alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
§ 120.45 Maintenance levels. ( a ) *Organizational-level maintenance* (or basic-level maintenance) is the first level of maintenance that can be performed on-equipment (directly on the defense article or support equipment) without specialized training. It consists of repairing, inspecting, servicing, calibrating, lubricating, or adjusting equipment, as well as replacing minor parts, components, assemblies, and line-replaceable spares or units. This includes modifications, enhancements, or upgrades that would result in improving only the reliability or maintainability of the commodity (e.g., an increased mean time between failure) and does not enhance the basic performance or capability of the defense article.
( b ) *Intermediate-level maintenance* is second-level maintenance performed off-equipment (on removed parts, components, or equipment) at or by designated maintenance shops or centers, tenders, or field teams. It may consist of calibrating, repairing, testing, or replacing damaged or unserviceable parts, components, or assemblies. This includes modifications, enhancements, or upgrades that would result in improving only the reliability or maintainability of the commodity (e.g., an increased mean time between failure) and does not enhance the basic performance or capability of the defense article.
( c ) *Depot-level maintenance* is third-level maintenance performed on- or off-equipment at or by a major repair facility, shipyard, or field team, each with necessary equipment and personnel of requisite technical skill. It consists of providing evaluation or repair beyond unit or organization capability. This maintenance consists of inspecting, testing, calibrating, repairing, overhauling, refurbishing, reconditioning, and one-to-one replacing of any defective parts, components, or assemblies. This includes modifications, enhancements, or upgrades that would result in improving only the reliability or maintainability of the commodity (e.g., an increased mean time between failure) and does not enhance the basic performance or capability of the defense article.
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Plaintiff submitted a declaration in support of his application, but did not address

therein any issue concerning bias.

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TSEGAI HAILE,

Plaintiff,

 v.

SANTA ROSA MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, et

al.,

Defendants

 /

No. 08-4149 MMC

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

APPLICATION FILED MARCH 24, 2010

The Court is in receipt of plaintiff’s “Application; Motion for Court’s Assistance to

Appoint a Counsel; to Proceed in Forma Pauperis and Statements & Concerns of

Impartiality?,” filed March 24, 2010. Having read and considered the application, the Court

rules as follows:

1. To the extent the application seeks an order of disqualification, the application is

hereby DENIED as procedurally defective, as it is not supported by a declaration,1

 and

substantively improper, as it is based solely on court rulings. See United States v. Sibla,

624 F.2d 864, 869 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding bias must stem from “extrajudicial source”), 

2. To the extent the application seeks an order allowing plaintiff to proceed in forma

Case 3:08-cv-04149-MMC Document 187 Filed 04/07/10 Page 1 of 2
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pauperis, the application is hereby DENIED, for the reason that no filing fee is due.

3. To the extent the application seeks reconsideration of the Court’s Order of March

15, 2010, the application is hereby DENIED. Contrary to plaintiff’s argument, plaintiff has

failed to show he will be deprived of liberty if he does not prevail in the instant action, nor

has he shown, in light of the jury’s findings in favor of defendant made herein, that his

claims have merit.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 7, 2010 

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

Case 3:08-cv-04149-MMC Document 187 Filed 04/07/10 Page 2 of 2
### §2297h–10b. Secretarial determinations; congressional notification

#### (a) Secretarial determinations

In this fiscal year, and in each subsequent fiscal year, any determination (including a determination made prior to December 16, 2014) by the Secretary of Energy under section 2297h–10(d)(2)(B) of this title shall be valid for not more than 2 calendar years subsequent to such determination.

#### (b) Congressional notification

In this fiscal year, and in each subsequent fiscal year, not less than 30 days prior to the provision of uranium in any form the Secretary of Energy shall notify the Committees on Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the Senate of the following—

(1) the provisions of law (including regulations) authorizing the provision of uranium;

(2) the amount of uranium to be provided;

(3) an estimate by the Secretary of Energy of the gross fair market value of the uranium on the expected date of the provision of the uranium;

(4) the expected date of the provision of the uranium;

(5) the recipient of the uranium;

(6) the value the Secretary of Energy expects to receive in exchange for the uranium, including any adjustments to the gross fair market value of the uranium; and

(7) whether the uranium to be provided is encumbered by any restriction on use under an international agreement or otherwise.

(Pub. L. 113–235, div. D, title III, §306, Dec. 16, 2014, 128 Stat. 2324.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Codification

Section was enacted as part of the Energy and Water Development and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2015, and also as part of the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015, and not as part of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 which comprises this chapter.
#### § 212.18 Purpose and scope.

This subpart contains the rules that the USAID follows under the Privacy Act of 1974 (PA), 5 U.S.C. 552a, as amended. These rules should be read together with the text of the statute, which provides additional information about records maintained on individuals. The rules in this subpart apply to all records in systems of records maintained by the agency that are retrieved by an individual's name or personal identifier. They describe the procedures by which individuals may request access to records about themselves, request amendment or correction of those records, and request an accounting of disclosures of those records by the agency. If any records retrieved pursuant to an access request under the PA are found to be exempt from access under that Act, they will be processed for possible disclosure under the FOIA, as amended. No fees shall be charged for access to or amendment of PA records.
#### AMERICAN ICE CO., Respondent, v. CATSKILL CEMENT CO., Appellant.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department.

March 8, 1905.)

Action by the American Ice Company against the Catskill Cement Company.

PER CURIAM.

Application for leave to appeal to Court of Appeals granted, and questions certified as follows: “(1) Before the enactment of chapter 749, Laws 1904, had the defendant the right to carry on a lawful manufacturing business upon lands bordering on the Hudson river, if in so doing smoke, cinders, dust, or soot was discharged from its mill into the air, and carried by the winds over and upon ice formed in said river, to the injury of such ice, provided the defendant’s mill was properly constructed and operated with due care? (2) Before the enactment of chapter 749, Laws 1904, had the plaintiff the right to restrain and prevent the defendant from operating its said mill, for the reason that in so doing smoke, cinders, dust, or soot was discharged from said mill into the air, and carried by the winds over and upon ice formed in the Hudson river, to the injury of such ice, although the defendant’s mill was properly constructed and operated with due care in carrying tin a lawful manufacturing business? (3) Is chapter 749 of the Laws of 1904 of this state constitutional?”
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

 v.

JON DECANO, a.k.a. Jon Darren 

Maglangit,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 15-10456

D.C. No. 1:14-cr-00469-HG

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Hawaii

Helen Gillmor, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted December 14, 2016**

Before: WALLACE, LEAVY, and FISHER, Circuit Judges. 

Jon Decano appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges the 

140-month sentence imposed following his guilty-plea conviction for conspiracy to 

distribute a controlled substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

DEC 19 2016

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
 2 15-10456 

and 846. We dismiss.

The government contends that this appeal is barred by a valid appeal waiver. 

We review de novo whether a defendant has waived his right to appeal. See 

United States v. Harris, 628 F.3d 1203, 1205 (9th Cir. 2011). The terms of the 

appeal waiver in Decano’s plea agreement unambiguously encompass this appeal

of his below-Guidelines sentence. See id. at 1205-06. Decano’s arguments that 

the waiver is unenforceable because his sentence is illegal are without merit. First, 

the district court did not have to apply U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 in considering the 

government’s motion for a downward departure because that Guideline provision 

is not implicated here. See Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 819 (2010) 

(section 1B1.10 governs 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) sentence modification 

proceedings). Second, Decano’s claim that he received no benefit in exchange for 

his guilty plea is belied by the record. Finally, we decline to consider Decano’s

claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal. See 

United States v. Rahman, 642 F.3d 1257, 1259-60 (9th Cir. 2011).

DISMISSED.
### §4655. Requirements for uniform land acquisition policies; payments of expenses incidental to transfer of real property to State; payment of litigation expenses in certain cases

(a) Notwithstanding any other law, the head of a Federal agency shall not approve any program or project or any grant to, or contract or agreement with, an acquiring agency under which Federal financial assistance will be available to pay all or part of the cost of any program or project which will result in the acquisition of real property on and after January 2, 1971, unless he receives satisfactory assurances from such acquiring agency that—

(1) in acquiring real property it will be guided, to the greatest extent practicable under State law, by the land acquisition policies in section 4651 of this title and the provisions of section 4652 of this title, and

(2) property owners will be paid or reimbursed for necessary expenses as specified in sections 4653 and 4654 of this title.

(b) For purposes of this section, the term "acquiring agency" means—

(1) a State agency (as defined in section 4601(3) of this title) which has the authority to acquire property by eminent domain under State law, and

(2) a State agency or person which does not have such authority, to the extent provided by the head of the lead agency by regulation.

(Pub. L. 91–646, title III, §305, Jan. 2, 1971, 84 Stat. 1906; Pub. L. 100–17, title IV, §417, Apr. 2, 1987, 101 Stat. 256.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Amendments

1987—Pub. L. 100–17 designated existing provisions as subsec. (a), substituted "an acquiring agency" for "a State agency" and "such acquiring agency" for "such State agency", and added subsec. (b).

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Effective Date of 1987 Amendment

Amendment by Pub. L. 100–17 effective on effective date provided in regulations promulgated under section 4633 of this title (as amended by section 412 of Pub. L. 100–17), but not later than 2 years after Apr. 2, 1987, see section 418 of Pub. L. 100–17, set out as a note under section 4601 of this title.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Daniel O’Connor, Appellant.

Appeal by defendant from two judgments of the Supreme Court, Richmond County, both rendered January 28, 1976, the first convicting him of robbery in the first degree, upon a jury verdict, and sentencing him to an indeterminate term of imprisonment of from 11 years to 22 years, and the second convicting him of robbery in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and sentencing him to an indeterminate term of imprisonment of from 6 years to 12 years, the sentences to run consecutively. Judgments affirmed. We have carefully reviewed the record and have determined that the jury verdicts before us for review were proper. As to *801the sentences, the record reveals that under the first indictment (Indictment No. 117/75) defendant was found guilty by a jury of robbery in the first degree for the forcible stealing at gunpoint of money and drugs from a pharmacy on Staten Island on the evening of December 21, 1974. Under the second indictment (Indictment No. 65/75), and after a separate jury trial, defendant was again found guilty, this time of robbery in the second degree, for the forcible stealing of money and drugs at gunpoint from another Staten Island pharmacy on December 23, 1974. Three other indictments, each also involving the holdup of a pharmacy on Staten Island at gunpoint, were dismissed at time of sentencing. The probation report indicates that from February 19,1954 to March 31, 1975, defendant was arrested a total of 19 times for other offenses, some of which included charges of robbery, burglary, grand larceny, and criminal possession of a weapon. His prior convictions included one for attempted robbery in the third degree, another for unlawful entry and two convictions for petit larceny. Since defendant was convicted under separate indictments for two unrelated robberies, the imposition of consecutive sentences was within the competence of the trial court (see Penal Law, § 70.25, subds 1, *2; People v Paul,*46 AD2d 838). Furthermore, upon the trial record of each case, and the probation report, which accurately portray the defendant as an antisocial habitual criminal with a propensity towards committing crimes with the use of dangerous weapons, it cannot be said that the imposition by the trial court of consecutive sentences of 11 to 22 years on the first degree robbery conviction, and 6 to 12 years on the second degree robbery conviction was unwarranted. Damiani, J. P., Titone, Shapiro and Cohalan, JJ., concur.
#### § 92.34 Fastening certificate to instrument.

The proper place for the certificate of acknowledgment is after the signature of the parties to the instrument. If the instrument is a printed form, the certificate will almost invariably be a part of the form. When Form FS-88 is used or when the certificate must be prepared on a sheet separate from the instrument, it should be fastened to the instrument as the last sheet. The method of fastening notarial certificates is prescribed in § 92.17.
Exhibit 99.2



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906

OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



I, J. Keith Kitchen, Chief Accounting Officer of Pumatech, Inc. (the Company), do hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| |  |  | the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the quarter ended April 30, 2003, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the Report), fully complies
with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | - |  | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| |  |  | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | - |  | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



Dated: June 13, 2003



|/s/    J. KEITH KITCHEN                                                 
|------------------------------------------------------------------------
|J. Keith Kitchen                                                        
|Vice President of Finance and Administration andChief Accounting Officer



|* |  | A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to and will be retained by Pumatech, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange
Commission or its staff upon request.
|- |  | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
§ 51.42 Persons born in the United States applying for a passport for the first time. ( a ) *Primary evidence of birth in the United States.* A person born in the United States generally must submit a birth certificate. The birth certificate must show the full name of the applicant, the applicant's place and date of birth, the full name of the parent(s), and must be signed by the official custodian of birth records, bear the seal of the issuing office, and show a filing date within one year of the date of birth.
( b ) *Secondary evidence of birth in the United States.* If the applicant cannot submit a birth certificate that meets the requirement of paragraph (a) of this section, he or she must submit secondary evidence sufficient to establish to the satisfaction of the Department that he or she was born in the United States. Secondary evidence includes but is not limited to hospital birth certificates, baptismal certificates, medical and school records, certificates of circumcision, other documentary evidence created shortly after birth but generally not more than 5 years after birth, and/or affidavits of persons having personal knowledge of the facts of the birth.
#### (A) In the Matter of John R. Alex, Appellant, v. Robert E. Murphy, as Warden of Auburn Prison, Respondent. (Paul Magill, Esq., assigned counsel.) (B) The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Benjamin Barber, Appellant. (Peter L. Parrino, Esq., assigned counsel.) (C) The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Lewis G. Brown, Appellant. (Harold B. Ashworth, Esq., assigned counsel.) (D) The People of the State of New York ex rel. Amedio Ciani, Appellant, v. Robert E. Murphy, as Warden of Auburn Prison, Respondent. (Frank M. Leary, Esq., assigned counsel.) (E) The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Charles Falzone, Appellant. (F) The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. John Morgan, Jr., Appellant. (Eugene J. Ouchie, Esq., assigned counsel.) (G) The People of the State of New York ex rel. Edward Smith, Appellant, v. Walter H. Wilkins, as Warden of Attica Prison, Respondent.

[In each action] Motion granted to prosecute appeal on original papers and typewritten briefs.
I 

112TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 4367 

To amend the Electronic Fund Transfer Act to limit the fee disclosure 

requirement for an automatic teller machine to the screen of that machine. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

APRIL 17, 2012 

Mr. LUETKEMEYER (for himself and Mr. DAVID SCOTT of Georgia) introduced 

the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Financial Services 

A BILL 

To amend the Electronic Fund Transfer Act to limit the 

fee disclosure requirement for an automatic teller machine to the screen of that machine. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. FEE DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENT. 

4 Section 904(d)(3)(B) of the Consumer Credit Protec5 tion Act (15 U.S.C. 1693b(d)(3)(B)) (commonly known 

6 as the ‘‘Electronic Fund Transfer Act’’) is amended— 

7 (1) by striking ‘‘REQUIREMENTS.’’ and all that 

8 follows through ‘‘The notice required under clauses 

9 (i) and (ii)’’ and inserting ‘‘REQUIREMENT.—‘The 


smartinez on DSK6TPTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 4367 IH

1 notice required under clauses (i) and (ii)’ ’’ after 

2 ‘‘NOTICE’’; and 

3 (2) by striking ‘‘, except that during the period 

4 beginning’’ and all that follows and inserting a pe5 riod. 

Æ 


smartinez on DSK6TPTVN1PROD with BILLS
§ 35.33 Witnesses. ( a ) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, testimony at the hearing shall be given orally by witnesses under oath or affirmation.
( b ) At the discretion of the ALJ, testimony may be admitted in the form of a written statement or deposition. Any such written statement must be provided to all other parties along with the last known address of such witness, in a manner which allows sufficient time for other parties to subpoena such witness for cross-examination at the hearing. Prior written statements of witnesses proposed to testify at the hearing and deposition transcripts shall be exchanged as provided in § 35.22(a).
( c ) The ALJ shall exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence in order to make— ( 1 ) The interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth;
( 2 ) To avoid needless consumption of time; and
( 3 ) To protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment.
( d ) The ALJ shall permit the parties to conduct such cross-examination as may be required for a full and true disclosure of the facts.
( e ) At the discretion of the ALJ, a witness may be cross-examined on matters relevant to the proceeding without regard to the scope of his or her direct examination. To the extent permitted by the ALJ, cross-examination on matters outside the scope of direct examination shall be conducted in the manner of direct examination and may proceed by leading questions only if the witness is a hostile witness, an adverse party, or a witness identified with an adverse party.
( f ) Upon motion of any party, the ALJ shall order witnesses excluded so that they cannot hear the testimony of other witnesses. This rule does not authorize exclusion of— ( 1 ) A party who is an individual;
( 2 ) In the case of a party that is not an individual, an officer or employee of the party designated by the party's representative; or
( 3 ) An individual whose presence is shown by a party to be essential to the presentation of its case, including an individual employed by the Government engaged in assisting the representative for the Government.
### §5792. Transferred

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Codification

Section, Pub. L. 108–21, title III, §362, Apr. 30, 2003, 117 Stat. 665, was editorially reclassified and is set out in a note under section 3101 of Title 40, Public Buildings, Property, and Works.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Steven Miller, Appellant.

[717 NYS2d 897]

—Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Robinson, J.), rendered May 26, 1998, convicting him of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree, upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

We have reviewed the record and agree with the defendant’s assigned counsel that there are no nonfrivolous issues which could be raised on appeal. Counsel’s application for leave to withdraw as counsel is granted *(see, Anders v California,*386 US 738; *People v Paige,*54 AD2d 631; *cf., People v Gonzalez,*47 NY2d 606). Ritter, J. P., Thompson, Friedmann, H. Miller and Feuerstein, JJ., concur.