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TSA OVERSIGHT PART III: EFFECTIVE SECURITY 

OR SECURITY THEATER? 

JOINT HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT 

AND GOVERNMENT REFORM 

AND THE

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION 

AND INFRASTRUCTURE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

MARCH 26, 2012 

Printed for the use of the Committees on Government Reform and 

Transportation and Infrastructure 

Serial No. 112–174 

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

Serial No. 112–78 

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house 

http://www.house.gov/reform 

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California, Chairman 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida 

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina 

JIM JORDAN, Ohio 

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

TIM WALBERG, Michigan 

JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma 

JUSTIN AMASH, Michigan 

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York 

PAUL A. GOSAR, Arizona 

RAU ́ L R. LABRADOR, Idaho 

PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

JOE WALSH, Illinois 

TREY GOWDY, South Carolina 

DENNIS A. ROSS, Florida 

FRANK C. GUINTA, New Hampshire 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland, Ranking 

Minority Member 

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York 

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio 

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts 

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri 

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

MIKE QUIGLEY, Illinois 

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois 

BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa 

PETER WELCH, Vermont 

JOHN A. YARMUTH, Kentucky 

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

LAWRENCE J. BRADY, Staff Director 

JOHN D. CUADERES, Deputy Staff Director 

ROBERT BORDEN, General Counsel 

LINDA A. GOOD, Chief Clerk 

DAVID RAPALLO, Minority Staff Director 

(III) 

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida, Chairman 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

GARY G. MILLER, California 

TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

ANDY HARRIS, Maryland 

ERIC A. ‘‘RICK’’ CRAWFORD, Arkansas 

JAIME HERRERA BEUTLER, Washington 

FRANK C. GUINTA, New Hampshire 

RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois 

LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania 

CHIP CRAVAACK, Minnesota 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana 

BILLY LONG, Missouri 

BOB GIBBS, Ohio 

PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania 

RICHARD L. HANNA, New York 

JEFFREY M. LANDRY, Louisiana 

STEVE SOUTHERLAND II, Florida 

JEFF DENHAM, California 

JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma 

REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin 

CHARLES J. ‘‘CHUCK’’ FLEISCHMANN, 

Tennessee 

NICK J. RAHALL II, West Virginia 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

JERROLD NADLER, New York 

CORRINE BROWN, Florida 

BOB FILNER, California 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland 

LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa 

TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts 

TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York 

MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois 

MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii 

JASON ALTMIRE, Pennsylvania 

TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota 

HEATH SHULER, North Carolina 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

LAURA RICHARDSON, California 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland 

(V) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held on March 26, 2012 ............................................................................ 1 

WITNESSES 

Mr. Christopher L. McLaughlin, Assistant Administrator for Security Operations, Transportation Security Administration 

Oral statement .................................................................................................. 5 

Written statement ............................................................................................ 8 

Mr. Stephen Sadler, Assistant Administrator for Intelligence and Analysis, 

Transportation Security Administration 

Oral statement .................................................................................................. 6 

Written statement ............................................................................................ 8 

Mr. Stephen M. Lord, Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, U.S. 

Government Accountability Office 

Oral statement .................................................................................................. 17 

Written statement ............................................................................................ 00 

Rear Admiral Paul F. Zukunft, Assistant Commandant for Marine Safety, 

Security, and Stewardship, U.S. Coast Guard 

Oral statement .................................................................................................. 19 

APPENDIX 

The Honorable Elijah E. Cummings, a Member of Congress from the State 

of Maryland, Opening Statement ....................................................................... 62 

Facebook Questions & Comments for TSA ............................................................ 64 

Questions for The Honorable John S. Pistole, Administrator, Transportation 

Security Administration from The Chairman of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, The Honorable John L. Mica, a Member of Congress from the State of Florida ........................................................................... 67 

Submitted for the Record by The Honorable Blake Farenthold, a Member 

of Congress from the State of Texas ................................................................... 69 

The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Member of Congress from the State 

Virginia, Opening Statement .............................................................................. 70 

Questions and Responses ........................................................................................ 71 

(1) 

TSA OVERSIGHT PART III: EFFECTIVE 

SECURITY OR SECURITY THEATER? 

Monday, March 26, 2012 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM, JOINT WITH THE

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE, Washington, D.C. 

The committees met, pursuant to call, at 1:32 p.m., in Room 

2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Darrell E. Issa [chairman of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform] presiding. 

Present from the Committee on Oversight and 

Government Reform: Representatives Issa, Mica, Farenthold, 

Cummings, Norton, and Connolly. 

Present from the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure: Representatives Mica, Petri, Coble, Cravaack, Farenthold, 

Norton, Cummings, Boswell, and Cohen. 

Also Present: Representative Blackburn. 

Staff Present from the Committee on Oversight and Government 

Reform: Thomas A. Alexander, Senior Counsel; Michael R. Bebeau, 

Assistant Clerk; Molly Boyl, Parliamentarian; Gwen D’Luzansky, 

Assistant Clerk; Adam P. Fromm, Director of Member Services and 

Committee Operations; Linda Good, Chief Clerk; Mitchell S. 

Kominsky, Counsel; Mark D. Marin, Director of Oversight; Jeff 

Solsby, Senior Communications Advisor; Rebecca Watkins, Press 

Secretary; Kevin Corbin, Minority Deputy Clerk; Jennifer Hoffman, 

Minority Press Secretary; Carla Hultberg, Minority Chief Clerk; 

Peter Kenny, Minority Counsel; Lucinda Lessley, Minority Policy 

Director; and Carlos Uriarte, Minority Counsel. 

Staff Present from the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure: Gil Macklin, Professional Staff Member; Sean McMaster, 

Professional Staff Member; and Shant Boyajian, Professional Staff 

Member. 

Chairman ISSA. The committee will come to order. 

The Oversight Committee exists to secure two fundamental principles: First, Americans have a right to know that money Washington takes from them is well-spent; and, second, Americans deserve an efficient, effective government that works for them. Our 

duty on the Oversight and Government Reform Committee is to 

protect these rights. 

Our solemn responsibility is to hold government accountable to 

taxpayers, because taxpayers have a right to know what they get 

from their government. We will work tirelessly, in partnership with 

2 

citizen watchdogs, to deliver the facts to the American people and 

bring genuine reform to the Federal bureaucracy. 

This is our mission statement. 

Today, we are calling the third hearing conducted by the Oversight Committee, today a joint hearing, where we plan to hold at 

least two additional TSA oversight hearings in April and May. 

There is no question that the TSA serves a vital role. The question is, in a post-9/11 period, are we getting value for our money? 

Do we in fact have a system which is thorough and complete, that 

in fact takes care of all of us? Or do we have a fairly expensive, 

labor-intensive system that in fact is not making us appreciably 

safer? In a time of budget limitations, TSA, although essential, 

must in fact deliver value to the American people. 

With more than 65,000 men and women working for TSA, it is 

not a small agency. This is more men and women working for an 

aviation-based safety organization than build all the Ford automobiles in America combined. Only one-quarter of the funds used 

by TSA come from aviation fees. Three-quarters come directly from 

the American people, meaning those of us who do not fly are paying a heavy price for those who do. 

But even the billion-and-a-half-plus dollars paid for out of landing fees and other collections, ticket fees, to run our airports, in 

fact, is a high price to pay—a burden, if you will, on our efficiency. 

So whether the dollars come from ticket fees or come from the taxpayer directly, it is essential that we review TSA’s effectiveness. 

By 2013, TSA will arguably, by its own accounting, have wasted 

more than $500 million of taxpayer money developing advanced imaging technology, or AIT, machines. In addition to public outrage 

over privacy violations, classified GAO reports paint a dire picture 

of ineffectiveness. GAO believes Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques, or SPOT, program, which has already cost taxpayers $800 million, is ineffective and that Congress should consider limiting funds for this program. GAO, as a nonpartisan organization, claims that TSA deployed SPOT before having solid scientific basis for its effectiveness and that when it worked, it was 

only an accident. 

Despite a potential $3.2 billion cost to the Federal Government 

and industry, GAO continues to find that TSA is failing to properly 

administer TWIC, the Transportation Worker Identification Credential. I have seen this failure myself. I have seen a mandated bio 

ID simply waived. Showing a picture ID is not, in fact, what Congress mandated. Deploying these and deploying them in a way in 

which they are quick and effective is essential. Let’s remember, it 

cost a lot of money to produce the card; simply using it as a highprice ID card is not acceptable. 

Without creating a plan to upgrade its explosive detection system, or EDS, which will cost $964 million or more to the taxpayer, 

TSA cannot ensure updating EDS will be feasible or cost-effective. 

Now, let me just reiterate. EDS is an important system. Whether 

it is the inadvertent touching of fertilizer or the real operational 

use of explosives, we need to know. We need to screen. It is an effective tool if it works. If it doesn’t work and work 100 percent of 

the time, we have the biggest problem we could possibly have. 

3 

Lastly, the VIPR program, Visual Intermodal Prevention and Response, faces serious questions from both security experts and legal 

scholars about the effectiveness and constitutionality of this initiative. TSA is not performing or taking into serious consideration the 

cost-benefits, and that is a big part of what this committee is here 

to ask questions on today. Not, is it nice to have; not, might it 

work; not, do we must do something; but, in fact, have we done a 

cost-benefit analysis? Have we screened through many choices, developed, researched, but only deployed those which work? 

In fact, what we do know here at this committee and at the 

Transportation Committee is that we have fielded products that 

don’t work, in the past. And when it becomes known by the public 

that a product has a gaping flaw, that product becomes essentially 

useless. Sadly, what we discover is, even when it becomes public, 

there is no other tool. So, in fact, we continue screening people, 

knowing that screening alone is not enough and that the public 

knows that. 

And, with that, I now recognize the chairman of the Subcommittee on Aviation Infrastructure, Mr. Petri, for his opening 

statement. 

Mr. PETRI. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for 

organizing this important hearing and doing so with the Transportation Committee. 

After 9/11, the Transportation Committee held a number of hearings to attempt to determine what happened and what needed to 

be done. And it became very clear at those hearings that the thenexisting Federal policy of requiring easy access to the cockpit in 

case there was a medical emergency or something of that sort was 

not the most secure way to go. That policy was changed, and now 

our cockpits are hardened; that is to say, it is very difficult for a 

passenger to take over an airplane and turn it into a weapon, as 

happened on 9/11. 

That, in my opinion, is the most significant security change since 

that time. Beyond that, of course, people can go on airplanes and 

possibly take a plane down, can create mischief, become a hara-kiri 

person, as they could if they were to go to a football stadium or on 

a cruise liner or any other sort of—a train—other modes of transportation. We do have a security problem, but it is not restricted 

to airlines. And the major part of the danger of airlines, I think, 

was dealt with when it became impossible for people to take over 

the airplane and turn it into a weapon, as happened on 9/11. 

That said, of course, we have this regime that all of us experience who serve in Congress, if you live any distance at all, on a 

weekly basis practically, if not more often. We are inspecting millions of travelers, hundreds of thousands, every month, the same 

people over and over and over again. And that has to be wasteful 

and intrusive. And this has been going on now for 10 years. If it 

is going to go on for another 10 years, it behooves us to come up 

with a more efficient, less intrusive, more sensible program so that 

we concentrate on where there might be a risk, rather than inspecting the same people over and over and over again. 

When we had hearings back at the time of 9/11, experts came in, 

testified before the Transportation Committee, from Israel and a 

number of other countries that certainly have for many years faced 

4 

very, very heightened security threats. Hardening the cockpit was 

one of the things that they advised and which we did. Other things 

that they have advised we have not done: trying to track people 

when they buy tickets and working on the intelligence side of 

things to see if there is some sort of a likelihood that that person 

might be a risk; put ways of inspecting people and how they behave 

not just at the airport, looking through their drawers and socks 

and looking at their shoes, but looking at how they interact with 

ticket agents, how they generally behave, not just at the airport 

but as they go about their business of preparing possibly to do 

things of risk. 

It seems to me that there are a lot more strategic and intelligent 

ways to go about it than spending hundreds of millions of dollars, 

impeding the growth of the transportation sector, aviation sector, 

and basically changing the psychology of Americans to have them 

starting to feel that they somehow have done something wrong and 

they are being subjected to pat-down and shakedown, as we do 

when we are worrying about someone who has committed a crime 

or—we are assuming everyone is guilty and treating them practically like prisoners when they are American taxpaying citizens. 

So I feel that we have a lot to do to straighten this whole mess 

out. It is not a cost-effective or very disciplined approach. And after 

10 years, we owe more to the American people. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for having this hearing. 

Chairman ISSA. I thank the gentleman. 

Chairman ISSA. The gentleman yields back. 

I now ask unanimous consent that our colleague from Tennessee, 

Mrs. Blackburn, be allowed to participate in today’s hearing. 

Without objection, so ordered. 

I will now note that the ranking members of each of the committees are driving in and have been delayed. It is not a flight, as far 

as I know. So they will make their opening statements after our 

witnesses make theirs. I am assured they will be here by then. 

With that, I would like to now introduce our first panel. Mr. 

Christopher L. McLaughlin is the Assistant Administrator for Security Operations at the Transportation Security Administration. 

Mr. Stephen Sadler is the Assistant Administrator for Intelligence 

and Analysis at the Transportation Security Administration. Mr. 

Stephen Lord is director for homeland security at the U.S. Government Accountability Office—our wing, if you will. And Rear Admiral Zukunft, with the U.S. Coast Guard, is an Assistant Commandant for Marine Safety, Security, and Stewardship, and I 

might mention, without a doubt the best jewel ever given to homeland security, in my opinion and in the ranking member’s opinion. 

Pursuant to the rules of this committee, would you all please rise 

to take the oath? Raise your right hand. 

Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you are 

about to give will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but 

the truth? 

Let the record indicate that—please have a seat—all witnesses 

answered in the affirmative. 

Now, my predecessor, whose portrait is up there, Mr. Towns, 

began a tradition of explaining the obvious, but he did it every 

time, and I appreciated it. Your entire opening statements will be 

5 

placed in the record. In front of you you have a countdown clock. 

And like so many things that you look at, you say, does it really 

matter? The answer is, please summarize if you run out of time. 

We would like to get through all of you and get you out of here 

with full questions and answers in a timely fashion. And remember, your opening statements will be available in their entirety. 

Mr. McLaughlin, you are first. You have 5 minutes. 

WITNESS STATEMENTS 

STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER L. MCLAUGHLIN 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. Good afternoon, Chairman Issa and distinguished members of the committees. Thank you for the opportunity 

to testify today. 

TSA has made significant strides in our deployment and utilization of AIT over the past year. Automatic Target Recognition software, recently installed in the majority of our machines, enhanced 

passenger privacy by eliminating passenger-specific images, while 

improving throughput capabilities and streamlining the checkpoint 

screening process. 

In the fall of 2011, my office began to further develop operational 

performance targets, including a new AIT utilization goal that is 

consistent with the DHS, OIG, and GAO recommendations. Tied to 

this, we implemented an action plan to increase AIT utilization 

across the Nation. As a result of these efforts, our utilization performance between February 2011 and February 2012 improved by 

200 percent. 

In addition to AIT, we are employing CAT/BPSS technology to 

automatically verify passenger documents. CAT/BPSS will eventually replace the current procedures used to detect fraudulent or altered documents. We will deploy this technology for operational 

testing at a few airports beginning next month. 

Technology is only one mechanism to identify potential threats. 

The SPOT program uses behavior observation and analysis to identify potentially high-risk individuals who may pose a threat to 

transportation security. SPOT was scientifically validated in 2011 

by the DHS Science and Technology Division, representing the 

most thorough analysis of any behavioral screening program to 

date. No other counterterrorism or similar security program is 

known to have been subjected to such a rigorous, systematic evaluation. This study revealed that SPOT was significantly more effective at identifying high-risk passengers than random screening protocols. That said, TSA continues working with DHS S&T and the 

broader research community to increase the effectiveness and the 

efficiency of this behavior-based screening process. 

Subsequent to the validation study, TSA took steps last fall to 

enhance the program. Under a new pilot, behavior detection officers employ a specialized interview technique to determine if a 

traveller should be referred for additional screening at the checkpoint. This additional interaction, used by security agencies worldwide, enables officers to better verify or dispel concerns about suspicious behavior and anomalies. Preliminary analysis shows an increase in the rate of detection of high-risk passengers. And TSA is 

6 

currently conducting analysis with the DHS Science and Technology Directorate to inform a validation process for future rollout. 

Complementing these program developments, TSA has begun 

teaching a tactical communications course for our frontline workforce. This training focuses on active listening, empathy, and verbal 

communication techniques and will be complete by the end of 2012. 

These initiatives are some of the key aspects of TSA’s security 

infrastructure that provide the backbone for our overall risk-based 

strategy. This strategy demonstrates our commitment to move 

away from a one-size-fits-all security model. While this approach 

was necessary after 9/11 and has been effective over the past decade, key enablers now allow TSA to move toward a more intuitive 

solution. 

Perhaps the most widely known RBS initiative is TSA PreCheck. 

To date, approximately 600,000 passengers have experienced an expedited screening through TSA PreCheck. By the end of 2012, we 

expect to offer to passengers in 35 of our busiest airports the benefits of TSA PreCheck. In addition to eligible frequent fliers and 

members of CBP’s Trusted Traveler programs, we just expanded 

PreCheck to include active-duty U.S. military traveling out of 

Reagan National Airport. 

In addition to PreCheck, last fall we implemented new screening 

procedures for children 12 and under, allowing them to leave their 

shoes on and go through a less intrusive security screening process. 

And just last Monday, at a few airports we began testing similar 

modified procedures for passengers 75 and older. 

Finally, we are also supporting efforts to test identity-based 

screening for airline pilots. So far, over 470,000 uniformed pilots 

have cleared security through the Known Crewmember program. 

These initiatives have allowed us to expedite the screening process for children, our military, many frequent fliers, and, now in 

testing, the elderly. They have resulted in fewer divestiture requirements and a significant reduction in pat-downs, while allowing us more time to focus on travelers we believe are likely to pose 

a risk to our transportation network, including those on terrorist 

watchlists. 

By enhancing the effectiveness of our current programs and 

layering in our risk-based security initiatives, TSA continues to 

work toward our goal of providing the most effective security in the 

most efficient way. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to testify. 

At this time, I would like to introduce my colleague, Mr. Stephen 

Sadler, Assistant Administrator for TSA’s Office of Intelligence and 

Analysis. 

Chairman ISSA. The gentleman is recognized. 

STATEMENT OF STEPHEN SADLER 

Mr. SADLER. Good afternoon, Chairman Issa and distinguished 

members of the committees. I appreciate the opportunity to testify 

on some of the work we are doing in coordination with the United 

States Coast Guard to strengthen security throughout our Nation’s 

maritime transportation system. 

The Transportation Worker Identification Credential program, or 

TWIC, is an important security measure designed to ensure that 

7 

individuals who pose a threat to security do not gain unescorted access to secure areas of certain maritime facilities and vessels. Prior 

to the TWIC program, there was no standard identity verification 

or background check policy for entrance to a port. Today, facility 

owners and operators can look for one standard identification document issued after the successful completion of a thorough security 

threat assessment. 

The identity verification and threat assessment requirements of 

the TWIC program support the DHS multilayered approach to protecting the Nation’s transportation system and enhance security at 

our ports. Several key objectives, included in the SAFE Port Act of 

2006, were met during the initial rollout of the program in October 

2007. These include milestones for implementing TWIC enrollment 

sites, conducting security threat assessments, and issuing TWICs. 

On April 15, 2009, U.S. Coast Guard regulation implemented the 

requirement for all unescorted workers in secure areas and all 

mariners to possess a valid TWIC. As of this month, almost 2 million transportation workers, including longshoremen, truckers, and 

port employees, have received a TWIC. 

This past February, TSA deployed changes to allow TWIC holders to receive comparability for the security threat assessment 

when applying for a hazardous materials endorsement under a 

State-issued commercial driver’s license. Under comparability, 

hazmat applicants with a valid TWIC can pay a reduced fee and 

do not need to go to an enrollment center; they can go directly to 

their State licensing agency to apply for this endorsement. Currently, 11 States and the District of Columbia have availed themselves of this capability. 

TSA also recently awarded its Universal Enrollment Services 

contract. This new capability will allow individuals to apply for 

multiple programs such as TWIC and HME at the same location, 

provide enrollment centers across a broader geographic range, and 

allow enrollment for new or future programs serviced by TSA. 

On May 31st, 2011, TSA completed the required data collection 

phase of the TWIC Reader Pilot. TSA gathered information from 7 

ports, 13 facilities, and 4 vessel operations that collectively installed 156 readers of various types and models best suited to their 

business needs. These sites provided data regarding reader performance and reliability as well as throughput data of vehicle and 

pedestrian access points. 

The final report was submitted to Congress February 27th, 2012. 

This data provides a clearer picture of the likely impacts of using 

readers at maritime facilities and on vessel operations. The TWIC 

Reader Pilot concludes that TWIC reader systems function properly 

when they are designed, installed, and operated in a manner consistent with the characteristics and business needs of the facility 

or the vessel operation. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I look forward to 

your questions. 

Chairman ISSA. Thank you. 

[Prepared statement of Mr. McLaughlin and Mr. Sadler follows:] 

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Chairman ISSA. Mr. Lord? 

STATEMENT OF STEPHEN M. LORD 

Mr. LORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and other members of the 

committee. Thank you for inviting me here today to discuss TSA’s 

progress and related challenges in deploying three key security programs. My observations are based on a large body of work the GAO 

has completed over the last few years. 

I would first like to note that DHS and TSA have made some notable achievements since the 9/11 attacks in securing our Nation’s 

ports and airports. And as the TSA witnesses noted today, some remaining challenges still exist. 

The first program I would like to discuss today is TSA’s behavior 

detection program, also called SPOT. This program consists of over 

3,000 behavior detection officers that are deployed to over 160 U.S. 

airports. This program is a key part of TSA’s efforts to focus more 

attention on dangerous people versus dangerous items, which I 

support. 

Bottom line on the program is, while TSA has taken some steps 

to validate the science behind the program, much more work remains to fully validate it, establish sound performance metrics, and 

assess costs and benefits. And as we noted in our prior work, all 

these additional steps could take several more years to complete. 

And as we noted in our report on the program, TSA deployed 

SPOT nationwide before determining whether it had a valid scientific basis. The good news is, DHS did complete an initial validation study in April 2011, which concluded that the program was 

more effective than random screening. However, as the study itself 

noted, it was not designed to fully answer the very important question of whether you can use behavior detection principles for 

counterterrorism purposes in the airport environment. A scientific 

consensus on this issue simply does not exist. 

Another key report recommendation was to develop better performance measures. The importance of this is underscored by looking at the arrests made under the program. For example, 27 percent of the 300 SPOT arrests made in 2010 were illegal aliens, raising questions about mission focus. 

The second TSA program I would like to discuss today is TSA’s 

body scanner program, commonly referred to as advanced imaging 

technology or AITs. As you know, these scanners were deployed in 

response to the attempted Christmas Day attack of a Northwest 

Airlines flight. About 640 of these units are now in place at over 

160 airports. According to TSA, these machines provide superior 

benefits over walk-through metal detectors since they are capable 

of detecting non-metallic threat objects. 

Earlier this year, we issued a classified report on AIT. While 

most of the details are still classified, TSA agreed to allow us to 

note some of the details regarding the utilization rates of these 

units for today’s hearing. We found that some of these units had 

been used less than 30 percent of the day since their installation. 

And the good news is, in response to our report, TSA agreed to 

take steps to address these low utilization rates. 

The last program I would like to briefly discuss today is TSA’s 

maritime biometric credential program called TWIC. In terms of 

18 

progress, TSA has now enrolled over two million maritime workers 

in the program. However, our 2011 report identified a number of 

significant internal control weaknesses in card enrollment, background checking, and use that we believe have limited the security 

benefits of the program. In fact, these weaknesses may have contributed to the breach of selected U.S. facilities during covert tests 

we conducted as part of this review. 

We recommended that DHS and TSA strengthen program controls as well as complete an effectiveness study to clarify the current program’s contributions to enhancing maritime security. DHS 

has established a working group with executive oversight to address our important TWIC report recommendations. We look forward to seeing the results of this committee’s work. 

In closing, TSA has established a number of security layers and 

programs to thwart potential terrorist attacks. However, our past 

work has identified a number of ways these efforts could be 

strengthened to help ensure American taxpayers receive a good return on their considerable investment. I am hoping that today’s 

hearing can provide some additional insights on how these programs can be strengthened and be made more cost-effective. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement, and I look forward 

to your questions. 

Chairman ISSA. Thank you. 

[Prepared statement of Mr. Lord follows:] 

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Chairman ISSA. Admiral? 

STATEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL PAUL F. ZUKUNFT 

Admiral ZUKUNFT. Good afternoon, Chairman Issa and distinguished members of the committees. I am honored to appear before 

you today to speak about the Coast Guard’s role in enforcing compliance with the Transportation Worker Identification Credential, 

or TWIC, program within the maritime transportation system. 

The TWIC program, as envisioned under the Maritime Transportation Security Act, or MTSA, of 2002 and strengthened by the 

SAFE Port Act of 2006, requires that all credentialed merchant 

mariners and transportation workers seeking unescorted access to 

secure areas of MTSA-regulated facilities and vessels undergo a security check and receive a TWIC. The TWIC is currently required 

for unescorted access to approximately 2,700 regulatory facilities, 

12,000 regulated vessels, and 50 regulated Outer Continental Shelf 

facilities. 

While the Transportation Security Administration has primary 

responsibility for the issuance of TWICs, the Coast Guard has primary responsibility for ensuring compliance with the TWIC regulations. All of the approximately 2,700 maritime facilities impacted 

by the TWIC regulations are and have been in compliance since the 

April 15th, 2009, implementation date. The Coast Guard continues 

to conduct both unannounced and announced inspections to ensure 

compliance. Additionally, the Coast Guard has verified more than 

213,000 TWICs through a combination of visual and electronic 

means. 

In accordance with the SAFE Port Act, a pilot program was conducted by TSA to evaluate the feasibility and technical and operational impacts of implementing a TWIC reader system. Electronic 

readers add another layer of security associated with the TWIC by 

providing biometric confirmation of the TWIC holder’s identity. 

TSA’s report on the pilot program was delivered to Congress on 

February 27th, and the Coast Guard is now incorporating the results of the pilot in our rulemaking for electronic readers in the 

maritime environment. This rulemaking will apply requirements in 

a risk-based fashion to leverage security benefits and capabilities. 

Additionally, Section 809 of the Coast Guard Authorization Act 

of 2010 amended the original TWIC requirements to include only 

those mariners allowed unescorted access to a secure area designated in a vessel security plan. As elements of the Coast Guard 

merchant mariner credential issuance process relies upon data received through TWIC enrollment, the provision was neither selfexecuting or easily implemented. Noting such, the Coast Guard 

issued a policy letter in December 2011 to remove the requirement 

to hold a TWIC for mariners currently inactive or those serving on 

vessels that do not require a vessel security plan. The Coast Guard 

continues to work toward codification of this change through a 

rulemaking process. 

A GAO report on TWIC in May 2011 identified a weakness in 

verification of TWICs in the field. In response, we issued policy to 

our field units directing thorough verification of TWICs at checkpoints, highlighting that a quick flash of the TWIC was not acceptable. The electronic readers deployed at our units ensure each perVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:36 Sep 12, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00041 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\75743.TXT APRIL
36 

son attempting to enter a facility is carrying a TWIC. And, to date, 

we have implemented over 275 readers to our field units. 

We continue to work with our DHS partners and particularly 

with TSA, as well as State and local agencies, to continue to improve the TWIC program for seafarers and other maritime transportation workers by balancing a steadfast commitment to security 

while facilitating commerce. 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I will 

be pleased to answer your questions. 

Chairman ISSA. Thank you. 

Chairman ISSA. And as earlier announced, we will now recognize 

the gentleman from Maryland for his opening statement. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Today, the Oversight Committee and the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee convene to examine measures TSA utilizes 

to secure our Nation’s transportation networks. 

In the realm of aviation security, the TSA must achieve a delicate balance. TSA must be effective in meeting the evolving threats 

posed by terrorists. We also expect it to be responsive to the needs 

of the public and the demands of commerce. 

Since the terrible events of September 11th, 2001, several attacks have been attempted against commercial planes, including 

the attempted bombing on Christmas Day 2009 of Northwest Airlines Flight 253 and the attempted bombing in 2010 of a cargo jet 

using a bomb disguised as an inkjet cartridge. These incidents 

demonstrate the constantly evolving threats TSA must counter. 

TSA’s 43,000 transportation security officers must screen more 

than 2 million passengers every day in our Nation’s 450 airports. 

Although the vast majority of passengers pose no risk, these officers must find the equivalent of a needle in a haystack. 

In response to the Christmas Day bombing attempt, TSA increased its deployment of advanced imagining technology systems 

to screen passengers for both metallic and non-metallic threats. 

More recently, TSA has developed the PreCheck program to expedite screening for low-risk travellers, such as members of the military. 

I welcome TSA’s efforts to develop a more intelligent, risk-based 

approach to transportation security. Recognizing the enormity of 

the challenge TSA faces, as the agency develops new screening 

techniques we must ensure that it strikes the appropriate balance 

between moving too quickly to deploy untested or unreliable technologies or techniques and moving too slowly to address new 

threats. 

Today’s hearing will also review the Transportation Worker Identification Credential. When I served as chairman of the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation, I convened hearings in 2007 and 2008 to review the rollout of TWIC. 

And I thank the Coast Guard for joining us today. 

Unlike many screening techniques TSA uses in the aviation 

realm, Congress mandated what became the TWIC program and 

required that this program be funded by fees collected from enrollees. There are now more than 2.1 million enrollees, and, by our estimate, these enrollees have paid approximately $280 million to implement this program. 

37 

To close the security perimeter that TWIC is intended to create, 

we must finally implement the use of readers so that these cards 

are no longer just expensive flash passes. TSA must also ensure 

that TWICs are not issued to ineligible applicants. 

However, we must also view TWIC in the broader maritime security context. TWIC is meant to control land-side access to secure 

areas of U.S. ports and secure areas of U.S. vessels. There are 

many risks that approach our ports, particularly from the water 

side, that TWIC was never intended to address. None of the individuals on the estimated 17 million small boats operating in our 

waters are required to carry TWICs, and none of the foreign mariners on the more than 9,000 foreign-flagged vessels calling on U.S. 

ports carry TWICs. 

Our first and most critical line of maritime defense, our thin blue 

line at sea, is the Coast Guard, which must defend our coasts, rescue thousands at sea, respond to marine casualties and oil spills, 

intercept drugs and migrants, and enforce security requirements at 

2,500 facilities and on nearly 13,000 vessels regulated by the Maritime Transportation Security Act. 

This service of 42,000 active-duty officers and members do all of 

this on a budget of less than $10 billion per year, less than 2 percent of the DOD’s base budget. And they now face additional cuts 

and the loss of up to 1,000 active-duty slots in next year’s budget. 

The Coast Guard does all that we ask of them to do. However, 

we cannot continue to stretch the service and assume that it will 

never break or that gaps will not open in our maritime security. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back, and I want to thank you 

for your courtesy. 

Chairman ISSA. I thank the gentleman. 

Chairman ISSA. We have also been joined by the chairman of the 

full Transportation Committee, and I now recognize him. 

Mr. MICA. First of all, thank you so much, Chairman Issa, and 

to your committee, Government Reform and Oversight. I am honored to co-chair this hearing with you. I am sorry there was a little 

bit of a delay getting back here today, but pleased to be with you. 

And I thank you for your leadership on this. 

This is a very important agency that we have joint responsibility 

over. Our committee has some limited oversight responsibility. 

Under Transportation, as you may recall, historically, TSA was created. I happened to chair the Subcommittee on Aviation in 2001 

after the horrific terrorist attacks. 

Since that time, TSA has grown from 16,500 screeners and a 

small cadre of different transportation security activities which we 

joined together. It was a much smaller beginning, and, unfortunately, TSA has mushroomed to 65,000 employees, of which there 

are 14,000 administrative personnel—4,000 in Washington and 

10,000 out in the field. 

We never intended it to mushroom to this size. And, as you 

know, I have been critical particularly of the administrative cost. 

Even with the administrative cost, we might be able to endure that 

kind of expenditure, which has now grown to $8 billion, if it meant 

we were secure. But instead, as this committee report today reviews, we have a number of programs that are so far behind. 

38 

One that I would like to talk about is the TWIC program, Transportation Worker Identification Card. We have spent hundreds of 

millions of dollars, and it is still in limbo. Some of the equipment 

that has been purchased does not do the job. I know we can’t talk 

about all of it here in this open setting. But the deployment and 

acquisition of expensive equipment that is supposed to protect us, 

which wasn’t properly tested, vetted, and the deployment could 

have probably have been done better by a high school class project. 

TSA has had five Administrators in 9 years. We had a period 

under the Obama administration in which we had no Administrator for almost a year. It is difficult enough with an agency like 

TSA or any other Federal agency to operate with an Administrator 

in Washington, let alone not having an Administrator for that period of time. 

I have other concerns, having monitored this as closely as anyone 

in Congress. We are still at risk; the Nation is still at risk. Unfortunately, even the layered system—and TSA will talk to you about 

a layered system. Almost every layer is just flawed. The behavior 

detection, which I worked with previous Administrators to put in— 

when we had equipment that didn’t work, TSA again bought equipment that didn’t work. Just following that equipment, the puffers— 

and I have had my investigative staff follow that—they sat and we 

were paying rent on them on a vacant—I am sorry, in a warehouse 

that then they spent $600, I think, per piece of equipment. They 

told us that DOD had them destroyed, but only after we prompted 

the action. 

Sent investigators down to look at another—jointly, we sent them 

down to look at another warehouse we had gotten information that 

was full of equipment, some of it purchased, some of it should have 

been deployed, some of it sitting there at great taxpayer expense 

for a long time paying rent on it. 

And then the nerve to cause us to delay—and I might even ask 

if we can’t get the information to subpoena it—when we were informing TSA that we were sending our investigative staff there, to 

delay our staff and investigation by a week so trucks could come 

up and haul this stuff away, even some as our investigators were 

appearing on the scene. 

It is just a very expensive and disappointing operation. I have 

had faith in Administrator Pistole. He promised reform. He has 

told the committee he would reform the agency. And I don’t see 

that happening, unfortunately. 

But that is just the highlights, Mr. Chairman. It is just important that we get to the bottom of this. There is a lot of hard-earned 

taxpayer money going for, unfortunately, theater security, not real 

security. And we have to stop paying that price before we pay a 

huge price with another successful attack by terrorists. 

I yield back the balance of my time. 

Chairman ISSA. I thank the gentleman. 

I will now recognize myself for 5 minutes. 

I have the advantage of knowing your bios. You may not know 

mine, but I spent nearly 3 decades in security. And the one thing 

I know about security is, there are two types. There is the type 

that convince people that your target is harder than somebody 

else’s. In other words, I can’t protect all cars, but I can make the 

39 

crook choose to steal the car next to the one protected by Viper. 

That is what I would say you have as a system here today. 

You, in fact, have a series of hardenings. They work sometimes. 

And I am speaking particularly about in the aviation. These programs certainly seem to be good programs. And in every case, as 

the wind blows through the screen, those spots clearly will at times 

stop targets. But targets, particularly terrorist targets, are in fact 

exactly like you would expect: They are mobile, they are responsive. 

If we do not have a layered security system that has a sufficient 

force to at least be like the hull of a ship, Admiral, one in which 

we know there will be a few leaks that you have to pump out but 

for the most part it is watertight—our security system today is 

clearly not watertight. 

The accidental catching of the bad guys belabors two points: one, 

the many people who in fact find themselves, like most of us on the 

dais, going through security and sometimes they have us pull 

something out, sometimes they don’t; sometimes they do a secondary, sometimes they don’t. 

I am going to give you just a couple. We opened up this hearing 

to Facebook. I am just giving you anecdotal ones, but I will supply 

all of them. I will place them in the record, and I will also supply 

all of them to you so you can respond to the individuals in their 

entirety. 

But, for example, Joe Carica. He is a U.S. Marine. He was flying 

in his Dress Blues ‘‘D’’ uniform. He was forced to remove his trousers in full view of passengers because his shirt-stays beneath 

them were scaring a TSA employee. It didn’t matter that he explained what it was, and it didn’t matter that they were something 

that he undoubtedly had seen many times before if he were a veteran. Of course, you and I all know that the turnover at TSA is 

high and the training is seemingly perpetual. 

The next one is from Reagan Shea, who says, ‘‘I am a disabled 

person and have been targeted for groping. My wife travels with 

a portable oxygen concentrator, and her use of the machine means 

she get pawed by hand every time we travel.’’ 

Julia Rachiele: ‘‘The TSA has taken away my freedom to travel 

because I wear a medical device and cannot go through the amount 

of radiation I would be subjected to. As a result, I get an enhanced 

pat-down procedure every time.’’ 

Lastly—and there are plenty more; there are over 350—‘‘I am 

Wendy. I have worn an artificial leg since I was 4. I am now 61. 

I used to travel a lot for my work but gave up traveling after being 

assaulted by TSA constantly, even to the point of having my 

breasts checked instead of my leg prosthesis.’’ 

First question I have for the panel, and particularly for the aviation side: There are 65,000 to 67,000 TSA workers, men and 

women who are trying to do a good job. A quarter of them are employed in administration. 

First question for you is, do you think that is a fair ratio of administration? Or do you think you are, in fact, a bloated, bureaucratic organization that has a lot of people working on a lot of systems that ultimately, after procurement, don’t work? 

Mr. McLaughlin? 

40 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. Sir, I will respond to that. First of all, thank 

you for recognizing the very hardworking men and women of TSA. 

Our folks in the field are working hard every day to keep all of us 

safe as we travel. 

I will have to take for the record the ratio for administrative to 

frontline personnel. I think it might be different from that, but I 

will get back to you. 

Chairman ISSA. Well, I will give you one—I travel, obviously, to 

a number of places—Houston, Sacramento—but San Diego and 

Dulles are my two majors. I can tell you that I periodically count, 

and for 4 active checkpoints in San Diego there will be as many 

as 35 people in blue standing there. 

So even if your administrative count were not one in four, 

wouldn’t you agree, based on your own observations, that the 

amount of people directly at a checkpoint versus the total number 

would seem to be extremely high? In other words, you haven’t created any efficiency in the 10 years of your existence. 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. Well, certainly, I don’t agree with that. TSA 

is working hard to provide the most effective—— 

Chairman ISSA. Well, let’s go through the numbers, though, 

quickly. Because I am really on overtime, and I will make it up to 

the ranking member. 

There are four times as many TSA employees as there was 7 or 

8 years ago, correct? 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. Again, I don’t believe—— 

Chairman ISSA. In 2002, 16,000 in your initial authorization, so 

you had less than that. By 2005, you were still below 35,000. You 

are now over 65,000. In the last, let’s say, 5 years, when you have 

more than doubled in numbers, have the American people seen 

shorter lines? Yes or no? 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. I do believe that the American people have 

seen shorter lines in the last 4 or 5 years. 

Chairman ISSA. Yeah. Well, with that, I would like you to check 

your figures. The fact is, they haven’t seen shorter lines. I fly to 

enough airports to tell you that, in fact, you are not giving shorter 

lines. You are taking longer for each one and using more people. 

With that, I would recognize the ranking member for his questions. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

TSA recently completed the reader pilot test required by the 

SAFE Port Act. And as I mentioned in my opening statement, I believe that to maximize the security TWIC can provide, we must 

move to implement the use of the readers. 

Assistant Secretary Sadler, TSA was responsible for the recent 

reader pilot test. And, Admiral Zukunft, the Coast Guard is responsible for promulgating the final reader rule. Let me ask both of you 

this: Will it be technically feasible for facilities to install readers 

that can quickly and reliably read TWIC cards without impeding 

the flow of workers into ports and to the secure areas of vessels? 

And by what date do you think the installation of the readers can 

realistically be achieved? 

And I think we have been—it seems like we ought to be able to 

get this done, gentlemen, some kind of way. We have been messing 

around with this for a while. 

41 

Oh, come on, some of you, one of you. Admiral? 

Admiral ZUKUNFT. Ranking Member, I would be pleased to answer that. 

As you know, we have embarked upon the rulemaking process. 

Getting to a final rule, before we do that we really need to adjudicate the comments. So that would be very informative to answer 

that very question, with the objective of not impeding commerce. 

There are over 32 recognized commercial-off-the-shelf TWIC 

readers. We expect one of the concerns will be, you know, whether 

you use a mobile system or whether it is a fixed system that would 

be at a container terminal. But we would envision approximately 

a 2-year period of time from the time a final rule was on the street 

to full implementation across industry. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Sadler, do you have a response? 

Mr. SADLER. Yes. I think, sir, during the pilot we did show that 

when the readers were installed properly, the people who worked 

in the facilities were trained properly, and the workers were assimilated to the cards and the use of the cards with those readers, 

that they did work properly. They did not impede the flow of commerce in those particular ports. 

But it does depend on the installation, it does depend on the 

training, and it does depend on whether the facility has picked the 

right reader for its business need. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Okay. 

Admiral Zukunft, the GAO reported that its employees were successful in accessing ports using counterfeit TWICs—authentic 

TWICs acquired through fraudulent means in false business cases. 

Let me ask you this. I want you to clarify that individual ports 

still have the authority, and indeed the responsibility, to deny admission even to those who have valid and authentic TWICs if they 

have no business on the port property. Is that correct? 

Admiral ZUKUNFT. That is correct. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. And, that said, what steps has the Coast Guard 

taken to address the GAO’s findings? And, additionally, do you 

think the use of readers will help close these security gaps? 

Admiral ZUKUNFT. Ranking Member, I do. We have issued policy 

guidance to our field units. To date, they have been out in the field 

screening, doing spot checks. We have done over 200,000 of these 

spot checks. In a 2-day period alone last week, we ran over 450 

spot checks. And out of those 450, we did find 58 members who had 

no rightful business being at those particular facilities. 

We engage extensively with our stakeholders through our security committees and certainly the facility owners. They are interested, first of all, in those who may have criminal intent, which is 

one of the slices of information that TWIC provides. And on a 

steady basis, that pool of 2 million TWIC card holders are being 

screened against the terrorist screening database. So there is 

realtime information but also a benefit to the facility owners as 

well. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Yeah, TWIC is the only part of our maritime security regime that—and that is very significant. The Coast Guard 

is and will remain the most important element of that regime, but 

the strains of budget cuts on the service are obvious. For example, 

in 2010, 10 of the 12 cutters deployed to respond to the earthquake 

42 

in Haiti suffered significant problems, and 2 had to be taken out 

of service and sent in for major repairs. Is that right? 

Admiral ZUKUNFT. I was intimately involved with that response, 

Ranking Member, and that is true. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. And in February of this year, the GAO issued a 

new report finding that, in part due to a lack of funding, the Coast 

Guard does not have any fully operating interagency operating centers, though these were required by the SAFE Port Act to be established by October 2009. 

Similar to the GAO, the DHS inspector general and others have 

noted the Coast Guard’s inability to meet safety and security mission requirements in the Arctic as the ice cover opens to allow more 

shipping operations in those latitudes. Nonetheless, the President’s 

budget proposes extensive cuts both to the Coast Guard’s end 

strength and its capital account. No funding was requested for the 

acquisition of the National Security Cutter 7 or 8. And this budget 

will conclude the acquisition of the Fast Response Cutter at a number substantially below the approved program of record. 

Finally, this is my last question. While I know that the Coast 

Guard strives to meet every mission requirement, can you comment 

on the challenges the service is facing in balancing its competing 

mission needs, particularly in the maritime security arena, in light 

of the significant budget constraints? 

I have always complained about the Coast Guard not having 

enough money. I am just trying to figure out how you are going to 

do all the things you have to do, particularly since 9/11, with regard to the budget cuts. 

Admiral ZUKUNFT. I would be pleased to, Ranking Member 

Cummings. 

I was involved in the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. I was the Federal on-scene coordinator for over 7 months. And the President directed that we triple our response effort. 

The Coast Guard has no force in garrison; we are constantly 

doing frontline operations. And so we had the good fortune, if you 

want to call it that, where we didn’t have another contingency occurring at the same time as Deepwater Horizon, so I was able to 

redeploy buoy tenders from Cordova, Alaska, to Honolulu and marshal all of those resources into the Gulf of Mexico. We were able 

to do the same during the earthquake in Haiti, even though some 

of those ships did have maintenance challenges, and we did the 

same during Hurricane Katrina. 

So the challenge we face in the maritime security domain is, 

what if we have multiple threats? What if we have a hurricane and 

then we have a threat to national security taking place concurrently? And that is where we really run into resource challenges, 

because we have to reallocate resources from one mission to another. And we are at risk because we don’t have the resources to 

do both. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much. 

Chairman ISSA. I thank the gentleman. 

We now recognize the chairman of the full committee, Mr. Mica, 

for 5 minutes. 

Mr. MICA. Well, first of all, my friends at TSA and other witnesses, since my last hearing, which was with the Appropriations 

43 

subcommittee—I am not a member of that subcommittee but was 

allowed to ask questions, as we have extended to others who are 

not on our committee. And—— 

Chairman ISSA. We recommend that system to all committees. 

Mr. MICA. Well, yes. And the funny thing about that is, Mr. 

Chairman—and I won’t allow this to take away from my time, but 

I have to put this caveat in. TSA found out that I would be a witness, so they sent Mr. Pistole an email. The email said, ‘‘Mr. Mica 

is going to be there, so when he asks a question, Mr. Pistole, take 

a long time answering it so you eat up his time.’’ The problem is 

that they—again, sometimes you think it is the gang that can’t 

shoot straight, but they shot the email to CQ. I think that was the 

publication. 

So, again, reserving my time, if you would answer fairly briefly 

and not use the directive of that memo. One of my concerns, of 

course, is the Transportation Worker Identification Card. We have 

spent over a half a billion dollars, is that correct? Yes or no? Mr. 

McLaughlin? Mr. Sadler? 

Mr. SADLER. I will take that one, sir. To date—— 

Mr. MICA. I have $511 million spent. 

Mr. SADLER. To date, on the program itself, we have expended approximately $374 million. 

Mr. MICA. But I have $511 million. 

Mr. SADLER. You may be including grants in that. I would have 

to go back and check that number. 

Mr. MICA. Well, we wouldn’t want to leave any—I mean, I consider that as an expenditure, money spent. All right, well, we will 

say in the neighborhood of a half a billion. 

And the card is supposed to allow us to identify who goes into 

our ports. We passed the law setting that requirement up back 

after 2001, right, Mr. Sadler? Who wants to answer? 

Mr. SADLER. I believe that was required by the MTSA of 2002. 

Mr. MICA. 2002, after 2001. Thank you. 

They have produced—1.9 million of the cards are active, printed 

2.1 million of them. We still do not have all of the components that 

were required under the law, including iris and thumbprint, as far 

as biometric capability, do we, Mr. Sadler? 

Mr. SADLER. We have the capability to include an iris on the chip 

of the card. 

Mr. MICA. But you do not have a standard for iris, right? 

Mr. SADLER. That is correct. NIST has just put out a proposed 

change to the standard to include iris. 

Mr. MICA. Again, I just have to go back because this is not going 

to be Groundhog Day, but I had a hearing April 14th, almost a 

year ago, and the director of the NIST Information Technology Lab 

testified. And I have the questions here. ‘‘When will you finish the 

iris capability?’’ ‘‘Draft publication will be’’—this is last year— 

‘‘hopefully before next week.’’ ‘‘And when will you finish the final 

standard?’’ ‘‘By the end of the year.’’ That was last year. 

Now, I was told at the beginning of the year it might be, what? 

This summer? Is that what you have heard? 

Mr. SADLER. No, sir, I haven’t gotten a time for when the—— 

Mr. MICA. So don’t have a time. They told us this summer. So 

we are now going into our ninth year. 

44 

Now, it is great that we produced these TWIC cards at great 

public expense, a half a billion, but then I read that you are still 

in a pilot reader program. So, basically, we have 1 million of these 

cards and we don’t have readers; is that correct? 

Mr. SADLER. Well, just to go—— 

Mr. MICA. Do the ports have readers? 

Mr. SADLER. —just to go back a second—— 

Mr. MICA. Do the ports have readers? 

Mr. SADLER. —there is a fingerprint template on the chip of the 

card. 

Mr. MICA. Do the ports have readers? 

Mr. SADLER. Certain ports do have readers. And we have 35 

readers that are—— 

Mr. MICA. Do we have—— 

Mr. SADLER. —on our approved products list that the ports can 

use. 

Mr. MICA. How many of the ports would have readers, and how 

many of these cards are able to be read? 

Mr. SADLER. Well, we know—— 

Mr. MICA. As a percentage. 

Mr. SADLER.—we know that the pilot ports have readers. I don’t 

know the number of ports outside of the pilot ports that have readers. I do know the Coast Guard has—— 

Mr. MICA. Staff, can we insert in the record at this time the very 

small number of ports that in fact have readers? And we don’t—— 

Chairman ISSA. Without objection, so ordered. 

Mr. MICA. Thank you. 

Behavior detection, let me go into this. And I am just going to 

take 1 more minute, because I had to—— 

Chairman ISSA. Without objection, so ordered. 

Mr. MICA. Behavior detection program, we have spent a billion 

dollars on it. Can someone—can someone say that that is correct? 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. Sir, I believe that number is slightly below 

that, but we will get back to you for the record. 

Mr. MICA. Okay. All right. 

And I also—I asked—when I knew that the puffers didn’t work, 

that they had bought and told me that they would work, and actually went up and had them tested, went through, every time it 

didn’t detect some trace elements that were put on me, I was told 

it was just a technical problem. And we just destroyed those; is 

that correct? We paid $600 a piece to destroy the puffers; is that 

correct? 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. I believe that is correct. 

Mr. MICA. I don’t even want to know how long they sat in the 

warehouse, and then they had DOD destroy them. But getting 

something else in place because the technology didn’t work, and 

you all have seen the classified reports on the performance of the 

advanced imaging technology equipment, have you not? 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. Yes. 

Mr. MICA. So we know by that performance and the lack of performance of what we have seen with the puffers, that behavior detection is very important and others use it successfully. The problem is GAO reviewed the performance and said that 24 times, 17 

known terrorists went through airports, passed TSA, and they have 

45 

yet to detect one terrorist. And that was actually a question that 

was submitted by one of the Floridians we had open question online that we allowed people. Can you name any terrorists that you 

have actually stopped in the program? 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. We are not aware of any terrorists transiting 

a checkpoint where BDOs were actively working. While we accept 

GAO’s comments that there were 24 instances in SPOT airports, 

we do not know that BDOs were working at the time that those 

individuals came through, number one. And number two, we know, 

in hindsight, they were not operational, so they were not exhibiting 

signs of stress, fear, or deception. 

Mr. MICA. Thank you. 

Mr. LORD. May I comment on that? 

Chairman ISSA. Yes. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. LORD. I am the GAO representative. I think our point in the 

report was to study the travel patterns that people associate with 

terrorists to see if they were exhibiting any SPOT behaviors. At 

this time, I don’t believe it is known whether they were exhibiting 

behaviors or not. And we made that recommendation in the spirit 

of improving the program to develop better performance measures. 

We suggested reviewing the videotapes; we thought that would be 

a rich source of information to help refine the program. 

Mr. MICA. At this point, Mr. Chairman, I will also ask unanimous consent to put in the record, we went up and looked in Boston of where they have a demonstration project, and I think there 

is still one in Detroit, and we saw unbelievable configuration. 

Chairman ISSA. Without objection. 

Mr. MICA. And we want to detail our findings, which we also 

passed on to the administration. 

Chairman ISSA. Without objection that will be placed in the 

record. 

And I now go to Mr. Boswell, a gentleman who I served with on 

the Select Intelligence Committee, who more than anybody here on 

the dais today knows what the special skills are necessary to read 

somebody who may be a terrorist. And the gentleman is recognized. 

Mr. BOSWELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You may have overstated that a little bit but nevertheless. 

Chairman ISSA. No, I remember our times behind closed doors 

very, very well, and you were truly the senior statesman there on 

that issue. 

Mr. BOSWELL. Very, very kind, and I appreciate it. First off, I 

want to start with a positive remark. We stood up what we do, Mr. 

Chairman, is going to be a pretty humongous agency, as we started 

out with the need we had and the situation that caused it. And I 

would like to compliment the courtesy and the efforts that people 

starting new careers, if you will, have demonstrated. 

The one thing that amazes me, and it is not rocket science, and 

I have been waiting and waiting and waiting; I was really pleased 

to see we could realize we could push the air crews through a little 

quicker and not delay things. There are a number of us here, myself included, that held probably as high a clearance as one can get 

for years, but I still am checked as if I were suspect of walking 

through the same airport, time and time and time and time again. 

46 

I know there are some people that have a malady because of 

things happened in the service. And there seems to be no effort to 

recognize that, my gosh, they have had a background check, top secret, top secret crypto, so on and so on. Do you have any intention 

to ever try and take advantage of that and expedite things a little 

bit, or are you going to keep on doing it like you have been doing 

it? 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. Sir, actually, the answer to that question is 

we are actively engaged with a number of different groups to try 

to expand our PreCheck population. Again, PreCheck is the program that is allowing expedited screening for individuals that are 

qualified, either today in pilot phase because they are part of frequent flier program or they have opted in through CBP’s Global 

Entry. 

We extended the program to active duty military traveling out of 

Reagan National airport. That started last week. 

And we are exploring other groups that we can work with. 

Mr. BOSWELL. Well, I understand the active military, and you 

know, people like Mr. Issa and myself and others, you know, took 

off the uniform one day and did work the next, but the history is 

still there. 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. We are actively looking at that. 

Mr. BOSWELL. What is your timeline for active on this? Seems 

like simple, straightforward; the record is either there or it is not. 

The case that I know of, at least I can speak for myself, I know 

the record is there. 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. There are two aspects, really, that we focus 

on. 

One is, to your point, if the record is there, and then two is our 

ability to reconcile that at the checkpoint. So there is a technology 

piece that allows us to verify that someone is who we believe they 

are. 

We started this process in the fall of last year, and already, in 

just March, we are up over 600,000 participants in the program. 

So I think we are working quickly to expand the program, but we 

are doing it also cautiously to make sure that we are maintaining 

security every step along the way. 

Mr. BOSWELL. I appreciate that, but I still just don’t understand 

why you can’t take—it is like discovering the wheel all over or 

passing up the fact that we have spent a lot of money in the past 

on doing background checks on a number of people, and it is just 

like it never happened. 

How many years have been going on now that we have been 

doing this? And it seems like you have had time to proceed a little 

bit further along the way. But, again, I want to leave and stop on 

a positive note. I think that the personnel are courteous, work hard 

and are sincere and are following the rules that the administrators 

gave them to operate by. 

I just think we could do a little bit better. I do appreciate the 

fact we don’t have to leave pilots and air crews standing in line as 

we did for some time. I thought that would probably get solved, but 

we are leaving a lot of other people. It takes up time. It clogs up 

the process when it could be a pretty simple identification. Most of 

us that have spent time in the service have even got a printed ID 

47 

card that says we served 20-plus years, and a lot of information on 

there, seems like it could be used. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I yield back. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. [Presiding.] I see I am up next. So I will yield 

myself 5 minutes. 

First off, I would like to thank you all for taking the opportunity 

to be here. I think I am in the unique position of being the one 

Member of Congress who actually serves on all three committees 

that has jurisdiction over the TSA: Government & Oversight Reform Committee; the Transportation Committee; and Homeland Security. So I actually spend a whole lot of time with this issue, as 

well as quite a bit of time traveling and experiencing the service 

of the TSA. 

I would like to say the vast majority, I would say almost without 

exception, but there are exceptions, the TSA employees that I have 

encountered in my travels have all been courteous and professional 

in nature. 

However, as part of preparing for this, just like Chairman Issa, 

I opened up my social media sites to comments with respect to experiences with the TSA, and I received quite a few negative comments as well. 

And without objection, I would like to get those entered into the 

record as well. So ordered. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. I do want to talk about some of the problems 

that people have reported with the TSA. I understand we are in a 

situation where it is a stressful environment for many people traveling. The TSA is squeezed into spaces in airports not designed for 

the level of screening, but if you look at some of these instances, 

and we had one in the news just last week of the gentleman in the 

wheelchair being patted, it seems like at some point if we could 

just use some common sense and slow down a little bit and offer 

to do some of these screenings in a private area or in a screenedoff area. And maybe it is worth spinning a little effort on creating 

spaces that are a more friendly to that; we might be able to do better there. I just encourage both the TSA and the traveling public 

not to get worked up. I think there are some better ways to do this. 

I did want to talk a little bit about the SPOT program. I am concerned how effective behavioral detection program is with the limited amount interaction there is between the TSA agents and the 

general public. About 6 months ago, I think I commented in one 

of these hearings that I could get through the entire airport without uttering a word other than ‘‘thank you’’ to anybody: Check in 

at a kiosk; hand my stuff to the TSA; hand my stuff to the gate 

agent. Now at least the TSA is at least asking me for my full name. 

It seems like SPOT would be better off if there was a little bit 

more engagement. 

Mr. McLaughlin and Mr. Sadler, would you like to comment on 

that. 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. Thank you. First, if I could, just for everyone’s 

awareness, every passenger that travels through checkpoint is entitled to private screening upon request. We want to make sure that 

we honor that commitment. 

48 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. It might be something you consider offering, 

especially to the elderly and disabled and children. 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. Sure. And with regard to the video from last 

week, that was actually a video that was over 2 years old. And 

with the policy changes that we put in place last fall, again, we 

have seen a traumatic decline in the number of times where we 

have had to pat down children and now the elderly with our new 

program. 

With regard to SPOT and your question, sir, I agree with you 

that our SPOT program in its current form is largely an observation program where our officers are trained to observe signs of fear, 

of deception, and of stress that are different than the general traveling public—— 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. And Mr. Lord, there is no way to really test 

that, because you can’t imitate those behaviors. Is that correct? 

Mr. LORD. While the behaviors can be imitated, as in any deterrence program, it’s effectiveness is difficult to evaluate. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. I apologize, I am going quickly because of time. 

What is the roll out schedule nationwide for TSA? I dusted off my 

Global Entry card because I am looking real forward to being able 

to use that. 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. We have, the administrator and the Secretary 

announced I think in February that we intend to roll out to the 35 

busiest airports by the end of this calendar year. And so far, we 

are on target for that. As of last week, we are at 11 airports, and 

we continue to roll out a couple airports a week and will begin adding additional airlines as well. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. Mr. Lord, I know you spend a fair amount of 

time studying what the TSA does, and I have also had access to 

some of these classified reports to a level that I am a little bit concerned. But I wanted to ask you, do you see some things that we 

are not doing that we should be doing to increase security? I know 

that really isn’t something specifically you study, but you all spend 

a lot of time looking at what they are doing and how. 

Mr. LORD. I can’t think of anything off the top of my head. We 

completed a large body of work on various layers of TSA’s security 

programs. All of our reports include recommendations to improve 

things, so we think we are having a positive impact on the programs, and TSA has been very receptive to most of our recommendations. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. I see I am out of time. Hopefully, we will get 

to a second round of questions. I will now recognize Mr. Connolly, 

the gentleman from Virginia, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you all for 

being here today. 

I think we need to start, as our colleague Mr. Boswell did, positively recognizing the extraordinary difficulty of the mission here. 

In a free society, how do we graft on to that protective and necessarily often intrusive measures to protect the public, after tragedy of 9/11 especially? In a democracy, frankly, it seems to me we 

ought to be arguing about this all the time, because I don’t think 

we should ever get complacent about either side of this, my right 

to privacy and my right to be protected, and the role of government 

in fulfilling that mission. 

49 

So I think it is a natural tension and not necessarily always a 

reflection on the men and women who are trying to fulfill this mission. 

And my observation thoroughly is that the men and women who 

have been recruited to fulfill this mission are actually doing on balance, a very good job. And many of them are very professional in 

their approach to the public. But as the chairman indicated and 

Mr. Issa indicated, our committee chair, there are, however, occasions where that is not the case. 

And one thing I just commend you, Mr. McLaughlin, and you, 

Mr. Sadler, a simple training in ‘‘please’’ and ‘‘thank you’’ would 

really go a long way with the public. I wish I could say everybody 

remembers that, but we are not cattle, and we are citizens, and we 

are not to be presumed guilty of anything. And barking orders like 

people are cattle is not appropriate. And I would urge you strongly 

to make sure—I know it seems simple, but it gets on the traveling 

public’s nerves, and it undoes a lot of the wonderful work otherwise 

being done by the employees of TSA. 

So, once in a while, there are people who just, I don’t know, they 

don’t feel they need to do that or they are giving orders. And what 

we are really trying do here in a free society is to get compliance. 

And most of the public I think actually understands that and is 

willing to tolerate the fair amount of intrusiveness, more than I 

would have guessed actually, but they do expect to be treated with 

respect. 

So I think so long as we can do that in the training of our men 

and women, I think we would also go a long way to enhancing the 

compliance, understanding we are all in this together. 

Mr. Lord, last year, TSA ranked 232 out of 241 Federal agencies 

and entities in the Partnership of Public Services Best Places to 

Work. In other words, it was in the bottom 5 percent of Federal 

agencies as, yeah, I would love to work there. And it ranked second 

to last for pay, family-friendly management policies and performance-based incentives. Would you comment? 

Mr. LORD. I am aware of that survey. First, I would like to comment that GAO consistently ranked near the top. I believe, last 

year, we were second. 

I saw the scores for DHS and TSA. I think some of that reflects, 

they have a very large screening workforce that does a somewhat 

stressful job. They are interacting with the public on a day-to-day 

basis, and sometimes that is stressful. It wasn’t clear to me, 

though, what the department was doing about it on an organizational wide basis. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. We are going to give them an opportunity to comment on that. But are you familiar with the turnover rate last 

year? 

Mr. LORD. Not specifically. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Would it surprise you for me to tell you that it 

was 13 percent? 

Mr. LORD. If that is accurate, that would not surprise me, no. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. And it has been 10 percent for at least the last 

5 years and that that is significantly higher than the average of 

Federal agencies? 

50 

Mr. LORD. Any time any organization experiences that type of 

turnover, obviously, you are dealing with some—it imposes certainly challenges—— 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Given the sensitive nature of the mission, the security mission, should it concern us, in your opinion, that we have 

low morale and high turn over, and that that actually could—in 

theory, could affect the performance of the mission? 

Mr. LORD. I am not sure what the root causes are. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Well, putting aside causes, just those facts, 

would that not suggest it could compromise the mission, that we 

are less than enthusiastic about carrying out the mission or less 

than caring about it because I don’t even like being here. I don’t 

like my boss or I don’t like the policies of the agency. What I am 

worried about is, in addition to the men and women who are suffering that low morale, what is the impact on the traveling public 

in terms of their carrying out their mission? 

Mr. LORD. That would concern me as a TSA executive. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Chairman, I won’t ask any more, but if you 

would wouldn’t mind allowing Mr. McLaughlin and Mr. Sadler to 

respond. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. Without objection. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I thank the chair. 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. Thank you. 

First of all, to your comment about training, I am pleased to let 

you know that earlier this year, we began a training initiative that 

we are referring to as PACOM. And that initiative is a training 

that all TSA frontline employees and their managers in the field 

will go through, which focuses specifically on active listening skills, 

on empathy, as well as on a communication technique that hopefully will improve that experience; the caveat being that airports 

are very busy and loud places, and sometimes it is hard to balance 

the need to communicate in a way that is heard without being 

overheard, so to speak. 

My numbers with regard to attrition—— 

Mr. CONNOLLY. If I could interrupt you. There is a difference between, ‘‘please put your hands up,’’ you know, in the machine 

versus ‘‘put your hands up.’’ 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. Agreed and that is what this training addresses specifically. 

Again, we are on target to get that training complete for managers and supervisors by June of this and for the entire frontline 

staff by December of this year. 

The numbers that I have for attrition are 6.1 percent for full timers and then 18 percent for part-timers. So while we are concerned 

about the part time number, the overall number that I think you 

have might be skewed somewhat by that data. 

With regard to what we are doing to improve our standing in the 

best places to work, and I can tell you from personal experience, 

first of all, being an employer in both the private sector and now 

in Federal service, having worked with thousands and thousands 

of employees, I will tell you that I am very proud of the dedication 

of my workforce and their commitment to the mission. 

I think, overall, their focus on the mission is not consistent with 

the rating that we received in the best places to work. That being 

51 

said, we have a number of initiatives as we move forward to improve the overall morale. We have national advisory councils. We 

have trainings, like the ones that I described, where feedback from 

officers are—literally one officer described it as life-changing event 

for her in terms of her understanding of her role and how she could 

interact better with customers, which has an impact on morale. 

And then I would also say some of it just comes with the newness with our agencies, an agency that is less than 10 years old or 

just now 10 years old is going to have a different growth curve 

than a Federal agency that has been around for 50, 100 or even 

200 years. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. Thank you very much. We will now proceed to 

another expert in the field, the gentleman from Minnesota, former 

airline pilot himself, recognize Mr. Cravaack for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. Expert? I don’t now about that. End user, yes, 

definitely. 

I just have a couple of questions. And I thank everybody for coming here today because I think everybody wants the same issue, 

wants safety in the air, and make sure our people that are working 

with us are happy and do their job efficiently and effectively. 

And thank you for the Coast Guard and all the things your men 

and women do for you, Admiral. 

I would just like to talk about a couple of things. Joe passenger 

walking through my first level of security; I am going to go through 

SPOT. I see SPOT developing probably into something more of 

what we see in Amsterdam, Israel, going through more proactive 

challenge-reply, taking a look at behaviors. So I see that developing. Right now, it is not a totally effective tool, but let’s just deal 

with the now if we may. 

So we hit SPOT as we head on to the screening area. Go to the 

screening area, and Mr. Lord, you said 30 percent are used by AIT 

machines; is that correct, 30 percent of the passengers going 

through? 

Mr. LORD. It is—yeah, according to Mr. McLaughlin, that is correct. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. We found that some AITs were used less than 30 

percent of the time, as highlighted in my prepared statement. So 

30 percent of the passengers are going through the newer, more 

improved AIT machines. Would you consider, as much as you can 

within this arena, are the AITs 100 percent absolute? Are they foolproof? 

Mr. LORD. I can’t discuss any of the details, but in general, any 

technology has limitations. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. We all have limitations, any technology is going 

to have some type of limitations. Now, of course, through the metal 

detectors, those are a little bit less advantageous. So only 30 percent of those people have gone through the first phase of SPOT, 

now going through 30 percent will even say they go through an AIT 

machine, where the other 70 percent have gone through metal detectors, which are basically less—I don’t want to say less safe, but 

not as good as the AIT machines. 

Okay, then we get to the gate, and we have the gate agent making sure you get on the right aircraft. We have gone through some 

52 

security, but there is a possibility that something could have 

slipped through. 

Let’s talk about the aircraft itself. The aircraft is sitting on the 

tarmac, and around the aircraft, we have nearly a million airport 

workers working around that aircraft are credentialed. These 

credentialed airport works have direct access to nonpublic areas 

and sanitized areas SIDAs, so here they are working in the shadow 

of the air plane, close to a million workers. Could you tell me how 

these workers, these million workers, are credentialed? 

Mr. LORD. There is a—they all are required to wear secure identification display badges, and they are essentially vetted against 

terrorist watchlists, immigration databases and criminal records. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. We have all seen most recently with all of the— 

we have seen drugs being smuggled on board aircraft; we have 

seen numerous theft rings that have been working in and around 

the aircraft. And it would be safe to say that there are also holes 

within this program as well. Would you be correct in that? 

Mr. LORD. There are various vulnerabilities in the layers based 

on the work we completed to date. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. So we have a potential going to the aircraft, some 

passengers being screened, even having a very good possibility of 

getting through SPOT and also screening techniques. And we have 

just as equal opportunity for the potential of items being given— 

put on board the aircraft on the shadow of the aircraft through 

credentialed workers. So my question to you, and I am going to 

give you a very good one, Mr. McLaughlin, if you don’t mind, sir, 

and I say this with all due respect, so with the potential of having 

a person that has malintent coming on board the aircraft, linking 

up with a device that is on board the aircraft through a 

credentialed person in the shadow of that aircraft, that aircraft 

gets underway and is in the air, what are the line of defenses capable in the air at that time? Who is the last line of defense, Mr. 

McLaughlin? And don’t say the cockpit door, the armed cockpit 

door. 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. That wasn’t even my answer. 

With the multiple layers in place, there are on a number of 

flights, we do have Federal Air Marshals. But the layer of security 

that is in place, that is an important layer today, and we talk 

about it from time to time and we know it when we fly, is the actual passenger. That individual that learned as many lessons on 9/ 

11 as the rest us have learned. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. True, no truer words are spoken. If I may have 

indulgence, Mr. Chair, but if a professional terrorist has done this 

routine a hundred times, they know when that cockpit door is 

going to be open. They know when it is going to be closed. They 

know a lot of things about the aircraft that your average traveling 

public does not know. So my question to you, sir, is there are really 

not that many FAMs available per flight, and that is a classified 

number, but why in God’s green Earth would we cut in half a volunteer program that protects the aircraft for $15 a flight? Why 

would we do that? 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. Sir, I can’t really discuss that topic because it 

is really outside my area of responsibility at TSA. I can reinforce 

some of the other layers that are on the ground, including the work 

53 

that we do in and around the airport, and we can take that question for the record in terms of—— 

Mr. CRAVAACK. I would appreciate that. This program, the Fed- eral Flight Deck Officer program, is being cut in half, a $15-perflight program that was the last line of defense for many potential 

terrorists wishing to take that aircraft and use it as a weapon of 

mass destruction. So with that, sir, I would appreciate your information on that. 

And with that, sir, I thank the chair’s indulgence, and I yield 

back. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. Thank you very much. 

We will now recognize the gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. 

Cohen. 

Mr. COHEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First, I would like to incorporate by reference all the nice things 

said about TSA personnel in my home community in Memphis, particularly, for they be voters, but also in Washington, where they 

are not, have all been courteous and nice folk. They have got a 

tough job, having to do kind of a monotonous gig, and they are not 

the most popular people to see when you have to go through that. 

It is not like Customs and checkpoint Charlie, but still, it is something you don’t look forward to and relish. 

The other is about the TWIC cards, and I reiterate the concerns 

we have got in Memphis with the TWIC cards and they are important, but there seems like there could be a better way to allow the 

people that receive them to pick them up, rather than have to do 

it personally; they could be done through the mail like driver’s licenses and other licenses are. An improvement in that system 

would be helpful in my community. Who is the expert here on the 

process we go through at the airport? 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. The airport would be myself. 

Mr. COHEN. Let me ask you this, today, for the first time, I was 

asked to take off my watch. Why? 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. While I clearly wasn’t there with you, it is 

possible that our divest officer, the individual who is working to facilitate the travel of customers, might have felt that it would alarm 

and that you might have had an easier experience by removing it, 

but you are not required to remove your watch. 

Mr. COHEN. Well, they made it like everybody was; she was announcing, take off your watch. And just like with the very flawed 

systems that they have for onboard diagnostics and the check engine light and folks being able to get their car inspected, if the light 

is on, even if the car doesn’t emit any type of carbon vapors over 

and above what is expected, they won’t pass you. And they say, 

well, it will save you problems in the future. That is not EPA’s job; 

nor is it your job to make it less likely. 

I don’t get it. It made no sense to me at all. And she said, you 

have got to take it off. I mean, it is just like, the rules need to be 

consistent. For a while, we didn’t do shoes, and then the guy had 

the shoe, and then some places had shoes and some didn’t. Now, 

today, I notice shoes must not be in a bin, but they must be laid 

flat on the conveyer belt. Is that a uniform rule? 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. That is not a rule in place today. At one point, 

we actually changed our procedure with shoes and have subseVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:36 Sep 12, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00059 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\75743.TXT APRIL
54 

quently some time ago changed that back to allow them to be 

placed in a bin or on the belt. However—— 

Mr. COHEN. In Memphis, they have got a sign that says they 

must be placed flat on the conveyer belt, which is not a big deal, 

but sometimes your shoes can get crushed between two bags. And 

if you care about your shoes, that is not wonderful. 

The watch thing just seems it is the inconsistency of everything 

gets you. I am comfortable in my manhood, and so the guy was 

fine, didn’t have a problem. But I got out, and he wanted to pat 

me down, and he patted down my chest. The same soap I use every 

day. Never been patted down before on my chest. The machine 

must have messed up is all I can figure. 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. Again, I can’t speak to your specific situation, 

but I can look into it for you. 

Mr. COHEN. I am not terribly concerned. It just seems like there 

should be some consistency. And the machines sometimes may be 

set at different levels or something, because sometimes you go 

through and they want to look at your arm or look at this or that. 

And I mean, I am not the Bionic Man in any—well, whatever. I 

don’t have any parts that are new or metallic, so it makes no sense. 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. So our goal is to be uniform and consistent, 

and at the same time, we also want to be random and unpredictable at times because we find that is helpful in terms of our work 

in security, but we are looking for a uniform and consistent experience for travelers as they come through, and as I said, I am happy 

to follow up on that. 

Mr. COHEN. I agree with Mr. Boswell that there probably should 

be some type of system where you have your most likely people 

that you know that are frequent fliers and are safe and going to 

do any—one day, there was this lady there who has got the richest 

husband in town almost. And she has got a place in Aspen, and she 

has got a place in France. And they were going through all of her— 

if anybody wants to stay alive, it is her. I mean, she has got it all. 

And they were going through all of her stuff. When they saw all 

of that, they should have realized, this woman wants to live. Sometimes it is a little common sense. 

How much did the puffers cost us? The whole puffer process? 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. So the puffers predate my time at TSA, I can 

take that question for the record and get back to you. We talked 

earlier about the disposal fee for the puffers. 

Mr. COHEN. And they are history, I know that, but that was a 

loser from jump street, too. I mean, here in Washington, one line 

had a puffer, and one line didn’t. So if you are a terrorist, you 

would go through the line that didn’t have the puffer, thinking the 

puffer worked. The fact that the puffer doesn’t work, the terrorist 

could have chosen either line. But they said, well, extra security 

was given on the other line if there was some problem; they looked 

at you even closer. Well, if they looked at you closer in the other 

line, why didn’t they look at you closer in the puffer line? I mean, 

the puffer thing was really bad. 

But otherwise, all the TSA people are great. You have a tough 

job. I know you will make it better. 

I yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. Thank you, Mr. Cohen. 

55 

And the staff informs me that the puffers were around $30 million. If that is incorrect, please let us know. 

I think the same situation exists today. I fly home sometimes on 

American, sometimes on United. If you go on United at DCA, you 

go through a full body scanner. If you on American, you go through 

a metal detector. It doesn’t take a rocket scientists to figure out 

there is a potential issue there. 

We now recognize the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. 

Coble. 

Mr. COBLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I arrived a bit delayed. For that, I apologize; I had a conflicted 

schedule. And maybe these questions may have already been pursued. 

Mr. Sadler, what has been the total cost of the TWIC program 

to the Federal Government and the private sector? 

Mr. SADLER. To date, the program costs are approximately $374 million. That would include $100 million in appropriations and 

about $274 million in user fees for individuals who have paid for 

the TWIC card. 

Mr. COBLE. The Federal Government and the private sector, 

both? 

Mr. SADLER. Yes, sir. That is the appropriated money to start the program, the $100 million, and then the $274 million was the user 

fees when you enroll and get a TWIC card issued to you. 

Mr. COBLE. Thank you, sir. 

Admiral, what is the amount of money that you allocate for 

TWIC administration each year? 

Admiral ZUKUNFT. Ours is very minimal. We have expended about $2 million looking at mostly commercial off-the-shelf technology. 

Mr. COBLE. That is $2 million annually? 

Admiral ZUKUNFT. To date. That does not include the day-to-day 

expenses of our personnel. I do a number of missions, one of those 

is validating TWICs at these facilities, but that is part of our mission set already. 

Mr. COBLE. And how many Coast Guard personnel are dedicated 

to oversight of the TWIC program? 

Admiral ZUKUNFT. They are not dedicated solely to TWIC, but 

they do facility inspections. And TWIC is just one element of that. 

So they are looking at everything from what infrastructure is in 

place and so those exist at all of our sectors, all of our ports 

throughout the United States. 

And one example of that is we recently shut down a facility in 

Miami because it didn’t have the appropriate safeguards, unrelated 

to TWIC, but there were literally holes in the fence line that would 

allow people with no business to enter into those facilities. 

Mr. COBLE. How long has TWIC been online? 

Admiral ZUKUNFT. TWIC was implemented in 2009, on April 

15th, and that is when 2,700 facilities were required to have TWIC. 

And on that milestone date, all facilities were in compliance. The 

TWIC reader is going to be critical as we go forward, because that 

will be the next enabling mechanism because that biometric chip 

is really what provides the next level of security, beyond the visual 

recognition that is on the existing TWICs. 

56 

Mr. COBLE. Thank you, Admiral. 

Thank you, gentlemen. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. Thank you very much. 

Seeing no one else on the other side, I will go to Mrs. Blackburn 

from Tennessee for 5 minutes. 

Mrs. BLACKBURN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank the 

committee for allowing me to participate today. 

This is an issue, TSA and their participation and their conduct 

is something is that is important to my constituents. And Mr. Lord 

and Mr. McLaughlin have both mentioned constituent satisfaction, 

customer satisfaction, as a goal. 

I would just commend to you looking at The Economist magazine’s online poll, which they have up right now. And the question 

they are asking is whether or not changes made to airport security 

since 9/11 have done more harm than good. And at last check, as 

I checked, it was 87 percent of the readers agree that changes that 

airport security have done more harm than good. 

So, gentlemen, I would contend that we are not doing our best 

at customer service, and I think, Mr. Connolly, my colleague from 

the other side of the aisle, spoke well to that. 

I want to talk with you a little about the VIPR teams, because 

on October 20th, 2011, my home State of Tennessee became the 

first State in the country to deploy VIPR teams simultaneously at 

five weigh stations and two bus stations. The teams included your 

TSOs, BDOs, explosive detection, canine teams. 

My office was informed by TSA that the point of operation was 

for TSA agents to recruit truck drivers into the First Observer 

Highway Security Program. The TSOs and the BDOs involved in 

the operation were only supposed to be handing out recruitment 

brochures since neither position has actual Federal law enforcement training. However, I have got a couple posters here; you can 

see back here. If you look at these posters, and I will call that one 

Exhibit A, and if you were watching the video of this transaction, 

you would see that this individual, who is designated as a TSA employee, is walking around and inspecting the truck. So if they were 

supposed to be handing out brochures, what were they doing inspecting the truck? And what type training do the TSOs and the 

BDOs receive to detect abnormalities or potential threats in semi 

trucks, Mr. McLaughlin? 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. Thank you. 

First, the exercise—or I should say, the VIPR that you reference 

in your State of Tennessee was, it is important to note, a joint 

training exercise with 23 different agencies, both Federal, State 

and local, where TSA was invited to participate. And by all accounts, the 2- or 3-day exercise went off very well. It was an important opportunity for us to build relationships to ensure that in the 

event of a real national security emergency, we have the types of 

relationships—— 

Mrs. BLACKBURN. Sir, you are using my time. But I would just 

ask what type training do they have to actually do these inspections and to detect the abnormalities that would be there on our 

Nation’s highways? Because they have no Federal law enforcement 

training, correct? 

57 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. During this exercise, the officers did not conduct any screening of any vehicles, nor—— 

Mrs. BLACKBURN. Okay, let me put up poster number two. Then 

why did they ask to open the top of this—open this truck and look? 

Was there a specific threat to Tennessee highways on October 20th, 

2011? And was there any intelligence suggesting that a suspected 

terrorist may be driving a semi truck across Tennessee? And were 

there specific threats that were deterred by conducting this operation? 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. Well, I can’t talk about threats that might 

have been deterred. I can tell you, again, that this was a training 

exercise, not an exercise based on active intelligence in the State. 

Mrs. BLACKBURN. Okay. 

Mr. Sadler, do you have anything to add to that? 

Mr. SADLER. No, ma’am. 

Mrs. BLACKBURN. You don’t. Well, there, again, I want to go back 

to this question, what kind of specific training do they have to be 

on the Nation’s highways conducting these kinds of searches? 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. TSOs and BDOs do not receive specific training with regard to screening vehicles in the highway mode of transportation. The canine team that I believe that I see up there, although it is from a distance appears, to be a multi modal dog that 

is trained in that mode of transportation. 

Mrs. BLACKBURN. So, even though our TSOs have no Federal law 

enforcement training, you are pleased that they you are participating in these type exercises? 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. Again, the VIPR program is set up to provide 

a visual deterrent and to work in conjunction with our State and 

local partners and all modes of transportation. And part of that, 

again, is to build relationships in terms of an exercise—— 

Mrs. BLACKBURN. So these TSOs, who have been administratively reclassified from being screeners and processors and given no 

Federal law enforcement training, are going to be out on our Nation’s highways and our seaports and participating in this type of 

activity? 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. I am not sure I understood that as a question. 

Mrs. BLACKBURN. Okay. Well, let me ask you this, based on the 

performance that you have seen with the VIPR teams and their 

ability to prevent specific terrorist threats, what kind of grade 

would you give them? 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. I think that our VIPR teams do a very good 

job in a mode of transportation where we have very limited resources. I think our VIPR teams working in conjunction with State 

and local agencies do a very good job of providing a visible deterrent to people that might be attempting to do something bad. 

Mrs. BLACKBURN. A to F, what kind of grade would you give 

them? 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. I don’t know that I have the experience to say 

specifically. Based on the experience I do have, I would give them 

a grade B plus to A minus, and that largely just based on the 

length of time that the program has been in place. It is a program 

that is only 5 years old in totality. 

Mrs. BLACKBURN. I would just remind you that your agency has 

agreed that performance measures need to be developed for the 

58 

VIPR teams, so that there can be some measured results and some 

quantifiable data, and we will follow that as we move forward. 

One last question that I would have for you, have the VIPR 

teams ever pulled over cars, SUVs or vans? 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. I am not aware of a TSA asset on a VIPR 

team pulling over a car or van, but I can take that question for the 

record. 

Mrs. BLACKBURN. I would love to have that answer, because, to 

my knowledge, there is no terrorist that has ever driven a semi 

truck. So we find is very curious, the method that was being employed with the VIPR teams and their presence. And you can go 

look at the Zazi example or Shahzad example, and those were car 

cars and SUVs. They were not semi trucks. 

I yield back. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. Thank you very much. We will now start our 

second round of questioning, and I will give it a go for 5 minutes, 

and then we will go to Mr. Cummings. 

As we talk about the SPOT program for a minute, if a BDO 

SPOT agent were able to see something that they considered to be 

suspicious behavior, what is the follow up there? What can they 

do? Do they engage the person in conversation? What is the procedure when a SPOT agent detects something? Is there something 

they can do? And if so, can you tell me what that is? 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. So, in our SPOT program, our officers are 

trained to observe behavior and engage in casual conversations 

with individuals. If the circumstances warrant, they can engage 

local law enforcement for further follow up. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. And so if they detected something suspicious, 

can they stop them from boarding the plane? 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. If you are asking can they physically detain 

an individual, SPOT officers are not trained nor do we want them 

to physically detain an individual. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. I set a SPOT officer off for some reason, and 

I can just walk on and get on my plane; they can’t stop me. 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. I apologize. I misunderstood your question. I 

thought you speaking physically. 

A SPOT officer, if they have reason to believe that you are suspicious, can engage a local law enforcement officer, who will interview you and either send you on your way or ask you additional 

questions. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. Has a SPOT officer ever stopped somebody 

from boarding a plane? 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. Not to my knowledge. Again, there are times 

when a SPOT officer will engage in conversation, but I cannot—I 

don’t know of a time when an officer has stopped someone from 

getting an airplane. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. How much are we paying these guys to chat 

up passengers? 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. So our SPOT officers are paid in the same 

range as our Federal officers, beginning at the F band and topping 

G band, somewhere between $37,000 and $50,000. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. Last year, in TSA oversight, part one, hearing 

by the OGR committee, Chairman Mica asked some panels about 

the effectiveness of the full body scanners and whether or not they 

59 

could detect body cavity inserts or surgically implanted explosive 

devices. And the unanimous answer to that question was no. 

On July 6th of 2011, the TSA released a notice to airlines warning them of the increased threat caused by explosive implant methods. And earlier this month, someone posted a video on the Internet demonstrating how to defeat these machines. Why are we continuing to spend hundreds of millions of dollars on technology with 

such obvious vulnerabilities? And what have you done with respect 

to the hearing last month and the revelation that they can’t detect 

some these things? 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. First of all, I would point out that recently, 

our administrator testified with regard to AIT effectiveness. And 

there is a follow-up hearing, as I understand it, in the month of 

April in a classified setting where he will be able to get into more 

details. So I will tell you that we, obviously, on a daily basis review 

vulnerabilities in our system and ensure that we have mitigations 

in place, including AIT, which is our best deterrent or our best detection against metallic and nonmetallic threats—— 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. And is it your plan to replace all the 

magnetometers with AITs? 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. That is not our current plan. Based on sort of 

our evolution with the risk-based security, we are looking at the 

best way to deploy the best assets we have in configurations that 

makes sense across the system. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. And as they are purchased, are they getting 

deployed in a timely manner. I know there are some warehouses 

that a lot of this equipment sits in as it gets deployed, and the last 

I had heard, we weren’t using modern deployment techniques, like 

drop-shipping them to airports. 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. To my knowledge there are no AITs in the 

warehouse that you refer to. The AITs are being deployed readily, 

and our utilization numbers are improving dramatically on a daily 

basis. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. And where are we with getting a peer-reviewed safety evaluation of these machines, specifically four TSA 

agents that are nearby and operating them and frequent screenees, 

be they frequent fliers or—I realize now the airline staffs are typically are diverted through magnetometers, but I saw a pregnant female TSA officer right by one of those machines and was concerned, because I understand there are no peer-reviewed safety 

checks there. 

Mr. MCLAUGHLIN. So with regard to the backscatter technology, 

which is the one that uses radiation, there have been three, as I 

understand it, independent studies, including one from NIST, one 

from the Food and Drug Administration, and one from the U.S. 

Army. 

In addition to that, the machines are subjected to regular dosimeter testing to ensure that they fall within safe limits. And with 

every test that has been conducted, the units are well below established limits. All of the tests that I just referred to, both NIST and 

the Food and Drug, as well as the Army, and as well as the surveys 

with dosimeter surveys, are available on TSA’s public Web site at 

tsa.gov. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. Mr. Lord, are you comfortable with those? 

60 

Mr. LORD. The IG recently reported on that and repeated much 

of the same information Mr. McLaughlin just provided. I am comfortable with what I heard, but if you are interested in having us 

conduct follow up, I can certainly talk to your staff after—— 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. Thank you very much. We will be in touch. 

Now recognize the ranking member, Mr. Cummings, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Assistant Secretary Sadler, the GAO reported that its audit 

found that TSA had inadequate screening systems in place to identify applicants ineligible for TWICs and to deny the issuance of 

TWICs to them. What steps has TSA taken to address these findings? 

Mr. SADLER. Well, the first thing we did was we created an executive level oversight board coordination with DHS to map out our 

short-term, medium-term and long-term strategy to address these 

recommendations. Immediately after receiving the report and the 

recommendations, we retrained the trusted agents; those are the 

individuals who collect the information at the enrollment sites, 

their ability to identify fraudulent documentation. 

We also made system modifications that allow to us collect more 

information on the documents that are collected, pass that to our 

adjudicators so they could be reviewed more thoroughly. The midterm and longer-term plan, we are making arrangements with the 

U.S. IDENT system, U.S. VISIT, so we can send our fingerprints 

into that repository and check our fingerprints that we have 

against the fingerprints in their repository to see if anybody is applying under multiple names or identities. 

The other long-term project that we are working on is to wrap 

that capability with the FBI, and what that means is, currently, we 

are required to submit fingerprints, a new set of fingerprints each 

time we want a criminal history records check. What we are working towards is seeing if we can submit the fingerprints we have on 

file to the FBI to get a criminal history records check without hauling someone in to submit a new set of prints, and also that capability will tell us if the individual has committed some type of 

criminal offense in between the applications that they make every 

5 years. 

So there are a number of things we are doing. We took the recommendations very seriously, and we are doing the best we can 

with the program. We want to make it the best that it can be. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Now, during a hearing on TWIC held by the Senate Commerce Committee in May of 2011, Mr. Lord indicated in response to a question from Senator Boozman that a normal driver’s 

license is at least as secure, probably in many cases more secure, 

than a TWIC. Is a TWIC more or less secure than a normal driver’s 

license? 

Mr. SADLER. I would have to defer to Mr. Lord on how he came 

to that conclusion. But for the TWIC, we think that TWIC is a secure credential, because you have to remember prior to TWIC, you 

could go to a port and gain access to a port with multiple credentials, possibly a credit card, a union card, any number of credentials. 

61 

So the first thing I would say about the TWIC is, it is the first 

time a common credential has been issued in a maritime environment, which means we can train to that credential. The second 

thing I would say is we developed many security features to put 

on that card, and we did that in coordination with other agencies, 

including the forensics document lab at ICE. So we did the best we 

could do make that card secure. 

And then you also need to keep in mind it has a biometric on 

it, and although the readers aren’t in place at the Coast Guard 

does have portable handheld readers that they can use to do random checks and security checks, as well as do checks as far as for 

port security inspections and vessel security inspections each year. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Admiral Zukunft, Section 809 of the Coast Guard 

Authorization Act of 2010 exempts mariners who do not need access to a secure area of a vessel from the requirement that they 

obtain a TWIC. Coast Guard Policy Letter 1115 implements Section 809 but still requires those seeking their first mariner credential to visit a TWIC enrollment center, essentially, to complete the 

TWIC enrollment process and pay the enrollment fee. 

Admiral, I understand that the TWIC exemption has been estimated by the Coast Guard to apply to potentially 60,000 of the 

210,000 licensed mariners in the United States. Is that correct? 

Admiral ZUKUNFT. That is correct. And to date, we have only had 

approximately only 68 take advantage of the 809 provision. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. And why do you think that is? 

Admiral ZUKUNFT. For some, they see that TWIC as an employment opportunity. So if an employer would ask, why do you not 

have a TWIC, in this competitive environment, they see that as advantageous to have that credential and an up-to-date background 

check. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. I see my time has expired. I yield back. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. Thank you very much. There are quite a few 

other questions, and some of the other members that had to leave 

did want to ask some additional questions, so with that in mind, 

we will be submitting additional questions in writing to complete 

the record as we finish this up. 

Also, without objection, I would like to leave 7 days open for 

members to submit both those questions and opening statements. 

I would like to thank each and every member of the panel for 

being with us, commend you for your service to this country, and 

urge you to continue to look for ways to improve what you and your 

agencies are able to do to better serve and better spend—more efficiently spend and use the taxpayers money to provide a safe transportation environment for all of us. Thank you for being here. 

We are done. 

[Whereupon, at 3:30 p.m., the committees were adjourned.] 

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