alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### In the Matter of Charmine W., A Child Alleged to be Neglected, Appellant. Viola W. et al., Respondents.

Family Court, New York County, entered August 30, 1977, dismissing petition in a child protective proceeding, unanimously reversed, on the law and the facts, the petition reinstated, and the matter remanded for a new hearing, without costs and without disbursements. The evidence, inclusive of a hospital record, showed that the subject three-month-old child was brought to a hospital displaying the signs of what has come to be referred to as the "battered child syndrome.” The treating doctor testified at the hearing that the child was in *770a condition of considerable trauma and that there was a large area of bruising over the left side of her face and scalp; that her left eyelid was swollen shut; and that there were hemorrhages in the white portion of both eyes. The right side of the child’s jaw was also swollen and her urine contained blood. Further, that the injuries were the result of multiple blows inflicted by a blunt or cushioned instrument, perhaps a hand or some soft object and that it would take the force of at least a five year old to have caused the injuries, and, further, that the injuries were inconsistent with the parents’ explanation that their three-year-old child threw a toy—a plastic rocket with motor—into the crib. A caseworker established that the child’s mother had an alcohol problem. Though recognizing the applicable standard of proof to be a preponderance of the evidence (Family Ct Act, § 1046, subd [b], par [i]), the court treated the matter as solely a search for the fixation of blame, dismissing for "utter failure of proof’ and completely ignoring the statutory stated purpose of article 10 of the act: child protective proceedings. Section 1011 states: "This article is designed to establish procedures to help protect children from injury or mistreatment and to help safeguard their physical, mental, and emotional well-being. It is designed to provide a due process of law for determining when the state, through its family court, may intervene against the wishes of a parent on behalf of a child so that his needs are properly met.” As the Family Court has heretofore stated: "In child protective proceedings it is the function of the trial court to determine not only that neglect or abuse exist, but also whether it is *likely*to exist. *(Matter of Abeena H.*[64 Mise 2d 965].) The court is sitting as *parens patriae*in a matter such as this *(Finlay v. Finlay,*240 N. Y. 429), and cannot be limited to conditions already existing or activities which occurred in the past, but must of necessity concern itself with events that might occur should certain conditions continue.” *(Matter of Santos,*71 Mise 2d 789, 791; emphasis in original.) The court’s duty, thus succinctly defined, was not carried out, and we remand for that purpose. Concur—Kupferman, J. P., Birns, Silverman, Lane and Markewich, JJ.
#### FRANCHI v. TIRELLI.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Term.

March 21, 1905.)

Debt of Another—Assumption—Consideration.

Where defendant, in consideration of plaintiff’s forbearance to press her claim against the estate of defendant’s deceased husband, agreed to pay the same herself, and, plaintiff havin'g consented to such arrangement, defendant paid a part of the claim, such forbearance constituted a sufficient consideration to support the promise.

[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see vol. 11, Cent. Dig. Contracts, §§ 316-327, 337.]

Appeal from City Court of New York, Special Term.

Action by Angela Franchi against Angela Tirelli. From a judgment sustaining a demurrer to defendant’s first defense, and sustaining *785the complaint as stating facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Argued before SCOTT, O’GORMAN, and BLANCHARD, JJ.

Frank A. K. Boland, for appellant.

Edward A. Alexander and J. Park Henderson, for respondent.

BLANCHARD, J.

The complaint alleges, in substance, that the plaintiff sold certain goods to one Tirelli, who, before paying for them, died intestate. His widow, the defendant, was appointed the administratrix of the estate of the decedent, and continued to carry on the business in which he had been engaged. The plaintiff presented her claim to the administratrix, who agreed with her that, if she would not file and prove her claim against the defendant as administratrix, she (the defendant) would pay it herself out of the profits of her husband’s business, and from the proceeds of a policy which had been taken out upon the life of her husband. The plaintiff relied upon this agreement of the defendant, and therefore did not prosecute her claim against the estate. The defendant partly performed her agreement by paying the plaintiff about 12 per cent, of her claim, but has failed to pay the balance. It is to recover this balance that this action is brought. The defendant, as separate defenses, pleads, first, the statute of frauds; and, second, no consideration. The plaintiff demurs to these defenses as insufficient in law. The judgment sustains the demurrer to the first defense, and overrules the demurrer to the second defense, and also sustains the complaint, as stating facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. From this judgment the .defendant alone appeals.

We are of the opinion that the complaint states a cause of action. The defendant had an individual interest in the property left by the testator, her husband, by virtue of the statute of distributions; and it was therefore for her benefit that the plaintiff, at her request, refrained from prosecuting her claim against the estate of which she was the administratrix. This forbearance on her part was sufficient consideration to support the defendant’s promise to assume the debt and pay it as an original obligation. The fact that she has partly performed this agreement by making a substantial payment upon it supports this conclusion.

The judgment should therefore be affirmed, with costs. All concur.
#### § 17.1 General.

This part establishes procedures for notifying individuals of their rights if they have received an overpayment from the Foreign Service Retirement and Disability Fund under Chapter 8 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980, as amended, including their right to contest the determination that there has been an overpayment and the right to request a waiver of recovery of the overpayment. This part also provides the procedures for administrative determination of these rights and for appeals of negative determinations.
[Federal Register Volume 69, Number 244 (Tuesday, December 21, 2004)]
[Notices]
[Pages 76512-76513]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 04-27831]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION


Region IV North Florida District Advisory Council; Public Meeting

    The U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) North Florida District 
Advisory Council located in Jacksonville, Florida, will host a public 
meeting at 12 p.m. e.s.t. on Wednesday, January 19, 2005 at the SBA 
North Florida District Office located at 7825

[[Page 76513]]

Baymeadows Way, Jacksonville, FL 32256, to discuss such matters that 
may be presented by members, and staff of the U.S. Small Business 
Administration, or others present. Anyone wishing to make an oral 
presentation to the Board must contact Wilfredo J. Gonzalez, District 
Director, in writing by letter or fax no later than Monday, January 3, 
2005, in order to be placed on the agenda.
    Contact information: Wilfredo J. Gonzalez, District Director, U.S. 
Small Business Administration, 7825 Baymeadows Way; Suite 100B, 
Jacksonville, FL 32256, Telephone (904) 443-1900, FAX (202) 481-4188.

Matthew K. Becker,
Committee Management Officer.
[FR Doc. 04-27831 Filed 12-20-04; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8025-01-P
Case 3:08-cv-04724-JL Document 43 Filed 03/16/10 Page 1 of 2 Case3:08-cv-04724-JL Document42 Filed03/12/10 Page1 of 2
Case 3:08-cv-04724-JL Document 43 Filed 03/16/10 Page 2 of 2 Case3:08-cv-04724-JL Document42 Filed03/12/10 Page2 of 2
#### §§ 9.14-9.19 [Reserved]
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

STERLING RAY CUNIO, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

 v.

KATE BROWN, in her Official Capacity

as Governor of the State of Oregon;

COLETTE PETERS, in her Official

Capacity as Director of the Oregon

Department of Corrections; KRISTIN A.

WINGES-YANEZ, in her Official

Capacity as Chairperson, Oregon Board of

Parole and Post-Prison Supervision; jointly

and severally, 

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 15-35519

D.C. No. 6:14-cv-01647-TC

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Oregon

Thomas M. Coffin, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted May 10, 2017

Portland, Oregon

FILED

JUN 13 2017

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Before: BYBEE and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges, and RAKOFF,** Senior District

Judge.

 

Cunio appeals the district court’s dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim on

Younger abstention grounds. We review de novo whether Younger abstention

applies. Green v. City of Tucson, 255 F.3d 1086, 1093 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc).

 Younger abstention is only appropriate if “the federal plaintiff is not barred

from litigating federal constitutional issues in the state proceeding.” San Jose

Silicon Valley Chamber of Commerce Political Action Comm. v. City of San Jose,

546 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir. 2008). The pending proceeding before the Oregon

Court of Appeals does not provide Cunio “an adequate opportunity to raise his

federal constitutional claims.” Meredith v. Oregon, 321 F.3d 807, 818 (9th Cir.

2003). That proceeding only addresses the 48-year minimum sentence imposed by

the Oregon Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision (“Parole Board”) in 2012

for Cunio’s homicide offenses. See Or. Rev. Stat. § 144.335 (challenging final

orders of the Parole Board). Oregon law required Cunio to challenge the 23-year

portion of his determinate guidelines sentence for his non-homicide offenses in

separate proceedings. See Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 138.050 (direct appeal), 138.510–680

(post-conviction relief). None of these proceedings provided Cunio an “adequate”

** The Honorable Jed S. Rakoff, Senior United States District Judge for

the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.

2
and “full and fair” opportunity to challenge the combined effect of his sentences as

a de facto life sentence without parole, or to challenge the constitutionality of

Oregon’s bifurcated sentencing scheme for juveniles convicted of homicide and

non-homicide crimes in a single judgment. Meredith, 321 F.3d at 818–19. The

district court therefore should not have abstained.

REVERSED.

3
#### American Motorist Insurance Company et al., Appellants, v Superior Acoustics Inc. et al., Respondents, et al., Defendants.

[716 NYS2d 389]

—Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Paula Omansky, J.), entered May 25, 1999, granting the motion of defendant Transamerica Insurance Company and the cross motion of defendants Superior Acoustics Inc. and Pacific Employers Insurance Company for summary judgment dismissing the complaint as against them, unanimously affirmed, with costs.

Defendants-respondents were entitled to summary judgment dismissing the complaint as against them in light of their submission of unrefuted evidence demonstrating that plaintiffs were not named as additional insured on the policies issued to *98plaintiff Lehr’s subcontractors, and that there was no request on the part of the subcontractors to add plaintiffs as additional insureds. Plaintiffs’ submission of a certificate of insurance naming Lehr as an additional insured on the policy issued by Transamerica to co-defendant subcontractor Petrocelli Electric Company, Inc. and their reliance on a similar certificate allegedly issued by defendant Pacific to defendant Superior, which contained disclaimers that it was for information only, that it conferred no rights on the holder, that it did not amend, extend or alter the coverage provided by the policy and that it was subject to all the terms, exclusions and conditions of the policy, was insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether plaintiffs had been named as additional insureds under the subject policies *(see, St. George v Barney Corp.,*270 AD2d 171; *Buccini v 1568 Broadway Assocs.,*250 AD2d 466).

We have considered plaintiffs’ remaining contentions and find them unavailing. Concur — Williams, J. P., Mazzarelli, Lerner, Buckley and Friedman, JJ.
#### Christine Castellano, Appellant, v T.J. Byrne’s Bar & Restaurant, Respondent, et al., Defendant.

[715 NYS2d 58]

—Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Sheila Abdus-Salaam, J.), entered on or about October 6, 1999, which, in an action for personal injuries sustained in a slip and fall on defendants’ premises, insofar as appealed from, granted defendant-respondent’s motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to comply with a so-ordered stipulation dismissing the action unless plaintiff appeared for a physical examination, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

The so-ordered stipulation, dated May 21, 1999, provided that plaintiff was to appear for physical examination no later than July 15, 1999, the particular date to be set by 10-day *13written notice. By letter addressed to plaintiffs attorney dated May 25, 1999, defendant’s medical administrator confirmed a telephone conversation scheduling plaintiffs physical exam for June 14, 1999. Plaintiff did not appear at the doctor’s office on June 14, claiming, in opposition to defendant’s subsequent motion to dismiss, that she never received notice of the June 14 appointment. The motion court, in granting the motion, noted a “history” of noncompliance by plaintiff which included failure to file a note of issue, resulting in dismissal, followed by restoration upon condition that plaintiff appear for orthopedic examination which, in turn, was followed by her failure to appear for two scheduled examinations and, when given an opportunity to appear for a third, neglected to do so as well. Concur — Nardelli, J. P., Tom, Lerner, Buckley and Friedman, JJ.
**Exhibit 32.1**

 

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO**

**18 U.S.C. SECTION1350,**

**AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

In connection with theQuarterly Report of Omtool, Ltd. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the periodended March 31, 2005 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission onthe date hereof (the “Report”), I, Robert L. Voelk, Chief Executive Officer ofthe Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant toSection 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to my knowledge, that:

 

(1)                                  TheReport fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

 

(2)                                  Theinformation contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 

 
| /s/ Robert  L. Voelk     |   |
|--------------------------|--------|
| Robert L.  Voelk         |
| Chief  Executive Officer |
| May 12,  2005       |

 

----
### §3796d–7. Transferred

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Codification

Section 3796d–7 was editorially reclassified as section 10308 of Title 34, Crime Control and Law Enforcement.
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Department of State

          - [Public Notice 4935]

      ( print page 75587)    
Acting under the authority of Section 212(a)(3)(B)(vi)(II) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(II), and in consultation with the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of State has concluded that Al Manar is a “terrorist organization” within the meaning of that section of the INA.

                    This notice shall be published in the                     **Federal Register**                    , and is effective upon publication.                

Dated: December 15, 2004.

William P. Pope,

Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Acting, Department of State.

[FR Doc. 04-27801 Filed 12-16-04; 5:00 pm]

BILLING CODE 4710-10-P
#### George S. Moss, Appellant, v. Roy M. Carstairs, Respondent, et al., Defendants. Roy M. Carstairs, Respondent, v. George S. Moss et al., Appellants.

Motion by appellants, renewed on the argument of the appeal, to amend the caption in the notice of appeal so as to include additional respondents, denied. Ughetta, Acting P. J., Kleinfeld, Christ, Pette and Brennan, JJ., concur.
### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 16

- 41484 Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff

- Appellee

v.
ROBERTO MARTINEZ

- RAMIREZ , Defendant

- Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. 1:16

- CR

- 385

- 1

Before SMITH, CLEMENT, and COSTA, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: *
The Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Roberto Martinez

Ramirez has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance
with Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and United States v. Flores , 632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Martinez

- Ramirez h a s not fi led a response. We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record reflected therein. We concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no

* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5 , the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED June 20 , 2017 Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Case: 16-41484 Document: 00514040457 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/20/2017No. 16

- 41484

2 nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. See 5 TH C IR

. R. 42.2. Case: 16-41484 Document: 00514040457 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/20/2017
#### J. W. Devine *et al.*v. Mary J. Silvers.

(Filed Aug. 24, 1899.)

*Appeal*— Review—Case-Made. Where the case-made does not show that it contains all the evidence, it cannot be considered, thought the certificate of the trial judge contains a statement to that. effect.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

*Error from the District Court of Lincoln County,*before■ *Jno. H. Burford, District Judge.*

*Herod & Widmer*and *J. C. Strang,*for plaintiffs in error..

*H. R. Thurston,*for defendant in error.

Action by Mary J. Silvers against J. W. Devine and' Emil Barwig. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendants-bring error.

Affirmed.

Per Curiam:

The assignment of errors include the-overruling of the motion for a new trial, rendering judgment for the defendant in error, giving-erroneous instructions, excluding legal, competent,, material, and relevant testimony, and admitting illegal, incompetent, and immaterial evidence. A discussion of these assignments of error would require an examination of the evidence, but there is no case-made brought here in such a form as to show .that it contains all the evidence-which was heard upon the trial. The statement connected with the evidence simply shows that, “ Case-Closed.” The statement of the stenographer is that “the-*701above and foregoing is a true and correct transcript of my shorthand notes taken during the course of the trial.” The certificate of the trial judge states that the case-made •contains all the evidence, but such a statement is insufficient. The statement should be inserted in the case itself, and not in the certificate of the judge who settles the case. *(Wade v.*Gould, this volume, p. 690, *Bell v. Bell*[Kan. Sup.] 56 Pac. 472.)

We have examined the instructions of the court which have been objected to, and find no ruling which could have been'prejudicial to the rights of the plaintiffs in •error. The judgment of the court below-is affirmed.

Burford, C. J., having presided in the court below, not -sitting.
### §5314. Consultation by Secretary with other Federal departments, etc.

In carrying out the provisions of this chapter including the issuance of regulations, the Secretary shall consult with other Federal departments and agencies administering Federal grant-in-aid programs.

(Pub. L. 93–383, title I, §114, Aug. 22, 1974, 88 Stat. 651.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### References in Text

This chapter, referred to in text, was in the original "this title", meaning title I of Pub. L. 93–383, Aug. 22, 1974, 88 Stat. 633, which is classified principally to this chapter. For complete classification of title I to the Code, see Tables.
*

 Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be

published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 97-20680

Summary Calendar

 

KENNETH IVORY GANTHER,

Petitioner-Appellant,

versus

GARY L. JOHNSON, DIRECTOR,

TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE,

INSTITUTIONAL DIVISION,

Respondent-Appellee.

____________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. H-93-CV-3523

____________________________________

June 11, 1998

Before JONES, SMITH and STEWART, Circuit Judges

PER CURIAM:*

Kenneth Ivory Ganther (#610862) appeals the denial of his petition for habeas corpus, filed

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Ganther's argument that his appeal was affected by the district court's

failure to enter judgment on a separate document is unavailing because he filed a timely notice of

appeal. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e); Harcon Barge Co. v. D & G Boat Rentals, Inc., 784 F.2d 665,
667-69 (5th Cir. 1986) (en banc); Fed. R. App. P. 4(a). Additionally, his constitutional rights to an

impartial jury were not impaired by the trial court's limit on his voir dire examination of the

prospective jury. See Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 594-95 (1976); King v. Lynaugh, 850 F.2d

1055, 1058 (5th Cir. 1988).

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.