NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

CLINT EASTWOOD MAEZ, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 15-0336

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2014-116706-001

The Honorable Robert E. Miles, Judge Retired

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Alice Jones

Counsel for Appellee

The Stavris Law Firm, PLLC, Scottsdale

By Christopher Stavris

Counsel for Appellant
STATE v. MAEZ

Decision of the Court

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MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Randall M. Howe delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Diane M. Johnsen and Judge Andrew W. Gould joined.

H O W E, Judge:

¶1 Clint Eastwood Maez appeals his convictions and sentences 

relating to a drive by shooting. Maez argues that the trial court erred by 

denying his request for a self-defense instruction for the use of deadly 

physical force. For the following reasons, we affirm. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Late one night in March 2014, K.L., her boyfriend G.G., and 

some of their family members were having a get-together in K.L.’s uncle’s 

front yard. When G.G. decided to leave, his cousin E.L. volunteered to give 

him a ride home. As the two stood by E.L.’s car in the driveway, Maez, 

K.L.’s ex-boyfriend, drove past the uncle’s house with his windows down, 

staring at them. Maez made a U-turn, passed the house again, and then

sped up to the main road. G.G., recognizing Maez, yelled “what’s up, get 

out of the car,” then told E.L. to “take me to confront” him. The two 

followed Maez, who was already two blocks down the street, out of the 

residential neighborhood at a speed twice the 25 mile per hour limit, 

eventually getting “a couple feet” behind Maez before he turned east onto 

a major roadway.

¶3 E.L. and G.G. continued to follow him on the roadway, 

driving as fast as 50 miles per hour—10 miles above the posted speed 

limit—and staying about six to seven car-lengths behind Maez for a half 

mile. When Maez approached a major intersection, the light turned red but 

he ran the light and drove through the intersection. E.L. and G.G. also ran 

the red light to continue to follow Maez. Maez then slowed his car down 

and moved into the turning lane. Approximately 40 feet past the 

intersection, E.L. and G.G. caught up to Maez. As they pulled up to the side 

of Maez’s car, G.G. leaned forward and saw Maez’s hand pointing a gun 

toward his passenger’s side window. Before G.G. could warn E.L. about the 

gun and tell him to stop the car, Maez shot at them four times. Both E.L. 

and G.G. sustained gunshot wounds. 
STATE v. MAEZ

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¶4 G.G. identified Maez to Phoenix Police and provided Maez’s

address. A week later, police conducted surveillance on the address G.G. 

provided and eventually took Maez into custody after forcibly stopping a 

vehicle Maez was riding. The State charged Maez with two counts of drive 

by shooting, two counts of aggravated assault, one count of discharge of a 

firearm at a structure, and one count of misconduct involving weapons.

¶5 At Maez’s jury trial, E.L. and G.G. testified that although they 

were speeding behind Maez, E.L. drove “normally” and never honked at 

Maez, never tried to touch his bumper or drive Maez’s car off the road, and 

even stopped to wait for traffic before turning onto the roadway from the 

residential neighborhood. Both men further testified that neither of them 

were armed at the time and that neither had made any hand or gun-like 

gestures or motions out of their car toward Maez or had yelled anything at 

him while driving. G.G. further testified that he wanted E.L. to follow Maez 

to “chas[e] him down and confront him” to tell him to stay away from K.L., 

and that if “we were going to fight we were going to fight.”

¶6 Based on this testimony, Maez requested a self-defense 

instruction for the use of deadly physical force. He argued that G.G.’s 

telling Maez to “get out of the car” as Maez drove by the house, wanting to 

confront Maez and possibly fight him, and E.L.’s fast driving to catch up to 

him—even running a red light to stay behind him—constituted the 

“slightest evidence” necessary to warrant an instruction that he was 

justified in using deadly physical force to defend himself. The State 

objected, arguing that Maez denied shooting at E.L. and G.G. by asserting

in his opening statement that the State lacked sufficient evidence and by 

cross-examining witnesses in a manner consistent with that theory. In 

denying Maez’s motion, the trial court concluded that insufficient evidence 

supported the justification instruction because no evidence showed that 

Maez was aware that E.L. and G.G. were following him or that Maez knew 

of G.G.’s intent to confront and possibly fight him.

¶7 The jury convicted Maez on all charges, finding all but the 

misconduct offense dangerous offenses. Maez timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

¶8 Maez argues that the trial court erred by denying his request 

to instruct the jury on self-defense by the use of deadly physical force. We 

review the trial court’s denial of a jury instruction for an abuse of discretion, 

but review independently whether the evidence supports a justification 

instruction as a question of law that involves no discretionary factual 
STATE v. MAEZ

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determination. State v. Almeida, 238 Ariz. 77, 80 ¶ 9, 356 P.3d 822, 825 

(App. 2015). In doing so, we view the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the proponent of the instruction. Id. at 78 ¶ 2, 356 P.3d at 823. Absent a 

clear abuse of its discretion, we will not reverse the trial court’s denial of a 

jury instruction. State v. Bolten, 182 Ariz. 290, 309, 896 P.2d 830, 849 (1995). 

We will also affirm a trial court’s ruling if the result was correct for any 

legally correct reason. State v. Perez, 141 Ariz. 459, 464, 687 P.2d 1214, 1219 

(1984). Because insufficient evidence supported the self-defense instruction

Maez requested, the trial court did not err in denying Maez’s request. 

¶9 A party is entitled to an instruction on any theory the 

evidence reasonably supports. Almeida, 238 Ariz. at 79 ¶ 9, 356 P.3d at 824. 

In Arizona, “a person is justified in threatening or using deadly physical 

force against another . . . when and to the degree a reasonable person would 

believe that deadly physical force is immediately necessary to protect 

himself against the other’s use or attempted use of unlawful deadly 

physical force.” A.R.S. § 13–405(A)(2). To be entitled to a self-defense 

instruction, a defendant need only present the “slightest evidence” that he 

acted in self-defense. State v. King, 225 Ariz. 87, 90 ¶ 14, 235 P.3d 240, 243 

(2010). The “slightest evidence” is evidence which tends to prove a hostile 

demonstration—an “outward act which may be reasonably regarded as 

placing the defendant in imminent danger of losing his life or sustaining 

great bodily harm.” State v. Lujan, 136 Ariz. 102, 104, 664 P.2d 646, 648 

(1983). The question is focused on whether a reasonable person in the 

defendant’s circumstances would have believed that physical force was 

immediately necessary to protect himself. King, 225 Ariz. at 90 ¶ 12, 235 P.3d 

at 243. 

¶10 Because the evidence does not show even the slightest 

evidence necessary to support a self-defense instruction for the use of 

deadly physical force, the court did not err in denying Maez’s request. 

Deadly physical force is “force that . . . in the manner of its use or intended 

use is capable of creating a substantial risk of causing death or serious 

physical injury.” A.R.S. § 13–105(14). Here, the record shows that neither 

E.L. nor G.G. used or attempted to use any unlawful deadly physical force 

against Maez. For the majority of the time they followed Maez, E.L. and 

G.G. remained approximately six or seven car-lengths behind him. Neither 

E.L. nor G.G. yelled at or threatened Maez while they were driving. E.L. 

and G.G. also did not make any hand or gun-like gestures toward Maez. 

Further, although E.L. and G.G. drove at a high speed, the record reflects 

that E.L. did not honk at Maez, make any attempts to drive him off the road, 

touch bumpers with him, or otherwise use the vehicle to cause Maez deadly 
STATE v. MAEZ

Decision of the Court

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or non-deadly harm. The record additionally shows that neither E.L. nor 

G.G. were armed.

¶11 Moreover, on these undisputed facts, no reasonable person in 

Maez’s circumstances would believe that shooting E.L. and G.G. was the 

degree of force immediately necessary for his protection. In fact, the record 

shows that G.G. saw Maez pointing a gun toward the passenger’s side of 

his car before E.L. and G.G.’s car had pulled directly beside him. This shows 

that Maez had decided to shoot at them before Maez could determine 

whether E.L. or G.G. were attempting to use deadly physical force against 

him. His actions were not reactive. Accordingly, because the record 

contains not even the slightest evidence that deadly physical force was 

immediately necessary for Maez’s protection, the trial court properly 

denied Maez’s requested self-defense instruction. 

CONCLUSION

¶12 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.