NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MARLON BLACHER,

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

B. DIEBALL, Correctional Sergeant, 

individually and in his official capacity; 

ELVIN VALENZUELA, Warden, 

individually and in his official capacity, 

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 16-56667 

D.C. No. 2:14-cv-07985-GW-AGR 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

George H. Wu, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted October 23, 2017**

Before: LEAVY, WATFORD, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.

Marlon Blacher, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district 

court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional 

violations related to an administrative rule violation. We have jurisdiction under 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

NOV 2 2017

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 16-56667 

28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(6). Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341 (9th Cir. 2010). We may 

affirm on any basis supported by the record. Enlow v. Salem-Keizer Yellow Cab 

Co., 389 F.3d 802, 811 (9th Cir. 2004). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Blacher’s due process claim against 

defendant Dieball because Blacher failed to allege facts sufficient to show a 

protected liberty interest or “atypical and significant hardship.” Sandin v. Conner, 

515 U.S. 472, 483-85 (1995) (a prisoner has no protected liberty interest when the 

sanction imposed neither extends the length of his sentence nor imposes an 

“atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary 

incidents of prison life”); Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1077-78 (9th Cir. 

2003) (due process procedural protections “adhere only when the disciplinary 

action implicates a protected liberty interest”).

Dismissal of Blacher’s First Amendment retaliation claim was proper 

because Blacher failed to allege facts sufficient to show that Dieball’s actions did 

not advance legitimate goals of the correctional institution. See Watison v. Carter, 

668 F.3d 1108, 1114 (9th Cir. 2012) (setting forth elements of a First Amendment 

retaliation claim in the prison context). 
3 16-56667 

The district court properly dismissed Blacher’s Eighth Amendment claim 

because Blacher failed to allege facts sufficient to show that Dieball acted with 

deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm. See Farmer v. 

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994) (a prison official is deliberately indifferent 

only if he “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety”).

The district court properly dismissed Blacher’s equal protection claim

because Blacher failed to allege facts sufficient to show that Dieball discriminated 

against him based on his race. See Hartmann v. Cal. Dep’t of Corrs. & Rehab., 

707 F.3d 1114, 1123 (9th Cir. 2013) (“To prevail on an Equal Protection claim 

brought under § 1983, [plaintiff] must allege facts plausibly showing that the 

defendants acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate against [him] based 

upon membership in a protected class.” (citations and internal quotation marks 

omitted)).

The district court properly dismissed Blacher’s due process claim against 

defendant Valenzuela because Blacher failed to allege facts sufficient to show a 

protected liberty interest. See Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 

2003) (“[I]nmates lack a separate constitutional entitlement to a specific prison 

grievance procedure.”).
4 16-56667 

Dismissal of Blacher’s “conflict of interests” claim was proper because 

Blacher failed to allege facts sufficient to state any plausible claim for relief. See 

Hebbe, 627 F.3d at 341-42 (although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, a 

plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim).

The district court properly dismissed Blacher’s claim that the punishment 

constituted double jeopardy. See United States v. Brown, 59 F.3d 102, 104

(explaining that double jeopardy does not attach to prison disciplinary 

proceedings). 

The district court properly dismissed Blacher’s claim that the punishment 

constituted slavery or involuntary servitude. See Draper v. Rhay, 315 F.2d 193, 

197 (9th Cir. 1963) (“There is no federally protected right of a state prisoner not to 

work while imprisoned after conviction.”). 

We reject as meritless Blacher’s contentions that the district court failed to 

use Blacher’s correct legal name, his habeas petition is protected by copyright, and 

defendants were required to respond to his “Affidavit of Corporate Denial.”

We do not consider Blacher’s contentions regarding the district court’s

denial of his various motions because they are not supported by argument. See 

Acosta-Huerta v. Estelle, 7 F.3d 139, 144 (9th Cir. 1993).
5 16-56667 

We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on 

appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.