## I L L I N O I S 

## O F F I C I A L 

## RE P O R T S Appellate Court

Wiggen v. Wiggen , 2011 IL App (2d) 100982

Appellate Court Caption PATRI CIA A WI GGEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ANNA TEWEL L WI G G EN
, D e f

e n d a n t ( B ria n Ro u ghton and Kay

la Roughton, Individually and d/b/a Roughton Galler ies, Inc., and Roughton Galleries, Inc., a Texas Corporation, De fenda

nts-Appellee s).

District & N o. Second District Docke t No. 2-10-0982

Filed J uly 27, 2011

Held (Note : This syl lab us

con st it ute s no par t o

f the opi nio n of the cour t but has bee n pre

par ed by the Repo rt er of D e c i s i o n s f

o r t h e

c o n v e n i e n c e o

f t h e

rea der

. ) A complaint ag ainst Texas defe ndants alleg ing conver sion, fra ud and reple vin in connec tion with the sale of a painting was proper ly dismiss ed for t h e lack of persona l jurisdiction, since defe ndants did not have continuous and sy st em atic contac ts with I llinois
, they had no office in I llinois
, there was no evidenc e of direc t marketing to I llinois residents, they did not initiate the transac tion, they never enter ed I llinois
, and they responde d to solicitations, and, there fore
, defe ndants lacke d sufficie nt minimum contac ts with I llinois to allow I llinois courts to exercise persona l jurisdiction over them.

Dec ision Under Review Appea l from the Circuit Court of Du Pag e County
, No. 09-AR-2583; the Hon. B ruce R. Kelsey , J udg e, pre siding.

J udg ment Affir med.Counsel on

Appea l L isa M. Giese and Christopher J

. Mau re r, both of Ander son & Associates, P.C., of Wheaton, for appellant.

Br adley N. Pollock and Adam C. Kruse, both of Walsh, Knippen, Knig ht & Pollock, Chtd., of Wheaton, for a ppellees.

Panel PRES IDI NG JUS TI CE J ORGENSEN deliver ed the judgment of the court, with opinion.
J ustices McL are n and B owman conc urre d in the judgme nt and opinion.

OP INION

¶ 1 T h e plaintiff, Patricia A. Wigg en, a resident of I llinois
, appea ls the trial court ’s o rd er dismiss ing her complaint alleg ing conver sion, fra ud, and reple vin ag ainst defe ndants Brian and Kayla R oug hton and R o u gh ton Galler ies, Inc. (collectively
, the R oug htons), residents of Texas, for lack of persona l jurisdiction. Another defe ndant, Anna Tewe ll Wigg en, an I llinois resident, r emains as a party to the action. We af

firm.

¶ 2 I . BA CKGROUND ¶ 3 This appea l arises out of a transac tion for the J uly 2006 sale of a painting from Anna to the Roughtons, who own an art g allery in Texas. At the time of the sale, Anna was marrie d
to Patri cia’s brother, but they wer e divorce d in October 2008. In August 2009, Patricia demande d the return of the painting and filed suit, alleg ing that she was the actua l owner of the painting and that it was sold without her consent. The Roughtons wer e added as parties in J anuar y 2010. ¶ 4 In April 2010, the Roug htons moved to dismi ss, arguing that the court lac ked per sonal jurisdiction over them. Affida vits att ac h ed to the motion showed that, in Dec ember 2005, Anna called the g allery and spoke to Brian. Anna told him that she was interested in selling

a painting on behalf of her family and inquired whether the Roughtons would be interested in purcha sing it. Over the course of the next six months, Brian spoke with Anna on the phone and exchang ed e-ma il corr espondenc e with her about the painting. Kay la was not involved in the transac tion and never spoke to Anna or

had any other for m of contac t with her. ¶ 5 On J uly 12, 2006, Anna c alled B rian, off eringto sell the painting to the Roughtons for $40,000, and Brian acc epted. That day
, he sent to Anna a chec k, along with a box in which
to ship the painting. The box and check wer e shipped from Texas and sent to I llinois

. On September 14, 2006, the Roughtons sold the painting

.

-2-¶ 6 Brian rema ined in Texas during the entire transac tion. He never trave led to I llinois , and

Anna never went to Texas. The Roughtons have no phy sical business prese nce in I llinois and they never direc ted any adver tisements or solicitations to Anna. They do not adver tise or otherwise solicit business in I llinois
, other than by maintaining a website and adver tising in

sever al national ar

t mag azines, trade jour

nals, and we bsites. ¶ 7 On May 19, 2010, a hearing was held, and Patricia asked the court to take judicial notice of e-ma ils to show that Brian initiated the sale. Patricia argued that, beca use the contra ct was perf ormed in I llinois
, the court had persona l jurisdiction over the Roughtons. The court did not take notice of the e-ma ils, be cause they wer e not a ttached to any

filed cour

t paper s and had not bee n p ro perly put befor e the court, but the court agree d that, on the fac e of the materia ls be fore it, the contra ct was completed in I llinois

. Ba sed on that deter mination, the
court fo u n d that, “at this point in time on the surfa ce,” there was sufficie nt contac t with I llinois to deny the motion to dismiss

. The court stated its assumption that, if other facts

came out later, c ounsel would make a n appropriate motion. ¶ 8 On J une 18, 2010, t h e R o u gh t o n s filed a motion to rec onsider, arguing that the cour t

err ed in its application of the l aw. The Rough t o ns also noted t hat t he court had refer ence d the possibili ty of additional fac ts arising and that materia l from Anna was not considere d at the hea ringon the motion to dis miss. ¶ 9 The Roughtons attache d to the motion an aff idavit from Anna, stating that she initiated
contac t with the Roughtons about selling the painting. Anna aver red that, over the course of six months, she communicated with Brian by e-ma il and telephone and made various repr esentations about the co ndition of the painting. Through these discussions, Anna understood that any purcha se of the painting was conting ent upon its rec eipt and acc eptanc e to ensure that it did notexhibi t too much “cr acklier .” On J uly 11, 2006, Anna c alled B rian and asked whether he agree d to pur chase the painting. Brian acc epted, conting ent upon his inspection of t he crac klier. Brian sent Anna a check for $40,000 and a box for shippi ng of the painting. Anna sent the painting and held the chec k until Brian inspected the painting and approve d of its condition. Anna aver red that her only contac t with the Roughtons was at her initiation or request and that she did not ex pect that the R oug htons would have to come to the I llinois courts in re g ard to a ny dispute over the pa inting. ¶ 10 Also attache d to the motion to re co n sider wer e e-ma ils sent betwee n Anna and B rian showing that Brian expressed conce rn about the cra cklier and told Anna that he would send

a box for shipping along with a chec k. Then, he would inspect the painting upon rec eipt and eit h er h e would ship it back the next day if it was not acc eptable, or, if it was acc eptable, Anna c ould cash the c heck. Anna re plied that she would ac cept B rian’s te rms. ¶ 11 Patricia filed a response to the moti o n , arguing that the motion was improper be cause there was no newly discovere d evidenc e, chang e in the law, or err or in the court’s application of t he law. On J uly 21, 2010, the parties wer e a l lowed additional time to supplement their briefs in order to addre ss MacNeil v. Trambert
, 401 I ll. App. 3d 1077 (2010), a case decide d on J une 18, 2010. ¶ 12 A hearing on the matter was set for September 1, 2 0 1 0

. T h ere is no transcript of that hearing or substitut e for a transcript

. T h at same day
, the court g rante d the motion to

-3-rec onsider and dismiss ed the complaint ag ainst the Roughtons for lack of persona l

jurisdiction. Patricia appe als.

¶ 13 I I . ANALYSI S ¶ 14 A. Anna’ s Affidavit ¶ 15 In her reply brief, Patricia contends for the first time that we should not consider Anna’ s aff idavit, beca

use t here was no showing that it could not have be en provided as an exhibi t with the Roughtons’ orig inal motion. Howeve r, points not arg ued in the appellant’ s brief are forf eited. See I ll. S. C t. R. 341(h)(7) ( eff . J uly 1, 2008); R. 341(j) (e ff. July 1, 2008) (re ply brief “conf

ined strictly” to responding to the arguments prese nted in the appellee ’s b ri ef) ; Sylve ster v. Chicago Park District
, 179 I ll. 2d 500, 507 (1997) (issues raised for the first time in the re ply

brief a re forfe ited). Further, Patricia has not provided a transcript or subs titute of the he aringon the motion to reconsider showingwhat tra

nspired that would be grounds for err or. For example, she has not shown what the parties prese nted or argued, that she made any sort of objection to consi d er at ion of the aff idavit, or what the court deter mined as the basis of its judgment. ¶ 16 “[A]n appellant has t h e b u rd en t o p re s en t a s u ff i ci entl y complete rec ord of the proce eding s at trial to support a claim of err or, and in the absenc e of such a rec ord on appea l, it will be presumed that the order enter ed by the trial court was in c onformity with la w and had a sufficie nt fac tual basis. Any do ubts which may arise from t he incompleteness of t he

rec ord will be resolved ag ainst the appellant.” Foutch v. O’Bry ant , 99 I ll. 2d 389, 391-92 (1984). In the absenc e of a complete rec ord, we must presume that the trial court had ample g rounds supporting its deter mination. Rock Island County v. Boalbey
, 242 I ll. App. 3d 461, 462 (1993). ¶ 17 Her e, without a transcript of the hearing on the motion to rec onsider or a substitut e, we

assum e that Patricia did not object, that the affidavit was acce pted at the hearing as n ew l y discovere d evidenc e, o r that the trial court otherwise had ample grounds to support its deter mination about the aff

idavit. This is particul ar ly appropriate when the motion for

rec onsideration was based in part on the court’s indications that it would be open to lear ning of additional fac ts that arose , and when new case law arose during the pendenc y of t h e proce eding s. Acc ording ly , we c onsider Anna ’s af fidavit.

¶ 18 B. Per sonal J urisdiction ¶ 19 Patri ci a ar gu es that the I llinois courts have persona l jurisdiction over the Roug htons beca use the Roughtons neg otiated the contra ct with an I llinois resident, they have a website and have adve rtised nationally , and the c ontrac t was performed in I llinois

. The Roughtons contend t h at t h ei r contac ts with I llinois are too attenuate d to support persona l jurisdiction

over them, beca

use they have no phy sical contac t with I llinois and wer e passive purcha sers who did not initi ate the tr ansac tion, which was not substantially perf ormed in I llinois

. ¶ 20 “The plaintiff has the burden of proving a prima facie case for jurisdiction when seeking j u risdiction over a nonresident defe ndant.” Bolger v. Nautica International, Inc.
, 369 I l l

.

-4-App. 3d 947, 949-50 (2007) (citing Keller v. Hende rson , 359 I ll. App. 3d 605, 610 (2005),

and Spartan Motors, Inc. v. Lube Power, Inc.
, 337 I ll. App. 3d 556, 559 (2003))

. When the trial court decide s the issue of persona l jurisdiction based solely on documentar y evidenc e,

our revie w is de novo

. Id

. at 950. “In revie wing aff idavits and pleading s, we resolve conflicts betwee n the documents in the plaintiff’s favor for purposes of deter mining whether a prima facie case for jurisdiction has been shown.” Id

. “A plaintiff’s prima facie case for jurisdiction can be overc ome by

a def endant’ s uncontradic ted evidenc e that def eats jurisdiction.” Id

. ¶ 21 Section 2-209(c ) of the Code of Civil Procedur e (the long- arm statute) allows an I llinois
court to exercise persona l jurisdiction on any basis permitted by the I llinois Constitution and the Constitution of the United States. 735 I L CS 5/2-209(c) (West 2008). “Thus, the long- arm statute has been held to be coextensive with the due proce ss require ments of the I llinois and Unit ed S t at es Constitutions.” Bolger
, 369 I ll. App. 3d at 950; see G.M. Signs, Inc. v. Kirn Signs, Inc.
, 231 I ll. App. 3d 339, 342 (1992). Acc ording ly
, the issue is addre ssed acc ording to due proc ess re quirements. ¶ 22 Under state due proce ss guara ntees, i t m u s t b e fa i r, just, and rea sonable to require a nonresident to defe nd an action in I llinois
, considering t h e quality and nature of the defe ndant’s acts that occur in I llinois or that aff ect interests located i n I l l i n o i s

. Rollins v. Ellwood
, 141 I ll. 2d 244, 271 (1990). “ ‘F eder al due proce ss analy sis require s a three -prong 1 analy sis consisting of whether (1) the nonresident defe ndant had “minimum contac ts” with the forum st at e s u ch t h at there was “fa ir war ning” that the nonresident defe ndant may be haled into court there ; (2) the action arose out of or related to the defe ndant’s contac ts with the forum state; and (3) i t i s re as o nable to require the defe ndant to litigate in the forum state.’ ” Bolger
, 369 I ll. App. 3d at 950 (quoting Ke l l er , 3 59 I ll. App. 3d at 613); see also Burger K i n g Co r p

. v. Rudzewicz
, 471 U.S. 462, 471-77 (1985). At issue in this appea l is whether the Roughtons had sufficie nt minimum contac ts with I llinois so that I llinois courts

can a ssert per sonal jurisdiction over them.

¶ 23 1. MinimumContacts ¶ 24 “In order for persona l jurisdiction to comport with fede ral due proce ss require ments, the defe ndant must have c erta in minimum contacts with the for um state such that maintaining the suit there does not offe nd traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Bolger
, 369 I ll. App. 3d at 951 (citing International Shoe Co. v. W ashi n g t o n , 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)) . “The minimum contac ts r equire d for persona l jur isdiction must be based on some act by which the defe ndant purposef ully avails itself of the privileg e of conducting activities within the forum sta t e, thus invoking the benef its and protec tions of its laws.” Id

. (citing

I n Kel le r , we not ed tha t “i n al m ost al l cas es, when fe der al due pro ces s con cer ns re gardi ng 1
per son al j uri sdi ct ion ar e sat is fi ed, so ar e I ll ino is due pro ces s conce rns .” Kel le r , 359 I ll . App. 3d at 620. T hus
, bec aus e the re was no con te nti on tha t the ana lysis diver ged, we hel d tha t “be cau se fe der al due pro ces s con cer ns have bee n sat is fi ed in thi s cas e, so have I ll ino is due p r o c e s s con cer ns.” Id

. Simila rl y, nei the r par ty in thi s cas e ass er ts tha t the ana lyses diver ge. T hus
, we add r e s s o n l y t he fe der al due pr oce ss st and ar d.

-5-Burger King Corp.
, 471 U.S. at 475, and Keller
, 359 I ll. App. 3d at 612-13). The purposefulavailment re quirement e x ists so t hat an out-of -state de fenda

nt will not be forc ed to liti g ate in a distant or inconvenient forum solely as a result of random, fortuitous, or attenuate d
contac ts or t h e u n i l ater al act of a consumer or some other third person. Id

. The minimum
contac ts require d for the exercise of persona l jurisdiction differ depending on whether g ener al jurisdiction or specific jurisdiction is being sought. Id

. Pa t ri cia argues that both g ener al and spe cific jurisdiction ar e pre sent.

¶ 25 a. Ge nera l J urisdiction ¶ 26 “Ge nera l jurisdiction can be found when the defe ndant has continuous and sy s t em at i c g ener al business contac ts with the forum.” Id

. (citing Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall , 466 U.S. 408, 416 (1984), and Keller
, 359 I ll. App. 3d at 613). “I llinois limit s g ener al jurisdiction over nonresidents to instances in which the nonresident was prese nt and doing business in the forum.” Id

. (citing Roiser v. Cascade Mountain, Inc
., 367 I ll. App. 3d 559, 562 (2006))

. “That standard require s a nonresident defe ndant to car ry on business activity in I llinois
, not oc casiona lly or casua lly
, but w ith a fair measure of perma nence and continuity .” Id

. (citing Roiser
, 367 I ll. App. 3d at 562). The standard is quite high and means that the fore ign defe ndant has in eff ect taken up residenc e in I llinois and, there fore
, may be sued on cau s es of action both related and unrela ted to its activities there

. Id

. Transie nt contac t, such as attendanc e at trade shows, adver tising, or the mere solicitation of customers, is insufficient to establish g ener al jurisdiction. Id . at 951-52. ¶ 27 Her e, the Roughtons do not have continuous and sy stematic contac ts with I llinois . They do not maintain an office in I llinois and, althoug h they have a website and adver tise in some national trade journals, there is no eviden ce t h at those materia ls solicit purcha ses from residents of I llinois or any other state, and there is no evidenc e of direc t marke ting to I llinois residents. There is no evidenc e of regular business activity in I llinois or trav el t o I llinois

. Thus, the Roughtons do not car ry on business activity i n I l l i n o i s with any degree of perm an en ce or continuity

. There fore
, the courts of I llinois cannot exercise persona l jurisdiction over them under a g ener al jurisdiction theory

.

¶ 28 b. Specific Jurisdiction ¶ 29 “A court has specific jurisdiction over a defe ndant if the suit arises out of or relates to the defe ndant’s contac ts with the forum state.” Id

. at 952 (citing Keller
, 359 I ll. App. 3d at 613). For specific jurisdiction, the suit must arise direc tly out of the contac ts betwee n the defe ndant and the forum. Id

. At a minimum
, t h e co urt must find an act by which the defe ndant purposef ully avails him or herse lf of the privileg e of conducting activities within the forum
stat e, thus invoking the benef its and protec tions of its laws. Id

. “The focus is on the defe ndant’s activities within the forum State, not on t h o s e o f the plaintiff.” (Interna l quotation marks omitted.) Id

. ¶ 30 “[T] he fac tors a court con s i d er s t o d et er m i n e whether a defe ndant has suffic iently
transac ted business in I llinois so as to have purposef ully availed him or herse lf of the benef its of I llinois law are : (1) who initiated the transac tion; (2) wher e the contra ct was formed; and

-6-(3) wher e perf ormanc e of the contra ct was to take place .” Id

. (citing Viktron Ltd. Partnership

v. Program Data, Inc.
, 326 I ll. App. 3d 111, 117 (2001), and Campbell v. Mills
, 262 I ll. App. 3d 624, 628 (1994))

. ¶ 31 “In ca s es i n volving a contra ct for the sale of g oods, courts have found the exercise of per s o n al jurisdiction appropriate when the nonresident defe ndant actively initiated the
t ransa ction, or when a portion of the contra ct perf ormanc e was car

ried out in I llinois .” Id

. (citing Keller
, 359 I ll. App. 3 d at 618-19). Howeve r, an individual’s contra ct with a nonresident defe ndant alone does not automatically e s ta b li s h th e r e q

u is it e mi n im

u m c o nta c ts. Id

. (citing G.M. Signs
, 231 I ll. App. 3d at 343). This is particula rly true when the nonresident defe ndant is a buyer, rathe r than a seller. In those circ umstances, we d i s t i n gu i s h betwee n active a nd passive purc haser s. Chalek v. Klein , 193 I ll. App. 3d 767, 772 (1990). ¶ 32 “Unde r this approa ch, if the nonr esident buyer is a passive party who mere ly

place s an order by mail, telephone, or to a salesper son and acc epts the seller’ s price as stated in adver tising or other forms of solicitation, the courts of the seller State wi l l n o t be able to exercise in pe rsonam jurisdiction over the buyer.” Id

. at 772-73. “I f the buyer depar ts f rom

a passive rol e b y d i ctating or vigor ously neg otiating contra ct terms or by inspecting production fac iliti es, the unfairne ss which would be associate d with the exercise of long arm jurisdiction over that buyer dissipates, and he or she will be subject to persona l jurisdiction in the courts of the seller’ s State.” Id . at 773. ¶ 33 “The ty

pe of conduct which would char acte rize an active purchaser is far more ty pical in dealing s betwee n major business org anizations than in transac tions in which a consumer

or even a small shopkeepe r is the purcha ser.” Id

. “Distinguishing betwee n active and passive purcha sers there fore protec ts the ordinary mail order c onsumer who mer ely order s an item of merc handise from a company in a distant State from having to submit to the jurisdiction of the courts of that State while at the same time it protec ts sellers who manufa cture custombuilt products acc ording t o a nonresident buyer’ s specific ations.” Id

. “F urthermor e, under this approa ch, individuals from other States who order g oods from I llinois residents will not be subject to the jurisdiction of our courts mere ly beca use they have enter ed into a contra ct with I llinois residents.” Id

. It addre sses the due proce s s co n ce rn s expressed by the United States Suprem e Court in Burger King
, and it allows potential nonresident defe ndants to structure their conduct with some degree of assura nce as to whether it will rende r them liable to suit i n I llinois

. Id

. ¶ 34 In Chalek
, the defe ndant buyer p u rchased a single product from an I llinois seller. The defe ndant made the first contac t t o the seller to inquire about making the purcha se, called another time in response to materia ls sent by the seller, and sent a chec k to the seller. When the product arrived, the defe ndant deter mined that it was n o t s at isfactor y and stopped pay ment on the che ck. Howe ver, the defe ndant neve r ente red I llinois
, never neg otiated the
terms of the purcha se agree ment, and did not otherwise depar t from the role of a passive buyer. The ref

ore, w e dete rmined that per sonal jurisdiction was lacking

. ¶ 35 In compar ison, in G.M. Signs
, the defe ndant buyer did not have any phy sical prese nce in I llinois

. Howeve r, the plaintiff seller did not solicit the defe ndant’s business. The defe ndant
trave led to I llino i s to inspect the seller’ s manufa cturing fac iliti es and then initiated and

-7-neg otiated an ong oing purcha sing relationship with the seller for the purcha se of cu s t o m

produce d produ cts that wer e made acc ording to the defe ndant’s specific ations. In that instance, the defe ndant was an active purcha ser who was subject to persona l jurisdiction in I llinois

. G.M. Signs , 231 I ll. App. 3d at 344-45. ¶ 36 Her e, t h e fa ct s fa ll betwee n those of Chalek and G.M. Signs
, but the rec ord does not support a conclusion that the Roughtons wer e the ty pe of active purcha sers nece ssary for the exercise of persona l jurisdiction over them. The Roughtons did not initiate the t ransa ction and instead responde d to solicitations from Anna. Indeed, Anna aver red that all contac t was at her reque st. The Roughtons never ente re d t h e state, and the action involved a single purcha se with no further ong oing relationship b etween Anna and the Roughtons. W e note that the Roughtons did neg otiate in relation to the transac tion, but u n l i k e neg otiations in

case s that g ave rise to persona l jurisdiction, there is no evidenc e that the R o ug htons vigor ously neg otiated price or arr ang ed for an ong oing relationship involving custom product. Instead, th e R oug htons responde d to solicitations, acc epted the price that was offe red to them, and neg otiated only for the ability to inspect th e p ai nting befor e their purcha se bec ame f

inal. ¶ 37 Patricia argues t hat t he co n t ra ct was formed and perf ormed in I llinois
, g iving the state j urisdiction over the Roughtons. She also arg ues that the Roughtons committed a t o rt i n I llinois by direc ting the remova l of t he paint ing from I llinois to Texas, making I llinois the place of wro n g doing. But the R oug htons’ perf ormanc e in relation to the contract occurre d in Texas. The contra ct require d Anna to ship the painting to Texas and was conting ent upon the R oug htons’ inspection of t h e painting in Texas. The Roughtons issued the check from their off i ces in Texas and, afte r their inspection, title to the painting passed in Texas. See Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America v. Mobil Rock

y Mountain, Inc.
, 155 I ll. App. 3d 841, 846 (1986) (cour se of perf ormanc e that included transfe r of titl e i n another state did not constitute a transac tion of business sufficie nt to g ive jurisdiction to I llinois ); Chicago Film Enterprises v. Jablanow
, 55 I ll. App. 3d 739, 743 (1977) (transac tion i n a s u i t o v er a film shipped to Missouri from I llinois took place in Missouri). Fur ther, to the extent that I llinois

was the location of wrong doing, it was based on Anna’ s actions in initiating and car rying the deal through to completion. The actions from the R o u g htons’ side of the transac tion took place in Texas. Although Patricia alleg ed in her complaint that the Roughtons purcha sed the painting knowing that An n a d id not own it, nothing in the evidenc e that was provided for establishing personal jurisdiction supports that alleg ation. There is no evidenc e that the Roughtons we re e ven aw are of Patricia’ s exi stence

. ¶ 38 Patricia also arg ues that the Roughtons’ w ebsite establishes jurisdiction. The exis tence of a website may

or m ay not be sufficient to asser t persona l jurisdiction, depending on the level of interac tivity and the commerc ial nature of the information exchang ed. MacNeil
, 401 I ll. App. 3d at 1083. Patricia argues that the Roughtons’ website is interac tive beca use they admit that they solicit business through that site. Howeve r, nothing in the rec ord provides any additional fac ts about the nature of the we bsite and whe ther the Roughtons use i t to soli cit purcha ses of paintings as opposed to only sales of paintings from the g allery

. I f the site does not solicit purcha ses of artwor k, which is what is pertinent to this case , its exis tence would be less rele vant to the deter mination of persona l jurisdiction. There also is no evidenc e that

-8-the website specific ally solicits customers in I l l i nois and no evidenc e about the amount of

solicitation on the site as compar ed to noncommerc ial information. Wit hout more, the rec ord is insufficient to show that the ex istence of t h e we b s i te gives I llinois persona l jurisdiction over the Roughtons. ¶ 39 The materia l in the rec ord shows that the Roughtons wer e passive buyers who wer e not subject t o the j urisdiction of t he I llinois cou rt s

. W e also observe that, beca use P atricia did
not provide a transcript or substitut e o f t h e h ea ri ng on the motion to rec onsider, it is unknown what, if any , additional fac ts or arguments arose at that hearing. To the extent that there wer e additional fac ts pr esente d about the perf ormanc e of the contra ct, the location of any wrong doing, o r t h e n ature of the Roughtons’ website, we must assume that the trial court’s order was in c onformity with la w and had a sufficie nt f

actua l ba sis. See Foutch
, 99 I ll. 2d at 391-92.

¶ 40 I I I . CONCLUSI ON ¶ 41 The Roughtons lacke d sufficie nt minimum cont ac t s wi t h I l l i n o i s for our courts to exercise pe rsonal jurisdiction over them. Acc ording ly
, the j udg ment of t he circuit court of Du Pag e County

is affirme d.

¶ 42 Affir

med.

-9-