%20Ware%20and%20Delmar%20re%20SBA%20OIG%20.pdf).

149 Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Press Release: Clyburn to Mnuchin, Powell: 

“Implement Main Street Lending Program to Support Economic Recovery” (Aug. 6, 2020) (online at 

coronavirus.house.gov/news/press-releases/clyburn-mnuchin-powell-implement-main-street-lending-programsupport-economic).

150 Staff, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Prioritizing Wall Street: The Fed’s Corporate 

Bond Purchases During the Coronavirus Pandemic (Sept. 23, 2020) (online at 

coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/Staff%20Report%20%289-23-

2020%29_FINAL.pdf).

151 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Press Release: Federal Reserve Announces 

Extensive New Measures to Support the Economy (Mar. 23, 2020) (online at 

www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20200323b.htm). 

152 National Bureau of Economic Research, The Fed Takes on Corporate Credit Risk: An Analysis of the 

Efficacy of the SMCCF (Sept. 2020) (online at www.nber.org/papers/w27809.pdf); S&P Global Ratings, Credit 

Trends: Global Financing Conditions: Bond Issuance Is Expected to Finish 2020 Up 6% After a Strong Second 

Quarter (July 27, 2020) (online at www.spglobal.com/ratings/en/research/articles/200727-credit-trends-globalfinancing-conditions-bond-issuance-is-expected-to-finish-2020-up-6-after-a-strong-sec-11584612). 

153 Staff, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Prioritizing Wall Street: The Fed’s Corporate 

Bond Purchases During the Coronavirus Pandemic (Sept. 23, 2020) (online at

coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/Staff%20Report%20%289-23-

2020%29_FINAL.pdf).

154 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Periodic Report: Update on Outstanding Lending 

Facilities Authorized by the Board Under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act (PDF), MSNLF TransactionSpecific Disclosures (XLSX) (Oct. 8, 2020) (online at 

www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/mainstreetlending.htm).

155 Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Press Release: Clyburn to Mnuchin, Powell: 

“Implement Main Street Lending Program to Support Economic Recovery” (Aug. 6, 2020) (online at 

coronavirus.house.gov/news/press-releases/clyburn-mnuchin-powell-implement-main-street-lending-programsupport-economic). 

156 Briefing by Andreas Lehnert, Director, Division of Financial Stability, Board of Governors of the 

Federal Reserve System, and Adam Lerrick, Counselor to the Secretary, Department of the Treasury, to Staff, Select 

Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis (Sept. 11, 2020).

62
157 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Periodic Report: Update on Outstanding Lending 

Facilities Authorized by the Board Under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act (PDF), MLF TransactionSpecific Disclosures (XLSX) (Oct. 8, 2020) (online at www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/muni.htm).

158 Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, State Borrowing No Substitute for Additional Direct Aid to Help 

States Weather COVID Downturn (June 29, 2020) (online at www.cbpp.org/research/state-budget-and-tax/stateborrowing-no-substitute-for-additional-direct-aid-to-help-states).

159 Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, § 4112(a) (2020).

160 Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Press Release: Committees Launch Investigation into 

Waste and Abuse in Treasury’s Payroll Support Program (July 29, 2020) (online at 

coronavirus.house.gov/news/press-releases/committees-launch-investigation-waste-and-abuse-treasury-s-payrollsupport).

161 Id.

162 Staff, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, “Unnecessary Costs”: How the Trump 

Administration Allowed Thousands of Aviation Workers to Lose Their Jobs (Oct. 9, 2020) (online at 

coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/PSP%20Report%20Final.pdf).

163 Id.

164 Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Press Release: Clyburn Secures Commitment from 

Aviation Contractors to Preserve Over 30,000 Jobs (Oct. 21, 2020) (online at coronavirus.house.gov/news/pressreleases/clyburn-secures-commitment-aviation-contractors-preserve-over-30000-jobs).

165 Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Press Release: Clyburn Calls on Cargo Carriers to 

Return Hundreds of Millions of Taxpayer Dollars (Oct. 20, 2020) (online at coronavirus.house.gov/news/pressreleases/clyburn-calls-cargo-carriers-return-hundreds-millions-taxpayer-dollars). 

166 Coronavirus-Infected Americans Flown Home Against CDC’s Advice, Washington Post (Feb. 20, 2020) 

(online at www.washingtonpost.com/health/coronavirus-diamond-princess-cruise-americans/2020/02/20/b6f54cae5279-11ea-b119-4faabac6674f_story.html). 

167 Health Officials Warn Americans to Plan for the Spread of Coronavirus in U.S., National Public Radio 

(Feb. 25, 2020) (online at www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2020/02/25/809318447/health-officials-warnamericans-to-start-planning-for-spread-of-coronavirus-in-u).

168 Health Chief’s Early Missteps Set Back Coronavirus Response, Wall Street Journal (Apr. 22, 2020) 

(online at www.wsj.com/articles/health-chiefs-early-missteps-set-back-coronavirus-response-11587570514).

169 How Jared Kushner’s Secret Testing Plan “Went Poof into Thin Air,” Vanity Fair (July 30, 2020)

(online at www.vanityfair.com/news/2020/07/how-jared-kushners-secret-testing-plan-went-poof-into-thin-air).

170 ‘We’ve Been Muzzled’: CDC Sources Say White House Putting Politics Ahead of Science, CNN (May 

20, 2020) (online at www.cnn.com/2020/05/20/politics/coronavirus-travel-alert-cdc-white-house-tensionsinvs/index.html).

171 Official: White House Didn’t Want to Tell Seniors Not to Fly, Associated Press (Mar. 7, 2020) (online 

at apnews.com/article/921ad7f1f08d7634bf681ba785faf269).

172 CDC to Resume Regular Coronavirus Briefings After Being Sidelined by White House, CNN (May 30, 

2020) (online at www.cnn.com/2020/05/30/politics/cdc-coronavirus-briefings-resume/index.html). 

173 Inside the Fall of the CDC, Pro Publica (Oct. 15, 2020) (online at www.propublica.org/article/insidethe-fall-of-the-cdc).

174 A Demoralized CDC Grapples with White House Meddling and Its Own Mistakes, Wall Street Journal 

(Oct. 15, 2020) (online at www.wsj.com/articles/a-demoralized-cdc-grapples-with-white-house-meddling-and-itsown-mistakes-11602776561).

175 Trump Administration Plans to Extend Virus Border Restrictions Indefinitely, New York Times (May 

13, 2020) (online at www.nytimes.com/2020/05/13/us/politics/trump-coronavirus-border-restrictions.html).

63
176 Inside the Fall of the CDC, ProPublica (Oct. 15, 2020) (online at www.propublica.org/article/inside-thefall-of-the-cdc).

177 Committee on Oversight and Reform, Press Release: New Document Shows Inadequate Distribution of 

Personal Protective Equipment and Critical Medical Supplies to States (Apr. 8, 2020) (online at 

oversight.house.gov/news/press-releases/new-document-shows-inadequate-distribution-of-personal-protectiveequipment-and).

178 ‘We’re Not a Shipping Clerk’: Trump Tells Governors to Step up Efforts to Get Medical Supplies, 

Politico (Mar. 19, 2020) (online at www.politico.com/news/2020/03/19/trump-governors-coronavirus-medicalsupplies-137658).

179 “That’s Their Problem”: How Jared Kushner Let the Markets Decide America’s COVID-19 Fate, 

Vanity Fair (Sept. 17, 2020) (online at www.vanityfair.com/news/2020/09/jared-kushner-let-the-markets-decidecovid-19-fate).

180 Trump Administration Scrapped Plan to Send Every American a Mask in April, Email Shows, NBC 

News (Sept. 17, 2020) (online at www.nbcnews.com/health/health-news/trump-administration-scrapped-plan-sendevery-american-mask-april-email-n1240359); Postal Service’s Plan to Send 650M Face Masks to Americans 

Allegedly Nixed by White House, ABC News (Sept. 17, 2020) (online at www.abcnews.go.com/Politics/postalservices-plan-send-650m-face-masks-americans/story?id=73081928).

181 White House Task Force Quietly Softened Cruise Ship No-Sail Restrictions After Months of Industry 

Deference, USA Today (Apr. 13, 2020) (online at www.usatoday.com/story/travel/cruises/2020/04/13/coronaviruscruise-ships-saw-red-flags-amid-chaotic-federal-response/2937001001/).

182 Inside the Fall of the CDC, Pro Publica (Oct. 15, 2020) (online at www.propublica.org/article/insidethe-fall-of-the-cdc).

183 ‘Toxic’: CDC Staffers Say Morale Inside the Public Health Agency Has Plummeted During the 

Pandemic, NBC News (Oct. 25, 2020) (online at www.nbcnews.com/health/health-care/toxic-cdc-staffers-saymorale-inside-public-health-agency-has-n1244661).

184 Most States that Are Reopening Fail to Meet White House Guidelines, New York Times (May 7, 2020) 

(online at www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/05/07/us/coronavirus-states-reopen-criteria.html).

185 Trump Wants U.S. ‘Opened Up’ by Easter, Despite Health Officials’ Warnings, New York Times (Mar. 

24, 2020) (online at www.nytimes.com/2020/03/24/us/politics/trump-coronavirus-easter.html).

186 Woodward Book: Trump Says He Knew Coronavirus Was ‘Deadly’ and Worse than the Flu While 

Intentionally Misleading Americans, Washington Post (Sept. 9, 2020) (online at 

www.washingtonpost.com/politics/bob-woodward-rage-book-trump/2020/09/09/0368fe3c-efd2-11ea-b4bc3a2098fc73d4_story.html).

187 Trump Halts Funding to World Health Organization, Politico (Apr. 14, 2020) (online at 

www.politico.com/news/2020/04/14/trump-world-health-organization-funding-186786).

188 Vaccine Chief Says He Was Removed After Questioning Drug Trump Promoted, New York Times (May 

5, 2020) (online at www.nytimes.com/2020/04/22/us/coronavirus-live-coverage.html).

189 CDC Director’s Office Ordered Softening of Covid Safety Protocols, MSNBC (Sept. 22, 2020) (online 

at www.msnbc.com/rachel-maddow/watch/cdc-director-s-office-ordered-softening-of-covid-safety-protocols92362309670).

190 Under Pence, Politics Regularly Seeped into the Coronavirus Task Force, New York Times (Oct. 8, 

2020) (online at www.nytimes.com/2020/10/08/us/politics/pence-coronavirus-task-force.html).

191 Trump Administration Buries Detailed CDC Advice on Reopening, Associated Press (May 7, 2020) 

(online at www.apnews.com/article/7a00d5fba3249e573d2ead4bd323a4d4); White House Rejected ‘Overly 

Prescriptive’ CDC Guidance for Reopening Communities, National Public Radio (May 7, 2020) (online at 

www.npr.org/2020/05/07/852090268/white-house-rejected-overly-prescriptive-cdc-guidance-for-reopeningbusinesses).

64
192 Trump Officials Interfered with CDC Reports on Covid-19, Politico (Sept. 12, 2020) (online at 

www.politico.com/news/2020/09/11/exclusive-trump-officials-interfered-with-cdc-reports-on-covid-19-412809).

193 Trump Admin Pulls NIH Grant for Coronavirus Research over Ties to Wuhan Lab at Heart of 

Conspiracy Theories, ABC News (May 1, 2020) (online at abcnews.go.com/Politics/trump-admin-pulls-nih-grantcoronavirus-research-ties/story?id=70418101).

194 Trump’s Wuhan Lab Coronavirus Conspiracy Theory Is Bogus, According to, Uh, Everyone, Vice (May 

5, 2020) (online at www.vice.com/en_us/article/7kpzv4/trumps-wuhan-lab-coronavirus-conspiracy-theory-is-bogusaccording-to-uh-everyone).

195 No Virus Deaths by Mid-May? White House Economists Say They Didn’t Forecast Early End to 

Fatalities, New York Times (May 6, 2020) (online at www.nytimes.com/2020/05/06/business/coronavirus-whitehouse-economists.html).

196 Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Press Release: Documents Reveal Potential 

Unresolved Conflicts Of Interest Among Top Operation Warp Speed Advisors (Sept. 22, 2020) (online at 

coronavirus.house.gov/news/press-releases/documents-reveal-potential-unresolved-conflicts-interest-among-topoperation); Vaccine Project Contract Raises Transparency Questions, Politico (July 31, 2020) (online at 

www.politico.com/news/2020/07/31/vaccine-project-contract-raises-transparency-questions-389822). 

197 Doctors Warn of ‘Tinderbox Scenario’ if Coronavirus Spreads in ICE Detention, CNN (Mar. 20, 2020) 

(online at www.cnn.com/2020/03/20/health/doctors-ice-detention-coronavirus/index.html).

198 The Cruelty of Trump’s ICE Under COVID-19, Boston Review (May 19, 2020) (online at 

bostonreview.net/global-justice/lauren-carasik-deadly-immigration-enforcement-during-covid-19-pandemic).

199 A Demoralized CDC Grapples with White House Meddling and Its Own Mistakes, Wall Street Journal 

(Oct. 15, 2020) (online at www.wsj.com/articles/a-demoralized-cdc-grapples-with-white-house-meddling-and-itsown-mistakes-11602776561).

200 Inside the Fall of the CDC, ProPublica (Oct. 15, 2020) (online at www.propublica.org/article/inside-thefall-of-the-cdc).

201 White House and CDC Remove Coronavirus Warnings About Choirs in Faith Guidance, Washington 

Post (May 28, 2020) (online at www.washingtonpost.com/health/white-house-and-cdc-remove-coronaviruswarnings-about-choirs-in-faith-guidance/2020/05/28/5d9c526e-a117-11ea-9590-1858a893bd59_story.html).

202 White House Puts ‘Politicals’ at CDC to Try to Control Info, Associated Press (Oct. 16, 2020) (online at 

apnews.com/article/election-2020-virus-outbreak-pandemics-public-health-new-yorke321f4c9098b4db4dd6b1eda76a5179e).

203 Pence Tells Governors to Repeat Misleading Claim on Outbreaks, New York Times (June 16, 2020) 

(online at www.nytimes.com/2020/06/15/world/coronavirus-usa-world.html). 

204 The Attack on Voting, New York Times (Sept. 30, 2020) (online at 

www.nytimes.com/2020/09/30/magazine/trump-voter-fraud.html). 

205 Letter from Chairman James E. Clyburn, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, et al., to 

Secretary of Health and Human Services Alex M. Azar II (June 25, 2020) (online at 

coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2020-06-

25.Clyburn%20Foster%20Kim%20et%20al.%20to%20Azar%20II-HHS%20re%20Federal%20Testing.pdf).

206 Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Press Release: Select Subcommittee Calls on White 

House, Governors to Comply with Unpublished Recommendations to Contain Virus (July 29, 2020) (online at 

coronavirus.house.gov/news/press-releases/select-subcommittee-calls-white-house-governors-comply-unpublished); 

Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Press Release: Select Subcommittee Releases Eight Weeks of 

Coronavirus Task Force Reports Kept Secret by the White House (Aug. 31, 2020) (online at 

coronavirus.house.gov/news/press-releases/select-subcommittee-releases-eight-weeks-coronavirus-task-forcereports-kept).

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207 CDC Feels Pressure from Trump as Rift Grows over Coronavirus Response, Washington Post (July 9, 

2020) (online at www.washingtonpost.com/health/trump-sidelines-public-health-advisers-in-growing-rift-overcoronavirus-response/2020/07/09/ad803218-c12a-11ea-9fdd-b7ac6b051dc8_story.html). 

208 Read the Email Between Caputo and Dr. Alexander, New York Times (Sept. 18, 2020) (online at 

www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/09/18/us/read-the-email-between-caputo-and-dr.html).

209 Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Press Release: At Hearing, Secretary Azar Refuses to 

Accept Trump Administration Responsibility for Deaths of Over 200,000 Americans (Oct. 2, 2020) (online at 

coronavirus.house.gov/news/press-releases/hearing-secretary-azar-refuses-accept-trump-administrationresponsibility-deaths).

210 Fauci Is Sidelined by the White House as He Steps up Blunt Talk on Pandemic, Washington Post (July 

11, 2020) (online at www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/07/11/fauci-trump-coronavirus/); White House Takes 

Aim at Fauci but Trump Has No Current Plans to Fire Him, Source Says, CNN (July 13, 2020) (online at 

www.cnn.com/2020/07/12/politics/fauci-trump-coronavirus/index.html).

211 Peter Navarro, Anthony Fauci Has Been Wrong About Everything I Have Interacted with Him on, USA 

Today (July 14, 2020) (online at www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/todaysdebate/2020/07/14/anthony-fauci-wrongwith-me-peter-navarro-editorials-debates/5439374002/).

212 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Considerations for K-12 Schools: Readiness and Planning 

Tool (July 1, 2020) (online at www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/downloads/community/School-Admin-K12-

readiness-and-planning-tool.pdf). 

213 CDC’s Robert Redfield: After Pressure on School Reopenings from Donald Trump, Changes ‘Not a 

Revision’ of Guidelines, USA Today (July 9, 2020) (online at 

www.usatoday.com/story/news/health/2020/07/09/covid-cases-cdc-says-school-reopening-guidelines-wontrevised/5404983002/); CDC Director Concedes Schools in ‘Hot Spots’ Face Tougher Call on Reopening, 

Washington Post (July 24, 2020) (online at www.washingtonpost.com/education/cdc-director-concedes-schools-inhot-spots-face-tougher-call-on-reopening/2020/07/24/273ee068-cdd8-11ea-b0e3-d55bda07d66a_story.html).

214 Behind the White House Effort to Pressure the C.D.C. on School Openings, New York Times (Sept. 28, 

2020) (online at www.nytimes.com/2020/09/28/us/politics/white-house-cdc-coronavirus-schools.html).

215 Trump Eyes New Unproven Coronavirus “Cure,” Axios (Aug. 16, 2020) (online at 

www.axios.com/trump-covid-oleandrin-9896f570-6cd8-4919-af3a-65ebad113d41.html).

216 Trump Has Launched an All-Out Attack on the FDA. Will Its Scientific Integrity Survive?, Stat News 

(Aug. 27, 2020) (online at www.statnews.com/2020/08/27/trump-has-launched-an-all-out-attack-on-the-fda-will-itsscientific-integrity-survive/); Two P.R. Experts at F.D.A. Have Been Ousted After Blood Plasma Fiasco, New York 

Times (Aug. 28, 2020) (online at www.nytimes.com/2020/08/28/health/blood-plasma-fda.html).

217 Trump Administration Strips C.D.C. of Control of Coronavirus Data, New York Times (July 14, 2020) 

(online at www.nytimes.com/2020/07/14/us/politics/trump-cdc-coronavirus.html).

218 Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Hybrid Hearing on “the Urgent Need for a National 

Plan to Contain the Coronavirus” (July 31, 2020) (online at coronavirus.house.gov/news/press-releases/hearingwhite-house-task-force-members-confirm-failed-us-response-made).

219 Trump’s Den of Dissent: Inside the White House Task Force as Coronavirus Surges, Washington Post 

(Oct. 19, 2020) (online at www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trumps-den-of-dissent-inside-the-white-house-taskforce-as-coronavirus-surges/2020/10/19/7ff8ee6a-0a6e-11eb-859b-f9c27abe638d_story.html).

220 Trump Officials Interfered with CDC Reports on Covid-19, Politico (Sept. 12, 2020) (online at 

www.politico.com/news/2020/09/11/exclusive-trump-officials-interfered-with-cdc-reports-on-covid-19-412809).

221 Emails Show HHS Official Trying to Muzzle Fauci, Politico (Sept. 9, 2020) (online at 

www.politico.com/news/2020/09/09/emails-show-hhs-muzzle-fauci-410861).

222 Scientists Worry About Political Influence over Coronavirus Vaccine Project, New York Times (Aug. 2, 

2020) (online at www.nytimes.com/2020/08/02/us/politics/coronavirus-vaccine.html).

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223 Trump Officials Interfered with CDC Reports on Covid-19, Politico (Sept. 12, 2020) (online at 

www.politico.com/news/2020/09/11/exclusive-trump-officials-interfered-with-cdc-reports-on-covid-19-412809).

224 Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Press Release: At Hearing, Secretary Azar Refuses to 

Accept Trump Administration Responsibility for Deaths of Over 200,000 Americans (Oct. 2, 2020) (online at 

coronavirus.house.gov/news/press-releases/hearing-secretary-azar-refuses-accept-trump-administrationresponsibility-deaths).

225 Trump Officials Interfered with CDC Reports on Covid-19, Politico (Sept. 12, 2020) (online at 

www.politico.com/news/2020/09/11/exclusive-trump-officials-interfered-with-cdc-reports-on-covid-19-412809).

226 F.D.A.’s Emergency Approval of Blood Plasma Is Now on Hold, New York Times (Aug. 28, 2020) 

(online at www.nytimes.com/2020/08/19/us/politics/blood-plasma-covid-19.html); Trump Touts FDA’s Emergency 

Authorization of Convalescent Plasma as Historic Breakthrough, But Scientists Are Doubtful, Washington Post 

(Aug. 23, 2020) (online at www.washingtonpost.com/health/2020/08/23/trump-convalescent-plasma-okay/). 

227 Clinical Memorandum from Food and Drug Administration, EUA 26382: Emergency Use Authorization 

(EUA) Request (Aug. 23, 2020) (online at www.fda.gov/media/141480/download).

228 FDA’s Hahn Apologizes for Overselling Plasma’s Benefits as a COVID-19 Treatment, National Public 

Radio (Aug. 25, 2020) (online at www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2020/08/25/905792261/fdas-hahn-apologizesfor-overselling-plasmas-benefits-as-a-covid-19-treatment); Two P.R. Experts at F.D.A. Have Been Ousted After 

Blood Plasma Fiasco, New York Times (Aug. 28, 2020) (online at www.nytimes.com/2020/08/28/health/bloodplasma-fda.html).

229 Updated CDC Guidelines Now Say People Exposed to Coronavirus May Not Need to Be Tested, CNN 

(Aug. 26, 2020) (online at www.cnn.com/2020/08/26/health/cdc-guidelines-coronavirus-testing/index.html).

230 Trump Without Evidence Accuses ‘Deep State’ at FDA of Slow-Walking Coronavirus Vaccines and 

Treatments, Washington Post (Aug. 22, 2020) (online at www.washingtonpost.com/health/2020/08/22/trumpwithout-evidence-accuses-deep-state-fda-slow-walking-coronavirus-vaccines-treatments/).

231 ‘She Couldn’t Even Pronounce Convalescent Plasma’: FDA Ousts Spokesperson After 2 Weeks, 

Politico (Aug. 28, 2020) (online at www.politico.com/news/2020/08/28/fda-top-spokesperson-leaves-404422).

232 HHS Bids $250 Million Contract Meant to ‘Defeat Despair and Inspire Hope’ on Coronavirus, Politico 

(Aug. 31, 2020) (online at www.politico.com/news/2020/08/31/hhs-contract-coronavirus-despair-hope-406361).

233 Health Official to Take Leave of Absence After He Attacked Federal Scientists, New York Times (Sept. 

18, 2020) (online at www.nytimes.com/2020/09/16/us/politics/michael-caputo-hhs-leave-of-absence.html).

234 HHS Ad Blitz Sputters as Celebrities Back Away, Politico (Sept. 29, 2020) (online at 

www.politico.com/news/2020/09/29/hhs-ad-blitz-sputters-as-celebrities-back-away-423274).

235 Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Press Release: At Hearing, Secretary Azar Refuses to 

Accept Trump Administration Responsibility for Deaths of Over 200,000 Americans (Oct. 2, 2020) (online at 

coronavirus.house.gov/news/press-releases/hearing-secretary-azar-refuses-accept-trump-administrationresponsibility-deaths).

236 HHS Chief Overrode FDA Officials to Ease Testing Rules, Politico (Sept. 15, 2020) (online at 

www.politico.com/news/2020/09/15/hhs-alex-azar-overrode-fda-testing-rules-415400).

237 White House Blocked C.D.C. from Requiring Masks on Public Transportation, New York Times (Oct. 

9, 2020) (online at www.nytimes.com/2020/10/09/health/coronavirus-covid-masks-cdc.html).

238 CDC to Passengers and Workers: Wear a Mask When You Are on a Plane, Train, Bus or Other Public 

Transit, Washington Post (Oct. 19, 2020) (online at www.washingtonpost.com/health/2020/10/19/cdc-mask-planetrain-bus/).

239 Whistle-Blowing Scientist Quits Government with Final Broadside, New York Times (Oct. 6, 2020) 

(online at www.nytimes.com/2020/10/06/us/politics/whistle-blower-rick-bright.html).

240 Whistleblower Rick Bright Says Trump Admin’s Virus Approach Is ‘Dangerous.’ NBC News (Oct. 8, 

2020) (online at www.nbcnews.com/politics/politics-news/hhs-whistleblower-rick-bright-resigns-n1242357).

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241 FDA Chief Vows Agency Will Not Accept Political Pressure on Coronavirus Vaccine, Axios (Sept. 23, 

2020) (online at www.axios.com/coronavirus-vaccine-fda-chief-political-pressure-9aa17a5d-58a5-4c7d-a4aaa15378d4342b.html). 

242 White House Blocks New Coronavirus Vaccine Guidelines, New York Times (Oct. 5, 2020) (online at 

www.nytimes.com/2020/10/05/us/politics/coronavirus-vaccine-guidelines.html).

243 White House Lifts Block on FDA’s Stricter Vaccine Requirements, Politico (Oct. 6, 2020) (online at 

www.politico.com/news/2020/10/06/fda-vaccine-guidelines-white-house-426764).

244 Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Press Release: Select Subcommittee Finds White 

House Task Force Weakened Recommendations as Infection Rates Rose (Sept. 16, 2020) (online at 

coronavirus.house.gov/news/press-releases/select-subcommittee-finds-white-house-task-force-weakenedrecommendations).

245 A Demoralized CDC Grapples with White House Meddling and Its Own Mistakes, Wall Street Journal 

(Oct. 15, 2020) (online at www.wsj.com/articles/a-demoralized-cdc-grapples-with-white-house-meddling-and-itsown-mistakes-11602776561).

246 Trump Official Pressured CDC to Change Report on Covid and Kids, Politico (Oct. 5, 2020) (online at 

www.politico.com/news/2020/10/05/trump-cdc-coronavirus-report-change-425538).

247 In ‘Power Grab,’ Health Secretary Azar Asserts Authority Over F.D.A., New York Times (Sept. 19, 

2020) (online at www.nytimes.com/2020/09/19/health/azar-hhs-fda.html).

248 Trump Scorns His Own Scientists Over Virus Data, New York Times (Sept. 16, 2020) (online at 

www.nytimes.com/2020/09/16/us/politics/trump-cdc-covid-vaccine.html).

249 CDC Reverses Guidelines Stating the Coronavirus Is Airborne Virus [UPDATE], Huffington Post (Sept. 

21, 2020) (online at www.huffpost.com/entry/coronavirus-airborne-in-aerosols-cdcsays_n_5f689b89c5b6480e8972428d?ncid=engmodushpmg00000004).

250 The Coronavirus May Be Adrift in Indoor Air, C.D.C. Acknowledges, New York Times (Oct. 5, 2020) 

(online at www.nytimes.com/2020/10/05/health/cdc-coronavirus-airborne-indoor-air.html).

251 Scoop: CDC Director Overruled on Cruise Ship Ban, Axios (Sept. 29, 2020) (online at 

www.axios.com/scoop-white-house-overruled-cdc-cruise-ships-florida-91442136-1b8e-442e-a2a1-

0b24e9a39fb6.html).

252 Trump Pushes FDA to Quickly Clear Coronavirus Antibody Treatments, Erroneously Calling Them a 

‘Cure,’ Washington Post (Oct. 8, 2020) (online at www.washingtonpost.com/health/2020/10/08/trump-regeneronantibodies-covid/).

253 FDA Pushes Back on Trump Administration Attempt to Rebrand ‘Emergency Authorization,’ Politico 

(Oct. 13, 2020) (online at www.politico.com/news/2020/10/13/fda-trump-covid-rebrand-429277).

254 Trump’s Den of Dissent: Inside the White House Task Force as Coronavirus Surges, Washington Post 

(Oct. 19, 2020) (online at www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trumps-den-of-dissent-inside-the-white-house-taskforce-as-coronavirus-surges/2020/10/19/7ff8ee6a-0a6e-11eb-859b-f9c27abe638d_story.html).

255 Trump Administration Pressures CDC to Back Detention of Migrant Children in Border Hotels Amid 

Coronavirus, Washington Post (Oct. 23, 2020) (online at www.washingtonpost.com/health/2020/10/23/immigrantminors-hotels-trump/).

256 White House Blocked Anthony Fauci from Appearing on ABC News Show, Host Says, Huffington Post 

(Oct. 12, 2020) (online at www.huffingtonpost.com.au/entry/white-house-anthony-fauci-tvshows_n_5f834e04c5b6e5c320000669?utm_hp_ref=au-us-politics).

257 ‘The Data Speak for Themselves’: Dr. Anthony Fauci Says White House Held a ‘Superspreader Event’ 

for Coronavirus, USA Today (Oct. 9, 2020) (online at www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2020/10/09/anthonyfauci-white-house-held-covid-superspreader-event/5940483002/).

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258 CNN Exclusive: Fauci Says He Was Taken Out of Context in New Trump Campaign Ad Touting 

Coronavirus Response, CNN (Oct. 11, 2020) (online at www.cnn.com/2020/10/11/politics/fauci-trump-campaignad-out-of-context/index.html).

259 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (Oct. 13, 2020) (online at 

twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1315988404694396929).

69