AFFIRM; and Opinion Filed December 22, 2022 

S 

In The 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-22-00026-CV 

DERRICK RICHARDSON, Appellant 

V. 

REPUBLIC TITLE OF TEXAS, INC., Appellee 

On Appeal from the 44th Judicial District Court 

Dallas County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. DC-21-02244 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Before Justices Partida-Kipness, Nowell, and Rosenberg1

Opinion by Justice Rosenberg 

 Derrick Richardson appeals the trial court’s summary judgment granted in 

favor of appellee Republic Title of Texas, Inc. In three issues, Richardson 

challenges Republic Title’s standing and the trial court’s denial of his motion for 

continuance and motion for new trial and asserts genuine issues of material fact 

existed such that the trial court’s grant of summary judgment was in error. We affirm 

the trial court’s judgment. Because all dispositive issues are settled in law, we issue 

this memorandum opinion. See TEX. R. APP. 47.2((a), 47.4. 

1

 The Hon. Barbara Rosenberg, Justice, Assigned 
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BACKGROUND

In 2008, Richardson formed FortCon, Incorporated with his then-girlfriend 

Tracey Hickman-Thomas. Richardson was a home builder and wanted to start a 

company to acquire work on military bases. In FortCon’s Certificate of Formation, 

Hickman-Thomas was listed as the sole director and owned all the company’s shares 

because FortCon was intended to be a woman-owned business for the purpose of 

obtaining federal contracts. 

In 2009, Richardson signed, as president of Classical Homes, Inc., a general 

warranty deed that conveyed ownership of six lots of real property located in the 

City of Hutchins to FortCon. On May 5, 2020, Hickman-Thomas signed, as 

president of FortCon, a general warranty deed conveying five of those six lots of real 

property (the Property) to Shepard Place Homes, Inc. On July 13, 2020, Shepard 

Place Homes, Inc. conveyed the Property to Camden Homes, LLC. Republic Title 

issued a title policy, listing Camden Homes as the insured. 

On October 8, 2020, Richardson sent a letter addressed to Camden Homes, 

Shepard Place Homes, the City of Hutchins Police Department, members of the 

Hutchins City Council, the Dallas District Attorney’s Office, several banks, and title 

companies. In his letter, Richardson asserted the Property had been fraudulently 

transferred from FortCon to Shepard Place Homes. He claimed to be the owner of 

the Property and that Hickman-Thomas lacked the authority to sell same. He 

directed the title companies to “pause or cease any conveyance of title regarding 
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these lots . . . and advise [others] that these lots were illegally conveyed and shall be 

void.” 

On February 22, 2021, Republic Title filed a petition for declaratory judgment 

against Richardson, seeking a declaration that Hickman-Thomas had authority to 

sign the deed conveying the Property on behalf of FortCon and that the deed at issue 

is not fraudulent but rather a valid deed conveying the Property to Camden Homes.2

 

Richardson filed an answer and counterclaim for a declaration that HickmanThomas lacked authority to sign the deed on behalf of FortCon and that Republic 

Title was on notice of same such that the deed in question was void. 

On June 10, the trial court granted Richardson’s counsel’s motion to withdraw 

as counsel for Richardson. On June 25, Republic Title filed a motion for summary 

judgment, seeking traditional summary judgment on its own declaratory judgment 

action and no-evidence summary judgment on Richardson’s counterclaim. On 

August 2, Richardson filed a pro se response. On August 10, Richardson retained 

new counsel who later filed a motion to continue on Richardson’s behalf before the 

trial court ruled on the motion for summary judgment. On September 1, the trial 

court granted Republic Title’s motion for summary judgment. Richardson filed a 

motion for new trial, arguing, among other things, that the trial court erred by failing 

2

 Prior to filing this action, Republic Title sought and conducted Rule 202 depositions of Richardson 

and Hickman-Thomas. 
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to grant his motion to continue. The trial court overruled the motion for new trial. 

This appeal followed. 

DISCUSSION

I. The Trial Court Had Subject Matter Jurisdiction 

In his first issue, Richardson urges the trial court lacked subject matter 

jurisdiction. More particularly, according to Richardson, Republic Title lacked 

standing in the underlying suit, Republic Title’s injuries were hypothetical and 

speculative such that its claim was not ripe, and Republic Title’s claim lacked a 

justiciable issue the trial court could resolve. 

We review questions of standing de novo because standing is a component of 

subject matter jurisdiction. See Farmers Tex. Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Beasley, 598 

S.W.3d 237, 240 (Tex. 2020). Standing is a threshold requirement to maintaining a 

lawsuit. See id. at 240–41. To establish standing in Texas, a plaintiff must allege 

“a concrete injury . . . and a real controversy between the parties that will be resolved 

by the court.” See id. at 241. Specifically, the plaintiff must allege a threatened or 

actual injury—it may not be hypothetical. See id. 

Richardson contends that Republic Title was not entitled to bring suit against 

him on its own behalf, rather than as an agent of Camden Homes, and could not 

show either a contractual or common law right to bring suit against him. Although 

courts and parties have sometimes blurred the distinction between standing and 

capacity, we believe that the issue presented here is more appropriately characterized 
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as one of capacity. See Austin Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. Lovato, 171 S.W.3d 845, 848 

(Tex. 2005); see, e.g., King-Mays v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 194 S.W.3d 143, 145 

(Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, pet. denied) (concluding appellant raised issue of capacity 

by arguing trial court improperly rendered judgment for appellee insurer without 

evidence proving insurer was subrogee for its insured). A plaintiff 

has standing when it is personally aggrieved, regardless of whether it is acting with 

legal authority; a party has capacity when it has the legal authority to act, regardless 

of whether it has a justiciable interest in the controversy. See id. at 848–49. 

Unlike standing, however, which may be raised at any time, a challenge to a party’s 

capacity must be raised by a verified pleading in the trial court. See id. at 849 (citing 

TEX. R. CIV. P. 93(1)–(2); Sixth RMA Partners v. Sibley, 111 S.W.3d 46, 56 (Tex. 

2003)). Richardson did not raise the issue of capacity in the trial court and thus has 

failed to preserve the issue on appeal. See King-Mays, 194 S.W.3d at 145. 

As for ripeness and lack of justiciable controversy, Richardson argues 

Republic Title’s action seeking a declaration of rights is insufficient to establish that 

an injury had or was likely to occur at the time Republic Title filed its suit.3

 

The issue of ripeness questions when a particular action may be brought and 

inquires as to whether the facts have developed sufficiently so that an injury has 

3

 Ripeness is a component of subject matter jurisdiction, and ripeness is one of several categories of 

justiciability, and thus we apply a de novo review here as well. See Sw. Elec. Power Co. v. Lynch, 595 

S.W.3d 678, 683 (Tex. 2020); Noell v. Air Park Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., 246 S.W.3d 827, 832 (Tex. 

App.—Dallas 2008, pet. denied). 
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occurred or is likely to occur. Noell v. Air Park Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., 246 

S.W.3d 827, 832 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, pet. denied). The focus of the ripeness 

inquiry is therefore on whether the case involves uncertain or contingent future 

events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all. Id.

However, a justiciable controversy need not be a fully ripened cause of action. 

Id. To confer jurisdiction, the fact situation must manifest the ripening seeds of a 

controversy, which appear where the claims of several parties are present and 

indicative of threatened litigation in the immediate future which seems unavoidable, 

even though the differences between the parties as to their legal rights have not 

reached the state of an actual controversy. Id. A declaratory judgment action does 

not vest a court with the power to pass upon hypothetical or contingent situations, or 

to determine questions not then essential to the decision of an actual controversy, 

although such questions may in the future require adjudication. Id.

Here, Republic Title’s petition alleged that soon after it closed the transaction 

between Shepherd Place and Camden Homes, Richardson sent a letter to numerous 

title companies, lenders and other recipients alleging that he was the president of 

FortCon and that Hickman-Thomas, whose signature appears on the deed in 

question, was not authorized to sign the deed. Moreover, Republic Title included a 

copy of that letter as an exhibit to its motion for summary judgment, and that letter 

claims that Richardson filed a police report with the City of Hutchins Police 

Department for theft of properties and specifically advises “Title Companies: Please 
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pause or cease any conveyance of title regarding these lots. Also, please . . . advise 

that these lots were illegally conveyed and shall be void.” We conclude the petition 

and the evidence thus are indicative of threatened litigation in the immediate future 

with respect to the ownership of the Property and Republic Title’s obligations under 

its policy such that the trial court did not err in concluding it had subject matter 

jurisdiction. See Noell, 246 S.W.3d 827, 832 

We overrule Richardson’s first issue. 

II. The Trial Court Did Not Err by Denying Richardson’s Motion for New 

Trial 

In his second issue, Richardson argues the trial court abused its discretion by 

denying his motion for new trial. His motion for new trial sought relief on two 

grounds: first, the trial court erred by denying his motion for continuance of the 

summary judgment, and second, the trial court erred by granting summary judgment 

in favor of Republic Title. 

A. The Trial Court Did Not Err by Denying Richardson’s Motion for 

Continuance 

According to Richardson, his previous counsel failed to respond to written 

discovery requests propounded by Republic Title before the deadline to do so and 

failed to advise the trial court and Richardson of the deadline to respond to same 

before withdrawing from representation. Richardson obtained new counsel who 

filed a verified motion for continuance after the motion for summary judgment was 

heard by submission but before the trial court ruled. In his motion for new trial and 
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on appeal, Richardson argued the trial court abused its discretion by denying his 

motion because the case had been on file for approximately seven months, the 

deadline for discovery had not yet passed before the trial court granted summary 

judgment, and his motion to continue requested additional time to conduct discovery 

and cure other discovery issues. 

We review the denial of a motion for continuance for an abuse of discretion. 

Wal-Mart Stores Tex., LP v. Crosby, 295 S.W.3d 346, 356 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, 

pet. denied). A trial court does not abuse its discretion by denying a motion for 

continuance that does not meet the requirements of rule 252 of the Texas Rules of 

Civil Procedure. Id. Rule 252 provides for the application of continuance and 

requires that if a party applies for continuance to conduct discovery, 

the party applying therefor shall make affidavit that such testimony is 

material, showing the materiality thereof, and that he has used due 

diligence to procure such testimony, stating such diligence, and the 

cause of failure, if known; that such testimony cannot be procured from 

any other source; and, if it be for the absence of a witness, he shall state 

the name and residence of the witness, and what he expects to prove by 

him; and also state that the continuance is not sought for delay only, but 

that justice may be done; provided that, on a first application for a 

continuance, it shall not be necessary to show that the absent testimony 

cannot be procured from any other source. 

TEX. R. CIV. P. 252. Accordingly, we have held that if a continuance is sought in 

order to pursue further discovery, the motion must describe the evidence sought, 

explain its materiality, and show the party requesting the continuance has used due 

diligence to obtain the evidence. See Crosby, 295 S.W.3d at 356. 
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Here, Richardson’s motion for continuance explained his need for 

continuance as follows: 

Because of the short amount of time of the undersigned’s retention, the 

undersigned has not had a sufficient amount of time to review all of the 

written discovery, depositions, and Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary 

Judgment. It appears at first glance that additional necessary parties 

need to be brought into the case, i.e., the person that sold the lots and 

the buyers of the lots, in a cross-action. It also appears that there are 

several outstanding discovery issues that must be cured. The 

undersigned counsel therefore request a continuance of Plaintiff’s 

Motion. 

Thus, the motion did not describe what evidence Richardson sought, explain its 

materiality, or show that he had used due diligence to obtain the evidence. See 

Crosby, 295 S.W.3d at 356. 

Moreover, to the extent Richardson complains about the time the case had 

been on file and the fact that the deadline for discovery had not yet passed, the 

authorities he cites indicate length of time the case has been on file is one of many 

factors to consider and that other factors include the materiality of the discovery 

sought and whether the party seeking the continuance had exercised due diligence. 

See Laughlin v. Bergman, 962 S.W.2d 64, 65–66 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 

1997, pet. denied); Levinthal v. Kelsey-Seybold Clinic, P.A., 902 S.W.2d 508, 510 

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no writ); Verkin v. Sw. Ctr. One, Ltd., 784 

S.W.2d 92, 94–95 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, writ denied). Having 

concluded Richardson failed to comply with rule 252, we decline his invitation to 

consider the timing of the motion as dispositive on this record. 
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Accordingly, we overrule Richardson’s second issue.4

B. The Trial Court Did Not Err by Denying Richardson’s Motion for 

New Trial Granting Summary Judgment 

In the second part of his second issue, Richardson complains the trial court 

erred by denying his motion for new trial, urging genuine issues of material fact exist 

as to whether Hickman-Thomas was removed as president, director, and sole 

shareholder of FortCon such that the trial court’s grant of summary judgment was in 

error. 

We review the granting of a motion for summary judgment de novo. 

Merriman v. XTO Energy, Inc., 407 S.W.3d 244, 248 (Tex. 2013). We must 

determine whether there is more than a scintilla of probative evidence raising 

genuine issues of material fact. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c), (i).5

 We review the 

record in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, indulging every reasonable 

inference and resolving any doubts against the movant. See Buck v. Palmer, 381 

S.W.3d 525, 527 (Tex. 2012) (citing City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 824 

(Tex. 2005)). Undisputed evidence may be conclusive of the absence of a material 

4

 Because we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to grant Richardson’s motion 

to continue, we further conclude the trial court did not err by denying the motion for new trial on that 

ground. See, e.g., Lowe v. Townview Watersong, L.L.C., 155 S.W.3d 445, 448 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, 

no pet.) (having concluded no abuse of discretion in granting continuance, likewise concluded appellant 

failed to demonstrate trial court abused its discretion in denying motion for new trial). 

5

 Both parties brought forth summary judgment evidence in the context of Republic Title’s hybrid noevidence and traditional motion, “so the differing burdens of the two forms of summary judgment motion 

are of no import here. The ultimate question is simply whether a fact issue exists.” See Buck, v. Palmer, 

381 S.W.3d 525, 527 n.2 (Tex. 2012). 
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fact issue, but only if reasonable people could not differ in their conclusions as to 

that evidence. See id.

Richardson argues he provided evidence that Hickman-Thomas was removed 

as president and director of FortCon in 2015. He also urges she conflicted herself in 

her testimony that she has been the president, director, and sole shareholder of 

FortCon from 2009 through the time of her testimony in January 2021, that she 

requested to remove herself from FortCon in 2017, and that Richardson had been a 

director of FortCon at an unspecified time between 2009 and the time of her 

testimony. Finally, he argues that publicly available documents identified him as 

claiming to be the president of FortCon such that Republic Title had constructive 

notice of same. 

We initially conclude that Republic Title offered evidence that established 

Hickman-Thomas had the authority to transfer ownership of the Property on May 5, 

2020, when she signed a general warranty deed conveying the Property to Shepard 

Place Homes, Inc. The record includes a copy of that deed as well as the 2008 

Certificate of Formation for FortCon, which identified Hickman-Thomas as the sole 

director of FortCon. The record also includes the 2009 general warranty deed that 

conveyed ownership of the Property to FortCon. The record contains an application 

for reinstatement of FortCon’s charter in 2015, which includes Hickman-Thomas’s 

signature, as well as a certificate of consent to action without meeting of the sole 

director dated March 31, 2020, and signed by Hickman-Thomas as president of 
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FortCon, which identifies her as “sole signor of FortCon, Inc,” as well as an affidavit 

from Hickman-Thomas swearing that from 2009 until the execution of that affidavit 

that she has been the president, sole shareholder, and director of FortCon. Finally, 

the record contains a December 20, 2019 tax citation from Dallas County identifying 

Hickman-Thomas as director of FortCon. 

We disagree with Richardson that any of the evidence he specifically 

identifies or any of the evidence in the record constitutes a material fact issue 

regarding whether Hickman-Thomas had the authority to transfer ownership of the 

Property on behalf of FortCon.6

 Although Hickman-Thomas testified that at one 

time she requested to be removed from a position of authority or ownership of 

FortCon, she also testified that she never received any documentation to authorize 

her removal and that no further action outside of her email exchange with Richardson 

ever took place. The 2020 deed conveying the Property from FortCon to Shepherd 

Place was signed by Hickman-Thomas as “president.” The 2008 Certificate of 

Formation identified only Hickman-Thomas as the director of FortCon, and 

Richardson testified that she was the sole director of FortCon at the time of its 

formation. 

6

 The evidence in the record is comprised of exhibits to Republic Title’s motion, Richardson’s pro se 

response, and Richardson’s motion for new trial. Republic Title objected to Richardson’s pro se response 

as untimely and not served on them. The trial court did not explicitly rule on Republic Title’s objection 

when it granted summary judgment in favor of Republic Title. Assuming, without deciding, our review 

encompasses all exhibits filed, not just those attached to Republic Title’s motion, our conclusion remains 

the same as discussed infra.
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Evidence in the record indicates that at least one time, Hickman-Thomas 

expressed interest in transferring ownership of FortCon from herself to Richardson, 

but we conclude that evidence is no more than a mere scintilla. Richardson testified 

that in 2015 or 2017 or 2018, Hickman-Thomas transferred all ownership of FortCon 

to Richardson and that she “did not have decision making . . . ability with FortCon.” 

In his pro se response to Republic Title’s motion for summary judgment, Richardson 

attached an email he had written to Hickman-Thomas, purportedly to send her a 

document that would transfer ownership of FortCon from Hickman-Thomas to 

himself. The document itself was not included in the record. Richardson also 

offered text message exchanges that he averred were between himself and HickmanThomas and indicated her interest in disclaiming any ownership in FortCon. 

However, he did not offer any documents to support that this transfer of ownership 

took place. Instead all documentation in the record supports that Hickman-Thomas 

had the authority to transfer the Property on behalf of FortCon. 

The publicly available documents Richardson claims gave Republic Title 

constructive notice that he claimed to be the president of FortCon do not create a 

fact issue either. The record contains a certificate of amendment from September 

26, 2016, and signed by Richardson, which requests removal of Hickman-Thomas 

as director of FortCon and the addition of Richardson as director of FortCon. But, 

given the evidence that Hickman-Thomas was the sole director and owner of 

FortCon, such a certificate of amendment could not possibly be effective without 
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some indication of her consent. See Acton v. Point-O-Purchase Advertising Co., 

143 S.W.2d 406, 409 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1940, no writ) (holding sole owners of all 

corporation’s stock privileged as individuals to deal as they chose with corporation’s 

property); see also Newman v. Toy, 926 S.W.2d 629, 631 (Tex. App.—Austin 1996, 

writ denied) (similar). The other documents are a 2015 franchise tax report signed 

by Richardson as president of FortCon and a 2016 statement of change of the 

registered agent from Hickman-Thomas to Richardson, neither of which establishes 

or creates a fact issue as to Hickman-Thomas’s authority, as she may have become 

president of FortCon after that time or retained her ownership of FortCon or her 

position as sole director. See id.

Accordingly, we conclude the evidence establishes as a matter of law that 

Hickman-Thomas had authority to transfer ownership of the Property and that no 

more than a scintilla of evidence in the record controverts that conclusion. Thus, we 

overrule the second part of Richardson’s second issue. 

CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s order granting Republic Title summary judgment. 

220026F.P05 

 

/Barbara Rosenberg/

BARBARA ROSENBERG 

JUSTICE, ASSIGNED 
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S 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

JUDGMENT 

DERRICK RICHARDSON, 

Appellant 

No. 05-22-00026-CV V. 

REPUBLIC TITLE OF TEXAS, 

INC., Appellee 

 On Appeal from the 44th Judicial 

District Court, Dallas County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. DC-21-02244. 

Opinion delivered by Justice 

Rosenberg. Justices Partida-Kipness 

and Nowell participating. 

 In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial 

court is AFFIRMED. 

 It is ORDERED that appellee REPUBLIC TITLE OF TEXAS, INC. 

recover its costs of this appeal from appellant DERRICK RICHARDSON. 

Judgment entered this 22nd day of December 2022.