UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ ANTONE LAMANDINGO KNOX, Petitioner - Appellant,

v. ANITA TRAMMELL, Warden, Respondent - Appellee. No. 15-6074 (D.C. No. 5:14- CV-00353-W) (W.D. Okla.)

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

________________ _________________ Before KELLY , BACHARACH , and MORITZ , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ Petitioner Antone Lamandingo Knox, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks a certificate of appealability (COA) to appeal the district court’s denial of his Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion. His motion sought relief from a yea r-old district court order dismissing Knox’s previously-file d Rule 60(b) motion. We deny the application for a COA and dismiss the appeal.

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not ma terially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctr ines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cite d, however, for its persuasi ve value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### October 30, 2015
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 I. B ACKGROUND Knox pleaded guilty in 1995 to attempted robbery with a firearm after former conviction of two or more felonies, poin ting a firearm at another after former conviction of two or more felonies, a nd possession of a firearm after former conviction of two or more felonies. He has filed numerous § 2254 petitions challenging his conviction, all of which were dismissed. See Knox v. Workman , 425 F. App’x 781, 783-84 (10th Cir. 2011) (a ffirming the dismissal of his petition as time-barred); Knox v. Trammell , No. CIV-12-1393-W, 201 3 WL 1908313, at *1 (W.D. Okla. May 7, 2013) (dismissing for lack of jurisdiction because petition was an unauthorized second or successive petition); Knox v. Trammell , No. CIV-13-925-W, 2013 WL 5460826, at *1 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 30, 2013) (dismissing for lack of juri sdiction because petition was another unauthorized second or successive petition), appeal dismissed, No. 13-6229 (10th Cir. Dec. 27, 2013). On April 10, 2014, Knox filed an “Ex Parte Motion for [Rule] 60(b)(1) Thru (6) [Relief].” R. at 4. The district cour t construed this filing as another unauthorized second or successive § 2254 petition challenging his conv iction. “A district court does not have jurisdiction to address the merits of a sec ond or successive . . . § 2254 claim until [the circuit] court has granted the required authorization.” In re Cline , 531 F.3d 1249, 1251 (10th Cir. 2008) (per curiam). When presented with an unauthorized second or successive applicati on, the district court has the option to transfer the application to this court if a tran sfer is in the interest of justice or dismiss it for lack of jurisdiction. See id . at 1252. The district court determined it was not in3 the interest of justice to tran sfer Knox’s filing to this c ourt for authorization, clearly explaining that the claims K nox sought to raise were not based on either a new rule of constitutional law or on a ny newly discovered evidence, as is required to file a second or successive petition, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2). Thus, it dismissed the matter for lack of jurisd iction on May 14, 2014. Knox did not file a timely appeal from the May 2014 dismissa l order. Instead he filed two motions on April 3, 2015. First, he file d a motion for transcripts, claiming he needed copies of all the transcripts, magist rate reports and recommendations, and court orders in all of his prior § 2254 pro ceedings so that he could seek authorization from the Tenth Circ uit to file a second or successive § 2254 petition. Second, he filed a Rule 60(b) mo tion, ostensibly file d “in support of” his motion for transcripts. R. at 65. In th e latter motion, Knox so ught relief from the May 2014 dismissal order unde r Rule 60(b)(6). He ar gued that he had raised constitutional claims in his April 2014 motion that would satisfy the authorization requirements and, thus, the district court should have transferred his 2014 filing to the Tenth Circuit in the in terest of justice. The district court denied both motions in a single order. It denied Knox’s transcript motion because the dockets in Knox’s previous § 2254 proceedings showed Knox had been mailed copies of all the pa pers, pleadings and orders in each. It denied his Rule 60(b) motion, reaffirming its decision that it was not in the interest of justice to transfer th e matter to the Tenth Circuit. Th e district court denied Knox’s request to proceed in forma pauperis and denied him a COA to appeal.4 II. D ISCUSSION Knox’s COA application continues to asse rt arguments relati ng to the district court’s May 2014 order and judg ment of dismissal. We la ck jurisdiction to review that order, however, because Knox did no t file a timely no tice of appeal. See Bowles v. Russell , 551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007) (“[T]he time ly filing of a notice of appeal in a civil case is a jurisdictiona l requirement.”). Judgment was entered on May 5, 2014, and Knox did not file his notice of appeal until April 15, 2015. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A) (providing that any notice of app eal in a civil case mu st be filed within thirty days of entry of judgment). Knox’s Rule 60(b) motion did not toll the applicable thirty-day period because that motion was not filed within twenty-eight days of entry of judgment. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(vi). A COA is required for Knox to appeal th e denial of his April 2015 Rule 60(b) motion because that motion, in substance and effect, reasse rted the same grounds for relief from Knox’s underlying conviction as he raised in his April 2014 filing. See United States v. Nelson , 465 F.3d 1145, 1147 (10th Ci r. 2006). We will issue a COA only if Knox has made “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). We de ny a COA because reasonable jurists would not debate the correctness of the dist rict court’s ruling. The COA application is frivolous. 1

1 It is unclear from Knox’s garbled COA ap plication if he also seeks to appeal the denial of his motion for tr anscripts. To the extent he is seeking to appeal that ruling, we conclude a COA is not require d because the ruling on that motion did not (continued)5 Knox has filed a motion for sanctions, in which he asks this court to sanction the Respondent for matters related to hi s prison mail and other prison conditions. We have reviewed the motion and deny it. We deny Knox’s request for a COA and his motion for sanctions and dismiss the appeal. Appellant’s motion to pro ceed in forma pauperis is denied.

Entered for the Court

Paul J. Kelly, Jr. Circuit Judge

dispose of the merits of Knox ’s § 2254 habeas petition. See Harbison v. Bell , 556 U.S. 180, 183 (2009) (holding COA not required to exercise appellate jurisdiction to review a distri ct court’s final order that doe s not dispose of the merits of the habeas petition). We have reviewed the motion and conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Knox ’s request for the transcripts, papers, pleadings and orders in al l of his § 2254 proceedings.