United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Testimony 

Before the Committee on Armed Services 

U.S. Senate

SECURING, STABILIZING, 

AND REBUILDING IRAQ 

Iraqi Government Has Not 

Met Most Legislative, 

Security, and Economic 

Benchmarks 

Statement of David M. Walker 

Comptroller General of the United States 

For Release on Delivery

Expected at 9:00 a.m. EDT

Friday, September 7, 2007

 

GAO-07-1230T 
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: 

I am pleased to appear today to discuss our report1

 on whether or not the 

government of Iraq has met 18 benchmarks contained in the U.S. Troop 

Readiness, Veterans’ Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability 

Appropriations Act of 20072 (the Act). The Act requires GAO to report on 

the status of the achievement of these benchmarks. Consistent with GAO’s 

core values and our desire to be fair and balanced, we also considered and 

used a “partially met” rating for some benchmarks. In comparison, the Act

requires the administration to report on whether satisfactory progress is 

being made toward meeting the benchmarks. The benchmarks cover Iraqi

government actions needed to advance reconciliation within Iraqi society, 

improve the security of the Iraqi population, provide essential services to 

the population, and promote economic well-being. 

To complete this work, we reviewed U.S. agency and Iraqi documents and 

interviewed officials from the Departments of Defense, State, and the 

Treasury; the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) and its subordinate 

commands; the Defense Intelligence Agency; the Central Intelligence

Agency; the National Intelligence Council; and the United Nations. These 

officials included Ryan Crocker, the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, and General

David H. Petraeus, Commander of the Multi-National Force-Iraq. We made 

multiple visits to Iraq during 2006 and 2007, most recently from July 22 to 

August 1, 2007. Our analyses were enhanced by approximately 100 Iraqrelated reports and testimonies that we have completed since May 2003. 

We conducted our review in accordance with generally accepted 

government auditing standards. 

In summary, we found Summary 

The benchmarks were derived from commitments first articulated by the 

Iraqi government in June 2006. 

The Iraqi government met 3, partially met 4, and did not meet 11 of its 18

benchmarks. Overall, key legislation has not been passed, violence 

remains high, and it is unclear whether the Iraqi government will spend 

 1

GAO, Iraqi Government Has Not Met Most Legislative, Security, and Economic

Benchmarks (GAO-07-1195) (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 4, 2007). 

2

Section 1314 of P.L. 110-28. 

Page 1 GAO-07-1230T 
$10 billion in reconstruction funds. These results do not diminish the 

courageous efforts of coalition forces and progress that has been made in 

several areas, including Anbar Province. 

The Iraqi government met one of eight legislative benchmarks: the rights 

of minority political parties in Iraq’s legislature are protected. The 

government has not enacted legislation on de-Ba’athification, oil revenue

sharing, provincial elections, amnesty, and militia disarmament. 

It is unclear whether sectarian violence in Iraq has decreased—a key 

security benchmark—since it is difficult to measure whether the 

perpetrators’ intents were sectarian in nature, and other measures of 

population security show differing trends. 

As the Congress considers the way forward in Iraq, it should balance the 

achievement of the 18 Iraqi benchmarks with military progress and with 

homeland security goals, foreign policy goals, and other goals of the 

United States. 

Page 2 GAO-07-1230T 
The benchmarks contained in the Act were derived from commitments 

articulated by the Iraqi government beginning in June 2006 and affirmed in 

subsequent statements by Prime Minister Maliki in September 2006 and 

January 2007 (see fig. 1). Iraq’s commitments to these benchmarks were 

most recently stated in the May 2007 International Compact for Iraq. 

Origins of the 

Benchmarks 

Page 3 GAO-07-1230T 
Figure 1: Origin of Iraqi Benchmarks 

Source: GAO analysis of Department of State, Department of Defense, and Iraqi government data.

1. Forming a Constitutional Review Committee and then completing 

the constitutional review.

2. Enacting and implementing legislation on de-Ba’athification.

3. Enacting and implementing legislation to ensure the equitable distribution 

of hydrocarbon resources of the people of Iraq without regard to the sect 

or ethnicity of recipients, and enacting and implementing legislation to 

ensure that the energy resources of Iraq benefit Sunni Arabs, Shia Arabs, 

Kurds, and other Iraqi citizens in an equitable manner.

4. Enacting and implementing legislation on procedures to form 

semi-autonomous regions.

5. Enacting and implementing legislation establishing an Independent 

High Electoral Commission, provincial elections law, provincial council 

authorities, and a date for provincial elections.

6. Enacting and implementing legislation addressing amnesty.

7. Enacting and implementing legislation establishing a strong militia 

disarmament program to ensure that such security forces are 

accountable only to the central government and loyal to the Constitution 

of Iraq.

8. Establishing supporting political, media, economic, and services 

committees in support of the Baghdad security plan.

10. Providing Iraqi commanders with all authorities to execute this plan and 

to make tactical and operational decisions, in consultation with U.S. 

commanders, without political intervention, to include the authority to 

pursue all extremists, including Sunni insurgents and Shiite militias.

11. Ensuring that the Iraqi security forces are providing 

even-handed enforcement of the law.

12. Ensuring that, according to President Bush, Prime Minister Maliki 

said ‘‘the Baghdad security plan will not provide a safe haven for 

any outlaws, regardless of [their] sectarian or political affiliation.’’

13. Reducing the level of sectarian violence in Iraq and eliminating 

militia control of local security.

14. Establishing all of the planned joint security stations in 

neighborhoods across Baghdad.b

15. Increasing the number of Iraqi security forces’ units capable of 

operating independently.

16. Ensuring that the rights of minority political parties in the Iraqi 

legislature are protected.

17. Allocating and spending $10 billion in Iraqi revenues for reconstruction 

projects, including delivery of essential services, on an equitable basis. 

18. Ensuring that Iraq’s political authorities are not undermining or making 

false accusations against members of the Iraqi security forces.

9. Providing three trained and ready Iraqi brigades to support 

Baghdad operations.

May

Compact 

commitments 

by GOI 

May 25, 2007

BENCHMARKS Public Law 110-28

Jan. & 

Feb.

Prime 

Minister

Maliki’s

speeches 

Jan.

 Highlights

of the Iraq 

Strategy 

Review

Jan. 

President 

Bush’s New 

Way 

Forward 

speech 

Jan. 

Additional 

commitments 

by Prime 

Minister Maliki

Sept. 

Prime Minister 

Maliki’s 

Benchmarksa

June 

24 Point Iraqi 

National 

Reconciliation 

Plan 

2006 2007

Page 4 GAO-07-1230T 
a

Iraq’s Policy Committee on National Security agreed upon a set of political, security, and economic 

benchmarks and an associated timeline in September 2006. These were reaffirmed by the 

Presidency Council on October 16, 2006. 

b

In December 2006 the Multi-National Force-Iraq and government of Iraq agreed to establish the Joint

Security Stations. 

As of August 30, 2007, the Iraqi government met 3, partially met 4, and did

not meet 11 of its 18 benchmarks. Overall, key legislation has not been 

passed, violence remains high, and it is unclear whether the Iraqi 

government will spend $10 billion in reconstruction funds. 

GAO Assessment of 

the 18 Benchmarks 

Page 5 GAO-07-1230T 
Figure 2: GAO Assessment of the 18 Benchmarks 

Number of independent units declined 

between March and July 2007.

Source: GAO analysis of UN, U.S., and Iraqi data.

Enacting and implementing legislation establishing an Independent High 

Electoral Commission, provincial elections law, provincial council authorities, 

and a date for provincial elections.

Benchmark

Funds allocated but unlikely to be fully

spent.

Committee formed but amendments not

approved by the Iraqi legislature and no

referendum scheduled.

Laws drafted.

3 of 4 components drafted; none being 

considered by parliament. 

Law enacted; implementation scheduled 

for 2008. 

Commission law enacted and

implemented; however, supporting laws

not enacted.

No law drafted.

No law drafted.

Committees established.

32 of 34 stations established.

Forces provided; some of limited 

effectiveness.

Militia infiltration of some security forces 

enables some safe havens.

Militias control some local security; 

unclear whether sectarian violence has

decreased.

Forming a Constitutional Review Committee and completing the 

constitutional review.

GAO 

assessment Status

Enacting and implementing legislation on de-Ba’athification.

Enacting and implementing legislation to ensure the equitable distribution of 

hydrocarbon resources of the people of Iraq without regard to the sect or 

ethnicity of recipients, and enacting and implementing legislation to ensure 

that the energy resources of Iraq benefit Sunni Arabs, Shia Arabs, Kurds, 

and other Iraqi citizens in an equitable manner.

Enacting and implementing legislation addressing amnesty.

Enacting and implementing legislation establishing a strong militia 

disarmament program to ensure that such security forces are accountable 

only to the central government and loyal to the Constitution of Iraq.

Establishing supporting political, media, economic, and services 

committees in support of the Baghdad security plan.

Ensuring that Iraqi security forces are providing even-handed enforcement 

of the law.

Ensuring that, according to President Bush, Prime Minister Maliki said “the 

Baghdad security plan will not provide a safe haven for any outlaws, 

regardless of [their] sectarian or political affiliation.”

Reducing the level of sectarian violence in Iraq and eliminating militia 

control of local security. 

Establishing all of the planned joint security stations in neighborhoods 

across Baghdad.

Ensuring that the rights of minority political parties in the Iraqi legislature 

are protected.

Increasing the number of Iraqi security forces units capable of operating 

independently.

Allocating and spending $10 billion in Iraqi revenues for reconstruction 

projects, including delivery of essential services, on an equitable basis.

Ensuring that Iraq’s political authorities are not undermining or making false 

accusations against members of the Iraqi security forces.

Providing Iraqi commanders with all authorities to execute this plan and to 

make tactical and operational decisions, in consultation with U.S. 

commanders, without political intervention, to include the authority to 

pursue all extremists, including Sunni insurgents and Shiite militias.

Providing three trained and ready brigades to support Baghdad operations.

Enacting and implementing legislation on procedures to form 

semi-autonomous regions.

Met Partially met Not met

Unsubstantiated accusations 

continue to be made.

Legislators’ rights protected; minority 

citizens’ rights unprotected.

Political intervention continues.

Iraqi security forces engaged in 

sectarian-based abuses.

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

18.

Page 6 GAO-07-1230T 
The Iraqi government met one of eight legislative benchmarks: the rights 

of minority political parties in Iraq’s legislature are protected. The 

government also partially met one benchmark — to enact and implement 

legislation on the formation of regions; this law was enacted in October 

2006 but will not be implemented until April 2008. Six other legislative 

benchmarks have not been met. Specifically, a review committee has not

completed work on important revisions to Iraq’s constitution. Further, the 

government has not enacted legislation on de-Ba’athification, oil revenue

sharing, provincial elections, amnesty, and militia disarmament. The 

administration’s report cited progress in achieving some benchmarks but 

provided little information on what step in the legislative process each 

benchmark had reached. We provide that information below.

Most Legislative 

Benchmarks Have Yet 

to Be Enacted and 

Implemented 

Page 7 GAO-07-1230T 
Figure 3: Enactment and Implementation Status of Six Legislative Benchmarks 

Source: GAO analysis of Department of State, Department of Defense, UN and Iraqi government data.

No legislation drafted

Framework 

Revenue sharing

Ministry of Oil Restructuring

Iraq National Oil Company

Electoral commission

Provincial authoritiesc

Provincial election law

Provincial election dated

Elections

Amnesty

Disarmament and demobilization

De-Ba’athificationa

Hydrocarbon laws

Drafting

laws Enacting Implementing

Laws drafted and reviewed

Draft referred to Council of 

 Representatives/Committee

Draft placed on calendar by 

Speaker’s Office

First reading completed

Draft amended by Committee; placed 

on calendar by Speaker’s Office

Second reading completed

Draft amended by Committee; placed 

on calendar by Speaker’s Office

Third reading completed; vote taken

Ratification procedures

Law published in Gazette

Guidance issued by Prime Minister

Orders written by Cabinet 

Minister/other

Directives drafted by Director 

General/other

Formation of regions b

Notes: 

a

The Iraqi legislature is considering several competing drafts. 

b

The Iraqi Constitution exempts the law on formation of regions from following the Presidency 

Council’s ratification process that is set out in Article 138 of the Constitution. 

c

The draft deals with broader federal versus provincial powers, according to the United Nations. 

d

According to State, the Iraqi government may not need a law to set the election date, though to date

this is unclear. 

Page 8 GAO-07-1230T 
Two of nine security benchmarks have been met. Specifically, Iraq’s 

government has established various committees in support of the Baghdad 

security plan and established almost all of the planned Joint Security 

Stations in Baghdad. The government has partially met the benchmarks of 

providing three trained and ready brigades for Baghdad operations and 

eliminating safe havens for outlawed groups. Five other benchmarks have 

not been met. The government has not eliminated militia control of local 

security, eliminated political intervention in military operations, ensured 

even-handed enforcement of the law, increased army units capable of 

independent operations, and ensured that political authorities made no 

false accusations against security forces. It is unclear whether sectarian 

violence in Iraq has decreased—a key security benchmark—since it is 

difficult to measure perpetrators’ intents, and various other measures of 

population security from different sources show differing trends. As 

displayed in figure 4, average daily attacks against civilians have remained

unchanged from February to July 2007. 

Mixed Results in 

Achieving Security 

Benchmarks 

Page 9 GAO-07-1230T 
Figure 4: Average Number of Daily, Enemy-Initiated Attacks against the Coalition, Iraqi Security Forces, and Civilians (May 

2003-July 2007) 

Public Law 110-28 requires GAO to report to Congress by September 1, 

2007,

3

 on whether or not the government of Iraq has met 18 benchmarks 

contained in the Act, and the status of the achievement of these 

benchmarks. The Act requires the administration to report in July and 

September 2007 on whether satisfactory progress is being made toward 

meeting the benchmarks. As stated previously, we considered and used a 

“partially met” rating in several circumstances. Figure 5 compares the two 

assessments.

Comparison of GAO 

and Executive Branch 

Assessments 

 3

GAO provided this report to Congress on September 4, 2007, the first business day 

following September 1, 2007. 

Page 10 GAO-07-1230T 
Figure 5: Comparison of GAO Assessment with Administration’s July 2007 Initial Benchmark Assessment Report 

a

According to the U.S. State Department, conditions are not present for these benchmarks. 

Page 11 GAO-07-1230T 
As of August 30, 2007, the Iraqi government met 3, partially met 4, and had

not met 11 of 18 legislative, security, and economic benchmarks. The Iraqi

government has not fulfilled commitments it first made in June 2006 to 

advance legislative, security, and economic measures that would promote 

national reconciliation among Iraq’s warring factions. Of particular 

concern is the lack of progress on de-Ba’athification legislation that could 

promote greater Sunni participation in the national government and 

comprehensive hydrocarbon legislation that would distribute Iraq’s vast 

oil wealth. In late August, Iraq’s senior Shi’a, Sunni Arab and Kurdish 

political leaders signed a Unity Accord signaling efforts to foster greater

national reconciliation. The Accord covered draft legislation on deBa’thification reform and provincial powers laws, as well as setting up a 

mechanism to release some Sunni detainees being held without charges. 

However, the polarization of Iraq’s major sects and ethnic groups and 

fighting among Sh’ia factions further diminishes the stability of Iraq’s 

governing coalition and its potential to enact legislation needed for 

sectarian reconciliation. 

Reconciliation was also premised on a reduction in violence. While the 

Baghdad security plan was intended to reduce sectarian violence, it is 

unclear whether violence has been reduced. Measuring such violence may 

be difficult since the perpetrators’ intents are not clearly known. Other 

measures, such as the number of enemy-initiated attacks, show that 

violence has remained high through July 2007. 

As the Congress considers the way forward in Iraq, it should balance the 

achievement of the 18 Iraqi benchmarks with military progress and 

homeland security, foreign policy, and other goals of the United States. 

Future administration reports on the benchmarks would be more useful to

the Congress if they clearly depicted the status of each legislative 

benchmark, provided additional quantitative and qualitative information 

on violence from all relevant U.S. agencies, and specified the performance 

and loyalties of Iraqi security forces supporting coalition operations. 

In preparing future reports to Congress and to help increase transparency 

on progress made toward achieving the benchmarks, we recommend that: 

Conclusions 

Recommendations 

1. The Secretary of State provide information to the President that clearly 

specifies the status in drafting, enacting, and implementing Iraqi 

legislation; 

Page 12 GAO-07-1230T 
2. The Secretary of Defense and the heads of other appropriate agencies 

provide information to the President on trends in sectarian violence 

with appropriate caveats, as well as broader quantitative and 

qualitative measures of security; and 

3. The Secretary of Defense and the heads of other appropriate agencies 

provide additional information on the operational readiness of Iraqi 

security forces supporting the Baghdad security plan, particularly 

information on their loyalty and willingness to help secure Baghdad. 

We provided drafts of the report accompanying this testimony to the 

relevant U.S. agencies for review and comment, which we incorporated as 

appropriate. We received written comments from the Departments of State 

and Defense and technical comments from the Central Intelligence Agency 

and National Intelligence Council, which are included in the report. State 

and DOD concurred with our recommendations but disagreed with our 

assessment of certain benchmarks. Although we analyzed classified data, 

including the August 2007 National Intelligence Estimate for Iraq, the 

testimony and report only contain unclassified information, as of August 

30, 2007. We issued a classified report to supplement the information 

discussed in our report.4

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, this concludes my prepared 

statement. I would be happy to answer any questions that you may have. 

If you or your staffs have any questions about this testimony, please 

contact me at (202) 512-5500 or Mr. Joseph A. Christoff, Director, 

International Affairs and Trade, at (202) 512-8979. Key contributors to this 

testimony include Stephen Lord, David Bruno, Howard Cott, Timothy 

Fairbanks, Mattias Fenton, Whitney Havens, Dorian Herring, Bruce 

Kutnick, Judith McCloskey, Tetsuo Miyabara, and Kathleen Monahan. 

Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgements 

 4

GAO-07-1223C. 

Page 13 GAO-07-1230T 
In addition, Ashley Alley, Monica Brym, Lessie Burke-Johnson, Joe 

Carney, Miriam Carroll, Debbie Chung, Thomas Costa, Lynn Cothern, 

Aniruddha Dasgupta, Martin de Alteriis, Etana Finkler, Muriel Forster, 

Patrick Hickey, Michael Jenkins, Sona Kalapura, Jeremy Latimer, Mary 

Moutsos, Sidney Schwartz, Jena Sinkfield, Audrey Solis, Cynthia Taylor,

and Christina Werth provided technical assistance. 

Page 14 GAO-07-1230T (320539) 
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