U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402–0001

55–247 PDF 2011

FEDERAL PROTECTIVE SERVICE: 

WILL CONTINUING CHALLENGES WEAKEN 

TRANSITION AND IMPEDE PROGRESS? 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

NOVEMBER 18, 2009 

Serial No. 111–43 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi, Chairman 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

JANE HARMAN, California 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

HENRY CUELLAR, Texas 

CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania 

YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York 

LAURA RICHARDSON, California 

ANN KIRKPATRICK, Arizona 

BEN RAY LUJA ́ N, New Mexico 

BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey 

EMANUEL CLEAVER, Missouri 

AL GREEN, Texas 

JAMES A. HIMES, Connecticut 

MARY JO KILROY, Ohio 

ERIC J.J. MASSA, New York 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

VACANCY

PETER T. KING, New York 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

PETE OLSON, Texas 

ANH ‘‘JOSEPH’’ CAO, Louisiana 

STEVE AUSTRIA, Ohio 

I. LANIER AVANT, Staff Director 

ROSALINE COHEN, Chief Counsel 

MICHAEL TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

ROBERT O’CONNOR, Minority Staff Director 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 1 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 2 

The Honorable Peter T. King, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of New York, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland Security ........ 3 

The Honorable Laura Richardson, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of California: 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 8 

WITNESSES 

PANEL I 

Mr. Rand Beers, Under Secretary, National Protection Programs Directorate, 

Department of Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 9 

Joint Prepared Statement ................................................................................... 11 

Mr. Gary W. Schenkel, Director, Federal Protective Service, National Protection Programs Directorate, Department of Homeland Security: 

Joint Prepared Statement ................................................................................... 11 

Mr. Robert A. Peck, Commissioner, Public Buildings Service, General Services 

Administration: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 13 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 14 

Mr. Mark L. Goldstein, Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues, Government 

Accountability Office: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 15 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 17 

PANEL II 

Mr. David L. Wright, President, American Federation of Government Employees, Local 918: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 52 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 54 

Mr. Stephen D. Amitay, Federal Legislative Counsel, National Association 

of Security Companies: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 60 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 62 

FOR THE RECORD 

The Honorable Peter T. King, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of New York, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland Security: 

Letter From the American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE 

Local 918—Federal Protective Service) .......................................................... 4 
Page

IV 

APPENDIX 

Questions From Chairman Bennie G. Thompson of Mississippi for Rand 

Beers, Under Secretary, National Protection Programs Directorate, Department of Homeland Security ................................................................................. 71 

Questions From Honorable Charles W. Dent of Pennsylvania for Rand Beers, 

Under Secretary, National Protection Programs Directorate, Department 

of Homeland Security .......................................................................................... 76 

Questions From Chairman Bennie G. Thompson of Mississippi for Gary W. 

Schenkel, Director, Federal Protective Service, National Protection Programs Directorate, Department of Homeland Security .................................... 77 

Questions From Honorable Charles W. Dent of Pennsylvania for Gary W. 

Schenkel, Director, Federal Protective Service, National Protection Programs Directorate, Department of Homeland Security .................................... 102 

Questions From Chairman Bennie G. Thompson of Mississippi for Robert 

A. Peck, Commissioner, Public Buildings Service, General Services Administration ................................................................................................................. 102 

Question From Honorable Charles W. Dent of Pennsylvania for Robert A. 

Peck, Commissioner, Public Buildings Service, General Services Administration ................................................................................................................... 102 

Questions From Chairman Bennie G. Thompson of Mississippi for Mark L. 

Goldstein, Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues, Government Accountability Issues ......................................................................................................... 103 

Questions From Chairman Bennie G. Thompson of Mississippi for David 

L. Wright, President, American Federation of Government Employees— 

Local 918 ............................................................................................................... 103 

Questions From Honorable Charles W. Dent of Pennsylvania for David L. 

Wright, President, American Federation of Government Employees—Local 

918 ......................................................................................................................... 105 

Questions From Chairman Bennie G. Thompson of Mississippi for Stephen 

D. Amitay, Federal Legislative Counsel, National Association of Security 

Companies ............................................................................................................ 106 

Questions From Honorable Charles W. Dent of Pennsylvania for Stephen 

D. Amitay, Federal Legislative Counsel, National Association of Security 

Companies ............................................................................................................ 106 
(1) 

FEDERAL PROTECTIVE SERVICE: WILL CONTINUING CHALLENGES WEAKEN TRANSITION AND IMPEDE PROGRESS? 

Wednesday, November 18, 2009 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:03 a.m., in Room 311, 

Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Bennie G. Thompson [Chairman of the committee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Thompson, Jackson Lee, Cuellar, Carney, Clarke, Richardson, Himes, King, Dent, Olson, Cao, and Austria. 

Chairman THOMPSON [presiding]. The Committee on Homeland 

Security will come to order. 

The committee is meeting today to receive testimony on ‘‘Federal 

Protective Service: Will Continuing Challenges Weaken Transition 

and Impede Progress?’’ 

Good morning. I would like to thank our witnesses for appearing 

before us today. 

We are here this morning to discuss the continuing challenges 

faced by the Federal Protective Service, and how those challenges 

may affect its future. The Federal Protective Service is responsible 

for protecting Federal Government property, personnel, visitors 

and customers, by providing law enforcement and related security 

services for about 9,000 buildings that are under the control and 

custody of the General Services Administration. 

FPS responds to incidents, conducts risk assessments, participates in security meetings with GSA property managers and tenant agencies, and determines whether GSA buildings meet security 

standards established by the Interagency Security Committee. 

To carry out this mission, FPS currently employs about 1,200 

Federal employees. About one-half of the FPS workforce are Federal law enforcement security officers. But those officers are not responsible for providing a law enforcement presence at Federal facilities. On the contrary, these employees are dedicated to overseeing the 15,000 members of a contract guard force. 

For most people, the contract guards are the face of the Federal 

Protective Service. FPS officers, formerly major actors in Federal 

law enforcement, have become primarily responsible for administration and management of a large and growing network of private 

guards. This trend is likely to continue. 
2 

While Congress has mandated that FPS maintain staffing levels 

of at least 1,200, GAO has found that the agency continues to have 

a high attrition rate. Like most other Federal agencies, FPS must 

address the impending retirements of the baby boom generation. 

About 30 percent of the FPS employees will be eligible to retire in 

the next 5 years. 

The impending retirements, combined with a high attrition rate, 

indicate that FPS must implement a strategic human capital plan. 

Yet GAO has found that FPS does not have a strategic human capital plan. 

The lack of a human capital plan could be mitigated by stellar 

oversight of its force of contract guards. But GAO has found that 

FPS does not effectively oversee training and performance of these 

guards. In fact, in one region, FPS failed to provide X-ray or magnetometer training to 1,500 guards since 2004. Nonetheless, these 

guards were assigned to posts at Federal facilities. 

In addition to training and oversight challenges, GAO has identified substantial security vulnerabilities in the FPS guard program. 

GAO investigators were able to successfully carry the IED components through security checkpoints monitored by contract guards in 

10 out of 10 Federal facilities it tested. 

Failures in the guard program could be mitigated by accurate 

FPS assessments of risk, and the implementation of countermeasures by GSA and its tenant agencies. However, GAO has 

found that FPS has only limited influence over the allocation of resources, because resource allocation decisions are a responsibility of 

GSA and tenant agencies. 

I think it is fair to say that the current state of FPS is bleak. 

However, the Department has put forward a transition plan to 

move FPS and implement changes throughout the agency. 

We cannot assume that relocation alone will resolve FPS’s problems. The multi-dimensional and complex challenges faced by this 

agency have been in the making for years. The solution to these 

problems will require resources, planning, and commitment. 

This plan is a first step, but it cannot be the only step taken. 

I look forward to the testimony presented today, and I look forward to the actions that follow. 

[The statement of Chairman Thompson follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN BENNIE G. THOMPSON

We are here today to discuss the continuing challenges faced by the Federal Protective Service and how those challenges may affect its future. 

The Federal Protective Service (FPS) is responsible for protecting Federal Government property, personnel, visitors, and customers by providing law enforcement and 

related security services for about 9,000 buildings that are under the control and 

custody of the General Services Administration (GSA). 

FPS responds to incidents, conducts risk assessments, participates in security 

meetings with GSA property managers and tenant agencies, and determines whether GSA buildings meet security standards established by the Interagency Security 

Committee. 

To carry out this mission, FPS currently employs about 1,200 Federal employees. 

About one-half of the FPS workforce are Federal Law Enforcement Security Officers 

(LESO). But those officers are not responsible for providing a law enforcement presence at Federal facilities. On the contrary, these employees are dedicated to overseeing the 15,000 members of a contract guard workforce. 

For most people, the contract guards are the face of the Federal Protective Service. 
3 

FPS officers, formerly major actors in Federal law enforcement, have become primarily responsible for administration and management of a large and growing network of private guards. 

And this trend is likely to continue. While Congress has mandated that FPS 

maintain staffing levels of at least 1,200, GAO has found that the agency continues 

to have a high attrition rate. 

And like most other Federal agencies, FPS must address the impending retirements of the Baby-Boom generation. About 30 percent of FPS employees will be eligible to retire in the next 5 years. 

These impending retirements combined with a high attrition rate indicate that 

FPS must implement a strategic human capital plan. Yet GAO has found that FPS 

does not have a strategic human capital plan. 

The lack of a human capital plan could be mitigated by stellar oversight of its 

force of contract guards. But GAO has found that FPS does not effectively oversee 

training and performance of these guards. In fact, in one region, FPS failed to provide X-ray or magnetometer training to 1,500 guards since 2004. Nonetheless, these 

guards were assigned to posts at Federal facilities. 

In addition to training and oversight challenges, GAO has identified substantial 

security vulnerabilities in the FPS guard program. GAO investigators were able to 

successfully carry the IED components through security checkpoints monitored by 

contract guards in 10 out of 10 Federal facilities it tested. 

Failures in the guard program could be mitigated by accurate FPS assessments 

of risk and the implementation of countermeasures by GSA and its tenant agencies. 

However, GAO has found that FPS’s has only limited influence over the allocation 

of resources because resource allocation decisions are the responsibility of GSA and 

tenant agencies. 

I think it is fair to say that the current state of FPS is bleak. 

However, the Department has put forward a transition plan to move FPS and implement changes throughout the agency. We cannot assume that relocation alone 

will resolve FPS’s problems. 

The multidimensional and complex challenges faced by this agency have been in 

the making for years. The solution to these problems will require resources, planning, and commitment. 

This plan is the first step. But it cannot be the only step taken. 

Chairman THOMPSON. The Chair now recognizes the Ranking 

Member of the full committee, the gentleman from New York, Mr. 

King, for an opening statement. 

Mr. KING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your courtesy. Thank you for scheduling this hearing. I welcome all the witnesses here today. 

Unfortunately, I will not be able to stay past 10:30. There is a 

large press conference with 9/11 victims, which will be held—which 

I will have to attend. They have come here from New York. 

But I am very interested in this hearing. I know that the Federal 

Protective Service is a vital component of our Nation’s homeland 

security. I certainly look forward to going through the testimony 

and reviewing what is said here today. 

One of the concerns I do have, which echoes what the Chairman 

says, is the GAO reports, which did show significant weaknesses in 

the Federal Protection Services as far as providing the security 

that is needed at our Federal facilities. 

I also bring that up in view of the fact that, of the recent decision 

by the attorney general to hold the trial of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed in Manhattan, in the Southern District. I would be, again, 

very interested in the testimony as to how you feel the measures 

will be taken to protect the Federal facilities in Lower Manhattan, 

what extra steps are going to be taken. 

Obviously, I know you are not going to go into detail. But whether or not you feel that that job can be done. In that regard, I will 

be introducing a letter which recently—I guess it is a copy of a letter to you, Mr. Schenkel, from the American Federation of Govern-
4 

ment Employees, where they talk about severe staffing shortages 

in the New York region. 

So, to me, again, not saying whether that letter is accurate or 

not, but the fact these are serious issues in any event, but to be 

raised with upcoming Federal proceedings in New York with 

Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. I think they take on a particular significance, and I will be looking forward to you addressing that. 

So, with that, Mr. Chairman, again, I thank you for scheduling 

the hearing. I look forward to the testimony, and I regret the fact 

that I will probably have to leave here about 10:30. I am sure you 

will be able to carry on without me, and your heart will not be broken. 

Chairman THOMPSON. It will be difficult. 

Mr. KING. Thank you. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you. 

Without objection, we will enter the letter into the record. 

[The information follows:] 

LETTER FROM THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (AFGE 

LOCAL 918—FEDERAL PROTECTIVE SERVICE) SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY

RANKING MEMBER PETER T. KING

OCTOBER 14, 2009. 

Gary W. Schenkel, 

Director, Federal Protective Service, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 800 N. 

Capitol St. NW, Suite 500, Washington, DC 20002. 

Subject: Region 2: Critical Staffing Levels; Poor Leadership and Management 

MR. SCHENKEL: I write to you today to formally express my serious concerns about 

Region 2 leadership and critical staffing levels within New York City. 

AFGE Local 918–FPS remains extremely concerned about severely inefficient 

staffing levels in New York City and the poor leadership within Region 2. We find 

that the Federal Protective Service is in severe crisis in New York City and despite 

repeated warnings there have been no significant changes or actions taken to address the issues. FPS lacks the necessary staffing and proper leadership within New 

York City and is unable to effectively carry out its mission in the highest risk metropolitan area within the United States. Federal buildings in New York City are at 

great risk and urgent action is needed to address this situation. 

Senior leadership and managers of Region 2 have consistently demonstrated that 

they lack the necessary skill, experience, and initiative to ensure the protection of 

Federal facilities in New York City. AFGE Local 918 finds the Regional management decisions and actions, and the lack thereof on numerous occasions, to be a 

major threat to mission accomplishment. The following are some of the primary 

issues that detail AFGE Local 918’s serious concerns about Region 2. 

• The staffing levels of Region 2 are critical. The Region lacks adequate staffing 

to accomplish the mission. As one of the most at-risk metropolitan locations in 

the country, New York City staffing levels are severely inadequate. FPS does 

not maintain 24-hour coverage in New York City or any part of the Region. Yet, 

despite the critical staffing levels, the Region continues to allow members to 

travel on temporary duty to locations outside of the Region, fails to have a formal mechanism in place to ensure coverage during employee absences and lacks 

a formal procedure for the appropriate use and fair distribution of overtime. Region 2, especially in New York City, needs to ensure maximum coverage by uniformed FPS staff at all times and limit the temporary assignment of staff until 

such time as a major increase staffing is accomplished in the Region. Region 

2 lacks sufficient staffing to participate in special details and assignments. The 

risk to Federal facilities in New York City is just too great to allow the very 

few staff available in New York City to be assigned to work in other locations. 

The following demonstrate serious issues that severely strain the staffing and 

ability for FPS to accomplish its mission in Region 2. 

• The Metro New York District Director David Metzger has been temporarily 

assigned to serve as an instructor for the RAMP training program. This action will leave New York City without a District Director for the period of 

September 15, 2009 through January 15, 2010. This same District Director 
5 

has been attending training and otherwise on leave or temporary assignment 

and out of the District for extended periods throughout the year. With staffing 

already at critical levels in the District and the recent terrorist threat against 

New York City which is being called the most significant terror threat since 

September 11, 2001, we find it incomprehensible that the Region would allow 

the Metro District Director to be absent for such an extended period of time. 

Mr. Metzger has lost touch with the day-to-day operations of his command 

and the lack of leadership has negatively impacted the effectiveness of the 

District. 

• In addition to the District Commander, the Region has assigned an Area 

Commander and an inspector to RAMP instructor duties outside the Region. 

The Region has also assigned two inspectors to the G–20 detail in Pittsburgh. 

In addition, the Region has experienced the extended absence of one Metro 

District Inspector due to a line of duty injury, a second Metro District Inspector for a misconduct allegation, a third Metro District Inspector for a firearms 

qualification issue, a fourth Metro District Inspector has been detailed for 

many months to the Chemical Security Compliance Division, a fifth Metro 

District Inspector has been detailed for many months to Plum Island. The 

pending retirements of a Metro District Police Sergeant, Police Captain and 

a Physical Security Specialist all contribute to the negative staffing issues 

that continue to persist in Region 2 and particularly in New York City. 

• Two recently hired Inspectors have been without a bullet-resistant vest for 

over 3 months. These Inspectors have been in soft uniform performing administrative duties during this time period. Despite the Local’s repeated inquiries 

and calls for urgent action, neither the inspectors nor the Local have seen any 

indication that management is taking any action to obtain the vests so these 

inspectors can return to full uniformed duty. 

• There is an insufficient number of Field Training Inspectors to ensure the 

success of the Field Training Evaluation Program required of all new inspectors. This shortage will surely delay the proper implementation of the Program—resulting in otherwise qualified law enforcement officers to perform 

administrative duties. 

• The Risk Management Branch Chief, Joseph Cuciti, and Law Enforcement 

and Security Program Manager Terence Hoey are frequently out of the office 

on details to FLETC, FPS Headquarters, military leave and the like. The Region 2 Risk Management Branch is ineffective as a result. 

• On September 11, 2009, the 8th anniversary of the 9/11 terror attacks, Region 

2, took no special actions. It was business as usual in New York City and 

throughout the Region with the Metro District pressuring staff to continue work 

on facility security assessments, security level determinations and other administrative work rather than directing highly visible and vigilant patrols of Federal facilities throughout the Region, especially in New York City. Despite the 

fact that the Vice-President of the United States, the Secretary of State, and 

the Secretary of Homeland Security were in Lower Manhattan, Regional management did not so much as send out an email to staff urging vigilance or marking the anniversary of the attacks that had such a major impact on Region 2 

and New York City. Regional management should have directed all law enforcement personnel to be in uniform and conducting highly visible directed patrol 

of Federal facilities throughout the Region, the suspension of non-essential administrative work by law enforcement officers for the day and established a formal plan in advance to ensure maximum staffing coverage. We now know that 

terrorists linked to al Qaeda had planned to carry out attacks in New York City 

on September 11, 2009. Region 2 would have been severely unprepared for any 

attacks. Further, the President of the United States was in New York City at 

a Federal facility in Lower Manhattan and still the Region continued with business as usual. AFGE is baffled and disgusted with Regional management for 

their lack of care or concern on September 11 and for its continuing lack of attention for events going on around New York City in and around Federal facilities. 

• There are two Area Commanders within Metro District. Area Commander 

Rafael Bou covers the New York City boroughs of Manhattan, Brooklyn, and 

The Bronx while Area Commander Saul Roond covers Long Island and New 

York City borough of Queens. Both of the Area Commanders are routinely operating on the 30th floor of 26 Federal Plaza at adjacent desks. Considering the 

geographic dispersion of personnel throughout these two areas, it is difficult to 

understand why both of these Area Commanders are working in such close 

proximity. 
6 

• Area Commander Rafael Bou rarely wears the class C duty uniform and is routinely in plain clothes. With an inspector-based work force, the Area Commander is now the first-line supervisor of the uniformed workforce. Mr. Bou 

does not seem to understand that. He routinely relies on the two remaining Police Sergeants to serve as the uniformed supervisor. This is problematic as GS– 

10 Police Sergeants should not be supervising GS–12 inspectors. In addition, 

Mr. Bou is frequently out of contact with his subordinates. He rarely answers 

his cell phone, his voice mailbox is always full and messages cannot be left. He 

rarely replies to emails citing the fact that his email folder is full, preventing 

him from replying. He frequently is not available on the radio. He arrives and 

departs at varying times and no one seems to know when he is in or when he 

is out. He repeatedly claims he is retiring within days but obviously by his continued presence that is false. We find Mr. Bou’s actions to be abhorrent and a 

significant risk to the uniformed staff and the Federal facilities in New York 

City. • Area Commander Rafael Bou serves as the ‘‘Lead COTR’’ for a number of security guard contracts in the Region. He routinely fails to take timely or appropriate action on issues reported by inspectors. In a recent incident, an FPS Police Officer reported to an inspector that he discovered a contract guard had 

abandoned his post at a Level IV facility for at least 2 hours. The inspector conducted a review of security camera footage which revealed the guard had left 

his post for a majority of his tour of duty. The inspector recommended to Mr. 

Bou that the contract guard be immediately removed from performing work on 

the contract. Mr. Bou subsequently approached the Police Officer who initially 

discovered the incident and asked the Officer if a letter of reprimand would suffice as a form of punishment to address the matter. The Police Officer deferred 

the matter to the inspector. The guard was not immediately removed as recommended and the contract guard was found to have abandoned his post again 

on his next tour of duty. The inspector reported the incident to Mr. Bou and 

again called for the guard’s removal which was completed a few days later. The 

fact that Mr. Bou would consult with the Police Officer and not the inspector 

on the appropriate means to address this matter as well as his failure to 

promptly address this matter in light of the recent national media attention 

given to FPS oversight of contract guards is bewildering. • On a separate contract guard issue, a contract security guard in Manhattan was 

removed from performing work on a contract due to the guard’s failure to take 

appropriate action to prevent and identify persons who vandalized Federal property in his presence. In addition, it was determined through close monitoring 

by a group of inspectors that the guard had serious issues with following instructions and paying attention to his duties. A few months later, the same individual who was removed from the Manhattan contract was found to be working at two Security Level IV facilities in Queens. The matter was reported to 

Mr. Bou for action yet he failed to take action. The guard continues to work 

as a contract security guard at Level IV Federal facilities in Queens. The Local 

is bewildered how an individual can be removed from performing work under 

a Federal contract in one borough and yet be allowed to gain employment under 

a separate Federal contract in another adjacent borough in the same District 

of the same Region of FPS. Further, we find it abhorrent that the matter was 

not immediately addressed by Mr. Bou when it was brought to his attention. 

The matter was referred to the Joint Intake Center for action but the guard 

continues to work as a contract guard. 

• In the Upstate New York area, the limited staffing and vast geographic area 

requires inspectors to conduct extensive travel. Inspectors are expected to travel 

over 120 miles to conduct checks of Federal facilities and contract guards. Recently, inspectors were required to travel 240 miles to pick-up ToughBook 

laptop computers. They also travel the same route quarterly to conduct firearms 

qualification. It is neither fair nor safe to expect these inspectors to travel such 

extensive distances during a tour of duty. 

• The Region has demonstrated that it has no clue when it comes to processing 

worker compensation claims. A recent line of duty injury suffered by an inspector revealed the lack of knowledge by Regional management in handling these 

issues which resulted in the delayed filing of paperwork. In meetings with 

AFGE representatives, the Regional Director and Deputy Regional Director indicated that the responsibility for the administration of the program was being 

transferred from Mission Support Chief Martin Mcrimmon to Special Assistant 

John Natale. At a subsequent meeting, the Deputy Regional Director indicated 

that the Mission Support Chief would again be handling OWCP matters. Shortly, after that meeting Regional management advised the Local that OWCP mat-
7 

ters would again be handled by Special Assistant John Natale. In order to avoid 

the problems encountered in past line of duty cases, the Local recommended 

that Regional management establish a standard operating procedure and provide training to its supervisors on handling line of duty injuries. Rather than 

accept the lessons learned from past incidents, the Region took a lax approach 

to the matter. They put together a cut-and-paste job of a memo which they 

placed on the shared server drive using a Region 11 Standard Operating Procedure (SOP). They failed to change the points of contact in the policy, leaving 

the Region 11 point of contact and not adding a Region 2 point of contact. This 

lack of attention to detail is indicative of the manner in which Region 2 management handles all matters. 

• Region 2 Threat Management Branch distributes a daily report via email to 

FPS HQ and Regional staff—to include non-law enforcement personnel and staff 

of other agencies. Until recent inquiry by an AFGE representative, the report 

routinely contained the name, date of birth, social security number and residence of subjects. This information is now being redacted in most instances but 

the report continues to contain an excessive amount of information to include 

the names of law enforcement personnel taking actions, investigative and operational methods and techniques employed in Regional daily operations. The unauthorized disclosure of this information could adversely impact the conduct of 

Regional law enforcement and security operations or the privacy or welfare of 

involved persons. Routinely, the synopsis of the form 3155 is cut and past into 

the daily report with little or no modification. This amounts to releasing the 

form 3155 each time the daily report is prepared and distributed. If a daily report to non-law enforcement personnel and outside Agencies is necessary, its 

content should be minimal with very short and minimally descriptive summaries of daily events. In addition, the report should be reviewed for accuracy, 

proper format and any errors prior to distribution. The frequently observed typographical errors, cut-and-paste formatting errors that include use of a variety 

of fonts on occasion and other minor errors indicate that a careful review of this 

product before its dissemination is not being conducted. 

• The Region replaced all portable radios. As a continuing evidence of the Region’s lack of attention to detail, only one Region 2 channel was programmed 

into the new portable radios. To date, this has not been corrected and the Region 2 portable radios continue to have only a single change programmed. On 

a related note, when the Region received new vehicles, the vehicles sat in a 

parking garage for months before being assigned. When vehicles were replaced, 

old vehicles sat in the garage for months. There was no timely issuance or return of vehicles to ensure maximum cost efficiency. The Region 2 Mission Support Service Branch frequently creates more problems than they solve. 

• Region 2 recently hired three Area Commanders for Metro District. Each of 

these new managers was hired from outside the agency. There were no internal 

promotions. Two of the Area Commanders have sat around for several months 

while they await required FLETC training dates. One of the Area Commanders 

has accumulated nearly 200 hours of leave-without-pay during his tenure with 

FPS. The agency needs to promote from within its current ranks and have an 

effective, formal mechanism in place to develop inspectors for leadership and 

management positions within the agency. 

AFGE Local 918–FPS has been expressing its serious concerns about Region 2 for 

several years. Our concerns have gone mainly unaddressed. There is a systemic 

problem with poor leadership and management in Region 2. We believe that senior 

Region 2 leadership lacks the motivation, skills, and abilities to effectively lead and 

manage FPS operations in the 21st Century. Changes in senior Regional leadership 

are necessary if Region 2 is to become an effective component of FPS. 

I would like the opportunity to discuss these issues with you and work together 

to find solutions. We remain extremely concerned about the critical staffing issues 

in New York City. I felt it necessary to address the staffing issue in further detail 

in additional correspondence with you and to Members of Congress. I strongly urge 

immediate action to address the management deficiencies in New York City. 

Sincerely, 

DAVID L. WRIGHT, 

President, AFGE Local 918–FPS. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Other Members of the committee are reminded that under committee rules, opening statements may be 

submitted for the record. 

[The statement of Hon. Richardson follows:] 
8 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HONORABLE LAURA RICHARDSON

NOVEMBER 17, 2009 

Mister Chairman, thank you for convening this very important hearing today examining the continuing challenges faced by the Federal Protective Service. I appreciate your commitment to this vital issue. I would also like to thank our witnesses 

for being here today. 

The Federal Protective Service (FPS) provides law enforcement and security services for almost 9,000 Federal facilities and countless millions in Federal assets. The 

sheer scope of this kind of service means that we must do everything we can to ensure that they have the resources and organizational structure in place to effectively 

do their job and keep our many buildings and employees safe in the face of the 

many threats to their security. 

The reports regarding lapses in security due to carelessness, negligence, and lack 

of training is distressing, to say the very least. We are relying on FPS for the security of so many people and places—and too many reports of this nature indicate an 

epidemic, not an isolated incident. And considering that one of the buildings 

breached was a House office building right across the street from the Capitol, an 

important symbol of our Nation and an irresistible target for terrorists, I would 

think that is a clear sign that change is needed. 

As the representative of the 37th Congressional District in California which is a 

target-rich area for terrorists due to its close proximity to the Ports of Los Angeles 

and Long Beach, I have a particular interest in ensuring that this agency has the 

resources and structure in place to not only adequately handle its duties but to 

excel. Therefore, it is of particular import to me that the Federal Protective Services 

is doing the best job it possibly can. 

The transfer of FPS from Immigration and Customs Enforcement to the National 

Protection and Programs Directorate will most certainly have an effect on FPS’ governance, function, and accountability. With so much at stake, we must ensure that 

this transition is as smooth and seamless as it possibly can be. Too much time has 

passed already since the problems within FPS have been identified. I look forward 

to hearing the ideas and recommendations of our distinguished panel of witnesses 

as to how we can improve this Service and further secure our Nation against 

threats. 

Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for convening this hearing. I yield back my time. 

Chairman THOMPSON. I now welcome our first panel of witnesses. 

Our first witness is Mr. Rand Beers, the Under Secretary for the 

National Protection and Programs Directorate. Mr. Beers oversees 

the operation of the directorate’s subcomponents: Cybersecurity 

and communications; infrastructure protection; risk management 

and analysis; and the United States visitors and immigration status indicator technology, commonly referred to as US–VISIT program. 

Soon, he will be adding FPS to this list of subcomponents under 

his direction. I do not know what else after that, Mr. Beers, but 

I am sure you will handle it. 

Our second witness is Mr. Gary Schenkel, the appointed director 

of Federal Protective Service in March 2007. Prior to joining the 

FPS, he served as assistant Federal security director for the Transportation Security Administration at Chicago Midway Airport. 

Welcome. 

Our third witness is Mr. Robert Peck, the commissioner of Public 

Buildings Service at the General Services Administration. As commissioner, Mr. Peck is responsible for design, construction, and 

leasing of 354 million square feet of Government property. 

Welcome, Mr. Peck. 

Our final witness on this panel is Mr. Mark Goldstein, who is the 

director of the Physical Infrastructure Issues team at the Govern-
9 

ment Accountability Office. Mr. Goldstein is responsible for GAO’s 

work in the areas of Government facilities and telecommunications. 

I also welcome you here today, Mr. Goldstein. 

Without objection, the witnesses’ full statements will be inserted 

in the record. I now ask each witness to summarize his statement 

for 5 minutes. 

Mr. Beers, however, will make a single statement for both FPS 

and NPPD. Mr. Schenkel will participate in the question-and-answer segment of the hearing. We look forward to hearing his responses under Members’ questions. 

I now recognize Secretary Beers. 

STATEMENT OF RAND BEERS, UNDER SECRETARY, NATIONAL 

PROTECTION PROGRAMS DIRECTORATE, DEPARTMENT OF 

HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. BEERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, and Ranking 

Member King, and the other Members of the committee for inviting 

us to appear before you today to discuss the transition of the Federal Protective Service into the National Protection and Programs 

Directorate. 

We want to talk today about a number of those things. But I also 

want to acknowledge Director Schenkel here, and Bob Peck from 

GSA and Mark Goldstein from GAO, whom we work closely with. 

Both gentlemen are contributing importantly to the work of FPS. 

Let me start by saying that Secretary Napolitano and I have an 

enormous appreciation and tremendous respect for the work that 

FPS does every day all over the country. 

As you are aware, FPS was transferred to the National Protection and Programs Directorate on October 28 of this year with the 

signing of the Fiscal Year 2010 Department of Homeland Security 

Act. The protection of Federal facilities and their occupants is a 

critical mission. 

We at DHS need to ensure that FPS has the resources and the 

infrastructure to accomplish that mission. This is a charge which 

Secretary Napolitano has levied on us, and one which we take very 

seriously. 

For the past 6 months with respect to this transition, NPPD has 

worked closely with the Federal Protective Service and the Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agency to ensure an orderly 

transition. We will be happy to elaborate on that in the question 

period. 

Additionally, I believe that we have made important progress in 

addressing a number of the GAO recommendations. But clearly, 

more work needs to be done. 

With respect to that, as the committee is aware, since its transfer to DHS in 2003, FPS has been the subject of five GAO audits 

that have resulted in 20 recommendations for improving management and operations. 

With respect to those 20 recommendations, five have been addressed and closed; 10 related to facility protection, finance, and 

human capital planning are currently actively being worked; and 

five are tied directly to the implementation of FPS’s Risk Assessment and Management Program, or RAMP, and will likely remain 
10 

open until RAMP, which is now in its initial operating status, is 

fully operational in 2011. 

I would also like to address some of the major areas identified 

recently by GAO as needing improvement and review some of the 

actions and initiatives taken by FPS to make these changes. 

First, with respect to human capital, FPS has made improvements in its human capital management since the June 2008 GAO 

report recommended that FPS develop and implement a strategic 

approach to manage staffing resources. FPS has refined and is 

using a strategic staff allocation model to manage its staffing resources. Director Schenkel can fill you in on the details of that. 

FPS has also enhanced its capability to identify and report personnel strength levels, allowing FPS to better manage resource levels. FPS’s accomplishment led GAO to close this recommendation 

last month. In addition to this major accomplishment, FPS has 

used its human capital management plan to make important 

progress in recruiting, training, and allocating personnel during 

the past 18 months. 

Further, I would note that NPPD and FPS human capital management functions have been combined just this last week. This 

moves us, I think, into an integration that builds on the momentum, quite frankly, that FPS has already made and fully integrates 

NPPD’s human capital processes to improve the overall approach 

to management of staffing resources. 

Second, with respect to finance, GAO has offered recommendations for improving FPS’s financial processes. FPS, I think, has 

made some important improvements in this area. With Congressional support and guidance, FPS has improved its business processes and its enhanced financial functions to pay huge dividends. 

In the National Capital Region alone, for example, an improved 

procurement process for contracted guard services resulted in a 

$5.5 million cost reduction in 2008. These savings were passed directly to the agency client. 

Additionally, FPS has eliminated a backlog of 2,200 invoices totaling $92 million, some of which predated the creation of DHS. 

FPS has consolidated and centralized the entire invoice payment 

process. Since the beginning of 2008—fiscal year 2008—has paid 95 

percent of all invoices within 30 days. In its most recent month, the 

percentage rose to 99.5 percent. 

I think this is a mark of the seriousness with which we have 

taken the recommendations, and the efforts that FPS has undertaken to move forward. 

The third point I want to make is with respect to contract guard 

oversight. FPS has been developing detailed performance measures 

that are directly linked to the 2008 strategic plan. In fiscal year 

2010, FPS will formalize these performance measures. 

FPS has been developing a draft set of more than 80 potential 

measures that are aligned to FPS programs to determine FPS’s 

progress toward meeting the goals and objectives in that strategic 

plan. 

Furthermore, FPS is currently developing additional information 

collection and analysis tools to allow these comprehensive measures to be fully implemented. 
11 

Specifically to address these, FPS has responded by first identifying contract guards with expired certifications and qualifications, 

and brought them into compliance with contract provisions—or removed them. Second, it has required contract guards to complete 

additional training in magnetometer and X-ray screening operations and techniques. 

Third, it has authorized the use of overtime to increase the frequency of contract guard post inspections. Finally, we have established a National study group to determine what the causes of 

these lapses were and what more might be done. 

Finally, FPS has established a covert testing working group and 

set up a covert testing plan to complement these other overall efforts. 

In conclusion, transition of FPS advances Secretary Napolitano’s 

strategic vision and her commitment to align the functions within 

the Department of Homeland Security in a manner that leverages 

DHS’s resources and competencies. 

Director Schenkel and I would be happy to answer any of your 

questions. Thank you very much. 

[The joint statement of Mr. Beers and Mr. Schenkel follows:] 

JOINT PREPARED STATEMENT OF RAND BEERS AND GARY SCHENKEL

NOVEMBER 18, 2009 

Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member King, and Members of the committee, 

thank you for inviting me to appear before you today to discuss the transition of 

the Federal Protective Service (FPS). As you are aware, FPS transferred from U.S. 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to the National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) on October 28, 2009, with the signing of the Fiscal Year 

2010 Department of Homeland Security Act (Pub. L. 111–83). This move advances 

Secretary Napolitano’s strategic vision and her commitment to align functions within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in a manner that leverages the Department’s resources and competencies to maximize FPS’ contributions to the Department and its value to the Nation. 

For the past 6 months, NPPD has worked closely with FPS and ICE to ensure 

an orderly and seamless transition. I have an enormous appreciation and tremendous respect for FPS’s work. The protection of Federal facilities and their occupants 

is critical, and we need to ensure that FPS has the resources and infrastructure to 

accomplish that mission. FPS Director Schenkel and I take our responsibility to provide such resources and infrastructure very seriously; this framed our transition 

plan, guided us throughout the transition period, and will continue to inform our 

decisions as we move forward. 

GAO AUDIT SUMMARY

Since its transfer to DHS in 2003, the FPS has been the subject of five Government Accountability Office (GAO) audits that have resulted in 20 recommendations 

for improving its management and operations. The disposition of the 20 recommendations is as follows: 

• Five have been addressed and closed. 

• Ten related to facility protection, finance, and human capital planning and are 

being actively worked. 

• Five are tied directly to the implementation of FPS’s Risk Assessment and Management Program (RAMP), and likely will remain open until RAMP is fully 

operational in 2011. 

I would like to address some of the major areas identified by GAO as needing improvement—human capital, finance, and contract guard oversight—as well as review some of the actions and initiatives taken by FPS to make these changes. 

Human Capital 

FPS has made improvements in its human capital management since a June 2008 

GAO report recommended that FPS develop and implement a strategic approach to 

manage staffing resources. FPS refined, and is using, a strategic staff allocation 
12 

model to manage its staffing resources. It has also enhanced regional and headquarters capabilities to identify and report personnel strength levels, allowing FPS 

to achieve and maintain optimum resource levels. FPS’s accomplishments and improvements in this area led GAO to close this recommendation last month. 

In addition to this major accomplishment, FPS has used its human capital management plan to make remarkable progress in recruiting, training, and allocating 

personnel during the past 18 months. At the beginning of 2008, as a result of budget 

requirements, FPS was directed to reduce its staff from 1,100 to 950 employees. FPS 

immediately developed an action plan to bring about those reductions while still accomplishing its critical mission. To save the jobs of a large number of valued employees, FPS identified programs that would reimburse FPS for assignments of a 

substantial number of positions. Three months later, the enactment of the Fiscal 

Year 2008 Omnibus Act required FPS to increase its strength by 150 additional law 

enforcement personnel, rather than reduce its staff to 950. FPS aggressively 

changed course and conducted the most successful recruiting and selection campaign 

in FPS history. 

Further, just this week I combined NPPD and FPS human capital management 

functions. This move capitalizes on the momentum made by FPS in the human capital area and fully integrates NPPD’s human capital processes to improve the overall strategic approach to its management of staffing resources. 

Finance 

GAO has offered recommendations for improving FPS’s financial processes, and 

FPS has made important improvements. With Congress’ support and guidance, FPS 

has employed a strategic approach to improve its business processes, and its significantly enhanced financial functions have paid huge dividends. In the National Capital Region alone, an improved procurement process for guard services resulted in 

reducing the cost of three new security guard contracts by $5.5 million in fiscal year 

2008, savings that were passed directly to the agency client. An especially noteworthy accomplishment was the elimination of a backlog of 2,200 invoices totaling 

$92 million, some of which pre-dated the creation of DHS. To improve FPS’ invoice 

payment processes, FPS consolidated the entire process by requiring that all invoices be sent to a central location. Since the beginning of fiscal year 2008, FPS has 

paid 95 percent of all invoices within 30 days, and, in the most recent month, the 

percentage of payments paid within 30 days rose to 99.5 percent. 

FPS continues to refine its financial business processes. This year, it developed 

and implemented an activity-based cost model that captures obligations and expenses and links them directly to the appropriate line of business, activity, and cost 

center. The model is still being tested, but early results indicate that it will allow 

us to analyze security costs by facility, risk level, and performance. This capability 

will assist in developing and evaluating potential alternative fee methodologies that 

align costs of services required for designated security levels. 

Contract Guard Oversight 

During the past year, FPS has been developing detailed performance measures 

that are directly linked to its strategic plan, which was issued in 2008. FPS has developed a draft set of more than 80 potential measures that are aligned to FPS programs and can provide information to determine FPS progress toward meeting the 

goals and objectives in the strategic plan. FPS is now testing and refining the highest priority measures to ensure their feasibility and accuracy. Based on this testing, 

FPS will establish comprehensive performance measures in fiscal year 2010. Further, FPS is currently developing additional information collection and analysis tools 

to allow these comprehensive measures to be fully implemented. 

To specifically address the most recent oversight issues reported by GAO, FPS has 

responded to improve oversight of it contract guard force. For example, within hours 

of learning of lapses in screening procedures in selected facilities, FPS: 

• Established a National study group to determine the causes of the lapses and 

to recommend measures to prevent their recurrence; 

• Authorized overtime to increase the frequency of contract guard post inspections; 

• Required contract guards to complete additional training in magnetometer and 

X-ray screening operations and techniques; and 

• Identified contract guards with expired certifications and qualifications and 

brought them into compliance with contract provisions or removed them. 

In addition to these measures, FPS established a Covert Testing Working Group 

and tasked its members to develop a Covert Testing Program to enhance and complement on-going overt efforts to improve oversight and promote attentiveness and 

professionalism of the contract guard force. The working group has developed a 
13 

draft program that will contribute to a multi-faceted approach to achieve FPS strategic goals effectively and efficiently and to ensure secure facilities and safe occupants. This approach will be integrated with FPS’ formal program review process, 

which facilitates data analysis management and consistent follow-up to ensure that 

corrective actions and identified policy and training deficiencies are adequately addressed and resolved. We anticipate that the new policy directive to implement the 

program will be in place no later than December 11, 2009. 

I thank you for your time today. I appreciate the opportunity to discuss the Federal Protective Service’s transition and progress. I will be happy to answer any 

questions from the committee. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you for your testimony. 

I now recognize Commissioner Peck to summarize his statement 

for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF ROBERT A. PECK, COMMISSIONER, PUBLIC 

BUILDINGS SERVICE, GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION 

Mr. PECK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member, Congressman King. Thank you for inviting GSA to come to this hearing 

this morning. 

Mr. Chairman, you noted the range of our buildings, 354 million 

square feet of buildings that house 1 million Federal tenants all 

around the country. I think what I would like to do most is to put 

the issue of security in context. 

We always say that we have no more important mission in GSA, 

a mission which we share with the Federal Protective Service, of 

providing for the security of the people who work in our Federal 

buildings, and for the citizens who come to visit. 

It is important to note that this is an incredibly difficult undertaking, because our buildings, by and large, are not high-security 

installations in the traditional sense of a place where you can surround it with double concertina wire and high-intensity lighting, 

and keep everybody out. 

On the contrary, we invite the public into our buildings. They 

paid for the buildings. The people who work in those buildings 

serve the public. So, it is a balance that we have to maintain, and 

it makes security quite a bit more difficult than it is in other contexts. 

Second, in our buildings we have agencies with a wide range of 

responsibilities—and, commensurately, a wide range of threats 

against them—from law enforcement agencies, courts, U.S. attorneys’ offices, to agencies like Social Security and CIS, who are 

there to serve people who have business to conduct with the Government. 

Security is something that happens in a continuum, beginning 

with intelligence, with the efforts of our military overseas to disrupt those foreign threats against us, and moving into technology 

in our buildings, and also the human assets, which is the focus 

mostly of your hearing today. But it is important for us to work on, 

and we are working with FPS and other Federal agencies on defining what the threats are, and what are those threats that we can 

reasonably and most effectively mitigate by measures in our buildings. 

As I said, some measures against threats have to be taken outside our buildings. Then, there are those threats which we need to 

accept, in a way, as a risk of doing business in a democracy. All 

of that makes this a very complicated job, and a job which requires 
14 

a look at each and every Federal facility as a separate security 

issue. 

The question of what we do when we get down to what I often 

refer to as the last line of defense, the human assets we have in 

the buildings, which are mostly contract guards, but also Federal 

Protective Service officers. 

There are lots of issues which we are going to bring up today. 

They have to do with training. They have to do with costs. Whether 

the guards that we employ are Federal employees or private sector, 

we need to consider how much money it is going to cost us. 

I think there may be opportunities in which we can find that we 

need fewer human assets on site, and replace them possibly with 

more roving patrols and with different sorts of technology and different sorts of access procedures to our buildings. 

I would just tell you, we are working as hard as we can with the 

Federal Protective Service. We have liaisons in each one of our 11 

regions, who are specifically dedicated to working with the Federal 

Protective Service on doing asset security risk analyses on our 

buildings, and working day-to-day to make sure that security is 

done as seamlessly as possible. 

Two days ago, we held a—Federal Protective Service, which runs 

the Interagency Security Committee—held a conference in which 

we discussed the physical standards which apply to the construction and renovation of our buildings. We had some very good conversations about the issues I have raised here about balancing security openness and mitigating our threats in the most effective 

way. 

Finally I will just say, I will defer mostly to the Department of 

Homeland Security and FPS on the issue that Congressman King 

raised about the upcoming trial in New York. I will just—I will 

note that we have had terrorist trials in that venue before. As you 

know, Congressman, the State and the city also have courts nearby. We have a lot of assets that we rely on, quite frankly, from the 

city of New York and the State. But we also do have Federal assets. We do have a pretty robust Federal Protective Service presence in New York City. 

The physical arrangement of the courthouse and lockup near 

there, the detention center near there, I believe are among the 

things that made us decide that this is a venue that we can protect. But it will require more assets. It will require some inconvenience to employees and visitors and drivers in New York City. 

Thank you, and I am happy to answer any questions, obviously. 

[The statement of Mr. Peck follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBERT A. PECK

NOVEMBER 18, 2009 

Good morning Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member King, and Members of this 

committee. My name is Robert A. Peck and I am the Commissioner of the General 

Services Administration’s (GSA’s) Public Buildings Service (PBS). Thank you for inviting me to appear before you today to discuss GSA’s role and expectations in the 

security of our facilities. 

We have no more important responsibility than safeguarding our roughly 1 million Federal tenants, housed in GSA facilities, and their visitors in a manner that 

reflects the values of American democracy and the responsibility of our Government 

to be open to the citizens it serves. Our buildings must be secure and at the same 
15 

time must also be inviting and a good neighbor in their communities. This is a tall 

order. 

GSA’s PBS is one of the largest and most diversified public real estate organizations in the world. Our real estate inventory consists of over 8,600 owned and leased 

assets with nearly 354 million square feet of space across all 50 States, 6 territories, 

and the District of Columbia. Our portfolio is composed primarily of office buildings, 

courthouses, land ports of entry, and warehouses. GSA’s goal is to manage these assets efficiently, while delivering and maintaining superior workplaces at best value 

to our client agencies and the American taxpayer. Achieving this goal requires a 

complete understanding of the threats facing our facilities, the accurate and timely 

identification of vulnerabilities, and a clear understanding of the tools available to 

us to overcome the vulnerabilities and counter the threats. 

We rely on the Federal Protective Service (FPS) to conduct risk assessments of 

our facilities. These assessments and additional input from FPS help inform how 

we design, acquire, and run our buildings. 

Like all executive branch agencies, GSA and FPS are subject to the security 

standards established by the Interagency Security Committee (ISC). The ISC’s 

membership includes representatives from more than 40 Executive departments and 

agencies, in addition to the U.S. Courts. 

GSA is the only Federal agency whose mission is real property management that 

is represented in the ISC. Through our participation, we ensure that the real property perspective is included in all standards. Specifically, PBS engages representatives from all disciplines in developing our input: Leasing specialists, architects, engineers, portfolio management professionals, customer service representatives, child 

care center specialists, and building management officials. 

We are encouraged that the ISC is working to develop new standards that are 

moving in a direction that allows greater flexibility about risk-based allocation. At 

GSA, we firmly believe in the need for risk-based allocation of resources throughout 

our portfolio. Even in the area of physical security, this is particularly important. 

Funding and efforts must first be focused on the highest risk facilities, and against 

the highest risk threats. 

GSA remains committed to providing our customers with a comprehensive work 

environment to allow them to complete their mission. We work continuously with 

FPS to assess, support, and safeguard our Federal facilities. I met recently with 

FPS leadership in Kansas City to advance the risk-based allocation approach to security. 

In closing, I’d like to reiterate that PBS is committed to providing our customers 

with the most effective working environments we can. Current standards dictate security measures that applied across a broad range of facilities. Integrating a new 

risk-based approach provides us with the most flexibility to address site-specific conditions and balance necessary security measures with openness of our public buildings. 

I look forward to working with the committee as we continue to make great 

strides in this area. Thank you for allowing me to testify before you today. I welcome any questions you might have. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you for your testimony. 

I now recognize Director Goldstein to summarize his statement 

for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF MARK L. GOLDSTEIN, DIRECTOR, PHYSICAL 

INFRASTRUCTURE ISSUES, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY 

OFFICE 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the 

committee. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify on the Federal Protective Service and its progress in meeting its mission of protecting 

Federal buildings, employees, and citizens. 

As you know, FPS, within the Department of Homeland Security, 

is responsible for providing law enforcement and related security 

services for nearly 9,000 Federal facilities. 

In 2004, GAO identified a set of key protection practices from the 

collective practices of Federal agencies in the private sector, which 

included allocation of resources, using risk management, strategic 
16 

management of human capital, leveraging technology, information 

sharing and coordination, and performance measurement and testing. 

My testimony today is based on a GAO report being released, as 

well as past reports and testimonies, and discusses limitations FPS 

faces in protecting GSA buildings and resulting vulnerabilities, and 

actions that FPS was taking. 

To perform this work, we used the key practices as our criteria, 

visited a number of GSA buildings, surveyed tenant agencies, analyzed pertinent laws, and also conducted covert testings at 10 

judgmentally selected, high-security buildings in four cities. 

FPS’s approach to securing GSA buildings reflects some aspects 

of key protection practices. However, GAO found limitations in 

each area and identified vulnerabilities. 

More specifically, FPS faces obstacles in allocating resources 

using risk management. FPS uses an outdated risk assessment tool 

and a subjective, time-consuming process to assess risk. In addition, resource allocation decisions are the responsibility of GSA and 

tenant agencies. This leads to uncertainty about whether risks are 

being mitigated. 

Also, FPS continues to struggle with funding challenges that impede its ability to allocate resources effectively, and a lack of equity 

remains in the fees paid by tenants. 

Second, FPS does not have a strategic human capital management plan to guide its current and future workforce planning efforts, making it difficult to discern how effective its transition to 

an inspector-based workforce will be. 

Furthermore, because contract guards were not properly trained 

and did not comply with post orders, GAO investigators concealing 

components for an improvised explosive device passed undetected 

by FPS guards at 10 of 10 high-security facilities in four major cities. Many contract guards lack required certifications to stand post 

in Federal facilities. 

Third, FPS lacks a systematic approach for leveraging technology, and inspectors do not provide tenant agencies with an analysis of alternative technologies, the cost and the associated reduction in risk. As a result, there is limited assurance that the recommendations inspectors make are the best available alternatives, 

and tenant agencies must make resource allocation decisions without key information. 

Fourth, FPS has developed information-sharing and coordination 

mechanisms with GSA and tenant agencies, but there is inconsistency in the type of information shared and the frequency of coordination. 

Fifth, FPS lacks a reliable data management system for accurately tracking performance measurement and testing. Without 

such a system, it is difficult for FPS to evaluate and improve the 

effectiveness of its efforts, allocate resources, or make informed risk 

management decisions. 

FPS is taking steps to better protect GSA buildings. For example, 

FPS is developing a new risk assessment program, and has recently focused on improving the oversight of its contract guard program. Additionally, GAO has recommended that FPS implements 
17 

specific actions to make greater use of key practices and otherwise 

improve security. 

However, FPS has not completed many related corrective actions, 

and FPS faces implementation challenges to achieve those objectives, as well. 

Nonetheless, adhering to key practices and implementing GAO’s 

recommendations in specific areas would enhance FPS’s chances for 

future success, and could position FPS to become a leader and 

benchmark agency for facility protection in the Federal Government. 

This concludes my statement. I would be happy to answer any 

questions the committee may have. 

[The statement of Mr. Goldstein follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MARK L. GOLDSTEIN

NOVEMBER 18, 2009 

GAO HIGHLIGHTS

Highlights of GAO–10–236T, a testimony to the Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives. 

Why GAO Did This Study 

The Federal Protective Service (FPS) within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is responsible for providing law enforcement and related security services 

for nearly 9,000 Federal facilities under the control and custody of the General Services Administration (GSA). In 2004 GAO identified a set of key protection practices 

from the collective practices of Federal agencies and the private sector, which included allocation of resources using risk management, strategic management of 

human capital, leveraging of technology, information sharing and coordination, and 

performance measurement and testing. 

This testimony is based on past reports and testimonies and discusses: (1) Limitations FPS faces in protecting GSA buildings and resulting vulnerabilities; and (2) 

actions FPS is taking. To perform this work, GAO used its key practices as criteria, 

visited a number of GSA buildings, surveyed tenant agencies, analyzed pertinent 

laws and DHS and GSA documents, conducted covert testing at 10 judgmentally selected high-security buildings in four cities, and interviewed officials from DHS, 

GSA, and tenant agencies, and contractors and guards. 

What GAO Recommends 

GAO makes no new recommendations in this testimony. DHS concurred with 

GAO’s past recommendations for FPS, but FPS has not completed many related corrective actions. 

HOMELAND SECURITY.—GREATER ATTENTION TO KEY PRACTICES WOULD HELP ADDRESS

SECURITY VULNERABILITIES AT FEDERAL BUILDINGS

What GAO Found 

FPS’s approach to securing GSA buildings reflects some aspects of key protection 

practices; however, GAO found limitations in each area and identified 

vulnerabilities. More specifically: 

• FPS faces obstacles in allocating resources using risk management. FPS uses 

an outdated risk assessment tool and a subjective, time-consuming process to 

assess risk. In addition, resource allocation decisions are the responsibility of 

GSA and tenant agencies. This leads to uncertainty about whether risks are 

being mitigated. Also, FPS continues to struggle with funding challenges that 

impede its ability to allocate resources effectively. 

• FPS does not have a strategic human capital management plan to guide its current and future workforce planning efforts, making it difficult to discern how 

effective its transition to an inspector-based workforce will be. Furthermore, because contract guards were not properly trained and did not comply with post 

orders, GAO investigators concealing components for an improvised explosive 

device passed undetected by FPS guards at 10 of 10 high-security facilities in 

four major cities. 
18 

1GAO, High Risk Series: An Update, GAO–09–271 (Washington, DC: Jan. 1, 2009). 2 40 U.S.C. § 1315. 3Funding for FPS is provided through revenues and collections of security fees charged to 

building tenants in FPS-protected property. The revenues and collections are credited to FPS’s 

appropriation and are available until expended for the protection of Federally-owned and leased 

buildings and for FPS’s operations. 4GAO, Homeland Security: Further Actions Needed to Coordinate Federal Agencies’ Facility 

Protection Efforts and Promote Key Practices, GAO–05–49 (Washington, DC: Nov. 30, 2004). 5We did not include the key practice of aligning assets to mission because GSA, not FPS, controls the asset inventory. 

• FPS lacks a systematic approach for leveraging technology, and inspectors do 

not provide tenant agencies with an analysis of alternative technologies, their 

cost, and the associated reduction in risk. As a result, there is limited assurance 

that the recommendations inspectors make are the best available alternatives, 

and tenant agencies must make resource allocation decisions without key information. • FPS has developed information sharing and coordination mechanisms with GSA 

and tenant agencies, but there is inconsistency in the type of information 

shared and the frequency of coordination. • FPS lacks a reliable data management system for accurately tracking performance measurement and testing. Without such a system, it is difficult for FPS 

to evaluate and improve the effectiveness of its efforts, allocate resources, or 

make informed risk management decisions. 

FPS is taking actions to better protect GSA buildings, in part as a result of GAO’s 

recommendations. For example, FPS is developing a new risk assessment program 

and has recently focused on improving oversight of its contract guard program. Additionally, GAO has recommended that FPS implement specific actions to make 

greater use of key practices and otherwise improve security. However, FPS has not 

completed many related corrective actions and FPS faces implementation challenges 

as well. Nonetheless, adhering to key practices and implementing GAO’s recommendations in specific areas would enhance FPS’s chances for future success, and 

could position FPS to become a leader and benchmark agency for facility protection 

in the Federal Government. 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the committee: We are pleased to be here to discuss the Federal Protective Service’s (FPS) efforts to ensure the protection of the 

more than 1 million Government employees, as well as members of the public, who 

work in and visit the nearly 9,000 Federal facilities that are under the control and 

custody of the General Services Administration (GSA). There has not been a largescale attack on a domestic Federal facility since the terrorist attacks of September 

11, 2001, and the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. Nevertheless, the shooting death this past year of a guard at the U.S. 

Holocaust Memorial Museum—though not a Federal facility—demonstrates the continued vulnerability of public buildings. Moreover, the challenge of protecting Federal real property is one of the major reasons for GAO’s designation of Federal real 

property management as a high-risk area.1

FPS—within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)—is authorized to protect the buildings, grounds, and property that are under the control and custody of 

GSA, as well as the persons on the property; to enforce Federal laws and regulations 

aimed at protecting GSA buildings and persons on the property; and to investigate 

offenses against these buildings and persons.2 FPS conducts its mission by providing 

security services through two types of activities: (1) Physical security activities— 

conducting building risk assessments of facilities and recommending countermeasures aimed at preventing incidents at facilities—and (2) law enforcement activities—proactively patrolling facilities, responding to incidents, conducting criminal investigations, and exercising arrest authority. To accomplish its mission of protecting Federal facilities, FPS currently has a budget 3 of around $1 billion, nearly 

1,200 full-time employees, and about 15,000 contract security guards deployed at 

Federal facilities across the country. 

We have identified a set of key facility protection practices from the collective 

practices of Federal agencies and the private sector to provide a framework for guiding agencies’ protection efforts and addressing challenges.4 The key practices essentially form the foundation of a comprehensive approach to building protection. We 

have used these key practices to evaluate how FPS protects GSA buildings and will 

focus on the following five key practices for this testimony:5

• Allocation of resources using risk management.—Identify threats, assess 

vulnerabilities, and determine critical assets to protect, and use information on 

these and other elements to develop countermeasures and prioritize the allocation of resources as conditions change. 
19 

6This testimony draws upon five primary sources. We reported on FPS’s allocation of resources using risk management, leveraging of technology, and information sharing and coordination in GAO, Homeland Security: Greater Attention to Key Practices Would Improve the Federal 

Protective Service’s Approach to Facility Protection, GAO–10–142 (Washington, DC: Oct. 23, 

2009). We reported on FPS’s strategic management of human capital in GAO, Homeland Security: Federal Protective Service Has Taken Some Initial Steps to Address Its Challenges, but 

Vulnerabilities Still Exist, GAO–09–1047T (Washington, DC: Sept. 23, 2009); GAO, Homeland 

Security: Preliminary Results Show Federal Protective Service’s Ability to Protect Federal Facilities Is Hampered By Weaknesses in Its Contract Security Guard Program, GAO–09–859T (Washington, DC: July 8, 2009); and GAO, Homeland Security: Federal Protective Service Should Improve Human Capital Planning and Better Communicate with Tenants, GAO–09–749 (Washington, DC: July 30, 2009). We reported on FPS’s performance management and testing in GAO, 

Homeland Security: The Federal Protective Service Faces Several Challenges That Hamper Its 

Ability to Protect Federal Facilities, GAO–08–683 (Washington, DC: June 11, 2008). 7GAO–10–142. 

• Strategic management of human capital.—Manage human capital to maximize 

Government performance and ensure accountability in asset protection through, 

for example, recruitment of skilled staff, training, and retention. • Leveraging of technology.—Select technologies to enhance asset security through 

methods like access control, detection, and surveillance systems. This involves 

not only using technology, but also ensuring positive returns on investments in 

the form of reduced vulnerabilities. • Information sharing and coordination.—Establish means of coordinating and 

sharing security and threat information internally, within large organizations, 

and externally, with other Government entities and the private sector. • Performance measurement and testing.—Use metrics, such as implementation 

timelines, and active testing, such as unannounced on-site assessments, to ensure accountability for achieving program goals and improving security at facilities. 

This testimony is based on past reports and testimonies 6 and discusses: (1) Limitations FPS faces in protecting GSA buildings and resulting vulnerabilities and (2) 

actions FPS is taking to address challenges. Work for these past reports and testimonies included using our key practices as a framework for assessing facility protection efforts by FPS management and at individual buildings. We also visited FPS 

regions and selected GSA buildings to assess FPS activities first-hand. We surveyed 

a sample of 1,398 Federal officials who work in GSA buildings in FPS’s 11 regions 

and are responsible for collaborating with FPS on security issues. Additionally, we 

reviewed training and certification data for 663 randomly selected guards in 6 of 

FPS’s 11 regions. Because of the sensitivity of some of the information in our prior 

work, we cannot specifically identify the locations of the incidents discussed. We 

also conducted covert testing at 10 judgmentally selected high-risk facilities in four 

cities. For all of our work, we reviewed related laws and directives, interviewed officials, and analyzed documents and data from DHS and GSA, and interviewed tenant agency representatives, contractors, and guards. The previous work on which 

this testimony is based was conducted in accordance with generally accepted Government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the 

audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence 

obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our 

audit objectives. 

FPS FACES CHALLENGES IN MANY AREAS, RAISING CONCERNS ABOUT VULNERABILITIES

Risk Management Approach Is Inadequate and Has Limitations 

FPS assesses risk and recommends countermeasures to GSA and tenant agencies; 

however, FPS’s ability to influence the allocation of resources using risk management is limited because resource allocation decisions are the responsibility of GSA 

and tenant agencies, which may be unwilling to fund the countermeasures FPS recommends. We have found that under the current risk management approach, the 

security equipment that FPS recommends and is responsible for acquiring, installing, and maintaining may not be implemented if tenant agencies are unwilling to 

fund it.7 For example, in August 2007 FPS recommended a security equipment 

countermeasure—the upgrade of a surveillance system shared by two high-security 

locations that, according to FPS officials, would cost around $650,000. While members of one building security committee (BSC) told us they approved spending between $350,000 and $375,000 to fund their agencies’ share of the countermeasure, 

they said that the BSC of the other location would not approve funding; therefore, 

FPS could not upgrade the system it had recommended. In November 2008 FPS officials told us that they were moving ahead with the project by drawing on unex-
20 

8GAO–08–683. 

9Some of the basic security services covered by this fee include law enforcement activities at 

GSA facilities, preliminary investigations, the capture and detention of suspects, and completion 

of BSAs. 10GAO–08–683. 

pended revenues from the two locations’ building-specific fees and the funding that 

was approved by one of the BSCs. Furthermore, FPS officials, in May 2009, told us 

that all cameras had been repaired and all monitoring and recording devices had 

been replaced, and that the two BSCs had approved additional upgrades and that 

FPS was implementing them. As we reported in June 2008, we have found other 

instances in which recommended security countermeasures were not implemented 

at some of the buildings we visited because BSC members could not agree on which 

countermeasures to implement or were unable to obtain funding from their agencies.8

Compounding this situation, FPS takes a building-by-building approach to risk 

management, using an outdated risk assessment tool to create building security assessments (BSA), rather than taking a more comprehensive, strategic approach and 

assessing risks among all buildings in GSA’s inventory and recommending countermeasure priorities to GSA and tenant agencies. As a result, the current approach 

provides less assurance that the most critical risks at Federal buildings across the 

country are being prioritized and mitigated. Also, GSA and tenant agencies have 

concerns about the quality and timeliness of FPS’s risk assessment services and are 

taking steps to obtain their own risk assessments. For example, GSA officials told 

us they have had difficulties receiving timely risk assessments from FPS for space 

GSA is considering leasing. These risk assessments must be completed before GSA 

can take possession of the property and lease it to tenant agencies. An inefficient 

risk assessment process for new lease projects can add costs for GSA and create 

problems for both GSA and tenant agencies that have been planning for a move. 

Therefore, GSA is updating a risk assessment tool that it began developing in 1998, 

but has not recently used, to better ensure the timeliness and comprehensiveness 

of these risk assessments. GSA officials told us that in the future they may use this 

tool for other physical security activities, such as conducting other types of risk assessments and determining security countermeasures for new facilities. Additionally, although tenant agencies have typically taken responsibility for assessing risk 

and securing the interior of their buildings, assessing exterior risks will require additional expertise and resources. This is an inefficient approach considering that 

tenant agencies are paying FPS to assess building security. 

Finally, FPS continues to struggle with funding challenges that impede its ability 

to allocate resources to more effectively manage risk. FPS faces challenges in ensuring that its fee-based funding structure accounts for the varying levels of risk and 

types of services provided at Federal facilities. FPS funds its operations through security fees charged to tenant agencies. However, FPS’s basic security fee, which 

funds most of its operations, does not account for the risk faced by specific buildings, 

the level of service provided, or the cost of providing services, raising questions 

about equity.9 FPS charges Federal agencies the same basic security fee regardless 

of the perceived threat to a particular building or agency. In fiscal year 2009, FPS 

charged 66 cents per square foot for basic security. Although FPS categorizes buildings according to security levels based on its assessment of each building’s risk and 

size, this assessment does not affect the security fee FPS charges. For example, 

Level I facilities typically face less risk because they are generally small storefronttype operations with a low level of public contact, such as a Social Security Administration office. However, these facilities are charged the same basic security fee of 

66 cents per square foot as a Level IV facility that has a high volume of public contact and may contain high-risk law enforcement and intelligence agencies and highly sensitive Government records. We also have reported that basing Government 

fees on the cost of providing a service promotes equity, especially when the cost of 

providing the service differs significantly among different users, as is the case with 

FPS. In our June 2008 report, we recommended that FPS improve its use of the 

fee-based system by developing a method to accurately account for the cost of providing security services to tenant agencies and ensuring that its fee structure takes 

into consideration the varying levels of risk and service provided at GSA facilities.10

We also recommended an evaluation of whether FPS’s current use of a fee-based 

system or an alternative funding mechanism is the most appropriate manner to 

fund the agency. While DHS agreed with these recommendations, FPS has not fully 

implemented them. 
21 

11GAO–09–749. 12This mandate in DHS’s fiscal year 2008 appropriation act was effective for fiscal year 2008 

only, since mandates in annual appropriation acts are presumed to be applicable for that fiscal 

year unless specified to the contrary. DHS’s appropriation act for fiscal year 2009 also mandated 

that FPS have no fewer than 1,200 full-time employees. See Pub. L. No. 110–161, Div. E, 121 

Stat. 1844, 2051–2052 (2007) and Pub. L. No. 110–329, Div D. 1222 Stat. 3574, 3659–3660 

(2008). 13GAO–08–683. 14GAO–09–859T. 15GAO–05–49. 16 At the time of our review, a Level IV facility had more than 450 Federal employees, more 

than 150,000 square feet, a high volume of public contact, and tenant agencies that could inContinued 

Improvements Needed in Human Capital Planning and Contract Guard Management 

FPS does not have a strategic human capital plan to guide its current and future 

workforce planning efforts, including effective processes for training, retention, and 

staff development. Instead, FPS has developed a short-term hiring plan that does 

not include key human capital principles, such as determining an agency’s optimum 

staffing needs. Moreover, FPS has been transitioning to an inspector-based workforce, thus eliminating the police officer position and relying primarily on FPS inspectors for both law enforcement and physical security activities. FPS believes that 

this change will ensure that its staff has the right mix of technical skills and training needed to accomplish its mission. However, FPS’s ability to provide law enforcement services under its inspector-based workforce approach may be diminished because FPS will rely on its inspectors to provide these services and physical security 

services simultaneously. In the absence of a strategic human capital plan, it is difficult to discern how effective an inspector-based workforce approach will be. The 

lack of a human capital plan has also contributed to inconsistent approaches in how 

FPS regions and headquarters are managing human capital activities. For example, 

FPS officials in some of the regions we visited said they implement their own procedures for managing their workforce, including processes for performance feedback, 

training, and mentoring. Additionally, FPS does not collect data on its workforce’s 

knowledge, skills, and abilities. These elements are necessary for successful workforce planning activities, such as identifying and filling skill gaps and succession 

planning. We recently recommended that FPS improve how it collects data on its 

workforce’s knowledge, skills, and abilities to help it better manage and understand 

current and future workforce needs; and use these data in the development and implementation of a long-term strategic human capital plan that addresses key principles for effective strategic workforce planning.11 DHS concurred with our recommendations. 

Furthermore, FPS did not meet its fiscal year 2008 mandated deadline of increasing its staffing level to no fewer than 1,200 full-time employees by July 31, 2008, 

and instead met this staffing level in April 2009.12 FPS’s staff has steadily declined 

since 2004 and critical law enforcement services have been reduced or eliminated. 

For example, FPS has eliminated its use of proactive patrol to prevent or detect 

criminal violations at many GSA buildings. According to some FPS officials at regions we visited, not providing proactive patrol has limited its law enforcement personnel to a reactive force.13 Additionally, officials stated that in the past, proactive 

patrol permitted its police officers and inspectors to identify and apprehend individuals that were surveilling GSA buildings. In contrast, when FPS is not able to patrol Federal buildings, there is increased potential for illegal entry and other criminal activity. In one city we visited, a deceased individual had been found in a vacant 

GSA facility that was not regularly patrolled by FPS. FPS officials stated that the 

deceased individual had been inside the building for approximately 3 months. 

FPS does not fully ensure that its contract security guards have the training and 

certifications required to be deployed to a GSA building.14 We have noted that the 

effectiveness of a risk management approach depends on the involvement of experienced and professional security personnel.15 Further, that the chances of omitting 

major steps in the risk management process increase if personnel are not well 

trained in applying risk management. FPS requires that all prospective guards complete about 128 hours of training including 8 hours of X-ray and magnetometer 

training. However, in one region, FPS has not provided the X-ray or magnetometer 

training to its 1,500 guards since 2004. Nonetheless, these guards are assigned to 

posts at GSA buildings. X-ray training is critical because guards control access 

points at buildings. Insufficient X-ray and magnetometer training may have contributed to several incidents at GSA buildings in which guards were negligent in carrying out their responsibilities. For example, at a Level IV 16 Federal facility in a 
22 

clude high-risk law enforcement and intelligence agencies, courts, judicial offices, and highly 

sensitive Government records. 17 X-ray machines are hazardous because of the potential radiation exposure. In contrast, 

magnetometers do not emit radiation and are used to detect metal. 18With this safety feature disabled, the X-ray machine’s belt was operating continuously although the guard was not present. 19GAO–09–859T. 20 At the time of our review, a Level III facility had between 151 and 450 Federal employees, 

80,000 to 150,000 square feet, and a moderate to high volume of public contact. 21GAO–09–859T. 22GAO–09–859T. 

major metropolitan area, an infant in a carrier was sent through an X-ray machine 

due to a guard’s negligence.17 Specifically, according to an FPS official in that region, a woman with her infant in a carrier attempted to enter the facility, which 

has child care services. While retrieving her identification, the woman placed the 

carrier on the X-ray machine. Because the guard was not paying attention and the 

machine’s safety features had been disabled,18 the infant in the carrier was sent 

through the X-ray machine. FPS investigated the incident and dismissed the guard; 

however, the guard subsequently sued FPS for not providing the required X-ray 

training. The guard won the suit because FPS could not produce any documentation 

to show that the guard had received the training, according to an FPS official. In 

addition, FPS officials from that region could not tell us whether the X-ray machine’s safety features had been repaired. Additionally, we found that FPS does not 

have a fully reliable system for monitoring and verifying guard training and certification requirements. We reviewed 663 randomly selected guard records and found 

that 62 percent of the guards had at least one expired certification, including a declaration that guards have not been convicted of domestic violence, which make them 

ineligible to carry firearms. 

We also found that some guards were not provided building-specific training, such 

as what actions to take during a building evacuation or a building emergency.19

This lack of training may have contributed to several incidents where guards neglected their assigned responsibilities. For example, • at a Level IV facility, the guards did not follow evacuation procedures and left 

two access points unattended, thereby leaving the facility vulnerable; • at a Level IV facility, the guard allowed employees to enter the building while 

an incident involving suspicious packages was being investigated; and, • at a Level III facility,20 the guard allowed employees to access the area affected 

by a suspicious package, which was required to be evacuated. 

FPS has limited assurance that its guards are complying with post orders.21 It 

does not have specific National guidance on when and how guard inspections should 

be performed. FPS’s inspections of guard posts at GSA buildings are inconsistent 

and the quality varied in the six regions we examined. We also found that guard 

inspections are typically completed by FPS during regular business hours and in locations where FPS has a field office, and seldom on nights or weekends. However, 

on an occasion when FPS officials conducted a post inspection at night, they found 

a guard asleep at his post after taking a pain-killer prescription drug. FPS also 

found other incidents at high-security facilities where guards neglected or inadequately performed their assigned responsibilities. For example, a guard failed to 

recognize or did not properly X-ray a box containing handguns at the loading dock 

at a facility. FPS became aware of the situation because the handguns were delivered to FPS. 

Because guards were not properly trained and did not comply with post orders, 

our investigators—with the components for an improvised explosive device (IED) 

concealed on their persons—passed undetected through access points controlled by 

FPS guards at 10 of 10 Level IV facilities in four major cities where GAO conducted 

covert tests.22 The specific components for this device, items used to conceal the device components, and the methods of concealment that we used during our covert 

testing are classified, and thus are not discussed in this testimony. Of the 10 Level 

IV facilities our investigators penetrated, 8 were Government-owned and 2 were 

leased facilities. The facilities included district offices of a U.S. Senator and a U.S. 

Representative as well as agencies of the Departments of Homeland Security, 

Transportation, Health and Human Services, Justice, State, and others. The two 

leased facilities did not have any guards at the access control points at the time of 

our testing. Using publicly available information, our investigators identified a type 

of device that a terrorist could use to cause damage to a Federal facility and threaten the safety of Federal workers and the general public. The device was an IED 

made up of two parts—a liquid explosive and a low-yield detonator—and included 

a variety of materials not typically brought into a Federal facility by employees or 
23 

23Tests that we performed at a National laboratory in February 2006 and July 2007 demonstrated that a terrorist using these devices could cause severe damage to a Federal facility 

and threaten the safety of Federal workers and the general public. Our investigators obtained 

the components for these devices at local stores and over the internet for less than $150. 24 U.S. Department of Justice, Vulnerability Assessment of Federal Facilities, (Washington, 

DC, June 28, 1995). The Department of Justice standards recommend minimum security measures for Federal buildings. 25Following the Oklahoma City bombing, Executive Order 12977 called for the creation of an 

interagency security committee to address the quality and effectiveness of physical security requirements for Federal facilities by developing and evaluating security standards. The Interagency Security Committee has representation from all major Federal departments and agencies. 26GAO–10–142. 

the public. Although the detonator itself could function as an IED, investigators determined that it could also be used to set off a liquid explosive and cause significantly more damage. To ensure safety during this testing, we took precautions so 

that the IED would not explode. For example, we lowered the concentration level 

of the material.23 To gain entry into each of the 10 Level IV facilities, our investigators showed a photo identification (a State driver’s license) and walked through the 

magnetometers without incident. Our investigators also placed their briefcases with 

the IED material on the conveyor belt of the X-ray machine, but the guards detected 

nothing. Furthermore, our investigators did not receive any secondary searches from 

the guards that might have revealed the IED material that they brought into the 

facilities. At security checkpoints at 3 of the 10 facilities, our investigators noticed 

that the guard was not looking at the X-ray screen as some of the IED components 

passed through the machine. A guard questioned an item in the briefcase at one 

of the 10 facilities but the materials were subsequently allowed through the X-ray 

machines. At each facility, once past the guard screening checkpoint, our investigators proceeded to a restroom and assembled the IED. At some of the facilities, the 

restrooms were locked. Our investigators gained access by asking employees to let 

them in. With the IED completely assembled in a briefcase, our investigators 

walked freely around several floors of the facilities and into various Executive and 

Legislative branch offices, as described above. 

Systematic Approach for Cost-Effectively Leveraging Technology Is Lacking 

Leveraging technology is a key practice over which FPS has somewhat more control, but FPS does not have a comprehensive approach for identifying, acquiring, 

and assessing the cost-effectiveness of the security equipment that its inspectors 

recommend. Individual FPS inspectors have considerable latitude in determining 

which technologies and other countermeasures to recommend, but the inspectors receive little training and guidance in how to assess the relative cost-effectiveness of 

these technologies or determine the expected return on investment. FPS officials 

told us that inspectors make technology decisions based on the initial training they 

receive, personal knowledge and experience, and contacts with vendors. FPS inspectors receive some training in identifying and recommending security technologies as 

part of their initial FPS physical security training. Since FPS was transferred to 

DHS in 2003, its refresher training program for inspectors has primarily focused on 

law enforcement. Consequently, inspectors lack recurring technology training. Additionally, FPS does not provide inspectors with specialized guidance and standards 

for cost-effectively selecting technology. In the absence of specific guidance, inspectors follow the Department of Justice minimum countermeasure standards 24 and 

other relevant Interagency Security Committee standards,25 but these standards do 

not assist users in selecting cost-effective technologies. Moreover, the document that 

FPS uses to convey its countermeasure recommendations to GSA and tenant agencies—the BSA executive summary—includes cost estimates but no analysis of alternatives. As a result, GSA and tenant agencies have limited assurance that the investments in technologies and other countermeasures that FPS inspectors recommend are cost-effective, consistent across buildings, and the best available alternatives. 

For example, at one location we visited, an explosives detection dog was used to 

screen mail that is distributed elsewhere.26 In 2006, FPS had recommended, based 

on the results of its risk analysis, the use of this dog and an X-ray machine, although at the time of our visit only the dog was being used. Moreover, the dog and 

handler work 12-hour shifts Monday through Friday when most mail is delivered 

and shipped, and the dog needs a break every 7 minutes. The GSA regional security 
24 

27 In 2006 GSA established the Building Security and Policy Division within its Public Buildings Service to oversee its security operations and policies and liaise with FPS. Additionally, 

the division developed the Regional Security Network, which consists of several staff per GSA 

region to further enhance coordination with FPS at the regional and building levels, and to 

carry out GSA security policy in collaboration with FPS and tenant agencies. 28GAO–10–142. 

officials 27 we spoke with questioned whether this approach was more effective and 

efficient than using an on-site enhanced X-ray machine that could detect biological 

and chemical agents as well as explosives and could be used anytime. In accordance 

with its policies, FPS conducted a BSA of the site in 2008 and determined that 

using an enhanced X-ray machine and an explosives detection dog would bring the 

projected threat rating of the site down from moderate to low. FPS included estimated one-time installation and recurring costs in the BSA and executive summary, 

but did not include the estimated cost and risk of the following mail screening options: (1) Usage of the dog and the additional countermeasure; (2) usage of the additional countermeasure only; and (3) usage of the dog only. Consequently, tenant 

agency representatives would have to investigate the cost and risk implications of 

these options on their own to make an informed resource allocation decision. 

Information Sharing and Coordination Practices Lack Consistency 

It is critical that FPS—as the provider of law enforcement and related security 

services for GSA buildings—and GSA—as the manager of these properties—have 

well-established lines of communication with each other and with tenant agencies 

to ensure that all parties are aware of the ever-changing risks in a dynamic threat 

environment and that FPS and GSA are taking appropriate actions to reduce 

vulnerabilities. While FPS and GSA top management have established communication channels, the types of information shared at the regional and building levels 

are inconsistent, and overall, FPS and GSA disagree over what information should 

be shared. For example, the memorandum of agreement between DHS and GSA 

specifies that FPS will provide quarterly briefings at the regional level, but FPS had 

not been providing them consistently across all regions. FPS resumed the practice 

in October 2008, however, GSA security officials said that these briefings mostly focused on crime statistics and did not constitute comprehensive threat analyses. Additionally, FPS is only required to meet formally with GSA property managers and 

tenant agencies as part of the BSA process—an event that occurs every 2 to 5 years, 

depending on a building’s security level. We identified information sharing gaps at 

several Level III and IV sites that we visited, and found that in some cases these 

deficiencies led to decreased security awareness and increased risk.28

• At one location, we observed during our interview with the building security 

committee (BSC) that the committee members were confused about procedures 

for screening visitors who are passengers in employees’ cars that enter the 

building via the parking garage. One of the tenants recounted an incident in 

which a security guard directed the visitor to walk through the garage to an 

appropriate screening station. According to the GSA property manager, this action created a safety hazard. The GSA property manager knew the appropriate 

screening procedure, but told us there was no written policy on the procedure 

that members could access. Additionally, BSC members told us that the committee met as needed. 

• At one location, FPS had received inaccurate square footage data from GSA and 

had therefore overcharged the primary tenant agency for a guard post that protected space shared by all the tenants. According to the GSA property manager, 

once GSA was made aware of the problem, the agency obtained updated information and worked with the tenant agencies to develop a cost-sharing plan for 

the guard post, which made the primary tenant agency’s security expenses 

somewhat more equitable. BSC members told us that the committee met regularly. 

• At one location, members of a BSC told us that they met as needed, although 

even when they hold meetings, one of the main tenant agencies typically does 

not participate. GSA officials commented that this tenant adheres to its agency’s building security protocols and does not necessarily follow GSA’s tenant 

policies and procedures, which GSA thinks creates security risks for the entire 

building. 

• At one location, tenant agency representatives and officials from FPS told us 

they met regularly, but GSA officials told us they were not invited to these 

meetings. GSA officials at this location told us that they invite FPS to their 

property management meetings for that location, but FPS does not attend. GSA 

officials also said they do not receive timely incident information for the site 
25 

29 In June 2009 tenant agency representatives told us that at all times, they had been aware 

of the location of the equipment and assured proper safeguarding of the equipment during the 

reconstruction process. 30GAO–09–749. 31GAO–09–749. 

from FPS and suggested that increased communication among the agencies 

would help them be more effective managers of their properties and provide tenants with better customer service. 

• At one location, GSA undertook a major renovation project beginning in April 

2007. FPS, GSA, and tenant agency representatives did not all meet together 

regularly to make security preparations or manage security operations during 

construction. FPS officials told us they had not been invited to project meetings, 

although GSA officials told us that they had invited FPS and that FPS attended 

some meetings. In May 2008, FPS discovered that specific surveillance equipment had been removed. As of May 2009, FPS officials told us they did not 

know who had removed the equipment and were working with tenant agency 

representatives to recover it. However in June 2009 tenant agency representatives told us that they believed FPS was fully aware that the equipment had 

been removed in December 2007.29

Additionally, we conducted a survey of GSA tenant agencies and found that they 

had mixed views about some of the services they pay FPS to provide.30 Notably, the 

survey results indicated that the roles and responsibilities of FPS and tenant agencies are unclear, primarily because on average about one-third of tenant agencies 

could not comment on how satisfied or dissatisfied they were with FPS’s level of 

communication of its services, partly because they had little to no interaction with 

FPS officers. Although FPS plans to implement education and outreach initiatives 

to improve customer service to tenant agencies, it will face challenges because of its 

lack of complete and accurate contact data. During the course of our review, we 

found that approximately 53 percent of the e-mail addresses and 27 percent of the 

telephone numbers for designated points of contacts were missing from FPS’s contact database and the database required a substantial amount of revising. Complete 

and accurate contact information for FPS’s customers is critical for information 

sharing and an essential component of any customer service initiative. Therefore, 

to improve its services to GSA and tenant agencies, we recommended that FPS collect and maintain an accurate and comprehensive list of all facility-designated 

points of contact, as well as a system for regularly updating this list; and develop 

and implement a program for education and outreach to GSA and tenant agencies 

to ensure they are aware of the current roles, responsibilities, and services provided 

by FPS.31 DHS concurred with our recommendations. 

Furthermore, while FPS and GSA acknowledge that the two organizations are 

partners in protecting and securing GSA buildings, FPS and GSA fundamentally 

disagree over how much of the information in the BSA should be shared. Per the 

memorandum of agreement, FPS is required to share the BSA executive summary 

with GSA and FPS believes that this document contains sufficient information for 

GSA to make decisions about purchasing and implementing FPS’s recommended 

countermeasures. However, GSA officials at all levels cite limitations with the BSA 

executive summary saying, for example, that it does not contain enough contextual 

information on threats and vulnerabilities to support FPS’s countermeasure recommendations and justify the expenses that GSA and tenant agencies would incur 

by installing additional countermeasures. Moreover, GSA security officials told us 

that FPS does not consistently share BSA executive summaries across all regions. 

Instead, GSA wants to receive BSAs in their entirety so that it can better protect 

GSA buildings and the tenants who occupy them. According to GSA, building protection functions are an integral part of its property preservation, operation, and management responsibilities. 

In a post-September 11 era, it is vital that Federal agencies work together to 

share information to advance homeland security and critical infrastructure protection efforts. Information is a crucial tool in fighting terrorism, and the timely dissemination of that information to the appropriate Government agency is absolutely 

critical to maintaining the security of our Nation. The ability to share security-related information can unify the efforts of Federal agencies in preventing or minimizing terrorist attacks. However, in the absence of comprehensive informationsharing plans, many aspects of homeland security information sharing can be ineffective and fragmented. In 2005, we designated information sharing for homeland 

security as a Government-wide high-risk area because of the significant challenges 
26 

32GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO–05–207 (Washington, DC: Jan. 1, 2005). 33GAO–10–142. 34GAO–08–683. 

faced in this area 32—challenges that are still evident today. It is critical that FPS 

and GSA—which both have protection functions for GSA buildings, their occupants, 

and those who visit them—reach consensus on sharing information in a timely manner to support homeland security and critical infrastructure protection efforts. 

We recently recommended that FPS reach consensus with GSA on what information contained in the BSA is needed for GSA to fulfill its responsibilities related to 

the protection of Federal buildings and occupants, and accordingly, establish internal controls to ensure that shared information is adequately safeguarded; guidance 

for employees to use in deciding what information to protect with sensitive but unclassified designations; provisions for training on making designations, controlling, 

and sharing such information with GSA and other entities; and a review process to 

evaluate how well this information sharing process is working, with results reported 

to the Secretary of Homeland Security.33 While DHS concurred with this recommendation, we are concerned that the steps it described in its response were not 

comprehensive enough to address the intent of the recommendation. For example, 

DHS did not explicitly commit to reaching consensus with GSA in identifying building security information that can be shared, or to the steps we outlined in our recommendation—steps that in our view comprise a comprehensive plan for sharing 

and safeguarding sensitive information. Therefore, it is important that FPS engage 

GSA in identifying what building security information can be shared and follow the 

information sharing and safeguarding steps we included in our recommendation to 

ensure that GSA acquires the information it needs to protect the 9,000 buildings 

under its control and custody, the Federal employees who work in them, and those 

who visit them. 

Performance Measurement Is Limited 

We have reported that FPS is limited in its ability to assess the effectiveness of 

its efforts to protect GSA buildings.34 To determine how well it is accomplishing its 

mission to protect GSA buildings, FPS has identified some output measures that are 

a part of the Office of Management and Budget’s Performance Assessment Rating 

Tool. These measures include determining whether security countermeasures have 

been deployed and are fully operational, the amount of time it takes to respond to 

an incident, and the percentage of BSAs completed on time. Some of these measures 

are also included in FPS’s Federal facilities security index, which is used to assess 

its performance. However, FPS has not developed outcome measures to evaluate the 

net effect of its efforts to protect GSA buildings. While output measures are helpful, 

outcome measures are also important because they can provide FPS with broader 

information on program results, such as the extent to which its decision to move 

to an inspector-based workforce will enhance security at GSA facilities or help identify the security gaps that remain at GSA facilities and determine what action may 

be needed to address them. In addition, FPS does not have a reliable data management system that will allow it to accurately track these measures or other important measures such as the number of crimes and other incidents occurring at GSA 

facilities. Without such a system, it is difficult for FPS to evaluate and improve the 

effectiveness of its efforts to protect Federal employees and facilities, allocate its 

limited resources, or make informed risk management decisions. For example, weaknesses in one of FPS’s countermeasure tracking systems make it difficult to accurately track the implementation status of recommended countermeasures such as 

security cameras and X-ray machines. Without this ability, FPS has difficulty determining whether it has mitigated the risk of GSA facilities to crime or a terrorist 

attack. 

FPS IS TAKING STEPS TO BETTER PROTECT GSA BUILDINGS, BUT HAS NOT FULLY

IMPLEMENTED ACTIONS AND FACES SIGNIFICANT CHALLENGES

While FPS is taking some actions in each of the key practice areas to improve 

its ability to better protect GSA buildings. Additionally, GAO has recommended that 

FPS implement specific actions to promote greater usage of key protection practices 

and otherwise improve security. However, FPS has not completed many related corrective actions and FPS faces implementation challenges as well. 

FPS Is Developing a New Program to Assess Risk, Manage Human Capital, and 

Measure Performance 

FPS is developing the Risk Assessment and Management Program (RAMP), which 

could enhance its approach to assessing risk, managing human capital, and meas-
27 

35The National Infrastructure Protection Plan was founded through Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 and sets forth National policy on how the plan’s risk management framework 

and sector partnership model are to be implemented by sector-specific agencies. FPS is the agency responsible for the Government Facilities sector. 36GAO–09–859T. 37GAO–08–863. 38GAO–08–683. 39GAO–10–142. 

uring performance. With regard to improving the effectiveness of FPS’s risk management approach and the quality of BSAs, FPS believes RAMP will provide inspectors with the information needed to make more informed and defensible recommendations for security countermeasures. FPS also anticipates that RAMP will 

allow inspectors to obtain information from one electronic source, generate reports 

automatically, enable FPS to track selected countermeasures throughout their life 

cycle, address some concerns about the subjectivity inherent in BSAs, and reduce 

the amount of time inspectors and managers spend on administrative work. Additionally, FPS is designing RAMP so that it will produce risk assessments that are 

compliant with Interagency Security Committee standards, compatible with the risk 

management framework set forth by the National Infrastructure Protection Plan,35

and consistent with the business processes outlined in the memorandum of agreement with GSA. According to FPS, RAMP will support all components of the BSA 

process, including gathering and reviewing building information; conducting and recording interviews; assessing threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences to develop 

a detailed risk profile; recommending appropriate countermeasures; and producing 

BSA reports. FPS also plans to use RAMP to track and analyze certain workforce 

data, contract guard program data, and other performance data such as the types 

and definitions of incidents and incident response times. 

Although FPS intends for RAMP to improve its approach to risk assessment, 

human capital management, and performance measurement, it is not clear that FPS 

has fully addressed some implementation issues. For example, one issue concerns 

the accuracy and reliability of the information that will be entered into RAMP. According to FPS, the agency plans to transfer data from several of its legacy systems, 

including the Contract Guard Employment Requirements Tracking System 

(CERTS), into RAMP. In July 2009, we testified on the accuracy and reliability 

issues associated with CERTS.36 FPS subsequently conducted an audit of CERTS 

to determine the status of its guard training and certification. However, the results 

of the audit showed that FPS was able to verify the status for about 7,600 of its 

15,000 guards. According to an FPS official, one of its regions did not meet the deadline for submitting data to headquarters because its data were not accurate or reliable and therefore about 1,500 guards were not included in the audit. FPS was not 

able to explain why it was not able to verify the status of the remaining 5,900 

guards. In 2008, we recommended that FPS develop and implement specific guidelines and standards for measuring its performance and improve how it categorizes, 

collects, and analyzes data to help it better manage and understand the results of 

its efforts to protect GSA facilities and DHS concurred with our recommendation.37

RAMP could be the vehicle through which FPS implements these recommendations, 

but the use of inaccurate and unreliable data will hamper performance measurement efforts. 

Furthermore, it is unclear whether FPS will meet the implementation goals established in the program’s proposed timeline. FPS began designing RAMP in early 2007 

and expects to implement the program in three phases, completing its implementation by the end of fiscal year 2011. However, in June 2008, we reported that FPS 

was going to implement a pilot version of RAMP in fiscal year 2009,38 but in May 

2009, FPS officials told us they intend to implement the first phase in the beginning 

of fiscal year 2010. Until RAMP components are fully implemented, FPS will continue to rely on its current risk assessment tool, methodology, and process, potentially leaving GSA and tenant agencies dissatisfied. Additionally, FPS will continue 

to rely on its disparate workforce data management systems and CERTS or localized databases that have proven to be inaccurate and unreliable. We recently recommended that FPS provide the Secretary of Homeland Security with regular updates on the status of RAMP including the implementation status of deliverables, 

clear timelines for completion of tasks and milestones, and plans for addressing any 

implementation obstacles.39 DHS concurred with our recommendation and stated 

that FPS will submit a monthly report to the Secretary. 
28 

FPS’s Actions to Improve Guard Management May Be Difficult to Implement and 

Maintain 

FPS took on a number of immediate actions with respect to contract guard management in response to our covert testing. • In July 2009, the Director of FPS instructed Regional Directors to accelerate the 

implementation of FPS’s requirement that two guard posts at Level IV facilities 

be inspected weekly. • FPS, in July 2009, also required more X-ray and magnetometer training for inspectors and guards. For example, FPS has recently issued an information bulletin to all inspectors and guards to provide them with information about package screening, including examples of disguised items that may not be detected 

by magnetometers or X-ray equipment. Moreover, FPS produced a 15-minute 

training video designed to provide information on bomb component detection. 

According to FPS, each guard was required to read the information bulletin and 

watch the DVD within 30 days. 

Despite the steps FPS has taken, there are a number of factors that will make 

implementing and sustaining these actions difficult. First, FPS does not have adequate controls to monitor and track whether its 11 regions are completing these new 

requirements. Thus, FPS cannot say with certainty that it is being done. According 

to a FPS regional official, implementing the new requirements may present a number of challenges, in part, because new directives appear to be based primarily on 

what works well from a headquarters or National Capital Region perspective, and 

not a regional perspective that reflects local conditions and limitations in staffing 

resources. In addition, another regional official estimated that his region is meeting 

about 10 percent of the required oversight hours and officials in another region said 

they are struggling to monitor the delivery of contractor-provided training in the region. Second, FPS has not completed any workforce analysis to determine if its current staff of about 930 law enforcement security officers will be able to effectively 

complete the additional inspections and provide the X-ray and magnetometer training to 15,000 guards, in addition to their current physical security and law enforcement responsibilities. According to the Director of FPS, while having more resources 

would help address the weaknesses in the guard program, the additional resources 

would have to be trained and thus could not be deployed immediately. 

FPS Is Developing a Program to Standardize Equipment and Contracting 

FPS is also taking steps to implement a more systematic approach to technology 

acquisition by developing a National Countermeasures Program, which could help 

FPS leverage technology more cost-effectively. According to FPS, the program will 

establish standards and National procurement contracts for security equipment, including X-ray machines, magnetometers, surveillance systems, and intrusion detection systems. FPS officials told us that instead of having inspectors search for vendors to establish equipment acquisition, installation, and maintenance contracts, inspectors will call an FPS mission support center with their countermeasure recommendations and the center will procure the services through standardized contracts. According to FPS, the program will also include life-cycle management plans 

for countermeasures. FPS officials said they established an X-ray machine contract 

and that future program contracts will also explore the use of the schedule as a 

source for National purchase and service contracts. According to FPS, the National 

Countermeasures Program should provide the agency with a framework to better 

manage its security equipment inventory; meet its operational requirement to identify, implement, and maintain security equipment; and respond to stakeholders’ 

needs by establishing Nation-wide resources, streamlining procurement procedures, 

and strengthening communications with its customers. FPS officials told us they believe this program will result in increased efficiencies because inspectors will not 

have to spend their time facilitating the establishment of contracts for security 

equipment because these contracts will be standardized Nation-wide. 

Although the National Countermeasures Program includes improvements that 

may enhance FPS’s ability to leverage technology, it does not establish tools for assessing the cost-effectiveness of competing technologies and countermeasures and 

implementation has been delayed. Security professionals are faced with a multitude 

of technology options offered by private vendors, including advanced intrusion detection systems, biotechnology options for screening people, and sophisticated video 

monitoring. Having tools and guidance to determine which technologies most costeffectively address identified vulnerabilities is a central component of the leveraging 

technology key practice. FPS officials told us that the National Countermeasures 

Program will enable inspectors to develop countermeasure cost estimates that can 

be shared with GSA and tenant agencies. However, incorporating a tool for evaluating the cost-effectiveness of alternative technologies into FPS’s planned improve-
29 

40GAO–10–142. 41GAO–10–142. 42GAO, Federal Real Property: DHS Has Made Progress, but Additional Actions Are Needed 

to Address Real Property Management and Security Challenges, GAO–07–658 (Washington, DC: 

June 22, 2007). In this report, we used the key practices to assess DHS’s security operations 

with respect to the Government-owned and leased buildings in its real property portfolio, but 

did not specifically focus on FPS. 43GAO, Smithsonian Institution: Funding Challenges Affect Facilities’ Conditions and Security, Endangering Collections, GAO–07–1127 (Washington, DC: Sept. 28, 2007). 44GAO, Homeland Security: Actions Needed to Improve Security Practices at National Icons 

and Parks, GAO–09–983 (Washington, DC: Aug. 28, 2009). 45 Interagency Security Committee, Use of Physical Security Performance Measures, (Washington, DC, June 16, 2009). 

ments in the security acquisition area would represent an enhanced application of 

this key practice. Therefore, we recently recommended that FPS develop a methodology and guidance for assessing and comparing the cost-effectiveness of technology 

alternatives, and DHS concurred with our recommendation.40

Another concern is that FPS had planned to implement the program throughout 

fiscal year 2009, but extended implementation into fiscal year 2010, thus it is not 

clear whether FPS will meet the program’s milestones in accordance with updated 

timelines. Until the National Countermeasures Program is fully implemented, FPS 

will continue to rely on individual inspectors to make technology decisions. For example, FPS had anticipated that the X-ray machine and magnetometer contracts 

would be awarded by December 2008, and that contracts for surveillance and intrusion detection systems would be awarded during fiscal year 2009. In May 2009, FPS 

officials told us that the X-ray machine contract was awarded on April 30, 2009, and 

that they anticipated awarding the magnetometer contract in the fourth quarter of 

fiscal year 2009 and an electronic security services contract for surveillance and intrusion detection systems during the second quarter of fiscal year 2010. We recently 

recommended that FPS provide the Secretary of Homeland Security with regular 

updates on the status of the National Countermeasures Program, including the implementation status of deliverables, clear timelines for completion of tasks and milestones, and plans for addressing any implementation obstacles.41 DHS concurred 

with this recommendation and stated that FPS will submit a monthly report to the 

Secretary. 

Key Practices Provide a Framework for Improvement for FPS and Other Agencies 

Finally, as we stated at the outset, the protection of Federal real property has 

been and continues to be a major concern. Therefore, we have used our key protection practices as criteria to evaluate the security efforts of other departments, agencies, and entities and have made recommendations to promote greater usage of key 

practices in ensuring the security of public spaces and of those who work at and 

visit them. For example, we have examined how DHS 42 and the Smithsonian Institution 43 secure their assets and identified challenges. Most recently, we evaluated 

the National Park Service’s (Park Service) approach to National icon and park protection.44 We found that although the Park Service has implemented a range of security program improvements in recent years that reflected some aspects of key 

practices, there were also limitations. Specifically, the Park Service: (1) Does not 

manage risk service-wide or ensure the best return on security technology investments; (2) lacks a service-wide approach to sharing information internally and 

measuring performance; and (3) lacks clearly defined security roles and a security 

training curriculum. With millions of people visiting the Nation’s nearly 400 park 

units annually, ensuring their security and the protection of our National treasures 

is paramount. More emphasis on the key practices would provide greater assurance 

that Park Service assets are well protected and that Park Service resources are 

being used efficiently to improve protection. 

FPS faces challenges that are similar, in many respects, to those that agencies 

across the Government are facing. Our key practices provide a framework for assessing and improving protection practices, and in fact, the Interagency Security 

Committee is using our key facility protection practices as key management practices to guide its priorities and work activities. For example, the committee established subcommittees for technology best practices and training, and working groups 

in the areas of performance measures and strategic human capital management. 

The committee also issued performance measurement guidance in 2009.45 Without 

greater attention to key protection practices, FPS will be ill equipped to efficiently 

and effectively fulfill its responsibilities of assessing risk, strategically managing its 

workforce and contract guard program, recommending countermeasures, sharing information and coordinating with GSA and tenant agencies to secure GSA buildings, 
30 

and measuring and testing its performance as the security landscape changes and 

new threats emerge. Furthermore, implementing our specific recommendations related to areas such as human capital and risk management will be critical steps in 

the right direction. Overall, following this framework—adhering to key practices and 

implementing recommendations in specific areas—would enhance FPS’s chances for 

future success and could position FPS to become a leader and benchmark agency 

for facility protection in the Federal Government. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes our testimony. We are pleased to answer any questions you might have. 

Chairman THOMPSON. I would like to thank all of the witnesses 

for their testimony. 

I remind each Member that he or she will have 5 minutes to 

question the panel. 

I will now recognize myself for questions. I do not often do this, 

but, without objection, before I start the questions, I would like to 

show a GAO video of some of the things Mr. Goldstein talked 

about, to give the committee a broader flavor for some of the issues 

we will be discussing here today. 

We will now view the video. 

[Video played.] 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you for the video. 

Mr. Goldstein, were those clips of some of the testing that you 

talked about, the 10 out of 10 spots? Or can you just give us some 

history of that? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Yes, Mr. Chairman. What the video showed, it 

showed three different things. The first was one of our investigators going into a Level four Government facility. It was actually 

one of the buildings that we tested. It occurred in April and May 

of this year. 

The investigator is carrying the implements to make the device 

that the second and third frames show. So, it shows our investigator going through security and not being stopped. 

At none of the 10 buildings that we went into were we stopped. 

We were able to go into the buildings with the materials, assemble 

the devices in a bathroom, and walk unimpeded through all of the 

various offices in the 10 buildings in the four cities that we went 

to. 

These offices included a variety of different Federal departments, 

including the Department of Justice, Department of Homeland Security, Department of State, including the field office of a Senator 

and a U.S. Representative. 

The second shot was actually just the detonator which was carried in, which has its own explosive power. 

The third shot was an actual test that was done at a National 

laboratory of the device being exploded itself. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Schenkel, have you been provided information relative to 

these tests that GAO performed? 

Mr. SCHENKEL. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Fortunately, Mr. Goldstein 

and his team came to us immediately after they conducted these 

tests and informed us as to the seriousness of this situation. 

Chairman THOMPSON. What did you do? 

Mr. SCHENKEL. We took immediate actions. Within hours, we 

had already contacted all of our regional directors, authorized additional overtime, explained the situation as to what was going on. 
31 

Added to this, though, is the challenge that none of the items of 

the disassembled components or of the device itself were prohibited 

items in itself, which adds to the challenge of trying to—— 

Chairman THOMPSON. Why were they not prohibited? 

Mr. SCHENKEL. The components themselves, or the determination of what is prohibited items, is not determined by the Federal 

Protective Service, sir. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Who determines it? 

Mr. SCHENKEL. It is determined by the Facilities Security Committee of each building. 

Chairman THOMPSON. So, is that Mr. Peck? Is that GSA? 

Mr. SCHENKEL. No, sir. Each facility, each GSA facility, all 9,000, 

have a Facilities Security Committee made up either of the—if it 

is a primary or a single-tenant building, it will be just the single 

agency that represents the Facilities Security Committee. If it is a 

multi-tenant agent—or a multi-tenant facility—— 

Chairman THOMPSON. Who oversees this committee? 

Mr. SCHENKEL. The chairman is normally the largest tenant 

within the building of a multi-tenant facility. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Mr. Beers, is this something you are familiar with? 

Mr. BEERS. Yes, sir. It is something that Mr. Goldstein has pointed out on several occasions. Mr. Peck mentioned that we had a 

summit of Federal security officers this week to go over this particular issue and the disconnect that Mr. Goldstein notes between 

the security committee and the people who actually do the protection. 

We are instituting a number of changes to try to fix that particular problem, sir. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Well, my discomfort is, you have a facilities committee, which probably has very little working knowledge 

of what bad things happen to be from a security perspective, making policy decisions that could jeopardize anybody going into a Federal building. So, that causes me real concern. 

Mr. BEERS. Sir, you are absolutely correct. What we are trying 

to rectify with respect to that, and what this summit was about to 

discuss, is, one, ensuring that there is a security provider on each 

of those committees, that the voting for undertaking measures—or, 

in this case, defining what are prohibited items—include the security considerations, and that the members of the committee will be 

trained in these securities issues. 

There are a number of other things that we consider, but your 

point is exactly right. That is something that we at DHS are trying 

to correct in association with GSA. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Mr. Schenkel, of those 10 situations, did 

we cancel any of the contracts of any of the contract security personnel? 

Mr. SCHENKEL. No, sir, we did not, because they did not violate 

any of the post orders that they were instructed to execute. The 

reason being, again, is that none of these components, in and of 

themselves, were prohibited items. 

Chairman THOMPSON. What is GAO’s position on that? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Mr. Chairman, I would probably respectfully disagree a little bit with Director Schenkel, in that our investigators 
32 

noted, and we informed FPS at the time, that a number of the 

buildings through which we gained entry and passed through security, the contract guards were not looking at their monitors, first 

of all. 

Many of the materials that were brought into the Federal buildings to make these devices, while they may not be specifically prohibited, are in themselves unusual. Guards should have been asking questions as to why individuals had a purpose for bringing 

such items into a Federal building. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Well, we might do another round, but I 

will yield to the Ranking Member for questions. 

Mr. KING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I will address this question, I guess, to Secretary Beers, Mr. 

Schenkel, Mr. Peck, whoever wants to answer it or jump in. 

As you know, I am opposed to the trials coming to New York, 

coming to the United States. That is neither here nor there for the 

purpose of today’s hearing. 

I would like to, under the assumption that the trial is going to 

be held in New York, ask what you think the role of the Federal 

Protective Service will be. I think Mr. Peck touched on some of 

this. You talk about coordinating with the State and local law enforcement, because my recollection of that area is, you have the 

Southern District courthouse, you have the MCC. You have at least 

three city or State courthouses. There is also, within about a 2- or 

3-minute walk, a significant Federal facility. 

What role do you see for the FPS? In the context of your answer, 

and then I will step back, address the staffing issue that was 

raised by the union. Also, whether or not you have to bring more 

personnel there from other facilities, such as the Eastern District 

of New York or other Federal facilities. 

Do you have the personnel to do what you think would have to 

be done? Because unlike previous trials, this will obviously receive 

more coverage, more publicity, more notoriety, et cetera. 

So, anyway, if you could just—you know, whatever you can tell 

me about that. I am not looking for any specifics. I do not expect 

you to have the answers today. But just at least in a general way, 

discuss how this will be approached. 

Thank you very much. 

Mr. SCHENKEL. If I may, sir, I will address that question. 

The Federal Protective Service has the responsibility for the perimeters of U.S. courthouses. As in 1993 in New York, on the occasion of the trials for the first bombing, what we will do is work in 

conjunction with the United States Marshals Service, and coordinate with State and local law enforcement and other Federal law 

enforcement agencies, and integrate our services with the other 

services, with the other law enforcement agencies. 

What we will do in general is that, just as at the Moussaoui trial 

and previous trials that I mentioned in New York, what we will do 

is have to deploy individual members from the Federal Protective 

Service, certified law enforcement officers. We have what we call 

a CIRT team, a Critical Incident Response Team, in every one of 

our 11 regions. 

What we will do is rotate those folks into the adequate numbers 

that are necessary after they have developed the actual protection 
33 

plan. We will just continually rotate the individuals to provide that 

necessary protection. 

Mr. KING. Now, in light of the correspondence from Local 918, do 

you feel there is sufficient staffing at that location presently? Secondly, if you have to bring in personnel from other sites within the 

area, is that going to leave them understaffed? 

Mr. SCHENKEL. It is certainly a challenge. That is region two in 

New York. Region two does not have the staff to perform their 

daily functions and provide the additional security necessary for 

the courthouse, if it follows the same pattern as the previous trials. 

What we will have to do is rotate those CIRT teams. As I have 

described, none of them will be out of their regions for more than 

14 days. We have to pull from all 11 regions to meet adequate 

numbers. We had to do something very similar when President 

Obama was elected, in Chicago, to protect his facility. It is something we have worked down to a science, if you will. 

But the short answer is, no, we will not be able to support it out 

of New York. We will have to use CIRT teams to assist. 

Mr. KING. How about the, I guess, the peripheral issue, anyway, 

of there being not enough staffing in the region anyway? 

Mr. SCHENKEL. Staffing is a challenge—— 

Mr. KING. I am not saying that is true. I am just saying—I am 

asking you to respond to the charge. 

Mr. SCHENKEL. Staffing is a challenge across the country. It is 

a very difficult challenge. As we have discovered most recently by 

these very disturbing videos, that it takes a lot of oversight to provide the adequate supervision for the contract guard force. 

When we first transferred out of GSA, we had approximately 

5,000 contract guards. We now have approximately 15,000 contract 

guards. We have fewer inspectors at this time than we did when 

we transferred in 2003. 

Mr. BEERS. With respect to that, sir, if I might add, this issue, 

that is, the staffing levels of FPS, is one of the major study efforts 

that we have underway. Secretary Napolitano asked us to work together with FPS to ensure that, in fact, we have the right resource 

and staffing levels to match the missions that FPS currently has. 

That study is underway, and we will, obviously, report to you 

and the other body on the results of that study as soon as it is complete. 

That will have, then, a statement by DHS about what the appropriate level ought to be, and, if it is an increase, how we will get 

there, and how we will pay for it. 

Mr. KING. Thank you very much. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thanks. 

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Carney, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CARNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Just basically, then, are you—to continue on this vein—are you 

saying that we do not have adequate staff, as configured, to address this? 

Mr. SCHENKEL. I am sorry. 

Mr. SCHENKEL. For New York, sir. 

Mr. CARNEY. For New York. For the upcoming trials. 
34 

Mr. SCHENKEL. Based on the seriousness of the trial and the historical perspective, which is all we have to go on, is the numbers 

that we needed for the previous trials, we do not have any of our 

regions that could support that and provide their daily operational 

requirements, as well. 

We would have to use a CIRT team from—at least a CIRT 

team—from another region. 

Mr. PECK. Can I expand on that? 

Mr. CARNEY. Yes. 

Mr. PECK. I think what we are really saying is, as in a typical 

military operation where you sometimes thin your lines in one 

place to create the mass in another place to conduct an operation, 

that is what we do. 

I was in GSA in the Clinton administration, and I know that 

when we had the Timothy McVeigh trial after Oklahoma City, we 

did the same thing. We sent people to the trial in Denver. 

But, you know, I do not think there is any way not to say that 

that means you are taking resources from someplace else where 

you do not feel that you have the same immediate need, and putting them, in this case, into New York City. 

But we do not—obviously, we do not staff, and never would staff, 

for the maximum possible deployment level that you see in any 

given place. So, they move people around. 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. If I may, Congressman, to just add to that, that 

several of the reports the GAO has released in the past get to this 

point in that moving people around in the way that they need to 

does undermine the security of the remaining areas and slows 

down lots of different other kinds of things, like building security 

assessments. It reduces proactive patrols and does undermine security in the other regions. 

Mr. CARNEY. Well, Mr. Goldstein, let me ask this, then. By 

GAO’s assessment, how understaffed is FPS? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. I think, at this point in time, nobody knows. We 

are encouraged that the Department is doing a staffing assessment 

to try and understand that. 

But a concern we have raised before is that it is difficult to understand what you are staffing needs will be until you have done 

a risk assessment, an effective risk assessment process, so you understand fully what the vulnerabilities and threats are, because it 

is difficult to staff not knowing that. We have had quite a number 

of criticisms of that process. 

So, it is a little bit like shooting in the dark right now until they 

can get in place an effective risk assessment process that lets them 

understand what staffing is really required to protect Federal property. 

Mr. CARNEY. Mr. Beers, how far down the road are we? How 

dark is that room? 

Mr. BEERS. We have been, at this point in time, through two 

iterations of data that we and FPS have worked on. It has gone 

back to FPS for some answers to some more questions. 

I am reluctant to give you a precise date that it is going to be 

done. But it will be done, if not by the end of this calendar year, 

very early in the next calendar year. 
35 

The Secretary has charged us to come up with this response in 

a timely enough fashion that we could present it to the Congress, 

and on the assumption that it would require additional resources 

and personnel, give you all an opportunity to interact with us on 

how we get there, should that be the requirement. 

So, we need to get this done, or we are not going to be able to 

respond to what has been a long-standing point by Members of 

Congress, as well as the GAO, about the levels, the staffing levels 

of FPS. 

Mr. CARNEY. Mr. Schenkel, do you agree with that? Or what is 

your assessment? 

Mr. SCHENKEL. I certainly agree with the responsibility to approach this in a fiscally sound manner. That is exactly what Mr. 

Beers is talking about. 

However, on the other hand, one of the things that I think that 

we have made great strides in—and Mr. Goldstein has not been 

able to see this one yet—is we have rolled out our Risk Assessment 

Management Program this year. As was pointed out, we had a very 

antiquated, very old system, where we were dependent on six different systems to conduct an actual risk assessment. 

As of Monday of this week, we have rolled out our new Risk Assessment Management Program, RAMP. This was accomplished 

from basically a cocktail napkin to actual fruition in less than 2 

years by some very dedicated, very smart individuals within FPS. 

That piece will also provide those answers that we owe the Secretary, because that will assist in providing the necessary metrics 

to validate staffing numbers. 

Mr. CARNEY. Well, that is good. I mean, yes, you owe the Secretary, but you also owe, well, hell, everybody in this room that 

comes to work in these buildings every day. 

Mr. SCHENKEL. Totally understand that, sir. 

Mr. CARNEY. Thank you. My time is up. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman THOMPSON. I guess, the question from me is, Mr. Goldstein, have you seen this risk assessment document? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. The new risk assessment program, as Director 

Schenkel mentioned, is just this week being implemented. We are 

quite pleased that they are, I think, actually a little ahead of 

schedule, as I understand. So, that is the good news. 

One concern we have remaining, though, is that much of the information that is in RAMP may not be accurate—not necessarily 

the part relating to the building security assessment process, because that new tool is fairly vigorous. But RAMP is also going to 

be used to track the certifications and qualifications of contract 

guards. 

As you know, we have had various concerns about whether those 

qualifications are up-to-date. It is our understanding that the information being put into RAMP to be able to track whether guards 

are qualified is the old data, which has many inaccuracies and 

flaws in it. So, while the agency has been cleaning that up, we are 

concerned that they may be inputting bad data into that new system, which has, obviously, a lot of problems associated with it. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Mr. Schenkel, are we putting bad data 

into the system? 
36 

Mr. SCHENKEL. No, sir, we are not. 

Immediately after we found out about the penetration tests, coincidentally, I guess it would be, simultaneously, we were also scrubbing the CERTS data. That is the guard—certification information. 

Previous to the outlay of RAMP, we had three points of failure, 

where the CERTS could provide an inaccurate validation of a 

guard’s certification, either from the guard company, from the individual region, or at the—in the CERTS system itself. 

Subsequent to that, we did 100 percent scrub of all guard certifications. We have narrowed this down now because of daily inspections on these certifications. We have narrowed this down and implemented all of this data into RAMP. If there is a single point of 

failure, it is a failure on the side of caution. In other words, it will 

prevent an individual guard from standing post, as opposed to allowing someone to stand post that is not certified. 

Chairman THOMPSON. I am sure you know that a request for a 

follow-up review by GAO is coming. 

Mr. SCHENKEL. Yes, sir. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you. 

Mr. Olson, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. OLSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank the 

witnesses for appearing before the committee today to help us with 

this decision and some of the ramifications thereof. 

I am concerned about the choice of the Southern District of New 

York as the venue to try terrorists like Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. 

As many of you know, over the weekend, the Washington Post 

reported on how Attorney General Holder came to choose New 

York as the place to try Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. The Post 

wrote, ‘‘The U.S. Marshals concluded that the Southern District of 

New York—with its hardened courthouse, secure Metropolitan Correctional Center and underground transportation tunnels through 

which to bring defendants to and from court each day—was, hands 

down, the safest option.’’ 

That courthouse, as you all know, is six blocks away from 

Ground Zero. There are many family members of the victims who 

are still living in that area. 

There are going to be constitutional questions when Khalid 

Sheikh Mohammed gets on United States soil. When he goes before 

a judge, you can bet his lawyers are going to file for change of 

venue. I can almost guarantee that. 

Given that that is going to be something that is going to happen, 

my question for the panel is this. Is there another courthouse, any 

courthouse in the Nation, with a similar security infrastructure 

that is equipped to handle a trial like this? Or is such a security 

system unique to the Southern District of New York? 

Again, I would like all of your opinions on that. Thank you. 

Who wants to go first? 

Mr. PECK. Yes, I probably know—I am thinking fast, Congressman. I am thinking there are a few other complexes that I can 

think of. I am thinking of the major cities where we have a combination of resources like a correctional center and a courthouse together. I could ask my colleagues. 

I will answer for the record, but I believe that there are only two 

other cities I can think of where we have a metropolitan correc-
37 

tional center that close. I do not know if the transportation system 

between that and the courthouse is the same. 

I will say, having seen high security trials take place in the 

Southern District of New York, before I understand why the attorney general made the decision, it is a place that we are used to defending, and where there is a conglomeration of resources that we 

have. 

But I will be happy to answer for the record whether there are 

any other places. 

But honestly, had someone said to me, off the top of my head, 

where would you go for a place like this? New York would have 

probably been at the top of my list. 

Mr. OLSON. Again, my concern is, you know, New York was 

where these attacks happened. It has a unique, historic, tragic role 

in the day of September 11. In American jurisprudence, we know 

what is going to happen. We know that that lawyer defending 

Khalid Sheikh Mohammed is going to ask for a change of venue. 

Again, my question is, is there another place we can go and have 

the security that, apparently, New York has? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. We have not done the work, Congressman, to be 

able to answer that question. So, I really could not respond to you. 

Mr. OLSON. Is it something, Mr. Goldstein, you all are considering? I mean, take a look at this sort of contingency plan, depending—I mean, again, once we bring him here and put him on U.S. 

soil, there is going to be a host of constitutional issues that are 

going to come up. We need to be ahead of that. 

I mean, these people are—you know, I went down to Guantanamo Bay this January. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed is an evil man. 

I mean, he has hate in his heart. He will not back down. Again, 

we need to make sure that we try him in the most secure place in 

America and have backups in case something happens again, New 

York being the venue that it is. 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. I would be happy to talk to you and your staff 

at a further time. 

Mr. OLSON. Anybody else. 

Mr. SCHENKEL. I can just tell you, from a security standpoint, I 

am not as familiar as Mr. Peck with all the facilities. I can only 

think of several that maybe have two of the three. 

But the security—there has to be modifications, no matter where 

they would transfer him to. We would have to meet those security 

requirements. But it would be an integrated effort, not just an FPS 

or a U.S. Marshals Service. It would be an integrated effort for all 

Federal and State and local law enforcement. 

Mr. OLSON. Thank you for the answer to those questions. Again, 

I encourage you to start thinking about that now, because it is 

something that is going to be coming down the pike when he 

stands in that courtroom. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back my time. Thank you. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you. 

The gentlelady from New York, Ms. Clarke, for 5 minutes. 

Ms. CLARKE. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I think my colleagues today have raised some very important 

issues with regards to the Federal Protective Service. We certainly 

see the nearly 9,000 buildings throughout our Nation as an impor-
38 

tant asset to us. Your Department plays an important role in our 

Nation’s homeland security, with the mission of keeping all Americans safe. 

Although small in size, with approximately 1,200 employees, evidence of the hard work done by your employees can be seen any 

time someone walks into any Federal building administered either 

through GSA or DHS. So, I would like to say that from the outset. 

Our committee held a hearing in May 2007, about the challenges 

that plagued the service at the time. During that hearing, I was 

extremely dismayed at the service’s low staffing levels and dependence on poorly trained contract guards. 

That, I think, is one of the biggest sticking points, given the expanded role that people are going to actually see you in, once this 

trial does come to the city of New York. I think we have pretty 

much driven that point home. 

Mr. Chairman, I am kind of shocked that after 2 years, you 

know, the FPS has not become more robust. I think that is part 

of the conversation that we are having here today. I have heard 

about the study that is going to take place with regards to staffing 

and the commensurate risk assessment tool that will be applied to 

the staffing requirement of FPS. 

But what do we expect the outcome will be? What can we do in 

anticipation of that? 

I think that, Mr. Schenkel, you have certainly—Director 

Schenkel—you have certainly witnessed the strain on your employees and the challenges that it has faced. Are there some recommendations that you are giving to the Secretary, given this 

heavy mandate now before you, which will mean a shifting of resources, a pulling of CERTs, the opening of vulnerabilities in other 

parts of the Nation, because of the constraints that you are under? 

Have you begun having those conversations? 

Mr. SCHENKEL. Ma’am, what we are trying to do is look for the 

most effective and efficient use of the resources we have. 

When you talked about our contract guards—and we are certainly proud of 99.9 percent of them and their activities—that is 

one of the avenues that we are exploring, is those gaps in training 

that perhaps could enhance the guard force, as opposed to some of 

the things that we are dependent on contractors to provide. 

That, weighed against our resources, our Federal resources, are 

some of the answers that we are looking for. It is a proactive process. It is not something that we take lightly. It is certainly something that we are making strides in on the positive side in enhancing the guards’ training and abilities, but it is also giving us pictures, if you will, or a view into what the most effective and efficient use of what our inspectors are doing and should be doing. 

Ms. CLARKE. Director Schenkel, you do not, then, anticipate any 

increase in the level of your staffing, given the expansion of the 

mandate of the work that you do? You just do not anticipate that. 

You are basically reconciled to a doing-more-with-less mentality? 

Mr. SCHENKEL. I think that is part of the process. To say that 

we need a definite number of additional employees right now, 

would not be the most effective and efficient use of our resources. 

I think that once we determine what they actually should be 

doing, how much time it takes them to do that, especially with the 
39 

advance of these new technologies that will time stamp and also 

develop other efficiencies, we may provide—may be able to provide—more time in some areas than we had before. 

I think those are the answers that need to be given before we 

actually come up with a specific number. 

Ms. CLARKE. So, are you just saying—because I am running out 

of time—that you are going to be working to craft out specifically 

the role of the FPS in this unique situation, in collaboration with 

other law enforcement entities that will be operating simultaneously during this period? 

Because I think that it is important for people to know that there 

is this immediate sort of focus on FPS, because we know of your 

role, the important pieces to understand specifically, what that role 

would be, and what the chain of command would be in an environment such as the courthouse protection, that brings in other law 

enforcement entities. Would you speak to that? 

Mr. SCHENKEL. Yes, ma’am. We have enjoyed a very positive relationship with State and local law enforcement, I think, ever since 

the existence of our service. 

As Mr. Peck spoke to earlier, we cannot staff for every event in 

every location. So, consequently, we are very dependent, and work 

very well with the State and local law enforcement. 

If it is an event that is on Federal property that we are responsible for, we take command and control. If it is an event that happens near our property, but could affect our property, we support 

that local law enforcement or Federal agency that has the lead on 

those instances. 

Mr. BEERS. If I might add to that, I would just say, first of all, 

do not—with respect to the larger question of the staffing size for 

FPS—do not walk away with the assumption that we have ruled 

out increasing the size of FPS. We have absolutely not ruled that 

out. 

We just want to make sure, as Director Schenkel just indicated, 

that, with the onslaught of new technology and new procedures, 

that will increase the productivity of the current workforce. Then, 

what other requirements are there on top of that? 

Second, with respect to—and this is with respect to the New 

York City issue. Please understand, as I know you must, the New 

York City Police Department has the strongest counterterrorism 

activity of any police force in the country, which is undoubtedly one 

of the major reasons that led to Attorney General Holder’s decision 

to place that in New York City. 

It is not just the Marshals. It is not just FPS. It is that whole, 

total package put together that is going to provide the security. 

Thank you. 

Mr. PECK. Mr. Chairman, if I may? I mean, I do not know how 

you want to allocate the time. But if I could put one other thing 

on the table, I wanted to reinforce what Secretary Beers said, 

which is that I think we all think that—I do not think we think 

that FPS’s current staffing level is sacrosanct, that if they need 

more resources, that they should get it. 

But before we do that, we really do need to do a better job of assessing the threat and what other means we have to mitigate the 

threats. 
40 

But the other point I wanted to add is this. It is important for 

you to know that the Federal Protective Service is mostly funded 

by security fee payments by Federal agencies in Federal buildings. 

It does not get a separate appropriation. 

There is an interesting conversation, I will just say, that goes on 

when we ask Federal—when we tell Federal agencies about the security they need. While I cannot say that anyone has ever balked 

at a security measure that we or FPS recommend, on the other 

hand, the charge is made per square foot, and we do get questions 

sometimes from the central finance people in Washington about 

how much they are paying, and what they are getting for it, as 

they should question. 

But it raises questions, just as the way we work with the Facility 

Security Committees and what their role is. I think the role of the 

security fee and how it is assessed, and whether that is the only 

way to fund FPS, is something that at some point ought to be on 

the table. 

Chairman THOMPSON. One of the comments that come to mind, 

Mr. Schenkel, how problematic is it that contract guards have no 

arrest power? 

Mr. SCHENKEL. It is not problematic, sir, because they enjoy—if 

that is the correct term—the extension of our authority in being 

able to detain individuals and/or exert deadly force in the event 

that either their or someone else’s life is threatened. 

The working relationships that we have in large Federal facilities 

where we have FPS presence on hand, where they can actually effect the arrest, works extremely well, and, plus, our relationships 

with State and local law enforcement in all of our other areas that 

we are responsible for. 

Chairman THOMPSON. So, now, your testimony is that they have 

the power to detain, but not the power to arrest. 

Mr. SCHENKEL. That is correct, sir. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Is that your understanding, Mr. Goldstein? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. It is my understanding, sir, yes. The problem 

arises, though—and we have reported this previously—is that 

there is a great variety of instruction by the contract guard companies to their guards about what kinds of actions they should be 

taking. 

We have done many interviews with the guards themselves. We 

have interviewed hundreds of them over the course of the last yearand-a-half. In talking to them, their understanding of what their 

role is, even within an individual company, differs greatly. 

We know of certain instances and have reported them, where, in 

fact, there was, at one Level four facility—and we reported this not 

that long ago—where an individual who was being detained by the 

Federal Protective Service, escaped from the officers, ran through 

the building wearing just one handcuff, had had his shirt ripped 

off when running out the front lobby of—this is a Level four building. 

All of the contract guards who were in the lobby, all of whom 

were armed, simply stepped away. The FPS officers went running 

after him and did not catch him. The individual was actually ap-
41 

prehended by an FPS officer several blocks away, who happened to 

be in a vehicle. 

So, there is a great variety of response that the contract guards 

actually provide, because there is not uniform training, sir. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Mr. Schenkel, is there a written policy directive on detention and arrest? 

Mr. SCHENKEL. Yes, sir. It is in our security guard information 

manual. To agree with Mr. Goldstein, as I most often do, that is 

one of the areas that we have really drilled down into over this 

past year. That is the consistency and standardization of guard 

training. 

That is also one of the areas that would affect staffing. We have 

to determine the appropriate number of guard—inherently governmental guard training hours that we would need to provide to all 

contract guards. 

We have already assumed 16 additional hours from what we had 

previously had, because that certainly is an area of concern. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Can you provide the committee with the 

written detention policy that FPS provides for the contract guards, 

with respect to both detention and arrest? 

Mr. SCHENKEL. Yes, sir. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you. 

Next is the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. Cao, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CAO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I have a question for Mr. Schenkel. In the GAO report made September 23, 2009, the GAO found that FPS does not have a fully 

reliable system for monitoring, and there find whether guards have 

the training and certification which are required. 

How far are you in addressing the need to implement this system 

to monitor and verify whether or not the guards have the requisite 

training? 

Mr. SCHENKEL. Yes, sir. We have already institutionalized that 

by placing that piece into RAMP. We recognized that there was a 

failing in that area, approximately a year ago, and had incorporated that into phase one of our Risk Assessment Management 

Program. 

All of our guards are in that system. In the event that there is— 

and the way this system works, I should provide that first. The 

way this system works is, if a guard certification is due on 1 July, 

that guard, that guard company and the region will receive a notice 

30 days prior to that. That individual will be notified to have to go 

regain his or her certification prior to that time. 

In the event that we have conducted guard post inspection after 

the 1st, and that individual is not certified, he or she will be immediately removed from post, because that is built into the automated 

system. 

Mr. CAO. Now, in your training and certifications, do you make 

sure that these contracting companies, these training facilities, do 

they provide training to the guards to make sure that they recognize new techniques, new equipment that are being used by terrorist groups around the world? 

Mr. SCHENKEL. Yes, sir. As a matter of fact, our threat management division publishes regular training bulletins, and our training 

division has produced specific training bulletins in regard to the 
42 

penetration. We have also produced a training video. We have completed about 99.4 percent of all of the 15,000 guards have completed that training, as well, sir. 

Mr. CAO. Okay. 

Also, in April of this year, the inspector general concluded that 

FPS did not use consistent selection practices to award guard contracts. In addition to these problems with awarding contracts, the 

IG noted a significant lack of oversight of the contractors once they 

are posted to security details. 

What have you done to address this issue? 

Mr. SCHENKEL. We work hand-in-hand with our consolidated contracting groups, currently under the leadership of the Office of Procurement Operations at DHS. But they are technically FPS employees. 

So, what we have done is promulgated specific directives addressing this consistency. Again, this is a consistency requirement 

across all 11 regions that was done, basically, 11 different ways 

several years ago. 

As a result of these policy changes, we have also incorporated a 

project management office that reviews the performance, and we 

have incorporated a semiannual performance review of each individual guard contract company. Subsequent to that review, we will 

make the determination as whether or not to reward that contract 

or to terminate that contract. 

Mr. CAO. In 2009, the ISC published the use of physical security 

performance measures, which requires assessing the effectiveness 

of security procedures through performance measures and testing. 

What is the status of this implementation? Do you know? 

Mr. SCHENKEL. Again, part of that is incorporated into RAMP, 

where we have all the countermeasures that are in a specific building are now incorporated into that system, where we can not only 

identify the necessity for a replacement, repair, et cetera, but it 

also provides the visibility across all 9,000 buildings to give us the 

comparison necessary. 

Mr. CAO. So, can you assure us that we are safer now in these 

Federal buildings than we were 4 months ago? 

Mr. SCHENKEL. I would say yes. Mr. Thompson had asked me 

that 2 years ago. I said I think they were safer then. I think they 

are safer now, 2 years, because we—2 years even later—because 

we have focused on our core mission, on our core competencies, and 

really have made tremendous strides across the board, not only on 

the mission support side, but certainly on the inspector side. Our 

uniformed operations and our investigators are totally dedicated to 

the protection mission. 

Mr. CAO. Thank you very much. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you very much. 

For the committee’s information, Mr. Schenkel, where are we 

from FPS’s training of contractors, in terms of what FPS requires? 

Do we have a backlog? 

Mr. SCHENKEL. We do not have a backlog now. All of our contractors have been trained to the adequate levels for the magnetometer 

and X-ray training, which is our part of it. 
43 

We have additionally institutionalized what we call a National 

weapons training program, which provides an additional 16 hours 

of magnetometer and X-ray training. 

Chairman THOMPSON. So, your testimony is that there is no 

backlog on any of the training of the contractors. 

Mr. SCHENKEL. If there is a backlog, it is not dependent on the 

FPS training. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Is there a backlog of contractor training of 

its employees? 

Mr. SCHENKEL. Sir, I am sorry, but I would not know that, because those employees would be prevented from standing post. 

Chairman THOMPSON. But that is not the case. Mr. Goldstein 

just said that they checked records of people who were working, 

whose credentials had expired. 

Mr. SCHENKEL. That is absolutely correct, sir. That was prior to 

the outset of RAMP and the 100 percent scrub of all the certifications. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Mr. Goldstein, do you agree with that? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. I cannot answer that question specifically, however, something quite related, which is when FPS recently did the 

scrub that Director Schenkel is mentioning. This was just a couple 

of months ago. To prepare for RAMP and after our recent report, 

they found themselves that upwards of 50 percent of the guards did 

not have adequate certifications in place. At least one whole region 

was unable to provide information to the system, because it simply 

was not adequate. 

So, I know that that is certainly a goal of the Federal Protective 

Service to achieve, but we have not gone back in to check. Based 

on the kind of information that we are gathering to complete the 

report that we are doing for this committee, we are still concerned 

that that is not the case. 

Chairman THOMPSON. So, Mr. Schenkel, your testimony now is, 

all that is done, it is correct, and that we are 100 percent. 

Mr. SCHENKEL. We are 100 percent of guards in our system. If 

they have guards on the contract that are not working on a FPS 

contract, we have no control over that. Nor would they be allowed 

to stand in a FPS post. 

Chairman THOMPSON. I do not want us to get into semantics, but 

if we have contract guards at any Federal building, your testimony 

is that those guards have met the requisite training that FPS requires. 

Mr. SCHENKEL. I will give you a 99 percent qualification of yes, 

sir. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Well, I am going to allow you to provide 

that to the committee in writing, based on your review, and taking 

into consideration what Mr. Goldstein just shared with the committee. 

You are aware of the FDA situation with the guards, right? 

Mr. SCHENKEL. Was that the Chenega situation, sir? 

Chairman THOMPSON. Yes. 

Mr. SCHENKEL. Yes, sir. That contract was terminated 30 September. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Did FPS find that out? Or somebody else 

found that out? 
44 

Mr. SCHENKEL. It was found out on an Operation Shield conducted by the National Capital Region of the Federal Protective 

Service, at which time they conducted the guard post inspection 

and discovered, I believe it was 58 guards, that did not have certifications in the system. That does not necessarily mean that they 

were not certified. It is just that they were not in the system. That 

is that very difficult and challenging three-piece system that we 

used to operate under. 

Chairman THOMPSON. So, RAMP has replaced it? 

Mr. SCHENKEL. I am not positive which company has taken over 

that—— 

Chairman THOMPSON. No, no. I am not—— 

Mr. SCHENKEL. Oh, RAMP. I am sorry, sir. Yes, sir, RAMP is the 

new—— 

Chairman THOMPSON. Okay. 

Mr. SCHENKEL. RAMP has replaced the old CERTS system. Yes, 

sir. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Okay, well, the gentleman from Texas, 

Mr. Cuellar. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank the 

witnesses for being here with us. 

Let me go ahead and go and talk about contract oversight. Since 

1995, the number of contract guards have gone up to about 13,000. 

The number of uniformed Federal officers has gone down to roughly about 600 individuals. 

Let me go back to the issue that I believe the Chairman brought 

up on power of arrest. As an attorney, I will tell you that—and I 

think we all know this—that the contract guards do not have the 

power to arrest. If you put me—and I am not a peace officer, not 

certified by any law enforcement entity—if I stood next to one of 

those contract officers, we both have the same power. 

Is that correct, Mr. Schenkel? 

Mr. SCHENKEL. Basically, that is. Yes, sir. The same as a citizen 

arrest. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Right. If you put any individual member of the 

public out there next to one of those contract officers, that individual has the same power as that guard. 

Is that correct? 

Mr. SCHENKEL. Technically, yes, sir. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Okay. When you say ‘‘technically,’’ legally? I would 

say, ‘‘yes.’’ I mean, I would say, yes, technically. You are trying to 

say, technically, there is a difference. I am talking about legally. 

What is the technical part of it? 

Mr. SCHENKEL. Well, the technical part would be that they are 

trained individuals in the use of force. They have a minimal protection, as opposed to a standard citizen. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Okay. Now, I understand that the inspector general, GAO also, that there have been different reviews that have 

come out on the operations of FPS. I believe, October 2006, the Department of Homeland, Office of Inspector General, the OIG audited the operations, and found that the agency was not performing 

effective oversight over the contract guard program. 

Is that correct? 

Mr. SCHENKEL. Yes, sir. 
45 

Mr. CUELLAR. I believe that on April 2009, the OIG report again 

concluded that the FPS was not performing adequate contract oversight of its guards. Is that correct? 

Mr. SCHENKEL. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. CUELLAR. All right. June 2008, GAO report also identified inadequate oversight of the contract program as, you know, one of 

the key challenges in order to give protection. Is that correct? 

Mr. SCHENKEL. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CUELLAR. All right. When do you start implementing the recommendations that the OIG or the audit, or the GAO provided? I 

mean, I would assume—I mean, if I was you, or I was in your 

place, I would assume that, if somebody gave me some recommendation, I would sit down with that agency who were trying 

to implement this. It was not only one time, but I see three different types. 

When do we start implementing those recommendations? 

Mr. SCHENKEL. We started in 2006 and 2007, when we made the 

determination to go to an inspector-based force and concentrate on 

our core mission of protection, as opposed to some of the other distracting law enforcement missions. 

Since that time, we have had to standardize the policies and procedures for the Federal Protective Service. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Do you all have a—I am sorry—do you have a 

strategic plan? 

Mr. SCHENKEL. Yes, we do, sir. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Okay. Mr. Chairman, could I ask for a copy of 

that? 

I would ask you if you could send that within 3 days, if you do 

not mind. I am sure you have it available, handy. 

Now, GAO found different issues, first of all, qualifications and 

certifications. The large number of contract guards who do not have 

training and certification required to be deployed at a Federal facility, has that been addressed? 

Mr. SCHENKEL. Yes, sir, it has. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Okay. 

GAO, is that correct? Mr. Goldstein? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. At this point in time, we are not certain. We 

have not gone back and retested to determine whether or not the 

new system in place is adequate. It is something we certainly could 

do for the committee. But we cannot answer that question today. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Mr. Chairman, could I request that answer for the 

committee? 

Compliance with post orders. 

GAO found that the agency was inconsistent in its inspection of 

guard compliance with post orders. Has that been complied with? 

Have the post orders been complied with? 

Mr. SCHENKEL. FPS provides the template for post orders. The 

Facility Security Committees actually write the post orders. 

Mr. CUELLAR. All right. 

Mr. SCHENKEL. We have standardized the template, but we do 

not have the authority to standardize the procedures. 

Mr. CUELLAR. GAO, any response on that, on the post order compliance? 
46 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. I think the post orders really come down to a 

question of adherence by the contract guard companies, ensuring 

that the contract guards are trained properly, but also oversight 

from FPS. As Director Schenkel mentioned, one of the biggest challenges they have is having sufficient staff to really oversee the contract guard program, which is challenging. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Right. Well, let me ask, because my time is up, on 

the covert testing problems that we had on the allocation of resources using risk management, and some of the issues that were 

brought up on the management of human capital deficiencies, on 

the difficulty of meeting mandated staffing levels, on a lack of 

human capital plan. 

By the way, a capital plan should be part of the strategic plan 

also, Mr. Schenkel. 

On those issues, could I—Mr. Chairman, I am going to ask the 

GAO and Mr. Schenkel if they can provide that information to the 

committee. 

One last question, and I will close, Mr. Chairman, on the GAO. 

Has any of the customers, tenants ever complained about paying 

a higher fee for more security, that you know of? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. We have talked to many tenants in the course 

of our work, and we have had a little variety of responses. Many 

tenants are concerned. Our report on human capital in July 2009, 

has a survey of many of the tenants. 

Many of the tenants have been concerned that their fees are 

going up, but their services may not be going up with it, you know, 

at the same time. In other words, because of the challenges FPS 

has faced and the lack of officers in many places, there have been 

concerns that the security is not what it was, that there are not 

officers present at all at times, and the way it used to be. 

The FPS is challenged by the staffing situation, sir. 

Mr. CUELLAR. If the Chairman allows me, if I could, on those responses. Strategic plan, within 3 days that should be available. The 

other one, I assume, maybe 30 days from both of you, or if that 

would be an adequate timetable. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Three days for both is fine with me. 

Is that a problem? 

Beg your pardon? 

Mr. SCHENKEL. I am sorry. I do not believe so. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Okay. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you. 

The gentlelady from California for 5 minutes. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First of all, hopefully, Mr. Beers, has the question been asked to 

you about the payment during the transition period of collecting 

fees? Have we already—did anyone do that question yet? 

Mr. BEERS. About the level of fees for—— 

Ms. RICHARDSON. During the transition period? 

Mr. BEERS. Yes. It was brought up by Director Schenkel in the 

transition briefings that we received as part of the transition team. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Okay. 

Mr. BEERS. These issues have all come up during that period. 
47 

Ms. RICHARDSON. But it is my understanding that the NPPD requires the FPS to pay the transition costs. Is that correct? 

Mr. BEERS. That is correct. There are services rendered on behalf 

of them. We would be out of compliance if we used other monies 

to pay for our servicing of FPS. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Okay. But has that cost us anything in terms 

of our current staffing levels? 

Mr. BEERS. The cost of the transition is—we have some estimates. It is not finally determined. We are working with FPS to 

determine precisely what those costs will be. 

This is an additional cost, quite frankly, over and above the cost, 

the services that ICE has been providing, or that FPS will provide 

when this transition is complete, which will be by the—by no later 

than the end of fiscal year 2010. But our effort is to have that completed earlier than that time. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. So, if it is in addition to what has been done 

before, have you considered increasing the building security fee to 

cover—— 

Mr. BEERS. We are trying to make this transition not cause an 

increase in the overall fees. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Then who is going to pay for it? 

Mr. BEERS. FPS. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Do you feel that they have the sufficient budget to do so? 

Mr. BEERS. We are working on that. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. What do you mean by that? 

Mr. BEERS. I mean we are in discussion about where the funding 

would come from within the FPS budget in order to pay for those 

costs. At this particular point in time, that is a subject that is still 

under discussion, so I am not in a position to tell you precisely 

where that money will come from in the FPS budget. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Mr. Goldstein, is that something you are privy 

to? Do you have an opinion on that, of whether you feel they would 

be able to absorb that in their budget? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. We have not looked at it specifically. They are 

clearly hamstrung with respect to their budget in many ways 

today. 

Our concern is one of transparency for the agencies who pay 

their security fees. They do not have the understanding that it is 

going to pay for administrative costs in transitioning an agency 

from one part of the Department to another. They believe it is 

going to pay for enhancing the security of their facility. So, that is 

a concern that we have. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. So, then, you would be of the mind that the 

costs would not be increased, or that would be your recommendation. 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. I do not have a recommendation at this point. 

We have not sat down with DHS to discuss this specifically. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Okay. Do you have any intentions to do so? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. We certainly can. We have not done so at this 

point. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Okay. My last question is for Mr. Peck. 

The GAO recommends that the FPS and the GSA make improvements to facilitate information sharing. If would say anything 
48 

across the board, you know, what this committee talks a lot about 

is information sharing and communication. 

How would the GSA collaborate with the NPPD and the FPS 

during the transition to address any information-sharing issues? 

Mr. PECK. Like I say, I have been in this job for 3 months. I 

think my first week on the job, because I had done it before, I had 

a conversation with the security people we have at GSA, because 

we have certain National security responsibilities aside from just 

protecting our buildings, about intelligence and security information sharing with FPS, other agencies of the Federal Government. 

I do not think that the transition—specifically on the question of 

FPS and GSA—I do not think that the transition will affect our information sharing. I do believe that we have a good channel of communication between us and the DHS and the Federal Protective 

Service on the information sharing that we need. 

There are certain things that could happen that would require 

that we take certain actions at a Federal building on the management side, that we depend on DHS and other agencies of the Government to tell us. I think we have pretty good channels. 

I am not going to tell you, however, that I believe that all of the 

information sharing in the Government, some of the information 

that they may need from time to time, I would not guarantee that 

we have fixed that problem totally inside the Government. 

But I must say, we believe we have the channels. We have the 

security clearance, if necessary, the handling of classified documents and information that we need to do that. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Do you anticipate figuring out whether it is 

fixed? Well, not necessarily whether it is fixed, but whether it is 

working? 

Mr. PECK. I mean, we run exercises. We do all those sorts of 

things you do to see if things are working well. 

I am confident that we, as I say, that we have the information 

we need with DHS on those threats that are specific to Federal facilities. Yes, we do. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, could I have another 20 seconds? I think he wanted to respond. 

Thank you. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Mr. Schenkel. 

Mr. SCHENKEL. I just wanted to help Mr. Peck out here, because 

the most contentious issue was the sharing of the full facility security assessment. Under our new program of RAMP, we have provided—we will be providing, I should say—the fully disclosed facility security assessment. 

You know, we have enjoyed an ever increasing, positive relationship with the GSA over the last several years. This is a giant step 

forward. That was the issue in particular that came up under Mr. 

Goldstein’s audit. 

Mr. PECK. With respect to that, may I say that, if I can, Mr. 

Chairman—— 

Chairman THOMPSON. Go ahead. 

Mr. PECK [continuing]. That is really important, what underlies 

an awful lot of the questions here and that we really need to talk 

about is, it is one thing for us to establish uniform standards with 

respect to security in facilities, which we do for how much of a 
49 

blast resistance they should have, for example, or what the overall 

training for guards should be. 

But as I started out by saying, that each facility is unique in the 

kinds of agencies it houses, the accessibility we need from the public, how far they are from a curb, or whether they are in a threatened geography in this country or not, that it makes this job much 

more complicated. 

I will just say with respect to our question about security guards 

and overseeing them, this is something that I have seen over some 

15 years being associated with GSA and FPS, if you go back to my 

first term in GSA. That FPS has transitioned, I would not say, 

though, all the way, but from a force where many of the members 

of FPS regarded themselves primarily as uniformed police officers, 

to an organization where they are doing security. 

So, I think that shift of resources has happened. Clearly, we all 

need to keep working on it. 

But it is because security guards get hired, and then they have 

to adapt to specific circumstances in a building, that the training 

is even more complicated, and overseeing them is more complicated. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you very much. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman THOMPSON. I am happy to see that GSA and FPS are 

talking, because at some point, GAO said, that was not the case. 

But we now have it before this committee that you are doing that. 

We thank you. 

The gentlelady from Texas for 5 minutes. 

Ms. Jackson Lee. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I thank 

the witnesses for their presence here today, and the witnesses of 

the second panel. 

I think we have to direct questions in the backdrop of an enormous number that is really shocking to me. I recognize that Federal Government has a large number of Federal buildings. I will 

find the number here in a moment. 

But what shocks me is that we are talking about 5,000 contractual companies or contracts dealing with the security of Federal 

buildings post-9/11. 

I find that both disturbing in terms of the ability for oversight 

and the carefulness in which the personnel are actually trained, 

the certification, and the Federal Government even knowing what 

the level of security is for the thousands upon thousands of Federal 

employees and individuals who have to go into Federal buildings 

on Federal business. 

So, Secretary Beers, if I can, can you give any explanation as to 

what happened in the video that Chairman Thompson showed? 

Mr. BEERS. Yes, ma’am. As we have indicated in a variety of 

fora, the issues at hand involve several aspects, the first of which 

is, were the guards at the facilities that the GAO looked at adequately trained and certified in order to be able to perform the job 

that should be expected of them to do that? 

That particular issue was addressed by Director Schenkel and 

his staff in terms of an immediate audit of all the contract guards, 

to make sure that their certifications were up-to-date. Now, this 
50 

past week, the initiation of the Risk Assessment Management Program, RAMP, which they now have an automated, uniform, national system—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. When do you think that program—forgive me 

for doing an intervention here. When will the RAMP program be 

fully operational? 

Mr. BEERS. Fully operational, it will be 2011. But the initial 

point, and the point of Mr. Goldstein’s investigation, that is the 

first part of the program, which is the listing of all the contract 

guards and their certification status, so that Director Schenkel and 

his staff will know when they need to have that updated, will provide indications to the company that they have got a 30-day window to finish that and get it done, or they will not be allowed to 

stay on post. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me just say that, if this was not a play 

game, if you will, lives would have been lost. I am taken aback by 

the answers—and this is on-going. This is, obviously, preceding 

this administration. So, you are now having to be the problem-solvers, and I acknowledge that. 

But I need to be pointed in the fact that this could have resulted 

in massive loss of life. 

The question is, have we changed the mindset—again, 5,000 outside contractors. What is the present position on increasing the 

number of those who are under the Federal Protective Service as 

employees? 

Mr. BEERS. We have, at the direction of Secretary Napolitano, 

undertaken a review of the staff size of the Federal Protective 

Service. We have had two data calls and meetings to discuss that 

information. We have asked for more information. We owe her, as 

soon as possible, the results of that, in order both to provide that 

to her, but also to provide that to you, so that you know what we 

think the optimal resource and personnel—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Well, what do you think that—if Mr. Chairman would indulge me, I see my seconds are running out. 

What is your perception of 5,000? What do you think you would 

need to increase it by to have a balance of the huge number of outside contractors, which I can imagine you can get your hands 

around in training, no matter what kind of system you put in 

place? 

Mr. BEERS. Let me let Director Schenkel answer the specific 

question, because I am not aware that, under his responsibilities, 

he has 5,000 contracts. That would be one for every three guards. 

I do not think we are—I think that is for all Federal facilities, and 

not what FPS is responsible for protecting. 

Mr. SCHENKEL. Yes, ma’am. There are 372,000, I think, Federal 

facilities. We are only responsible for the 9,000 GSA owned or 

leased, of which we have approximately 52, 53 contractors, and approximately 126 contracts. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Well, let me move quickly to the General Accountability Office, please, and Mr. Peck. What is your assessment 

of what they have? 

Mr. PECK. The number of contracts? It has got to be much more 

like what they are discussing. We have 1,500 Government-owned 

buildings, about 8,000 that are leased facilities, some of which— 
51 

many of which we have contract guards for. So, it is 15,000 guards 

in GSA facilities. It would be much more like a smaller number of 

contracts. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. A small number of contracts? 

Mr. PECK. I mean a smaller number of contracts than—I would 

be inclined to think the number that Mr. Schenkel cites is probably 

closer—I do not know specifically—than anything like 5,000. That 

may refer to contracts at Department of Defense installations, and 

all those other Government agencies. 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. If I may, ma’am. Director Schenkel is basically 

right. There are 300-and-some-odd contracts covering—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Are the 5,000 covering all the other buildings? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. That I do not know. We have not looked at—we 

have only looked at the 9,000 Federal buildings under GSA—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me just get this to this final question. 

In our report it says that GSA, that FPS, provides regular briefings on building security, performs security assessments and 

makes recommendations on security countermeasures to GSA and 

tenants. However, GSA and tenant agencies ultimately decide 

whether to sign onto the recommended countermeasures. 

So, to GSA, which is Mr. Peck, I would just like to get in writing 

the FPS recommendations for the last year—if we have to go back 

further—and then, the response of GSA in terms of funding or complying with those recommendations. 

Mr. PECK. Okay. I would like to be clear. The decisions on those 

recommendations—it goes back to something we said before—the 

decisions on what to do in specific buildings is made by something 

called the Facility Security Committee, which is not a GSA committee. It is chaired by the largest—the head of the largest—tenant 

in a Federal building. 

Having said that, I will go back and see what—I will go back and 

get you the documentation that you asked for. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would only say 

that there is a lot of confusion. There seems to be one hand not 

knowing what the other hand is doing. But I would hope that, at 

some point, we can balance contracts with hired personnel, trained 

by the Federal Government, and being under the auspices of the 

Federal Protective Service, National Protection Programs Directorate. 

Thank you very much. I yield back. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you very much. 

I would like to thank our panel of witnesses for their valuable 

testimony, and the Members for their questions, likewise. 

Secretary Beers, the facilities committee is troubling. I think I do 

not have to say anything else. I would suggest that you have to 

look at it. Whatever we need to do—if there is legislation, or whatever—from a security perspective, to have people with no security 

training making security decisions is a no-brainer, in my estimation, and, I think, based on GAO’s situation. 

The other issue is the 2010 transition plan. Committee staff has 

been working with your staff on making sure that we are kept up 

with what is going on. 

We need your word that we will not be impeded from doing our 

work by your staff, by a lack of information. 
52 

Mr. BEERS. Yes, sir. With respect to the first issue, we are in 

total agreement with respect to dealing with the Facility Security 

Committees. That is why—and this is one of the values as a marriage of FPS and NPPD. 

We had always in NPPD been responsible for the Interagency Security Committee, which is the oversight body of this larger process. That is why we had this summit meeting this week that Mr. 

Peck and I both attended, and that our leader, Austin Smith, ran. 

We are expecting a number of solid recommendations coming out 

of that. I gave you some indication of what they—the direction that 

we are going. 

But I can tell you that Secretary Napolitano is personally interested in this. I have had at least two conversations with her specifically on this point after she became aware of this challenge that 

Director Schenkel and Mr. Goldstein, as well, have pointed to. So, 

we really are focused on that. 

With respect to the provision of information, we owe you a report, I believe by the end of this calendar year, on the status of the 

transition. That is not to say that we will not talk or provide information in between. But we owe you, as we owe ourselves, a constant monitoring of this process. We will keep you informed, sir. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you very much. We look forward to 

it. 

Before being dismissed, I would remind our first panel of witnesses that the Members of the committee may have additional 

questions for you. We will ask you to respond expeditiously in writing to those questions. 

Thank you again. It was a good hearing. 

I would now ask the clerk to please prepare the witness table for 

our second panel. 

I would like to thank the panel again. 

Welcome to the second panel of witnesses. 

Our first witness is Mr. David Wright, president of the AFGE, 

Local 918. Mr. Wright is a 23-year veteran of the Federal Protective Service. During his tenure at AFGE Local 918 as president, he 

sought to expose management problems at ICE and FPS. 

Welcome, Mr. Wright. 

Our second witness is Mr. Stephen Amitay. He is the Federal 

legislative counsel for the National Association of Security Companies, the Nation’s largest contract security association. Its member 

companies employ over 400,000 security officers throughout the 

United States in the commercial and governmental sections. 

Welcome. 

I would once again like to thank all our witnesses for being here 

today. As previously stated, the witnesses’ full statement will be inserted in the record. I would now ask each witness to summarize 

his statement for 5 minutes, beginning with Mr. Wright. 

STATEMENT OF DAVID L. WRIGHT, PRESIDENT, AMERICAN 

FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, LOCAL 918 

Mr. WRIGHT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member King and Members of 

the committee. My name is David Wright. I am president of AFGE 

Local 918, the FPS union. 
53 

Since the 9/11 attacks, I have watched with growing frustration 

and outrage as the FPS was allowed to deteriorate. Despite intervention by Congress to establish minimum staffing levels, FPS still 

has less boots on the ground than when it joined DHS. With our 

move to NPPD, I am hopeful that DHS can finally get the vital 

mission of protecting Federal employees and facilities right. 

The FPS faces daunting challenges, and its officers and inspectors have been shocked and dismayed by the recent GAO reports 

and vulnerabilities that continue to exist. Every day, they put their 

lives on the line to accomplish the DHS mission, and have sacrificed their family time to work the many hours of overtime to ensure that facilities are protected. 

While we are finally confident that DHS leadership wants FPS 

to succeed, we need your help to make sure the embedded, intransigent and unaccountable bureaucrats at OMB cooperate to provide 

the resources necessary to accomplish our mission. 

One glaring example is the monitoring and training of FPS contract guards. In 2001, there were 5,000 contract guards and 1,450 

total FPS personnel. By 2009, there were 15,000 contract guards, 

but only 1,225 total FPS personnel. 

That threefold increase in guards, coupled with a 16 percent cut 

in FPS staff, was a recipe for failure. No one should have been surprised to discover the deficiencies in contract guard management, 

performance and guards’ abilities to detect weapons and explosives. 

Despite this critical shortfall, OMB actually decreased security 

charges collected to monitor and administer contract guards by 25 

percent this year. 

When GAO covertly entered FPS jurisdictions with explosives, 

FPS over-reliance on contract guards was exposed. Security has 

clearly been reduced. Staggering lapses by GAO make in-sourcing 

of contract guards at high-risk buildings an important component 

of any overall reform effort for FPS. 

Among the other challenges faced by FPS is a funding structure 

that has resulted in cuts of $700 million since 9/11. 

We have FPS law enforcement officers that do not have Federal 

law enforcement retirement or benefits. FPS operates only during 

normal business hours in New York and other major cities. Criminals and terrorists do not work business hours, and neither should 

FPS. 

Building security committees have failed to approve critical security countermeasures. There is a case going on right now of an FPS 

recommendation for a night-time guard at a courthouse in a western State. That guard countermeasure has been declined for years 

by the non-security professionals of the FSC, and very recently, 

there were gunshots directed into that Congressional office window. 

We also face field law enforcement staff that is significantly 

below Congressionally mandated minimums, and lastly, a critical 

manpower shortage in New York City. 

We need your help to remedy these challenges by: No. 1, mandating sufficient FPS staff to protect Federal employees and facilities; No. 2, recognize FPS dedicated law enforcement officers with 

appropriate law enforcement benefits and pay; No. 3, in-source contract guard positions at high-risk facilities by replacing them with 
54 

Federal police officers; and No. 4, remedy the FPS manpower crisis 

in New York. 

A trial of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed at the New York City Federal courthouse will present a security risk that FPS is ill-equipped 

to handle with depleting security to other Federal buildings in the 

country. 

Since 2001, while FPS has decreased and the risk of attack on 

Federal facilities has increased, the number of non-DOD and nonFPS security specialists and police officers has increased by over 

3,200 positions. The V.A. police, which protects 154 medical centers 

Nation-wide is twice the size of FPS in manpower. 

The sole Federal agency charged with the critical mission of protecting thousands of Federal buildings and millions of Federal employees and visitors from terrorist and criminal attack, the Federal 

Protective Service is now within NPPD, but remains an agency in 

crisis. 

I believe the state of the FPS right now is little different than 

that of the airline industry’s security prior to 9/11. Then, a reliance 

on poorly trained, unmonitored contract guards with no law enforcement authority, security implementation by conflicting entities, an unworkable funding structure, and a perception of security 

through inspections instead of protection by boots-on-the-ground 

Federal officers proved disastrous. 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member King, Members of the committee, when America demanded professional security at airports 

in the wake of 9/11, Congress and the administration responded by 

hiring over 20,000 Federal officers to staff the TSA. Now is the 

time to do the same for FPS. The dedicated men and women of FPS 

need your help to enable our success and to protect Federal employees and properties across the Nation. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify. 

[The statement of Mr. Wright follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DAVID L. WRIGHT

NOVEMBER 18, 2009

Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member King and Members of the committee: My 

name is David Wright. I am President of AFGE Local 918, which represents the 

dedicated men and women of the Federal Protective Service. I have been an FPS 

Law Enforcement Officer for the past 23 years. In the 8 years since the September 

11 attacks, I watched with growing frustration and outrage, as the Federal Protective Service was allowed to deteriorate and drift like a rudderless, sinking ship. Despite intervention by Congress to establish minimum staffing levels, FPS still has 

significantly less boots-on-the-ground in-service field staff than when it joined DHS. 

The transition to the National Protection Programs Directorate is clearly a welcome 

change in the right direction. I am hopeful that under the leadership of Secretary 

Napolitano and Under Secretary Beers, DHS can finally get the vital mission of protecting the over 1 million dedicated civil servants who work in the 9,000 FPS secured facilities located in over 2,100 American communities right. 

The Federal Protective Service indeed faces daunting challenges, and its officers 

and inspectors have been shocked and dismayed by the recent GAO reports and 

vulnerabilities that continue to exist. Every day, they put their lives on the line to 

accomplish the DHS mission and have willingly sacrificed their leisure and family 

time to work the many hours of overtime required to make sure facilities are protected and contract guards are correctly trained and proficient in their duties. Despite these yeoman efforts, FPS does not have sufficient staff to accomplish these 

vital tasks. While we are finally confident the Department leadership wants FPS 

to succeed, we need your help to make sure the embedded, intransigent, and unac-
55 

countable bureaucrats at OMB cooperate to provide the minimum resources necessary to accomplish our mission. 

One glaring example is the monitoring and training of contract guards. In 2001 

there were 5,000 contract guards and FPS was authorized over 1,450 total personnel. By 2009 there were 15,000 contract guards, but FPS was authorized only 

1,225 total personnel. A three-fold increase in guards coupled with a 16 percent cut 

in FPS staff was a recipe for failure. No one should have been surprised to discover 

shortfalls in contract guard management, performance, and ability to detect weapons and explosives. Clearly OMB should have increased the resources available for 

monitoring, rather than imposing a cut. 

Based in the GAO test, where without detection, they entered facilities with explosives; the overreliance on contract guards—particularly at the highest security 

level buildings—has clearly reduced the effectiveness of security provided around 

these facilities. The staggering lapses found by the GAO make insourcing of contract 

guards at high risk buildings an important component of any overall reform effort 

for FPS. 

We do not dispute GAO findings that FPS could better manage its roles, and are 

encouraged that implementation of the long planned Risk Assessment Management 

Program (RAMP) is a major step foRAMPrward to provide a viable tool that will 

assist our officers and inspectors to manage defined risks at the facility and local 

levels. While will apply GAO key practices to facility protection, the additional 

workload and tracking of field staff actions will result in increased time to complete 

assessments. Since the overall mission will not change RAMP could add to the real 

root cause of most FPS failures and the largest impediment to progress, which is 

a lack of sufficient field staff. 

Major challenges that hamper the protection of Government employees and members of the public who work in and visit Federal facilities include: 

• Diminished security and increased the risk of crime or terrorist attacks to facilities as a result of decreased or eliminated law enforcement services such as 

proactive patrol in many locations. 

• Contract guards that lack law enforcement authority, and are not adequately 

monitored or trained. 

• An unworkable and inefficient funding structure that has resulted in funding 

being cut by $700 million since 9/11, employee pay reduced by 10 percent, and 

unbudgeted transition costs. 

• The fiscal year 2010 appropriations act requires FPS to pay the costs of transition to NPPD from its revenues, but OMB has not yet raised security charges 

to provide any increased revenue. 

• FPS consistently loses high performing employees because our law enforcement 

officers are not recognized as such and do not have the same benefits as other 

agencies with equivalent missions. 

• Limited service hours in major cities impact critical monitoring tasks. 

• Inadequate time to complete necessary tasks, including security assessments. 

• Building Security Committees that fail to understand or approve critical security measures. 

• ISC guidance interpreted by tenant and GSA security staff that could result in 

hiding rather than accepting or mitigating risk. 

• Coordination with other agencies security personnel who frequently attempt to 

ineffectively duplicate FPS provided services and hamper consistent application 

of risk-based security measures. 

• In-service field staff below Congressionally mandated levels. 

• FPS lacks membership on the interagency security committee and no longer has 

a role as an honest broker to ensure compliance with security standards. 

• FPS field managers need to build a labor management partnership to establish 

one team dedicated to the critical Federal facilities protection mission. 

To meet these challenges and to achieve the promise of one Department responsible for securing the Homeland, including Federal employees and facilities, an effective long and short-term strategy is necessary. Congress should take these critical 

initial steps: 

1. Immediately mandate sufficient FPS staff to meet mission requirements. 

2. Recognize FPS’s dedicated law enforcement officers as such with appropriate 

pay and benefits. 

3. Stop the fee-funding scheme that forces agencies to choose between adequate 

protection for their employees and service to the public, by proposing direct appropriation of essential basic and mandated security measures. 

4. In-source contract guard positions at high-risk facilities, by replacing them 

with Federal Police Officers. 
56 

5. Give DHS the tools to protect Federal facilities by codifying the role of the 

Interagency Security Committee; and restoring FPS Committee membership as 

its honest broker. 

CONTINUING CHALLENGES TO EFFECTIVE PROTECTION

1. Diminished security and increased the risk of crime or terrorist attacks in 

many facilities as a result of decreased or eliminated law enforcement services such 

as proactive patrol in many locations. 

The GAO has pointed to the importance of a uniformed, Federal law enforcement 

presence surrounding Federal buildings as an essential security requirement to detect and deter attack. It is an approach embraced by virtually all law enforcement 

agencies across the country. A properly staffed FPS would function as a community 

police organization where security and law enforcement tasks are integrated. The 

focus would be proactive and designed to prevent criminal and terrorist attack, rather than the traditional police model of merely responding to reports of crime, determining if a law was violated, initiating action through the criminal justice system 

and cleaning up the resulting mess. FPS’ protection mission will be best accomplished by using inspectors, augmented by Federal Police Officers (series 083) in the 

largest cities, and at the highest risk facilities. Inspectors would be assigned as the 

designated service provider for a mix of high and lower risk facilities to conduct facility security assessments, support facility security committees, assist facility emergency planning, train facility tenants on security topics, assist with facility emergency plans, train contract guards, and verify functionality of most security countermeasures. Both police officers and inspectors would provide law enforcement response, proactive patrol, guard performance inspections, verification of guard certifications, and guard training monitoring. 

2. Contract guards that lack law enforcement authority and are not adequately 

monitored or trained. 

The GAO has documented the risks inherent in depending on contract guards as 

a force multiplier without adequate Government inspection, performance monitoring, and training. Contract guards lack the authority to arrest. With additional 

staff, FPS would have significantly higher assurance guards are performing and are 

trained to the specifications of the contract, through robust inspection and monitoring protocols. Contract guards should not have the responsibility for all dedicated 

facility patrol, access control, CCTV monitoring, and weapons detection at all facilities, including complex buildings with established high and very high risks. Roving 

patrol and weapons detection positions at the highest risk facilities should be performed by Federal police officers, just as they are at the White House, the Capitol 

and Congressional office buildings, and the Pentagon. In-sourcing these positions at 

select facilities to use FPS police officers would materially reduce the risk of successful attack using tactics similar to those used by the GAO. The use of contract 

guards can continue for monitoring functions, for agency specific requirements, and 

at lower risk facilities with guard requirements, such as Social Security offices. Additionally, these police officers would have a natural career path, building on their 

experience as Federal officers, to the inspector position, thus creating an initial accession position within FPS. 

3. An unworkable and inefficient funding structure that has resulted in funding 

being cut by $700 million since 9/11, employee pay reduced by 10 percent, and 

unbudgeted transition costs. 

The history of the unworkable FPS funding method has been well documented. 

Congress created DHS to prioritize risk mitigation strategies based on threat, vulnerability, and consequence of attack. DHS cannot perform this function for the 

Federal facilities it is charged with protecting under the current security charge 

FPS funding scheme. 

In the post-9/11 world of today, it makes virtually no sense to rely upon a square 

footage based fee to entirely determine funding for the FPS. While State and local 

taxes are used to fund basic police and security functions, no Government collects 

fees from other Government budget accounts for these essential services. Relying 

only on increased basic fees, as OMB has done, ultimately reduces the basic security 

services agencies can afford and increases the risk of their employees and facilities 

to attack. Prior to its transfer to DHS, GSA subsidized the FPS by $139 million 

above security fee collections and paid FPS overhead and other costs from its appropriated base. DHS however, has relied only on security fee collections, resulting in 

a net cut of $700 million (including inflation adjustments of 2.5%) between 2003 and 

2008, despite increases in the fees charged to agencies for their protection. 
57 

4. The fiscal year 2010 appropriations act requires FPS to pay transition costs 

from its revenues but OMB has not raised security charges to provide any increased 

revenue. Without increased security charges, particularly after this year’s 25 percent cut 

in the FPS charge to administer and monitor contract guards, to cover FPS support 

costs which were previously provided without charge by ICE, FPS will likely be 

forced to cancel procurement of critical capital items and may have to curtail operations or hiring of replacement staff. 

5. FPS consistently loses high performing employees because our law enforcement 

officers are not recognized as such and do not have the same benefits as other agencies with equivalent missions. 

FPS officers have been denied the same benefits many other officers with equivalent missions receive including the Capitol Police and the Secret Service Uniformed 

Division. This results in excessive attrition, and impedes recruitment of many superbly qualified law enforcement candidates. 

6. Limited service hours in major cities that impact critical monitoring tasks. 

The GAO found that in most regions FPS is only on duty during regular business 

hours. Guards are not routinely monitored at night and on weekends. FPS does not 

even have 24-hour staffing in New York City. Criminals and terrorists don’t work 

business hours and neither should FPS. Night and weekend staffing should be established in the 18 to 20 major metropolitan areas with the greatest number of 

high-risk and total facilities. 

7. Inadequate time to complete critical tasks, including security assessments. 

The GAO has reported FPS inspectors do not have enough time to complete Facility Security Assessments. Some only have 10 percent of the time required to complete quality assessments to established standards. In the last 2 years, as FPS attempted to reduce the various increased risks reported by the GAO without increased FTE, our inspectors and police officers had to rob Peter to pay Paul to get 

the job done. In some cases this had the effect of reducing risk in one area by adding it in another. Additional staffing, including police officers, coupled with a reduction in the number and mix of facilities assigned to each inspector is critical to the 

success of a viable community policing model. 

8. Building Security Committees that fail to approve critical security measures. 

The GAO reported Building Security Committees (BSC), which are not composed 

of security professionals, have responsibility for approving security countermeasures 

to reduce that facilities vulnerability to attack. Additionally, due to budget pressures agencies had competing uses, in addition to security, for their funds. Recently 

at an unguarded courthouse in a western State, there were gunshots directed into 

a congressional office window. FPS has proposed a nighttime guard for that facility 

each year since initial building planning in 2002, but it has not been implemented 

by the BSC. Action to place DHS in charge of this process is necessary to ensure 

facilities are properly protected. 

9. ISC guidance interpreted by tenant and GSA security staff that could result 

in hiding rather than accepting or mitigating risk. 

The Interagency Security Committee (ISC) recently promulgated new guidance on 

the establishment of Facility Security Level (FSL). The FSL determines what level 

of protection a building should have. Members of the GSA and other agency security 

staff have stated that if a facility is not going to implement required security standards, the FSL level should be downgraded as a risk acceptance measure. This has 

the effect of hiding, not mitigating risk. DHS should be assigned a clearly defined 

management and oversight role for the ISC to ensure consistent implementation of 

its critical security guidance, rather than the ‘‘consensus basis’’ under which it currently operates. 

10. Coordination with other agencies security personnel who frequently attempt 

to ineffectively duplicate FPS provided services and hamper consistent application 

of risk-based security measures. 

Since 2001 the number of non-DOD security specialists and police officers has increased by over 3,200 positions. Many of these security positions appear to duplicate 

functions and services provided by FPS, and may represent inefficient empire building. Some agencies have even claimed that since they have security specialists they 

should not have to pay security charges. This is like a homeowner buying a shotgun 

and garden hose, then claiming he should be exempt from paying taxes for police 

and fire protection. Ad hoc security staff and procedures can create additional 

vulnerabilities and make coordination of Government-wide standards difficult. It 

was even reported that the DHS Office of Security attempted to create its own law 

enforcement agency to protect its GSA owned space, rather than use FPS for the 

service. The ‘‘I will take care of my agency and everyone else be damned’’ attitude 

prevalent in some of these uncoordinated security staffs increase the risk that we 
58 

may fail to put the pieces together to prevent an attack. These separate organizations each build their own supervisory and overhead staff and in total cost more 

than placing the responsibility with a single agency. A single provider like FPS can 

achieve Nation-wide economies of scale that elude most non-DOD security staffs. 

11. In-service field staff below Congressionally-mandated levels. 

The fiscal year 2010 DHS Appropriations Act mandates that OMB and DHS shall 

ensure fee collections are sufficient to ensure that the Federal Protective Service 

maintains not fewer than 1,200 full-time equivalent staff and 900 full-time equivalent police officers, inspectors, area commanders, and special agents who, while 

working, are directly engaged on a daily basis protecting and enforcing laws at Federal buildings (referred to as ‘‘in-service field staff’’). Based on ICE and OMB guidance the FPS in-service field staff has been interpreted as including all personnel 

assigned to FPS law enforcement positions. Thus the 900 minimum includes recruits 

who have not even attended FLETC Uniformed Police training, personnel on longterm restricted duty that prevents service as a law enforcement officer, regional office GS–14 and –15 managers, regional intelligence and JTTF Agents, and staff assigned to the FPS National headquarters. This appears to be at variance with the 

very specific language of the act. The committee should clarify to the DHS Secretary 

and Director of OMB, that in-service means in-service, and FPS should be immediately funded to recruit sufficient staff to ensure compliance. 

12. FPS is not a member of the interagency security committee and no longer has 

a role as an honest broker to ensure compliance with security standards. 

When President Clinton issued Executive Order 12977 in 1995 he specified that 

the Director (then Assistant Commissioner) of FPS was a member of the ISC. He 

also made the Director of FPS responsible for monitoring Federal agency compliance 

with the policies and recommendations of the ISC. When the Bush administration 

revised the order upon the creation of DHS, these critical roles were eliminated. 

13. FPS field managers need to build a labor management partnership to establish one team dedicated to the critical Federal facilities protection mission. 

In some regions managers attempt to manage workload by imposing impossible 

deadlines rather than working together with employees to set achievable goals. We 

have inspectors and police officers who work up to 60 hours a week to meet management demands for National and regional goals, but in some locations these dedicated officers work the extra hours without overtime pay because they cannot do 

all that is necessary in the time allowed by their management. Officers also report 

that administrative contracting tasks detract from essential protective activities, 

while other regions get these tasks done at the region headquarters. Better 

partnering can build a cohesive team where goals can be accomplished without fear 

as a primary motivation. 

14. With the potential terrorist trials in New York likely requiring significant augmentation of the FPS NYC staff, more staff is required to prevent diversion of staff 

from other areas. 

ACTIONS TO MEET CHALLENGES AND ENSURE PROGRESS

To meet these challenges and to achieve the promise of one Department responsible for securing the homeland, including Federal employees and facilities, an effective long- and short-term strategy is necessary. Congress should take these critical 

initial steps: 

1. Provide sufficient FPS staff to meet mission requirements. 

• In fiscal year 2010 FPS is projected to have 1,225 personnel and approximately 

$240 million to protect 9,000 facilities and over 1 million employees Nationwide. 

• There are over 1,600 Capitol Police with $292 million, to protect the Capitol and 

Congressional offices in a 12-block area of Washington, DC. 

• The Secret Service has over 1,300 officers in its Uniformed Division, to protect 

its assigned facilities in Washington, DC. 

• The Veterans Health Administration has over 2,500 police officers to protect 

their 154 medical centers Nation-wide. 

• Clearly FPS is not adequately staffed to accomplish its mission. 

• Immediately establish a minimum requirement of 1,200 field law enforcement 

staff (in-service field staff as defined in the DHS Appropriations Act) to protect 

buildings, including effective monitoring of contract guard performance and 

training. 

• Mandate night and weekend service in the largest cities with the highest number of high-risk facilities, using police officers to augment the inspector force. 
59 

• Notify DHS and OMB that in-service field staff as defined in the fiscal year 

2010 appropriations act means in-service staff in the field, not merely any position categorized as law enforcement. • Additional resources may be required after receipt of a budget request that reflects an output driven staff allocation model. 

2. Recognize FPS’ dedicated law enforcement officers as such with appropriate pay 

and benefits. • FPS officers should be granted the same authority given to all other Federal 

law enforcement officers to carry their service weapons on a 24/7 basis. Not only 

does this provide an additional police presence in communities where these officers reside, it also gives the officers protection against retribution from persons 

they have arrested and others who might wish to do them harm. • FPS police officers and inspectors are treated as second-class citizens in regards 

to the Federal law enforcement status. They should be granted the same retirement benefits afforded to other law enforcement personnel with virtually the 

same mission. • FPS police officers and inspectors received a retention allowance and were 

placed on special pay tables until 2007. These initiatives significantly slowed attrition and retained highly qualified employees. When these were eliminated, 

many of the most qualified and experienced employees moved to other law enforcement and security positions with higher pay rates. FPS law enforcement 

personnel should receive Administratively Uncontrollable Overtime (AUO) at an 

initial rate of 25 percent. This will enhance overall facility security and guard 

monitoring by ensuring officers can accomplish of all assigned tasks. Chemical 

inspectors and Protective Service Advisors within NPPD currently receive AUO 

to improve their ability to accomplish the myriad of tasks they are assigned, 

thus showing two situations in NPPD where this proposal works to improve 

mission performance. 

3. Stop the fee-funding scheme that forces agencies to choose between adequate 

protection for their employees and service to the public, by proposing direct appropriation of essential basic and mandated security measures. All basic, building-specific and security fixture security costs should be authorized and directly appropriated to FPS to implement an integrated risk-based strategy to protect Federal 

facilities. • Direct appropriation for basic operations could be achieved through a transfer 

of funds by the Office of Management and Budget to the FPS of $0.66 for each 

square foot assigned to each Department and agency occupying GSA space (excluding facilities protected by the Secret Service Uniformed Division) from the 

agencies appropriation, with unoccupied and out-leased space considered as assigned to the GSA. • Direct appropriation for Building Specific Security Services, can also be 

achieved through a transfer of the costs paid by each agency, plus the charge 

paid for FPS program administration. 

• Optional security services to meet agency standards, such as guards at SSA 

Service Offices, should continue to be provided through the existing Security 

Work Authorization process. 

4. In-source contract guard positions at high-risk facilities, by replacing them with 

Federal police officers. 

• Just as Congress and the White House use Federal police officers for dedicated 

patrol and weapons detection positions, all high-risk Federal facilities should 

use these highly qualified law enforcement personnel rather than depending entirely on contract guards to perform these functions. 

• Direct the Department to in-source these positions. 

• Implement the transition at the rate of 300 officers a year. 

5. Give DHS the tools to protect Federal facilities by codifying the role of the 

Interagency Security Committee; and restoring FPS Committee membership and its 

honest broker. 

• With the mandate of section 1315 of title 40 USC that the DHS protect all Federal facilities, the ISC should be codified as well. 

• FPS should be restored to its roles in the original directive. 

• Clear guidance should be provided that DHS is in charge of security standards 

for Federal facilities. Federal facility security standards are too important to be 

left to a consensus decision by ad hoc committee members. 

6. Recognize the FPS manpower crisis in New York City—particularly in relation 

to upcoming terrorist trials. 

• Obtain an immediate assessment of present law enforcement and support staffing in NYC. 

• Obtain an immediate status of present management challenges. 
60 

• Mandate FPS to correct management deficiencies and hire personnel sufficient 

to ensure 24/7 law enforcement coverage and to staff security for the upcoming 

terrorist trials. 

SUMMARY

Mr. Chairman, the sole Federal agency charged with the critical mission of protecting thousands of Federal buildings and millions of people from terrorist and 

criminal attack is on a path to mission success within NPPD. However, it is faced 

with significant challenges that if not remedied will impede progress. I believe the 

state of the FPS right now is little different from that of the airline industry security prior to 9/11. There, a reliance on poorly trained, unmonitored contract guards 

with no law enforcement authority; security implementation by conflicting entities; 

an unworkable funding structure; and a perception of security through inspections, 

instead of protection by boots-on-the-ground Federal officers proved disastrous. 

It should not have happened then, and it should not be allowed to happen now. 

The dedicated men and women of FPS need your help to enable our success and 

to protect Federal employees across the country. Again, thank you for the opportunity to testify at this important hearing. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you very much for your testimony. 

I now recognize Mr. Amitay to summarize his statement for 5 

minutes. 

STATEMENT OF STEPHEN D. AMITAY, FEDERAL LEGISLATIVE 

COUNSEL, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITY COMPANIES 

Mr. AMITAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear 

here today to discuss the continuing challenges of FPS as they 

transition from ICE to NPPD. 

I am Federal legislative counsel to the National Association of 

Security Companies, NASCO. NASCO is the largest contract security trade association, as you said, representing private security 

companies that employ more than 400,000 security officers across 

the United States of America. 

Private security officers protect Federal facilities, businesses, 

public areas, and critical infrastructure, and they are often the first 

responder on the scene of a security or terrorism incident. 

NASCO member companies employ many former law enforcement and military personnel as both security officers and in their 

management. 

Sadly, the death of private security Officer Stephen Johns earlier 

this year at the Holocaust Museum was a tragic reminder of the 

vital role that private security officers play every day in protecting 

the public. 

NASCO firmly believes that Federal facilities can be sufficiently 

protected, and in a cost-efficient manner, through the utilization of 

private security officers. However, the recent findings of the GAO 

in its study of the FPS contract guard program were troubling, and 

the problems identified need to be addressed by both FPS and contractors. 

On the operational level, the impending roll-out of RAMP, a centralized, interactive database management system, should provide 

for a significant improvement over the current unreliable, decentralized system for collecting and monitoring security officer training and certification data. 

FPS is also updating and planning to provide more, and more 

frequent, X-ray and magnetometer training. Given the security officer’s primary role of building access control, deficiencies in this 
61 

critical training were understandably highlighted by the GAO. 

NASCO members have also called for improvements to be made to 

current FPS firearms training for security officers. 

NASCO strongly agrees with the GAO recommendation for better 

building-specific and scenario-specific training. 

One long-standing issue that has already been discussed today 

has caused much confusion among FPS contract security officers, 

and where better or clearer guidance is needed, is on the subject 

of what actions constitute detention of a person, which can be lawful, and what actions constitute an arrest, which usually is unlawful, and can give rise to a lawsuit. 

NASCO is also hopeful that efforts to improve program management and increase oversight will lead to better communication between FPS offices and between FPS and contractors. At certain levels, the communication between FPS and contractors is excellent, 

but in others it is not so good, which has resulted in delays and 

added expenses in the hiring and processing of officers. 

However, in the final analysis, the flaws and weaknesses in contractor and security officer performance found by the GAO expose 

a more fundamental issue at hand: Quality versus cost. 

It is NASCO’s position—and we think the public agrees—that 

quality should always play a primary role when selecting a private 

security company, particularly when the protection of Federal employees, visitors, and facilities is involved. 

There are tangible reasons why higher quality security costs 

more. Higher salaries attract higher caliber officers; internal company training, screening, and operational procedures will be better; 

and internal company management oversight will be stronger. 

The FPS contract award process needs to be adjusted to ensure 

that quality service and performance is properly considered in relation to cost. NASCO is not alone in believing that FPS security contracts, awarded based on best value, are often realistically awarded 

based on lowest cost. Technical capability and past performance of 

a company are not being valued as they should. 

As for the impending transfer of FPS from under ICE to NPPD, 

we believe it is a very positive move. As many have already pointed 

out, the Federal infrastructure protection mission of FPS aligns 

with NPPD’s mission to protect all critical infrastructure. 

In closing, while work needs to be done to address and resolve 

the current problems in the contract guard program, NASCO believes that, with a greater regard to quality in the procurement 

process, and with improvements in contract and data management, 

oversight and training, the performance of FPS contractors and security officers will increase, and thus, so too, will the level of security at Federal facilities. 

NASCO stands ready to work with the committee and its staff 

on any and all efforts to improve the standards and quality of contract security at FPS and elsewhere. 

Thank you. 

[The statement of Mr. Amitay follows:] 
62 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF STEPHEN D. AMITAY

NOVEMBER 18, 2009 

BACKGROUND ON NASCO AND PRIVATE SECURITY

NASCO is the Nation’s largest contract security trade association, representing 

private security companies that employ more than 400,000 security officers across 

the Nation who are servicing commercial and Governmental clients including the 

Federal Protective Service (FPS). Formed in 1972, NASCO has strived to increase 

awareness and understanding among policy-makers, consumers, the media, and the 

general public of the important role of private security in safeguarding persons and 

property. NASCO also has been a leading advocate for raising standards at the Federal, State, and local level for the licensing of private security firms and the registration, screening, and training of security officers. 

Nearly 2 million people are employed in private security domestically compared 

to fewer than 700,000 public law enforcement personnel. Approximately 75 percent 

of private security personnel work for contract security companies, with the balance 

serving as proprietary or ‘‘in-house’’ security. The vast majority of contract security 

firms employ many former law enforcement and military personnel in senior management. 

Private security officers are guarding Federal facilities, businesses, public areas, 

and critical infrastructure sites (of which 85 percent are owned by the private sector) and they are often the ‘‘first’’ responders on the scene of any security or terrorism-related incident. Sadly, the death of private security officer Stephen Johns 

earlier this year at the Holocaust museum, killed in the line of duty protecting museum patrons, was a tragic reminder of the vital role that private security officers 

play every day in protecting the public. 

As mentioned, raising standards for the industry and security officers is a core 

NASCO mission. In recent years, NASCO and its member companies have worked 

to pass licensing and training legislation in States such as Mississippi, Alabama, 

Colorado, and California. Earlier this year, Alabama enacted a law to set up a State 

board to regulate and oversee the licensing of private security companies and set 

training for security officers. In California, over the past several years, laws have 

been enacted to increase training requirements for security officers and to include 

weapons of mass destruction and terrorism awareness courses. In addition, with 

NASCO support, California has lead the way in bringing ‘‘in-house’’ security officers 

and employers into compliance with existing security licensing and training requirements. 

On the Federal level, NASCO is currently working with Congress and the Justice 

Department to provide for the effective implementation of the ‘‘Private Security Officers Employment Authorization Act of 2004’’ (PSOEAA) that provides Federal authorization to employers of private security officers to request a limited FBI criminal 

history check. 

The principal role of private security officers is to protect people and property 

from accidents and crime, control access to a facility or location, and observe and 

report suspicious activities. They serve as the ‘‘eyes and ears’’ of public law enforcement and play an important supporting role to law enforcement. They conduct incident interviews, prepare incident reports and provide legal testimony. Private security officers may be armed pursuant to State and Federal laws, and in certain jurisdictions armed security officers are granted police powers. Generally though, private 

security officers do not have police powers and their powers correspond to those of 

private citizens. Overall, private security provides businesses, organizations, and 

Governmental entities with a readily available efficient proven layer of security and 

deterrence. 

CONTRACT SECURITY AND THE FEDERAL PROTECTIVE SERVICE

There are approximately 13,000 contract security officers—working for 67 contractors—at facilities under the jurisdiction of Federal Protective Service (FPS). FPS 

contract security officers are primarily responsible for controlling access to Federal 

facilities by checking identifications and operating screening equipment, such as Xray machines and magnetometers. In most instances, security officers do not have 

arrest authority but can detain individuals who are being disruptive or pose a danger to public safety until the arrival of law enforcement. 

Before being assigned to a post or an area of responsibility at a Federal facility, 

FPS requires that all security officers undergo background suitability checks and 

complete approximately 128 hours of training provided by the contractor and FPS, 

including 8 hours of FPS provided X-ray and magnetometer training. Security offi-
63 

cers must also pass an FPS-administered written examination and possess the necessary certificates, licenses, and permits as required by the contract. Each security 

officer’s required qualifications, certifications, and other requirements are tracked 

through the FPS Contract Guard Employment Requirements Tracking System 

(CERTS) and by the contract security company. 

FPS CONTRACT GUARD PROGRAM ISSUES

NASCO firmly believes that Federal facilities can be effectively protected—and in 

a cost-efficient manner—through the utilization of private security officers. However, there is no question that the recent findings of the GAO in its study of the 

FPS Contract Guard Program were troubling and the problems identified need to 

be addressed by both FPS and contractors. NASCO has maintained a good working 

relationship with FPS officials involved with the Contract Guard Program, and we 

appreciate that FPS leadership has encouraged a strong partnership between contractors and FPS. We believe that efforts underway at FPS to address problems 

identified by GAO with the Contract Guard Program can be successful, and that 

there are other means also that can lead to better performance and greater security 

all around. 

On the operational level, the impending roll-out of the Risk Assessment Management Program (RAMP)—a centralized interactive database management system— 

should provide for a big improvement over the current unreliable de-centralized 

CERTS system for collecting and monitoring training and certification data. RAMP 

should make the input of data more efficient and provide FPS with access to more 

up-to-date and reliable data in one location. More so, it should enable FPS to manage and control contractor data better, which has been a real problem for contractors. It is envisioned that one day RAMP will even be able to provide notices to contractors when a security officer’s certification is about to expire. FPS is also upgrading its post-tracking system which should allow for quicker reconciliation of invoices 

and allow for more prompt contractor payment. NASCO also supports FPS’ on-going 

effort to standardize and professionalize the contract security officer force. 

The GAO report was particularly critical of lapses and weaknesses in the FPS’s 

X-ray and magnetometer training. Given the contract security officer’s primary role 

as one of access control, adequate training in this area is crucial. The GAO noted 

that in some cases the required training was simply not provided to the contract 

security officers by FPS and in other cases it was inadequate. NASCO member companies with FPS contracts have encountered such difficulties with X-ray and magnetometer training. FPS has reported that it has moved to update the X-ray and magnetometer training, as well as provide it more frequently, and we applaud this action. 

The GAO also noted that improvements in building-specific and scenario-specific 

training are needed and we strongly believe improvements in these areas could be 

very beneficial. One long-standing area of confusion for contract security officers is 

the line between detaining an individual (lawful) and arresting an individual (usually unlawful and subject to a lawsuit). If a security officer has reason to believe 

an individual is committing or about to commit an unlawful act and he stops and 

handcuffs that individual and calls the police, is that an arrest or detention? Better 

training and better contractual guidance is needed to address this important issue. 

Another area where some contractors believe better training and additional contractual requirements are needed is in the area of firearms training. FPS mandates 

that all contract security officers pass a rigorous firearms course which is very commendable, but only requires one firearms qualification a year (FPS officers, who fire 

the same firearms course, train and qualify four times a year). Without a corresponding contract requirement for sufficient training and qualifications for contract security officers to stay proficient, there could be dangerous ramifications in 

a scenario like the one that unfolded at the Holocaust museum. 

NASCO also supports the GAO’s call for better management and oversight of Contract Guard Program contracts and the need for more and better trained Contracting Officer Technical Representatives (COTRs) and efforts are underway to assign more COTRs. Nonetheless, underlying the issue of better management and 

oversight is need for better communication between FPS offices, and between FPS 

and contractors. The results of such communication problems were pervasive in the 

GAO’s findings. At certain levels the communication between FPS and contractors 

is excellent, and FPS is working hard to ascertain the problems and concerns of contractors. But regular instances of information and documents not flowing from one 

area of FPS to another—resulting in multiple requests for the same information— 

have caused delays and added expenses in the hiring and processing of officers. 

There have also been problems that have resulted from inconsistent or inadequate 
64 

notification and administrative procedures involved in the officer application process, as well as in the process for submitting officer certifications. The conduct of certain training has also been affected by a lack of communication between FPS headquarters and the field. 

In the final analysis though, while improvements in contract oversight and management, data automation, communication, and training will improve the Contract 

Guard Program, the flaws and weaknesses in contractor performance found by the 

GAO expose a more fundamental issue, ‘‘quality versus cost.’’ It is NASCO’s position, and we think the public agrees, that quality should always play a primary role 

when selecting a private security company, particularly when the protection of Federal employees, visitors, and facilities is involved. There are tangible reasons why 

higher quality security costs more. Higher salaries attract higher caliber officers; 

training and screening will be better; and management oversight will be stronger. 

The FPS contract award process must be altered to ensure that quality service and 

performance, in relation to cost, is properly considered. FPS efforts to improve training and oversight can lead to improved contractor and officer performance, but until 

procurers of contract security services effectively put quality ahead of cost, problems 

with contractors such as those that the GAO report highlighted will persist. 

Currently, FPS Contract Guard Program contract awards are not bound by lowest 

bid requirements, and all eligible bidders must meet an acceptable qualifying standard. However, NASCO is not alone in believing that awards allegedly based on ‘‘best 

value’’ are more realistically based on lowest cost, and technical capability and past 

performance are not being valued as they should. NASCO supports the inclusion of 

higher performance related standards in contracts, as well as taking steps to ensure 

that the quality of a company’s training, personnel, management, and operational 

procedures—which result in a higher bid—are adequately considered during the procurement process. 

Some have speculated that bringing FPS security ‘‘in-house’’ through the creation 

of a federalized FPS security force could be a solution to the current challenges in 

the Contract Guard Program. NASCO contends that the cost of an in-house force 

(let alone the issues and costs involved in creating such a force), versus the current 

cost of contract security officers will reveal that there is a great deal of room to increase compensation, selection, and training standards for FPS contract security officers to provide better security at Federal facilities, while at the same time remaining at a much lower cost per officer than ‘‘in-house’’ security officers. 

THE TRANSFER OF FPS FROM ICE TO NPPD

We believe the impending transfer of FPS from under ICE to NPPD is a very positive move. It has already been pointed out by many observers that the Federal infrastructure protection mission of FPS aligns with NPPD’s mission to protect all 

critical infrastructure (of which Federal buildings is an important element). This 

alignment should lead to greater effectiveness for both NPPD and FPS. NPPD also 

chairs the operations of the Interagency Security Committee, which not only is the 

lead in the Federal Government for setting Government-wide security policies for 

Federal facilities, but the committee has also been working with FPS in its effort 

to bring better standardization to Federal contract security officers. 

CONCLUDING REMARKS

When FPS was taken out from GSA and put under ICE in 2003, FPS faced significant challenges and difficulties, some old and some new. Combined with subsequent significant reductions in the FPS inspector and law enforcement officer force, 

those difficulties contributed to serious flaws and deficiencies in the Contract Guard 

Program. However, NASCO believes that under the leadership of Director Schenkel, 

FPS is making considerable strides to rectify the problems with the program. While 

there is still much work to be done, with FPS (now better situated under NPPD), 

security contractors, and Congress all working together, the shared goal to provide 

for better safety and protection of Federal employees, Federal contractors and visitors in at Federal facilities protected by FPS can be attained. As it has for the past 

several years, NASCO stands ready to work with the committee and its staff on any 

and all efforts to improve the standards and quality of contract security within and 

outside the Federal Government. 

Chairman THOMPSON. I would like to thank the witnesses for 

their testimony. I remind each Member that he or she will have 5 

minutes to question the panel. 

I will now recognize myself for the first questions. 
65 

Let me again thank both of you for your testimony. 

Every now and then we get labor and contract people together 

on the same panel. One of the things I want to assure both of you, 

is that this committee is looking at, how can we keep the security 

at those Federal buildings the best that we can. The options are 

either ramp up the Federal employment aspect, look at the contracting, ramp that up. 

But one of the issues that both of you gentlemen talked about, 

spoke of training. We are really concerned about it. 

If you heard the testimony and questions from the committee on 

the first panel, we kind of burrowed down. We just want to make 

sure that it is done right. 

That facilities committee caused us real heartburn, because you 

have some people in those buildings making security decisions in 

many instances that do not know anything about security. They 

just happen to be the largest tenant, or something like that. 

With respect to the FPS training, Mr. Wright, are you satisfied 

with the training that the officers in your local receive on the fulltime side? 

Mr. WRIGHT. I will take a little bit of credit for opening this can 

of worms. Since the whistle blowing in 2006, the exposure of the 

FPS deficit—I think we all recall accounts of between $40 million 

and $80 million in deficit—there were huge cost-cutting measures 

undertaken. Part of those cost-cutting measures was a reduction in 

training for Federal officers. 

We have had very few what we call LERTs, or law enforcement 

refresher training, at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center. So, security has definitely suffered in the times of what was 

described as a deficit. 

Prior to that, FPS had excellent training and pretty much the 

funds to accomplish that training. But as it stands today, I think 

there is a deficiency in Federal officer training in FPS. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you. 

Mr. Amitay, with respect to FPS’s requirements for contract security personnel, what has been the position of your trade group 

with respect to their training requirement? 

Mr. AMITAY. Well, contractors are required to provide 128 hours 

of training. In addition, and then there is also FPS-provided training. 

We think the amount of training is sufficient, with certain exceptions. As has been noted, the FPS provided X-ray and magnetometer training. There have been problems with that. This has 

been related to NASCO from contractors with FPS contracts. 

But FPS, we have been working with FPS. So, the contractors— 

and they have seen that FPS is trying to beef up that X-ray and 

magnetometer training, to provide it more, to do updated and to 

provide more of it. 

In other areas, for instance, firearms training, some have said 

that, whereas law enforcement FPS officers qualify four times a 

year for the firearm training, the contract security officers only 

qualify once a year. It is a very rigorous firearms training, which 

is to be commended. But we feel that the proficiency level could be 

lacking without the proper amount of qualifications per year. 
66 

But we have noticed that FPS has really started to work on improving the training that it currently has. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Without getting too deep in the weeds, 

there was a question about arrest power. What has your membership said about arrest powers? 

Mr. AMITAY. Yes, it has been—this is a big issue. 

Normally, private security officers do not have arrest power. 

However, there are some exceptions. For instance, in Virginia, a licensed, armed security officer does have arrest power at the facility 

where he is protecting. Also, in the District of Columbia, there is 

a class of officer called a ‘‘special police officer,’’ who has arrest authority. 

But primarily, contract security officers—— 

Chairman THOMPSON. Now, is this with FPS? 

Mr. AMITAY. Well, if FPS made it a requirement of the contracts 

that the contract security officer be a special police officer, then, 

yes, it could be incorporated into the contract. 

Chairman THOMPSON. So, do you know of any? 

Mr. AMITAY. Excuse me, sir. 

Yes. Very few contracts require SPO training as of now, but more 

could. 

Chairman THOMPSON. So, the answer is yes or no? 

Mr. AMITAY. The answer is ‘‘yes.’’ 

Chairman THOMPSON. That you know of contracts that FPS has 

in force that allows arrest powers for the private security. 

Mr. AMITAY. Right. Yes. Again, it is based on the local jurisdiction. 

But if the local jurisdiction does allow for a class of private security officer to have arrest powers, it is the local law, then, yes, then 

those types of officers with arrest powers can be included—you 

know, can be guarding FPS facilities—if the contract says that for 

these facilities, for this contract, the security officers need to be 

special police officers. 

Chairman THOMPSON. I would love for you to provide the committee with a list of those contracts. 

Mr. Wright, has the mix between full-time Federal and contract 

employees provided any tensions in the workplace, to your knowledge? 

Mr. WRIGHT. Yes, and very timely to this discussion here today. 

We have instances of, since the July 8 hearing, the increased 

oversight and increased contract guard monitoring. This results in 

tensions between Federal officers and private guards. 

One tactic that I have noticed in one region in particular, is a 

propensity to allege harassment by private guards alleging harassment towards Federal officers. In those cases, we have very definite 

problems getting our officers into these facilities, getting them protected and shielded from these, what I consider malicious charges 

by private guards. 

There are tensions. I mean, we are the monitors. We are the ones 

that find the wrongdoing. We are—our Federal officers are the ones 

that find individuals sleeping, or without proper commissions. So, 

yes, there is absolutely tension. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you. 

I yield 5 minutes to the gentlelady from California. 
67 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also want to 

thank you for holding this hearing, because as we are hearing now 

on both sides, and information, clearly, you know, this information 

needs to be had. 

Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask, could we get a clarification 

from the folks who spoke in the first panel, if, in fact, as Mr. 

Wright has just presented, that the staffing costs have been decreased by 25 percent? 

Chairman THOMPSON. Without objection. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Okay. 

My second thing is, Mr. Wright, do you guys have an on-going 

contract? Your local, do you guys have an on-going contract? 

Mr. WRIGHT. No. No, we do not. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Okay. I am new on the committee. I know with 

transportation, for example—and I am, actually, fairly new to Congress—a year or so ago there was the whole thing of TSA was not, 

you know, under contracting. 

Is that the same with the FPS, with the officers, that they are 

not? 

Mr. WRIGHT. What has happened is, we all know we were formerly GSA. We had GSA contracts. In December 2005, we were 

certified by FLRA as AFGE. 

At that point, in December 2005, FPS was placed under a year 

2000 labor contract. Once we were inside of ICE, we started our 

labor contract negotiations in February 2007 were the preliminaries. June 2007, we started actual negotiations. To this day, that 

contract has not been signed—not even close to being signed. 

The one complication now—and certainly, I do not view it as a 

complication—is that we are now under NPPD and no longer subject to those ICE contract negotiations. 

So, very technically, we are tied to a year 2000 labor agreement, 

originally under the Immigration and Naturalization Service—— 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Okay. Let me stop you there, because there is 

only so far we are actually able to delve into this. 

Mr. Chairman, might I also suggest that, being on the Transportation Committee, I know there was a long time that our contract 

has been left out. Secretary LaHood has made a commitment to get 

to the table and address some of these issues. 

I might also suggest that we request of Secretary Napolitano any 

outstanding things that might be hanging, that have not been resolved, that they go to the table and do them—or whoever the appropriate people—— 

Chairman THOMPSON. If the gentlelady would yield. 

This committee has a longstanding commitment to giving workers the right to choose representation. I do not see why your suggestion is not consistent with that longstanding commitment. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Okay. 

Then, Mr. Amitay, could you describe for me what are the qualifications for—do you have a list of standard qualifications that the 

contract officers must meet? Is there a standard? 

Mr. AMITAY. That standard is set completely by FPS. I know that 

they do have—I recently saw a brochure that—it was titled ‘‘Standards for the FPS Contract Guard Program.’’ All the standards for 

the guards are set by FPS. 
68 

Ms. RICHARDSON. To your knowledge with your association, how 

much auditing actually goes on to determine if what the contractor 

says that they are meeting, in terms of who they are bringing forward, is, in fact, correct information? 

Mr. AMITAY. We do not do any studies of that. 

But I would like to say, though, that we welcome more oversight 

of the program. We welcome more oversight of contractors. There 

have been problems with contractors. If there are problems with 

certain contractors, then maybe they should not continue to have 

those contracts. 

NASCO has always stood for raising the standards in the industry. We fully believe that when you have raised standards and you 

base your contracts based on quality as opposed to cost, you will 

be able to get that sufficient level of protection that is required, 

and at a much lower and more efficient rate than hiring full-time 

Federal police officers. 

In some instances, you just do not need a full-time law enforcement officer monitoring X-rays and magnetometer machines, you 

know. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Well, my time is about to expire. Let me just 

say this. 

Mr. Chairman, I think, in light of some of the things that have 

happened, you know, even on full military bases very recently, and 

with what we have dealt with in the last few years, and certainly, 

probably what is ahead, I would venture to say, we have to be very 

careful. We do not know what we are going to expect, that any person might walk into any building on any given day to do something 

that is inappropriate. 

So, I would actually say that, I would prefer, particularly in a 

Federal building, where there is a public expectation that appropriate security does exist, that all efforts are made to do that. 

I will not get into the nuts and bolts of whether it is one or 

whether it is the other. But I think we have an obligation. The 

public expects us, that we are providing a certain level of service. 

Unfortunately, there have been a couple of instances where that 

probably has not been the case. 

So, I look forward to working with the Chairman. I thank you 

for having this hearing, and I look forward to all of the follow-up 

to ensure that we can create that within our buildings. Thank you. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Now, I would like to thank the gentlelady 

from California, as well as our witnesses, for their valuable testimony, and the Members for their questions. 

Before concluding, however, I would like to remind our panel of 

witnesses that the Members of the committee may have additional 

questions for you, over and above what we have already laid out. 

We ask that you respond expeditiously in writing to those questions. 

Now, the other commitment I give to both witnesses is from an 

oversight standpoint. Our job is to see that any of those DHS-related components do the best job possible. If there is anything 

going on that you do not see consistent with established policies, 

please let us know. 

I know staff loves to hear me give them work, but one mistake 

and we are in trouble. We do not want any of that to ever happen. 
69 

So, that is a standing offer to anybody. If the policies are inconsistent, whatever, the regulations, be they contract security as well 

as Federal employees, please let us know. 

Hearing no further business, however, and a vote has been 

called, the committee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:17 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

(71) 

A P P E N D I X 

QUESTIONS FROM CHAIRMAN BENNIE G. THOMPSON OF MISSISSIPPI FOR RAND BEERS, UNDER SECRETARY, NATIONAL PROTECTION PROGRAMS DIRECTORATE, DEPARTMENT

OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Question 1. GAO’s investigation revealed glaring gaps in the security capability 

of the FPS contract guard force. GAO found that contract guards failed to conduct 

adequate screening to detect improvised explosive devices and other prohibited 

weapons. In addition, GAO observed security breaches during evacuations and 

emergencies caused by the guards’ lack of familiarity with the specific buildings 

they were guarding. 

Answer. To ensure that guards are properly trained and familiar with the facilities they protect, the National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) recognizes that it is essential to collect and continually manage a wide range of information on both the guards used by the Federal Protective Service (FPS) and the facilities FPS protects. This includes the certifications of guard training provided by the 

guard companies to FPS, as well as detailed facility and countermeasure information necessary to appropriately mitigate risk for the facility. FPS has greatly enhanced its capabilities to collect and manage this range of information through the 

Risk Assessment and Management Program (RAMP), which began operations in November 2009. With the implementation of RAMP as a centralized tool for managing 

facility risk, FPS has initiated electronic tracking of certification records by all contractors. This allows FPS to rectify the deficiencies that existed in legacy systems 

and provides real-time, up-to-date information on guard certifications in two ways: 

1. The certification information comes directly from the source (e.g., the contract 

companies that are responsible for maintaining records on the training their 

employees have received); and 

2. FPS receives regular updates from certifications that are uploaded and 

verified within the centralized RAMP system. This allows for improved tracking 

of certifications and directly supports the regular audits of contractor records. 

The FPS Risk Management Division is currently revising the FPS policy (09–001) 

that details the site inspection and audit procedures of contractors. This policy will 

increase the requirement for audits from 10 percent of the files quarterly to 10 percent of the files monthly. The revised policy will also provide prescriptive instructions on specific record-auditing methods. As a result, the frequency and scope of 

guard certification audits will be greatly increased. This will provide FPS with increased assurance the contract guards performing on FPS contracts possess the appropriate training and certification. 

In addition to the increased oversight of the contractor-provided training and inspection of the guard posts within the Federal buildings, FPS has developed a National Weapons Detection Program (NWDP) to increase the guard’s awareness and 

detection capabilities. The NWDP requires 16 hours of additional training on the 

newly purchased magnetometers and X-ray machines. This training addresses the 

proper use of screening equipment, screening procedures, and overall education on 

potential threats. FPS has published three additional, specific training bulletins, 

produced a training video, and modified guard contracts to ensure 100 percent compliance with this essential guard training. 

FPS provides guard post orders for each specific guard post within a Federal 

building. These post orders are coordinated with the tenant agencies and describe 

the exact functions the guards are to perform at their posts. The guards are trained 

on the post orders and rehearse the emergency response portion of the orders during 

annual exercises, including fire drills, occupant emergency plan exercises, and shelter-in-place exercises. 

Question 1b. How does NPPD plan to improve security at Federal buildings? 

Answer. As stated above, the Federal Protective Service (FPS) increased the required number of hours of training and developed the National Weapons Detection 
72 

Program (NWDP), which requires additional training on the proper use and overall 

education on the newly purchased magnetometers and X-ray machines. In addition, 

FPS is in the final stages of implementing a Covert Security Testing Program to 

test the effectiveness of security countermeasures as part of its multifaceted strategy to achieve its core mission: Secure facilities and provide safety to occupants 

within those facilities. The Covert Security Testing Program is designed to assess 

countermeasure (e.g., contract security guards) effectiveness, identify policy and 

training deficiencies, ensure immediate corrective action, and document, analyze, 

and archive results. Each covert security test will be followed immediately by a corrective action briefing, which will be used to inform regional management officials 

and the Contracting Officer’s Technical Representative (COTR) that they have been 

the subject of a covert security test. The test team will share the results of the testing and recommend remedies for any identified control weaknesses, deficiencies, or 

security vulnerabilities, if necessary. Finally, regional directors will be responsible 

for ensuring the submission of accurate and complete contractor performance evaluations that include deficiencies identified during covert security testing when appropriate. 

Question 1c. Who will be responsible for carrying out NPPD’s plans for improving 

security? 

Answer. The National Protection and Programs Directorate’s (NPPD’s) Office of 

Infrastructure Protection (IP) and FPS will be responsible for carrying out NPPD’s 

plans on facility security improvements. The ISC has the responsibility for determining the direction of security for all Federal facilities and has already begun to 

take on some of the hardest questions concerning the appropriate Federal building 

security standards. Although FPS has responsibility for only 9,000 of the more than 

350,000 Federal facilities that fall under the ISC responsibility, the ISC has recognized the unique position of the General Services Administration (GSA) facilities. 

They represent the facilities that house the preponderance of Federal employees and 

visitors to those facilities. Therefore such facilities may need to be addressed in a 

special manner. FPS and GSA have already begun drafting minimum security 

standards for GSA properties. FPS will receive direct oversight from the Under Secretary of NPPD and will continue its effort in the positive direction it has taken 

over these past several years. 

Question 1d. What has NPPD done to consider reducing the reliance on contract 

guards, given their shortcomings? 

Answer. FPS has initially explored several operational options including the conversion of some or all of the nearly 15,000 contract guards to Federal positions. Currently, FPS uses a hybrid model in which FPS inspectors are assigned to directly 

oversee the contract guard force at specific facilities. NPPD has not had an opportunity to fully review and evaluate all the challenges related to federalizing or partially federalizing the guard workforce. Full analysis of these challenges would need 

to evaluate the security benefits of a very complex transition effort, average costs, 

and the logistical management of new hires. NPPD and Department leadership will 

work together to review the recommendations of previous studies conducted for FPS. 

NPPD will also reach out to the Transportation Security Administration to gain the 

benefits of their experience. 

Question 2. The FPS transition plan describes a transition process that will take 

about 20 months. The first briefing to Congress is scheduled to occur in April 2010. 

Can you give me your commitment that we will receive an update prior to that 

time? I would hope that we would receive a progress report no later than February 

2010. 

Answer. The Federal Protective Service (FPS) Transition Plan submitted to Congress in August 2009 included structured reporting requirements and proposed two 

Congressional briefings during the 20-month period. The plan recommended that 

these briefings take place in April 2010 and December 2010. The submitted plan 

was premised on an effective transition date of October 1, 2009. The FPS plan was 

transmitted later than planned, on October 28, 2009, so the transition date was adjusted accordingly in the plan’s milestones outlining the detailed phases for the 

transition. The FPS Transition Senior Working Group has met regularly since June 

1 and will continue to meet until the transition is complete. This group consists of 

the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Management at Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the Chief Operating Officer of the National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD), and the Director of FPS as co-chairs with reporting 

staff-level working groups including an Operations Working Group and an Acquisitions Working Group. We intend to keep Congress informed of our progress throughout this process and expect to provide additional information before the end of February 2010. 
73 

Question 3. According to the transition plan, FPS is working with NPPD and DHS 

leadership to create a workforce staffing model that is based on changes to risk, 

threat, and consequence. Please explain the expertise that NPPD brings to bear in 

helping FPS refine its risk-based staffing model to focus on high- and very highlevel risk facilities and how this approach will address the limitations in the current 

risk assessment and countermeasure acquisition programs which have been raised 

by GAO. 

Answer. As noted in the Federal Protective Service (FPS) Transition Plan, FPS 

is refining its staffing model focusing threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences at 

high- and very high-risk facilities. The model is expected to project workforce needs 

based on identified risk consistent with a high concentration of Federal facilities, 

large populations, and designation as an Urban Areas Security Initiative city. As 

noted in the plan, the National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD), the 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and FPS leadership will review the final 

results of the analysis and will forward any appropriate recommendations in subsequent budget requests. Through this transition period, NPPD and FPS will work together on new Government Accountability Office (GAO) and DHS Office of the Inspector General (OIG) engagements and also review recommendations that remain 

open after the effective date of FPS transitioning from the U.S. Immigration and 

Customs Enforcement (ICE) to NPPD. 

FPS has already prepared a workforce study based on identifiable risks to ensure 

the maximum risk mitigation at the National level. The workforce study is a fluid, 

living collection of data and observations that need to be adjusted continuously 

based upon mission assignments, GAO or OIG recommendations and findings, 

changes in Interagency Security Committee requirements, and a host of other National security and regulatory recommendations. Although the document remains a 

draft and does not necessarily reflect the DHS or administration position, it will 

serve as a starting point for continued review within NPPD. As part of NPPD, FPS 

can avail itself of a full range of risk-management tools and practices available 

throughout the NPPD components, including the Office of Risk Management and 

Analysis and the Office of Infrastructure Protection with its Homeland Infrastructure Threat and Risk Analysis Center. These risk-oriented tool kits offer bona fide 

threat data and provide professionally trained analysts and potentially alternative 

risk models. 

Question 4. FPS is constrained to influence the allocation of resources based on 

the results of its risk assessment because FPS does not own the buildings it protects. Tenant agencies are free to reject the security measures recommended by 

FPS. Without a change in this situation, little will be accomplished. What do you 

believe can be done to assure that tenant agencies and GSA will implement FPS’s 

security recommendations? 

Answer. The Federal Protective Service (FPS) is professionalizing its work force 

and customer service and introducing the Risk Assessment Management Program 

(RAMP). These activities increase FPS’s credibility and ability to work with the Facility Security Committees (FSC) to determine appropriate and timely implementation of countermeasures. FPS has made strong recommendations to the Interagency 

Security Committee (ISC) on strengthening the position of security professionals 

and ensuring that security expertise is part of the FSC makeup. To enhance the 

ISC’s efforts to provide guidance to the operation of FSCs, FPS has petitioned the 

ISC for a full, voting-member position. In addition, because FPS is responsible for 

providing law enforcement and security services for approximately 9,000 buildings 

under the control and custody of the General Services Administration (GSA), FPS 

is working in step with GSA to provide portfolio-specific solutions. Consequently, 

FPS and GSA have engaged in conversations to establish a working group to address minimal security standards for GSA owned and leased properties that FPS is 

charged with protecting. In addition, FPS and GSA are in the midst of rewriting 

the FPS/GSA Memorandum of Agreement, which will continue to move our two organizations in the right direction of consistency and standardization of security of 

the GSA properties. 

Question 5. You testified that a summit was held to discuss plans to ensure that 

each facility security committee with authority to approve or deny FPS security recommendations has at least one voting member who is a security provider, and that 

all committee members are trained on security issues. Please provide the committee 

with a narrative description of this summit, a copy of the agenda, and minutes or 

other contemporaneous recordings of this meeting. 

Answer. The Interagency Security Committee (ISC) held a summit on November 

16, 2009, to bring together thought leaders from throughout the Federal Government with differing perspectives on how security decisions should be made, to review and discuss the questions and comments that correspond with the four feed-
74 

back themes. The Hon. Rand Beers, Under Secretary, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Robert Peck, Commissioner, Public Buildings, General Services 

Administration (GSA) addressed the Summit participants and encouraged a united 

Federal front. Eighty leaders from 30 agencies and departments spent the day together and presented an outline for how the ISC should move forward to address 

how to make security decisions in Federal facilities. 

Expectations are for the ISC Working Group to reconcile the Summit participants’ 

comments, and develop a new draft to release for comment in mid-2010. If necessary, the ISC will hold another Summit to determine if follow-up, testing, and/ 

or validation are required. The ISC will closely monitor and support the progress 

of the Working Group. 

A draft of guidelines for Facility Security Committees (FSC) was released for comment in the summer of 2009 and the feedback was then categorized into four overarching themes: 

1. Who are the decisionmakers and what are their roles? 

2. What information do decisionmakers need and how is voting weighed? 

3. How is security funded? 

4. How is risk accepted? 

Please find attached the agenda from this meeting. 
75 

Question 6. GAO recommends that FPS develop a comprehensive plan for sharing 

and safeguarding information with GSA. How will NPPD assist FPS in developing 

this comprehensive plan on information sharing? 

Answer. As the Government Accountability Office’s report findings and recommendations noted, the General Services Administration (GSA) experienced difficulties with getting requested information from the Federal Protective Service 

(FPS) because of information dissemination restrictions on the FPS-generated reports. The inability to share the reports with GSA’s non-law enforcement security 

personnel presented a major obstacle. These law enforcement-sensitive reports included on-going investigations and other law enforcement activities, and the information GSA needed was difficult to extract for release to GSA. FPS recently implemented a new program initiative known as the Risk Assessment and Management 

Program (RAMP), which is designed to more easily facilitate conducting comprehensive risk assessments and provide those results to applicable stakeholders. The Facility Security Assessment report produced by RAMP includes sensitive-but-unclassified information that is For Official Use Only, but segregates the law enforcement 
76 

information. As a result, while there remain specific constraints on sharing that information per Department of Homeland Security (DHS) policy, these restrictions do 

not include those placed on law enforcement information. FPS has evaluated this 

policy and is pleased to share information with GSA while meeting the necessary 

requirements to protect sensitive information. The reports produced from RAMP include this detailed information on safeguarding For Official Use Only information 

and state that it must be provided only to those with a valid need to know and who 

have the ability to secure the information either electronically or physically. The 

National Protection and Programs Directorate, FPS and DHS leadership will continue to monitor report-user stakeholders such as GSA to ensure that such information is made accessible while safeguarding information marked accordingly. 

Question 7. Please provide an update on the status of labor contract negotiations 

between DHS and FPS. Specify when DHS expects to finalize FPS labor agreements, and who has responsibility for ensuring that this process is completed in a 

timely manner. 

Answer. National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) management looks 

forward to developing a strong and productive working relationship with the Federal 

Protective Service’s (FPS) exclusive union representative. NPPD management received notification that the American Federation of Government Employees filed a 

certification of the unit petition with the Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA) 

to seek representation of the FPS workforce eligible to be in a bargaining unit. Once 

the FLRA makes a determination as to the exclusive representative of the appropriate bargaining unit, NPPD and the exclusive representatives will begin negotiating a new collective bargaining agreement. A time frame to complete negotiations 

will be established at that time. NPPD’s Office of Resources Administration will be 

responsible for ensuring that the process is completed in a timely manner. 

QUESTIONS FROM HONORABLE CHARLES W. DENT OF PENNSYLVANIA FOR RAND

BEERS, UNDER SECRETARY, NATIONAL PROTECTION PROGRAMS DIRECTORATE, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Question 1. Given recent FPS contractor force failure highlighted by various GAO 

reports, is the Federal Protective Service’s contractor force adequately trained to secure the buildings and facilities that will be used during the trials of detainees? 

Answer. FPS will collaborate with other Federal, State, and local law enforcement 

agencies, under the USMS lead, to provide an appropriate law enforcement presence 

at the trials. 

Question 2a. Does the FPS have adequate resources in New York City to meet 

its existing security responsibilities? 

Answer. FPS will collaborate with other Federal, State, and local law enforcement 

agencies, under the USMS lead, to provide an appropriate law enforcement presence 

at the trials. 

Question 2b. Would the existing resources (as of November 18, 2009) need to be 

augmented to meet the demands associated with transferring detainees into New 

York City for the purposes of prosecution? 

Answer. FPS will collaborate with other Federal, State, and local law enforcement 

agencies, under the USMS lead, to provide an appropriate law enforcement presence 

at the trials. 

Question 2c. If so, how does DHS plan to augment those forces, and by how many 

additional personnel? 

Answer. FPS will collaborate with other Federal, State, and local law enforcement 

agencies, under the USMS lead, to provide an appropriate law enforcement presence 

at the trials. 

Question 3. To what degree was DHS and specifically FPS consulted prior to the 

decision to transfer these detainees to New York City? 

Answer. FPS was not notified prior to the announcement. 

Question 4a. How often are security assessments conducted by FPS on these types 

of facilities? 

Answer. Facilities such as the primary U.S. Courthouses in New York City are 

rated as Facility Security Level (FSL) IV and are assessed every 3 years. 

In February 2008, the Interagency Security Committee (ISC) issued a standard 

titled, ‘‘Facility Security Level Determinations for Federal Facilities.’’ This standard 

provides the criteria for determining the facility security level for Federal facilities 

and establishes a minimum standard for how often facilities at each level need to 

have a risk assessment performed. The schedule is once every 5 years for Level I 

and II facilities and once every 3 years for Level III, IV, and V facilities. FPS will 

adhere to this schedule; however, assessments can be completed before their established minimum schedule, and FPS will retain the capacity to conduct assessments 
77 

earlier than required in certain circumstances that present a substantial change to 

the operating state of the facility under consideration. 

Question 4b. Is there a standard? 

Answer. Yes. Following the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Facility in 

Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, on April 19, 1995, the President directed the Department of Justice to assess the vulnerability of Federal office facilities to terrorism 

and other acts of violence. The report that resulted, the 1995 Vulnerability Assessment of Federal Facilities, established criteria for categorizing Federal office facilities into five security levels and served as the foundation for current ISC standards. 

In 2006, ISC established a working group to review and update the content of the 

1995 report. The review of that report resulted in the development of the ISC Standard Facility Security Level Determinations for Federal Facilities, which redefines 

the criteria and process used to determine the FSL of a Federal facility. 

Specifically, it provides a risk-based approach to determining the FSL that is consistent with the National Infrastructure Protection Plan. It considers mission criticality, symbolism, facility population, facility size, threat to tenant agencies, and intangible factors. In addition, it discusses special considerations for Level V facilities; 

campuses, complexes, and Federal centers; changes in the FSL; and co-location of 

tenants with similar security needs. 

This standard also changes the frequency for conducting recurring building security assessments. The new frequency is: 

Every 5 years: Level I and II facilities; 

Every 3 years: Level III, IV, and V facilities. 

Question 5. One of the problems identified by GAO and previous inspector general 

reports is inadequate staffing of FPS. Although the number of contract guards has 

increased three-fold since 9/11, the number of FPS inspectors has decreased. Has 

the Department conducted a staffing needs analysis to improve the coverage of oversight over contract guards? 

If so, could you please provide the most recent report to the committee? 

Answer. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is currently reviewing the 

staffing levels of the Federal Protective Service (FPS). This is, in part, a response 

to the July 2009 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report entitled ‘‘Preliminary Results Show Federal Protective Service’s Ability to Protect Federal Facilities 

Is Hampered By Weaknesses in Its Contract Security Guard Program.’’ The review 

is being conducted under the guidance of the Under Secretary for the National Protection and Programs Directorate and in response to the Secretary of Homeland Security’s direction for a thorough review of FPS’s operations and staffing levels following the July 2009 GAO report. Once that review is finalized, DHS will engage, 

as appropriate, with Congress, including the House Committee on Homeland Security. It should be noted, though, that FPS has previously conducted staffing-level reviews and human capital planning efforts, including an analysis conducted in 2009. 

This analysis document is in draft form and is currently being reviewed within the 

Department; thus, it is not appropriate at this point to share the document outside 

of the Department. 

Question 6. Should the FPS contracted guard force be federalized, as was done 

with TSA screeners in 2001? If so, why? If not, why not? 

Answer. The Federal Protective Service (FPS) has initially explored several operational options including the conversion of some or all of the nearly 15,000 contract 

guards to Federal positions. Currently, FPS uses a hybrid model in which FPS inspectors are assigned to directly oversee the contract guard force at specific facilities. The National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) has not had an opportunity to fully review and evaluate all the challenges related to federalizing or 

partially federalizing the guard workforce. An analysis of these challenges would 

need to evaluate the security benefits of a very complex transition effort, average 

costs, and the logistical management of new hires. NPPD and Department leadership will work together to review the recommendations of previous studies conducted for FPS. NPPD will also reach out to the Transportation Security Administration to gain the benefits of its experience. 

QUESTIONS FROM CHAIRMAN BENNIE G. THOMPSON OF MISSISSIPPI FOR GARY W. 

SCHENKEL, DIRECTOR, FEDERAL PROTECTIVE SERVICE, NATIONAL PROTECTION PROGRAMS DIRECTORATE, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Question 1. Please provide the committee with the written arrest and detention 

policy that FPS provides to contract guards. 
78 

* The information has been retained in committee files. 

Answer. Please see Attachment 12 entitled ‘‘Federal Protective Service (FPS) Security Guard Information Manual.’’* 

Question 2. You testified that you are 99 percent certain that all contract guards 

at Federal buildings have met FPS training and certification requirements. Please 

provide the committee with documentation demonstrating that all guards standing 

post at Federal buildings have completed requisite trainings and certifications. 

Answer. On July 7, 2009, each Federal Protective Service (FPS) Regional Director 

was tasked to provide FPS Headquarters with up-to-date and accurate information 

on all active contract security guards. As stipulated in contracts with contract guard 

companies, contractors maintain the systems of records. The records are maintained 

at the contractor’s business location and are audited by FPS. Through a physical 

inspection of all active guard employee folders, it was determined whether required 

records were present, current, and valid. The outcome of this 100 percent review of 

records netted these results: Guards were found to be disqualified and removed from 

post; deductions were made from contracts for disqualified guards; and several 

criminal investigations stemmed from fraudulent certification records identified. 

By September 14, 2009, individual guard records were uploaded in the Contract 

Guard Employment Requirements Tracking System based on information received 

from the FPS Regions. This information then underwent a data-level quality assurance review to ensure that required information was present so that it could be migrated into the Risk Assessment Management Program (RAMP), which will provide 

a near-time reflection of the contractor guard records. For example, by November 

5, 2009, this process corrected 75 percent of guard records that were found not to 

have a company association. Any remaining records that could not be associated 

with a guard company—and thus validated through the 100 percent review—were 

not migrated into RAMP. 

FPS put all contract guard companies on notice that substandard performance by 

contract guards is unacceptable and will not be tolerated and informed them that 

the number and frequency of inspections of guard post and certifications will increase. All regions were required to continue their enhanced oversight of guard certification compliance through an increased number of post inspections, operation 

shields, and administrative audits and to report the specific actions they would take 

to address and correct contract guard performance issues directly to FPS Headquarters. Operation Shield activities test contract guard proficiency and compliance 

with post orders, policies, and procedures. This additional scrutiny resulted in a 

drop in the percentage of certified guards between September and October. 

Data was migrated into RAMP and on November 16, 2009, FPS provided each 

guard company with reports of employment and certification data for each of their 

employees. Companies were asked to review, validate, and provide any additional 

updates for their employees to ensure that the information held by FPS in RAMP 

is consistent with their records. Based on information provided by guard companies 

on their employees, the number of certified guards available to work on FPS posts 

has already begun to increase because of continued updates and validation of guard 

certification records by FPS Regions. FPS confirms that all FPS guards at Federal 

buildings have met FPS training and certification requirements through post inspections. 

Question 3a. GAO reported that FPS no longer has officers patrol buildings to prevent or detect criminal activity. As a result, criminals could freely conduct surveillance of a Federal building without the agency’s knowledge. 

Why has FPS eliminated proactive building patrols? 

Answer. The Federal Protective Service (FPS) has adopted a risk-based approach 

to providing effective security for all facilities it protects. In doing so, FPS leverages 

Federal and contract personnel, as well as technology, to provide integrated security 

and law enforcement services. With the current funding provided for FPS’s basic operations, a workforce of approximately 1,225 full-time equivalents can be supported. 

Given that constraint, FPS has to effectively leverage those personnel to provide the 

maximum risk mitigation to Federal facilities across the Nation. Because Federal 

facilities do not experience uniform levels of risk, FPS allocates its resources based 

on where its work will provide the greatest security and risk reduction. Additionally, 

FPS uses a variety of countermeasures in Federal facilities that serve as a force 

multiplier, allowing the agency to accomplish its risk mitigation goals while maximizing the time available for personnel to conduct the varied activities for which 

FPS is responsible. These countermeasures range from contracted protective security officers to electronic systems such as closed-circuit video to intrusion-detection 

systems. By leveraging technology and adopting a risk-based approach to protection, 
79 

FPS provides efficient security and law enforcement services while adhering to key 

practices for risk management identified by the Government Accountability Office. 

Question 3b. How will FPS work with NPPD to ensure that FPS devotes adequate 

resources to patrolling Federal buildings? 

Answer. FPS and the National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) are 

working closely together to ensure that all Federal buildings are safe. This responsibility encompasses numerous aspects of physical security and protective countermeasures to protect the Federal employees who serve in these facilities and the millions of visitors who visit these facilities each year. NPPD and the FPS achieve 

these goals through a risk-based approach to conducting security assessments, offering emergency planning services and providing physical security to these Federal facilities. NPPD and FPS take these responsibilities seriously and are continuously 

developing new methods and incorporating new technologies to enhance the security 

of these facilities and better equip and train the FPS personnel who perform or support the performance of these tasks. 

Question 4a. GAO reported that in rural areas where FPS does not have a field 

office, FPS rarely monitors contract guards. 

How many field offices does FPS have in rural areas? 

Answer. The Federal Protective Service (FPS) has 125 field office locations in 

rural areas. 

Question 4b. How many FPS officers are stationed in rural field offices? 

Answer. FPS has 203 officers in rural areas. 

Question 4c. For each FPS officer in a rural field office, how many facilities is the 

FPS officer responsible for monitoring? 

Answer. FPS does not track facilities per field office, but, with approximately 

9,000 facilities and at our current manning of 1225, each Law Enforcement Security 

Officer (LESO) is responsible for monitoring on average 12 buildings. 

Question 4d. Will FPS and NPPD work on a solution for ensuring that Federal 

buildings in rural areas are safe? 

Answer. FPS and the National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) are 

working closely together to ensure that all Federal buildings are safe. NPPD and 

FPS achieve these goals through a risk-based approach to conducting security assessments, offering emergency planning services, and providing physical security to 

these Federal facilities. NPPD and FPS take these responsibilities seriously and are 

continuously developing new methods and incorporating new technologies to enhance the security of these facilities and better equip and train the FPS personnel 

who perform or support these tasks. 

Question 5a. In response to GAO recommendations to improve FPS building inspections, in March 2009, FPS issued a policy directive to standardize inspections 

across all FPS regions. 

When will FPS complete the implementation of this directive? 

Answer. The FPS Director implemented directive number FPS–09–001, Guard 

Contract Performance Monitoring Program, in March 2009. This directive established policy for FPS performance monitoring of contract security guards, guard 

forces, and contractor management functions. It also assigned organizational responsibilities for post, site, and administrative inspections and annual contractor performance evaluations. 

To further our efforts to improve operations, business practices, and overall standardization, FPS established the position of Assistant Director for Compliance in August 2009, based upon the identified need to integrate formerly unsystematic efforts 

to manage and address FPS weaknesses in compliance and oversight. The coordinated activities of the Directorate will enable FPS to adhere to a planned approach 

to risk management and internal control by documenting and evaluating risk and 

controls at the process level through compliance investigations, program reviews, 

self-inspection cycles, data analyses, proactive corrective action, policy oversight, 

and continuous quality improvement. 

In fiscal year 2009, FPS completed a gap analysis that identified policy requirements to standardize operations and business practices. FPS identified and initiated 

development of 48 priority policy requirements by establishing a goal of 20 policies 

to be developed in fiscal year 2009. Fiscal year 2009 success resulted in the implementation of 26 policies that have standardized operations and business practices. 

We made an effort to prioritize fiscal year 2009 policies to support or assist in 

achieving milestones toward resolving open recommendations from the Government 

Accountability Office and DHS Office of the Inspector General reports. In addition, 

FPS conducted training for Headquarters Division Directors and key staff to implement the directive development process and system. As part of the directive development process and system, FPS implemented the Standard Subject Identification Se-
80 

ries, which provides the framework for a subject-based, future-state policy manual 

that we are currently populating as policy directives are implemented. 

FPS will continue to remain flexible and responsive to the changing needs of the 

organization while continuing to improve the quality and clarity of policy directives. 

We have 27 policy directives currently in the draft development stage that we will 

endeavor to implement during fiscal year 2010. 

Question 5b. Who is responsible for ensuring that the policy directive is a success? 

Answer. The FPS Director is ultimately responsible for ensuring implementation 

and compliance with all policy directives. FPS–09–001, Guard Contract Performance 

Monitoring Program, outlines roles and responsibilities throughout the organizational structure of FPS. However, Regional Directors are responsible for implementation and adherence at the field level. 

Prior to March 2009, FPS recognized the need for developing policy directives 

throughout the organization. We have since undertaken a comprehensive program 

by which we have developed and issued National policy directives that have led to 

the standardization of business practices, which includes the implementation of 29 

policy directives. Of these 29 policy directives, eight have impacted the improvement 

of contract guard oversight: 

07–005, Agency Technical Representative Program, 4/30/07.—This directive establishes the roles and responsibilities for the assignment and use of agency technical representatives (ATR) to provide limited, on-site, contract, and operational 

oversight for the contract guard program. 

ATRs are appointed by the FPS Contracting Officer’s Technical Representative 

providing limited on-site contract and operational oversight. Upon appointment of 

an ATR, the COTR provides the appointment documentation to the Contracting Officer for record keeping and auditing purposes. 

08–003, Contract Guard Post Desk Book Program, 10/10/08.—This directive establishes the FPS contract guard post desk book program and assigns organizational 

responsibilities for the development, management, and administration of standardized post desk books for all contract security guard force activities. 

08–007, Oversight of Contractor-Provided Training, 11/12/08.—This directive establishes policy and procedures for FPS monitoring and oversight of contractor performance in providing contract-required security guard training. 

08–008, Contract Guard Written Examination Program, 11/17/08.—This directive 

establishes the policy and procedures requiring contract security guards to pass a 

written examination to work on an FPS contract. 

09–001, Guard Contract Performance Monitoring Program, 3/11/09.—This directive establishes policy for FPS performance monitoring of contract security guards, 

guard forces, and contractor management functions. It also assigns organizational 

responsibilities for post, site, and administrative inspections and annual contractor 

performance evaluations. 

15.7.2.5, Operation Shield, 6/5/09.—This directive establishes FPS policy, standards, responsibilities, and implementation procedures for Operation Shield. Operation Shield activities test contract guard proficiency and compliance with post orders, policies, and procedures. 

15.9.1.1, Security Guard Acquisition Planning and Pre-Award, 9/23/09.—This directive establishes standardized requirements for, and organizational responsibilities of, the FPS Security Guard Acquisition Planning and Pre-Award process. This 

directive improves oversight by standardizing roles and responsibilities of employees 

engaged in acquisition planning for contract security guard services. 

15.5.1.5, Initial Offense and Incident Case Reporting, 9/30/09.—This directive establishes the requirements for incident reporting by FPS law enforcement officers 

and security guards. This directive improves oversight by standardizing contract security guard reporting of Part III offenses, which include security, assistance, and 

miscellaneous incidents of a non-criminal nature. 

FPS has also established a Covert Testing Working Group (CTWG), whose membership includes supervisory and non-supervisory employees from Headquarters and 

field offices. The purpose of the CTWG is to enhance and complement on-going efforts to improve operational oversight of the Contract Guard Program. The working 

group will contribute to the overall approach to effect cultural change, both inside 

and outside the organization, to effectively and efficiently achieve the FPS Strategic 

Goals and ensure secure facilities and safe occupants. 

Specifically, the CTWG will: 

• Develop a covert testing program with Headquarters leadership and oversight; 

• Draft National policy to address covert testing operations (Complete); 

• Determine training requirements and equipment needs (e.g., standard covert 

testing kits), estimate cost and complete procurement (Completion NLT 1/25/10, 

On Track); and 
81 

• Deploy covert test teams and document results (First deployment no later than 

April 1, 2010, On Track). 

To complement the previous milestones, the CTWG will also: 

• Review existing resources on covert testing operations to maximize policy development time frames and capitalize on existing Government resources; 

• Determine additional human resource needs to ensure that covert testing operations have the desired impact; 

• Develop a National schedule for the conduct of covert testing operations at Federal facilities; 

• Consider counter-surveillance as part of pre-operational planning for covert 

testing operations; 

• Develop standardized case management documentation, reporting, and data 

management; and 

• Develop procedures for integration with the program review process to manage 

data analysis and proper follow-up to ensure that corrective actions and identified policy and training deficiencies are adequately addressed. 

Question 6. Please provide this committee with copies of all current Memoranda 

of Understanding between FPS and local police departments in the areas where FPS 

operates. 

Answer. The Federal Protective Service (FPS) provides integrated security and 

law enforcement services to nearly 9,000 Federal facilities Nation-wide. Because 

FPS is a relatively small agency, it is not possible to have personnel in all places 

at all times. Accordingly, strong relationships with State and local law enforcement 

are essential to accomplishing the FPS mission. Through information sharing initiatives, joint training, exercises, and regular response activities, FPS has always 

worked well with State and local law enforcement partners. Given that there are 

approximately 17,000 law enforcement organizations across the country, the time 

and cost involved in initiating, negotiating, and maintaining formal Memoranda of 

Understanding with this large variety of law enforcement agencies make this an 

unfeasible arrangement. The question of financial responsibility and liability prevents many local governments from entering into formal written agreements. Additionally, depending on the State or locality, existing local laws often prescribe the 

relationship between Federal officers and their State and local counterparts. Working within these existing legal frameworks and maintaining strong relationships 

with partner law enforcement agencies allows FPS to work well with other law enforcement agencies while focusing its efforts on the protection of Federal facilities. 

Question 7. Please provide a narrative of all security countermeasure recommendations FPS issued to GSA or GSA tenants in the past year, and the corresponding GSA or tenant agency response to each FPS recommendation. For instances in which GSA or the tenant agency declined to implement the recommended 

security countermeasure, specify the basis for this decision. 

Answer. Currently, the Federal Protective Service (FPS) is dependant on six disparate systems to conclude a Facility Security Assessment (FSA). Consequently, 

FPS will have to review each of the 9,000 existing FSAs separately and make comparisons with each Facility Security Committee (FSC). However, FPS’s new Risk Assessment and Management Program (RAMP) system, introduced November 2009, 

will provide a comprehensive picture and analysis of all General Services Administration (GSA) facilities under FPS control and will be able to document those countermeasures that are recommended against those countermeasures that are implemented. This process will be completed in accordance with the Interagency Security 

Committee (ISC) Facility Security Level (FSL) schedule. 

FPS works in conjunction with the GSA. FPS recommends countermeasures for 

each building within the GSA inventory on a risk-based approach. Based on that 

risk, specific countermeasures are recommended that are either fixtures or features 

(i.e., considered permanent alterations to the building or grounds) or categorized as 

countermeasure equipment and guards. Examples of a fixture or feature are 

bollards, structural hardening of a facility, or a device embedded in the ground to 

prevent vehicle access. If the fixed countermeasure recommendations are accepted 

by the FSC, GSA funds the purchase and installation and amortizes the costs into 

the tenants’ rent bill. The countermeasure equipment and guards are also recommended based on the comprehensive risk-based assessment and are the direct responsibility of the tenants; thus, the FSC either accepts or rejects the FPS recommendation for implementation. Examples of these are X-ray machines, metal detectors, closed-circuit television cameras, perimeter lighting, and contract security 

guards. The FSC does not produce a document to reject the implementation of recommended countermeasures formally and is not required to document those recommendations that were not accepted or declined. For the most part, the FSC mere-
82 

ly fails to sign off on the FSA. There are no penalties or fines associated with not 

complying with the recommendation to implement recommended countermeasures. 

FPS uses countermeasures from seven basic systems to enhance security and 

mitigate risk for Federal facilities: Access control, alarms, barriers, communications, 

guard forces, screening, and surveillance. To determine the appropriate countermeasures to employ for a particular facility, FPS conducts comprehensive risk assessments that gather and analyze detailed information on likely threats, 

vulnerabilities, and potential consequences. Along with this information, FPS also 

used standards issued by the ISC to ensure that countermeasures required by 

standards are present in Federal facilities. The applicable countermeasure standards depend on the FSL of the building under consideration. For instance, the use 

of physical barriers is not applicable for Level I and Level II facilities (the lowest 

of 5 levels), is desirable for Level III facilities, and is a minimum standard for Level 

IV and Level V facilities. Using a comprehensive risk analysis, FPS makes appropriate recommendations to facility tenants for countermeasures to mitigate applicable risks. These recommendations are presented to the FSC at the facility, and the 

FSC determines which recommended countermeasures to implement. Given this 

model for security decisions, the facility tenants, as represented on an FSC, often 

may not move forward with implementing countermeasures. FPS does not have the 

authority to mandate implementation of recommended countermeasures. In the past 

year, FPS conducted more than 2,400 facility security assessments. In some cases, 

the existing level of risk mitigation was functioning well, and no additional countermeasures were necessary beyond regular training for facility tenants. In others, extensive countermeasure projects were recommended. In some of these cases, implementing these countermeasures entails extensive coordination with the tenants, 

GSA, and other stakeholders (such as city planners, engineers, or preservation 

groups). For example, barrier projects in the National Capital Area have to be coordinated with the National Capital Planning Commission to ensure that they adhere to the guidelines for designing security in the Nation’s Capital as issued by 

that organization. Accordingly, countermeasure projects for FPS range from simple, 

low-cost items that can be easily implemented to multi-year projects that require 

advanced budgeting and extensive coordination. 

Question 8a. At the hearing, David Wright of AFGE testified that as of this year, 

FPS has reduced security charges used to pay for monitoring and administrative activities related to contract guard oversight by 25 percent. 

Please explain whether FPS has decreased its security charges, and if so, the reason for this reduction. 

Answer. FPS has not reduced security charges; however, FPS reduced its administrative surcharge. The surcharge reduction was made as a result of an analysis of 

resource needs. As a result, FPS reduced its overhead charge by 25 percent, from 

an 8 percent charge in fiscal year 2009 to a 6 percent charge in fiscal year 2010 

($15 million). Since this time, FPS has developed a full costing of the funding needs 

arising from the FPS transition to NPPD and for future fiscal years the surcharge 

will be reevaluated. 

Question 8b. Having reduced its security charges, how will FPS ensure that it has 

adequate resources to conduct monitoring and administrative activity related to contract guards? 

Answer. As part of the National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) 

Transition Plan, FPS is working diligently with Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and NPPD to maximize efficiencies for FPS. FPS’s dependency on ICE 

for many of its required services has been defined in a series of agreements between 

NPPD and ICE to continue, alter, or discontinue many of these services. With regards to requirements that will be more cost-effective by absorbing or creating services within FPS or NPPD, monies previously paid to ICE will be recouped and redirected as appropriate. Examples of these are Fleet Management, Facilities Management, and Services. In circumstances where continuation of service with ICE makes 

better fiscal and operational sense, FPS will continue to pay its appropriate share 

to ICE. An example of this is a continuation of service with the National Firearms 

Tactical Training Unit. Only in extreme circumstances will FPS either delay or defray resources from forthcoming projects to meet immediate requirements. 

As indicated above, FPS has deferred certain capital investments to ensure that 

funds are available to continue the increased levels of contract guard monitoring 

and oversight initiated in fiscal year 2009. Additionally, since 2008, FPS has invested in technology upgrades that will substantially improve the way the contract 

guard force is monitored and supervised. With rugged, mobile laptops and the Risk 

Assessment and Management Program (RAMP), FPS inspectors will have immediate access to a contract guard’s training and certification status. Time saved completing written forms and running computer checks at the office will allow inspec-
83 

tors to spend more time servicing Federal facilities and monitoring guard performance. 

In addition to RAMP, in fiscal year 2010, FPS will procure a Post Tracking System that will ensure that security posts are adequately staffed and that disqualified 

guards do not stand post. The system will alert if an unqualified guard seeks to 

enter on duty. If there is a lapse, the guard company will be electronically notified 

that the guard may not perform work on the contract. At present, contract guards 

sign in on paper sheets at each Federal facility. Until those are collected, reviewed, 

and assessed, the sheets are of little value. FPS aggressively deducts fees when contract companies fail to provide the service FPS expects. The automated system is 

a significant step forward, removes delay, and provides automatic safeguards. 

Question 9a. Please identify all companies holding current contracts to provide 

guard services on behalf of FPS. For each contract, indicate the term of the contract, 

the annual cost of each contract, and whether the contract requires any contract 

guards to be qualified or trained as special police officers, or requires any contract 

guards to have arrest authority. 

Answer. Attachment 20 to this response provides a listing of companies that provide guard services on behalf of the Federal Protective Service (FPS). Additionally, 

it includes the term of contracts (remaining contract options) and estimated annual 

costs. Two FPS contracts in the National Capital Region include a requirement for 

special police officers: 

Contract.—HSCEEC–08–D–00005. 

Contractor.—Jenkins Security Consultants. 

Awarded.—5/22/2008. 

Period of Performance.—08/01/2008–7/31/2013. 

Contract.—HSCEEC–09–D–00013. 

Contractor.—Knight Protective Service. 

Awarded.—7/31/2009. 

Period of Performance.—11/01/2009–10/31/2014. 

Question 9b. Has FPS or DHS analyzed the labor and overhead costs associated 

with these contracts? If so, please provide contract guard costs, separately delineating labor and overhead costs. 

Answer. FPS guard service contracts are considered commercial services under 

FAR 2.101 (see paragraph 6 of Commercial Item definition), and, therefore, are exempt from certified cost or pricing data requirements under FAR 15–403–1(c)(3). Accordingly, FPS acquires guard services under FAR Part 12, Commercial Item Acquisitions, or under FAR 8.4, Federal Supply Schedule procedures, which do not require the contractor to delineate the separate components of its price, such as labor 

and overhead. However, we recently have required the guard service contractors to 

provide a price element breakdown of their quoted/proposed rate to evaluate price 

realism, as provided by FAR 15.404–1(d)(3). The purpose of our price realism reviews is limited to assessing the contractor’s understanding of the solicitation requirements and assessing performance risk. While such analysis may include reviewing the proposed labor and components of overhead pricing, these amounts are 

based on commercial pricing and, therefore, may not be representative of the contractor’s actual costs. To determine the actual labor and overhead costs incurred by 

the contractor in performing FPS guard services contracts, an audit of the contractor’s books and records would be necessary, which is not permitted under commercially priced contracts. 
84 

DETAILED BREAKOUT OF FPS CONTRACTS REPORTED BY REGIONAL CONTRACT GUARD PROGRAMS 

FPS 

Region Contract No. Contractor Description of Services Estimated Total Contract Value Estimated Annual Value Term/Options Remaining 

1 ...... HSCEE1–08–D– 

00002.

C&D Security 

MGMT INC.

Guard Services/MA, 

RI.

$17,722,240 $3,544,448 10/1/2009 thru 9/30/2010 

10/1/2010 thru 9/30/2011 10/1/2011 thru 9/30/2012 10/1/2012 thru 9/30/2013 

1 ...... HSCEE1–08–D– 

00001.

C&D Security 

MGMT INC.

Guard Services CT $19,663,853 $3,932,771 10/1/2009 thru 9/30/2010 

10/1/2010 thru 9/30/2011 10/1/2011 thru 9/30/2012 10/1/2012 thru 9/30/2013 

1 ...... HSCEEI–08–A– 

00001.

MVM, INC. ............. Guard Services/New 

England.

$60,000,000 $12,000,000 8/18/2009 thru 8/17/2010 

8/18/2010 thru 8/17/2011 8/18/2011 thru 8/17/2012 8/18/2012 thru 8/17/2013 

2 ...... HSCEE2–09–A– 

00005.

Wackenhut Services, Inc. (WSI). Guard Services— Upstate NY. $55,000,000 $11,000,000 Option 1 10/01/09–9/30/10 Option 2 10/01/10–9/30/11 

Option 3 10/01/11–9/30/12 Option 4 10/01/12–9/30/13 

2 ...... HSCEE2–08–Q– 

00003.

FJC Security ........... Guard Services ....... $28,000,000 $5,600,000 Initial yr: 10/01/08–9/30/09 

Option 1 10/01/09–9/30/10 Option 2 10/01/10–9/30/11 Option 3 10/01/11–9/30/12 Option 4 10/01/12–9/30/13 

2 ...... GS–07F–0504N ....... Alante Security 

Group.

Guard Services 

(Queens, NY).

$24,000,000 $4,800,000 Initial yr: 12/01/08–11/30/09 

Option 1 12/01/09–11/30/10 Option 2 12/01/10–11/30/11 Option 3 12/01/11–11/30/12 Option 4 12/01/12–11/30/13 

2 ...... HSCEE2–09–A– 

00006.

Wackenhut Corp ..... Guard Services FBI 

Facilities in upstate NY.

$4,500,000 $900,000 Option 1 10/01/09–9/30/10 

Option 2 10/01/10–9/30/11 Option 3 10/01/11–9/30/12 Option 4 10/01/12–9/30/13 
85 

2 ...... HSCEE2–08–R– 

0001.

MVM, INC. ............. Guard Services ....... $30,000,000 $6,000,000 Option 1 7/01/09–6/30/10 

Option 2 7/01/10–6/30/11 Option 3 7/01/11–6/30/12 Option 4 7/01/12–6/30/13 

2 ...... HSCEE2–08–R– 

00005.

FJC Security ........... Guard service 

(Brooklyn, NY).

$12,000,000 $2,400,000 Initial yr: 12/01/08–11/30/09 

Option 1 12/01/09–11/30/10 Option 2 12/01/10–11/30/11 Option 3 12/01/11–11/30/12 Option 4 12/01/12–11/30/13 

2 ...... HSCEE2–08–R– 

00001.

Alutiiq, Inc. ............. Guard Services ....... $10,586,000 $2,117,200 Initial yr: 1/01/09–12/31/10 

Option 1 1/01/11–12/31/11 Option 2 1/01/12–12/31/12 Option 3 1/01/13–12/31/13 Option 4 1/01/14–12/31/14 

3 ...... HSCEGI–05– 

CF00004.

BSA/LB&B .............. Guard Services for 

CMS, Baltimore, MD.

$25,606,626 $5,121,325 Contract expires 3/31/10 

3 ...... HSCEGI–07–A– 

00006.

C & D Security ....... Guard Svc./Metro. 

Phila.

$42,226,387 $8,445,277 Option 2 (4/1/09–3/31/10) 

Option 3 (4/1/10–3/31/11) Option 4 (4/1/11–3/31/12) 

3 ...... HSCEGI–07–D– 

00006.

T & W Company, 

Inc.

Guard Services WV 

Panhandle.

$32,854,663 $6,570,933 Option 3 (11/1/10–10/30/11) 

Option 4 (11/1/11–10/30/12) 

3 ...... HSCEE3–09–A– 

00005.

DECO ...................... Guard Services 

Delaware State.

$3,252,244 $650,449 Award (12/1/08–11/30/09) 

Option 1 (12/1/09–11/30/10) Option 2 (12/1/10–11/30/11) Option 3 (12/1/11–11/30/12) Option 4 (12/1/12–11/30/13) 

3 ...... HSCEE3–08–A– 

00003.

ARES ....................... Guard Services New 

Jersey State.

$11,106,450 $2,221,290 Award (12/1/08–11/30/09) 

Option 1 (12/1/09–11/30/10) Option 2 (12/1/10–11/30/11) Option 3 (12/1/11–11/30/12) Option 4 (12/1/12–11/30/13) 

3 ...... HSCEE3–08–A– 

00002.

Paragon Systems .... Guard Services Virginia. $42,388,500 $8,477,700 Award (4–1–2009–3–31–2010) Option 1 (4–1–2010–3–31–2011) 

Option 2 (4–1–2011–3–31–2012) Option 3 (4–1–2012–32–31–2013) Option 4 (4–1–2013–3–31–2014) 
86 

DETAILED BREAKOUT OF FPS CONTRACTS REPORTED BY REGIONAL CONTRACT GUARD PROGRAMS—Continued 

FPS 

Region Contract No. Contractor Description of Services Estimated Total Contract Value Estimated Annual Value Term/Options Remaining 

3 ...... HSCEE3–08–A– 

00001.

Knight Protective 

Services.

Guard Services/PA $25,563,532 $5,112,706 Option 1 (10/1/09–9/30/10) 

Option 2 (10/1/10–9/30/11) Option 3 (10/1/11–9/30/12) Option 4 (10/1/12–9/30/13) 

3 ...... HSCEGI–05– 

CF00005.

SANTE FE .............. Guard Services/ 

NDIC.

$3,260,218 $652,044 Contract expires 3/31/10 

3 ...... GS–07F–02676L ..... Security Consultants Group. Guard Services West Virginia. $15,858,609 $3,171,722 Contract expires 3/31/10 3 ...... HSCEGI–05–D– 

F00006.

ARES ....................... Guard Services 

Maryland State.

$49,731,853 $9,946,371 Option 4 (7/1/09–5/31/10) 

3 ...... HSCEE3–09–A– 

00006.

Eagle Technologies 

Inc.

Guard Services Ft 

Detrick, MD.

$11,197,548 $2,239,510 Award (4–8–2009–4–7–2010) 

Option 1 (4–8–2010–4–7–2011) Option 2 (4–8–2011–4–7–2012) Option 3 (4–8–2012–4–7–2013) Option 4 (2–8–2013–4–7–2014) 

3 ...... HSCEE3–09–D– 

00001.

Action Facilities 

Mgmt.

CBP, Harpers Ferry 

WV.

$6,869,630 $1,373,926 Award (3–1–09–2–28–2010) 

Option 1 (3–1–2010–2–28–2011) Option 2 (3–1–2011–2–28–2012) Option 3 (3–1–2012–2–28–2013) Option 4 (3–1–2013–2–28–2014) 

4 ...... HSCEG1–07–A– 

00010.

SCG, INC ................ Guard Services 

State of Alabama.

$42,980,920 $8,596,184 Opt 3 10/1/2010–9/30/2011 

Opt 4 10/1/2011–9/30/2012 

4 ...... HSCEG1–07–A– 

00009.

SCG, INC ................ GUARD SERVICES 

STATE OF TENNESSEE.

$41,949,771 $8,389,954 Opt 3 8/1/2010–7/31/2011 

Opt 4 8/1/2011–7/31/2012 

4 ...... HSCEGI–07–A– 

00013.

Paragon Systems, 

Inc.

Guard Svc.—SC ...... $29,465,229 $5,893,046 Opt 2 11/1/2009–10/31/2010 

Opt 3 11/1/2010–10/31/2011 Opt 4 11/1/2011–10/31/2012 
87 

4 ...... HSCEE4–08–A– 

0001.

PARAGON SYSTEMS. Guard Service ......... $87,871,580 $17,574,316 Opt 2 4/1/2010–3/31/2011 Opt 3 4/1/2011–3/31/2012 

Opt 4 4/1/2012–3/31/2013 

4 ...... HSCEE4–08–a– 

00008.

SCG ......................... SECURITY GUARD 

SVC–KENTUCKY.

$29,460,845 $5,892,169 Opt 2 10/1/2010–9/30/2011 

Opt 3 10/1/2011–9/30/2012 Opt 4 10/1/2012–9/30/2013 

4 ...... HSCEE4–08–A– 

00002.

SCG ......................... GUARD SERVICES, MS. $19,656,437 $3,931,287 4/1/2010–3/31/2011 4/1/2011–3/31/2012 

4/1/2012–3/31/2013 

4 ...... HSCEE4–08–A– 

0004.

SCG ......................... GUARD SERVICES, NC. $18,249,165 $3,649,833 Opt 2 8/1/2010–7/31/2011 Opt 3 8/1/2011–7/31/2012 

Opt 4 8/1/2012–7/31/2013 

4 ...... HSCEE4–09–D– 

00001.

ALUTIIQ–MELE, 

LLC.

SECURITY GUARD 

SVC, Southern FL.

$75,000,000 $15,000,000 10/1/09–9/30–2014 

4 ...... HSCEGI–07–A– 

00012.

ARES GROUP ........ GUARD SERVICE $62,099,576 $12,419,915 Opt 3 10/1/2010–9/30/2011 

Opt 4 10/1/2011–9/30/2012 

4 ...... HSCEE4–08–A– 

00007.

SCG ......................... GUARD SERVICE $7,987,200 $1,597,440 Opt 2 10/1/2010–9/30/2011 

Opt 3 10/1/2011–9/30/2012 Opt 4 10/1/2012–9/30/2013 

5 ...... HSCEC509A00005 DECO Security Svcs Two State (2) State 

Armed Security Guard Services for MN & WI.

$61,433,991 $12,286,798 Base 9/1/09–8/31/10 

Option 1 9/1/10–8/31/11 Option 2 9/1/11–8/31/12 Option 3 9/1/12–8/31/13 Option 4 9/1/13–8/31/14 

5 ...... HSCEC509A00004 DECO Security Svcs Armed Security 

Guard Services for State of MI.

$57,656,711 $11,531,342 Base 7/1/09–3/31/10 

Option 1 4/1/10–3/31/11 Option 2 4/1/11–3/31/12 Option 3 4/1/12–3/31/13 Option 4 4/1/13–3/31/14 

5 ...... HSCEC509A00002 DECO Security Svcs Armed Security 

Guard Services for State of OH.

$60,970,831 $12,194,166 Base 4/1/09–3/31/10 

Option 1 4/1/10–3/31/11 Option 2 4/1/11–3/31/12 Option 3 4/1/12–3/31/13 Option 4 4/1/13–3/31/14 
88 

DETAILED BREAKOUT OF FPS CONTRACTS REPORTED BY REGIONAL CONTRACT GUARD PROGRAMS—Continued 

FPS 

Region Contract No. Contractor Description of Services Estimated Total Contract Value Estimated Annual Value Term/Options Remaining 

5 ...... HSCEC509A00006 Security Consultants Group (SCG). Armed Security Guard Services 

for State of IL.

$79,715,583 $15,943,117 Base 7/1/09–6/30/10 

Option 1 7/1/10–6/30/11 Option 2 7/1/11–6/30/12 Option 3 7/1/12–6/30/13 Option 4 7/11/13–6/30/14 

5 ...... HSCEC509A00003 DECO Security Svcs Armed Security 

Guard Services for State of IN.

$37,633,216 $7,526,643 Base 6/1/09–5/31/10 

Option 1 6/1/10–5/31/11 Option 2 6/1/11–5/31/12 Option 3 6/1/12–5/31/13 Option 4 6/1/13–5/31/14 

6 ...... HSCEC608D00001 MVM ........................ Guard Services ....... $224,000,000 $44,800,000 Base Year 3/1/09–9/30/09 

1st yr option 10/1/09–9/30/10 2nd yr option 10/10–9/30/11 3rd yr option 10/1/11–9/30/12 4th yr option 10/1/12–9/30/13 

7 ...... GS–07F–0306L .......

HSCEC7–08–F– 

00082.

Southwestern Security Services, Inc. Tyler, Texas Area ... $462,356 $92,471 Contract Expires 2/28/10 

7 ...... GS–07F–0306L .......

HSCEC7–08–F– 

00088.

Southwestern Security Services, Inc. West Texas, Lub- bock, Permian 

Basin, Big Springs, etc.

$901,192 $180,238 Contract Expires 2/28/10 

7 ...... GS–07F–0305L .......

HSCEC7–08–F– 

00081.

The J Diamond 

Group, Inc.

New Mexico—Texas 

Cities Only.

$8,920,693 $1,784,139 Contract Expires 2/28/10 

7 ...... GS–07F–0305L .......

HSCEC7–08–00084 

The J Diamond 

Group, Inc.

Denton, Texas Area $2,453,084 $490,617 Contract Expires 2/28/10 

7 ...... GS–07F–0306L .......

HSCEC7–08–F– 

00079.

Southwestern Security Services, Inc. Northern Lou- isiana—Texas 

Cities Only.

$2,249,745 $449,949 Contract Expires 2/28/10 
89 

7 ...... GS–07F–5426R .......

HSCEC7–08–F– 

00085.

Mike Garcia Merchant Security. El Paso Bridges, TX $3,280,334 $656,067 Contract Expires 2/28/10 

7 ...... GS–07F–0306L .......

HSCEC7–08–F– 

00043.

Southwestern Security Services, Inc. Brownsville, Har- lingen, Laredo, 

Texas.

$2,686,850 $537,370 Contract Expires 2/28/10 

7 ...... GS–07F–0266K .......

HSCEC7–08–F– 

00078.

Knight Protective 

Services, Inc.

Oklahoma State ...... $11,186,496 $2,237,299 Contract Expires 1/31/10 

7 ...... GS–07F–0266K .......

HSCEC7–08–F– 

00075.

Knight Protective 

Services, Inc.

Houston, Texas ....... $6,840,400 $1,368,080 Contract Expires 2/28/10 

7 ...... GS–07F–0305L .......

HSCEC7–08–F– 

00041.

The J Diamond 

Group, Inc.

Corpus Christi/Victoria, TX. $1,473,684 $294,737 Contract Expires 2/28/10 

7 ...... GS–07F–0267L .......

HSCEC7–08–F– 

00086.

Security Consultants Group. Dallas, Texas .......... $16,488,320 $3,297,664 Contract Expires 2/28/10 

7 ...... GS–07F–0305L .......

HSCEC7–08–F– 

00040.

The J Diamond 

Group, Inc.

San Antonio/ 

Kerrville, TX.

$3,442,318 $688,464 Contract Expires 2/28/10 

7 ...... GS–07F–0305L .......

HSCEC7–08–F– 

00076.

The J Diamond 

Group, Inc.

El Paso–FOB, TX ... $3,909,159 $781,832 Contract Expires 2/28/10 

7 ...... GS–07F–0306L .......

HSCEC7–08–F– 

00048.

Southwestern Security Services, Inc. Guard Services ....... $504,584 $100,917 Contract Expires 2/28/10 

7 ...... GS–07F–0605N .......

HSCEC7–08–F– 

00120.

Superior Protection 

Services, Inc.

Brownsville, Harlingen, McAllen, 

Texas.

$2,916,477 $583,295 Contract Expires 12/28/10 

7 ...... GS–07F–0363M ......

HSCEC7–09–A– 

00001.

ARES Group Inc ..... State of Arkansas ... $14,174,484 $2,834,897 Base 09/01/09–09/30/10 

Option I 10/01/10–09/30/11 Option II 10/01/11–09/30/12 Option III 10/01/12–09/30/13 Option IV 10/01/13–09/30/14 
90 

DETAILED BREAKOUT OF FPS CONTRACTS REPORTED BY REGIONAL CONTRACT GUARD PROGRAMS—Continued 

FPS 

Region Contract No. Contractor Description of Services Estimated Total Contract Value Estimated Annual Value Term/Options Remaining 

7 ...... GS–07F–0305L .......

HSCEC7–09–A– 

00002.

The J Diamond 

Group, Inc.

State of New Mexico $26,630,140 $5,326,028 Base 10/01/09–09/30/10 

Option I 10/01/10–09/30/11 Option II 10/01/11–09/30/12 Option III 10/01/12–09/30/13 Option IV 10/01/13–09/30/14 

7 ...... GS–07F–0305L .......

HSCEC7–10–A– 

00001.

The J Diamond 

Group, Inc.

Fort Worth/Austin, 

Texas.

$33,182,677 $6,636,535 Base 12/01/09–11/30/10 

Option I 12/01/10–11/30/11 Option II 12/01/11–11/30/12 Option III 12/01/12–11/30/13 Option IV 12/01/13–11/30/14 

7 ...... GS–07F–5576R .......

HSCEC7–10–A– 

00002.

Inter-Con ................. State of Louisiana .. $49,104,558 $9,820,912 Base 12/01/09–11/30/10 

Option I 12/01/10–11/30/11 Option II 12/01/11–11/30/12 Option III 12/01/12–11/30/13 Option IV 12/01/13–11/30/14 

7 ...... GS–07F–0103M ......

HSCEC7–09–A– 

00003.

DECO ...................... State of Oklahoma $36,809,787 $7,361,957 Base 2/01/10–1/31/11 

Option I 2/01/11–1/31/12 Option II 2/01/12–1/30/13 Option III 2/01/13–01/31/14 Option IV 2/01/14–1/31/15 

8 ...... HSCEW8–09–A– 

00001.

DECO, Inc ............... Guard Services Colorado. $57,094,725 $11,418,945 Option 1 (01/01/2010–12/31/2010) Option 2 (01/01/2011–12/31/2011) 

Option 3 (01/01/2012–12/31/2012) Option 4 (01/01/2013–12/31/2013) 

8 ...... HSCECA–07–A– 

70006.

SCG, INC ................ GUARD SVC 

SOUTH DAKOTA.

$2,932,916 $586,583 Option 2 (04/01/2009–03/31/2010) 

Option 3 (04/01/2011–03/31/2012) Option 4 (04/01/2012–03/31/2013) 

8 ...... HSCECA–07–A– 

70008.

SCG, INC ................ GUARD SVC WYOMING. $3,824,187 $764,837 Option 2 (04/01/2009–03/31/2010) Option 3 (04/01/2011–03/31/2012) 

Option 4 (04/01/2012–03/31/2013) 
91 

8 ...... HSCECA–07–A– 

70004.

SCG, INC ................ GUARD SVC MONTANA. $8,658,009 $1,731,602 Option 2 (04/01/2009–03/31/2010) Option 3 (04/01/2011–03/31/2012) 

Option 4 (04/01/2012–03/31/2013) 

8 ...... HSCECA–07–A– 

70005.

SCG, INC ................ GUARD SVC 

NORTH DAKOTA.

$2,479,996 $495,999 Option 2 (04/01/2009–03/31/2010) 

Option 3 (04/01/2011–03/31/2012) Option 4 (04/01/2012–03/31/2013) 

8 ...... HSCECA–07–A– 

70007.

SCG, INC ................ GUARD SVC UTAH $15,189,018 $3,037,804 Option 2 (04/01/2009–03/31/2010) 

Option 3 (04/01/2011–03/31/2012) Option 4 (04/01/2012–03/31/2013) 

9 ...... HSCECA–07–F– 

00046.

TRINITY PROTECTION SERVICES, 

INC.

Guard Services< 

Northern CA.

$58,998,706 $11,799,741 Option 3 10/1/09–9/30–10 

Option 4 10/1/2010–9/30/2011 

9 ...... HSCECA–07–F– 

00047.

SECURITY CONSULTANTS 

GROUP INC.

Guard Services< 

Central CA.

$55,220,811 $11,044,162 Option 3 10/1/09–9/30/10 

Option 4 10/1/2010–9/30/2011 

9 ...... HSCEW9–08–F– 

00002.

(FSS No. 

GS07F0267L).

SECURITY CONSULTANTS 

GROUP.

Guard Services, NV $19,753,663 $3,950,733 Option 3–10/1/10–9/30/11 

Option 4–10/1/11–9/30/12 

9 ...... HSCEW9–09–A– 

00002.

Security Consultants Group. Arizona Guard Con- tract. $24,962,312 $4,992,462 Option 2 (10/1/10–09/30/11) Option 3 (10/1/11–09/30/12) 

Option 4 (10/1/12–09/30/13) 

9 ...... BPA No. HSCEW9– 

09–A–00003.

(FSS No. 

GS07F0418K).

Paragon Systems, 

Inc.

Armed Guard Service–Los Angeles, 

CA.

$99,396,497 $19,879,299 Option 1 (10/1/09–09/30/10) 

Option 2 (10/1/10–09/30/11) Option 3 (10/1/11–09/30/12) Option 4 (10/1/12–09/30/13) 

9 ...... BPA No. HSCEW9– 

09–A–00004.

(FSS No. 

GS07F0418K).

Paragon Systems, 

Inc.

Armed Guard Service–San Diego, CA. $49,205,673 $9,841,135 Option 1 (10/1/09–09/30/10) Option 2 (10/1/10–09/30/11) 

Option 3 (10/1/11–09/30/12) Option 4 (10/1/12–09/30/13) 

10 .... HSCECA–07–A– 

70010.

PARAGON SYSTEMS. ARMED GUARD SERVICES FOR 

NORTHERN WASHINGTON.

$28,698,099 $5,739,620 Option 4 (5/16/2010–5/15/2011) 

Option 5 (5/16/2011–5/15/2012) 
92 

DETAILED BREAKOUT OF FPS CONTRACTS REPORTED BY REGIONAL CONTRACT GUARD PROGRAMS—Continued 

FPS 

Region Contract No. Contractor Description of Services Estimated Total Contract Value Estimated Annual Value Term/Options Remaining 

10 .... HSCECA–07–A– 

70009.

PARAGON SYSTEMS. ARMED GUARD SERVICES FOR 

OREGON STATEWIDE AND SOUTH WASHINGTON.

$20,133,234 $4,026,647 Option 4 (7/1/2010–6/30/2011) 

Option 5 (7/1/2011–6/30/2012) 

10 .... HSCEXP06CF00004 PARAGON SYSTEMS. ARMED GUARD SERVICES FOR 

SOUTHWESTERN WASHINGTON.

$5,284,105 $1,056,821 Option 4 (4/1/2010–3/31/2011) 

10 .... HSCECA07A70000 GUARDIAN SECURITY SYSTEMS, 

INC.

ARMED GUARD 

SERVICES FOR KETCHIKAN.

$238,907 $47,781 Option 3 (10/1/2009–9/30/2010) 

Option 4 (10/1/2010–9/30/2011) 

10 .... HSCEWA09A00003 SCG ......................... ARMED GUARD 

SERVICES FOR IDAHO AND EASTERN WASHINGTON.

$2,945,145 $2,945,145 Contract Expires 2/28/10 

11 .... HSCEEC–10–A– 

00001.

Coastal International Security. Guard Services, NCR. $116,000,000 $23,200,000 BPA through 12/3/2014 

11 .... GS11P04MPC0037 Kingdom Security 

Services.

Guard Services, 

NCR.

$1,516,933 $303,387 Expires 2/28/10 

11 .... HSCEEC08A00001 USEC Services Corp Guard Services, 

NCR.

$19,000,000 $3,800,000 BPA through 11/30/2012 

11 .... HSCEEC08A00004 SecTek ..................... Guard Services, 

NCR.

$7,324,629 $1,464,926 BPA through 1/3/2012 

11 .... HSCEEC08A00005 DTM Corporation ... Guard Services, 

NCR.

$21,700,000 $4,340,000 BPA through 1/3/2012 
93 

11 .... HSCEEC08A00006 Allied Barton Security. Guard Services, NCR. $11,196,000 $2,239,200 BPA through 1/13/13 11 .... HSCEEC08A00007 Ares Protective 

Service.

Guard Services, 

NCR.

$2,093,000 $418,600 BPA through 01/11/113 

11 .... HSCEEC08A00008 DTM Corporation ... Guard Services, 

NCR.

$2,700,000 $540,000 BPA through 1/11/2013 

11 .... HSCEEC08A00009 SecTek ..................... Guard Services, 

NCR.

$29,200,000 $5,840,000 BPA through 3/31/2013 

11 .... HSCEEC08A00015 Paragon Systems .... Guard Services, 

NCR.

$52,000,000 $10,400,000 BPA through 5/31/2013 

11 .... HSCEEC08A00016 Coastal International Security. Guard Services, NCR. $32,000,000 $6,400,000 BPA through 5/31/2013 11 .... HSCEEC08A00017 Jenkins Security 

Consultants.

Guard Services, 

NCR.

$5,000,000 $1,000,000 BPA through 5/31/2013 

11 .... HSCEEC08A00019 MVM ........................ Guard Services, 

NCR.

$41,500,000 $8,300,000 BPA through 9/30/2014 

11 .... HSCEEC08A00020 Elite Protective 

Services.

Guard Services, 

NCR.

$43,000,000 $8,600,000 BPA through 5/31/2013 

11 .... HSCEEC08A00021 Frontier Systems 

Integrators.

Guard Services, 

NCR.

$7,898,216 $1,579,643 BPA through 8/17/2013 

11 .... HSCEEC08A00022 Coastal International Security. Guard Services, NCR. $14,628,434 $2,925,687 BPA through 9/30/2013 11 .... HSCEEC08C00001 Jenkins Security 

Consultants.

Guard Services, 

NCR.

$5,811,748 $1,162,350 Option II 10/1/2009–9/30/2010 

Option III 10/1/2010–9/30/2011 Option IV 10/1/2011–9/30/2012 Option V 10/1/2012–7/31/2013 

11 .... HSCEEC08D00001 DTM Corporation ... Guard Services, 

NCR.

$481,632 $96,326 Option I 12/1/2008–11/30/2009 

Option II 12/1/2009–11/30/2010 Option III 12/1/2010–11/30/2011 

11 .... HSCEEC08D00002 Special Operations 

Group.

Guard Services, 

NCR.

$6,623,493 $1,324,699 Option I 12/1/2008–11/30/2009 

Option II 12/1/2009–11/30/2010 Option III 12/1/2010–11/30/2011 Option IV 12/1/2011–11/30/2012 
94 

DETAILED BREAKOUT OF FPS CONTRACTS REPORTED BY REGIONAL CONTRACT GUARD PROGRAMS—Continued 

FPS 

Region Contract No. Contractor Description of Services Estimated Total Contract Value Estimated Annual Value Term/Options Remaining 

11 .... HSCEEC08D00003 Jenkins Security 

Consultants.

Guard Services, 

NCR.

$8,227,876 $1,645,575 Option I 12/1/2008–11/30/2009 

Option II 12/1/2009–11/30/2010 Option III 12/1/2010–11/30/2011 Option IV 12/1/2011–11/30/2012 

11 .... HSCEEC08D00004 Master Security ...... Guard Services, 

NCR.

$21,155,585 $4,231,117 Option I 12/1/2008–11/30/2009 

Option II 12/1/2009–11/30/2010 Option III 12/1/2010–11/30/2011 Option IV 12/1/2011–11/30/2012 

11 .... HSCEEC08D00005 Jenkins Security 

Consultants.

Guard Services, 

NCR.

$23,889,389 $4,777,878 Base Period 8/1/2008–7/31/2009 

Option I 8/1/2009–7/31/2010 Option II 8/1/2010–7/31/2011 Option III 8/1/2011–7/31/2012 Option IV 8/1/2012–7/31/2013 

11 .... HSCEEC08D00006 DTM Corporation ... Guard Services, 

NCR.

$3,489,230 $697,846 Base Period 9/1/2008–8/31/2009 

Option I 9/1/2009–8/31/2010 Option II 9/1/2010–8/31/2011 Option III 9/1/2011–8/31/2012 Option IV 9/1/2012–8/31/2013 

11 .... HSCEEC08D00007 Jenkins Security 

Consultants.

Guard Services, 

NCR.

$10,324,000 $2,064,800 Base Period 11/1/2008–10/31/2009 

Option I 11/1/2009–10/31/2010 Option II 11/1/2010–10/31/2011 Option III 11/1/2011–10/31/2012 Option IV 11/1/2012–10/31/2013 

11 .... HSCEEC08D00008 Jenkins Security 

Consultants.

Guard Services, 

NCR.

$7,873,830 $1,574,766 Base Period 10/1/2008–9/30/2009 

Option I 10/1/2009–9/30/2010 Option II 10/1/2010–9/30/2011 Option III 10/1/2011–9/30/2012 Option IV 10/1/2012–9/30/2013 

11 .... HSCEEC09A00001 Coastal International Security. Guard Services, NCR. $34,533,841 $6,906,768 BPA through 9/30/2013 
95 

11 .... HSCEEC09A00002 Master Security ...... Guard Services, 

NCR.

$872,445 $174,489 BPA through 12/31/2009 

11 .... HSCEEC09A00004 Sectek ...................... Guard Services, 

NCR.

$15,300,000 $3,060,000 BPA through 3/31/2014 

11 .... HSCEEC09A00005 Coastal International Security. Guard Services, NCR. $9,637,499 $1,927,500 BPA through 8/31/2014 11 .... HSCEEC09A00006 Elite Protective 

Services.

Guard Services, 

NCR.

$10,559,593 $2,111,919 BPA through 11/30/2014 

11 .... HSCEEC09D00004 Jenkins Security ..... Guard Services, 

NCR.

$13,387,895 $2,677,579 Base Period 12/1/08–11/30/09 

Option 1 12/1/09–11/30/10 Option 2 12/1/10–11/30/11 Option 3 12/1/11–11/30/12 Option 4 12/1/12–11/30/13 

11 .... HSCEEC09D00005 AmPro International. Guard Services, NCR. $10,295,260 $2,059,052 Base Period 1/1/2009–12/31/2009 Option Period I 1/1/2010–12/31/ 

2010 

Option Period II 1/1/2011–12/31/ 

2011 

Option Period III 1/1/2012–12/31/ 

2012 

Option Period IV 1/1/2013–12/31/ 

2013 

11 .... HSCEEC09D00006 The Whitestone 

Group.

Guard Services, 

NCR.

$13,709,585 $2,741,917 Base Period 2/1/2009–1/31/2010 

Option Period I 2/1/2010–1/31/ 

2011 

Option Period II 2/1/2011–1/31/ 

2012 

Option Period III 2/1/2012–1/31/ 

2013 

Option Period IV 2/1/2013–1/31/ 

2014 
96 

DETAILED BREAKOUT OF FPS CONTRACTS REPORTED BY REGIONAL CONTRACT GUARD PROGRAMS—Continued 

FPS 

Region Contract No. Contractor Description of Services Estimated Total Contract Value Estimated Annual Value Term/Options Remaining 

11 .... HSCEEC09D00007 Knight Protective 

Service.

Guard Services, 

NCR.

$49,573,882 $9,914,776 Base Period 4/1/2009–11/30/2009 

Option Period I 12/1/2009–11/30/ 

2010 

Option Period II 12/1/2010–11/30/ 

2011 

Option Period III 12/1/2011–11/30/ 

2012 

Option Period IV 12/1/2012–11/30/ 

2013 

11 .... HSCEEC09D00008 American Security 

Programs.

Guard Services, 

NCR.

$17,070,918 $3,414,184 Base Period 2/1/2009–1/31/2010 

Option Period I 2/1/2010–1/31/ 

2011 

Option Period II 2/1/2011–1/31/ 

2012 

Option Period III 2/1/2012–1/31/ 

2013 

Option Period IV 2/1/2013–1/31/ 

2014 

11 .... HSCEEC09D00009 C&D Security ......... Guard Services, 

NCR.

$24,539,905 $4,907,981 Base Period 6/1/2009–5/31/2010 

Option Period I 6/1/2010–5/31/ 

2011 

Option Period II 6/1/2011–5/30/ 

2012 

Option Period III 6/1/2012–5/31/ 

2013 

Option Period IV 6/1/2013–5/30/ 

2014 
97 

11 .... HSCEEC09D00010 Master Security ...... Guard Services, 

NCR.

$3,212,715 $642,543 Base Period 5/1/2009–4/30/2010 

Option Period I 5/1/2010–4/30/ 

2011 

Option Period II 5/1/2011–4/30/ 

2012 

Option Period III 5/1/2012–4/30/ 

2013 

Option Period IV 5/1/2013–4/30/ 

2014 

11 .... HSCEEC09D00011 Master Security ...... Guard Services, 

NCR.

$3,707,607 $741,521 Base Period 5/1/2009–4/30/2010 

Option Period I 5/1/2010–4/30/ 

2011 

Option Period II 5/1/2011–4/30/ 

2012 

Option Period III 5/1/2012–4/30/ 

2013 

Option Period IV 5/1/2013–4/30/ 

2014 

11 .... HSCEEC09D00012 C&D Security ......... Guard Services, 

NCR.

$12,816,165 $2,563,233 Base Period 6/1/2009–5/31/2010 

Option Period I 6/1/2010–5/31/ 

2011 

Option Period II 6/1/2011–5/30/ 

2012 

Option Period III 6/1/2012–5/31/ 

2013 

Option Period IV 6/1/2013–5/30/ 

2014 

11 .... HSCEEC09D00013 Knight Protective 

Service.

Guard Services, 

NCR.

$34,720,713 $6,944,143 Base Period 12/1/08–11/30/09 

Option 1 12/1/09–11/30/10 Option 2 12/1/10–11/30/11 Option 3 12/1/11–11/30/12 Option 4 12/1/12–11/30/13 

11 .... HSCEEC10A00001 Coastal International Security. Guard Services, NCR. $65,410,402 $13,082,080 BPA Through 9/30/2014 
98 

DETAILED BREAKOUT OF FPS CONTRACTS REPORTED BY REGIONAL CONTRACT GUARD PROGRAMS—Continued 

FPS 

Region Contract No. Contractor Description of Services Estimated Total Contract Value Estimated Annual Value Term/Options Remaining 

11 .... HSCEEC10D00001 Master Security ...... Guard Services, 

NCR.

$3,738,474 $747,695 Base Period 1/1/10–12/31/10 

Option 1 1/1/11–12/31/11 Option 2 1/1/12–12/31/12 Option 3 1/1/13–12/31/13 Option 4 1/1/14–12/31/14 
99 

Question 10a. GAO has provided the committee a list of all recommendations GAO 

has made to FPS since FPS was transferred to DHS. For each recommendation, 

GAO noted whether FPS has fully addressed the issue, or whether the issue remains open. For each open GAO recommendation, please provide the following information: 

Where the agency concurs with the recommendation, but has not completed actions to address the recommendation, please provide a listing of tasks remaining, 

the title of the individual overseeing completion of the recommendation and the expected completion date. 

Question 10b. Where the agency does not concur with the recommendation, please 

provide a narrative explanation stating the reasons for the failure to concur. 

Answer. Please see the attached spreadsheet, GAO/OIG Status Report. 
100 

GAO/OIG STATUS REPORT 

Recommended Performance Reporting for Period [Enter Current Period’s Dates Here] 

Report 

Number 

Report Title Schedule Status 

OIG 09– 

51 

Federal Protective Service Contract Guard Procurement and Oversight Process On Track 

Milestones Description FPS Est. Start Date FPS Est. Due Date Percent Complete Assignee 

1.0 ....... Refine and complete standardized procedures and 

templates to ensure that the Federal Protective Service consistently solicits and awards guard contracts in the Government’s best interests.

6/12/2008 4/30/2009 100 Division Director 

2.0 ....... Allocate sufficient Consolidated Contracting Group 

and regional program office staff to perform thorough technical evaluations and award timely follow-on guard contracts that are in the Government’s best interests.

6/5/2008 9/22/2009 100 Division Director 

3.0 ....... Provide training to the regional program office personnel who participate in technical evaluations so 

that they can successfully evaluate contractor technical proposals to award best value guard contracts.

2/5/2009 4/30/2009 100 Division Director 

4.0 ....... Develop standardized policies and procedures to ensure that FPS personnel provide effective contract oversight. At a minimum, policies and procedures need to include performing and documenting inspections, reviewing invoices, assessing monetary deductions, evaluating contractor 

performance, and testing quality control plans.

4/30/2009 10/1/2009 100 Division Directors 

5.0 ....... Develop an agency-wide information system to collect and report the frequency of all inspections 

and their results to provide Nation-wide FPS managers with the necessary information to evaluate building security and contractor performance.

8/1/2008 11/16/2009 100 Division Director 
101 

6.0 ....... Increase staffing and resources at the regional program offices to perform the necessary contract administration and oversight function over guard 

services.

3/10/2008 12/30/2009 97 Asst. Director 

6.1 ....... Increase the number of Law Enforcement personnel 

to the 900 level to increase oversight of the contract guard services.

3/10/2008 5/1/2009 100 Division Director 

6.2 ....... Increase the number of Mission Support personnel 

to 300 to assist in the administration of guard support services.

3/10/2008 5/1/2009 100 Division Director 

6.3 ....... Establish a Level III Program Manager in the FPS 

Operations Directorate.

1/14/2009 4/29/2009 100 Asst. Director 

6.4 ....... Establish positions for, and hire, Program Managers within each region and at the FPS HQ for 

guard contract administrative expertise.

1/14/2009 12/30/2009 80 Asst. Director 

6.5 ....... Increase the number of trained Contracting Officer 

Technical Representatives (COTRs) to ensure qualified guard contract oversight.

3/10/2008 12/30/2009 100 Asst. Director 

6.6 ....... Implement FPS Policy to ensure the proper 

resourcing of Technical evaluation teams. Note: Addressed in section 6.6a of the Security Guard Acquisition Planning and Pre-Award policy.

10/1/2008 8/1/2009 100 Division Director/Regional Directors 
102 

QUESTIONS FROM HONORABLE CHARLES W. DENT OF PENNSYLVANIA FOR GARY W. 

SCHENKEL, DIRECTOR, FEDERAL PROTECTIVE SERVICE, NATIONAL PROTECTION PROGRAMS DIRECTORATE, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Question 1. Some have proposed moving away from a system where FPS is reliant 

on funding from other agencies to support its staff. Have you looked at the fee-funding system and are you satisfied that it best supports FPS’s needs? 

Answer. The Federal Protective Service (FPS) continues to be funded through revenues and collections in the same manner that existed when FPS was under the 

General Services Administration (GSA) prior to its transfer to the Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS). 

FPS has initiated a study of funding strategies that will support the security and 

protection mission of FPS within DHS using the preliminary data being obtained 

from the recently deployed ABC Model and risk-based workforce performance 

metrics obtained from FPS subject-matter experts. A preliminary report will be completed in the first quarter of fiscal year 2010. Based on the preliminary findings, 

the most promising fee methodologies, along with options that include combinations 

of different fees with other funding sources, will be presented to departmental management for further consideration. 

Question 2. What is the benefit of a universal per square foot approach, as opposed to a fee for service per building approach? 

Answer. The method to assess and collect the basic security charge is similar to 

a flat tax based on square feet, while the overhead charges for building-specific and 

SWA services are based on the additional security services delivered at the specific 

building or requested by a specific tenant agency in the building. 

This approach is not very different from the property taxes assessed by State, 

local, and municipal authorities to establish adequate levels of public safety services 

to protect the residents that they serve. The majority of taxpayers will not require 

public safety services during a tax year, but the jurisdiction must still maintain sufficient resources to respond to all emergencies. Likewise, FPS is required to maintain a sufficient force to provide law enforcement and security services across the 

entire GSA real property inventory. 

FPS will be looking at alternative funding methodologies that may better support 

the FPS law enforcement and security mission. 

QUESTIONS FROM CHAIRMAN BENNIE G. THOMPSON OF MISSISSIPPI FOR ROBERT A. 

PECK, COMMISSIONER, PUBLIC BUILDINGS SERVICE, GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION

Question 1. What role did GSA play in transition planning? What input did you 

provide to NPPD to facilitate a successful transition? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 2. GAO reported that GSA and FPS have not completed renegotiating 

the Memorandum of Agreement that governs the agencies’ relationship. This agreement also addresses information sharing. How will you work with NPPD and FPS 

during the transition to ensure that this renegotiation is completed in a timely manner? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 3. Please provide a narrative of all security countermeasure recommendations FPS issued to GSA or GSA tenants in the past year, and the corresponding GSA or tenant agency response to each FPS recommendation. For instances in which GSA or the tenant agency declined to implement the recommended 

security countermeasure, specify the basis for this decision. 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

QUESTION FROM HONORABLE CHARLES W. DENT OF PENNSYLVANIA FOR ROBERT A. 

PECK, COMMISSIONER, PUBLIC BUILDINGS SERVICE, GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION

Question. Has GSA examined altering the process by which FPS recommendations 

are reviewed, appropriated and implemented? 

Should building security committees be making security-related decisions? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 
103 

QUESTIONS FROM CHAIRMAN BENNIE G. THOMPSON OF MISSISSIPPI FOR MARK L. 

GOLDSTEIN, DIRECTOR, PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE ISSUES, GOVERNMENT AC- COUNTABILITY ISSUES

Question 1. You recommended that FPS and GSA coordinate better on sharing security and threat information. What steps should NPPD take during the transition 

to improve information sharing between FPS and GSA? 

Answer. NPPD should ensure that FPS reaches consensus with GSA on what information contained in facility security assessments are needed for GSA to fulfill its 

responsibilities related to the protection of Federal buildings and its occupants. In 

addition, NPPD should require that FPS and GSA establish internal controls to ensure that shared information is adequately safeguarded. 

Question 2. In your opinion, how can NPPD best contribute its knowledge and expertise to improve FPS physical protection of Federal facilities? 

Answer. While we have not conducted any reviews of NPPD, we think that 

NPPD’s knowledge and experience in securing the Nation’s critical infrastructure 

should help improve FPS’s ability to protect Federal facilities. 

QUESTIONS FROM CHAIRMAN BENNIE G. THOMPSON OF MISSISSIPPI FOR DAVID L. 

WRIGHT, PRESIDENT, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES—LOCAL

918 

Question 1. In your testimony, you recommend that FPS federalize contract guard 

positions at high-risk facilities. How would this improve the safety of Federal buildings? 

Answer. A properly trained Federal Police Officer has a higher level of qualifications and training than a contract security guard, is held to a higher level of responsibility, is supervised by other trained law enforcement officers, and typically has 

a lower turnover rate than a contract guard. This substantially increases the likelihood that they will recognize a threat and take appropriate enforcement action 

when compared to a contract guard. Additionally, their basic training is standardized through the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) and the FPS 

National training staff, where contractor basic training is taught by each guard 

company and often has an undue focus on avoiding liability to the company. Just 

as the use of Federal Police Officers has improved the safety of Congressional facilities, the White House, and the Pentagon, their use at our highest risk GSA facilities 

would have the same result. 

Question 2a. How much training do FPS inspectors receive on risk assessment? 

Answer. With the implementation of the new Risk Assessment Management Program (RAMP) the assessment training has changed. Prior to RAMP, all inspectors 

have received 4 weeks of Physical Security Training, including the assessment process. Now inspectors and police officers Nation-wide are receiving 2 weeks of instruction on RAMP and all are expected to complete this training by the end of March. 

New inspectors will now complete a 6-week initial Security Academy. Additionally, 

one of the 30 areas trained and evaluated during the 12-week field training and 

evaluation program is the risk assessment process. 

Question 2b. How much law enforcement training do FPS inspectors receive? 

Answer. New inspectors must successfully complete the 12-week Uniformed Police 

Training Program at FLETC, 3 weeks of FPS orientation/advanced FPS specific 

training, and a 12-week field training and evaluation program. 

Question 2c. What percentage of an FPS inspector’s time is spent performing risk 

assessment duties? 

Answer. The percentage varies based on the number of inspectors and the number 

and mix of facilities assigned to each. Many of our inspectors have reported it was 

not unusual to spend 18 to 20 weeks of the year (38 percent) conducting assessments. 

This year the ISC changed the interval between assessments for high-risk (Level 

4) buildings from every 2 to every 3 years; and low-risk (Level 1 & 2) buildings from 

every 4 years to every 5 years, reducing the number of assessments required each 

year. However, with the advent of RAMP and its highly detailed risk evaluation 

process, the time required to complete the average assessment will increase. Our inspectors estimate at the current staffing level they will spend an average of 13 to 

15 weeks a year (25 percent) conducting assessments. 

On average an inspector should spend no more than 6 weeks (12 percent) spread 

over the year on assessments, which is ultimately only a planning document. In 

order to implement the security plan from the assessment, provide law enforcement 

response and proactive patrol; ensure human, electronic, physical, and procedural 

countermeasures work as intended; and monitor and mentor contract guard performance, significant proactive time and effort is absolutely necessary for success. 
104 

As GAO has reported FPS does not have sufficient inspectors and police officers to 

provide proactive patrol, ensure its countermeasures are working, and monitor to 

ensure guards and guard companies are complying with their contractual obligations. 

Question 2d. How does this compare to the amount of time spent on law enforcement duties? 

Answer. At current inadequate staffing levels, our inspectors are severely challenged to allocate sufficient time for law enforcement duties, including proactive patrol, while meeting mandates for assessments and guard monitoring. Estimates on 

the amount of time spent on law enforcement duties from our field staff in many 

locations range from 10 percent to 25 percent, even with overtime use for some 

guard training monitoring and off-hour inspections. 

Question 2e. Since FPS inspectors are primarily trained in law enforcement, what 

steps would you recommend NPPD take to ensure inspectors are able to devote 

more time to law enforcement duties? 

Answer. First, recognize that inspectors are essentially community police officers 

by increasing FPS field staff so sufficient inspectors and police officers are available, 

to provide necessary service. This increase in staff will reduce the number of buildings assigned to each inspector to a level where they can successfully complete their 

duties while reducing the documented risk to facilities inherent in an understaffed 

FPS. Recommend Congress confer law enforcement retirement benefits on FPS law 

enforcement personnel on the same basis as Customs and Border Protection officers. 

Second, extend service hours in the largest cities to include night and weekend 

service—criminals and terrorists don’t work only during business hours, and neither 

should FPS. Authorize administratively uncontrollable overtime for inspectors and 

officers to ensure they accomplish the myriad of tasks inherent in their community 

police officer role. 

Third, increase staffing in smaller cities to provide minimum service to urban 

communities and border stations. These three steps would increase resources in our 

highest-risk cities and provide minimal service coincident to risk for facilities located in lower-risk cities/rural areas. 

In order to accomplish these steps Congressional mandates will be necessary to 

encourage OMB approval of the necessary funding, when requested by DHS. 

Question 3. NPPD chairs the operations of the Interagency Security Committee, 

which has responsibility for establishing Government-wide security policies for Federal facilities. In your opinion, how will FPS benefit from becoming a part of the 

agency that chairs this committee? 

Answer. FPS will undoubtedly benefit from the synergy of being in the same organization as the ISC Secretariat. However, FPS is still not a member of the committee as they were prior to transfer to DHS, nor do they have the honest broker 

compliance monitoring role they had prior to the 2003 revisions to the ISC Executive Order. Additionally, the ISC was formed by an Executive Order that predates 

the establishment of DHS and the Secretary’s mandate to be primarily responsible 

for the protection of Federal facilities. The overall security of all facilities will be 

improved if Congress codifies the role, functions, and mission of the ISC as part of 

DHS under the supervision of the Secretary, to help her accomplish the facilities 

protection mission mandated by the Homeland Security Act. The ISC as currently 

managed and structured, has in some ways increased risk to Federal facilities 

through its practice of placing the non-professional Facility Security Committees in 

charge of determining which security measures, weapons screening and access control measures they will accept. Additionally, the ISC promulgates standards and 

guidelines based on the consensus of its members. Under this concept neither the 

DHS Secretary nor FPS can even mandate minimum access control and weapons 

screening standards for any facilities. The ISC, as presently constituted, is broken 

and needs to be fixed by Congress. 

Question 4. FPS is developing a new risk assessment tool called the Risk Assessment Management Program (RAMP). In your opinion, will RAMP streamline and 

improve the risk assessment process? 

Answer. RAMP improves the risk assessment process by considering all aspects 

of the facility and its buffer zone to determine threats, vulnerability, and consequence. It will streamline the management of countermeasures, the overall assessment process, and bring together legacy GSA systems. RAMP will not save time 

since it incorporates many assessment best practices that require additional effort 

by our inspectors to properly conduct assessments and validate countermeasure effectiveness. While RAMP may greatly improve our ability to standardize and document risks to each facility, right now FPS simply does not have enough inspectors 

to do this critical job right, without creating vulnerabilities in other areas. 
105 

Question 5. Did NPPD consult with AFGE when preparing its transition plan, 

specifically with regard to their plans for managing human capital at FPS? 

Answer. Neither ICE nor NPPD consulted with AFGE while preparing its transition plan, and did not share any element of the plan with AFGE. I became aware 

of the ‘‘plans’’ for managing human capital when they were publically announced 

after the transfer. Additionally, we understand the transition plan requires FPS to 

pay NPPD over $25 million, from its security charge revenue, for services previously 

provided by ICE from its appropriation without cost to FPS. It seems to me that 

if ICE paid for the service from its appropriation the Secretary should be directed 

to reprogram these oversight and administration funds from ICE to NPPD. Paying 

these costs from FPS security collections effectively reduces FPS direct services and 

capital investment to the detriment of the security of Federal employees and facilities, as well as the FPS field force. 

QUESTIONS FROM HONORABLE CHARLES W. DENT OF PENNSYLVANIA FOR DAVID L. 

WRIGHT, PRESIDENT, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES—LOCAL

918 

Question 1. In your testimony you cite inadequate staffing levels as a reason for 

some of the problems we discussed. Please estimate how many additional FPS staff 

would be needed to meet its current mandates? 

Answer. To meet the current FPS mandate to protect only GSA owned and leased 

facilities (about half of the Non-DOD Federal facilities) at least 490 additional nonsupervisory inspectors and police officers are required. I estimate this increase in 

direct service staff would also require about 120 more supervisors, managers, and 

mission support staff. The total additional staff requirement would be approximately 

610. Under the current security charge funding scheme, this could be achieved while 

maintaining only a pennies basic per square foot law enforcement and security 

charge of .88, coupled with an administrative charge of 10 percent (which was 8 percent in 2009 and 15 percent in 2007) on guard services to pay for the contract guard 

monitoring functions. 

A total Nation-wide FPS staff of 1,860 would still be less than 75 percent of the 

2,500 police officers the VA uses to police and secure its medical centers, and barely 

200 more than the Capitol Police use to secure Congressional facilities in Washington, DC. With a total staff of 1,860 there would be sufficient officers and inspectors in all major cites with significant concentrations of Federal employees and highrisk buildings, and minimal effective service for facilities in lower risk rural communities. 

Question 2. In your testimony you also raise the specter of abolishing the fee-funding system, in which FPS charges tenant agencies a flat rate of .66/square foot to 

protect buildings. What system would you propose to generate revenues for FPS to 

adequately protect these tenant agencies other than appropriations? 

Answer. Security at GSA buildings is funded through four sources, all of which 

are funds already appropriated to other Federal agencies, so we really are not ‘‘feefunded’’. Funding is currently billed on a monthly basis based on annual security 

charges. 

The .66/square foot is only for basic services. Those facilities with complex security needs often pay an additional $3 to $4/square foot for the cost of guards and 

other security countermeasures. Many also pay additional square foot charges to 

GSA to amortize the cost of security fixtures like vehicle barriers and window protection. 

One simple alternative would be to transfer the basic, building specific, and fixture charges to create a FPS appropriation, thus providing Congress ready visibility 

on facility security costs and allowing DHS to prioritize security measures where 

there is the highest risk. Optional security services that are not required by an ISC 

standard, such as guards at each Social Security Office, would continue to be funded 

by agencies on a reimbursable basis through Security Work Authorizations. 

Other alternatives that maintain the fee-funded myth could include an annual 

technical transfer of projected costs by OMB so FPS does not have to bill each agency on a monthly basis; or a transfer from GSA at the beginning of each year of all 

projected security costs with GSA collecting the costs, as necessary, from their tenants. Both these and other similar alternatives would require legislative direction. 

Question 3. GAO has cited a lack of training and recertification by FPS contract 

guards. Short of federalizing the FPS, what are ways to improve security at Federal 

buildings, or is it possible to improve oversight and training alone? 

Answer. If Congress chooses to accept the inherent risks of using a mix of 15,000 

contract guards and approximately 1,250 Federal employees in FPS, there are several ways to improve security. While contract guards will never achieve the same 
106 

effectiveness as the Federal Police Officers used to protect the Capitol, White House, 

and Pentagon, rigorous performance and training monitoring coupled with consistent observation and mentoring by FPS inspectors and police officers can mitigate 

some of this risk. However, there was no real mitigation of these inherent risks 

when the number of guards increased from 5,000 to 15,000 while FPS was forced 

to significantly decrease its inspectors and officers. Also there are numerous facilities where agencies procure their own contract guards who do not operate under any 

FPS supervision, DHS should revoke the delegations of authority for these facilities 

and bring them fully under the FPS protective mantle. Additionally, Congress could 

provide statutory procurement authorizations to ensure guard companies are held 

accountable for their performance and to streamline the acquisition process for these 

critical services. If FPS is to continue using contract guards in their current roles 

a separate part of the Federal Acquisition Regulation for FPS procured guard services to implement the statutory procurement guidance would be necessary. 

The improvement of oversight, training, and acquisition procedures are only a viable alternative with significant increases in FPS law enforcement staff to function 

in a true community police role to protect Federal facilities while using properly 

trained and monitored contract guards as a force multiplier. 

QUESTIONS FROM CHAIRMAN BENNIE G. THOMPSON OF MISSISSIPPI FOR STEPHEN D. 

AMITAY, FEDERAL LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITY

COMPANIES

Question 1. Given the systemic problems GAO uncovered, are companies changing 

their approach to hiring or oversight of contract guards? Are companies working together to make industry-wide improvements? 

Answer. NASCO fully believes that FPS and contract security companies with 

FPS contracts must address the hiring, certification, and oversight problems uncovered by the GAO and make changes and improvements where necessary. It is a core 

mission of NASCO and its member companies to work together industry-wide to improve the hiring and performance of contract security officers including efforts to 

enact better licensing, training, and background checks standards. NASCO has 

proactively discussed with FPS and made suggestions on possible ways to improve 

FPS guard training and performance, as mentioned in the written testimony. 

Question 2. You testified that you are aware of FPS contracts that require security guards to be trained as special police officers (SPOs), and that SPOs have arrest 

power, unlike other security guards. Please identify which FPS security guard contracts require contract guards to be qualified or trained as SPOs. Include the name 

of the company that holds each contract, and the locations where the guards stand 

post. 

Answer. NASCO does not have access to FPS contracting records that would provide information on which FPS security guard contracts require contract guards to 

be qualified or trained as SPO’s. FPS has indicated that SPO’s currently are, or 

have been in the past, required in FPS guard contracts. The committee should contact FPS for more information on this issue. 

Question 3. According to news reports, contract security guards at private facilities have staged walk-outs to protest unfair pay. How have contract guard companies resolved these labor issues? 

Answer. NASCO does not monitor or involve itself in the resolution of labor-management issues at contract security companies. Each contract security company handles labor issues on their own and NASCO is not in a position to generally characterize how companies have resolved certain labor issues such as ‘‘unfair pay.’’ 

QUESTIONS FROM HONORABLE CHARLES W. DENT OF PENNSYLVANIA FOR STEPHEN D. 

AMITAY, FEDERAL LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITY

COMPANIES

Question 1. What additional steps would improve security at FPS buildings? 

What are some of the challenges associated with doing so? 

Answer. In the NASCO written testimony, several current efforts underway at 

FPS to improve the contract guard program were highlighted that NASCO believes 

can improve security at FPS building. In terms of additional steps that could be 

taken to improve security, again, the written testimony mentions better firearms 

training, better communication between FPS offices and contractors, and the inclusion of higher performance-related standards in contracts. One security-related issue 

that remains problematic and requires attention and improvement on the part of 

FPS is the need for written guidelines or standard operating procedures providing 

security guards with clear instructions and guidance regarding detention authority 

and related procedures. NASCO also believes that steps should be taken to ensure 
107 

that the quality of a company’s training, personnel, management, and operational 

procedures—which result in a higher bid—are adequately considered during the procurement process. The challenge is for FPS to be able to have the resources to spend 

more money for better security officer services. 

Question 2. In your testimony you cite significant reductions in the FPS inspector 

and law enforcement officer force having exacerbated problems at FPS. Going forward, do you believe FPS has the resources it needs to make strides and rectify the 

agency’s problems? 

If not, what increase in resources would you recommend? 

Answer. NASCO does believe that the current initiatives under way at FPS, in 

combination with the Congressionally-mandated FPS personnel levels, can help to 

rectify the agency’s problems. As mentioned above, more resources could be utilized 

to provide for higher performance standards in FPS security guard contracts and 

to account for better management, training, and other company qualifications in the 

contract award process. Resources are needed so that FPS contracts to be truly 

awarded based on ‘‘best value’’ and not solely ‘‘lowest cost’’, which would lead to better performance by security contractors and could resolve problems in the FPS Contract Guard Program. 

Æ