DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

 Office of Inspector General 

< 

FEMA’s Preparedness for 

the Next Catastrophic Disaster 

OIG-08-34 March 2008
 

 

March 28, 2008 

Preface 

The Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, was established by the 

Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296) by amendment to the Inspector General 

Act of 1978. This is one of a series of audit, inspection, and special reports prepared as part of 

our oversight responsibilities to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness within the 

department. 

This report addresses FEMA’s preparedness for the next catastrophic disaster. It is based on 

interviews with employees and officials of relevant agencies and institutions, direct observations, 

and a review of applicable documents. 

It is our hope that this report will result in more effective, efficient, and economical operations. 

We express our appreciation to all of those who contributed to the preparation of this report. 

Richard L. Skinner 

Inspector General 
 

Table of Contents/Abbreviations 

Executive Summary.........................................................................................................................1 

Background......................................................................................................................................4 

Results of Review ............................................................................................................................7 

Overall Planning ..................................................................................................................8 

Coordination and Support..................................................................................................15 

Interoperable Communications..........................................................................................19 

Logistics.............................................................................................................................25 

Evacuations........................................................................................................................30 

Housing..............................................................................................................................34 

Disaster Workforce ............................................................................................................39 

Mission Assignments.........................................................................................................43 

Acquisition Management...................................................................................................48 

Conclusion and Recommendations................................................................................................53 

Management Comments and OIG Evaluation ...............................................................................54 

Appendices 

Appendix A: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology............................................. 57 

Appendix B: Management Comments to the Draft Report ................................. 60 

Appendix C: Selected Reports............................................................................. 78 

Appendix D: Major Contributors to This Report................................................. 79 

Appendix E: Report Distribution......................................................................... 80
 

Abbreviations 

CAP Contract Administration Plan 

COTR Contracting Officer’s Technical Representative 

CPD Community Preparedness Division 

DHAP Disaster Housing Assistance Program 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

DOD Department of Defense 

DOJ Department of Justice 
 

Table of Contents/Abbreviations 

eCAPS Enterprise Coordination and Approvals Processing System 

EMI Emergency Management Institute 

FCO Federal Coordinating Officer 

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency 

FY Fiscal Year 

GAO Government Accountability Office 

GAP Gap Analysis Program 

GPS Global Positioning System 

GSA General Services Administration 

HSPD-8 Homeland Security Presidential Directive-8 

HUD Department of Housing and Urban Development 

IA-TAC Individual Assistance Technical Assistance Contract 

ICTAP Interoperable Communications Technical Assistance Program 

IT Information Technology 

IWN Integrated Wireless Network 

LIMS Logistics Information Management System 

MA Mission Assignment 

MAWG Mission Assignment Working Group 

MERS Mobile Emergency Response Support 

MRE Meal, Ready-To-Eat (emergency meals) 

NDHS National Disaster Housing Strategy 

NIMS National Incident Management System 

NLC National Logistics Coordinator 

NPD National Preparedness Directorate 

NRF National Response Framework 

NRP National Response Plan 

OAM Office of Acquisition Management 

OEC Office of Emergency Communications 

OIC Office for Interoperability and Compatibility 

OIG Office of Inspector General 

OMB Office of Management and Budget 

PFO Principal Federal Official 

P.L. Public Law 

RAMP Remedial Action Management Program 

SHCP Strategic Human Capital Plan 

TAV Total Asset Visibility 

USACE U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
OIG 

Department of Homeland Security 

Office of Inspector General 

Executive Summary 

On July 31, 2007, the House Committee on Oversight and 

Government Reform held a hearing to review the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) preparedness to 

handle a future disaster. During that hearing, the Deputy Inspector 

General for Emergency Management Oversight testified that the 

“New FEMA” had made progress in many areas related to disaster 

preparedness, but that generally FEMA was not fully prepared for 

a catastrophic disaster. The Committee, in turn, requested that the 

Office of Inspector General (OIG) provide a high-level assessment 

of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)/FEMA’s 

preparedness for the next catastrophic disaster. 

The primary objectives of our assessment were to identify key 

areas for preparing for a catastrophic disaster, and determine the 

progress FEMA has made in the key areas since Hurricane Katrina 

struck in August 2005. 

We reviewed pertinent reports, including those of our office and 

the Government Accountability Office (GAO), as well as 

congressional testimony. We identified nine key areas critical to 

successful catastrophic preparedness efforts. We collaborated with 

FEMA officials to identify two to five critical components within 

each key area. We interviewed FEMA officials and evaluated 

documents provided by them. We assessed FEMA’s progress in 

each of the areas using a four-tiered scale: substantial progress, 

moderate progress, modest progress, and limited or no progress. 

Given the scope and limitations of our review, we did not perform 

an in-depth assessment of each of the nine key preparedness areas. 

We used the critical components within each area, as well as our 

broader knowledge of the key preparedness areas, to gauge 

FEMA’s overall progress in those areas. 

Overall, FEMA has made moderate progress in five of the nine key 

areas, modest progress in three areas, and limited progress in one 

FEMA’s Preparedness for the Next Catastrophic Disaster 

Page 1 
area (See Figure 1). FEMA officials said that budget shortfalls, 

reorganizations, inadequate information technology systems, and 

confusing or limited authorities negatively affected their progress. 

We agree with FEMA. FEMA would also benefit from better 

knowledge management and plans for sustaining initiatives that are 

underway. 

We are recommending that FEMA (1) conduct a comprehensive 

“needs analysis” to determine where they are now and where they 

need to be, as an agency, in terms of preparedness for a 

catastrophic disaster; (2) develop and sustain a system for tracking 

progress of programs, initiatives, and enhancements; and (3) 

provide regular updates regarding progress on all major 

preparedness initiatives and projects. 

FEMA’s Preparedness for the Next Catastrophic Disaster 

Page 2 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Figure 1: Scorecard for Select FEMA Preparedness Areas 

Key Preparedness Areas Progress 

OVERALL PLANNING Moderate 

• Develop a strategic framework and guidance for integration of prevention, Moderate 

response, and recovery efforts 

• Complete assessments of capabilities/readiness at the national/state/local levels Modest 

• Enhance preparedness at all levels Moderate 

• Enhance community preparedness Moderate 

• Enhance preparedness for the management and resolution of catastrophic events Moderate 

COORDINATION AND SUPPORT Moderate 

• Implement the new National Response Framework and Specific Operational Plans Modest 

• Clarify the roles, responsibilities, and authorities of the Principal Federal Official Moderate 

and Federal Coordinating Officer 

• Provide law enforcement access to FEMA records Substantial 

INTEROPERABLE COMMUNICATIONS 

• Achieve coordination among all DHS components charged with improving 

interoperable communications 

• Ensure federal disaster communications assets and operating procedures are in 

place for disaster response and recovery 

• Manage federal interoperable communication grants and programs 

Moderate 

Modest 

Moderate 

Moderate 

LOGISTICS 

• Establish total asset visibility 

• Improve pre-positioning of commodities 

Moderate 

Moderate 

Moderate 

EVACUATIONS 

• Develop Gap Analysis Program 

• Enhance Gulf Coast Mass Evacuation Capability 

Modest 

Moderate 

Substantial 

HOUSING Modest 

• Establish a National Disaster Housing Strategy Modest 

• Develop plans to purchase, track, and dispose of temporary housing units Modest 

• Strengthen state and local commitment to house affected citizens Modest 

DISASTER WORKFORCE 

• Adopt a Strategic Human Capital Plan, including specific strategies for the 

development of a surge capacity disaster workforce 

• Manage the disaster workforce consistent with the Strategic Human Capital Plan 

and integrate workforce management tracking systems 

Modest 

Moderate 

Modest 

MISSION ASSIGNMENTS Limited 

• Improve guidance for mission assignments (i.e., regulations, policies, and Modest 

operating procedures) 

• Improve staffing and training Limited 

• Enhance management of mission assignments Limited 

ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT Moderate 

• Have pre-disaster contracts in place Moderate 

• Recruit, train, and retain sufficient acquisition staff Moderate 

• Provide for post-award oversight Modest 

Note: The summary ratings of progress for the nine key areas are based on our assessments of the critical 

components listed, as well as our broader knowledge of the areas. FEMA officials generally agreed that 

these critical components are among the most important, and we believe they are strong indicators 

of overall progress. 

FEMA’s Preparedness for the Next Catastrophic Disaster 

Page 3 
Background 

In responding to emergency situations, whether natural or manmade, current doctrine dictates that government agencies and 

organizations most local to the situation act as first responders. 

When state and local governments become overwhelmed by the 

size or scope of the disaster, state officials may request assistance 

from the federal government; so federal agencies must always be 

prepared to provide support when needed. President Carter issued 

an executive order in 1979 merging many of the separate disasterrelated federal functions and creating FEMA. Following the 

terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11), the Homeland 

Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296) (Homeland Security Act) 

realigned FEMA and made it part of the newly formed Department 

of Homeland Security (DHS). 

FEMA’s statutory authority comes from the Robert T. Stafford 

Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, as amended (P.L. 

100-707) (Stafford Act), which was signed into law in 1988 and 

amended the Disaster Relief Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-288). To access 

federal assistance under the Stafford Act, states must make an 

emergency or major disaster declaration request that is reviewed 

by FEMA for presidential approval. The Stafford Act also permits 

FEMA to anticipate declarations and pre-stage federal personnel 

and resources when a disaster threatening human health and safety 

is imminent, but not yet declared. 

Hurricane Katrina, which made landfall on August 29, 2005, was 

the Nation’s most costly natural disaster, killing more than 1,800 

people, destroying 300,000 Gulf Coast homes, and displacing 

about 1 million people. It is estimated that Hurricane Katrina 

caused over $81 billion in damages. Another proxy for the 

magnitude of the storm is FEMA’s budget during Fiscal Years 

(FY) 2005 and 2006. Figure 2 reflects FEMA’s budgetary 

resources from FY 2004 to FY 2007. 

Reports issued by Congress, the White House, federal Offices of 

Inspector General, and GAO, among others, identified issues 

including questionable leadership decisions and capabilities, 

organizational failures, overwhelmed response and 

communications systems, and inadequate statutory authorities, as 

contributors to the poor response. In the wake of Hurricane 

Katrina, it became clear that FEMA’s efforts to support state and 

local emergency management and to prepare for federal response 

FEMA’s Preparedness for the Next Catastrophic Disaster 

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Figure 2: FEMA’s Budgetary Resources, Fiscal Years 2004 through 2007 

0 

10 

20 

30 

40 

50 

60 

70 

80 

90 

Dollars in Billions 

2004 2005 2006 2007 

Fiscal Year 

Source: DHS Annual Financial Report Data. Budgetary resources include unobligated balances 

carried forward; recoveries of prior year obligations; current year budget authority; and nonexpenditure transfers. 

and recovery in natural disasters were insufficient for an event of 

such catastrophic magnitude. 

As a result, Congress enacted a number of changes to enhance the 

federal government’s response capabilities for emergency 

management. In total, six statutes enacted by the 109th Congress 

contain changes that apply to future federal emergency 

management actions. While most of the laws contained relatively 

few changes to federal authorities related to emergencies and 

disasters, the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 

2006, (P.L. 109-295, Title VI – National Emergency Management, 

of the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 

2007) (Post-Katrina Act) contained many changes that have longterm consequences for FEMA and other federal entities. That 

statute reorganizes FEMA, expands its statutory authority, and 

imposes new conditions and requirements on the operations of the 

FEMA’s Preparedness for the Next Catastrophic Disaster 

Page 5 
 

Office of the Administrator

Administrator

Harvey E. Johnson 

Disaster 

Operations 

Assistant 

Administrator 

Glenn Cannon

Prog. Analysis

Director

Marko Bourne 

Office of Management

Deirdre Lee

Director 

Jonathan Thompson

Office of Chief Couns

Chief Counsel 

David Trissell 

Exec. Secretary

Elizabeth Edge 

National 

Continuity

Programs

Assistant 

Administrator 

Mitigation 

Assistant 

Administrator 

David Maursta

Assistant 

Administrator

Logistics

Management

Assistant 

Administrator 

William “Eric

Officer

Margaret Peggy Young

Associate Deputy 

Administrator

Bob Shea

Assistant 

Administrator

Lisa Lewis

Acting

National 

Preparedness 

Deputy 

Administrator 

Denis Schrader

Administratio

Assistant 

Region I 

Region II Steven Kempf 

Region III Jon Sarubbi Administrato

Region IV Major P. May 

Region V Ed Buikema Administrato

Re on VI William Peterson Office of Equal Rights 

Director 

Pauline Campbell

National Capital Regio 

Coordination

Director 

 

agency. Figure 3 shows the structure of the reorganized “New 

FEMA.” 

Figure 3: FEMA Organization 

– 

– 

Office of the Administrator 

Administrator 

Dep. Administrator/Chief Operating Officer 

Disaster 

Operations 

Assistant 

Administrator 

Office of Management 

Director/Chief Acquisition el Office of Chief Counsel Chief Counsel 

MarthaRainville 

National 

Continuity 

Programs 

Assistant 

Administrator 

d 

Mitigation 

Assistant 

Administrator 

Disaster Assistance 

Assistant 

Administrator 

” 

Smith 

Logistics 

Management 

Assistant 

Administrator 

“ ” 

Office of Chief Financial 

Officer 

Grant Programs 

Assistant 

Administrator 

National 

Preparedness 

Deputy 

Administrator 

n 

United States Fire 

Administration 

Assistant 

Administrator 

- – 

-

– – r 

- -

- - r 

gi -

Regions I – X 

Administrators 

Office of Equal Rights 

Director n 

Chris Geldart 

National Capital Region 

Coordination 

Director 

Office of Policy and 

Prog. Analysis 

Director 

Law Enforcement 

Advisor to the 

Administrator 

Gulf Coast Recovery 

Associate Deputy 

Administrator 

Executive Secretariat 

Exec. Secretary 

Office of External Affairs 

Director 

Associate Deputy 

Administrator 

Source: FEMA. Dotted lines are coordination. Solid lines are command and control. 

FEMA’s Preparedness for the Next Catastrophic Disaster 

Page 6 
 

Results of Review 

We assessed the progress that FEMA has made to improve the 

following elements of its catastrophic disaster preparedness 

initiatives: 

• Overall Planning; 

• Coordination and Support; 

• Interoperable Communications; 

• Logistics; 

• Evacuations; 

• Housing; 

• Disaster Workforce; 

• Mission Assignments; and 

• Acquisition Management. 

Overall, FEMA has made moderate progress in five of the nine key 

areas, modest progress in three areas, and limited progress in one 

area. FEMA officials said that budget shortfalls, reorganizations, 

inadequate information technology (IT) systems, and confusing or 

limited authorities negatively affected their progress. We agree 

with FEMA. FEMA would also benefit from better knowledge 

management and plans for sustaining initiatives that are underway. 

FEMA is spending millions of dollars on new initiatives and 

enhancements to its disaster management systems. These 

initiatives are critical to enhancing FEMA’s ability to better 

respond to disasters, but it is not clear that they are well-planned or 

integrated. It is also not clear that FEMA’s top management 

effectively communicates a vision and plans for these initiatives to 

staff or that there is clear ownership and accountability for each 

initiative. 

FEMA is making progress in transforming itself to be better 

prepared to lead the federal effort in responding to a catastrophic 

disaster. FEMA can build upon this progress by continuing to 

develop the nine key areas discussed in this report. 

FEMA’s Preparedness for the Next Catastrophic Disaster 

Page 7 
 

 

Overall Planning 

Background 

Homeland Security Presidential Directive-8 “National Preparedness” 

(HSPD-8) was issued on December 17, 2003. HSPD-8 established 

“policies to strengthen the preparedness of the United States to prevent 

and respond to threatened or actual domestic terrorist attacks, major 

disasters, and other emergencies by requiring a national domestic allhazards preparedness goal [bold added], establishing mechanisms for 

improved delivery of Federal preparedness assistance to State and local 

governments, and outlining actions to strengthen preparedness capabilities 

of Federal, State, and local entities.” 

The National Preparedness Guidelines (Guidelines) were released in 

September 2007. The Guidelines contain four primary elements: 

• National Preparedness Vision; 

• National Planning Scenarios; 

• Universal Task List; and 

• Target Capabilities List. 

The National Preparedness Vision, as set forth in the Guidelines, is: “A 

nation prepared with coordinated capabilities to prevent, protect against, 

respond to, and recover from all hazards in a way that balances risk with 

resources and need.” 

FEMA’s Preparedness for the Next Catastrophic Disaster 

Page 8 
The “New FEMA,” specifically the National Preparedness Directorate 

(NPD), is responsible for using the Guidelines to ensure that the Nation is 

prepared for the next disaster, whether natural or manmade. 

We reviewed five critical areas in Overall Planning in which FEMA, led 

by NPD, is focusing its efforts to respond to the next disaster: 

•	 Develop a strategic framework and guidance for integration of 

prevention, response, and recovery efforts 

•	 Complete assessments of capabilities/readiness at the 

national/state/local levels 

•	 Enhance preparedness at all levels 

•	 Enhance community preparedness 

•	 Enhance preparedness for the management and resolution of 

catastrophic events 

Develop a strategic framework 

and guidance 

Complete assessments of 

capabilities/readiness 

Enhance preparedness at all 

levels 

Enhance preparedness for the management 

and resolution of catastrophic events Enhance community preparedness 

Critical Components 

Develop a strategic framework and guidance (Moderate) – NPD is charged 

with developing a single, strategic framework for integration of 

prevention, response, and recovery efforts of FEMA’s various offices and 

programs. The strategic framework and guidance under development are 

based on HSPD-8, but officials said they currently have to work from 

“dozens of different national strategies and directives.” Reconciling 

FEMA’s Preparedness for the Next Catastrophic Disaster 

Page 9 
multiple sources of guidance hinders achieving “strategic coherence,” i.e., 

coherence among peer strategic documents or generations of documents. 

However, FEMA does consider grants one area of growing success in 

using strategic guidance to steer the use of federal funds toward the 

National Preparedness Vision. NPD officials said they are seeing results 

in states’ investments of core capabilities. 

Complete assessments of capabilities/readiness (Modest) – NPD is 

currently working to conduct assessments of capabilities and readiness at 

the national, state, and local levels, but the “assessment problem” is 

complex. NPD said the assessment task was understated in HSPD-8. The 

comprehensive state assessment effort currently underway is unique, and 

according to NPD officials, questions remain about how to collect the 

right information without undue burden on the states. 

NPD officials said that the assessment they are prototyping (a selfassessment) is only one of four components of a comprehensive 

assessment. Three additional elements are necessary: peer reviews, 

compliance monitoring, and exercise/corrective action programs. FEMA 

officials did not say when any of these three remaining elements might be 

implemented. 

NPD finished testing a prototype assessment in December 2007. 

Conducting the assessments nationwide will require coordination, 

especially among federal, state, local, and tribal governments, and the 

private sector. NPD officials said that performing nationwide assessments 

will be expensive and will require dedicated program support and funding. 

The office with principal responsibility for the assessments has a small 

budget and no separate appropriation, and it did not receive the level of 

staffing requested. NPD has tried to leverage its funding by augmenting 

its own staff with working groups and contractors, and programs such as 

the DHS Science & Technology Centers of Excellence and the Homeland 

Security Institute. NPD officials said that their past progress was affected 

by: 

•	 Not having all of the people involved with National Preparedness 

efforts in one place within the DHS organizational structure; 

•	 Friction between FEMA and the former DHS Preparedness 

Directorate; and 

•	 Disruption of their analytical resources. 

FEMA’s Preparedness for the Next Catastrophic Disaster 

Page 10 
 

 

The preparedness realignment prompted by the Post-Katrina Act has 

consolidated preparedness activities, and NPD officials said they believe 

they are now on the path to achieving unity of effort. 

Enhance preparedness at all levels (Moderate) – NPD officials said that 

while there is a long history of recovery and response planning, the 

preparedness and protection mission areas are just being built, and these 

areas and their preparedness requirements are still being defined. The 

challenge is mostly cultural; for example, federal efforts focus primarily 

on planning for low probability but high consequence events, e.g., a 

catastrophic hurricane; while state, local, and tribal efforts tend to focus on 

events that are more probable but are usually not as damaging, e.g., local 

flooding or auto accidents. The National Response Framework (NRF) 

stresses the important balance between these two planning structures. 

NPD is currently revising a guide for state and local emergency planning, 

coordinating with core groups and other agencies to plan for a range of 

potential events. 

The NRF, which is intended to guide all-hazards response, was issued on 

January 22, 2008, with an effective date of March 22, 2008. Officials said 

that in response to criticism that the first draft excluded stakeholders’ 

concerns, the drafting process was made more inclusive. More than 4,000 

individuals participated in briefings, conferences, and training; and 

hundreds of agencies and individuals provided suggestions for changes. 

In working to enhance preparedness, NPD officials face both budget and 

staffing challenges. The directorate faces an approximately one-quarter 

vacancy rate, attributable to the temporary effect of realignment and 

significant workforce attrition. NPD officials said they have the necessary 

authorities and policies, but they lack the resources to get the job done. 

Enhance community preparedness (Moderate) – Since 9/11, there has been 

increased recognition of the role citizens play in protecting the homeland 

and supporting first responders. After Hurricane Katrina, the White House 

recommended that “DHS should make citizen and community 

preparedness a National priority.”1

 Implementation of National Priority 8, 

“Community Preparedness: Strengthening Planning and Citizen 

Capabilities,” is the responsibility of the Community Preparedness 

Division (CPD) of the NPD. Three of CPD’s community preparedness 

initiatives are: 

• Assessing and strengthening community preparedness; 

1 The Federal Response to Katrina: Lessons Learned (The White House, February 2006), p. 121. 

FEMA’s Preparedness for the Next Catastrophic Disaster 

Page 11 
 

•	 Leading strategic coordination and integration of community 

preparedness efforts; and 

•	 Initiating partnerships for preparedness research. 

A primary goal of CPD is to ensure that community preparedness is 

included in a consistent way in policy, guidance, training, and exercises. 

Officials said that while the inclusion of citizen preparedness as a National 

Priority was a significant step, this is an ongoing challenge that requires 

actively seeking out “points of cooperation” and educating DHS and 

FEMA staff on the significant value of community preparedness and 

planning. 

Key to the effort of coordinating and integrating community preparedness 

efforts is the Citizen Corps program. Citizen Corps was launched in 2002 

and has grown to include a nationwide network of over 2,300 state, 

territorial, tribal, and local Councils. CPD is tasked with coordinating the 

Citizen Corps initiative at the federal level. Specific efforts underway 

include developing and providing national guidance, tools, and training for 

Citizen Corps Councils to support community preparedness and resiliency; 

and strengthening the National Citizen Corps Council. 

As with the other areas, budget and staffing affect the success of CPD’s 

efforts. The office is very small and has a very lean budget. Additionally, 

long delays in getting Office of Management and Budget (OMB) approval 

for data collection have hindered state and local data collection and 

research efforts. 

Another challenge is that multiple offices within DHS have responsibility 

for elements of community preparedness and partnerships with nongovernmental entities. Perhaps as an outgrowth of the previous separation 

of preparedness functions within DHS, other offices develop and support 

related preparedness education for individuals and preparedness planning 

activities for communities. For example, the Ready campaign2

 is 

coordinated by the DHS Office of Public Affairs, there is a Center for 

Faith-Based and Community Initiatives in FEMA, and a Private Sector 

Office in both FEMA and DHS. Some officials said it might be more 

effective to place the responsibility for all community preparedness and 

nongovernmental partnership efforts in a single office. 

2

 According to a DHS Fact Sheet, Ready, a national public service advertising campaign launched in 

February 2003, is “designed to educate and empower Americans to prepare for and respond to emergencies 

including natural disasters and potential terrorist attacks. The goal of the campaign is to get the public 

involved and ultimately to increase the level of basic preparedness across the nation.” 

FEMA’s Preparedness for the Next Catastrophic Disaster 

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Enhance preparedness for the management and resolution of catastrophic 

events (Moderate) – NPD officials discussed several planning efforts 

underway that will enhance preparedness for catastrophic events, 

including in the Gulf Coast, Florida, the New Madrid seismic zone, and 

Tier 1 Urban Areas. NPD is responsible for enhancing preparedness 

through catastrophic planning, but the Disaster Operations Directorate is 

carrying out the actual planning efforts, with input from FEMA’s Disaster 

Assistance and Mitigation Directorates. The Florida and New Madrid 

efforts are the largest of the initiatives. The Florida effort focuses on a 

catastrophic hurricane striking Southern Florida – a “notice” event; and 

the New Madrid effort plans for a catastrophic earthquake along the New 

Madrid fault – a “no-notice” event. 

FEMA has made and is making significant progress. The primary 

problem, in our opinion, is that the planning efforts discussed above are 

very geocentric. For example, the Florida effort may put that state and 

region in a much better position should a hurricane strike, but if the next 

catastrophic hurricane hits some other major region along the Gulf or 

Atlantic coast, it will not be of much help. Disaster Operations officials 

said that the plans are not very transferrable among jurisdictions; however, 

they also said that these planning efforts can provide a foundation for 

additional planning. 

Continuing Concerns 

Planning is the foundation of FEMA’s preparedness efforts, yet budget 

and staffing shortfalls and continuing reorganizations across FEMA 

hamper progress. FEMA does not yet have a strategic plan guiding NPD 

efforts, which would help in prioritizing needs and ensuring that efforts 

are well-planned and executed.3 Additionally, the expense of conducting 

state assessments may prevent their completion. 

Given that individual citizens’ preparedness can greatly enhance or 

hamper response, community preparedness planning should receive 

adequate funding and staff, and be better integrated into planning 

programs. Consideration should also be given to whether all community 

and individual preparedness programs should be coordinated by a single 

office in DHS or FEMA. 

3 We received a draft document from DHS entitled “Integrated Planning System” (Draft Version 1.4) just 

prior to finalizing this report; however, it is labeled a “Pre-Decisional Working Paper” that is not yet 

finalized. 

FEMA’s Preparedness for the Next Catastrophic Disaster 

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OIG Planned Work and Areas for Continuing Oversight 

In 2008, we plan to review the development of FEMA’s plans, policies, 

and procedures that will be used to prepare for, respond to, and recover 

from a disaster. This will include the ongoing development and 

implementation of the NRF and its annexes, efforts to enhance community 

preparedness, and further catastrophic planning. 

For this and all other areas covered in the report, we are prepared to 

deploy to Joint Field Offices to provide independent and objective advice 

to FEMA officials and to identify, document, and review potential FEMA 

and state disaster management problems and issues. 

FEMA’s Preparedness for the Next Catastrophic Disaster 

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Coordination and Support 

Background 

Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, efforts were 

undertaken to develop a national planning framework for emergency 

management. The result of this effort was the creation of the National 

Response Plan (NRP). The purpose of the NRP was to establish a 

comprehensive, national, all-hazards approach to domestic incident 

management across a spectrum of activities including prevention, 

preparedness, response, and recovery. In May 2005, when DHS released 

the NRP, it superseded the Federal Response Plan, U.S. Government 

Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan, and Federal Radiological 

Emergency Response Plan. 

In August 2005, the NRP was used in response to Hurricane Katrina, but it 

fell far short of the seamless, coordinated effort that had been envisioned 

at its creation. Problems ranging from poor coordination of federal 

support, to confusion about the roles and authorities of incident managers, 

to inadequate information sharing among responders all plagued the 

response to this catastrophic disaster. Of particular concern was confusion 

about the respective roles, responsibilities, and authorities of the Principal 

Federal Official (PFO) and the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO). 

To assess FEMA’s readiness to respond to a future catastrophic disaster, 

we assessed efforts to: 

FEMA’s Preparedness for the Next Catastrophic Disaster 

Page 15 
 

 

•	 Implement the new NRF and Specific Operational Plans 

•	 Clarify the roles, responsibilities, and authorities of the PFO and FCO 

•	 Provide law enforcement access to FEMA records in support of 

Emergency Support Function - 13 (ESF-13), Public Safety and 

Security 

Implement the new NRF and 

Specific Operational Plans 

Clarify the roles, responsibilities, 

and authorities of the PFO and 

FCO 

Provide law enforcement access 

to FEMA records 

Critical Components 

Implement the new National Response Framework and Specific 

Operational Plans (Modest) – A revised NRP incorporating lessons 

learned from the 2005 hurricane season was released 9 months after 

Hurricane Katrina, with additional revisions issued several months later. 

In September 2006, DHS initiated another revision process of both the 

NRP and the National Incident Management System (NIMS). FEMA 

officials said they reviewed several thousand comments on the newly 

named National Response Framework prior to releasing it on January 22, 

2008. However, FEMA’s National Advisory Council was not established 

in time to have meaningful input into the development of the NRF. 

As part of the National Preparedness Guidelines, DHS developed 15 

National Planning Scenarios to establish the range of response 

requirements to facilitate preparedness planning. However, FEMA 

officials said that operational plans, which build on the National Planning 

Scenarios and govern the response to disasters, have not been finalized. 

FEMA officials told us the DHS Operations Coordination Directorate has 

responsibility for strategic level planning, whereas FEMA coordinates 

interagency and intergovernmental concept of operations (CONOPS) and 

operational planning. The NRF describes interoperability and 

collaboration as a critical aspect of successful response planning. 

Clarify the roles, responsibilities, and authorities of the Principal Federal 

Official and Federal Coordinating Officer (Moderate) – According to the 

recently released NRF, the Secretary of Homeland Security is the PFO 

FEMA’s Preparedness for the Next Catastrophic Disaster 

Page 16 
 

responsible for management of domestic incidents, and the FEMA 

Administrator is the principal advisor to the President, the Secretary of 

Homeland Security, and the Homeland Security Council on all matters 

regarding emergency management. The Secretary may elect to designate 

a single individual to serve as PFO to ensure consistency of federal 

support as well as the overall effectiveness of the federal incident 

management. According to the NRF, for Stafford Act incidents, upon the 

recommendation of the FEMA Administrator and the Secretary of 

Homeland Security, the President appoints an FCO to coordinate federal 

support in response to and recovery from emergencies and major 

disasters.4 The FCO represents the FEMA Administrator in the field to 

discharge all FEMA responsibilities for response, recovery and mitigation 

programs. 

FEMA officials said that they are confident the NRF clarifies the role of 

the PFO. FEMA said, “... the PFO, as the Secretary’s personal 

representative, provides the Secretary with real-time situational awareness 

concerning the overall status of the incident, the involvement of Federal 

departments and agencies across all mission areas, and the level of 

coordination among senior Federal officials, and officials of state, local, 

territorial, and tribal governments, nongovernmental organizations, and 

the media. The PFO can make the Secretary aware of any coordination 

breakdowns that may require intervention by executive officials of federal 

departments and agencies, and assist in elevating issues of national 

priority or with national policy implications to interagency bodies charged 

with addressing those matters.”5 

While FEMA officials stressed their confidence in the PFO/FCO 

clarification, there has been little time to assess whether the clarification is 

well understood by emergency management practitioners and other 

stakeholders. It will take additional exercises or an actual disaster before 

we will know for certain whether the roles are sufficiently clarified and 

understood in the field. 

Provide law enforcement access to FEMA records (Substantial) – 

Immediately after Hurricane Katrina, concerns were raised about data 

sharing between law enforcement agencies and FEMA. Months after 

Hurricane Katrina made landfall, DHS and the Department of Justice 

(DOJ) executed an agreement providing law enforcement officials direct 

access to FEMA disaster recovery assistance files for fraud investigations. 

4

 The provision of the Stafford Act regarding appointment of the FCO reads, “immediately upon his 

declaration of a major disaster or emergency, the President shall appoint a Federal coordinating officer to
 

operate in the affected area.” 

5 Written response from FEMA’s National Preparedness Directorate, received November 28, 2007. 

FEMA’s Preparedness for the Next Catastrophic Disaster 

Page 17 
 

 

 

In January 2007, DHS and DOJ executed an access agreement for the 

purpose of locating missing children displaced due to disasters. Recently, 

FEMA officials said that a third agreement was executed with the United 

States Marshals Service, which grants limited access to disaster assistance 

records for the purposes of locating sex offenders and apprehending 

fleeing felons in the aftermath of a disaster. FEMA said that establishing 

protocols, procedures, and processes with DOJ to improve data access and 

information sharing is 75% complete. 

Continuing Concerns 

The operational plans that govern the federal response to a disaster are 

incomplete or have not been adequately reviewed or tested. Also, a single 

planning system has not been finalized to ensure the integration of 

strategic, concept, and operational planning across all levels of national 

preparedness. 

OIG Planned Work and Areas for Continuing Oversight 

In FY 2008, we will continue to review FEMA readiness and assess its 

capabilities to respond to the next catastrophic disaster. We plan to 

determine to what extent FEMA has assessed its capabilities to respond to 

a catastrophic disaster and how it has used its readiness goals and 

performance measures in the process. We will also review FEMA’s 

Remedial Action Management Program (RAMP) to determine to what 

extent FEMA is using RAMP to implement lessons learned from disasters 

and exercises, which will include a focus on communications and 

information sharing. 

FEMA’s Preparedness for the Next Catastrophic Disaster 

Page 18 
 

 

 

Interoperable Communications 

Background 

Hurricane Katrina caused significant damages and outages to the entire 

telecommunications infrastructure in the Gulf region, seriously delaying 

reporting and coordination, and consequently affecting the efficiency and 

effectiveness of response efforts. Communication among those 

responding to a disaster is an essential element of a successful response 

and recovery effort, yet it is generally recognized that the inability to 

communicate effectively was one of the major impediments to Hurricane 

Katrina response efforts. The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 

Upon the United States (9-11 Commission) had previously identified 

interoperable communications between emergency responders as a major 

challenge. 

Subsequent to Hurricane Katrina, numerous reports and recommendations 

identified a wide range of necessary corrective actions related to 

interoperability, ranging from improved planning to coordination between 

all levels of government and the private sector to operational 

enhancements, such as technological improvements emphasizing wireless 

communications. The President’s National Security Telecommunications 

Advisory Committee reported in January 2007 that interoperability 

challenges recognized after 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina included a lack of 

interoperable equipment at the tactical level, ineffective use of available 

communications assets caused by poor resource planning, and an overall 

lack of integrated command structures to enable interoperability. 

FEMA’s Preparedness for the Next Catastrophic Disaster 

Page 19 
 

 

 

Multiple components within DHS and FEMA have roles and 

responsibilities for improving interoperable communications, which is a 

vital element of disaster response. Also, the duties of the FEMA 

Administrator, as described in the NRF and Post-Katrina Act, include 

preparation for all-hazard incidents and helping ensure the acquisition of 

operable and interoperable communications capabilities by federal, state, 

local, and tribal governments and emergency response providers. We 

assessed the following critical areas: 

•	 Achieve coordination among all DHS components charged with 

improving interoperable communications 

•	 Ensure federal disaster communications and operating procedures are 

in place for disaster response and recovery 

•	 Manage federal interoperable communication grants and programs 

Achieve coordination among Ensure federal disaster Manage federal communications assets and interoperable communication all DHS components procedures are in place grants and programs 

Critical Components 

Achieve coordination among all DHS components charged with 

improving interoperable communications (Modest) – Actions taken by 

DHS to improve disaster response communications and interoperability 

involved a major reorganization of DHS components charged with 

advancing communications interoperability. DHS must achieve 

coordination among all its components, including FEMA, charged with 

improving interoperable communications, especially with respect to 

planning and establishing lines of authority, roles, and responsibilities, if 

success is to be achieved. However, currently there is no single entity to 

coordinate the ongoing interoperability activities and initiatives. 

DHS established the Office of Emergency Communications (OEC) to 

support “the Secretary of Homeland Security in developing, 

implementing, and coordinating interoperable and operable 

communications for the emergency response community at all levels of 

FEMA’s Preparedness for the Next Catastrophic Disaster 

Page 20 
 

government.”6 OEC assumed three major programs from other DHS 

components: 

•	 The wireless communications programs under the Integrated 

Wireless Network (IWN); 

•	 The Interoperable Communications Technical Assistance Program 

(ICTAP); and 

•	 Aspects of the SAFECOM7 program. 

OEC’s goal is to better integrate DHS’ emergency communications 

planning, preparedness, protection, crisis management, and recovery 

capabilities, including attainment of interoperable and emergency 

communications nationwide. 

The Command Control and Interoperability Division, within DHS’ 

Science and Technology Directorate, retained responsibilities for research 

and development, testing and evaluation, and standards for the SAFECOM 

program through the Office for Interoperability and Compatibility (OIC). 

Other programs for which OIC had responsibility were transferred to other 

DHS components. FEMA is responsible for administering interoperability 

grants and training. The overarching challenge is to achieve coordination 

among all of these programs and offices to foster advancement and avoid 

duplicating efforts. 

The Post-Katrina Act required the development of a National 

Communications Baseline Assessment to identify needed capabilities of 

first responders, assess current capabilities, identify gaps and obstacles, 

and establish a national interoperable emergency communications 

inventory. OEC is currently conducting this assessment. 

DHS officials told us the National Communications Baseline Assessment 

would provide the first comprehensive assessment of emergency 

communications capabilities, including operability and interoperability, 

across all levels of government. This assessment is intended to 

incorporate information from the federal perspective, to show the full 

scope and scale of interoperable emergency communications nationwide. 

The final assessment and recommendations are expected in May 2008 and 

will be used to develop the National Emergency Communications Plan. 

6

 http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/gc_1189774174005.shtm.
 7

 SAFECOM is a DHS program to provide “research, development, testing and evaluation, guidance, tools, 

and templates on interoperable communications-related issues to local, tribal, state, and federal emergency 

response agencies” (http://www.safecomprogram.gov/SAFECOM/). 

FEMA’s Preparedness for the Next Catastrophic Disaster 

Page 21 
It is important to note that although technological improvements are 

important, cultural issues related to coordination and cooperation among 

emergency responders, and standard operating procedures and guidelines, 

are an equal or greater challenge. 

FEMA is developing disaster emergency communications policies and 

procedures to facilitate effective emergency management, operability, and 

interoperability during catastrophic events. However, achieving effective 

coordination among all DHS components specifically charged with 

improving interoperable communications remains difficult. Each 

organization continues to operate independently within the limits of its 

own authorities established during the DHS reorganization. According to 

the Post-Katrina Act, the FEMA Administrator shall provide federal 

leadership necessary to prepare for, protect against, respond to, recover 

from, or mitigate against a natural disaster, act of terrorism, or other manmade disaster. However, FEMA officials said they need specific authority 

to coordinate with and direct DHS components providing emergency 

communications during disasters to achieve substantial progress in this 

critical area. 

Ensure federal disaster communications assets and operating procedures 

are in place (Moderate) – FEMA officials said there is a renewed 

commitment to make emergency communications a core competency of 

the agency. The Disaster Operations Directorate is responsible for disaster 

interoperable communications, including tactical and operational 

functions, such as those provided by the Mobile Emergency Response 

Support (MERS). MERS provides mobile telecommunications, life and 

operational support, and power generation required for the onsite 

management of response activities. MERS capabilities are being 

enhanced to provide assistance to a wider geographic area and assist with 

the restoration of disaster area communications within 96 hours. It is 

anticipated that Incident Response Vehicles with expanded 

communications capabilities will be available in each of FEMA’s 10 

regions. FEMA continues to work with state, local, and tribal entities on 

interoperability plans, available equipment, and multi-jurisdictional 

interoperability. 

FEMA officials said that the agency has hosted or participated in a number 

of conferences and exercises to share technological resources and 

knowledge, and practice interoperability across the full spectrum of 

disaster response operations using deployable systems of partner 

organizations and first responders. FEMA also has created the Disaster 

Emergency Communications Division and intends to be an informed and 

FEMA’s Preparedness for the Next Catastrophic Disaster 

Page 22 
 

 

engaged advocate for disaster emergency communications issues and the 

communications needs of emergency responders. 

Manage interoperable communication grants and programs (Moderate) – 

From FY 2003 through FY 2006, DHS awarded approximately $2.9 

billion in grants to enhance state and local interoperable communications 

efforts. An additional $1 billion will be distributed through the Public 

Safety Interoperable Communication Grant Program. 

There are no fewer than 10 federal interoperability initiatives underway.8 

In light of the importance of interoperability and such large expenditures 

to strengthen it, the effective management of federal interoperability 

grants and programs is essential. 

Continuing Concerns 

A number of outstanding issues regarding interoperable communications 

need to be addressed. First, a number of DHS components have specific 

roles and responsibilities for improving interoperability, yet there is no 

single mechanism in place to link and orchestrate the numerous programs 

and initiatives underway, nor is there a clear line of accountability. 

Second, OEC is currently operating with a skeletal, full-time equivalent 

staff. OEC has assumed a large portion of responsibilities and programs 

directed at improving interoperable communications, and it requires 

additional staff and an adequate budget. Completion of the National 

Communications Baseline Assessment, incorporation of federal 

interoperability into SAFECOM, and the acquisition of additional MERS 

and Incident Response Vehicles are outstanding issues that need to be 

addressed before the next catastrophic disaster. 

OIG Planned Work and Areas for Continuing Oversight 

OIG will conduct an inspection to determine how effectively FEMA and 

the National Protection and Programs Directorate coordinate challenges 

with respect to overlapping or shared responsibilities. We also plan to 

review OneNet, a single network that DHS is deploying to support 

interoperability and data sharing, to determine DHS’ progress in 

consolidating its networks onto OneNet to achieve operational efficiencies 

8

 Interoperability programs and initiatives include: Statewide Communications Interoperability Planning 

Methodology; Regional Communications Interoperability Pilots; RapidCom 1; Interoperability Continuum; 

SAFECOM Grant Guidance; Statement of Requirements for Emergency Response Communications; 

Public Safety Architecture Framework; Standards Acceleration for Interoperable Communications; Tactical 

Interoperable Communications Plans; Public Safety Interoperable Communication Grant Program; and, 

Emergency Support Function-2, Communications. 

FEMA’s Preparedness for the Next Catastrophic Disaster 

Page 23 
and cost savings. We initiated an audit in January 2008 to determine the 

extent to which FEMA effectively manages grant resources to provide 

sufficient financial and programmatic monitoring of all grants, including 

interoperability grants. 

FEMA’s Preparedness for the Next Catastrophic Disaster 

Page 24 
Logistics
 

Background 

In April 2007, as part of the FEMA reorganization, logistics was elevated 

from a branch to a directorate-level program office – the Logistics 

Management Directorate. Logistics is the agency’s major program office 

responsible for logistics policy, guidance, standards, execution, and 

governance of logistics support, services, and operations. Its mission is to 

effectively plan, manage, and sustain the national logistics response and 

recovery operations, in support of domestic emergencies and special 

events. Logistics is organized around four core competencies: 

• Logistics Operations; 

• Logistics Plans and Exercises; 

• Distribution Management; and 

• Property Management. 

In times of domestic disasters, FEMA’s logistics responsibilities include 

acquiring, receiving, storing, shipping, tracking, sustaining, and 

recovering commodities, assets, and property. 

Logistics’ ability to track commodities is one of the keys to fulfilling its 

mission. The disasters of 2004 and 2005 highlighted FEMA’s lack of 

standardized policies and procedures, as well as inconsistencies stemming 

from multiple, independent computer and paper-based systems that 

generated incompatible tracking numbers not readily crossed-referenced. 

During Hurricane Katrina, FEMA largely relied on the Logistics 

Information Management System (LIMS) for property management, and 

FEMA’s Preparedness for the Next Catastrophic Disaster 

Page 25 
manual spreadsheets and paper processes, telephones, faxes, and emails to 

track and gain visibility over commodities movements. 

FEMA management is focused on improving the logistics core 

competencies to a level that will effectively and efficiently respond to a 

catastrophic disaster. We reviewed two critical areas to gain a sense of 

FEMA’s progress in efforts to: 

• Establish total asset visibility (TAV) 

• Improve pre-positioning of commodities 

Establish total asset visibility Improve pre-positioning of 

commodities 

Critical Components 

Establish total asset visibility (Moderate) – After the 2004 hurricane 

season, FEMA recognized a need for an improved TAV program. At the 

time Hurricane Katrina struck, however, the TAV program was not fully 

tested. Prior to 2004, FEMA had invested in multiple systems to support 

its unique inventory needs, but they were not well integrated, often 

overlapping and duplicating efforts. 

At the end of 2004, FEMA initiated the TAV concept and system, which 

incorporated an automated system to improve visibility via Global 

Positioning System (GPS) tracking technology, to give FEMA visibility 

over the supply chain from inventory to delivery. FEMA planned to roll 

out the pilot TAV system (Phase 1) in 2005, but this was delayed when 

Hurricane Katrina struck, and the roll-out did not occur until February 

2006. Currently, the TAV system is able to track the movement of more 

than 200 types of assets and commodities, with a primary focus on the 

“Big 8” commodities: water, emergency meals (MREs), blue roof plastic 

sheeting, tarps, cots, blankets, temporary housing units, and emergency 

FEMA’s Preparedness for the Next Catastrophic Disaster 

Page 26 
 

 

generators. However, FEMA personnel said that there are many gaps in 

the system. The current TAV system capability integrates a suite of 

systems to provide order visibility, order management, and in-transit 

visibility. FEMA is using the TAV system at FEMA headquarters and all 

10 regions, plus a warehouse management system at distribution centers in 

Atlanta, Georgia and Fort Worth, Texas. 

FEMA personnel said that two of the primary challenges to improving the 

TAV system are retaining a sufficient amount of staffing and overcoming 

TAV user resistance from the field. Officials said that field resistance is 

being addressed by increasing communications throughout FEMA and by 

providing role-based training.9 

Improve pre-positioning of commodities (Moderate) – The specific type 

and quantity of commodities and support assets that the public will need in 

the aftermath of a disaster or other incident varies, but emergency 

response experience indicates some common needs. These include water 

(usually bottled), MREs, cots, blankets, tarps, and emergency generators. 

Typically, state and local governments meet their initial citizens’ needs for 

common commodities, but when state and local governments’ capabilities 

are exceeded, the state may request FEMA’s assistance. FEMA personnel 

said they did have supplies pre-positioned during the 2005 hurricane 

season, but the quantities were insufficient and delivery was not timely. 

In preparation for the 2006 hurricane season, FEMA pre-deployed more 

than 1,000 tractor-trailers containing disaster response supplies to 

hurricane prone states. The pre-deployment was undertaken despite the 

knowledge that some supplies were at risk, especially perishable items 

stored in non-temperature-controlled trailers in extreme heat. After the 

2006 hurricane season, Logistics reevaluated and modified its prepositioning planning and strategy for the 2007 season. Logistics estimated 

that to pre-position commodities in the 11 hurricane prone states alone 

would cost $357 million.10 FEMA has determined through in-depth 

analysis that pre-positioning commodities is not logistically prudent nor an 

effective use of taxpayer funds. Instead, FEMA is increasing its emphasis 

on identifying alternatives for meeting support requirements in a timely 

manner by strengthening relationships with public and private sector 

partners such as the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), U.S. Army Corps 

9

 In a separate audit being conducted by our office, auditors were told by FEMA field staff that “resistance” 

stems from the TAV system not meeting their functional requirements. Field staff said that they were 

optimistic about TAV and anxious to use it, but the system needs further development before it will 

perform as necessary without requiring augmentation from other systems. 

10 This figure includes estimated costs for commodities in Regions I, II, III, IV, and VI, and transportation
 

costs in Regions IV and VI. 

FEMA’s Preparedness for the Next Catastrophic Disaster 

Page 27 
of Engineers (USACE), American Red Cross, and General Services 

Administration (GSA). It has set a goal to support 1 million people and 

20,000 federal responders within 72 hours of a “no-notice” event. 

Interagency agreements are expected to provide FEMA with MREs, fuel, 

ice, medical supplies, water, cots, blankets, tarps, and heavy equipment. 

In an effort to develop a more responsive, flexible, and sustainable supply 

chain management strategy, Logistics established a Distribution 

Management Strategy Working Group. The Working Group has begun to 

galvanize the national logistics response partner community and is 

developing and documenting an integrated national policy and strategy for 

managing and controlling inventory, strategic positioning, and distribution 

of critical commodities, resources, equipment and services. The Working 

Group will support Logistics as the National Logistics Coordinator (NLC), 

which will collaborate with other federal agencies such as GSA, 

Department of Defense (DOD), DLA, Department of Health and Human 

Services, USACE, and Department of Agriculture, in addition to public 

and private sector partners, nongovernmental organizations, and other 

stakeholders, ensuring a fully coordinated and effective service and 

support capability. A NLC kick-off forum is scheduled for the end of 

March 2008 to develop a mission statement, discuss ongoing logistics 

challenges, and form integrated working subgroups to identify and 

develop solutions. 

Continuing Concerns 

Logistics has made progress in a number of areas but still needs to develop 

standardized policies and procedures, effective internal controls, and 

sufficient funding and resources. 

OIG Planned Work and Areas for Continuing Oversight 

Our work plan for FY 2008 includes reviews on the extent of 

improvements made in logistics management since Hurricane Katrina and 

what additional changes are needed, including how FEMA will: 

• Determine what is needed and where it is needed; 

• Coordinate requirements with state and local governments; 

• Coordinate with federal agencies and other response organizations; 

• Identify the best sources for needed resources; 

• Track deliveries; 

• Maintain adequate logistics staffing; 

• Communicate throughout the logistics process; and 

FEMA’s Preparedness for the Next Catastrophic Disaster 

Page 28 
• Evaluate and report on their performance. 

We also are planning an audit to determine the effectiveness of FEMA’s 

plans and approaches to reengineering its disaster-related logistics 

processes and improving the capabilities for supporting IT systems. 

FEMA’s Preparedness for the Next Catastrophic Disaster 

Page 29 
Evacuations 

Background 

Initial responsibility for the evacuation of individuals from disaster areas 

lies with state and local government. However, when state and local 

emergency management systems become overwhelmed, an affected state, 

through the authorities provided by the Stafford Act, may request 

assistance from FEMA. This assistance may include the reimbursement of 

costs incurred by the state or may include direct assistance such as 

providing buses, trains, and air ambulances for evacuation. In the 

aftermath of hurricanes Katrina and Rita, it became apparent the federal 

government might need to put resources into place proactively when state 

and local governments delay or are unable to request assistance. 

According to one FEMA official, the agency is now working to better 

position itself to provide “accelerated federal assistance” to respond to a 

disaster. FEMA is also working with state and local officials to identify 

shortcomings in existing evacuation plans and find ways to mitigate those 

shortcomings prior to a disaster. 

There is no one office at FEMA responsible for federal evacuation 

planning and operational efforts. Responsibility spans several 

directorates, including Logistics, Disaster Operations, and Disaster 

Assistance, as well as the Office of Acquisition Management. For this 

reason, it was difficult to gain a clear picture of FEMA’s progress in 

preparing for a future disaster in the area of evacuations. 

FEMA’s Preparedness for the Next Catastrophic Disaster 

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We gathered information on several specific planning initiatives underway 

in the area of evacuations. Catastrophic planning initiatives were 

discussed above in the section on Overall Planning. We also reviewed the 

following specific initiatives: 

•	 Develop Gap Analysis Program (GAP) 

•	 Enhance Gulf Coast Mass Evacuation Capability Enhancement 

Initiative 

Gap Analysis Program Gulf Coast Mass Evacuation 

Capability Enhancement Initiative 

Critical Components 

Develop Gap Analysis Program (Moderate) – GAP, which began in 

February 2007, focuses on gathering information needed to ensure 

operational readiness at the local, state, and federal levels. It serves as the 

starting point for planning efforts, beginning at the local level and working 

up through the states, to FEMA regions, and then to FEMA Headquarters 

entities. The first iteration of the GAP, conducted in 18 states, was 

completed in preparation for the 2007 hurricane season. It focused on 

seven critical areas where needs of citizens must be addressed in the first 

72 hours after a disaster: mass evacuation, sheltering, interim housing, 

fuel distribution, commodities distribution, debris removal, and medical 

needs. Interoperable communications was considered for inclusion, but it 

was left out because this area is being covered by different assessment 

efforts. For the 2008 assessment, officials decided to drop interim housing 

since it is not actually necessary in the first 72 hours, and they added 

search and rescue. 

While the first iteration of GAP was completed in time for the 2007 

hurricane season, officials recognized that there might be inaccuracies in 

the data. FEMA officials said some states may have downplayed their 

assets and capabilities, thinking this would qualify them for additional 

federal funding. Other states may have overstated their assets and 

FEMA’s Preparedness for the Next Catastrophic Disaster 

Page 31 
capabilities, not wanting it known that they were not well prepared. 

Regardless of data accuracy, officials said they believe the GAP 

succeeded in prompting many state and local officials to think about their 

own response strategies and their expectations of assistance from other 

governmental entities. 

Besides providing data on state and local capabilities, officials said GAP is 

helping to build trust between local, state, and federal partners. GAP is 

also helping officials at all levels of government to identify options, as 

well as manage expectations for what assistance other governmental 

entities will be able to provide to them. FEMA officials stated that, in the 

past, some states saw FEMA as a “department store,” in that they could 

expect to get what they needed, when they needed it. GAP gives FEMA 

officials a better idea of what preparations state and local governments 

have made, what assets they have, and where additional assistance might 

be needed. With needs identified, FEMA can tap into its interagency 

partners to arrange additional assistance. 

Officials indicated that GAP is a high priority in the budget but, as with 

other initiatives, more money, people, and time are needed. A lack of 

funding, which results in a lack of staffing, has slowed down the 

completion of the first round of GAP analyses for all states. Officials said 

they have the authority they need to carry out the GAP analyses, but they 

expressed frustrations in the area of IT. They do not have a dedicated IT 

staff for GAP, and they have been told they must use in-house IT support 

even though they believe they could get better IT support, including better 

analysis tools, by using a contractor. 

Enhance Gulf Coast Mass Evacuation Capability Enhancement Initiative 

(Substantial) – The Gulf Coast Mass Evacuation Capability Enhancement 

Initiative was a structured program, carried out between April 2007 and 

July 2007, that targeted the Gulf Coast region’s (excluding Florida) 

evacuation needs. Hurricane Katrina demonstrated a number of 

evacuation challenges, including ensuring adequate transportation for 

evacuees, ensuring other states’ willingness to accept evacuees, and 

coordinating resources, including buses and other modes of transportation, 

to ensure that localities were not relying on the same resources in their 

individual evacuation plans. 

A FEMA team, comprising Region IV and Region VI personnel, and 

supplemented with contractors, worked with state officials in states that 

might need to evacuate citizens and in states that might be in a position to 

host evacuees, to determine where and how citizens would be moved. The 

goal was to develop an organized plan for evacuating states and to have 

FEMA’s Preparedness for the Next Catastrophic Disaster 

Page 32 
state-to-state agreements in place for transporting and sheltering evacuees. 

For example, Louisiana and Alabama came to agreement on how they 

would handle evacuees between the two states. An important by-product 

of the initiative was starting a dialogue with and between states to discuss 

their planning shortcomings and how states could help one another. 

Since the initiative was a one-time planning effort that is now complete, 

the responsibility for continuing the planning process will fall to FEMA’s 

regional offices. For planning to proceed from the FEMA Headquarters 

level, additional funding would be necessary. This initiative merits the 

rating of substantial progress; however, despite repeated requests, FEMA 

has not yet provided us with the final report, i.e., briefing slides, on this 

project. Consequently, we cannot opine with certainty that this initiative 

met its intended results. 

Continuing Concerns 

The two programs highlighted above have helped FEMA in assessing 

evacuation needs and enhancing evacuation planning. However, adequate 

funding for continuing evacuation planning is an issue. Additionally, 

because of the multiple offices and disciplines involved in evacuation 

planning, FEMA should establish a single entity to take “ownership” of 

overall evacuation planning and implementation. 

Of the FEMA officials we spoke with, only one senior leader articulated 

an overall strategy for coordinating federal evacuation efforts across 

directorates, but no documentation was provided to support this claim of 

coordination. FEMA provided the Mass Evacuation Incident Annex to the 

NRF, but this document is still in draft and has not been finalized. 

Recognizing the span of responsibility across directorates/offices, FEMA 

needs an overarching strategic plan if federal evacuation efforts are to be 

successful. 

OIG Planned Work and Areas for Continuing Oversight 

We plan to continue to review FEMA’s evacuation policies, plans, and 

procedures as they are developed. Of particular interest will be the final 

version of the Mass Evacuation Incident Annex to the NRF and the 

evacuee tracking system being developed. We plan to review FEMA’s: 

• Plans for mass care operations; 

• Development of a new National Sheltering System; and 

• Coordination plans for mass evacuations. 

FEMA’s Preparedness for the Next Catastrophic Disaster 

Page 33 
 

Housing 

Background 

After a Presidential disaster declaration, FEMA leads the federal response 

by coordinating federal resources to support local, tribal, and state 

governments and voluntary agencies in providing housing to those 

displaced by a disaster. One of the major criticisms of FEMA after 

Hurricane Katrina focused on FEMA’s inability to provide immediate, 

short-term housing assistance to evacuees, and then transition those still in 

need to more permanent forms of housing. 

In any major disaster, such as Hurricane Katrina, the availability of hotels, 

motels, and other rental units for disaster victims within a reasonable 

commute is very limited due to damage to these facilities and the need to 

house victims, as well as recovery workers. Housing assistance for 

disaster victims may include factory-built, semi-permanent, or permanent 

construction housing,11 including handicapped-accessible housing; rental, 

repair, or replacement assistance; loan assistance; and referrals and access 

to other sources of housing assistance. According to FEMA, the National 

Disaster Housing Strategy (NDHS) will help guide future disaster housing 

assistance, but during the time of our review this document was still in 

draft. 

We reviewed three critical components to assess FEMA’s progress in 

efforts to: 

11 The Post-Katrina Act allows for semi-permanent and permanent construction. 

FEMA’s Preparedness for the Next Catastrophic Disaster 

Page 34 
 

•	 Establish a National Disaster Housing Strategy 

•	 Develop plans to purchase, track, and dispose of temporary housing 

units 

•	 Strengthen state and local commitment to house affected citizens 

Develop plans to purchase,

Housing Strategy track, and dispose of commitment to house 

temporary housing units affected citizens 

Establish a National Disaster Strengthen state and local 

Critical Components 

Establish a National Disaster Housing Strategy (Modest) – When 

Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast region, there were not adequate 

plans in place at the federal, state, or local level to deal with the 

unprecedented movement of displaced evacuees or to provide sheltering or 

transitional housing on the scale required after this catastrophic disaster. 

According to FEMA officials, FEMA began assisting states in catastrophic 

disaster planning in 1998, but did not follow through with the effort due to 

a lack of sufficient funding at both the federal and state levels. 

Furthermore, the NRP, which guided the response to Hurricane Katrina, 

did not explicitly address catastrophic disaster housing plans. 

The Post-Katrina Act requires FEMA to develop, coordinate, and maintain 

an NDHS. According to FEMA, the NDHS, which is intended to 

complement and support the NRF, will convey national guidance, 

operating principles, and a vision for public (federal, state, tribal, local), 

private, and nonprofit cooperation in providing disaster-housing 

assistance. It will also define the roles, programs, authorities, and 

responsibilities of all entities involved, detailing shared responsibilities 

and emphasizing the cooperative efforts required to provide disasterhousing assistance. While catastrophic housing is to be addressed by the 

NDHS, FEMA officials said that there is a lack of adequate funding and 

resources to test the strategy once it has been finalized. 

At the time of our review, the draft NDHS was still being reviewed, 

coordinated, and refined among FEMA and its interagency partners. The 

lack of a comprehensive disaster housing strategy could have a significant 

FEMA’s Preparedness for the Next Catastrophic Disaster 

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impact on FEMA’s ability to meet housing needs for disaster victims in a 

future catastrophic disaster. 

Develop plans to purchase, track, and dispose of temporary housing units 

(Modest) – FEMA has traditionally relied primarily on two housing 

options for evacuees: rental units and manufactured housing (mobile 

homes and travel trailers). Despite having purchased thousands of 

temporary housing units in the past 2 years, FEMA still lacks clear plans 

on how to speedily put these units in place to house evacuees. FEMA 

officials said that they are now attempting to take specific corrective 

actions to improve how they use their housing options.12 

Under FEMA’s Recovery (Interim) Policy 1003, FEMA will establish an 

annual baseline inventory for fully mission-capable temporary housing 

units, including travel trailers and mobile homes. This policy will guide 

FEMA in maintaining a sufficient inventory of temporary housing units to 

meet an immediate demand after a declared disaster. For calendar year 

2007, the inventory baseline was set at 13,500 units. The inventory levels 

are to be adjusted annually. In FY 2008, it is FEMA’s goal to have three 

to five indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity contracts in place for 

commercial production of housing units. These units will be built based 

on FEMA’s specifications and standards, and will include units that 

comply with Uniform Federal Accessibility Standards for people with 

disabilities. FEMA’s new specifications for housing units are intended to 

ensure that new units are designed and constructed to emit limited levels 

of formaldehyde that are well below industry and Department of Housing 

and Urban Development (HUD) standards, and units will be tested to 

ensure they meet these specifications.13 

FEMA officials said they are continuing to make improvements to the 

Individual Assistance Technical Assistance Contracts (IA-TAC), which 

are used when needed to support FEMA’s housing mission after a disaster. 

FEMA’s goal for the most recent IA-TAC contracts is to have a more 

comprehensive pre-disaster contract in place that will better address 

accountability, quality assurance, and tracking. FEMA officials said there 

is much work to be done in developing pre-disaster contracts for 

procurement of housing units and in developing an agency-wide strategy 

12 During our review, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and FEMA released the preliminary 

results of the testing for formaldehyde in travel trailers and mobile homes. The results indicate that 

unacceptable levels of formaldehyde were detected in both types of units. The FEMA Administrator stated 

“We [FEMA] will not ever use trailers again.” We plan to review FEMA’s current use of travel trailers and 

mobile homes, as well as their progress in developing alternative strategies for housing evacuees. 13 Due to the recent developments on mobile homes and travel trailers, FEMA may modify this housing 

policy. 

FEMA’s Preparedness for the Next Catastrophic Disaster 

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for disposing of housing units. Logistics currently expends significant 

resources storing units that may never be used again because there is no 

clear disposition strategy in place. 

FEMA’s Joint Housing Solutions Group has been actively working to 

review and assess new, innovative forms of temporary alternative housing, 

to determine whether any can be used to assist in a catastrophic disaster 

environment. 

Strengthen state and local commitment to house affected citizens (Modest) 

In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, a number of local communities were 

very reluctant, or even directly refused, to accept FEMA mobile home and 

travel trailer group sites in their communities. In some cases, state or local 

governments agreed to temporary housing sites, but then reversed their 

decision after housing installation had begun. Each time this happened, 

FEMA was further delayed in housing disaster victims and incurred 

additional costs. 

FEMA’s current Mass Sheltering and Housing Assistance strategy to 

support catastrophic housing needs starts with exploiting all available 

existing rental or vacant household dwellings in the affected area, then 

expanding outward into other jurisdictions or states. FEMA, in 

conjunction with HUD, is developing a HUD-FEMA Housing Portal. 

This portal will provide housing information in a consolidated format 

accessible to disaster victims and FEMA housing staff to assist individuals 

and families in finding rental housing following a Presidentially declared 

disaster. However, FEMA still lacks some of the resources necessary to 

successfully and expediently execute the strategy, and many states have 

restricted the number of out-of-state evacuees they are willing to accept, 

potentially restricting access to otherwise available housing units. FEMA 

housing officials said that the absence of universal acceptance by state and 

local governments for contingency housing missions will inhibit an 

optimal response. 

Continuing Concerns 

While FEMA is striving to improve its disaster housing assistance strategy 

and coordination, it needs to develop and test new and innovative 

catastrophic disaster housing plans to deal with large-scale displacement 

of citizens for extended periods. Traditional housing programs for nontraditional disaster events have been shown to be inefficient, ineffective, 

and costly. The FEMA Administrator has stated that FEMA will never 

use trailers again. This raises concerns about how FEMA plans to 

FEMA’s Preparedness for the Next Catastrophic Disaster 

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temporarily house disaster victims for future disasters when hotels, motels, 

and other rental units are often unavailable due to damage. 

In July 2007, FEMA entered into an interagency agreement with HUD to 

administer the Disaster Housing Assistance Program (DHAP). The DHAP 

provides temporary housing assistance, by means of a monthly rent 

subsidy, to eligible families displaced by hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 

Under the interagency agreement, HUD will act as the servicing agent for 

this program. FEMA needs to carefully monitor the services provided by 

HUD and the costs associated with them. 

FEMA needs to improve communications with state and local 

governments and other agencies with respect to disaster housing 

assistance, particularly with respect to what assistance FEMA can be 

expected to provide after a disaster. FEMA also needs to improve the 

program guidance for state and local governments. 

OIG Planned Work and Areas for Continuing Oversight 

We are currently reviewing how well FEMA is managing its housing 

program transition efforts, what role other federal agencies should have in 

transitional housing, and whether FEMA has devised a road map for 

transitioning disaster victims from transitional housing sites to more 

permanent types of housing. We also are concluding a review that 

examined to what extent FEMA’s transitional housing program met the 

needs of hurricane victims. 

Additionally, we plan reviews of other FEMA housing-related activities, 

such as strategies for addressing persistent transitional housing issues, to 

what extent FEMA is using its Remedial Action Management Program to 

implement lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina and other disasters, the 

efficacy of the Emergency Housing Unit Program, and duplication of 

benefits under the disaster housing home repair grant assistance program. 

FEMA’s Preparedness for the Next Catastrophic Disaster 

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Disaster Workforce 

Background 

The need for a trained, effective disaster workforce is one issue mentioned 

consistently in reports regarding FEMA’s response to Hurricane Katrina. 

FEMA’s disaster workforce consists mainly of reservists who serve 

temporarily during a disaster with no employee benefits. FEMA struggled 

to provide adequate numbers of staff in response to Hurricane Katrina and 

did not have the automated support needed to deploy over 5,000 disaster 

personnel on short notice. New hires did not receive adequate training 

during FEMA’s accelerated orientation process, and FEMA lacked a 

central training records management system. The shortage of qualified 

staff for key positions responding to Hurricane Katrina negatively 

impacted the effectiveness of FEMA’s response and recovery operation. 

The Post-Katrina Act provides for the rebuilding of FEMA’s permanent 

and reserve workforces through tools such as a strategic human capital 

plan, structured career paths, and recruitment and retention bonuses. The 

Post-Katrina Act also requires a plan to establish and implement a surge 

workforce, including an adequate number of properly trained personnel to 

meet specific response-team capabilities. 

As FEMA and DHS have evolved, the disaster workforce structure and 

systems have not kept pace. Since 1992, FEMA has initiated 12 studies to 

look at the use and structure of its disaster workforce; however, FEMA 

FEMA’s Preparedness for the Next Catastrophic Disaster 

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Manage the disaster workforce consistent

Adopt a Strategic Human with the Strategic Human Capital Plan 

Capital Plan and integrate workforce management 

tracking systems 

has not implemented the recommendations from any of those studies. In 

FY 2006, FEMA obligated over $2 million for another examination of its 

disaster workforce, to remedy problems in three major areas: workforce 

structure, automated workforce management systems, and training and 

credentialing. This initiative resulted in a report entitled “FEMA: A New 

Disaster Reserve Workforce Model,” dated September 30, 2007. FEMA 

is in the planning stages of implementing recommendations from this 

study. 

We reviewed two critical areas identified as weaknesses after Hurricane 

Katrina to assess FEMA’s efforts to: 

•	 Adopt a Strategic Human Capital Plan, including specific strategies for 

the development of a surge capacity disaster workforce 

•	 Manage the disaster workforce consistent with the Strategic Human 

Capital Plan and integrate workforce management tracking systems to 

deploy, train, and credential disaster workforce employees 

Critical Components 

Adopt a Strategic Human Capital Plan, including specific strategies for the 

development of a surge capacity disaster workforce (Moderate) – FEMA 

has been criticized by both GAO and our office for not having a Strategic 

Human Capital Plan (SHCP). FEMA outsourced the preparation of this 

plan and expected to deliver it to Congress in December 2007. FEMA 

officials said that the disaster surge workforce capacity planning 

requirements of the Post-Katrina Act will be addressed through the work 

of a separate contractor. To its credit, FEMA met its goal of increasing 

permanent, full-time staff to 95% of allowed on-board level by June 2007, 

hired a new Human Capital Director and Deputy Director, and began a 

project to optimize the Human Capital Division. However, more work 

FEMA’s Preparedness for the Next Catastrophic Disaster 

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remains, including finalizing the SHCP and ensuring that newly hired staff 

are fully trained. 

Manage the disaster workforce consistent with the Strategic Human 

Capital Plan and integrate workforce management tracking systems 

(Modest) – In December 2006, FEMA hired a contractor to develop a new 

disaster reserve workforce model to support FEMA’s vision of being the 

Nation’s preeminent emergency management agency. The contractor’s 

report, entitled “FEMA: A New Disaster Reserve Workforce Model,” 

makes recommendations for structuring the disaster workforce and lays 

out a roadmap for accomplishing the recommendations. One significant 

recommendation is to establish a director-level office, the FEMA Office of 

Reserves, to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of professional 

operations and to drive integrated efforts from an agency-wide 

perspective. The study also discusses realigning and reducing FEMA’s 

disaster cadres from 23 to 9. 

The study recommends: 

•	 Establishing clear lines of authority and responsibility within a 

new Office of Reserves; 

•	 Providing employee benefits to disaster workforce reservists; 

•	 Increasing training and credentialing funds; and 

•	 Creating consolidated systems to track the deployment and training 

of the disaster workforce. 

FEMA has assigned a Project Management Officer to determine the 

feasibility of implementing these and other recommendations, including 

establishing a FEMA Office of Reserves. 

Most of these recommendations are not new. FEMA has historically been 

slow to implement effective change for its disaster workforce. FEMA has 

already studied this problem 12 times but did not implement 

recommendations from any of the previous studies. FEMA said that a 

lack of funding is the reason for its inability to implement previous 

recommendations. 

Continuing Concerns 

FEMA has not taken advantage of two relatively quiet hurricane seasons 

since Hurricane Katrina to make needed changes to its Disaster 

Workforce. FEMA reports that it does not have the budget, staffing, 

policies, authorities, or IT needed to implement the corrective actions. 

Indeed, if the sweeping disaster workforce changes recommended a 

FEMA’s Preparedness for the Next Catastrophic Disaster 

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number of times by Congress, GAO, our office, and FEMA contractors are 

to be made, adequate funding must be provided to ensure the success of 

recommended actions. Some of the recommended changes also will 

require legislative action to amend the Stafford Act. 

FEMA has not completed 18 of the 36 corrective actions (50%) that it 

agreed to take in response to disaster workforce-related recommendations 

in our FY 2006 report, “A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster 

Management Activities in Response to Hurricane Katrina.” All but one of 

the incomplete actions originally had target completion dates before June 

2007. 

FEMA also has not completed or could not verify the completion of six of 

nine workforce-related actions required by the Post-Katrina Act. The six 

incomplete or unconfirmed actions are: 

•	 Developing a Strategic Human Capital Plan; 

•	 Establishing career paths; 

•	 Conferring with state, local, and tribal government officials when 

selecting Regional Administrators; 

•	 Training regional strike teams as a unit and equipping and staffing 

these teams; 

•	 Implementing a surge force capacity plan; and 

•	 Providing a report describing progress towards integrating LIMS, 

the Automated Deployment Database, and the National 

Emergency Management Information System. 

The congressionally mandated due dates for these actions ranged from 

March 2007 through July 2007. 

OIG Planned Work and Areas for Continuing Oversight 

We are currently completing work on a follow-up audit of six disaster 

workforce-related recommendations in our FY 2006 report, “A 

Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities in 

Response to Hurricane Katrina.” This audit also includes an evaluation of 

FEMA’s progress in complying with the disaster workforce-related 

requirements in the Post-Katrina Act. 

FEMA’s Preparedness for the Next Catastrophic Disaster 

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Mission Assignments 

Modest Progress Moderate Progress 

Substantial Progress 

Limited or No 

Progress 

Background 

FEMA is responsible for coordinating the urgent, short-term emergency 

deployment of federal resources to address immediate threats and for 

stewardship of the associated expenditures from the Disaster Relief Fund. 

FEMA uses mission assignments (MA) to request disaster response 

support from other federal agencies. Past audits and reviews regarding 

MAs have concluded that FEMA’s management controls were generally 

not adequate to ensure: 

•	 Deliverables (missions tasked) met requirements; 

•	 Costs were reasonable; 

•	 Invoices were accurate; 

•	 Federal property and equipment were adequately accounted for or 

managed; and 

•	 FEMA’s interests were protected. 

MA policies, procedures, training, staffing, and funding have never been 

fully addressed by FEMA, creating misunderstandings among federal 

agencies concerning operational and fiduciary responsibilities. FEMA 

guidelines regarding the MA process, from issuance of an assignment 

through execution and close-out, are vague. 

In early 2006, FEMA began working with DOD and other federal agencies 

to improve the MA process and also launched an interagency MA training 

program. The Emergency Management Institute (EMI) offers an MA 

FEMA’s Preparedness for the Next Catastrophic Disaster 

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orientation course and an introductory course on MA processing, and is 

currently developing an online independent study course that presents an 

overview of the MA process. 

In November 2007, FEMA initiated an ambitious project to re-engineer 

the processes, relationships, and resources involved in managing MAs. 

Reflecting upon lessons learned from Hurricane Dean, the California 

wildfires, and TOPOFF-4,14 FEMA’s Disaster Operations Directorate 

formed an intra/interagency Mission Assignment Working Group 

(MAWG) to review MA processes and procedures and develop 

recommendations for the management of MAs. The effort focused on 

meeting the goals of FEMA’s FY 2008-2013 Strategic Plan issued in draft 

in November 2007, complying with congressional mandates, and 

responding to various audits and studies. It is anticipated that the review, 

development, and implementation of these improvements will be 

completed by June 2008. 

We reviewed three critical components to assess FEMA’s efforts to: 

•	 Improve guidance for mission assignments, i.e., regulations, policies, 

and operating procedures 

•	 Improve staffing and training 

•	 Enhance management of mission assignments 

Improve guidance for Mission Improve staffing and training Enhance management of 

Assignments Mission Assignments 

Critical Components 

Improve guidance for mission assignments, i.e., regulations, policies, and 

operating procedures (Modest) – The MAWG’s Strategic Plan identifies 

the goal of having new policies, procedures, training materials, and 

14 Top Officials (TOPOFF) is the nation’s premier terrorism preparedness exercise, involving top officials 

at every level of government, as well as representatives from the international community and private 

sector. 

FEMA’s Preparedness for the Next Catastrophic Disaster 

Page 44 
recommended revisions to federal regulations and possibly legislation 

completed by the beginning of hurricane season 2008. The MAWG has 

focused much of its attention on pre-scripted MAs, which are essentially 

mission assignment templates that are used to facilitate planning for 

certain repetitive response activities, and to reduce the time it takes to 

deploy federal resources. Pre-scripted MAs describe other federal 

agencies’ resources or capabilities that are commonly called upon during 

an incident response. They are intended to facilitate a more rapid delivery 

of the types of federal assistance frequently requested. 

FEMA officials said there are 223 pre-scripted MAs under development 

and listed in the operational working draft of the “Pre-Scripted Mission 

Assignment Catalogue,” which FEMA intends to publish by June 2008. 

FEMA has developed a standard operating procedures (SOP) manual for 

MAs that outlines the policies, procedures, and processes that FEMA uses 

to collaborate with other federal agencies and organizations when 

responding to disasters and intends to release an updated draft of this 

manual in March 2008. 

Overall, the process for developing pre-scripted MAs is well-established 

now and ready for use in future incidents. FEMA plans to post approved 

pre-scripted MAs to the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) 

to increase interagency coordination and real-time situational awareness. 

However, these pre-scripted MAs are only one of an assortment of tools 

for conducting response operations and do not, by themselves, provide a 

complete picture of FEMA’s readiness to carry out mission assignments. 

Additionally, our audit of HSIN disclosed that this network is not used 

extensively by those in the emergency management community and may 

not be the best avenue to make other federal agencies aware of prescripted MAs.15 

Improve staffing and training (Limited) – FEMA senior management 

seems to recognize the considerable interaction and collaboration that the 

MA process requires to ensure that the process works for all players, not 

merely FEMA. It is essential to incorporate all aspects and resources of 

the process. This includes the people who administer the process, the 

processes used to deliver assistance, the governing policies, and the 

performance necessary to ensure that expectations are realized and 

missions accomplished effectively. 

The most substantial MAWG recommendation concerned the 

establishment of and investment in MAs as a program area rather than a 

 

 

15 Homeland Security Information Network Could Support Information Sharing More Effectively (OIG-06-

38, June 2006). 

FEMA’s Preparedness for the Next Catastrophic Disaster 

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collateral functional process or duty that only comes into play during an 

incident response. The MAWG participants see development of an MA 

program office, with dedicated full-time staff and management team, preestablished budget, and officially delegated authorities and 

responsibilities, as the best chance for substantial improvement in all 

aspects of the MA process. 

Effective incident response also hinges on leaders and on-scene operators 

who are trained and prepared to act. During a crisis, there is little time to 

determine staff qualifications, and it is vital that qualifications be preidentified and appropriately aligned with the incident. According to the 

MAWG’s Strategic Plan, FEMA intends to develop a schedule of 

appropriate training by March 2008, which will be conducted through 

June 2008. The MAWG also plans to identify a cadre of MA managers 

and will introduce a credentialing program. 

Enhance management of mission assignments (Limited) – Managing and 

accounting for MA resources is crucial to the management of the federal 

response to an incident. The current MA data collection/information 

system, Enterprise Coordination and Approvals Processing System 

(eCAPS), was designed with a focus on the administrative aspects of 

documenting, approving, and reporting on MAs, rather than tracking the 

actual work requested and performed, or on the status and outcomes of 

missions assigned. New processes developed by the MAWG will need to 

be reflected in updated information systems. Modifications to the eCAPS 

system have recently begun that provide more user-friendly features, and 

provide a better audit trail with improved search capabilities, thereby 

reducing the likelihood of MA duplications resulting from manual 

processes. 

Continuing Concerns 

Support from FEMA management will be required to implement the 

MAWG’s Strategic Plan, which calls for an infrastructure overhaul of the 

MA process. A significant investment of resources – personnel, training, 

time, and budget – will be required to begin the re-engineering efforts. 

After the revised infrastructure has been put into place, an MA program 

office will need resources to sustain the effort. 

OIG Planned Work and Areas for Continuing Oversight 

We are planning to audit FEMA’s management of MAs to determine to 

what extent FEMA is: 

FEMA’s Preparedness for the Next Catastrophic Disaster 

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•	 Establishing MA requirements and identifying appropriate 

capabilities to fulfill those assignments; 

•	 Coordinating and monitoring the implementation of MAs; 

•	 Ensuring that MA expenditures are verified and that procured 

property is accounted for; and 

•	 Closing MAs in a timely manner. 

We will continue to collaborate with FEMA’s Disaster Operations 

Directorate staff and the interagency MAWG in a consultative role to 

provide independent and objective guidance and oversight in 

implementing the revamped operations and infrastructure as recommended 

in their Strategic Plan. 

Our FY 2008 work plan also leaves room to provide audit resources, as 

needed, to assess the MA process as it is being carried out in future 

disasters. We will also continue to work jointly with other agencies’ OIGs 

to audit and assess interagency use of, and accountability over, MAs. 

FEMA’s Preparedness for the Next Catastrophic Disaster 

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Acquisition Management 

Background 

Acquisition management is more than awarding a contract, it is the entire 

process that begins with identifying and clarifying a mission need and 

ends with the final close-out of an award. When good acquisition 

management is not in place, response capabilities are weakened, taxpayer 

money is often wasted, and the public’s trust in the government falls. 

FEMA’s acquisition function was heavily tasked in responding to 

hurricanes Katrina and Rita and suffered from several shortcomings. 

These shortcomings included a lack of pre-existing preparedness 

contracts; untrained staff; and poor planning for post-award monitoring 

and oversight. 

Post-Katrina, FEMA management has focused on developing the 

acquisition function to a level that can effectively and efficiently respond 

to another catastrophic disaster. To assess FEMA’s progress in this area, 

we reviewed the following three critical components: 

• Have pre-disaster contracts in place 

• Recruit, train, and retain sufficient acquisition staff 

• Provide for post-award oversight 

FEMA’s Preparedness for the Next Catastrophic Disaster 

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Have pre-disaster Recruit, train, and retain Provide for post-award 

contracts in place sufficient acquisition staff oversight 

Critical Components 

Have pre-disaster contracts in place (Moderate) – Prior to Hurricane 

Katrina, FEMA had few contracts in place to be used at the time of a 

disaster. By awarding preparedness contracts prior to a disaster, FEMA 

has the time to run a full and open competition in order to ensure the best 

value to the government. Without pre-disaster contracts in place, FEMA 

is forced to award contracts on a non-competitive basis or to lesserqualified vendors in order to support a prompt response after the disaster 

occurs. 

FEMA’s Office of Acquisition Management (OAM) has awarded 

approximately 27 pre-disaster response contracts, up from the 9 predisaster contracts in place before Hurricane Katrina struck. Additionally, 

approximately 70 recovery contracts have been awarded. OAM officials 

said that they used extensive market research, negotiation, and 

competition to award these contracts, which will provide goods and 

services traditionally needed in a disaster and not fully provided by state 

and local governments. FEMA has also signed a number of pre-disaster 

Interagency Agreements with other federal agencies, which will allow 

FEMA to use the contracts of these federal partners. OAM officials said 

that all FCOs now have a list of these pre-disaster agreements in a 

“disaster response contract toolbox.” However, OAM only recently 

provided us a list of those contracts despite our repeated requests. 

Consequently, we have not had the opportunity to review them and opine 

on their utility for FCOs in a disaster environment. 

OAM has also created an Acquisition Program & Planning (AP&P) 

branch, which will function as the primary link between acquisitions and 

the program areas that generate requirements, to assist with pre-disaster 

contracts. 

Recruit, train, and retain sufficient acquisition staff (Moderate) – When 

Hurricane Katrina struck, FEMA had just 35 contracting staff in place. 

FEMA’s Preparedness for the Next Catastrophic Disaster 

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Since Hurricane Katrina, this number has grown to 162 positions 

authorized, with 136 positions filled. OAM has expanded its policy office 

and is upgrading its contract writing system. Additionally, FEMA has 

updated its “Emergency Acquisition Field Guide,” which is designed to 

define the critical elements of an emergency acquisition in plain language 

so that any member of the disaster support team can understand and apply 

proper procedures. 

FEMA reports significantly increasing staffing of both Contracting 

Officer’s Technical Representatives (COTR) and Contracting Officers. 

FEMA has established a COTR Program Management Office “to ensure 

COTRs have the training, support, and tools needed for effective contract 

administration.” To date, more than 700 program officials have trained 

and been certified as COTRs. 

OAM also reports building their training initiatives to ensure contracting 

staff have the necessary skills for their positions. The office has worked 

with the Defense Acquisition University and the Federal Acquisition 

Institute to ensure that OAM staff complete the courses necessary to meet 

qualifications requirements. 

Provide for post-award oversight (Modest) – Contracting responsibilities 

do not end with the issuance of an award. In fact, one of the most 

important aspects of the job, contract monitoring and oversight, begins 

after the award has been made. A lack of post-award oversight was a 

problem for FEMA in its response to Hurricane Katrina. Since then, 

FEMA reports taking some important steps in improving contract 

oversight. 

FEMA officials said that they have developed Contract Administration 

Plans (CAP) intended to improve post-award contract execution by 

providing consistency in how FEMA competes, orders, and administers 

task orders. CAPs outline the required levels of contractor oversight, 

contract terms and conditions, performance milestones, and reporting 

requirements. The CAPs are designed to balance task order competition 

with the need to expeditiously make awards after a disaster. FEMA said 

they believe CAPs will also foster consistent contract administration 

processes for COTRs across FEMA regions. FEMA also said the 

additional training and support being provided to COTRs through the new 

COTR Program Management Office will contribute to better post-award 

oversight. 

FEMA’s Preparedness for the Next Catastrophic Disaster 

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Continuing Concerns 

While FEMA has made progress in a number of areas and seemingly 

improved its acquisition management function, many concerns remain. 

FEMA said that many more pre-disaster contracts are in place. However, 

FEMA has not afforded us the opportunity to review them, nor have we 

been able to determine whether guidance on the use of the contracts has 

been developed and communicated to all federal, state, and local partners. 

Consequently, we cannot opine on their reasonableness or utility. FEMA 

also said that these contracts ensure fair and reasonable prices, but because 

these contracts were only recently shared with us, we have not had an 

opportunity to assess pricing and other aspects of the contracts. 

Staffing levels also remain a concern. Even though OAM has hired a 

number of contracting employees, a FEMA official said that contracting 

personnel coming in often have less than a year’s experience. This makes 

OAM’s training plans very important. 

We are also concerned about OAM’s data management, in that we have 

had difficulty getting data from OAM, and FEMA is late in submitting 

reports to Congress mandated by the Post-Katrina Act. This raises 

concerns about OAM’s data management capabilities. 

In our acquisition management scorecard published in April 2007,16 we 

reported several areas of concern. Of those, OAM is making some 

progress in the following areas: 

•	 Developing a full partnership with other FEMA components; 

•	 Developing policies and procedures for comprehensive program 

management; and 

•	 Hiring and training a sufficient number of contracting staff. 

However, FEMA continues to show weaknesses in: 

•	 Developing an integrated acquisition system; and 

•	 Developing reliable, integrated financial and information systems. 

OIG Planned Work and Areas for Continuing Oversight 

For the remainder of 2008, we will continue to conduct a broad body of 

work on FEMA’s acquisition functions to identify additional 

16 Semiannual Report to the Congress: October 1, 2006 – March 31, 2007 (Department of Homeland 

Security Office of Inspector General, April 30, 2007) pp. 59-78. 

FEMA’s Preparedness for the Next Catastrophic Disaster 

Page 51 
improvements that FEMA can make. Specifically, we will audit FEMA’s 

acquisition internal controls, workforce, and process, as well as property 

management. We also plan to review a select number of 2007 disaster 

contracts to assess the extent to which FEMA has improved its ability to 

track, manage, and monitor disaster contracts. 

The urgency and complexity of FEMA’s mission will continue to demand 

effective acquisition strategies in preparing for, preventing, responding to, 

and recovering from disasters. While DHS continues to build its 

acquisition management capabilities in the component agencies and on the 

department-wide level, acquisition management will continue to be an 

important area of oversight for our office. 

FEMA’s Preparedness for the Next Catastrophic Disaster 

Page 52 
Conclusion and Recommendations 

FEMA has made progress in all of the areas we reviewed, although 

in some areas this progress has been limited or modest. FEMA 

officials said that budget shortfalls, reorganizations, inadequate IT 

systems, and confusing or limited authorities negatively affected 

their progress. We agree with FEMA. FEMA would also benefit 

from better knowledge management and plans for sustaining 

initiatives that are underway. 

Recommendation 1 - We recommend that FEMA conduct a 

comprehensive “needs analysis” to determine where they are now 

and where they need to be, as an agency, in terms of preparedness 

for a catastrophic disaster. This will assist FEMA with integrating 

their projects and avoiding duplicative efforts. 

Recommendation 2 - We recommend that FEMA develop and 

sustain a system for tracking progress of programs, initiatives, and 

enhancements, both planned and underway, using project 

management tools, e.g., Quad charts, Gantt charts or similar tools. 

This system would benefit FEMA by providing a means of 

increasing awareness of FEMA’s efforts and the planning behind 

them. It would also help ensure that knowledge and vision that 

may reside with the agency’s leadership is shared among staff and 

other stakeholders. For each project, a single leader accountable 

for the success of the project should be identified. 

Tracking system tools should, for each initiative within each 

preparedness area, contain information including: (1) Name of the 

project leader; (2) Status of the project, including budget, schedule, 

and where necessary, approvals from DHS and OMB; 

(3) Performance requirements or parameters; and (4) Other key 

issues, concerns, or challenges to completion of the project, e.g., 

lack of funding or staffing, legislative changes needed, and 

cooperation of other federal agencies needed. 

Recommendation 3 - To enhance accountability and transparency, 

and to enhance the ability of key stakeholders to assist FEMA in 

achieving its mission, we recommend that FEMA provide regular 

updates regarding progress on all major preparedness initiatives 

and projects. 

FEMA’s Preparedness for the Next Catastrophic Disaster 

Page 53 
 

Management Comments and OIG Evaluation 

FEMA provided written comments on the draft of this report. 

FEMA generally concurred with all of our recommendations and 

provided technical comments, which we have incorporated into the 

report as appropriate. (FEMA’s written comments are contained in 

Appendix B). 

Recommendations 

In response to recommendation 1, that FEMA conduct a 

catastrophic needs assessment, FEMA agreed. However, FEMA 

said they do not believe the report fully reflects the work that has 

already been done in this area, and that the organization does not 

need another over-arching assessment. They believe they need an 

opportunity to implement their new Strategic Plan and to “continue 

to take action on the remaining PKEMRA [Post-Katrina Act] 

requirements and any outstanding GAO and IG recommendations.” 

FEMA is under considerable pressure from several fronts and is 

attempting to respond to numerous mandates and 

recommendations. This supports our recommendation that FEMA 

needs to ensure that their efforts are efficient and integrated to 

avoid duplication. One way to accomplish this is through an 

agency-wide needs analysis. FEMA said their efforts are “being 

managed through the combined efforts of frequent senior staff 

meetings, working level staff meetings, and the Investment 

Working Group and the Program Analysis division of the Office of 

Policy and Program Analysis.” We remain concerned that this 

coordination does not permeate the entire organization. 

In response to recommendation 2, that FEMA develop and sustain 

a system for tracking progress of programs and initiatives, FEMA 

said they have begun instituting project management practices. 

However, the examples they provided were related to major 

acquisitions. FEMA needs to bring project management practices 

and a comprehensive project tracking system to all agency projects 

and initiatives, so that stakeholders are aware of projects and 

decision makers have solid information. FEMA claims they are 

tracking projects “through a variety of means” and that “several 

electronic systems collectively track the progress of different 

programs within the agency.” We are recommending a single, 

comprehensive tracking system for real-time visibility on projects 

FEMA’s Preparedness for the Next Catastrophic Disaster 

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and initiatives, including key indicators such as schedule, budget, 

and necessary approvals. 

In response to recommendation 3, that FEMA provide regular 

updates regarding progress on all major preparedness initiatives 

and projects, FEMA said they are already providing updates and 

working on a comprehensive reporting effort. They also said they 

are required to provide monthly or quarterly reports to Congress on 

a number of topics. We remain concerned that these reports are 

often late. 

General Comments 

Methodology: FEMA said they believe the metrics and 

measurements used throughout the report “are too subjective and 

do not reflect the considerable effort to date as accurately as they 

might.” FEMA also said the draft report provides only a cursory 

explanation of the methodology used to rate FEMA. 

Our methodology is clearly outlined in Appendix A. The ratings 

are subjective, but the rating scale and level of subjectivity are 

appropriate to this high-level assessment. In response to several 

questions FEMA posed in their comments, we want to again make 

clear that the overall rating for each key area is not an average of 

the ratings for the critical components within each area. The 

overall rating is based in part on the component ratings, but also on 

our broader knowledge of the key preparedness areas. 

Mitigation’s Role in Preparedness: FEMA said they did not 

believe the report adequately addressed the role of mitigation in 

preparedness, response and prevention of catastrophic disasters. 

Mitigation is an important element of the emergency management 

cycle; however, mitigation falls outside the scope of our 

assessment on FEMA’s ability to respond to a catastrophic 

disaster. 

Coordination Among Offices: FEMA said that this report provides 

a stovepipe review of the nine key areas, “leaving the impression 

that these are separate and disparate entities not fully coordinated.” 

As an example of efforts coordinated among different areas, 

FEMA provides information on two catastrophic disaster planning 

efforts: the New Madrid Seismic Zone Area effort and the State of 

Florida hurricane effort. In fact, we highlight both of these efforts 

in the report and indicate that the efforts are coordinated among the 

FEMA’s Preparedness for the Next Catastrophic Disaster 

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Disaster Operations, Disaster Assistance, and Mitigation 

Directorates. 

IT Modernization: FEMA provided general comments on their 

efforts to modernize IT infrastructure and systems; however, they 

did not provide any specific comments on how we addressed IT 

systems in the report. Our report does discuss IT systems, where 

appropriate, and our office has ongoing work in this area. 

Grant Programs: FEMA said that grants were only mentioned as 

they related to Interoperable Communications, and that we did not 

include discussion of preparedness grant programs that FEMA 

provides to State and local jurisdictions to build preparedness 

capabilities. We recognize and appreciate that FEMA 

preparedness grants play an important role in enhancing state and 

local governments’ preparedness; however, the focus of this report 

was FEMA’s ability to respond to a catastrophic disaster when 

state and local capabilities are overwhelmed. 

FEMA’s Preparedness for the Next Catastrophic Disaster 

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Appendix A 

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 

At the request of Congress, we conducted a high-level “scorecard” 

assessment of FEMA’s preparedness to respond to the next 

catastrophic disaster. Together with congressional staff and 

FEMA officials, we identified nine key areas as those most vital to 

FEMA’s preparedness: 

•	 Overall Planning; 

•	 Coordination and Support; 

•	 Interoperable Communications; 

•	 Logistics; 

•	 Evacuations; 

•	 Housing; 

•	 Disaster Workforce; 

•	 Mission Assignments; and 

•	 Acquisition Management. 

Within each of the nine key areas, there are numerous critical 

actions that need to take place before FEMA is sufficiently 

prepared for a catastrophic disaster. To use our time and resources 

wisely, we collaborated with FEMA officials to determine two to 

five critical components within each key area. We: 

•	 Conducted interviews with top FEMA officials and, in 

limited cases, DHS officials; 

•	 Reviewed numerous reports and testimony from our office, 

GAO, Congress, and others regarding FEMA’s readiness 

(See Appendix C); 

•	 Reviewed documents provided by FEMA, including plans, 

policies, organization charts, and self-assessments; and 

•	 Reviewed applicable laws, such as the Stafford Act (P.L. 

100-707), Homeland Security Act (P.L. 107-296) and PostKatrina Act (P.L. 109-295). 

Our ratings for the nine key areas reviewed are based on a fourtiered system ranging from “limited or no progress” to “substantial 

progress.” Throughout this report, we based our ratings on the 

following criteria: 

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Limited or No Progress: There is an awareness of the critical 

issues needing to be addressed, but specific corrective actions have 

not been identified. 

Within this phase, interim steps include a problem analysis, 

discussion of corrective actions, and development of a strategic 

plan. 

Modest Progress: Corrective actions have been identified, but 

implementation is not yet underway. 

Within this phase, interim steps include selecting corrective 

actions, obtaining management approval, planning for 

implementation, and securing a funding commitment from DHS 

for each action. 

Moderate Progress: Implementation of corrective actions is 

underway, but few if any have been completed. 

Substantial Progress: Most or all of the corrective actions have 

been implemented. 

Our ability to conduct this assessment was limited by FEMA’s 

inability to provide requested documents in a timely manner. 

Given the scope and limitations of our review, we did not perform 

an in-depth assessment of each of the nine key preparedness areas. 

We used the critical components, as well as our broader knowledge 

of the key areas, to gauge FEMA’s overall progress in those areas. 

For ease of understanding, we used the same rating categories as 

we used to rate the critical components within each area; however, 

we adapted the criteria to present a better picture of the progress 

FEMA has made overall. For example, to achieve moderate 

progress overall, FEMA would have to have identified and 

completed more than a few corrective actions. To achieve a rating 

of substantial progress overall, FEMA would have to have 

completed most corrective actions in the key preparedness area. 

We conducted our review between October 2007 and February 

2008 under the authority of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as 

amended, and according to the Government Auditing Standards 

issued by the Comptroller General of the United States. Major 

OIG contributors to the review are identified in Appendix D. 

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The principal OIG points of contact for the review are Matt 

Jadacki, Deputy Inspector General for Emergency Management 

Oversight at (202) 254-4100 and Donald Bumgardner, Director, 

Disaster Acquisition Division, Office of Emergency Management 

Oversight at (202) 254-4226. 

FEMA’s Preparedness for the Next Catastrophic Disaster 

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FEMA Response to the DHS OIG Draft Report, 

“FEMA's Preparedness for the Next Catastrophic Disaster” 

(issued March 6, 2008) 

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) appreciates the opportunity to 

review and comment on the Department of Homeland Security, Office of the Inspector 

General (DHS OIG) draft report “FEMA’s Preparedness for the Next Catastrophic 

Disaster,” issued March 6, 2008. 

FEMA agrees with the DHS OIG’s assessment that improvements have been made to all 

components of the agency since Hurricane Katrina in 2005. We understand that DHS 

OIG had a relatively small window of time in which to conduct their research, and as a 

result did not have the opportunity to conduct an in-dept assessment of each of the nine 

key preparedness areas identified. FEMA pace of improvement has been steady and we 

have endeavored to utilize our resources wisely to move forward on the many 

requirements we have identified or have been recommended by other entities. 

While we appreciate the acknowledgement of our progress in your report we are 

concerned that the metrics and measurements used throughout this report are too 

subjective and do not reflect the considerable effort to date as accurately as they might. 

Appendix A of this draft report provides only a cursory explanation of the methodology 

used to rate FEMA. In some instances, it seems the short window available to create this 

report led to a disconnect between DHS OIG’s lines on inquiry and the FEMA program 

staff’s targeted responses. FEMA made every reasonable effort to meet DHS OIG’s 

requests while addressing hundreds of other requests by GAO and Congress within the 

same timeframes. Specific examples of our concerns are cited in this response. 

FEMA appreciates DHS OIG’s recognition in the opening Executive Summary and 

would like to use this report to highlight improvements. FEMA is continuously bringing 

on energetic new employees and promoting experienced ones from within, updating our 

IT infrastructure, improving our procurement practices, improving the quality of our 

policies and guidance to our nation, conducting exercises, and actively responding to 

emergencies. 

Recommendations: 

Recommendation 1: We recommend that FEMA conduct a comprehensive “needs 

analysis” to determine where they are now and where they need to be, as an agency, in 

terms of preparedness for a catastrophic disaster. This will assist FEMA with 

integrating their projects and avoiding duplicative efforts. 

FEMA’s Preparedness for the Next Catastrophic Disaster 

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FEMA agrees with this recommendation, but believes the report does not reflect fully the 

work that has already been done in this area. Taking into account the combined lessons 

learned from Katrina, and suggestions and requirements from numerous sources, FEMA 

has recently completed its new Strategic Plan. This document goes to print in mid-March 

2008. Even though the plan is only now going to final print it has been in place and used 

by all of the FEMA directorates for the past 9 months in their development process for 

program improvements. In December of 2006 FEMA published agency vision and 

disaster preparedness concept of operations which has guided our actions and priorities. 

In 2007 we completed 17 specific needs assessments and analysis that spanned our 

business functions, logistics and communications. Those assessments have provided a 

blue print for our change efforts. In the last year, we stood up a Program Analysis and 

Evaluation capability for the first time in FEMA, and reinvigorated the Investment 

Working Group which had been moribund in years past. 

Each FEMA office has numerous projects and programs underway to improve service 

and interoperability with other parts of FEMA, DHS, and our partners across the 

government and in states and localities. This entire effort is being managed through the 

combined efforts of frequent senior staff meetings, working level staff meetings, and the 

Investment Working Group and the Program Analysis division of the Office of Policy 

and Program Analysis to eliminate duplication and increase our preparedness, mitigation, 

recovery, and response capabilities. 

Since the landfall of Hurricane Katrina in 2005, FEMA has been the subject of dozens of 

analyses, engagements, studies, and reports. Many of these reports were created by 

outside entities, including DHS OIG, GAO, and Congress. DHS OIG cites a number of 

these documents on pages 60-61 of this draft report. The Post Katrina Emergency 

Management Reform Act (PKEMRA) specified over 250 actions for FEMA to take. 

FEMA currently has over 100 open engagements with the GAO, and over 100 open 

engagements with DHS-OIG. This translates to over 100 open recommendations from 

GAO, and over 600 open recommendations from DHS-OIG. Many of these 

recommendations are overlapping and/or complementary. 

FEMA has no shortage of recommendations of improvements the agency needs to make, 

and has had our capability gaps clearly spelled out. The sheer workload associated with 

responding to the administrative documentation requirements of over 700 

recommendations from DHS OIG and GAO is directly impacting our continued efforts to 

improve FEMA. We believe another assessment or analysis is not required. 

FEMA does not believe it needs another over-arching assessment. FEMA instead 

believes that we be given an opportunity to implement our new Strategic Plan, and 

continue to take action on the remaining PKEMRA requirements and any outstanding 

GAO and IG recommendations. 

FEMA’s Preparedness for the Next Catastrophic Disaster 

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Recommendation 2: 

We recommend that FEMA develop and sustain a system for tracking the progress of 

programs, initiatives, and enhancements, both planned and underway, using project 

management tools, e.g.. Quad charts, Gantt charts or similar tools. This system would 

benefit FEMA by providing a means of increasing awareness of FEMA’s effort and the 

planning behind them. It would also help ensure that knowledge and vision that may 

reside with the agency’s leadership is shared among staff and other stakeholders. For 

each project, a single leader accountable for the success of the project should be 

identified. 

Tracking system tools should, for each initiative within each preparedness area, contain 

information including: (1) Name of the project leader; (2) Status of the project, including 

budget, schedule, and where necessary, approvals from DHS and OMB; (3) Performance 

requirements or parameters; and (4) Other key issues, concerns, or challenges to 

completion of the project, e.g. lack of funding or staffing, legislative changes needed, 

cooperation of other federal agencies needed. 

Prior to 2005, FEMA was not conducting large-scale acquisition programs and had no 

experience with project management principals. However, in the past year we have 

changed that and begun instituting project management practices. Examples of existing 

and beginning Program Management Office (PMO) efforts include the Integrated Public 

Alert and Warning (IPAWS) program and a new one forming is the Mt. Weather 

modernization project. Each PMO is staffed with professionally trained program 

managers. Future efforts will also follow this pattern. As part of our IT modernization 

process, our Business Management Office is investigating ways to bring this capability to 

the agency as an enterprise system. 

FEMA is tracking its progress on all fronts through a variety of means. FEMA senior 

staff meets several times a week (including biweekly teleconferences with all of the 

Regions and satellite offices). The Investment Working Group, co-chaired by the Office 

of Policy and Program Analysis and the Office of the Chief Financial Officer, manages 

FEMA’s budget process and is improving our investment decision capability. 

Several electronic systems collectively track the progress of different programs within the 

agency. The most recent addition is the Executive Management System, currently 

deployed as an active pilot program. The initial deployment of the system is tracking or 

will track all of FEMA’s DHS OIG and GAO engagements and recommendations 

(including tying progress to a specific program manager), legislative tasks, questions for 

the record and “getbacks”, and FEMA transformation and change of administration plans. 

This system will continue to evolve and allow for the tracking of other lines of business. 

FEMA’s Preparedness for the Next Catastrophic Disaster 

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Recommendation 3: 

To enhance accountability and transparency, and to enhance the ability of key 

stakeholders to assist FEMA in achieving its mission, we recommend that FEMA provide 

regular updates regarding progress on all major preparedness initiatives and projects. 

FEMA is already actively providing these updates and is working on a comprehensive 

reporting effort which will be completed in April of 2008. PKEMRA mandated FEMA 

brief Congress on virtually all aspects of Preparedness on a quarterly basis. The next 

briefs of the different House and Senate committees are scheduled for early May 2008. 

PKEMRA also mandated FEMA provide a number of monthly and quarterly reports to 

Congress, on topics including our quarterly staffing vacancies, National Capital Region 

planning efforts, the disaster relief fund, disaster contracting, disaster declarations, etc. 

As we continue to promulgate our national plans and guidance, including the National 

Response Framework, we have updated Congress and have legislatively-mandated 

updates scheduled 

Finally, both from PKEMRA, at the request of Congressional committees, and on our 

own initiative, FEMA continues to brief Congress on all manner of preparedness, 

response, recovery, mitigation, and disaster logistics issues. 

General Comments on the Draft Report: 

Methodology: DHS OIG’s description of its reporting methodology should be more 

comprehensive. Appendix A of this draft report provides only a cursory explanation of 

the methodology used to rate FEMA. We do have the following questions and concerns 

about the specifics of the report. 

How did the OIG determine FEMA’s progress within each of the four ratings? What was 

the benchmark measure used to grade our efforts? It is unclear as to how the IG 

calculated and tabulated the ratings for the nine key areas as the summation of individual 

ratings for the critical components do not always equate to the overall key area score. 

For example, “Evacuations” total is Modest, but the two areas are Moderate & 

Substantial). How were the ratings from the “critical components” weighted to come up 

with a final score? At the exit conference, it was mentioned that it was not an average. 

FEMA’s Preparedness for the Next Catastrophic Disaster 

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Mitigation’s Role in Preparedness: This report does not adequately address Mitigation’s 

role in preparedness, response and prevention of catastrophic disasters. The four legs of 

FEMA’s disaster strategy can be summarized with preparedness, recovery, response, and 

mitigation—this report focuses only on the first three. 

While Mitigation activities are generally thought of as occurring after the disaster, 

Mitigation is quite involved in the development and management of a suitable cadre 

versed in engineering, grants management, flood insurance, and public outreach, all prior 

to a disaster. In addition, Mitigation manages the development of hazard mitigation plans 

at the state and local level, a requirement for the receipt of certain public and mitigation 

assistance grants. This is all part of being prepared for the next disaster. 

Coordination Between Offices: This report provides a stovepipe review of the following 

areas: Overall Planning; Coordination and Support; Interoperable Communications; 

Logistics; Evacuations; Housing; Disaster (Surge) Workforce; Mission Assignments; and 

Acquisition Management. Each of these areas is addressed individually, leaving the 

impression that these are separate and disparate entities not fully coordinated. The report 

does not address holistic coordination efforts that have been initiated by FEMA to 

address catastrophic disaster operations planning. 

An example of this is the Disaster Operations and Disaster Assistance Directorate’s joint 

efforts in Federal Agency Catastrophic Disaster Operations Planning for two geo-specific 

areas: the eight (8) State New Madrid Seismic Zone Area (NMSZ); and the State of 

Florida. The NMSZ initiative addresses response planning for a catastrophic earthquake 

that would address four FEMA regions involving the following eight States: Alabama, 

Arkansas, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Mississippi, Missouri, and Tennessee. The State 

of Florida initiative involves catastrophic disaster operations response planning for a 

Category 5 Hurricane making landfall on South Florida which would put most of South 

Florida under 1-4+ feet of water for weeks, destroy the homes of more than 60 percent of 

the population, leave 4 million people without electricity, cripple the State’s 

transportation infrastructure, and have a devastating effect on South Florida’s $200 

billion per year service, agriculture, and tourism industries. 

These efforts provide readiness planning, technical assistance and project management to 

develop a Federal Concept of Operations, and Federal Catastrophic Earthquake Plan, 

Regional specific plans and individual State catastrophic disaster response plans. The 

intent is to horizontally and vertically integrate multijurisdictional response plans at the 

local, private sector, State, Tribal and Federal level. In fiscal years 2006 and 2007, 

FEMA invested over $20,000,000 in these initiatives. 

Both the NMSZ and Florida initiatives involve bottom up planning from the local to the 

State level and eventually to the Federal level via scenario driven workshops. To date, 

this process has involved the local and State emergency management communities, with 

some involvement of the Regions and other Federal agencies through the FEMA 

FEMA’s Preparedness for the Next Catastrophic Disaster 

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Regional Interagency Steering Committees (RISC). The planning to date at the local and 

State level has been robust and helped identify the unmet requirements that will need to 

be addressed by Federal level planning. The intent is to bring all of the areas addressed 

in the OIG report into a cohesive and robust Federal response to all-hazards through this 

scenario-driven planning process. 

IT Modernization: As FEMA continues to modernize its IT infrastructure and systems, 

we have identified budget shortfalls, and experienced issues with several information 

systems. We continued to refine organizational structure, and welcome the inclusion of 

the DHS Office of the Chief Information Officer (OCIO) in a complete assessment of IT 

requirements, capabilities, and readiness, as some program offices have reported IT 

limitations. As we move forward, our newly formed Customer Advocate Branch will 

assist program offices in identifying and documenting their mission needs, concepts of 

operations, business requirements, and lifecycle funding, and in conveying those 

requirements through formalized capital and operational planning processes. 

Grant Programs: Grants are only mentioned as they are related to Interoperable 

Communications. There is no mention of the preparedness grant programs (SHSP, 

UASI, etc.) that we provide to State and local jurisdictions to build preparedness 

capabilities (although the IG does mention the current audit of our grant programs) which 

have a direct bearing on the amount of support FEMA may have to provide in a disaster. 

There is a direct correlation between the ability of state and local governments to be 

prepared and FEMA’s success in being able to support them. The report has no mention 

of this dynamic. This removed a key aspect of FEMA’s preparedness strategy from 

consideration in this analysis. 

Comments on the Draft Report by Section: 

Table of Contents: 

(Disaster Operations) Table of Contents: MERS Mobile Emergency Resource Response 

Support 

P. 6: (Logistics) 

FEMA requests additional clarification on DHS OIG’s methodology for determining 

progress. Was the methodology same across all reviewed areas? What was it based on?
 

P. 13: (NPD) 

Do the evaluation criteria represent overall progress or do they represent progress in 

implementing the plan of action? 

This report states the “prototype assessment” (NPS) will not progress because it has “a 

small budget, no separate appropriation and did not receive the level of staffing 

FEMA’s Preparedness for the Next Catastrophic Disaster 

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requested”. This is factually inaccurate. To date, NPD has spent almost $5 million on 

the development of this effort. 

P. 16: (NPD) 

Community Preparedness Division: Enhance community preparedness (Moderate) – 

Since 9/11, there has been increased recognition of the role citizens play in protecting the 

homeland and supporting first responders. After Hurricane Katrina, the White House 

recommended that “DHS should make citizen and community preparedness a National 

priority.”1 Implementation of National Priority 8, “Community Preparedness: 

Strengthening Planning and Citizen Capabilities,” is the responsibility of the Community 

Preparedness Division (CPD) of the NPD. 

Three of CPD’s community preparedness Initiatives are: 

• Assessing and strengthening community preparedness; 

• Leading strategic coordination and integration of community preparedness efforts; and 

• Initiating partnerships for preparedness research. 

A primary goal of CPD is to ensure that community preparedness is included in a 

consistent way in policy, guidance, training, and exercises. The inclusion of citizen 

preparedness as a national priority was a significant step. This is an ongoing challenge 

that requires actively seeking out “points of cooperation” and educating DHS and FEMA 

staff on the significant value of community preparedness and planning through the 

network of Citizen Corps Councils. 

Citizen Corps was launched in 2002 as part of the USA Freedom Corps initiative and has 

grown to include a nationwide network of over 2,300 State, territorial, tribal, and local 

councils. Citizen Corps’ mission is to bring government and community leaders together 

in all-hazards community preparedness, planning, mitigation, response and recovery. In 

addition, State and local preparedness is supported by national Citizen Corps Partner 

Programs and Affiliates that provide specific training and resources for citizens. CPD is 

tasked with coordinating the Citizen Corps initiative at the federal level. CPD is 

developing and providing national guidance, tools, and training for Citizen Corps 

Councils to support community preparedness and resiliency. CPD is also and 

strengthening the inclusion of community based planning in FEMA guidance through the 

new FEMA Integrated Planning System. 

P.21 (Disaster Operations) 

Critical Components, 2nd Paragraph: “FEMA officials also said that it has not been 

decided which DHS component will lead the effort to integrate strategic, concept, and 

operation planning to ensure consistency and interoperability.” This statement is 

incorrect. The DHS Operations Coordination Directorate has responsibility for strategic 

level planning, whereas FEMA coordinates interagency and intergovernmental CONOPS 

and operational planning. 

FEMA’s Preparedness for the Next Catastrophic Disaster 

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P.22 (Disaster Operations) 

1st Paragraph: Please capitalize “FEMA Administrator” 

P.22 (Mitigation) 

The broad description of an FCO’s execution of Stafford Act responsibilities subsequent 

to a Presidential declaration fails to mention the provision of Mitigation programs. 

“-...the President appoints an FCO to coordinate federal support in response to 

and recovery from emergencies and major disasters. The FCO represents the 

FEMA administrator in the field to discharge all FEMA responsibilities for the 

response and recovery efforts underway.” 

To ensure Congress is aware of the FCOs’ mitigation responsibilities, we recommend the 

following edit in the last line of the sentence: 

“-...all FEMA responsibilities for the response, recovery and mitigation 

programs.” 

P.24 (OCC and Disaster Operations) 

Interoperable Communications: In this section, FEMA is rated on progress to “Achieve 

coordination among all DHS components charged with improving interoperable 

communications.” This is one of our lowest scores and does not reflect the fact that the 

issue is a shared one with the Office of Emergency Communications and the Science and 

Technology Safecom program. FEMA’s communications equipment IS interoperable 

across the Department and with our state and local partners. However, DHS, not FEMA, 

is primarily responsible for this coordination across the Department on this issue. This 

point was raised at the Exit Conference. FEMA requests that this distinction be made in 

this report. 

We also suggest including this statement incorporation in the final report after last 

paragraph... “are an equal or greater challenge.” 

“FEMA is developing disaster emergency communications policies and 

procedures to facilitate effective emergency management, operability, and 

interoperability during catastrophic events. However, achieving effective 

coordination among all DHS components specifically charged with improving 

interoperable communications remains difficult. Each organization continues to 

operate independently within the limits of its own authorities established during 

the DHS reorganization. If FEMA is charged with coordinating among all of 

DHS, it needs specific authority to coordinate with and direct DHS components 

providing emergency communications during disasters to achieve substantial 

progress in this critical area. 

FEMA’s Preparedness for the Next Catastrophic Disaster 

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P. 27 (Disaster Operations) 

1st Paragraph: Mobile Emergency Resource Response Support (MERS) 

2nd Paragraph: FEMA has also created the Disaster Emergency Communications Office 

Division and intends to be an informed and engaged advocate for disaster emergency 

communications issues and the communications needs of emergency responders. 

P. 28 (Disaster Operations) 

1st Paragraph: Mobile Emergency Resource Response Support 

P. 29 (Logistics) 

FEMA strongly disagrees with the progress indicator and does not understand basis for 

ranking. During Hurricane Katrina FEMA Logistics (formerly part of Disaster 

Operations) had little to no tracking capabilities. FEMA now has logistics tracking 

capabilities in all 10 Regions, and continues to improve our capabilities. 

P. 30 (Logistics) 

Statement Begins: “Prior to 2004, FEMA had invested in multiple systems...” – this 

statement is incorrect from a logistics program. It was not until after 2004 (see below) 

did Logistics invest in “inventory and supply chain management”. What system was 

DHS OIG referencing?
 

2nd Paragraph: FEMA recommends adding, after first sentence, that the system’s pilot 

was originally set to be tested in 2005, but was postponed upon Hurricane Katrina’s 

landfall. The pilot system was rolled out in February 2006. 

Sentence beginning with: “Currently, the TAV system is able to track the 

movement......”Big 8” commodities: water, emergency meals...” This is factually 

incorrect and FEMA recommends replacing with : 

“Currently, the TAV system is able to track the movement of more than 200 types 

of commodities, with a primary focus on the “Big 7” commodities of water, 

emergency meals (MREs), blue roof plastic sheeting, tarps, cots, blankets and key 

assets including emergency generators and temporary housing units.” 

Sentence reading “However, FEMA personnel said that there are many gaps in the 

system” – this is an unsubstantiated comment and we have no basis by which to judge its 

merits. What specific gaps are being referred to? Recommend it be deleted. 

P. 31 (Logistics) 

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Last line of 2nd full paragraph: “FEMA personnel said they did have supplies prepositioned during the 2005 hurricane season, but the quantities were insufficient and 

delivery was not timely.” FEMA recommends replacing with: 

“FEMA staff interviewed stated they did have supplies pre-positioned during the 

2005 hurricane season, but the quantities pre-positioned were never intended to 

sustain a catastrophic disaster. The main problem experienced during Katrina was 

“reach-back” capability to acquire large quantities of sustainment commodities 

once stored stocks were depleted.” 

Sentence reading: “LMD estimated that to pre-position commodities in the 11 hurricane 

prone states alone would cost $350 million.” FEMA recommends adding this footnote: 

“This figure includes estimated cost for commodities in Regions I, II, III, IV, & 

VI and transportation costs in region IV & VI” 

Sentence reading: “Instead, FEMA is increasing its emphasis on identifying strengthen 

relationships....and the General Services Administration (GSA).” FEMA requests 

adding that we are strengthening our relationships with the private sector. 

Sentence reading: ““It has set a goal of meeting 100% of emergency requirements within 

72 hours of an event.” This statement is incorrect. Our planning factors are based on 

support for “1 million people within first 72 hours with life-saving commodities, food 

and water.” 

P. 32 (Logistics) 

Under Continuing Concerns: 

Statement Reads “Logistics has made progress in a number of areas, but still needs to 

develop standardized policies and procedures, effective internal controls and sufficient 

funding and resources.” FEMA recommend deleting last portion. Logistics has 

sufficient funding and resources to accomplish its mission. 

P. 33 (OCC) 

Evacuations: There is a substantial disconnect between the overall score for evacuations 

(modest) and the sub-scores for the gap analysis program (moderate) and the gulf coast 

mass evacuation capability enhancement initiative (substantial). DHS OIG expressed 

concern that several offices within FEMA had responsibility for evacuations without an 

“overall strategy” for evacuations. FEMA does not have the overall responsibility for 

evacuations, State and Local governments do and to imply otherwise exceeds FEMA’s 

statutory authority. If this were a central concern of the DHS OIG’s and the basis for 

scoring FEMA in this area, the DHS OIG should have made it an explicit “critical 

component.” (According to the Executive Summary, the DHS OIG collaborated with 

FEMA to come up with 2 to 5 critical components within each area.) Of the critical 

components that were listed under Evacuations, FEMA received some of its best scores 

FEMA’s Preparedness for the Next Catastrophic Disaster 

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in the entire report; yet, the overall score is one of FEMA’s worst. It would seem that, 

even considering the DHS OIG’s concerns overall centralized responsibility for 

evacuations, FEMA’s scores in these two critical components would be illustrative of 

FEMA’s progress in this area and lead to a better overall score. Furthermore, the DHS 

OIG comments that “it was difficult to gain a clear picture of FEMA’s progress” in this 

area. It appears DHS OIG equated the difficulty with gaining a clear picture with only 

modest progress by FEMA. This negative assumption is problematic given the progress 

FEMA demonstrated in the two critical components that the DHS OIG was able to 

evaluate. 

P. 33-36 (Disaster Assistance) 

Evacuations: FEMA would like to make DHS OIG aware of two initiatives under 

development that will greatly improve our evacuation management capabilities: the Mass 

Evacuee Support Planning initiative and a mass evacuation tracking capability. 

The Mass Evacuee Support Planning initiative, which began in late 2006, is being 

developed concurrently with the Mass Evacuation Incident Annex to the NRF, the 

NMETS (described above), National Shelter System enhancements, and other related 

mass care improvements. The Mass Evacuee Support Planning initiative focuses on 

developing strategies and guidelines for support of displaced disaster victims through 

development of planning guidance and a Host-State Evacuee Support Plan template. 

These planning efforts will enhance operational effectiveness to provide recovery 

assistance to individuals and households, as well as public assistance to State and local 

governments in the event of an extraordinary or catastrophic disaster. To ensure the 

guidance and template realistically address State concerns and operational perspectives, 

the template will be created and refined from host-State evacuee support plans developed 

in select States. The host-State evacuee support plans are developed through workshops 

that employ realistic catastrophic scenarios and consequence estimates which drive 

discussion and planning, and ultimately the creation of functional, integrated evacuee 

support plans. 

The States which are participating in development of initial model plans include: 

Arkansas, Georgia, Tennessee, and Oklahoma – all of these states provided significant 

evacuee support following Hurricane Katrina. Two states have held Evacuee Support 

Planning Workshops: Georgia, Aug 1 - 3, 2007; and Arkansas, Sept 11 - 13, 2007 (held 

in conjunction with the New Madrid Seismic Zone Catastrophic Planning Workshop). 

Tennessee’s workshop will be the week of March 17, 2008. 

FEMA is also developing a mass evacuation tracking capability that is a tool to support 

the Mass Evacuation Incident Annex to the NRF. The goal is to provide a single national 

system to support multi-state, state-managed, or local evacuation operations. FEMA 

expects to be able to test this new capability this spring. A key aspect of the capability 

will be protection of evacuee information. The capability will is being developed in a 

way that will enable it to support the management of congregate care operations. 

FEMA’s Preparedness for the Next Catastrophic Disaster 

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P. 37-41 (Disaster Assistance) 

Housing: FEMA has continued to build its partnerships with other Federal, State, local, 

and volunteers as relates to housing. This is demonstrated in the coalition-based 

approach set forth in the National Disaster Housing Strategy. It is also exemplified in our 

successful execution of the interagency agreement (IAA) with HUD to establish the 

Disaster Housing Assistance Program, a temporary housing rental assistance and case 

management program for identified individuals and households displaced by Hurricanes 

Katrina and Rita. This model for providing additional and sustainable housing resources 

through HUD is also being evaluated for use in future events. 

In the first paragraph of the Background subsection on P. 37 and again on P. 41, the OIG 

indicates that part of FEMA’s mission is to “transition those still in need to more 

permanent forms of housing.” This does not accurately reflect FEMA’s disaster housing 

responsibilities. FEMA’s mission is to assist State and local governments to ensure 

displaced persons are sheltered and to transition those still in need to post-disaster interim 

housing. When the recovery process transitions to long-term, permanent housing needs, 

FEMA has worked with other federal agencies, namely HUD, to provide critical housing 

and community development resources to aid state, local, and tribal in longer-term 

disaster recovery efforts. 

In the second paragraph of this Background subsection, the OIG indicates that housing 

assistance may include semi-permanent, or permanent construction. Given that this 

paragraph begins with a description of the situation after Hurricane Katrina, it would be 

important to emphasize that FEMA was first provided the authority to provide housing 

assistance in the form of semi-permanent, or permanent construction by the Post Katrina 

Emergency Management Reform Act. 

The third paragraph of the Background subsection discusses a need for improved 

communication with state and local governments. It is our view that the core issue is that 

FEMA needs to do a better job of communicating with state and local governments about 

what they can expect FEMA assistance to provide after a disaster. 

On P. 38, under the subsection Critical Components, DHS OIG indicates that “FEMA did 

not have a plan in place to deal with the unprecedented movement of displaced 

evacuees”. This statement over-states FEMA’s roles and authorities for evacuations prior 

to the passage of the Post Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act. Additionally, 

FEMA had assisted the State of Louisiana and its localities to develop the Southeast 

Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Plan. It would be more accurate to say that adequate 

plans were not in place at the Federal, state, or local level to deal with the unprecedented 

movement of displaced evacuees from Hurricane Katrina. 

P.40, under the subsection Strengthen state and local commitment to house affected 

citizens, the DHS OIG expresses concern over the lack of resources to exploit all 

FEMA’s Preparedness for the Next Catastrophic Disaster 

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available existing dwellings. We would like to make the DHS OIG aware of the joint 

HUD-FEMA Housing Portal initiative. This portal will provide housing information in a 

consolidated format accessible to disaster victims and FEMA housing staff. FEMA and 

HUD have reached an agreement for the development, management, operation, and 

security of a secure connection between HUD's National Housing Locator System 

(NHLS) and FEMA's Housing Portal. Connecting these systems will provide an internetbased website to assist individuals and families in finding rental housing following a 

Presidentially declared disaster. This connection will also make HUD’s considerable 

array of rental resources available to FEMA housing personnel. Network/cyber security 

issues must be resolved to permit completion of this FEMA-HUD joint effort. 

P. 40 (OCC)
 

Please capitalize “Administrator” in last paragraph on P. 40. 

P. 42 (OCC) 

Disaster Surge Workforce: FEMA does not understand how DHS OIG calculated the 

overall score for Disaster (Surge) Workforce. The average of the scores for the two 

critical components that were evaluated is higher than the overall score. If the issues 

addressed in the OIG’s “Continuing Concerns” for this area were important enough to 

impact the overall score, they should have been made explicit “critical components,” so 

that FEMA could have tailored its responses accordingly in the limited response time 

available. 

P. 42-45 (NPD) 

Disaster Surge Workforce: EMI is working with the Office of Disaster Reserve 

Workforce, FEMA Cadre Managers, Region Training Managers, and FEMA Program 

Offices to develop and maintain standardized Position Specific Task Books, 

Credentialing Plans, and a training and exercise curriculum for the Disaster Reserve 

Workforce that is aligned with the Position Task Books and Credentialing Plans. EMI 

has completed the Position Task Books for the Joint Field Office and is moving forward 

on the Position Task Books for the Regional Response Coordinating Centers and 

National Response Coordinating Center. Credentialing Plans are completed for the 

Federal Coordinating Officer cadre and Environmental and Historical cadre. EMI is 

working with the remaining cadres to develop their credentialing plans. To meet the 

training needs, EMI currently has a series of courses under development for JFO 

leadership as well as the various support functions. These new courses are being made 

available starting in April, 2008. 

P. 42 (Office of Management) 

“Disaster (Surge) Workforce” 

Clarification of terminology: The “surge” workforce is the capacity required beyond the 

base reservist level in order to meet the operational requirements for a catastrophic event. 

The “reserve” workforce is the intermittent employees that are deployed to work disasters 

FEMA’s Preparedness for the Next Catastrophic Disaster 

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on an ongoing basis and with the exception of the “generalist” position are not considered 

“surge”. 

FEMA’s Strategic Human Capital Plan (SHCP) is in final review and concurrence. Once 

all appropriate concurrences have been obtained, comments or concerns addressed, and 

appropriate modifications made, the report will be forwarded DHS/OMB and to Congress 

by April 15, 2008. At that point, the SCHP will also act as the guiding force behind 

critical recruitment, staffing, and retention activities for the FEMA workforce. 

SCHP updates will lay out the specific strategies for development of a surge capacity 

force. Strategies for this workforce will be developed in coordination with FEMA’s 

Disaster Reserve Workforce Program Management Office. 

FEMA has implemented recommendations from our Disaster Reserve Workforce 

(referenced on pg 44 of the draft report), including: 

	 Establishing the Office of the Disaster Reserve Workforce with the centralized 

focus to develop, deploy and support a professional Disaster Reserve Workforce; 

 Developing implementation plans for specific assessment recommendations; 

 Developing proposed legislative language and the costs associated with 

implementing those additional authorities. 

	 Identifying internal Human Capital policies to be changed and developing the 

plans to achieve the changes (e.g., allowing reservists to accrue and use sick leave 

while deployed); 

	 Preparing and implementing an interim plan to identify additional surge capacity 

for the 2008 hurricane season and to address requirements in Section 624 of 

PKEMRA; 

	 Completing Phase I enhancements to the Automated Deployment Database with a 

new server and software that will improve reporting capabilities and create 

interactive processes for both managers and reservists; and 

	 Submitting budget requests for FY 2010 to support the new more robust program 

requirements (i.e., the earliest budget cycle in which this can be done). 

P. 42 (Disaster Operations) 

1st Paragraph, FEMA recommends adding: “FEMA struggled to provide adequate 

numbers of staff in response to Hurricane Katrina and did not have the automated support 

needed to deploy over 5,000 disaster personnel...” 

2nd Paragraph, FEMA recommends adding: “The Post-Katrina Act also requires a plan to 

establish and implement a surge workforce, including an adequate...” 

P. 44 (Mitigation) 

FEMA’s Preparedness for the Next Catastrophic Disaster 

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The report states a recommendation of the contractor study to reduce FEMA’s cadres 

from 23 to 9. This is not an accurate statement of the recommendation. 

P. 45 (Disaster Operations) 

5th Bullet: “Training regional strike teams as a unit and equip and staff these teams;” 

As required in the Post-Katrina Act, FEMA is developing the next generation of rapidly 

deployable interagency emergency response teams, which the Post–Katrina Act referred 

to as strike teams, and FEMA has named Incident Management Assistance Teams 

(IMATs). These teams will coordinate the initial Federal response; support the emergent 

needs of State and local jurisdictions; possess the capability to provide initial situational 

awareness for Federal decision-makers; and support the initial establishment of a unified 

command. These teams will ultimately provide the three national-level response teams 

and regional-level emergency response “strike” teams. One National IMAT is currently 

operational in the National Capital Region, and FEMA plans to stand up three Regional 

IMATs by summer 2008. 

P. 46-49 (Disaster Operations and NPD) 

Mission Assignments: The draft report implies FEMA did not begin to re-engineer the 

processes, relationships, and resources involved in management of Mission Assignments 

(MAs) until November 2007. This process was initiated in spring 2006 when FEMA 

developed revised guidance for Pre-Scripted Mission Assignments (PSMAs) and worked 

with the Department of Defense and other Federal Agencies to improve existing PSMAs. 

Both FEMA and the Department spent months of time and dedicated manpower prior to 

the 2007 hurricane season to improve the MA process and the development of PSMAs 

involving other Federal Agencies. A revised manual for MAs resulted, and was the basis 

of improvements from November 2007 forward. 

FEMA also embarked on a robust interagency MA training program for Regions and 

other Federal agencies in Spring 2006. This considerably improved the interagency 

understanding of Mission Assignments. The report states that “MA policies, procedures, 

training, staffing, and funding have never been fully addressed by FEMA, creating 

misunderstandings among federal agencies concerning operational and fiduciary 

responsibilities.” FEMA recognized this as a problem and started addressing it in 2006. 

The categorization that “Limited or No Progress” on the P. 46 dashboard misrepresents 

the efforts to address this issue and the progress made. 

EMI is developing an online independent study course, Mission Assignment Overview 

IS-293 to address the basic MA process for anyone who may be involved in the MA 

process. FEMA anticipates deploying the course by July, 2008. 

EMI offers a two-day course, Orientation to Mission Assignments, for the FEMA 

Regional Interagency Steering Committee which is comprised of other Federal Agencies 

and State and Tribal staff. The purpose of this course is to provide an overview of the 

MA process for FEMA's various disaster partners. 

FEMA’s Preparedness for the Next Catastrophic Disaster 

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EMI delivers an additional course, Introduction to MA Processing E347, for FEMA 

Operations Section Chiefs, Mission Assignment staff and other JFO leadership. The 

purpose of this course is to develop in-depth skills for the MA process. 

P. 48 (Disaster Operations) 

Mission Assignments: 1st Sentence: Comment – There are currently 223 PSMAs under 

development listed in the draft PSMA Catalogue – Operational Working Draft. The 

intention is to publish the current drafts in this catalogue by June 2008. 

FEMA developed a Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) manual to explain and 

streamline the process for issuing MAs. The MA SOP outlines the policies, procedures, 

and processes that FEMA uses to interact and coordinate with other Federal Departments 

and Agencies and organizations when responding to disasters. Plans are to release an 

updated “Coordinating Draft” of the MA SOP in March 2008. 

P.49 (Disaster Operations) 

4th Paragraph: FEMA recommends editing to read, “We will continue to collaborate with 

FEMA’s Disaster Operations Directorate staff and the interagency...” 

P. 50 (Grants)
 

Under “Acquisition Management, Background”, 1st sentence, the word “grant” should be 

removed. The awarding of a grant is not part of the acquisition management process. 

They are separate processes. 

P.50-53 (Office of Management)
 

Acquisition Management: Figure 1 in the Executive Summary assesses Acquisition 

Management as “Modest/Moderate.” However the narrative on P. 50, (paragraph three, 

sentence two), states that “modest progress has been made overall...” It is recommended 

that these assessments be reconciled and made consistent as no lower than 

“modest/moderate.” 

The assessment on P. 52 of the third criticized component under Acquisition 

Management, namely, “provide for post-award oversight,” does not adequately recognize 

the robust Contracting Officer’s Technical Representative (COTR) program that FEMA 

put in place last year. The COTR program is mentioned in the draft report under the 

second critical component, “recruit, train, and retain sufficient acquisition staff,” but 

primarily from a staffing perspective. The COTR program will significantly bolster postaward oversight as well. 

FEMA created a COTR Program Management Office (PMO) in May 2007 to implement 

the training, support, and tools needed for effective contract administration. The FEMA 

COTR PMO provides Agency-wide oversight, accountability and operational 

effectiveness of the Agency’s COTRs. This program has also improved the 

FEMA’s Preparedness for the Next Catastrophic Disaster 

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competencies of its COTRs, and has thereby improved the quality of work performed by 

them. Most recently FEMA requested funding to develop its COTRs in a tiered structure 

that goes beyond the DHS-required forty hours of annual training. By tiering the COTRs 

at levels I, II, and III, FEMA will be able to tailor a COTR’s competencies and 

development to the level of program he or she will be assigned to support. This will 

improve both the pre- and post-award contracting activities. The COTR tiered 

certification structure represents an investment in the “New FEMA” by supporting the 

transformation of the current workforce to a highly skilled and effective contract 

management program. Based on this, FEMA considers this component as having 

moderate progress made. 

FEMA’s Preparedness for the Next Catastrophic Disaster 

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Appendix C 

Selected Reports 

Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General 

A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities in 

Response to Hurricane Katrina (OIG-06-32, March 2006). 

Fiscal Year 2008 Annual Performance Plan. 

Homeland Security Information Network Could Support Information 

Sharing More Effectively (OIG-06-38, June 2006). 

Major Management Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland 

Security (OIG-08-11, November 2007). 

Semiannual Report to the Congress: October 1, 2006 – March 31, 

2007. 

Government Accountability Office 

Actions Needed to Clarify Responsibilities and Increase Preparedness 

for Evacuations (GAO-07-44, December 2006). 

Observations on DHS and FEMA Efforts to Prepare for and Respond 

to Major and Catastrophic Disasters and Address Related 

Recommendations and Legislation (GAO-07-835T, May 

2007). 

Other Documents 

A Failure of Initiative: Final Report of the Select Bipartisan 

Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to 

Hurricane Katrina (United States House of Representatives, 

February 2006). 

Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared (U.S. Senate: Special 

Report of the Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs, S. Rept. 109-322, 2006). 

The Federal Response to Katrina: Lessons Learned (The White 

House, February 2006). 

FEMA’s Preparedness for the Next Catastrophic Disaster 

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Appendix D 

Major Contributors to This Report 

Department of Homeland Security – Office of Inspector General 

Office of Emergency Management Oversight 

Donald Bumgardner, Lead Director 

Norman Brown, Director 

Gina Smith, Director 

Amy Hall, Project Manager 

Modupe Akinsika, Supervisory Auditor 

Moises Dugan, Supervisory Program Analyst 

Polin Cohanne, Program Analyst 

Trudi Powell, Auditor 

Katherine Roberts, Program Analyst 

Lori Smith, Auditor 

FEMA’s Preparedness for the Next Catastrophic Disaster 

Page 79 
Appendix E 

Report Distribution 

Department of Homeland Security 

Secretary 

Deputy Secretary 

Chief of Staff 

Deputy Chief of Staff 

General Counsel 

Executive Secretary 

Director, GAO/OIG Liaison Office 

Assistant Secretary for Policy 

Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs 

Assistant Secretary for Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs 

Chief Privacy Officer 

Federal Emergency Management Agency 

Administrator 

Assistant Administrator 

Deputy Administrator, National Preparedness Directorate 

FEMA GAO/OIG Liaison 

Office of Management and Budget 

Chief, Homeland Security Branch 

DHS OIG Budget Examiner 

Congress 

Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees, as 

appropriate 

FEMA’s Preparedness for the Next Catastrophic Disaster 

Page 80 
Additional Information and Copies 

To obtain additional copies of this report, call the Office of Inspector General 

(OIG) at (202) 254-4199, fax your request to (202) 254-4305, or visit the OIG web 

site at www.dhs.gov/oig. 

OIG Hotline 

To report alleged fraud, waste, abuse or mismanagement, or any other kind of 

criminal or noncriminal misconduct relative to department programs or 

operations: 

• Call our Hotline at 1-800-323-8603; 

• Fax the complaint directly to us at (202) 254-4292; 

• Email us at DHSOIGHOTLINE@dhs.gov; or 

•	 Write to us at: 

DHS Office of Inspector General/MAIL STOP 2600, Attention: 

Office of Investigations - Hotline, 245 Murray Drive, SW, Building 410, 

Washington, DC 20528. 

The OIG seeks to protect the identity of each writer and caller.