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CHILD CUSTODY PROTECTION ACT

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

ON

H.R. 476

SEPTEMBER 6, 2001

Serial No. 36

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/judiciary

(II)

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., WISCONSIN, Chairman

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois

GEORGE W. GEKAS, Pennsylvania

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina

LAMAR SMITH, Texas

ELTON GALLEGLY, California

BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio

BOB BARR, Georgia

WILLIAM L. JENKINS, Tennessee

CHRIS CANNON, Utah

LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina

SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama

JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida

JOHN N. HOSTETTLER, Indiana

MARK GREEN, Wisconsin

RIC KELLER, Florida

DARRELL E. ISSA, California

MELISSA A. HART, Pennsylvania

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona

[VACANCY]

JOHN CONYERS, JR., Michigan

BARNEY FRANK, Massachusetts

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California

RICK BOUCHER, Virginia

JERROLD NADLER, New York

ROBERT C. SCOTT, Virginia

MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina

ZOE LOFGREN, California

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas

MAXINE WATERS, California

MARTIN T. MEEHAN, Massachusetts

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida

TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin

ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California

PHILIP G. KIKO, Chief of Staff-General Counsel

PERRY H. APELBAUM, Minority Chief Counsel and Staff Director

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio, Chairman

WILLIAM L. JENKINS, Tennessee

LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina

SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama

JOHN N. HOSTETTLER, Indiana

MELISSA A. HART, Pennsylvania,

Vice Chair

LAMAR SMITH, Texas

[VACANCY]

JERROLD NADLER, New York

BARNEY FRANK, Massachusetts

JOHN CONYERS, JR., Michigan

ROBERT C. SCOTT, Virginia

MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina

BRADLEY S. CLANTON, Chief Counsel

PAUL B. TAYLOR, Counsel

CRYSTAL M. ROBERTS, Counsel

DAVID LACHMANN, Minority Professional Staff Member

(III)

C O N T E N T S

SEPTEMBER 6, 2001

OPENING STATEMENT

The Honorable Steve Chabot, a Representative in Congress From the State

of Ohio, and Chairman, Subcommittee on the Constitution ............................ 1

The Honorable Jerrold Nadler, a Representative in Congress From the State

of New York, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on the Constitution ....... 3

WITNESSES

Ms. Eileen Roberts, Mothers Against Minors’ Abortions, Fredericksburg, VA

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 5

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 7

Mr. John Harrison, Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 8

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 9

Rev. Katherine Ragsdale, Vicar, St. David’s Episcopal Church

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 10

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 12

Ms. Teresa S. Collett, Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 14

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 16

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING

The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, a Representative in Congress From the

State of Florida ..................................................................................................... 31

Mr. Laurence H. Tribe, Tyler Professor of Constitutional Law, Harvard University and Mr. Peter J. Rubin, Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown

University ............................................................................................................. 35

APPENDIX

STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Testimony of Bill and Karen Bell ........................................................................... 51

Testimony of Rosemary J. Dempsey, Director of Washington, D.C. Office

of the Center for Reproductive Law and Policy (CRLP) ................................... 52

(1)

CHILD CUSTODY PROTECTION ACT

THURSDAY SEPTEMBER 6, 2001

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION,

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,

Washington, DC.

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10 a.m., in Room

2237, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Steve Chabot [Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.

Mr. CHABOT. The Committee will come to order.

I am Steve Chabot, the Chairman of the Subcommittee on the

Constitution.

This morning, the Subcommittee on the Constitution convenes to

receive testimony concerning H.R. 476, the Child Custody Protection Act. The Child Custody Protection Act would make it a Federal offense to knowingly transport a minor across the State line

with the intent that she obtain an abortion in circumvention of a

State’s parental consent or notification law.

Over 20 States currently enforce laws requiring the consent or

notification of at least one parent or court authorization before a

minor can obtain an abortion. Such laws reflect widespread agreement that it is the parents of a pregnant minor who are best suited

to provide her counsel, guidance and support as she decides whether to continue her pregnancy or to undergo an abortion.

Despite public support and court approval of parental consent,

there exists substantial evidence that they are regularly evaded.

Abortion counselors often refer girls to out-of-State abortion clinics,

claiming that this is the only option for girls who don’t want to tell

their parents about their pregnancy. Studies confirm the prevalence of this practice and reveal an unmistakable correlation between the number of girls seeking abortions out-of-State and the

existence of parental consent or notification laws in the girls’ home

States. One prominent abortion rights advocate even stated that

there are thousands of minors who cross State lines every year in

order to obtain an abortion.

This conduct is only aided by the dubious practices of many abortion clinics located in States lacking parental involvement laws. To

gin up business, some clinics even advertise in the Yellow Pages

distributed in nearby States that require parental involvement—

advising young girls that they can obtain an abortion without parental consent or notification. Such ads only serve to lure young

girls residing in States with parental involvement laws to these

clinics, denying parents the opportunity to provide love, support,

2

and advice to their daughter as she makes one of the most important decisions of her life.

When parents are not involved in the abortion decisions of a

child, the risks to the child’s health significantly increase. Only

parents have the knowledge to provide a physician with important

family medical history and information on their daughter’s medical

and psychological health. Only parents may provide authorization

for the release of pertinent data from family physicians.

Few could argue that providing a complete and thorough medical

history before an abortion is performed on a young girl is not critical to ensure quality care and an accurate medical assessment. Parental involvement also ensures that young girls who undergo abortions receive appropriate post-abortion care, especially if they show

symptoms of complications. Post-abortion medical care is critical

because young adolescent girls are more likely to suffer complications, some of which can lead to a lifetime of reproductive health

complications.

It is likely a girl’s parents, not the individuals who have assisted

or transported her across State lines, who will have the best opportunity to recognize symptoms indicating post-abortion complications. They will also be able to assist her in obtaining immediate

medical care should symptoms persist. Clearly, this is not possible

if a girl’s parents have been kept in the dark about their daughter’s

abortion.

When confused and frightened young girls are assisted in and encouraged to circumvent parental notice and consent laws by crossing State lines, they are led into what will likely be a hasty and

potentially ill-advised decision. Often these girls are being guided

by those who do not share the love and affection that most parents

have that for their children. In the worst of circumstances, these

individuals have a great incentive to avoid criminal liability for

their conduct, given the fact that a majority of teenage pregnancies

are caused by adult men.

Parental notice and consent laws reflect a State’s reasoned and

constitutional conclusion that the best interests of a pregnant

minor are served when her parents are consulted and involved in

the process. States are free to craft their parental notice and consent laws to allow a minor to consult a grandparent or other family

member in lieu of parents and a few States have, in fact, made

such a choice. Most, however, have chosen not to allow close relatives to serve as surrogates for parents in the abortion context.

If a young girl’s circumstances are such that parental involvement is not in her best interest, grandparents and close relatives

are free to assist that girl in pursuing a judicial bypass. Indeed, the

U.S. Supreme Court has required judicial bypass procedures to be

included in State’s parental consent statutes.

As the U.S. Supreme Court has stated, ‘‘the natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interest of their children.’’

The decision to obtain an abortion is, as the Court also stated, ‘‘a

grave decision and a girl of tender years under emotional stress

may be ill-equipped to make it without mature advice and emotional support.’’

In light of the widespread practice of circumventing validly enacted parental involvement laws by transporting minors across

3

State lines, it is entirely appropriate for Congress with its exclusive

constitutional authority to regulate interstate commerce to enact

the Child Custody Protection Act. The safety of young girls and the

rights of parents demand no less.

I now yield to the Ranking Member of the Committee, Mr. Nadler, for any opening statement.

Mr. NADLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have to confess that I am beginning to feel a bit like Sisyphus,

condemned to revisit, reargue, revote and repeat every issue endlessly—every issue that is demanded by some faction of the fanatical right wing gathered underneath the Republican big tent. Not

content to make the elephants dance in a circle, we in the minority

must also assume the burden of keeping these constituencies happy

by helping the majority push their burden up the mountain again

and again and waste our time with the same nonsensical bills, the

same hearings, the same votes, the same lack of legislative product.

We know this bill is going nowhere in the Senate. Why are we

wasting our time on it for the third year in a row?

So far this year we have done the Flag Constitutional Amendment again. This is the third abortion bill that is going nowhere.

We are even calling the same witnesses. Every single one of these

witnesses has testified before this Committee in the past on this

bill. We have heard their testimony.

Frankly, if you see me reading the newspaper, it is not out of

rudeness. It is out of the fact that I don’t have to waste my time

hearing the same testimony again on the same subject again for no

purpose.

I want to be a good sport, Mr. Chairman, but I am beginning to

feel like I am being punished for some unknown offense against

heaven. Were it not for the fact that the consequences of this illadvised and unconstitutional proposal would cost lives and destroy

families, I would be tempted to throw up my hands and simply

walk away from this hearing. I cannot do that. The stakes are too

high. No matter how many times I have to repeat this, I know that

both you and I and our colleagues on this Committee feel too

strongly about what is at stake here.

Mr. Chairman, you have given arguments eloquently in the last

few minutes about why it is advisable to have in various States a

parental consent bill. Those are issues for the States. Some States

have chosen to do so. If I were a State legislator, as I used to be,

I would certainly vote against such a bill, as I did repeatedly. But

those are issues for the States. Some States have chosen to do so.

Some States have chosen not to do so.

How dare we—by what arrogation of power, by what contempt

for States’ rights, by what contempt for civil liberties of individuals,

do we arrogate to ourselves the power to pass a bill or try to pass

a bill—because it is going nowhere, as we know—but to go through

the motions and pretend that we are passing a bill that would punish someone for crossing a State line to help someone do in that

State what is legal to do in that State?

I cannot imagine that that is a constitutional provision. If it

were, the results of the Civil War would be reversed. This would

be a confederation again, and people would refer to the United

4

States as they did before the Civil War instead of as we refer to

the United States today as one single country.

People can do in a given State what is legal to do in that State

without fearing punishment, period. To attempt to make it a crime

to cross a State line or to assist someone who has a right to cross

that State line for the purpose of doing something legal in that

State is clearly unconstitutional. But it is a sop for the right wing,

and I suppose it gets a few votes.

The Chairman mentioned statistics that show—and they may

very well be—I have no idea—I assume he is telling the truth— that there are statistics that show where there are States which

permit abortions without parental consent adjacent to States that

do not, the rate of abortion in those States go up. The conclusion

that I draw from that is it shows the desperation with which young

girls who cannot, out of terror or fear, inform their parents of their

desperate need for an abortion, in their opinion, that they are willing to go to those other States to get the abortion.

If you have a family where a daughter has any kind of normal

relationship—what we call normal relationship with her parents— of course, she is going to tell her parents and seek their help and

guidance and love and assistance in this situation instead of going

to another State, a strange town, to people she does not know, to

get an abortion. Unfortunately, not every family in the United

States has such a characteristic. There are people who created

pregnancies through incest. There are people who would beat their

daughters if they were told of this. There are families where there

is domestic violence and domestic abuse. There are all kinds of situations.

And if a daughter is so desperate that she would rather seek the

assistance of a grandmother or a friend to help her go to another

State to get an abortion where it is legal to do so, by what arrogance do we say to her, no, do it alone. Don’t let your grandmother

assist you. Don’t let your best friend assist you. Don’t let your boyfriend or fiancee assist you.

This is not only unconstitutional, and wrong-headed, it is vicious

legislation. It is also fictitious legislation, because it is not going

anywhere.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you.

Do any of the other Members of the Committee wish to make an

opening statement?

Then we will get to the testimony.

Before I do that, I would like to mention that our distinguished

colleague, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, the principal sponsor of this legislation, will be joining us here shortly. She had another thing that she

had to go to first. I would ask unanimous consent that when she

does join that she be permitted to make a brief statement at an appropriate time.

Without objection, we will now proceed with the witness introduction.

On our panel this morning we will hear from Ms. Eileen Roberts.

Ms. Roberts is the founder of Mothers Against Minors’ Abortion, an

organization that educates the public and informs State legislators

of the need for public policy that protects minors and the rights of

5

their parents to be involved in the abortion decisions of their children. And we welcome you here this morning.

Our second witness will be John C. Harrison, a Professor of Law

at the University of Virginia Law School. Professor Harrison started his tenure at the University of Virginia in 1993 after working

as Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel. Professor Harrison teaches various

courses, including administrative law, constitutional history, constitutional law and Federal courts. Professor Harrison was associated with the Washington, D.C., law firm of Patton, Boggs and

Blow.

Our third witness this morning will be the Reverend Doctor

Katherine Hancock Ragsdale, testifying on behalf of the Religious

Coalition for Reproductive Choice and National Abortion and Reproductive Rights Action League. A former staff officer at the Episcopal Church’s national offices, the Reverend Doctor Ragsdale is a

member of the Executive Committee of the Religious Coalition for

Reproductive Choice and was Chair of the Religious Coalition

Board from 1992 to 1999. In addition, she is a member of the board

of the National Abortion Reproductive Rights Action League and

the White House Project.

This morning, the Reverend Doctor Ragsdale will testify about

her experiences as Vicar of David’s Episcopal Church located just

outside of Boston, Massachusetts.

Our final witness is Professor Teresa S. Collett. Since 1990, Professor Collett has taught various legal courses at South Texas College of Law, including professional responsibility; property, wills

and trusts; church-state relations and the legal limits of medical

decision-making. Professor Collett has also served as a visiting professor at Notre Dame Law School; Washington University School of

Law in St. Louis, Missouri; University of Texas School of Law; University of Houston Law Center and the University of Oklahoma

College of Law. Prior to joining South Texas College of Law, Professor Collett was affiliated with the law firm of Crow and Dunlevy

in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.

We thank all of you for being here this morning. I ask each of

you try to summarize your testimony in 5 minutes or less, if at all

possible. We do have the written statements and can go into more

detail for a longer amount of time should Members choose to do

that.

We do have a lighting system here which we ask you to sort of

glance at periodically. The green light means you have 5 minutes.

When the yellow light comes on, that means please wrap it up.

When the red light comes on, please stop.

I have a gavel, but I try not to use that if I do don’t have to.

So we thank you all for being here, and we will start here this

morning with Ms. Roberts.

STATEMENT OF EILEEN ROBERTS, MOTHERS AGAINST

MINORS’ ABORTIONS, FREDERICKSBURG, VA

Ms. ROBERTS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the

Committee. Thank you for allowing me to testify this morning.

As stated, my name is Eileen Roberts; and I am the founder of

an organization called Mothers Against Minors’ Abortions or

6

MAMA. This organization was formed to serve as a collective voice

for others who also seek to restore the rights of parents to be involved when their minor-aged daughter seeks an abortion, whether

in their community or for those who are taken across State lines.

More significant, however, is the fact that I am a mother of a

daughter who at age 14 underwent an abortion without my knowledge. During my daughter’s rebellion toward parental authority,

my daughter was encouraged by her boyfriend, with the assistance

of an adult friend, to obtain a secret abortion without my knowledge. This adult friend even drove my daughter to the abortion

clinic 45 miles from our home and even paid for my daughter’s

abortion.

Wondering why our daughter had become depressed over the

next 2 weeks, my husband and I had thought perhaps her boyfriend had introduced her to drugs so we searched for answers.

Words cannot express the—cannot adequately express the Orwellian nightmare of discovering that your child had undergone an

abortion from a questionnaire that we found under her pillow

which she failed to return to the abortion clinic. As a result of her

depression my daughter was hospitalized, at which time it was discovered that the abortion had been incompletely performed, requiring surgery to repair the damage done by the abortionist. I was

called and told that that surgery could not be performed unless I

signed a consent form. The following year, my daughter developed

an infection also requiring hospitalization, which I had to sign a

consent form. To add insult to injury, my husband and I are responsible for over $27,000 in medical costs.

I am here today to ask this Committee to reject the eccentric notion that any adult stranger has the right to abduct our minor-aged

daughters and take them to another State for a secret abortion. I

speak for those parents that I know around the country whose

daughters has been taken out of States for their abortions. Many

times, these attempts are to evade parental notification and consent laws and also attempts to conceal criminal activity and statutory rape. Certainly, if a child is raped, a parent needs to know

about it so this criminal, whether an uncle, a brother, can be prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law.

I am horrified that our daughters are being dumped in our driveways after they are seized from our care, made to skip school, lie

and deceive their parents, to be transported across State lines,

whether that distance is 2 miles or 100 miles away. Where are

these strangers when the emotional and physical repercussions

occur? They are kidnapping another young adolescent girl and

transporting her for another secret abortion; and, thus, the malicious activity occurs over and over again.

When will this activity stop? When will those responsible for

these secret abortions be held accountable for the financial costs

and emotional and physical follow-up care from a disastrous legal

abortion?

I am aware and concerned, Mr. Nadler, for the many teens who

are truly from abused homes who were snatched away and given

a secret abortion and then sent back home to the abuser. This activity is contrary to the laws of this country and these girls need

7

to be removed from that home and the environment and the family

encouraged to pursue professional help.

Additionally, if my daughter, Mr. Nadler, was raped, especially

by a family member, I certainly would want to be notified so I

could have this criminal brought to justice.

While testifying at hearings such as this I am reminded of the

many young adult teens, especially Dawn from New York whose

parents were notified in time to make funeral arrangements after

their daughter’s legal abortion. Mrs. Ruth Ravenell and her hus- band were awarded $1.3 million by the State of New York for the

wrongful death of their 13-year-old daughter. Mrs. Ravenell shared

with me in the Senate Education and Health Committee in Richmond, Virginia, that she sat next to the hospital bed before her

daughter died, with her hand over her mouth to help keep herself

from screaming.

In conclusion, what has happened to my family has happened

and cannot be changed. Had I had the opportunity though, to be

notified I would have put my arms around my daughter and said,

I love you. We can work this through together. By supporting and

passing the Child Custody Protection Act, parental notification and

consent laws will be secured; and I can say with confidence that

our young adolescent daughters will be protected and family dignity will be restored.

And just to mention one other thing, Mr. Nadler. I am sorry that

we are wasting your time in trying to protect the 12, 13 and 14-

year-old children in this country who are snatched from their parents and are dumped on their driveways to pick up the pieces, as

in my family, and be responsible for the financial costs of over

$27,000. Let us make those people, like the Reverend Ragsdale, responsible if she is taking those people over State lines to pay the

financial costs, which this Child Custody Protection Act will help.

Thank you.

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Roberts follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF EILEEN ROBERTS

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, thank you for allowing me to testify this morning. My name is Eileen Roberts. I am the founder of an organization

called Mothers Against Minor’s Abortions, or MAMA. This organization was formed

to serve as a collective voice for others who also seek to restore the rights of parents

to be involved when their minor-aged daughter seeks an abortion, whether in their

community or for those who are taken across State lines.

More significant, however, is the fact that I am a mother of a daughter, who at

the age of 14 underwent an abortion without my knowledge. At age 13 a close relationship I had with my daughter was interrupted by a period of her rebelling, which

included a relationship with a boy which I knew was not in her best interest. My

daughter refused my request not to see this boy, but I continued to unconditionally

love her and care for her to the best of my ability, during this difficulty time.

During my daughter’s rebellion towards parental authority, my daughter was encouraged by her boyfriend, with the assistance of an adult friend, to obtain a secret

abortion without my knowledge. This adult friend drove my daughter to the abortion clinic 45 miles away from our home and even paid for my daughter’s abortion.

Wondering why our daughter had become depressed over the next two weeks, my

husband and I thought perhaps her boyfriend had introduced her to drugs, so we

searched for answers. Words cannot adequately communicate the Orwellian nightmare of discovering that your child had undergone and abortion from a questionnaire we found under her pillow, which she failed to return to the abortion clinic.

As a result of her depression, my daughter was hospitalized at which time it was

discovered that the abortion had been incompletely performed, requiring surgery to

8

repair the damage done by the abortionist. I was called and was told that my

daughter could not have that surgery without a signed consent by myself or my husband.

The following year my daughter developed an infection and was diagnosed as having pelvic inflammatory disease as a direct result of that abortion, which again required a two day hospitalization for IV antibiotic therapy and required a signed consent form. To add insult to injury, my husband and I were responsible for the medical costs, which amounted to over $27,000.

I am here today to ask this committee to reject the eccentric notion that any adult

stranger has the right to abduct our minor-aged daughters and take them to another state for a secret abortion. I speak for those parents I know around the country whose daughters have been taken out of State for their abortions. Many times

these are attempts to evade parental notification and consent laws and also attempts to conceal criminal activity, such as statutory rape. Certainly if a child is

raped, a parent needs to know about it so this criminal can be prosecuted to the

fullest extent of the law.

I am horrified that our daughter are being dumped on our driveways after they

are seized from our care, made to skip school, lie and deceive their parents to be

transported across State lines, whether that distance be two miles or 100 miles.

Where are these strangers when the emotional and physical repercussions occur?

They are kidnapping another young adolescent girl and transporting her for another

secret abortion, and thus the malicious activity occurs over and over. When will this

activity stop? When will those responsible for these secret abortions be held accountable for the financial costs of emotional and physical follow-up care from a disastrous legal abortion?

I am reminded of the many young adolecent teens, especially Dawn from New

York whose parents were notified in time to make funeral arrangements, after their

daughter’s legal abortion. Mrs. Ruth Ravenell and her husband were awarded $1.3

million dollars by the State of New York for the wrongful death of their 13-yearold daughter. Mrs. Ravenell, shared with me and the Senate Education and Health

Committee in Richmond, Virginia that she sat in the hospital before her daughter

died, with her hand over her mouth to help keep herself from screaming.

I am aware and concerned for the many teens who are truly from abusive homes

who are snatched away, given a secret abortion, and then sent back home to the

abuser. This activity is contrary to the laws of this country and these girls need to

be removed from that home and the environment and the family encouraged to pursue professional help. Additionally, if my daughter was raped, especially by a family

member, I certainly would want to be notified, so I could have this criminal brought

to justice.

On September 2, 2001 the New York Times Magazine featured an advertisement,

regarding the Becky Bell family. I have testified with the Bell’s in committee hearings throughout this country. The lesson to be learned from Becky’s death is not

that parental notification laws are bad, but just the opposite. Had Becky Bell been

encouraged to obey the Indiana law, by the Planned Parenthood Clinic Becky sought

counseling from, to tell her parents, rather than that most teens go to the neighboring State of Kentucky, Becky Bell would be alive today. The Indiana parental

notification law did not kill Becky, but rather the denial of parental involvement,

deceit and false information did.

In conclusion, what has happened to my family, has happened, that cannot be

changed. Had I had the opportunity to be notified, I would have put my arms

around my daughter and said ‘‘I love you, we can work this through together’’. By

supporting and passing the Child Custody Protection Act, parental notification and

consent laws will be secured, and I can say with confidence that our young adolescent daughters will be protected, and family dignity will be restored.

Mr. CHABOT. Professor Harrison.

STATEMENT OF JOHN HARRISON, PROFESSOR OF LAW,

UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA SCHOOL OF LAW

Mr. HARRISON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think I can be quite

brief.

The Subcommittee has asked me again to comment on the constitutionality of this proposed legislation. I believe it is within Congress’ power to adopt. It is a regulation of interstate commerce of

the transportation by one person of someone else across a State

line.

9

1This statement is substantially identical to the testimony I provided the Subcommittee at

a hearing on May 27, 1999, with respect to H.R. 1218 in the 106th Congress. See H.R. Rep.

No. 106–204 (June 25, 1999). 2Darby overruled Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), which held unconstitutional a

ban on interstate shipment of goods made with child labor. The Court in Hammer found that

the statute was in excess of the commerce power, even though it regulated only interstate transportation, because its purpose was related to production, which is a local activity.

It is also the performance of a function that Congress periodically

performs in resolving conflicts and inconsistencies created by the

existence of the Federal union, States in the union that have different social policies, different rules, in this case different rules

about parental notification and parental consent with respect to

abortions by minors. That nature of the Federal union creates a

conflict of jurisdictions, one under which one State says—the State

in which the minor resides says that the consent of the parent or

guardian is required and another State, one in which the abortion

is to be performed, says that it is not. It is a conflict between State

jurisdictions.

A resolution of that conflict deciding which State’s policy is to

prevail is one of the functions that Congress periodically performs.

It is not the most common exercise of the commerce power, but it

is one that periodically does underlie the commerce power. So it is

a familiar exercise of congressional authority.

I also think the bill does not raise any independent questions

concerning the right to privacy because the Supreme Court has explained that parental consent and notification requirements are

frequently constitutional. They are certainly, in general, constitutional. Some of them are unconstitutional. But were a State to have

an unconstitutional parental consent requirement, the requirement

itself would be inoperative and Congress could not act to enforce

it. I don’t think that is the standard situation. States now well

know the rules and can conform their laws to it.

But, in any event, this bill does not raise an independent problem under it. So I believe it to be constitutional, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Harrison follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN C. HARRISON

The Subcommittee has asked that I testify concerning Congress’ power to enact

H.R. 476, the Child Custody Protection Act.1

The proposed legislation would make it a federal crime knowingly to transport

across a state line ‘‘an individual who has not attained the age of 18 years . . . with

the intent that such individual obtain an abortion, and thereby in fact [to abridge]

the right of a parent under a law requiring parental involvement in a minor’s abortion decision, in force in the State where the individual resides.’’

H.R. 476 is a regulation of commerce among the several States. Commerce, as

that term is used in the Constitution, includes travel whether or not that travel is

for reasons of business. E.g., Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917). To

transport another person across state lines is to engage in commerce among the

States. There is thus no need to address the scope of Congress’ power to regulate

activity that is not, but that affects, commerce among the States, see, e.g., A.L.A.

Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Wickard v. Filburn,

317 U.S. 111 (1942); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); United States v.

Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).

Under the Supreme Court’s current doctrine, Congress can adopt rules concerning

interstate commerce, such as this one, for reasons related primarily to local activity

rather than commerce itself. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).2 Hence

even if H.R. 476 reflected a substantive congressional policy concerning abortion and

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3The rule of the Webb-Kenyon Act currently appears in Section 2 of the Twenty-First Amendment.

domestic relations it would be a valid exercise of the commerce power because it

is a regulation of interstate commerce.

Even under the more limited view of the commerce power that has prevailed in

the past, H.R. 476 would be within Congress’ power. This legislation, unlike the

child labor statute at issue in Hammer v. Dagenhart, does not rest primarily on a

congressional policy independent of that of the State that has primary jurisdiction

to regulate the subject matter involved. Rather, in legislation like this Congress

would be seeking to ensure that the laws of the State primarily concerned, the State

in which the minor resides, are complied with. In doing so Congress would be dealing with a problem that arises from the federal union, not making its own decisions

concerning local matters such as domestic relations or abortion.

H.R. 476 in this regard resembles the Webb-Kenyon Act, Act of March 1, 1913,

37 Stat. 699, which dealt with a problem posed by then-current dormant commerce

clause doctrine for States with strong prohibition laws. Such States, under Leisy v.

Hardin, 135 U.S. 100 (1890), were limited in their power to regulate liquor that was

shipped from out of state. Under the Webb-Kenyon Act, liquor was ‘‘deprived of its

interstate character’’ (to use the old terminology) and its introduction into a dry

State prohibited. The Court upheld the Webb-Kenyon Act in Clark Distilling Company v. Western Maryland Railway Company and State of West Virginia, 242 U.S.

311 (1917).3

My testimony is concerned with the Commerce Clause, not with the limitations

on the regulation of abortion that the Court has found in the Due Process Clauses

of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. That focus is appropriate, I think, because H.R. 476 does not raise any questions concerning the permissible regulation

of abortion that are independent of the state laws that it is designed to effectuate.

To the extent that a state rule is inconsistent with the Court’s doctrine, that rule

is ineffective and this bill would not make it effective. Hence it is unnecessary to

ask, for example, whether subsection (b)(1) of proposed section 2431 of title 18

would constitute an adequate exception to a rule regulating abortion. Because constitutional limits on the States’ regulatory authority are in effect incorporated into

proposed Section 2431, subsection (b)(1) is in addition to any exceptions required by

the Court’s doctrine.

This testimony on legal issues associated with H.R. 476 is provided to the Subcommittee as a public service. It represents my own views and is not presented on

behalf of any client or my employer, the University of Virginia.

Mr. CHABOT. Reverend Ragsdale.

STATEMENT OF REV. KATHERINE RAGSDALE, VICAR, ST.

DAVID’S EPISCOPAL CHURCH

Rev. RAGSDALE. Good morning again.

I am a priest of a small parish in Massachusetts; and I am here,

I think, for pretty much the same reason that Mrs. Roberts is here

and that everyone is here, because we care very much about the

safety, health, and well-being of women and particularly of girls.

What we disagree about is how best to accomplish that.

As a parish priest, I deal with people every day who are wrestling with how to make the best decisions that they can, the most

responsible moral decisions that they can. That is my joy to do.

I want to tell you about another situation, another young girl. I

didn’t know this girl, who I will call Karen, before I was called by

her school nurse, who wanted to know if I could come up with not

the $27,000 Ms. Roberts suggest I fork over but at least bus and

cab fare to get her to the hospital for a scheduled abortion. And I

was stunned, not at the request for the money but at the idea that

this 15-year-old girl would be making a several-hour trip alone by

bus and cab to her abortion and, even worse still, back home from

it.

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As it happened, I was going to be in town that day; and so I went

and picked this girl up—Karen. The nurse explained that she also

was sorry that Karen had to travel that way, but there was no one

to take her. Her father could not be trusted with the information.

They were afraid that he would throw her out of the house, if not

beat her. And her mother wasn’t on the scene. There were no other

relatives on the scene. There was no one to take care of her. So I

went and drove her to Boston.

While we drove, we talked; and she told me about her dreams

for the future, what she wanted to do, what she wanted to be. I

talked to her about the hard work and personal responsibility that

would be necessary to get there. She also told me how she got pregnant, how guilty she felt. It was date rape. She didn’t know to call

it that. The boy pushed her down, forced himself on her. But he

didn’t use a knife and he didn’t use a gun, and so she didn’t realize

that it was rape. She just felt guilty.

And I talked to her about the limits of personal responsibility

and how not everything that happens to us is what God wants for

us and how much God loved her and what she would have to do

to get where she wanted to go in life. And I took her in for her procedure. I took her back to school to her nurse’s office; and I drove

home wondering how many other bright, funny, thoughtful girls

brimming with possibilities weren’t lucky enough to know somebody who knew somebody who could help them. Back then, before

this all started, it never occurred to me that anyone would criminalize someone who was able and willing to help such a girl.

I find it troubling that those of us in this room should be at odds,

because I think what we are trying to do is the same thing. We

want fewer unplanned pregnancies. We want young people who

face problems, particularly problems that have to do with their

health and their futures, to receive love and support and counsel

from responsible adults, preferably their parents.

Mr. Chairman, you talked about all the reasons it is important

for a girl to have parental involvement before a medical procedure;

and you are absolutely right. And if I thought that this bill would

accomplish parental involvement, if I thought it would eliminate

the kind of pain Ms. Roberts spoke about, this panel would be even

more on balance than it is because I would be on the other side,

but it won’t do that. This bill isn’t about resolving problems. This

bill is about punishing people. And while I understand that even

the best of us have punitive impulses from time to time, we have

no business codifying then. They are venal. They are beneath the

dignity of any member of the human family.

What we need to be talking about is reality-based, age-appropriate sex education and safe and affordable contraception. We

need to be talking about welfare, child care and violence at home,

on the streets and our families. We need to be looking for new ways

to solve our problems, not new ways to punish victims and the people who care for them.

But no matter how successful we are at that, there will still be

kids who can’t talk to their parents. And there will still be kids

who can and should talk to their parents—like Becky Bell—kids

who should, but they won’t. Is that a bad idea? Yeah. Is that bad

judgment? Absolutely. But friends, teenagers have been known to

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exercise bad judgment. It is what they do. And there is no law any

of us can pass that will stop that from happening.

We need to protect the children who cannot trust their parents.

There is no excuse good enough to justify further imperiling children who are already in danger in their own homes.

If we can’t bring ourselves to find the compassion to do that for

them, then do it out of self-interest. Do it because—oppose this bill

because it is punitive and mean-spirited. Oppose out of compassion

for those kids who can’t talk to their parents. And, if all else fails,

oppose it for purely selfish reasons. Oppose it because you don’t

want your daughter or granddaughter or niece to die just because

she couldn’t face her parents and you had outlawed all her other

options.

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Rev. Ragsdale follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF KATHERINE HANCOCK RAGSDALE

Ladies and gentlemen of the Subcommittee, thank you for the invitation to speak

with you this morning. My name is Katherine Hancock Ragsdale. I am an Episcopal

priest and former chair of the board of the Religious Coalition for Reproductive

Choice, a 28-year-old coalition of over 40 national religious organizations representing over a dozen mainline denominations and faith groups. I also serve on the

board of the National Abortion and Reproductive Rights Action League. I am the

vicar, or priest in charge, of a congregation in a very small town in Massachusetts.

It is primarily as a parish priest that I am here today. As a parish priest it is my

privilege to be intimately involved in the lives of a variety of people who struggle

every day with what it means be ethical, morally responsible people of God in an

always complex, frequently confusing, sometimes difficult, and occasionally tragic

modern world. It is my job, and my joy, to try to help, and that’s why I’m here

today.

I recall vividly a day when I left my home near Cambridge, Massachusetts, and

drove to one of the economically challenged cities to the north of me to pick up a

fifteen-year-old girl and drive her to Boston for an 8 a.m. appointment for an abortion. I didn’t know the girl—I knew her school nurse. The nurse had called me a

few days earlier to see if I knew where she might find money to give the girl for

bus fare to and cab fare home from the hospital. I was stunned—a fifteen-year-old

girl was going to have to get up at the crack of dawn and take multiple buses to

the hospital alone? The nurse shared my concern but explained that the girl had

no one to turn to. She feared for her safety if her father found out and there was

no other relative close enough to help. There was no one to be with her. So I went.

And during our hour-long drive to Boston we talked.

She told me about her dreams for the future—all the things she thought she

might like to do and be. I talked to her about the kind of hard work and personal

responsibility it would take to get there.

She told me about the guilt she felt for being pregnant—even though the pregnancy was the result of a date rape. She didn’t call it that. She just told me about

the really cute guy from school who seemed so nice and about how pleased she was

when he asked her out. And then, she told me, he asked her to have sex with him

and she refused. And he asked her again—and again. And then he pushed her down

and forced himself on her. But he didn’t pull a gun, or break any bones, or cause

any serious injury—other than a pregnancy and a wounded spirit—so she didn’t

know to call it rape. She figured the fault was hers for not somehow having known

that he wasn’t really the ‘‘nice boy’’ he had seemed. And I talked to her about the

limits of personal responsibility; about how not everything that happens to us is our

own fault, or God’s will; and about how much God loves her.

Then I took her inside and turned her over to some very kind nurses. I went

downstairs to get a couple of prescriptions filled for her. I paid for the prescriptions

after I was informed that they’d either need the girl’s father’s signature in order

to charge them to his insurance, or the completion of a pile of forms that looked

far too complex for any fifteen-year-old to have to deal with. I drove her back to

her school and walked her to the nurse’s office and turned her over to someone who

would look out for her for the rest of the day. And then I drove home wondering

how many bright, funny, thoughtful girls, girls brimming with promise, were not

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lucky enough to know someone who knew someone who could help. I despaired that

in a society as rich and, purportedly, reasonable and compassionate as ours, any

young woman should ever find herself in such a position. It never occurred to me

that anyone would ever try to criminalize those who were able and willing to help.

Although New Hampshire was closer to that girl’s home than Boston, as it happened, I did not take her across state lines. Nor did I, to my knowledge, break any

laws. But if either of those things had been necessary in order to help her, I would

have done them. And if helping young women like her should be made illegal I will,

nonetheless, continue to do it. I have no choice because some years ago I stood before an altar and a Bishop and the people of God and vowed ‘‘to proclaim by word

and deed the Gospel of Jesus Christ and to fashion (my) life in accordance with its

precepts—to love and serve the people among whom (I) work, caring alike for young

and old, strong and weak, rich and poor.’’ I have no choice. Even if you tell me that

it is a crime to exercise my ministry, I will have no choice. And, I assure you, I

am not alone.

I find it troubling, to say the least, that those of us in this room should find ourselves at odds over this issue. Presumably we all want the same things. We want

fewer unplanned pregnancies and we want young people who face problems, particularly problems that have to do with their health and their futures, to receive loving

support and counsel from responsible adults. This bill, however, doesn’t help to

achieve those goals. It doesn’t resolve the problems with which we are faced. It

doesn’t even address those problems. This is not a bill about solutions; it’s a bill

about punishments. And, while it is the rare saint who is not sometimes subject to

punitive impulses, such impulses are, nonetheless, venal and beneath the dignity of

Americans or of any member of the human family.

We should be talking, instead, about reality-based, age-appropriate sex education

for all young people, and about safe, affordable, and available contraception. We

should be figuring out how we impress upon boys that ‘‘no’’ really does mean ‘‘no,’’ and about how to teach girls to defend themselves. We should be talking about education and economics; about childcare and welfare; about violence at home and on

the streets; not about new ways to punish victims and those who care for them.

Yet, no matter how intense and successful our efforts, there will still be minors

who face unplanned pregnancies. And some of them will still decide that abortion

is the best—sometimes the most responsible—option for them. And then, as now,

we will want them to be able to turn to their parents for love and support and guidance. That is, I have to assume, the noble motive behind this bill. We are appalled at

the thought of any girl having to face and make such a decision without the help

of her parents, as well we should be. Still, several years ago the Episcopal Church

passed a resolution opposing any parental consent or notification requirements that

did not include provision for non-judicial by-pass. In our view, any morally responsible notification or consent requirement had to allow young women to turn for help

to a responsible adult other than a parent or a judge—to go instead to a grandparent or an aunt, a teacher or neighbor, a counselor, minister or rabbi. Our resolution encourages the very things this bill would outlaw. Sure, we want young people

to be able to turn to their parents. But when they can’t or won’t we want to make

it easier, not harder, for them to turn to other responsible adults.

We adopted this resolution (by a large majority) not because we don’t care about

parental involvement. The Episcopal Church wants young women to be able to turn

to their parents for help when faced with serious decisions. I want that. I’m sure

you, and everyone in this room, wants that. And, in fact, most girls—more than

60%—do turn to their parents. We’d like it to be 100%. But we know that no one

can simply legislate healthy communication within families. And we know that, of

those girls who do not involve their parents, many feared violence or being thrown

out of their home. Statistical and anecdotal evidence demonstrates that, in far too

many American homes, such fears are not unfounded. There is no excuse good

enough to justify legislation or regulation that further imperils young people who

are already living in danger in their own homes.

Even if we were to find ourselves drained of the last vestiges of our compassion

there would still be a self-interested reason to fear and oppose this legislation. It

imperils all young women, even those in our own families. One hopes that none of

the young women we know and love has anything to fear from their parents. We

may even be quite confident that this is true. But let’s not kid ourselves. Even in

the happiest and healthiest of families teens sometimes cannot bring themselves to

confide in their parents. Even in families like Rebecca Bell’s. Perhaps you remember

her story. Becky’s parents report that they had a very good and loving relationship

with their daughter. They believed that there was nothing that she couldn’t or

wouldn’t tell them. But when Becky became pregnant she apparently couldn’t stand

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the thought of disappointing and hurting the parents she loved. And she lived in

a state that required parental notification. So she had an illegal abortion—and she

died.

Should Becky Bell have talked to her parents? I think so. Did she exercise poor

judgment? Absolutely. But, sisters and brothers, I’m here to tell you, teenagers will,

from time to time, exercise poor judgment. It’s a fact of nature and there is no law

you can pass that will change that. The penalty should not be death.

Oppose this bill. Oppose it because no matter how good the intentions of its authors and supporters, it is, in essence, punitive and mean-spirited. Oppose it out of

compassion for those young people who cannot, for reasons of their safety, comply

with its provisions. If all else fails, oppose it for purely selfish reasons. Oppose it

because you don’t want your daughter, or granddaughter, or niece to die just because she couldn’t face her parents and you had outlawed all her other options.

Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today.

Mr. CHABOT. Professor Collett.

STATEMENT OF TERESA S. COLLETT, PROFESSOR OF LAW,

SOUTH TEXAS COLLEGE OF LAW

Ms. COLLETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The views I am about to express do not represent the views of

my law school or any other organization or individual. What they

do express are the views I have come to after my study of parental

involvement laws throughout the country and also my role in assisting the State legislative sponsors in the State of Texas in the

adoption of the Texas Parental Notification Act, which became effective in January of 2000.

In fact, Mr. Chairman, there are not 20 effective parental involvement laws in this country. There are currently parental involvement laws on the books of 43 States in this country. Now, of

those 43, eight of those States have laws that have been determined to be constitutionally affirmed either under the State Constitution or the Federal Constitution. Nine of the remaining States

have laws that empower abortion providers or other third parties

to determine the level of involvement. So, in fact, we have 26

States that have laws that effectively guarantee parental involvement in the vast majority of cases.

But that still reflects a remarkable consensus in this country, a

consensus that we also find in the public opinion polls. In fact, that

consensus even extends to young adults.

MTV, not typically identified as a member of the right wing conspiracy mentioned by Mr. Nadler, did a survey of 18 to 24-year-olds

and found that 68 percent of those surveyed agreed that parents

should have to consent, not simply be notified, consent prior to the

performance of an abortion on a minor. In addition to that, all

other surveys asking neutral questions about parental involvement

reflect 70 to 80 percent consensus in this country in favor of parental involvement.

The reason for that are the very reasons that the Supreme Court

has articulated in upholding the constitutionality of those laws,

and there are two primary reasons:

Number one, parental involvement laws improve the medical

care of young girls facing an unplanned pregnancy. They do so in

three ways.

First, as the Supreme Court has observed, parents are in a better

position to select, in the words of the Court, competent and ethical

abortion providers. The National Abortion Federation in their

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Guide to Good Care advises women seeking an abortion to determine whether or not the abortion provider, first, is a licensed physician in the jurisdictions where the abortion is going to occur and,

second, whether he or she has admitting privileges in a hospital

within 20 minutes from the site where the abortion is going to

occur. A concerned parent is far more likely to inquire into those

qualifications than a panicky teen who simply no longer wants to

be pregnant.

The second benefit that the Supreme Court has identified is that

parents are in a better position to give a full and complete medical

history. With the onset of chemically-induced abortions as well as

surgical abortions, there are choices that have to be made even beyond the simple decisions to continue or terminate the pregnancy.

Parents have better knowledge of the pharmacology of the girl,

whether or not she is going to have an adverse reaction, whether

a surgically-induced abortion would be a better option than a

chemically-induced abortion; and parents need to be in a position

to give that information to physicians.

And third and perhaps most importantly and reinforced by a recent opinion of the Florida intermediate appellate court upholding

that State’s parental involvement law is the fact that parents have

to know that the abortion has occurred in order to respond appropriately to post-abortion complications.

I agree with Reverend Ragsdale that, in fact, there are girls that

find themselves experiencing an unplanned pregnancy who, because of their family circumstances, could not safely go to a parent.

But that is not the vast majority of cases. In fact, studies published

by the Family Planning Perspectives magazine from the

Gutmacher Institute, a research affiliate of Planned Parenthood,

have determined that the major reason that girls won’t go to their

parents is because they don’t want to disappoint them. They don’t

want to face their parents and tell them that they have engaged

in sex, either because they feel wrongfully guilty or because they

feel like they screwed up and they really did intentionally engage

in sexual conduct contrary to the parents’ wishes.

That cannot be an adequate justification to keep parents in the

dark so that these parents mistake hemorrhaging for a heavy period or post-abortion stress syndrome for ordinary teenage angst.

Parents have a right to know so that they can be the first to

help. And in fact, that is what parental involvement laws are

about.

Now this particular legislation does not create a national parental consent or notification law. But what it does do is ensure that

the reasonable judgment of those States that have enacted such legally effective laws are observed by other States concerning those

residents. It is an ordinary exercise of this power in the Congress,

and I urge Members of this Committee to enact what is one of the

few points of consensus on what is otherwise a very divisive political issue.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Collett follows:]

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Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. We appreciate the witnesses’

testimony here this morning.

We have a joint session with the President of Mexico, Mr. Fox,

starting at 11 o’clock. We’ve got six Members here, counting the

proponent of this legislation, Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. I am going to suggest that we limit the statement by Ms. Ros-Lehtinen and the

questioning by ourselves to 3 minutes so everybody has an opportunity to do that. If that is acceptable to do that, I would ask unanimous consent that we do that.

Mr. NADLER. I object to that, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. CHABOT. The objection is noted.

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Ms. Ros-Lehtinen, pursuant to our unanimous consent, you are

recognized for the purpose of making an opening statement.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman; and I

thank the witnesses and the Subcommittee Members for this opportunity to testify.

Abortion is perhaps one of the most life-altering and life-threatening of procedures. It leaves lasting medical, emotional and psychological consequences and, as noted by the United States Supreme Court, particularly so when the patient is immature.

Although Roe v. Wade legalized abortion in 1973, it did not legalize the right for persons other than a parent or a guardian to decide what is best for a child. Nor did it legalize the right for strangers to place a child in a dangerous situation that is often described

as potentially fatal.

My legislation, the Child Custody Protection Act, will make it a

Federal misdemeanor to transport an underage child across State

lines in circumvention of State and local parental and notification

laws for the purpose of obtaining an abortion.

Last year, in the 106th Congress, I introduced this legislation;

and it passed the House with a vote of 270 in favor and 159

against, almost a two-thirds majority. In the Congress before that,

this legislation also passed with a vote of 276 to 150. Significant

support for this legislation is not surprising because, according to

Zogby International, 66 percent of people surveyed believed that

doctors should be legally required to notify the parents of a girl

under the legal age who request an abortion.

In addition, a 1999 fact sheet created by the Planned Parenthood

Federation of America entitled Teenagers, Abortion and Government Intrusion Laws cites ‘‘few would deny that most teenagers,

especially younger ones, would benefit from adult guidance when

faced with an unwanted pregnancy. Few would deny that such

guidance ideally should come from the teenager’s parents.’’

Parental consent or parental notification laws may vary from

State to State, but they are all made with the same purpose in

mind, to protect frightened and confused adolescent girls from

harm.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for considering this vital piece of legislation; and I hope that this Subcommittee will support H.R. 476

for the purpose of upholding safety laws designed by individual

States, a bill that would protect parents’ rights to be involved in

decisions involving their minor children and would work to

strengthen the bonds of America’s families.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you the Members of the

Subcommittee.

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Ms. Ros-Lehtinen.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Ros-Lehtinen follows:]

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Mr. CHABOT. At this point, we will move to the questioning portion; and I recognize myself for 5 minutes for questions.

Ms. Roberts, if I could start with you. You have heard some of

the concern and criticism or whatever from some of the opponents

of this legislation; and one of the arguments they make is that, you

know, some parents are abusive and their children are afraid to go

to those parents. That obviously affects the parents who really do

love and care and are not abusive to their children which, in my

view, is the vast majority. Could you comment on that issue and

what your thoughts and concerns are about that?

Ms. ROBERTS. As I said in my testimony, that what we are doing

in this country is we are giving a girl from an abusive home who

claims to the authorities if she has to go before the judge, well, I

can’t tell my parents because I am beaten. But what we are doing

in this country, instead of investigating the abuse, going to that

family, the likes of Planned Parenthood and the feminists for the

majority—majority of feminists are encouraging girls to have secret

abortions, not telling on those abusers and then sending them back

home to the abuser where they can be abused again. That seems

a little bit uncompassionate in my eyes.

I would rather the family gather together in a social service situation to investigate the abuse and why it is happening and get that

child out of the home, investigate the abuse, and then go on and

get that family the help they need. Because the abuse most likely

started way back and it is just a continuous situation that won’t

stop without professional help.

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much.

Professor Harrison, in your written testimony you had stated

that the Child Custody Protection Act is similar to the WebbKenyon Act enacted by Congress back in 1913 in order to prohibit

the transportation of liquor from a wet State to a dry State. Could

you explain to us the rationale applied by the Supreme Court in

upholding that provision in Clark Distilling Company v. Western

Maryland Railway Company?

Mr. HARRISON. The Court’s thinking was that Congress has authority over interstate commerce and that the States have authority over whether to be wet or dry. So this falls into the situation

where there is a potential conflict created by the existence of the

Federal union.

Some States—a State can decide to be wet. A State can decide

to be dry. And the problem for the dry State—there was a problem

for the dry States that was created specifically by their being in a

Federal union with some wet States. The Dormant Commerce

Clause the Court had earlier decided about 15, 20 years before

that, they decided that the Dormant Commerce Clause made it impossible for the States—took away from the States part of their

normal legal armament to control their domestic policy and made

it impossible for the States to limit the introduction of liquor from

out-of-State. But the power to do that had not sort of all together

gone away but had been transferred from one level of government

to the other.

So Congress decided that the policy that ought to govern there

was the policy where the liquor would be consumed and so reinforced the authority of that State by making it illegal to transport

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liquor into a State in violation of the laws of that State, a principle

that is now in the Constitution in section 2 of the 21st amendment.

So the decision, which of the two possible States is going to have

jurisdiction, is one that is often made at the higher—the Federal

level.

Mr. CHABOT. Just to be clear, it is your opinion the passage of

this legislation would withstand a constitutional challenge—in your

opinion?

Mr. HARRISON. I believe that it would.

Mr. CHABOT. Reverend Ragsdale, if I could ask you a question,

also. In your statement, you had stated—and I quote again. This

is from the statement, although your oral testimony may have been

slightly different but I think very similar: Of those girls who do not

involve their parents, many fear violence or being thrown out of

their home. Are you familiar with judicial bypass procedures and

are you aware that during such procedures judges routinely address such tragic consequences and circumstances when reviewing

a pregnant minor’s petition for a judicial bypass?

Rev. RAGSDALE. I am aware that 75 percent of girls already do

talk to their parents about this; and of those who don’t, judicial bypass is an option.

The Episcopal Church nationally some years ago dealt with this

issue and decided that we could only support parental consent and

notification laws that allowed for a nonjudicial bypass, something

pretty much exactly like what this bill tries to outlaw, the ability

for persons other than the parents, the judiciary, priests, counselors, teachers, precisely because we understand that the judicial

bypass system, one, is very difficult for a young teenager to navigate and is intimidating.

Frankly, I would be intimidated by it, and I am way more than

a teenager and not easily intimidated. So the idea of a 15-year-old

trying to navigate that system is a little overwhelming.

Secondly, we know that in not every State and area is the judiciary inclined to behave fairly regarding these petitions; and there

is not a lot of time to go through an appellate process when a

young girl is facing a pregnancy.

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you.

Finally, Professor Collett, I realize that parental involvement

laws are not identical from State to State. They vary, as you indicated in your testimony. Can you tell us generally what factors

judges take into consideration when hearing a judicial bypass case?

Ms. COLLETT. Well, under Supreme Court precedent, if you have

a parental consent law the courts are required to grant an exemption from that parental consent requirement under two circumstances at a minimum. Number one, they have to grant an exemption where the girl can establish that she is sufficiently mature

and well-informed or, in the alternative, if the girl can establish

that parental involvement or parental consent is not in her best interest.

Now the United States Supreme Court case law in giving further

definition to those terms is rather scanty. There is simply not much

elaboration. But when you look at the State Supreme Court opinions and intermediate appellate opinions, what we begin to see is

the standard for mature and well-informed are standards that

34

courts are fairly familiar with. Because courts throughout the country have had emancipation statutes for minors for a number of

years that have required them to determine whether a minor is

sufficiently mature to emancipate here entirely from her parents.

For example, in Texas, we have had an emancipation statute for

over 100 years. So our courts are familiar with that.

Well-informed is a similar standard to that for informed consent

that courts use routinely in informed consent tort cases. So, again,

there is adequate case law and information available.

The second best interest test is a standard courts use in custody

disputes. Again, it is a standard that is familiar to family law

courts and jurists that apply the standard in a number of contexts

unrelated to abortion. Typically, it is things like the age; whether

or not the girl knows the complications associated with the procedure that she is proposing to undergo; whether or not she has been

the victim of sexual assault and abuse; whether the choice of abortion is the product of coercion; whether or not she is aware of other

options, like carrying the pregnancy to term and raising the child

by herself or carrying the pregnancy to term and placing the child

with adoption. Those sorts of considerations are legitimate, and

courts have sustained them.

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. My time has expired.

The gentleman from New York is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. NADLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Since we have so little time, I will simply start by observing that

most of the testimony of Professor Collett and several other people

is entirely irrelevant to this bill since the worthiness and intelligence or lack thereof of parental notification or consent laws is

not before us today. They are the subjects of State legislative action.

The question before us today is with respect to a bill that would

criminalize someone accompanying a minor across a State line for

the purpose of doing something legal in the State in which they go.

I would similarly observe that Professor Harrison’s comparison to

the Webb-Kenyon Act of 1913 is exactly backwards since that act

made it criminal to go from a wet State to a dry State; in other

words, to perform something illegal in the State you are going to.

The bill we are dealing with today says in effect that we are going

to force a young woman trying to obtain an abortion to carry with

her on her back across State lines through restrictive laws of the

State that she is leaving to give extra territorial effect in the State

she is going to the laws of the State she is no longer in.

Now, presumably, if she travelled across State lines with the intention of establishing residence in that new State, we wouldn’t

even be talking about this because she would have no connection

with that old State. But if she has an intent to return to that old

State, we are saying that under those circumstances we can make

it criminal for someone to accompany her.

Let me say that there is no doubt in my mind that, Professor

Harrison to the contrary, notwithstanding that this is an unconstitutional bill, I ask to enter into a record a memo here from Professor Tribe, Laurence Tribe, the Professor of Constitutional Law

at Harvard and Peter Rubin, Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University.

35

1 Each of us has already made a written submission to Congress demonstrating that the proposed statute also violates the Constitution because of the cruel and dangerous method it employs to attempt to deter pregnant young women from obtaining lawful abortions in neighboring

states; because it places an ‘‘undue burden’’ upon the pregnant young woman’s night to choose

to terminate her pregnancy; and because it lacks a constitutionally-mandated exception for abortions necessary to protect the health of the pregnant woman. See ‘‘The Constitution and the Proposed Child Custody Protection Act,’’ Written Testimony of Peter J. Rubin before the Senate

Committee on the Judiciary (‘‘Rubin Testimony’’), May 20, 1998 at 6–7 (proposed law will brutally endanger the safety of pregnant minors to whom it applies in violation of the Due Process

Clause); Memorandum of Law of Professor Laurence H. Tribe to the Hon. Orrin G. Hatch and

the other Members of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, June 23 1998 (‘‘Tribe Memorandum’’) at 6–9 (proposed law would impose an ‘‘undue burden’’ under Planned Parenthood of

Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), and lacks a required health exception);

Rubin Testimony at 7–10 (same). This testimony was submitted in 1999, and addressed identically-worded bills considered by a previous Congress. The Supreme Court’s subsequent decision

Continued

Mr. CHABOT. Without objection.

Mr. NADLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The information referred to follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF LAURENCE H. TRIBE AND PETER J. RUBIN

INTRODUCTION

We have been asked to submit our assessment of whether H.R. 476, now pending

before the House, is consistent with constitutional principles of federalism. It is our

considered view that the proposed statute violates those principles, principles that

are fundamental to our constitutional order. That statute violates the rights of

states to enact and enforce their own laws governing conduct within their territorial

boundaries, and the rights of the residents of each of the United States and of the

District of Columbia to travel to and from any state of the Union for lawful purposes, a right strongly reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in its recent landmark decision in Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999). We have therefore concluded that the proposed law would, if enacted, violate the Constitution of the United States.

H.R. 476 would provide criminal and civil penalties, including imprisonment for

up to one year, for any person who

knowingly transports an individual who has not attained the age of 18 years

across a State line, with the intent that such individual obtain an abortion . . .

[if] an abortion is performed on the individual, in a State other than the State

where the individual resides, without the parental consent or notification, or the

judicial authorization, that would have been required by that law in the State

where the individual resides.

H.R. 476, § 2 (a) (proposed 18 U.S.C. § 2431(a)(1) and (2)). In other words, this law

makes it a federal crime to assist a pregnant minor to obtain a lawful abortion. The

criminal penalties kick in if the abortion the young woman seeks would be performed in a state other than her state of residence, and in accord with the less restrictive laws of that state, unless she complies with the more severe restrictions

her home state imposes upon abortions performed upon minors within its territorial

limits. The law contains no exceptions for situations where the young woman’s home

state purports to disclaim any such extraterritorial effect for its parental consultation rules, or where it is a pregnant young woman’s close friend, or her aunt or

grandmother, or a member of the clergy, who accompanies her ‘‘across a State line’’

on this frightening journey, even where she would have obtained the abortion anyway, whether lawfully in another state after a more perilous trip alone, or illegally

(and less safely) in her home state because she is too frightened to seek a judicial

bypass or too terrified of physical abuse to notify a parent or legal guardian who

may, indeed, be the cause of her pregnancy. It does not exempt health care providers, including doctors, from possible criminal or civil penalties. Nor does it uniformly apply home-state laws on pregnant minors who obtain out of-state abortions.

The law applies only where the young woman seeks to go from a state with a more

restrictive regime into a state with a less restrictive one.

This amounts to a statutory attempt to force this most vulnerable class of young

women to carry the restrictive laws of their home states strapped to their backs,

bearing the great weight of those laws like the bars of a prison that follows them

wherever they go (unless they are willing to go alone). Such a law violates the basic

premises upon which our federal system is constructed, and therefore violates the

Constitution of the United States.1

36

in Stenberg v. Carhart confirms and reinforces the constitutional analysis contained in that testimony. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 930, 930–938 (2000) (invalidating an abortion

restriction that contained only an exception for the woman’s life identical to the one included

in H.R. 476 because, like H.R. 476, it failed to include a constitutionally-required ‘‘exception for

the preservation of the . . . health of the mother’’); cf. id at 930, 945–946 (citations and internal

quotation marks omitted) (independently invalidating that statute because it ‘‘impose[d] an

undue burden on . . . the ability’’ of those among the approximately ten percent of women seeking abortions who do so during the second trimester of pregnancy ‘‘to choose a [particular method of obtaining an] abortion’’). Although the purpose of this memorandum is to address questions of federalism, each of us adheres to his previously expressed views. 2There are significant constitutional limits, of course, even upon a state’s authority to tax its

residents on transactions undertaken, or income earned, in other states, but so long as there

is no taxation without representation (as there is not if the resident’s eligibility to vote remains

intact notwithstanding temporary absence from the state) and so long as the subject of the tax

is not such as to incur a danger of multiple taxation, the absent resident’s continuing eligibility

for whatever benefits and services the state constitutionally extends to all its residents and only

to its residents imposes a potential burden on state resources for which at least a minimal tax

may in some circumstances be warranted.

ANALYSIS

The essence of federalism is that the several states have not only different physical territories and different topographies but also different political and legal regimes. Crossing the border into another state, which every citizen has a right to do,

may perhaps not permit the traveler to escape all tax or other fiscal or recordkeeping duties owed to the state as a condition of remaining a resident and thus

a citizen of that state,2 but necessarily permits the traveler temporarily to shed her

home state’s regime of laws regulating primary conduct in favor of the legal regime

of the state she has chosen to visit. Whether cast in terms of the destination state’s authority to enact laws effective throughout its domain without having to make exceptions for travelers from other states, or cast in terms of the individual’s right to

travel—which would almost certainly be deterred and would in any event be rendered virtually meaningless if the traveler could not shake the conduct-constraining

laws of her home state—the proposition that a state may not project its laws into

other states by following its citizens there is bedrock in our federal system.

One need reflect only briefly on what rejecting that proposition would mean in

order to understand how axiomatic it is to the structure of federalism. Suppose that

your home state or Congress could lock you into the legal regime of your home state

as you travel across the country. This would mean that the speed limits, marriage

regulations, restrictions on adoption, rules about assisted suicide, firearms regulations, and all other controls over behavior enacted by the state you sought to leave

behind, either temporarily or permanently, would in fact follow you into all 49 of

the other states as you traveled the length and breadth of the nation in search of

more hospitable ‘‘rules of the road.’’ If your search was for a more favorable legal

environment in which to make your home, you might as well just look up the laws

of distant states on the internet rather than roaming about in a futile effort at sampling them, since you will not actually experience those laws by traveling there. And

if your search was for a less hostile legal environment in which to attend college

or spend a summer vacation or obtain a medical procedure, you might as well skip

even the internet, since the theoretically less hostile laws of other jurisdictions will

mean nothing to you so long as your state of residence remains unchanged.

Unless the right to travel interstate means nothing more than the right to change

the scenery, opting for the open fields of Kansas or the mountains of Colorado or

the beaches of Florida but all the while living under the legal regime of whichever

state you call home, telling you that the laws governing your behavior will remain

constant as you cross from one state into another and then another is tantamount

to telling you that you may in truth be compelled to remain at home—although you

may, of course, engage in a simulacrum of interstate travel, with an experience

much like that of the visitor to a virtual reality arcade who is strapped into special

equipment that provides the look and feel of alternative physical environments—

from sea to shining sea—but that does not alter the political and legal environment

one iota. And, of course, if home-state legislation, or congressional legislation, may

saddle the home state’s citizens with that state’s abortion regulation regime, then

it may saddle them with their home state’s adoption and marriage regimes as well,

and with piece after piece of the home state’s legal fabric until the home state’s citizens are all safely and tightly wrapped in the straitjacket of the home state’s entire

legal regime. There are no constitutional scissors that can cut this process short,

no principled metric that can supply a stopping point. The principle underlying H.R.

476 is nothing less, therefore, than the principle that individuals may indeed be

tightly bound by the legal regimes of their home states even as they traverse the

37

nation by traveling to other states with very different regimes of law. It follows,

therefore, that—unless the right to engage in interstate travel that is so central to

our federal system is indeed only a night to change the surrounding scenery—H.R.

476 rests on a principle that obliterates that right completely.

It is irrelevant to the federalism analysis that the proposed federal statute does

not literally prohibit the minor herself from obtaining an out-of-state abortion without complying with the parental consent or notification laws of her home state,

criminalizing instead only the conduct of assisting such a young woman by transporting her across state lines. The manifest and indeed avowed purpose of the statute is to prevent the pregnant minor from crossing state lines to obtain an abortion

that is lawful in her state of destination whenever it would have violated her home

state’s law to obtain an abortion there because the pregnant woman has not fully

complied with her home state’s requirements for parental consent or notification.

The means used to achieve this end do not alter the constitutional calculus. Prohibiting assistance in crossing state lines in the manner of this proposed statute suffers

the same infirmity with respect to our federal structure as would a direct ban on

traveling across state lines to obtain an abortion that complies with all the laws of

the state where it is performed without first complying also with the laws that

would apply to obtaining an abortion in one’s home state.

The federalism principle we have described operates routinely in our national life.

Indeed, it is so commonplace it is taken for granted. Thus, for example, neither Virginia nor Congress could prohibit residents of Virginia, where casino gambling is illegal, from traveling interstate to gamble in a casino in Nevada. (Indeed, the economy of Nevada essentially depends upon this aspect of federalism for its continued

vitality.) People who like to hunt cannot be prohibited from traveling to states

where hunting is legal in order to avail themselves of those pro-hunting laws just

because such hunting may be illegal in their home state. And citizens of every state

must be free, for example, to read and watch material, even constitutionally unprotected material, in New York City the distribution of which might be unlawful in

their own states, but which New York has chosen not to forbid. To call interstate

travel for such purposes an ‘‘evasion’’ or ‘‘circumvention’’ of one’s home-state laws—

as H.R. 476 purports to do, see H.R. 476, § 2(a) (heading of the proposed 18 U.S.C.

§ 2431) (‘‘Transportation of minors in circumvention of certain laws relating to abortion’’)—is to misunderstand the basic premise of federalism: one is entitled to avoid

those laws by traveling interstate. Doing so amounts to neither evasion nor circumvention.

Put simply, you may not be compelled to abandon your citizenship in your home

state as a condition of voting with your feet for the legal and political regime of

whatever other state you wish to visit. The fact that you intend to return home cannot undercut your right, while in another state, to be governed by its rules of primary conduct rather than by the rules of primary conduct of the state from which

you came and to which you will return. When in Rome, perhaps you will not do as

the Romans do, but you are entitled—if this figurative Rome is within the United

States—to be governed as the Romans are. If something is lawful for one of them

to do, it must be lawful for you as well. The fact that each state is free, notwithstanding Article IV, to make certain benefits available on a preferential basis to its

own citizens does not mean that a state’s criminal laws may be replaced with stricter ones for the visiting citizen from another state, whether by that state’s own

choice or by virtue of the law of the visitor’s state or by virtue of a congressional

enactment. To be sure, a state need not treat the travels of its citizens to other

states as suddenly lifting otherwise applicable restrictions when they return home.

Thus, a state that bans the possession of gambling equipment, of specific kinds of

weapons, of liquor, or of obscene material may certainly enforce such bans against

anyone who would bring the contraband items into the jurisdiction, including its

own residents returning from a gambling state, a hunting state, a drinking state,

or a state that chooses not to outlaw obscenity. But that is a far cry from projecting

one state’s restrictive gambling, firearms, alcohol, or obscenity laws into another

state whenever citizens of the first state venture there.

Thus states cannot prohibit the lawful out-of-state conduct of their citizens, nor

may they impose criminal-law-backed burdens—as H.R. 476 would do—upon those

lawfully engaged in business or other activity within their sister states. Indeed, this

principle is so fundamental that it runs through the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence

in cases that are nominally about provisions and rights as diverse as the Commerce

Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the right to travel, which is itself derived from

38

3See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 500–504 (1999) (describing the various components of the

right to travel and their constitutional derivation).

several distinct constitutional sources.3 See, e.g., Healy v. Beer Institute, 491 U.S.

324, 336 n. 13 (1989) (Commerce Clause decision quoting Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457

U.S. 624, 643 (1982) (plurality opinion), which in turn quoted the Court’s Due Process decision in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 197 (1977)) (‘‘The limits on a State’s power to enact substantive legislation are similar to the limits on the jurisdiction

of state courts. In either case, ‘‘any attempt ‘directly’ to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction over persons or property would offend sister States and exceed the inherent

limit of the State’s power.’ ’’).

The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed this fundamental principle in its landmark right to travel decision, Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999). There the Court

held that, even with congressional approval, the State of California was powerless

to carve out an exception to its otherwise-applicable legal regime by providing recently-arrived residents with only the welfare benefits that they would have been

entitled to receive under the laws of their former states of residence. This attempt

to saddle these interstate travelers with the laws of their former home states—even if only the welfare laws, laws that would operate far less directly and less powerfully than would a special criminal-law restriction on primary conduct—was held to

impose an unconstitutional penalty upon their right to interstate travel, which, the

Court held, is guaranteed them by the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Saenz, 526 U.S. at 503–504.

Although Saenz concerned new residents of a state, the decision also reaffirmed

that the constitutional right to travel under the Privileges and Immunities Clause

of Article IV, Section 2, provides a similar type of protection to a non-resident who

enters a state not to settle, but with an intent eventually to return to her home

state:

[B]y virtue of a person’s state citizenship, a citizen of one State who travels in

other States, intending to return home at the end of his journey, is entitled to

enjoy the ‘‘Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States’’ that he

visits. This provision removes ‘‘from the citizens of each State the disabilities

of alienage in the other States.’’ Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall.168,180(1869). It provides important protections for nonresidents who enter a State whether to obtain employment, Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978), to procure medical

services, Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 200 (1973), or even to engage in commercial shrimp fishing, Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948).

Saenz, 526 U.S. at 501–502 ( footnotes and parenthetical omitted).

Indeed, Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), which was decided over a quarter century ago, and to which the Saenz court referred, specifically held that, under Article

IV of the Constitution, a state may not restrict the ability of visiting non-residents

to obtain abortions on the same terms and conditions under which they are made

available by law to state residents. ‘‘[T]he Privileges and Immunities Clause, Const.

Art. IV, § 2, protects persons . . . who enter [a state] seeking the medical services

that are available there.’’ Id. at 200.

Thus, in terms of protection from being hobbled by the laws of one’s home state

wherever one travels, nothing turns on whether the interstate traveler intends to

remain permanently in her destination state, or to return to her state of origin.

Combined with the Court’s holding that, like the states, Congress may not contravene the principles of federalism that are sometimes described under the ‘‘right

to travel’’ label, Saenz reinforces the conclusion, if it were not clear before, that even

if enacted by Congress, a law like H.R. 476 that attempts by reference to a state’s own laws to control that state’s resident’s out-of-state conduct on pains of criminal

punishment, whether of that resident or of whoever might assist her to travel interstate, would violate the federal Constitution. See also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394

U.S. 618, 629–630 (1969) (invalidating an Act of Congress mandating a durational

residency requirement for recently-arrived District of Columbia residents seeking to

obtain welfare assistance).

In 1999, this Committee heard testimony from Professor Lino Graglia of the University of Texas School of Law. An opponent of constitutional abortion rights, he

candidly conceded that the proposed law would ‘‘make it . . . more dangerous for

young women to exercise their constitutional right to obtain a safe and legal abortion.’’ Testimony of Lino A. Graglia on H.R. 1218 before the Constitution Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives, May

27, 1999 at 1. He also concluded, however, that ‘‘the Act furthers the principle of

federalism to the extent that it reinforces or makes effective the very small amount

of policymaking authority on the abortion issue that the Supreme Court, an arm of

39

4 Although the failure of H.R. 476 to exempt states that would not opt to give their parental

involvement laws extraterritorial effect certainly aggravates its violation of federalism, this proposed statute would, as we have shown, violate federalism principles even if it permitted states

to opt out. Just as Congress may not license the state of destination of an interstate traveler

to hobble the new resident, even temporarily, with the laws of her former state of residence

(even with respect to mere benefits that the state of destination is free to limit to its own residents), see Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. at 507–508, so Congress may not license an interstate traveler’s home state, during the time of that traveler’s sojourn in other states, to hobble her with

its laws. 5 In this regard, the Subcommittee on the Constitution has previously heard the testimony of

Billie Lominick, a 63-year-old grandmother who helped a pregnant minor from a physically and

sexually abusive household cross state lines to obtain an abortion after she was unable to find

any judge in her home state of South Carolina who would hear her judicial bypass petition.

There is also evidence that the rate at which some state judges grant these petitions is disproportionately low, something that appears to reflect their own personal views about abortion

rather than the legal standards they are supposed to apply: For example, in 1992 the director

Continued

the national government, has permitted to remain with the States.’’ Id. at 2. He testified that he supported the bill because he would support ‘‘anything Congress can

do to move control of the issue back into the hands of the States.’’ Id. at 1.

Of course, as the description of H.R. 476 we have given above demonstrates, that

proposed statute would do nothing to move ‘‘back’’ into the hands of the states any

of the control over abortion that was precluded by Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973),

and its progeny. The several states already have their own distinctive regimes for

regulating the provision of abortion services to pregnant minors, regimes that are

permitted under the Supreme Court’s abortion rulings. That, indeed, is the very

premise of this proposed law. But, rather than respecting federalism by permitting

each state’s law to operate within its own sphere, the proposed federal statute would

contravene that essential principle of federalism by saddling the abortion-seeking

young woman with the restrictive law of her home state wherever she may travel

within the United States unless she travels unaided. Indeed, it would add insult to

this federalism injury by imposing its regime regardless of the wishes of her home

state, whose legislature might recoil from the prospect of transforming its parental

notification laws, enacted ostensibly to encourage the provision of loving support

and advice to distraught young women, into an obstacle to the most desperate of

these young women, compelling them in the moment of their greatest despair to

choose between, on the one hand, telling someone close to them of their situation

and perhaps exposing this loved one to criminal punishment, and, on the other,

going to the back alleys or on an unaccompanied trip to another, possibly distant

state. This federal statute would therefore violate rather than reinforce basic constitutional principles of federalism.4

The fact that the proposed law applies only to those assisting the interstate travel

of minors seeking abortions may make the federalism-based constitutional infirmity

somewhat less obvious—while at the same time rendering the law more vulnerable

to constitutional challenge because of the danger in which it will place the class of

frightened, perhaps desperate young women least able totravelsafelyontheirown.

The importance of protecting the relationship between parents and their minor children cannot be gainsaid. But in the end, the fact that the proposed statute involves

the interstate travel only of minors does not alter our conclusion.

No less than the right to end a pregnancy, the constitutional right to travel interstate and to take advantage of the laws of other states exists even for those citizens

who are not yet eighteen. ‘‘Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being

magically only when one attains the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as well

as adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights.’’

Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976). Nonetheless, the Court has held that, in furtherance of the minors’ best interests, government may in some circumstances have more leeway to regulate where minors are

concerned. Thus, whereas a law that sought, for example, to burden adult women

with their home state’s constitutionally acceptable waiting periods for abortion (or

with their home state’s constitutionally permissible medical regulations that may

make abortion more costly) even when they traveled out of state to avoid those waiting periods (or other regulations) would obviously be unconstitutional, it might be

argued that a law like the proposed one, which seeks to force a young woman to

comply with her home state’s parental consent laws regardless of her circumstances,

is, because of its focus on minors, somehow saved from constitutional invalidity.

It is not, for at least two reasons. First, the importance of the constitutional right

in question for the pregnant minor too desperate even to seek judicial approval for

abortion in her home state—either because of its futility there,5 or because of her

40

of a woman’s clinic in Indianapolis reported that in six years she had never known of any minor

successfully obtaining a judicial bypass in that city. See Lewin, Parental Consent to Abortion:

How Enforcement Can Vary, The New York Times, May 28,1992 at Al. In Ohio, one 17° year

old had a petition denied by a judge who concluded that she had ‘‘not had enough hard knocks

in her life.’’ Id. 6For a description of the emotional trauma that may be involved in judicial bypass proceedings, see Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 441–442 and n. 29 (1990). Although bypass

procedures are required by the Constitution in order to prevent imposition by parental consent

or notification laws of a substantial obstacle in the path of a pregnant minor who wishes to have

an abortion, in at least some states ‘‘[t]he court [bypass] experience [itself] produced fear, tension, anxiety, and shame among minors, causing some who were mature, and some whose best

interests would have been served by an abortion, to ‘forego the bypass option and either notify

their parents or carry to term.’ ’’ Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 441–442 (quoting the unchallenged finding of the district court). Indeed, rather than undergo the judicial bypass process, some girls

have apparently been driven to obtain unlawful abortions, which has led to death of at least

one 17 year old, Becky Bell. See Lewin, supra note 5. 7 Nor does this law even purport to be justified as a reflection of Congress’s own vision of what

would best protect the pregnant minor. This law does not impose a federal parental involvement

standard either nationwide or, assuming it would be constitutionally permissible, upon all pregnant minors engaged in interstate travel for purposes of having an abortion. For Congress to

decide to apply its parental involvement regime only when minors travel from more restrictive

to less restrictive states, and for it to do so without itself determining what level of parental

involvement is appropriate—as is the case with H.R. 476—is incompatible with either a protection-of-minors purpose or a federalism-promoting purpose.

terror at a judicial proceeding held to discuss her pregnancy and personal circumstances 6—means that government’s power to burden that choice is severely restricted. As Justice Powell wrote over two decades ago:

The pregnant minor’s options are much different from those facing a minor in

other situations, such as deciding whether to marry. . . . A pregnant adolescent

. . . cannot preserve for long the possibility of aborting, which effectively expires in a matter of weeks from the onset of pregnancy.

Moreover, the potentially severe detriment facing a pregnant woman is not mitigated by her minority. Indeed, considering her probable education, employment

skills, financial resources, and emotional maturity, unwanted motherhood may be

exceptionally burdensome for a minor. In addition, the fact of having a child brings

with it adult legal responsibility, for parenthood, like attainment of the age of majority, is one of the traditional criteria for the termination of the legal disabilities

of minority. In sum, there are few situations in which denying a minor the right

to make an important decision will have consequences so grave and indelible.

Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti II), 443 U.S. 622, 642 (1979) (plurality opinion) (citations

omitted).

Second, the fact that the penalties on travel out of state by minors who do not

first seek parental consent or judicial bypass are triggered only by intent to obtain

a lawful abortion and only if the minor’s home state has more stringent ‘‘minor protection’’ provisions in the form of parental involvement rules than the state of destination, renders any protection-of-minors exception to the basic rule of federalism

unavailable.

To begin with, the proposed law, unlike one that evenhandedly defers to each

state’s determination of what will best protect the emotional health and physical

safety of its pregnant minors who seek to terminate their pregnancies, simply defers

to states with strict parental control laws and subordinates the interests of states

that have decided that legally-mandated consent or notification is not a sound

means of protecting pregnant minors. The law does not purport to impose a uniform

nationwide requirement that all pregnant young women should be subject to the

abortion laws of their home states and only those abortion laws wherever they may

travel. Thus, under H.R. 476, a pregnant minor whose parents believe that it would

be both destructive and profoundly disrespectful to their mature, sexually active

daughter to require her by law to obtain their consent before having an abortion,

and who live in a state whose laws reflect that view, would, despite the judgment

expressed in the laws of her home state, still be required to obtain parental consent

should she seek an abortion in a neighboring state with a stricter parental involvement law—something she might do, for example, because that is where the nearest

abortion provider is located. This substantively slanted way in which H.R. 476

would operate fatally undermines any argument that might otherwise be available

that principles of federalism must give way because this law seeks to ensure that

the health and safety of pregnant minors are protected in the way their home states

have decided would be best.7

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8We have not raised any objection that H.R. 476 would exceed Congress’s affirmative Commerce Clause authority under Lopez v. United States, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). We do not believe

such an objection would be well-taken. Of course, to the extent an affirmatively authorized federal requirement of parental involvement in interstate surgical trips would unduly burden the

abortion rights of minors, it would be unconstitutional.

In addition, the proposed law, again unlike one protecting parental involvement

generally, selectively targets one form of control: control with respect to the constitutionally protected procedure of terminating a pregnancy before viability. The

proposed law does not do a thing for parental control if the minor is being assisted

into another state (or, where the relevant regulation is local, into another city or

county) for the purpose of obtaining a tattoo, or endoscopic surgery to correct a foot

problem, or laser surgery for an eye defect. The law is activated only when the medical procedure being obtained in another state is the termination of a pregnancy.

It is as though Congress proposed to assist parents in controlling their children

when, and only when, those children wish to buy constitutionally protected but sexually explicit books about methods of birth control and abortion in states where the

sale of such books to these minors is entirely lawful.

The basic constitutional principle that such laws overlook is that the greater

power does not necessarily include the lesser. Thus, for example, even though socalled ‘‘fighting words’’ may be banned altogether despite the First Amendment, it

is unconstitutional, the Supreme Court held in 1992, for government selectively to

ban those fighting words that are racist or anti-semitic in character. See R.A. V. v.

City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391–392 (1992). To take another example, Congress

could not make it a crime to assist a minor who has had an abortion in the past

to cross a state line in order to obtain a lawful form of cosmetic surgery elsewhere

if that minor has not complied with her state’s valid parental involvement law for

such surgery. Even though Congress might enact a broader law that would cover

all the minors in the class described, it could not enact a law aimed only at those

who have had abortions. Such a law would impermissibly single out abortion for

special burdens. The proposed law does so as well. Thus, even if a law that were

properly drawn to protect minors could constitutionally displace one of the basic

rules of federalism, the proposed statute can not.8

Lastly, in oral testimony given in 1999 before the Subcommittee on the Constitution, Professor John Harrison of the University of Virginia, while conceding that ordinarily a law such as this, which purported to impose upon an individual her home

state’s laws in order to prevent her from engaging in lawful conduct in one of the

other states, would be constitutionally ‘‘doubtful,’’ argued that the constitutionality

of this law is resolved by the fact that it relates to ‘‘domestic relations,’’ a sphere

in which, according to Professor Harrison, ‘‘the state with the primary jurisdiction

over the rights and responsibilities of parties to the domestic relations is the state

of residence . . . and not the state where the conduct’’ at issue occurs. See transcript of the Hearing of the Constitution Subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee on the Child Custody Protection Act, May 27,1999.

This ‘‘domestic relations exception’’ to principles of federalism described by Professor Harrison, however, does not exist, at least not in any context relevant to the

constitutionality of H.R. 476. To be sure, acting pursuant to Article IV, § 1, Congress

has prescribed special state obligations to accord full faith and credit to judgments

in the domestic relations context—for example, to child custody determinations and

child support orders. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1738A, 1738B. These provisions also establish

choice of law principles governing modification of domestic relations orders. In addition, in a controversial provision whose constitutionality is open to question, Congress has said that states are not required to accord full faith and credit to samesex marriages. Id. at § 1738C.

But the special measures adopted by Congress in the domestic relations context

can provide no justification for H.R. 476. There is a world of difference between provisions like §§ 1738A and 1738B, which prescribe the full faith and credit to which

state judicial decrees and judgments are entitled, and proposed H.R. 476, which in

effect gives state statutes extraterritorial operation—by purporting to impose criminal liability for interstate travel undertaken to engage in conduct lawful within the

territorial jurisdiction of the state in which the conduct is to occur, based solely

upon the laws in effect in the state of residence of the individual who seeks to travel

to a state where she can engage in that conduct lawfully.

The Supreme Court has always differentiated ‘‘the credit owed to laws (legislative

measures and common law) and to judgments.’’ Baker v. General Motors Corp., 522

U.S. 222, 232 (1998). For example, while a state may not decline on public policy

grounds to give full faith and credit to a judicial judgment from another state, see,

e.g., Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 237 (1908), a forum state has always been

42

free to consider its own public policies in declining to follow the legislative enactments of other states. See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 421–24 (1979). In short,

under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, a state has never been compelled ‘‘to substitute the statutes of other states for its own statutes dealing with a subject matter

concerning which it is competent to legislate.’’ Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comn’n, 306 U.S. 493, 501 (1939). In fact, the Full Faith and Credit

Clause was meant to prevent ‘‘parochial entrenchment on the interests of other

States.’’ Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 272 (1980) (plurality

opinion). A state is under no obligation to enforce another state’s statute with which

it disagrees.

But H.R. 476 would run afoul of that principle. It imposes the restrictive laws of

a woman’s home state wherever she travels, in derogation of the usual rules regarding choice of law and full faith and credit.

Mr. NADLER. I would like to read a couple of sentences from that

memo and ask Professor Harrison to comment on them.

The federalism principle we have described operates routinely in

our national life and is so commonplace that it is taken for granted.

For example, neither Virginia nor Congress could prohibit residents

of Virginia, where casino gambling is illegal, from traveling interstate to gamble in a casino in Nevada. People who like to hunt cannot be prohibited from travelling to States where hunting is legal

in order to avail themselves of those pro-hunting laws just because

such hunting may be illegal in their own States.

In the recent case of Saenz v. Roe, 2 years ago, the Supreme

Court held that, even with congressional approval, the State of

California was powerless to carve out an exception to its otherwiseapplicable legal regime by providing recently arrived residents with

only the welfare benefits they would have been entitled to receive

under the laws of their former States. This attempt to saddle these

interstate travellers with the laws of their former home States was

held to impose an unconstitutional penalty upon their right to

interstate travel, which the Court has held is guaranteed them by

the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the 14th amendment.

Quote, by virtue of a State person’s private citizenship, a citizen

of one State who travels to other States, intending to return home

at the end of the journey, is entitled to enjoy the privileges and immunities of States of citizens in the several States that he visits.

This provision removes from the citizens of each State the disabilities of alienage in other States. These are quotes from that decision.

It provides important protections for nonresidents who enter a

State whether to obtain employment, to procure medical services or

even to engage in commercial shrimp fishing. That is the end of

that quote.

Indeed, finally, the case of Doe v. Bolton, Supreme Court, specifically held that, under article IV of the Constitution, a State may

not restrict nonresidents to obtain abortions on the same terms and

conditions under which they are made available by law to State

residents; protects persons seeking medical services available

there.

And it is obvious that if it is legal for them to do that, it is just

as legal for anyone to accompany them to help them to do that.

Can you comment on how this bill could possibly be constitutional?

43

Mr. HARRISON. Quite briefly, the answer with respect to the right

to travel is that we are dealing with minors whose general control

over their own—— Mr. NADLER. Excuse me. The Court has held—and I will get to

the quote in a moment if you want—that a minor’s constitutional

rights are exactly the same, especially with respect to the right to

travel, as a nonminor.

Mr. HARRISON. They have said that minors do not lack all constitutional rights. They have not said as a general matter, I don’t

believe, that minors have every right that an adult has. That, for

example, a 6-year-old has a right to decide where to reside. I think

that the custodial authority of a parent generally extends to deciding where to reside.

Mr. NADLER. Do you think we can pass a law that says that a

minor cannot cross the State line against the wish of a parent?

Mr. HARRISON. Quite possibly.

Mr. NADLER. Could you criminalize that?

Mr. HARRISON. For example, could Congress make it a crime for

someone to transport a minor across the State line to consume alcohol?

Mr. NADLER. If it were legal—— Mr. HARRISON. Yes. To go to a place—— Mr. NADLER. That is exactly—excuse me. There is no point in

asking that question. That is exactly the same bill as this one. It

is exactly the same question. And I would suggest the answer is

no.

Mr. HARRISON. I think it is yes precisely because of parental authority with respect to minors.

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman’s time has expired. The gentleman

from Indiana is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. HOSTETTLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I find it interesting that those who espouse the idea of the separation of church and State would have an Episcopal priest come

and testify before us on this issue. But that notwithstanding and

given the fact that in your testimony, Reverend Ragsdale, you say

it is primarily as a parish priest that I am here today, I will ask

you some questions. Could you quote me book, chapter and verse

in the Bible that supports your stance?

Rev. RAGSDALE. No, nor could you quote one that opposes my

stance. The Bible does not consider American constitutional law or

abortion. And certainly it doesn’t speak about parental consent and

notification, unless you would like to consider Jesus in the temple

at 12 years old without his parents’ consent talking with the rabbis

and worrying them half to death. However, it doesn’t say whether

that should be legislated.

Mr. HOSTETTLER. Let me respond to you. You don’t care either,

because in your own testimony it says, ‘‘and if helping young

woman like her should be made illegal I will, nonetheless, continue

to do it.’’ I am not talking about constitutional law. I am talking

about the higher authority that I believe that you are invoking by

saying you will disregard Federal law and do whatever it is you

feel led to do.

Rev. RAGSDALE. It is not a matter of what I feel led to do. It is

what I have vowed. I vowed obedience to my church, and I have

44

vowed obedience to God. Consequently, if this is criminalized, I will

have no alternative but to be a criminal—— Mr. HOSTETTLER. Let me tell you what David says about it.

Rev. RAGSDALE. David whom?

Mr. HOSTETTLER. He was King of Israel at one time.

I will praise thee—in Psalm 139:14, I will praise thee for I am

fearfully and wonderfully made. Marvelous are thy works and that

my soul knowest right well. My substance was not hid from thee

when I was made in secret and curiously wrought in the lowest

parts of the earth. Thine eyes did see my substance yet being

unperfect and in thine book, all my members were written, which

in continuance were fashioned when as yet, there was none of

them.

And I will get to another discussion.

Rev. RAGSDALE. I understand that you are using this to suggest

that abortion should not be legal, which I don’t think is the question at hand here. But I would also say that Psalms doesn’t discuss

abortion any more than we should assume from that verse that babies are formed in the bowels of the earth and magically transported into their mother’s wombs, which is what a literal interpretation of that Psalm would have us believe. It is not about gestation or abortion. It is about the magnificence of God.

Mr. HOSTETTLER. Jeremiah 1:4–5. And the word of the Lord

came unto me saying, before I formed thee in the belly, I knew

thee. And before thou camest forth out of the womb, I sanctify thee

and I ordain thee a prophet into the nations.

And then—— Rev. RAGSDALE. Congressman, I am real familiar with the text.

You could—— Mr. HOSTETTLER. Well, you didn’t know who David was.

Rev. RAGSDALE. There are a lot of them. I didn’t know which one

you referred to. You didn’t say the Bible. Perhaps you could go directly to your question.

Mr. HOSTETTLER. Let me just say one more, and I will get back

to the point that you made in your testimony.

Luke 1:39–42, where it says, and Mary rose in those days and

went to the hill country with haste into a City of Judah and entered into the house of Zachariah and saluted Elizabeth. And it

came to pass that when Elizabeth heard the salutation of Mary,

the babe leaped in her womb and Elizabeth was filled with the

Holy Ghost. And she spoke out with a loud voice and said, blessed

art thou among women and blessed is the fruit of thy womb.

Now, in your testimony, you speak about the will of God and that

not everything happens by the will of God, and I talked to her

about the limits of personal responsibility, about how not everything that happens to her is her own fault or God’s will and about

how much God loves her.

Now was it in God’s will, in your opinion, after hearing those

verses, for her to have an abortion? Because that is what we are

talking about. Because you are exactly right in your point. Was it

in your opinion God’s will for her to have an abortion or was it

David—was there a David, former King of Israel or a Jeremiah or

maybe even a Jesus Christ that you were in the process of assisting a young woman into destroying? Did you know for a fact that,

45

for example, it was God’s will and that God had not wrought that

child within that young woman’s womb to be someone special, to

be someone extra special in that case?

Rev. RAGSDALE. Congressman, you are arguing against abortion,

which is a different issue.

Mr. HOSTETTLER. Hey, please believe me. I am a Congressman.

I know exactly what the issue is we are talking about. We are talking about transporting people not to have a drink but to have an

abortion.

You say you are here as a parish priest. That is fine. I appreciate

that. I am asking you, as a priest—and you are talking about God’s

will in your testimony. I didn’t bring up God’s will in the testimony. You brought it up. So I am simply asking you, did you feel

it was God’s will——

Rev. RAGSDALE. As a priest and a professional theologian who

has spent years and years studying those texts in the Hebrew and

the Greek and the history of scholarship of them, I am aware that

we can’t translate them literally and that none of us are capable

ever of knowing in the moment with certainty what God’s will is.

What we do is struggle with faith and trust God to be with us in

the struggle, make the best decisions we can and trust that, right

or wrong, God will be with us through them.

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman’s time has expired.

Mr. HOSTETTLER. Mr. Chairman, I want to ask one more question.

Mr. CHABOT. Unanimous consent. The gentleman has 1 minute.

Mr. HOSTETTLER. Did you accommodate the young woman’s reporting of the rape to the authorities?

Reverend RAGSDALE. It was a date rape.

Mr. HOSTETTLER. It was rape. I mean, my understanding is——

Reverend RAGSDALE. The precise description was a date rape

that would have been very, very difficult to prosecute and something she was not prepared to do.

Mr. HOSTETTLER. So I guess the question is no, you did not accommodate her in reporting rape?

Reverend RAGSDALE. She was in a sexual act with another minor

who did not beat her up and to whom she did not kick, scream, or

yell no. She just kept telling him she was not interested. That traditionally is not a case that would stand up in to prosecution.

Clearly, she was forced against her will, but it wouldn’t stand up

to prosecution. And, no, I didn’t decide to put her on trial make her

a test case when she had enough going on in her life.

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman’s time has expired. We appreciate

that last point the gentleman made.

The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Scott, is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Professor Harrison, let me

ask a couple of questions. As I understand the bill, if the minor

drives herself, transports herself, nobody else in the car, to get an

abortion across State lines, there is, in fact, no violation of this Act,

is that correct?

Mr. HARRISON. I believe that there is—you have in mind subsection B-2, is that——

46

Mr. SCOTT. No. The whole thing. I mean, the whole thing is

about somebody transporting. It says except whoever knowingly

transports an individual who has not attained the age of 18. If the

person under 18 transports herself, there is no violation of the bill,

is that right?

Mr. HARRISON. I confess, I hadn’t thought about that, Mr. Scott.

Because the question would be if you transport yourself, does

that——

Mr. SCOTT. Then you go down a little later that there is an exception, the person getting the abortion can’t be prosecuted.

Mr. HARRISON. That is why I went to B-2. That was the point.

Mr. SCOTT. So that if the child goes alone, there is no violation

of the act. You can skip past all the parental content laws you

want so long as you go alone. Is that right?

Mr. HARRISON. If that is what subsection B-2 means, that is

right.

Mr. SCOTT. I think that is what the bill means. I was a little confused with your exchange with the gentleman from New York.

Could we pass a bill that prohibits people traveling, transporting

people from Virginia where casino gambling is not legal to Atlantic

City? Could Congress pass such a law and withstand constitutional

challenge?

Mr. HARRISON. Quite possibly not. I don’t want to be too strong

about that, Mr. Scott. I doubt it. But I do want to make——

Mr. SCOTT. Without regard to the policy.

Mr. HARRISON. I know. I am not talking about policy with respect

to anything here. I do want to say that the Supreme Court’s cases

on the right to travel are few. They are generally about actions by

the States, for example Saenz v. Roe is about the States, Crandall

v. Nevada is about the State. So limitations on Congress’s power

are much less understood. I think—I am not disagreeing with you,

I am just saying——

Mr. SCOTT. How is this bill different from that question?

Mr. HARRISON. Again, the crucial point with respect to this bill

is that it involves minors who are on—the whole point——

Mr. SCOTT. Do we pass a law prohibiting minors leaving Virginia

to go gamble in Atlantic City?

Mr. HARRISON. Without the consent of their parents, quite possibly, yes. One of the things of the existence of parental notification

and consent requirements and their constitutionality with respect

to abortion demonstrates is that the legal treatment of minors, the

legal treatment of people who are——

Mr. SCOTT. So if a bus company had one of these tours to Atlantic City from Virginia, it would be possible to prohibit such an act,

you would be able to prohibit that.

Let me ask another question. There is another question I am trying to get in. If a child arrives at a doctor’s office in the State without the parental content laws, having left a State with the parental

consent laws, if the doctor knows she got there by herself, there

would be no violation, he could proceed with the abortion without

any jeopardy; is that right?

Mr. HARRISON. Again, assuming what we are assuming about

subsection B-2, yeah.

47

Mr. SCOTT. Is a cab driver in jeopardy by giving someone a taxicab ride from Virginia to an abortion clinic in Washington D.C.?

Mr. HARRISON. I certainly don’t think so. I think it would be very

unusual for the cab driver or the bus driver to have the intent that

the minor receive an abortion. The cab driver or bus driver’s intent

is just to get the person where they are going.

Mr. NADLER. Would the gentleman yield for a moment? What if

the minor, in the course of the cab ride, told the cab driver why

she was going to Washington. Would he then be liable under this

statute?

Mr. HARRISON. I don’t think so. Because again, I wouldn’t describe it as being part of the cab driver’s intent and one——

Mr. NADLER. It is now part of his intent since he now knows why

she is going.

Mr. HARRISON. No. Knowledge isn’t intent. It doesn’t matter to

the cab driver. Is the cab driver’s reason for taking her across the

border to get the—no, the cab drivers reason is to get the fare. The

cab driver doesn’t care whether she is trying to get an abortion or

not.

Mr. SCOTT. After the parents find out that the cab driver picked

her up in Virginia and took her directly to an abortion clinic in

Washington D.C., and found out that, in the course of the trip,

found out exactly why she was going, can the parents sue the cab

driver?

Mr. HARRISON. I don’t think so.

Mr. SCOTT. Why not?

Mr. HARRISON. It is the minor’s intent to get the abortion, it is

not the cab driver’s.

Mr. SCOTT. How is that different from the next door neighbor

taking the child to the abortion clinic?

Mr. HARRISON. Because the reason the next door neighbor did it,

or hypothetically, the reason the next door neighbor does it is in

order to get the abortion. That matters to the next door neighbor.

It is a cause of the next door neighbor’s action, it is not a cause

of the cab driver’s action.

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman’s time has expired. If he needs an

additional minute.

Mr. SCOTT. I will yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman from New York is recognized for 1

minute.

Mr. NADLER. Let’s assume the fact that the next door neighbor

is motivated by the fact the minor paid her to accompany her

across the State line for the purpose of getting the abortion. She

is now just as not liable as the cab driver? Her motive now is to

get paid.

Mr. HARRISON. If that is—yeah, I don’t think you would say

under those circumstances that the person who did the transporting had the intent that the minor——

Mr. NADLER. In order to get around this statute, if it is ever

passed, all you have to do is provide that the minors are told by

the abortion clinics make sure you give her a dollar to pay her to

accompany you across the State line. That is okay.

48

Mr. HARRISON. I don’t think so, because it is possible to have

more than one intent. We are talking about the situation—the cab

driver, as far as—— Mr. NADLER. Let’s assume it is $50. Not a nominal amount. In

other words, this bill is entirely ineffectual as long as the person

accompanying the minor across the State line is motivated by the

fact that she is being paid to do. So we are going to set up a commercial operation to do that and that would be fine under this bill.

Mr. HARRISON. Again, I don’t think so.

Mr. NADLER. Why not?

Mr. HARRISON. Because the cases I have been, like the cab driver

and the bus driver, are those in which the only motivation for the

cab driver or the bus driver is to get the fare.

Mr. NADLER. Let’s assume the only motivation of the people—we

are now saying we are going to have people, we are going to pay

somebody—we are going to go to local unemployment line and offer

people $100 a piece to accompany minors across State lines to abortion clinics. Under this, if the cab driver is not liable under the bill,

how could that person be liable?

Mr. HARRISON. Probably not if that individual doesn’t have the

intent that the abortion take place, if it doesn’t matter to that individual.

Mr. NADLER. Could you make this bill entirely ineffectual simply

by paying people, by paying people to run a courier service rather

than having trusted friends do it?

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman’s time has expired. If you want to

answer the question. We have gotten into so many hypotheticals

here.

Mr. NADLER. Constitutionally, you would have to be able to do

that.

Mr. HARRISON. We have haven’t been talking about that. We

have been talking about what the coverage of the bill is.

Mr. NADLER. No. No. No. What I am saying is, as you said, the

cab driver, and the bus driver would not be liable and Constitutionally, you probably couldn’t make them liable. Forget the Constitutional issue.

Mr. HARRISON. I didn’t say that.

Mr. NADLER. But they are not liable under the terms of this bill

because they have no intent. They don’t care why she is going, they

are just being paid a fare. So if that is the case, then you could

evade the bill. Someone who wanted to could evade the bill simply

by setting up—soliciting contributions, we are going to get $50,000

for the purpose of paying people who will be motivated solely by

the cash to accompany minors who want such assistance to go to

abortion clinics in States which permit them without parental consent from States which don’t. Then this bill would be evaded, correct?

Mr. HARRISON. I don’t want to unduly occupy the Subcommittee’s

time, but it seems to me in that situation, the person who raised

the $50,000 would, in a meaningful sense, be doing the transporting, paying for it and they would have the intent. But again,

we are into deep hypothetical.

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman’s time has expired. The Chairman

would just note that every law that Congress has ever passed is

49

subject to hypotheticals that could be thrown up in and to make

that law look like it is unnecessary to be passed. That is why we

have courts that ultimately determine these situations when they

come up.

Mr. NADLER. Mr. Chairman, since the Chairman commented, I

would like to comment. Certainly people think of ways to evade

laws. Nonetheless one of the things we in Congress do, or ought to

do, is consider whether there are easy ways to evade laws that we

are considering passing, and if there are, either you do something

about that or maybe you think that your law is ineffective and you

shouldn’t pass it.

Mr. CHABOT. I want to thank the witnesses for their testimony

here this morning. It was mentioned that we have had this hearing

before and some of these witnesses have already testified. I would

just personally say that I thought they all did a very good job. This

was a very informative hearing, I think, for all the Members here.

Those Members that were not here hopefully will read the testimony so that they can get up to speed on this. I want to thank all

the witnesses for coming at this time.

Mr. NADLER. Mr. Chairman, before we adjourn. Mr. Chairman I

ask unanimous consent that all Members be permitted to submit

additional testimony and other materials for the record.

Mr. CHABOT. Without objection.

Mr. NADLER. I would like to ask you a couple questions if I may.

Could you give the minority some indication of the majority’s intention with respect to the schedule in this legislation? Does the majority intend to have a Subcommittee markup and could you give

us some indication of when this might be, and does the Chairman

have any indication where the full Committee Chairman plans further action on this legislation? And if so, when that might be?

Mr. CHABOT. The Chairman will speak to the Chairman of the

full Committee, Chairman Sensenbrenner, and provide that information as soon as it is available.

Mr. NADLER. What about a Subcommittee markup? Do we have

any intention of that?

Mr. CHABOT. Same answer. We will look at that and talk to the

Chairman and get back to you just as quickly as possible.

Mr. NADLER. Thank you.

Mr. CHABOT. We are adjourned. Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 11:13 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

(51)

A P P E N D I X

STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF BILL AND KAREN BELL

We appreciate the opportunity to address this committee concerning the legislation that is being considered in Congress, the ‘‘Teen Endangerment Act.’’ This legislation would make it a federal crime to transport a minor across state lines for the

purpose of accessing an abortion.

Because of our daughter Becky’s death from an illegal abortion, we have traveled

the country speaking about teen pregnancy, abortion and parental involvement

laws. We feel we can speak to these issues and laws with some knowledge and authority.

September of this year marks the 12th anniversary of our Becky’s death.

Do you remember when you were sixteen and fell in love for the first time? I remember when my daughter Becky was 16. She was our sunshine. She had the

kindest heart and loved old people, animals and babies.

In 1988, our beautiful, vibrant, 17-year-old daughter Becky died suddenly, after

a six-day illness. The pathologist who directed her autopsy concluded that the cause

of her death was streptococcus pneumonia, brought about by an illegal abortion.

Learning this, we finally understood our daughter’s last words. In the hospital, she

had taken off her oxygen mask and said, ‘‘Mom, Dad, I love you. Forgive me.’’ How could this have happened? Why would Becky have risked an illegal abortion?

How could parents as close to their daughter as we had always been not have

known that she was pregnant and desperate to deal with a situation that she believed she couldn’t share with us?

We learned the sad answers to these questions in the weeks following our daughter’s death. Becky had told her girlfriends that she believed we would be terribly

hurt and disappointed in her if she told us about her pregnancy. Like a lot of young

people, she was not comfortable sharing intimate details of her developing sexuality

with her parents.

Becky discovered that our state has a parental consent law, which requires girls

under the age of 18 to get their parent’s permission before they can get an abortion.

A Planned Parenthood counselor told her that she could apply for a judicial bypass

as an alternative to parental consent. The counselor remembered Becky’s response: ‘‘If I can’t talk to my parents, how can I tell a judge who doesn’t even know me?’’ We now know that in over ten years on the bench, the judge in our district has

never issued a waiver to a teen for an abortion.

Desperate to avoid telling us about her pregnancy, and therefore unable to go to

a reputable medical establishment, where abortions are performed compassionately

and safely every day, Becky found someone operating outside the law who would

help her. Becky had a back alley abortion. Indiana’s parental involvement law ultimately led our daughter to her death.

Studies have established that the majority of teenagers (60–70%) do talk to their

parents when they become pregnant. Of those who don’t, about one-third are at risk

of physical or emotional abuse. The rest, like Becky, believe for myriad reasons that

this is a problem they must face without their parents. Yes, we want very much

for our daughters to involve us, but once they make the decision, this law being considered will not force these young women to involve their parents. Are we willing

to sacrifice any of our young women so that the proponents of these laws can have

their way?

Parental involvement laws further isolate girls, who feel it is impossible to turn

to their parents, forcing them to instead make decisions and arrangements on their

own.

All parents would want to know if their child was in a situation like Becky’s. In

fact, we would have supported the law in our state before we experienced the loss

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of our daughter. We have been forced to learn in the most painful way imaginable

that laws cannot create family communication. We would rather have not known

that our daughter had had an abortion, if it meant that she could have obtained

the best of care, and come back home safely to us.

Many of you have daughters and granddaughters, and we are sure that you would

want to be involved in any issues relating to their health and well-being—just as

we did. Yet, the law in Indiana did not force Becky to involve us at her most desperate time.

As much as we would have wanted to help Becky through this crisis, the law did

not succeed in forcing her to talk to us about issues she found too upsetting to share

with us. For the sake of other parents’ daughters, we urge legislators who are considering this very dangerous bill to remember Becky Bell, and to pass no laws that

will increase the chances that even one desperate girl will feel that her only choice

is an illegal abortion.

We speak out against this dangerous legislation because of our granddaughter.

Someday she will be 17. We realized we’d do everything possible to ensure that she

will have options her aunt Becky did not.

The law in Indiana did not make Becky come to us. Will these laws be any different?

Thank you.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROSEMARY J. DEMPSEY

I offer this testimony in opposition to the Child Custody Protection Act (CCPA)

as Director of the Washington, D.C. office of the Center for Reproductive Law & Policy (CRLP), a legal advocacy organization dedicated to protecting and defending

women’s reproductive rights both in the United States and internationally. Since

1992, CRLP attorneys have represented millions of women and health care providers, at every level of the state and federal court systems, whose access to safe

abortion is threatened by this bill. CRLP is committed to defending the reproductive

rights of the most vulnerable and often disenfranchised members of society, including minor women.

CRLP has worked to block enforcement under state constitutions of onerous and

discriminatory cases in Alaska, Florida, Louisiana, Montana, Pennsylvania, and Virginia. CRLP’s President, Janet Benshoof, argued the landmark Supreme Court

forced parental involvement case of Hodgson v. Minnesota 497 U.S.417 (1990) and

CRLP lawyers were the counsel of record in the two most recent reproductive rights

cases decided by the United States Supreme Court: Ferguson v. City of Charleston,

523 U.S. 67 (2001) and Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000).

We submit as our testimony the attached briefing paper which clearly demonstrates that passage of CCPA would violate the established Constitutional principles of federalism, reproductive rights, the right to travel, and First & Fifth

Amendment protections. If enacted into law, the Act would create chaos for health

care providers, in enforcement, and for the young women and persons seeking to assist them.

Furthermore, the Act punishes adolescents by making it more difficult for them

to safely access constitutionally protected abortion services. CCPA will not protect

young women nor will it strengthen family ties. Rather, it will punish and endanger

those women who cannot discuss an unwanted pregnancy with their parents by forcing them to travel to another state alone, seek an unsafe illegal abortion, attempt

to self-abort, or carry an unwanted pregnancy to term.

We ask you to carefully read and seriously evaluate our legal analysis and reject

the Child Custody Protection Act, H.R. 476.

THE CHILD CUSTODY PROTECTION ACT (CCPA):

CREATING CHAOS AND PUNISHING ADOLESCENTS

Overview

The Child Custody Protection Act (CCPA) would make it a crime for any person,

other than a parent, to knowingly transport a woman under the age of 18 across

a state line to obtain an abortion if the minor does not comply with the requirements of the forced parental involvement law of her state of residence. An indiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:04 Oct 12, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00056 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 G:\WORK\CONST\090601\75018.000 HJUD2 PsN: HJUD2
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vidual who assists a young woman in violation of this proposed measure faces both

civil and criminal liability, including imprisonment for up to one year, fines of up

to $100,000, or both. The bill would also allow parents to bring civil suits against

anyone assisting the young woman. Prosecution may be avoided only if the abortion

is necessary to save the life of the minor because of a physical disorder, physical

injury, or physical illness.

CCPA discriminates amongst state laws: not every state’s parental involvement

law will follow a minor from her state of residence to the state where she obtains

an abortion. The bill’s requirements apply to only those ‘‘parental involvement laws’’ as defined by CCPA. CCPA defines ‘‘parental involvement laws’’ as a law ‘‘requiring,

before an abortion is performed on a minor, either (i) the notification to, or consent

of, a parent of that minor; or (ii) proceedings in a State court’’ waiving the requirement. CCPA’s definition of ‘‘parental involvement laws’’ explicitly excludes state

laws that permit, as an alternative, notification to or consent of any other person,

such as a grandparent or aunt. Therefore, under CCPA, the requirements of ‘‘strict’’ parental involvement laws—those that match the CCPA definition—will be imposed

on minors traveling out-of-state with companions and abortion providers in those

states. However, CCPA will not impose the requirements of a state law that is

‘‘broader’’ than the CCPA definition—such as a law that allows a grandparent to

consent to the minor’s abortion—on accompanied minors or providers in other

states.

CCPA alters the general principles that the laws of one state are not enforceable

in another state and that people are required to comply with the laws of the state

in which they are located but not the laws of any other state. CCPA would make

minors seeking out-of-state abortions who are accompanied by non-parents (i.e.

trusted relatives or friends) subject to the laws of the state in which she seeks an

abortion and the laws of her state of residence. Although the minor herself is exempt from prosecution under CCPA, she must comply with both states’ laws or risk

federal criminal prosecutions of her companion as well as the abortion provider. Minors’ fears of prosecution of those who help them may lead them to travel out-ofstate alone, the only certain way to avoid all risk of prosecution. In the alternative,

minors may seek illegal abortions in their own state, attempt to self-abort or carry

unwanted pregnancies to term. CCPA is an extreme and intrusive attempt to prohibit young women from obtaining safe and legal abortions.

The deceptively titled ‘‘Child Custody Protection Act’’ would:

• Violate Established Constitutional Principles of reproductive rights, federalism, the right to travel, the First Amendment and the Equal Protection

prong of the Fifth Amendment

• Create Chaos for health care providers, in enforcement, and for the young

women and persons seeking to assist these women by forcing them to negotiate a maze of state laws

• Punish Adolescents by endangering young women who are afraid or unable

to discuss their unwanted pregnancies with their parents, potentially forcing

them to travel alone to another state or even to seek an illegal abortion

I. VIOLATING THE CONSTITUTION

CCPA’s radical attempt to limit young women’s access to abortion would come at

the expense of the right to reproductive choice established in Roe v. Wade and numerous other established constitutional principles.

The Child Custody Protection Act would unconstitutionally:

• violate principles of federalism

• burden young women’s access to abortion

• endanger young women due to its lack of a health exception and an adequate

life exception

• hinder the right to travel recognized under the Privileges and Immunities

Clause

• compromise the First Amendment right to associate

• infringe upon the Equal Protection prong of the Fifth Amendment

Violating Principles of Federalism

CCPA would violate fundamental principles of federalism and state sovereignty.

A core principle of American federalism is that laws of a state apply only within

the state’s boundaries. CCPA would require some people to carry their own state’s

laws with them when traveling within the United States. Under CCPA, a minor

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crossing state lines with a trusted relative or friend would not only be subject to

the parental involvement law of the state she has entered, but would be subject to

the parental involvement law of her home state, if her home state’s law is as strict

as the CCPA definition.

Allowing a state’s laws to extend beyond its borders runs completely contrary to

the state sovereignty principles on which this country is founded. For example, gambling is legal in the state of Nevada, but not in California. Residents of Nevada are

prohibited from gambling while in California, while residents of California are permitted to gamble while in Nevada. Forcing California citizens to carry their home

state’s law into Nevada, thereby prohibiting them from gambling while in Nevada,

would be inconsistent with federalism principles. In addition, requiring Nevada officials to monitor California residents and enforce California law within Nevada’s borders would be nonsensical. Enforcing different states’ laws within a state’s borders

would be even more ludicrous in the case of abortion—a constitutionally protected

right—then it would be in the case of casino gambling, which is not a constitutionally protected activity.

Twenty-seven states and the District of Columbia either have parental involvement laws that do not meet the ‘‘strict’’ definition in CCPA, have parental involvement laws which are not enforced in their state, or have not enacted a parental involvement law. (See State Chart). These laws regarding abortion and minors are

treated as second-class laws by CCPA. Within those twenty-seven states and the

District, CCPA would impose the requirements of other states, whose laws come

within CCPA’s definition of parental involvement, on non-resident minors accompanied by a non-parent. Thus, CCPA would displace the laws of those states and

the District, representing approximately 58% of the U.S. population, with the laws

of the other twenty-three states, representing just 42% of the population. Health

care providers would be forced to comply, within their own state’s borders, with laws

that their own state has not adopted and, in some cases, has explicitly rejected. This

is an unprecedented Congressional intrusion into what should be an area of state

prerogative.

Proponents of CCPA advocate its adoption as a means to promote federalism.

However, the explicit aim of CCPA is to supplant the laws of a majority of states

with those of a Congressionally-preferred minority. In effect, CCPA would make

those state laws that Congress prefers (those requiring ‘‘strict’’ parental involvement) controlling in states with laws that they do not like (those with broader or

no parental involvement requirements). This is an unprecedented Congressional intrusion into what has traditionally been an arena in which each state regulates its

own citizens.

Burdening Young Women’s Access to Abortion

CCPA would unduly burden access to abortion for young women who travel across

state lines to obtain services and who choose not to involve their parents. In 1973,

the U.S. Supreme Court recognized a constitutional right to choose whether or not

to have an abortion in the landmark decision Roe v. Wade. The Court reaffirmed

the right to choose in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,

holding that restrictions on this right are unconstitutional if they impose an ‘‘undue

burden’’ on a woman’s access to abortion. The right extends to both minors and

adults, but the Supreme Court has permitted individual states to restrict the ability

of young women to obtain abortions within that state’s borders.

The United States Supreme Court has ruled that states may require parental consent or notification before a minor obtains an abortion in that state, provided the

law also provides an ‘‘alternative’’ to parental involvement, such as a judicial bypass

procedure, by which a young woman can obtain an abortion without involving a parent. To obtain a judicial bypass, a young woman must appear before a judge and

prove either that she is mature enough to decide whether to have an abortion or

that an abortion would be in her best interests.

Thirty-three states enforce parental involvement laws. These laws vary in their

requirements, but, absent CCPA, they apply only to minors receiving an abortion

within the state. Twenty-three of these states have ‘‘strict’’ laws that fit CCPA’s restrictive definition of a ‘‘parental involvement law.’’ Nine states have parental involvement laws that are ‘‘broader’’ than the definition in CCPA, in that they do not

limit the notification or consent requirement to a parent exclusively, but allow involvement of some other adult, such as a grandparent or other relative, clergy member, or counselor. One state has requirements that are more restrictive than, but

do not match, the CCPA definition. Of the remaining seventeen states, ten have enacted parental involvement laws, which are not enforced within the state due to

court rulings or Attorney General opinions; seven states and the District of Columbia have not enacted forced parental involvement laws. (See State Chart).

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Under current law, a minor must always meet the requirements of the state in

which she is receiving an abortion. Under CCPA, a minor from one of the twentythree states that has a forced ‘‘parental involvement law,’’ as defined by CCPA,

would carry her home state’s law with her when she travels across state lines with

a trusted relative or friend to receive an abortion. She would therefore have to meet

the requirements of both her home state and the state in which she receives the

abortion. If the minor does not comply with her home state’s requirements in the

state to which she traveled, the person who assists the minor would face liability,

as would the medical professionals who provide the health services. Every minor

from a state with a ‘‘strict’’ parental involvement law will be faced with a choice:

overcome the extra obstacles created by CCPA or travel alone out of state.

In order to protect a supportive non-parent who is accompanying her from criminal liability, a minor would need to determine both her own state’s law and that

of the state in which she is seeking an abortion. CCPA would create an undue burden for these young women by requiring them to comply with multiple state laws.

For example, both Minnesota and Pennsylvania have ‘‘strict’’ parental involvement

laws under CCPA. Pennsylvania requires that a minor obtain the written consent

of one parent. Minnesota requires that a minor provide written notice to both parents at least forty-eight hours prior to having an abortion. A minor from Pennsylvania may choose to travel to Minnesota to receive an abortion from a provider close

to her extended family. The young woman would need to comply with both states’

forced parental involvement laws—getting the written consent of one parent and

providing written notification to the other parent—in order to protect an accompanying non-parent from liability.

If a young woman chooses to obtain a judicial bypass of the parental involvement

requirements, she will also face an undue burden under CCPA, as she may need

to go to court in two states—her home state and the state in which she seeks the

abortion. For example, a Pennsylvania resident traveling to Minnesota with a nonparent to obtain an abortion would have to obtain a judicial bypass in both states

because the minor carries Pennsylvania’s ‘‘strict’’ parental involvement law with her

wherever she goes. While going to court can be a daunting experience even for

adults, minors face additional difficulties in judicial bypass proceedings. It is frightening for many minors to disclose intimate details of her life to strangers in a formal, legal process. Some minors live in regions in which the local judges never grant

bypass petitions, or the closest court that hears the petitions is located hundreds

of miles away. Moreover, many young women find it difficult to take time off from

school or work in order to appear at a hearing. Going through this process just one

time is a burden on minors; doing it two times in two different states would place

an unconstitutional undue burden on a young woman’s access to abortion.

CCPA would also create an undue burden on minor’s access to abortion by deterring trusted relatives and friends from helping a young woman due to fear of criminal and civil liability. Even if some people were willing to take this risk, young

women seeking abortions may refrain from seeking advice and assistance for fear

of exposing family members, clergy, counselors, or other supportive friends to liability. As a result, young woman may choose to instead travel alone across state lines.

In addition to putting persons who travel with the minor at risk of liability, CCPA

places health care providers at risk, thus further unduly burden minors’ access to

abortion services. Fear of prosecution may lead some clinics, which already face harassment and a myriad of other state regulations, to refuse services to young women.

Failing to Provide a Health or an Adequate Life Exception

The Supreme Court held in Roe v. Wade, Planned Parenthood of Southeastern

Pennsylvania v. Casey, and Stenberg v. Carhart that restrictions on abortion must

contain exceptions to allow for abortions necessary to protect both the life and

health of the pregnant woman. In another ruling, Doe v. Bolton, the Court held that

factors including age, emotional state, and psychological status could be considered

in defining a woman’s well-being and health. Nonetheless, CCPA fails to provide

any health exception. Moreover, CCPA provides an inadequate life exception by failing to allow for abortion in cases of a life-threatening mental illness. The failure

to include these provisions shows an utter lack of regard for established constitutional law and seriously endangers the health and safety of young women.

Hindering the Right to Travel

CCPA would unconstitutionally regulate interstate travel between certain states,

for certain people and under certain conditions. It would make the legality of interstate travel dependent upon the traveler’s state of residency, the purpose of the travel, and the people with whom she is traveling.

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The right to travel freely between the states is a fundamental right of state citizenship, which is protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV

of the Constitution. This includes ‘‘the right to be treated as a welcome visitor rather than an unfriendly alien’’ when traveling between the states. The Supreme Court

has held that the Privileges and Immunities Clause ‘‘protect[s] persons who enter

[a state] seeking the medical services that are available there.’’ Thus, Article IV

gives constitutional protection to a minor who travels from her home state to another state to ‘‘procure medical services,’’ including, specifically, abortion services

(the subject of the Court’s 1973 decision in Doe v. Bolton). Therefore, a minor transported from, for example, Massachusetts to Maine by a friend or relative for an

abortion—as well as the person who accompanies her—has the right to be treated

as a ‘‘welcome visitor rather than an unfriendly alien.’’

Under CCPA, minors crossing state lines to seek medical services would be subjected to different treatment than minors who seek those services in their home

state. Also, minors crossing state lines to seek medical services would be treated differently depending on their state of origin: minors from states without parental involvement laws would be treated as a favored class, while minors from states with

‘‘strict’’ parental involvement laws would face special burdens. Moreover, a minor

who traveled alone into a state from a state with a ‘‘strict’’ parental involvement

law would be treated more favorably than a minor from the same state who traveled

with a non-parent: the lone minor would only need to comply with the law of the

state she entered, but the accompanied minor would have to comply with the requirements of the state she entered as well as her home state. CCPA creates a

hodgepodge of restrictions on interstate travel and results in the disparate treatment of people based on their state of residence, thereby violating the rights of citizenship recognized by the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV.

Violating the First Amendment Right to Associate

The First Amendment protects freedom of association through its explicit guarantee of the right to peaceably assemble. This protection includes the rights of individuals, including minors, to come together to advance their rights and interest. To

that end, people may ‘‘pool their resources’’ to effectuate both their right to travel

and obtain an abortion.

CCPA would directly attack this right of association by criminalizing the association between a minor and another person for the purpose of effectuating the minor’s

right to choose abortion. The right to choose abortion inevitably involves an association between the woman seeking abortion and, at a minimum, the health care provider who will perform the procedure. In some cases, the association may involve

pooling of financial resources to pay for the procedure, an association with family

and friends to make a decision and effectuate it, and an association with counselors

and spiritual leaders, amongst other associations. CCPA would single out one such

association—association between a minor and another person who accompanies her

across state lines—and criminalize it.

Infringing Upon the Equal Protection Prong of the Fifth Amendment

The Fifth Amendment prohibits Congress from depriving individuals of equal protection of the law. Equal protection case law prohibits Congress from creating a

classification that penalizes the exercise of a constitutional right, except in furtherance of a compelling interest. When such a classification is formed, it is subject to

strict scrutiny, the highest level of judicial scrutiny. Under strict scrutiny analysis,

the government has the burden of establishing that the classification is narrowly

tailored and based on the furtherance of a compelling governmental interest. CCPA

would impermissibly classify persons based on the exercise of two fundamental

rights; the constitutional right to choose abortion and the right to interstate travel,

because it is not narrowly tailored nor does it further a compelling governmental

interest.

As to the right to reproductive choice, CCPA explicitly classifies among minors

being transported across state lines as well as among those persons transporting

them: it penalizes only those persons who are assisting minors in exercising their

right to abortion. CCPA further classifies, in an arbitrary manner, among persons

assisting minors by drawing distinctions based on the minor’s state of residence.

However, persons transporting minors across state lines are not penalized by CCPA

if the minors are being transported for any of a host of purposes, including a number of other medical procedures far riskier than abortion, or, for example, to exercise

the right to marry.

Any claimed interest in effectuating state laws is implemented by CCPA in such

a discriminatory fashion that the interest itself can hardly be called compelling, or

even legitimate. In addition, even if the purpose of CCPA is to prevent minors from

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evading certain state abortion laws, and even if that interest were legitimate, CCPA

is unconstitutionally underinclusive. Because parents are exempt from liability

under CCPA, a mother living in Minnesota who drives her daughter to Iowa to

avoid Minnesota’s two-parent notice law (and the alternative judicial bypass) would

not be punishable under CCPA but any other adult who does so commits a crime.

Further, any interest in parental involvement per se is not compelling—instead, the

Supreme Court has recognized that such interests are at best substantial or significant. Were they compelling, they could completely override the minor’s right to abortion—and they cannot.

As to the right to interstate travel, CCPA also impermissibly classifies among

both minors and the persons transporting them. The minor’s state of residency determines whether the person transporting her is committing a crime. No other federal statute classifies among interstate travelers based upon their state residency.

Indeed, the Court’s decision in Saenz v. Roe confirms the illegitimacy of classifying

based on state of residence. In that case, the Court held that state residency is not

a permissible classification among welfare beneficiaries. Surely, if it is unconstitutional for the government to reduce welfare benefits based on state residency, it is

similarly unconstitutional to bar a person from entering a state to exercise a constitutional right based on her state of residency.

II. CREATING CHAOS

CCPA would create chaos for everyone involved in a minor’s abortion decision: the

young woman, the supportive individuals on whom she relies, and health care providers. Health care providers would be faced with the task of comparing their own

state’s laws to the laws of other states and to CCPA’s definition of ‘‘parental involvement laws’’ and then, if necessary, making sure that minors had complied with all

applicable laws before providing an abortion. Minors will face the increased burden

of deciphering these laws in an attempt to protect those caring relatives and friends

who assist them.

Chaos for Young Women

CCPA would trap the unwary minor in a chaotic maze of conflicting state laws.

Currently, a minor seeking an abortion can expect the health care providers from

whom she seeks an abortion to be familiar with their state’s applicable legal requirements and the minor can rely on those persons for assistance in understanding

how to comply with the law. However, under CCPA, the minor could no longer rely

solely on the assistance of the provider in making sure that she and those accompanying her are meeting all applicable legal requirements. Minors in these circumstances would need to determine the law in both her home state and the state

to which she is traveling in order to protect those assisting her. This may require

contacting clinics in multiple states or researching the applicable forced parental involvement statutes, using the definition specified under CCPA, to determine which

laws are applicable.

Chaos in the Enforcement of CCPA

CCPA would create chaos by pitting conflicting state laws against each other and

by mandating that the strictest parental involvement laws be met in multiple

states. CCPA would require all states, even those with no forced parental involvement law, to enforce the parental involvement laws of the twenty-three ‘‘strict’’

states. If CCPA were to become law, states would no longer have control over the

applicable laws within their own borders. For example, within a state that does not

enforce a parental involvement law, such as New York, some people will be subject

to parental involvement laws enacted by legislature of other states, such as Pennsylvania. The result would be that laws of one state would be supplanted by decisions

made by state legislatures of other states.

Enforcement of CCPA would be chaotic for state and federal officials. In our highly mobile society, minors may arrive in a state from anywhere in the country for

the purpose of having an abortion. Although violation of CCPA would be a federal—

not local—crime, it is likely that complaints of alleged violations will be made to

local law enforcement officials. To properly enforce CCPA, law enforcement officials

would need to be familiar with the current parental involvement requirements of

all fifty states and the District of Columbia, as well as with the CCPA definition

of a ‘‘parental involvement law.’’ Officials would have to determine the state of residence of the minor and identify any non-parent(s) who accompanied the minor. Obtaining and maintaining familiarity with these numerous laws and allocating the

necessary resources to identify individuals who may have violated CCPA would be

chaotic for local law enforcement.

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Chaos for Health Care Providers

Health care providers who know that a minor has been transported across state

lines by a non-parent would also be at risk from a number of complex provisions

regarding conspiracy, accomplice and accessory liability. Under these provisions, a

medical professional that provides services to a minor would be forced to act as an

agent of law enforcement by policing waiting rooms for potential violators. The provider would have to determine whether the minor seeking an abortion is from another state; whether she was accompanied across state lines by a non-parent;

whether, under CCPA, she is required to comply with the forced parental involvement law of her home state and, if so, whether she did. Of course, the provider will

have to determine whether the minor also complied with the parental involvement

requirements, if any, of the state in which she is seeking the abortion. If the provider determines that the minor was required to, but did not comply with the law

of her home state, the provider must deny services and report the accompanying

adult to the authorities or risk liability himself. Thus, to avoid criminal liability,

health care providers in every state would need to be familiar with, and be ready

to comply with, numerous state laws, or deny services to any minor who cannot

prove she resides in the state where the provider is located.

CCPA would subject health care workers to liability for providing abortions to minors from states with ‘‘strict’’ forced parental involvement laws as defined by CCPA

if the minors are transported across state lines by non-parents. Conversely, providers would face no such liability for the provision of abortion services to minors

from states with ‘‘broader’’ forced parental involvement laws than those which are

defined by CCPA. In this way, CCPA would force providers to treat minors from

states without ‘‘strict’’ parental involvement laws as a favored class, while minors

from states with ‘‘strict’’ parental involvement laws would face special burdens and

maybe even a denial of abortion services.

III. PUNISHING ADOLESCENTS

The deceptively titled ‘‘Child Custody Protection Act’’ would not ‘‘protect’’ minors.

By making it more difficult for them to safely access constitutionally protected abortion services, CCPA would punish the very adolescents that it purports to protect.

CCPA would punish those young women who decide to seek an abortion in another

state by requiring them to comply with laws of multiple states, or to travel alone

if they cannot involve their parents. In addition, by mandating communication only

with parents, CCPA would punish minors by criminalizing assistance received from

close family and friends, clergy or counselors. Finally, CCPA would discourage nonparents from assisting minors in obtaining desired medical care by the threat of

criminal penalties.

Ignoring Geographic and Economic Realities

Minors may decide to obtain an abortion outside of their state of residency for a

variety of reasons. These young women’s decisions may not be related to the particular laws of a state but may be based on important factors in obtaining any

health care services, such as location, recommendations of others, and the proximity

of loved ones.

The location of the closest abortion provider may be a factor in deciding where

a minor chooses to obtain an abortion. As of 1996, 86% of all counties in the United

States did not have an abortion provider. Therefore, for some young women, the

closest provider may be in a neighboring state.

Minors may also travel to neighboring states based on clinic recommendations or

for financial reasons. A minor may receive a recommendation from a trusted individual for a doctor or a clinic that happens to be in a neighboring state. Or varying

medical costs may mean that a clinic in a neighboring state provides a more economical option for a minor. If minors are prevented from going out of state for abortions in such situations, they may obtain unsafe, illegal abortions, attempt to selfabort or carry an unwanted pregnancy to term.

Legislating Family Dynamics

Regardless of state mandates requiring disclosure, young women’s parents often

are aware of the minor’s decision to have an abortion. In addition, whether or not

they are required to do so by law, health care providers routinely suggest that a

young woman involve her parents if possible. Attempts to legislate family dynamics

without considering the differing relationships that exist within families is dangerous and unrealistic.

When young women avoid parental involvement in their abortion decision, the

choice is usually well justified. In families where abusive relationships or other

problems prevent good communication between parents and their teenage daughVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:04 Oct 12, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00062 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 G:\WORK\CONST\090601\75018.000 HJUD2 PsN: HJUD2
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ters, state-mandated discussions can exacerbate existing problems. For battered

teenagers and incest survivors in particular, forced parental involvement laws increase the risks in an already dangerous situation. Even in the best of circumstances, candid communication about sexuality and reproductive issues may not

take place in families. Generally, mandatory notification and consent requirements

are not an effective means of encouraging more open discussion and can actually

damage relations among family members.

CCPA is not designed to enhance communication between minors and their parents. Rather, CCPA seeks to deter young women from obtaining a safe and legal

abortion, thus forcing them to act alone, seek risky alternatives within their state

of residence or to carry unwanted pregnancies to term.

Discouraging Non-Parents from Helping Young Women

CCPA also fails to recognize the importance of other family members and trusted

adults in a young woman’s life. The law ignores the fact that many young women

involve adults, other than their parents, whom they trust and to whom they are

close in their decisions to seek an abortion. These adults can include: grandparents,

siblings, or other extended family members; clergy, teachers, social workers, or other

counselors; and supportive friends. CCPA would preclude a minor from receiving assistance from these supportive adults in traveling across state lines for an abortion

or risk exposing them to criminal liabilities, including jail time and fines. CCPA

could lead to the arrest of clergy and grandmothers who are looking out for the best

interests of the young women they care about.

V. CONCLUSION

The deceptively titled ‘‘Child Custody Protection Act’’ would create chaos and punish young women by restricting their access to abortion services. The bill would violate the federal constitution, in particular by contravening principles of federalism

and infringing the rights to reproductive choice, interstate travel, and freedom of

association. CCPA does not ‘‘protect’’ minors. CCPA does not foster family communication. CCPA’s sole purpose is to punish caring relatives and friends and abortion

providers who seek to provide guidance and support to minors seeking abortions.

Consequently, CCPA will force many young women to travel alone, seek risky alternatives, or carry unwanted pregnancies to term.

VI. APPENDIX

A. Language of H. R. 476 (2001) as Introduced in the House of Representatives

A BILL

To amend title 18, United States Code, to prohibit taking minors across State lines

in circumvention of laws requiring the involvement of parents in abortion decisions.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States

of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the ‘Child Custody Protection Act.’

SEC. 2. TRANSPORTATION OF MINORS IN CIRCUMVENTION OF CERTAIN

LAWS RELATING TO ABORTION.

(a) IN GENERAL—Title 18, United States Code, is amended by inserting after

chapter 117 the following:

‘CHAPTER 117A—TRANSPORTATION OF MINORS IN CIRCUMVENTION OF

CERTAIN LAWS RELATING TO ABORTION

‘Sec. 2431. Transportation of minors in circumvention of certain laws relating to

abortion.

‘Sec. 2431. Transportation of minors in circumvention of certain laws relating to

abortion.

‘(a) OFFENSE—

‘(1) GENERALLY—Except as provided in subsection (b), whoever knowingly

transports an individual who has not attained the age of 18 years across a State

line, with the intent that such individual obtain an abortion, and thereby in fact

abridges the right of a parent under a law requiring parental involvement in

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a minor’s abortion decision, in force in the State where the individual resides,

shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.

‘(2) DEFINITION—For the purposes of this subsection, an abridgement of the

right of a parent occurs if an abortion is performed on the individual, in a State

other than the State where the individual resides, without the parental consent

or notification, or the judicial authorization, that would have been required by

that law had the abortion been performed in the State where the individual resides.

‘(b) EXCEPTIONS—(1) The prohibition of subsection (a) does not apply if the abortion was necessary to save the life of the minor because her life was endangered

by a physical disorder, physical injury, or physical illness, including a life endangering physical condition caused by or arising from the pregnancy itself.

‘(2) An individual transported in violation of this section, and any parent of that individual, may not be prosecuted or sued for a violation of this section, a conspiracy

to violate this section, or an offense under section 2 or 3 based on a violation of this

section.

‘(c) AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE—It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution for an

offense, or to a civil action, based on a violation of this section that the defendant

reasonably believed, based on information the defendant obtained directly from a

parent of the individual or other compelling facts, that before the individual obtained the abortion, the parental consent or notification, or judicial authorization

took place that would have been required by the law requiring parental involvement

in a minor’s abortion decision, had the abortion been performed in the State where

the individual resides.

‘(d) CIVIL ACTION—Any parent who suffers legal harm from a violation of subsection (a) may obtain appropriate relief in a civil action.

‘(e) DEFINITIONS—For the purposes of this section—

‘(1) a law requiring parental involvement in a minor’s abortion decision is a

law—

‘(A) requiring, before an abortion is performed on a minor, either—

‘(i) the notification to, or consent of, a parent of that minor; or

‘(ii) proceedings in a State court; and

‘(B) that does not provide as an alternative to the requirements described

in subparagraph (A) notification to or consent of any person or entity who

is not described in that subparagraph;

‘(2) the term ‘parent’ means—

‘(A) a parent or guardian;

‘(B) a legal custodian; or

‘(C) a person standing in loco parentis who has care and control of the

minor, and with whom the minor regularly resides,

who is designated by the law requiring parental involvement in the minor’s

abortion decision as a person to whom notification, or from whom consent, is

required;

‘(3) the term ‘minor’ means an individual who is not older than the maximum

age requiring parental notification or consent, or proceedings in a State court,

under the law requiring parental involvement in a minor’s abortion decision;

and

‘(4) the term ‘State’ includes the District of Columbia and any commonwealth,

possession, or other territory of the United States.’.

(b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT—The table of chapters for part I of title 18, United

States Code, is amended by inserting after the item relating to chapter 117 the following new item:

‘117A. Transportation of minors in circumvention of certain laws relating to abortion—2431‘.

B. America Speaks Out Against CCPA

Newspapers from across the country recognize CCPA as an attempt to block

young women from exercising their constitutionally protected right to obtain an

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abortion. These editorials also recognize that this legislation attempts to ban abortions at the cost of American constitutional tradition and principles.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, June 30, 1999

A Cruel Scheme to Curb Abortion ‘‘Don’t be misled by the label. The benignly titled ‘Child Custody Protection Act’ . . . is in fact a cold-hearted piece of legislation that would jeopardize the health

of desperate young women seeking abortions and potentially imprison adults who

help them. The bill also flouts the Constitution. . . . Apart from undermining the

constitutional right to an abortion, the legislation violates the right of citizens to

travel freely and to be treated as ‘a welcome visitor rather than an unfriendly alien’ when entering another state—a right recently upheld by the Supreme Court in a

California welfare case. . . . In addition, the bill could result in legal chaos as Federal prosecutors try to figure out the interaction between this new Federal statute

and a host of different parental notification laws in the states. Lawmakers on both

sides of the aisle and the abortion debate should join to defeat this misguided proposal. . . .’’

ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH, July 5, 1999

Locking Up Grandma ‘‘If the House of Representatives really was trying to protect young women seeking abortions, it would not have passed the Child Custody Protection Act [during

the 106th Congress].

The bill would make it harder for young women with abusive parents to obtain

a safe and legal abortion. . . . If, on the other hand, the purpose of the House was

to make abortions even more difficult to obtain, then the bill makes perfect sense.

. . . Most members of Congress are voting for these bills with one goal in mind— stopping abortion. . . .’’

THE COURIER JOURNAL, July 2, 1999

Punishing Helpers ‘‘THE ASSAULT on abortion rights continued . . . as the U. S. House voted [in

the 106th Congress] to make it a crime for a non-parent to accompany a minor to

receive an abortion in a state that does not require parental consent.

This latest action by House Republicans has been touted as a protective Measure.

. . . How unfortunate that the writers of the bill have chosen to hide behind a profamily stance to cover their real intent, which is to make abortion for many young,

vulnerable women nearly impossible. . . . [T]he horror stories of women unable to

receive safe, legal abortions are not so far behind us that we should force today’s young women back into those same life-threatening predicaments.’’

THE WASHINGTON POST, July 28, 1998

The Abortion Legislation ‘‘. . . The Child Custody Protection Act does not seem, on its face, to be a particularly extreme piece of antiabortion legislation. . . . The bill, however, is considerably dicier than it initially appears. Abortion foes know that they could not pass

a national law requiring parental notification or consent. And this backdoor effort

to approximate that goal has serious problems that should trouble even those who

don’t oppose state laws requiring parental involvement in minors’ abortions.

The central problem with the proposal is that it causes restrictive state laws to

follow residents in their travels outside of their home state and then has the federal

government prosecuting people for activity that is lawful in the locations in which

it takes place. The right to travel between states is constitutionally protected, abortion rights similarly are guaranteed and it is legal in many states to accompany a

minor to an abortion clinic without telling her parents. It is, therefore, hard to fathom how it could be a crime to cross state lines in helping a minor obtain an abortion.’’

PITTSBURGH POST GAZETTE, August 1, 1998

Run For The Border; State Lines Mean Nothing In Congress’ Anti-Abortion Zeal

‘‘One of the keystones of the American federal system is that, so long as they comply with the U.S. Constitution and its Bill of Rights, states can enact criminal laws

of their own choosing. . . .

That is, of course, unless Congress decides to turn the federal system on its head

and ban people from helping a minor cross state lines to get an abortion. . . .’’

THE NEWS & OBSERVER, July 28, 1998

Congress Crosses the Line

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‘‘. . . [C]ongress does not—and should not—have the power to follow residents

across state lines to enforce laws that don’t apply in neighboring jurisdictions. After

parental consent, what would be next?

The ability of individual states to determine their own laws, within certain limits,

is fundamental to our way of government. The inappropriately named Child Custody

Protection Act would establish a dangerous precedent that could damage that tradition and would be ripe for abuse.’’

STAR TRIBUNE, July 13, 1998

Antiabortion Bill: Don’t Make Adult Helpers Criminals ‘‘. . . Concocted by the formidable antichoice movement, this ‘Protection Act’ is

one more in a long, tiresome series of legislative efforts to chip away at a woman’s right to choose. They cannot dismantle Roe vs. Wade directly, so they go to the

states, or target doctors or clinics. They harass women outside medical facilities;

they try to block FDA approval of the abortion pill RU-486, which is widely used

in Europe. Now they want to intimidate friends and family members out of helping

young women consider all of their options when faced with an unwanted pregnancy.

...’’

ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, June 9, 1998

Abortion Politics ‘‘Republicans in Congress have recently been under tremendous pressure from

conservative religious activists to move on their legislative priorities. That explains

why a particularly dangerous anti-abortion measure, the Child Custody Protection

Act of 1998 (S. 1645/H.R. 3682), is on a fast track through Congress. . . .

This legislation is not about promoting families or parental rights. It’s about stopping young women from exercising their right to abortion.’’

C. The Medical Community Speaks Out Against CCPA

The American medical community opposes forced parental involvement laws on

the grounds they pose dangers to the health and well-being of young women. CCPA

would exacerbate the problems posed by such laws by delaying access to abortion

services and requiring young women to travel alone to obtain an abortion. CCPA

could lead to a new generation of back alley abortions for those young women who

are determined to end their pregnancies.

American Medical Association (AMA)

‘‘With respect to parental involvement when minors seek an abortion, the AMA

believes that the following guidelines constitute good medical practice: (1) Physicians should ascertain the law in their state on parental involvement. . . . (2) Physicians should strongly encourage minors to discuss their pregnancy with their parents. . . . (3) Physicians should not feel or be compelled to require minors to obtain

consent of their parents before deciding whether to undergo an abortion. The patient—even an adolescent—generally must decide whether, on balance, parental involvement is advisable. Accordingly, minors should ultimately be allowed to decide

whether parental involvement is appropriate. (4) Physicians should try to ensure

that minor patients have made an informed decision. . . . Minors should be urged

to seek the advice and counsel of those adults in whom they have confidence, including professional counselors, relatives, friends, teachers, or the clergy.’’ (Council on

Ethical and Judicial Affairs; Report H; House of Delegates Meeting; June 1992)

The American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP)

‘‘The AAP reaffirms its position that the rights of adolescents to confidential care

when considering abortion should be protected. Genuine concern for the best interests of minors argues strongly against mandatory parental consent and notification

laws. Although the stated intent of mandatory parental consent laws is to enhance

family communication and parental responsibility, there is no supporting evidence

that the laws have these effects. . . . There is evidence that such legislation may

have an adverse impact on some families and that it increases the risk of medical

and psychological harm to the adolescent. Judicial bypass provisions do not ameliorate the risk.’’ (The Adolescent’s Right to Confidential Care When Considering Abortion (RE9614); American Academy of Pediatrics, Policy Statement; Vol. 97, Number

5; May 1996, pp 746–751)

American Medical Women’s Association (AMWA)

‘‘We feel that abortion is a decision that should be reached between patients and

physicians, and we believe that forced parental involvement will have a negative imVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:04 Oct 12, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00066 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 G:\WORK\CONST\090601\75018.000 HJUD2 PsN: HJUD2
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pact on the doctor-patient relationship.’’ (Letter from AMWA president Clarita E.

Herrera to Congresswoman Ros-Lehtinen expressing opposition to H.R. 1218; April

22, 1999)

American Public Health Association (APHA)

‘‘Confidential family planning and primary care services are necessary for adolescents and teenagers to receive immediate quality medical treatment. Fear of parental knowledge or abuse often deters adolescents from seeking family planning services and medical care.’’ (Fact Sheet: Parental Consent for FamilyPlanning; http://

www.apha.org/legislative/factsheets/fs10.htm)

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