About the Report

This report provides an analysis of the informal security actors 

in the Nigerian states of Plateau, Kaduna, and Kano and in 

the capital city of Abuja. Although it is not a state, Abuja was 

included because many informal security stakeholders are based 

there. The key issues considered are the types of informal 

security actors, the structures of these actors, their recruitment 

and training mechanisms, their accountability issues, their 

relationships with formal security actors, and perceptions of 

them. Interviews were conducted with sixty informal security 

actors and stakeholders in January and February 2015. 

The report contributes to a more nuanced understanding 

of the informal security structures in Nigeria.

About the Author

Ernest Ogbozor is a doctoral researcher at the School for 

Conflict Analysis and Resolution at George Mason University in 

Arlington, Virginia. The author thanks Dr. Linda Bishai, director 

of North Africa Programs, and Georgia Holmer, director of 

Countering Violent Extremism, at the United States Institute 

of Peace (USIP) for their guidance and support during the 

research and writing of this report.

2301 Constitution Ave., NW • Washington, DC 20037 • 202.457.1700 • fax 202.429.6063

Special Report 391 September 2016

© 2016 by the United States Institute of Peace. 

All rights reserved.

Contents

Introduction 2

Background on the Informal Security Sector in Nigeria 3

Informal Security Actors in Plateau, Kaduna, and Kano 6

Operational Structures 8

Recruitment and Training 9

Accountability Mechanisms 11

Relationships with Formal Security Actors 12

Perceptions of the Informal Security Sector 13

Conclusions and Recommendations 14

Ernest Ogbozor 

Understanding the Informal 

Security Sector in Nigeria

Summary

• Informal security actors such as vigilantes play a variety of roles in African communities. 

Research has tended to focus on the negative impacts of informal security providers, including the perpetration of human rights violations, rather than on the essential roles these 

groups play in a community’s safety and security.

• The study referenced in this report focused on Plateau, Kaduna, and Kano states in Nigeria. 

These states have long histories of ethnoreligious and political-related violence. A number 

of informal security actors are active in these states due to the high rate of violence. The 

study also considered Abuja because of the presence of informal security stakeholders in the 

nation’s capital city. 

• In Nigeria, vigilantes have both positive and negative impacts. Abuses by vigilantes must 

be addressed formally and structurally while preserving the important role of vigilantes as 

protectors of their communities.

• Among the various informal security actors in Nigeria, the Vigilante Group of Nigeria is the 

oldest recognized actor. The group is perceived as playing an important role in providing 

critical policing services to Nigerians, particularly in rural communities. 

• The roles and functions of vigilante groups include providing security, early warning alerts, 

and traffic control; gathering intelligence; settling disputes; and conducting community 

development activities. Most groups carry out security roles; some combine security functions with community development activities or enforcing religious rights. 

• The operational structures and administrative procedures of informal security providers vary 

from one group to another; some groups have well-documented operational guidelines and 

administrative procedures, whereas others have no written operational manuals or administrative and financial systems. 

• Most informal security providers have weak internal and external accountability systems. 

Internally, group leaders or village heads provide oversight of a group’s activities. External 

monitoring by official security agencies exists in some cases but is not formalized or enforced. 

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE www.usip.org

SPECIAL REPORT
2 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 391

• Some informal policing groups have cordial relationships with formal security actors; however, 

there are no formal working agreements or memoranda of understanding with official security 

agencies. Many vigilante groups do not receive training on state laws or on how to operate 

as a security outfit in the country. 

• Perceptions about the activities of informal security actors vary, but many residents within 

the communities interviewed prefer vigilante groups to the police. The police are often 

unavailable when they are needed in rural communities. 

Introduction

Informal security actors are key players in security provision in many African communities. 

Studies on informal policing structures often focus on victims of vigilantism and breaches 

of human rights perpetrated by vigilantes, neglecting the beneficial role vigilantes play in 

ensuring the safety and security of local communities.1 In Nigeria, vigilantes have both negative and positive impacts: abuses by vigilantes must be addressed formally and structurally 

while preserving the important role of vigilantes as protectors of their communities. Informal 

mechanisms for protection have thrived in certain rural areas, where the majority of the people 

are excluded from mainstream security provisioning.2 In these cases, nonstate security actors 

have increasingly bridged the vacuum created by the inability of formal security institutions 

to ensure the safety of citizens.3 Plateau, Kaduna, and Kano states have long histories of 

ethnoreligious and political-related violence. A number of informal actors are active in these 

states, which have high rates of violence.4 This report provides an analysis of the informal 

security providers in Plateau, Kaduna, and Kano. It discusses the informal security actors present in these states, their structures, their recruitment and training mechanisms, accountability 

issues, their relationships with formal security actors, and perceptions of them.

This report is based on previous studies of the informal security sector and on semistructured field interviews. The specific questions addressed are: Who are the nonstate 

security actors in Plateau, Kaduna, and Kano states? What, if any, recruitment and training 

procedures and accountability mechanisms exist? How do nonstate security actors in these 

states interact with the formal security sector? How are nonstate security actors in Plateau, 

Kaduna, Kano, and Abuja perceived? 

Semistructured interviews using open-ended questions were the main source of data 

collection. Interviewees included vigilantes and members of community neighborhood 

watch groups, community members, local leaders, private security guards, workers from 

nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and formal security officials. Sixty individuals were 

interviewed in Plateau’s Jos North and South local government areas (LGAs), Kaduna’s Jema’a 

and Sanga LGAs, and Kano’s Feggae and Nasarawa LGAs, as well as in Abuja, Federal Capital 

Territory. Abuja, the nation’s capital, was included because of the presence of a large number 

of informal security stakeholders, such as NGOs, security agencies, and paramilitary agencies. Participants were identified and interviewed in January and February 2015. 

The majority of participants expressed similar opinions about reasons for the existence of 

informal policing groups. A leader of an organization supporting such groups noted, “There 

are about 377,000 policemen in Nigeria for 170 million people. Sadly, half of the entire Nigeria Police Force is serving the politicians.”5 He added, “Some senior government personnel 

have about fifty policemen attached to him and his family.” Rather than patrol local communities, police officers prefer to take on jobs where they can earn additional income, such as 

working for politicians, guarding security checkpoints, or working as guards at commercial 

banks. In Nigeria, the ratio of police to the population is low—about 1 police officer for 

every 500 Nigerians. Compare these numbers with South Africa, where the ratio of police to 

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily 

reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace, 

which does not advocate specific policy positions.

To request permission to photocopy or reprint materials, 

email: permissions@usip.org.

About the Institute

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, 

nonpartisan institution established and funded by Congress. 

Its goals are to help prevent and resolve violent conflicts, 

promote postconflict peacebuilding, and increase conflict 

management tools, capacity, and intellectual capital 

worldwide. The Institute does this by empowering others 

with knowledge, skills, and resources, as well as by its direct 

involvement in conflict zones around the globe.

Board of Directors

Stephen J. Hadley (Chair), Principal, RiceHadleyGates, LLC, 

Washington, DC • George E. Moose (Vice Chair), Adjunct 

Professor of Practice, The George Washington University, Washington, DC • Judy Ansley, Former Assistant to the President and 

Deputy National Security Advisor under George W. Bush, Washington, DC • Eric Edelman, Hertog Distinguished Practitioner 

in Residence, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International 

Studies, Washington, DC • Joseph Eldridge, University Chaplain 

and Senior Adjunct Professorial Lecturer, School of International 

Service, American University, Washington, DC • Kerry Kennedy, 

President, Robert F. Kennedy Center for Justice and Human 

Rights, Washington, DC • Ikram U. Khan, President, Quality Care 

Consultants, LLC., Las Vegas, NV • Stephen D. Krasner, Graham 

H. Stuart Professor of International Relations at Stanford 

University, Palo Alto, CA • John A. Lancaster, Former Executive 

Director, International Council on Independent Living, Potsdam, 

NY • Jeremy A. Rabkin, Professor of Law, George Mason 

University, Fairfax, VA • J. Robinson West, Chairman, PFC 

Energy, Washington, DC • Nancy Zirkin, Executive Vice 

President, Leadership Conference on Civil and 

Human Rights, Washington, DC 

Members Ex Officio

John Kerry, Secretary of State • Ashton Carter, Secretary of 

Defense • Gregg F. Martin, Major General, U.S. Army; President, 

National Defense University • Nancy Lindborg, President, 

United States Institute of Peace (nonvoting)
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 391 3

the population is about 1 police officer per 250 people.6 A member of a vigilante group in 

Plateau said, “Police are not enough; I volunteer for our community vigilante to safeguard 

our lives and properties.”7 Many respondents expressed concern about the necessity of the 

complementary roles of the vigilante groups, suggesting that many Nigerians feel they are 

underpoliced. 

The Nigeria Police Force suffers from insufficient funding and equipment, mismanagement, abuse of power, and corruption. Vigilantes flourish not only in places where the state 

lacks the capacity to protect citizens from crime, but also where the state is believed to be 

corrupt or untrustworthy,8 including in Plateau, Kaduna, and Kano. In March 2014, President 

Goodluck Jonathan convened a national conference to discuss challenges to national cohesion and develop solutions to those challenges. One of the recommendations stemming from 

the conference, which 492 delegates attended, was the establishment of a state-level police 

force in Nigeria—a confirmation of the urgent need for alternative security arrangements. 

Reacting to this proposal, the national commandant of the Vigilante Group of Nigeria (VGN), 

Usman Jahun, suggested that the VGN could play the role of state police by virtue of its 

structure and strength.9

Background on the Informal Security Sector in Nigeria 

The informal security sector is sometimes referred to as the informal policing structure or 

the voluntary policing sector (VPS). In Nigeria, these groups are referred to as vigilantes, 

neighborhood watch, community guards, or traditional police;10 vigilante is the most common term. In traditional Nigerian societies, vigilantes are known as ndi-nche (guards), yan 

banga (vigilante), and olodes (hunters), among other names. 

Vigilantism is “an organized attempt by a group of ordinary citizens to enforce norms 

and maintain law and order on behalf of their communities, often by resorting to violence, 

in the perceived absence of effective official state action through the police and courts.”11 

According to Alemika and Chukwuma, there are four main types of vigilantism: 

• Neighborhood or community: Neighborhood watch and community vigilante groups 

organized by community associations 

• Ethnic: Vigilante groups organized along ethnic lines to defend ethnic interest

• Religious: Vigilantes with faith roots 

• State-sponsored: Groups that operate with the support of local governments12

These types are not rigid or exclusive; one group might combine the features of two or 

more of these types.13 For example, Hisba is an informal security group that has faith and 

state-sponsored roots. Another classification that has been used to distinguish among the 

different types of informal security actors is militant and nonmilitant groups. This classification is used loosely, however, because a nonmilitant group could become militant and vice 

versa, or even combine both features, thus making it difficult to draw a line between the 

two categories. Laurent Fourchard writes that vigilante groups protect lives and properties, 

defend ethnic groups, and work as thugs on behalf of elite political leaders.14 As Usman 

Jahun notes, unlike the Nigeria Police Force or the Nigeria Security and Civil Defense Corps, 

which are coordinated through formal established systems with rules, informal policing units 

differ in structure and operation and operate independently from each other, with various 

methods of providing and ensuring security.15

Among the informal policing structures in Nigeria, the VGN, with millions of members, 

is probably the largest actor.16 Vigilantism dates to the precolonial era, when vigilante 

groups were small, characterized by loose and uncoordinated leadership and activities, and 
4 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 391

operated independently in the various local areas of the federations. As time went on, the 

vigilante groups unified to form the VGN, with operations at the local, state, regional, and 

national levels.17

In comparison, the first police force in Nigeria was established in 1861 by the British 

colonial administration to control the restive population of Lagos state. The regional police 

forces in the north and southern regions of the country were merged in 1930 to form the 

Nigeria Police Force.18 Thus, the VGN essentially predates the establishment of formal policing in Nigeria. 

The activities of vigilante groups are largely obscure because they operate without a 

legal mandate. The VGN officially registered on February 18, 1999, with the Corporate Affairs 

Commission Companies and Allied Matters, the federal agency charged with registering notfor-profit organizations. The status of the VGN as a not-for-profit organization reflects the 

perception of the group as a social welfare organization rather than as an auxiliary state 

security agency. In the absence of formal recognition by the state, the VGN gained some 

legitimacy with its not-for-profit status, even as the actions of some VGN actors in regard to 

alleged human rights violations continues to undermine its status. It is worth noting that 

the VGN registration coincided with Nigeria’s return to democratic governance after fifteen 

years of military rule. 

In 2000, the various state chapters of the VGN agreed to form a unified group at the 

national level to improve coordination and service delivery. Before then, VGN activities at 

the regional and national levels were nonexistent or limited. The purpose of a national platform was to attract support from the national authority by aligning the VGN’s activities with 

those of federal government agencies. Regional and national coordination offices were set 

up as platforms for lobbying and advocacy with the relevant federal government agencies. 

The core support for these VGN operations was from state and local government authorities. 

In 2011, Commandant Jahun moved the national secretariat of the organization from 

Kaduna state to Abuja. The move to Abuja brought VGN headquarters closer to the federal government ministries; however, the resources needed to sustain a national office in the nation’s 

capital have almost overwhelmed the organization’s budget. The federal government does not 

fund the VGN, although contributions from some state chapters have enabled it to maintain 

physical presence in Abuja. 

The VGN has a four-level governance structure: national, regional, state, and LGA; districts/

members are units within the LGA. At the national level, twelve members, including the 

national commandant and the deputy national commandant, constitute the national executive council, which coordinates activities at the national level. Program areas include general 

operations, administration, finance, logistics, intelligence, training, anti–human trafficking, 

community policing, and government interrelations. 

Six regional commandants are in charge of the six VGN regional offices. The regional 

offices are in the six geopolitical zones of the country—northwest, north-central, northeast, 

southwest, south-south, and southeast—that encompass thirty-six states. Each regional 

commandant controls five to seven states, and all regional commandants report directly to 

the national commandant. The regional offices coordinate activities at the state level. The 

structures at the state and LGA levels are similar to that of the national level, consisting of 

a management team and executive councils. There are 36 state and 744 LGA commands. The 

foot soldiers of the vigilantes are the members of the local government districts and units 

(see figure 1). 

With millions of members at the federal, regional, state, and local government levels, 

the VGN is more widely distributed than any other policing group in the country. It thus 

has the capacity to play a complementary role to the formal security sector. As the VGN 

With millions of members 

at the federal, regional, state, 

and local government levels, the 

VGN is more widely distributed 

than any other policing 

group in the country. 
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 391 5

national commandant has underlined, “By virtue of VGN’s structure and rural base, it could 

serve as an auxiliary agency to the national security forces.”19 Assessments conducted in 

2005, 2006, and 2007 by the Security, Justice and Growth Program (a project of the United 

Kingdom’s Department for International Development Nigeria) attest to the leadership role 

of the VGN and rank it above other informal policing groups in the country.20 The vision of 

the VGN is “to reduce criminal activities and fear of crime in the society; reduce hazards to 

the community as a whole; and provide reassurance to the community.” Its mission is “to 

help secure a safe and just society in which the rights and responsibilities of individuals, 

families, and communities are properly safeguarded.” 

Lacking financial support, however, the VGN’s ability to function effectively is unclear. 

The federal government does not recognize or provide financial support to the VGN, and 

there is no national legislation to guide group operations. As Vigilante magazine pointed 

out in 2014, “The federal government does not recognize the vigilante group of Nigeria, 

but the services of the group are felt all over the country.”21 Yet, the contributions of the 

VGN and the Civilian Joint Task Force to the federal security forces to contain Boko Haram 

have been acknowledged.22 According to Borno VGN Commander Abdullahi Muhammad, by 

mid-2014, three hundred officers from the Borno VGN chapter had been killed fighting Boko 

Haram. “For instance, our former commander which I took over from was killed alongside 

his wives...our state secretary, and many others,”23 he said. The VGN national commandant 

admitted that the national headquarters struggles to support the widows and orphans of 

deceased members.

Figure 1. Structure of the VGN

Source: Author’s field survey, 2015.

National 

Commandant

State 

Commandants 

Regional 

Commandant

 South-South 

LGAs

Commandants

District 

Commandants

Members Members Members Members Members Members

District 

Commandants

District 

Commandants

District 

Commandants

District 

Commandants

District 

Commandants

LGAs

Commandants

LGAs

Commandants

LGAs

Commandants

LGAs

Commandants

LGAs

Commandants

State 

Commandants 

State 

Commandants 

State 

Commandants 

State 

Commandants 

State 

Commandants 

Regional 

Commandant

 Southeast 

Regional 

Commandant

 Southwest 

Regional 

Commandant

Northwest

Regional 

Commandant

Northeast

Regional 

Commandant

North-Central 

Deputy National 

Commandant

(Admin)
6 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 391

The organization and operation of the vigilante groups in the states and local governments differ from federal and regional organization and operation. State and local government VGN chapters receive significant financial support from local authorities. In some 

states, laws exist to guide the activities of the informal groups. Such legalization makes 

the VGN an agent of the state security apparatus, with financial implications on the part of 

the local authority. Abuja and seventeen states, including Plateau, Kaduna, and Kano, have 

enacted laws guiding the activities of the VGN. Six states—Sokoto, Katsina, Zamfara, Edo, 

Delta, and Bayelsa—have vigilante laws pending in their respective state governments. 

The VGN is working to persuade the remaining twelve states to enact legislation to guide 

vigilante operations. 

Informal Security Actors in Plateau, Kaduna, and Kano 

Plateau, Kaduna, and Kano have all passed laws regarding the activities of vigilante groups. 

The legalization of and support for vigilante activities enables the VPS in these states to act 

as local police. Operation Rainbow and Neighbourhood Watch (Plateau), the VGN (Kaduna), 

and the Hisba Commission (Kano) are the dominant informal policing actors. However, 

other VPS groups exist that are neither registered nor recognized by the local authorities. 

The activities of these groups are often hidden from public scrutiny because of the remote 

nature of their operations, which are mostly in rural communities. In Plateau, Kaduna, and 

Kano, the state-recognized actors operate alongside local voluntary policing groups. 

Plateau State 

Operation Rainbow and Neighbourhood Watch (collectively referred to as OR) was established by the Plateau State Operation Rainbow and Neighbourhood Watch Law of 2012.24 

Operation Rainbow is a formal security unit consisting of the police, the army, the State 

Security Service, and the air force; Neighbourhood Watch is a civilian unit. These two units 

function together, with the Neighbourhood Watch gathering intelligence information for 

Operation Rainbow to act on. It is alleged that the hybrid nature of OR, a combination 

of formal and informal policing components, led to the establishment and legalization of 

informal policing groups in Plateau.25

Critics of OR argue that the Plateau state government cannot be trusted and that the 

government uses the state security outfit to police certain sections of the populace.26 

Plateau is divided between indigenes (mostly Christians) and nonindigenes (mostly Muslim 

settlers). The way in which the security forces have handled outbreaks of violence in the Plateau since the early 2000s has resulted in an environment of mistrust between indigenes and 

nonindigenes. The Operation Rainbow and Neighbourhood Watch structures were merged to 

create synergy between the federal (official security agencies) and state (Neighbourhood 

Watch) security infrastructures to satisfy the opposing forces. The added value of the state 

security structure is Neighbourhood Watch branches in all the state LGAs. 

The VGN Plateau state chapter is the other major informal policing group in the state. 

According to a local vigilante leader, “The Plateau branch of the VGN started in the late seventies, but collapsed at a point in time due to inactivity.”27 Traces of defunct VGN units were 

revived as the need for community security increased. These units include the Angwan Miango 

and Tudun Wada units in the Jos North LGA. The Angwan Miango unit started in 2009 and consists of only Christian members, whereas the Tudun Wada unit has only Muslim members. The 

homogenous membership of these groups is a reflection of the settlement patterns and divisions between the Christian and Muslim communities in the state. The relationship between 

these two groups is cause for concern: a series of outbreaks of mass violence in Jos—in 2001, 

Plateau, Kaduna, and Kano have 

all passed laws regarding the 

activities of vigilante groups. 

The legalization of and support 

for vigilante activities enables 

the VPS in these states to 

act as local police.
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 391 7

2004, and 2008—left hundreds of people dead and communities segregated. Violence broke 

out again in Jos in 2014 and 2015, with killings in several villages in the outskirts of Jos.

The Sarkin Arab Ward Neighbourhood Watch and the Rahwol Kaneng Neighbourhood 

Watch Du District are also active voluntary policing groups. They were established in the 

wake of security concerns in their respective wards and districts. The Sarkin Arab Ward 

Neighbourhood Watch started in 2001 to enhance peaceful coexistence between Christian 

and Muslim communities. The group evolved from various ethnic group associations. The 

collapse of some VGN units contributed to the establishment of such organizations to 

address security concerns in the urban slum communities of Jos North and South LGAs. 

Kaduna State 

On June 6, 2013, the Kaduna State House of Assembly ratified the State Vigilante Service 

Law, which legalized the operation of vigilante groups.28 The law states: “Vigilance Service 

is a registered service of people in a community that have agreed to render assistance on 

crime detection, prevention, and promotion of security consciousness in the community.”29 

The law regulates the activities of the VPS to assist in securing lives and properties in the 

rural communities. Unlike in Plateau state, in Kaduna, the VGN is the dominant informal 

policing actor. The VGN in Kaduna dates to 1982, when it provided voluntary surveillance 

to the Tudun Wada community of Kaduna North local government, a safe haven for criminal 

activities. The operations of the group now cover the twenty-three LGAs in the state. The 

VGN Kaduna chapter is one of the most well-established branches, largely because the VGN’s 

national headquarters were based in Kaduna before they were relocated to Abuja in 2011. 

Following the 2011 postelection violence in Kaduna, the Jema’a emirate of the Vigilance 

Service was established in Kafanchan to help protect the community from attacks. Kafanchan, the capital of Jema’a, had been adversely affected by the violence. Kafanchan is a 

semiurban settlement with predominantly Muslim and Christian communities. The structure 

of the vigilante group in Kafanchan is similar to that in Jos city, with homogenous Christian 

and Muslim member groups; an emirate imam heads a unit with only Muslim members, while 

a chaplain heads the Christian unit. “We have a good working relationship irrespective of 

the homogeneous make-up of the units,”30 said a chaplain leader. 

The other voluntary policing actors in Kaduna are the community and neighborhood 

watches, with operations at the LGA and district levels. The community neighborhood 

watches were established to monitor activities of unknown gunmen in the southern Kaduna 

communities. The Antang and Sanga community watch groups are typical examples. The 

Antang Community Watch grew out of the Antang Youth Development Association, a registered community development association. The Sanga Community Watch was formed after 

several attacks by unknown gunmen in the Sanga LGA. A member of the community watch 

discussed what motivated him to join the group: “I joined our community watch group after 

my spouse was killed in a police station attack.”31 “Security deteriorates in our community,” 

said another member of the group. “My brother was killed when he went to the farm to 

collect his farm implements.”32 Community watch groups are common in southern Kaduna 

areas that have experienced attacks from unknown gunmen. 

Kano State 

Kano legalized the operation of voluntary policing groups in 2012 with the Neighbourhood 

Watch (Vigilante Security) Groups Law.33 The law provides for the establishment, registration, and monitoring of neighborhood watches. Vigilante policing groups operated in Kano 

state prior to the law, however. For example, Hisba, a notable voluntary policing actor with 

religious affiliation, has been operating in Kano since the late 1990s. Kano was among the 
8 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 391

first states in northern Nigeria to establish a Hisba commission following the introduction 

of Sharia law in the country in 1999. Hisba, according to an interviewee, encourages “what 

is good and discourag[es] what is bad.”34 Hisba enforces the Sharia legal system and serves 

as a mechanism for safeguarding the welfare and laws of the community. It operates alongside other informal state actors, such as the Kano state chapter of the VGN, the Kano State 

Security Guard, and the Kano Road and Transport Authority (KAROTA). 

KAROTA was established in 2011 to control the free flow of traffic in the Kano metropolis 

and to eliminate street trading and illegal parking.35 KAROTA also works to eliminate illegal 

motor parks and to prevent street hawking. KAROTA partners with the Platinum Parking and 

Management Services (PPMS), an agency that manages toll and parking fees collections. 

However, KAROTA and PPMS operatives sometimes infringe on people’s rights by arresting 

and impounding vehicles. The function of KAROTA overlaps with functions of state and 

federal agencies such as the Vehicle Inspection Agency, the Federal Road Safety Commission, and the police, creating unhealthy competitions among agencies. The VGN, Hisba, and 

KAROTA are the most popular informal policing structures in Kano state. 

Overall, the various types of voluntary policing groups identified in Plateau, Kaduna, and 

Kano states can be categorized into neighborhood and community vigilantism, religious 

vigilantism, state-sponsored vigilantism, or a combination of the categories.36 Hisba represents a combination of a state- and religious-sponsored group, but it is unclear if Hisba is a 

vigilante group, a religious institution, or a government welfare agency. 

Operational Structures

The operational structures of voluntary policing groups vary. Some groups have welldocumented structures, operational guidelines, and administrative procedures, whereas 

others have no written operational manuals or administrative or financial procedures. Most 

state-sponsored actors have structures at the state, zonal, local government, and community 

levels, whereas some voluntary policing groups have structures at the community level only. 

OR, VGN state chapters, and Hisba all have operations at various government levels, making 

their services available to many beneficiaries, particularly in rural areas. 

OR has a state coordinator who oversees activities at the headquarters. Below this level 

are LGA supervisors, ward supervisors, and district operations. The group operates a centralized system with field operations in all the Plateau LGAs. Compared with other voluntary 

policing groups in Plateau, OR has functional operational guidelines and administrative procedures. In contrast, the structure of the Plateau state branch of the VGN is weak because 

there is no strong coordination unit. The collapse of the initial VGN units and the establishment of Operation Rainbow, a parallel security outfit, affected the development of the VGN 

Plateau chapter. This chapter of the VGN now exists as fragmented units, as represented by 

the Angwan Miango Vigilante and the Tudun Wada units. The members of the groups at the 

state, local government, and community levels consist of few executive and management 

officers. The Angwan Miango Vigilante has a chairman, a secretary, an elder’s forum, and 

about twenty field operatives. 

The VGN’s operations in Kaduna and Kano are well structured. The Kaduna branch has a 

central headquarters and three zonal offices. At the LGA level, a commandant oversees each 

LGA division. Below the local government are traditional institutions known as a chiefdoms 

(for Christian communities) or emirates (for Muslim-dominated communities), each headed by 

a chiefdom or an emirate commandant, respectively. The number of chiefdoms and emirates 

varies in a given LGA. The standard VGN structure consists of a state headquarter, zones, LGAs, 

districts, and units. The number of VGNs per zone in Kano state is depicted in table 1.37
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 391 9

Vigilantes considerably outnumber police in Kano: there were 100,754 vigilantes in 2011 

compared to just 6,000 police.38

Similarly, there are four levels in the Hisba structure: state, senatorial district, LGA, and 

community. At the state level, there are three divisions of Hisba: board, administration, 

and command. The board advises the government on Islamic matters, the administration 

handles administrative activities of the Hisba commission, and the command controls the 

enforcement of Sharia law. The Hisba command is the operations unit of the group, with four 

divisions and 10,000 Hisba corps. Within the Hisba command, the functions include special 

services (traffic control), a humanitarian unit (caring for the population), sensitization and 

reorientation units (settlement disputes), and a women’s division (handling issues relating 

to the abuse of women’s rights and domestic violence). 

Hisba combines security duties with religion and social welfare services, including patrolling schools and communities to monitor behavior, gather information, monitor social activities, and participate in traffic control. According to a Hisba official, the activities of Hisba 

also include protecting the Islamic faith, supporting moral standards, discouraging immoral 

behaviors, fostering social standards, and ensuring that social norms are understood. Hisba 

preaches to couples about Islam, encourages singles to marry, funds marriages, and investigates divorce cases. It also carries out HIV/pregnancy testing and other unsolicited activities, such as patrolling communities and monitoring behavior. Some of these activities, 

according to a community member respondent, are parallel to the original purpose of Hisba. 

Seventy percent of all cases reportedly handled by Hisba are matrimonial issues in nature.39 

Regardless of their structures, all the informal security groups perform a similar function: 

safeguard lives and property in their communities. In a broad sense, the primary duties of 

vigilantes are to complement security agencies, gather intelligence information, and arrest and 

hand over suspected criminals to the police. Some groups combine security provisioning with 

social development activities (construction of roads, bridges, and environmental sanitation 

facilities), while some engage in land dispute settlement and monitor drug use. The operational 

structure and mandates of informal policing groups may vary, but their functions are similar. 

Recruitment and Training

There are no standard procedures for recruitment and training among informal policing 

groups. Referrals by existing members of a group are the most common method of recruitment by most of the groups; they usually do not advertise openings in print, electronic, 

Table 1. Members of the VGN Kano Chapter per Zone in 2011 

Source: Adapted from Vigilante Group of Nigeria Kano State Security Initiative Report (Vigilante Group of Nigeria, 

Kano Command, 2011).

S/N Zones Existing 

members

New members Total members Percentage

1 Kano Municipal 6,420 5,106 11,526 11

2 Rano 5,233 17,919 23,152 22

3 Dambatta 6,085 7,244 13,329 13

4 Wudil 5,333 12,106 17,439 17

5 Bichi 12,622 22,499 35,121 35

State HQ 164 23 187 2

Total 35,857 64,897 100,754 100

Regardless of their structures, 

all the informal security groups 

perform a similar function: 

safeguard lives and property 

in their communities.
10 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 391

or social media. Vetting processes such as interviews, screening, and reference checks of 

potential members vary from one group to another. Some vigilante members interviewed 

noted that reference checks are carried out occasionally; others maintained that they are 

rarely carried out. Some state-sponsored groups like OR and Hisba have recruitment and 

training guidelines that are monitored by the state authority. In some VGN state chapters, 

the recruitment procedures are partially captured in the law, but implementation might be 

different than what the law prescribes. In the absence of a uniform recruitment system, the 

competence of those recruited by the vigilante groups is questionable. 

A VPS candidate often purchases an application form. The application form and charges 

are at the discretion of the leaders or the managers of each group. For example, the Angwan 

Miango and the Tudun Wada VGN units sell application forms for N1500 (about $10). The 

cost of the Sarkin Arab Ward Neighbourhood Watch membership application packet is N3300 

(about $20).40 It includes charges for an application form, a uniform, an ID card, and a 

passport photo. The charges are moderate but often not affordable to prospective vigilante 

members. The Sarkin Arab Ward Neighbourhood Watch asks for a reference letter for or a 

guarantor’s endorsement of a potential new member. Most voluntary policing groups require 

an applicant to be eighteen years old; there is no maximum age. 

One individual interviewed said that female applicants usually need consent from their 

fathers or spouses to be accepted. This informal policy stems from cultural norms that relegate females to male domination. It is unclear how women from female-headed households 

and divorcees who have no one to seek consent from are handled. 

Some groups do not screen potential members. In Kaduna, membership in a community watch group is compulsory for every youth, male and female, twenty years and older. 

Because community members know each other, there is no need for screening or interviews. 

A community member who refuses to join a community watch group or absconds from the 

group is charged a penalty. In these communities, joining the VPS is considered involuntary 

service to the community. 

Regarding training and professional development, most members do not receive formal 

training from the police or other law enforcement agencies. VPS leaders and top officials 

often participate in training workshops organized by NGOs, but district-level operatives 

rarely are offered such opportunities. State-sponsored VPS groups may offer trainings facilitated by formal state actors. These trainings are usually on a needs basis and are usually 

given to new members. OR trains its members on intelligence gathering and human rights 

issues before deployment. Hisba conducts training for newly recruited members.41

Support for training differs from one group to another. Some vigilantes receive subventions or monthly financial support from their state and local government authorities; some 

groups provide their own working tools, such as uniforms, raincoats, sticks, flashlights, 

whistles, knives, machetes, and locally made guns. Some VPS groups receive support and 

motivation such as prayers and working materials from their communities. Kaduna and Kano 

state governments provide monthly subventions to their state VGN branches. The Kano state 

government pays a monthly allowance to the Hisba corps. OR pays allowance to its Neighbourhood Watch members at the district level. The benefits paid by the state government to 

the VPS are usually meager but appreciated. As a VPS member from Plateau noted, “Members 

of other informal groups in the state desire to work for OR where they could, at least, get 

something.” The support from OR is thus a motivation for the group’s members. 

Informal policing groups employ various strategies to raise funds to purchase working materials and attract support for their operations. Private individuals may donate 

materials such as flashlights, raincoats, whistles, and bomb detectors. Some VPS members 

engage in jobs, such as farming, teaching, or trading to raise funds for group activities. 

Regarding training and 

professional development, most 

members do not receive formal 

training from the police or other 

law enforcement agencies. 
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 391 11

A community watch member in Kaduna said, “We work as cooperative farm laborers to raise 

money to buy working materials.”42

Accountability Mechanisms 

In general, vigilante groups have weak internal and external accountability systems. A 

group manager or local community leader may oversee the group’s activities. In the absence 

of standard disciplinary procedures or measures, leaders use their own discretion to direct 

activities and sanction members for misconduct. Externally, community members may find 

it difficult to hold vigilantes accountable for their actions. There is no formal system for 

complaints and feedback from the community about the activities of vigilantes, leaving 

communities at the mercy of the groups. For state-sponsored actors, the law that establishes 

the group spells out oversight mechanisms, but implementation of the law is often difficult 

due to the remote nature of most VPS activities. Some VPS activities are carried out in rural 

communities with no access to communication infrastructures. 

The Operation Rainbow and Neighbourhood Watch law underlines that “the Plateau 

State Commissioner of Police shall oversee all the activities of registered Operatives of the 

Neighbourhood Watch within the State.”43 The law also stipulates that Neighbourhood 

Watch maintain a minimum of four thousand operatives within an LGA. The local government chairman endorses the registration of each operative after identifying that the person 

meets minimum qualifications (has received a first school leaving certificate or attended 

primary school; is eighteen years or older; has no criminal convictions).44 On the recommendation of the LGA supervisor or ward supervisor, the Neighbourhood Watch coordinator 

has the power to remove an operative for reasons of misconduct. However, the law does not 

provide guidelines on sanctions for misconduct. 

In the VGN Plateau chapter, the state coordinator and the unit leader oversee and monitor 

group activities. The manager of the Sarkin Arab Ward Neighbourhood Watch oversees operations and sanctions offending members through suspension or outright dismissal. The Rahwol 

Kaneng Neighbourhood Watch has a disciplinary committee; depending on the gravity of a 

member’s offense, disciplinary measures might include seizure of membership ID card, suspension, or expulsion. For severe cases, such as rape, the suspect may be reported to the police 

or banished from the community. The majority of the vigilante members interviewed said that 

when a vigilante catches a suspected criminal, they often take the person to the police. 

In the Angwan Miango community, a young woman returned home late one night after 

nightclubbing; she was interrogated, detained, and raped by a vigilante member. In Angwan 

Rukuba, an urban slum area of the Jos North LGA, a vigilante member was alleged to have 

killed a man who was going out with his girlfriend. In these cases, the accused were dismissed from the groups. Dismissal or suspension is sometimes the most severe punishment 

vigilantes face, for they often escape any punishment from the formal legal system for even 

severe crimes, such as rape and murder.

The Vigilance Service Law of Kaduna State vests control and command to the state VGN 

commander in liaison with the commissioner, the State Security Service, Nigeria Security 

and Civil Defense Corps, and the LGA divisional police officers. The state VGN commander 

is responsible for monitoring the activities of the group and reporting infractions to the 

official security agencies. The VGN zonal and LGA commandants control activities of the 

various units in their jurisdictions. Village chiefs and leaders of community watch groups 

oversee the operations of the groups. Externally, according to an interviewee, “the divisional 

police officer [DPO] is supposed to monitor the VGN activities in its jurisdiction, but it’s not 

often the case as the DPO may be engaged in other activities.”45

There is no formal system 

for complaints and feedback 

from the community about the 

activities of vigilantes, leaving 

communities at the mercy 

of the groups.
12 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 391

An interviewee from Kaduna shared his personal observation of how vigilantes treated 

two people linked to stolen construction materials: “In mid-2014 at my house construction 

site, two people guarding the site collaborated to steal some of my building materials. They 

were later reported to the vigilante in the community.”46 The respondent added, “In the 

process of interrogation, the suspects were flogged by the vigilante and one of the suspects 

died in the process....The intentions of the vigilantes were not to kill the suspects, but the 

group lacked first aid skills to revive the suspects before assistance arrived. The vigilante 

members responsible were not charged for the crime. The victim was alleged to have caused 

his death.”47 However, according to the Kaduna vigilance law, “No torture or any form of 

inhuman or degrading treatment shall be used on any person during arrest, except that 

reasonable force may be applied to prevent the suspect from escaping.”48 Thus, laws exist 

to protect victims from abuses by vigilantes, but implementation of the laws is difficult and 

vigilantes do go unpunished for severe crimes. 

The Kano state government oversees Hisba’s activities. Hisba’s disciplinary measures 

include suspension or dismissal for serious offenses and referrals to the Sharia court. The 

Kano state government also oversees KAROTA’s activities. KAROTA, according to a Kano 

metropolis resident, is a menace on the roads when members detain and impound vehicles. 

Another resident said that KAROTA and PPMS make money for the state government by 

policing the roads. These interviewees believe that it is difficult for the state government 

to curtail the activities of such organizations. One Kano resident suggested that if KAROTA’s 

activities were to be curtailed, operatives might engage in criminal activities. On the part of 

the government, curtailment could also lead to a reduction in revenue. The long-term effect 

is that commuters and the public remain at the mercy of the VPS groups. 

Relationships with Formal Security Actors 

Most of the respondents agreed that relationships between informal and formal security 

actors are very cordial or somewhat cordial (see table 2). However, the extent of that cordiality varies. Formal and informal security actors may share intelligence information and partner 

for joint patrols in the communities. Some VPS use photo identification cards issued by the 

Divisional Police Office (DPO), and some receive materials and cash donations from formal 

security agencies and state governments. 

Table 2. Relationships between Formal and Informal Security Actors

Nature of 

relationship

Plateau Kaduna Kano Abuja

Very cordial 41.2% 60.0% 41.7% 37.5%

Somewhat cordial 35.3% 26.7% 50.0% 25.0%

Somewhat hostile 11.8% 0.00 8.30% 18.8%

Very hostile 0.00 0.00 0.00 12.5%

No opinion 11.80% 13.3% 8.30% 6.30%

Number of 

respondents 17 15 12 16

Source: Author’s field survey, 2015.

Laws exist to protect victims 

from abuses by vigilantes, but 

implementation of the laws is 

difficult and vigilantes do go 

unpunished for severe crimes. 
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 391 13

The Sarkin Arab Ward Neighbourhood Watch and the State Task Force (STF) in Plateau 

have a well-established relationship. For example, members of the Sarkin Arab Ward Neighbourhood Watch conduct joint community patrols with the STF, and the neighborhood watch 

shares intelligence information with the official state actors. To support Sarkin Arab Ward 

Neighbourhood Watch activities, the STF donated working materials and cash to the group. 

The Sarkin Arab Ward Neighbourhood Watch uses photo identity cards issued by the police 

as proof of a working relationship with the formal security actor. 

Similarly, vigilante groups in some communities in southern Kaduna complement the 

police in carrying out arrests. According to a vigilante unit leader, “The vigilante groups in 

southern Kaduna zones such as Kaura, Lere, and Sanga were licensed to use guns because 

of the activities of the unknown gunmen.” According to the state’s vigilance service law, 

vigilantes are not permitted to use weapons, but an exception is made in southern Kaduna 

due to frequent threats. A vigilante member said that this exception would not be possible 

without a working relationship and trust between the police and the vigilantes. However, 

there is no official agreement or memorandum of understanding between the VPS and the 

police, and formal actors do not train vigilantes on state laws or work ethics. The police and 

vigilantes collaborate on joint patrols in the communities but on little else. 

According to the VGN Kano commander, “There is [a] good working relationship between 

the Kano state government and the state VGN chapter.” The state government provides 

material and financial support to the group—for example, the forty-four local government 

offices use vehicles donated by the state government. The VGN reciprocates by providing 

security services in various communities. In Kano, there is some friction between the state 

government and Hisba; some practices of Hisba, such as flogging, have declined after the 

government was forced to restructure Hisba operations due to community complaints. As 

for KAROTA, unchecked activities of the group sometimes result in confrontations between 

operatives and commuters or security agents. In one case, a KAROTA operative was involved 

in a fight with security agents for impounding a police officer’s vehicle. 

In Abuja, respondents described somewhat hostile relationships between formal and 

informal security actors. Their perceptions may stem from the fact that informal security 

actors are less active in the cities. In this state, as in many others, vigilantes are centered 

in rural areas. 

Perceptions of the Informal Security Sector

In most communities, the informal security sector is preferred to the formal agencies. Perceptions of the informal security sector are based on three factors: availability, trust, and 

effectiveness. According to one respondent, the police are often unavailable when they are 

needed in rural communities. Most of the respondents expressed this concern as a reason 

for their preference for vigilante groups. There are general perceptions about police being 

corrupt and untrustworthy; some respondents said that they prefer the local settlement of 

disputes without recourse to the police, even when the police are available. Other factors 

that contributed to general preference of the vigilantes over the police were the informal 

actors’ knowledge of the local environment, making vigilantes more effective in their local 

environments (see table 3). 

Perceptions of the informal 

security sector are based on 

three factors: availability, trust, 

and effectiveness. 
14 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 391

Table 3. Effectiveness of Informal Security Actors 

Source: Author’s field survey, 2015.

Effectiveness rating Plateau Kaduna Kano Abuja 

Very effective 47.10% 53.3% 41.7% 31.00%

Somewhat effective 23.50% 33.3% 50.0% 25.00%

Somewhat 

ineffective

11.80% 6.70% 8.30% 25.00%

Very ineffective 5.90% 0.00 0.00 6.25%

No opinion 11.80% 6.70% 8.30% 12.50%

Number of 

respondents 

17 15 12 16

In Kuru District, Jos South LGA, there is competition between the VGN unit and the OR. 

The OR claims to operate within the ambit of the law by restricting its activities to intelligence duties and information gathering. The VGN is linked to violations of human rights, 

arbitrary arrests, forced detention, and torture. It also levies and collects taxes from community members. Nevertheless, an OR ward supervisor confirmed that the VGN is preferred to 

the OR because of the VGN’s prompt dispensation of justice without recourse to the police. 

According to another respondent, the police are not trusted when they have custody of 

perpetrators of crime, and have been accused of freeing perpetrators of crimes in Plateau. 

In regard to Hisba, one respondent noted that “Hisba does not collect bribes unlike other 

formal and informal institutions.”49 This attribute makes Hisba different from other vigilante 

groups and most formal security actors, because bribery and corruption are major challenges 

for the Nigeria Police Force. But there are questions about Hisba’s violations of people’s 

rights, particularly those of women. KAROTA is perceived as having overlapping functions 

with other state agencies, such as the police, the Vehicle Inspection Agency, and the Federal Road Safety Commission. KAROTA acknowledges the overlap in function, particularly in 

enforcing traffic rules and regulations, but says, “There are lots of works for people to do,” 

implying that the task of traffic management requires many resources. KAROTA employs 

youths who are not properly trained. The major complaints about KAROTA’s activities were 

from commuters, who described KAROTA’s operatives as harsh and a menace on Kano roads 

when they impound cars, fight, and engage in violent arrests. 

Some respondents in Abuja expressed perceptions of informal security actors as somewhat ineffective or very ineffective. This perception could be due to the fact that informal 

security actors are mostly rural based and thus less noticeable in cities such as Abuja. The 

majority of city dwellers rely on formal security actors rather than vigilantes. 

Conclusions and Recommendations

As this report has demonstrated, vigilantes have both positive and negative impacts on the 

communities in which they operate. Abuses committed by the vigilantes must be addressed 

formally and structurally—but addressed in such a way that the role of vigilantes as protectors 
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 391 15

of their communities is preserved and their effectiveness enhanced. The following recommendations would, if implemented, help to attain these goals.

Most states and local government authorities have legalized the activities of vigilante 

groups, but Nigeria does not have a national vigilante law. The absence of national legislation has made it difficult for the VGN to attract support from the federal government. 

Under the present arrangement, members of state vigilante groups are not formally held 

accountable for their actions. Looking ahead, vigilantes should be charged for violations of 

the disparate vigilance service laws, and justice should be sought for victims of vigilantes.

Vigilantes need to be trained about human rights and international humanitarian law so 

that they learn not to infringe on people’s rights. There have been some attempts in this 

regard, targeting vigilante leaders, but the foot soldiers and grassroots members who have 

direct contact with communities need training as well. 

The relationship between the police and vigilante groups needs to be redefined. A 

memorandum of understanding that spells out the terms of collaboration or partnerships 

should be written. Joint patrols and other needs-based relationships should be replaced 

with long-term partnership agreements that clearly define the terms of cooperation 

between the actors. 

The role of women in the security sector needs to be defined. The existing security sector, including the informal security structure, reinforces the traditional culture of subjecting 

women to male control and domination. 

Notes

1. E. Alemika and Innocent C. Chukwuma, “The Poor and Informal Policing in Nigeria: A Report on the Peoples’ 

Perceptions and Priorities on Safety, Security and Informal Policing in the A2J Focal States in Nigeria” (Lagos: 

CLEEN, 2004). 

2. Chris Kwaja, “Informal Security Provision in Nigeria: Implications for Security Sector Governance” (Kitchener: 

Security Sector Reform Centre, 2014).

3. Ibid.

4. A. Kimenyi et al., “The Impact of Conflict and Political Instability on Agricultural Investments in Mali and 

Nigeria,” Brookings Africa Growth Initiative Working Paper 17 (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2014).

5. Vigilante supporter, field interview in Abuja, January 2015. 

6. South African Police Service, Department of Police, June 27, 2015.

7. Vigilante member, field survey in Plateau, January 2015.

8. A. Kantor and P. Mariam, Understanding Vigilantism: Informal Security Providers and Security Sector Reform in 

Liberia (Stockholm: Folke Bernadotte Academy, 2010).

9. Vigilante (October–December 2014).

10. Alemika and Chukwuma, “The Poor and Informal Policing in Nigeria.”

11. Laurent Fourchard, “The Politics of Mobilization for Security in South African Townships,” African Affairs 110, no. 

441 (2011): 607–627.

12. Alemika and Chukwuma, “The Poor and Informal Policing in Nigeria.”

13. Ibid.

14. Laurent Fourchard, “A New Name for an Old Practice: Vigilantes in South-Western Nigeria,” Journal of the 

International African Institute 78, no. 1 (2008), 16–40.

15. VGN National Commandant Usman Jahun, field interview in Abuja, January 2015.

16. Jahun, “Profile of the Vigilante Group of Nigeria, 2014,” n.d.

17. Ibid. 

18. CLEEN Foundation, Civil Society Panel on Police Reform in Nigeria 2012: Final Report (Lagos: CLEEN, September 2012).

19. VGN National Commandant Usman Jahun, field interview in Abuja, January 2015.

20. Jahun, “Profile of the Vigilante Group of Nigeria.” 

21. Vigilante (October–December 2014).

22. The Civilian Joint Task Force is an informal policing group working with the Multinational Task Force in northeast 

Nigeria.

23. Vigilante (October–December 2014)

24. See Operation Rainbow and Neighbourhood Watch Bill, Plateau, 2012.

25. See P. A. Gwaza, “The Clash of Two Security Conceptions on the Plateau: Issues, Problems, and Prognoses” (Abuja: 

Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution, 2014). 
26. Ibid. 

27. Local vigilante leader, field interview in Plateau, January 2015.

28. See the Kaduna State Vigilante Law, Kaduna State of Nigeria Gazette 9 (47), June 13, 2013.

29. Ibid. 

30. VGN chaplain, field interview in Kaduna, January 2015. 

31. Community respondent, field interview in Kaduna, January 2015. 

32. Community watch member, field interview in Kaduna, January 2015. 

33. See Neighbourhood Watch (Vigilante Security) Groups Law 2012 (1433.H), Kano. 

34. Respondent, field interview in Kano, January 2015.

35. Kano Road and Traffic Agency (KAROTA) Traffic Guide, Handbill. No. 40, Club Road Kano.

36. Alemika and Chukwuma, “The Poor and Informal Policing in Nigeria.”

37. See Vigilante Group of Nigeria, Kano State Security Initiative Report (Vigilante Group of Nigeria, Kano Command, 2011).

38. Author’s analysis of the Kano State Security Initiative Report (2011).

39. Hisba official, field interview in Kano, January 2015.

40. Sarkin Arab Ward Neighbourhood Watch, Entrance Form, Rule and Regulations for Members and Membership 

Acceptance letter, 2015.

41. Hisba official, interview at the Hisba headquarters, January 2015.

42. Respondent, field interview in Kaduna, January 2015.

43. See Operation Rainbow and Neighbourhood Watch Bill, Plateau, Part IV (32) 2012.

44. Ibid.

45. Community respondent, field interview in Kaduna, January 2015.

46. Respondent, field interview in Kaduna, January 2015.

47. Ibid.

48. See the Kaduna State Vigilante Law, Kaduna State of Nigeria Gazette, part 2 (section 9).

49. Respondent, field interview in Kaduna, January 2015. 

Of Related Interest

• Prioritizing Security Sector Reform: A New U.S. Approach edited by Querine Hanlon and Richard 

H. Shultz, Jr. (USIP Press, 2016)

• Peacebuilding in Libya: Cross-Border Transactions and the Civil Society Landscape by Sherine N. 

El Taraboulsi (Peace Brief, June 2016)

• Perceptions of Security in Libya by Naji Abou Khalil and Laurence Hargreaves (Peaceworks, 

May 2015)

• Inclusive Approaches to Community Policing and CVE by Georgia Holmer and Fulco van 

Deventer (Special Report, September 2014)

• Why Do Youth Join Boko Haram? by Freedom Onuoha (Special Report, June 2014)

ISBN: 978-1-60127-618-6

An online edition of this and related 

reports can be found on our website 

(www.usip.org), together with additional 

information on the subject.

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