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TO CONSIDER POSSIBLE IMPEACHMENT OF 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE G. THOMAS 

PORTEOUS, JR. (PART I) 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

TASK FORCE ON JUDICIAL IMPEACHMENT 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

NOVEMBER 17 AND 18, 2009 

Serial No. 111–43 

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://judiciary.house.gov 

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

JOHN CONYERS, JR., Michigan, Chairman 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

RICK BOUCHER, Virginia 

JERROLD NADLER, New York 

ROBERT C. ‘‘BOBBY’’ SCOTT, Virginia 

MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

MAXINE WATERS, California 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., 

Georgia 

PEDRO PIERLUISI, Puerto Rico 

MIKE QUIGLEY, Illinois 

JUDY CHU, California 

LUIS V. GUTIERREZ, Illinois 

TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin 

CHARLES A. GONZALEZ, Texas 

ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

LINDA T. SA ́ NCHEZ, California 

DEBBIE WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Florida 

DANIEL MAFFEI, New York 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

STEVE KING, Iowa 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas 

JIM JORDAN, Ohio 

TED POE, Texas 

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah 

TOM ROONEY, Florida 

GREGG HARPER, Mississippi 

PERRY APELBAUM, Majority Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

SEAN MCLAUGHLIN, Minority Chief of Staff and General Counsel 

TASK FORCE ON JUDICIAL IMPEACHMENT

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California, Chairman 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., 

Georgia 

PEDRO PIERLUISI, Puerto Rico 

CHARLES A. GONZALEZ, Texas 

BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

NOVEMBER 17 AND 18, 2009 

Page 

November 17, 2009 .................................................................................................. 1 

November 18, 2009 .................................................................................................. 139 

OPENING STATEMENTS 

The Honorable Adam B. Schiff, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of California, and Chairman, Task Force on Judicial Impeachment ............... 1 

The Honorable Bob Goodlatte, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Virginia, and Ranking Member, Task Force on Judicial Impeachment ...... 5 

The Honorable Lamar Smith, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Texas, and Ranking Member, Committee on the Judiciary ......................... 7 

The Honorable Steve Cohen, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Tennessee, and Member, Task Force on Judicial Impeachment .................. 7 

The Honorable Henry C. ‘‘Hank’’ Johnson, Jr., a Representative in Congress 

from the State of Georgia, and Member, Task Force on Judicial Impeachment ...................................................................................................................... 8 

The Honorable Pedro Pierluisi, a Representative in Congress from Puerto 

Rico, and Member, Task Force on Judicial Impeachment ................................ 9 

WITNESSES 

Mr. Robert Creely, Attorney, New Orleans, LA 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 19 

Mr. Jacob Amato, Jr., Attorney, New Orleans, LA 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 99 

Mr. Joseph Mole, Attorney, New Orleans, LA 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 140 

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Exhibit of Alan Baron, Counsel, Task Force on Judicial Impeachment, submitted by the Honorable Adam B. Schiff, a Representative in Congress 

from the State of California, and Chairman, Task Force on Judicial Impeachment ............................................................................................................. 58 

(1) 

TO CONSIDER POSSIBLE IMPEACHMENT OF 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE G. THOMAS PORTEOUS, JR. (PART I) 

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 17, 2009 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

TASK FORCE ON JUDICIAL IMPEACHMENT

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 

Washington, DC. 

The Task Force met, pursuant to notice, at 10:36 a.m., in room 

2141, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Adam Schiff 

(Chairman of the Task Force) presiding. 

Present: Representatives Schiff, Cohen, Johnson, Gonzalez, 

Pierluisi, Goodlatte, Lungren, Gohmert, and Sensenbrenner. 

Staff Present: Alan Baron, Counsel; Harold Damelin, Counsel; 

Mark H. Dubester, Counsel; Jessica Klein, Staff Assistant; and 

Kirsten Konar, Counsel. 

Mr. SCHIFF. This hearing of the House Judiciary Task Force on 

Judicial Impeachment will now come to order. Without objection, 

the Chair will be authorized to declare a recess of the hearing. 

I will now recognize myself for an opening statement. 

This hearing has been called to commence the inquiry into 

whether United States District Court Judge Thomas Porteous 

should be impeached by the United States House of Representatives. Article I, Section 1 of the Constitution vests the sole power 

of impeachment in the House of Representatives. As has been 

noted in the past, such a task is not one that we welcome. However, it is an important responsibility that has been entrusted to 

us by the founders. 

In late 1999, the United States Department of Justice and the 

Federal Bureau of Investigation began a criminal investigation of 

Judge Porteous. Several years later, the Department of Justice submitted a complaint referring allegations of judicial misconduct concerning Judge Porteous to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. The 

complaint noted that the FBI and a grand jury had been investigating Judge Porteous for many years but decided not to bring 

criminal charges and instead referred the case to the courts and 

Congress for disciplinary proceedings and potential impeachment. 

Despite the Department’s decision not to charge Judge Porteous 

with violations of Federal criminal law, the complaint stated that 

the investigation uncovered evidence of ‘‘pervasive misconduct committed by Judge Porteous.’’ 

2 

The complaint states, ‘‘Collectively, the evidence indicates that 

Judge Porteous may have violated Federal and state criminal laws, 

controlling canons of judicial conduct, rules of professional responsibility, and conducted himself in a manner antithetical to the constitutional standard of good behavior required of all Federal 

judges.’’ 

The evidence of misconduct cited included the following: one, evidence that Judge Porteous solicited and accepted money and other 

things of value from attorneys and litigants with matters before 

him; evidence number two, that Judge Porteous accepted things of 

value from a bail bonds company with business before his judicial 

district and its owners in exchange for access and assistance; number three, evidence that the judge filed false pleadings and concealed assets in a bankruptcy proceeding and violated an order of 

that court; and number four, evidence that Judge Porteous submitted additional false and misleading statements in official proceedings; number five, further circumstantial evidence that Judge 

Porteous engaged in corrupt activities; and, finally, number six, 

that the judge was incompetent to serve. 

The Department of Justice’s complaint concluded that the instances of Judge Porteous’s dishonesty in his own sworn statements and court filings, his decade-long course of conduct in soliciting and accepting a stream of payments and gifts from litigants 

and lawyers with matters before him, and his repeated failures to 

disclose those dealings to interested parties and the court all 

render him unfit as an Article III judge. 

Upon receipt of the department’s complaint, the fifth circuit appointed a special investigatory committee to investigate the allegations. Hearings were held, at which Judge Porteous, representing 

himself, made statements, cross-examined witnesses, and called 

witnesses on his own behalf. In November 2007, the special investigatory committee issued a report detailing the findings of their 

investigation of Judge Porteous. The special committee concluded 

that the matter should be referred to the Judicial Conference of the 

United States because Judge Porteous had engaged in conduct 

which might constitute grounds for impeachment under both Article I and Article III of the Constitution. 

On December 20, 2007, the full Judicial Council of the United 

States Court of Appeals for the fifth circuit by a majority vote accepted and approved the special investigatory committee’s findings 

and certified the matter to the Judicial Conference of the United 

States. 

On June 17, 2008, the Judicial Conference of the United States 

voted unanimously to certify to the speaker of the House its determination that consideration of impeachment of Judge Porteous may 

be warranted based on substantial evidence that Judge Porteous 

repeatedly committed perjury by signing false financial disclosure 

forms under oath in violation of law, concealing the cash and 

things of value he solicited and received from lawyers appearing in 

litigation before him, that Judge Porteous repeatedly committed 

perjury by signing false statements under oath in a personal bankruptcy proceeding, in violation of law and the code of conduct for 

U.S. judges, that Judge Porteous willfully and systematically concealed from litigation and litigators and the public financial transVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:13 Feb 02, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\WORK\JUDIMP\11171809\53638.000 HJUD1 PsN: DOUGA
3 

actions by filing false financial disclosure forms in violation of law 

and the judicial code of conduct, that Judge Porteous violated several criminal statutes and ethical canons by presiding over the 

Liljeberg matter, and that Judge Porteous made false representations with intent to defraud a bank and causing the bank to incur 

losses, in violation of law. 

The Judicial Conference of the United States concluded that this 

conduct has individually and collectively brought disrepute to the 

Federal judiciary. On September 10, 2008, the Judicial Council of 

the fifth circuit issued an order and public reprimand, taking the 

maximum disciplinary action allowed by law against Judge 

Porteous, suspending him for 2 years or until Congress takes final 

action on the impeachment proceedings, whichever occurs earlier. 

On September 17, 2008, the House of Representatives passed 

House Resolution 1448 by unanimous consent authorizing and directing this Task Force to inquire whether Judge Porteous should 

be impeached. This authority was continued in January 2009, pursuant to House Resolution 15. Accordingly, we are conducting this 

evidentiary hearing today. 

Article III, Section 1 provides that the judges both of the supreme and inferior courts shall hold their offices during good behavior and shall at stated times receive for their services a compensation which shall not be diminished during their continuance 

in office. 

Article II, Section 4 of the Constitution provides that all civil officers of the United States shall be removed from office on impeachment, for and conviction of treason, bribery, or other high crimes 

and misdemeanors. 

The framers sought to protect the institutions of the government, 

according to one impeachment report, by providing for the removal 

of persons who are unfit to hold positions of public trust. The Congressional Research Service has written the phrase ‘‘high crimes 

and misdemeanors’’ is not defined in the Constitution or in statute. 

No definitive list of types of conduct falling within the high 

crimes and misdemeanors language has been forthcoming as a result of this debate, but some measure of clarification has emerged. 

The precedents in this country reflect the fact that conduct which 

may not constitute a crime, but which may still be serious misbehavior bringing disrepute upon the public office involved, may 

provide a sufficient ground for impeachment. 

The purpose of this and future hearings will be to develop a 

record upon which the Task Force can recommend whether to 

adopt articles of impeachment. These proceedings do not constitute 

a trial, as the constitutional power to try impeachment resides in 

the Senate. 

This inquiry will focus on whether Judge Porteous’s conduct provides a sufficient basis for impeachment. In order to develop the 

record, the Task Force has called witnesses and will admit documents that will help us determine whether the constitutional 

standard for impeachment has been met. This Task Force will proceed in a fair, open, deliberate, and thorough manner, and our 

work has and will continue to be done on a bipartisan basis. 

To date, Task Force staff has interviewed over 50 individuals, deposed about 20 witnesses under oath, and obtained documents from 

4 

various sources, including four witnesses, the 24th Judicial Court 

in Jefferson Parish, Louisiana, and the Department of Justice. 

I would like to note that Judge Porteous was offered the opportunity to respond personally to questions concerning his conduct in 

the form of a deposition. He declined our invitation. 

Today’s hearing will focus on allegations that Judge Porteous violated the public trust, the law, and ethical canons by presiding over 

the case in In Re: Liljeberg Enterprises, Incorporated. In that matter, which was tried without a jury, the evidence indicates that 

Judge Porteous denied a motion to recuse himself from the case 

based on his relationship with the lawyers in the case. In denying 

the motion, he failed to disclose that the lawyers in question had 

provided him with cash. 

Thereafter, while a bench verdict was pending, there is evidence 

that he solicited and received from the lawyers appearing before 

him illegal gratuities in the form of cash and other things of value. 

As the Judicial Conference noted, this conduct, which was undertaken in a concealed manner, deprived the public of its right to his 

honest services and constituted an abuse of his judicial office. 

In subsequent hearings, we will cover other allegations involving 

false statements in bankruptcy proceedings, a corrupt relationship 

with the owners of a bail bond company, and other allegations of 

improper gifts and gratuities, as well as hearings on the constitutional issues involved. 

Before we proceed, I would like to discuss some important procedural matters. Based on correspondence with Judge Porteous’s 

counsel and after consulting with Ranking Member Goodlatte, we 

will use several procedures, which I will describe. 

Judge Porteous has been offered a chance to testify and be questioned at an appropriate hearing. I understand that Judge Porteous 

is present today, as is his counsel. 

Counsel, could you introduce yourself? 

Mr. STARNS. My name is Remy Starns, 2001, Jefferson Highway, 

New Orleans, Louisiana. And I am counsel for Judge Porteous. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Could you bring the microphone just a little closer? 

Thank you. 

And, Counsel, we have offered Judge Porteous the opportunity to 

testify at an appropriate hearing. Is it your intention for Judge 

Porteous at an appropriate hearing to testify during these proceedings? 

Mr. STARNS. I am sorry, Mr. Chairman. I didn’t hear you. 

Mr. SCHIFF. We have offered Judge Porteous the opportunity to 

testify at an appropriate hearing with advance notice to the Committee. Is it your intention to have Judge Porteous testify at one 

of our hearings? 

Mr. STARNS. That has not been determined. Judge Porteous will 

not testify today. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Counsel, you will have an opportunity if you like to 

make an opening statement. Would you like to make an opening 

statement? 

Mr. STARNS. Mr. Westling is going to make an opening statement 

for us. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Okay. 

5 

Mr. WESTLING. Congressman, my name is Richard Westling. I 

am lead counsel for Judge Porteous. I have had numerous correspondence with you, and I appreciate the opportunity to be here 

today. 

Oh, I am sorry. I apologize. 

We have received your letters requesting information about 

Judge Porteous’s intent. It is not his intent at this time to appear 

as a witness at these hearings, but to simply attend as a person 

who is obviously interested in what is going on here today. 

Mr. SCHIFF. And would you just confirm for the record that 

Judge Porteous is present with us today? 

Mr. WESTLING. Yes, he is, your honor. 

Mr. SCHIFF. And, Counsel, you will be given an opportunity to 

make a statement during the hearing, as well as an opportunity to 

question witnesses, if you choose to accept that invitation. 

Mr. WESTLING. Thank you. 

Mr. SCHIFF. We have also invited Judge Porteous to submit documentary evidence on his behalf. He has also been given the opportunity to request the specific individuals be permitted to testify. 

As I just mentioned, counsel for Judge Porteous will be permitted 

to question any of the witnesses that he so chooses for 10 minutes 

each. While this is consistent with past precedent, it should be 

noted that this is an extraordinary prerogative that is being granted. This, after all, is not a trial, but is more in the nature of a 

grand jury proceeding. 

The Task Force reminds Judge Porteous and his counsel that no 

objections or other interruptions in the testimony will be permitted. 

After all Members wishing to make an opening statement will have 

the opportunity to do so, I will ask Task Force counsel Alan Baron 

to brief us for up to 20 minutes, providing a general overview of 

the matter under consideration today. After his presentation, the 

first witness will be sworn in and questioned for up to 20 minutes 

by Task Force counsel. 

After that initial period, Members will be recognized for questions under the 5-minute rule. Judge Porteous’s counsel will then 

be permitted to question the witnesses for 10 minutes. Finally, 

Members will be permitted to ask any further questions of the witness. 

After the Task Force is concluded with one witness, the next will 

be called. Hearing no objection, that will be the procedure. 

I would now like to recognize my colleague, Mr. Goodlatte, the 

distinguished Ranking Member of the Task Force, for his opening 

remarks, and I want to thank him again for the manner in which 

he has conducted this investigation. It has really been a completely 

bipartisan, really nonpartisan effort, and I want to thank him and 

introduce my Ranking Member. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, I believe that the procedures we have laid out 

this morning are fair and will facilitate a comprehensive hearing 

on this particular aspect of our inquiry into the conduct of Judge 

Porteous. I also want to thank you for administering this Task 

Force in a bipartisan manner. 

Article III of the Constitution provides that Federal judges are 

appointed for life and that they shall hold their offices during good 

6 

behavior. Indeed, the framers knew that an independent judiciary 

free of political motivations was necessary to the fair resolution of 

disputes and the fair administration of our laws. 

However, the framers were also pragmatists and had the foresight to include checks against the abuse of independence and 

power that comes with a judicial appointment. Article III, Section 

2, Clause 5 of the Constitution grants the House of Representatives 

the sole power of impeachment. 

This is a very serious power that should not be undertaken lightly. However, if evidence emerges that an individual is abusing his 

judicial office, the integrity of the judicial system becomes compromised and the House of Representatives has the duty to investigate the matter and take any appropriate actions to end the 

abuse and restore confidence in the judicial system. 

As the Committee of jurisdiction over the Federal bench and the 

Committee with authority over the impeachment process, the Judiciary Committee has a somber obligation to root out activities that 

undermine the impartiality of the Federal bench. For orderly society to continue, it is crucial that citizens continue to have faith 

that the judicial system will exercise its authority to determine disputes fairly and without partiality. 

I thank Chairman Conyers and Ranking Member Smith for authorizing this Task Force on Judicial Impeachment. While this is 

not pleasant work, it is necessary. 

Today we are examining the potential misconduct of Judge 

Thomas Porteous. The Judicial Conference of the United States forwarded this matter to the Congress for further consideration after 

concluding that Judge Porteous ‘‘has engaged in conduct which 

might constitute one or more grounds for impeachment.’’ 

Since then, the Task Force has been working diligently to investigate Porteous’s conduct and has worked with law enforcement 

and judicial officials, has conducted numerous interviews, taken 

depositions from key witnesses, and gathered evidence and transcripts from the previous investigations. 

These efforts have uncovered a large amount of information that 

the Task Force Members need to consider. We will hold a series of 

hearings to examine all of this information. However, today’s hearing will focus on Judge Porteous’s conduct leading up to and during 

the Liljeberg case, which was argued before Judge Porteous. 

The witnesses here today represented the litigants in the 

Liljeberg case, and they have firsthand knowledge of the incidents 

surrounding that case. It is worth noting that Judge Porteous was 

extended an invitation to come make a statement before the Task 

Force and respond to questions, but has so far declined to do so. 

It is also worth noting that the Task Force has permitted Judge 

Porteous’s counsel to ask questions of the witnesses today. 

If the evidence shows that wrongdoing occurred, then the Task 

Force will make the appropriate recommendations to the full Judiciary Committee, and we will have more work to do. I look forward 

to hearing from the witnesses and rooting out the facts in an objective manner. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this important hearing. 

Mr. SCHIFF. I thank the gentleman. 

7 

And I would now like to recognize the Ranking Member of the 

full Committee, Mr. Lamar Smith of Texas, for his comments. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you for holding this important hearing to consider the 

possible impeachment of Judge G. Thomas Porteous, and I appreciate the way you and the Ranking Member, Mr. Goodlatte, have 

conducted the ongoing investigation. 

The Constitution grants the House of Representatives the sole 

power to impeach a sitting Federal judge. This is a very serious 

power that Congress does not take likely. Impeachment by the 

House constitutes one of the few checks on the judiciary and is to 

be used only in instances when a judge betrays his office or proves 

unfit to hold that position of trust. 

We want to be fair to Judge Porteous and to that end, the Task 

Force has granted his attorney the opportunity to examine the witnesses who will be called to testify. Judge Porteous has also been 

invited to appear and testify at these hearings in order to explain 

why his conduct does not warrant impeachment. 

It is our constitutional duty not to prejudge the evidence in this 

matter or to anticipate the course of these proceedings. However, 

it should be noted that the allegations of misconduct and improprieties by Judge Porteous are serious, numerous, varied, and occurred over a period of many years. 

Based on a review of the allegations of misconduct by Judge 

Porteous that the Task Force has examined, the Judicial Conference certified to the speaker of the House that consideration of 

the impeachment of Judge Porteous may be warranted. Around the 

same time, the Judicial Council of the fifth circuit issued an order 

and public reprimand, imposing the maximum disciplinary action 

allowed by law against Judge Porteous. 

As of September 10, 2008, Judge Porteous has been suspended 

from the bench for 2 years or until Congress takes final action on 

the impeachment proceedings. 

Though judges rule on the law, they are not above the law. To 

preserve equality and fairness in our constitutional democracy, we 

must protect the integrity of the courts. The time has come for 

Congress to determine whether Judge Porteous’s conduct has 

deemed him unworthy to serve on the Federal bench. 

Now, I thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again, I look forward to hearing from the witnesses. 

Mr. SCHIFF. I thank the gentleman. 

At this time, I would be happy to recognize other Members who 

wish to make an opening statement. 

Mr. Cohen of Tennessee? 

Mr. COHEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the work 

you have done and the other Members of this Task Force. 

The judiciary has to be like Caesar’s wife, beyond reproach, as 

people have to have a highest opinion of fairness in that division 

of government, not that they shouldn’t in all three. But the judiciary holds a special place. And to soil the cloth is a serious issue 

that has to be discussed here by this Committee in this impeachment hearing. 

There are allegations, Mr. Chairman, that Judge Porteous has 

received money and other things of value from attorneys with busiVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:13 Feb 02, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\WORK\JUDIMP\11171809\53638.000 HJUD1 PsN: DOUGA
8 

ness before his court, and he has not denied that. He has claimed 

that some of these monies were for a personal nature and that people just extended them because of personal friendships. Nevertheless, that does raise an issue about the appearance of impropriety 

and certainly something Caesar’s wife would not have been involved in. 

The same friendship judge—attorneys appeared before his bench. 

And if the friendship were that close, it is troubling to know that 

the defense—receiving money is this close friendship, and if the 

friendship is that close to where people give cash monies, that they 

wouldn’t—that they would be allowed to practice before him and 

there wouldn’t be any disclosure to the other party or the public 

about the close personal relationship. 

There is a series of transactions and involvements that, as a lawyer and as a Member of this Judiciary Committee, that I find troubling. Nevertheless, of course, we have to listen to all of the testimony that is solicited and the statements of Judge Porteous and/ 

or his counsel and be impartial in this particular hearing. 

But our duty is to try to see what the facts are and maintain the 

integrity of the judiciary system in light of the task given us by the 

Chairman and determine whether justice dictates that we take action and send this on to the Senate for the overall good of the judiciary. 

These are very serious allegations that have been leveled against 

the judge and a serious and solemn duty that we must take and 

uphold to maintain the integrity of the judiciary and our Nation. 

I look forward to the testimony from the witnesses today and reserve our final judgment until after these proceedings are concluded, and I do appreciate the work of Chairman Schiff and Vice 

Chairman Goodlatte and the whole Task Force staff, especially Mr. 

Baron, in moving this investigation forward. 

And I yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. SCHIFF. I thank the gentleman. 

Who else seeks recognition? 

Yes, Judge Hank Johnson? 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to first thank the two leaders of the Task Force, Mr. 

Schiff and Mr. Goodlatte, with handling this matter in a manner 

that would make us all proud because we know that this will be 

a fair proceeding. 

And it is important, ladies and gentlemen, that we maintain the 

integrity of our judiciary, which is fundamental to the functioning 

of our legal system. As a former judge, current Chairman of the 

Subcommittee on Courts and Competition Policy, and a Member of 

the Impeachment Task Force, I believe in the importance of a judiciary free from judicial misconduct. 

Judge Porteous’s behavior is particularly egregious, as he stands 

accused. One example of this misbehavior, his refusal to recuse 

himself from a case in which he had significant financial and personal ties to the attorneys, and his deliberate attempt to conceal 

these relationships, goes to an issue that I am very concerned 

about. In fact, the Subcommittee on Courts and Competition Policy 

will be examining the state of Federal judicial recusal laws in an 

upcoming hearing on judicial recusal. 

9 

I am appalled at the additional violations that Judge Porteous 

committed, including accepting what can clearly be interpreted as 

bribes from counsel with cases in front of him, and false statements 

on his 2001 bankruptcy filings. 

I look forward to the testimony of the witnesses today and thank 

you. 

Mr. SCHIFF. I thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Pierluisi of Puerto Rico? 

Mr. PIERLUISI. Thank you, Chairman Schiff. I appreciate all the 

hard work you, Vice Chairman Goodlatte, and the Task Force staff 

have done in connection with this important inquiry. 

In our justice system, judges are called upon to be neutral arbiters of the disputes pending before them. Nearly as important as 

actual impartiality is the appearance of impartiality. For the public 

to have faith in the judiciary, it is critical that they never have reasonable grounds to suspect that a legal dispute was decided based 

on any factor other than the merits of the case. 

The troubling allegations being made against Judge Porteous directly implicate these two principles. Testimony that was provided 

in the earlier proceedings suggests that Judge Porteous may have 

used his office to solicit things of value from attorneys who were 

appearing before him. Specifically, according to this testimony, 

both before and during the pendency of the case before him, Judge 

Porteous received free meals and cash from the attorneys litigating 

that case. 

Equally troubling is the allegation that Judge Porteous concealed 

his solicitation and received things of value from the defendant’s 

attorneys in the case, thereby depriving plaintiff’s counsel of information it needed to fully assert that the claim that Judge Porteous 

should—had before him, that he had to recuse himself from dealing 

with it. 

If the facts presented in prior proceedings are correct, it is difficult to see how justice could have been fairly administered in 

Judge Porteous’s courtroom. At a minimum, an objective observer 

would have serious doubts that Judge Porteous could be neutral 

and unbiased. 

I want to emphasize that the testimony I have just described was 

provided in other forms to other investigative bodies. It is not the 

testimony that this Task Force has taken. Today we have an opportunity to hear directly from those most knowledgeable about Judge 

Porteous’s conduct and, importantly, to allow Judge Porteous’s attorney to cross-examine these witnesses. No judge should be removed from office unless the facts presented to Congress demonstrate that he or she is not fit for office. 

I come to this hearing with an open mind, and I—and a desire 

to understand more fully the facts surrounding Judge Porteous’s alleged conduct. I thank the witnesses for joining us, and I look forward to their testimony. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Does any other Member seek recognition for an 

opening statement? 

Seeing none, Mr. Westling, this would be a perfect time if you 

would like to make a brief opening statement. And you might take 

a seat at the table and—— 

10 

Mr. WESTLING. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. The microphone—— 

Mr. SCHIFF. If you can bring that mic very close to you, I think 

we could hear you a little better. 

Mr. WESTLING. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Members 

of the Task Force. First, I want to thank you for the opportunity 

to appear before you today. Judge Porteous is here with me, along 

with other counsel and Members of the team that have been working on this matter. We appreciate the courtesies extended by the 

Committee and the opportunity to participate in the hearings. 

I think the thing that people need to understand is that Judge 

Porteous has been on the bench in Louisiana for many years. Since 

1994, he was a Federal judge serving in the Eastern District of 

Louisiana, as this Committee is well aware. I practiced there both 

as a Federal prosecutor and then as a defense lawyer for many 

years. I am well aware of his reputation in the community, and you 

will find that there are no lawyers who are ever going to tell you 

that Judge Porteous did anything but the right thing in his own 

mind when he made decisions from the bench. 

As someone who has spent his life in a trial courtroom, the ability of a judge to properly try and discharge a case is critical in my 

line of work, as it is for many of you before you came to this body. 

And I think what you will find is that there has never been an argument that what happened in Judge Porteous’s courtroom was 

anything but fair. And I think the testimony before the Committee 

will bear that out. 

This is not a case that involves abuse of judicial office. It is a 

case that involves friendships that go back years, and it involves 

some decisions that perhaps in the light of day, looking backward, 

would have been made differently under different circumstances. 

But we have to remember—and this Committee’s well aware—that 

the constitutional standard for impeachment is very high, the independence of the judiciary and its ability to do its job fairly and 

forthrightly is critical to the functioning of this Nation and of the 

balance of powers between the branches of government. 

And that is why I am confident this Committee will carefully 

weigh the issues before it. We simply hope that you all will, as you 

have indicated, keep an open mind and evaluate the evidence fairly 

and give us our opportunity, as you already agreed to do, to participate as much as possible under the rules. 

Thank you. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Thank you, Counsel. 

We will now hear a brief introduction to the factual predicate of 

the case from Special Impeachment Counsel Alan Baron. Mr. 

Baron served as special impeachment counsel for the United States 

House of Representatives from 1987 to 1989, working on two judicial impeachment proceedings during that time. Mr. Baron was retained in October 2008 as special impeachment counsel by the 

House Judiciary Committee with regard to the possible impeachment of U.S. District Judge Thomas Porteous and, thereafter, U.S. 

District Judge Samuel Kent. 

Mr. Baron, when you are ready, please proceed. 

Mr. BARON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Members of the Task 

Force. 

11 

What I intend to do is to provide you with an overview of what 

constituted really three investigations into the activities of Judge 

Porteous, one by the Department of Justice, the initial investigation, secondly, the Fifth Circuit Special Investigatory Committee 

investigation, and, third, the Task Force investigation itself. 

We made—the Task Force made an independent investigation of 

Judge Porteous because the House has this unique function that is 

the sole power to impeach. Although we built upon the investigations that were conducted by the executive and judicial branches, 

we felt that the House had to make its own investigation and reach 

its own determinations. 

The Members should have before them a manila folder which has 

within it a hearing memorandum, also a—what we call the 

Liljeberg timeline, which will be the organizing principle of the 

presentation I make this morning, and finally, copies of the 

PowerPoint, which will be integrated into the timeline. 

Judge Porteous was born in December 1946, and he will be 63 

this December. In the early 1970’s, he graduated from LSU law 

school, specifically 1971, and he was a law partner with Jacob 

Amato, from whom you will hear later today, between 1973 and 

1974. 

Robert Creely, who also you will hear from later today, also practiced at that law firm. From October 1973 to August 1984, Judge 

Porteous also served as an assistant district attorney in Jefferson 

Parish, Louisiana. 

In August 1984, Judge Porteous was elected and served as the 

24th Judicial—District Court, as a judge in that court, for Jefferson 

Parish, and he served in that capacity from August 1984 to September 1994. 

Beginning in 1984 and shortly thereafter, Judge Porteous began 

routinely to request money from Robert Creely. And as we will see, 

Creely provided this money through partnership draws that he 

took from the law firm of Creely and Amato. If we could have first 

PowerPoint. 

This is an excerpt from Creely’s grand jury testimony, that is, 

the investigation conducted by the Department of Justice. He is 

asked by one of the questioners, ‘‘Let me ask you something about 

the mechanics of this. When he,’’ Judge Porteous, ‘‘came to you and 

hit you up, asked you for money, were you walking around with 

hundreds of dollars on you or did you have to take steps in order 

to get the cash?’’ 

Creely then responds, ‘‘I don’t remember the first time he asked 

me. If I had money in my pocket and I handed it to him, very well 

could have done that. But the bottom line was, the first time he 

asked me for money, I gave him money. And how the mechanics 

were about, that came about in which I gave it to him, I gave it 

to him. I don’t deny that.’’ 

He continues. And this now—it was a pattern that was set up 

over time after that first instance. He says, ‘‘I think sometimes I 

had to go cash a check, take a draw. Yes, yes, sir, I did not always 

have money to hand him. I would have to get—I would have to say, 

you know—you know, his tuition is due. He can’t pay his tuition, 

Jake.’’ Jake is Jake Amato, his law partner. ‘‘And he’d say, ‘All 

right. You know, how much money does he need?’ And I would say, 

12 

‘$500 or $1,000, whatever. I just want to be fair to him.’ And we 

have go get a check cashed and give him the money.’’ 

Now, the interesting thing is, Judge Porteous really doesn’t contest what Creely has just said. Now, I will report to the Task Force 

that—I guess several days ago—Judge Porteous brought an action 

naming me, Mr. Damelin and Mr. Dubester, in our official capacities seeking a TRO, which would have prevented us, if it had been 

successful, from using his—Judge Porteous’s testimony in the fifth 

circuit on the grounds—alleged grounds that it violated his Fifth 

Amendment right. 

Last night, Judge Richard Leon of the U.S. District Court in the 

District of Columbia dismissed the motion and denied the temporary restraining order. You can understand why Judge Porteous 

would not want that testimony made public, because here is 

Porteous’s response to the allegation from Creely that he had given 

the money. ‘‘Judge Porteous, over the years, how much cash have 

you received from Jake Amato and Bob Creely or their law firm?’’ 

‘‘I have no earthly idea.’’ ‘‘It could have been $10,000 or more, isn’t 

that right?’’ ‘‘Again, you are asking me to speculate. I have no idea, 

is all I can tell you.’’ ‘‘When did you first start getting cash from 

Messrs. Amato, Creely, or their law firm?’’ ‘‘Probably when I was 

on the state bench.’’ ‘‘And that practice continued into 1994 when 

you became a Federal judge, did it not?’’ ‘‘I believe that is correct.’’ 

So Judge Porteous doesn’t say it didn’t happen. He is a little 

vague on the details, but it happened. 

Eventually, what happens is that Creely begins to resent and 

protest of giving the judge this money. This is in the late 1980’s. 

And if we look at the next PowerPoint, ‘‘I told’’—this is Creely now 

testimony—testimony from the fifth circuit. This is now the fifth 

circuit inquiry. ‘‘I told him that I—we could not continue giving 

him money. I couldn’t continue giving him money. I got tired of the 

requests for every request he made. I was tired of it.’’ 

‘‘There came a time’’—and here is Creely in the grand jury— 

‘‘There came a time where, you know, this borrowing turned into 

this, as you said, burden. And that is a good word, because I, you 

know, can use many words for it, but he—there was a time I said, 

‘You know, I just can’t keep doing this, man. I can’t keep supporting your family.’ And I told him I had to stop. ‘I have got to 

stop doing this, all right?’ ’’ 

And then he says something very important. ‘‘But he started 

sending curatorships over to my office, all right? And he would 

send like two or three at a time. And he then started.’’ Now, let 

me stop for a minute and explain what a curatorship is. 

If there was a missing party in a lawsuit—and typically these 

were foreclosures by banks. That was often the way it would happen. They would appoint a local lawyer to perform basically ministerial tasks to sit in, to send a letter to the last known address. 

It was a very minor thing, basically done more by a paralegal or 

a secretary than the lawyers. And the fee was paid by the bank in 

most instances, and it was very modest, a couple hundred dollars. 

What Creely is saying is that, when he balked at sending this 

money to Porteous, Porteous then instituted this curatorship 

scheme, that is, I will send you curatorships, and you guys send 

me the money. 

13 

Creely goes on in the grand jury, he says, ‘‘He then starting calling and saying, ‘Look, I have been sending you curators, you know? 

Can you give me the money for the curators?’ I said, ‘Man.’ So I 

talked to my law partner. I said, ‘Jake, you know, man, what do 

we do?’ He says, ‘Well, just go ahead and give it to him.’ We decided to give him the money. We would deduct the expenses. We 

would pay income tax on it.’’ 

And here we go again. Judge Porteous is asked about this. Again, 

he doesn’t deny it. This is now Judge Porteous in the fifth circuit. 

Question: ‘‘Do you recall Mr. Creely refusing to pay you money before the curatorship started?’’ Answer: ‘‘He may have said I needed 

to get my finances under control.’’ Yes. 

He goes on. ‘‘And after receiving curatorships, Messrs. Creely 

and/or Amato and/or their law firm would give you money, correct?’’ Answer: ‘‘Occasionally.’’ 

We have a slide here which will just show you what a curatorship looks like. This is issued by Judge Porteous. And if you go to 

the next page, it is to Mr. Creely, signed by Porteous. It is just an 

example. 

Now, as part of the Task Force effort, the curatorships have been 

mentioned in a paragraph in a referral letter from the Department 

of Justice to the fifth circuit. It was not particularly explored in the 

fifth circuit, as I recall. 

Mark Dubester and Harry Damelin, who were Members of the 

Task Force staff, did a superb job, and they found a woman named 

Jodi Rotolo, who had never been interviewed, and she had been the 

bookkeeper for Amato and Creely. She led them to—she advised 

them, ‘‘By the way, I think there is a computer run at the old firm 

that lists the curatorships for the firm.’’ 

Well, they went. They got—with permission, they got the computer run. It turned out that they had over 300 curatorships on 

this computer run. And they then had to go to the local courthouse, 

and it was not computerized. They literally took the Amato and 

Creely list and then gave it over to the clerk, who is pretty old, so 

they had to literally by hand combing through the files to go find 

these curatorships. 

The curatorship list—computerized list indicated it was over 300. 

To date, they have found about 208 of these. And it is a work in 

progress. They are still looking. 

But if you look at the next slide, out of the 208, 191 were sent 

by Judge Porteous to the Creely/Amato law firm. And if—you 

know, what sounds like a small matter—$200, really, who is going 

to—not much to get excited about. But when you are talking about 

close to $200 of them, we are now talking about a pool of money 

out of which Judge Porteous could call up and say, ‘‘Hey, how about 

some money?’’ approaching $38,000, perhaps even $40,000. So that 

is the significance of the curatorships. 

Now, in June 1993, the so-called Liljeberg case—the case, actually, is Lifemark Hospitals of Louisiana v. Liljeberg Enterprises— 

is filed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana and assigned to a Judge Livaudais. This is 1993. Porteous 

is not even a Federal judge yet. 

Very briefly, without going into much detail, it is a complex case. 

It involves foreclosures on a hospital property. It involves bankVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:13 Feb 02, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\WORK\JUDIMP\11171809\53638.000 HJUD1 PsN: DOUGA
14 

ruptcy issues, real estate issues, contract issues, as to who had the 

right to run the pharmacy in the hospital. It is a complex case. 

But before this case comes to Judge Porteous—because he doesn’t 

get it until he is a Federal judge—Judge Porteous is now being considered as of April 1994. He is being considered for a possible Federal judgeship. As part of that process, he has to fill out and sign 

what is called a supplement to standard form 86, an SF-86. 

On there, he is asked this question: ‘‘Is there anything in your 

personal life that could be used by someone to coerce or blackmail 

you? Is there anything in your life that could cause embarrassment 

to you or to the President if publicly known? If so, please provide 

full details.’’ 

Now, by this time, we know that he has been getting all this 

money and the curatorships. His answer to that question is, ‘‘No.’’ 

And that is stated under oath. He signs—he says ‘‘I understand the 

information being provided on this supplement to the SF-86 is to 

be considered part of the original SF-86 and a false statement on 

this form is punishable by law.’’ I take it back: It is not under oath, 

but it is punishable by law to make a false statement on this document. He signs that knowingly. 

He is nominated to be a Federal judge in August 1994. In September 1994, he is asked to fill out and sign the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary questionnaire for judicial nominees. Again, he is asked a question: ‘‘Please advise the committee 

of any unfavorable information that may affect your nomination.’’ 

Again, this is after he has been taking the monies from CreelyAmato, the curatorship arrangement. His answer to that inquiry is, 

‘‘To the best of my knowledge, I do not know of any unfavorable 

information that may affect my nomination.’’ 

And we have—again, it is an affidavit. ‘‘I, Gabriel Thomas 

Porteous, Jr., do swear that the information provided in this statement is to the best of my knowledge true and accurate.’’ 

In January of—he is now on the Federal bench. In late 1994, 

Amato and Creely pay for some or all of a party to celebrate Judge 

Porteous’s swearing in as a Federal judge. And on January 16, 

1996, the Liljeberg case is now assigned to Judge Porteous. Trial 

is scheduled for November 4, 1996. 

On September 19, 1996, Mr. Jacob Amato and Mr. Levenson 

enter their appearance as co-counsel on behalf of the Liljebergs. 

Now, this is about 6 weeks before the scheduled trial date of a very 

complex case that has been around for several years. And I think 

it is fair to say that, although they are experienced trial lawyers, 

a case of this complexity was not normally the kind of case they 

handled. They did a lot of personal injury work, divorce work. I am 

not saying they weren’t capable of handling it, but it certainly 

wasn’t their type of case, and it is just 6 weeks until trial is supposed to come on. 

They are also retained on a contingent fee basis. It had to—and 

the fee range of it had to be approved because there was bankruptcy involved, so there had to be approved by the trustee and 

bankruptcy. So we know that they were to receive an 11 percent 

contingent fee. Mr. Amato estimated in his testimony that that fee 

was worth—if they were successful, anywhere from $500,000 to $1 

million to him and his law firm. 

15 

During this period—and we have here the entry of appearance, 

Judge Porteous—I am sorry, Amato and Levenson are substituted 

as attorneys of record. You can see there—and Amato signs as 

Amato and Creely. It is not just personally. And they are now in 

the case. 

Sometime between 1996 and 1999—we couldn’t pin down the 

exact date—Mr. Levenson goes on some hunting trips with Judge 

Porteous, but we couldn’t figure out exactly when. 

Now, Lifemark—now, they come in for Liljeberg. Amato and 

Levenson are in for Liljeberg. The attorney for Lifemark was a Mr. 

Joe Mole, who will also—he is here to testify. He is very concerned 

about this late appearance of Amato and Levenson on behalf of 

Liljeberg. He knows just from word of mouth around town that 

they are very close cronies of the judge. He also knows this is—this 

makes—this just really doesn’t make a lot of sense that they would 

be coming in just 6 weeks before the trial is supposed to start. 

He files a motion to recuse. Essentially, he is saying, ‘‘Judge, you 

should not sit in this case because of your close relationship with 

these lawyers, who have just gotten into the case.’’ He doesn’t know 

anything about the money situation that we know about. 

And I would like to—through the efforts of—none of the prior investigations, Department of Justice or the fifth circuit, apparently 

got hold of the transcript of that recusal hearing. And I—through 

the efforts of Kirsten Konar, a Member of the Task Force staff, we 

were able to get the actual transcripts, so we don’t have to rely on 

memory here. We have got the actual words of what happened in 

court. 

I want to set the scene. Mole has filed a motion to ask the judge 

to get off the case. Now, of course, Porteous knows, if anybody does, 

about the relationship that he has with Amato and Creely. Well, 

we will go into what he says. 

Amato is in the courtroom. He doesn’t say anything, never opens 

his mouth, but, of course, he knows that—about paying the money 

to Porteous and the whole curatorship scheme. Mole doesn’t know. 

Levenson, who argues on behalf of the Liljebergs, has been interviewed, and he says—he denies that he knew about the monetary 

relationship and basically feels he was used. We can’t prove to the 

contrary, so we will just accept that. 

We see here that Levenson and Amato are in. And I think it is 

worth going through what happens at that recusal hearing in a little bit of detail. 

Judge Porteous starts off by quoting a case that sort of sets the 

standard or sets a rule approving a motion to recuse, if it is appropriate. He is quoting now: ‘‘A lawyer who reasonably believes that 

the judge before whom he is appearing should not sit must raise 

the issue so that it may be confronted and put to rest. Any other 

course would risk undermining public confidence in our judicial 

system.’’ That is the end of the quote. 

And now here is Porteous. ‘‘I cite that so that everyone understands that I recognize my duty and obligations, and I am fully 

prepared to listen.’’ He then goes on to say, ‘‘If anyone wants to decide whether I am a friend with Mr. Amato or Mr. Levenson, I will 

put that to rest. The answer is affirmative yes. Mr. Amato and I 

practiced the law together probably 20-plus years ago.’’ 

16 

The court again, ‘‘Yes, Mr. Amato and Mr. Levenson are friends 

of mine. Have I ever been to either one of them’s house? The answer is a definitive no. Have I gone along to lunch with them? The 

answer is a definitive yes. Have I been going to lunch with all the 

members of the bar? The answer is yes.’’ 

No mention by Judge Porteous of what really is the issue, that 

is, that he has been getting all this thousands of dollars from 

Amato and Creely. Mr. Mole, at a great disadvantage, says, ‘‘The 

public perception is that they do dine with you, travel with you, 

they have contributed to your campaigns,’’ and Porteous pounces on 

this. ‘‘Well, luckily, I didn’t have any campaigns, so I am interested 

to find out how you know that. I never had any campaigns, counsel. I have never had an opponent. The first time I ran, 1984, I 

think is the only time they gave me money.’’ Now, this is, again, 

with full knowledge of all the other thousands of dollars that he 

has received from them. 

The court goes on to say, ‘‘You haven’t offended me, but don’t 

misstate. Don’t come up with a document that clearly shows well 

in excess of $6,700 with some innuendo, that means they gave that 

money to me. If you would have checked your homework, you 

would have found that that was a Justice For All program for all 

judges in Jefferson Parish, but go ahead. I don’t dispute I received 

funding from lawyers.’’ And, again, he never reveals the real funding that should have been on the table. 

‘‘I have always taken the position, if there was ever any question 

in my mind that this court should recuse itself, that I would notify 

counsel and give them the opportunity if they wanted to ask me 

to get off. I don’t think a well-informed individual can question my 

impartiality in this case.’’ 

Well, in effect, what you have here is Porteous and Amato, who 

know the facts, just not disclosing it, completely misleading and 

disguising the nature of the actual relationship. 

Lifemark sought a writ of mandamus from the fifth circuit to 

get—force the recusal, and that was denied. But, again, when Mole 

filed his papers, he doesn’t know about the financial arrangement. 

Mr. Mole brings in a counter-crony, if you will, a Mr. Gardner. 

This was at the insistence of his client, who comes in—and I anticipate you might want to discuss that with Mr. Mole and find out 

why he did that. 

From June 16 to July 23, 1997, Judge Porteous held a non-jury 

trial, no jury, but he sits on—after the conclusion of the evidence, 

he doesn’t decide the case for nearly 3 years. He doesn’t decide it 

until July—I am sorry, until April of 2000, just short—2 months 

short of 3 years. The next slide shows that, during this period, 

while the Liljeberg case is under advisement, his financial condition is deteriorating. 

You see here, year end 1996, this is around the time of the 

recusal motion. He is in credit—got credit card debt of $44,000 and 

an IRA balance of $59,000. In June 1997—this is during the trial 

in Liljeberg—his credit card debt has risen to $69,000. His IRA balance is now down to $20,000. In June 1999—and we will get into 

this—he asks Amato while the case is pending for money, because 

he said he needed it to pay for his son’s wedding expenses. By this 

17 

time, his credit card debt is up to $103,000. His IRA balance is 

down to $9,500. 

In April of 2000, when he decides Liljeberg, his credit card debt 

is up to $153,000, and his IRA has gone up to $12,000. Now, you 

might ask, what was the nature of this credit card debt? We have 

analyzed it, and in large measure, these are money advances at casinos. It is clear that Judge Porteous is a heavy gambler, and that 

that is where he has run up much of this debt, in the casinos. 

We talk about lunches. And, you know, these are not inexpensive 

or casual affairs. We looked at the credit card records. These 

lunches run hundreds of dollars, lots of—you know, at some of the 

finest restaurants in New Orleans, Emeril’s, big—the steakhouses, 

Smith & Wollensky, et cetera. We have gone through all that. And 

so while the case is under advisement, Amato, Gardner, Levenson 

are taking Porteous out to lunch numerous times. 

And I think—I want to go to the next slide—this is Federal 

grand jury testimony of Judge Bodenheimer. And Bodenheimer becomes a states court judge in late 1998, 1999. By this time, of 

course, Porteous is a Federal court judge. And he is sort of mentoring Bodenheimer in what he can expect. And here is 

Bodenheimer’s relating his advice from Judge Porteous. 

‘‘Judge Porteous was there, and he walks over, and he said, ‘Congratulations, kid, you know? Now, let me tell you—let me give you 

some pointers about being a judge. Number one, you will never be 

known as Ronny again. You will be Judge for the rest of your life. 

Number two, you will never have to buy lunch again, okay? There 

will always be somebody to take you to lunch. Number three’ ’’— 

well, you can read it. This was Judge Porteous’s attitude as a Federal judge about his relationships for the judge and the lawyers. 

Now, Amato was questioned about whether he had been solicited 

for money from Judge Porteous during the case that the—during 

the time that the Liljeberg case was pending. This is a deposition 

that has taken of Amato. 

Question: ‘‘Okay, you previously testified he asked’’—he, 

Porteous—‘‘asked you for money on that fishing trip. Is that correct?’’ Answer: ‘‘He told me that the wedding, his son’s wedding, 

ran over-budget and that he couldn’t afford it and could I lend 

him—give him—somehow get him some money to help out.’’ 

‘‘Okay, you don’t remember the exact word he used?’’ Answer: 

‘‘No.’’ ‘‘But clearly he wanted you to provide him money to help 

him?’’ ‘‘Yes.’’ ‘‘The amount of money—did you, in fact, provide him 

the money?’’ ‘‘Yes.’’ ‘‘The amount of money that he asked for, do you 

have a recollection?’’ He says, ‘‘It is about $2,500.’’ 

Now, again, Judge Porteous does not dispute the event. In the 

fifth circuit, he testifies, ‘‘Do you recall in 1999, summer, May, 

June, receiving $2,000?’’ ‘‘I have read Mr. Amato’s grand jury testimony. He says we were fishing. I made some representation I was 

having difficulties. They loaned me some money or give me some 

money.’’ ‘‘Well, whether or not you recall asking Mr. Amato for 

money during this fishing trip, do you recall getting an envelope 

with $2,000 shortly thereafter?’’ ‘‘Yes, something seems to suggest 

there may have been an envelope. I don’t remember the size of an 

envelope, how I got the envelope, or anything about it.’’ 

18 

And he goes on to say, basically, that he got the money. He 

doesn’t dispute it. 

‘‘Did you ever pay back the loan?’’ ‘‘No, I didn’t. I declared bankruptcy in 2001 and, of course, I didn’t list it.’’ I am not sure what 

he means to say there, but the point is, if it were a debt, presumably it would have been listed in his bankruptcy, but that is his 

testimony. 

Again, it is undisputed about what happened. There are other 

events during the time the case is pending. While it is under advisement, Levenson, Amato, Gardner and Creely provide money for 

Porteous to help pay for an externship for one of his sons in D.C. 

Levenson goes with him to the fifth circuit judicial conference in 

April 1999. In May 1999, Creely pays for part of the costs of Judge 

Porteous’s son’s bachelor party dinner in Las Vegas. Gardner also 

went on this trip and paid for a portion of the dinner, but he never 

tells Mole about it. 

The actual event when he asks for money from Amato at the 

fishing trip, that was on June 29, 1999. In late 1999, Amato pays 

$1,500 for a party celebrating Porteous’s fifth year on the bench. 

He still hasn’t decided the case. It is still under advisement. 

Levenson goes on a trip with him on a hunting facility. 

And in April 26, 2000, Porteous issues his decision in favor of the 

defendant, Liljeberg, represented by the Amato and Creely law firm 

and Leonard Levenson. Now, again, we have been going along with 

the Liljeberg case and going along the timeline. I am going to stick 

with the timeline, but we are going to divert for a moment here. 

In approximately June of 2000, Judge Porteous retains Claude 

Lightfoot as his bankruptcy attorney. Another event, in August of 

2000, Lifemark files an appeal to the fifth circuit from Judge 

Porteous’s decision in favor of Liljeberg. And on March 28, 2001, 

Porteous and his wife file for bankruptcy. 

And could we have that document? If you look at the highlighted 

version, the name of the debtor—he goes in under the name of 

Ortous—O-r-t-o-u-s—G.T. 

He also, as his street address—and we have evidence that he 

only gives a post office box. And this is a post office box that he 

had gone out and obtained about a week before he files for bankruptcy. He could have put it in the area on the form where it says 

it is a mailing address and still given his street address. He doesn’t 

do that. He just puts down a P.O. box that he had just acquired. 

And if you go to the next page, this, of course, is under penalty 

of perjury, and it is signed—well, I guess it is signed in the name 

of Ortous. About a week or 10 days later, he refiles under the real 

names. He claims—and Mr. Lightfoot confirms—that Judge 

Porteous did this—at least the false name—on the advice of his 

bankruptcy counsel, that it was okay to file under a false name. 

On August 28, 2002, the fifth circuit reversed Judge Porteous’s 

decision in Liljeberg. That in and of itself is not that big a deal, 

except when you look at the language employed by the appellate 

court in reviewing and analyzing Judge Porteous’s decision. Understand, this is the decision he makes in favor of Amato—the AmatoCreely law firm, where they stand to make a fee of anywhere from 

$500,000 to $1 million, and Levenson. 

19 

‘‘The extraordinary duty the district court imposed on Lifemark 

who loaned the money to build the hospital and held the mortgage 

is explicable. This is a mere chimera, existing nowhere in Louisiana law. It was apparently constructed out of whole cloth.’’ 

He said—finds—this has another finding. The court says it ‘‘borders on the absurd,’’ ‘‘clearly erroneous,’’ ‘‘this is not the law.’’ 

Again, on the next page, ‘‘comes close to being nonsensical.’’ And, 

of course, they reverse. For people who have read appellate opinions even when they reverse a judge, this is really amazing language. There was—his opinion was simply, utterly, totally indefensible. 

We have the live witnesses who are—were the actual participants in these events. Mr. Amato, Mr. Creely, and Mr. Mole are 

here to testify as fact witnesses in connection with what I have described to the Task Force. 

Thank you. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Baron, thank you for that briefing. 

And we will now begin with our first witness, Robert Creely, Esquire. 

VOICE. He is being escorted in. 

Mr. SCHIFF. He is being—okay. He is being brought in. He will 

be here shortly. 

Mr. Baron, can you go ahead and remove your nameplate from 

the desk? Thank you. 

Our first witness is Robert Creely, Esquire. Mr. Creely is an attorney with a law practice in the New Orleans area. He is here 

pursuant to subpoena and has been previously served with an immunity order that compels his truthful testimony at the proceedings before the House. Mr. Creely is joined by his counsel. 

And, Counsel, can you introduce yourself for the record? 

Mr. CAPITELLI. Yes, Mr. Chairman, Ralph Capitelli. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Thank you, Counsel. 

I will now swear the witness. 

Mr. Creely, please raise your right hand. 

[Witness sworn.] 

Mr. SCHIFF. Thank you. You may be seated. 

TESTIMONY OF ROBERT CREELY, ATTORNEY, 

NEW ORLEANS, LA 

Mr. CREELY. I have a problem hearing. And when you were addressing Mr. Capitelli, I was going to answer his question. I have 

a hearing deficiency, is what I am trying to tell you. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Creely, then if you—you will need to pull that 

microphone very close to your mouth. If you have any problem 

hearing us at any time, please ask that we stop and repeat the 

question. And we will try to make sure the mics are close to us. 

But, again, if you have any trouble hearing, please stop us and say, 

you know, would you please repeat the question? 

I am going to now recognize Task Force counsel, Mr. Mark 

Dubester, to question the witness. 

Mr. Dubester? 

Mr. DUBESTER. Okay, Mr. Creely, in a nice, loud voice, just introduce yourself. 

Mr. CREELY. Introduce myself? Robert G. Creely. 

20 

Mr. DUBESTER. And, Mr. Creely, did you go to law school? 

Mr. CREELY. Yes, I did, sir. 

Mr. DUBESTER. And where did you go to law school? 

Mr. CREELY. Loyola University. 

Mr. DUBESTER. When did you graduate? 

Mr. CREELY. 1974. 

Mr. DUBESTER. Okay. I am going to ask you a couple introductory questions just to cover your background, and then we will get 

into the heart of the questions that I am going to ask you. Can you 

hear me okay? 

Mr. CREELY. I can hear you. I am doing the best I can to hear 

you. 

Mr. DUBESTER. Okay. First, in the 1970’s, did you go to work for 

Mr. Amato? 

Mr. CREELY. Yes, I did. 

Mr. DUBESTER. And was Judge Porteous a partner of Mr. Amato 

at the time? 

Mr. CREELY. Yes. 

Mr. DUBESTER. And you knew him beforehand, but you also became friends of his when you were working with Mr. Amato and 

Judge Porteous, correct? 

Mr. CREELY. Yes. 

Mr. DUBESTER. And at some point, you and Mr. Amato went off 

by yourselves in your own practice. Is that correct? 

Mr. CREELY. Yes, sir. That is right. 

Mr. DUBESTER. And was that a full-blown partnership, 50/50 you 

and Jake? 

Mr. CREELY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DUBESTER. Okay. And in 1984, do you recall Judge Porteous 

becoming a state judge? 

Mr. CREELY. Judge Porteous became a state judge in 1984, yes, 

sir. 

Mr. DUBESTER. Okay. And you maintained a friendship with 

Judge Porteous after he became a state judge, correct? 

Mr. CREELY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DUBESTER. That consisted of taking him to lunch, taking him 

on hunting trips, other socializing of that nature, correct? 

Mr. CREELY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DUBESTER. And generally, whenever you socialized where 

there was money to be spent, who paid? 

Mr. CREELY. Well, I did, the firm did. 

Mr. DUBESTER. Okay. Okay, I want to talk to you about one of 

the matters which is of concern to the Members here. Did there 

come a time when Judge Porteous was a state judge that he made 

requests of you for cash? 

Mr. CREELY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DUBESTER. And can you describe what you recall about those 

requests, how they began and how they changed over time? 

Mr. CREELY. I don’t understand how they began, but over time, 

I began to resist making payments, and he began to use excuses 

such as he needed it for tuition, needed it for living expenses, 

things of that nature. 

Mr. DUBESTER. Okay. So can you just give a feel to the Members 

what Judge Porteous would say to you? He would say to you what? 

21 

‘‘Bob, I need some money’’? ‘‘Bob’’—what would he say? Use his 

voice and your voice. Tell them the conversation that would happen. 

Mr. CREELY. I wish you would give me a little leniency over a 

25 period of lifespan memory—— 

Mr. DUBESTER. Sure. 

Mr. CREELY [continuing]. Back to the 1980’s. But, basically, there 

is his living expenses, his necessities, food—not food, but education, 

things of that nature. 

Mr. DUBESTER. Okay. 

Mr. CREELY. I don’t remember exactly 25 years ago a conversation between he and I about what he wanted, but he made requests. Let there be no doubt in my testimony that I gave him 

money. 

Mr. DUBESTER. Okay. And the very first requests he made of you, 

were those of smaller amounts of money? 

Mr. CREELY. Very small amounts of money. 

Mr. DUBESTER. Okay. Now, did you like giving him money? 

Mr. CREELY. No. 

Mr. DUBESTER. Okay. What, if anything, did you do or say to 

Judge Porteous to communicate your displeasure with his requests? 

Mr. CREELY. I told him, quite frankly, I thought it was an imposition on our friendship for him to continue to ask me for money. 

Mr. DUBESTER. Okay. And did you say to that—did you say that 

to him more than once? 

Mr. CREELY. Yes, sir. But, once again, you are going back 25 

years. I am doing the best—my recollection is yes. 

Mr. DUBESTER. And after you communicated to Judge Porteous 

your displeasure, what did Judge Porteous do so that you could 

have money to give him? 

Mr. CREELY. Well, I don’t know what he did so that I could have 

money to give him, but he started sending curatorships to the office. 

Mr. DUBESTER. Okay. And in one—in 30 seconds, what is a curatorship? 

Mr. CREELY. A curatorship is an appointment by the court to represent an absentee defendant. 

Mr. DUBESTER. Okay. And was there a small fee, in the nature of $200 or thereabouts, that your office would receive for handling 

this curatorship? 

Mr. CREELY. I don’t remember what the fee was, but there was 

a fee, a small fee—I believe it was $150, $175. It could be $200, 

but there was a fee that we received to representing the indigent 

or the absentee defendant. 

Mr. DUBESTER. Okay. And if the clerk’s office has represented to 

us, that it was—by 1989, it was $200. Is that consistent with your 

recollection? 

Mr. CREELY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DUBESTER. Okay. Now, did you want Judge Porteous to assign you curatorships? 

Mr. CREELY. I am sorry, sir? 

Mr. DUBESTER. Did you want him to assign you curatorships? 

Mr. CREELY. No, I did not. 

Mr. DUBESTER. Were these important to your business? 

22 

Mr. CREELY. No. 

Mr. DUBESTER. Okay, who actually in your office took care of 

these matters? 

Mr. CREELY. My secretary. 

Mr. DUBESTER. Okay. Now, what was the relationship of the fact 

that Judge Porteous gave you these curatorships in relation to his 

requests for money? What was the relationship between those two 

events? 

Mr. CREELY. What was the relationship between—— 

Mr. DUBESTER. His assigning you curatorships and his requesting money from you? 

Mr. CREELY. In my mind, there was no relationship. 

Mr. DUBESTER. Okay. Well, what did he communicate to you as 

to why he assigned you the curatorships? 

Mr. CREELY. He didn’t communicate anything to me as to why 

he was sending me curatorships. 

Mr. DUBESTER. Well, explain what was going on then. 

Mr. CREELY. It would better maybe that way. 

Mr. DUBESTER. Okay. 

Mr. CREELY. He started sending curatorships. I complained about 

giving him money before and after he sent me curatorships, our office curatorships. I didn’t want to give him money before; I didn’t 

want to give him money after. I began to avoid Judge Porteous as 

much as I could, because I knew he was going to be asking me for 

money. 

Eventually, one day, he called my office, and he asked my secretary if we had been getting curators. My secretary communicated 

that fact back to me. I then went to the judge and told him that 

I didn’t appreciate him calling my office and, two, that I made no 

relationship between him giving me curators and me giving him 

gifts of money. And that is the evolution of that fact. 

Mr. DUBESTER. In your mind, was it clear to you that Judge 

Porteous had assigned you curators, curatorships, so that you 

would have a pool of money so you could give him back cash? 

Mr. CREELY. That was not in my mind, sir. 

Mr. DUBESTER. I am asking, in your mind, did you understand 

that Judge Porteous was assigning you curatorships so that you 

would have cash to give him back? 

Mr. CREELY. Eventually, that is what I thought he was doing, 

yes. 

Mr. DUBESTER. And what is it that caused you to have that understanding? 

Mr. CREELY. Because he kept calling my office. 

Mr. DUBESTER. And how was it that he communicated the link 

between the curatorships and the cash? 

Mr. CREELY. I don’t know that he did communicate a link. I don’t 

believe he had a record of curators that he sent; he just kept asking 

me to give him money over the years and I kept complaining about 

giving him money. 

Mr. DUBESTER. Okay. But he made inquiries in your office about 

the curatorships that he had sent to you, correct? 

Mr. CREELY. Yes, sir. 

23 

Mr. DUBESTER. And you understood that—you understood that 

he linked the assignment of curatorships to you giving him cash, 

correct? 

Mr. CREELY. I suspected that he had that feeling, yes. 

Mr. DUBESTER. Okay. Now, the assignment of curatorships were 

official acts by Judge Porteous as a state judge, correct? 

Mr. CREELY. Correct. 

Mr. DUBESTER. And he could have assigned those curatorships to 

anybody else in the New Orleans bar, correct? 

Mr. CREELY. Yes. And I am sure that he did. 

Mr. DUBESTER. Okay. But the ones he assigned to you, he assigned to you and to no one else, right? 

Mr. CREELY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DUBESTER. And in your mind, you knew he did that because 

you were giving him money, correct? 

Mr. CREELY. I suspected that he had that motivation, yes. 

Mr. DUBESTER. Okay. So he was taking official acts to enrich 

himself, correct? 

Mr. CREELY. I can’t speak for him, but that was my understanding. 

Mr. DUBESTER. Okay. And, in fact, he took hundreds of official 

acts in assigning you curatorships so you would have money so he 

could ask you for money. These were hundreds of official acts he 

took as a state judge to enrich himself. Isn’t that what you perceived? 

Mr. CREELY. I am sorry, sir. I am very sorry. 

Mr. DUBESTER. I will move on to the next question. Now, how did 

the fact that you had these curatorships influence your attitude 

about giving Judge Porteous money? 

Mr. CREELY. What? 

Mr. CAPITELLI. Can you repeat that one? 

Mr. DUBESTER. Did the fact that you had these curatorships 

make it easier for you to give him money? 

Mr. CREELY. Yes, sir. As I testified, I believe, on many, many 

previous occasions, it was a justification, okay? He was a very dear 

friend of ours. He was—you know, maybe I overestimated the 

friendship, but I considered him to be a very close friend who I 

loved. 

Mr. DUBESTER. Okay. 

Mr. CREELY. And he would give me curatorships, and it became 

a justification to help him out so that I didn’t have to go and spend 

my own money on him. It was—it was a major pain in the neck, 

curators. I want you to know that. 

Mr. DUBESTER. Okay. So to make it clear, you felt when you were 

giving him back these curatorship monies, it was almost as if these 

weren’t your monies, these were monies that he had provided to 

you so you could then tap to give back to him? 

Mr. CREELY. The monies went into our operating account. I did 

not keep track curator for curator what I gave him. He would make 

requests—maybe monthly—and I would give him money when he 

made these requests. I would avoid him until I couldn’t avoid him 

anymore. Then I made a payment to him. 

Mr. DUBESTER. Okay. Now, you have previously estimated that 

you gave him about $20,000 over time. Is that correct? 

24 

Mr. CREELY. I—— 

Mr. DUBESTER. Sorry, you and Mr. Amato, $10,000 each, roughly? 

Mr. CREELY. Over a 10-year period of time, yes, sir. 

Mr. DUBESTER. Okay. Well, except for the $2,000 we are going 

to talk about when he was a Federal judge, most of that happened 

in his last years on the state court bench, correct? 

Mr. CREELY. They happened while he was on the state court 

bench, yes, sir. 

Mr. DUBESTER. Okay. Now, the amount of curatorship fees that 

have been identified are close to about $40,000, and the amount 

may actually rise as further searching is conducted. Would that 

suggest to you that the amount may be as much as $30,000 or even 

more? 

Mr. CREELY. I didn’t hear him. 

I have estimated and guesstimated as to the amount of cash I 

gave him. I cannot tell you other than guess—other than guess 

what I gave him. I made a guess that I gave him $10,000 and my 

law partner gave him $10,000. 

Mr. DUBESTER. And, by the way, this was all cash, correct? 

Mr. CREELY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DUBESTER. Now, did you feel comfortable giving Judge 

Porteous cash in response to his requests? 

Mr. CREELY. Yes, I felt uncomfortable. I felt put upon. I felt 

taken advantage of. I did. 

Mr. DUBESTER. Okay. Now, I want to turn to 1994. Do you recall 

being interviewed by the FBI in connection with its background 

check of Judge Porteous? 

Mr. CREELY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DUBESTER. And how did—do you know how the FBI got your 

name to interview? 

Mr. CREELY. What did he say? I am sorry? 

Mr. DUBESTER. How did the FBI get your name, if you know? 

Mr. CREELY. Judge Porteous gave them my name. 

Mr. DUBESTER. Okay. And you just made a gesture. Were you 

pointing to Judge Porteous, who is sitting behind you? 

Okay. Now, the FBI write-up—they did a write-up of the interview with you. And you—it says that you stated—and I am reading 

verbatim—‘‘Creely advised that he knows of no financial problems 

on the part of the candidate and the candidate appears to live within his economic means.’’ Do you dispute making that statement? 

Mr. CREELY. No, I do not dispute giving that statement. 

Mr. DUBESTER. And would that statement have been true? 

Mr. CREELY. Was it—I am sorry? 

Mr. DUBESTER. Was that statement true? 

Mr. CREELY. The statement was probably not accurate. And the 

statement was—and I will tell you—we have interviewed about 

this beforehand—I knew nothing about his checkbook or whether 

it was negative at the end of the month. 

Mr. DUBESTER. I understand. Mr. Creely, listen—— 

Mr. CREELY. All I know is what he told me. He told me he was 

having financial problems. 

25 

Mr. DUBESTER. Okay. So if the FBI interview quotes you as saying that you know of no financial problem, that wouldn’t have been 

a true statement, right? 

Mr. CREELY. Correct. 

Mr. DUBESTER. And why would you make a statement like that 

to help Judge Porteous in the background check process? 

Mr. CREELY. As I told you, I didn’t want to do anything to impede his advancement. He was a friend. He was a very manipulative friend. And I didn’t want to—I didn’t want to hurt the guy. 

Mr. DUBESTER. Okay. And you also—I mean, as a practical matter, you didn’t want the FBI poking around in your financial relationship with Judge Porteous, did you? 

Mr. CREELY. Well, if I didn’t want that to happen, I would have 

never volunteered to give the interview. I wasn’t subpoenaed to 

give the interview. I volunteered the interview. 

Mr. DUBESTER. No, but Judge Porteous suggested that the FBI 

call you, correct? 

Mr. CREELY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DUBESTER. And at the time that Judge Porteous suggested 

that the FBI call you, Judge Porteous knew that you had given him 

thousands of dollars, correct? 

Mr. CREELY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DUBESTER. And that is not something that you said or would 

have said or could conceivably have told the FBI in that interview, 

correct? 

Mr. CREELY. If I was asked that question, I don’t know what— 

my response would have probably been negative. 

Mr. DUBESTER. Okay. And you also indicated in response to the 

FBI’s interview that you never knew Judge Porteous to abuse alcohol. Do you remember saying that? 

Mr. CREELY. Yes. That is a pretty vague question about abusing 

alcohol. 

Mr. DUBESTER. Okay. But the fact of the matter is, you had seen 

him abuse alcohol, too, correct? 

Mr. CREELY. If they asked me that, they asked me that, and I 

would tell them no, I didn’t know of him abusing alcohol. 

Mr. DUBESTER. Well, do you ever remember an incident where 

you have saw Judge Porteous obviously having abused alcohol? 

Mr. CREELY. Yes. 

Mr. DUBESTER. Describe one incident. Describe the incident that 

you have previously testified about at a casino where you—and describe Judge Porteous’s behavior when you knew that he had 

abused alcohol. 

Mr. CREELY. Well, I guess if everybody uses alcohol, you have improper behavior from one time from another. But, yes, I know that 

he drank to excess and probably functioned better under alcohol 

than he did without alcohol. 

Mr. DUBESTER. Okay. Well, was there an incident at a casino in 

which he was—had to actually be lectured by somebody at the casino because he was drunk? 

Mr. CREELY. An incident at a casino? 

Mr. DUBESTER. Yes, where he messed around with your chips because he was drunk. 

26 

Mr. CREELY. He knocked my chips over. I am not a very big gambler. He was acting in an obnoxious fashion, and he interfered with 

my play. 

Mr. DUBESTER. Okay. 

Mr. CREELY. And I got up and left. 

Mr. DUBESTER. But the point simply is, not only did you not tell 

the FBI the truth about his financial circumstances, you also didn’t 

tell them the truth about his drinking, correct? 

Mr. CREELY. Yes. Yes—— 

Mr. DUBESTER. Okay. I want to turn to 1999, Mr. Creely, while— 

you remember your partner, Mr. Amato, had the Liljeberg case. Do 

you remember that? 

Mr. CREELY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DUBESTER. And in 1999, while Mr. Amato—sorry, while that 

case was under advisement, do you remember going to Las Vegas 

with Judge Porteous for his son’s bachelor party? 

Mr. CREELY. I knew there was a case under advisement by Judge 

Porteous on the Liljeberg case. 

Mr. DUBESTER. Okay. And in Las Vegas, what, if any, expenses 

did you pay on behalf of Judge Porteous? 

Mr. CREELY. What expenses did I pay on behalf of Judge 

Porteous? 

Mr. DUBESTER. Yes. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CREELY. In Las Vegas? 

Mr. DUBESTER. Yes, in 1999. 

Mr. CREELY. As we talked about earlier, the only expense that 

I recall paying for him was a meal. You showed me a document—— 

Mr. DUBESTER. Okay, let’s just talk about the meal. Was that 

about a $500 meal in the nature of for his son’s bachelor party dinner? 

Mr. CREELY. There was—yes. 

Mr. DUBESTER. Okay. And you have seen documents which suggest that you also paid for Judge Porteous’s room in excess of over 

$400. Do you recall that? 

Mr. CREELY. I recall you showing me a document to that effect. 

Mr. DUBESTER. Do you recall paying for his room, as well? 

Mr. CREELY. I do not recall paying for his room. 

Mr. DUBESTER. Do you dispute that—if the records show, in conjunction with your—in connection with your memory, that you 

spent close to $1,000 for Judge Porteous in Las Vegas in 1999? Do 

you dispute that? 

Mr. CREELY. I cannot dispute the records. 

Mr. DUBESTER. Okay. 

Mr. CREELY. But I would like to state the meal, so that—— 

Mr. DUBESTER. Sure. 

Mr. CREELY. There were 20 people, 25 people at a bachelor party 

meal for his son. I was a guest of his son. The way I recall it, the 

meal check came out. There were 25 adults at this dinner. Everybody put their credit card onto the waiter’s tray. The meal was divided up and the tip. You know, with four or five men at my table. 

And there is no way you can eat a meal at a high-end steakhouse 

and drink for $400 or $500. I paid a portion of that meal. I didn’t 

pay for the entire meal. 

27 

Mr. DUBESTER. Fair enough. Did you pay over $500 for—towards 

the bachelor party dinner? 

Mr. CREELY. Whatever the record reflects. If it says $500, yes. 

Mr. DUBESTER. Okay. And finally, did you ever appear in front 

of Judge Porteous yourself personally? 

Mr. CREELY. I am sorry, sir? 

Mr. DUBESTER. Did you ever appear in front of Judge Porteous 

personally? 

Mr. CREELY. In 20 years that he sat on the state and Federal 

bench, I appeared before him three times, one time in state court, 

which was a jury trial. It was my first jury trial. The jury ruled 

in my favor. 

The insurance company wanted to appeal that ruling. They posted a surety bond to secure payment for the judgment. The insurance company was going insolvent. I filed a motion to test the solvency of the surety. He denied my motion outright. 

I had an interdiction of an elderly woman who was horribly mistreated in front of him. He ruled in my favor. Nobody could have 

lost that case. 

When he was in Federal court—and I believe it was the early 

’90’s—my recollection is I had a state court class action. A discovery issue came up over my entitlement to records that may have 

been protected by a Federal statute. And I don’t remember. It was 

the MMTJ or MMJT are the initials for it, which prohibit state 

courts or any court from inquiring into financial data from financial institutions. 

The defense lawyers removed it, got allotted—from state court, 

got allotted to Judge Porteous. They requested a TRO. He was well 

aware of everybody on the pleadings. He granted the defendant’s 

TRO. In other words, he ruled against me. 

We had a telephone status conference about the preliminary injunction that was coming up, and he blatantly, flat-out, over the 

telephone, ‘‘I am granting the preliminary injunction. If you want 

to make a record, come over. You are wasting your time,’’ basically. 

I made a record. I appealed him, and the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals overturned his ruling. That is all I remember 

doing in front of him for 30 years. So I got nothing back in return 

from him for curators. I mean, I did this out of friendship. 

Mr. DUBESTER. In none of those cases did opposing counsel know 

that you had given him thousands of dollars, correct? 

Mr. CREELY. Well, in the one in Federal court? 

Mr. DUBESTER. Yes. 

Mr. CREELY. He ruled against me before I even showed up. He 

ruled against me before I came. To answer your question, no, but 

he signed a TRO. I showed up. I lost. 

Mr. DUBESTER. Thank you very much. 

Mr. CREELY. Without—outright lost. 

Mr. SCHIFF. I thank you, Mr. Dubester. 

Mr. Creely, Members of the Committee now will take a brief opportunity to follow up on the questions that were asked by our 

counsel. 

I wanted to start out asking you about the curatorships. I think 

you testified earlier in answer to Mr. Dubester’s questions that you 

didn’t ask for the curatorships. Is that right? 

28 

Mr. CREELY. That is correct. 

Mr. SCHIFF. So you never went to the court and sought to become 

an attorney handling curatorships, right? 

Mr. CREELY. I was very busy. I didn’t want curators. 

Mr. SCHIFF. You consider them to be kind of a nuisance and not 

what you wanted to make your practice out of, right? 

Mr. CREELY. Absolutely not. 

Mr. SCHIFF. So it was Judge Porteous’s initiative to send you 

these curatorships? 

Mr. CREELY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SCHIFF. And he took this initiative at a time when you were 

resisting giving him more money? 

Mr. CREELY. Correct. 

Mr. SCHIFF. For some time—maybe a period of years—he would 

hit you up for money, and you were starting to tell him it has got 

to come to an end, correct? 

Mr. CREELY. I am sorry? 

Mr. SCHIFF. For some years, you were giving him money. You got 

tired of giving him money, and you told him it has got to stop, 

right? 

Mr. CREELY. Yes. 

Mr. SCHIFF. And around the time you told him it had to stop, the 

curatorships started showing up in your office. Is that right? 

Mr. CREELY. Correct. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Now, during the course of your receiving these curatorships, wouldn’t Judge Porteous call your office and inquire how 

many curators he had sent over to your office recently? 

Mr. CREELY. After a period of time, I began to avoid Judge 

Porteous, because I knew what he wanted from me: money. And 

I—I didn’t—I avoided him. He then called my office and asked, had 

we been getting the curators? That conversation was related back 

to me by my secretary. 

I approached him and told him that the curators and what I gave 

him had nothing to do with each other, and if he wanted to stop 

giving me curators, stop giving me curators. And if he would have 

stopped giving me curators, I probably would have continued to 

help him, because he was a friend. 

Mr. SCHIFF. But he would call and ask about whether you were 

getting the curators at the same time he would call and ask for 

money. Is that right? 

Mr. CREELY. He would ask for money, I would avoid him, and 

then he would call the office and ask the—if we had been receiving 

the curators. 

Mr. SCHIFF. And he would want to know how many curators you 

had received at a given time, when he would call? Is that the information you got back? 

Mr. CREELY. The information I had back is he wanted to know 

if we were getting the curators. And then he would start hitting on 

me for money again. 

Mr. SCHIFF. And so the conversations about the curatorships took 

place at the same time as the conversations about money? So the 

conversations the judge had with you about the curatorships, when 

he would call your office for curatorships, was at the same time 

that he would make requests for money. Is that right? 

29 

Mr. CREELY. I would have to say he was asking for money, and 

I was avoiding giving him money, so he called the office and asked 

for—if we were getting the curators. And, eventually, he would get 

money. 

Mr. SCHIFF. And when—did he ever get money—did he ever 

make the request for money of your secretary, or did it always go 

to you directly? 

Mr. CREELY. He made the request to my secretary. 

Mr. SCHIFF. For money? 

Mr. CREELY. Right. Well, to whether or not we were receiving curators, curators he was sending. 

Mr. SCHIFF. My question is, did he ever ask your secretary to get 

money from you for him? Or did the request for money always go 

directly to you? 

Mr. CREELY. The request for money, as I recall it, came directly 

from me. There is no telling what he did. I—he could have made 

that request. I am only aware of what requests he made of me. 

Mr. SCHIFF. So you don’t know whether he—you didn’t get a 

message from your secretary that the judge called, he wanted to 

know how many curatorships he had sent over, and he wants more 

money? Did your secretary ever tell you something along those 

lines? 

Mr. CREELY. I don’t recall that, but she said he was looking for 

curators—and, I mean, this is 15 years ago. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Did she tell you why he wanted to know how many 

curators he had sent over to your office? 

Mr. CREELY. I am sure the answer to that is obvious, because he 

wanted money. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Why is the answer to that obvious? 

Mr. CREELY. I am sorry, sir? 

Mr. SCHIFF. Why is the answer to that obvious? 

Mr. CREELY. I think it is obvious. 

Mr. SCHIFF. So it is obvious to you that the reason he was calling 

about the curatorships was because he wanted to call and ask you 

for money? 

Mr. CREELY. Yes. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Now, you—in your grand jury testimony, you testified, ‘‘And he then started calling me, saying, ‘Look, I have been 

sending you curators, you know. Can you give me the money for 

the curators?’ I said, ‘Man.’ So I talked to my law partner. I said, 

‘Jake, you know, man, what do we do?’ He says, ‘Well, just go 

ahead and give it to him.’ We decided to give him the money. We 

would deduct the expenses. We would pay income taxes on it.’’ 

That was your testimony before the grand jury. Was that accurate testimony? 

Mr. CREELY. It was as accurate as I could be, yes. 

Mr. SCHIFF. So to the best of your recollection, when the judge 

would call, he would ask you for the money for the curators? 

Mr. CREELY. That is my recollection, is he was calling to see— 

get an account of how many curators were there or how many curators we received so that he could ask me for money for curators. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Did you and your partner, Mr. Amato, ever consider 

giving him checks, writing him checks when he asked for money, 

as opposed to giving him cash? 

30 

Mr. CREELY. No, we did not. 

Mr. SCHIFF. And why didn’t you write a check from the law firm 

instead of going through the process of taking a draw and giving 

him cash? 

Mr. CREELY. Well, two things. One, I didn’t think giving money 

was improper. The ethical and judicial codes is I can give money 

to anybody I want to. What he has to report is a different thing. 

If I wrote him a check, I would have to have gone through a complete accounting breakdown as to what it is for, deductions, and so 

forth. He wanted cash. 

Mr. SCHIFF. So he told you he wanted cash, he didn’t want it— 

he didn’t want a check? 

Mr. CREELY. Correct. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Now, I am not sure I understood, because I think 

you used a double negative. Were you saying that you knew it was 

improper to give him money or that you thought it was proper to 

give him money? 

Mr. CREELY. Well, it is improper for me to give him money for 

him to rule on a case that I want him to rule on. If I would say, 

‘‘I will give you money if you rule on a case,’’ that is improper. But 

my reading of the canons of judicial ethics is that I can give gifts, 

including cash, to judges, as long as they report it on their disclosure statement. 

Mr. SCHIFF. So why didn’t you write a check from the firm if it 

was appropriate for you to give him money? 

Mr. CREELY. It would have been appropriate for him to give him 

money if I wrote him a check from the firm, yes. 

Mr. SCHIFF. So my question is, why didn’t you write a check if 

you thought that was an appropriate thing to do? 

Mr. CREELY. Because he didn’t want a check, one. Two, my law 

partner and I had a habit of, on a weekly basis, taking a draw, a 

cash draw. And out of that cash draw, we would give him monies. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Creely, isn’t it also correct that you didn’t want 

a written record of your giving money to a judge? 

Mr. CREELY. No, I didn’t want a written record that I was giving 

money to a judge. But—no. 

Mr. SCHIFF. At this point, let me turn to my Ranking Member, 

Mr. Goodlatte, for his questions. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Creely, to follow up on the Chairman’s question, when you 

say—may I borrow that—when you say, ‘‘We decided to give him 

the money. We would deduct the expenses. We would pay income 

taxes on it.’’ And you say you always paid him in cash, how did you 

account for that in the books of the law firm? 

Mr. CREELY. There was—there was no way—that was a general 

line statement. It was income coming into the office, income coming 

into the office. It would go into the general account on—and there 

would be a file generated for each case. Each case, we would have 

income and expenses. The income would then go on our income tax 

return. 

So, you know, I don’t know where that statement was taken 

from, but—— 

Mr. GOODLATTE. It is your grand jury testimony regarding the 

curatorships. 

31 

Mr. CREELY. We would—we would get money, put it in the bank, 

take a draw, and give him cash. But it wouldn’t be four curatorships goes into the bank and we kept track of it in that fashion. 

We would—we would take a draw and give him money. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. And would you each take a draw at the same 

time? How did that work? You both were giving him money. Was 

that not correct? 

Mr. CREELY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. And did you each take a draw? Did you keep 

track of how much he was drawing to give him and how much you 

were drawing to give him? Or—— 

Mr. CREELY. Yes, we—at first, it was not a lot of money. Toward 

the end, he would ask for $500 or $1,000. I wasn’t paying him $500 

or $1,000 out of my pocket. So my—I went to—my law partner and 

I went and took a draw of an equal amount and gave him the 

money. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. And why was it an equal draw? If he was your 

friend and you were giving him the money because he was your 

friend, why would you be concerned, you and your partner, taking 

equal draws from the firm? Wasn’t this really a business expense 

for the firm that would cause you to each take an equal amount 

to give him funds? 

Mr. CREELY. It wasn’t an expense. We treated it as income and 

paid taxes on it. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Sure. But you were both doing it. 

Mr. CREELY. Correct. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. And you were doing it equally. Why would 

that—given as a matter of friendship, why would it matter to you 

if you gave it equally? Why wouldn’t—that would only matter, it 

would seem to me, looking at this as a business undertaking that 

you are going to each provide funds to the judge for the benefit of 

your legal practice. You would say, ‘‘Well, let’s each take an 

amount equally and give it to the judge,’’ as opposed to, ‘‘Well, he 

is my friend, so I am going to give him this money. He is your 

friend. You give him whatever amount you want to give him.’’ 

Mr. CREELY. We took it as a draw. We treated the man as a 

friend. We respected his needs. And he made a request to either 

me or Jake, Jake or I—what monies he requested. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Do you know if other attorneys in the legal community were also giving Judge Porteous money? 

Mr. CREELY. I am sorry, sir? 

Mr. GOODLATTE. I said, do you know if other attorneys in the 

legal community in New Orleans were also giving Judge Porteous 

money? 

Mr. CREELY. I have read—to answer your question, yes. And the 

reason I have read so many confidential reports that have been 

posted over the Internet, have written so many summarizations of 

my testimony and other people’s testimony, it all blends together 

into like a soup as to what—and then you put 15 to 25 years of 

life, and memory into this, and it is hard to determine what you 

read, what you remember, and things of that nature. I mean, we 

are going back to 1984. 

32 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Sure. But collectively, both in terms of what you 

have read and what you remember, is it your impression that others were giving funds to Judge Porteous? 

Mr. CREELY. Yes. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. And did you know of any of those at the time 

that you were also giving funds to Judge Porteous? Were you 

aware that others were giving funds to him? 

Mr. CREELY. At what time? From—— 

Mr. GOODLATTE. At the time—well, during the timeframe between when you started giving funds to him and when you stopped 

giving funds to him. Were you aware at that time that others were 

giving funds to him? 

Mr. CREELY. A 25-year period of time, and I have only heard people complain. I can only assume—if you want me to assume—— 

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Creely, can you talk more closely into the microphone? You may want to pull it—thank you. 

Mr. CREELY. I can only assume that, if you were a good friend 

of Judge Porteous, that he would ask you for cash. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. That was your impression that was a common 

practice of his? 

Mr. CREELY. My impression or my guesstimation would be yes. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. And can you tell us why you and Mr. Amato 

were brought into the Liljeberg case? 

Mr. CREELY. I was never brought into the Liljeberg case. Mr. 

Amato was brought into the Liljeberg case. I was—never had one 

single meeting involving a Liljeberg case. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. But your firm was brought into the Liljeberg 

case? 

Mr. CREELY. Firm was brought into the Liljeberg case. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. The listing referred to Amato and Creely in the 

filing with the court. So your firm was brought into the Liljeberg 

case. 

Mr. CREELY. If that is what the listing says, I have no reason 

whatsoever—— 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Did you ever have any conversations with Mr. 

Amato about the reason why the firm was brought in to the case? 

Mr. CREELY. No. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. No. You have no idea why that was? Was it the 

type of case that you or Mr. Amato would ordinarily be brought 

into? 

Mr. CREELY. Myself, I handled very complex cases over the past 

10 years, multi-party class-action litigation that involve neutrinal 

litigation, neutrinal litigation in Federal court involving hundreds 

of lawyers, been involved in probably 10 class-action multi-party 

cases in state court. I handled cases in Federal court, maritime 

cases in Federal court—— 

Mr. GOODLATTE. What about Mr. Amato? Since you said you 

didn’t personally do anything in that case, what about Mr. Amato? 

Mr. CREELY. Mr. Amato, to my knowledge, did not have a large— 

did not have a Federal practice. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. But you had no conversations with him about 

why he was being brought into work on the Liljeberg case 6 weeks 

before trial? 

Mr. CREELY. I don’t recall any specific conversation, but—— 

33 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Let me move on to another area. 

Mr. SCHIFF. And, Mr. Creely, you really need to talk directly into 

the microphone. You have a habit of—— 

Mr. CREELY. I have an eye infection, and I am trying to keep 

away from anything that may be contagious to somebody. I am 

very sorry. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Creely, during his time on the Federal 

bench, did Judge Porteous ever use court employees, such as his 

secretary, to either pick up money from you or request money of 

you for private purposes? 

Mr. CREELY. The only time I recall is during the 1999 period of 

time, I believe his secretary came by to pick up money. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. This would have been Rhonda Danos? 

Mr. CREELY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. And she came by to pick up an envelope with 

$2,000 in cash in it? 

Mr. CREELY. That is my understanding, yes. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Would that have included cash from both you 

and Mr. Amato? Or is that just your cash? 

Mr. CREELY. Well, we—cash Mr. Amato asked me to give him to 

give to the judge. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. So the two of you each—not—didn’t write a 

check, but you each put cash in an envelope from each of you, and 

then the judge’s secretary came over and picked up that cash? Is 

that your recollection? 

Mr. CREELY. It is my understanding. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. All right. Are you aware of any other situation 

in which Judge Porteous used a court employee—I am sorry. You 

need to use the microphone. 

Mr. CREELY. Why he was on the Federal bench? 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Or the state bench, either one. 

Mr. CREELY. You need to use the microphone, Counsel, so we can 

hear what you are trying to say. 

Mr. CAPITELLI. I am sorry—hearing on that. Would you repeat 

that question? 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Yes. My question was, in addition to the instance involving Rhonda Danos that he just testified about. Are 

you aware of any other instances while he was a Federal or state 

court judge where he used court employees for the purpose of picking up money after making some of these requests? 

Mr. CREELY. No, sir. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, those are the only questions I have. 

Mr. SCHIFF. I thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Cohen? 

Mr. COHEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Creely, what—how many curatorships do you think you had 

over the period of years from Judge Porteous? 

Mr. CREELY. There is a list that was requested by Mark through 

these proceedings. I have not—I knew a list existed. 

Mr. COHEN. Ten, twenty, a hundred? 

Mr. CREELY. I would say 100, at least. 

Mr. COHEN. At least 100. And what did the average curatorship 

pay? How much did you get paid for the average—— 

34 

Mr. CREELY. I would say between $150 and $175. 

Mr. COHEN. And you hated doing these? You didn’t like doing 

them; it was a nuisance. Is that correct? 

Mr. CREELY. I am sorry. 

Mr. COHEN. You say it was a nuisance. You didn’t like doing 

them? 

Mr. CREELY. I didn’t do them. They were purely—they were 

purely administrative. There were secretarial-type things. All you 

did was provide a note of evidence to the court that you made an 

attempt to provide or find the absentee defendant, and that was all 

you did. 

Mr. COHEN. Do you know if other people were curators in Judge 

Porteous’s court? 

Mr. CREELY. Yes. 

Mr. COHEN. And did those people, to the best of your knowledge, 

give Judge Porteous money, as well? 

Mr. CREELY. Judge Porteous testified to the fact that they did. 

Mr. COHEN. Just about every one of them? Just about all of 

them? 

Mr. CREELY. Oh, I don’t know about just about all of them. I 

know he testified that at least one lawyer gave him money. 

Mr. COHEN. Did you give money to other judges other than Judge 

Porteous? 

Mr. CREELY. Campaign contributions. 

Mr. COHEN. Those were checks? 

Mr. CREELY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. COHEN. But you never gave cash to another judge? 

Mr. CREELY. No. 

Mr. COHEN. So the only reason you gave cash to Judge Porteous 

is because he asked for it and he was your friend. Is that right? 

Mr. CREELY. The only reason I gave it to him was because he 

was a friend in need. 

Mr. COHEN. Do you—because he was a friend in need. 

Mr. CREELY. In need. 

Mr. COHEN. All right. 

Mr. CREELY. I got nothing back in state court for doing that, 

nothing. 

Mr. COHEN. But your firm was hired to this particular case. Is 

that correct? 

Mr. CREELY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. COHEN. And you are a senior partner in the firm? 

Mr. CREELY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. COHEN. Did you benefit from the overall profits of the firm? 

Did you share in the profits? 

Mr. CREELY. Of the law firm? 

Mr. COHEN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CREELY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. COHEN. And so how can you say you never benefited from 

it when your firm was appointed and might have won a judgment? 

Mr. CREELY. Well, the only way I benefited is the excess curators 

that I didn’t give to him in the form of cash. I didn’t benefit by any 

case, because every case I had in front of him, he ruled against me. 

Mr. COHEN. How about in the case where Mr.—your partner, did 

you—have a partner in your firm was hired? 

35 

Mr. CREELY. I had a partner that was hired on the case that we 

didn’t get paid any money on. 

Mr. COHEN. Didn’t get paid any money, because it was reversed 

on appeal. 

Mr. CREELY. Yes, just like I—much like I—reversed on the case 

he tried for me. 

Mr. COHEN. Right. But if it hadn’t been reversed on appeal, you 

would have benefited from that, right? 

Mr. CREELY. I would have benefited by it, but, sir, none of those 

cases were resolved in state court. That case was earmarked, destined for Federal appeal court. They all are. Every large case that 

I have, with minor exception, is finally adjudicated in the appellate 

court, particularly on legally—on legal and most of the time factual 

issues. That case was never going to be resolved in state court, in 

my mind—I mean, in Federal court, in my mind, never. 

Mr. COHEN. But you have got to get a judgment in federal—district court to be adjudicated and get a—and get a final recovery in 

the appellate level. Is that not correct? 

Mr. CREELY. I just had a case that I got a class-action 680 people 

that I got a judgment in state court, and the appellate court reversed it—reduced it by 60 percent. There is a lot of times you try 

cases and you take an appeal and the court either raises, lowers, 

takes away, gives to. You never know what the court of appeals is 

going to do. 

Mr. COHEN. I am aware of that, but I am losing your logic, sir. 

You—if—you can’t get to Federal court, to appellate court, unless 

you win at the district level. Is that correct? 

Mr. CREELY. No. If you lose at the judicial level, you can take an 

appeal to the appellate court, sir, just like the other side on this 

case. Apparently—and I hadn’t read the judgment—they lost. They 

took an appeal. 

Mr. COHEN. Were they not the defendants in that case? 

Mr. CREELY. Whoever the defendants were, they were. I don’t 

know who the defendants are. All I know is Lifemark or something 

to that effect. I don’t know the names of all the defendants. I was 

completely excluded from that case, every aspect of that case. 

Mr. COHEN. Have you—what else did you—did you provide to 

Judge Porteous, other than cash? You paid for lunches and dinners. 

Is that correct? 

Mr. CREELY. You know, I would take him to lunch and to dinners, as other people did. And I hunted with him. He and I were 

more or less adult from almost high school—best of friends. I hunted with him. I fished with him. We were friends, and everybody in 

the city of New Orleans knew we were friends, everybody. 

Mr. COHEN. And what else did you give him, other than hunt 

with him—when you hunted or fished with him, you—what did 

you—did you extend some benefits to him financially that he 

wouldn’t have to pick up? 

Mr. CREELY. In what? What, like paying for fuel or gasoline for 

the boat or something like that? 

Mr. COHEN. Yes. 

Mr. CREELY. Well, no. Nobody paid for a hunting or fishing trip 

when they came with me. Nobody. 

36 

Mr. COHEN. What other type things did you do for Judge 

Porteous? 

Mr. CREELY. The best of my recollection, I took him on three 

hunting trips in 20 years out of the country, two when he was on 

the state court bench, one early on when he was on the Federal 

bench. 

Mr. COHEN. No football tickets, nothing like that? No football 

tickets? 

Mr. CREELY. I have no recollection of buying him a football ticket. 

Mr. COHEN. No further questions, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SCHIFF. I thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Lungren of California? 

Mr. LUNGREN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Creely, did your firm get curatorships from other judges? 

Mr. CREELY. Yes. 

Mr. LUNGREN. In those instances, did any other judges ask you 

for money to help them with their personal expenses? 

Mr. CREELY. No, but they asked for campaign contributions. 

Mr. LUNGREN. But did they ever ask you for money for personal 

expenses? 

Mr. CREELY. No. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Did they ever ask you for money in cash? 

Mr. CREELY. No. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Did they ever send a member of their court staff 

to your office to pick up cash? 

Mr. CREELY. No. 

Mr. LUNGREN. So this is not a normal type of the legal culture 

of New Orleans? 

Mr. CREELY. This is not a—it is not normal, but our friendship 

was very different—— 

Mr. LUNGREN. Let me ask you about the proprietorship—propriety, excuse me. In the Federal case, where there is a motion of 

recusal involving your law firm, do you think your law firm had 

any obligation—or representative of your law firm had any obligation whatsoever to inform the other parties through their attorneys 

or the other attorney that your—that the judge in the case had 

been the beneficiary of thousands of dollars of cash donations, contributions, gifts, whatever you want to call it, from your law firm? 

Mr. CREELY. Absolutely, but I was not a party of that recusation 

proceeding, didn’t even know it was going on. Yes. 

Mr. LUNGREN. To your knowledge, did a representative of your 

law firm of which you are a senior member make that information 

available on the public record to the other attorney or attorneys involved? 

Mr. CREELY. I don’t believe he did. 

Mr. LUNGREN. That is all I have. Thank you. 

Mr. SCHIFF. I thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Creely, we see—or Mr. Johnson? 

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Are you now facing or do you expect to face or have you faced 

state bar disciplinary proceedings in Louisiana? 

Mr. CREELY. I received an inquiry, but nothing else. I think that 

they have deferred until this is over with. 

37 

Mr. JOHNSON. They have deferred what? 

Mr. CREELY. I think that they are deferring until this procedure 

is over with. 

Mr. JOHNSON. What about Judge Porteous? Has he, to your 

knowledge, been the subject of a bar complaint? 

Mr. CREELY. I have no idea. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Were you the subject of a bar complaint or did the 

state bar just take this up on its own motion? 

Mr. CREELY. The state took it up on its own motion when they— 

one of—one of the news channels or something broke a story in the 

newspaper, posted documents entitled ‘‘Confidential,’’ and I got a 

letter from the disciplinary council that they were going to look 

into this matter. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Approximately when was that? 

Mr. CREELY. Pardon me? 

Mr. JOHNSON. Approximately when was that? 

Mr. CREELY. I think it—I think it happened 2 years ago. 

Mr. JOHNSON. So have you had to respond at all in writing to 

this letter of inquiry or notice of inquiry? 

Mr. CREELY. No, I have not had to explain it. I am sure I will. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Do you—why did you—feeling so uncomfortable 

about it, why did you continue to give Judge Porteous cash money? 

And tell me, when did it start? And when is the last time you gave 

him some cash? 

Mr. CREELY. It may be hard to believe, but when you don’t have 

any cases in front of a judge, okay, with the exception of the jury 

trial—— 

Mr. JOHNSON. And you are speaking of you personally or the 

firm? 

Mr. CREELY. I think—I think my law partner may have had a 

couple of cases in front of him, and he ruled against him, too, in 

state court. And we are talking about state court. But it may be 

hard to believe, but everybody has a friend, and we have all had 

friends. 

Mr. JOHNSON. But, I mean, you felt uncomfortable at giving him 

some money. What was it that made you feel uncomfortable? 

Mr. CREELY. About—— 

Mr. JOHNSON. And why did you feel uncomfortable? 

Mr. CREELY [continuing]. At that point in time—at that point in 

time, what made me feel comfortable about it—— 

Mr. JOHNSON. Uncomfortable. 

Mr. CREELY. Uncomfortable? 

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes. You have testified here today that it made 

you feel uncomfortable to be leaned on, if you will, for cash money. 

Mr. CREELY. Because I began to feel like I was getting taken advantage of. I don’t—I don’t know if anybody—— 

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, what do you mean when you say ‘‘taken advantage of’’? What do you mean? 

Mr. CREELY. That I don’t believe, in my mind, that he was using 

the money for the things that he told me he was using it for. 

Mr. JOHNSON. What did he tell you he was using the money for? 

Mr. CREELY. Tuition, things household related. 

Mr. JOHNSON. What did you later find out about his use of the 

money that you gave? 

38 

Mr. CREELY. Just word of mouth, seeing him live a higher lifestyle than you would expect, but I want you to understand that the 

motivation for trying to help a friend, I mean, the love of a wife 

is one thing. The love of another person because you care about 

them and—is a different thing. And I really cared about him and 

really—— 

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, has he ever given you anything, Judge 

Porteous? Did he care that much about you that he would give you 

anything? 

Mr. CREELY. No. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Did he ever pay for his meals? 

Mr. CREELY. No. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Did he ever pay for his trips to hunt—— 

Mr. CREELY. No. 

Mr. JOHNSON [continuing]. And fish? You paid it all? 

Mr. CREELY. Well, when you say trips, hunting trips, of course. 

I had a boat. I had a camp. Nobody paid for anything when they 

came with me, nobody. Nobody paid anything. 

Mr. JOHNSON. This curatorship situation, why do you resist characterizing the curatorship situation as a kickback, a kickback 

scheme? Isn’t that a classic kickback scheme? 

Mr. CREELY. I have read that word before. It was not a kickback 

scheme. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, I mean, doesn’t it have all of the hallmarks 

of a kickback scheme? I mean, he would forward you a monetary 

benefit for you and then call later to say, ‘‘Where is—where is the 

money?’’ Isn’t that a—and to do that repeatedly, isn’t that a kickback scheme? 

Mr. CREELY [continuing]. Whatever the definition of a kickback 

scheme is, if you—— 

Mr. JOHNSON. So why do you not want to characterize it in that 

way? 

Mr. CREELY. If he came to me and said, ‘‘I am going to give you 

curators in return for you giving me the money back,’’ I would refer 

to that as a kickback scheme. That is not what happened, okay? 

He gave me curators, and—— 

Mr. JOHNSON. Which you had not asked for? 

Mr. CREELY. That which I did not ask for. I did not sit down with 

him and contrive a situation where he would give me curators in 

return for him giving me money. 

Mr. JOHNSON. But was it an implicit understanding, as things 

went on with this curatorship process? 

Mr. CREELY. I am confused about your question, sir. 

Mr. JOHNSON. The curatorship process, you say that you would 

not—there was no agreement before this scheme started, but didn’t 

it become apparent to you during the course of the curatorship 

scheme that this was a way of you being able to pay Judge 

Porteous? 

Mr. CREELY. It evolved into that, yes. He began to rely upon the 

curators, began to call for them, and we rationalized he is asking 

for money, giving him the money. And it wasn’t all of the money, 

but, yes, it—that is what it sounds like. 

Mr. JOHNSON. All right. I have no further questions at this time. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Pierluisi? 

39 

Mr. PIERLUISI. Mr. Creely, I apologize if some of my questions 

are repetitive. I will try not to ask you questions you were posed 

before. 

But let me ask you, you have been talking about your friendship 

with Judge Porteous, and I want to explore that a bit. Do you have 

a large circle of friends at home? I mean, how many friends do you 

have, would you say? 

Mr. CREELY. How many friends do I have? 

Mr. PIERLUISI. Yes, friends, people who consider themselves your 

friends. 

Mr. CREELY. How many friends do I have? It is funny. When you 

are doing well, you have a lot of friends. When things are looking 

bad for you, you don’t have as many friends as you did before. So 

back then in that period of time, I had considered myself as having 

a considerable number of friends. 

Mr. PIERLUISI. And that is roughly how many, at the time of the 

relevant events here? 

Mr. CREELY. Sir, you know, I couldn’t tell you. I had acquaintances; I had friends. 

Mr. PIERLUISI. What is the difference between an acquaintance 

and a friend, in your mind? 

Mr. CREELY. How many friends what? 

Mr. PIERLUISI. I am just saying, how do you distinguish an acquaintance from a friend, in your mind? What is the difference? 

Mr. CREELY. The difference is just a long-term friendship, a 

friendship that you have had for years and years and years with 

that person. 

Mr. PIERLUISI. Do you visit with friends at their homes? 

Mr. CREELY. Pardon me? 

Mr. PIERLUISI. Do you visit with friends at their homes? 

Mr. CREELY. Yes. 

Mr. PIERLUISI. Do your friends visit at your home? 

Mr. CREELY. Yes. 

Mr. PIERLUISI. And you do that with close friends or with any 

friend? 

Mr. CREELY. Visit with them? 

Mr. PIERLUISI. Visit with them at home and so forth. 

Mr. CREELY. Yes. 

Mr. PIERLUISI. Did you visit with Judge Porteous at his home? 

Mr. CREELY. Yes. 

Mr. PIERLUISI. You would go to his home? 

Mr. CREELY. Yes. 

Mr. PIERLUISI. How often? 

Mr. CREELY. Well, often would be he would have a Christmas 

party with a great number of people there. I would go. On occasion, 

he would have different functions. And his friends that were very 

close to him brought me into their friendship circles. They had parties that I attended with Judge Porteous and his wife and kids. So, 

you know, yes, we visited—— 

Mr. PIERLUISI. Did he visit you at your home? 

Mr. CREELY. Yes, he visited me at my home. 

Mr. PIERLUISI. How often? 

Mr. CREELY. I can’t give you that number. He visited with me 

on occasion. I am not a real social home type person where I have 

40 

dinner parties and a lot of parties. I have had a few parties at my 

former home that I sold in 2003, but I didn’t—I wasn’t a real party 

type person. 

Mr. PIERLUISI. Did you feel you were a close friend of his, of 

Judge Porteous? 

Mr. CREELY. Did I think I was a close friend? 

Mr. PIERLUISI. Yes. 

Mr. CREELY. I thought he was a close friend of mine. And I 

thought I was a close friend of his. 

Mr. PIERLUISI. You appeared on a regular basis before his court, 

did you not? Or—did you appear before his court while he was a 

judge? 

Mr. CREELY. Did I appear in his court? 

Mr. PIERLUISI. Yes. 

Mr. CREELY. As I indicated earlier, in 20 years, I appeared in 

front of Judge Porteous three times. He ruled against me two out 

of the three times. Two cases he ruled against me were major 

cases, one in—when he was on the district case, the interdiction 

case, which doesn’t even warrant talking about. A freshman in law 

school could have won that case. 

The case in Federal court was a removal action. It was originally 

filed in state court. The defendants removed it to Federal court on 

a motion to quash a discovery request under a very specific Federal 

statute. Without calling anybody, he read the papers that were 

filed by the defendant, granted their TRO. We had a conference by 

telephone. His response was, ‘‘I have read the pleadings. You can 

make’’—and we immediately filed pleadings. ‘‘I have read the 

pleadings. You can come argue your motion; you will lose.’’ 

That was his basic—with all counsel on the telephone, I requested a record be made. I made a record. And he did just what 

he told me he was going to do over the telephone, ruled against me. 

I had to get relief in the form of a reversal from the United 

States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, which took me a year, and 

it cost—basically, I guess you could say, we lost the case. I mean, 

it was—it was a year away from resolution at that point in time. 

So, yes, I had three cases in front of him in 20 years. 

Mr. PIERLUISI. Did you feel that your friendship was—that your 

friendship was an issue at any point in time where you appeared 

before him? 

Mr. CREELY. Absolutely not. Judge Porteous did not—didn’t—if 

he wanted to do me a favor, he would have granted my motion on 

my request to test the solvency of the surety. He did not. If he 

wanted to do me a favor, he would have denied motion that the 

plaintiffs—the defendants had in the Federal court case requesting 

that I not be allowed to get the discovery. He did not. He did me 

no favors while he was on the bench. 

Mr. PIERLUISI. Did any of the parties involved in these three 

cases you are mentioning knew the extent of your friendship with 

the judge at the time? 

Mr. CREELY. No. 

Mr. PIERLUISI. No? 

Mr. CREELY. No. 

Mr. PIERLUISI. Did you feel that you had to disclose that at any 

point in time? 

41 

Mr. CREELY. Well, I tried a jury trial. I don’t know what our relationship back when the jury trial—I don’t even know the year, so 

I tried a jury trial. The jury made the decision in that case, not 

the judge, the jury. There is a stark group of jury charges that he 

hands out, that all the judges do. The jury made the ruling. Posttrial motions, he ruled against me, ruled against me. 

Mr. PIERLUISI. Well, you are a lawyer, and you are a trial lawyer, 

so you know that—that even in jury trial, a judge will be making 

rulings throughout the whole process, evidentiary rulings, as well 

as all kinds of motions he needs to deal with. You know that, don’t 

you? 

Mr. CREELY. And that case ended up in the Supreme Court, and 

the judgment at the trial court was affirmed by the Louisiana Supreme Court. 

Mr. PIERLUISI. As a lawyer, were you concerned at any point in 

time about the appearance of your friendship with this judge while 

you were appearing before him? 

Mr. CREELY. No, because I always thought that he was going to 

do what he was going to do. He was going to do the appropriate 

thing. 

Mr. PIERLUISI. That is what you thought. How about other people’s thoughts? Did you ever—were you ever concerned about what 

other people could be thinking about, in terms of your friendship 

with the judge you were appearing before? 

Mr. CREELY. Everybody in the parish or county that we practice 

in was aware of our friendship, everybody. I was a very popular 

lawyer. He was a very popular and—and charismatic judge. Everybody knew we were friends. Everybody. I am not saying, though, 

every single person. 

Mr. PIERLUISI. Are you then implying that, because everybody 

knew that you were friends, that nobody was concerned about that 

friendship when you were appearing before him? 

Mr. CREELY. If they were concerned about it, they could have 

filed a motion, and it would have been re-allotted to another division, and that court could have made a ruling whether or not our 

friendship would interfere with it. Just because you are a judge 

doesn’t mean that you are going to—you are going to do—do something improper. It doesn’t mean you are going to rule in my favor, 

as he did not, and we were friends. 

But I—I understand what you are saying, sir. And, I mean, do 

I have an obligation or does every lawyer who takes a judge to 

lunch, who is extremely friendly with a judge have an obligation 

before they try a case to say, ‘‘This guy or this woman is my friend, 

that I have taken this person to lunch, that I have been to Las 

Vegas with this person, that I have taken trips with this person’’? 

Does every lawyer have an obligation to say, ‘‘Look, I can’t—I have 

made the maximum amount of contributions to their campaign. I 

have—I have organized individuals to make maximum contributions to their campaign.’’ Does the lawyer have an obligation to do 

that? It is my understanding the lawyer does not. 

I didn’t think I had an obligation to tell people that I took Judge 

Porteous to lunch, that I had a friendship with him. 

42 

Mr. PIERLUISI. Did you—did you give him anything of value 

while he was judging any of the three cases that you were—that 

you mentioned? 

Mr. CREELY. If—if—if what I gave him fell within the time period of time in which he was judging those cases, the answer to 

that would be yes. 

Mr. PIERLUISI. And did I hear you right that you—in your mind, 

you thought that you could give him pretty much anything, so long 

as—and that he was the one who had to disclose it in his ethics 

forms? Is that how you understood this to work? 

Mr. CREELY. The—— 

Mr. PIERLUISI. That you could give him any gift and that it was 

simply his onerous or burden to report it in his ethics forms? Is 

that what you thought? 

Mr. CREELY. My understanding of—of the law is that I can make 

gifts to judges as long as a gift is not for him to do something in 

my favor judicially. I have read the canons of judicial ethics. I have 

consulted council with that. And that is my understanding of the 

law. If—that is my understanding. 

Mr. PIERLUISI. Were you concerned at any point in time about 

the appearance of giving a gift to a judge who is ruling on a case 

you are trying, sir? 

Mr. CREELY. If I did—do I—— 

Mr. PIERLUISI. Were you ever concerned about the appearance of 

giving a gift to a judge who is ruling on a case that you are trying? 

Mr. CREELY. Not when you—not when you know the judge is 

going to do what he thinks is appropriate. I—I—I didn’t think 

he—— 

Mr. PIERLUISI. You were not concerned about what others could 

think about that, you giving a gift to a judge who is ruling on a 

case that you are trying? 

Mr. CREELY. Counsel, I don’t want—sir, I don’t want to be combative in any way. I am trying to be as respectful and as cooperative as I can. And I have been every bit cooperative. 

Mr. PIERLUISI. I am being—and I myself am being respectful. If 

I am raising the tone of my voice, it is simply because—it is because I want you to listen carefully to what I am saying. But I am 

being respectful. I just want an answer. 

Mr. CREELY. I know you are. I just don’t want to be combative. 

I want to answer your question in as respectfully and as honorably 

and as honestly as I can. 

Mr. PIERLUISI. Were you ever concerned about the appearance— 

appearance, what others could think about you, giving gifts to a 

judge who is trying a case that you are—who is judging a case that 

you are trying, sir? 

Mr. CREELY. No. I didn’t—the three cases, I didn’t think that 

that would have an effect upon his outcome, and it—it did not, in 

fact, have an effect on any of the cases I tried in front of him. It 

had a negative effect. 

Mr. PIERLUISI. You had mentioned before that a motion—anybody could have filed a motion requesting his recusal in the three 

cases that you were mentioning, that you mentioned before. That 

actually happened in the Liljeberg case, didn’t it? You know that, 

right? That a motion for recusal was—was filed? 

43 

Mr. CREELY. I am aware of a motion to recuse from reading all 

these things, yes, sir. 

Mr. PIERLUISI. And—and let me ask you this. It was explored a 

bit by—by Congressman Cohen, but you stood to benefit from these 

curatorships, right? From whatever fees those curatorships generated, you stood to benefit as a partner of your firm, right? 

Mr. CREELY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. PIERLUISI. You did? 

Mr. CREELY. I got the money. 

Mr. PIERLUISI. You got the money. And the same with the fees, 

whatever fees could—could—the firm could earn in the Liljeberg 

case, you stood to benefit from those, didn’t you? 

Mr. CREELY. Absolutely. 

Mr. PIERLUISI. And to the best of your knowledge, while that case 

was pending before Judge Porteous, you gave something of value 

to the judge. 

Mr. CREELY. Correct. 

Mr. PIERLUISI. And you knew that that case was pending? 

Mr. CREELY. Yes. And if you are talking about the Las Vegas 

trip, opposing counsel was with us on that trip. 

Mr. PIERLUISI. Did you ever feel uncomfortable when giving monies or anything of value to the judge? 

Mr. CREELY. I felt put upon, and I felt—so if you can relate that 

to being uncomfortable, I felt—I got—I felt worn out, tired of it, 

yes. I felt—I got tired of being asked for money. 

Mr. PIERLUISI. Did you ever consider saying no to him? 

Mr. CREELY. I did say no. I told him I couldn’t continue to do 

this, and it would—a few weeks would pass by, and he would come 

back. 

Mr. PIERLUISI. Did you feel pressured upon? 

Mr. CREELY. I am sorry, sir? 

Mr. PIERLUISI. Did you feel that he was exerting pressure on 

you? 

Mr. CREELY. I felt that he was abusing a friendship, yes. I felt 

pressured by it. I felt he was abusing what I thought to be a friendship. I wouldn’t have done that to a friend of mine, okay? I 

wouldn’t have done what he did to me to a friend of mine. I have 

not done what he did to me to anybody that I know, any—anybody 

that I know. 

So, yes, I felt imposed upon. I felt taken advantage of. And I— 

I was tired of it. And I explained that to him. 

Mr. PIERLUISI. And that—and all of that happened while he was 

a sitting judge? 

Mr. CREELY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. PIERLUISI. I have no further questions. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Gonzalez? 

Mr. GONZALEZ. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And I 

apologize for my absence. And I am going to ask a couple of questions, and staff has provided me with some of the information that 

Mr. Baron was able to go over as he made his presentation. And 

I apologize if I repeat some of it. I just want to make sure that it 

was said and stated, because it forms some of the basis for the 

questions that I ask. 

44 

Mr. Creely, quite simply, did Judge Porteous use his position as 

a United States district trial judge to make requests of you for 

money? 

Mr. CREELY. Did he use his—— 

Mr. GONZALEZ. Did he use his position as a sitting U.S. 

judge—— 

Mr. CREELY. He used—— 

Mr. GONZALEZ [continuing]. To make a request of you for money? 

Mr. CREELY. No. He used the same thing that he used in state 

court, friendship. My—and he didn’t request money from me. If it 

is the incident you are talking about on the boat, he didn’t make 

a request of me. I wasn’t on that trip. I wasn’t with them. 

Mr. GONZALEZ. Okay, Mr. Creely, I didn’t ask you—you never responded to any of the requests in paid money to Judge Porteous 

because of his position as a sitting U.S. judge, is that correct? 

Mr. CREELY. Absolutely not. There was nothing—other than that 

one case I told you about that I had in front of him, his requests 

were from a friend to me—— 

Mr. GONZALEZ. All right. 

Mr. CREELY [continuing]. Telling me he needed money. 

Mr. GONZALEZ. Well, and then that is—I want to go to the next 

area, and that is this friendship. We all understand friendship. So 

let me ask you. If a friend in need, would there have been any 

other manner to have assisted Judge Porteous? Co-signer on a 

note? I mean, there are different ways, if you want to help a friend, 

than direct payment—— 

Mr. CREELY. Yes, that—— 

Mr. GONZALEZ. I mean, cash? 

Mr. CREELY. There would have been a lot of things. And— 

and—— 

Mr. GONZALEZ. But you didn’t do that. 

Mr. CREELY. Being 45 years old, when you look back over your 

life and you say, ‘‘Do I wish I would have gotten six or seven of 

his friends to come confront him and tell him to quit drinking?’’ 

Yes. Do I wish I could have done a number of other things to help 

him out? Yes. I didn’t, okay? I had a very active practice. I continued working. And I tried to help him with—with the need that he 

came to me and asked—asked me to help me. 

Mr. GONZALEZ. But what was available to your friend, Judge 

Porteous, was not available to anybody that did not enjoy the position that he had, simply meaning that he was able to appoint you, 

using his judicial authority, to a curatorship that resulted in payment to you. And by your own testimony—I am not going to go 

over it, because I think Mr. Baron went over it, there was a direct 

connection to your appointment, to you receiving a fee, paying 

taxes on it, and basically returning the money to Judge Porteous. 

Isn’t that correct? 

Mr. CREELY. A portion of the money, yes, sir. 

Mr. GONZALEZ. I guess I—I am just—I don’t understand the huge 

issue here. You are admitting that as a result of the judge’s position and abilities as a Federal district judge to reward you, by appointment, you were able to receive monies that you paid back, 

that were the basis for the loan back to the judge. Isn’t that what 

you just said? 

45 

Mr. CREELY. What I—I mean, if you go through this for 10 years, 

you know, you get very confused about things. He gave me curators. The curators went to our operating account. He asked for 

money. I gave him money. 

Mr. GONZALEZ. And this is the portion of the testimony that was 

made reference earlier in a PowerPoint. This is—I believe that this 

is—‘‘And so I told him I had to stop. I have got to stop doing this, 

all right? But he started sending curatorships over to my office, all 

right? And he would send like two or three at a time. And then he 

started calling and saying, ‘I been sending you curators, you know? 

Can you give me the money for the curators?’ I said, ‘Man.’ So I 

talked to my law partner. I said, ‘Jake, you know, man, what do 

we do?’ He says, ‘Well, just go ahead and give it to him.’ We decided to give him the money. We would deduct the expenses. We 

would pay income taxes on it.’’ 

Am I missing something here? 

Mr. CREELY. No. 

Mr. GONZALEZ. You identified money that was being paid to you 

as a result of an appointment by a Federal district judge. You identify that money as the basis for you to then turn the money back 

over to the judge. 

Mr. CREELY. It was—— 

Mr. GONZALEZ. Is that not—but for Judge Porteous’s position and 

ability to do that, would you have paid him the money? 

Mr. CREELY. It was a state court judge. Yes, I would—I would 

have paid—I would have—I would have probably given him money 

because I gave him money before he gave me curators, and I gave 

him money—— 

Mr. GONZALEZ. I am only talking about the money—did you give 

him money after receiving payment for your services as a curator? 

Mr. CREELY. Before and after. 

Mr. GONZALEZ. I am just talking about after at this point. You 

don’t see the connection there, sir? And I don’t mean to be harsh 

or whatever. I just think we are all lawyers, that we have all been 

in courtrooms. We know what—how witnesses answer these questions. But when you—when two and two should add up to four, it 

is hard to live with an answer when you are telling me it is five. 

Mr. CREELY. Sir, of course there can be a connection there, you 

know? 

Mr. GONZALEZ. But there was a connection, Mr. Creely. That is 

what we are all up here to establish, in part. And I think it is indisputable there is a connection by your own testimony. 

Mr. CREELY. The—the—— 

Mr. GONZALEZ. If I was your friend—— 

Mr. CREELY. The curators—— 

Mr. GONZALEZ [continuing]. And I owned a filling station on the 

corner, and you have been lending me money, because we are close, 

and you go fishing and hunting together, the difference is, as your 

friend at the filling station, I can’t get some sort of compensation 

to you that you turn around and pay—and that a third party—and 

in this case, either litigants or the United States government—is 

paying you money to basically get back to me. 

And I know what Mr. Johnson said. You know, we are looking 

at kickbacks and so. Nothing is ever clear. But on this one, I mean, 

46 

I think you have gone the direct link or the nexus between the appointment of a curatorship, the compensation you received that 

formed the basis to basically funnel the money back to the judge 

that appointed you. 

Mr. CREELY. It was an evolution into him giving us curators and 

our justification of giving them back to him. I think I have testified 

to that three or four times in different ways. I can’t remember 

every word of my testimony exactly as I have given it before, but 

that is, in essence, my testimony, sir. 

Mr. GONZALEZ. Thank you very much, Mr. Creely. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SCHIFF. I thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Gohmert? 

Mr. GOHMERT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you for your testimony, Mr. Creely. I am curious. 

Since this is a form of discovery here, and as an attorney, as a 

former judge and chief justice, I know lawyers talk. Did you ever 

hear from any other attorneys that they were asked to give money 

to the judge, either based on curatorships or otherwise? 

I am sorry. I am not—is the mic on? 

Mr. CREELY [continuing]. Nobody ever told me that the judge 

gave them curators and asked for money back. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Well, how about just that they had then asked for 

money or donated money to the judge personally? Did you ever 

hear of that? 

Mr. CAPITELLI. Excuse me. Could we ask the councilman to 

speak into the mic so we could hear a little better, too? 

Mr. GOHMERT. Yes. Thank you. Did you ever hear any other attorney say that they had provided money to the judge or asked for 

money? 

Mr. CREELY. Yes. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Okay. And—and what other attorneys would that 

be? What other attorneys—— 

Mr. CREELY. Well, no, I am—you know—— 

Mr. GOHMERT. But you have—you don’t know the names of the 

attorneys, but you know there was discussion in the area that 

other attorneys were asked for money like you had been? 

Mr. CREELY. There are names of attorneys. Judge Porteous testified to that. He testified—— 

Mr. GOHMERT. Do you know of—yes, I—I know. We have got the 

testimony, but I am asking you personally, were you aware of anyone else who had indicated they had provided money to the judge 

outside of your firm? 

Mr. CREELY. Other people have alluded to the fact that he had 

given his money, and I believe at least one other lawyer testified. 

I indicated that he gave money to the judge. 

Mr. GOHMERT. And, look, I understand this has got to be very 

uncomfortable. You are sitting here at the table. The judge is right 

behind you. I understand that. But I am curious—that is got to be 

tough on you and your law firm when you are asked for money, 

particularly cash, particularly when a case is pending, and someone is sent over to get $1,000. I am just curious, how—how do you 

deal with that? Do you—as—is that considered a business expense, 

47 

as far as tax purposes? How—how do you deal with that? Do you 

just take that right out of your own pocket? 

Because it sounds like a price of doing business. When you pay $1,000 cash, is that a business expense? I am asking. I really don’t 

know. 

Mr. CREELY. We paid income taxes on it. We absorbed it as income. 

Mr. GOHMERT. No, I—I knew that you had. But I am talking 

about, once you gave money to the judge—— 

Mr. CREELY. I didn’t give any money to the judge. I gave it to 

my law partner, and the judge apparently, because I was avoiding 

doing it, I was avoiding doing it—— 

Mr. GOHMERT. Oh, I see. You gave it to your law partner, and 

he provided it to the judge? 

Mr. CREELY. He provided it, from what I understand, to the 

judge’s secretary, because we were trying to avoid giving it to him. 

Mr. GOHMERT. I see. Okay. Well, I didn’t know—yes, I understood you paid tax on that. That was income to you. But then when 

you are asked by a judge to provide $1,000 cash, even though you 

give it to your partner and the partner gives it to the secretary, I 

didn’t know if you later dealt with that as a business expense, because it certainly cost you as an attorney. 

Mr. CREELY. Well, no, I didn’t treat it as a business expense, no, 

sir. 

Mr. GOHMERT. But you did feel like, when your partner asked for 

it—or I guess your partner felt like this is something we have got 

to do, because the judge has asked for it, correct? 

Mr. CREELY. Well, do you want me to tell you what happened? 

Mr. GOHMERT. Sure. 

Mr. CREELY. All right. What happened—the way it was told to 

me is they went fishing, and the judge broke down on the boat. 

What part of the boat—I mean, I said the front one time, the back 

one time. It could have been in the middle. I don’t know where. 

The judge broke down, according to my law partner, and told him 

he was having problems financing, you know, I said, tuition. I was 

cross-examined. Wasn’t it a wedding? I don’t know whether it was 

a tuition or a wedding. The fact of the matter, the money was 

given, broke down, started crying, said he couldn’t afford—I believe 

it was a wedding of his son, Timmy, some aspect of the wedding 

and needed help. He was embarrassed. My law partner came back 

from the trip and had a discussion with me about that, about how 

bad he felt about our friend, and asked me to—to give him $1,000. 

And I—I did. I cashed a check and gave him—gave him $1,000, 

gave my law partner $1,000. 

Mr. GOHMERT. But even though that was given from the partner’s standpoint to try to help a friend, you would expect that, 

since you gave that, that anybody in honesty who was asked if they 

had received anything from attorneys would have to acknowledge 

that he had received that, correct? 

Mr. CREELY. Oh, I don’t—I don’t doubt that the—the judge received it, and I don’t—and I don’t dispute that it was—it was—it 

was designed to give to the judge. I don’t—I don’t dispute any of 

that. 

Mr. GOHMERT. All right. All right. Thank you. 

48 

Mr. SCHIFF. At this point, Mr. Westling, if you would like, we 

will set the clock for 10 minutes, and you may question the witness. 

Mr. WESTLING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Creely, good afternoon. 

Mr. CREELY. Good afternoon, sir. 

Mr. WESTLING. You have been a friend of Judge Porteous’s for 

many years. Is that correct? 

Mr. CREELY. Yes. 

Mr. WESTLING. When did you first meet him, if you remember? 

Mr. CREELY. It is very hard to say. I may have met him in our 

later years of high school, definitely in 1974, while he was a lawyer 

at Gretna in a law firm. 

Mr. WESTLING. So you knew him for years. You then practiced 

with him in approximately 1974. Is that correct? 

Mr. CREELY. I am sorry? 

Mr. WESTLING. Then you practiced with him—practiced law with 

him in around 1974? 

Mr. CREELY. I didn’t practice. I practiced out of the same office. 

I did primarily real estate closings during that period of time. I 

can’t say I practiced with him, but we practiced out of the same 

facility. I worked for him. 

Mr. WESTLING. Okay. And so you knew him for approximately 10 

years before he went on to the state bench in 1984. Is that correct? 

Mr. CREELY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. WESTLING. And then you continue to know him to this day. 

That is also correct? You know him now, correct? 

Mr. CREELY. Yes. 

Mr. WESTLING. Okay. And so the 10 years on the state bench, 

when you have given testimony today regarding curatorships, that 

is limited to the period while he was a state judge. Is that correct? 

Mr. CREELY. Correct. 

Mr. WESTLING. All right. And so the curatorship situation ended 

in 1994, correct? 

Mr. CREELY. Obviously. 

Mr. WESTLING. Okay. The only time there has been ever any exchange of money between you and your partner and Judge 

Porteous that you are aware of while sitting as a Federal judge was 

in connection with this request arising from the fishing trip. Is that 

correct? 

Mr. CREELY. That I am aware of, yes. 

Mr. WESTLING. Okay. And then there was the trip to Las Vegas 

that you have testified about, as well. 

Mr. CREELY. Make that clear, please. 

Mr. WESTLING. Mr. Creely, did you ever give money to Judge 

Porteous because he was a judge or was it always because he was, 

first and foremost, your friend? 

Mr. CREELY. The only reason I would give money to anybody was 

because they were my friend, unless it was a charitable contribution. I would not have given him money because he was a judge. 

Mr. WESTLING. And—and I think you have testified, but at no 

time did you ever have an experience with Judge Porteous that led 

you to believe he was influenced by any of the money that you had 

given him over the years in his capacity as a judge. Is that correct? 

49 

Mr. CREELY. Obviously not. Two of the three cases I had in front 

of him, he ruled against me. 

Mr. WESTLING. In terms of your experience with him in Federal 

court, you indicated there was only one case, is that right, that you 

appeared in front of him? Or do I have that incorrect? 

Mr. CREELY. One case. 

Mr. WESTLING. All right. And that didn’t go so well for you. Is 

that right? 

Mr. CREELY. It was a removal action from state court, wasn’t 

filed in Federal court. It was removed on a Federal issue to his division by virtue of the request of a temporary restraining order by 

one of the defense counsel on a state court case. 

Mr. WESTLING. In every situation where you gave Judge Porteous 

money, whether he was on the state or the Federal bench, it was 

typically because of your concern about his personal well-being. Is 

that right? 

Mr. CREELY. Correct. 

Mr. WESTLING. And you knew his family? 

Mr. CREELY. Yes. 

Mr. WESTLING. Do you all have—both have children? 

Mr. CREELY. Yes. 

Mr. WESTLING. Do they know one another? 

Mr. CREELY. No. I have a 2-year-old and a 4-year-old child. I 

have a 27-year-old daughter. My 2- and 4-year-old do not know his 

children. 

Mr. WESTLING. But your 27-year-old does? 

Mr. CREELY. Yes. 

Mr. WESTLING. Okay. And I take it that you practice in—in and 

around the city of New Orleans, where there is a very close relationship between lawyers and the bar. Is that right? 

Mr. CREELY. Yes. 

Mr. WESTLING. And that is true of lawyers between—both lawyers and the bench and the bar, correct? 

Mr. CREELY. Correct. 

Mr. WESTLING. And so it is not unusual, is it, to see lawyers out 

to lunch with a judge, whether in the state or the Federal court? 

Mr. CREELY. It is very unusual not to see something like that 

going on. 

Mr. WESTLING. It happens all the time? 

Mr. CREELY. It happens every day. 

Mr. WESTLING. And the community is well aware of it both inside 

the courthouse—inside the courthouse and outside the courthouse, 

correct? 

Mr. CREELY. Is the community aware of that? 

Mr. WESTLING. I mean, the—the—the legal community inside 

and outside the courthouse is aware that judges socialize with lawyers, correct? 

Mr. CREELY. Of course. 

Mr. WESTLING. All right. And you indicated that your friendship 

with Judge Porteous was well known to the community at large 

that practiced in and around both the Gretna courthouse and the 

Federal courthouse. Is that right? 

Mr. CREELY. Yes. When we would—we would go fishing, we 

would take defense lawyers with us, we would take plaintiff lawVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:13 Feb 02, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00053 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\WORK\JUDIMP\11171809\53638.000 HJUD1 PsN: DOUGA
50 

yers with us. One trip that I took with him on a hunting trip to 

Mexico, we took a defense lawyer from a large firm. We didn’t disguise hunting and fishing. We hunted with other judges. We hunted with other lawyers. We hunted with plaintiff lawyers, defense 

lawyers. We hunted with business people. 

And some of the other judges that we went hunting with—cases 

in front of them. I was always treated fairly. None of that was done 

to influence anybody’s decision on anything or any case that I had. 

Mr. WESTLING. And if you had believed that any of the money 

that you were asked for by Judge Porteous when he was in difficult 

personal circumstances was, in fact, designed to influence him, you 

would have told him, no, you would not give him that money. Isn’t 

that right? 

But if he had asked you—because he said, ‘‘Hey, I am a judge. 

You need to give me money.’’ You would have told him no? 

Mr. CREELY. No. But that never came up. 

Mr. WESTLING. I understand. 

Mr. CREELY. Nothing like that came up. 

Mr. WESTLING. I understand. 

Mr. CREELY. I did divorce work when he was on the—on the— 

on the district bench. I tried one jury trial. The cases that I handled, he couldn’t hear while he was on the district bench. He was 

prevented from hearing them by court rule. 

Mr. WESTLING. Well, you have testified at some length about the 

period of time when he was on the state bench in which the issues 

of curators came up. And I think what you have said is that you 

gave him money before and after the curators. Is that right? 

Mr. CREELY. Correct. 

Mr. WESTLING. And that, had he asked you for money without 

ever giving you a curatorship, you would have continued to give 

him money out of friendship. Is that right? 

Mr. CREELY. Correct. 

Mr. WESTLING. Right. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Thank you, Counsel. 

I would like to follow up on some of the points that have been 

raised. And I will begin where defense counsel—or—or Mr.—Judge 

Porteous’s counsel left off. You said that you made payments to the 

judge before the curators, and you made payments to the judge 

after the curators, correct? 

Please talk into the microphone. 

Mr. CREELY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SCHIFF. And, of course, you made payments during the curators, correct? And you made payments during the time he was giving you the curators, right? 

Mr. CREELY. Correct. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SCHIFF. And did he give you curatorships all the way up and 

to the point he left the state bench? 

Mr. CREELY. You have the records. I believe that he did. 

Mr. SCHIFF. And so you testified that he continued to give you 

payments when the curators ended. He left the state bench for the 

Federal bench, correct? 

Mr. CREELY. Yes, sir. Well, just—I didn’t hear all of your question. He left the state bench and went to the Federal bench, yes. 

51 

Mr. SCHIFF. And you said the payments continued after the curatorships ended. Does that mean the payments continued while he 

was on the Federal bench? 

Mr. CREELY. No, no, no. Nothing continued while he was on the 

federal—no curator payments went to him on the federal—while he 

was on the—— 

Mr. SCHIFF. No, I understand that no curatorships were given to 

you when he was on the Federal bench, because he couldn’t, right? 

Mr. CREELY. Right. 

Mr. SCHIFF. But you have testified in answer to Mr. Westling’s 

questions that you gave him money before he even started sending 

you the curatorships, and you continued giving him money when 

the curatorships ended, implication being you would have given 

him money regardless of the curatorships, correct? 

Mr. CREELY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SCHIFF. So your payments continued after the curatorships 

stopped is what you have testified, right? 

Mr. CREELY. If you are trying to suggest that when he went to 

the—— 

Mr. SCHIFF. Please answer my question. You have testified that 

you continued giving him money after he stopped giving you curatorships, correct? 

Mr. CREELY. If I said that, I did not give him money when he 

was on the Federal bench, without the exception of the $1,000 we 

talked about. 

Mr. SCHIFF. So is it your testimony now that you stopped giving 

him money when he stopped sending you curatorships? 

Mr. CREELY. I think the question is, did I stop giving him money 

when he left the state bench? That is the answer. 

Mr. SCHIFF. So then your answer is, yes, when the curatorships 

stopped, you stopped giving him money? 

Mr. CREELY. And he—we stopped making the requests, and we 

distanced ourselves when we got on the Federal bench because he 

became associated with an entirely different group of people. It was 

almost like—I don’t know what he did. Our relationship just kind 

of like smoothed out when he got on the Federal bench. 

Mr. SCHIFF. So your testimony, in answer to Mr. Westling’s question, then, was incorrect? You did not continue the periodic payments to Judge Porteous after he stopped sending you the curatorships? 

Mr. CREELY. That is correct. 

Mr. SCHIFF. I just want to follow up on a couple of the questions 

that my colleagues asked. My colleague, Mr. Gohmert, asked you 

if you were aware of other attorneys having told you that they gave 

money to the judge. And you said that you were. You then made 

reference to Judge Porteous’s testimony or prior statements. 

I would like to follow up on my colleague’s question. What other 

attorneys have told you that they have given money to Judge 

Porteous? 

Mr. CREELY. You want me to give you names? 

Mr. SCHIFF. Yes. 

Mr. CREELY. Well, the person that—Don Gardner—— 

Mr. SCHIFF. Into the microphone, Mr. Creely. 

52 

Mr. CREELY. Don Gardner is the only person that I can remember. Lenny Levenson never acknowledged giving cash, but acknowledged a considerable amount of friendship and camaraderie, or 

whatever you want to call it with him, while this Liljeberg case was 

going on. And that is—that is it. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Have any other attorneys, other than Mr. Gardner 

or Mr. Levenson, told you either while this was going on or after 

this was concluded that they had also given Judge Porteous 

money? 

Mr. CREELY. No, not that I would remember. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Have any other attorneys or anyone else with business before the bar, in the bail bonds business, attorneys, private 

individuals, have any other people told you that they have given 

Judge Porteous money? 

Mr. CREELY. Not that I recall, no. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Have any other people told you that they have been 

asked for money by Judge Porteous? 

Mr. CREELY. Nobody has told me directly, but I have heard people talk about how he would impose upon them in different situations at gambling casinos and things like that. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Now, by that, are you referring to people telling you 

that Judge Porteous asked them for other forms of financial support, as in gambling chips or something of that nature? What are 

you referring to? 

Mr. CREELY. I don’t have—have a recollection of that. I just have 

a recollection of other people indicating that he made—he was just 

improper in some of his requests from them. I don’t—I don’t have— 

have a—a specific recollection of it. 

Mr. SCHIFF. And who, Mr. Creely, has indicated to you that the 

judge made an improper request to them? 

Mr. CREELY. I am sorry? 

Mr. SCHIFF. Who has made—who indicated to you that the judge 

made an improper request to them? 

Mr. CREELY. I don’t recall. It is just general conversation about 

him, about his—the way he acted, about the way he conducted 

himself, and people talking. It would be like a group of people talking. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Creely, earlier, our Task Force counsel asked 

you about your interview with the FBI. 

Mr. CREELY. About—yes. 

Mr. SCHIFF. And you stated there that there were certain things 

that you did not tell the FBI, in terms of—— 

Mr. CREELY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SCHIFF [continuing]. Your relationship with the judge, the 

money, gambling, et cetera, correct? 

Mr. CREELY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SCHIFF. You did that because you didn’t want to injure your 

friend’s chance of taking the Federal bench, correct? 

Mr. CREELY. Correct. 

Mr. SCHIFF. I don’t want to have the same problem here today. 

And I know you have a friendship with the judge you have testified 

about, but I want to ask you once again: Are you aware of any 

other attorneys than the ones you have mentioned that have either 

given the judge cash or been asked by the judge for cash? 

53 

Mr. CREELY. Other than my law partner—sir, I want you to 

know, I haven’t talked to this man in—outside of running into him 

for judicial proceedings concerning this matter for years. I don’t 

consider our friendship to exist anymore. I don’t consider that I 

have a relationship with him anymore. 

I mean, I don’t have any reason to help him. I have been injured 

beyond repair because of this. I can’t tell you the pain, and I can’t 

tell you the remorse, and I can’t tell you the financial hardship 

that this has caused me. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Let—— 

Mr. CREELY [continuing]. Myself more—— 

Mr. SCHIFF. Let me ask you, Mr. Creely, about the time when 

you were friends. And Mr. Amato’s friendship with the judge predated your own. Is that right? 

Mr. CREELY. Predated mine? 

Mr. SCHIFF. Yes. 

Mr. CREELY. Yes. 

Mr. SCHIFF. And Mr. Amato was a partner of the judge’s before 

you were—you joined the firm? 

Mr. CREELY. Yes. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Now, you have testified you have had the judge over 

to your house. You have been over to his house, correct? 

Mr. CREELY. Sorry. I am not doing—what was that again, sir? 

What was that one? 

Mr. SCHIFF. You testified that you had the judge over to your 

house, you have been over to the judge’s house. Is that right? 

Mr. CREELY. Yes. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Amato was also friends with the judge? 

Mr. CREELY. Yes. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Amato, you have seen at the judge’s home, also? 

Mr. CREELY. Well, I would have to tell you I don’t know, but I 

can tell you my personal experience with Mr. Amato. He has been 

my law partner for 30-say-plus years. And he lived around the corner from my home. And out of the 30 years that I knew Mr. Amato, 

I believe I was invited to his house on two occasions, twice. We did 

not have a social relationship between our families. So I don’t know 

if Judge Porteous was invited to his house. I don’t if Judge 

Porteous went to his house. I can only tell you that, if you had a 

law partner for 30-some-odd years, you would think you would be 

invited to his house more than one or two times over that period 

of time. I know he came to my house on several occasions. But—— 

Mr. SCHIFF. Sir, let me get back to my question, though. My 

question was, did you ever see your partner, Mr. Amato, at the 

judge’s home? 

Mr. CREELY. Did I see Amato at the judge’s home? 

Mr. SCHIFF. Correct. 

Mr. CREELY. The annual Christmas party that I think Judge 

Porteous had, I may have seen him there. I have no independent 

recollection of that. I know that we had mutual friends that had 

places in the country where they would have annual feasts, if I 

may say it, of game, food, things of that nature. I would see Jake. 

I would see Porteous and all of our mutual friends at those gatherings. 

54 

Mr. SCHIFF. And in the course of your 30-year partnership, you 

have only been to your partner’s house, Mr. Amato’s house, a couple times. Is that right? 

Mr. CREELY. I went to Porteous’s house a couple of times, yes. 

Mr. SCHIFF. In your 30-year partnership with Mr. Amato, you 

have only been to Mr. Amato’s house a couple of times? 

Mr. CREELY. Yes, but not very many. It may have been three, but 

I have not visited his home on a regular basis. It was very infrequent and—— 

Mr. SCHIFF. And during the times that—the infrequent times you 

visited Mr. Amato at his home, was Judge Porteous ever present? 

Mr. CREELY. No. Judge—I have never seen Judge Porteous at 

Amato’s house. 

Mr. SCHIFF. And to your knowledge, has Judge Porteous ever 

been to Mr. Amato’s house? 

Mr. CREELY. Been to where? 

Mr. SCHIFF. To your knowledge, has Judge Porteous ever been to 

Mr. Amato’s home? 

Mr. CREELY. I would be guessing. To my knowledge, no. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Now, you mentioned in your testimony that you 

stood nothing to benefit by virtue of your relationship with Judge 

Porteous. That was the kind of gist of your testimony, wasn’t it? 

Was it the gist of your—is it the gist of your testimony, Mr. Creely, 

that you stood nothing to benefit from your relationship with Judge 

Porteous, by virtue of his being a judge? 

Mr. CREELY. I got no benefit? 

Mr. SCHIFF. Was that—is that your testimony, Mr. Creely? 

Mr. CREELY. I got no benefit from him being a judge. I got no 

benefit at all from him being a judge. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Now, at the same time, Mr. Creely, you and your 

partner divided the proceeds of the firm pretty evenly? 

Mr. CREELY. Yes, sir. We divided proceeds from the firm, if that 

was your question. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Yes. You divided them fairly evenly? Do you divide 

the proceeds of the firm evenly between yourself and Mr. Amato? 

Mr. CREELY. Yes, sir. Yes. He may have gotten a little more, but 

yes. 

Mr. SCHIFF. And do you know why Mr. Amato, your partner, was 

brought into the Liljeberg case only 6 weeks before trial? 

Mr. CREELY. Do I know that? I don’t know that. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Creely, wasn’t he brought in because of his and 

your friendship with the judge? 

Mr. CREELY. Weren’t brought in from our friendship, because I 

didn’t know the Liljebergs from anything. It was a group of lawyers 

that were brought into that case. And I don’t—I didn’t know the 

Liljebergs from anybody. 

Mr. SCHIFF. So it wasn’t based on your firm’s long representation 

of the Liljebergs? 

Mr. CREELY. No, I didn’t know who the Liljebergs were. I may 

have met the Liljebergs one or two times during the course of the 

entire relationship. The meetings on Liljeberg weren’t held at 

Amato and Creely. The business records and things weren’t held at 

Amato and Creely. 

55 

Mr. SCHIFF. But the legal community understood your relationship and Mr. Amato’s relationship with Judge Porteous, right? 

Mr. CREELY. Correct. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Isn’t that why you were brought into this case by 

this company, Liljeberg, that you knew nothing about, 6 weeks before trial? 

Mr. CREELY. That is an answer that you want me to say yes to? 

Mr. SCHIFF. I want you to give us the truth, Mr. Creely. 

Mr. CREELY. I am trying to be truthful, okay? That may very 

well have been the reason why he was brought in. Maybe the 

Liljeberg family thought that they could get an advantage by somebody who knew the judge. I had no—I was not privy to any of those 

discussions. I was not privy to signing up the contract. I don’t even 

know what the contract reads, have no idea. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Creely, given the amounts of money that were 

involved in the Liljeberg case, were you aware that if the Liljebergs 

prevailed, as they did in the district court before Judge Porteous, 

that you and your partner stood to make between $500,000 to $1 

million? 

Mr. CREELY. Whatever the percentages were, I had no idea what 

the judgment was going to be. I didn’t know what the judgment, 

from what I read, was. And I think we had a 6 percent—I think— 

I don’t know. I haven’t seen the contract. I think the contract gave 

us 6 percent of the gross fee if we won, but I had no idea if we 

were going to win, two, whether the court of appeals was going to 

affirm any award. 

But whatever we—whatever award was going to be rendered, or 

whatever award we would get, we would get money off of it, yes. 

I was aware of that. 

Mr. SCHIFF. And during the pendency of this case, where your 

firm stood to earn between $500,000 to $1 million, the judge asked 

you for $2,500 in cash, and you and your partner gave it to him, 

right? 

Mr. CREELY. My recollection, it was $2,000 in cash. And, yes, I 

did give it to him. I gave him my portion of it. I gave to Jake who 

gave it to him. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Now, you testified earlier that something along the 

lines that the district court judgment, Judge Porteous’s decision in 

that case, really didn’t matter because the case would be appealed. 

Is that your testimony? 

Mr. CREELY. My testimony is—my experience is, every major 

case that I have had ends up in the court of appeals, unless it is 

settled. And if it is legal issues, most of the time, they end up in 

the court of appeals. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Are you trying to suggest to us, Mr. Creely, that 

somehow the district court decision really makes no difference to 

you or your clients, whether the judge rules for you, against you? 

Mr. CREELY. The district court decision makes a lot of difference, 

because the law is what the law is, that if the district court interprets the law in a particular inappropriate fashion, it is always corrected by the court of appeal. If the district court misapplies facts 

to cases or makes factual—makes manifestly erroneous factual 

findings, the court of appeals always corrects that, just like the 

56 

case I had with him. He was totally wrong on the law, and the 

court of appeal corrected him. 

I don’t know what the legal issues were in this case, but the 

court of appeal—that is why—the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals is 

a very sophisticated court, from what I understand it. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Creely, is there a reason why you want to suggest that a trial judge’s decision is of no consequence to your client 

in a multi-million-dollar litigation? Is there a reason you want to 

make that suggestion here today? 

Mr. CREELY. Of course a decision had consequences from the trial 

court judge. Who wants to go up losing? Who wants to go to the 

court of appeals losing a case? I don’t—— 

Mr. SCHIFF. Well, and more than that, doesn’t the trial court decision have an impact on the settlement value of the case? 

Mr. CREELY. The judge’s ruling? 

Mr. SCHIFF. Doesn’t that have an impact on the settlement value 

of the case? 

Mr. CREELY. I am sure it would have an impact on the settlement value of the case. If you were awarded $10,000, it wouldn’t— 

it would be much more settling. If he awarded a lot of money, it 

would impact settlement. But from what I understand subsequent 

to all of this, there was no real settlement discussions that took 

place among settling this case. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Creely, I want to ask you one last question, and 

then I will turn it over to my colleagues. You testified a couple 

times that you tried to avoid giving the judge money. You tried to 

go out of your way to avoid being put in a position of being asked 

for money. Why was that difficult? Why couldn’t you avoid him? 

Where would you see him when he asked you for money? 

Mr. CREELY. You name it. I mean, anywhere. I mean, we could 

have been at lunch. We could have been—I could have been at the 

courthouse. I could have been walking down the street. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Were there times, Mr. Creely, that he asked you for 

money while you were in the courthouse? 

Mr. CREELY. No, you are asking to me an estimation. I am—— 

Mr. SCHIFF. No, Mr. Creely, I am not asking you to make estimations. I am asking you, did Judge Porteous ever ask you for 

money while you were in the courthouse? 

Mr. CREELY. He could have. I don’t know. He—you know, we 

went out together. We had lunch together. He could have asked me 

for money anywhere. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Creely, nothing compelled you to take him out 

to lunch, right? 

Mr. CREELY. Of course not. 

Mr. SCHIFF. But you did, as a result of being an attorney, have 

to appear in the courthouse, didn’t you? 

Mr. CREELY. Yes, sir, I appeared in the courthouse. I didn’t practice law in front of him for 10 years. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Creely, my question is, as a lawyer, you had to 

go to the courthouse periodically, whether you were in his court or 

not, didn’t you? 

Mr. CREELY. Yes, sir. 

57 

Mr. SCHIFF. And as he was in the courthouse, did it make it difficult for you to avoid him completely because your business took 

you to the same building? 

Mr. CREELY. The question is, I had to go to the courthouse? 

Mr. SCHIFF. The question is, you said you wanted to avoid him. 

Was that difficult because you had to work in the same building? 

Mr. CREELY. We worked in the same building. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Do we need to repeat the question, Mr. Creely? You 

said you were trying to avoid the judge because he kept hitting you 

up for money. 

Mr. CREELY. Right. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Was it difficult to avoid the judge completely because you had to practice in the same courthouse? 

Mr. CREELY. It was—yes, because this was the courthouse that 

he practiced law in, which was the Gretna courthouse. This was 

the hearing—this was the courthouse where they handled divorce 

cases. It was in a different building, all right? 

The domestic relations section of the court was in a different 

building than the courthouse that Judge Porteous practiced law in. 

So you would—you would go to this building for relief on divorce 

cases. I believe back in the 1980’s, if you disagreed with rulings 

and hearing officers and so forth, you would have a trial in this 

building. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Creely, I am sorry, but the court reporter and 

the transcript won’t reflect what cup you are pointing to for a 

building. Let me just ask you very simply: Did your work as a lawyer take you into the same building where Judge Porteous either 

had his chambers or the courtroom in which he appeared? 

Mr. CREELY. Yes. 

Mr. SCHIFF. And when you would meet the judge for lunch, 

would you meet him in his chambers prior to going to lunch? 

Mr. CREELY. While we were in the courthouse? 

Mr. SCHIFF. When you would meet Judge Porteous for lunch, did 

you meet him in his chambers on occasion and then go from his 

chambers to lunch? 

Mr. CREELY. There is a possibility, yes. 

Mr. SCHIFF. In the microphone, Mr. Creely. 

Mr. CREELY. There is a possibility, yes. 

Mr. SCHIFF. And is it also a possibility that, while in his chambers before going to lunch, that he requested money from you? 

Mr. CREELY. There is a possibility, yes. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Goodlatte? 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I 

don’t believe any on our side have any additional questions of this 

witness. Thank you. 

Mr. SCHIFF. At this point, Mr. Creely’s testimony having concluded, we will recess for lunch and return in 45 minutes. Will 

that—in 45 minutes. 

We are in recess. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. SCHIFF. This hearing will come to order. 

58 

Before we begin and introduce the next witness, I would like to 

ask that the exhibits that Mr. Baron used earlier in his presentation be made a part of the record, unless there is objection. Hearing none, it will be so ordered. 

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Mr. SCHIFF. Our second witness today is Jacob Amato, Esquire. 

Mr. Amato is an attorney with a law practice in the New Orleans 

area. He is here pursuant to subpoena and has previously been 

served with an immunity order that compels his truthful testimony 

at proceedings before the House. I will now swear the witness. 

Mr. Amato, please raise your right hand. I don’t know if you are 

able to rise. 

[Witness sworn.] 

Mr. SCHIFF. Thank you. You may be seated. 

Mr. Dubester, you may now question the witness. 


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Mr. DUBESTER. Okay—please introduce yourself to the Members 

of the panel. 

Okay. Will you just—I am sorry. Okay. 

And, Mr. Amato, are you an attorney? 

TESTIMONY OF JACOB AMATO, JR., ATTORNEY, 

NEW ORLEANS, LA 

Mr. AMATO. Yes, I am. 

Mr. DUBESTER. And where do you practice? 

Mr. AMATO. Gretna, Louisiana. 

Mr. DUBESTER. And what parish is that? 

Mr. AMATO. Jefferson Parish. 

Mr. DUBESTER. And do you have offices which are right near the 

courthouse there? 

Mr. AMATO. Yes, right across the street from the Gretna courthouse. 

Mr. DUBESTER. Okay. Now, in the early 1970’s, were you a partner with Judge Porteous? 

Mr. AMATO. Yes, I was. 

Mr. DUBESTER. And did Mr. Creely work for you? 

Mr. AMATO. That is true. Mr. Creely did work for the law firm 

that—Edwards, Porteous and Amato, while he was in law school. 

Mr. DUBESTER. And are you older than Mr. Creely? 

Mr. AMATO. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DUBESTER. And were you a peer of Judge Porteous’s at law 

school? 

Mr. AMATO. I think I am older than he is. In fact, I know I am 

older than he is, but I don’t know. We didn’t—we went—he went 

to LSU, and I went to Loyola, so I didn’t meet him until after law 

school. 

Mr. DUBESTER. But in any event, Creely is junior to the two of 

you, correct? 

Mr. AMATO. Correct. 

Mr. DUBESTER. And you had a relationship with Judge Porteous 

as a friend before Mr. Creely came and joined the practice, right? 

Mr. AMATO. Correct. 

Mr. DUBESTER. Okay. Now, at some point, you and Mr. Creely 

formed your own practice. Is that right? 

Mr. AMATO. Correct. 

Mr. DUBESTER. Now, in the—starting with 1984, Judge Porteous 

was elected state judge. Is that correct? 

Mr. AMATO. I think that is correct. I don’t know the exact date. 

It is—— 

Mr. DUBESTER. And you maintained a friendship with him while 

he was a state judge? 

Mr. AMATO. Yes. 

Mr. DUBESTER. Okay. Now, at some point in the—did you become 

aware that Judge Porteous was making requests of Mr. Creely for 

cash? 

Mr. AMATO. At some point, yes. 

Mr. DUBESTER. And how did you become aware of that? 

Mr. AMATO. Mr. Creely came to me one day and said that Tom— 

or Judge Porteous asked him for some money based upon sending 

curatorships. 

100 

Mr. DUBESTER. Okay. Now, if you want to call everybody Tom 

and Bob, just because it is what you would refer to them, you just 

go ahead and do that. We will understand who you are referring 

to. 

Mr. AMATO. I ought to be polite to everybody. 

Mr. DUBESTER. Understood. Okay. And after this information or 

this communication came to you from Mr. Creely, what did you understand—what happened next, in terms of the request to Mr. 

Creely and the provision of monies to Judge Porteous? 

Mr. AMATO. Well, I never got a request from Judge Porteous ever 

as for any percentage of the curatorships. Bob would tell me Judge 

Porteous needs, you know, $500, $1,000, whatever it is for the curatorships, and we would each draw a check for whatever half the 

amount that he requested. 

Mr. DUBESTER. And you are making a reference to Bob needing 

money for the curatorships, so the request coming from the curatorships. What are you referring to? 

Mr. AMATO. Well, the judges can send curator cases to various 

lawyers, and they do for various reasons, usually to help out young 

lawyers with fees and sometimes for—you know, for their own personal reasons. You know, you might have worked in their campaign 

or some campaign contributions or something. And Judge Porteous 

sent curator cases to Bob Creely and at some point asked that he 

be—receive some of that money. 

Mr. DUBESTER. Okay. Now, the money that went to Judge 

Porteous that you have just described, did they come—was that 

Bob’s money, or your money, or both of your money? 

Mr. AMATO. It was our money. 

Mr. DUBESTER. And how did that process work, in terms of it 

being both your money? 

Mr. AMATO. Well, we each drew a salary, and we each—you 

know, a regular salary. And we also took draws. You know, if we 

had money this month, we took a little extra money. And when it 

was time to give Judge Porteous curator money, that the bookkeeper would write checks, $500 to me, $500 to Bob, checks would 

be cashed, and then some sort of way or another, Judge Porteous 

would receive the money. 

Mr. DUBESTER. Okay. Did you personally give Judge Porteous 

the cash? 

Mr. AMATO. I really—I am sure I had. I can’t be positive when— 

how much, but I really can’t—I can’t answer that. 

Mr. DUBESTER. Okay. Now, even though the requests were coming from Judge Porteous to Bob Creely, is there any question in 

your mind that Judge Porteous understood that the money going 

back to him including—it was money from you, as well as Bob? 

Mr. AMATO. Of course. We owned our own office building. We had 

checks. We had business cards. We filed pleadings and, you know, 

Amato and Creely, a professional law corporation. 

Mr. DUBESTER. Did you own real estate together? 

Mr. AMATO. Yes. 

Mr. DUBESTER. And the name on your—did you have a name on 

the building? 

101 

Mr. AMATO. We had our name on the building. We didn’t have 

a big building name that said the Amato and Creely Building, but 

we had our—— 

Mr. DUBESTER. Okay. 

Mr. AMATO [continuing]. Our office name on it. 

Mr. DUBESTER. You have been asked several times, I think, in 

different contexts if you have a sense of how much money you 

gave—the two of you gave back to Judge Porteous. Do you have 

any sense? 

Mr. AMATO. I would have to say over $10,000, but how much over, I don’t know. But I don’t think it was over $20,000. I just 

don’t know. 

Mr. DUBESTER. Okay. 

Mr. AMATO. I never had a finger on it. I never fooled with it. 

Mr. DUBESTER. Okay. But no—and also, most of that was being 

handled by Mr. Creely, correct? 

Mr. AMATO. Yes. 

Mr. DUBESTER. Okay. Mr. Creely has estimated—if others have estimated it to be at least $20,000, you don’t dispute that, do you? 

Mr. AMATO. No, I can’t—I have no way to refute it. 

Mr. DUBESTER. Okay. Now, did you feel you had a choice but to 

give Judge Porteous this money? 

Mr. AMATO. Yes, I think we had a choice, but I just wasn’t strong 

enough to put an end to it. To put an end to it, I would have to 

break up my law partnership and break up a friendship that I have 

had over a number of years with Judge Porteous, and I wasn’t 

strong enough. 

Mr. DUBESTER. Okay. Now, after Judge Porteous became a Federal judge, did you contribute to a party in his honor? 

Mr. AMATO. Yes. They had a—like a reception after he was 

sworn in and some sort of way, and I don’t know how we paid for 

a part of it or all of it. I am not sure. 

Mr. DUBESTER. Was that at the Jefferson Hotel? 

Mr. AMATO. The Jefferson Orleans. It is a banquet hall. 

Mr. DUBESTER. Okay. I want to go up until 1996 now. Were you 

retained as one of the attorneys to represent the Liljebergs? 

Mr. AMATO. I was. 

Mr. DUBESTER. And was that shortly before trial was scheduled 

in that case? 

Mr. AMATO. Not that I know of. I—that doesn’t ring true, because 

I know I worked on it for 18 months to 2 years before it ever went 

to trial. 

Mr. DUBESTER. Okay. It turns out trial was postponed, but do 

you recall when you were first retained to—or, sorry, first engaged—or first entered your appearance, rather, that that was just 

a few weeks before the trial date that was presently set at that 

time? 

Mr. AMATO. I don’t have any recollection of that. 

Mr. DUBESTER. Okay. What was your fee arrangement with the 

Liljebergs? 

Mr. AMATO [continuing]. Contingency fee, that I was to receive 

8 percent of the gross recovery. 

Mr. DUBESTER. Do you remember what your personal contingency fee was? 

102 

Mr. AMATO. Eight percent. 

Mr. DUBESTER. And do you remember what Mr. Levenson’s was? 

Mr. AMATO. I thought it was something less than that, at 4 percent or 5 percent. I don’t know. I mean, I never have negotiated 

or had anything to do with how—who hired Mr. Levenson. 

Mr. DUBESTER. If your side had prevailed, would any fee that you 

received have been split with Mr. Creely? 

Mr. AMATO. Of course. 

Mr. DUBESTER. Okay. By the way, were you like full 50/50 partners—— 

Mr. AMATO. Yes. 

Mr. DUBESTER [continuing]. In both expenses and income, correct? 

Mr. AMATO. Yes, and at the bank, too, when you sign the notes. 

Mr. DUBESTER. Okay. Now, understanding that there is a huge 

demand at the—in terms of what the sides are asking for, what did 

you realistically expect to be the range of what you could have 

hoped to have made if your client were successful in that case. 

What was that case worth to you? 

Mr. AMATO. Probably somewhere between $500,000 and 

$800,000, but you also have to understand that I worked 2 solid 

years and took no other cases in order to prepare that case. 

Mr. DUBESTER. Okay. So that case was exceptionally important 

to you? 

Mr. AMATO. Of course. 

Mr. DUBESTER. Now, do you recall that other side, Mr. Mole, filed 

a motion to recuse Judge Porteous after you and Mr. Levenson entered your appearance? 

Mr. AMATO. I recall that there was a motion to recuse filed, yes. 

Mr. DUBESTER. Do you recall who prepared the response for the 

Liljebergs? 

Mr. AMATO. I didn’t. I don’t know who prepared it. Usually, those 

are prepared by Ken Fonte. 

Mr. DUBESTER. Okay. And that is F-o-n-t-e, Mr. Fonte? 

Mr. AMATO. Yes. 

Mr. DUBESTER. And do you recall that Mr. Levenson actually 

ended up signing that pleading? 

Mr. AMATO. I don’t know. I don’t know who signed it. I don’t 

think I did, but I—it could well have been—— 

Mr. DUBESTER. As you sit here now, what do you recall the allegation that was made by Lifemark as part of its argument to seek 

the recusal of Judge Porteous? 

Mr. AMATO. The friendship between myself and Mr. Levenson 

and Judge Porteous and that we had given him campaign contributions and that we had been—he might have alleged that we were 

law partners at one time. He also alleged that we had—that they 

had a function called Justice For All, where all the judges in Jefferson Parish got together and had one mass campaign fund, raising 

campaign funds for elections. 

Mr. DUBESTER. I am going to cut you off. I understand—I don’t 

think we need to go into detail with that particular aspect of the 

allegation. You have described generally what the substance was. 

Now, was there actually a hearing in front of Judge Porteous 

where the Lifemarks—or Mr. Mole’s motion to recuse was argued? 

103 

Mr. AMATO. I am sure there was. 

Mr. DUBESTER. Do you recall that? 

Mr. AMATO. In 40 years of practicing law, I can’t recall every 

court appearance I made. I probably was there. 

Mr. DUBESTER. Okay. Now, in connection with the motion to 

recuse, do you recall whether or not—and I guess—let me complete 

my thought here. Do you recall whether or not you made any disclosure to Mr. Mole that, while Judge Porteous was a state judge, 

you and your partner had given him tens of thousands of dollars? 

Mr. AMATO. No. 

Mr. DUBESTER. And to your knowledge, did Judge Porteous make 

that disclosure? 

Mr. AMATO. Not that I know of. 

Mr. DUBESTER. And wasn’t that a material fact that would have 

been relevant to Joseph Mole and Lifemark? 

Mr. AMATO. Yes. 

Mr. DUBESTER. And why is it that you did not make any such 

disclosure as part of the Liljeberg recusal litigation? 

Mr. AMATO. Because I probably made the biggest mistake of my 

career. 

Mr. DUBESTER. And can you elaborate on that? 

Mr. AMATO. That is why I am here. 

Mr. DUBESTER. Okay. 

Mr. AMATO. If he would have recused himself, I would be in Gretna today practicing law. 

Mr. DUBESTER. So you don’t dispute that that was important information which should have been disclosed, correct? 

Mr. AMATO. At this time, no, I do not dispute that. 

Mr. DUBESTER. No, in terms of what your mindset was at the 

time, you were not about to make a disclosure like that because 

you knew it would be embarrassing for Judge Porteous, correct? 

Mr. AMATO. Absolutely. 

Mr. DUBESTER. And you were not about to say anything or make 

any disclosure which would have embarrassed him and your—as a 

judge on the Federal bench, correct? 

Mr. AMATO. That is correct. And as my friend. 

Mr. DUBESTER. Did you consider the issue as to the disclosure of 

your financial relationship at the most basic level to be that of 

Judge Porteous. 

Mr. AMATO. I am sorry. Would you give me that again? 

Mr. DUBESTER. Okay. You indicated you weren’t going to make 

that disclosure, but in your mind, were you staying silent because 

you were going to follow the lead of Judge Porteous to see what he 

was willing to disclose or would disclose at the hearing? 

Mr. AMATO. Yes. 

Mr. DUBESTER. Okay. Now, the trial was subsequently held in 

June or July 1997. Does that sound right to you? 

Mr. AMATO. It seems like it lasted 2 months, 3 months. 

Mr. DUBESTER. Okay. 

Mr. AMATO. I don’t know if it was ’97 or—I just don’t recall. 

Mr. DUBESTER. Okay. Fair enough. After the trial, did you continue to take Judge Porteous to lunch on a regular basis? 

Mr. AMATO. Judge Porteous and I have been eating lunch together for—since we have known each other, yes. 

104 

Mr. DUBESTER. Okay. And some of them, for lack of a better 

phrase, involved you eating well at Ruth’s Chris Steak House, the 

Beef Connection, Andrea’s, Emeril’s, and so forth, correct? 

Mr. AMATO. Yes, we had a nice—we had a good time. 

Mr. DUBESTER. By the way, it was a non-jury trial that was held 

in the Liljeberg case. Is that right? 

Mr. AMATO. Correct. 

Mr. DUBESTER. And the gap—the point in time I am talking 

about is after trial and before Judge Porteous rendered his verdict. 

So I am talking about roughly summer of 1997 to April of 2000, 

and that is the period that you have just testified that, as part of 

your whole life, you took him to restaurants that we have just mentioned, correct? 

Mr. AMATO. Right. 

Mr. DUBESTER. And, oh, by the way, you have taken him to restaurants hundreds of times in your life, fair enough? 

Mr. AMATO. Yes. 

Mr. DUBESTER. And how many times has he paid? 

Mr. AMATO. I know he is—I know I have gone to lunch where 

I didn’t pay, but I do recall him buying lunch at least on one occasion. 

Mr. DUBESTER. Okay. Now, at some point—and it has been identified at least by another witness as being in 1999—do you recall 

being asked to make a contribution to Judge Porteous’s son’s 

externship, some sort of educational activity in Washington, D.C.? 

Mr. AMATO. Yes. 

Mr. DUBESTER. What do you recall about that? 

Mr. AMATO. I recall that some sort of—and I don’t know the information got to me, but that one of his children were coming to 

Washington to extern, I think, for Senator Breaux, and they were 

looking for contributions to defray the cost. 

Mr. DUBESTER. And did you give a couple hundred dollars, do 

you think? 

Mr. AMATO. Yes. Yes, I did. 

Mr. DUBESTER. Would that have—would that request have come 

from Judge Porteous or from—or his secretary, Rhonda, if you recall? 

Mr. AMATO. Not from Judge Porteous. I don’t know who it came 

from. Not from Rhonda, but—— 

Mr. DUBESTER. Okay. Now, on June 29th of 1999, did you go on 

a fishing trip? 

Mr. AMATO. Yes. 

Mr. DUBESTER. And you reviewed your calendar in connection 

with your deposition, and you recall that your calendar reflects 

that fishing trip to have been on the day I just mentioned, correct? 

Mr. AMATO. Yes, I am pretty sure that is the date, yes. 

Mr. DUBESTER. Okay. And describe the fishing trip and describe 

what happened on that trip. 

Mr. AMATO. It was a weekday, and a friend of mine has a fairly 

large boat, and we were going to Caminada Pass, which is the pass 

at Grand Isle, and at certain times of the year, the fish run between the Gulf of Mexico and the marsh. And the fish just at night, 

they bubble up. They come to the surface, and it is a free-for-all. 

105 

So we went fishing that night. Judge Porteous was drinking. We 

were standing on the front of the boat, the two of us, and he was— 

I don’t know how to put it. He was really upset. He was—had a 

few drinks. He said, ‘‘My son’s wedding was more than I anticipated. The girl’s family can’t afford it. I invited too many guests.’’ 

Would I lend him, give him, provide him, however you want to call 

it, something, like $2,500, to pay for part of the wedding or the 

after-rehearsal party of something? 

And I felt compelled, based upon, one, his condition and our 

friendship that—that is what I would do. 

Mr. DUBESTER. And did—and did you do that? 

Mr. AMATO. Yes. 

Mr. DUBESTER. Basically, he was saying he couldn’t meet his financial condition and he was coming to you. 

Mr. AMATO. Well, I wouldn’t imagine he would come to me unless 

he couldn’t meet—if he could meet his financial obligations, he 

wouldn’t have come to me. 

Mr. DUBESTER. Was that a surprise, that event? 

Mr. AMATO. The first time he ever asked me for money, the last 

time he ever asked me for money, the last time we ever—the only 

time we ever discussed money, and that is the reason I was able 

to remember it. 

Mr. DUBESTER. Okay. 

Mr. AMATO. Because never was our relationship one where we 

talked about, ‘‘Give me this, and I will do that.’’ 

Mr. DUBESTER. Did you, in fact—what—sorry, what, if anything, 

did you do as a result of that conversation? 

Mr. AMATO. At some point within the next few days, a week, you know, I got him $2,000 or $2,500. I don’t recall how—did I pick— 

did I pick him up and go to lunch and we—I gave him the money? 

Or Rhonda came, Rhonda Danos, his secretary came and picked it 

up? I just don’t know. 

Mr. DUBESTER. And was that half your money and half Creely’s 

money? 

Mr. AMATO. I can’t tell. I had some cash at my house, and I think 

I used the cash at my house. 

Mr. DUBESTER. Because Creely recalls that—sorry, Bob Creely— 

Mr. Creely recalls that he paid half of that. That is not inconsistent 

with your memory either, is it? 

Mr. AMATO. If he said he paid half? 

Mr. DUBESTER. Yes. 

Mr. AMATO. Then he paid half. 

Mr. DUBESTER. And just one more—one more question here. In 

the fall of 1999, do you recall paying for a 5-year party—or a party 

to celebrate Judge Porteous’s 5 years on the bench? 

Mr. AMATO. Yes, I do. 

Mr. DUBESTER. Roughly how much was that? 

Mr. AMATO. I think it was $1,700. 

Mr. DUBESTER. And where was that, if you recall? 

Mr. AMATO. French Quarter in French Quarter Restaurant and 

Bar on Decatur, right across from the Morning Call. 

Mr. DUBESTER. That concludes my questions. Thank you, Mr. 

Amato. 

Mr. AMATO. Thank you, Mr. Dubester. 

106 

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Amato, I am going to ask you a few questions, 

and then my colleagues are, and then Mr. Westling and counsel for 

Judge Porteous will have a chance to ask you a few questions. 

I wanted to pick off—pick up where my colleague left off. You 

started to say when you were asked for cash—or asked for money 

by Judge Porteous on this fishing trip that you felt compelled to 

give it to him. And you said, number one, he was in need and he 

was my friend. 

Mr. AMATO. Right. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Was there a number two, Mr. Amato? Was there another reason you felt compelled to give him money? 

Mr. AMATO. I felt sorry for him. I really did. You know, it is 

tough to see somebody, you know, almost to the point of tears, you 

know, to do something for his children, which I suspected was the 

reason for the emotional outlay he had. 

Mr. SCHIFF. What affect would it have had on your relationship 

with Judge Porteous if you had said no, if you had said, ‘‘You are 

presiding over a case that is under submission, and I can’t give you 

cash’’? What would have been the impact on your relationship? 

Mr. AMATO. Probably none. It would remain the same. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Did you have any concern about the fact that you 

had litigation pending in his courtroom? 

Mr. AMATO. I do now. At the time, I didn’t give it much thought. 

Mr. SCHIFF. When the recusal motion was brought, Judge 

Porteous made a number of statements in court I would like to ask 

you about. At one point during the hearing on a motion to recuse, 

he said, ‘‘The first time I ran, 1984, I think is the only time when 

they gave me money.’’ Was that a truthful statement? 

Mr. AMATO. I don’t recall the statement, but I don’t know the 

context. I think the context might have been—that was when the 

first time he ran and the first time he collected money for campaign contributions. I—that is the best I can do. 

Mr. SCHIFF. If Judge Porteous represented at the hearing that 

the only time he had gotten money from you or Mr. Levenson was 

in 1984, would that have been a truthful statement? 

Mr. AMATO. In 1994? 

Mr. SCHIFF. If, during the recusal hearing—— 

Mr. AMATO. Oh, okay. I am sorry. 

Mr. SCHIFF.—Judge—if Judge Porteous represented at the 

recusal hearing that the only time he had gotten money from you 

or Mr. Levenson was in 1984, would that have been a truthful 

statement? 

Mr. AMATO. No, that wouldn’t have been true. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Now, if it came up in the context of a discussion of 

whether he had received campaign contributions, would it have 

been misleading for him to say that he had not gotten money, except in 1984, and not disclose the fact he had been getting personal 

cash for years? 

Mr. AMATO. Yes. 

Mr. SCHIFF. During the latter part of the recusal hearing, Judge 

Porteous said, ‘‘You haven’t offended me, but don’t misstate.’’ He is 

saying this to Mr. Mole, representing the other party, ‘‘But don’t 

misstate—don’t come up with a document that clearly shows well 

in excess of $6,700 with some innuendo, that that means that they 

107 

gave that money to me. If you would have checked your homework, 

you would have found that that was a Justice for All program for 

all judges in Jefferson Parish. But go ahead. I don’t dispute that 

I received funding from lawyers.’’ 

In light of the fact that he had been receiving thousands of dollars from you, wasn’t that a misleading statement? 

Mr. AMATO. Probably, because I—again, Mr. Schiff, I don’t know 

if he was referring to the Justice for All collection or something different. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Well, if the judge was taking issue with the opposing 

counsel for suggesting that you had given him money that, in fact, 

went for a different program, at the same time had, in fact, received thousands of dollars from you, wouldn’t it be misleading to 

the court not to reveal that? 

Mr. AMATO. Yes. 

Mr. SCHIFF. And wouldn’t it be misleading to the court to take 

issue with counsel for not doing their homework, when the court 

did not disclose that they had received thousands of dollars from 

you? 

Mr. AMATO. Yes. 

Mr. SCHIFF. The judge also said during that hearing, ‘‘I have always taken the position that if there was ever any question in my 

mind that this court should recuse itself, that I would notify counsel and give them the opportunity if they wanted to ask me to get 

off.’’ Given the fact that he did not notify counsel and did not give 

them the opportunity to ask him to get off, wasn’t that a misleading statement by the judge? 

Mr. AMATO. Yes. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Amato, are you aware of any other attorneys 

other than yourself and Mr. Creely who gave cash or other things 

of value to Judge Porteous? 

Mr. AMATO. Not firsthand, no. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Have you had other attorneys tell you that they— 

either they were asked for cash or they know of other parties who 

gave money to the judge? 

Mr. AMATO. No. 

Mr. SCHIFF. In discussing the curatorships, a couple times you 

made reference—you said the judge would ask for some of that 

money, referring to the curatorship money. Was there ever any 

doubt in your mind that what the judge was asking for, once he 

started the curators, sending curators to your office, was part of 

the money for the curatorships back to him? 

Mr. AMATO. Yes. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Yes there was a doubt or—my question is, was there 

ever any doubt in your mind that what he was asking for during 

the period he was sending you curatorships was part of the money 

he was sending you for the curatorships? 

Mr. AMATO. No, no doubt. 

Mr. SCHIFF. And I think, when my colleague asked you about 

how often or when you gave money directly to Judge Porteous, you 

said you couldn’t recall how often or when. Without asking you the 

specific dates or even number of times, do you recall that on several occasions you, in fact, gave cash to Judge Porteous? 

Mr. AMATO. Yes. 

108 

Mr. SCHIFF. And the amounts of cash that you would have given 

would have been anywhere from maybe less than $100 to several 

hundred dollars? 

Mr. AMATO. Probably in the range of $500 to $1,500. 

Mr. SCHIFF. And then the only time you would have given him 

more than that was after the fishing trip? 

Mr. AMATO. Right. Yes, sir. I am sorry. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Has Judge Porteous ever been to your house? 

Mr. AMATO. Judge Porteous ever been to my house? 

Mr. SCHIFF. Yes. 

Mr. AMATO. I think he has picked me up at my house. I don’t 

think he has been in my house. He has been to my country house. 

Mr. SCHIFF. So he has been to your country house? 

Mr. AMATO. Yes. 

Mr. SCHIFF. And how often has he been to your country house? 

Mr. AMATO. A couple of times. 

Mr. SCHIFF. And how often would you say he picked you up at 

your other residence? 

Mr. AMATO. Probably a couple of times. 

Mr. SCHIFF. And on what occasions would he have picked you up 

at your primary residence? 

Mr. AMATO. When we were going fishing or hunting or something. 

Mr. SCHIFF. And when he came to your country residence, did he 

spend the night at your country residence? 

Mr. AMATO. I think he did once. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Would those times when he picked you up or spent 

the night at the country residence, would that have taken place 

prior to the Liljeberg case or during the Liljeberg case? 

Mr. AMATO. I don’t know when he went to the place across the 

lake. I have had it for almost 20 years, and I don’t know, you know, 

before or after, during. I can’t answer that, sir. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Is there anything that would help refresh your recollection that we could provide you with, in terms of the dates, so 

you could determine when he would have come to your house? 

Mr. AMATO. No, nothing. 

Mr. SCHIFF. You—in terms of the amounts of cash that you and 

Mr. Creely provided to the judge, you said you thought it was in 

the neighborhood of 10 to 20 thousand. Is that right? 

Mr. AMATO. Yes. 

Mr. SCHIFF. And would that have been individually or between 

the two of you 10 to 20 thousand. 

Mr. AMATO. I think it is between the two of us. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Now, do you know what—roughly about what percentage of the money that you got from the curatorships that went 

back to the judge? Was it most of the money, minus expenses? Was 

it all of the money? Was it only part of the money? 

Mr. AMATO. It was part of the money. I think it—I don’t know 

what percentage. I didn’t have anything to do with it. 

Mr. SCHIFF. If—the records indicated that the amount of the curatorships over time approximated $40,000, would that indicate to 

you more accurately how much you think you would have given the 

judge over time between the two of you? 

109 

Mr. AMATO. I would think we would give him something less 

than $20,000. 

Mr. SCHIFF. So something less than half of the value of the curatorships? 

Mr. AMATO. Yes, because we had to take out expenses and, you 

know—when you have got a curatorship, you put an ad in the 

paper, and that costs so much money, and all that was deducted 

out before we got to a net fee. 

Mr. SCHIFF. You mentioned, I think, that you didn’t like having 

to make these payments. You weren’t strong enough to say no—— 

Mr. AMATO. Right. 

Mr. SCHIFF [continuing]. And in part because you thought it 

would break up your partnership with Mr. Creely. Why do you feel 

it would have broken up the partnership? 

Mr. AMATO. Because in order to put an end to it, I would probably have to report my partner to the bar association and the judge 

to the judiciary commission. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Can you explain that to me? 

Mr. AMATO. Well, in Louisiana, if you know someone is violating 

the ethics rules, you are under an obligation to report it. So I 

would have had to report my partner. So, in turn, we would have 

had to report the judge. 

Mr. SCHIFF. So if you said no, you felt you would have had to 

have gone public with—— 

Mr. AMATO. Correct. 

Mr. SCHIFF [continuing]. With the nature of the payments? 

Mr. AMATO. Uh-huh. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Is that a ‘‘yes’’? 

Mr. AMATO. Yes. 

Mr. SCHIFF. When you received the curatorships, you reported 

that as income to the business. 

Mr. AMATO. Absolutely. 

Mr. SCHIFF. And when you spend money to take out the advertisements, you deducted that as expenses. 

Mr. AMATO. Correct. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Did you deduct the—or did you deduct as an expense 

the amount that you gave to the judge? 

Mr. AMATO. No, we paid taxes on it. 

Mr. SCHIFF. You paid taxes on the curator income, right? 

Mr. AMATO. On whatever our—the curator fee would have been, 

we would have paid taxes on it. 

Mr. SCHIFF. But you did not deduct as an expense the amount 

you had to pay back to the judge? 

Mr. AMATO. No. 

Mr. SCHIFF. How were you brought into the Liljeberg case? 

Mr. AMATO. I got a call from Ken Fonte that they had a—that 

John Liljeberg and Bobby Liljeberg had a case in Federal court, 

and would I be interested in taking a look at the case to see if I 

would take over trying the case? 

Mr. SCHIFF. And why did Mr. Fonte bring you into the case? 

What were you bringing to the table? 

Mr. AMATO. Well, I was bringing 35 years of experience. I was 

bringing trying similar cases. Up until my recent health problems, 

110 

I was fairly vigorous at practicing law. And I thought I was a good 

lawyer. 

Now, what were their motives? I don’t know. But I know that the 

Liljebergs had a checkered history in Federal court that, no matter 

what they did, that they couldn’t win a case. They couldn’t hire a 

law firm. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Did you believe that at least part of the reason the 

Liljebergs may have wanted to bring you into the case was because 

your close friendship with the judge was well known? 

Mr. AMATO. I am sure that came into the mix. I don’t think it 

was the primary reason. But I think that came into their decisionmaking process. 

Mr. SCHIFF. So having that relationship with the judge was a 

benefit to you and Mr. Creely, in the sense that it helped bring 

business like the Liljebergs? 

Mr. AMATO. Yes. No question about that. It was—— 

Mr. SCHIFF. That is all the questions I have. 

Mr. Goodlatte? 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. AMATO. I am sorry. Excuse me. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. That is all right. Mr. Amato, Mr. Creely testified that these payments were often made by each of you equally. 

Is that your recollection? 

Mr. AMATO. Yes, sir. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. And why was that? You say that you received 

these conservatorships, you made payments—you received payments for them, you deducted the expenses, you paid this separately as a cash item, you didn’t write checks to the judge, you 

gave him cash, but you didn’t consider that a part of the business 

arrangement. Why was that? 

Mr. AMATO. Well, if he would have taken the money, all of the 

fee off the curators, he would have had to pay taxes at the end of 

the year, when it got to be, you know, you drew $60,000, and I 

drew $40,000—— 

Mr. GOODLATTE. No, I am talking about your payments to Judge 

Porteous. Why did you—the payments that you made, why didn’t 

you include those as a part of your business expenses? 

Mr. AMATO. We didn’t. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. I know. Why not? 

Mr. AMATO. I couldn’t answer that. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Wasn’t it because, as you indicated earlier, that 

is a violation of Louisiana law to be paying the judge? 

Mr. AMATO. Yes, that is probably correct. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. And why would you have to wait until your 

partnership with Mr. Creely broke up before you would report that 

violation of Louisiana law regarding your and Mr. Creely’s relationship with the judge? 

Mr. AMATO. We didn’t. We didn’t report it. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. I know you didn’t report it, but you said you 

didn’t want—you were worried that, if you didn’t make the payments, you would have to break up your partnership. And if you 

broke up your partnership, you would have to report that relationship and those payments with the judge to some authorities, I presume. Why would you have to wait until your partnership broke up 

111 

to do that? Why wouldn’t you simply do that because it is a violation of the law in the arrangement that you were in? 

Mr. AMATO. Because if it—whenever I would have done it, it 

would have broken up the partnership. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Well, now we are getting some circular reasoning here. If it were wrong to have made the payments and you 

would have to report it if your partnership broke up, why wouldn’t 

it be wrong to make the payments and the right thing to do to report it while the partnership’s ongoing? 

Mr. AMATO. Because it is a relationship I had with Bob Creely 

that, by reporting it to the bar association, it would have broken 

the partnership. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. So you knew that it was the wrong thing to 

make those payments to the judge at the time the payments were 

being made? 

Mr. AMATO. Yes. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Now, when you were hired for the Liljeberg 

case, what type of a legal practice did you have back then? 

Mr. AMATO. Well, there has been a lot of supposition as to what 

kind of legal practice I had. I started off—— 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Let me help you out a little bit. Mr. Creely said 

that, while he had handled some complex litigation similar to the 

Liljeberg case, you hadn’t. 

Mr. AMATO. Well, Mr. Creely was mistaken. He misspoke, because I had handled a number of cases, including Omnitech—sorry, 

Dr. X v. Clorox. I handled Bergeron v. International Marine. I handled Call Center v. Acadian Marine. I handled the American Tugs 

v. Hypernia Bank. I have handled a number of cases. I handled foreign companies. I handled foreign banks. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Now, let me—you said earlier that, during the 

2 years that you were working on the Liljeberg case, you didn’t 

take any other cases. Is that what you continue to maintain? 

Mr. AMATO. I didn’t devote any time to acquiring business, because we were working on the Liljeberg case. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Well, and you had the Liljeberg case on an 8 

percent contingent fee—— 

Mr. AMATO. Right. 

Mr. GOODLATTE [continuing]. For which you never recovered any 

fee. Is that correct? 

Mr. AMATO. That is correct. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Because the case was reversed on appeal. 

Mr. AMATO. Correct. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. How did you live for those 2 years if you weren’t 

taking any other business? 

Mr. AMATO. Well, in a business, when you do contingency work, 

the cases I would be settling, let’s say, next week, but cases that 

have been in my office for 2 or 3 years, and I also had other people 

in the office working on cases. And I had a partner who was generating an income at the same time. 

I mean, at one point in there, we were six or seven lawyers, so, 

you know, I was going to work every day working on the cases I 

had, and I was working on Liljeberg, but I wasn’t, you know, 

spending a lot of time in acquiring new business during that time. 

I am not saying I didn’t get any cases, but, you know, the acquisiVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:13 Feb 02, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00115 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\WORK\JUDIMP\11171809\53638.000 HJUD1 PsN: DOUGA
112 

tion of business slowed down because of the time I spent on the 

Liljeberg case. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Now, while the Liljeberg case was pending and 

Judge Porteous on the Federal bench was hearing the case, did 

Judge Porteous ever use any court employees, such as his secretary, to either pick up money from you or request money from 

you for private purposes? 

Mr. AMATO. Rhonda called us on a couple of occasions for things 

like the—— 

Mr. GOODLATTE. This is Rhonda Danos, who is his secretary? 

Mr. AMATO [continuing]. For the American Cancer Society, 

Brother Martin’s High School, I don’t know. I am sure there was 

other charities that she was involved in and that the judge was involved in. We were always buying tickets for something or another. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Did you write checks for those or did you pay 

cash for those? 

Mr. AMATO. Checks. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. You wrote checks? 

Mr. AMATO. Obviously. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Because those would have been charitable contributions for which you could take a deduction. Is that not correct? 

What about cash? 

Mr. AMATO. I don’t know if she ever did or not. I really don’t. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Creely testified that he provided $1,000 in cash and you provided $1,000 in cash, which was put in an envelope, which Ms. Danos picked up from you. 

Mr. AMATO. I don’t recall it, but I am—I can’t tell you that that 

didn’t happen. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. But you don’t know for sure? 

Mr. AMATO. I don’t know for sure. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Were you—did Judge Porteous ever mention to 

you that gambling debts were why he needed his money, not his 

son’s wedding or other things like that? 

Mr. AMATO. No, he never did mention that he had the gambling 

problem to me. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Did you ever go gambling with him? 

Mr. AMATO. Twice. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Can you tell us about those occasions? Did—— 

Mr. AMATO. I went to Las Vegas in the early 1980’s with a number of other lawyers on a junket, and he was on the junket, and 

he—I saw him play blackjack. And if I am not mistaken, one day 

in the afternoon, we were to meet at Harrah’s in New Orleans, and 

I don’t know if we met or I saw him at the table or what, but that 

is the extent of it. I never spent any time gambling with Judge 

Porteous. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. I think that is all the questions I have, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Mr. AMATO. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. SCHIFF. I thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Cohen from Tennessee? 

Mr. COHEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Amato, you have had a pretty good career as a lawyer, have 

you not? 

Mr. AMATO. I was very proud of my career, sir. 

113 

Mr. COHEN. And successful, as well? 

Mr. AMATO. I worked very hard, yes. 

Mr. COHEN. Right. Where would you estimate, before this case 

came up in 1997, I guess—when did you get assigned or appointed 

to this Liljeberg case? Was that in 1997? 

Mr. AMATO. I don’t know the year. It has been so long. 

Mr. COHEN. Well, let’s give an estimate of 1995-1996. What do 

you think your typical income was in a year like that? 

Mr. AMATO. I really can’t tell you, because my income varies year 

to year. 

Mr. COHEN. Yes, I know, but approximately. Were you making 

six figures? 

Mr. AMATO. Yes. 

Mr. COHEN. Making $500,000? 

Mr. AMATO. No. 

Mr. COHEN. Give me in the ballpark, on the typical year. 

Mr. AMATO. A hundred and fifty, two. 

Mr. COHEN. Hundred and fifty. And in the 2 years that you had 

this—worked on this case, you didn’t take any new business. You 

basically sacrificed what could have been work that would have developed into, give or take, $300,000, if you amortized over your career. You didn’t take any new business. Is that—that is what your 

testimony—— 

Mr. AMATO. I did take new business. I did not solicit a lot of new 

business, because I was busy on the Liljebergs. 

Mr. COHEN. Earlier—but first, you said you didn’t take any. You 

spent the whole 2 years working on this case. So that was not accurate. 

Mr. AMATO. That is what it seemed like I did for 2 years, was 

work on the case. 

Mr. COHEN. Okay. You didn’t take much new business. Most— 

basically, you worked on the case? 

Mr. AMATO. That is a much fairer statement. 

Mr. COHEN. And you were totally on a contingency fee? 

Mr. AMATO. Correct. 

Mr. COHEN. You must have been pretty positive you were going 

to win this case, to sacrifice the equivalent of $300,000? 

Mr. AMATO. When I took that case, I was convinced that the facts 

were in my favor, the law was in our favor, that the damages were 

there—— 

Mr. COHEN. Yes, and what else was in your favor? 

Mr. AMATO. That the judge was not unfriendly to us. 

Mr. COHEN. Not unfriendly? 

Mr. AMATO. Not unfriendly. And—— 

Mr. COHEN. So you had a pretty good expectancy you were going 

to win and you were going to collect $500,000 to $1 million? 

Mr. AMATO. I have never taken a case without the expectation 

of winning it. If I would have thought I wouldn’t be able to win it 

no matter who the judge would have been, I wouldn’t have taken 

the case at all. 

Mr. COHEN. All right. I practiced some law, but I haven’t done 

a whole lot of trial work. 

Mr. AMATO. Yes. 

114 

Mr. COHEN. In my knowledge, mostly contingency cases are 

plaintiffs work. How often does a defendant work on a contingency? 

Mr. AMATO. My client wasn’t a defendant. 

Mr. COHEN. He wasn’t? 

Mr. AMATO. No, he was a plaintiff. 

Mr. COHEN. He was the plaintiff. Okay. Okay. I was given some 

false information, incorrect information. So he was—he had a 

plaintiff’s case, and you just kind of worked on that and hoped you 

would collect. 

Did you have any idea what the—when the judge came to you 

and was complaining he didn’t have any money to pay for his son’s 

bachelor party or wedding or whatever it was, did you have any 

idea what a judge’s salary was? 

Mr. AMATO. I knew it was in the hundreds—hundred and something thousand dollar range. 

Mr. COHEN. Right. And that comes to more than a couple of 

thousand dollars a month. So what you gave him was—I mean, a 

week. I mean, so what you gave him was a week’s salary at—on 

the low end. Did you ask him if he was having a problem, why he 

couldn’t afford a week’s salary? 

Mr. AMATO. No, just gave it to him. 

Mr. COHEN. You have got lots of friends, don’t you? 

Mr. AMATO. I did, yes. 

Mr. COHEN. Yes. And how many of these other friends did you 

give money to like that? 

Mr. AMATO. I couldn’t tell you, sir. 

Mr. COHEN. Well, tell me two or three of them and how much 

you gave them. 

Mr. AMATO. I have lent money to my clients over—— 

Mr. COHEN. Lent? 

Mr. AMATO. Just lent. 

Mr. COHEN. You gave money to the judge. 

Mr. AMATO. Yes. 

Mr. COHEN. How many people did you give money to? 

Mr. AMATO. Couldn’t tell you. I couldn’t tell you. 

Mr. COHEN. Because there weren’t any, were there? 

Mr. AMATO. There was some, but none to the extent that Judge 

Porteous. 

Mr. COHEN. And was it because you liked Judge Porteous that 

much more? Was it because you felt so much more sorry for him? 

Or was it because he was a judge with a $500,000 to $1 million 

judgment in your future? 

Mr. AMATO. Probably a combination of all three. 

Mr. COHEN. And if you had to kind of do a weighted verdict, 

what percentage would you give the judgment you were looking toward? 

Mr. AMATO. I would give having the judge being not unfriendly, 

10 percent. 

Mr. COHEN. Ten percent? 

Mr. AMATO. Yes. 

Mr. COHEN. And the other 90 percent was you felt sorry for him? 

I am talking about the idea of why you gave him this money and 

you didn’t give other people money. And you said there were three 

reasons, and one of them is you felt sorry for him, and one of them, 

115 

he was your friend, and the other was he had this case before him 

which meant a lot to your financial future. 

Now, sometimes in damages, you can apportion damages, and 

you can give a certain percentage on each one that everybody takes 

a portion percentage—their negligence, in comparative negligence. 

What comparative part of that factor would you allocate to the 

judge’s being the determiner of your financial fate? 

Mr. AMATO. Well, he was—— 

Mr. COHEN. Seventy percent, eighty percent? 

Mr. AMATO. Probably, yes. 

Mr. COHEN. I think the facts speak for themselves. This sounds 

like the—that the situation down there in this case where you have 

got—what are these things called, these cases you have got, the— 

where you have got these appointments? 

Mr. AMATO. Curatorships. 

Mr. COHEN. Curatorships. Is this the judicial deduct box? 

Mr. AMATO. I don’t think so. 

Mr. COHEN. Sounds like it. 

Time. 

Mr. SCHIFF. The gentleman yields back. 

Mr. Sensenbrenner? 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just have a 

few questions. 

After the trial was concluded and while a decision was pending, 

did Judge Porteous ever solicit a cash contribution from you? 

Mr. AMATO. No. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Okay. Were any payments made by you to 

Judge Porteous between the time the trial was concluded and before the decision was rendered? 

Mr. AMATO. None other than the one I discussed of June 1999. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Okay. And—— 

Mr. AMATO. His son’s wedding. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Okay. So—and this was in the amount of approximately $2,000 for his wedding? 

Mr. AMATO. Yes. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Were there any other solicitations related 

to the wedding or a bachelor party during this period? 

Mr. AMATO. Not that—not from me. Not—no. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Okay. Do you have knowledge of any other 

solicitations that were made? 

Mr. AMATO. No. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Okay. Thank you. 

Mr. SCHIFF. The gentleman yields back. 

Mr. Johnson? 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me ask this question. You are familiar with this kickback 

scheme involving the curatorships, correct? 

Mr. AMATO. Correct. Yes, sir. 

Mr. JOHNSON. And the kickback scheme involved the judge forwarding—unsolicitedly forwarding to your firm the curatorships in 

return for you paying the judge the monies that your firm received 

for the—for the curatorships. Is that correct? 

Mr. AMATO. Part of the money, yes. Part of the money, yes, sir. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Part of it is yes? 

116 

Mr. AMATO. Part of—part of the fee, not the whole amount, part 

of the fee. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Okay. But you never solicited these curatorships? 

Mr. AMATO. No. I don’t think I ever got one from him. I am not 

sure, but I don’t think I even got a curator case from Judge 

Porteous. 

Mr. JOHNSON. So you—you were not a part of the—of the scheme 

for the curatorships? 

Mr. AMATO. I never talked to Judge Porteous about curator cases 

at all, never once the whole time. I never talked to him about curator cases. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Okay. You did talk with your partner, though, 

about it, Mr. Creely? 

Mr. AMATO. Correct. Correct. 

Mr. JOHNSON. And that was during the time that—that was during the time that—that this—these curatorships were coming in to 

the office? Is that correct? 

Mr. AMATO. At some point in time, I think that the curatorships 

were coming in—after they started coming in, Bob came to me and 

said, ‘‘Porteous wants some of the money from the curator cases.’’ 

That is what I recall. 

Mr. JOHNSON. So do you agree that that was a kickback scheme? 

Mr. AMATO. I don’t know what the legal definition with that 

would be. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, just—not a legal definition, but a—just a 

common knowledge definition. How did that scheme differ from a 

kickback scheme? 

Mr. AMATO. It probably didn’t. 

Mr. JOHNSON. It probably did not? All righty. 

And, listen, I see that you are—came to court today in—with a 

wheelchair. 

Mr. AMATO. Yes, sir. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Are you still practicing law right now? 

Mr. AMATO. Not very much. I am trying to get to Medicare. I 

hope you all pay us some health legislation. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, I like that. I like that. I voted for that myself, as a matter of fact. Bingo. 

Mr. AMATO. I must have hit a—— 

Mr. JOHNSON. Bingo. No further questions. No, I am just kidding. I am just kidding. So is Mr. Creely still your partner? 

Mr. AMATO. No, he is not my partner. I don’t know what he is— 

I know he is practicing law, but that is—it is—— 

Mr. JOHNSON. At any time after Judge Porteous was confirmed 

as a U.S. district court judge, at any time thereafter, did you provide any cash payments to him? 

Mr. AMATO. I am sure I did. I just don’t—I—I know we paid for, 

you know, a couple of things. I know we paid for his son being, you 

know, a part of the—his son being part of the—an externship, part 

for his anniversary party. You know, that is all I can recall. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Now, this—have you been the subject of a bar 

complaint regarding your relationship—— 

Mr. AMATO. It is my appreciation that that is confidential. 

117 

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, I am not asking you for the ruling on it, but 

you have been the subject—is that case—what posture is that case 

in now? 

Mr. AMATO. Not comfortable. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, I am sure. I am sure not. But is it—has the 

case already been disposed of? 

Mr. AMATO. No. 

Mr. JOHNSON. So it is pending? 

Mr. AMATO. Yes. 

Mr. JOHNSON. When was the complaint filed? 

Mr. AMATO. I—— 

Mr. JOHNSON. The bar complaint. 

Mr. AMATO. It has been at least a year. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Any—have you filed a responsive pleading? 

Mr. AMATO. I am being represented, and I am sure they are 

doing whatever they need to do. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Okay. But—is—are you accused in the bar complaint of a disbarrable offense? 

Mr. AMATO. The Louisiana State Bar can disbar you for just 

about anything. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, now, let me ask you this question. Did Judge 

Porteous—I think you said he paid for one lunch. 

Mr. AMATO. Yes. 

Mr. JOHNSON. How many times did you all go to lunch together 

and you picked up the tab? 

Mr. AMATO. Hundreds. 

Mr. JOHNSON. When he picked up the tab, was that only for himself or was that for he and you? 

Mr. AMATO. Both of us. 

Mr. JOHNSON. And did you—you have had some discussions with 

Judge Porteous about the Liljeberg recusal motion, have you not? 

Mr. AMATO. No. 

Mr. JOHNSON. You have never discussed that case? 

Mr. AMATO. No. I never discussed the recusal motion with him. 

Mr. JOHNSON. But you have discussed the case? 

Mr. AMATO. I have—I asked him, after the case was tried, when 

could—you know, how was the judgment coming? And he told me 

that he didn’t have a law clerk who could spend enough time to 

render a decision. Also, at some point, he told me that you better 

prove your case, because the fifth circuit will take it away if you 

don’t. And that is—I thought I proved my case, and the fifth circuit 

took the case away, took the judgment away. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Did you take the case—ask for an en banc hearing 

or oral arguments, anything like that? 

Mr. AMATO. I didn’t handle the appeals, but I think they went 

all the way to reach the United States Supreme Court. 

Mr. JOHNSON. You—the judge never paid you back any of the 

money that you gave him, cash money? 

Mr. AMATO. No. No, he has never paid me back. 

Mr. JOHNSON. So out of the approximately $10,000 that you say 

you gave Judge Porteous, would about half of that been before he 

become a Federal court judge? 

Mr. AMATO. I think most of it was before he became a Federal 

judge. 

118 

Mr. JOHNSON. But there were—there was some. Approximately 

how much would you say? 

Mr. AMATO. Well, the only thing I can tell you for sure was that 

the money for his son’s wedding. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Did you go to Las Vegas with him to gamble? 

Mr. AMATO. I did not. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Did you have any input in the preparation of the 

responsive pleadings to the motion to recuse in the Liljeberg case? 

Mr. AMATO. No, I did not. 

Mr. JOHNSON. What was your role during that—that part of the 

case? 

Mr. AMATO. The recusal? 

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes. Because you were attorney of record on the 

case, correct? 

Mr. AMATO. Sat in the courtroom and kept my mouth shut. 

Mr. JOHNSON. And you were attorney of record, as well? 

Mr. AMATO. I was one of the attorneys of record. There was five 

attorneys of record—— 

Mr. JOHNSON. But you weren’t the lead attorney? 

Mr. AMATO [continuing]. And a sixth attorney assistant. 

Mr. JOHNSON. This is the case that you were going to take an 

8 percent contingent fee out of? 

Mr. AMATO. Yes. 

Mr. JOHNSON. What kind of case was that, by the way? 

Mr. AMATO. It was with Lifemark and Tenet Healthcare stole my 

client’s hospital and tried to put him out of business. 

Mr. JOHNSON. All right, so a business tort? 

Mr. AMATO. It was a business tort that went on for years and 

that was very convoluted and very difficult. And—— 

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, let me ask you this question, sir. Your physical disability that you have that requires you to be in a wheelchair, is that because you—does this condition cause you to be unable to walk? 

Mr. AMATO. I can walk a certain distance, but I can’t walk more 

than a block without aid. I do very little walking. I haven’t traveled 

in 10 years on a plane. And I was lucky enough that the hotel 

rented wheelchairs, because I would have never made here without 

it. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, what is the reason for the wheelchair today? 

Mr. AMATO. Because I have a degenerative disc disease. I have 

had—my bottom of my spine is fused. I have cervical stenosis. I 

have lumbar stenosis. I have neuropathy in my hands and my feet. 

I have had two aortic aneurysm surgeries in the past year. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Okay. I got—— 

Mr. AMATO. I have cancer. 

Mr. JOHNSON. I got the—got the gist of it. You are not in good 

health at this time? 

Mr. AMATO. Well, it depends on what doctor I go to. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, let me ask you, did you ever provide the 

judge or facilitate the judge’s acquisition or use of any tangible 

item, be it a car, boat, airplane, any kind of service during the period in question? 

Mr. AMATO. He went fishing with us. I don’t—— 

119 

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, did—but did you facilitate his acquisition of 

a boat? 

Mr. AMATO. No, no. No, no. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Or house? 

Mr. AMATO. No. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Or any other tangible item? 

Mr. AMATO. No. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Did you make any gifts yourself to Judge 

Porteous’s family members or other relatives? 

Mr. AMATO. Wedding presents. Wedding presents. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Wedding presents for the son? 

Mr. AMATO. His children, yes. 

Mr. JOHNSON. What was that present, by the way? Or what were 

the presents? 

Mr. AMATO. I think we gave them cash. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Gave the son cash? 

Mr. AMATO. The son cash for the wedding present. 

Mr. JOHNSON. How much was that, you think? 

Mr. AMATO. I think it was about $250. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Did you—you did make payments to Judge 

Porteous prior to the Liljeberg trial while you were signed on to the 

case as an attorney for the plaintiff? Is that correct? 

Mr. AMATO. I don’t understand the question. I am sorry. 

Mr. JOHNSON. After you signed onto the Liljeberg case—— 

Mr. AMATO. Okay. 

Mr. JOHNSON [continuing]. Had you—after you signed up for that 

case, did you give the judge any money? 

Mr. AMATO. Other than the money for the son’s wedding, I don’t 

think so. I don’t recall any. 

Mr. JOHNSON. And you gave that money for the son’s wedding to 

the son? 

Mr. AMATO. To the judge. 

Mr. JOHNSON. To the judge? 

Mr. AMATO. Yes. 

Mr. JOHNSON. And that was cash money? 

Mr. AMATO. Yes. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Did he ask you for that? 

Mr. AMATO. Yes. 

Mr. JOHNSON. He asked you specifically for $250 for his son? 

Mr. AMATO. No. No. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, what did he ask you? 

Mr. AMATO. He asked me to help pay for his son’s wedding. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Was there any suggestion from him how much to 

pay? 

Mr. AMATO. I want to say he told me that he was short $2,500 

on—for the wedding, that his portion was $2,500 that he didn’t 

have. 

Mr. JOHNSON. And the wedding was in 1999? 

Mr. AMATO. Over 10 years ago, 1999. 

Mr. JOHNSON. I have no further questions at this time. 

Mr. SCHIFF. The gentleman yields back. 

Mr. Lungren? 

Mr. LUNGREN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

120 

Now, Mr. Amato, looking at the report and recommendation of 

the Judicial Conference Committee on Judicial Conduct and Disability, their findings—page 22—contains this statement: ‘‘Much of 

the available evidence concerns Judge Porteous’s solicitation and 

receipt of cash payments from a law firm, Amato v. Creely, with 

business before him as a Federal judge. This was a continuation of 

a relationship begun when Judge Porteous was a state court judge. 

While he was a state court judge, the law firm had indicated to 

Judge Porteous that it was unhappy with having to bear expenses 

or repeated payments to him.’’ 

‘‘In response, Judge Porteous frequently appointed the court to 

curatorship proceedings and at Judge Porteous’s suggestion, received in return a portion of the fees paid.’’ 

Do you have any—do you accept those facts as contained in this 

statement of facts in the report and recommendation of the Judicial 

Conference. 

Mr. AMATO. I don’t have any way to dispute it, no. That apparently is what happened between Judge Porteous and—— 

Mr. LUNGREN. And your law firm? 

Mr. AMATO. Yes. 

Mr. LUNGREN. It says further, on page 23, ‘‘Judge Porteous and 

his benefactors used methods of payments that left no paper trail. 

The gifts described above were always either in cash or direct payments of expenses to vendors. No checks to Judge Porteous were 

used.’’ 

Is that the facts, as far as you are concerned? 

Mr. AMATO. I don’t know of any vendors that we paid anything 

to, but we never did give him any checks. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Why? Why was it in cash? What was your purpose 

in making sure that they were cash payments? 

Mr. AMATO. I presume that the—— 

Mr. LUNGREN. No, I don’t want a presumption. This is why you 

did this or you in concert with your partner did this. Why did you 

give him cash? 

Mr. AMATO. Because we made a bad mistake. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Well, I mean, I know you made a bad mistake, but 

why would you give him cash? Why would you not give him a check 

in accordance with your usual procedure, running your law firm? 

Mr. AMATO. I have no further answer I can give, sir. I mean, we 

just did it that way. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Was it part of the deceit? 

Mr. AMATO. Yes. 

Mr. LUNGREN. All right. Now, interestingly enough, they say further that Judge Porteous’s financial disclosure form contains no 

record of these benefits. Had they been disclosed—that is, the benefits—opposing parties could have sought recusal and, were it denied, could have sought appellate relief. And the controlling authority is a case called Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp. 

from 1988. Is that the same client that you had in Liljeberg? 

Mr. AMATO. Yes. 

Mr. LUNGREN. And in that case, the finding was a vacation of 

judgment where a district judge failed to disclose he was a trustee 

of a university that had substantial business dealings with the litiVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:13 Feb 02, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00124 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\WORK\JUDIMP\11171809\53638.000 HJUD1 PsN: DOUGA
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gant before his court. Were you aware of that finding or that ruling 

at the time? 

Mr. AMATO. I am aware of that ruling, yes. 

Mr. LUNGREN. So a controlling authority on—in terms of recusal 

not only was known to you, but actually, it involved a case with 

the—the same person, the same entity that hired you for your 

work. Is that correct? 

Mr. AMATO. Correct. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Now, you said earlier about why they hired you. 

You said that it was for your experience and so forth. And according to the findings of the Judicial Conference Committee on Judicial Conduct and Disability, you were brought in 39 months after 

the case was originally filed and just 2 months before it was to go 

to trial before Judge Porteous. Is that correct? 

Mr. AMATO. I presume it is. I don’t—I don’t recall it that way, 

but I have no reason to doubt that that is—— 

Mr. LUNGREN. And you still stand on your statement that they 

were hiring you because of your experience in Federal court? 

Mr. AMATO. I think they were hiring me because I had a lot of 

trial experience. That is one of the reasons, yes. 

Mr. LUNGREN. And one of the statements you made was that you 

would not have taken this case unless you thought you could win, 

correct? 

Mr. AMATO. Correct. 

Mr. LUNGREN. You are aware of the appellate court reversal of 

the decision by Judge Porteous? 

Mr. AMATO. I think they were wrong. 

Mr. LUNGREN. You think they were wrong? 

Mr. AMATO. Yes. 

Mr. LUNGREN. So when they said, ‘‘The extraordinary duty the 

district court imposed upon Lifemark, who loaned money to build 

the hospital and held the mortgage on it to secure its payment, is 

inexplicable,’’ you find that an erroneous decision by them or erroneous conclusion by them? 

Mr. AMATO. Yes. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Where they say, ‘‘The district court’s finding of a 

conspiracy to wrest control of the hospital and medical office building from Liljeberg and the Liljeberg Enterprises border on the absurd,’’ you disagree with that? 

Mr. AMATO. Absolutely. 

Mr. LUNGREN. I see. 

And where the appellate court says, ‘‘The district court in 

Liljeberg Enterprises offer no statutory or case law support law for 

this proposition, a conspiracy theory, for the simple reason that it 

is not the law,’’ you disagree with them on that? 

Mr. AMATO. I would have to read more of the decision, but, yes, 

I think the court of appeals was wrong. I still think the court of 

appeals was wrong. 

Mr. LUNGREN. And where they say, ‘‘The idea that Lifemark deliberately subordinated its mortgage interest to Travelers, knowing 

it would result in a required payment, to wit, approximately $7.8 

million, to Travelers at any judicial sale, comes close to being nonsensical,’’ you find that wrong? 

122 

Mr. AMATO. Yes, because there was other litigation going on between Travelers and Jones Walker and—well, Lifemark was purchased by Tenet. That was going on almost simultaneous with this 

case, where all that was litigated. 

Mr. LUNGREN. And further on, when they talk about Lifemark as 

a mortgagee, did not have a duty to protect the hospital owner 

from other creditors asserting their rights against the hospital, as 

the district court held Lifemark did. And then further on, they said 

this is a chimera or ‘‘chimera,’’ existing nowhere in Louisiana law, 

it was apparently constructed out of whole cloth. You disagree with 

them on that? 

Mr. AMATO. Yes, sir. 

Mr. LUNGREN. But they did hire you because of your knowledge 

of the law and your ability in Federal court? 

Mr. AMATO. Yes. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Your law firm had a number of other—a number 

of other curatorships besides the ones sent to you by Judge 

Porteous—by the judge in this case, correct? 

Mr. AMATO. I am sure we received other curator cases. I 

don’t—— 

Mr. LUNGREN. You are not aware whether you did or you didn’t? 

Mr. AMATO. No, I said I am sure we did receive other curator 

cases. 

Mr. LUNGREN. In any of those cases, did you—are you aware of 

the judge who sent them to your office requesting payments either 

in cash or by check? 

Mr. AMATO. No. 

Mr. LUNGREN. So this is not a usual practice in New Orleans? 

Mr. AMATO. No. 

Mr. LUNGREN. When, if ever, did your ethnical antennae go up 

and indicate to you that something was wrong here? 

Mr. AMATO. I couldn’t tell you when. 

Mr. LUNGREN. According to your testimony before the court proceedings with Chief Justice—Judge Jones, Judge Benevides asked 

you about the—the curatorships, and they asked you how much, 

and you said it was never an amount that was astonishing. It was 

always a couple thousand dollars. 

Judge Benevides, ‘‘A couple thousand dollars sometimes every 6 

months and sometimes every 3 or 4 weeks?’’ ‘‘Yeah, but, I mean, 

it wasn’t a constant thing. It wasn’t, you know, look, I expect a 

check every Thursday or Friday or 2 weeks or anything like that.’’ 

But it was repetitive, correct? 

Mr. AMATO. Yes, sir. 

Mr. LUNGREN. And it took place over years? 

Mr. AMATO. Yes, sir. 

Mr. LUNGREN. And as you say, it was always a couple thousand 

dollars? That was your testimony under oath before that panel. 

Mr. AMATO. I think that is correct, yes. 

Mr. LUNGREN. We have had testimony about the draw that you or Mr. Creely made that is we believe $2,000, and Rhonda Danos 

came to pick it up. You do or do not recall that? 

Mr. AMATO. I don’t recall that specifically. I really don’t, sir. 

Mr. LUNGREN. During the pendency of the Federal case, do you 

recall making payments of cash to the judge? 

123 

Mr. AMATO. The only one I recall was for his son’s wedding. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Was that before, at the time that it was pending, 

or after the recusal motion? 

Mr. AMATO. It was prior to the judgment being rendered, after 

the recusal motion and the trial. 

Mr. LUNGREN. It was following the decision, the recusal motion 

that you then gave him money in that specific instance? 

Mr. AMATO. That is when his son got married, in June 1999, and 

I think the recusal motion was some years before that. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Chairman. 

Mr. SCHIFF. The gentleman yields back. 

At this point, Mr. Westling, if you have some questions, you may 

proceed. 

Mr. WESTLING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Amato, I will try to work through this quickly. I know you 

have been up here a long time. 

First, I think I just want to clarify: Your testimony has been 

clear that there was only a single time that Judge Porteous ever 

asked you for cash money, and that was in connection with his 

son’s wedding. Is that correct? 

Mr. AMATO. That is correct. 

Mr. WESTLING. So when you tell us about your knowledge about 

money and the curatorships, that was, in fact, something that you 

did not handle personally. Is that correct? 

Mr. AMATO. That is correct. 

Mr. WESTLING. That was something Mr. Creely handled? 

Mr. AMATO. Yes. 

Mr. WESTLING. And so, as a practical matter, you would say that 

he would recollect those facts better than you. Is that correct? 

Mr. AMATO. Yes. 

Mr. WESTLING. Okay. Now, moving on to the period of time— 

Judge Porteous became a Federal judge in 1994, as you are aware. 

He was confirmed on October 11, 1994. Does that sound about 

right to you? 

Mr. AMATO. I have no way to dispute that. 

Mr. WESTLING. And it was some couple of years later that you 

were actually retained to get involved in the Liljeberg case, correct? 

Mr. AMATO. Yes. 

Mr. WESTLING. All right. Now, Mr. Amato, you have talked some 

about your law practice. Were you typically a contingency lawyer? 

Mr. AMATO. Yes. 

Mr. WESTLING. So you were a person that was engaged in a business of evaluating cases before you got involved in them in an attempt to determine whether you thought you could bring back a 

judgment. Is that a fair statement? 

Mr. AMATO. Correct. 

Mr. WESTLING. And so, in this particular case, you made a comment about looking at the facts, looking at the records, and the 

work that you did in that regard. You also made a comment about 

a judge who was not unfriendly to you. 

Mr. AMATO. Correct. 

Mr. WESTLING. And I want, from a plaintiff’s lawyer’s perspective, what does that mean? 

124 

Mr. AMATO. That means a judge who will listen to you and hopefully will rule correctly, as opposed to some, you know, agenda that 

the judge has that is pro-defendant, pro-plaintiff, pro-whatever. 

Mr. WESTLING. And so when you used the term ‘‘not unfriendly,’’ 

you didn’t mean it was because it was Tom Porteous. You meant 

it was because it was a fair judge. Is that correct? 

Mr. AMATO. Correct. 

Mr. WESTLING. Have you known throughout your career Judge 

Porteous to do the right thing? 

Mr. AMATO. Always. 

Mr. WESTLING. Did you feel like your relationship ever made a 

difference when you were in his court, in terms of the way he 

would eventually rule? 

Mr. AMATO. No. 

Mr. WESTLING. Now, you have talked about the recusal motion, 

and that was, I think, filed in October 1996. Does that sound about 

right? 

Mr. AMATO. Yes. 

Mr. WESTLING. You were brought in about a month before that. 

Does that sound about right? 

Mr. AMATO. I don’t know when I was brought in. 

Mr. WESTLING. Do you also know that Mr. Mole was only in the 

case about 5 or 6 months before you were brought in? 

Mr. AMATO. No, I didn’t know that. 

Mr. WESTLING. So you have new counsel on both sides of this 

case and a recusal motion that has been filed. Is that a fair statement? 

Mr. AMATO. Yes, that is apparently what happened. 

Mr. WESTLING. You were brought in by lawyers who were already working on the case, correct? 

Mr. AMATO. Yes. 

Mr. WESTLING. And one of those lawyers was a gentleman by the 

name of Don Richard? 

Mr. AMATO. Yes. 

Mr. WESTLING. And he remained involved in the case through 

the trial, correct? 

Mr. AMATO. Don was basically lead, and I was second chair, and 

we did the bulk of the trial work and trial preparation. 

Mr. WESTLING. Now, you went through this very lengthy trial, 

and it was some 2 years later—well, I guess a year later that the 

case was tried, in 1997. Is that right? 

Mr. AMATO. I don’t—yes. 

Mr. WESTLING. Okay. Now, Mr. Amato, this was a contentious 

piece of litigation, fair statement? 

Mr. AMATO. Absolutely. 

Mr. WESTLING. Have you ever seen a fight like this in any other 

case you have ever handled? 

Mr. AMATO. Well, I have been in some pretty good fights, but this 

was a good fight. I mean, this was—this was, you know, blood and 

guts, up against the wall, no holds barred, you know, anything that 

they could do, they did. 

Mr. WESTLING. As a practical matter, this case had a lengthy history before you had gotten involved in it. Is that correct? 

Mr. AMATO. Yes. 

125 

Mr. WESTLING. And it had been a tactic used by both sides, the 

Liljebergs and by Tenet, to seek to disqualify judges in this case? 

Mr. AMATO. I know that it happened on some occasions prior to 

my entering the case. 

Mr. WESTLING. Isn’t it fair to say that Judge Porteous made very 

clear when the case got to him—and if you know this, you do, and 

if you don’t, just tell me—that he was insistent that the case would 

not delay any longer, but it would get to trial and resolution? 

Mr. AMATO. Yes. 

Mr. WESTLING. Okay. Now, you have also indicated that your 

sense of the facts was that the Liljebergs had been victims of 

Lifemark. Is that fair? 

Mr. AMATO. Yes. 

Mr. WESTLING. And that, in fact, they had been victims because 

of a certain amount of dishonesty, thievery, whatever the right 

term is, by the other side. Is that correct? 

Mr. AMATO. Those terms sound like Lifemark and Tenet. 

Mr. WESTLING. And so we are dealing here with a major national 

corporation. Is that correct? 

Mr. AMATO. Yes. 

Mr. WESTLING. And it was basically Tenet Healthcare. Is that 

right? 

Mr. AMATO. That is correct. 

Mr. WESTLING. And they are the same company that entered into 

a $900 million settlement for their falsehoods with the Federal 

Government within the last several years? 

Mr. AMATO. Yes. And during the pendency of this suit, we filed 

a qui tam suit—or a qui tam complaint against Tenet for all of the 

Medicaid fraud that they committed at the hospital. And the U.S. 

attorney in New Orleans at the time, Eddie Jordan, decided that 

it wasn’t worth pursuing. 

Mr. WESTLING. All right. Now, in this particular case, you have 

indicated that you felt confident that the result that Judge 

Porteous reached in issuing his more than 100-page opinion was 

correct. Is that right? 

Mr. AMATO. Yes. 

Mr. WESTLING. When you went to the fifth circuit—I know you 

didn’t handle the appeal—but lawyers went to the fifth circuit, 

there were issues that were critical that related to Louisiana law 

that were before the fifth circuit. Is that correct? 

Mr. AMATO. Specifically to Louisiana law. 

Mr. WESTLING. And the three judges who sat on that panel are 

all Texas judges with no experience in Louisiana law. Is that fair? 

Mr. AMATO. They were Texas judges. I don’t know what Louisiana experience they have. 

Mr. WESTLING. Do you know whether they had ever taken or 

passed the Louisiana state bar examination? 

Mr. AMATO. No, I wouldn’t know that. I really wouldn’t—— 

Mr. WESTLING. And just so it is clear, for the benefit of those 

present, Louisiana has a different body of law when it comes to just 

about everything that relates to civil interaction, in terms of obligations, contract and the like. Is that fair? 

Mr. AMATO. To some great extent, yes. 

126 

Mr. WESTLING. Mr. Amato, did you ever give Tom Porteous any 

money because he was a judge? 

Mr. AMATO. No. 

Mr. WESTLING. You gave it to him because he was your friend. 

Is that a fair statement? 

Mr. AMATO. Correct. 

Mr. WESTLING. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Amato, we have a few follow-up questions for 

you. Let me pick up where counsel just left off. 

You stated in your testimony that there was never a doubt in 

your mind that, once the curatorships started, the money that the 

judge was asking for was coming out of the curatorships. Is that 

right? 

Mr. AMATO. Yes. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Was that based on conversations you had with Mr. 

Creely? 

Mr. AMATO. Yes. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Creely made it plain in those conversations that 

the judge was calling and he wanted the money from the curatorships? 

Mr. AMATO. Yes. 

Mr. SCHIFF. And you remember that distinctly? 

Mr. AMATO. We are talking 25 years ago. I mean, how—you 

know, I knew some discussion took place that—you know, that this 

was something that we would have to deal with. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Were you aware that the judge would call your office 

periodically to find out how many curatorships he had sent over 

there recently? 

Mr. AMATO. No, I don’t recall him calling. I recall Mr. Creely 

complaining about him calling, but I don’t recall him calling. 

Mr. SCHIFF. And what were the nature of the complaints that 

Mr. Creely made? 

Mr. AMATO. Calling about the curators. Tom is calling about the 

curators. 

Mr. SCHIFF. And why was he calling about the curators? What 

was the gist of it? 

Mr. AMATO. I guess he needed money. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Was there any other purpose for him calling about 

the curators? 

Mr. AMATO. Not that I know of. 

Mr. SCHIFF. He didn’t get involved personally in finding out 

whether you took out advertisements on behalf of absent plaintiffs 

or parties, did he? 

Mr. AMATO. I don’t know what did. I doubt it. 

Mr. SCHIFF. You during the Liljeberg case had an attorney-client 

relationship with Liljeberg, correct? 

Mr. AMATO. Absolutely. 

Mr. SCHIFF. And that relationship continues to this day, in the 

sense that you are not—Liljeberg hasn’t waived its right to demand 

your confidence, correct? 

Mr. AMATO. That is correct. 

Mr. SCHIFF. And because of the relationship, you would not be 

in a position to come in to the hearing today and give us private 

information about weaknesses in Liljeberg’s case, would you? 

127 

Mr. AMATO. I don’t think so. I don’t think I could be in the position, and I am not—I don’t think I am in a position to violate the 

attorney-client privilege. And more so, I don’t think I am in a position to discuss the Liljeberg case, because I hadn’t looked at it. 

Mr. SCHIFF. What—and I want to make clear, we are not asking 

you to do either, but I do want to ask you whether you consider 

yourself still bound by your relationship with Liljeberg. 

Mr. AMATO. Yes. 

Mr. SCHIFF. You mentioned in answer to Mr. Cohen’s questions 

that there were several reasons why, when the judge hit you up for 

money during the fishing trip, that you gave it to him. 

Mr. AMATO. Yes. 

Mr. SCHIFF. You mentioned it was part friendship. You mentioned it was part feeling sorry for him. And you mentioned it was 

part that he was a judge presiding over a major case that you had 

before him, correct? 

Mr. AMATO. Yes. 

Mr. SCHIFF. And he asked you if you could quantify, well, how 

much of your motive in giving the money was related to each of 

those three things, right? 

Mr. AMATO. I think we tried to get there, yes. 

Mr. SCHIFF. And if I understood you correctly, you said that 70 

percent—70 percent to 80 percent of the reason you gave him the 

money was this was a judge presiding over this case you had, 

right? 

Mr. AMATO. No, I thought it was the other way around. I thought 

it was 10 percent to 20 percent because it was a judge who was 

listening to the case as opposed to the friendship I have had with 

him for—ever since he got out of law school. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Well, I am glad, because I want to clarify this. So 

in your estimation, then, 70 percent to 80 percent was friendship 

and 10 percent to 20 percent was this is a judge presiding over a 

very important case to me? 

Mr. AMATO. Yes. 

Mr. SCHIFF. You also mentioned, I believe in answer to Mr. Johnson’s questions, you were asked about, wasn’t this just a classic 

kickback scheme? I think he asked you, but again it was sort of a 

double negative, and I want to make sure we have it correct. This 

didn’t differ, I think was his question, from a kickback scheme. Let 

me ask it in the affirmative: This was really a form of a kickback 

scheme, wasn’t it? 

Mr. AMATO. I really don’t know how to answer that question, because there was never anything done as far as Tom sending curators, but you have got to do this for us on another case or you have 

got to let Joe Smith out of jail or anything like that. I think that 

would qualify as a kickback scheme. What this qualifies as, Lord 

only knows. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Amato, would you consider it a kickback scheme 

if someone sends you business, a curatorship, with expectation you 

will kick back some of that money to a person who sent you the 

case? 

Mr. AMATO. It would fit into that definition. 

Mr. SCHIFF. So wasn’t this a classic kickback arrangement? 

Mr. AMATO. Yes. 

128 

Mr. SCHIFF. On the fishing trip, you mentioned that the judge— 

well, actually, let me ask you. I don’t know if it was on the fishing 

trip. You mentioned that, during the pendency of the Liljeberg 

case, you had a conversation—maybe more than one conversation— 

with the judge about the Liljeberg case. And you said something 

very interesting. You said that the judge told you, ‘‘You’d better 

prove your facts, because otherwise the fifth circuit will take it 

away.’’ Is that what the judge told you? 

So the judge didn’t tell you, you needed to prove the facts to him. 

You needed to prove the facts, because otherwise the court of appeals would reverse, and that was his message to you. 

Mr. AMATO. No, his message was, you had better have a good 

case and you had better give me enough evidence that will withstand an appeal. And I thought that we did that. 

Mr. SCHIFF. So he was telling you, you had better have enough 

evidence that I can rule in your favor, otherwise, if I do, I will be 

reversed? 

Mr. AMATO. If I didn’t, he would be reversed. 

Mr. SCHIFF. That was his—— 

Mr. AMATO. If I proved—listen, it is not hard to explain, but I 

thought we over-proved the case. We produced their executives to 

testify as to how they set up a scheme to defraud my client. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Amato, I want to ask you about your conversations with the judge. I appreciate your feeling about the merits of 

the case, but I just want to make sure that we have this accurately. What the judge told you was not that you had to prove the 

case for his benefit, that you needed to show the facts. Otherwise, 

the fifth circuit would reverse him. Is that the message he gave 

you? 

Mr. AMATO. No. The message he gave me was, you are not getting a gift. You are going to try your case, and you are going to 

prove your case, and you are going to have to prove it to such an 

extent that the court of appeals is going to leave it alone. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Why would he mention the court of appeals? Why 

wouldn’t he say, ‘‘You are going to have to prove it to my satisfaction’’? 

Mr. AMATO. Because there is a history of the court of appeals 

that every case that the Liljebergs ever had did something to overturn the decision. 

Mr. SCHIFF. And when you asked him how is the judgment coming, this was at a time when it had been under submission for 

some time? 

Mr. AMATO. Yes. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Was this on the fishing trip? 

Mr. AMATO. No. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Was it before or after the fishing trip? 

Mr. AMATO. I couldn’t tell you. I really couldn’t, Mr. Schiff. You 

know, you are talking stuff that happened 10, 15 years ago. And 

I—sequentially, I cannot answer. I just don’t know. 

Mr. SCHIFF. And when the judge told you that you needed to 

prove the case or the fifth circuit would take it away, was it just 

the two of you, or were there other people present? 

Mr. AMATO. I don’t know. I don’t know. I don’t know who was 

there. 

129 

Mr. SCHIFF. Did you ever disclose to opposing counsel that you 

had had this ex parte communication about the case with the 

judge? 

Mr. AMATO. I didn’t think it was ex parte communication. We 

didn’t discuss the issues. We didn’t discuss facts. We didn’t discuss 

witnesses. You know, it is probably like, you know, how are you 

going to vote on something? You don’t have to give a reason. You 

can just—you know, I am going to vote Democrat this year or Republican this year. But you don’t give a reason. 

Mr. SCHIFF. I don’t think the relationship of an attorney representing a client before a judge is the same as how are you going 

to vote in an election. You didn’t feel you had any obligation to disclose to opposing counsel that you were discussing the pendency of 

a matter with the judge without any others present? 

Mr. AMATO. No, I didn’t consider it a discussion of the facts of 

the case or the merits of the case. 

Mr. SCHIFF. When Mr. Lungren asked you about why you had 

paid in cash rather than wrote a check from the firm to the judge, 

wasn’t this in large part, if not exclusively, because you didn’t want 

a paper trail? 

Mr. AMATO. No paper trail. 

Mr. SCHIFF. And, finally, you used the word unfriendly. 

Mr. AMATO. I am sorry? 

Mr. SCHIFF. You used the word unfriendly, that you thought you 

had a good chance to prevail on the case because the judge was not 

unfriendly. Similarly, you mentioned that you thought maybe one 

of the reasons why you were brought into the case was because of 

the wide knowledge that you had a friendship with the judge. Part 

of that friendship was providing him with thousands of dollars, 

wasn’t it? 

Mr. AMATO. I think Tom and I would have been friends no matter what, but I am sure he appreciated our generosity or our 

friendship shown that way. 

Mr. SCHIFF. I have no further questions. 

Mr. Goodlatte? 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Amato, to follow up on the question of the Chairman regarding your discussions with Judge Porteous about the Liljeberg case, 

did you ever have any discussions with him about the potential 

award in the case? 

Mr. AMATO. No, never did. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Well, then how did he come to have a conversation with you in which you talked about having to prove your case, 

and you characterized his message to you—I am not saying these 

are his words—but you characterized his message to you as, ‘‘You 

are not getting a gift.’’ How did you come to have a conversation 

with him where he would send a message to you, ‘‘You are not getting a gift. You have to prove your case’’? 

Mr. AMATO. Let me see if I understand the question. I think that 

the message he was trying to convey was that you—if you don’t 

prove your case to a preponderance—— 

Mr. GOODLATTE. I know what his message was. When did it 

occur? How did it come about? How did you happen to be talking 

to him? 

130 

Mr. AMATO. I don’t know if we were at lunch or we were drinking 

or what. But it came up that, you know, you had better prove your 

case. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Now, you said, ‘‘you had better prove your case 

or the fifth circuit is going to take it away from you.’’ What do you 

think he meant by ‘‘it’’? 

Mr. AMATO. The judgment. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. You had better prove your case, or the fifth circuit is going to take it away from you. How could he know that in 

advance? Wasn’t he really saying he is going to—he is going to take 

it away from him, that he was giving you a judgment, but you had 

better have enough evidence to sustain it or they would take it 

away? 

Mr. AMATO. I truly don’t understand, other than the fact that he 

conveyed to me that—— 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Well, why wouldn’t he say to you—let me characterize it a different way. Why wouldn’t he say to you, ‘‘You had 

better prove your case or I am going to rule against you’’? ‘‘You had 

better prove your case or I am going to take it away from you’’? 

Why would he say, ‘‘You had better prove your case or the fifth circuit is going to take it away from you’’? 

Mr. AMATO. Probably because of knowing him as long as I have— 

I have practiced law with him. I tried cases with him. I tried cases 

against him. I tried cases before him. I know what he expects in 

a trial, in a case, and I think any good trial lawyer understands 

that. What a judge expects from a—— 

Mr. GOODLATTE. That is a good standard for a judge to have for 

himself. Why would he be setting the standard for the fifth circuit, 

rather than for himself? 

Mr. AMATO. I don’t know. I just don’t know. I am just conveying 

what was related to me and—— 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Now, in response to Judge Porteous’s counsel, 

you said—he asked you, did the judge have a reputation for doing 

the right thing? And you said, ‘‘Always.’’ 

Mr. AMATO. Yes. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Is that what you thought when you were worried about breaking up your partnership because you were engaged 

in a kickback scheme with the judge and he was sending curatorships over and you were getting this work or your partner was getting this work and you were—the two of you—sending money from 

the law firm to the judge? Was he doing the right thing then? 

Mr. AMATO. What I meant by that answer was that the relationship we had with him never, to my knowledge, ever affected how 

he ruled in any case. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. But he nonetheless told you that he wouldn’t 

take it away, but the fifth circuit would take it away if you didn’t 

prove the case? 

Mr. AMATO. He must have knew something about the fifth circuit 

that I didn’t. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. All right. Yes, and as a judge, he was making 

the decision about who got the curatorships. Is that not correct? 

Mr. AMATO. On the state court, yes. 

131 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Right. But, I mean, he is saying that he had a 

different standard for himself on the state court than he had on the 

Federal court? 

Mr. AMATO. I presume he did. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. You are saying he did have a different standard? 

Mr. AMATO. I am sorry? 

Mr. GOODLATTE. He did have a different standard in the state 

court than he did in the Federal court? 

Mr. AMATO. I hope so. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Well, why would you expect that? 

Mr. AMATO. Because I know the man. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. But you know that the man took legal proceedings, gave them to your law firm, with the expectation that 

your law firm would provide him with cold, hard cash that he could 

use for whatever purposes—it wasn’t going to the court. It was 

going to his own benefit. And that would be what you knew about 

him before he moved to the Federal court. 

Now, on the Federal court, he says you had better prove your 

case not or I will overturn it or I will rule against you. He said you 

had better prove your case or the fifth circuit is going to take it 

away, as if to say, you had better make me look good with the evidence you produce when I rule in your favor, because otherwise you 

are not going to get very far, because the fifth circuit will take it 

away from you. 

Mr. AMATO. I think what he is telling me was is, you had better 

make your case look good or not only will I not give you a judgment, but the fifth circuit wouldn’t give you one. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Well, the fifth circuit would never get a shot at 

it unless he gave you a judgment, would it? 

Mr. AMATO. Correct. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. All right. Now, what was the overall contingent 

fee arrangement that the fellow who retained you in the Liljeberg 

case—what was the overall percentage that was going to be recovered if there were a judgment in favor of Liljeberg? 

Mr. AMATO. I don’t know. I don’t know what any other lawyers’ 

percentages were or who was getting what, who was getting paid 

by the hour, who was getting paid by—all I knew was, you know, 

was what my fee was going to be. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Your fee was 8 percent? 

Mr. AMATO. Right. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. And Mr. Levenson was also brought into the 

case? 

Mr. AMATO. He got—and Lenny told me that he was going to get 

4 percent. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Now, counsel for Judge Porteous indicated that, 

when you were brought in, which was in October—I am sorry, September 19th of 1996, both you and Mr. Levenson entered your appearances. At that time, the case had been pending for quite a long 

time and, in fact, had been assigned to Judge Porteous some 8 

months before that, on January 16, 1996. You came in, in September, while the case was set for trial the next month. 

132 

And the counsel for Judge Porteous said that Judge Porteous told 

you that the case wouldn’t be delayed. And is that right, that your 

understanding? 

Mr. AMATO. Of this question, yes. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Yes, that he was going to move this case along, 

that the case had already been pending for 8 months before you 

came in, it didn’t go to trial in point of fact until the following 

June, another 9 months after it was originally scheduled, and then 

a decision was not rendered for nearly 3 years after that. So the 

judge wasn’t really moving this case along swiftly at all, was he? 

Mr. AMATO. No, doesn’t appear to be. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. And during that time, he was milking all kinds 

of benefits from attorneys who were dealing with it, not only the 

payment—the cash payment that was made by you and your partner, but also a number of other benefits, in terms of trips and dinners and so on, all going on for a period of almost 3 years after he 

had heard the evidence in the case. So he wasn’t trying to move 

this case along swiftly. 

Mr. AMATO. Apparently not. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. And in the meantime, at some point, you don’t 

remember when, but at some point, he said, ‘‘You had better prove 

your case or the fifth circuit is going to take it away’’? 

Mr. AMATO. That was before I tried the case. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Before the case went to trial. But you don’t 

think that he was suggesting to you that you had better give him 

a good basis for making the decision, as opposed to simply telling 

you that he was going to try this fairly and honestly, that he had 

already decided that you were going to win the case, but you had 

better give him the evidence to make it? 

Mr. AMATO. No, I don’t think he decided I was going to win the 

case before I tried the case, and I don’t know when he decided 

whenever he was going to—he was going to rule in the case and 

into whose favor. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. But he took 3 years and quite a bit of payments 

from you and others to get to that point? 

Mr. AMATO. You would have to ask him that question. I don’t 

know. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. I hope to have the opportunity. 

Mr. AMATO. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Thank you, Mr. Amato. 

Mr. SCHIFF. The gentleman yields back. 

Mr. Johnson? 

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, thank you. 

It was—I think you testified earlier today that you took 2 years 

off to prepare for this case. That was your testimony this morning, 

correct? 

Mr. AMATO. Yes. 

Mr. JOHNSON. But then—and this Liljeberg case, did the plaintiffs come to your office first to retain you? Were you the first counsel retained on the case or signed up on the case as attorney? 

Mr. AMATO. No, I was not. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Who else had been—— 

Mr. AMATO. I don’t know what the order was, but Ken Fonte was 

their regular attorney. Don Richard, Doug Draper, then myself, 

133 

Lenny Levenson, and Hans Liljeberg, the nephew who was a lawyer, helped out. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Would you consider this case to have been complex 

litigation? 

Mr. AMATO. Yes. Not complex to the extent that other litigations 

are because of the number of parties, but there was—the complexity was brought about by the number of medical records and 

drug paraphernalia and drug dosages and how the dosages were to 

take place. And, you know, they would hide records, and they 

would hide all sorts of things. And, you know, that is what made 

it complex. 

Mr. JOHNSON. I see. Was there extensive—would you agree that 

the pre-trial discovery period produced a lot of discovery in the 

case? Was it massive discovery? 

Mr. AMATO. Yes, there was massive discovery going on prior to 

this case being tried. And there were other litigations that were 

being filed in state court and other Federal courts to minimize the 

effectiveness of the trial team that the Liljebergs had. They fired 

the key pharmacists at the hospital, which caused all sorts of litigation. You know, the discovery motions that, you know, that they 

would—we would file for interrogatories and requests for production and documents and for medical charts. And then they would 

come back and didn’t, wouldn’t produce it. 

Then we would have to go back to the magistrate and try to get 

what we needed. And then, you know, it just kept going on and on 

and on, where a good deal of the time was spent preparing for trial. 

Mr. JOHNSON. How long did discovery last? And how many depositions were taken? 

Mr. AMATO. I couldn’t answer that, sir. I really—it has been too 

long. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Were you involved in the discovery process? 

Mr. AMATO. Absolutely. 

Mr. JOHNSON. And you don’t recall whether any depositions were 

taken during the course of that litigation? 

Mr. AMATO. Oh, of course they were taken. I don’t know how 

many. I mean, I just couldn’t tell you how many were taken. You 

know, and—— 

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, let me ask you this question then. Were 

there any difficulties in the discovery process that caused any of 

the parties to have to file a motion to compel? 

Mr. AMATO. Absolutely. We had trouble—there was an attorney 

for Tenet who was in Dallas who we litigated on and on as to taking her deposition and, you know, litigated the attorney-client 

privilege and what was privilege and what wasn’t privileged and 

on. I mean, it was not, you know, an easy case to put together. 

Mr. JOHNSON. What were you doing for that 2 years that were 

not taking many cases? How were you using that time to prepare 

for this case? 

Mr. AMATO. Well, to start with, they had truckloads of documents. We had the Liljebergs on the building on veterans highway, 

and we made up a war room, and Don Richard and I would go 

there almost every day and go through documents and try to have 

documents match up. 

134 

Then we hired people to put it on computers. And then, on the 

weekends, the other lawyers would get together and discuss what 

we found and what was going on. There was also a bankruptcy proceeding that was going on at the same time, so it was bankruptcy 

stuff happening while we are trying to prepare for trial. 

And I am sure I mentioned this once before, but the Liljebergs 

could not hire a large law firm in the city of New Orleans for any 

law firm, because Tenet Healthcare had conflicted everybody out. 

Everybody was—every firm in the city of New Orleans was represented by Tenet. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, let me ask you this question. Did Judge 

Porteous rule on any of those pre-trial motions to compel discovery 

or any other pre-trial motions? 

Mr. AMATO. I think most of them are handled by the magistrate. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Did he issue any orders himself? 

Mr. AMATO. The magistrate or the judge? 

Mr. JOHNSON. The judge, Judge Porteous. 

Mr. AMATO. I am sure he did. I couldn’t answer. I don’t know 

enough. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Do you recall how the clients came out with respect to those rulings? 

Mr. AMATO. We won some and we lost some. 

Mr. JOHNSON. And it was all during this time that you were providing cash money to the good judge? 

Mr. AMATO. It was after, when his son got married, which was 

in 1999. 

Mr. JOHNSON. You are familiar with the term home cooking? 

Mr. AMATO. Been there. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Because—I am sorry. Say that again? 

Mr. AMATO. I said I have been home cooked. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes. So what does home cooking mean when you 

are trying cases? And you have tried a bunch of cases over 35 

years. 

Mr. AMATO. Well, there are a bunch of places I don’t go because 

the pot is too hot, but—— 

Mr. JOHNSON. What do you mean? 

Mr. AMATO [continuing]. Where the outsider can’t apparently get 

a fair shake, because of the relationship with the judges and the 

lawyers and the politicians and whatever else that goes into the 

mix. And it is called home cooking. I mean, I didn’t make up the 

word, but I have been home cooked. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, well, I will tell you, do you know of any lawyers that have been—that were on the other side of a case that you 

handled in front of Judge Porteous who were home cooked? 

Mr. AMATO. Mr. Johnson, I have never won a case that the other 

side didn’t think that I home cooked them. Every lawyer who ever 

lost a case thinks that some shenanigans went on that caused them 

to lose it, as opposed to out-lawyering them, out-working them, and 

having a better case. 

Mr. JOHNSON. What impact did you think that you would have 

on Judge Porteous by providing him with financial favors? 

Mr. AMATO. I didn’t think any. I didn’t think any. I didn’t think 

that my helping my friend would in any way affect his decisionmaking. 

135 

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, let me ask you this. If the circumstances 

were reversed and you were trying a case before Judge Porteous 

and—wouldn’t it—and you did not know Judge Porteous from the 

man in the moon, he just happened to be the judge on your particular case, would you not have been concerned if you found out 

that there was such a close relationship between my opposing 

counsel and the trial judge in my case? 

Mr. AMATO. I am concerned every time I walk into the courtroom. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, you would be concerned about that in particular, would you not? 

Mr. AMATO. It would give me some concern, yes. 

Mr. JOHNSON. During the motion to recuse, what role did you 

play in this? 

Mr. AMATO. I was in the courtroom. That was it. I didn’t prepare 

the pleadings. I didn’t argue the motion. I didn’t say a word. I was 

there. 

Mr. JOHNSON. So you were there the whole time the motion was 

being argued? 

Mr. AMATO. I don’t know if I was there the whole time. I probably was. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Was there an evidentiary hearing on that motion? 

Mr. AMATO. No. No—motion. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Were there any oral arguments presented prior to 

Judge Porteous ruling on the motion to recuse? 

Mr. AMATO. I am pretty sure, yes. 

Mr. JOHNSON. But you did not participate in it? 

Mr. AMATO. I did not. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Did you ever hear someone during that motion for 

recusal process make a misstatement about the true relationship 

that you, Mr. Creely had with Judge Porteous? 

Mr. AMATO. I don’t recall any statements made at all. I don’t 

know if there were misstatements or not. I just—I am sorry, Mr. 

Johnson, but, you know, that is 15 years ago and a lot of water 

under the bridge. I just don’t know. 

Mr. JOHNSON. This entire episode was revealed to the public 

when and how? 

Mr. AMATO. When the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals put on the 

Internet their decision to recommend the removal of Judge 

Porteous. 

Mr. JOHNSON. And when was that? 

Mr. AMATO. I don’t have the exact date. It was a year, year-anda-half ago or something. 

Mr. JOHNSON. So this was at proceedings by the U.S. attorney 

down at Eastern District of—— 

Mr. AMATO. This is after they decided not to indict Judge 

Porteous. And then the fifth circuit had some sort of hearing and 

rendered some sort of report based upon grand jury testimony and 

statements that they had collected or whatever. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Did you have occasion to speak with anyone in the 

U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District or for any other district with—or FBI or other investigators regarding this case prior 

to the conclusion of it by the U.S. attorney? 

Mr. AMATO. Yes. 

136 

Mr. JOHNSON. You did discuss? 

Mr. AMATO. I was called before the grand jury with immunity, 

and I testified truthfully, and I was called before the judiciary— 

fifth circuit judiciary hearing, and I testified truthfully. I met with 

counsel for the Committee on three occasions, I think, you know, 

three separate occasions, plus today. And I am here today. 

Mr. JOHNSON. This—do you feel like you would call Judge 

Porteous as a witness in your state bar notice of inquiry? Do you 

think he would be on your witness list? 

Mr. AMATO. I would hope so. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Now, you were given immunity. Why were you 

given immunity? And what kind of immunity were you given? 

Mr. AMATO. It was forced immunity. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Excuse me? 

Mr. AMATO. Forced immunity. And why was I given it? I have 

got a good lawyer. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Did Mr. Creely also—was he represented by your 

current attorney—— 

Mr. AMATO. Mr. Capitelli. 

Mr. JOHNSON [continuing]. At that time? 

Mr. AMATO. Yes. 

Mr. JOHNSON. And so both of you all were able to get immunity? 

Mr. AMATO. Yes. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Does this immunity apply to the filing of a criminal complaint against either one of you for being a party to a crime 

or a conspiracy? 

Mr. AMATO. I presume it does. 

Mr. JOHNSON. So at that time, you knew that you were in some 

legal jeopardy because of the relationship that you had with Judge 

Porteous? 

Mr. AMATO. Yes. 

Mr. JOHNSON. You—is that one of the reasons why you tried to 

cover up the cash payments to him by always doing things in cash? 

Mr. AMATO. Well, that all happened before any immunity came 

about. So I would presume that giving him cash was probably the 

easiest thing we could do. And, of course, it didn’t leave a paper 

trail. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Did Judge Porteous ever pay you back any of the 

money? 

Mr. AMATO. No. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions at this 

time. 

Mr. SCHIFF. The gentleman yields back. 

Mr. Amato, I know it has been a long day. I have two or three 

final questions, and then we will break. I want to just follow up 

on what my colleague asked you. If I understood you correctly, you 

anticipate that at your state bar disciplinary proceeding that you 

may call Judge Porteous as a witness? Is that correct? 

Mr. AMATO. Yes. 

Mr. SCHIFF. And so depending on what he says, it may have an 

impact on whether you can continue to practice law? 

Mr. AMATO. I doubt it. 

137 

Mr. SCHIFF. You mentioned that you thought that Judge 

Porteous had a reputation for being fair and always doing the right 

thing, correct? 

Mr. AMATO. Right. 

Mr. SCHIFF. He wasn’t either fair or doing the right thing during 

the recusal hearing, was he? 

Mr. AMATO. No. 

Mr. SCHIFF. The misleading statements that I read to you earlier, that wasn’t either fair or the right thing for him to lead the 

parties to believe that he had no cash relationship with the lawyers 

in the case, was it? 

Mr. AMATO. No. 

Mr. SCHIFF. And by failing to inform the opposing party that he 

had received cash from you over the years, didn’t the judge deprive 

that party of the right to the honest services of the court? 

Mr. AMATO. I think you will have to ask Judge Porteous that 

question. I don’t know. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Well, I am asking you the question. Don’t litigants 

in a courtroom have the right to the honest services of the judge? 

Mr. AMATO. I would hope so, yes. 

Mr. SCHIFF. And if they have a legitimate basis to make a motion 

to recuse or to appeal the denial of a motion to an appellate court, 

don’t they have the right to expect the judge will be truthful in presenting the facts that will be the basis of that motion to recuse? 

Mr. AMATO. Yes. 

Mr. SCHIFF. And weren’t they deprived of that when Judge 

Porteous failed to inform the parties that he had received cash 

from lawyers in the case? 

Mr. AMATO. Yes. 

Mr. SCHIFF. That will conclude your testimony today. This Committee will be in recess until 10 a.m. 

[Whereupon, at 5:31 p.m., the Task Force was adjourned.] 

(139) 

TO CONSIDER POSSIBLE IMPEACHMENT OF 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE G. THOMAS PORTEOUS, JR. (PART I)—Continued 

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 18, 2009 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

TASK FORCE ON JUDICIAL IMPEACHMENT

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 

Washington, DC. 

The Task Force met, pursuant to notice, at 10:04 a.m., in room 

2141, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Adam Schiff 

(Chairman of the Task Force) presiding. 

Present: Representatives Schiff, Conyers, Jackson Lee, Cohen, 

Johnson, Pierluisi, Goodlatte, Sensenbrenner, Lungren, and 

Gohmert. 

Staff present: Alan Baron, Counsel; Harold Damelin, Counsel; 

Mark H. Dubester, Consel; Kirsten Konar, Counsel; and Jessica 

Klein, Staff Assistant. 

Mr. SCHIFF. This hearing of the House Judiciary Task Force on 

Judicial Impeachment will now come to order. Without objection, 

the Chair will be authorized to declare a recess of the hearing. 

Today, we will continue our examination of allegations that 

Judge Porteous violated the public trust, the law and ethical canons by presiding over the Liljeberg case. 

Our third witness on this issue is Joseph Mole, Esquire. Mr. 

Mole is an attorney with a law practice in the New Orleans area. 

He is here pursuant to subpoena. He has not been given an immunity order. 

I will now swear the witness. 

[Witness sworn.] 

Thank you. You may be seated. 

Task Force counsel—just so you know the procedure today, Mr. 

Mole, Task Force counsel, Mr. Harry Damelin, is going to be starting by asking you questions. Members of the Task Force will then 

have a chance to ask you questions, as will counsel for Judge 

Porteous. Judge Porteous is present with us this afternoon, as is 

his counsel. 

And with that, we will begin with Mr. Damelin. 

Mr. DAMELIN. Good morning, sir. 

Mr. Mole, you are an attorney, correct? 

Okay. And where do you practice? 

Okay. And could you just generally describe what type of practice 

you have, sir? 

140 

TESTIMONY OF JOSEPH MOLE, ATTORNEY, 

NEW ORLEANS, LA 

Mr. MOLE. I have practiced 32 years. For most of that time, I 

have handled large, complex business lawsuits, commercial litigation of all sorts, antitrust, bankruptcy, leases, contracts. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Mole, you may want to move your microphone 

a little closer. 

Mr. MOLE. Closer? 

Mr. SCHIFF. You may want to lower that microphone, and you 

will need to talk very close to it so we can hear you. Thank you. 

Mr. DAMELIN. Mr. Mole, did there come a time when you became 

involved in the case that we will refer to as Lifemark v. Liljeberg? 

Mr. MOLE. Yes, in March 1996, the company that owned 

Lifemark became my client during a search for attorneys in New 

Orleans to take over an existing lawsuit. And I enrolled, I believe, 

in early April 1996 as counsel. 

Mr. DAMELIN. Okay. And for purposes of clarity, is it fair to say 

that you represented Lifemark against Liljeberg? Is that clear? 

Mr. MOLE. That is correct. 

Mr. DAMELIN. At the time you became involved in the case, had 

it already been assigned to Judge Porteous? 

Mr. MOLE. Yes, it was with Judge Porteous. 

Mr. DAMELIN. And had you ever previously had a case before 

Judge Porteous either in state or Federal court? 

Mr. MOLE. No, I had never had a case with Judge Porteous. 

Mr. DAMELIN. Okay. And you say you got involved in the case 

around March 1996? 

Mr. MOLE. I believe the interview with the client was in March. 

I enrolled as counsel, if memory serves me, on April 5, 2006, in the 

actual lawsuit, as counsel of record for the two Lifemark companies. 

Mr. DAMELIN. And when you got involved in the case, was there 

a trial date already set? 

Mr. MOLE. Again, if memory serves me correct, trial was set for 

early November of that year, 1996. 

Mr. DAMELIN. And when you got involved in the case, were Jake 

Amato and Leonard Levenson already in the case? 

Mr. MOLE. No, they were not. They didn’t surface until they 

made a motion to enroll sometime in September, I believe. 

Mr. DAMELIN. Of what year is that? 

Mr. MOLE. 1996. 

Mr. DAMELIN. And approximately how close to trial was it when 

they enrolled or entered their notice of appearance? 

Mr. MOLE. Well, when I briefed the issue to—with the court, I 

used the term 6 weeks before trial, so that is what I think it was. 

Mr. DAMELIN. At the time they entered their appearance in the 

case, did you know either of the gentlemen? 

Mr. MOLE. I did not. 

Mr. DAMELIN. Have you come to find out since the time they entered their appearance what type of fee arrangement that they had 

in connection with the case? By that, I mean, was it an hourly rate 

or a contingent fee basis? 

Mr. MOLE. Yes, I did find out. Because the Liljeberg companies— 

one or both of them—involved in the litigation were in Chapter 11 

141 

proceedings, Mr. Levenson and Mr. Amato had to make an application to the bankruptcy court to get their fee arrangement approved. 

I found that in the bankruptcy record, and they had a contingency 

fee arrangement, and it was their deal. I don’t know what their 

deal between themselves was, but between Mr. Levenson and Mr. 

Amato’s firm, the deal was they got 11 percent of the value of the 

hospital claim that was part of the litigation. 

Mr. DAMELIN. Okay. And when they entered their appearance, 

Mr. Mole, did that cause you any concern? And if so, why? 

Mr. MOLE. Well, as in any case, you know, especially a case as 

big as that, you investigate every aspect of it. So when two new 

lawyers signed up 6 weeks before trial, it raised some concerns, 

and so I did what I would always do, is I did some due diligence 

into who these guys were. And I made phone calls and talked to 

people and developed some concerns, yes. 

Mr. DAMELIN. Okay, what did you learn in the course of your due 

diligence? 

Mr. MOLE. I learned that—from people who would talk to me, 

but didn’t want to, you know, sign an affidavit or go on the 

record—that Mr. Levenson and Mr. Amato were very close to Judge 

Porteous, that Mr. Amato had been his law partner, as had Mr. 

Creely—Amato and Creely was the firm—and Mr. Levenson was 

very close to Judge Porteous and had—I think had been to a fifth 

circuit conference or two as Judge Porteous’s guest, that they frequently socialized in—in the way of lunches, hunting trips, and 

things like that, and that they—I also knew—well, I formed the 

opinion that there was—there was a high likelihood that the case— 

it was a bench trial. There was no jury. So it would be entirely a 

decision by the judge in a case that had been valued as high as 

$200 million for my client that the case would be handled in the 

way by the judge that would be favorable to his friends, and that 

was of deep concern. 

Mr. DAMELIN. As a result of your due diligence and the conclusions that you reached, did you then file a motion to recuse Judge 

Porteous from the case? 

Mr. MOLE. Yes, after I did my investigation, such as it was, I, 

of course, conferred with my client. I dealt with a lawyer in house 

at Lifemark. And we decided the best course of action was to take 

a shot at recusal. 

Mr. DAMELIN. Okay. Had you ever filed a motion to recuse a Federal judge previously in your years of practice? 

Mr. MOLE. I believe that is the only time I have ever done it in 

any court. 

Mr. DAMELIN. And could you explain what the factual underpinning or basis was of the motion that you filed? 

Mr. MOLE. Well, usually when you file a motion to recuse, you 

have to have some evidence that you present to the court—relationship or a fact that you think the judge should consider in disqualifying himself for whatever reason. 

I had no cold facts. All I had was my opinion, based upon hearsay from people who didn’t want to be public about their opinion, 

so I signed an affidavit that said pretty much what I told you, Mr. 

Damelin, that there was an appearance—possible appearance of 

impropriety. I argued that the judge shouldn’t be handling a case 

142 

where two of his closest friends, if not his very closest friends, had 

just signed up 6 weeks before trial, whose facts had been in litigation since 1987 in one court or another, and that I didn’t believe 

they had anything to add, other than their relationship with the 

judge, and that if the result came out in a certain way, it would 

create an appearance that things had not been right. And that is 

what I argued. 

Mr. DAMELIN. Mr. Mole? 

Mr. MOLE. And filed an affidavit to that effect. 

Mr. DAMELIN. Okay, Mr. Mole, let me ask you this. At the time 

of your motion, in October 1996, were you aware of the fact that 

other than campaign contributions, Jake Amato and his law partner, Bob Creely, had given Judge Porteous thousands of dollars in 

cash while he was a state judge? 

Mr. MOLE. No, I was not. If I had known that fact, I would have 

made it—made it—to the court it time. 

Mr. DAMELIN. Okay. Would that have been a significant fact that 

you would have used in your motion to recuse? 

Mr. MOLE. Obviously. I think that would have been—that would 

have made the motion to recuse mandatory to be granted. 

Mr. DAMELIN. Now, just a small point, but what if the money 

that I just mentioned came solely from a Mr. Creely? Would that 

still have been important to you in connection with the motion to 

recuse Judge Porteous? 

Mr. MOLE. Well, the firm on the pleading was Amato and Creely, 

so, yes, it would have. It was the firm, not just Mr. Amato. But Mr. 

Creely didn’t participate in the trial, but, yes, it would have been 

very—— 

Mr. DAMELIN. Okay. Now, did there come a time that Judge 

Porteous, in fact, held a hearing with regard to your motion to 

recuse? 

Mr. MOLE. Yes. Yes, we made the motion probably in September, 

and the hearing was in mid-October. 

Mr. DAMELIN. Now, were Mr. Levenson and Mr. Amato present 

at the hearing with regard to your motion to recuse? 

Mr. MOLE. Yes, they were. 

Mr. DAMELIN. And at any time, either before, during or after the 

hearing, were you ever informed that Mr. Amato had previously 

provided Judge Porteous thousands of dollars when he was a state 

judge? 

Mr. MOLE. No. 

Mr. DAMELIN. Would this fact have been important to you, again, 

in connection with arguing the motion to recuse? 

Mr. MOLE. Yes. It would have been pretty significant. 

Mr. DAMELIN. Now, at the recusal hearing, Judge Porteous stated, ‘‘Yes, Mr. Amato and Mr. Levenson are friends of mine. Have 

I gone along to lunch with them? The definite answer is yes.’’ Now, 

were you aware or was it ever disclosed to you that, in fact, for a 

number of years, both Mr. Amato and Mr. Levenson had regularly 

been paying for hundreds of expensive lunches for Judge Porteous? 

Mr. MOLE. Well, I knew from my—what I called an investigation 

that they did lunch together frequently. I didn’t know the details 

of that arrangement. 

Mr. DAMELIN. Were you aware of the extent of that in any way? 

143 

Mr. MOLE. No, only what I heard on the phone from people who 

were willing to talk to me. 

Mr. DAMELIN. Now, did Judge Porteous, in fact, deny your motion to recuse? 

Mr. MOLE. He did. 

Mr. DAMELIN. Okay. And then the matter proceeded to trial 

eventually? 

Mr. MOLE. The trial setting of November 6th was pushed back, 

and we began trial in June 1997, tried the case for—over a period 

of, I believe, 6 weeks. 

Mr. DAMELIN. Okay, we will get to that. We will get back to that 

in a minute. But after Judge Porteous denied your motion to 

recuse, did you retain an attorney named Don Gardner to become 

part of the Lifemark team? 

Mr. MOLE. Yes, I did. 

Mr. DAMELIN. What type of practice did Don Gardner have? 

Mr. MOLE. Don seemed to do mostly family law, divorces, and 

personal injury type cases in Jefferson Parish. 

Mr. DAMELIN. Okay. Was that in any way relevant and relative, 

his experience, to the type of case that you were handling? 

Mr. MOLE. No, it was not. 

Mr. DAMELIN. Why was Gardner then brought in by Lifemark? 

Mr. MOLE. After we lost the motion to recuse, my client and I 

discussed that—and my client insisted that we try to find a lawyer 

who, like Mr. Amato and Mr. Levenson, was a friend with the 

judge and knew him very well. They were concerned that they 

would do everything they can to achieve a level playing field. 

I resisted doing that. I am not happy with the fact that we did 

it. But my client insisted, and so we did it. 

Mr. DAMELIN. And so was Gardner brought into the case simply 

because of his relationship with Judge Porteous? 

Mr. MOLE. Yes. 

Mr. DAMELIN. And at the trial that subsequently proceeded, did 

he play any role whatsoever? 

Mr. MOLE. No, Don was there every day, but he did not take a 

witness or do any argument. 

Mr. DAMELIN. Based on Mr. Gardner’s fee arrangement, how 

much was he paid when he simply entered the case? 

Mr. MOLE. He got a retainer of $100,000. 

Mr. DAMELIN. Now, when did the case eventually proceed to 

trial? 

Mr. MOLE. We began, I believe, in mid-June. The last day of trial 

was July 31. But we didn’t try it every day in that interim. I believe there were 16 or 17 days of evidence. 

Mr. DAMELIN. This was a non-jury trial? 

Mr. MOLE. That is correct. 

Mr. DAMELIN. Were you the lead trial counsel on the Lifemark 

side of the case? 

Mr. MOLE. I was. 

Mr. DAMELIN. Now, during the trial, did Judge Porteous at some 

point in time get involved in the questioning of your witnesses 

after they had, in fact, been cross-examined by the Liljeberg attorneys? Did that happen during the trial? 

144 

Mr. MOLE. Yes, it did happen. They would occur when we put on 

a strong or important witness. I or one of my partners would examine him. And I think we did a very good job at trial. And when we 

do a good job with an important witness, the Liljebergs’ lawyers 

would cross-examine. And typically, to my recollection and my 

opinion, our witnesses did very well on cross. 

Mr. DAMELIN. Did or did not do very well on cross, the Liljeberg 

lawyers? 

Mr. MOLE. I didn’t feel they laid a glove on them. But Judge 

Porteous would question my witnesses. And, as you know, judges 

are allowed to question witnesses, especially in a bench trial, but 

I felt that the judge had gone too far in cross-examine and done 

some damage. So I was determined at some point to object or ask 

the judge for some relief from what I—the damage I thought he 

had done, because the judge with the black robe is pretty hard for 

a witness to resist. 

Mr. DAMELIN. Okay. So at some point during the trial, when 

Judge Porteous was examining witnesses that you had called and 

examined and Liljeberg had cross-examined, did you, in fact, raise 

an objection to the judge? 

Mr. MOLE. Yes. After he had done that to three or four of my witnesses, there was a particularly important witness named Steve 

Fouche. He was an intelligent man. He was a pharmacist, but he 

was relatively unsophisticated as far as the trial went. He did a 

very good job on direct, survived cross very well, and then the 

judge went into him with some questions. 

When Judge Porteous finished his questions, I stood up and said, 

‘‘Judge, may I follow up?’’ And I remember Judge Porteous’s response was, ‘‘Nobody follows me up.’’ And I said, ‘‘Well, then, 

Judge, with all due respect, I object. I think you have gone too far 

with these questions.’’ And it is a little bit of a blur after that, but 

I recall that he got very incensed. And at some point, we had bench 

books on the bench, that we had given the judge, big, black binders 

of documents. He would pick up several of them and threw them 

like a soccer ball toward me in anger. That was on a Thursday 

afternoon. 

Mr. DAMELIN. He physically threw the binders at you? 

Mr. MOLE. Well, I mean, I don’t think there was any realistic 

possibility he would get them as far as I was. It was about the 

same distance as I am from Mr. Schiff. But whether he was throwing at me, I don’t know. But it was in my general direction. 

Mr. DAMELIN. Okay. And then what happened after he threw the 

binders? 

Mr. MOLE. You know, it is—it is—it was the end of the day. We 

stopped court. There was no trial on Friday. It was Thursday afternoon. We came back Monday, and the judge ruled on my objection. 

He had written an opinion, read it into the record—my objection 

to his questions, but then allowed me to follow up with the witness, 

and then we went on to the trial. Over the weekend, no one was 

willing to stand close to me. 

Mr. DAMELIN. You have done a lot of trial work over the years. 

Has anything like that ever happened to you before? 

Mr. MOLE. No, I have made judges angry before, but no one has 

thrown things at me in court. 

145 

Mr. DAMELIN. As the trial concluded, Mr. Mole, did you feel that 

you had clearly proven your case? 

Mr. MOLE. Yes, well, lawyers always feel they do a good job, but 

I felt we had—it was a slam dunk. I think we had—to use another 

metaphor, pitched a shutout. I thought it was not a close case. It 

was a difficult case, long, but I think we had done a very good job. 

Mr. DAMELIN. Now, the judge had this case under advisement for 

quite a long period of time. Is that correct? 

Mr. MOLE. Yes, I think almost 3 years. 

Mr. DAMELIN. Now, let me ask you this. During the time that 

this case was under advisement, from July 1997 until the judge 

issued his opinion in April of 2000, did you know that Mr. Amato 

and Mr. Levenson took Judge Porteous out to lunch on a number 

of occasions? 

Mr. MOLE. No, I had no knowledge of that. 

Mr. DAMELIN. Did you know that Mr. Amato and Mr. Levenson 

contributed money to Judge Porteous to help pay for some type of 

intern or externship for one of Judge Porteous’s sons? 

Mr. MOLE. No one told me that. 

Mr. DAMELIN. Did you know that Judge Porteous requested 

money from Amato and that Amato had given him about $2,500 in 

cash? 

Mr. MOLE. No, I didn’t know that. 

Mr. DAMELIN. Did you know that Amato had paid about $1,500 

for a party to celebrate Judge Porteous’s fifth year on the bench? 

Mr. MOLE. No, I didn’t know that. 

Mr. DAMELIN. Okay. And with regard to Mr. Levenson, did you 

know that he had, in fact, traveled to Washington with Judge 

Porteous at the end of January 1999, that he traveled to Houston 

with Judge Porteous in April 1999, that he was in Las Vegas with 

Judge Porteous in October 1999, and that Levenson and Judge 

Porteous went on hunting trips together, including a hunting trip 

to a hunting lodge in December 1999? Did you know that? 

Mr. MOLE. No. All of those things were the things I—sort of 

things I feared were happening or would happen, but had—I had 

no knowledge of. 

Mr. DAMELIN. Would any or all of those things had been important to you to know while that case was under advisement? 

Mr. MOLE. Certainly. 

Mr. DAMELIN. Okay. Now, at the recusal hearing in 1996, Judge 

Porteous said that he would let you know if anything ever came up 

which in his mind might be a cause for recusal? That is in the 

transcript of the recusal hearing. Now, did Judge Porteous, his secretary, his courtroom clerk, or anyone else ever let you know about 

any of the above-mentioned events that I just pointed out to you? 

Mr. MOLE. No. No one ever informed me of those facts. 

Mr. DAMELIN. Now, you got Judge Porteous’s decision in April of 

2000. What was your reaction when you read that decision? 

Mr. MOLE. You know, I was not surprised with the outcome. 

Some aspects of it were unusual in the remedies that Judge 

Porteous fashioned. 

Mr. DAMELIN. When you say you weren’t surprised with the outcome, you had previously said you thought you had pitched a shutout, so what do you mean you weren’t surprised with the outcome? 

146 

Mr. MOLE. I felt we would lose. I felt that the playing field 

wasn’t level. I didn’t have any confidence that we would get what 

I considered a victory, which was to keep the hospital and sever 

the relationships between the Liljebergs and my clients. 

Mr. DAMELIN. So was Judge Porteous’s decision, the one he rendered in April, a loss for you and your client? 

Mr. MOLE. A very big loss. He had given the hospital—it is a convoluted story, by my clients own the hospital. It is a nice, large 

hospital in suburban New Orleans that had previously been owned 

by the Liljebergs. He had ordered the hospital be given back to the 

Liljebergs, not a remedy that had even been requested, but it was 

a valuable hospital. 

Mr. DAMELIN. Okay. Now, based on the judge’s decision and your 

understanding of the contingent fee arrangement that Amato and 

Creely had, approximately how much did they stand to make if 

Judge Porteous’s decision was allowed to stand? 

Mr. MOLE. Well, based on their fee arrangement of 11 percent, 

they were to get 11 percent of the value of the hospital claim. At 

trial, Mr. Amato and Mr. Levenson’s expert valued the hospital in 

a range of between roughly $50 million and $75 million, so their 

fee would have been 11 percent of that figure. My math is somewhere between $5 million and $8 million. 

Mr. DAMELIN. Okay. Now, did you appeal Judge Porteous’s decision to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals? 

Mr. MOLE. We did. The client and I located a firm who had a 

good relationship with Lifemark, a Texas firm, Haynes and Boone, 

who did the lion’s share of the work on the appeal, but I participated actively in it. 

Mr. DAMELIN. Okay. And the fifth circuit eventually reversed 

that decision, did they not, Judge Porteous’s decision? 

Mr. MOLE. Yes, Judge Porteous’s decision was, I believe, 108 

pages, and theirs was 116. 

Mr. DAMELIN. Okay. And was that reversal in the fifth circuit— 

did you view that as a win for you and your clients? 

Mr. MOLE. Yes. It was a resounding win. 

Mr. DAMELIN. Okay. Now, an issue has been raised in the course 

of the hearing so far that the panel of fifth circuit judges that ruled 

that decision—that made that decision were from Texas and they 

didn’t understand or misinterpreted Louisiana law. How would you 

respond or how do you—how do you respond to that observation? 

Mr. MOLE. Gee, the fifth circuit is a highly respected circuit. Louisiana law is not that unusual. I mean, people use the Napoleonic 

code, lawyers do, to try to intimidate clients into hiring Louisiana 

lawyers, but it is not that different anymore. We hired, as a lawyer 

on our side, Louisiana’s foremost expert on the real property transactions, Max Nathan, a lawyer who had taught me in law school. 

We made the arguments that the fifth circuit accepted under Louisiana law. The fifth circuit handles—it is a three-state circuit, so 

it handles a very high proportion of Louisiana cases every day, so 

it knows Louisiana law well. 

What else? The judge who wrote the opinion, Judge 

Higginbotham, is perhaps the sharpest and most respected mind on 

the fifth circuit. I think he is been considered for the Supreme 

147 

Court before. He is a little old now, but he is a very good judge. 

That just doesn’t resonate with—— 

Mr. DAMELIN. So you don’t think that that group of three judges 

on the fifth circuit misunderstood or didn’t understand Louisiana 

law? 

Mr. MOLE. And they also hire very talented clerks from all over 

the country. They get the pick of the crop, so—I am not even sure 

that is right that all three judges were from Texas, but I am sure 

Judge Higginbotham, I think, is a Dallas lawyer originally. 

Mr. DAMELIN. Okay. In—in all of your years of practice, Mr. 

Mole, do you ever recall being involved in a case where an appeals 

court used such harsh language as the fifth circuit did here in reversing a trial judge’s decision? 

Mr. MOLE. I only have my own experiences, but I have never 

seen an appeals court use language like the fifth circuit used to describe the opinion. The thing that does resonate with me is the 

term they used, ‘‘made up out of whole cloth.’’ That pretty much 

matched my view of what had happened in the district court. 

Mr. DAMELIN. Okay, Mr. Mole. Thank you. I have no further 

questions. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Thank you. 

Mr. Mole, I would like to ask you a number of follow-up questions. First, as a threshold matter, you came in, you were brought 

in to the Liljeberg case in March, and the case at that time was 

set for November. Is that right? 

Mr. MOLE. That is correct. 

Mr. SCHIFF. So you were brought in more than half a year before 

the trial date? 

Mr. MOLE. Yes, that was a problem. We had to scurry to assimilate an enormous amount of history. We succeeded in being able to 

take a lot of depositions, some that had already been—already been 

taken, so we did a lot of work. 

Mr. SCHIFF. There was a suggestion in questioning yesterday 

that both you and Mr. Amato and Levenson were all new arrivals 

on the case prior to the trial, but that wouldn’t be correct, would 

it? 

Mr. MOLE. Well, I mean, I—the time period is what it is. I got 

in, in early April, and he got in, in mid-September. So it is—but 

we did put a lot of lawyers on it, a lot of paralegals, and spent— 

you know, I have never had just one case at a time, but I pretty 

much spent all the time I could on that case for whatever the interval is. And we ended up postponing the trial until June, so that 

worked out. 

Mr. SCHIFF. So you were brought in more than 6 months prior 

to trial? And Mr. Amato was brought in only about 6 weeks from 

trial? 

Mr. MOLE. That is correct. 

Mr. SCHIFF. It would be unusual to bring in new lawyers 6 weeks 

before a complex trial, wouldn’t it? 

Mr. MOLE. It was. And the existing Liljeberg lawyers had a long 

history with the case, and they were all specialists in the areas 

that they were handling, Don Richard and Doug Draper, who handled the bankruptcy and technical issues. 

148 

Mr. SCHIFF. I want to ask you about the recusal hearing. Judge 

Porteous during the hearing stated that ‘‘a lawyer who reasonably 

believes that the judge before whom he is appearing should not sit 

must raise the issue so that it may be confronted and put to rest. 

Any other course would risk undermining public confidence in our 

judicial system. I cite that so everyone understands that I recognize my duty and obligations and that I am fully prepared to listen.’’ 

Did the judge indicate to you that he at least understood the law, 

in terms of what he was required to do on a recusal motion? 

Mr. MOLE. Yes. 

Mr. SCHIFF. He knew what the appropriate standard was? 

Mr. MOLE. Yes, he seemed to understand, and we certainly 

briefed it thoroughly. It is a very difficult thing to do, to ask a 

judge to recuse themselves. 

Mr. SCHIFF. When he went on to say, ‘‘Yes, Mr. Amato and Mr. 

Levenson are friends of mine. Have I ever been to either one of 

them’s house? The answer is a definitive no. Have I gone along to 

lunch with them? The answer is a definitive yes. Have I been going 

to lunch with all of the members of the bar? The answer is yes.’’ 

When the judge made those statements, was he, in your opinion, 

trying to give the impression that, yes, they were friends, but not 

unlike every other member of the bar that he had lunch with? 

Mr. MOLE. That was my impression. 

Mr. SCHIFF. When you pointed out, Mr. Mole—you said, ‘‘The 

public perception is that they do dine with you, travel with you, 

that they have contributed to your campaigns.’’ The judge responded, ‘‘Well, luckily, I didn’t have any campaigns, so I am interested to find out how you know that. I never had any campaigns, 

Counsel. I never had an opponent.’’ 

He then goes on to say, ‘‘The first time I ran, 1984, I think is 

the only time when they gave me money.’’ Was it your impression 

from what the judge was saying that he was making the claim that 

he had only received money once and that was back in 1984? 

Mr. MOLE. In the form of campaign contributions. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Now, you were concerned about campaign contributions because that might affect the way he presided over the case, 

right? 

Mr. MOLE. Yes, but I know from experience that campaign contributions are not a reason to ask for a recusal, because in Louisiana, we have elected judges, and the fact that the lawyer has 

contributed to the judge that he is trying a case to is not grounds 

for recusal. But in Judge Porteous’s case, he was a Federal judge. 

All I had to work with was the fact that there are public campaign 

records that told me that Jake Amato and Lenny Levenson had 

given him some money, so I raised that. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Now, all you had to work with was the campaign 

cash issue, because you were unaware of the fact that Mr. Amato 

and his partner had given somewhere between $10,000 to $20,000 

in personal cash to the judge, right? 

Mr. MOLE. Yes. Part of the way I pitched the recusal—and it was 

a very difficult thing to word, was, ‘‘Judge, you disclose to us, because we don’t have records, what the relationship is in full. And 

if you are comfortable with it, then it will work. And if it is—if you 

149 

are not, then I have a point that you need to address.’’ And that 

was—I was hoping he would make disclosure. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Now, I take it that, had you known of the relationship where as a state judge, he would send curators to the AmatoCreely law firm, and they would kick back some of the money from 

those curatorships to the judge, if you had known of that relationship, that would have been much more significant to you than any 

campaign contribution, in terms of the recusal motion. 

Mr. MOLE. That has all kinds of implications. Yes, that would 

have been a serious concern. I may have had—that that would 

have been a serious concern, yes. 

Mr. SCHIFF. At another point in the hearing, the judge said to 

you, ‘‘You haven’t offended me, but don’t misstate. Don’t come up 

here with a document that clearly shows well in excess of $6,700 

with some innuendo that that means that they gave that money to 

me. If you would have checked your homework, you would have 

found that that was a Justice for All program for all judges in Jefferson Parish. But go ahead. I don’t dispute that I receive funding 

from lawyers.’’ 

When the judge said that, he was taking issue with your suggestion or characterization that money had gone to him when, in fact, 

it had gone to all the judges, right? 

Mr. MOLE. That is correct. Yes, I remember that. 

Mr. SCHIFF. And he was basically saying you hadn’t done your 

homework, right? 

Mr. MOLE. That is—yes. But from the campaign records, all I 

saw was the number and his name. And it hadn’t been properly apportioned, but he was correct. It was a mistake, in fact. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Given what—what you know now in terms of the relationship between Mr. Amato and the judge, where over a period 

of time, he had given the judge thousands of dollars, do you consider it misleading that the judge accused you of not doing your 

homework for suggesting that he had gotten campaign cash, when, 

in fact, he had received a tremendous amount of personal cash? 

Mr. MOLE. I felt he should have disclosed those things. And I 

think, in context, it was an omission that was material that he 

should have made and should have told us, yes, what the financial 

relationship was and had been. I do think it was a misrepresentation. 

Mr. SCHIFF. By suggesting that he had never gotten campaign 

cash and not disclosing the fact that he had gotten a lot of personal 

cash, do you feel that he misled you? 

Mr. MOLE. Absolutely. 

Mr. SCHIFF. The court goes on to say, ‘‘I have always taken the 

position that if there was ever any question in my mind that this 

court should recuse itself, that I would notify counsel and give 

them the opportunity if they wanted to ask me to get off. Did the 

court give you that opportunity? 

Mr. MOLE. No. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Do you feel that you were deprived of the right to 

honest services of the judge? 

Mr. MOLE. I think my client was, yes. I think my client was mistreated by the system—or by the judge on that level. 

150 

Mr. SCHIFF. Now, you mentioned that your client insisted that 

you bring in Mr. Gardner. 

Mr. MOLE. Yes. 

Mr. SCHIFF. And this was a step you were reluctant to take? 

Mr. MOLE. That is correct. 

Mr. SCHIFF. And the reason you brought Mr. Gardner in was you 

needed to offset the advantage you felt the other party had in 

bringing in two friends of the judge? 

Mr. MOLE. That is correct. And part of the reason—there are a 

lot of reasons for it, but that is essentially it. We were trying to 

achieve a level playing field, to get a source of information, yes. 

Mr. SCHIFF. And, Mr. Mole, do you consider that a corruption of 

the system, too, that both you and the opposing party felt they 

needed to bring friends of the judge in as counsel? 

Mr. MOLE. I am sorry. I didn’t hear the first part of your question. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Do you feel that—that also is a corruption of the system, where in order to have a level playing field or secure some advantage, that either you or the other party or both have to bring 

in friends of the judge as counsel on the case? 

Mr. MOLE. I do. It was deeply offensive to me as a lawyer that 

the case depends on something other than the facts and the law. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Now, you knew by reputation that Mr. Gardner had 

a relationship with the judge, was a friend of the judge? 

Mr. MOLE. Well, once my client said we needed to get someone 

else who is a friend of the judge, I began looking around and making phone calls again. And I found Mr. Gardner that way. I interviewed him, and that is basically the selection process. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Now, were you aware that Mr. Gardner at some 

point had also given cash to the judge? 

Mr. MOLE. No, I was not. 

Mr. SCHIFF. My—our counsel made reference to a trip to Las 

Vegas during the Liljeberg case. Were you aware Mr. Gardner had 

also gone on that trip? 

Mr. MOLE. No. Don told me he was quite close to the judge and 

they would go to dinners where he would provide wine—you know, 

and entertain the judge, and participate in social events with him. 

But I didn’t know that he had given him money or the extent of 

how much money he gave him or what he paid for or what the— 

what the social arrangements were. Frankly, I didn’t want to know. 

Mr. SCHIFF. During the course of your research for your client to 

find another lawyer to bring into the case, did other lawyers in the 

community ever tell you that they were aware of attorneys giving 

money to the judge? 

Mr. MOLE. No one ever told me that. People were always very 

careful. Some people wouldn’t—frankly, wouldn’t talk to me about 

it. When I told him what my problem was, they would say, ‘‘I can’t 

talk to you about that.’’ 

Mr. SCHIFF. During the—the time when the Liljeberg case was 

under submission, we heard testimony yesterday that Mr. Amato 

had a conversation with Judge Porteous, a private conversation, in 

which the judge said, ‘‘You had better prove your case, or the fifth 

circuit will take it away from you.’’ Were you aware of this conversation? 

151 

Mr. MOLE. No, I was not. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Do you consider it appropriate for the judge and opposing counsel to have a—to have a private conversation about a 

case that is under submission? 

Mr. MOLE. Absolutely. You know, my first job as a lawyer was 

clerking for an old Irish Federal judge who would never talk to a 

lawyer on any level if he had a case with them. I don’t think ex 

parte communications are proper, certainly not about the case 

itself. 

Mr. SCHIFF. I just want to make sure I have heard your original 

answer correctly. So your view is it is improper to have that kind 

of ex parte contact? 

Mr. MOLE. Absolutely. 

Mr. SCHIFF. And how do you—in the context of the Liljeberg case, 

how would you interpret a statement, ‘‘You had better prove your 

facts, because otherwise the fifth circuit will take it away from 

you’’? 

Mr. MOLE. I think you are asking me to interpret someone else’s 

thoughts. But with that statement, I would interpret it as the 

judge was concerned that what he did was supportable by a record 

so that it wouldn’t be reversed on appeal. And, you know, there 

was a sense in the trial that I was straining to make that impossible, to make a record that couldn’t be supported—a ruling for the 

Liljebergs. So I think there was some sense that it was going to 

be a difficult thing for the judge to do. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Can you explain that, though? You know, what I 

think is kind of perplexing to us is the idea that the judge has to 

struggle to reach a decision that the court of appeals can uphold. 

You said that it—it was—you were straining to demonstrate during 

the trial facts or bring out facts that would not allow a judgment 

to be held. Can you explain what you mean by that? 

Mr. MOLE. Well, for example, on the hospital claims, the 

Liljebergs have lost their hospital, and my client had bought it at 

a foreclosure sale. And they sued my client in a posture as a plaintiff for the value of the hospital. And their expert witness was— 

I felt we had destroyed him on cross-examination. His opinion as 

to the value of the hospital was unsupported and foolish. 

And that meant the judge, in my opinion, knew that if he gave 

the $75 million as an award for the loss of the hospital, there was 

no evidence or even expert opinion to support that. And yet—and 

when he wrote the opinion, he got around that by simply ordering 

us to give the hospital back to the Liljebergs, something that is totally unsupportable, but that is—that was my objective, is to make 

the record so bulletproof there was no way to support any result 

other than what we thought was appropriate. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Now, the remedy of giving the hospital back to the 

opposing party, was that a remedy that was asked for in the litigation? 

Mr. MOLE. That was the most stunning part of the opinion. No, 

it wasn’t even requested by any party that I remember. It was really surprising. 

Mr. SCHIFF. And was the first time that you learned of this when 

the opinion came out? 

152 

Mr. MOLE. I remember very well turning to that page and saying, ‘‘This is—holy cow. This is really unusual.’’ 

Mr. SCHIFF. So during the litigation, opposing counsel and the 

opposing party were seeking damages, but in the judge’s order, the 

judge awarded the hospital to the other party? 

Mr. MOLE. Yes. 

Mr. SCHIFF. And at no time in the pleadings or in arguments of 

counsel did the opposing party actually ask for that remedy? 

Mr. MOLE. To my recollection, no. We were so—I was totally 

stunned and surprised by that particular aspect of the opinion. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Did you ever learn beyond your suspicions why 

Amato and Levenson were brought in? 

Mr. MOLE. Only from these proceedings, from the subsequent 

proceedings. I testified in the fifth circuit in that proceeding with— 

the fifth circuit’s judiciary commission, or whatever the term is, investigated and made a recommendation to this body. And I had the 

same sort of questions you have asked that suggested these things 

have happened, but other than that, I have no direct knowledge of 

them. 

And I testified in the grand jury hearings, but I don’t believe 

there is any suggestion there. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Just one last question before I turn it over to my fellow colleagues. You mentioned that you weren’t surprised by the 

outcome in the case. What was it about the nature of the trial or 

the—the judge’s conduct of the trial that led you to believe you 

were going to lose in the end, notwithstanding your feeling about 

the merits? 

Mr. MOLE. You know, after trying a lot of cases, you just get a 

feeling when it—it is hard to isolate the factors, but there was the 

reputation that I had learned of before trial. 

Mr. SCHIFF. And what reputation are you talking about? 

Mr. MOLE. Of the relationship between Judge Porteous and these 

two lawyers. Judge Porteous came from a state court bench. He 

had been a state court judge in—in Jefferson Parish, which has a 

history of corruption. So that confirmed or reinforced my concern 

about a corrupt result. 

The attitude of the lawyers, the flow of the trial, you know, 

Judge Porteous is a strong personality and a good trial judge, in 

the sense that he knows the rules of evidence. He is decisive. So 

I can’t say the trial made me feel like he was leaning on me, but 

nonetheless, I felt just an instinct that, you know, this is—this is— 

I know where this is going to end up, and my remedy is going to 

be in the court of appeal. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Thank you. That is it for me. 

Mr. Goodlatte? 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Mole, you—in response to questions from Mr. Damelin and 

from the Chairman, you indicated you believe that Judge Porteous 

had a duty to disclose during the hearing on your motion that he 

recuse himself of the payments that he had received from the attorneys on the other side. And I presume—perhaps you answered this. 

I presume that as this case drug on for a long period of time after 

the case was tried and these other payments were received, I preVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:13 Feb 02, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00156 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 H:\WORK\JUDIMP\11171809\53638.000 HJUD1 PsN: DOUGA
153 

sume you felt that he would have had a duty to have disclosed that 

to the parties in the case, as well. Is that correct? 

Mr. MOLE. Yes. While the case was under submission would have 

been a particularly sensitive period—things happen that affects the 

outcome. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Doesn’t Judge Porteous’s failure to notify the 

parties after these events—after, in fact, he said he would do so— 

amount to a fraud on the court? 

Mr. MOLE. I have never been a judge, so I don’t reach legal conclusions, but my opinion is it was a fraud on my client. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. And that that is a—that is in—in fact, a part 

of a judicial proceeding over which he was the presiding officer that 

would be, in fact, more than a fraud on your client. It would be a 

fraud on our judicial system, would it not? 

Mr. MOLE. Yes, I would tend to agree with you, yes, but it is not 

my decision. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. What was your reaction when you read Judge 

Porteous’s opinion in the Liljeberg case? 

Mr. MOLE. You know, I remember where I was when I read it. 

I was in court to try another case in Jefferson Parish, and somebody brought it over to me, before BlackBerries. I think this was 

in, what, 2000—yes, 2000. And I remember flipping through it, 

standing there and saying, ‘‘Jeez, he hit us there, he hit us there, 

he hit us there,’’ so there were a number of claims. It was a very 

big case. And when I got to the decision on the—on the hospital, 

my reaction was, ‘‘Well, that is good. This is so off-the-wall it is 

going to be easier to shoot at the whole opinion on appeal. This is 

so unbelievable as a result, that he would simply take the hospital 

and give it back to the Liljebergs. I have to look at this, but I don’t 

think there is any support to that.’’ 

Mr. GOODLATTE. But did your original concern about his relationship with the attorneys and your motion to have him recuse himself come back to mind, as you read that opinion? 

Mr. MOLE. You know, I am—I am a trial lawyer, so I am only 

result-oriented. At that point, I was focused on, ‘‘Okay, let’s get on 

to the appeal.’’ I put all that time in. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Knowing what you know now, which is more 

than what you knew then, about the relationship between the 

judge and the attorneys, do you believe that the decision was based 

solely on a reasonable interpretation of the relevant law? Or do you 

think it was influenced, at least in part, by his relationship with 

others? 

Mr. MOLE. I think it is the latter. You know, yesterday, I 

watched in the conference room as Mr. Amato testified. And, you 

know, I heard all those facts, but hearing Jake say them, it sort 

of took my breath away. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Were you familiar with the conversation that 

Mr. Amato testified to yesterday about his conversation with the 

judge in which he basically said, ‘‘You had better make your case, 

or the fifth circuit will take it away from you’’? 

Mr. MOLE. You know, that rang true, from based on—on what 

I saw and believe. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Were you surprised or concerned about the 

length of time it took the judge to decide this case, almost 3 years 

154 

from the time you went into court until he rendered an opinion? 

Is that common? 

Mr. MOLE. No, it was very unusual. It was very hard on my client. But it was always puzzling as to why it was taking so long, 

because that didn’t benefit anyone. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. So were there any efforts made to determine— 

you know, to contact the court and ask the judge, ‘‘Why are you 

taking so long to render an opinion?’’ Or were you worried that 

that might have an adverse effect on his decision? 

Mr. MOLE. You are always careful about contacting a judge who 

has got your case in his hands. I called Don Gardner, the lawyer 

we had hired, and said, ‘‘Do you know what is going on? Have you 

seen the judge?’’ And his reaction was, ‘‘Don’t know. He is taking 

a long time. It is a hard case.’’ 

Mr. GOODLATTE. When you retained Mr. Gardner, Mr. Gardner 

was paid a retainer of $100,000—— 

Mr. MOLE. That is correct. 

Mr. GOODLATTE [continuing]. Was that based against any hourly 

work or simply based upon him showing up in court and doing 

what you ask him to do during the court of the trial? 

Mr. MOLE. That was a retainer that he was going to keep no 

matter what. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. And did he have any contingency arrangement? 

Mr. MOLE. Yes, there was—his fee went up, as the result got bet- ter for us, to a maximum of $500,000. And part of my thinking on 

agreeing to that was, I wanted to make him have an interest in the 

case, because I wanted to be able to trust him to be interested in 

the outcome when he became involved. And I was hoping that pressure from both sides, of having friends on both sides would cause 

the judge to step aside. There was also a payment that Don would 

get if the judge did recuse himself. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Now, you said that, during the trial, Judge 

Porteous on several occasions examined or cross-examined your 

witnesses after you had put them on and after the Liljeberg attorneys had questioned those witnesses. 

Mr. MOLE. That is correct. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. That is not entirely unusual. Judges do ask 

questions in cases, don’t they? 

Mr. MOLE. Absolutely. And he did—he did that to at least one 

of the Liljeberg witnesses that I recall, laid into him pretty well. 

He has a strong personality. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. I think that is all the questions I have, Mr. 

Chairman. Thank you. 

Mr. SCHIFF. The gentleman yields back. 

Ms. Jackson Lee? 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

And, Mr. Mole, thank you for your presence here. Some of the 

questions I may pose may have already been answered, but let me 

try to sort of lump them together and pose a series of questions to 

you. 

First, let me ask you this. Did you ever give anything to Judge 

Porteous, any—anything, a gift? 

Mr. MOLE. No, I have never given him anything, never taken 

him to lunch, never—— 

155 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Did you ever—did you ever take him to lunch? 

Mr. MOLE. Never. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Did you ever give him cash? 

Mr. MOLE. No. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Did you ever go hunting with him? 

Mr. MOLE. No. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Would you ever give things of value of the nature that I just asked to a judge, period, or if you had a case before 

he or she? 

Mr. MOLE. No. I have contributed to judges’ campaigns, but that 

is the limit of what I have done with a judge. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. And you had a case before him. Could you 

just—the case involved what issue? The case that you had before 

him involved what issue? 

Mr. MOLE. Before Judge Porteous? 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Yes. 

Mr. MOLE. It was a very old dispute. The Liljebergs are a family 

in New Orleans. They are originally pharmacists. They obtained a 

license to build a hospital in New Orleans in the suburbs in the 

early 1980’s, and they didn’t have the money or the expertise to 

build or run it, so they hired Lifemark to build it, to finance it, and 

then Lifemark leased the hospital from them, and they had a contractual arrangement with Lifemark to run the pharmacy in the 

hospital for a profit. And then they had a mortgage on the hospital 

that was held by Lifemark. 

And so all those relationships went bad almost immediately. The 

litigation began in 1987 in state court over pharmacy payments. 

The Liljebergs got into other financial trouble with other lenders 

in the 1980’s and early 1990’s and lost their hospital to Travelers, 

who had financed their medical office building. So by the time we 

got to trial, the litigation was over the loss of the hospital, which 

they blamed on my client. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Which is Lifemark? 

Mr. MOLE. Lifemark. And over how much money Lifemark owed 

them for running the pharmacy. And the claims there varied between—I think the judgment value of Judge Porteous’s judgment 

was about $15 million. The Liljebergs sought up to $30 million or 

$40 million. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. So this was a case long in brewing and very 

important and very complex? 

Mr. MOLE. Yes. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. A lot of documentation, a lot of work that 

would go into it for your preparation? 

Mr. MOLE. Absolutely, yes. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. And I understand that, in the course of working on this case, there was a decision to hire Don Gardner. And forgive me if you have answered this, but I just want to try and reinforce the point. How much was Mr. Gardner paid for simply entering into the contract? 

Mr. MOLE. One hundred thousand dollars. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. And it was a complicated case. Could you 

point out to any precise expertise that Mr. Gardner had for this 

case? 

Mr. MOLE. None. 

156 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. And did he assist you, did he examine any 

witnesses? 

Mr. MOLE. He did no work at trial. I talked to Don quite a bit. 

You know, he gave me some insight into Judge Porteous’s personality and likes and dislikes that might help us with witnesses and 

how we pitch certain issues, which was helpful. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. But minimal? 

Mr. MOLE. Yes. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. A minimum. Do you think that your clients 

were influenced—or let me just ask this. Did Mr. Gardner have a 

relationship with Judge Porteous? 

Mr. MOLE. Yes. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Do you think your clients had any understanding of that? And was there some consideration of that fact? 

Mr. MOLE. I would say that is the only reason he was hired. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Would you think that the value of Mr. Gardner’s services—and let me clarify that or qualify that by saying this 

is not a trying of Mr. Gardner. I am sure that he is a well respected lawyer. But let me try to find out, was the compensation 

equal to the services rendered? 

Mr. MOLE. You know, it was a risk taken by him to get involved, 

and it was a risk taken by my client to pay him that much money. 

I don’t think the fee was unearned in that sense. I think it was— 

it was earned. A difficult situation, and I am not—you know, not 

happy about it. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me try to put it in a different way so 

that—certainly, counsel can provide a variety of support, but did— 

did the—the level of work, intensity of work equal to the purpose 

or for his being retained? 

Mr. MOLE. Well, in a sense, Ms. Jackson Lee, Don is a very active lawyer. He is the kind of guy who is in court every day, who 

has a dozen files in his briefcase, and has lots of people in the middle of divorces who want his constant attention. I will say this for 

him: He was very diligent in being in court and being available and 

being supportive. You know, I like him, enjoyed his company, but 

he had to give all that up, so I don’t know how much in fees he 

lost and how much in clients’ goodwill he lost, but it was worth— 

worth it to my client to pay him that much to give that up. 

And so, I mean, the bargain was what they made, and, you 

know, I wouldn’t—I wouldn’t say the fee was unearned. I think 

he—he gave us what we asked for. And—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. But it was a decision of the client and not of 

yours? 

Mr. MOLE. I ultimately went along with the client, but if I hadn’t 

agreed to do it, they would have found another lawyer. I would 

have lost the case. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Did Don Gardner ever tell you that he saw 

Amato’s partner, Creely, in Las Vegas with Judge Porteous at his 

son’s bachelor’s party? 

Mr. MOLE. No, I didn’t know about that. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. That doesn’t ring a bell? 

Mr. MOLE. No, it does not. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. If you had known that, would that have been 

important to you at the time? 

157 

Mr. MOLE. You know, I wanted to know who was paying for it. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. The idea of having a team on the other side 

of the case that may have had a longstanding relationship, you 

practices for a number of years—I am sure you have practiced in 

state and local courts, as Federal courts, rather. How much of a 

disadvantage and how injurious is that to the justice system to 

have potentially individuals in the opposition that may have had 

a financial relationship with the decider? 

Mr. MOLE. You know, that is a very difficult and a very big question. You know, as a lawyer, I have practiced law all around the 

country and in Puerto Rico, tried cases, anyway. And you visit 

courthouses where you don’t know anybody, and you walk in, and 

everybody else knows everybody else, and you know the judges 

have—and even in New Orleans, I would go into courthouses where 

the judges know the lawyers, but they don’t know you. 

And that is normal. That is human relationships, and you live 

with that, and I know how to handle that. But if—you know, and 

judges socialize, and I think they—you know, they socialize with 

lawyers. It is natural. And it is a good thing. 

But if there is a financial relationship, you sort of have to trust 

the judge to disclose that or to withdraw and—and draw his own 

boundaries that make the system work. 

I can deal with social relationships. You know, I can get to like 

people or get them to like me or not. And I can trust the system 

that way. But if it is a financial relationship, I can’t work with 

that. You know, I just need to have the system work the right way. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman, this is my last question. But, 

Mister, you sought a recusal, did you not? 

Mr. MOLE. Certainly did. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. And were you successful? 

Mr. MOLE. No, we lost. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. And what was the final result of the case in 

the—in the trial court? 

Mr. MOLE. We lost. You know, it was—there were many aspects 

of the case. We lost every one big. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. And as a—we always have a special affinity 

for the case we are trying. But as a seasoned lawyer, do you think 

you had some aspects of your case being meritorious? 

Mr. MOLE. You know, I watched Jake yesterday say he thought 

he won. And every lawyer thinks, you know, they are great. It is 

the nature of the beast. And my wife has to deal with that. 

But I truly think we pitched a shutout, that it was a silly case 

and we should have won, and it was fueled by something other 

than, you know, facts and law. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. And you don’t think because you were the defense in a plaintiff’s oriented court system that it might have been 

that biased, plaintiff versus defense, big guys versus the little 

hometown guys? 

Mr. MOLE. There may have been some of that. But, you know, 

I find in commercial litigation you—you find less of that. These are 

two business interests that were, you know, going at it head to 

head. And the Liljebergs were a smaller entity, but that may have 

been part of it. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. So you were in a lopsided situation? 

158 

Mr. MOLE. Yes. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SCHIFF. The gentlewoman yields back. 

Mr. Lungren? 

Mr. LUNGREN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Mole, for many—many years, I have introduced legislation to 

allow peremptory challenge in the Federal system. If there had 

been a peremptory challenge, you would have had a different judge, 

wouldn’t you? 

Mr. MOLE. I certainly would have used it. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Since you don’t have a peremptory challenge in 

the Federal system, what is your recourse in a trial where you believe the judge may not give you a fair hearing? 

Mr. MOLE. Well, you could make a motion to recuse. And then 

you—failing that, you make a very good record. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Is there—what information that has been revealed 

through these proceedings and the proceedings in the fifth circuit— 

what of that information was—were you aware of at the time you 

made your recusal motion? 

Mr. MOLE. Well, all I knew was that Mr. Amato and Mr. 

Levenson dined frequently with Judge Porteous, didn’t know who 

paid, although I suspected they paid, and that they socialized, 

hunting trips, entertainment, out-of-town trips frequently. And I 

knew that they had a history, as Mr. Amato and Mr. Creely did, 

anyway, a history as law partners with Judge Porteous. 

I learned that Mr. Levenson—and I am still not certain about 

this—that Mr. Levenson had been Judge Porteous’s guest at a 

Fifth Circuit Judicial Conference, at—I believe at which judges are 

entitled to take along one non-judge guest, a lawyer, typically, I 

guess. 

And that is pretty much the facts I was aware of, but they 

weren’t admissible evidence. It was all people telling me that stuff. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Could you—Mr. Lungren—Mr. Mole, could you pull 

the microphone down and bring it a little closer to you? 

Mr. MOLE. Sure. 

Mr. SCHIFF. You want to bring it down even more than that. 

Mr. LUNGREN. In making your request, your motion for recusal, 

was that by way of written evidence or—or written documents that 

you filed with the court, articulating these—these specific concerns? 

Mr. MOLE. Yes. Ordinarily, you know, I haven’t done it but once, 

but ordinarily, when you make a motion to recuse, you submit evidence in the form of an affidavit—— 

Mr. LUNGREN. Right. 

Mr. MOLE [continuing]. From a banker or somebody who says, ‘‘I 

have a relationship,’’ or, ‘‘I know their cousins,’’ or something. I had 

none of that, so I submitted my own affidavit saying, ‘‘I have heard 

these things.’’ And that left me feeling a little exposed. 

Mr. LUNGREN. You had none of that because neither the judge 

nor the attorneys on the other side revealed those things to you, 

correct? 

Mr. MOLE. That is certainly true. 

159 

Mr. LUNGREN. Was it your understanding there was any obligation on the part of the judge or the other attorneys to reveal that 

to you and to reveal that to the court for the record? 

Mr. MOLE. As I recall, my legal research and reasoning, when we 

made the motion to recuse, my focus was on the judge. I don’t have 

any understanding and haven’t analyzed what the lawyer’s responsibility was. I think that is a whole other ball game with the ethics 

commission of the Louisiana Bar Association. But my effort was to 

get the judge to disclose. And I thought he should disclose the details of the relationship. 

Mr. LUNGREN. As a lawyer before the Federal courts and the 

Louisiana bar, would you believe you would have a responsibility 

to articulate facts that would indicated a personal relationship with 

the judge if a recusal motion were being made in a case in which 

you represented one of the parties? 

Mr. MOLE. Yes, and I agreed with what Jake said yesterday, that 

if—if he were going to disclose the facts that he has disclosed to 

this body, he would have had to disclose them to the Louisiana Bar 

Association, as well. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Yesterday, when I questioned Mr. Amato, I asked 

him about the conclusions of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in 

which they characterized Judge Porteous’s ruling and various aspects of it as inexplicable, constructed entirely out of whole cloth, 

nonsensical, absurd, indicating that there was nothing based in law 

or fact to justify the decision. 

Yet under cross-examination, I believe, Mr. Amato suggested 

that, well, you have to understand, the appellate judges were from 

Texas, and they don’t understand Louisiana law. 

I don’t practice in Louisiana. I haven’t practiced in Louisiana. 

What would your response be to that? 

Mr. MOLE. I smiled when I heard it yesterday, too. I was listening to the monitor. I think it is laughable. I think the fifth circuit 

is a fine court. I think Judge Higginbotham, who wrote the opinion, 

is the most respected member of that court. He is known for his 

intellect. 

Mr. LUNGREN. This is Judge Higginbotham that is known by 

opinions that he writes for the fifth circuit, correct? 

Mr. MOLE. Largely on Louisiana law. Louisiana is a very litigious state. It is one of three states only in the fifth circuit, so it 

is Mississippi, Louisiana and Texas. So a substantial number of the 

fifth circuit’s opinions are about Louisiana issues. And they have 

their pick of the law clerks from the law schools. 

So they—you know, it is a good court. And the fact that they 

don’t know Louisiana law is ludicrous. And Louisiana law is not 

that weird. We used to be, and we used the Napoleonic code to 

scare out-of-state clients into hiring us, but it really isn’t that different anymore. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Well, truth is a defense. So thank you for that. 

Do you have an opinion about the possible reason for the delay 

in the rendering of the opinion? In other words, did that delay disadvantage either side disproportionately? 

Mr. MOLE. It did my client, in the sense that it had to—it had 

to post a bond. I think we posted a bond of approximately—maybe 

160 

$40 million, somewhere plus or minus $10 million, a large bond. So 

that had to be maintained and interest had to be paid. 

Also, one of the key aspects of the decision was not monetary. We 

sued to sever the relationship, the contract with the Liljebergs. 

They ran the pharmacy in the hospital. They are very difficult people. And it was very difficult to run a hospital with a pharmacy 

which supplies all the medications who was hostile to my client, because they have to cooperate to treat patients. And the Liljebergs 

were always reporting the hospital to various state agencies and 

trying to make trouble and suing us. This is not the only lawsuit 

that we had with them, so it was a very difficult relationship, and 

severing that relationship was very important, and that went on 

for 3 more years than it had to, in my opinion. 

Mr. LUNGREN. So delay didn’t work in the favor of your client? 

Mr. MOLE. It certainly did not. 

Mr. LUNGREN. On page 183 of your testimony for the fifth circuit, 

you make reference to Mr. Gardner telling you something about 

Jeep leases and Jeep purchases. What was that in reference to? 

Mr. MOLE. At one point, Don told me that Judge Porteous’s son 

had gotten a new Jeep and he didn’t know where it came from and 

he wondered about it. And that is about all I remember about that. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Okay. So you don’t have any further information—— 

Mr. MOLE. No facts. 

Mr. LUNGREN [continuing]. On that. Is that correct? 

Mr. MOLE. That is correct. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Any attorney in this room who has been in a 

courtroom understands the uncertainty when you go before any 

judge, even a judge you may know well. But going into an environment where a judge has a personal relationship with the attorneys 

on the other side, where there are actual payments of funds made 

by those attorneys to that judge, where in the past there are legal 

proceedings directed to those attorneys by the judge and which result in some financial benefit to those attorneys, and is the source 

of the funds that they pay the judge for his personal expenses, if 

you have that information going in, if you would have had that information going in, what would you advise your clients about the 

prospects of getting a fair trial? 

Mr. MOLE. We would say it is extremely doubtful that we will get 

a fair trial and that, if those facts were exposed to the light of day, 

that if the judge refused to recuse himself, we certainly had an almost certain chance of getting that reversed by a court of appeal, 

if the facts were fully known. 

Mr. LUNGREN. During the conduct of the trial itself, did you feel 

you were getting a fair shot? 

Mr. MOLE. Yes, I think Judge Porteous conducted the trial in a 

way that objectively had the feel of a balanced experience. I mean, 

I didn’t—he didn’t refuse me the opportunity to put on my evidence. He didn’t refuse to sustain my objections when I made them. 

Some he did, some he didn’t, like any judge. 

But, you know, just the overall impression I had, knowing everything I knew, and synthesizing that information, my opinion was 

we were—we were trying it for the—for the court of appeals. We 

were making a record to survive his judgment. 

161 

Mr. LUNGREN. And when you—when you actually had an opportunity to review his opinion in the case, with respect to the findings of fact and findings of law and the conclusions he rendered, 

what was your observation then? 

Mr. MOLE. Well, like I said, I mean, my main—my principal reaction was, ‘‘This is good for my client, because it is so one-sided 

and so unsupportable that it will raise eyebrows and we should be 

able to get it reversed.’’ And in some of the claims where I didn’t 

feel we had as strong a case as others, I think our case increased 

in value. 

Mr. LUNGREN. But you weren’t banking on a Fifth Circuit Court 

of Appeals that couldn’t understand the intricacies of Louisiana 

law, were you? 

Mr. MOLE. No. I had every confidence they would understand 

that. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Didn’t you want a Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 

that did, in fact, understand the laws and the proper application 

of the laws in the case? 

Mr. MOLE. Absolutely. If you look at our briefs to the fifth circuit, 

we took that argument on the hospital and put it up front, because 

it was so unsupportable and so clear what the result should be 

under Louisiana law. And we went back to French commentators 

and translated them and sent them to the court. So we layered 

that brief with all the Louisiana law we had. It wasn’t something 

that concerned us. Those are—those are bright judges, and it is a 

bright court. 

Mr. LUNGREN. You didn’t make appeal to Texas law, I take it? 

Mr. MOLE. No. I have been in Texas. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. SCHIFF. The gentleman yields back. 

Mr. Cohen? 

Mr. COHEN. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

How long have you practiced law in the New Orleans area? 

Mr. MOLE. Thirty-two years. The first year was as a clerk to a 

Federal judge. 

Mr. COHEN. So you are aware of the general opinions of the 

members of the bar about the judiciary in the New Orleans area? 

Mr. MOLE. Yes. 

Mr. COHEN. Do you believe members of the bar are aware of the 

issues that have arisen concerning Judge Porteous and this hearing? 

Mr. MOLE. Well, it is certainly gotten extensive press coverage. 

Yes, it is—everybody is aware of it. 

Mr. COHEN. And do you—how do you believe these issues that 

have been written in the press, that have been discussed, that have 

been aired now on C-SPAN, that are out in the public domain, 

might affect the attitude of the New Orleans bar toward having a— 

a sitting judge who is in this situation? 

Mr. MOLE. You know, I can’t speak for other people. I think it 

is unfortunate; it reflects bad on the legal community in general in 

Louisiana, in New Orleans. You know, we have had our problems 

with judges, mostly on the state court. There have been Federal 

judges who have been convicted of crimes. And it is—and it is comforting to know the system ultimately works. Here we are today. 

162 

Mr. COHEN. Is Judge Porteous still hearing cases? 

Mr. MOLE. No, he is not. 

Mr. COHEN. How long has he stopped? 

Mr. MOLE. I believe it has been a little over a year, but I am not 

certain. I think at that fifth circuit hearing, after that, he was 

taken out of active cases. 

Mr. COHEN. So that was done by the—was that—that wasn’t voluntary? 

Mr. MOLE. I think he voluntary stopped hearing criminal and 

other cases involving the government some time ago. 

Mr. COHEN. How about civil cases? 

Mr. MOLE. Civil cases, I think he gave up—I am not certain, but 

I believe it was—the fifth circuit took him out of active work about 

a year ago, maybe longer. 

Mr. COHEN. And is there somebody hearing cases in his stead? 

Mr. MOLE. It is a big court, so, you know, I don’t know if they 

have been reapportioned to other judges or—I don’t believe there 

is anybody temporarily holding his—his bench. 

Mr. COHEN. Do you know if there has been—there is a backlog 

of cases in New Orleans? Has it been difficult on attorneys to get 

cases to trial, more difficult than normal? 

Mr. MOLE. I don’t believe it has. It is a big bench, and there is 

a lot of post-Hurricane Katrina work still going on. So it is busy, 

but I don’t think it is—you get a pretty good trial date setting in 

New Orleans. 

Mr. COHEN. I yield back the balance of my time, sir. 

Mr. SCHIFF. The gentleman yields back. 

Mr. Sensenbrenner? 

Mr. Johnson? 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

How many judges—how many trial court judges—federal district 

court judges in the Eastern District of Louisiana? 

Mr. MOLE. I believe there are 16, and there are a number of senior judges, senior—who are active, so it is probably up to about 20. 

Mr. JOHNSON. How did the Liljeberg case happen to be assigned 

to Judge Porteous? 

Mr. MOLE. The previous Federal judge who had died, Judge Oakley Jones, and his cases were re-allotted, and Judge Porteous got 

that case, by random allotment, to my knowledge. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Did you keep up with the criminal investigation 

done of Judge Porteous in connection with the events we are talking about today? 

Mr. MOLE. I was interviewed and testified to the grand jury. I 

was interviewed by the FBI and testified to the grand jury. Other 

than that, I have read the newspapers, because it was—it was 

known in the public. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Do you have any suspicions about why Judge 

Porteous was not indicted by the U.S. attorney? 

Mr. MOLE. I have no knowledge of how that decision was made 

one way or the other. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Do the judges run on a—on—do they run for reelection as Democrats and Republicans? Or is it a non-political 

race? 

Mr. MOLE. Well, they are all appointed by—— 

163 

Mr. JOHNSON. Excuse me. I am sorry. Gosh, okay, all right. 

Mr. MOLE. So we can tell who appointed them, but that is about 

as far as their politics go. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Okay. I am sorry. I am starting to think back to 

the state court days. 

So your testimony is that you have no suspicions about the failure to indict Judge Porteous by the U.S. attorney? 

Mr. MOLE. No. You know, I—having been caught up in this sort 

of by accident, and I have not tried to learn any more than comes 

my way through this process. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Now, the entry of appearance of Mr. Amato and 

Mr. Levenson was about 6 weeks before trial. Is that correct? 

Mr. MOLE. That is my recollection, yes. I think they made their 

appearance on September 19. They made their application to be 

employed on September 16 in the bankruptcy court. And the trial 

was set for, I believe, November 4 or November 6, whichever was 

a Monday. So that is the math. 

Mr. JOHNSON. And this came as a surprise to you, did it not? 

Mr. MOLE. Yes. 

Mr. JOHNSON. And let me ask you a question about your—your 

client. Did your client have to expend more money than it would 

have had to spend had you not had this strong suspicion of a—that 

you may get home cooked in Judge Porteous’s court? 

Mr. MOLE. You know, it is impossible to be certain about, but 

probably. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, I mean, without—without the plaintiffs having hired Mr. Amato and Mr. Levenson, would it have been necessary for your client to spend $100,000 retaining Mr. Gardner? 

Mr. MOLE. No. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Were there—are there any delays during the 

course of this episode that cost your client money, such as the 3- 

year delay between the—the time that the evidence was in and the 

time that there was a decision issued by the judge? 

Mr. MOLE. That certainly cost money, but I don’t know what 

would have happened if it had taken another path. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, I mean—— 

Mr. MOLE. Certainly, all those things were expensive. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, let’s speak hypothetically. If you had won 

the case—and you are pretty certain it was a slam dunk—if you 

had won that case, there would have been no need for your client 

to—to move into the fifth circuit. Is that correct? 

Mr. MOLE. That is correct, but the other side may have appealed. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Do you have any idea how much the—the appeal 

to the 11th Circuit cost your client? 

Mr. MOLE. I think, in attorney’s fees, it was probably close to $1 

million between my firm, which was minor on the appeal, and the 

Texas firm, which was major in that role. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Now, with respect to the recusal motion, I think 

you have testified that there was a short—or there was a hearing 

on that particular motion that you filed after giving it a lot of 

thought. 

Mr. MOLE. That is correct. 

Mr. JOHNSON. And you had never filed a motion to recuse in, 

what, then 25 years of practicing law? 

164 

Mr. MOLE. And haven’t since. 

Mr. JOHNSON. And how long did the hearing take on this motion 

to recuse? 

Mr. MOLE. Less than an hour. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Okay. And this hearing consisted of you submitting an affidavit to the court with hearsay information. 

Mr. MOLE. Yes, my hearsay in a brief with the law and argument. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes. And—— 

Mr. MOLE. And an oral argument with the judge and opposing 

counsel. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. Amato was there listening during that proceeding? 

Mr. MOLE. I believe he was, yes. I don’t believe he spoke. It was 

principally Mr. Levenson who argued the other side. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Are you—could you say that Mr.—would it be fair 

to say that Mr. Amato did nothing to clear up the nature of the 

relationship that he had with Judge Porteous? 

Mr. MOLE. That would be accurate. 

Mr. JOHNSON. And Mr. Lungren asked you this question. I am 

going to just ask it again. You know, well, strike that. Strike that. 

What was the reason why Judge Porteous took so long in issuing 

a ruling in this case? 

Mr. MOLE. You know, I am not certain. What I have heard—and 

it makes sense—is that he did it himself and he didn’t have a law 

clerk who was consistently available throughout the process to understand everything, who could work on it. And, you know, other 

than that, I could only speculate. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Were there any discovery disputes between the 

parties during that litigation? 

Mr. MOLE. Well, pre-trial, no. You know, there were—before I got 

in the case, there were significant discovery disputes in the record. 

By the time I got in, things went pretty smoothly in discovery, because everybody was eager to get to trial, and it worked pretty 

well. 

Mr. JOHNSON. So after the time that Amato and Levenson signed 

on to the case, did the court have an opportunity or did Judge 

Porteous have an opportunity to rule on any motions that were 

filed by either party, plaintiff or the defendant? 

Mr. MOLE. Yes, we filed significant pre-trial dispositive motions, 

which were denied, motion for summary judgment. We filed, as I 

recall, early on, I filed a motion for leave to amend, to restructure 

the claims so that I could ask for a jury, because that was one way 

to avoid part of the problem that we had with the judge to get a 

jury, but that was denied, as well. It would have been very difficult 

to get a jury because of the bankruptcy jurisdiction, but I tried that 

angle, as well. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Did the findings of fact and conclusions of law on 

any of those motions that you filed or—excuse me, that were heard 

after Amato and Levenson made the first appearance—first appearance in the case, was there any judicial ruling that was appealed to the fifth circuit? 

Mr. MOLE. None of those, no. Under the Federal practice, you 

could only appeal once the case is final. The only thing we took to 

165 

the fifth circuit prematurely was the denial of the recusal, and the 

fifth circuit refused my appeal on that, as well. 

Mr. JOHNSON. One minute, Mr. Chairman. 

Now, the judge ordering a return of the hospital—and, by the 

way, before I go into that, let me ask this question. Were you surprised by any of the rulings on your motions that the judge made 

during the period between trial and the time that Amato and 

Levenson signed on to the case? 

Mr. MOLE. No. 

Mr. JOHNSON. You didn’t feel that any of those rulings were in 

any way outlandish or unsupported by sufficient evidence? 

Mr. MOLE. No, I had—I don’t have a clear recollection of the 

basis for most of them, although I can guess, and, you know, they 

are the usual pre-trial motions, and I was surprised by the outcome. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Now, the judge ordering the return of the hospital 

to the Liljebergs, what benefit would accrued to Levenson and 

Amato, to your knowledge, if that ruling had been upheld on appeal? 

Mr. MOLE. Their fee arrangement was they received 11 percent 

of the recovery on the claim for the loss of the hospital. So that 

would have been between them and the Liljebergs, but if they got 

the hospital back, the trick would have been to value the hospital— 

their own experts had valued it at a range between $50 million and 

$75 million. So if I were them, I would say, ‘‘Mr. Liljeberg, you owe 

me 11 percent of $75 million.’’ And that is what—that is what I 

think the fee should have been. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Were the conclusions drawn from the testimony 

of—well, strike that. Were the judges questions of your witness— 

you talked about the judge cross-examining your witness—it was 

cross-examination, was it not? 

Mr. MOLE. Yes. Well, I mean, he questioned them. I felt it was 

across the line in the cross-examination, but that was my opinion. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Leading questions and—— 

Mr. MOLE. Yes, suggesting the answers and leaning on the witness strongly. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes. And how many questions do you—did the 

judge ask during that time period, during—— 

Mr. MOLE. You know, probably not more than 15, 20 minutes, 

but Judge Porteous is a good lawyer, so he got it over with quickly, 

and he got to the point, so he did a good job of questioning. And 

that is what I wanted an opportunity to follow up on. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Were the—any of the—was any of the testimony 

that that witness, your witness, gave under cross-examination by 

Judge Porteous cited by Judge Porteous in his ruling on the disposition of the case? 

Mr. MOLE. I don’t recall. I don’t recall that it was. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Were the judge’s questions, based on your knowledge and experience, unusually partial to the plaintiff’s case? 

Mr. MOLE. I felt I had a valid objection that they were at the 

time. But like I said, he did that to one of the—at least one of the 

Liljeberg’s witnesses, as well, so maybe that is just his style, but 

I wanted the record—like every good lawyer, you want to—you 

want to get the last word. 

166 

Mr. JOHNSON. Was the issue of the judge cross-examining your 

witness for 10, 15, 20 minutes, was that a subject of the appeal to 

the fifth circuit? 

Mr. MOLE. No, it was not. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Were there any other incidents in the—in the 

trial, during the trial which might have indicated bias or a corrupt 

intent on the part of Judge Porteous? 

Mr. MOLE. Nothing else stands out, Mr. Johnson. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, sir, and I have no further questions 

at this time, and I will yield back. 

Mr. SCHIFF. The gentleman yields back. 

Mr. Gohmert? 

Mr. GOHMERT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, again, like Mr. Johnson, I would request a word limit rather than a time limit. It will work better. But thank you. 

Mr. Mole, I am curious about a couple of things. But for one, this 

occurred back around 1997 that you filed a motion to recuse. Are 

you aware of whether information went out among the local bar in 

New Orleans about your case and what had occurred in your case? 

Mr. MOLE. Yes, I don’t know. Certainly, everybody I knew heard 

me complain about how long it was under submission. The motion 

to recuse was in October 1996. We tried the case in 1997. I don’t 

think it was that publicly—— 

Mr. GOHMERT. Do you remember—do you remember about what 

year you found out that there was money being paid by attorneys 

for your opponent to the judge that just happened to coincide with, 

basically, the—based on the number of curatorship cases that were 

sent to their firm? 

Mr. MOLE. I didn’t learn of that until the fifth circuit lawyers 

interviewed me to be a witness in their proceedings, which I believe was about a year-and-a-half ago, maybe 2 years. So I learned 

that relatively late in the game. 

Mr. GOHMERT. I see. So that was not common knowledge then 

around the bar in New Orleans? 

Mr. MOLE. No. I don’t think that became common knowledge 

until the fifth circuit published its—or made public its recommendation that Judge Porteous be impeached. 

Mr. GOHMERT. If Judge Porteous were to begin receiving cases 

submitted again, assigned again by lifting of the suspension by the 

fifth circuit, other than the firm of Creely, would you know of lawyers around New Orleans who would not be requesting a jury trial 

on complex cases? 

Mr. MOLE. No, I think—you know, I think they would have a 

problem getting lawyers who were comfortable with him as the 

only fact-finder. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Because one of the concerns I have is that litigants normally are supposed to have a right to either have a trial 

by jury or a trial by judge. And if one of those two is effectively 

excluded, then it would seem to be an unfair judicial situation for 

the people in that district. You understand my point? 

Mr. MOLE. Absolutely. And I would certainly ask him not to hear 

my cases if I went back to Federal court. 

167 

Mr. GOHMERT. Or if you had a case assigned back in his court, 

I know you would look forward to it, but would you go to the court, 

or would you be requesting a jury in Judge Porteous’s court? 

Mr. MOLE. I almost always request—I request a jury. 

Mr. GOHMERT. I am curious. I know that some terms that are 

used in the Constitution and in the law have meanings that are 

relative. One term that is used in the Constitution is good behavior, that the judges both of the supreme and inferior courts shall 

hold their offices during good behavior. And so I am wondering 

about—since I have never been a member of the bar in New Orleans. I have been a member of the fifth circuit bar, but not of New 

Orleans. 

I am curious—and never having been before a court lower than 

the fifth circuit in New Orleans, I am curious, is good behavior considered to be—or include sending curatorship cases to attorney’s 

firms and expecting funds back based on the number of curatorships? Is that considered good behavior in the New Orleans bar, to 

your knowledge? 

Mr. MOLE. Well, that happened, I believe, in the state court 

bench. But—— 

Mr. GOHMERT. Well, that is correct. But that, again, was in New 

Orleans. 

Mr. MOLE. You know, I don’t—like you said, it is a relative term, 

and I think it is this body’s job to decide. 

Mr. GOHMERT. So are you saying that that is a common occurrence? I am wondering, because we had a dissent filed by another 

Louisiana judge, and just from my experience, it seems like people 

who engage in the same conduct as someone being charged are 

often more sympathetic to the one being charged. And so I am just 

curious how prevalent the practice is and if that is something that 

is common to your knowledge in the New Orleans bar? 

Mr. MOLE. It certainly is not. That would certainly raise eyebrows, and it sounds to me like that something that would be of 

interest to a prosecuting attorney—— 

Mr. GOHMERT. Because I—— 

Mr. MOLE.—U.S. attorney. 

Mr. GOHMERT. I am just trying to figure out exactly what the 

standard is there. 

Mr. MOLE. Good behavior. 

Mr. GOHMERT. We—this—yes, good behavior. And this—well, the 

Crime Subcommittee had a hearing in New Orleans a couple years 

or so ago chaired by Chairman Bobby Scott in which the U.S. attorney said the number one problem in New Orleans before Hurricane 

Katrina was graft and corruption and the number-one problem in 

New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina is still graft and corruption. 

That was his observation. 

I was also surprised to find during that testimony—we were at 

least told in that hearing that it is not uncommon practice for a 

criminal defense attorney to contact a state judge directly, ex parte, 

without the prosecutor knowing, and make a case for lowering the 

bond of a criminal defendant in—in jail. And if the judge is willing 

to lower the bond to a level that the defendant can make and post 

and get out of jail, then that judge’s court gets a cut of that bond 

that is made by the criminal defendant. 

168 

Somebody like me and others who have been involved in our judicial system in other states were rather shocked by that and 

shocked to find that apparently that was considered appropriate 

there in New Orleans. So I am just trying to find the extent to 

which conduct that apparently is undisputed was considered appropriate behavior, good behavior. 

How about throwing books from the bench? You said you have 

never had them thrown in your direction before. Have you seen 

them thrown in other lawyers’ directions in other cases in New Orleans? 

Mr. MOLE. No, sir, I have not. And, you know, I think in Louisiana, we have a reputation for corruption that is unfortunate. 

And I would disagree that it is our primary problem right now. We 

have—— 

Mr. GOHMERT. No, I am just telling you what the testimony was 

at our hearing. 

Mr. MOLE. I just—well, offering my observation, but I think it is 

certainly bad behavior to take kickbacks from lawyers for assigning 

them work for the judge—— 

Mr. GOHMERT. But I don’t think it is universally acknowledged 

that they were kickbacks. Apparently, they just happened to coincide with the number of curatorships that were assigned and be 

around the $150 initially and then $200 per case. It just happened 

to coincide directly with the number of curatorships, to my understanding of the evidence before us. 

So you—to answer my question, though, you have never seen a 

judge throw books from the bench before in anybody’s direction? 

Mr. MOLE. No. I have never experienced that either as a witness 

or as an object of throwing. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Well, and, Mr. Chairman, I am not sure how 

many cases were assigned after the action was taken against Judge 

Porteous, but I would request to see if we could get information on 

how many jury trials compared to bench trials were requested after 

the time that this information came to light, because I am concerned about the effect on future litigants if the information we 

take from this hearing were deemed to be good behavior and allowable and Judge Porteous to go back to the bench and resume his 

caseload. I am wondering if there were already indications that it 

would have affected litigants’ rights to have a bench trial as perceived by the litigants, if the Chair understands my request. 

Mr. SCHIFF. I do. And we can try to find out that information. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Thank you. And I would yield back. 

Mr. SCHIFF. The gentleman yields back. 

Mr. Pierluisi? 

Mr. PIERLUISI. Good morning, Mr. Mole. 

Mr. MOLE. Good morning. 

Mr. PIERLUISI. How long have you been practicing in New Orleans? 

Mr. MOLE. Thirty-two years. 

Mr. PIERLUISI. Have you devoted a substantial amount of your 

time to trial work? 

Mr. MOLE. Yes. 

Mr. PIERLUISI. That is the main line of your practice? 

169 

Mr. MOLE. I would say my work has been about 95 percent litigation. 

Mr. PIERLUISI. And you appear on a regular basis before both 

state courts and Federal courts? 

Mr. MOLE. That is correct. 

Mr. PIERLUISI. To your knowledge, what are the—what is the— 

the entity that imposes the code of ethics in—in Louisiana? 

Mr. MOLE. The Louisiana bar. 

Mr. PIERLUISI. For lawyers? 

Mr. MOLE. On lawyers, it is the Louisiana Bar Association. 

Mr. PIERLUISI. How about the—— 

Mr. MOLE. I think the Supreme Court enforces it. 

Mr. PIERLUISI. And the Supreme Court enforces it? 

Mr. MOLE. Yes. 

Mr. PIERLUISI. And how about the U.S. district court in Louisiana? Does it have its own set of local rules? 

Mr. MOLE. No. For some cases, it adopts by reference to Louisiana rules. And in cases in Federal jurisdiction, it adopts the 

model rules of ethics. 

Mr. PIERLUISI. In this particular case that we are concerned 

about, the Lifemark-Liljeberg case, what set of ethics rules were 

applicable, to your knowledge? 

Mr. MOLE. I really haven’t looked into that, Mr. Pierluisi. I am 

sure they are implicated, but I don’t know the specific rules. I 

mean, it is such a general problem. 

Mr. PIERLUISI. This was a diversity case? 

Mr. MOLE. No. The basic jurisdiction arose under bankruptcy. 

Mr. PIERLUISI. I see. 

Mr. MOLE. And it may have been diverse citizenship, but that 

was not the basis for jurisdiction in most of the controversy. 

Mr. PIERLUISI. Any ethics rules, other than the Louisiana rules, 

applying here to your—to the best of your knowledge? 

Mr. MOLE. Not to the best of my knowledge. I think it would be 

Louisiana’s rules. 

Mr. PIERLUISI. Louisiana’s rules, okay. Now, given that you have 

been practicing so long, is it customary in New Orleans for trial 

lawyers to go out to lunch or dinner with Federal judges and pay 

for those meals? 

Mr. MOLE. I don’t know how frequent it is. I know it does happen. You know, nobody raises any eyebrows at that. 

Mr. PIERLUISI. Is it customary for trial lawyers to go out to lunch 

again or dinner with a Federal judge who is at the time presiding 

or overseeing a case that those trial lawyers are handling and, on 

top of it, pay for the bill? 

Mr. MOLE. You know, I certainly have never done that. I don’t 

know that it would raise eyebrows. I think every judge sets his own 

boundaries on those issues. So I really—I am really not competent 

to give you a general answer on that. 

Mr. PIERLUISI. Is it customary—said differently, is it customary 

in New Orleans for trial lawyers to have ex parte contact with Federal judges while a case is pending? 

Mr. MOLE. No, that is forbidden. 

Mr. PIERLUISI. Is that the line where you—that you don’t cross 

over? 

170 

Mr. MOLE. Absolutely. 

Mr. PIERLUISI. Is that the line that most lawyers and trial lawyers in New Orleans avoid crossing? 

Mr. MOLE. It is the line you are supposed to avoid crossing in 

state and Federal court everywhere I have ever practiced. 

Mr. PIERLUISI. To your knowledge, is there any ethics rule prohibiting ex parte contact between counsel and a sitting judge or a 

trial judge? 

Mr. MOLE. I know it is forbidden. I don’t know the—the rule. 

Yes, it is forbidden. I don’t know—you know, it is like the Ten 

Commandments. I don’t know which—which number it crosses, but 

it is certainly something you shouldn’t do. 

Mr. PIERLUISI. Now, you testified earlier that you were uncomfortable about engaging counsel—I believe Gardner—in your case. 

And you explained that your client was, you know, insisting upon 

it. Is that a fair way of summarizing what you said to us before? 

Mr. MOLE. Yes. 

Mr. PIERLUISI. Now, had you done something similar before in 

any case, meaning bring in a counsel primarily because of his 

friendship or acquaintance with the trial judge? 

Mr. MOLE. Certainly never in Federal court. When I have practiced in courthouses outside of the New Orleans courts, I will hire 

local counsel who may be local and know everybody. It is just because I—I don’t know the court’s customs and practices, and I want 

someone who does. 

Mr. PIERLUISI. Is it customary in New Orleans for trial lawyers 

appearing before the Federal court there to bring in counsel, again, 

for the primary reason of, you know, having a friend of the judge 

sitting at counsel’s table? 

Mr. MOLE. Absolutely not. I think most judges would be offended 

if you did that, certainly on our Federal bench. 

Mr. PIERLUISI. By the way, this case, Lifemark-Liljeberg, is over 

with, and it has been over with now for many years, right? 

Mr. MOLE. Yes. 

Mr. PIERLUISI. Sitting here today, you have no interest—your client—even your client has no interest in what you are telling us? 

Mr. MOLE. That is correct. I have checked with them, and they 

have—— 

Mr. PIERLUISI. No financial impact, no—— 

Mr. MOLE. No, none. 

Mr. PIERLUISI. Is it fair for me to say that your interest in appearing here today is simply to cooperate with this Task Force and 

this proceeding? 

Mr. MOLE. That and the subpoena that I got. [Laughter.] 

Mr. PIERLUISI. That in and of itself encourages some cooperation. 

But apart from that, I mean, you have no stake in this. 

Mr. MOLE. None. 

Mr. PIERLUISI. And your former or existing client, Lifemark, 

doesn’t either. 

Mr. MOLE. They don’t even own the hospital anymore. 

Mr. PIERLUISI. When you learned about the ex parte contacts between your opposing counsel and Judge Porteous, after the case 

was tried and it was just waiting for his decision, how did you feel 

about that? 

171 

Mr. MOLE. Well, I didn’t know about what has been disclosed 

here until after the case was decided. But when I learned of Judge 

Porteous’—the extent of his relationship with Jake Amato and Bob 

Creely and Lenny Levenson, it confirmed my suspicions, yes. 

Mr. PIERLUISI. To your knowledge, did Judge Porteous have ex 

parte contacts with either Amato or Creely or Levenson without 

Gardner being present? 

Mr. MOLE. I don’t know. Like I said, I have tried to stay out of 

learning any more than I already know. 

Mr. PIERLUISI. If any such contact happened, what do you feel 

about it? What do you believe? 

Mr. MOLE. I think it would be my duty to disclose it to the appropriate ethical bodies. 

Mr. PIERLUISI. I have no further questions. Thank you. 

Mr. MOLE. You are welcome. 

Mr. SCHIFF. The gentleman yields back. 

At this point, Mr. Westling, you have an opportunity to question 

the witness. 

Mr. WESTLING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Mole, good afternoon, or not quite afternoon, I guess. 

Mr. MOLE. We have got 5 minutes left. 

Mr. WESTLING. Five minutes left. I will try to use them wisely. 

You have testified in two prior occasions relating to this matter. 

Is that correct? 

Mr. MOLE. Under oath, yes. 

Mr. WESTLING. One was before the grand jury and the other before the fifth circuit panel, correct? 

Mr. MOLE. That is correct. 

Mr. WESTLING. And in all of that testimony, you have always indicated that you felt the way that Judge Porteous handled the trial 

was professional and as a gentleman and was polite, with the one 

exception of the book incident we have heard about. Is that correct? 

Mr. MOLE. That is correct. And even that, I took some pride in 

being able to get him so angry at me that he threw something at 

me. That is a—that is a—— 

Mr. WESTLING. And just to kind of close up on that issue, you 

have told us that, when you came back the next week, the judge 

not only ruled in a manner on the record that seemed well thought 

out, he overruled your objection, but gave you the opportunity to 

do what you had been asking to do. Is that correct? 

Mr. MOLE. That is correct. That is correct. 

Mr. WESTLING. And he seemed to have calmed down about the 

whole situation? 

Mr. MOLE. Yes. 

Mr. WESTLING. Okay. And I assume it is fair to say, in all the 

numbers of years you have been in front of Federal judges in the 

city of New Orleans, that this is not the first time one has lost 

their temper with you? 

Mr. MOLE. No. And even outside of New Orleans. 

Mr. WESTLING. And you also talked about Judge Porteous and 

his questioning of witnesses following on the questions of, in many 

cases, the cross-examining attorneys for the Liljebergs, correct? 

Mr. MOLE. Yes. 

172 

Mr. WESTLING. Okay. And he would follow up with his own questions. And at times, you felt that went further than you would have 

preferred. 

Mr. MOLE. That is correct. 

Mr. WESTLING. And that is because you thought it was undoing 

work you thought you had done well. Fair statement? 

Mr. MOLE. Work that I and the witness had both done well, yes. 

Mr. WESTLING. But in each case, he didn’t cause the witness to 

say anything that wasn’t true, did he? 

Mr. MOLE. I don’t recall the details, but I felt he had pushed the 

witness to points that were not fair without any follow-up. 

Mr. WESTLING. Okay. And so what was appropriate was a followup, not exactly what he was doing in questioning? 

Mr. MOLE. And that is what got him angry. 

Mr. WESTLING. All right. And so as a practical matter, this was 

not the first, nor will it be the last time that you have had a Federal judge get involved in questioning, particularly during a bench 

trial? 

Mr. MOLE. Certainly not. 

Mr. WESTLING. Now, you have talked to us about—just a few 

more things about the—the conduct of the trial. He made evidentiary rulings, correct? 

Mr. MOLE. Absolutely. 

Mr. WESTLING. He showed a facility with the rules of evidence 

that is not typical in a trial judge. Do you think that is a fair statement? 

Mr. MOLE. I have said it before: Judge Porteous is a good trial 

judge. He knows the rules of evidence. He has got a good command 

of the courtroom. And you want a judge who is decisive and doesn’t 

dither and knows what he is doing when he makes rulings. 

Mr. WESTLING. And in this particular case, that kind of a judge 

was helpful, don’t you think? 

Mr. MOLE. It makes the trial go smoothly. 

Mr. WESTLING. Okay. And so this was generally a smooth trial? 

Mr. MOLE. Yes. Tense, but smooth. 

Mr. WESTLING. And when you say that, intense, I mean, this was 

a very longstanding dispute between two parties that were not 

afraid to litigate. Is that a fair statement? 

Mr. MOLE. They were—there was a lot of animosity. It was extremely intense. And a lot of emotion between the parties. 

Mr. WESTLING. And, in fact, it had a long history before you were 

involved. 

Mr. MOLE. Litigation began in 1987. 

Mr. WESTLING. 1980—— 

Mr. MOLE. And the contractual relationship began in 1983. 

Mr. WESTLING. Okay. So the relationship went back to 1983, the 

litigation back to 1987. 

Mr. MOLE. That is correct. 

Mr. WESTLING. And so this is coming to trial, really, after 10 

years of fighting. 

Mr. MOLE. Yes. 

Mr. WESTLING. And Judge Porteous moved it through the trial 

phase expeditiously? 

Mr. MOLE. I would agree with that. 

173 

Mr. WESTLING. All right. And you got a trial in a case that had 

been wanting a trial for quite a while. 

Mr. MOLE. It was essential to my client to get through that. 

Mr. WESTLING. All right. Now, let’s talk a little bit about the lawyers that are in the case when you enter, which I understand was 

in the early part of 1996, if I have my dates right. 

Mr. MOLE. I made my appearance in April. 

Mr. WESTLING. Okay. So at the time, Don Richard is the principal lawyer for the Liljebergs? 

Mr. MOLE. Don seemed to be the lead lawyer. 

Mr. WESTLING. Okay. And he remained involved in the case 

through the trial, correct? 

Mr. MOLE. Yes. 

Mr. WESTLING. And he continued to play a substantial role in the 

trial? 

Mr. MOLE. Yes. In fact, Don was engaged until the very end. 

Mr. WESTLING. Okay. And Don is a lawyer who at the time was 

practicing in a small practice. 

Mr. MOLE. Yes. Don is—he, at one point, was my partner at a 

previous firm. 

Mr. WESTLING. Okay. He is a good lawyer. 

Mr. MOLE. Don is very well respected, represents the Archdiocese 

of New Orleans, the Baptist Theological Seminary. He seems to 

have an avenue to God-related work. 

Mr. WESTLING. Okay. And so he stayed involved. And what you 

know at this point is that, at some point, Amato and Mr. Levenson 

are brought in, and they work with Don on the case. 

Mr. MOLE. Yes, and there were other lawyers involved, as well 

as Don, and—at the time they came in. 

Mr. WESTLING. And you all had a team, as well, I assume? 

Mr. MOLE. Yes, I brought in two young partners—maybe they 

were still associates at the time—a couple of paralegals, staff of 

people that I routinely worked with. 

Mr. WESTLING. Okay. And so there is a lot of legal firepower on 

each side of this case? 

Mr. MOLE. Yes. 

Mr. WESTLING. A lot of documents, a lot of issues? 

Mr. MOLE. Big case, lot of issues. 

Mr. WESTLING. Mr. Amato and Mr. Levenson are brought in, but 

by the time that happens, are you confident you are going to keep 

that November trial date, or is that questionable? 

Mr. MOLE. Well, the November trial date was an attractive thing 

to my client, to me. But we did ask to get it continued. In fact, the 

judge, I think, volunteered that, because of the recusal. But we 

were—Judge Porteous, every time we saw him in status conferences and whatnot, reinforced that he was not prone to move it. 

He wanted to get the trial over with quickly, which was good. 

Mr. WESTLING. But as a practical matter, while they came in late 

against a trial date, the questionability was, would that be the real 

trial date. Fair statement? 

Mr. MOLE. We were pretty certain of it at the time. The only 

thing that pushed it back, to my recollection, was the motion to 

recuse caused Judge Porteous to suspend everything, and so we 

174 

could get that over with and get it behind us and I could get to 

the fifth circuit and back. 

Mr. WESTLING. All right. 

Mr. MOLE. That—and I think the fact that we got to June was 

a product of that. 

Mr. WESTLING. But as a practical matter, it was set within the 

year and it went to trial within the year, correct? 

Mr. MOLE. That is correct. And we did a lot of things in between. 

Mr. WESTLING. Now, you are unsuccessful in getting the fifth circuit to review the recusal issue. And you have some discussions— 

and I am not looking to go into the discussions with your client— 

but that leads you to determine that it is appropriate—or it makes 

sense, may be a better way to put it—to go out and look for another 

lawyer in the New Orleans community to—I think your words 

are—level the playing field. 

Mr. MOLE. That was something I consulted with my client about. 

And jointly we decided to go ahead and do that, yes. 

Mr. WESTLING. Now, there are other—well, at the time that 

Judge Porteous is handling this case, he has been on the Federal 

bench only a few years. Is that right? 

Mr. MOLE. I believe he was—took the bench—the Federal bench 

in 1994. 

Mr. WESTLING. All right. And he had come from Jefferson Parish? 

Mr. MOLE. Yes, he had been a state court elected judge. 

Mr. WESTLING. All right. And as a practical matter, often when 

you go over to Jefferson Parish, there is some discussion about 

bringing other lawyers into cases, is there not? 

Mr. MOLE. Frequently, yes. 

Mr. WESTLING. All right. So when you learned Judge Porteous 

has the case, you are thinking of him from a state judge perspective. Is that a fair statement? You don’t know him as a Federal 

judge? 

Mr. MOLE. I didn’t know him as a state court judge, either. I had 

never had a case with Judge Porteous in state court or Federal 

court. The fact that he had been on the Jefferson Parish bench was 

one of the factors that we considered. 

Mr. WESTLING. So you go out and you—you look for Mr. Gardner. 

And by the way, was there a relationship that you had in the past 

with any one that was involved in judging the case? I think there 

was a magistrate in this case. Was he a former law partner of 

yours? 

Mr. MOLE. You have got to be speaking about Jay Wilkinson, 

who was a partner of mine. I don’t know that we ever brought any 

issues to him as a magistrate, but, yes, he had been a partner. 

Mr. WESTLING. But he was the magistrate assigned to the case. 

Is that correct? 

Mr. MOLE. I think you are right, but we never—we never—he 

handled discovery issues. And by the time I got in, those were all 

behind us. 

Mr. WESTLING. Basically resolved? 

Mr. MOLE. Yes, I don’t think we ever had recourse to Jay in the 

case. We may have; I just don’t recall that. 

175 

Mr. WESTLING. But I also think there was a point where, in 

terms of looking for your lawyer that we have talked about, you 

had a conversation with Jay’s brother? 

Mr. MOLE. Tom, yes. 

Mr. WESTLING. Okay. And he is involved in politics in Jefferson 

Parish? 

Mr. MOLE. He is the parish attorney for Jefferson Parish, was 

then. 

Mr. WESTLING. Okay. And so was that the way you identified 

Don Gardner? 

Mr. MOLE. Pretty much. Tom recommended him for somebody 

who knew the judge well. 

Mr. WESTLING. And so, despite the fact that you were uncomfortable with this, your client felt that it was best to find someone that 

had a relationship with the judge? 

Mr. MOLE. It is safe to say they felt exposed and naked and they 

wanted to put on as much protection as possible. 

Mr. WESTLING. All right. 

Mr. MOLE. And that is why we did it. 

Mr. WESTLING. And so you confected an agreement with Mr. 

Gardner that you testified about where he was going to get a minimum of $100,000, correct? 

Mr. MOLE. He got that, yes. 

Mr. WESTLING. All right. And that if various things happened, he 

could get more money? 

Mr. MOLE. That is correct. 

Mr. WESTLING. And one of those things would have been, had 

Judge Porteous recused himself, he would have gotten another 

$100,000. Is that correct? 

Mr. MOLE. And then he would have been out of the case. 

Mr. WESTLING. All right. But the net effect was, there was a provision in the agreement that said, if Judge Porteous withdraws, 

you are entitled to additional money? 

Mr. MOLE. That is correct. 

Mr. WESTLING. Okay. And I think you have testified that the reason for that was just a concern about keeping Mr. Gardner interested in the case. Is that fair? 

Mr. MOLE. Correct. And I was hoping that his presence would 

also cause the judge to feel like there were too many of his friends 

in the case and he needed to get out. 

Mr. WESTLING. Mr. Chairman, I am noticing my light is on. 

Could I have a few more moments? 

Mr. SCHIFF. Yes, of course, Counsel. 

Mr. WESTLING. Thank you. 

So when you went to Mr. Gardner and hired him, you talked 

with him about Judge Porteous, I am assuming? 

Mr. MOLE. Sure did. 

Mr. WESTLING. And what did he tell you about the benefits of 

hiring him in this case? 

Mr. MOLE. Don was very—you have got to know him. He is a 

character. He is very forthright about—he had a very close relationship. He and the judge shared a taste for wine, and he often 

gave him bottles of wine and shared them with him and had him 

over to dinners where they experienced new wines that he had 

176 

brought in from California, and that—but he made clear to me, 

over and over, in hiring me, you are not going to get any results, 

there is nothing I can do to influence what this judge will do with 

the law, so, you know, I am happy to help you and I am happy to 

take your money, but, you know, I will—I will give you any insight 

I have into how this judge thinks or, you know, what he likes, 

whether you should shave your moustache off or put on a nurse as 

opposed to a doctor for a bit of evidence, things like that. 

Mr. WESTLING. All right. But as a practical matter, he was adamant that it wouldn’t make a difference to Judge Porteous that a 

friend was in his court. Is that fair? 

Mr. MOLE. He said that over and over. 

Mr. WESTLING. And so he also was saying that about Jake Amato 

and Lenny Levenson? 

Mr. MOLE. You know, I don’t think he was as definite about that. 

I don’t know that I asked him that question. I made it plain to him 

why we were bringing him in, and he said he thought he could 

help. 

Mr. WESTLING. During the course of the trial, you learned that 

Mr. Gardner was—during the—it may be a better way to put it— 

during the course of the case, you knew that Mr. Gardner was continuing to have his friendship with Judge Porteous, correct? 

Mr. MOLE. Yes. 

Mr. WESTLING. You knew he was continuing to entertain Judge 

Porteous, correct? 

Mr. MOLE. I believe they still socialized. That is what I—that is 

what I knew. 

Mr. WESTLING. And, in fact, you were asked in the grand jury 

about whether entertaining expenses for Judge Porteous had come 

in any way from the money that he received as a result of the fee. 

And I think you indicated that you didn’t have any reason to know 

that one way or another. 

Mr. MOLE. I don’t recall the testimony, but that is certainly accurate. 

Mr. WESTLING. Okay. But it wasn’t a situation where you were 

left in the dark about the fact that Mr. Gardner continued to socialize with his friend? 

Mr. MOLE. I knew they still socialized. 

Mr. WESTLING. Okay. And I assume you weren’t concerned about 

that? 

Mr. MOLE. No. No, I had no concerns about that. 

Mr. WESTLING. Okay. 

Is it fair to say that the Liljebergs had—well, they had raised 

this issue—the issues in this case well before Judge Porteous was 

involved in the fifth circuit. Are you aware of that? 

Mr. MOLE. I am sorry. Would you repeat that, Mr. Westling? 

Mr. WESTLING. Sure. It wasn’t well said, so I will be happy to. 

Mr. MOLE. Sure. 

Mr. WESTLING. The Liljebergs had litigated appellate issues in 

this case before your involvement and before it was assigned to 

Judge Porteous. Is that correct? 

Mr. MOLE. Yes, they had had state law—state court and certainly fifth circuit appeals that I was aware of. 

177 

Mr. WESTLING. And do you recall there being language in the 

fifth circuit opinion in this case that referenced older decisions by 

the fifth circuit? 

Mr. MOLE. Yes, there was one fifth circuit opinion that we cited 

over and over that indicated that the fifth circuit had a low opinion 

of the Liljebergs’ lawyer—previous lawyer’s tactics. 

Mr. WESTLING. Okay. And so that resurfaced in the opinion here? 

Mr. MOLE. Yes. 

Mr. WESTLING. Okay. Now, in terms of the evidence in this case, 

is it—I know you have said it is a slam-dunk, but, I mean, you are 

a trial lawyer and I am a trial lawyer. I mean, we don’t have that 

many slam-dunks, do we? 

Mr. MOLE. Yes. 

Mr. WESTLING. We all like to think we have one, but whether we 

do, I guess, remains in the result. Fair statement? 

Mr. MOLE. Right. 

Mr. WESTLING. Okay. There was a number of items of evidence 

in this case that came in during the trial that went to one side or 

the other. This was not a one-sided set of evidence. Fair statement? 

Mr. MOLE. You know, it was a huge case. And I don’t recall all 

the evidence, but certainly both sides put on a thorough case of 

their evidence. 

Mr. WESTLING. And Judge Porteous wrote about an 108-page 

opinion? 

Mr. MOLE. Yes. 

Mr. WESTLING. And in doing that, he made findings of fact, and 

he supported those in many cases with citations to the record or 

to evidence, correct? 

Mr. MOLE. I certainly would agree with that. 

Mr. WESTLING. And you didn’t look at it and say, ‘‘Gee, I think 

the evidence is wrong.’’ What you thought, it was that his conclusions were wrong. Fair statement? 

Mr. MOLE. Yes. You know, I think—I think he certainly twisted 

the evidence for the hospital result and for the severance of the 

contract. I didn’t agree with those results, didn’t think it was supportable. 

Mr. WESTLING. All right. One moment. 

I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Thank you, Counsel. 

We just have a few more questions and then we are going to 

have votes shortly. And hopefully, we will be able to release you. 

You mentioned a couple things I want to follow up on. One was 

that you just wanted to survive the judgment, I think was the expression that you used. Does that indicate that you had the feeling 

all along during the trial that the judge was going to rule the other 

way? 

Mr. MOLE. Yes, I did. 

Mr. SCHIFF. So notwithstanding the fact that at least the atmospherics of the way the judge conducted the trial gave the appearance of a fair trial, you strongly believed he was ultimately going 

to rule against you? 

Mr. MOLE. Yes. I mean, if I could analogize it to a boxing match 

where you put on your best fight and then the referees decided the 

178 

other guy won by decision, that is—that is what I—that is where 

I felt we were headed. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Now, in your experience as a litigator, are you familiar with judges’ efforts to make sure that their record is upheld on 

appeal? 

Mr. MOLE. I am not sure what you are referring to. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Well, in other words, if a judge wants their—their 

decision to be upheld on appeal, they will conduct the trial in a 

way that will create a suitable record for appeal, won’t they? 

Mr. MOLE. Sure. 

Mr. SCHIFF. So if this judge wanted to find for a certain party, 

it would be in his interest to conduct the trial in a way that would 

appear to the appellate court to be fair? 

Mr. MOLE. I would assume he would want that, yes. 

Mr. SCHIFF. You mentioned that, you know, as a trial judge, 

Judge Porteous knew what he was doing and knew the rules of evidence. And that was manifest, too, in his handling of the recusal 

hearing. He understood what the legal standards were and the arguments you were making, correct? 

Mr. MOLE. Yes. And I think, in retrospect, in the recusal, he was 

just flat-out dishonest with us. But at trial, you know, it was just 

a trial. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Now, you mentioned you—you appealed. You sought 

a writ of mandamus on the denial of the recusal motion? 

Mr. MOLE. Yes, I took an immediate supervisory writ. 

Mr. SCHIFF. And in that motion to the court of appeals, you presented whatever record you had that supported the recusal motion, 

correct? 

Mr. MOLE. Yes, the motion was about that thick, and the only 

evidence I had was my own affidavit, which was obviously not 

enough to get the fifth circuit to do what it seldom does. 

Mr. SCHIFF. And is it a fair statement to say that because Judge 

Porteous did not disclose what he had a duty to disclose during the 

recusal hearing that the record you sent to the court of appeals was 

an incomplete record? 

Mr. MOLE. There was no hard evidence. 

Mr. SCHIFF. And as a result of that, the court of appeals was deprived of the information it needed to make an appropriate judgment on the recusal motion. Is that right? 

Mr. MOLE. That is certainly my opinion. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Do you have any question about whether the court 

of appeals would have reversed the recusal denial had they known 

of the payments that were received by the judge from lawyers in 

the case? 

Mr. MOLE. You know, I can’t presume to speak for the fifth circuit. They are pretty good at what they do. But I can’t imagine 

they would have denied the appeal under those circumstances. 

Mr. SCHIFF. So because of the failure of the judge to disclose 

what he had a duty to disclose in the district court, you were deprived of the services of the court of appeals? 

Mr. MOLE. Absolutely. You know, if I had been able to tell the 

fifth circuit that the judge had a relationship with at least one of 

the lawyers whereby he received money in return for referrals of 

curatorships, that he was bought hundreds of lunches, expensive 

179 

lunches, that he traveled at their expense, and that he received 

cash from them when he asked, I don’t have any doubt they would 

have—you know, we would have got what we asked for. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Do you have any doubt as to whether if you had 

been able to disclose to the court of appeals that he had solicited 

$2,500 in cash from one of the attorneys and received it while the 

case was under submission, do you have any question about whether the court of appeals would have taken that case away from him? 

Mr. MOLE. No, I don’t have any doubt about that. It is just the 

sort of thing I feared. 

Mr. SCHIFF. You mentioned—— 

Mr. COHEN. Could you speak into the microphone? We couldn’t 

hear that. 

Mr. MOLE. I said that is just the sort of fact that I feared existed 

but didn’t know about. 

Mr. SCHIFF. You said something interesting, that in terms of the 

package from Mr. Gardner, it was $100,000 upfront. There was another $100,000 if the recusal motion was granted. Is that right? 

Mr. MOLE. Well, it was well after the recusal was decided. It 

was—— 

Mr. SCHIFF. Well, no, but—— 

Mr. MOLE.—$100,000 if the judge steps—recused himself for any 

reason thereafter. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Okay. I think you said—and I want to make sure I 

understood this correctly—that if the judge recused himself, then 

Gardner was out of the case. 

Mr. MOLE. Correct. 

Mr. SCHIFF. By that, did you mean that, if the judge took himself 

off the case, that Gardner’s participation in the case after that 

would not be necessary and he would no longer be part of the legal 

team on the case? 

Mr. MOLE. That is correct. 

Mr. SCHIFF. So Gardner was brought in because of his relationship with the judge and, if the judge changed and you got a new 

judge, there was no need to have Gardner on the case anymore. 

Mr. MOLE. I certainly didn’t want him to continue to be involved. 

Mr. SCHIFF. To your knowledge, was there any reason why 

Amato and Levenson were brought into the case unrelated to their 

relationship with the judge? 

Mr. MOLE. You know, by my due diligence, what I learned of 

them leads me to conclude that there was no other reason. They 

had no expertise or experience that made them suitable for that 

case. And certainly, what they did during the course of the case 

didn’t change that opinion. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Had they not been brought in and the recusal—necessitating the recusal motion, is it possible the trial would have 

gone on the scheduled date in November? 

Mr. MOLE. Yes, I think it is—you know, you would have to ask 

Judge Porteous what his calendar was like back then, but I think 

it was more likely than not we were going to go to trial on November 6th absent the recusal. I think that—that rocked the boat substantially. 

Mr. SCHIFF. I have no further questions. 

Mr. Goodlatte? 

180 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Chairman, I think we have concluded our 

questions for this witness. And I don’t think we have any further 

on this side. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Yes, Mr. Johnson? 

Mr. JOHNSON. All right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Under examination from Judge Westling, you talked about you 

knew that there was an ongoing social relationship between Judge 

Porteous and the—the attorney, Levenson and Amato, or Levenson 

or Amato. You knew that there was some socialization going on between them, correct? 

Mr. MOLE. Absolutely. 

Mr. JOHNSON. But you didn’t know what the extent of the social 

relationship was at that time? 

Mr. MOLE. No. I didn’t know certainly what I know now. 

Mr. JOHNSON. And you did not know that during the pendency 

of the judge’s decision you—that Judge Porteous was receiving cash 

from the—one of the attorneys or the attorneys for the plaintiff? 

Mr. MOLE. No, I think if that fact had been known, the alarms 

would have gone off all over. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Now, Judge Porteous did a good job handling the 

motion for recusal, in your opinion? 

Mr. MOLE. I don’t know what you mean by ‘‘good.’’ I think he 

reached the wrong result for improper reasons, which is all that 

mattered. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, let me ask the question this way. Did it appear that Judge Porteous, in your legal opinion, knew the rules of 

judicial recusal? 

Mr. MOLE. I think he understood what was required of him, yes, 

but the sense I had of standing in front of him and asking him to 

step down, implying that he was compromised, was that he was 

looking at me to find out how much I knew, and that if I didn’t 

know enough, he certainly wasn’t going to grant my motion. That 

was the feeling I had when it was—when he banged the gavel 

down. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Gentleman yields back. 

I want to thank the witness and Members for their participation. 

Without objection, the record will remain open for 5 legislative 

days for Members to submit any additional materials. Again, I 

want to thank everyone for their time and patience. 

This hearing of the Impeachment Task Force is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:18 p.m., the Task Force was adjourned.] 

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