UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

KAREEM SAINT ROBERSON, a/k/a

No. 96-4056

Poncho, a/k/a Dog, a/k/a Kareen

Saint Roberson, a/k/a Saint

Roberson, a/k/a Poncho Roberson,

a/k/a Paul Squeeky Johnson,

Defendant-Appellant.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

GEROYNE ALEXANDER WOODS, a/k/a

No. 96-4057

Twin, a/k/a Eightball, a/k/a Twin

Woods, a/k/a Eightball Woods,

a/k/a Jerome Woods, a/k/a Jerome

Alexander,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Wilmington.

W. Earl Britt, District Judge.

(CR-95-45-BR)

Submitted: October 29, 1996

Decided: January 10, 1997

Before WILKINS, HAMILTON, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________________________________________
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

Dean R. Davis, Wilmington, North Carolina; Walter H. Paramore, III,

Jacksonville, North Carolina, for Appellants. Janice McKenzie Cole,

United States Attorney, John S. Bowler, Assistant United States

Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Defendants Roberson and Woods pled guilty to distributing crack

cocaine and marijuana. They appeal, raising several challenges to

their sentences. Finding no error, we affirm.

Defendant Woods contends that the district court erred in receiving

evidence from the Government that went beyond the amount of drugs

cited in the plea agreement. The disputed evidence was used to calculate Woods's relevant conduct for sentencing purposes. Woods argues

that he has a contractual obligation with the Government to be held

accountable only for the drug quantities that he pled guilty to in the

plea agreement. However, the plea agreement does not represent that

the amount specified in the count to which Woods pled guilty would

be the limit of what he would be held responsible for regarding relevant conduct. See USSG § 1B1.3(a) (Nov. 1995).

During Woods's Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 hearing, the court warned him

that the Government would not withhold any evidence concerning relevant conduct. The computation of offense levels encompasses relevant conduct including drug quantities not specified in the count of

 2
conviction if they are part of the same course of conduct or common

scheme or plan. United States v. Ellis, 975 F.2d 1061, 1067 (4th Cir.

1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 945 (1993). The only additional relevant

conduct for which the court held Woods responsible is a prior transaction with a confidential informant in which the informant sold approximately nine ounces of cocaine base for Roberson and Woods.

Woods claims that the district court did not properly support its

determination of drug quantity attributable to him. When a defendant

makes an objection to the PSR, the sentencing court must make a

finding resolving the matter or determine that such a finding is unnecessary because it would not impact sentencing. Fed. R. Crim. P.

32(c)(1). This requirement is satisfied, however, if the district court

expressly adopts the findings in the PSR. United States v. Walker, 29

F.3d 908, 911 (4th Cir. 1994); United States v. Morgan, 942 F.2d 243,

245 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1040 (1992) and 506 U.S.

1061 (1993).

At sentencing, FBI Special Agent Ackley identified by name the

informant whose assistance led the police to the Defendants, and

stated that the cooperation provided by the informant led to numerous

arrests, warrants, and other information regarding other drug dealers.

The dealers were subsequently arrested and convicted. Ackley further

stated that in every instance in which the informant provided information, the information was subsequently proven to be true. Ackley also

stated that Roberson had cooperated during interviews and had corroborated the information provided by the informant regarding

Woods.

After Ackley's testimony and argument on the matter, the court

ruled "by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount of drugs

attributable to [Woods] is as set forth in the Presentence Report." We

find that the court's decision is well-founded and meets the requirement under Rule 32(c)(1).

The district court sentenced Roberson as a career offender pursuant

to USSG § 4B1.1. To be sentenced as a career offender, the defendant

must have, inter alia, at least two prior felony convictions of a crime

of violence or a controlled substance offense. USSG§ 4B1.1. A controlled substance offense is a violation of a state or federal law "pro-

 3
hibiting the manufacture, import, export, distribution, or dispensing of

a controlled substance" or the possession of a controlled substance

with the intent to do the same. USSG § 4B1.2.

The PSR reveals that Roberson had two prior felony convictions.

The first was for possession with the intent to sell cocaine base in

California in February 1990. The second felony conviction was for

robbery and assault with a deadly weapon. Roberson argues that the

wording of the California drug offense does not comport with the

requirements for a controlled substance offense under § 4B1.2. He

argues that the California violation of "willfully and unlawfully possess[ing] for sale and purchas[ing] for purpose of sale of a controlled

substance" does not meet the definition of "possession of a controlled

substance . . . with intent to manufacture, import, export, distribute or

dispense" under § 4B1.2.

The statutory intent is clear that Roberson's previous felony controlled substance offense is included under § 4B1.2. In addition, at

sentencing Roberson merely objected to being sentenced as a career

offender, but was "unable to present any argument or authority that

refutes the probation officer's analysis regarding career offender."

We therefore affirm the judgments. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented

in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

 4