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H.R. 4954,

THE SAFE PORT ACT

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC 

SECURITY, INFRASTRUCTURE 

PROTECTION, AND CYBERSECURITY

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

MARCH 16, 2006

Serial No. 109–69

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

PETER T. KING, New York, Chairman 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas 

CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut 

JOHN LINDER, Georgia 

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana 

TOM DAVIS, Virginia 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

JIM GIBBONS, Nevada 

ROB SIMMONS, Connecticut 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

STEVAN PEARCE, New Mexico 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

BOBBY JINDAL, Louisiana 

DAVE G. REICHERT, Washington 

MICHAEL MCCAUL, Texas 

CHARLIE DENT, Pennsylvania 

GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

JANE HARMAN, California 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

NITA M. LOWEY, New York 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON-LEE, Texas 

BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey 

DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, U.S. Virgin Islands 

BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC SECURITY, INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION, AND

CYBERSECURITY

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California, Chairman 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas 

JOHN LINDER, Georgia 

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

STEVAN PEARCE, New Mexico 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

BOBBY JINDAL, Louisiana 

PETER T. KING, New York (Ex Officio) 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON-LEE, Texas 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (Ex Officio)

(II) 
(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page 

STATEMENTS

The Honorable Daniel E. Lungren, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of California, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Economic Security, 

Infrastructure Protection, and Cybersecurity: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 1

Prepared Opening Statement .............................................................................. 2

The Honorable Loretta Sanchez, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of California, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Economic 

Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Cybersecurity .................................... 3

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland 

Security ................................................................................................................. 5 

The Honorable Norman D. Dicks, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Washington ............................................................................................. 41

The Honorable Jane Harman, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Caifornia ........................................................................................................... 6

The Honorable Sheila Jackson-Lee, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Texas ....................................................................................................... 32

WITNESSES

Mr. Jayson Ahern, Assistant Commissioner, Office of Field Operations, 

Customs and Border Protection, Department of Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 7

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 9

Captain Brian Salerno, Deputy Director, Inspections and Compliance, United 

States Coast Guard, Department of Homeland Security .................................. 15

Mr. Eugene Pentimonti, Senior Vice President, Government Relations, 

MAERSK Inc: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 16

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 19

Mr. Noel Cunningham, Principal, MARSEC Group: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 21

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 23 

(1)

H.R. 4954, THE SECURITY AND 

ACCOUNTABILITY FOR EVERY PORT ACT 

Thursday, March 16, 2006

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, SUBCOMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC SECURITY, INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION, AND CYBERSECURITY, Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 12:18 p.m., in Room 

311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Daniel Lungren [chairman of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Lungren, Sanchez, Dicks, Lofgren, 

Jackson-Lee, Thompson, and Harman. 

Mr. LUNGREN. [Presiding.] The committee will come to order. 

We meet today to hear testimony on H.R. 4954, the Security and 

Accountability For Every Port Act, that is the SAFE Port Act of 

2006. 

We will gather testimony from port security experts and industry 

stakeholders on what Congresswoman Harman and I, as well as 

others on this committee and subcommittee, believe to be a very 

important piece of legislation. 

This Tuesday, Ms. Harman and I, joined by 48 other members, 

including Ranking Member Sanchez, introduced the SAFE Port 

Act. As you can guess by this hearing, we are not wasting any time 

in making this legislation law. We have been working on this issue 

of port security for quite some time and are encouraged by the increased urgency with which the issue is now being discussed and 

considered. 

I would like to welcome and thank our witnesses, Mr. Jayson 

Ahern, the assistant commissioner for the office of field operations 

in the U.S. Customs and Border Protection; Captain Brian Salerno, 

the deputy director of inspections and compliance, the United 

States Coast Guard; Mr. Eugene Pentimonti, the senior vice president for government relations for Maersk, Inc.; and Mr. Noel 

Cunningham, the principal for the MARSEC Group and former director of operations and emergency management for the Port of Los 

Angeles. 

The Security and Accountability For Every Port, or SAFE Port 

Act, is a comprehensive proposal to strengthen the maritime transportation system through a layered security strategy that builds on 

already-existing initiatives to secure the supply chain from the 

point of origin to delivery in the United States. I believe the administration has established a foundation upon which we are building, 

but the building upon that foundation is urgent. 
2

This legislation focuses on improving security both at home and 

abroad by expanding capabilities, maximizing available resources, 

and pushing our borders outward. 

The legislation has three key ideas: first, enhancing security at 

U.S. ports by establishing a $400 million port security grant program with dedicated funding from custom duties; requiring terrorist watch list checks of all port employees with secure access at 

ports; and establishing additional joint operations centers and furthering the deployment of radiation detection equipment. 

Second, preventing threats from reaching the United States by 

authorizing and improving two Customs and Border Protection cornerstone security programs: the container security initiative and 

the customs trade partnership against terrorism. 

Third, tracking and protecting containers en route to the U.S. by 

improving our ability to detect high-risk containers through 

strengthening the automated targeting system; establishing container security standards; and supporting additional cargo security 

research and development, including reviving Operation Safe Commerce. 

Since September 11, the federal government has invested over $7 

billion in port security. There is no doubt that the funding and programs it supported has made us safer and our ports stronger. However, I think no one is satisfied with the past actions and believe 

that we must do nothing else. In fact, we must move forward with 

renewed focus and energy to improve our ports. 

I look forward to questioning the witnesses about the programs 

and funding in place currently are working; what impact the legislation will have when implemented, as well as any recommended 

changes. The committee is putting this legislation on the fast track. 

Tomorrow, members of the subcommittee will be going to the ports 

of Long Beach and Los Angeles to review port security operations, 

and after the March recess, we intend in this subcommittee to 

mark up this bill. 

We have every reason to believe that the full committee will act 

with dispatch as well. So we would like your help to develop the 

best legislative proposal possible. Again, I would like to thank the 

witnesses for being here today and for the work that all of you 

have done in your respective agencies and companies to protect our 

ports. 

Now, it is my pleasure to recognize the ranking minority member 

of the subcommittee, the gentlelady from California, Ms. Sanchez, 

for any comments she may make.

PREPARED OPENING STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DANIEL E. LUNGREN

Today the Subcommittee also meets to hold a legislative hearing on H.R. 4954, 

the Security and Accountability For Every Port, or ‘‘SAFE Port’’ Act. We will gather 

testimony from port security experts and industry stakeholders on what myself and 

Congresswoman Harman believe to be a very important piece of legislation. This 

Tuesday, Ms. Harman and myself, joined by 48 other Members, including Ranking 

Member Sanchez, introduced the SAFE Port Act. As you can guess by this hearing, 

we are not wasting any time in making this legislation law. Ms. Harman and I have 

been working on the issue of port security for quite some time now, and are encouraged by the increased urgency with which the issue is now being addressed.

I would like to welcome and thank our witnesses: 

• Mr. Jayson Ahern, (pronounced A-hern) the Assistant Commissioner for the 

Office of Field Operations in U.S. Customs and Border Protection 
3

• Captain Brian Salerno, the Deputy Director for Inspections & Compliance 

in the United States Coast Guard 

• Mr. Eugene Pentimonti, (pronounced pent-i-mont-e) the Senior Vice President for Government Relations for Maersk (pronounced Mersk) Inc 

• Mr. Noel Cunningham, the Principal for the MARSEC Group, and formally 

the Director of Operations and Emergency Management for the Port of Los Angeles 

The Security and Accountability for Every Port or ‘‘SAFE Port’’ Act is a comprehensive proposal to strengthen the maritime transportation system through a 

layered security strategy that builds on existing initiatives to secure the supply 

chain from the point of origin to delivery in the United States. This legislation focuses on improving security, both at home and abroad, by expanding capabilities, 

maximizing available resources, and pushing our borders outward.

The legislation has three key ideas: 

1. Enhancing Security at U.S. Ports by establishing a $400 million Port Security 

Grant Program with dedicated funding from Customs Duties, requiring terrorist 

watchlist checks of all port employees with secure access at ports, establishing additional joint operations centers, and furthering the deployment of radiation detection 

equipment. 

2. Preventing Threats from Reaching the U.S. by authorizing and improving two 

Customs and Border Protection cornerstone security programs—the Container Security Initiative (CSI) and the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C–

TPAT). 

3. Tracking and Protecting Containers En Route to the U.S. by improving our ability to detect high-risk containers through strengthening the Automated Targeting 

System, establishing container security standards, and supporting additional cargo 

security research and development, including reviving Operation Safe Commerce. 

Since September 11, 2001, the Federal Government has invested over $7 billion 

in port security. There is no doubt that the funding and the programs it supported 

made America safer and her ports stronger. However, we can’t be satisfied with past 

efforts and must move forward with renewed focus and energy to improve our ports. 

I look forward to questioning the witnesses about how the programs and funding 

in place currently are working, what impact the legislation will have when implemented, as well as any recommended changes. The Committee is putting this legislation on the fast track. Tomorrow Members of the Subcommittee will be going to 

the Ports of Long Beach and Los Angeles to review port security operations and 

after the March recess we intend to mark up this bill. We want your help to develop 

the best legislative proposal. 

Again, I’d like to thank the witnesses for being here today and for the work that 

you have each done in your respective agencies and companies to protect our ports. 

I will now recognize the Ranking Member, Ms. Sanchez, for any opening statement that she may wish to make at this time.

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank our witnesses for coming today to testify before 

us. 

I am pleased that we are finally looking and considering today 

the important issue of port security. Port security affects us every 

day. I tell my colleagues all day long that if it comes through the 

port, it is probably put on a train or it is put on a truck and it goes 

through all of our neighborhoods. So understanding what is in 

those containers and what could affect our people is a very, very 

important issue. The safety, checking these and having a secure 

trail of where they have been is very, very important to us. 

It is also very important from an economic standpoint. I remember a couple of years ago during Christmas when we had the shutdown at the L.A.–Long Beach ports. It cost us almost $2 billion a 

day, and it wasn’t just the California area. A factory in Alabama 

that does just-in-time and is waiting for parts to construct automobiles will have to layoff its people for the week if the pieces don’t 

come. So it is very, very important from an economic standpoint. 

And despite that, I don’t think we have done very much from the 

federal level to help secure the United States ports. I know that 
4

many of our local ports, because they are locally owned either by 

the city of Long Beach or the city of New York or what have you, 

have been not only putting up the first plans and methods of trying 

to secure the ports, but also their own money. So I think it is very 

important that we have this discussion. 

Many of us have been working on this issue for many years. I 

personally have introduced three separate bills on the issue of port 

security over the last 2 years, and this committee actually passed 

what was really the blueprint for this bill that we are going to be 

discussing today. Unfortunately, it didn’t get taken up by the Senate, but now it has. It is coming back, and so now we are going 

to, I hope, Mr. Chairman, pass a good bill. 

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses. I am particularly 

very interested in your thoughts on the customs trade partnership 

against terrorism, or C–TPAT. I think that it is a very valuable 

program, but I am concerned that the Customs Border Protection 

is granting substantial benefits such as decreases in the targeted 

risk, to the 63 percent of the C–TPAT members that haven’t been 

validated yet. I am concerned that this administration has been unwilling to request the resources for CBP to complete the validations 

quickly and thoroughly. 

Moreover, as time passes and supply chain technology develops, 

it may be more difficult for CBP to conduct follow-up validations 

that may be necessary to ensure that C–TPAT members continue 

to employ top-of-the-line security procedures. 

While you are here today, I would also like to hear what you are 

doing to get the transportation worker identification card implemented. It is an extremely valuable tool that will increase security 

at facilities nationwide. Last week, I added an amendment to the 

chairman’s TSA reorganization bill to set hard deadlines of June 1 

of this year and June 1 of 2007 for the release of the regulations 

and the implementation of this identification card. 

I am also very interested about an issue that many haven’t 

thought about, and this is the whole issue of independent truckers 

or the truckers that actually come into the port system. I certainly 

have seen some of these truckers waiting 4, 5, or 6 hours to get 

into the ports. I also understand that many of them, we don’t have 

background checks for many of them. So this could be one of the 

weak links happening at our ports. 

Some of them have had to declare bankruptcy because it is very 

difficult to make ends meet when you are trucking and the rates 

are low and you are waiting in line and you are not getting 

through and you are not hauling. You are not making money if you 

are not hauling. Many of them, I have a feeling, at least in the 

California area, may be undocumented. 

So we have to really consider that these people are getting into 

our port system. Now, one of the issues that this bill might do is 

to say that there are secure areas and people without the proper 

background checks would not be allowed in those areas. But I 

think any area of our port system is subject to problems with respect to somebody who might want to slow down from an economic 

standpoint or create havoc from a terrorist standpoint. So I would 

really like to talk about the trucks or at least bring that up as an 

issue, Mr. Chairman. 
5

I am pleased to be a cosponsor of the SAFE Port Act we will be 

discussing today, and which our committee, as you said, Mr. Chairman, will be marking up. I look forward to talking about the specific provisions of that bill and about the issues I just mentioned 

here. 

I thank you for your participation in this important hearing, and 

I yield back. 

Mr. LUNGREN. I thank the gentlelady for her comments. 

It was my intent at this point in time to yield to the chairman 

of the full committee for a statement, but the last time I saw the 

chairman he was wearing a green tie and surrounded by people 

named O’Hearn, Murphy, O’Connell. But I think he is going to try 

and get here after he settles with those folks. 

So the chair will now recognize the ranking minority member of 

the full committee, the gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Thompson, 

for any statement he may have. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I hope our chairman 

didn’t have something in the cup that was green, too. 

[Laughter.] 

So he may or may not be here, but I am sure he will be here. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to give my comments. I 

would like to applaud Congresswoman Harman and Chairman 

Lungren for this important piece of legislation. I would also like to 

give the ranking member of the subcommittee, Congresswoman 

Sanchez, who has sort of been out front on the port issues for quite 

a while, her support for this effort also. 

It is unfortunate that this issue was crystallized with the Dubai 

port incident. I think we all want to make our ports safe, but we 

have to do it systematically and not knee-jerk. So this act is the 

beginning of trying to make some of that happen. 

I would like to say, too, Mr. Chairman, that we have enough history from both the IG and GAO who talk about the critical port security gaps that we have here in this country. So this legislation 

and other legislation is going to be absolutely necessary if we are 

to make our ports safe. The public will demand it. I think they will 

say procrastination has gone on long enough. If we have the best 

minds available identifying what we need to do, we need to get on 

with it. At some point, we have to do that. 

I look forward to the testimony, not only from the Coast Guard 

and CPB, what they have to add to this piece of legislation, but Mr. 

Chairman, I want to make the ports safe. We have men and 

women who work every day on them. We have a lot of cargo that 

comes in, and we absolutely cannot accept second best. We have to 

have the best system available, and I look forward to the testimony. 

Thank you. 

Mr. LUNGREN. I thank the gentleman for his statement. 

Without objection, the chair recognizes Ms. Harman—although 

not a member of the subcommittee, a member of the full committee—for any comments she may make and for participation in 

the hearing today. 

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Ranking Member Sanchez and Ranking Member Thompson, for your 

generous remarks. 
6

I am very happy to sit in on this subcommittee hearing to speak 

for a bill that I believe will become law. It is hard to say something 

like that in this Congress, but I actually think we have a live one 

here. The notion that this bill was introduced on Tuesday, the day 

of the birth of my first granddaughter, and will be the subject of 

hearings today, and is tentatively going to be marked up at the end 

of this month, is I would say a legislative miracle. 

The other piece of the good news story is that a very similar bill 

has been introduced on a bipartisan basis on the Senate side by 

Senators Patty Murray, Susan Collins, Joe Lieberman and Norm 

Coleman. And that bill will be the subject of hearings in April, and 

also is expected to move. So it is a silver lining from Dubai ports 

issue that Congress has now focused on this, but many of us, as 

Ms. Sanchez said, have been focused on this for a very, very long 

time. 

As this bill moves, I hope that the best ideas that the House has 

had in a variety of bills will be incorporated and we will do our 

best job to come up with a strategy and adequate funding for true 

port security. 

I want to welcome particularly, if I might, one of the witnesses, 

one of my all-time favorites. He has a different hair style now, but 

Noel Cunningham did an extraordinary job in his role as director 

of operations and emergency management of the Port of Los Angeles. 

He and others, I would salute particularly two groups that I 

think have had the major role for making the ports of L.A. and 

Long Beach much safer than they were before 9/11. One of those 

groups is not here. The Coast Guard has played a magnificent role 

in pulling all of us in government together, but the other group 

that I would like to salute, and they are here in force, is the ILWU, 

a union of patriots who operate the cranes and do other things that 

are essential at our ports. 

Some astute, or maybe it was the same one, but astute crane operators noticed at the Port of L.A. fairly recently human beings getting out of a container that had just been downloaded from a ship. 

The bills of lading said ‘‘clothing,’’ but obviously the contents were, 

in this case, immigrant stowaways coming here to seek a better 

life. Those contents could have been terrorists or could have been 

the components for a radiological bomb, and that is what this committee worries about, all of us do. 

And that is why a strategy, which this bill proposes, to authorize 

the two big programs that check whether bad stuff is being onloaded at foreign ports and to fully fund other operations that will 

make certain that we push our borders out and we know absolutely 

what is arriving at our ports, is essential. 

I would just like to say one more thing. I have personally talked 

to Michael Chertoff, the secretary of homeland security, about this 

bill. I have urged him to support the concepts in this bill. I think 

it would be very helpful if we had DHS on board at the earliest 

time, and if DHS was part of shaping this into the best possible 

legislation. After all, Secretary Chertoff is a systems thinker. He 

knows that port security is the Achilles heel of our transportation 

security approach because it is so underfunded. 
7

And I really think, Mr. Chairman, with the help of all the members of the committee, especially Ms. Sanchez, that we can shape 

this into something that will be the right answer for the right problem at the right time. 

I am very pleased to be part of this hearing. Thank you very 

much. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Thank you, Ms. Harman. 

Obviously, under the rules, any member of the committee may 

submit an opening statement for the record. We are pleased to 

have this distinguished group of witnesses before us today on this 

important topic. Let me just remind you that your entire written 

statements will appear in the record. 

The chair recognizes Mr. Jay Ahern for 5 minutes to testify as 

our leadoff witness. 

STATEMENT OF JAYSON AHERN, ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER, 

OFFICE OF FIELD OPERATIONS, CUSTOMS AND BORDER 

PROTECTION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. AHERN. Thank you very much, Chairman Lungren and other 

members of the committee here today. 

My name is Jay Ahern. I am the assistant commissioner for field 

operations within Customs and Border Protection. I am also very 

pleased to be here with my colleague Captain Salerno from the 

Coast Guard, as well as our partners from the private sector here 

today, to talk about the security of our country and specifically 

maritime cargo security. 

Mr. Chairman, I specifically want to also commend you and your 

hard-working staff for bringing visibility to the cargo and port security issue long before the recent attention given to this issue 

through the Dubai Port World issue, and other members of the 

panel as well. I also am very appreciative of the strong support of 

CBP’s efforts to secure the global supply chain in America’s ports. 

Certainly, it is known that Customs and Border Protection’s priority mission is homeland security. As America’s frontline border 

agency, CBP is charged with the extraordinarily important mission 

of keeping terrorists and terrorist weapons out of our country. Securing America’s seaports and the global security of the cargo system continues to be a work in progress. 

I can say to you that our nation’s 322 ports of entry in the global 

supply chain are far safer today than they were before the terrorist 

attacks of September 11. Since 9/11, our nation has made great 

strides toward securing America’s borders, protecting trade and 

travel, and ensuring the vitality of our economy. 

Customs and Border Protection, along with other government 

agencies, along with our private sector and international partners, 

have instituted unprecedented programs to secure our seaports and 

the cargo moving into those seaports. We are pleased to see that 

many elements of our cargo security strategy are contained in the 

SAFE Port Act. 

It is also important to note that as I talk about our five interrelated elements of our strategy that none of our programs existed 

before 9/11. And also before 9/11, four separate agencies in three 

different departments of government were responsible for protecting our borders. Today, the personnel and the functions from all 
8

border agencies have been unified into one border agency within 

one department and government. 

The very existence of Customs and Border Protection makes us 

vastly better able to protect our nation from external threats. 

Shortly after 9/11, the United States Customs, now Customs and 

Border Protection, developed a layered defense strategy to secure 

the movement of cargo, without stifling legitimate trade and travel 

so important to the economy of this country. That strategy is built 

on five interrelated initiatives that extend our zone of security beyond our physical borders. We did not want our ports of entry to 

be the first time we had an opportunity to engage with a sea container coming into this country. 

The first is advance information of who and what is headed to 

the United States from abroad. That is the 24-hour Trade Act rules 

that require advance electronic information on all cargo, 100 percent of that cargo being shipped to the United States. The second 

element is taking that information and putting it through the automated targeting system housed at the National Targeting Center 

just outside of Washington, D.C. 

We use that information and we put it through targeting rules 

based on strategic intelligence to assess risk for terrorism on every 

cargo shipment headed to the United States. The National Targeting Center is staffed with representatives from Customs and 

Border Protection, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the 

FBI, the Coast Guard, as well as many other federal agencies. 

We continue to work to improve our targeting capabilities by enhancing integration of intelligence into our targeting efforts and 

continue to evaluate the data elements we are currently looking for 

targeting purposes, and I am glad to see that this act also addresses additional targeting elements. 

Third is the use of cutting-edge technology. When cargo arrives 

at our seaports, CBP uses large-scale X-ray systems, as well as radiation detection devices to screen the containers. At our nation’s 

seaports today, we have 190 radiation portal monitors and 59 

large-scale X-ray systems. Before 9/11, there were no radiation portal monitors at our seaports and only 60 large-scale X-ray systems 

at all of our seaports throughout the country. 

A fourth initiative involves partnering with other countries 

through the container security initiative, or CSI, to screen highrisk containers before they are loaded onboard vessels for the 

United States. We are currently now operational in 43 of the largest ports in the world. 

On March 8, we opened the most recent one in Port Salalah, 

Oman. These ports handle 74 percent of the cargo containers coming into the United States. Before 9/11, Customs and Border Protection did not have any officers stationed at foreign ports. By the 

end of 2006, we expect to have officers stationed at an additional 

seven ports, which would then account for 80 percent of the cargo 

coming into the United States. 

Finally, our fifth initiative involves partnering with the private 

sector through the customs trade partnership against terrorism, 

known as C–TPAT. Today’s C–TPAT has nearly 5,800 certified 

members from the private sector, including most of the largest U.S. 

importers who are working to increase supply chain security from 
9

foreign loading docks to the U.S. port of arrival. More than 10,000 

companies have applied to become C–TPAT members and through 

C–TPAT, CPB reviews the security practices of companies shipping 

goods to the United States, as well as companies providing services 

to those shippers. 

All these elements we need to continue to improve, and we are 

continuing to focus on that on a daily basis. But when you take 

these elements together, these five initiatives and put them in an 

interrelated strategy and extend our zone of security beyond our 

nation’s borders, we believe we are providing the country greater 

protection than we did certainly prior to 9/11. As I mentioned before, none of these elements existed before 9/11. 

In conclusion, we certainly know that America’s borders and the 

security of those borders is an ongoing and long-term effort. I am 

very proud of the men and women who work for Customs and Border Protection and within the Department of Homeland Security to 

secure those ports every day. I am proud of what we have done as 

a nation and have accomplished in a relatively short time to make 

America safer, and particularly our seaports more secure, but certainly more needs to be done. 

I will be happy to take any questions when it is my time. Thank 

you. 

[The statement of Mr. Ahern follows:]

COMBINED PREPARED STATEMENTS OF JAYSON P. AHERN AND

CAPTAIN BRIAN SALERNO

I. Introduction and Overview 

Chairman Lungren, Ranking Member Sanchez, Members of the Subcommittee, it 

is a privilege for the U.S. Coast Guard and U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

(CBP) to appear before you today to discuss the Department of Homeland Security’s 

programs that are fundamental to securing our nation’s ports, and maintaining the 

economic viability of the Marine Transportation System. 

CBP, as the guardian of the Nation’s borders, safeguards the homeland—foremost, 

by protecting the American public against terrorists and the instruments of terror; 

while at the same time, enforcing the laws of the United States and fostering the 

Nation’s economic security through lawful travel and trade. Contributing to all this 

is CBP’s time-honored duty of apprehending individuals attempting to enter the 

United States illegally, stemming the flow of illegal drugs and other contraband, 

protecting our agricultural and economic interests from harmful pests and diseases, 

protecting American businesses from theft of their intellectual property, regulating 

and facilitating international trade, collecting import duties, and enforcing U.S. 

trade laws. In FY 2005, CBP processed almost 29 million trade entries, collected 

$31.4 billion in revenue, seized 2 million pounds of narcotics, processed 431 million 

pedestrians and passengers, 121 million privately owned vehicles, and processed 

and cleared 25.3 million sea, rail and truck containers. We cannot protect against 

the entry of terrorists and the instruments of terror without performing all missions. 

The Coast Guard is the Federal agency in charge of maritime security in our ports 

and waterways. The Coast Guard works very closely with other agencies to pursue 

a collective strategy of ‘‘layered security.’’ Protective measures are implemented 

overseas within the global trade environment, others are implemented closer to our 

shores and then still other actions are taken within the U.S. ports themselves. In 

the overseas arena, the Coast Guard and CBP work together to identify security 

gaps in foreign ports through our International Port Security Program, which helps 

CBP position its resources appropriately to most effectively verify high risk cargo 

prior to loading onboard a ship bound for the U.S. Additionally, the Coast Guard 

has actively supported CBP on international delegations to develop international 

standards for supply chain security. The Coast Guard and CBP have also established mechanisms for CBP to obtain the cargo and crew information from the Coast 

Guard’s electronic Advance Notice of Arrival system. This allows both agencies to 
10

conduct vessel screening and targeting operations for high risk vessels bound for the 

U.S. thereby increasing the layers of protection associated with these vessels before 

they reach our shores. The Coast Guard and CBP have exchanged liaison officers 

at CBP’s National Targeting Center and at the Coast Guard’s Intelligence Coordination Center to facilitate information sharing and operational response coordination 

when high risk cargo, vessels or crew are identified. 

There are numerous other coordination initiatives underway that support cargo 

security. 

The Coast Guard and CBP are working together both on program management 

and to plan for operational issues associated with ‘‘Operation Safe Commerce’’ 

project, the DHS container seal regulation project, and both national and local level 

operational coordination issues to target vessels and respond to threats, among others. The concept of ‘‘layers of security’’ is complex, involving multiple types of activities 

to create a network of interdependent, overlapping and purposely redundant checkpoints designed to reduce vulnerabilities, as well as detect, deter and defeat threats. 

It entails developing security measures that cover the various components of the 

maritime transportation system, including people, infrastructure, conveyances and 

information systems. These security measures span distances geographically—from 

foreign ports of embarkation, through transit zones, to U.S. ports of entry and beyond—and involve the different modes of transportation that feed the global supply 

chain; and are implemented by various commercial, regulatory, law enforcement, intelligence, diplomatic and military entities. A significant challenge to constructing 

integrated layers of security is the fact that many of the layers are the responsibility of different agencies. Integrating these disparate maritime security layers involves not only unity of effort, shared responsibility, partnership, and mutual support, but requires an agency with significant maritime security responsibilities to 

act as a coordinator for the purposes of integrating the government’s efforts to provide layered security. 

We must perform all missions without stifling the flow of legitimate trade and 

travel that is so important to our nation’s economy. We have ‘‘twin goals:’’ Building 

more secure and more efficient borders.

II. Meeting Our Twin Goals: Building More Secure and More Efficient

Borders 

The Coast Guard works in concert with CBP to align respective agency roles and 

responsibilities regarding international trade. When cargo is moved on the waterborne leg of a trade route, the Coast Guard has oversight of the cargo’s care and 

carriage on the vessels and within the port facility. The Coast Guard also oversees 

the training and identity verification of professional mariners who are transporting 

the cargo. CBP has authority over the cargo contents and container standards. 

Using the information provided through the Coast Guard’s 96-hour notice of arrival 

rule and CBP’s 24-Hour cargo loading rule, the Coast Guard and CBP act to control 

vessels (and their cargoes) that pose an unacceptable risk to our ports. As a further 

improvement, the trade community can file required passenger and crew information via an electronic notice of arrival and departure system. This streamlines the 

process for industry and improves our ability to apply targeting and selectivity 

methods. With Coast Guard officers posted at the NTC, we continuously improve 

agency coordination and our collective ability to quickly take appropriate action 

when notified of a cargo of interest. 

As the single, unified border agency of the United States, CBP’s missions are extraordinarily important to the protection of America and the American people. In 

the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11th, CBP has developed initiatives to meet our twin goals of improving security and facilitating the flow of legitimate trade and travel. Our homeland strategy to secure and facilitate cargo moving 

to the United States is a layered defense approach built upon interrelated initiatives. They are: the 24-Hour and Trade Act rules, the Automated Targeting System 

(ATS), housed in CBP’s National Targeting Center, the use of non-intrusive inspection equipment and radiation detection portal monitors, the Container Security Initiative (CSI), and the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C–TPAT). 

Our remarks will focus primarily on how these complimentary layers enhance seaport security, and protect the nation.

Vessel Security 

There are approximately 11,000 U.S. vessels that that require vessel security 

plans (6,200 inspected vessels and 4,800 un-inspected vessels). The Coast Guard received, reviewed and approved all domestic vessel security plans. 

Since July 2004 the Coast Guard has conducted 16,000 foreign flag vessel 

boardings for security compliance with the International Ship and Port Security 
11

(ISPS) Code. These boardings were conducted either offshore or in port depending 

on the risk assessment completed prior to each vessel arrival in U.S port. From 

those 16,000 boardings the Coast Guard has imposed 143 detentions, expulsions or 

denials of entry for vessels that failed to comply with international security requirements. 

In addition the Coast Guard has established a process to identify and target High 

Interest Vessels. This process has resulted in 3,400 at sea security boardings and 

1,500 positive vessel control escorts since 2004 to ensure these vessels cannot be 

used as weapons of mass effect.

Advance Electronic Information 

As a result of the 24-Hour rule and the Trade Act, CBP requires advance electronic information on all cargo shipments coming to the United States by land, air, 

and sea, so that we know who and what is coming before it arrives in the United 

States. 24-Hour Advanced Cargo Rule, requiring all sea carriers, with the exception 

of bulk carriers and approved break-bulk cargo, to provide proper cargo descriptions 

and valid consignee addresses 24 hours before cargo is loaded at the foreign port 

for shipment to the United States. However, bulk carriers are not exempt from all 

advance electronic information requirements—they are required to transmit cargo 

information 24 hours prior to arrival in the U.S. for voyages that exceed 24 hours 

sailing time from the foreign port of loading, or transmit at the time of departure 

to the U.S. for voyages less than 24 hours sailing time to the U.S. from the foreign 

port of loading. Failure to meet the 24-Hour Advanced Cargo Rule results in a ‘‘do 

not load’’ message and other penalties. This program gives CBP greater awareness 

of what is being loaded onto ships bound for the United States and the advance information enables CBP to evaluate the terrorist risk from sea containers on 100% 

of shipments. 

In addition, the Coast Guard has taken multiple steps to enhance awareness in 

the maritime domain. One major step was the publication of the 96-hour Advanced 

Notice of Arrival regulations which requires vessels to provide detailed information 

to the Coast Guard 96-hours before a vessel arrives at a U.S. port from foreign 

ports. This regulation provides sufficient time to vet the crew, passengers, cargo and 

vessel information of all vessels prior to entering the U.S. from foreign ports By 

merging CBP and CG vessel and people information requirements into the electronic 

notice of arrival and departure, the reporting burden on the maritime industry will 

be reduced. Because the system was made available to the public on January 31, 

2005, it afforded vessel owners and operators the time to become familiar with the 

electronic notice of arrival and departure, and consequently have an easier time 

complying with CBPs APIS regulation which mandated the use of this system by 

June 6, 2005, as the approved method for submission in accordance with the APIS 

regulation.

Automated Targeting System 

The Automated Targeting System, which is used by National Targeting Center 

and field targeting units in the United States and overseas, is essential to our ability to target high-risk cargo and passengers entering the United States. ATS is the 

system through which we process advance manifest and passenger information to 

detect anomalies and ‘‘red flags,’’ and determine which passengers and cargo are 

‘‘high risk,’’ and should be scrutinized at the port of entry, or in some cases, overseas. 

ATS is a flexible, constantly evolving system that integrates enforcement and 

commercial databases. ATS analyzes electronic data related to individual shipments 

prior to arrival and ranks them in order of risk based on the application of algorithms and rules. The scores are divided into thresholds associated with further action by CBP, such as document review and inspection. 

The National Targeting Center, working closely with the Coast Guard, also vets 

and risk scores all cargo and cruise-ship passengers and crew prior to arrival. This 

ensures that DHS has full port security awareness for international maritime activity.

Container Security Initiative (CSI) and Customs-Trade Partnership 

Against Terrorism (C–TPAT): Extending our Zone of Security Outward—

Partnering with Other Countries 

Every day, approximately 31,000 seagoing containers arrive at our nation’s seaports equating to nearly 11.3 million a year. About 90% of the world’s manufactured 

goods move by container, much of it stacked many stories high on huge transport 

ships. Each year, two hundred million cargo containers are transported between the 

world’s seaports, constituting the most critical component of global trade. 

All trading nations depend on containerized shipping. Of all incoming trade to the 

United States, nearly half arrives by ship, and much of that is in sea containers. 
12

Other countries are even more dependent on sea container traffic, such as the U.K., 

Japan and Singapore. 

The fact is that, today, the greatest threat we face to global maritime security is 

the potential for terrorists to use the international maritime system to smuggle terrorist weapons—or even terrorist operatives—into a targeted country. 

If even a single container were to be exploited by terrorists, the disruption to 

trade and national economies would be enormous. In May 2002, the Brookings Institution estimated that costs associated with United States port closures from a detonated terrorist weapon could amount to $1 trillion from the resulting economic 

slump and changes in our ability to trade. 

Clearly, the risk to international maritime cargo demands a robust security strategy that can identify, prevent and deter threats, at the earliest point in the international supply chain, before arrival at the seaports of the targeted country. We 

must have a cohesive national cargo security strategy that better protects us against 

the threat posed by global terrorism without choking off the flow of legitimate trade, 

so important to our economic security, to our economy, and, to the global economy. 

Our nation developed a cargo security strategy that addresses cargo moving from 

areas outside of the United States to our ports of entry. Our strategy focuses on 

stopping any shipment by terrorists before it reaches the United States, and only 

as a last resort, when it arrives at a port of entry. 

The Container Security Initiative (CSI) and the Customs-Trade Partnership 

Against Terrorism (C–TPAT) initiatives bolster port security. The CSI initiative proposes a security regime to ensure that all containers posing a potential risk for terrorism are identified and inspected at foreign ports before they are placed on vessels 

destined for the United States. CBP continues to station multidisciplinary teams of 

U.S. officers from both CBP and Immigration and Customs Enforcement to work together with our host foreign government counterparts to develop additional investigative leads related to the terrorist threat to cargo destined to the United States. 

Through CSI, CBP works with host government Customs Services to examine 

high-risk maritime containerized cargo at foreign seaports, before they are loaded 

on board vessels destined for the United States. CSI is currently operational at 43 

foreign ports. By the end of 2006, we expect that 50 ports, covering 82% of maritime 

containerized cargo shipped to the U.S., and by the end of 2007, we expect to be 

operational in 58 ports covering 85% of maritime containerized cargo destined to the 

United States. 

As directed by MTSA, the International Port Security Program has begun visiting 

foreign countries to assess the effectiveness of anti-terrorism measures in foreign 

ports. 

To date, 45 countries have been assessed; 40 have been found to be in substantial 

compliance with the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code. 

These 45 countries are responsible for over 80% of the vessel arrivals to the United 

States. The five countries that are not in substantial compliance have been or will 

soon be notified to take corrective actions or risk being placed on a Port Security 

Advisory and have Conditions of Entry imposed on vessels arriving from their ports. 

The Coast Guard is on track to assess approximately 36 countries per year, with 

a goal of visiting all of our maritime trading partners within four years 

Through C–TPAT, CBP establishes voluntary best security practices for all parts 

of the supply chain, making it more difficult for a terrorist or terrorist sympathizer 

to introduce a weapon into a container being sent by a legitimate party to the 

United States. C–TPAT covers a wide variety of security practices, from fences and 

lighting to requiring that member companies conduct background checks on their 

employees, maintain current employee lists, and require that employees display 

proper identification. 

C–TPAT’s criteria also address physical access controls, facility security, information technology security, container security, security awareness and training, personnel screening, and important business partner requirements. These business 

partner requirements oblige C–TPAT members to conduct business with other C–

TPAT members who have committed to the same enhanced security requirements 

established by the C–TPAT program. 

The C–TPAT program has created a public-private and international partnership 

with nearly 5,800 businesses (over 10,000 have applied), including most of the largest U.S. importers. Forth-five percent of all merchandise imported into the United 

States is done so by C–TPAT member importers. C–TPAT, CBP and partner companies are working together to improve baseline security standards for supply chain 

and container security. CBP reviews the security practices of not only the company 

shipping the goods, but also the companies that provided them with any services. 

The validation process employed by CBP demonstrates and confirms the effectiveness, efficiency and accuracy of a C–TPAT certified member’s supply chain security. 
13

At present, the C–TPAT program has completed validations on 27 percent (1,545 

validations completed) of the certified membership, up from 8 percent (403 validations completed) a year ago. Additionally, validations are in progress on another 39 

percent (2,262 in progress) of certified members, and these validations will be completed throughout 2006, bringing the total percentage of certified members to 65 

percent by years’ end. In 2007, the C–TPAT program validations will continue. And 

we will have validated 100 percent by the end of CY 2007. 

Additionally, CBP has moved to tighten minimum-security criteria for membership in this voluntary program. Working closely with the trade community and key 

stakeholders, CBP has developed and implemented baseline security standards for 

member importers, sea carriers, and highway carriers. CBP will complete this process by the end of CY 2006, defining the minimum-security criteria for the remaining 

enrollment sectors—air carriers, rail carriers, brokers, freight forwarders, and foreign manufacturers. 

The Coast Guard supports several DHS initiatives such as Operation Safe Commerce (OSC), the Container Security Initiative (CSI) and the Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism (C–TPAT) to ensure mutual policies, programs and initiatives are complementary and cover the entire supply chain. The CSI and C–TPAT 

are programs that are designed to extend supply chain security improvements to 

overseas ports and further along the international supply chain.

Non-Intrusive Inspection Equipment and Radiation Detection Portals: 

CBP also uses cutting-edge technology, including large-scale X-ray and gamma 

ray machines and radiation detection devices to screen cargo. Presently, CBP operates over 680 radiation portal monitors at our nation’s ports, including 181 radiation 

portal monitors at seaports allowing us to scan 37 percent of arriving international 

cargo, and that number will continue to grow through the remainder of this year 

and 2007. CBP also utilizes over 170 large-scale non-intrusive inspection devices to 

examine cargo and has issued 12,400 hand-held radiation detection devices to its 

CBP officers. 

Further, the DHS Domestic Nuclear Detection Office’s (DNDO) FY 2007 budget 

request of nearly $536 million, a 70% increase from FY 2006, includes $157 million 

that will allow for the acquisition and deployment of nearly 300 current and nextgeneration radiation detection systems at our ports of entry. These funds, and funds 

provided in FY 2005 and FY 2006, will allow for the deployment of 621 RMPs to 

our Nation’s top seaports, which will allow us to screen approximately 98 percent 

inbound containers by December 2007. These systems will be deployed and operated 

by CBP. In addition, DNDO’s FY 2007 budget also includes $30.3 million for the 

development of enhanced cargo radiography screening systems for our ports of 

entry. These enhanced screening efforts will compliment the many informationbased programs CBP already has in place for enhanced port security. 

In addition to increased screening efforts at our own ports of entry for radioactive 

and nuclear materials, the Department fully endorses the concept of increased active and passive detection at foreign ports of departure. The systems DNDO is acquiring and developing can also be used by foreign ports with a CSI presence, as 

well as the Department of Energy’s Megaports initiative. We must continue to stress 

the need for increased screening at foreign ports of departure while at the same 

time having a robust screening effort at our own ports of entry. 

Port Security Grant Program and the Coast Guard 

The Port Security Grant Program is administered by the Office of Grants & 

Training (OG&T) in the Preparedness Directorate of DHS. The Coast Guard continues to plays an active role in the Port Security Grant Program, as it has in the 

first five rounds, and participates in the development of program guidance, conducts 

the field review process and is a member of the national review panel. 

In round five of the Port Security Grant Program, $142 million was awarded for 

132 projects. The current program has been improved substantially by using a riskbased formula to ensure that the projects funded provide the greatest risk reduction 

at the most critical ports. This same risk based formula will be used for round six 

in 2006.

Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) 

The TWIC program, which will satisfy the requirements in MTSA under 46 U.S.C. 

§ 47105, will ensure that only properly cleared and authorized personnel could gain 

access to secure areas of the Nation’s transportation system. 

The goals of the TWIC program are to: 

• Develop a common, secure biometric credential and standards that are interoperable across transportation modes and compatible with existing independent access 

control systems; 
14

• Establish processes to verify the identity of each TWIC applicant, complete a security threat assessment on the identified applicant, and positively link the issued credential to that applicant; and 

• Quickly revoke card holder privileges for individuals who are issued a TWIC but 

are subsequently determined to pose a threat after issuance of their credentials, and 

immediately remove lost, stolen, or compromised cards from the system. 

Encompassed within the TWIC program are requirements established by the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 to prevent unaccompanied individuals 

from entering a secure area of a vessel or facility unless the individual holds a 

transportation security card. Additionally, the Act requires that all holders of Merchant Mariner Credentials obtain a TWIC. With MTSA as their guide, the Coast 

Guard and TSA have worked closely to develop the maritime component of TWIC 

and are currently preparing a joint Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM). 

The Coast Guard is working very closely with the TSA to assist in the implementation of this new credentialing program. The Coast Guard is supportive of this regulatory effort. We will do everything within our ability to assist TSA in the development of this rulemaking and ensure that the TWIC and Merchant Mariner 

Credentialing initiatives are complementary in order to minimize the burden on 

mariners in the future.

Post TSI Coordination 

National Response Options Matrix 

The National Response Options Matrix (NROM) is intended to aid crisis action 

decision making at the national level, immediately following a maritime transportation security incident (TSI). It does not apply to the port experiencing the TSI, 

however. The NROM’s goal is to provide senior leadership with immediate preplanned short-term security options to prevent further attacks and protect the marine transportation system, maritime critical infrastructure and key assets (MCI/

KA), and high density population centers, following a maritime TSI. NROM is a 

‘‘Quick Reaction Card’’ decision aid for use by senior leadership to direct a possible 

Coast Guard wide security posture that may significantly impact maritime industry, 

change the maritime security (MARSEC) level, and perhaps affect/involve other 

DHS agencies or departments. These options may include changes in MARSEC level 

(for Coast Guard forces and maritime industry), potential change(s) in Coast Guard 

force protection condition (FPCON), or other risk mitigation options on a national 

level, regionally, or by specific ports. NROM has scenario-based mitigation options 

that were designed to build upon and strengthen existing measures, surge resources 

as necessary, control or restrict certain port activity, and only if necessary, close 

ports. NROM could also be useful in evaluating the Coast Guard’s response, if any, 

to U. S. or world-wide terrorist incidents outside of the maritime environment. 

If a maritime TSI should occur in one of our ports, the local responders (Federal 

Maritime Security Coordinator (Coast Guard Sector or Captain of the Port), other 

Federal agencies, state and local authorities, and partners in industry) will immediately react with prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery activities in that port and region. The premise of NROM is to have pre-planned security 

options that would be put in place in other ports throughout the country to prevent 

and protect against further attacks. The NROM is reflected in our planning for postincident maritime infrastructure recovery activities under the National Strategy for 

Maritime Security that was approved by the President last year. 

NROM answers the question, ‘‘What is being done in the other ports to prevent 

further attacks, protect maritime infrastructure and population centers, while facilitating the continued flow of commerce and legitimate use of the maritime environment.’’ Currently, the Coast Guard is working with CBP to incorporate CBP’s response/recovery measures, making it a joint-agency decision matrix document. We 

have also developed an electronic NROM to improve the visibility of the product and 

help facilitate its use.

III. Conclusion 

In summary, as noted already, the Coast Guard, CBP, industry partners, and 

many other Federal, state and local agencies work hand in hand to screen cargo, 

the vessels that transport the cargo and the facilities that load and discharge cargo 

to mitigate the risk to the Marine Transportation System. All containers and vessels 

that CBP and the Coast Guard determine to be of risk are examined using a variety 

of technologies, either at the foreign port, at sea, or upon arrival into the U.S. 

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee, we have briefly addressed DHS’s 

critical initiatives today that will help us protect America against terrorists and the 

instruments of terror, while at the same time enforcing the laws of the United 

States and fostering the Nation’s economic security through lawful travel and trade. 

We realize there is more to do, and with the continued support of the President, 
15

and the Congress, DHS will succeed in meeting the challenges posed by the ongoing 

terrorist threat and the need to facilitate ever-increasing numbers of legitimate 

shipments and travelers.

Mr. LUNGREN. Thank you very much, Mr. Ahern. 

And now the chair would recognize Captain Brian Salerno. 

STATEMENT OF BRIAN SALERNO, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, 

INSPECTIONS AND COMPLIANCE, UNITED STATES COAST 

GUARD, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Captain SALERNO. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Representative 

Sanchez, members of the subcommittee. 

I am Captain Brian Salerno, deputy director of inspections and 

compliance within the Coast Guard’s office of the assistant commandant for prevention. It is a pleasure to be here and represent 

the Coast Guard, together with our colleague, Assistant Commission Ahern, to discuss some of the Department of Homeland Security’s programs that are fundamental to securing our nation’s ports 

and maintaining the economic viability of the marine transportation system. 

As the federal agency responsible for maritime security in our 

nation’s ports and waterways, we work very closely with other 

agencies to pursue our collective strategy of layered defense. By 

that, I mean a strategy that incorporates a suite of protective 

measures, some of which are conducted overseas, others of which 

are carried out on ships that are due to arrive off our shores, and 

ultimately with measures that are undertaken in U.S. ports themselves. I would like to take just a minute or two to put that into 

context. 

The Coast Guard has a program established under the Maritime 

Transportation Security Act, commonly referred to as MTSA, to 

visit foreign ports and assess the degree to which they are complying with the security measures established by the International 

Ship and Port Facility Security Code, which is also commonly referred to as ISPFSC. ISPFSC is the international counterpart of 

MTSA. I am sorry about the acronyms. 

To date, we have visited over 45 foreign countries. When we find 

ports that do not comply with ISPFSC, vessels which call at those 

ports, and which subsequently come to the United States, are subject to elevated levels of security. In conducting these overseas visits, the Coast Guard works very closely with Customs and Border 

Protection, which also assesses foreign ports as part of its container 

security initiative. We exchange information on foreign ports and 

strive to conduct our respective assessments jointly. 

While in transit, ships are required to submit an advance notice 

of arrival. As you may recall, this was increased from a 24-hour advance notice to a 96-hour advance notice following the 9/11 attacks. 

The additional time allows for more thorough screening of crewmembers and passengers against terrorist watch lists, as well as 

giving us the opportunity to begin an initial screening of the cargo 

on board. The information received by the Coast Guard is shared 

with Customs and Border Protection as part of this initial screening process. 

Based on the vessel’s history and the results of our initial screening, the vessel may be subject to additional controls upon approach-
16

ing our shores, or if permitted to do so, upon entering our ports. 

Since July, 2004, the Coast Guard has conducted approximately 

16,000 foreign-flag vessel boardings. These were conducted either 

off-shore or in port, depending upon the risk assessment completed 

prior to port arrival. 

Since the ISPFSC code came into effect in July of 2004, the 

Coast Guard has imposed 143 control actions, meaning vessel detentions in port, expulsions from port, or denials of entry on vessels 

for failure to comply with international standards. Within the ports 

themselves, facilities are also subject to MTSA and ISPFSC. There 

are over 3,000 marine cargo facilities in the United States and each 

has been required to develop a security plan and submit that plan 

to the Coast Guard for approval. 

As part of its regulatory compliance responsibilities, the Coast 

Guard has required corrective actions on more than 700 violations 

of the MTSA security regulations. Of these, 44 were severe enough 

to result in major control actions by the Coast Guard such as termination of cargo operations or closure of the facility until corrective measures have been taken. 

One point that I do wish to make is that although the Coast 

Guard has an overall responsibility for enforcing security provisions of MTSA, we do not maintain a full-time presence in the facilities or on foreign vessels. It is the responsibility of the facility 

and the vessel operator to carry out their security plan. The Coast 

Guard verifies that they are doing so, and we do this with periodic 

visits and examinations. Naturally, the Coast Guard works very 

hard with the private sector to ensure that MTSA and ISPFSC are 

being complied with. 

This is just a sampling of what we have done and are doing to 

preserve the security of our ports. Thank you for the opportunity 

to testify today, and I will be happy to answer any questions you 

may have when it is my time. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Thank you very much, Captain Salerno, for your 

testimony. 

The chair would now recognize Mr. Gene Pentimonti for his testimony. Thank you, sir. 

STATEMENT OF EUGENE PENTIMONTI, SENIOR VICE 

PRESIDENT, GOVERNMENT RELATIONS, MAERSK, INC. 

Mr. PENTIMONTI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the 

subcommittee. 

My name is Gene Pentimonti, and I am senior vice president for 

government relations at Maersk. I appreciate the opportunity to 

appear before the subcommittee this morning to discuss the very 

important issues of maritime security and particularly the security 

and accountability for every port act. 

As you know, Maersk is one of the largest liner shipping companies in the world, serving customers all over the globe. With a fleet 

numbering more than 500 container vessels and about 1.4 million 

containers, we provide reliable and comprehensive ocean transportation services. Maersk, Incorporated is the North America agent 

for the parent company, A.P. Moller–Maersk Group’s liner businesses, Maersk Line and Safmarine. 
17

The A.P. Moller–Maersk Group employs more than 70,000 people 

in over 125 countries. In 1943, Maersk, Inc. was established as the 

general agent for A.P. Moller’s liner business, Maersk Line. Here 

in the United States, we generate employment for approximately 

12,000 Americans and we have committed to significant infrastructure investments both before and after 9/11. 

Maersk has been actively involved in maritime security issues for 

many years. Our commitment to security is captured by the watchwords for our whole activity: constant care. The security of our containers and the integrity of our transportation network are essential to our operations at Maersk. Marine transportation is a worldwide industry and is inherently intermodal. A container that is 

loaded at the U.S. seaport today can be almost anywhere in the nation within a few days. For many years, cargo moved fluidly 

through our ports and facilities subject to prevailing regulations, 

but the events of September 11 changed the way we think about 

maritime security. 

Maersk Line and all the other carriers serving the United States 

today are more concerned than ever about the security threats, for 

we know that terrorist elements might seize upon our transportation mode as an attack opportunity. To counter the potential impact on our fellow citizens, employees, port facilities, containers 

and vessels, Maersk has embarked on an even more aggressive enterprising campaign. We have entered voluntarily into a variety of 

U.S. government programs and pilot projects. For example we were 

the first enterprise-wide transportation company to be validated by 

the C–TPAT program. 

We also participate in the Supercarrier Initiative program, one 

of only 27 ocean carriers worldwide permitted by CBP to participate at this level. But we realize that it is not enough to make our 

operations within this country secure, so we have intensified our 

efforts to secure our international cargo network through the establishment of a comprehensive and vigorous global security policy 

and strategy that governs our sea and land-size operations worldwide. 

There is much in the SAFE Port Act that we at Maersk support 

and we commend you, Mr. Chairman, and other members, for 

working hard on maritime security. Maersk strongly supports the 

concept of performing the inspection functions at foreign ports before any container is loaded onto one of our vessels. We recognized 

that there are issues involving how this requirement can be implemented, and we pledge to work cooperatively with the U.S. and the 

foreign governments to achieve this desirable result. 

We believe there is great promise in non-intrusive inspection and 

it is important that this program be developed and implemented 

properly. In this regard, let me state that it is essential that sufficient funding be provided to enable CBP to carry out its responsibilities on foreign port inspections. The system requires that images from screening be reviewed by CBP and that terminal operators in foreign ports receive feedback from CBP. To accomplish 

this, the CBP’s databases need to be updated and designed so that 

images can be matched in real-time with information on file from 

CBP. Then in cases where further inspections are required, the additional inspection can occur immediately. 
18

Furthermore, for inspections in foreign countries to succeed, it 

must either be accomplished through bilateral or multilateral negotiations between the United States and countries where the requirements are imposed, or we must provide incentives for foreign 

port operators to perform those functions. The SAFE Port Act contains provisions appropriately addressing high-risk containers that 

can be identified before they reach American soil. 

A very significant part of this discussion about mechanisms to 

improve maritime security is the vessel cargo manifest. This manifest, based on longstanding regulatory and commercial standards, 

provides a great deal of specific useful information on all cargo that 

is brought into the United States. Among other items, it identifies 

the contents of the container or the cargo carried on board the vessel; the identity of the shipper and consignee; the port of origin; 

and the destination within the United States. 

We concur strongly with the provisions in the SAFE Port Act 

that enhanced manifest information is needed. It is the responsibility of shippers who possess this information to provide it and we 

must protect them and their confidentiality and integrity of the 

data. 

Of course, we also must be certain that the right kind of information is collected, as ocean carriers do not have, nor is there a need 

to have, this type of information. We must also be sure that the 

information collected can be acted upon quickly and that this process does not introduce an unreasonable amount of friction into the 

flow of global trade. 

Section 8 of the SAFE Port Act addresses the issue of employee 

identification. As you know, the MTSA Act of 2002 mandated that 

government develop this and issue credentials, including biometric 

identifiers and background checks, for transportation workers seeking unescorted access to secure areas within transportation facilities. We support the concept of the TWIC and pledge to provide information to assist in improving employee identification and assist 

in the implementation of the TWIC program. 

We are still in the process of examining thoroughly the SAFE 

Port Act, but please permit me to offer several general observations 

at this time. We will, of course, continue to discuss with you the 

specific issues that may arise through our review. A number of requirements are imposed by the SAFE Port Act and they must be 

evaluated with an eye toward reciprocity and their application to 

both imports and exports. We must anticipate whether our foreign 

trade partners will impose similar requirements and whether it is 

feasible for U.S. interests to comply. 

The SAFE Port Act or any other maritime security legislation 

should not duplicate or conflict with other requirements of law, and 

not add unnecessary levels of bureaucracy. Security is already a 

very complicated area and additional levels of paperwork and involvement by multiple agencies will not further the goal of making 

our marine transportation system safer. 

We support the continuation of C–TPAT and strongly believe the 

program should remain voluntary and not subject to governmental 

rulemaking. C–TPAT should be flexible enough to permit variations in the application to participants and not impose a generic 

set of rules on all of them. 
19

If a program similar to GreenLane is adopted, it must provide 

clear, direct benefits in return for implementing high security 

standards. This is essential if companies are going to undertake investments needed to become involved in the program and make the 

change the program requires. Today, the MTSA already requires 

the Department of Homeland Security to set standards for container security devices. CBP and DHS are testing devices against 

these standards. We should await the outcome of these tests and 

determine their technological feasibility before proceeding on this 

matter. 

Mr. Chairman, Maersk works hard to make our operations as 

safe as possible. This is in the national security interests of our 

country, our own commercial interests, and the interests of providing a safe and secure workplace for the environment of our employees. We at Maersk look forward to continuing discussing the 

SAFE Port Act and other security issues with you. I am happy to 

answer any questions that you may have. 

Thank you very much. 

[The statement of Mr. Pentimonti follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF EUGENE K. PENTIMONTI

Mr. Chairman, my name is Gene Pentimonti, and I am Senior Vice President for 

Government Relations at Maersk. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before the 

Subcommittee this morning to discuss the very important issue of maritime security 

and, in particular, the Security and Accountability for Every (SAFE) Port Act. 

As you may know, Maersk is one of the largest liner shipping companies in the 

world, serving customers all over the globe. With a fleet numbering more than 500 

container vessels and about 1.4 million operated containers, we provide reliable and 

comprehensive ocean shipping transportation. Maersk, Incorporated is the North 

America agent for parent company A.P. Moller-Maersk Group’s liner businesses, 

Maersk Line and Safmarine. The A.P. Moller-Maersk Group employs more than 

70,000 people in over 125 countries. 

In 1943, Maersk, Inc. was established as the general agent for A.P. Moller’s liner 

business, Maersk Line. Here in the United States, we generate employment for approximately 12,000 Americans and we have committed to significant infrastructure 

investments before and since September 11, 2001. 

Maersk has been actively involved in maritime security issues for many years. 

Our commitment to security is captured by the watch words for all our activities: 

‘‘Constant Care.’’ The security of our containers and the integrity of our transportation network are essential to our operations at Maersk. Marine transportation is 

a worldwide industry, and it is inherently intermodal—a container that is unloaded 

at a U.S. seaport today can be almost anywhere in the nation tomorrow or within 

days. 

For many years, cargo moved fluidly through our ports and facilities subject to 

prevailing regulations. But the events of September 11, 2001 changed the way we 

think about maritime security. Maersk Line and other carriers serving the United 

States today are more concerned than ever about security threats, for we know that 

terrorist elements might seize upon our transportation mode as an attack opportunity. 

To counter the potential impact on our fellow citizens, employees, ports facilities, 

containers and vessels, Maersk has embarked on an even more aggressive, enterprising campaign. We have entered voluntarily into a variety of U.S. government 

programs and pilot projects—for example, we were the first enterprise-wide transportation company to be validated by the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C–TPAT) Program. We also participate in the Super Carrier Initiative Program, one of only 27 ocean carriers worldwide permitted by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to participate at this level. But we realize that it is not enough 

to make our operations within this country secure, so we have intensified our efforts 

to secure our international cargo network through the establishment of a comprehensive and vigorous global security policy and strategy that governs our sea and 

landside operations worldwide. 
20

There is much in the SAFE Port Act that we at Maersk support and we commend 

you, Mr. Chairman, and other Members for working hard on maritime security. 

Maersk strongly supports the concept of performing the inspection function at foreign ports—before any container is loaded on a vessel. We recognize that there are 

issues involving how this requirement can be implemented, and we pledge to work 

cooperatively with U.S. and foreign governments to achieve this desirable result. We 

believe there is great promise in non-intrusive inspection and it is important that 

the program be developed and implemented properly. 

In this regard, let me state that it is essential that sufficient funding be provided 

to enable CBP to carry out its responsibilities of foreign port inspections. The system requires that images from screening be reviewed by CBP and that terminal operators in foreign ports receive feedback from CBP. To accomplish this, the CBP’s 

databases need to be updated and designed so that images can be matched in real 

time with information on file with CBP. Then, in cases where further inspection is 

required, the additional inspection can occur immediately. 

Furthermore, for inspections in foreign countries to succeed, it must either be accomplished through bilateral or multilateral negotiations between the United States 

and countries where the requirements are imposed (with the foreign country implementing the security procedures), or we must provide incentives for foreign port operators to perform those functions. 

The SAFE Port Act contains provisions appropriately addressing high-risk containers that can be identified before they reach American soil. A very significant 

part of the discussion about mechanisms to improve maritime security is the vessel 

cargo manifest. This manifest, based on long standing regulatory and commercial 

standards, provides a great deal of specific, useful information on all cargo that is 

brought into the United States. Among other items, it identifies the contents of the 

container or the cargo carried onboard the vessel, the identity of the shipper and 

consignee, the port of origin, and the destination within the United States. We concur strongly with provisions in the SAFE Port Act that enhanced manifest information is needed. It is the responsibility of shippers who possess this information to 

provide it and we must protect the confidentiality and integrity of the data. Of 

course, we also must be certain that the right kind of information is collected as 

ocean carriers do not have—nor is there a need to have—this type of information. 

We must also be sure that the information collected can be acted upon quickly, and 

that this process does not introduce an unreasonable amount of friction into the flow 

of global trade. 

Section 8 of the SAFE Port Act addresses the issue of employee identification. As 

you know, the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA) mandated that 

the government develop and issue credentials (including biometric identifiers and 

background checks) for transportation workers seeking unescorted access to secure 

areas within transportation facilities. We support the concept of the Transportation 

Worker Identification Card (TWIC), and pledge to provide information to assist in 

improving employee identification and assist in the implementation of the TWIC 

program. 

We are still in the process of examining thoroughly the SAFE Port Act, but please 

permit me to offer several general observations at this time. We will of course continue to discuss with you specific issues that may arise through our review. 

• A number of requirements are imposed by the SAFE Port Act, and they must 

be evaluated with an eye toward trade reciprocity, and their application to both 

imports and exports. We must anticipate whether our foreign trade partners 

will impose similar requirements, and whether it is feasible for U.S. interests 

to comply. 

• The SAFE Port Act or any other maritime security legislation should not duplicate or conflict with other requirements of law, and not add unnecessary levels of bureaucracy. Security is already a very complicated area, and additional 

levels of paperwork and involvement by multiple agencies will not further the 

overall goal of making our marine transportation system safer. 

• We support the continuation of C–TPAT, and strongly believe that the program should remain voluntary and not subject to governmental rulemaking. C–

TPAT should be flexible enough to permit variations in its application to participants, and not impose a generic set of rules on all of them. 

• If a program similar to GreenLane is adopted, it must provide clear, direct 

benefits in return for implementing high security standards. This is essential 

if companies are going to undertake the investment needed to become involved 

in the program and make the changes the program requires. 

• Today, the MTSA already requires that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) set standards for container security devices, and CBP and DHS are 

testing devices against these standards. We should await the outcome of these 
21

tests and determine their technological feasibility before proceeding on this matter. 

Mr. Chairman, Maersk works hard to make our operations as safe as possible. 

This is in the national security interests of our country, our own commercial interests, and the interests of providing a safe and secure workplace environment for our 

employees. ‘‘Constant Care’’ are our watchwords, and they form the foundation of 

every activity we take in this regard. 

We at Maersk look forward to continuing to discuss the SAFE Port Act and other 

security issues with you. I am happy to attempt to answer any questions you may 

have, and I appreciate very much the opportunity to appear before you this morning.

Mr. LUNGREN. Thank you, Mr. Pentimonti, for your testimony. 

The chair would now recognize Mr. Noel Cunningham. 

STATEMENT OF NOEL CUNNINGHAM, PRINCIPAL, MARSEC 

GROUP 

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, 

thank you for inviting me to testify before you today. I will be addressing the proposed Security and Accountability for Every Port 

Act, or SAFE Port Act. During this testimony, I will address the 

act and discuss other actions I believe are critical in addressing the 

vulnerabilities associated with maritime security. 

My assessment is based upon my 40 years of experience as a law 

enforcement officer, chief of the Port of Los Angeles Police, and director of operations at the nation’s largest seaport. In the interests 

of time, I would like to summarize my testimony and submit a 

complete written copy to the committee. I should also note that this 

testimony was prepared with the assistance of two other principals 

for the MARSEC group, Captain John Holmes, former captain of 

the Port of Los Angeles–Long Beach, and Dr. Charles Massey, who 

retired recently from Sandia National Laboratories as the program 

manager for the Department of Energy’s Second Line of Defense. 

As you may be aware, Captain Holmes and Dr. Massey have significant experience in port and border security and like myself 

were in the field during and after the tragic events of September 

11. Having had the opportunity to review the SAFE Port Act, I 

would like to commend the committee for its efforts and go on 

record as supporting the concepts embraced in the act. I wholeheartedly support the efforts outlined in areas of strategic planning, information management, and data integration. 

I am also pleased to see that the bill addresses existing concerns 

regarding trade reconstitution, that it will better define the 

GreenLane concept, and that it embraces the use of a common metric in the grant process. 

My experience leads me to believe, however, that the act could 

be made significantly more effective if this committee expanded its 

scope in order to establish new priorities for existing programs that 

are critical to the security of our ports. These include port identification, enhanced inspections in foreign ports, and security system 

integration at the local ports, regional and the national levels. 

I am also encouraged to see that the bill addresses the critical 

issue of research and development. It is my strong belief that our 

focus needs to transcend our current efforts at plugging the security gaps that we know, and embrace identification and prevention 

of those that we currently do not know about. If this is going to 
22

be done, intelligence gathering and research and development will 

be key elements in the success of these efforts. 

Although I am heartened by the areas of focus, I would like to 

see it expanded to specifically embrace all methods of cargo screening, including those that have proven to be most problematic up to 

this point: biological and chemical detection. Although I recognize 

this issue is generally addressed in some of the existing regulations, I would also like to support the idea of establishing requirements for training and exercises in the bill. As a career law enforcement officer, I cannot underscore enough the importance of a 

solid training program. 

It is my belief that when an assessment is conducted, key gaps 

will be identified. Three of these include inability to clearly determine who is working on our ports. Unlike our airports, our seaports have no credentialing program. One of the universal truths 

in law enforcement is that security starts with people. Responsible 

citizens are oftentimes much more reliable and accurate in detecting and deterring criminal or terrorist activity than sophisticated 

technological systems, just as Congresswoman Harman identified 

for the ILWU. If bad people cannot undertake their efforts without 

being exposed, the system will be more secure. 

Number two, inability to truly know what is in the containers 

that are arriving in the U.S. As my close friend and colleague Dr. 

Stephen Flynn has stated, the question must be asked: What is in 

the box? Given the complexity of the supply chain and the number 

of individuals involved, the only means to truly assure that the 

contents of the container do not pose a threat is to use technology 

to screen the contents. No port chief or captain of a port wants to 

be the individual who finds the dirty bomb after he has off-loaded 

it in his or her port. 

Third, lack of integration of current security systems on the local 

port, regional and national levels. In the post–9/11 climate, ports 

and terminals have embraced the use of security systems, cameras, 

access control and intrusion detection systems. Unfortunately, 

there are very few cases where ports have taken the lead and have 

found the funding to integrate these systems. As a result, knowledge of security breaches or attempted breaches are only known to 

that particular system. 

The gaps identified represent fundamental security shortfalls 

that must be addressed. Access control and overseas screening are 

the foundations to secure our supply chain and they represent the 

most significant and most efficient means to push back the borders. 

Until shortfalls such as these are rectified, the security of the entire supply chain must be called into question. 

Involvement of industry is also crucial in this effort. No one 

knows better where the security vulnerabilities are in the maritime 

industry than the industry. Tapping into this knowledge base is 

crucial. Operation Safe Commerce, in which me and my partners 

were key participants, is an example of industry helping to determine where the security efforts are best placed. The SAFE Act program continues to recognize and support this crucial industry-led 

effort. 

While container security is rightly the subject of much focus, 

cargo does not only move through the maritime industry in steel 
23

boxes. A weapon of mass destruction could also be transported to 

the United States on a bulk haul container, a roll on-roll off vessel, 

or a fishing trawler. Security of our nation depends on systems 

that will deal with all types of maritime threat delivery opportunities. 

I am pleased to see that the focus of this bill goes beyond containerized cargo and that research, development and testing of the 

processes and technologies will be addressed and that prioritized 

threats throughout the maritime system are included in this act. 

I also believe that if one is going to address the security needs, 

the issue of resources cannot be ignored. A question that must be 

asked during the planning and analysis stage outlined in this bill 

must be: Are the federal, state and local resources on hand sufficient to educate, deter, detect, respond and recover in the manner 

expected? I think that unfortunately the answer will be no. 

I, more than most, realize that priorities must be established 

based on principles of risk management. I have lived this reality 

for 40 years. Unfortunately, when organizations become driven 

more by funding parameters than risk management principles, adjustments need to be made. This is the situation we now find ourselves in. As such, I implore you to include as part of the planning 

requirements in this bill a match of the mission requirements and 

resources needed. 

I would once again like to commend the committee for your efforts. I can see that a great deal of work and thoughtful analysis 

has gone into this project. I am convinced that if additional concerns are addressed in areas such as port user identification, the 

TWIC, overseas inspections and security integration, the act has 

the ability to significantly enhance port and maritime and supply 

chain security. 

I would like to offer my assistance and the assistance of my colleagues and myself to support you in any way possible. I would like 

to also publicly acknowledge the hard work that my Congresswoman Millender–McDonald, has put into port security bill, H.R. 

478. I do know that the congresswoman desires working with this 

distinguished committee in considering some of the elements of 

H.R. 478 with the SAFE Act bill. 

I thank you, and I will be happy to answer any questions you 

may have. 

[The statement of Mr. Cunningham follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHIEF NOEL CUNNINGHAM

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me to testify before you today. I will be discussing the proposed ‘‘Security and Accountability 

For Every Port Act’’ or ‘‘SAFE Port Act.’’ During this testimony I will address the 

act, and discuss other actions that I believe are critical in addressing vulnerabilities 

associated with maritime security. My assessment is based on my 40 years of experience as a law enforcement officer, Chief of the Port of Los Angeles Police, and Director of Operations at the largest port in the United States. My testimony is also 

being provided from my vantage point as a Principal of The Marsec Group—a small 

group that provides maritime and supply chain security consulting services to public 

and private sector clients. 

I should also note that this testimony was prepared with the assistance of the two 

other principals from The MARSEC Group: Captain John Holmes, former Captain 

of the Port of Los Angeles—Long Beach and Dr. Charles Massey, who retired recently from Sandia National Laboratories as the program manager for the Department of Energy Second line of Defense Program. As you may be aware, Captain 
24

Holmes and Doctor Massey have significant experience in port and border security, 

and like myself were ‘‘in the field’’ during and after the tragic events of September 

11th. 

Having had the opportunity to review the SAFE Port Act, I would like to commend the committee for its efforts, and go on record as supporting the concepts embraced in the act. I wholeheartedly support the efforts outlined in the areas of strategic planning, information management and data integration. I am pleased to see 

that the bill addresses existing concerns regarding trade reconstitution. I am also 

very encouraged by the fact that the bill will better define the GreenLane process 

and that it embraces the use of a common metric in the Port Security Grant process. 

My experience leads me to believe, however, that the act could be made significantly more effective if this committee expanded its scope to establish new priorities 

for existing programs that are critical to the security of our ports. These include 

port user identification, enhanced inspections in foreign ports, and security system 

integration at the port, regional and national level. 

It is clear that the purpose of the ‘‘SAFE Port Act’’ is to improve maritime and 

cargo security, thereby protecting the safety and security of our citizens, our nation, 

and its economy. With over 80 percent of international trade volume carried by the 

maritime system, the likelihood that it will be targeted in the future by terrorists 

should be assumed. Although a great deal of discussion has taken place regarding 

whether maritime shipping is an appropriate means of transportation for a weapon 

of mass destruction, I firmly believe that this discussion misses the mark. If one 

is looking for a means of transport for a WMD there may be better vehicles. If one 

is looking for a means to cripple our economy, the transportation system is an exceptional target. 

Past terrorist attacks against an oil tanker and a LNG carrier would seem to support that the marine transportation system is both the ‘‘target’’ and the ‘‘arrow’’. To 

combat the terrorists and deploy systems to win the war on terror, the United 

States must aggressively support security programs already underway while implementing new ones to deal with the dynamic threat posed by modern day terrorists. 

Although the ‘‘SAFE Port Act’’ proposes a set of initiatives to complement, and/

or improve several existing maritime security programs, it is critical that an assessment of existing programs is conducted in order to identify and fill fundamental security gaps. The ‘‘SAFE Port Act’’ includes this crucial element and requires the development of a Strategic Plan to deal with the threat and ensure that security efforts are focused on the right issues. Equally important, given the likelihood of an 

attack on the maritime system, is an understanding of how the system will be restored after an attack. I am pleased to see that the Act addresses this important 

issue. 

I am encouraged to see that the bill addresses the critical issue of research and 

development. It is my strong belief that our focus needs to transcend our current 

efforts at plugging the security gaps that we know, and embrace the identification 

and prevention of those that currently do not exist. If this is going to be done, intelligence gathering and research and development will be key elements in the success 

of these efforts. Although I am heartened by these areas of focus, I would like to 

see the Act expanded to specifically embrace all methods of cargo scanning including 

those that have proven to be most problematic up to this point, i.e. chemical and 

biological detection. 

I also believe that the bill would be more comprehensive if the research and development section specifically addressed the issue of improving portable detection 

equipment. If we are truly going to embrace the concept of pushing back the borders 

and developing a multi-layered layered security system, it is critical that we not 

only conduct most of our inspections overseas (as is currently the focus of the Container Security and Megaports initiatives), but that we also provide our seagoing inspection teams the equipment that is needed to prevent illicit materials from being 

transported into and through U. S. waters. Seagoing examinations are hazardous 

undertakings. It is critical therefore that we develop equipment that is specifically 

made for the maritime environment. 

Although I recognize that this issue is generally addressed in some of the existing 

regulations, I would also like to support the idea of outlining requirements for training and exercises in the bill. As a career law-enforcement officer I can not underscore enough the criticality of a solid training program. It is my belief that this bill 

should require ports and port personnel to take a leadership role in port security 

training. Requirements should be put in place requiring port and regional training 

exercises in such areas as response, personnel evacuation and reconstitution of operations. 

It is my belief that when an assessment is conducted, key gaps will be identified. 

These include: 
25

• Inability to clearly determine who is working in our ports: Unlike our airports, our ports have no credentialing system. One of the universal truths in 

law enforcement is that security starts with people. Officers and responsible 

citizens are oftentimes much more reliable and accurate in detecting and deterring criminal, or terrorist, activities than sophisticated technological systems. If 

bad people can not undertake their efforts without being exposed, the system 

will be more secure. Identification of workers through efforts like the Transportation Worker Identification Card (TWIC) are on target and expansion of this 

type of information assessment and utilization to other members of the supply 

chain, including shippers, carriers, freight forwarders, and creditors, as mandated by this Act will improve security. However, issues associated with the privacy of the data will need to be addressed. Through a cooperative effort involving labor, the industry, and the government, I believe the important ‘‘information’’ component of the maritime system—a component that would include information about the cargo and the people involved in its purchase and movement—

can be used to make the system more secure. Credentialing and access control 

are the foundation of any effective security system. This program needs to become the highest security priority. 

• Inability to truly know what is in the containers arriving in the U.S: As my 

close friend and colleague, Dr. Stephen Flynn has stated, the question that 

must be asked is ‘‘what’s in the box?’’ Given the complexity of the supply chain 

and the number of individuals involved, the only means to truly ensure that the 

contents of the container do not pose a threat is to use technology to screen the 

contents. In order to truly embrace maritime security, this screening must be 

forced to occur prior to loading. At present the amount of foreign inspections 

is simply not significant enough to provide a deterrent effect. No Port Chief of 

Operations or Coast Guard Captain of the Port wants to be the individual who 

finds the dirty bomb after it is offloaded in his or her port. 

• Lack of integration of current security systems on the port, regional and national level: In the post 9/11 climate ports and terminals have embraced the use 

of security systems that include, cameras, access control and intrusion detection 

systems. Unfortunately there are few cases where ports have taken the lead, 

and/or found the funding to integrate these systems. As a result, knowledge of 

security breaches or attempted breaches are not known outside the identifying 

system, nor are they examined systematically. What currently exists in most 

ports is a conglomeration of individual hardware, and not a port-wide security 

system. 

The gaps identified represent fundamental security shortfalls that must be addressed. Access control and overseas screening are foundational to supply chain security, and they represent the most efficient means to push back the borders. Until 

shortfalls such as these are rectified, the security of the entire supply chain must 

be called into question. 

While the use of information assessment tools and sophisticated detection systems 

by government agencies are two important legs of the three-legged security stool, 

system security will not be achieved unless the last leg of the stool is accounted for. 

This leg consists of the major players in the maritime transportation system—labor, 

terminal operators, shippers, carriers, and port authorities. Involvement of these 

stakeholders has been pursued through initiatives such as the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C–TPAT). I am pleased to see that the ‘‘SAFE Port Act’’ 

wisely endorses this effort. 

I believe the shipping industry wants to do more in the area of security. Because 

they are in business, they must be able to justify some of the expense and I believe 

they are right to expect something in return for their investment. For example, businesses that invest in the security measures required for participation in C–TPAT 

should be given priority in clearing their cargo through customs over business that 

do not. Designation of a GreenLane with achievable and definable requirements will 

do much to persuade businesses to invest in processes and technologies that can 

make us more secure. 

The involvement of industry is also crucial from another aspect. No one knows 

better where the security vulnerabilities are in the maritime industry than the industry. Tapping into this knowledge base is crucial for success. Operation Safe Commerce, of which my partners and I were key participants, is an example of industry 

helping to determine where security efforts are best placed. The ‘‘SAFE Port Act’’ 

continues to support this crucial industry-led effort. 

While container security is rightly the subject of much focus, cargo does not only 

move through the maritime system only in steel boxes. A Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) could also be transported to the United States on a bulk oil tanker, a 

Roll-on/Roll-off vessel, or a fishing trawler. Security of our nation depends on sys-
26

tems that will deal with all types of maritime threat delivery vehicles and targets. 

I am please to see that the focus of the bill goes beyond containerized cargo and 

that research, development and testing of processes and technologies that will address prioritized threats throughout the maritime system, are included in this Act. 

I also believe that if one is going to address security needs, the issue of resources 

can not be ignored. A question that must be asked during the planning and analysis 

required in this bill must be: ‘‘Are the federal, state and local resources on hand 

sufficient to educate, deter, detect, respond, and recover in the manner expected?’’ 

I think that the unfortunate answer to this question will be ‘‘no’’. I, more than most, 

realize that priorities must be established based on the principals of risk management. I have lived this reality for over 40 years. 

Unfortunately, when organizations become driven more by funding parameters 

than risk management principals, adjustments need to be made. This is the situation we now find ourselves in. As such, I implore you to include, as part of the planning requirements in the bill, a match of the mission requirements and resources 

needed. 

I would once again like to commend the Committee for your efforts. I can see that 

a great deal of work and thoughtful analysis has gone into this project. I am convinced that if additional security concerns are addressed in areas such as port user 

identification, overseas inspection, and security integration, the Act has the ability 

to significantly enhance port, maritime and supply chain security. I would like to 

offer the assistance of my colleagues and myself to support you in any way possible 

in moving this critical Act forward. 

Thank you. I would be happy to answer any questions you may have.

Mr. LUNGREN. Thank you very much, Mr. Cunningham. 

The chair will recognize all members for 5 minute periods for 

questions. I will start the round of questions. 

Mr. Ahern, you heard Mr. Cunningham say that one of the major 

concerns, if not the major concern, is ‘‘what is in the box.’’ Some 

people have said, well, the solution is fairly simple. We have to inspect every single container in every single foreign port before it 

comes here. 

What are we doing in that regard? Is that possible? And people 

keep referring to the Hong Kong experience, where they seem to 

be able to do this, at least I hear that repeated many, many times, 

that they get to look at 100 percent of all the containers and why 

can’t we do the same. 

Mr. AHERN. Thank you very much. There are several questions 

in there, and I will answer in order, sir. 

First, when you take a look at the data elements to help us identify what is in the box, there are currently 24 elements of the 

manifest that we use for targeting, 17 off the entry. We are in the 

process right now of identifying what additional elements we do 

need for targeting so that we can make a better determination of 

what is in the box. We then run it through our automated targeting systems. 

We are also looking to see what the appropriateness is of changing some of the timeframes for filing of entry information, as opposed to receiving it at or after the time of arrival. We want to 

move that up, so we are considering that. 

We also need to take a look at the stow plan that is electronically 

available to make sure that we can match that against some of the 

information that is sent to us electronically to make sure there is 

no unmanifested boxes. That information is available, so we are 

seeing how we can introduce that into our system as well. 

Overseas, we have now expanded as recently as March 8, and 

brought about our 43rd container security initiative port. We now 
27

have close to a little over 74 percent of the containers coming to 

the United States actually transit through those overseas ports. 

Your last point relative to the ICIS model that is in Hong Kong, 

I had the opportunity to go and look at that in October of this past 

year. I would say that as has been represented by many, it is completely oversold as far as what its current capability is. It has been 

misrepresented as to what it is currently doing. It is not doing 100 

percent of the containers. It is set up in one land of one of the terminals there to just put about 300 containers an hour through 

there. 

I will tell you that certainly the concept is a good one. We need 

to take a look at it. We need to take a look at how we could deploy 

it in a very well thought-out manner. So it does continue to provide 

the level of pushing the borders out screening that is necessary to 

have the appropriate threshold setting for alarms, with a radiation 

portal monitor. There needs to be a concept of operation that is 

meaningful, not just pushing containers through that model that is 

currently out there. We also need to take the opportunity to develop good, well thought-out response protocols to resolve the 

alarms. 

We are currently in the analysis right now of some of the containers that have been put through there. We just within the last 

couple of weeks received 21,000 files from the computer that had 

been collecting some of the radiation spectra, so that we can do an 

analysis both with our subcontractor, which is Pacific Northwest 

Laboratories, and also the Department of Energy has brought in 

the Oakridge National Laboratory to do some analysis for us as 

well, so we could actually come up with a model of how many 

alarms would a terminal operator expect in an overseas environment that would need to be resolved prior to lading. 

So to sum up on the ICIS concept, I think it is again currently 

been clearly overstated as far as what its current capabilities are. 

It is not doing 100 percent. It is principally the same technology 

we use here in the United States, so it is not a question about the 

efficacy of the technology, but it is how do we deploy the concept 

of operations effectively so it is a meaningful test, and we have the 

right protocols in place. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Let me ask this, and both for Mr. Ahern and Captain Salerno. You have your plan in place. You have figured your 

at-risk containers and so forth. You know there has been some 

check on them at the foreign ports. What is to say there is not 

going to be someone opening the container while en route? Taking 

something in; putting something in; taking something out, et 

cetera. 

Mr. AHERN. Certainly, that is a vulnerability in the supply chain 

and we are not dismissing that fact. We have been very aggressively with the department’s Science and Technology Directorate 

looking at the appropriate container security devices that could 

help as a solution for that. We think we need to fast-forward that 

process. 

We have taken a look at we need to have a 99.6 effectiveness 

rate with the device so that we are not resolving nuisance alarms, 

because we are looking at a universe of over 11.3 million containers 
28

in fiscal year 2005 came into the United States from overseas. We 

are looking at about a 12 percent growth expected for this year. 

I would not want to have our officers focusing on nuisance or 

false alarms because the technology is not working effectively. Our 

testing has currently been showing somewhere in the 94 to 96 

range as far as for accuracy, and four to six points of having to resolve against a universe of 11 million containers gets into the 

400,000, 500,000, 600,000 containers that need to be alarmed just 

because the technology is not working correctly. 

So we need to continue to get better with that. We have challenged the industry to continue to fine-tune to make sure they 

meet our current specs, and we are looking forward to coming up 

with a solution, because it is absolutely a key vulnerability that 

needs to be sealed with an appropriate container security device. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Captain Salerno? 

Captain SALERNO. Yes, sir. One of the elements of the vessel security plan that is required under MTSA and under ISPFSC internationally are provisions to guard against tampering of the cargo. 

Essentially, this puts a burden on the ship’s crew for vigilance. 

What we have seen in terms of whether this works or not, we 

have in fact had a case where there were stowaways in a box and 

they did egress the box while onboard the vessel in mid-ocean. 

They were detected by the crew, and that situation was in fact reported to the Coast Guard. So it is just one example of how the 

plan in fact did work in that case. 

Mr. LUNGREN. I have a lot of questions to follow up, but my time 

is up. 

Ms. Sanchez is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Again, I want to thank you all for being before us, and in particular Chief Cunningham, welcome back. I think you were my 

guest on the panel 2 1/2 years ago when we had this committee at 

the time. 

Mr. Chairman, you were not in the Congress for the second time, 

but we had Mr. Cunningham before our committee in Los Angeles 

where we held one of our first hearings. He has been an incredible 

resource for a lot of the information that we have on many of the 

bills that we have introduced. 

So welcome back and thank you for being with us. I certainly will 

continue to enjoy yours and Mr. Holmes’ and others’ information 

and expertise as we try to work through this. 

My questions have to do with C–TPAT, because as you said, 

Chief Cunningham, what is in the box is incredibly important. 

Let’s face it, the majority of what we do is we read the list of what 

somebody is telling us is in the box. That is what is going on. And 

in many cases, my longshoremen tell me, there are other things in 

the box, and we will be making a field trip tomorrow to the ports 

to see how advanced we have gotten since the last time we were 

there, the last time we saw the X-ray machine that takes a look 

at the container, the last time we discussed the number of manhours that it takes CBP to pull apart a container and look at everything. 

Yes, I hope it has gotten better, but I really don’t believe we have 

gotten better X-ray technology that we had last year or the year 
29

before when we were there. I also don’t believe that we are checking that many more containers that are coming in. So what is in 

the box? 

So we have this program, C–TPAT, where we have 10,000 companies signed up to participate in it. To this point, only 1,545 of 

those companies have had their security measures validated. That 

means we ask these companies, we tell them you are going to get 

some benefits, you are going to go faster and get your stuff through 

faster, if you write us a plan that tells us all your security measures, and how you are going to make sure that your vendors are 

doing the right thing and everything is secure and your manifests 

are right, et cetera, et cetera. 

And of these 10,000, we have validated, I think that is from CBP, 

1,545. So there are thousands of companies that are receiving benefits despite the fact that there has been no confirmation of the security measures that are in place at these companies. 

So my question is, when will all of the currently pending validations be completed? I think this is to Mr. Ahern. And I don’t want 

to hear about possibly certified companies, because I understand 

that that would mean that you received it, you stamped it as received, and then you gave certification to companies. 

So I want to know what is the pending validation; how long is 

it going to take you to get these 10,000 companies done; and aren’t 

you granting risk or reductions to companies whose security plans 

have not yet been really been checked? 

Mr. AHERN. I would be happy to provide you with a full answer 

on that. Of the 10,000 applicants, and we have 5,800 certified 

members. That is the appropriate universe to apply these credits 

for the risk scoring as well as for the validations. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. So what does ‘‘certified’’ mean? 

Mr. AHERN. ‘‘Certified’’ means that they have actually supplied 

a security assessment to us that we have reviewed, and we have 

gone back and forth with the company in many iterations to make 

sure it is an appropriate security plan where they can demonstrate 

through their written submitted security plan of what they are 

doing overseas. They are not receiving any credit at that point 

until the plan is actually initially certified. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Wait. So if you are initially certified, you haven’t 

gone to really see what is going on. You have just taken their plan, 

you have reviewed it with them, and then you have certified it. 

Mr. AHERN. That is correct. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. And now you are giving them credit scores for 

being good companies. 

Mr. AHERN. Partial credit. We have it in three tiers. That would 

be the first credit they would receive some benefit for. We then 

have the universe of those that then are certified and validated. We 

currently have, as you stated, 1,545 companies which represents 27 

percent of the universe of 5,800 certified members that are actually 

validated at this point. We have another 2,262 validations currently in progress which would bring us up to 39 additional percent. 

So our goal is to be at 65 percent completed by the end of this 

calendar year. I am not happy where our progress has been. We 

had a total authorized level of 157 supply chain security specialists 
30

to hire this year. We are currently only in the mid–80s as far as 

with the current onboard strength. We just made a recent selection 

of 40 individuals that should be onboard within the next 30 to 45 

days, so we should have an opportunity to get those numbers significantly more accomplished in the coming months. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. So you have 80 people to check 10,000 companies? 

Mr. AHERN. We have currently 80 supply chain security specialists that are doing the validations. We have 40 more that are currently in the final review for EOD-ing within the next 30 to 45 

days. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. I have a lot more questions, as you can tell, Mr. 

Chairman, but I will yield back and hopefully you will give us another round. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Yes, we shall. 

Ms. Harman is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again, thank you and 

the ranking member for allowing me to participate in the subcommittee. 

I do want to say that I think your visit tomorrow to the ports 

of L.A. and Long Beach will be excellent. I apologize that I will not 

be there. I have a date with a new granddaughter and she lives 

in New York City, so I am going to Los Angeles via New York City. 

My apologies. 

I thought your testimony was excellent. I think there is a lot of 

information on the record now about the very good things that are 

happening. Our ports are more secure than they were on 9/11. 

Again, I want to thank the Coast Guard in particular for heroic efforts. 

We have something in this bill about joint operations centers, 

which we intend to be the place that would take charge in an emergency. I have often heard the comment that it is not clear who is 

in charge. I do want to ask all of the witnesses about your views 

of these joint operations centers and whether you think they will 

be useful and whether they will add to, not compete with, the excellent capability we already have on the ground. 

Just before you answer, because I am thinking my time will run 

out, I do want to commend something that we have in Los Angeles, 

which is the Area Maritime Security Committee, which does integrate all levels of government and does include I believe the private sector as well, and is by my lights a very important improvement since 9/11. 

I was recently there accompanied by Senator Susan Collins. We 

were there to ask the question: Are we ready for a major terrorist 

attack? Obviously, the answer is no one can be totally ready, but 

surely in the ports of L.A. and Long Beach we have a very significant prevention and response capability. So I want to commend 

you, and if you want to say anything about the state of readiness 

as you answer my question about the need for a joint operations 

center, please do that. 

This is to all the witnesses. 

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. I will respond that Los Angeles is the point 

that you identified as one of those models that you are pleased 

with. I, too, am pleased with the model. We have received exceptional leadership with the Coast Guard, the leadership of the Coast 
31

Guard and the captain of the port has been very strong in promoting the Area Maritime Security Committee, which is mandated 

by the Maritime Transportation Security Act. 

What makes the model work, though, it is an operation that involves all of the stakeholders. We have labor, we have the terminal 

operators, we have the local law enforcement, we have the federal 

agencies, the regulatory agencies. From that standpoint, yes, we do 

need it, and that language should stay in the bill. It is very important, and also I would suggest that we add exercises. The training 

and the exercises make that bill work. Right now, there is no mandate for that, but it is just the pure leadership that we are getting 

out of the Coast Guard that is making that work. 

Ms. HARMAN. Let me second your comment about the training 

and the exercises, but they also need to be, as I learned at that 

meeting a few weeks ago, really targeted in a better way than they 

are. And they need to be repetitive. We can’t do just one big bang, 

get a headline in a newspaper, and figure that the workforce and 

all of the stakeholders are adequately trained. Do you agree? 

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. I do agree. To not have the continuous and 

the repetition of the training, you have changes, the Coast Guard 

will change their leadership and their decision-makers and so will 

the local authorities. So it is important to have this training as 

part of the fabric of your security program and the change does not 

impact the leadership or change of the rules. 

Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I will be quiet. But could the other 

witnesses answer my question? Can we accommodate that? Thank 

you. 

Captain SALERNO. Good morning, Congresswoman. 

I would like to address the command center concept, because it 

is a very important one for the Coast Guard. As you may know, the 

Coast Guard has reorganized its field infrastructure where we had 

previously marine safety officers and group commands, they have 

been merged into what we now call sectors. There are 35 sectors 

established around the country. Essentially every port area in the 

nation is under the jurisdiction of at least one sector. 

Every sector has a command center. Part of their mandate is to 

engage local partners, other federal, state and local law enforcement, as well as private sector, port authorities and such. You 

mentioned the Area Maritime Security Committees, that is a requirement of the Maritime Transportation Security Act, so that in 

every Coast Guard area of operation, there is an Area Maritime Security Committee which brings together all of these stakeholders in 

the port community. Collectively, they are responsible for generating an area maritime security plan. 

We have authority and have exercised the authority to give certain members of this marine community, outside of the law enforcement community and outside the federal government, security 

clearances on a selective basis. For example, the head of a port authority may in fact need to know what particular threats may be 

operating in that port. We now have the means to bring them into 

the loop and to do that. 

As far as coordinating operations, our sector command centers 

are being fitted out to expand that capability. Traditionally, they 

have been search and rescue centers, somewhat limited in their 
32

focus. That has been expanded, much more inclusive, much more 

engagement with our agency partners and private sector partners. 

So that is very much in keeping with our plan for the future. We 

anticipate over the next several years we will see additional capabilities and the ability to share information that will be greatly expanded. 

Mr. AHERN. If I might just add very briefly on the command center concept, certainly the captain outlined it perfectly. I would just 

add one footnote to it, that the command centers should be where 

they make operational sense. That is one thing as we move forward 

when we do evaluation of where they should be placed, it is where 

it makes operational sense. We continue to partner with the Coast 

Guard. We actually began a pilot in Long Beach that we have not 

taken through the entire West Coast and we are going to be adopting it for national application just for joint targeting between the 

Coast Guard and CBP. 

I think to the question of the readiness of the ports, the president has approved through homeland security and national security presidential directives, HSPD 13 and NSPD 41, several elements that are calling for actions within the maritime domain. 

The one thing that remains to be completed is the maritime incident recovery plan, which calls for the resumption of trade. Should 

an incident occur, how do we resume trade? I would say that the 

comments are in. The only thing we are waiting for at this point 

is that we are taking some of the lessons learned from Katrina to 

add that in before we presented it for final approval. 

Mr. PENTIMONTI. I would like to simply add that as I mentioned 

in my testimony, we are concerned about the levels and amount of 

possibly conflicting legislative demands that come upon the industry. We have been frustrated in the past. But surely this command 

center deals with what is one of our long-living nightmares, and 

that is how we recover from incidents. 

So the industry quite heavily supports the concept of having coordinated and focused command capability in each of the locations 

where in fact there may be incidents. So we support it wholeheartedly. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Thank you very much. 

The gentlelady’s time is expired. The chair recognizes the 

gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Jackson-Lee. 

Ms. JACKSON-LEE. I thank the chairman and the ranking member for this hearing, and to Ms. Harman for the author of the legislation that I am pleased to be an original cosponsor of. 

Coming from Texas, we have one of the largest ports in Houston. 

Of course, it falls in a number of our districts. We spend a lot of 

time there. In fact, I spent some time there doing the Dubai port 

debate to assess the status of security at our port. 

Let me also before going into my questioning, what I do all the 

time when I see the Coast Guard is to again thank you so very 

much for your enormous leadership during the gulf coast disaster, 

Hurricane Katrina. I think it is appropriate whenever we are able 

to applaud the enormous act of saving lives, that we do so on the 

public record, and I do so at this time. 

Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member, I believe that this is appropriately a timely hearing, and I will take just a moment to express 
33

a sense of consternation, when we began to debate the question on 

the Dubai ports issue, to find out the predominance of foreign ownership of all of our ports in America. I think if you did a statistical 

analysis, you would find that 70 percent to 80 percent of our ports, 

terminals, et cetera, are foreign-operated or owned or leased, which 

raises a great sense of consternation from me. 

So as we proceed with the question of security and this particular legislation that focuses on container security and a number 

of other I think important elements. One is the strategic plan that 

is asking what is in place for maritime security, container security. 

I think we have the backdrop of questioning, why did America get 

to the point where we are in a sense foreign-owned at our ports? 

Now, the answer will be that port ownership or port operation is 

a global entity, and that you will find that occurring around the 

world. 

That may be well the case, but I still raise the question of why, 

if it is around the world, let’s just break even. Let’s not be losers. 

Let’s just make it 50/50, minimally, which is 50 percent domesticowned, if you will, and where are the incentives for such. And Mr. 

Chairman, I would argue that part of the work of this committee 

is to look at the question of incentives and why we are in this particular predicament. 

But as I raise that concern and sense of frustration and dislike, 

frankly, for that present posture, I also believe that we need to be 

proactive. I will be offering legislation that I am reviewing on a 

moratorium of further foreign leasing and/or ownership in America’s ports. 

Secondarily, I hope to offer an amendment as we move to full 

committee, or move to marking up this particular legislation, that 

deals with the seeking of existing security plans, not what will be, 

but what exists in the nation’s top ports, so that we can begin to 

have a further roadmap. 

It is somewhat we asked for after 9/11, which is to establish the 

vulnerability around America, a threat assessment plan, and I 

know that we might be still waiting on that at this point, some 5 

or 6 years later. I hope we don’t have to wait that long to find out 

what is going on in the nation’s ports. 

Let me then raise my question, Captain, to you, to find out about 

this seeming flaw in our system. When we began to debate the 

Dubai Ports World, we now have come to understand that as a terminal operator, because there was some debate saying that, oh, 

don’t worry about it; security is not in their hands. But as a terminal operator, my understanding is that the Dubai Ports World 

or any other foreign operator would be responsible for the security 

of their terminals, and that the Coast Guard simply checks compliance with security plans. 

Is this true? And how often does the Coast Guard visit terminal 

facilities to check compliance with security requirements? And does 

the Coast Guard conduct unannounced visits in order to be 

proactive? 

Let me raise this question with the assistant secretary on this 

issue of ferry security. One of the glaring anecdotal stories that we 

can tell is that a tanker, not a ferry per se, but a tanker loaded 
34

with weapons of mass destruction could be maybe even more destructive than the horrific act of 9/11. 

My question is, what are you aware of, working with the Coast 

Guard, steps are being taken to secure large ferry systems? And 

what technology is deployed to screen cars and trucks, but not halt 

the system? And we know that cars or trucks would be loaded with 

weapons of mass destruction, get on a ferry, and enter into the 

water system or a port, and warrant enormous destruction. 

So if you would answer those questions, and I would appreciate 

the comment on the idea of taking an assessment of nation’s security plans in the top 10 of our nation’s ports, and the whole idea, 

though this is a policy question, of how we can provide incentives 

for domestic ownership. 

Captain, why don’t you start out on this question of how do you 

check the security plans of terminal operators. 

Captain SALERNO. Yes, Congresswoman. 

From the Coast Guard’s perspective, the ownership of the facility 

is somewhat irrelevant to the requirements of that facility to develop and submit a plan to the Coast Guard for approval. There are 

certain elements that must be contained in that plan, such as how 

the facility will control access, how they will guard against tampering, what areas of the facility are secure and so forth. 

Ms. JACKSON-LEE. But they, the foreign entity, presents you the 

plan. Is that what I understand? 

Captain SALERNO. The owner of the facility does, yes. 

We verify. First of all, we approve that plan. If it meets all of 

the requirements of the law, then we do an on-site visit to verify 

that all of the procedures and equipment that they have stipulated 

in their plan are in fact in place and operational. 

We routinely would visit these facilities from a formal follow-up 

standpoint, at least annually. However, to get to your question, 

how frequently do we visit them unannounced, that will vary, but 

it is fairly routine for Coast Guard people either from a shore-side 

perspective or on the water-side in a boat would visit that facility 

several times during the year. It may be increased depending on 

threat levels, what we call maritime security conditions. Most of 

the time these visits would be unannounced. We would verify that 

the people are in fact following the provisions of their plan. 

Did I hit all the points that you were concerned about? 

Ms. JACKSON-LEE. The salient point is that they present you the 

plan. They are the owner regardless of whether they are a foreign 

owner or domestic. 

Captain SALERNO. That is correct. 

Ms. JACKSON-LEE. I thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. 

Thank you very much, Captain. 

Mr. Secretary? 

Mr. AHERN. Thank you for the field promotion, but it is the assistant commissioner of customs and border protection. 

Ms. JACKSON-LEE. Oh, I like ‘‘secretary,’’ so continue on. 

Mr. AHERN. It had a very nice ring to it, but I am a career individual, so keep that in perspective. 

[Laughter.] 

Ms. JACKSON-LEE. Thank you, Mr. Commissioner. 

Mr. AHERN. Thank you. 
35

I think first off, on the Dubai Port World transaction, I think it 

is important because I have had the opportunity in eight or nine 

open and closed hearings in the last couple of weeks, and had the 

opportunity to speak before many of you over the last couple of 

weeks as well, but continue to put into perspective the fact of what 

we were talking about in that transactions. 

There were foreign terminals currently operating in the United 

States that were going to be purchased by another foreign entity, 

and that cargo and containers and vessels were going to continue 

to come from countries of risk and they will continue to come today. 

I think that is why we need to continue to focus on the act that 

you are talking about here today to make sure that we have a good 

layer of defenses in place for all modes of travel coming in from 

outside of our borders, but make sure that we focus on that maritime security model by having interrelated elements of the strategy 

beginning overseas. Those are key points for us. 

Ms. JACKSON-LEE. So you wouldn’t have a problem with us assessing the, if you will, status of security in the nation’s top 10 

ports? 

Mr. AHERN. I would see no problem at all with that. I think that 

is a continuous process we need to be focused on. 

As your question then related to ferry operations, I would first 

begin by stating that one of the most successful apprehensions this 

country has seen for an actual terrorist coming into this country 

to do harm was on a ferry, coming in at Port Angeles. U.S. Customs at the time actually apprehended Ahmed Ressam, and he was 

actually to be the millennium bomber at Los Angeles airport, and 

he was successfully apprehended by our officers there in Port Angeles. 

We need to continue to deal with some of the same layers that 

we have for people coming into this country. We need to be getting 

the electronic manifests for ferries and cars coming on those vessels before they arrive in the United States. 

I think one of the additional things that is at this point in time 

in its final development inside of our organization and within the 

Department of Homeland Security is developing the requirements 

for the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative, to make sure that 

we have the appropriate documentation for people coning in, and 

ferries principally come to this country from Canada. 

So we need to make sure that we have the appropriate documentation with the appropriate security features issued to individuals that we then can electronically read and transmit in advance 

of their arrival so that we have some predictability of who is on 

those vessels. Those are the key points I wanted to raise on that 

aspect. 

Ms. JACKSON-LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I know my time is 

up. 

I simply, if the chairman would indulge me to speak to the chairman, is to simply say this hearing is timely. I think we are at a 

pinnacle crisis level and I think that quick action is warranted on 

securing the nation’s ports. 

I yield back. 

Mr. LUNGREN. I thank the gentlelady for her comments. 

We have time to go to a second round. 
36

I will start that off by asking Mr. Pentimonti, your organization 

is a foreign-owned organization, right? Your company is not an 

American company. 

Mr. PENTIMONTI. We operate as Maersk. Maersk, Inc. is an 

American-based company, but it is owned by A.P. Moller, which is 

a Danish-based company. 

Mr. LUNGREN. And you have terminal operations in Long BeachL.A.? 

Mr. PENTIMONTI. That is correct, in Los Angeles. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Los Angeles. In your statement, you stated that 

your company has contributed to significant infrastructure investments. There is always talk about the millions, the billions that are 

necessary for port security. I think oftentimes we assume that that 

means the government pays for all of that. 

What has your company done with respect to your own funds 

dedicated to port security in any American port, your facilities at 

any American port? 

Mr. PENTIMONTI. With very small exceptions, our company has 

funded virtually 100 percent of the costs that it has incurred in 

putting the security requirements of ISPFSC and all of the other 

CBP requirements on our cargo movements incur. So we have received I think some small grants from the government on various 

facility improvements, but they are a small percentage of the total 

facility improvements that we have made. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Would you have any estimate on how much your 

company has spent on port security improvements in your American port facilities since 9/11? 

Mr. PENTIMONTI. I don’t have a current number, but I could surely provide you that. It clearly is significant. We operate a number 

of ports throughout the East, Gulf and West Coasts, so there have 

been significant costs in improving our facilities to meet the requirements. In many cases, we exceed requirement levels that both 

the law and the regulations impose. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Thank you. 

Let me address this to the other three members of the panel. 

Yesterday or the day before, I had an opportunity to speak with 

some members of the longshoremen’s union. One of the things they 

were saying is from a birds eye view from the ground, while the 

security efforts that we talk about here in Washington are good, 

they suggested that what they have seen at some of the ports they 

worked at is lack of coordination. That is, one company’s facility security that may be fine, but there is no coordination among the 

company facilities themselves. 

So I guess I would ask Mr. Cunningham first, how does that 

measure up to your observation and what you attempted to do in 

Los Angeles? And then I would like to hear from both Captain 

Salerno and Mr. Ahern. 

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. I would suggest that that is probably an accurate assessment. Each of the operators do operate independent security systems. The Coast Guard, under the Maritime Transportation Security Act, each of the facilities have a facility security officer and there quarterly and sometimes more often meetings since 

that act was put in place. 
37

An effort has been made to coordinate the operations and the intelligence that is gathered from the cameras and the access data 

through the area of the Maritime Security Committee. Grants that 

are being applied for by the private sector, there is a requirement 

now that the port authority review those grants and assure that 

there is some coordination. 

From a perspective from the field, on the street, I would say that 

there is probably a dramatic need to improve and coordinate the 

private sector terminal security operations between themselves as 

well as that with the port authority and the Coast Guard. 

I may add that it is very important, and here’s where the federal 

government can play a major role, there are companies such as 

Maersk that are at the top of the line in the way of security. They 

are the Nordstrom’s in security. Yet, there are others that would 

cut corners and will not spend the dime for security. They take the 

profit and spend it in other places. 

So it is very important that the federal government does enact 

some standards to keep the playing field level, and not give one 

company any competitive advantage, and that is major issue in the 

level of security on who spends the money and who does not spend 

the money. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Let me just follow up with Captain Salerno, then, 

because the Coast Guard is responsible for reviewing the security 

programs and so forth. 

You have heard what Mr. Cunningham said about one may be 

doing a good job and not another. The reason this has come to my 

attention is that the longshoremen talked about an incident in 

Oakland where some fellow named Matthew Gaines, a 25-year-old 

individual, didn’t belong at that port, and managed to gain entry 

at various terminals, not just a single terminal, on different occasions, and so successful was he that he stowed away on ships traveling from Oakland to Los Angeles, Oakland to Japan, and I forget 

where the other one is. 

Now, after he had done that three times, I understand the captain of the port sent out a notice saying, don’t let this guy do it 

again, which I am glad they did, but isn’t that a suggestion that 

at least at Oakland we had a real problem, if one person could 

three times gain access not only to the ports, but also to stow away 

on these ships and take off? 

Captain SALERNO. Yes, sir, it is a problem. That is clearly not a 

situation that we want to see. It is the very thing we are trying 

to prevent. When those types of things happen, they are certainly 

investigated at the local level and also receive a great deal of scrutiny up our chain of command, as was the case for this individual. 

There are differences between facilities. The regulations themselves are performance-based. In other words, they set a standard 

that you are designed to achieve, you know, control access to your 

facility, for example, but it doesn’t specify the methodology that 

you use to accomplish that. 

As Mr. Cunningham mentioned, the Area Maritime Security 

Committee is really the focal point where a lot of coordination 

takes place at the port level. That is where information is shared, 

best practices are communicated between similar types of facilities. 
38

A lot occurs there where people can learn from each other. It is 

not inconceivable that you may have different ways of doing things. 

There are different risks at different types of terminals. A container terminal, for example, may have a different level of security 

and different methodologies that you may find a bulk grain terminal, for example, even within the same port. 

So there are going to be some legitimate differences, but the Area 

Maritime Security Committee is sort of that normalizing influence 

where those practices are shared. I won’t tell you it is a perfect system yet. There are always better ways to do things and improvements to be made, and there are some gaps in our system, as you 

pointed out. 

Mr. LUNGREN. My time has more than expired. 

The gentlelady from California, Ms. Sanchez, is recognized. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I just want to let Mr. Pentimonti know that I have a re-routing 

bill that you should take a look at and industry should support 

about what we do to resume trade if something goes wrong at one 

of our terminals or ports. 

I am going to go back to something that Chief Cunningham said 

earlier, two really great points: Who is working on our ports? And 

what is in the box? Obviously, who is working in the ports, I talked 

a little bit about the trucks and how that I think is a really big 

gap. 

After I ask a couple of questions, I hope that Chief Cunningham, 

you will sort of talk to some of these things because I think you 

have a real overall view of what is going on out at these ports, at 

least what we see in our own backyard. 

So the trucks, and the other issue, of course, is the ID card. Who 

is in our ports? Who is around there? 

I think another issue, too, is quite frankly with respect to the operators of these terminals. The ILWU or the longshoremen tell me 

that training is required. By Coast Guard regulation, training is required by the operators about what some of these guys are doing 

at particular points by the operators. They tell me there are plenty 

of operators who don’t provide that training. What ends up happening is that the union has to spend its dollars to make sure that 

its longshoremen are doing things correctly. 

And then go into what is in the box. You know, a container starts 

somewhere else, and we have been pushing this out to try to figure 

out what is in that container, and that is what the container security initiative is. I don’t think it works very well. I have had that 

discussion with Mr. Ahern before. And then it travels here, and one 

of the downfalls or the bad pieces of this is, as you already indicated earlier in your testimony, is that we don’t have a good system 

of knowing that that container didn’t go somewhere else, didn’t get 

stopped, didn’t get changed, didn’t get opened up, didn’t get something introduced into it, didn’t get switched out for some other container, before it reaches our ports. 

Part of that is the whole issue of when the container gets to the 

port, checking the seals. And I have a feeling that a lot of operators 

aren’t really checking the seals the way the Coast Guard regulations say they should be checked. I know that because my longshoremen tell me that. We are using cameras. Cameras can’t really 
39

tell whether a seal has been broken, whether it has been tampered 

with. I think we need to think about how we get back to the real 

basics of what is required and how we are doing that. 

Or the inspection of empty containers when they come into our 

ports, also aren’t being checked now by a longshoreman. People 

say, well the operators say, well we are weighing them. Well, you 

know, compared to what that weighs, I mean, you could put in a 

little suitcase of something that could be a bomb, radioactive, it 

could be something, who knows. 

So I think it is very important that we all work together and we 

get these issues on the table. These are other pieces that we might 

be able to introduce or introduce into a separate bill. 

I also want to get back to the whole issue of this, so you have 

this container, it leaves, it is not really tracked, it is not really 

sealed necessarily correctly all the way, it gets to the ports, and 

then we really don’t check it, we X-ray it, and maybe once in a 

while we open it. We are completely relying on what people are 

telling us are in there, and many times that is not what is really 

happening. 

More importantly, C–TPAT, we are relying on companies that we 

haven’t even gone out to check to see if in fact they have the security things in place that you said they had. Mr. Ahern, you talked 

about the 2,262 validations that are in progress. And yet these 

companies are still receiving a reduction of their risk targeting 

scores. But it is my understanding that the targeting scores of 

these companies are already below the threshold for inspections. 

So this cargo from these non-validated companies, are they inspected? 

Mr. AHERN. It is a whole series of questions here. I am not sure 

if you would like to begin with Mr. Cunningham. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. I think Mr. Cunningham, I would like to hear him 

address some of these issues because he has seen so much of this 

going back and forth in all the years he has been at the port. 

What about third-party validators? I mean, you have 80 people 

that can’t possibly check these 10,000 companies. What about having somebody else check them? Check, go out, and make the initial 

check on these plans that you are currently bringing in and stamping as approved and giving risk reduction for? 

Mr. AHERN. I think, given the questions, I think it is probably 

best to start with me and maybe Mr. Cunningham would wrap it 

up for you, if that is all right. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Yes, I think I said let’s start with you, and let’s 

have the chief talk about what is in the box, what we need to worry 

about. I get the number three, the number three about let’s coordinate all this. I think, you know, the model is in L.A. 

Mr. AHERN. Third-party validators. We have currently, to this 

point, we have not actually made the determination that thirdparty validators would be acceptable. We feel as though this is a 

government responsibility, even though there is no one more disappointed in our current performance than I am, even though you 

have certainly repeatedly stated your displeasure with us and how 

we are doing at our validations, there is no one that is more concerned about getting it done quicker than I am. 
40

Ms. SANCHEZ. I am not against the individuals who are doing 

this. I am just saying it is not getting done because the resources 

aren’t there. 

Mr. AHERN. And to the point of making sure that we bring 

enough resources to bear, we have been looking at a couple of different things. Certainly, as I stated earlier, we have 40 additional 

individuals that will be coming on within the next 30 to 45 days 

and that will get us above the 88 that we currently have on board. 

We have to this point resisted the notion of third-party validators. 

We think it is, again, a responsibility that we should be doing in 

the government, and not necessarily contracting it out. 

However, given the current situation and the expansion of C–

TPAT, which has been a good thing, we want to have more parties 

involved with a trusted program. We want to have the largest corporations in the industry, the importers reaching back to their suppliers, vendors, manufacturers, putting levels of security in place 

throughout the supply chain. 

Our challenge has been getting to all those locations to do the 

validations, so we are reconsidering whether we should be looking 

at third-party validators with controls. We have now expanded over 

the last year since the GAO report criticized lacking having a uniform way of doing the foreign validations. We now have a very uniform scored fashion where there are weights against the findings 

in the overseas environment, so that we can actually provide a uniform way of doing our validations. 

So perhaps we are coming to a point in time where in certain environments with certain countries that may not be of a significant 

risk, maybe the third-party validator has a fit for us. So we are 

going to be evaluating that with new eyes, but to this point we 

have been opposed to it. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Just to let you know, Commissioner, as you know, 

you can look at my record, I like federal employees. I think we 

have been having a discussion about TSA and whether we privatize 

or not, and you can certainly go back and see that I more than love 

federal employees. 

But the scope of work, if this is to work, is so large. I just believe 

that if we had others take a look at those plans and validate in the 

structure that they are actually doing what they say they are 

doing. And if this auditor or validator, whoever it is, sees that 

there are problems, gets back to you and says, you know, you need 

to come out and check this company here because it is not happening. 

I think there will still be more than enough work for the 88 plus 

40 plus 100 plus another 100 I think by the time we look at the 

number of companies that would love to be in the GreenLane to get 

through faster. 

So I would just ask you to consider that, and I don’t know if anybody else has any comments other than I would like to hear from 

Chief Cunningham overall on who is on our ports and what do we 

do about the box. 

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Who is on our ports, that is a critical question 

that quite frankly is the very foundation of our security or lack of. 

The fact that when you talk about foreign operators or American 

operators, the issue of what, the pleasurable things, the issues that 
41

I thought has come out of the Dubai discussions is that it has refocused security discussion on who is on our docks, and the fact 

that Los Angeles has foreign operators from Denmark and from 

Japan and Korea, and a lot of alliances that end up being both 

American and foreign operators. 

But the truth of the matter is we still don’t know whether it’s 

American or whether it’s a foreign operator who is on our docks. 

That is probably a fear of most Americans and a fear of the ILWU, 

who is on our docks. And one way of doing that, this bill I hope 

suggests that port identification, the TWIC, would answer that. It 

would answer that. We would know who is on our docks and access 

control would be in force right now where we are using driver’s licenses and employee IDs, and that is just not acceptable. That is 

insufficient. 

So that would answer a lot of the gaps in security that we find. 

The fact that empty containers are not being inspected, here again 

that is a cost issue with the port operator. That is an issue. It requires staffing. They are in the business to make money, and you 

do not make money by inspecting empty containers, and the risk 

assessment that has been done probably internally by their companies show that the threat, and we are concerned about the import 

and not the export of containers, so therefore there is very little attention paid to empty containers. 

One way of handling that is mandating or providing some type 

of program where empties become a part of the overall security 

plan for the entire region. That balances the playing field so one 

company does not do this and the other company does not do it, 

and therefore you will have a gap in your security. 

The issue with that customs has with the containers, what is in 

the box, that is so complicated. It is very, very complicated. The 

only solution, I believe, is just layers and layers of security that 

would deter the bad buys. It begins with enough will from the administration to begin the overseas examination, the inspection 

overseas. That is the first layer and that is probably the most important layer. 

The secondary layers are those layers that take place in between, 

routine and unpredictable inspections by the Coast Guard in regards to vessel inspections, as well as container inspections, and 

then the layers that are there on the land-side at the ports. So it 

is a layered approach, and we are years away from having 100 percent inspection. 

If Customs was to attempt to just up it 1 or 2 percent, I can 

imagine it would slow down our economy to the extent that we 

would all say why are our prices going up so high. So it is a very 

complicated equation that has to be balanced. But security foremost begins overseas, I believe, on the container business. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Mr. Dicks from Washington is recognized for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. DICKS. I regret that I wasn’t here for the whole hearing. I 

just had something I had to do. This is a very important issue. 

I want to just, there was a recent article written by Steve Flynn 

and James Loy, former commandant of the Coast Guard. One of 

their major points was since the United States cannot own and 

control all the systems, we must work with our trade partners and 
42

foreign companies to ensure security. A major step in that direction 

would be to construct a comprehensive global container inspection 

system that scans the contents of every single container destined 

for America’s waterfront before it leaves a port, rather than scanning just a tiny percentage we do now. 

This is not a pie-in-the-sky idea. Since January 2005, every container entering the truck gates of two of the world’s busiest container terminals in Hong Kong has passed through scanning and 

radiation detection devices. Images of the containers’ contents are 

then stored on computers so they can be scrutinized by American 

or other Custom authorities almost in real time. Custom inspectors 

can then issue orders not to load a container that worries them. 

Now, they were talking like there are four or five companies that 

have about 80 percent of the containers that come to the United 

States. If they would impose a $20 fee like we have on aviation, 

that would provide the resources that the administration has filed 

to provide to do this job right. 

I would like to get a reaction to this proposal from the panel. 

Mr. AHERN. I think first from the Customs and Border Protection 

perspective, sir, I would tell you, and I did speak to this earlier in 

the hearing today, that the ICIS model that currently is in operation in the port of Hong Kong has been overstated, given its current capability. There is one lane in one of the terminals that is 

currently operational. There is no operational protocols or threshold settings or concept of operations that are in place. The technology is footprinted there, but it is not currently in any kind of 

an operational mode that has been official. 

Having said that, I believe it is very important for us to take a 

look at the capabilities of a concept like that, putting it in an overseas environment. I think it is extremely complementary to our 

CSI ports where we would then have that technology. 

Mr. DICKS. Yes, it fits right in with the container security initiative. Right? 

Mr. AHERN. Absolutely. It is completely in line with pushing our 

borders out, having the opportunity to scan and screen before they 

are placed on a vessel for lading. 

Mr. DICKS. Has the administration looked at this to see if this 

would be, I mean, it is under the container security, do you guys 

run the container security initiative? 

Mr. AHERN. Yes. 

Mr. DICKS. Have you looked at this concept? 

Mr. AHERN. I was there in October of this past year. 

Mr. DICKS. I mean, you were there, but what have you done? 

Mr. AHERN. We are currently in dialogue with the commercial 

vendor that provides the technology package. We have actually got 

21,000 data files that have been collected from the computer that 

actually ran the containers, again with no response protocols to 

take a look at what that actually might mean for nuisance alarms 

or regular recurring alarms, given some of the commodities or even 

background threshold radiation that would alarm us. Those need 

to be resolved before they are placed onboard a vessel for the 

United States. 

The other thing we need to be reminded of also as far as the capabilities in the private sectors is when I met with them over 
43

there, they are very interested in investing in this and making the 

capital investment to put that there. 

Mr. DICKS. Hutchison is one of the leading companies in this, 

and they have said that they are going to do their Hong Kong-style 

inspection system in place within its 42 ports. 

Mr. AHERN. They are certainly one of the leaders on this front 

and they were there when I was there at the same time in October. 

The other point I think that is very important to realize here, 

too, is the private sector can certainly invest and deploy this there. 

Mr. DICKS. They have no choice because the administration has 

refused to put the money up that the Coast Guard needs to do the 

job. 

Mr. AHERN. They could certainly invest and put it there anywhere throughout the world that they like. However, one of the 

things that needs to be worked through as far as who is going to 

respond to the alarms, and there will be alarms that will come in 

every single day and every hour of every day that will alarm, that 

are nuisance or false positive alarms that need to be resolved by 

some government authority. 

The United States government does not have authority in a sovereign nation. When we have gone out and negotiated our declaration of principles, we have to go and work through the host country 

counterparts. They would have to take on the responsibility. 

Mr. DICKS. Couldn’t Hutchison in this case go out and inspect 

the container? 

Mr. AHERN. I don’t think that that has been thought through at 

this point in time, and I am not sure certainly that? 

Mr. DICKS. How many more years is it going to take us to think 

through these kind of issues? 

Mr. AHERN. I think it is not quite as simple as you might like. 

We certainly are moving very aggressively. We are engaged with 

the private sector. We are looking at the data so we can make? 

Mr. DICKS. Eighty-eight inspectors to monitor the compliance of 

the 5,800 importers who have vowed to secure their goods as they 

travel from factories to ship terminals doesn’t look to me like an 

overwhelming response; 88 inspectors. That is appalling. 

Mr. AHERN. That is for the C–TPAT program. 

Mr. DICKS. Yes. 

Mr. AHERN. That is not for CSI. 

Mr. DICKS. And the Coast Guard has got 20. How many people 

do we have in the container security initiative? 

Mr. AHERN. Approaching 200. 

Mr. DICKS. Worldwide? 

Mr. AHERN. At the 43 ports. 

Mr. DICKS. That is not very many either, if you are serious about 

trying to do something about it. 

Now, Captain Salerno, let me ask you another question. Does 

anybody else want to comment on this one first? 

Mr. PENTIMONTI. Just a quick comment. The industry, you mentioned the four carriers, we are excited about the concept of figuring out better what is inside our boxes. There is no doubt. We, 

as Mr. Ahern has indicated, we are interested in investing. Obviously, the complexity of doing this in a foreign location and getting 
44

response from CBP on these signals is probably the most concerning issue. 

Obviously, we can, with the technology, take the pictures of what 

is inside the box, but for it really to improve security immediately, 

we would have to have a response so that we would know whether 

a further physical inspection were needed or in fact the box was 

allowed to be loaded safely on a ship, recognizing that what those 

pictures showed was what they should have showed. 

It is that evaluation that I think, as I testified, needs some resources and needs some attention that CBP has not provided, that 

I believe funding is direly needed to take it forward. 

Mr. DICKS. So it is the inspection part, it is once you have decided there may be an issue, then where are the people from our 

side to go in and look at it? 

Mr. PENTIMONTI. The 80 percent of the volume that comes into 

the United States, as you suggest, from possibly four of these terminal operators globally, yes, I think the investment to do that, it 

would fit easily. But being able to take that data and have it usable so that we could make a determination, or a determination 

could be made that that container should be loaded and is safe to 

be loaded and should not be set aside to be inspected, that is really 

the critical step that needs to be developed in this system. We 

agree wholesomely with what Mr. Ahern has said that that development is something which needs to be done. 

Mr. DICKS. I want to go back to the captain here. The administration has long underfunded port security efforts despite the Coast 

Guard identifying more than? 

Mr. LUNGREN. Does the gentleman ask for unanimous consent 

for a couple of additional minutes? 

Mr. DICKS. A couple of additional minutes. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Without objection. 

Mr. DICKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The Coast Guard identifying $5 billion in terms of American 

ports to comply with the Maritime Security Act. The same assessment showed that more than $2 billion would be needed to meet 

the additional guidelines issues by the International Maritime Organization, totaling about $7.4 billion over 10 years and about $1.4 

billion for immediate needs. Although Congress has made an effort 

to provide funding, $125 million in 2004, $150 million in 2005, 

$175 million in 2006, $913 million since 9/11, the administration 

has requested only $46 million in targeted funding for port security. 

Why is this, Captain? Why is there such a huge disparity here? 

And what would this money, if it was appropriated, what would it 

be used for? What kinds of things are you doing with this port security money? Why is this great discrepancy between what you 

found when you did the Maritime Transportation Security Act? 

Captain SALERNO. Sir, the $7 billion for the MTSA implementation over a 10-year period was an economic estimate of the cost to 

industry to put into place the measures that were required. 

Mr. DICKS. So it was never contemplated that the government 

would fund this? 

Captain SALERNO. No, sir. 

Mr. DICKS. Has the private sector funded it? 
45

Captain SALERNO. That was intended to be a cost borne by the 

private sector. 

Mr. DICKS. Have they funded it? 

Captain SALERNO. Yes, sir, they have. 

Mr. DICKS. The $7 billion? 

Captain SALERNO. Well, the costs, this is over a 10-year period, 

that was projected in the rulemaking. We are not tracking the actual costs to private sector for the implementation. That was a cost 

estimate over that 10-year period. 

Mr. DICKS. Well, it certainly hasn’t registered high on the admin- istration’s list of priorities if they have only requested $46 million 

for this over 4 or 5 years. Isn’t that correct? 

Captain SALERNO. Sir, are you referring to the grant proposals? 

Mr. DICKS. Yes. 

Captain SALERNO. Okay. 

Mr. DICKS. Funding for port security. 

Captain SALERNO. The grants as designed were not intended to 

fully provide the costs of the implementation of these measures. 

They were as an assistance for special needs, but not intended to 

fully fund the cost of implementing MTSA. 

Mr. DICKS. Okay, what kinds of things are they doing with the 

money? 

Captain SALERNO. Well, there are a variety of measures that are 

in place, or that are proposed by the individual ports and individual facilities and vessel operators, depending on the 

vulnerabilities that they have identified and have brokered through 

the captain of the port and the Area Maritime Security Committee. 

These are sent up to a national process and they are evaluated and 

they compete for the amount of money that is available. 

Mr. DICKS. Okay. Give us a few examples, if you could, of what 

they are doing with that money. 

Captain SALERNO. Some facilities have put in for grants for physical barriers, fences, cameras, that sort of thing. Some have put in 

in the early stages for vulnerability assessments. We are pretty 

much past that phase now. 

There is just a number of things as they go through their 

vulnerabilities and they try to close gaps, they can put in for it. 

Public service organizations, for example, police departments that 

have port security functions have put in for communications equipment. So there is a wide range of grant requests that have been 

submitted over the years. 

Mr. LUNGREN. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. DICKS. Yes, thank you for the extra time, Mr. Chairman. I 

appreciate it. 

Mr. LUNGREN. The gentlelady from California, Ms. Harman, is 

recognized. 

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Congressman Dicks’s questions point up the need, and I think I 

know the whole panel agrees, for a more comprehensive strategy 

for port security, more money obviously, but targeted at risky 

ports, and at multi-year improvements, which is something that 

this bill does. 

I think this legislation as it will emerge from the House will include a lot of things that will help achieve the good suggestions 
46

made by our panel and the good suggestions made by some in the 

audience like the ILWU. In that connection, I would like to strongly endorse something that Ranking Member Sanchez said, and that 

is more formal port security training and better terminal evacuation training for the ILWU. It is something that they need. They 

have requested it. Hopefully, the owners association at the ports of 

L.A. and Long Beach will respond favorably. 

I want to ask just a couple of questions to follow-up on some of 

the comments already made. First of all, Mr. Cunningham was 

talking about the importance of TWIC cards. As I understand it, 

a regulation is long overdue out of DHS on TWIC cards. It is something I have spoken to Secretary Chertoff about. I wrote him a little friendly reminder yesterday. 

So one question is, where are we with that, and do you agree 

about the importance of knowing who is on the ports and having 

a standard system to make sure they are who they say they are? 

That is number one. 

Second question, and it was addressed I think by Mr. Ahern, but 

I am not sure, and that was about the resumption of trade. You 

said that the report there, or the plan on resumption of trade has 

been delayed so that it can incorporate the lessons learned from 

Katrina. I think all of us would like to learn the lessons from 

Katrina, but I hope that they will not further delay this report. 

Should we have a major attack tomorrow, I would want to know, 

I do want to know, and I am asking you, what are our plans for 

resumption of trade? 

We had, as I mentioned earlier, a real-life example of what the 

costs of a labor lockout look like, and they are huge. So unless we 

have a plan in place soon, I predict that we will not only not learn 

the lessons of Katrina, but we will repeat Katrina. So please answer, this is for the two DHS witnesses, please answer my question 

about TWIC cards and about how much longer do we have to wait 

for the resumption of trade plan. 

Captain SALERNO. I will address the TWIC. Certainly, in the 

aftermath of the Dubai Ports case, there has been renewed emphasis on coming up with a rulemaking on the TWIC. Not that it has 

been sitting idle. Over the past few years, there has been quite a 

bit done. Coast Guard participates with TSA on this. TSA has the 

lead, but there have been some technological obstacles. There has 

been a lot of discussions about what the vetting principles should 

be and so forth. 

The work group has been working very hard, certainly in the last 

few months, to look at ways to accelerate this process, and the best 

I can tell you at this point is that we would anticipate a statement 

from the secretary within the next few weeks on where that stands. 

Is it important? Absolutely. There is a significant vulnerability in 

our port security framework that the TWIC will address once it is 

finalized. 

Mr. AHERN. I think to give a full answer, going back to the statements I made about the HSPD 13 and NSPD 41, there are several 

elements that are approved. The maritime domain awareness, 

MDA, has been approved. The global maritime intelligence integration plan has been approved. When we take a look at the MOTR, 

the maritime operational threat response, the agency roles and re-
47

sponsibilities, that has been approved and placed, and that gives 

us kind of the temporary fit until the maritime incident recovery 

plan gets done. 

Certainly, as we did demonstrate at least within our component 

within the Department of Homeland Security, when we were able 

to close ports and redirect traffic, the commissioner of Customs and 

Border Protection has the authority to close or suspend activities 

and redirect it to other locations so that we can have continuity of 

operations, not suspend and then recover, which I think is a key 

thing as we go forward, is not hopefully to have to suspend and 

then begin recovery or resumption; that we try to keep it running 

for continuity of operations, and that is what we were able to maintain with moving vessels throughout the gulf to other locations, 

making sure that we also took a look at foreign-flag vessels under 

the Jones Act moving between ports to put relief efforts forward, 

and continue to keep trade going in this country as we were responding to the disaster of Katrina. 

Ms. HARMAN. Well, I think that is an answer better than my 

question. Continuity of trade is much better than resumption of 

trade, and the TWIC program is absolutely critical. It should not 

just be a pilot project at a few ports. It should be a national program, and I hope you are hearing the urgency, at least that I attach to it. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LUNGREN. I thank you. 

I thank all the members of the panel for testifying, for giving us 

your valuable testimony, and all members for their questions. 

The members of the committee may have some additional questions for you in writing and they would ask you to respond to those 

in writing. The hearing record will be held open for 10 days. 

And without objection, the committee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 2:16 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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