The Honor able Ar thur J . Tarnow , United States Dist rict Judge f or the Ea stern District of * Michig an, sitting by

desig nation. NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 08a0117n.06 F iled: F ebruary 25, 2008 No. 06-5242 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA, Plaintiff-Appellee , v. COREY COMMODORE, De fe nd ant- Ap pe lla

nt.

__________________________________________ ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP P E AL F ROM THE UN I TE D ST AT ES D I STR I CT CO UR T F OR THE EA STE RN DI STRI CT OF KENTUCKY

BEF ORE: MOORE and GRI FF I N, Circuit J udg es; and TARNO W, Dist rict Judge. * GRI FF I N, Circuit J udg e. Defen dan t Cor e y

Com mod or e a

pp e a ls h is s e nte nc e of

57 mon ths fo r b e inga

fe lon in possession of a fir ear

m, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g )(1) , and for possessing a

firea rm with an obliterated se rial number, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(k). This pe riod of incar cer ation was to run
consec utive to his state court sentenc e. De fenda nt argues that he r ece ived ineff ective le g al a s s ista

nce
and fu rt he r a rgue s th a t hi s sen te nc e is unr e a so na ble be c a us e the dis tr ic t c ourt

did no t su ff ic ie ntl y
a dd re ss t he fa c tor s li ste d in 18 U. S.C. § 3 55 3( a ). B e c a us e Com mod or e c ann ot d e mon str a te ine ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e on the ba sis of

the fa c tua l r e c or d a s p re se ntl y de ve loped , a

nd be c a us e his
se nte nc e wa s pro c e dura lly and su bs tanti ve ly re a so na

ble , we a ff

ir m the jud g me nt o f t

he dis tr ic t c ourt
.No. 06-5242

Un ite d S tates v . Co mm od

or e

- 2 -

I. Duringthe ea

rly morning hours of April 14, 2005, L exington police officer s on patrol in a high c rime ar ea of

the city observe d a man a

pproac h a known dr

ug house. The police stopped the man and a sked him sever al questions, in cl u d i n g h i s name. The man identified himself a s Corey L ew i s C o m m o d o re . On e o f t h e o ff i ce rs r e c o gn i z edC o m m o d o re an d kn ew h i m as h av i n g a reputation for ca

rry ing a firea rm. For safe ty

purposes, the of

fice rs beg an to pat down Commodore, at which point he fled on foot. The off icer s pursued Commodore a nd eventua lly

used a police taser to subdue him. The police found a loaded .357 mag num handg un in Comm odore’ s coat poc ket. The
se ri a l numbe r o n th e ha

nd g un ha d b e e n d e fa c e d, bu t th e B ur e a u o f A lc oh ol, To ba c c o, and F ir e arm s
rec overe d the num ber and lear ned that the handgun was stolen. At the t ime of the instant offe nse, Commodore was on pa

role for two counts of ar

med robbe ry . On J uly 7, 2005, an indictment was f iled ag ainst defe ndant, cha rg ing him with beinga fe lon in possession of a firea

rm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g )(1) , and with possession of a f irea rm wi th an ob lit e rate d se ri a l numbe r, in v iol a tio n o f 1 8 U .S. C. § 92 2( k) . B e c a us e Com mod or e wa s in the custody of t he C ommonwealth of Kentucky , the di strict court entered a writ of habeas c orpus ad p r o s e qu e n d

u m , o r d e r i n g h i m d e l i v e r e d i n t o f e d e r a l c u s t o dy. Commodore was a

rra igne d and assi g ned trial c ounsel. He e ntere d into a g uilty plea ag ree ment wher ein the par ties jointl y

rec ommended a ba se o ff en se leve l of 14. The a g ree ment pr ov ide d th a t th e pa

rt ie s und e rs too d that the re c omm e nd a tio n wa s no t bin din g on the dis tr ic t c ourt
.No. 06-5242

Un ite d S tates v . Co mm od

or e

- 3 - The a g ree ment further

stated that “D efen d an t wa i v es the rig ht to appeal a nd the rig ht to attack collater ally

the g uilty

plea, c onviction, and sentenc e, including any order of re stitut ion.” At t h e r ea rr ai gn m en t , t h e d i s t ri ct co u rt i n fo rm edC o m m o d o re that the g overnme nt would rea d the re levant portions of t he plea ag ree ment and admonished Comm odore to pa y close attention. The g overnme nt rea d throug h the plea ag ree ment, para g raph by para g raph, explaining the ef fec t of ea ch of the provisions c ontained there in. As to pa ragraph six of the plea ag ree ment , t h e go v ernment explained that “The U nited States and the de fenda n t have tog ether

revie wed the se ntencing g uidelines, and we make our notations as t o those g uidelines in the calc ulations, although the y are not binding upon the court.” . The g overnme nt noted that in para g raph nine of the a g ree ment, “the defe ndant waive s the rig ht to appeal a nd the rig ht to attack collate rally the g uilty

plea, c onviction, and sente nce, inc luding a ny order of re stitut ion.” The g overnme nt stated that at par ag raph f ifteen, the de fe nd ant a

nd his a tto rn e y a c kn ow le dg e d that the y un de rs too d the a g re e me nt, and a ff ixed the ir signatures on the f

inal pag e. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt

a sk e d Co mmo do re ’s tr ia l c ouns e l if the g ov e rnme nt r e c ounte d th e te rm s of t h e p l ea ag ree ment acc urate ly , to which he r eplied that they had. The district court then a sked Commodore if the plea

ag ree ment, as re ad by

the g overnme nt, was consistent with his understanding of the a g ree ment. Commodore replied that it was. Th e d i s t ri ct court late r addr essed the w aiver provision specifica lly , and informed Commodore “[n] ormally , y ou would have a rig ht to appeal that sentenc e to the United States Court of Appe als for the Sixt h Circuit, but as pointed out by [t he United States], y ou’ve waived y our right t o appea l and/or collate rally attack that sentence . Do y ouNo. 06-5242

Un ite d S tates v . Co mm od

or e

- 4 - understand that? ” Commodore answe red in the aff irmative. The district c ourt additionally stated “if the se ntence is more seve re tha n y ou expect it, y ou’ll still be bound by y our plea and will have no rig ht to withdraw it. Do y ou understand a ll that? ” Commodore replied that he did. The district
c ourt the n a sk e d, “ Do y ou

have any qu e sti on s a

bo ut it?” to wh ic h Com mod or e ans we re d that he did not. The district court a sked if Commodore wa s sure, a nd he answ ere d that h e wa s . The district court acc epted Commodore’s plea, sc heduled a sentenc ing he aring , and orde red that a Presente nce I nvestig ation Report (“ PSR ”) be prepa red. The PSR st ated that de fenda nt’s offe nse leve l as ca lculate d b y t he par ties was incor

rec t be c a us e Com mod or e ha d c omm itt e d th e ins tant o ff e ns e su bs e qu e nt t o b e ingc on vic te d o f a c ri me of violence
. See U. S.S. G. § 2 K2 .1 (a )( 4) (A ). Th e Pr e tr ia l Se rv ic e s O ff ic e r s tate d th e ba se of

fe ns e level wa s actua lly

20 which, af

ter a two-point upwar d adjustment for a n obliterated se rial number,

see U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(4) (2 0 0 5 ), and a three -point downwar d adjustment for a cce ptance of responsibility , see U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a) and (b), yielded a total offense level of 19. This c orre ction to t he of fe ns e le ve l mo ve d th e Gu ide lin e c us tod y ra ng e fr om 3 0 to 37 months to 5 7 to 71 mon ths
. Both p ar t i es objec ted to the PSR , stating that while they did not believe the ne w ca lculation to be
err oneous, they

wished the c ourt to impose a sentenc e in ac cord w ith the ear lier Guideline calc ulation. The district court state d that the plea agr ee m en t was not binding on the cour t and sentenc ed Commodore to 57 months of imprisonment, with the sentenc e to r un consec utive to the state se nte nce. Comm od or e the n f ile d th e ins tant a

pp e a l. T he g ov e rnme nt m ov e d to dis mis s th is appea l on the basis of Commodore’s a ppellate wa iver, which a pa nel of this court summarily denied.No. 06-5242

Un ite d S tates v . Co mm od

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- 5 -

II. Commodore asser

ts that his trial counsel rende red ine ffe ctive assistanc e. To preva il on a n ineffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel claim, Commodore must demonstrate that “ ‘counse l’s perf ormanc e was de fi ci ent, and that the de ficienc y prejudice d the def

ense.’ ” Ha liy m v . M

itc he ll , 492 F.3d 680, 7 1 1 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 7 ) ( qu o t i n g W igg ins v . S

mi th , 5 3 9 U. S
. 5 1 0 , 5 2 1 (2 0 0 3 ) ( ci t i n g Stricklan d v. W ashington , 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)) ). Commodore ar g ues that his counsel re ndere d ineffe ctive
a ssi sta nc e d

u r i n g p l e a

n e g o t i a t i o n s , d e m o n s t r a t e d b y c o un s e l ’ s f

a i l u r e t o a d d

u c e t h e p r o p e r

ba se of fe ns e le ve l f

or be inga vio le nt f e lon in p os se ssi on

of a fi re arm . T he g ov e rnme nt c on te nd s th a t,
even ass u mi n g Co mm o d o r e c and e mo n s tr a te in e f f e c ti v e a s s is ta

n c e , h e d id

n o t s u f f e r p r e ju dice beca use he declined the district court’s invitation to withdraw his plea and proc eed to tria l. During oral a rg ument, Commodore contende d that he would have withdraw n h i s p l ea had he r ece ived
a de qu a te a ssi sta

nc e fr om h is tri a l c ouns e l, a nd his fa ilure to a c c e pt t

he dis tr ic t c ourt’s of

fe r t o withdraw r esulted in prejudice
. We have g ener ally

declined to r eview claims of inef fec tive assistance of counse l on direct
a p p e a l b e c a u s e t h e r e c o r d i s u s u a l l y i n s u f

f i c i e n t l y d e v e l o p e d

t o a d dr e s s s u c h a

c l a i m a d e qu a t e l y. United States v. Gardne r , 4 1 7 F. 3 d 5 4 1 , 5 4 5 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 5 ) ( ci t i n g Un ite d States v. S ha ba zz , 263 F.3d 603 , 612 (6th Cir. 2001)). Instead, these claims are more a ppropriate ly

raised in a postconviction proce eding broug ht pur suant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Id. ; se e als o Massaro v. United States , 538 U.S. 500, 505 (2003) (noting that district courts ar e “the forum best suited to deve loping the f a c ts n e c e s s ar

y to d e te r mi n in g th e a d e qu a c y o f r e p r e s e n tati o n d u r in g an e n ti r e tr ia l.” ). AnNo. 06-5242

Un ite d S tates v . Co mm od

or e

- 6 - e xce pti on to thi s g e ne ra l rul e e xists , how e ve r, wh e n “th e re c or d is a de qu a te ly de ve lop e d to a llo w this Court to assess the merits of the issue.” Gardner , 4 1 7 F. 3 d at 5 4 5 (q u o t i n g Un ite d Sta te s v . H all , 200 F.3d 962, 965 ( 6th Cir. 2000)). Commodore urg es us to revie w his ineffe ctive assistanc e claim, ar g uing that his counsel’s defic iency

is a ppare nt f rom the re cord a

nd require s no additional fac tfinding. Commodore a rg ues that the pr op e r b a se of

fe ns e le ve l c ou ld h a ve e a sil y be e n d e te rm ine d h a d c ouns e l be e n s uf fi c ie ntl y dil ig e nt b e c a

us e Com mod or e ’s of

fe ns e le ve l w a s b a sed on e ith e r r e a dil y a pp are nt o r e a sil y discovera ble fac ts. Commodore argues that this mistake induced him to plead guilty . As his trial
c ouns e l e xpla ine d in

his ob je c tio n to the PSR: The De fenda

nt’s voluntary

plea, an d waiver

of ce rtain rig hts (including, but not limit ed to, rig ht to a trial by jury and rig ht to appeal a

nd/or collater ally

attack a ny sentenc e), wa s b ased, in pa rt, on discussions with undersig ned counse l reg arding sentenc ing matters, which e x pressly and ex plicitly conce rned a sentenc ing guideline calc ulation using a

Ba se Off ense L evel of

14. Com mod or e the re fo re c on te nd s th a t, g ive n th e re a dil y a pp are nt e rr or

of his tr ia l c ouns e l, a

nd his demonstrable r eliance on such, the pre sent rec ord is sufficie nt to review on dire ct appe al. This a rg ument, howeve r, even if meritorious, only conce rns Commodore’s claim of ineffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel as it relates to the improper b as e o ff ense level ca lculation. Com mod or e ha s not ar g ue d that th e fa c tua l r e c or d is su ff ic ie ntl y de ve lop e d to pe rm it r e vie w o f h is
c la im of ine ff

e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e a t the tim e of se nte nc ing
. Th e re a so nin g be hin d th e de c isi on no t to wi thd ra w C omm od or e ’s g uil ty

ple a is t oo mur

ky to a llo w i ns tant r e vie w. He re , we are no t pr ivy to whether Commodore and his coun s el d i s cu ssed the possibility of withdraw al of his plea, whetherNo. 06-5242

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or e

- 7 - Commodore expressed a d es ire to plea d g uilty reg ardle ss of counsel’ s advice , or whe ther the de c isi on to p le a d guil ty fel l w ith in t he pe numbr a

of so un d tr ia l stra

te g y . N or

are we pr e pa

re d to
a ssume that Co mmo do re wo uld have wi thd

ra wn his ple a ba se d sole ly on

his pr e se nt r e pr e se ntatio ns . We simpl y

cannot de termine fr om the pres en t re cord w hether trial counsel’ s conduct duringthe sentenc ing he aringwas objec tively defic ient. Rather, in or der to de termine the merits of this c laim, it is ne cessa ry to hear testimony

from Commodore, subject him to cross ex amination, and per haps hea r testimony

from the r espec tive trial
co u nsel. Such fac t finding is best suited to a § 2255 pr ocee ding be cause “‘the district court hea rs sp ok e n w or ds [the a

pp e llate c ourt ] ca

n s e e on ly in pr int and

se e s e xpre ssi on s [th e a

pp e llate c ourt ] will never se e . . . .’” Ma ssa ro , 5 3 8 U. S
. at 5 0 6 (qu o t i n g Un ite d S tates v. G rif

fin , 699 F.2d 1102, 1109 (11th Cir. 1983)). We theref

ore de cline to dec ide Commodore’s ine ff ective assistance c laim and express no opinion as to its m erits. We f urther encour ag e the district c ourt to a ppoint c ounsel for Commodore in the e ve nt he c ho os e s to pr oc e e d wi th a § 22 55 mot ion c la imi ng ine ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l. III
. Finally , Commodore argues that the sente nce imposed was unreasonable. When e valuating the re asonable ness of a

sentenc e, we consider “not only the l eng th of t he sentence but also the fa ctors
e v a lu a te d an d th e p r o c e d

u r e s e mp lo y e d

b y th e d is tr ic t c o u rt i nr e a c h in g it s s e n te n c ing deter mination.” United States v. Jone s , 4 8 9 F. 3 d 2 4 3 , 2 5 0 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 7 ) ( qu o t i n g United States v. W ebb , 403 F .3 d 373 , 383 (6 th Cir . 200 5) ). Our r e a so na ble ne ss i nq

uir y is the re fo re c omp ri se d o f b othNo. 06-5242

Un ite d S tates v . Co mm od

or e

- 8 - substantive and proc edura l components. Id. “A sentence may be procedura lly unrea sonable if ‘ the district judge fails to “conside r” the applicable Guidelines rang e or neg lects to “c onsider” the other fa c tor s li ste d in

18 U. S.C. § 3 55 3( a ), and

ins te a d simp ly se le c ts wh a t the jud g e de e ms a n a pp ro pr iate sentenc e without such re quired c onsideration.’” United States v. Fe rguson , 4 56 F .3 d 6 60 , 6 64 (6 th C i r. 2 0 0 6 ) ( qu o t i n g W

ebb , 4 03 F .3 d at 38 3. L ike wi se , “a se nte nc e may

[be ] sub sta

nti ve ly
unrea sonable whe re the district court ‘se lect[s] the sentenc e ar bitrarily , bas[es] t he s en tence on imp e rm iss ibl e fa c tor s, fa il[s] to c on sid e r p e rt ine nt § 35 53 (a ) f a c tor s, or g iv[e s] an unr e a so na

ble amount of weig ht to a

ny pertinent fa ctor.’” Ferguson , 4 5 6 F. 3 d at 6 6 4 (q u o t i n g W

ebb , 403 F.3d at 385). He re, Comm odore c halleng es his 57 month sentence as excessive a nd also argues that the district court did not adequately addre ss his arg uments as to why , in light of the various § 3553(a)
se nte nc ingfa c tor s, he wa s e nti tle d to a sh or te r s e nte nc e . T he se argume nts c on sti tut e a c ha lle ng e to both the proce dural a

nd substantive aspec ts of defe ndant’s sente nce. Turning first to the proce dural re asonable ness cha lleng e, we note that a se ntence imposed within the Guidelines, such as the one her e, ca rries w ith it a reb u t t ab l e p re sumption of
rea sonablene ss. United States v. Mc Gee , 4 9 4 F. 3 d 5 5 1 , 5 5 5 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 7 ) ( ci t i n g Rita v. United States , 551 U.S. —, 127 S. C t. 2456, 2462 ( 2007)). “This rebuttable presumption does not relieve the sentenc ing c ourt of its obligation to ex plain to the parties and the reviewing court it s rea sons for imposing a pa

rticular se ntence .” Unit ed S t a tes v. Richardson , 437 F.3d 550, 554 ( 6th Cir. 2006). Al tho ug h th e dis tr ic t c ourt is r e qu ir e d to we ig h a

nd e xami ne the va

ri ou s 1 8 U .S. C. § 35 53 (a ) f a c tor s, its considera

tion of t hese factor s “nee d not be evide nced e x plicitly .” United States v. W illiams , 436No. 06-5242

Un ite d S tates v . Co mm od

or e

- 9 - F.3d 706, 708 ( 6th Cir. 2006). I ndeed, w e do not re quire “ a ritual istic incantation of the 3553( a) fac tors it considers.” United States v. Chandler , 419 F.3d 484, 488 ( 6th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). W e hav e als o r e c e ntl y

he ld t hat w he n a

de fe nd ant b e lie ve s th a t th e dis tr ic t c ourt fa ile d to suff ic ie n tl y e xp la in it s r a ti o n a le f o r th e im p o s it io n o f a p arti c u la

r s e n te n c e , y e t d id n o t lodge an ob je c tio n w he n p ro mpt e d b y the dis tr ic t c ourt , his su bs e qu e nt c ha lle ng e is t o b e re vie we d f or pla in
e r ror. Un i t ed S t a t es v. Vonner , — F.3d —, 2008 WL320773, at *2-3 (6th Cir. F eb. 7, 2008) ( en banc) . Her e, def

endant wa s g iven an opportunity to object to the court’s sentenc e at the end of the sentenc ing h ea ri n g. Def

endant took this opportunity to reser ve his ea rlier objec tions, wherein he urg ed the c ourt to enfor ce the plea a g ree ment as written, despite the ag ree ment’s err ant ca lculation of the off ense le vel. Def

endant did not, howeve r, objec t to the sufficienc y of the cour t’s explanation for the se ntence imposed. There fore , althoug h defe ndant could have appea led t h e dis trict court’ s decision as to his other objec tions, and indeed did, any challeng e first made on appea l conce rning the suffic iency

of the c ourt’s explanation of the § 3553(a ) must be re viewed f or plain er

ror. Id. (c i t i n g Un ite d S

tates v . B os tic , 371 F.3d 865, 872- 73 (6th Cir. 2004)). He re , th e dis tr ic t c ourt

state d th a t it

wo uld c on sid e r t

he § 3 55 3( a ) f

a c tor s and

wo uld
a dd iti on all y

c on sid e r t

he pa rt ie s’ se nte nc ingre c omm e nd a tio n w he n d e te rm ini ngan a pp ro pr iate
se nte nc e . T he dis tr ic t c ourt a lso e xpla ine d th a t it

fo un d Co mmo do re ’s re c idi vis m, p art ic ula rl y his history of repe ated g un violence, as particula rly deser ving of a longe r sentenc e. The district court
a dd iti on a lly c on sid e re d Commo do re ’s argume nt fo r a c on c ur re nt s e nte nc e . T he dis tr ic t c ourt a lsoNo. 06-5242

Un ite d S tates v . Co mm od

or e

- 10 - stated explicitl y

that it had considered the § 3553(a) fac tors befor e im posing the 57-month sentence
consec utive to Comm odore’ s state prison term. We observe that the district court did not “‘f ail to calculate (or imprope rly calc ulat[e] ) the Gu ide lin e s r ang e , tr e a t [ ] the Gu ide lin e s a s ma nd a tor y , fail [ ] to c on sid e r t

he § 3 55 3( a ) f

a c tor s, select a s en tence based on c lear ly err oneous fa cts, or fa il [ ] t o adequately explain the chosen sentenc e.’” United States v. Se xton , 512 F.3d 326, 331 ( 6th Cir. 2008) (quotin g Ga l l v. Un ited States , — U.S. —, 128 S. C t. 586, 597 (2007))
. We theref ore c onclude that the district c ourt did not
co mm it an y p r o c e d

u r a l e r r o r in c a lc u lati n g th e 5 7
- mo n th s e n te n c e o r im p o s in g th e te r

m to run
consec utive to the state sentenc e. Commodore also argues that his sentenc e is substantively unrea sonable in that it is too long
c on sid e ri ng the “ vic tim le ss” natur e of the re le va nt c on du c t. T he Sup re me Court ha s r e c e ntl y

he ld that when a

sentenc e is “proc edura lly sound, the appe llate cour t should then consider the substantive
rea sonablene ss of the sentenc e imposed under a n abuse- of-discr etion standard.” Ga ll , 128 S. Ct . at 59 7; se e als o Sexton , 512 F.3d at 331. As we have alre ady conclude d that the district court did not proce durally

err in formulating defe ndant’s sentence, the only question left t o resolve is whether the dis tr ic t c ourt

a bu se d it s d isc re tio n in

imp os inga

57 -m on th s e nte nc e to r

un c on se c uti ve to t

he state sentenc e for

the cr iminal conduct pled to by defe ndant. Commodore’s argument is that his offense w as an e ssentially victimless crime and w ithout concomitant drugactivity or conspira cy . Def

endant therefor e believes that the prope rly calc ulated Guideline ra

ng e of 57 to 7 1 m o n ths was “e x tremely harsh” and “not justified.” T he district cour tNo. 06-5242

Un ite d S tates v . Co mm od

or e

- 11 - reje cted this assessment, findingthe cr ime was not mere possession of a firea rm, but possession of a fire arm by

a convic ted fe lon, one that has a history of g un violence. T he district cour t noted that C o m m o d o r e h a d r e p e a t e d l y f a i l e d t o f o l l o w t h e l aw , d e s p i t e h i s p u n i s h m e n t f o r p r i or of fe ns e s. Be cause the sentenc e imposed wa s within a proper ly calc ulated Guideline rang e, it is entit led to a presumption of re asonable ness. Sexton , 5 1 2 F
. 3 d at 3 3 2 (c i t i n g W

illiams , 4 3 6 F
. 3 d

a t 7 0 8 )
. We conclude that Commodore has not offe red e vidence sufficie nt to overcome this presumption. Id
. I V. For the above rea sons, we af firm def endant’ s conviction and sente nce.