This project was supported by Cooperative Agreement number 2002-CK-WX-K001 awarded by 

the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing. Points of view or 

opinions contained in this document are those of the IACP, and do not necessarily represent 

the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
 IACP Criminal Intelligence Sharing Report 

Table of Contents 

 

Executive Summary......................................................................................................................... i 

I. Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 1 

II. Summit Background and Purpose.......................................................................................... 3 

Summit Planning and Participation ............................................................................................ 3 

Summit Proceedings ................................................................................................................... 3 

III. The Necessity of a National Intelligence Plan....................................................................... 4 

The Call for a Plan ...................................................................................................................... 4 

Overcoming Barriers................................................................................................................... 5 

IV. The Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council................................................................ 6 

The Council’s Mandate............................................................................................................... 6 

Participants in the Coordinating Council.................................................................................... 7 

Organizational Considerations for the Coordinating Council .................................................. 10 

V. Core Recommendations for Achieving the Plan ................................................................. 12 

Promote Intelligence-Led Policing through a Common Understanding of “Criminal 

Intelligence” and its Usefulness................................................................................................ 12 

Provide the Critical Counterbalance of Civil Rights ................................................................ 14 

Increase Opportunities for Trust Building ................................................................................ 14 

Remedy Analytic Deficits......................................................................................................... 15 

Remedy Information Deficits ................................................................................................... 15 

Address Training Issues............................................................................................................ 15 

Address Technology Issues....................................................................................................... 16 

VI. Next Steps.............................................................................................................................. 18 

Local, State and Tribal Law Enforcement ................................................................................ 18 
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Congress and Federal Agencies................................................................................................ 19

Affinity Organizations, including the International Association of Chiefs of Police............... 20 

Endnotes........................................................................................................................................ 21 
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Acknowledgments 

Funding and support for the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) Criminal 

Intelligence Sharing Summit and this final report came from the office of the Community 

Oriented Policing Services (COPS) within the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ). We are 

grateful especially to COPS Director Carl Peed and COPS Deputy Director Ellen Scrivner for 

their vision on this effort. 

Throughout the project, but particularly during the conceptualization and planning stages, the 

summit benefited from the collaboration and contributions of the Advisory Board, whose 

members are recognized individually at the end of this report. 

We are indebted most to the participants who worked so diligently and productively to fashion 

the recommendations that appear in this report. We hope that we have synthesized and conveyed 

their contributions faithfully and accurately. Each participant is also acknowledged at the end of 

the report. 

Several individuals deserve special thanks for their leadership contributions to the summit and to 

the final report: Peter Modafferi, Chief of Detectives, Rockland County, and Russ Porter, 

Special Agent in Charge, Iowa Department of Public Safety, gave generously of their time and 

skills to plan and facilitate the Summit, and help craft this final report. Joe Polisar, IACP’s 

Second Vice President and Chief of the Garden Grove (CA) Police Department provided an 

opening keynote address that helped Summit Participants focus their efforts. 
 IACP Criminal Intelligence Sharing Report 

Executive Summary

Motivated by the tragic events of September 11 and resulting revelations that underscore the 

importance of improved intelligence exchange between national agencies, President Bush has

recently called for the creation of a Cabinet-level Department of Homeland Security. Among 

other things, the proposal emphasizes that improved criminal intelligence data sharing is critical 

to enhancing law enforcement and other emergency agencies’ capacities to protect the American 

public against terrorism and all other criminal acts that threaten its safety. Significantly, the

President’s proposal does not focus exclusively on improved intelligence sharing between

national-level agencies – it recognizes that non-federal protective services agencies must be

brought into the process. 

Law enforcement executives and intelligence experts from across the country who met at the 

International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) Criminal Intelligence Sharing Summit held

in Alexandria, Virginia, March 7-8, 2002 came to a similar conclusion, and their proposal aligns 

itself well with the President’s initiative. Participants engaged the issues through discussions on 

the capacities for and barriers to intelligence sharing, the standards and guidelines that direct 

intelligence sharing, technology and training related to intelligence sharing, and important legal 

and civil rights that must guide all criminal intelligence gathering and sharing processes. 

Discussions also focused on the unique potential for community oriented policing initiatives to 

aid in the gathering of locally driven intelligence. Summit participants articulated a vision in

which non-federal agencies are more than adjuncts to a national strategy for improved 

intelligence communication, but founding partners of any organization – and leading participants 

in any process – that helps coordinate the collection, analysis, dissemination and use of criminal 

intelligence data in the U.S. 

This summary provides an overview of the details of their proposal. 

The Necessity of a National Intelligence Plan 

The Call for a Plan 

While September 11 highlighted the urgency in improving the capacity of protective services 

agencies to share terrorism-relevant intelligence data, participants in the Criminal Intelligence

Sharing Summit stressed that the real need is to share all – not just terrorism-related – criminal 

intelligence. Better sharing of this broader body of crime-related intelligence could significantly

improve agencies’ capacity to protect public safety. 

To meet this vital need, Summit participants called upon federal leaders to affirm the need for all

law enforcement (local, state, Tribal and Federal) to join in the creation of a National 

Intelligence Plan. Such a Plan will: 

1. Create a coordinating council comprised of local, state, Tribal and Federal law 

enforcement executives (The Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council) to 

oversee and implement the National Intelligence Plan. 

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 IACP Criminal Intelligence Sharing Report 

2. Address the legal impediments to the effective transfer of criminal intelligence

between authorized enforcement agencies. Specifically, 

• The Plan will mandate a review by the FBI, the President’s National Security 

Advisor and the National Security Council (NSC) of all federal policies and 

legislation that restrict the flow of classified information. 

• The Plan will direct the FBI, the President’s National Security Advisor and 

NSC to revise security clearance categories and classifications, with an eye to 

increasing the information available to local law enforcement departments for

the prevention and investigation of crime in their jurisdictions. 

• The Plan will create a task force comprised of justice system professionals to

assess existing regulations and statutes to ensure a balance between the needs 

of law enforcement and individuals’ rights to privacy. 

• The Plan will recommend legislation to allow for the changes necessary for

improved information collection and intelligence sharing (while protecting

civil rights). 

Overcoming Barriers 

In issuing their call for a National Intelligence Plan, participants noted that the details of the Plan 

and the mandate of the Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council must be sufficient to 

overcome the substantial and, in some cases, longstanding barriers that hinder intelligence

sharing. Some of the most significant barriers stressed by Summit participants include the 

absence of a nationally coordinated process for intelligence generation and sharing; the 

“hierarchy” within the law enforcement and intelligence communities; federal, state, local and

tribal laws and policies that prevent sharing; the inaccessibility and/or disaggregation of 

technologies to support intelligence sharing; and deficits in intelligence analysis. 

The Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council 

The most central and enduring element of the Plan advocated by Summit participants is the call 

for a Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council. This Council provides an ongoing solution to

the identified need for a nationally coordinated, but locally driven, criminal intelligence

generation and sharing process for the promotion of public safety. 

The Council’s Mandate 

In general terms, the Council’s mandate is to promote, ensure and establish effective intelligence

sharing and to address and solve, in an ongoing fashion, the problems that inhibit it. In order to 

accomplish these tasks, the mandate must be central, permanent, powerful and inclusive. In

specific, the Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council shall: 

• Be chaired by a representative of local law enforcement and staffed fulltime by 

local, state, Tribal and Federal law enforcement personnel detailed from their 

respective agencies. 

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• Be structured in a way that allows representation from all types of law 

enforcement agencies, while limiting the total number to create a workable 

organizational unit. 

• Ensure compatible policy standards, guidelines and operating procedures in the

further development and integration of existing intelligence sharing systems 

(including standards for the collection, analysis, dissemination, storage and 

purging of information); create standards for participation in the Council and

coordinated intelligence network; promulgate standards and guidelines; publicize 

and enforce sanctions for the misuse of information from the coordinated 

network. 

• Create a “marketing strategy” to increase stakeholder participation in the

intelligence sharing process and conduct public education to promote public 

acceptance of the system overall. 

• Create a funding plan to ensure that the National Intelligence Plan is adequately 

funded. 

• Establish national level criminal intelligence analytical operation standards, 

methods and training to complement local, state, regional and Federal efforts and 

aid in the assessment of threats and supporting law enforcement courses of actions 

against community crimes and national security concerns. 

• Work with local, state, Tribal and Federal training academies and other training 

providers to make curriculum changes in support of the new intelligence-sharing

goals. 

• Work with states, localities and Tribes in eliminating barriers in their laws and

policies that limit intelligence sharing.

Participants in the Coordinating Council 

A variety of law enforcement and protective services organizations already engage in substantial 

intelligence sharing. Rather than replicating such efforts, the Council should seek to connect 

them, strengthen them, support their expansion as necessary and then fill other gaps in the 

current system. A selection of possible founding participant organizations includes: 

• The Regional Information Sharing Systems (RISS) and its technical assistance 

provider, the Institute for Intergovernmental Research (IIR). 

• The High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) Investigative Support

Centers (ISCs). 

• The Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit (LEIU). 

• State Law Enforcement Intelligence Networks (LEINs). 

• The International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts 

(IALEIA). 

• International bodies that track criminals and share information about trans-border 

crime problems. 

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• States’ and major cities’ law enforcement intelligence divisions. 

• Networks (existing and new) of local law enforcement agencies. While smaller 

local agencies are unlikely to have dedicated intelligence staff, they constitute the

majority of the departments in the U.S. It is vital that they, like larger

departments, participate in intelligence sharing and practice intelligence-led 

policing. 

Given the number of potential Council participants, decisions will need to be made on

limiting the total number of council members to ensure that the organization can be 

effective in its work.

Organizational Considerations for the Coordinating Council 

While Summit participants did not make specific organizational recommendations for the

Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council, they did raise several general organizational 

considerations. 

First, they stressed the importance of creating an organization in which relevant data can flow

appropriately to all parties that need it. Participants offered several images of this flow. One

image is that of a ladder, but rather than imagining intelligence transmission “up” and “down” its 

steps, the ladder should be turned on its side, so that all law enforcement and protective services 

entities have access to and equal status with respect to the flow of intelligence information. 

Another image is that of the hub, spokes and rim of a wheel, in which intelligence information 

flows “up,” “down,” and “between” nodes in the network. The graphic on the following page

shows the types of law enforcement agencies that must be included in the intelligence sharing 

continuum. 

Second, Summit participants emphasized the necessity of a broad-based effort for improving 

criminal intelligence generation and sharing. That is, participants stressed that local (nonfederal) law enforcement should be a driving force in the implementation of a National 

Intelligence Plan. The reasons for this emphasis are practical. Public safety in the United States

does not depend primarily on federal agencies – it depends primarily on the action and activities 

of local, state and Tribal law enforcement agencies, particularly in the current community 

policing environment. 

Third, Summit participants stressed the necessity of connecting federal agencies to the proposed

Coordinating Council. They observed that federal agencies’ connections with state and local 

intelligence networks are often weak, and that at least part of this problem stems from federal 

laws and policies that expressly prohibit intelligence sharing (which should be addressed through 

legislative efforts under the Plan). However, the difficulty of promoting intelligence sharing 

between federal and non-federal law enforcement agencies also arises from the different 

agencies’ cultures, and the Council, through its work, outreach and operations, must find ways to 

combat these attitudinal barriers to intelligence coordination. 

Fourth, Summit participants stressed that not only law enforcement personnel, but also other 

justice system agencies have an important role in the promotion of public safety. Summit

participants cited a need to inform, for example, corrections personnel, probation and parole 

officers, emergency management personnel and specialized security forces of particular 

iv

 IACP Criminal Intelligence Sharing Report 

situation-relevant intelligence. Thus, the Council’s organization ought to promote the

involvement of such players. 

Core Recommendations for Achieving the Plan 

The Summit participants supported their recommendations for a National Intelligence Plan and 

Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council with a series of additional, more detailed 

recommendations. They are specifically intended to help the Council and its component

agencies achieve the goals of the National Intelligence Plan. The participants’ additional 

proposals are: 

Promote Intelligence-Led Policing through a Common Understanding of Criminal 

Intelligence and its Usefulness 

It is difficult to enhance intelligence sharing without also having a shared understanding of what

“criminal intelligence” is. Summit participants’ definitions placed emphasis on the various ways

that intelligence supports the policing mission. In particular, they noted that “information” is not 

the same thing as “intelligence.” Rather, intelligence is the combination of credible information 

with quality analysis – information that has been evaluated and from which conclusions have 

been drawn. Criminal intelligence is data that can be used proactively for strategic and tactical

purposes. Even fairly restrictive definitions, such as those found in the U.S. Code of Federal

Regulations: 28 CFR Part 23 focus attention on the practical, pre-emptive uses of intelligence

for improved policing. 

As emphasized further in the next section, Summit participants also noted that appropriate 

definitions of criminal intelligence implicitly stress the protection of civil rights. Criminal 

intelligence is premised on circumstances that provide a reasonable suspicion that a crime has 

been committed or is being planned or that criminal conspiratorial activity is underway. 

Provide the Critical Counterbalance of Civil Rights 

In any criminal intelligence gathering and sharing effort – and certainly in any expanded effort 

such as that advocated by Summit participants – the need to protect individuals’ civil rights 

cannot be overstressed. Changes in law enforcement officers’ training, internal audit capacities, 

periodic external reviews and statutory protections are several important means of monitoring the

protection of citizens civil rights, and Summit participants recommended that they be part of the 

National Intelligence Plan and of the work of the Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council. 

Increase Opportunities for Trust Building 

Intelligence sharing cannot occur without trust between the parties sharing information. Thus, 

one of the central tasks of the Coordinating Council is to increase communication, strengthen 

relationships and help build trust between agencies and individuals in the intelligence network. 

Participants paid special attention to the difficulty of building trust as networks for sharing 

intelligence grow larger, and they suggested two strategies for overcoming this challenge. They 

suggested that the Council work to develop policies and procedures (such as improved security 

clearance methods) that could create institutional trust and they suggested that the Council 

consider creating smaller, linked intelligence sharing networks (rather than larger fully inclusive 

networks). Participants also cautioned against strategies that are not useful for trust building. 

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 IACP Criminal Intelligence Sharing Report 

They noted that technology supports the storage and transfer of information, but it cannot stand 

in for trust. Similarly, they noted that funding alone (for example, for improved technology or 

for the Council’s activities) does not result in trust building; funds must be combined with or 

targeted at specific activities that promote relationship building. 

Remedy Analytic Deficits 

Some participants expressed a desire for less uncollated, non-strategic information and more 

targeted, evaluative summary data. Other participants noted that information retrieval too often 

takes the place of information sharing and, worse that some analysts operate more as information 

retrievers than intelligence generators. The Council and its constituent agencies (with the 

cooperation of organizations like the International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence 

Analysts) must place a higher value on true analysis, support analyst positions and provide the 

opportunity for analysts to effectively engage in the intelligence mission. 

Remedy Information Deficits 

While some Summit participants cited an overload of unanalyzed information, others despaired 

that they did not receive even the most basic information that would improve their capacity to 

promote public safety. One participant suggested that perhaps the real problem is that large 

agencies and known organizations are receiving all the data. The goal of the improved 

intelligence sharing system should be to assist both large agencies and new parties in receiving 

the intelligence information that will be most useful to them. 

Address Training Issues 

There are multiple roles for training as U.S. law enforcement entities move toward a National 

Intelligence Plan and the development of a Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council. Without 

appropriate training, of both current and entering law enforcement personnel, it is possible that

change may be to the superstructure of the system only – and not result in changed action and 

behavior or the development of a new intelligence culture. Academy training and continuing 

education must teach about the new intelligence sharing system; emphasize that all personnel 

have a role in intelligence generation and sharing; serve as a means of trust building for 

intelligence sharing; equip relevant personnel to use new technologies for intelligence sharing; 

constantly underscore the importance of civil rights; and prepare intelligence managers to make 

sound situational decisions about when, how, what and with whom to share. 

Address Technology Issues 

Where appropriate levels of interpersonal trust exist, technology can facilitate the exchange of 

intelligence data. Unfortunately, the current system is greatly disaggregated and somewhat 

limited in capacity by comparison to the information systems used outside law enforcement. 

Summit participants expressed a desire for the integration of (or the capacity to make a single

query to) commonly used databases; these might include the National Law Enforcement 

Telecommunications System (NLETS), the Regional Information Sharing Systems (RISS), Law 

Enforcement Online (LEO), the Anti-Drug Network (ADNET) and the Financial Crimes 

Enforcement Network (FinCEN). Desirable technological updates include the capacity to 

employ data visualization methods and geographic information systems (GIS) for easier 

information analysis and communication. 

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Improving technology is necessary, but it comes with a host of caveats. First, careful attention

must be paid to civil rights issues in all technological improvements; there are risks to keeping a 

large quantity of information about individuals in a single place. Fortunately, technology

upgrades also offer an opportunity for improved security and better audit trails. Participants’ 

second caveat to technology improvement is that the process is costly. Because of this, it may be 

appropriate for a variety of federal, regional and state agencies to have a role in the development

and funding of improved or new technological capacities for intelligence gathering and sharing. 

Next Steps 

Local, state, Tribal and Federal law enforcement agencies and the affinity organizations that 

serve them must move aggressively toward the implementation of intelligence-led policing.

Possibilities for each type of agency and organization are listed below. 

Local, State and Tribal Law Enforcement 

Local, state and Tribal law enforcement chief executives have one of the most pressing tasks. 

They must ask, “What do I do to begin to work toward the vision and strategy suggested in the 

Summit report? What can our agency do to capture and produce intelligence within our 

department and work to share that information with other departments?” 

• Local, state, and Tribal law enforcement chief executives should adopt standards

for managing intelligence data. 

• In larger departments, the law enforcement chief executive should designate a 

highly trusted staff member as the agency’s intelligence manager or chief

intelligence officer. This individual should be responsible for the production of 

strategic intelligence information, sharing this intelligence with appropriate staff 

and other agencies, and “tasking” information gathering on topics when questions 

arise. 

• The chief executive officers of smaller departments must work with their staffs to

provide for the cross-training of all or select personnel in the intelligence mission; 

they must also seek ways to share intelligence resources and products with other 

departments, so that it is truly possible for them to practice intelligence-led 

policing. 

• Each law enforcement chief executive should assess his or her network or 

connections and organizational memberships and, as necessary, improve them;

agencies whose resource constraints make such networking difficult should seek 

support from state, regional and Federal sources. 

Congress and Federal Agencies 

• Congress must recognize the importance of the proposed National Intelligence 

Plan and create legislation (including adequate appropriations) to implement the 

Plan in its entirety. 

• Federal law enforcement agencies, bureaus and policy centers must improve their

communication with local, state, Tribal and regional, agencies, through improved 

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participation in current systems and through cooperation in the development of 

the Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council. 

Affinity Organizations, including the International Association of Chiefs of Police 

The IACP and other support organizations should: 

• Work with Congress and the Executive Branch on the creation and 

implementation of the proposed National Intelligence Plan. 

• Work with the Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council, once it is established,

to promulgate standards and guidelines for the development of intelligence 

functions within federal, state, local and tribal law enforcement agencies, and on 

the development of standards and guidelines for intelligence sharing within an 

improved intelligence network. 

• Work with state law enforcement academies on the development of intelligence 

curriculum and encourage state legislatures to pass statutes requiring such training 

at the academies and other ongoing training opportunities. 

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I. Introduction 

On June 18, 2002, President Bush called for the creation of a Cabinet-level Department of 

Homeland Security, which would consolidate a variety of protective and emergency response 

services within one administrative structure. Motivated by the tragic events of September 11 and 

by revelations in the events’ aftermath that underscore the importance of improved intelligence 

exchange between national agencies, the proposal emphasizes the United States’ need of a better 

system for the analysis, dissemination and use of criminal intelligence data. Such improvements 

are critical to law enforcement and other emergency agencies’ capacities to better protect the

American public not only against acts of terrorism, but also against any criminal acts that

threaten its safety. 

While many recent discussions have placed the responsibility for better intelligence analysis and

sharing on federal agencies, the President’s proposal does not focus exclusively on the national 

level. In its discussion of the bill that would establish the Department, the White House stated, 

“The Department of Homeland Security would coordinate, simplify and, where appropriate, 

consolidate government relations on issues for America’s state and local agencies. It would 

coordinate federal homeland security programs and information with state and local officials.”1

 

This element of the President’s plan is significant: non-federal agencies (local law enforcement, 

state police and regional law enforcement task forces) have both a great need for intelligence 

data and a great capacity to contribute to the process of intelligence generation. Indeed, these 

agencies have a need and obligation to participate in the process of intelligence gathering and 

sharing that is at least equal to that of national law enforcement and security agencies – as

poignantly demonstrated by the fact that the September 11 perpetrators lived and trained in cities 

and towns across the United States long before their actions drew national and international 

attention. 

Such observations underlay much of the discussion at the International Association of Chiefs of 

Police (IACP) Criminal Intelligence Sharing Summit held in Alexandria, Virginia, March 7-8, 

2002. Law enforcement executives and intelligence experts from across the country met at the 

Summit to discuss issues related to the collection, analysis and dissemination of criminal 

intelligence. This governing statement was crafted by Summit participants and guided all policy 

developments at the event. 

The United States law enforcement community is universally committed to the 

timely and seamless exchange of terrorist and criminal information and 

intelligence. In light of the tragedy of September 11, it is absolutely critical that

all law enforcement personnel work together to protect the nation, and we are

committed to doing so. 

Discussion topics included the capacities for and barriers to intelligence sharing, the standards 

and guidelines that direct intelligence sharing, technology and training related to intelligence

sharing, and important legal and civil rights that must guide all criminal intelligence gathering

and sharing processes. 

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 IACP Criminal Intelligence Sharing Report 

Participants concluded that there must be a focused, nationally coordinated effort that provides 

incentives and means for local, state, regional and federal law enforcement bodies to: 

• Gather information on criminals and criminal activity within the U.S. 

• Think about the information that is gathered, analyze it and turn it into useful 

criminal intelligence. 

• Proactively look to see when, where, how and to whom this criminal intelligence 

can be shared and used effectively. 

• Conduct this work in accordance with the rights afforded to all people by the 

United States Constitution. 

Summit participants reached a conclusion that is complementary to and aligns itself well with the

President’s proposal. They advocated a criminal intelligence gathering and sharing process that 

focuses on better methods for sharing among non-federal agencies and includes a method for 

passing critical data to national entities and receiving it from them. The vision is one in which 

state and local agencies are not merely adjuncts to a national strategy for improved intelligence

communication, but founding partners of and driving participants in any organization that helps 

coordinate the collection, analysis, dissemination and use of criminal intelligence data in the U.S. 

Participant findings and recommendations also relied on, and aligned well with current 

community oriented policing (COP) efforts across the U.S. In fact, the advent, and now 

continuous expansion of community oriented policing in the U.S. served as an underpinning to 

the policy discussion and recommendations from the Summit. Over the past decade, 

simultaneous to federally led initiatives to improve intelligence gathering, thousands of

community policing officers have been building close and productive relationships with the 

citizens they serve. The benefits of these relationships are directly related to information and

intelligence sharing:

• COP officers have immediate and unfettered access to local, neighborhood information as it

develops. 

• Citizens are aware of, and seek out COP officers to provide them with new information that

may be useful to criminal interdiction or long term problem solving. 

• The positive nature of COP/citizen relationships promotes a continuous and reliable transfer 

of information from one to the other. 

• Terrorism and other criminal activity by its nature (cell structure) is locally based, making 

neighborhoods a prime source of potentially useful information. 

Participants called for a strengthening of the local component of the continuum so that 

information flows along a flattened continuum of all types of law enforcement agencies, versus 

the traditional hierarchical flow (from federal to state/local) that has proven unwieldy and at 

times ineffective. It is time to maximize the potential for community policing efforts to serve as

a gateway of locally based information to prevent terrorism, and all other crimes, through the

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timely transfer of critical information from citizens to their local police agency and then across

the intelligence continuum.

This report, which is based on discussions at the IACP Criminal Intelligence Sharing Summit, 

expands upon the participants’ recommendations. It begins with a background section on the 

Summit purpose and process, details the need for a National Intelligence Plan, defines the 

purpose of the Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council, proceeds to the core 

recommendations that are aimed at helping the Council achieve the Plan and concludes with a 

list of possible next steps for local, state, and Tribal law enforcement agencies, the federal

government and the IACP. 

II. Summit Background and Purpose 

Since 1994, the IACP has held annual summits on critical issues facing law enforcement

agencies and the communities they serve. Each has brought together law enforcement and 

community leaders, justice system decision-makers, scholars and others with diverse expertise to 

share information, deliberate on issues and craft recommendations and action plans. Summit 

themes over the years have included: Violence in the United States, Murder in America, Youth 

Violence in America, Family Violence in America: Breaking the Cycle for Children Who 

Witness, Hate Crime in America, What Do Victims Want?, Juvenile Crime and Victimization, 

Improving Safety in Indian Country and Child Protection: Building Partnerships That Protect 

Our Children. 

The tragic events of September 11, 2001 were, in many senses, a stark reminder of the central 

role of criminal intelligence gathering and sharing to the provision of public safety. In 

recognition of this fact, the IACP leadership chose “Criminal Intelligence Sharing: Overcoming 

Barriers to Enhance Domestic Security” as the Summit topic for 2002. 

Summit Planning and Participation 

In collaboration with the Summit’s federal funding partner, the office of Community Oriented 

Policing Services (COPS) within the U.S. Department of Justice, the Summit Advisory Board

and 124 criminal intelligence experts from local, state, Tribal and Federal law enforcement

agencies, international law enforcement bodies, national and regional intelligence gathering and 

analysis organizations and academia that were identified by IACP staff and invited to participate

in the Criminal Intelligence Sharing Summit. In addition to a focus on intelligence, many 

participants brought additional perspectives and experience to the Summit, including, for 

example, investigation, community policing and technological expertise. 

Summit Proceedings 

The Summit approach – designed, tested and applied to all IACP summits since 1995 – created a

forum for candid information exchange among participants and provided an opportunity to 

synthesize differing viewpoints about the ways to better generate and share criminal intelligence.

The Summit began with a panel discussion during which issues related to criminal intelligence 

were discussed. Summit attendees were briefed on three projects that were initiated in recent 

years to address the problems and overcome the barriers related to the exchange of criminal 

intelligence. The successes and failures of these projects from the United Kingdom, the City of 

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New York and federal agencies involved in the counter drug effort were analyzed. Participants 

then separated into six breakout groups, consistent with the necessary action and policymaking

areas identified by the Summit’s advisors: 

• Capacities for and barriers to intelligence sharing 

• Standards and guidelines that direct intelligence sharing 

• Technology related to intelligence sharing 

• Necessary training to support intelligence sharing 

• Intersection between legal and civil rights issues 

The groups reconvened the next morning to summarize their discussions and present 

recommendations to the assembly. Following each presentation, summit participants were 

offered the opportunity to comment on, critique and refine the recommended actions. This 

participatory approach generated a set of consensus recommendations from leading 

practitioners, policymakers, researchers and scholars on how best to improve the processes of 

criminal intelligence sharing in the United States.

III. The Necessity of a National Intelligence Plan 

The Call for a Plan 

While September 11 highlighted urgency in improving the capacity of law enforcement agencies

(and their partners in emergency response) to share terrorism-relevant intelligence data, 

participants in the Criminal Intelligence Sharing Summit stressed that the real need is to share all 

– not just terrorism-related – criminal intelligence. They noted that while it is a critical task,

terrorism-related law enforcement is only a portion of their day-to-day public safety mission. 

The sharing of a broader body of crime-related intelligence could significantly improve the 

capacity of all law enforcement agencies to protect the public.

To meet the vital need of better criminal intelligence sharing, Summit participants called upon 

federal leaders to affirm the need for all law enforcement (local, state, federal and tribal) to join

in the creation of a National Intelligence Plan. Such a Plan will: 

1. Create a coordinating council comprised of local, state, Tribal and Federal law 

enforcement executives (The Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council) to 

oversee and implement the National Intelligence Plan. 

2. Address the legal impediments to the effective transfer of criminal intelligence

between authorized enforcement agencies. In specific, 

• The Plan will mandate a review by the FBI, the President’s National Security 

Advisor and the National Security Council (NSC) of all federal policies and 

legislation that restrict the flow of classified information. 

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 IACP Criminal Intelligence Sharing Report 

• The Plan will direct the FBI, the President’s National Security Advisor and 

NSC to revise security clearance categories and classifications, with an eye to 

increasing the information available to local law enforcement departments for

the prevention and investigation of crime in their jurisdictions. 

• The Plan will create a task force comprised of justice system professionals

(including representatives from the American Bar Association, American 

Civil Liberties Union, and other interested parties, especially other public 

defense and civil rights associations) to assess existing regulations and statutes 

to ensure a balance between the needs of law enforcement and individuals’ 

rights to privacy. 

• The Plan will recommend legislation to allow for changes in the intelligence

classification and security clearance procedures, and changes to any other 

statutory, regulatory, or case law impediments to improved information 

collection and intelligence sharing (such as those extant in the Patriot Act and

Oliphant vs. Suquamish Indian Tribe). 

Overcoming Barriers 

The details of the Plan and the mandate of the Council must be sufficient to overcome the 

substantial and, in some cases, longstanding barriers that hinder intelligence sharing. Some of 

the most significant obstacles stressed by Summit participants include: 

• The absence of a nationally coordinated process for intelligence generation and 

sharing. While substantial information sharing is occurring in some localities (for 

example, in some metro areas, states and regions, and may even include strong 

federal connections), there is no coordinated national process, and potentially 

useful intelligence is never developed or is not shared. Critically, there is no 

recognition of the line or field officer’s role in intelligence generation and 

sharing, nor is there any training to help that officer to be part of the intelligence 

sharing systems. Thus much of the nation’s capacity for an improved intelligence

generation and sharing system goes unutilized. 

• The “hierarchy” within the law enforcement and intelligence communities. In 

some cases real and in others only perceived, the hierarchical organization of law 

enforcement and intelligence agencies (with federal agencies being at the “top” of 

the pyramid and local, state, county, and Tribal agencies further down) leads to 

organizational incentives against intelligence sharing and even anti-sharing

cultures. At best, the disaggregation of activity means that managers in one 

agency might not imagine that others would find their intelligence data useful. At 

worst, the structure creates an “us” versus “them” mentality that stands in the way 

of productive collaboration. 

• Local, state, Tribal and Federal laws and policies that prevent sharing. By 

specifying who may have access to certain kinds of information these policies and

laws restrict the access of some of the very institutions and individuals who might

be best able to use intelligence for the promotion of public safety. The current 

laws and policies that guide the classification of intelligence information and 

5
 IACP Criminal Intelligence Sharing Report 

individuals’ clearance to view data are one example. Others include the elements

of financial privacy acts, electronic communication policies, and fraud laws that 

relate to intelligence sharing. Given the important public safety outcomes that 

can emerge from strategic intelligence sharing, such policies can become, and 

often are, self-defeating. 

• The inaccessibility and/or disaggregation of technologies to support intelligence 

sharing. While a variety of systems support intelligence sharing (or at least 

information sharing), not all relevant law enforcement agencies have access to

these systems. Most operate on a membership basis, which means some agencies 

may find them unaffordable (a problem more evident at the local level), while

others may not see the value to their organization in joining (a problem more

evident at the federal level). In addition, the systems that do exist, such as the 

Regional Information Sharing Systems (RISS), the National Law Enforcement

Telecommunications System (NLETS), the Anti-Drug Network (ADNET), and 

the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) are not well-integrated and

relatively modest in terms of their capacities and capabilities.

• Deficits in analysis. For a variety of reasons – including cost and budget 

considerations, a de-emphasis on intelligence generation at the local level, 

demands of the “now” that redirect analysts away from the production of strategic 

intelligence, and misunderstandings about the difference between intelligence and

information – a lot of intelligence-relevant information is never transformed into 

actual intelligence data. 

IV. The Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council 

The most central and enduring element of the National Intelligence Plan advocated by Summit 

participants is the call for a Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council. This Council provides 

an ongoing solution to the identified need for a nationally coordinated, locally driven criminal 

intelligence generation and sharing process. Regardless of the coordination that high-profile 

federal agencies work out among themselves, the Council supports and develops the capacity of 

all agencies, federal and non-federal alike, to generate and share criminal intelligence data. With 

a concentration on not only terrorism-related intelligence, but also all criminal intelligence, it 

improves the ability of local law enforcement agencies, state police, regional law enforcement

task forces, other protective agencies and federal partners to practice intelligence-based public 

safety protection. 

The Council’s Mandate 

In general terms, the Council’s mandate is to promote, ensure and establish effective intelligence

sharing and to address and solve, in an ongoing fashion, the problems that inhibit this sharing. In 

order to accomplish these tasks, the Council must be central, permanent, powerful and inclusive. 

The concept is similar to a precursor organization, the Counterdrug Intelligence Coordinating 

Group, but broader in scope and mission. In specific, the Criminal Intelligence Coordinating 

Council shall: 

6
 IACP Criminal Intelligence Sharing Report 

• Be chaired by a representative of local law enforcement and staffed fulltime by 

local, state, Tribal and Federal law enforcement personnel detailed from their 

respective agencies. 

• Be structured in a way that allows representation from all types of law 

enforcement agencies, while limiting the total number to create a workable 

organizational unit. 

• Take a lead role in developing compatible policy standards, guidelines and 

operating procedures for the further development and integration of existing 

intelligence sharing systems (including standards for the collection, analysis, 

dissemination, storage and purging of information); create standards for 

participation in the Council and coordinated system; promulgate standards and 

guidelines; publicize (and enforce) sanctions for the misuse of information from 

the coordinated system. 

• Create a marketing strategy to increase stakeholder participation in the

intelligence sharing process and conduct public education to promote acceptance 

of the system overall. 

• Create a funding plan to ensure that the National Intelligence Plan is adequately 

funded. 

• Establish national level criminal intelligence analytical operation standards, 

methods and training to complement local, regional and federal efforts and aid in 

the assessment of threats and supporting law enforcement courses of actions 

against community crimes and national security concerns. 

• Work with local, state, Tribal and Federal training academies and other training 

providers to make curriculum changes in support of the new intelligence sharing

goals; utilize available resources, and where necessary, seek new resources for the 

delivery of this training. 

• Work with states, localities and Tribes in eliminating barriers in laws and policies

that limit intelligence sharing. 

Participants in the Coordinating Council 

A variety of law enforcement and protective services organizations already engage in substantial 

information sharing. These organizations and agencies are critical founding participants in the 

national Coordinating Council. In other words, the Council will work best if it can engage the 

best efforts already underway. Rather than replicating such efforts, the Council should seek to 

connect them, strengthen them (which might include helping the various organizations focus on 

their comparative advantages2

 and promoting the exchange of intelligence), support their 

expansion as necessary and then fill other gaps in the current system. Possible founding 

participant organizations may include

3

: 

• The Regional Information Sharing Systems (RISS) and its technical assistance 

provider, the Institute for Intergovernmental Research (IIR). RISS is composed 

of six regional centers that share intelligence and coordinate efforts against

criminal networks that operate across jurisdictional lines. Each of the centers

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 IACP Criminal Intelligence Sharing Report 

determines a range of services to offer members and selects its own target crimes 

(drug trafficking, terrorism, violent crime, cybercrime, gang activity and 

organized criminal activities are typical targets). RISS serves almost 6,000 

member law enforcement agencies in 50 states, the District of Columbia, Guam, 

Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, 9 Canadian provinces, Australia, and 

England; the vast majority of member agencies are at the municipal and county 

levels, but the membership also includes more than 300 state agencies and over 

700 federal agencies (for example, the Drug Enforcement Administration, Federal 

Bureau of Investigation, Internal Revenue Service, Secret Service, Customs 

Service and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms). RISS is funded by the 

U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance.4

 

The Institute for Intergovernmental Research is a research and training

organization specializing in law enforcement, juvenile justice and criminal justice

issues. The Institute provides local, state and federal law enforcement agencies

with the hands-on help needed to implement changes that promote greater 

governmental effectiveness. IIR offers extensive project experience and staff 

capabilities in assessing the performance of operational, management and 

administrative systems and procedures of governmental agencies, and in 

providing policy research and technical training. The organization provides 

technical assistance and training support to the six RISS centers under a federal 

grant.5

• The High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) Investigative Support Centers 

(ISCs). Information gleaned from the collection, evaluation, analysis and 

synthesis of intelligence must be shared in order to reduce the production, 

transportation, distribution and use of drugs. Thus, the HIDTA ISCs create a 

communication infrastructure, facilitating information collection and analysis, 

intelligence dissemination and sharing between federal, state and local law 

enforcement agencies engaged in drug crime interdiction. Technical and strategic 

support to HIDTA initiatives, are the centerpieces of the ISC program. The ISCs 

services help promote officer safety, improve the operation of drug task forces

and target drug organizations and operations. A state or local and a federal law 

enforcement agency jointly manage the ISCs.6

• The Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit (LEIU). LEIU is a network of 

intelligence specialists from non-federal law enforcement agencies nationwide 

that promotes the gathering, recording and exchange of criminal intelligence. 

Originally focused on organized crime, LEIU has expanded its mission to include 

a broader range of criminal activity that crosses jurisdictional boundaries. Its aim 

is to be a national network of law enforcement personnel that remains small 

enough to instill trust between members but large enough to combat multijurisdictional crime problems.7

• State Law Enforcement Intelligence Networks (LEINs). LEINs are similar to

LEIU, but operate at the state level (although they do not exist in every state). 

The networks connect relevant intelligence, law enforcement and other protective 

services officers in a trust-based group who can rely on each other for the 

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 IACP Criminal Intelligence Sharing Report 

transmission of critical strategic intelligence for a region, state, or locality. For

example, one state LEIN cites criminal mobility as a primary reason for its

existence: “Because those engaged in illegal activities enjoy a high degree of 

mobility, it has become virtually impossible for individual local, county or state

agencies to monitor them without the resources provided by LEIN. This 

intelligence network offers the best prospect for early detection and prevention.”8

 

Another state LEIN describes its operations as follows: “LEIN serves as a 

mechanism for the statewide collection and exchange of criminal intelligence

information. LEIN members submit information reports to the Department’s 

Intelligence Bureau, which in turn disseminates the information to participating

agencies throughout the state. These agencies then use the information to identify 

and evaluate criminal activity in their area.”9

• The International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts 

(IALEIA). IALEIA’s “aim is to enhance general understanding of the role of 

intelligence analysis, encourage the recognition of intelligence analysis as a

professional endeavor, develop international qualification and competence 

standards, reinforce professional concepts, devise training standards and curricula, 

furnish advisory and related services on intelligence analysis matters, conduct 

analytic-related research studies and provide the ability to disseminate 

information regarding analytical techniques and methods.”10

• International bodies that track criminals and share information about transborder crime problems. Although there are others, the best example is Interpol 

and its Analytical Criminal Intelligence Unit. Interpol is an intergovernmental 

organization that facilitates and develops international law enforcement 

cooperation. Focusing on sectors such as offenses against persons and property, 

offenses involving cultural property, economic and financial fraud, and drugtrafficking and related offenses, Interpol collects and disseminates criminal and 

crime-related information to its 179 member countries via a highly secure system. 

The agency adds value to the extensive amount of criminal information it collects 

through the work of the Analytical Criminal Intelligence Unit, which produces 

criminal intelligence analysis reports and products for distribution to member 

countries.11 Because of America’s standing as a world power, there are many 

connections between the country’s domestic crime problems and international 

concerns – which makes such international connections vital. (The IACP’s 

International Policy Committee may be instrumental in drawing additional 

international agencies and organizations into the work of the Coordinating 

Council.) 

• States’ and Major Cities’ Law Enforcement Intelligence Divisions. While not all 

law enforcement agencies serving states and major urban areas have designated 

intelligence units, those that do are crucial founding partners in the Council.

Their experience and operation provide useful templates and linkages for other 

agencies. Where such units do not exist, the Council should to encourage their 

development. 

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• Smaller Law Enforcement Agencies. In addition to engaging existing networks 

and intelligence sharing organizations, the Criminal Intelligence Coordinating 

Council must find a way to include the many smaller local departments across the 

U.S. Nearly 10,500, or 77%, of the 13,500 law enforcement agencies serving 

U.S. states, counties, cities and towns have 24 or fewer sworn officers12, these 

agencies do not have staff dedicated to intelligence functions. Despite their

limited resources, it is no less critical that such departments – which constitute the

majority of the police departments in the United States – participate in

intelligence generation and sharing and practice intelligence-led policing. The 

Council must create models for their involvement and provide resources as 

necessary for their participation. One possibility is for the Council to help fund 

and then engage statewide networks of local law enforcement agencies, so that

each state network can act as a focal point and support center for intelligence 

sharing at the local level. As noted immediately below, securing and facilitating 

the involvement of local agencies in the intelligence mission is one of the most 

important organizational considerations for the Council as it moves forward. 

Local agencies of all sizes and types must have a viable role in both developing 

and accessing intelligence data.

Given the number of potential Council participants, decisions will need to be made on

limiting the total number of council members to ensure that the organization can be 

effective in its work.

Organizational Considerations for the Coordinating Council 

While Summit participants did not make specific organizational recommendations for the

Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council, they did raise several general organizational 

considerations. 

First, they stressed the importance of creating an organization in which relevant data can flow

appropriately to all parties that need it. Participants offered several images of this flow. For

example, they suggested that rather than seeing intelligence transmission as occurring “up” and 

“down” a ladder, the ladder should be turned on its side, so that all law enforcement and 

protective services entities have access to and equal status with respect to the flow of intelligence

information. Another image is that of the hub, spokes and rim of a wheel, in which intelligence 

information flows among and between nodes in the network. A well-developed network would 

link many hubs, allowing intelligence data to flow from hub to hub, and from there, along the 

spokes to the appropriate local nodes. In this image, managers of intelligence data have a pivotal 

role: they must ensure that individuals without direct links to each other are still able to

appropriately share intelligence and support each other.

Second, Summit participants emphasized the necessity of a broad-based effort for improving 

criminal intelligence generation and sharing. Apart from the reference to state and local entities 

in the President’s proposal for a Department of Homeland Security, much of the current national 

focus is on improving federal coordination mechanisms. While such improvements are 

welcome, that progress probably cannot be (and should not be) the centerpiece of improved 

intelligence communication. Instead, Summit participants stressed that local law enforcement 

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 IACP Criminal Intelligence Sharing Report 

(non-federal officers) should be a driving force in the implementation of a National Intelligence 

Plan. 

The reasons for this emphasis are practical. Public safety in the United States does not depend 

primarily on federal agencies – it depends primarily on the action and activities of local, state 

and tribal protective services agencies. To the extent that non-federal law enforcement officers 

are engaged in problem-oriented, intelligence-led policing, they have a vital need for intelligence 

and a crucial opportunity to contribute to the intelligence generation process. Indeed, given the 

436,000-plus13 patrol and investigative officers at the local level, there is a capacity advantage in

engaging them in the intelligence mission – community police are an underutilized resource 

when it comes to the collection, analysis and use of intelligence-relevant information. In sum, if 

“officers on the street” are the first focus of a strategy to improve intelligence sharing, and that

strategy stresses line officers’ roles with respect to other stakeholders and in “the big picture” 

(they are reporters of intelligence-relevant information, critical links in the information analysis 

chain and important consumers of intelligence data), it should to be possible to substantially 

increase intelligence sharing and improve public safety. 

Third, while Summit participants downplayed the role of federal agencies as the exclusive

leaders in the process of improving criminal intelligence sharing, they nonetheless stressed the 

necessity of connecting federal agencies to the proposed Coordinating Council. They observed 

that, already, federal agencies do not plug into current systems on a consistent basis, and many of 

the connections that do exist are sporadic and non-institutionalized. For instance, one locally 

based FBI agent may encourage his office to join RISS or have a positive experience working 

with local officers that leads to broader intelligence sharing while another officer in another city 

may have the opposite view. 

Part of this problem stems from federal laws and policies that expressly prohibit intelligence 

sharing – which justifies the legislative mandates of the National Intelligence Plan detailed 

above. Without compromising the reasons for such laws and policies, it should still be possible 

for non-federal agencies to receive information relevant to their missions that emerges from 

federal intelligence gathering efforts. For example, federal parties ought (to be able) to pass 

criminal intelligence information that surfaces during counter-intelligence activities or counterterrorism investigations to state, local and tribal police as appropriate. 

The difficulty of promoting intelligence sharing between federal and non-federal law 

enforcement agencies also arises from what might be called the culture of the institutions. Local

law enforcement officers have expressed dissatisfaction with the way they are viewed by federal 

officers, a view that only seems to find support in recent, public statements by federal agency 

representatives calling for traditionally federally led anti-terrorism and intelligence approaches. 

From the other perspective, federal officers may be dissatisfied with the way they and their

mission are viewed by local officers. For example, they may sense that local officers have not 

been trained to think about the broader implications of locally generated intelligence information 

or that local agencies begrudge the involvement of federal agencies. The Council, through its 

work, outreach and operations, must find ways to combat these attitudinal and cultural barriers to 

intelligence coordination. 

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 IACP Criminal Intelligence Sharing Report 

Fourth, Summit participants stressed that not only law enforcement personnel, but also other 

protective services agencies have an important role in the promotion of public safety. An 

improved intelligence sharing system must allow for appropriate flexibility in these actors’

access to intelligence. That is, law enforcement-based repositories of intelligence must have the 

flexibility to share (in a situation-appropriate manner) with other players. For instance, a state’s 

emergency management director may not be cleared for access to certain intelligence that affects 

his ability to do the job; knowledgeable local enforcement personnel should be allowed to share 

with that director on a situation-to-situation basis. In addition to emergency management 

personnel, Summit participants cited a need to inform corrections personnel, probation and 

parole officers and specialized security forces (such as the Utah security force created for the

2002 Winter Olympics) of particular situation-relevant intelligence. Thus, the Council’s 

organization and membership ought to reflect a commitment to public safety-relevant

intelligence sharing and, through its work, promote the involvement of all relevant parties (the

development of model policies is one possibility). 

V. Core Recommendations to Achieving the Plan 

The Summit participants supported their recommendations for a National Intelligence Plan and 

Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council with a series of additional recommendations, which 

are specifically intended to help the Council and its component agencies achieve the goals of the 

National Intelligence Plan. This section lists the participants’ critical suggestions and proposals. 

Promote Intelligence-Led Policing through a Common Understanding of Criminal 

Intelligence and its Usefulness 

It is difficult to enhance intelligence sharing without also having a shared understanding of what

“criminal intelligence” is. Summit participants stressed the following definitions: 

• The IACP National Law Enforcement Policy Center defines criminal intelligence

as “information compiled, analyzed and/or disseminated in an effort to anticipate,

prevent or monitor criminal activity.”14 It may be “strategic” (provide general 

guidance on emerging patterns and trends) or “tactical” (focused on a specific 

criminal event). Notably, it is distinct from “counterintelligence” (which is not

motivated by the occurrence of criminal activity but, rather, by the need to 

investigate espionage, sedition, subversion, etc., related to national security 

concerns).15

• The CIA’s Sherman Kent School for Intelligence Analysis stresses a slightly 

different categorical breakdown. “Background intelligence” describes the general 

“lay of the land,” for instance, it might describe a population and recent changes 

in its demographics; “current reportorial intelligence” describes important current 

events, or what has happened to a particular person or in terms of a particular 

problem in the last few days; “evaluative intelligence” is an analyst’s informed 

guess about what might soon happen and what the users of intelligence should be 

looking for. 

• “Information” is not the same thing as “intelligence.” Rather, intelligence is the

combination of credible information with quality analysis. As one expert has

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 IACP Criminal Intelligence Sharing Report 

argued, “Information (consists of) scattered bits of data,” whereas intelligence is

“information that has been filtered, distilled and analyzed ... (it is) something that 

can be acted upon ... (it is) what managers need to make decisions.”16 By

implication, intelligence sharing requires law enforcement agencies to first 

conduct and then share analysis. Indeed, the process of intelligence generation 

and sharing has multiple stages: law enforcement and other collaborating

agencies must be able to plan, gather, collate, analyze, manage, disseminate and 

then use intelligence data. 

• Intelligence is not equivalent to arrest-driven investigation, which is by nature

reactive and focused more on incidents than problem or threat assessments. In 

other words, the concept of proactive, intelligence-led policing defines

intelligence by stressing that intelligence is “a guide to operations rather than the

reverse.”17 

• Some state and federal laws provide legal definitions of intelligence. One of the 

most common legal citations is to the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations: 28 CFR 

23.3(b)(3) states that criminal intelligence information that can be put into a 

criminal intelligence sharing system is “information relevant to the identification

of and the criminal activity engaged in by an individual who or organization 

which is reasonably suspected of involvement in criminal activity, and ... (m)eets 

criminal intelligence system submission criteria.” Further, 28 CFR 23.20(a) states 

that a system shall only collect information on an individual if “there is 

reasonable suspicion that the individual is involved in criminal conduct or activity 

and the information is relevant to that criminal conduct or activity.” Significantly, 

these legal notions of intelligence information are relatively narrow and not 

always commensurate with the practice-oriented definitions above, a fact that can 

be confounding to intelligence analysts and law enforcement officials. 

While the forgoing definitions are not entirely equivalent, they overlap in two important respects, 

both of which result in improved policing and the better protection of public safety. 

First, all of the definitions cited by Summit participants place emphasis on the various ways that 

criminal intelligence supports the policing mission; implicitly and explicitly, they all embrace the 

practice of intelligence-led policing. Notably, it is precisely those approaches to policing that 

rely on intelligence to guide operations (including, for example, “pro-active policing,” “problemoriented policing,” “zero tolerance policing,” and “target-driven policing”) that have proven 

highly successful in addressing communities’ crime and public safety concerns,

18 a finding 

which underlines the importance of intelligence sharing. 

Second, the definitions all highlight the fact that the creation of criminal intelligence is premised 

on circumstances that provide a reasonable suspicion that a crime has been committed or is being

planned. A sound guiding principle in the collection of criminal intelligence is: “to ensure civil 

rights, investigative techniques shall be lawful and only as intrusive as necessary to gather

sufficient information to prevent the criminal act and/or identify and prosecute violators.”19

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 IACP Criminal Intelligence Sharing Report 

Provide the Critical Counterbalance of Civil Rights 

In any criminal intelligence gathering and sharing effort – and certainly in any expanded effort 

such as that advocated by Summit participants – the need to protect individuals’ civil rights 

cannot be overstressed. The fairly recent accusations of civil rights violations by the law

enforcement agencies of several major U.S. cities

20 underscore the necessity of paying ongoing 

and vigilant attention to individual Constitutional rights (such as the right to privacy) as efforts to 

gather and share criminal intelligence intensify. Dangers abound when law enforcement

agencies collect information in a targeted way, and the Plan and Council must create ways to be

ever mindful of this. 

Changes in law enforcement officers’ training, internal audit capacities, periodic reviews, etc., 

are important means of monitoring the protection of citizens civil rights, and Summit participants 

recommended that the changes be part of the National Intelligence Plan and of the work of the

Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council. In particular, they recommend that the Plan include 

the creation of a task force comprised of justice system professionals (including representatives 

from the American Bar Association, American Civil Liberties Union and other interested parties, 

especially other public defense and civil rights associations) to assess existing regulations and 

statutes to ensure a balance between the needs of law enforcement and individuals’ civil rights. 

Increase Opportunities for Trust Building 

Intelligence sharing cannot occur without trust between the parties sharing information. Indeed,

this maxim is a foundation of many of the existing networks for intelligence sharing, such as the 

state LEINs and the LEIU. Trust eases the natural communication barriers that exist between the 

members of different departments, different disciplines (for example, between investigators and 

patrol officers or between technology experts and department administrators) and different 

protective services agencies (for example, between federal investigators and county sheriffs). 

Trust building can be an important part of the cultural change that must occur in order to achieve 

improved intelligence sharing. One of the central tasks of the Coordinating Council is to find 

ways to increase interpersonal communication, strengthen relationships and, thus, help build trust 

between agencies and individuals in the system. 

Summit participants acknowledged the inherent contradiction in this goal – that improved 

intelligence sharing increases the size of networks, and as networks grow, it is harder for

individuals in the network to develop personal trust and share information. Two strategies were 

suggested to overcome this challenge. First, participants suggested that the Council work to 

develop policies and procedures (such as improved security clearance methods) that could create 

institutional trust and second, that the Council consider creating smaller, linked networks rather 

than larger fully inclusive networks for intelligence sharing (again, the idea of hub-to-hub and 

hub-to-spoke communication). 

At the same time, Summit participants cautioned that certain other strategies were not useful for

trust building. In particular, they noted that technology supports the storage and transfer of 

information, but it cannot stand in for trust. That is, even highly technologically capable systems

for intelligence sharing require the trust of those holding intelligence data. Individuals with 

information must be able to trust the system (that it cannot be inappropriately breached) and the 

system’s users (that they will not inappropriately share data) before they will use it as a sharing 

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 IACP Criminal Intelligence Sharing Report 

tool for the data they hold. Similarly, funding alone (for example, for improved technology or 

for the Council’s activities generally) does not result in the trust building necessary for 

intelligence data sharing; such funds must be combined with or targeted at specific activities that 

promote relationship building. Alongside trust building, participants supported strengthening 

security practices to protect law enforcement sensitive intelligence data as it becomes more 

widely shared. 

Remedy Analytic Deficits 

Two criticisms of the current systems for intelligence sharing signaled that too little intelligence

analysis may be occurring. Some participants noted that they feel deluged by “information” but

that they receive very little “intelligence.” In other words, they receive far too much uncollated,

unanalyzed information and not enough well-specified, strategic and action-oriented intelligence 

data. Their desire is for concise, targeted, evaluative summary data, and they expressed a 

particular interest in intelligence-based assessments of threats to and vulnerabilities in their

jurisdictions. In a related vein, other participants noted that information retrieval too often takes 

the place of intelligence sharing and, worse, that some analysts in the system are merely serving 

as information retrievers rather than intelligence generators. Summit participants stressed that 

not only the Council, but all law enforcement agencies must place a higher value on true 

analysis, support analyst positions and provide the opportunity for analysts to truly engage in the 

intelligence mission. Certainly, there is a critical training and outreach role for organizations like 

the International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts in this effort. 

Remedy Information Deficits 

At the same time that some Summit participants cited an overload of information, others

despaired that they did not receive even the most basic information from other agencies that

would improve their capacity to promote public safety. Examples of the kinds of information 

that some state, county, city and tribal Summit participants expressed a need to include are: 

identities of terrorists, suspected terrorists and those engaged in activities in support of terrorism; 

names, locations and other significant information about terrorist groups operating in a given 

jurisdiction; and methods of operations of major terrorists and terrorist organizations. 

Clearly, any system improvement must be capable of increasing not only intelligence sharing,

but also information sharing for those agencies that need it. As one participant suggested, 

perhaps the real problem is that the large agencies and known organizations are receiving all the 

data, and that the goal of the improved system directed by the Coordinating Council should be to 

assist both these larger agencies and new parties in receiving the intelligence data and 

information that will be most useful to them. 

Address Training Issues 

There are multiple roles for training as U.S. law enforcement entities move toward a National 

Intelligence Plan and the development of a Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council. Without 

appropriate training, for both current and entering law enforcement personnel, it is possible that 

change may be to the superstructure of the system only – and not result in changed action and 

behavior or the development of a new “culture.” 

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 IACP Criminal Intelligence Sharing Report 

Participants in the IACP Criminal Intelligence Sharing Summit stressed that law enforcement

officers’ academy training and continuing education must: 

• Inform officers on common definitions of intelligence and proper use of analysis. 

• Teach about the new intelligence sharing system. 

• Emphasize that all personnel (regardless of exact job description) have a role in 

intelligence generation and sharing. 

• Serve as a means of trust building for intelligence sharing. 

• Equip relevant personnel to use new technologies that complement or facilitate

intelligence sharing. 

• Constantly and consistently underscore the importance of civil rights and 

Constitutional protections in a world where more people may be authorized to 

know private things about others. 

• Prepare intelligence sharers, especially intelligence managers, to make sound

situational decisions about when, how, what and with whom to share. (Improved 

intelligence sharing makes more and more appropriate information available to

more people, but in a manner that respects individual privacy, security standards 

and law enforcement providers’ need to know. Responsibility for these difficult 

tasks rests predominantly with intelligence managers at the hubs of the system, 

and thus, their training deserves particular attention). 

Notably, the latter two training goals promote the notion of training as monitoring. That is, by 

including these ideas in academy and continuing education curricula, law enforcement personnel 

have the opportunity and knowledge to evaluate their agencies’ decision making and actions, and 

hold themselves and their colleagues more accountable. 

To improve intelligence training in a fast, effective manner and reach beyond academy 

resources, it will be important to take advantage of existing executive police training 

mechanisms as well. The Regional Community Policing Institutes (RCPIs) created by the COPS 

Office to promote community policing training regionally across the U.S. are an excellent 

example. 

The national network of RCPIs across the U.S. has provided community policing training to 

over 175,000 officers and citizens across the country. Each RCPI represents a partnership 

among a local law enforcement agency, an education institution, and a community group. A next 

step in training on intelligence sharing is to have RCPIs build the fundamental recommendations

of the summit report into their training curriculum. IACP plans to work closely with the COPS 

Office and RCPIs to bring this to fruition, translating summit recommendations into training 

curriculum elements. 

Address Technology Issues 

While heeding the warning that technology cannot substitute for intelligence sharing, where 

appropriate levels of interpersonal trust exist, technology can facilitate the exchange of 

intelligence data. Unfortunately, the current system is greatly disaggregated and somewhat 

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 IACP Criminal Intelligence Sharing Report 

limited by comparison to the information management technologies used outside law

enforcement. 

System elements that would be useful to better integrate include:21 

• The National Crime Information Center (NCIC) and the National Law 

Enforcement Telecommunications System (NLETS). NLETS is a communication 

backbone that provides access to state government agency databases. Together,

NCIC and NLETS provide information on wanted and missing persons, lost and 

stolen property, motor vehicle information, etc.22 

• The Regional Information Sharing Systems (RISS). The six regional RISS 

databases and five other intelligence systems are accessible from a single query

through each RISS database. Additionally, many HIDTAs, State Intelligence 

Databases, LEIU and the nationwide Clandestine Laboratory Seizure System 

(housed at the El Paso Intelligence Center) are available on the riss.net secure 

Intranet. RISS also has a cadre of trained analysts available to assist member 

agencies on a request basis. 

• Law Enforcement Online (LEO). LEO is a generalized source of law enforcement

intelligence compiled from many sources and can be subscribed to by law 

enforcement personnel at no cost. It functions as an information repository, but 

also features interactive chat groups, electronic calendars and e-mail options, all 

of which additionally support intelligence exchange.23

• The Anti-Drug Network (ADNETU). ADNETU supports collaboration among 

individuals and organizations operating in the counternarcotics arena. It allows 

these organizations to link drug-related pieces of information using real-time 

secure communications, data sharing and data analysis.24

• The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN). FinCEN controls more 

than 150 million reports filed under the Bank Secrecy Act and similar laws and 

provides these reports to federal, state and local law enforcement via an electronic 

gateway. Access to this information supports the detection, investigation and 

prosecution of domestic and international money laundering and other financial 

crimes.25

In addition to – or part of – the integration of these databases, desirable technological updates

include the capacity for single query access to multiple databases and the capacity to employ 

data visualization methods and geographic information systems (GIS) for easier information 

analysis and communication. 

Improving technology is necessary, but it comes with a host of caveats. First, careful attention

must be paid to civil rights issues in all technological improvements. In particular, there are risks 

to keeping a large quantity of information about individuals in a single place. From a civil rights 

perspective, there may be an advantage in avoiding substantial integration of intelligence 

databases and, instead, making it easier for authorized individuals to search multiple data 

sources. Similarly, the process of database integration is closely linked to the process of revising 

data classifications and expanding security clearances. When combining the information from 

17
 IACP Criminal Intelligence Sharing Report 

multiple databases, careful attention must be paid to the clearance level of the individual

accessing data; the integration technology must be capable of stripping data of certain

characteristics, if necessary. In other words, privacy, security and technological improvements 

are related problems. Given software improvements, however, Summit participants stressed that

technology upgrades also offer an opportunity for improved security. Upgrades can incorporate 

capacities to audit a trail of inquiries, so that the technology can help monitor the use of

intelligence.

The Summit participants’ second caveat to technology improvement is that the process is costly. 

Means must be found to integrate existing systems or transfer data from those systems to new 

data management programs. Methods and programs must be developed that aid in the use of 

data visualization and GIS, and train officers and analysts to use these programs. All relevant 

agencies must also be provided with access to these systems. Participants cited the Office of

Justice Programs, the Counter Drug Technology Assessment Center within the Office of 

National Drug Control Policy and National Law Enforcement and Corrections Technology 

Centers, among others, as agencies having potential roles in the development and funding of 

improved or new capacities for intelligence gathering and sharing. 

VI. Next Steps 

Local, state, Tribal and Federal law enforcement agencies and the affinity organizations that 

serve them must move aggressively toward the implementation of intelligence-led policing. This 

section begins to answer the action question that law enforcement chief executives and potential 

participant organizations in the Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council should be asking: 

“What should our department or organization do today to begin working toward the goals of the 

proposed National Intelligence Plan? 

Local, State, and Tribal Law Enforcement 

Local, state and Tribal law enforcement chief executives have one of the most pressing tasks. 

They must ask, “What should I do to begin to work toward the vision and strategy suggested in 

the Summit report? What can our agency do to capture and produce intelligence within our 

department and work to share that information with other departments?” The recommendations 

and findings of the IACP Criminal Intelligence Sharing Summit suggest these actions:26 

1. In large enough departments, the law enforcement chief executive should 

designate a highly trusted staff member as the agency’s intelligence manager or

“Chief Intelligence Officer” (CIO), who can take responsibility for the 

intelligence function within the agency. The CIO and his staff should be 

responsible for: 

• The production of evaluative, strategic and tactical intelligence information, 

which answers the question, “What does this tell us we might need to do?” 

This output ought to include the creation of a specific 

evaluative/strategic/tactical intelligence product for the agency. For example, 

some large cities’ police departments create weekly “homeland security

reports,” which contain information about current happenings; incidents, 

18
 IACP Criminal Intelligence Sharing Report 

events and trends about which law enforcement personnel should be

concerned; FBI alerts; and a paragraph suggesting “the way ahead,” or the 

kinds of things the departments’ intelligence analysts anticipate happening. 

Such documents force local law enforcement to be forward thinking and 

engage in intelligence-led policing. 

• Communicating or sharing this intelligence with appropriate staff and other

agencies. 

• “Tasking” information gathering when there are uncertainties about “what’s 

going on” or what certain unfiltered pieces of information might really mean. 

2. The chief executive officers of smaller departments must work with their staffs to

provide for the cross-training of all or select personnel in the intelligence mission. 

In some departments, this may mean cross-training a crime analyst to additionally

serve as an intelligence analyst. These departments must also seek ways to 

collaborate with larger departments that have a formal intelligence function or

with nearby departments of similar size, to share intelligence resources and

products, so that it is truly possible for them to practice intelligence-led policing. 

3. Each law enforcement chief executive should assess his or her network of

connections and organizational memberships and, as necessary, improve them. 

For some agencies, this means gaining access to NLETS; for others, it might 

mean joining RISS, participating in a state LEIN or linking up with another statelevel law enforcement network. Agencies whose resource constraints make such

networking difficult should seek support from state, regional and federal sources. 

4. State and local law enforcement chief executives should adopt standards for 

managing an intelligence unit and, more basically, intelligence data. Prior to the 

promulgation of model standards and guidelines by the Criminal Intelligence

Coordinating Council, agencies might rely on standards such as those promoted 

by LEIU and IACP. 

Congress and Federal Agencies 

Congress must recognize the importance of the proposed National Intelligence Plan and create 

legislation to implement the Plan in its entirety. This particularly includes expanding the vision 

for non-federal agencies’ participation in an improved criminal intelligence data sharing system. 

Funding should be provided to increase local, state and Tribal agencies’ resources for the 

collection, analysis, dissemination and use of intelligence data; to state law enforcement and 

related academies for curricular changes; and to federal agencies, bureaus and policy centers that 

can play a critical role in enhancing the participation of non-federal agencies in intelligence 

sharing. 

Federal law enforcement agencies, bureaus and policy centers must themselves take steps to 

improve their communication with the local, state, Tribal and regional agencies, through 

improved participation in current systems and through cooperation in the development of the

Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council. For example, individual officers in regional or state 

19
 IACP Criminal Intelligence Sharing Report 

bureaus should increase their efforts to reach out to state, local and tribal agencies, and perhaps 

especially to those without strong internal intelligence analysis and dissemination capacities. 

Affinity Organizations, including the International Association of Chiefs of Police 

Organizations such as the IACP, given the breadth of their interests and capabilities, have a 

variety of important roles in the improvement of criminal intelligence sharing and the promotion 

of the National Intelligence Plan. For example, the IACP (and like entities) should: 

• Work with Congress and the Executive Branch on the creation and 

implementation of the proposed National Intelligence Plan. 

• Work with the Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council, once it is established,

to promulgate standards and guidelines for the development of intelligence 

functions within state, local and tribal law enforcement agencies, and on the 

development of standards and guidelines for intelligence sharing within the 

improved system. 

• Work with state law enforcement academies on the development of intelligence 

curricula and encourage state legislatures to pass statutes requiring such training 

at the academies. 

• Work with larger, major city police departments to support their ongoing 

intelligence efforts, and provide opportunities for these agencies to share 

intelligence gathering and analysis techniques with one another. 

• Work with smaller police agencies (particularly those with fewer than 25 officers) 

to help them create intelligence gathering and analysis opportunities within their 

departments relying on existing resources rather than unrealistic staff additions. 

20
 IACP Criminal Intelligence Sharing Report 

21

Endnotes 

1

 www.whitehouse.gov/deptofhomeland/sect7.html 

2

 For example, RISS’s comparative advantage (strength) may be as a database manager, whereas LEIU’s 

comparative advantage (strength) may be as a personnel “vetting” organization. 

3

 This list is not intended to be comprehensive, as there are many agencies and organizations committed to the 

collection and dissemination of criminal intelligence information. Additions to the list might include the four 

national High Intensity Financial Crime Areas (HIFCAs), the National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC), the El Paso 

Intelligence Center (EPIC) and the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN). Brief descriptions of these 

organizations can be found in Marilyn Peterson, “Networks, Organizations and Resources,” Chapter 14 in Marilyn 

Peterson, Bob Morehouse and Richard Wright (eds.), Intelligence 2000: Revising the Basic Elements (Sacramento, 

CA: Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit and Lawrenceville, NJ: International Association of Law Enforcement 

Intelligence Analysts, 2000), pp. 193-199. 

4

 See www.iir.com/RISS/ 

5

 See www.iir.com/missions.htm 

6

 See www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/hidta/overview.html 

7

 See Marilyn Peterson, “Networks, Organizations and Resource,” op cit., p. 197. 

8

 www.geocities.com/Heartland/Meadows/6906/ 

9

 www.state.ia.us/government/dps/intell/lein/main.htm 

10 www.ialeia.org/about.html 

11 See www.interpol.int/Public/cia/default.asp 

12 Matthew Hickman and Brian Reaves, “Local Police Departments 1999,” Bureau of Justice Statistics, Office of 

Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, May 1999, p. 2. 

13 Ibid. 

14 IACP National Law Enforcement Policy Center, “Criminal Intelligence: Concepts and Issues Paper,” International 

Association of Chiefs of Police, Alexandria, VA, October 1998, p. 3. 

15 Ibid, paraphrased. This paper also provides further explanation and examples of these terms. 

16 Larry Kahaner, Competitive Intelligence: How to Gather, Analyze and Use Information to Move Your Business to 

the Top (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, Touchstone, 1997), pp. 20-21. 

17 R. Anderson, “Intelligence-Led Policing: A British Perspective,” in Intelligence-Led Policing (Lawrenceville, NJ: 

International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts, 1997), p. 1. 

18 Further discussion of intelligence-led policing can be found in Howard N. Atkin, “Intelligence-Led Policing,” in 

Chapter 2, “Applications of Intelligence,” in Marilyn Peterson, Bob Morehouse and Richard Wright (eds.), 

Intelligence 2000, op cit., pp. 13-21. 

19 Legal, Privacy and Civil Rights Issues Breakout Group, “Final Presentation Slides,” IACP Criminal Intelligence 

Sharing Summit, Alexandria, VA, March 7-8, 2002. 

20 For example, in the wake of protests against the World Trade Organization in Seattle in 1999, many police 

departments moved aggressively against protest groups before planned protest in their own cities. (John Barry, 

“Have the Police Been Cracking Down Too Hard on Political Protestors?” Speakout.com, June 15, 2000. 

speakout.com/activism/issue_briefs/1368b-1.html ) 

21 Like the list of proposed founding participants in the Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council, this is not 

intended to be a comprehensive list, although it perhaps includes the most important data systems on which 

technological integration should concentrate. A variety of additional federal and non-federal systems might be 

included (such as Immigration and Naturalization data, Customs Service data, etc.) at the outset or as the integration 

proceeds. 
 IACP Criminal Intelligence Sharing Report 

22

22 “Training Key #448,” International Association of Chiefs of Police, Alexandria, VA, 1994, p. 19. 

23 John King, “Collection,” in Intelligence 2000 (op cit.), p. 82. 

24 www.fas.org/irp/program/disseminate/adnet.htm 

25 www.ustreas.gov/fincen/ 

26 These suggestions are a subset of a larger set of possible sets such agencies might take. See, for example, Richard 

Wright, “10 Steps to Establishing A Successful Criminal Intelligence Program,” in Chapter 4, “Management of the 

Intelligence Unit,” in Marilyn Peterson, Bob Morehouse and Richard Wright (eds.), Intelligence 2000, op cit., pp. 

76-77. 
PROJECT STAFF AND CONSULTANTS 

Executive Staff 

William Berger 2001-2002 IACP President 

Dan Rosenblatt IACP Executive Director

Gene Cromartie IACP Deputy Executive Director

Jerry Needle IACP Director of Programs and Research

Summit Staff and Consultants 

Peter Modafferi Summit Liaison, Chair, IACP Police Investigative Operations 

Committee 

John Firman Summit Coordinator 

Miriam Jorgensen Summit Report Principal Author

Carmen Barnes Summit Report Editor 

William Albright Summit Report Editor 

Alison Vaughan Summit Support/Report Editor 

Sally Dorfmann Conference Manager, CSR Inc. 

Kate Onuska Senior Conference Coordinator, CSR Inc. 

Paul Murray Graphic Arts, CSR, Inc. 

Magalie Brunet Meeting Planner, CSR, Inc. 

Tim Buskey Summit Support 

Elaine Deck Summit Support

Marcie Deitch Summit Support 

Jennifer Hicks Summit Support

Aviva Kurash Summit Support

Anthony Pizzaro Summit Support 

Katherine Spivey Summit Support

Nancy Turner Summit Support 

Melanie Wade Summit Support

Breakout Group Facilitators

Technology

Phillip Ramer Special Agent in Charge, Florida Department of Law Enforcement

Privacy/Civil Rights/Legal

Bobi Wallace Chief, Community Outreach, FBI 

Capacities & Barriers

Daniel Oates Chief of Police, Ann Arbor Police 

Standards/Guidelines Policies

Russell M. Porter Special Agent in Charge, Iowa Department of Public Safety 

Ken Walker Texas Police Chiefs Association 

Training

Marilyn B. Peterson Financial Analysis, NJ Division of Criminal Justice
John A. Cocklin Carl J. Jensen, III 

Chief State Investigator Supervisory Special Agent 

New Jersey Division of Criminal Justice FBI Academy 

25 Market Street Quantico, VA 22135 

P.O. Box 085 (703) 632-1139 

Trenton, NJ 08625 jjarvis@fbiacademy.edu 

(609) 984-0048 

(609) 984-4466 Teresa M. Kettlekamp

cocklinj@dcj.lps.state.nj.us Deputy Director 

Illinois State Policy 

John Cutter P.O. Box 19461 

Inspector Intelligence Division Room 100 

New York Police Department Springfield, IL 62794 

140 - 58th Street (217) 785-7542 

Suite 6B 

Brooklyn, NY 11220 Charles Lutz 

Director

Counterdrug Intelligence Executive 

Secretariat 

William J. DeBlock 

Field Commander 

New York State Police 1331 F Street, NW

1220 Washington Avenue Suite 700 

Building 22 Washington, DC 20530 

Albany, NY 12226 (202) 353-1919 

(518) 457-9579 

(518) 457-4779 Phil Lynn 

wdeblock@troopers.state.ny.us Manager 

International Association of Chiefs of 

John Firman Police 

Director 515 North Washington Street 

International Association of Chiefs of Alexandria, VA 22314 

Police (703) 836-6767 

515 North Washington Street 

Alexandria, VA 22314 Randy Means 

(703) 836-6767 Thomas & Means, LLP 

1250 American Pacific Drive 

Edmond Hartnett Suite 512 

Chief, Intelligence Division Henderson, NV 89014 

New York Police Department (704) 948-5608 

140 - 58th Street 

Suite 6B 

Brooklyn, NY 11220 

INTELLIGENCE SHARING SUMMIT 

ADVISORY GROUP 
Peter A. Modafferi 

Chief of Detectives 

Rockland County District Attorney's 

Office 

One South Main Street 

New City, NY 10956 

(845) 638-5009 

(845) 685-0203 

modaffep@co.rockland.ny.us 

Jerry Needle 

Director, Program & Research Activities 

International Association of Chiefs of 

Police 

515 North Washington Street 

Alexandria, VA 22314 

(703) 836-6767 

Buddy Nix 

Director 

Georgia Bureau of Investigation 

P.O. Box 370808 

Decatur, GA 30037 

(404) 244-2501 

(404) 244-2757 

milton.nix@gbi.state.ga.us 

Daniel J. Oates 

Chief of Police 

Ann Arbor Police Department 

100 North Fifth Avenue 

Ann Arbor, MI 48104 

(734) 994-2848 

(734) 997-1506 

doates@ci.ann-arbor.mi.us 

Thomas P. O'Connor 

Deputy Chief 

Maryland Heights Police Department 

212 Millwell Drive` 

Maryland Heights, MO 63043 

(314) 298-8700 

(314) 298-9217 

toconnor@marylandheights.com 

Michael Pearson 

Executive Associate Commissioner 

Immigration & Naturalization Service 

425 I Street, NW 

Suite 7114 

Washington, DC 20536 

(202) 616-1600 

Marilyn B. Peterson 

Financial Analysis Coordinator 

New Jersey Division of Criminal Justice 

25 Market Street 

P.O. Box 085 

Trenton, NJ 08625 

(609) 984-1035 

petersonm@njdcj.org 

Joseph Polisar 

Chief of Police 

Garden Grove Police Department 

11301 Acacia Parkway 

P.O. Box 3070 

Garden Grove, CA 92840 

(714) 741-5900 

joep@garden-grove.org 

Russell M. Porter 

Special Agent in Charge 

Iowa Department of Public Safety 

Wallace State Office Building 

Des Moines, IA 50319-0049 

(515) 281-8627 

(515) 242-6136 

porter@dps.state.ia.us 

Phillip G. Ramer 

Special Agent in Charge 

Florida Department of Law Enforcement 

2331 Phillips Road 

Tallahassee, FL 32308 

(850) 410-7068 

(850) 410-7069 

philramer@fdle.state.fl.us 
Charles Ramsey 

Chief of Police 

Metropolitan Police Department 

300 Indiana Avenue, NW 

Washington, DC 20001 

(202) 727-4218 

Dan Rosenblatt 

Executive Director 

International Association of Chiefs of 

Police 

515 North Washington Street 

Alexandria, VA 22314 

(703) 836-6767 

rosenblatt@theiacp.com 

Ellen Scrivner 

Deputy Director 

COPS Office 

U.S. Department of Justice 

1100 Vermont Ave., NW, 10th Floor 

Washington, DC 20530 

(202) 514-5793 

ellen.scrivner2@usdoj.gov 

Thomas M. Seamon 

1250 Kenas Road 

North Wales, PA 19454 

(215) 997-1264 

Frank G. Straub 

Deputy Commissioner for Training 

New York City Police Department 

235 E. 20th Street 

New York, NY 10003 

(212) 477-9746 

Jim Sullivan 

Deputy Chief, Intelligence 

U.S. Department of Justice 

1300 New York Avenue, NW 

Suite 4000 

Washington, DC 20530 

(202) 616-9700 

Ken A. Walker 

Immediate Past President 

Texas Chiefs of Police Association 

9405 Nashville Street 

Lubbock, TX 79423 

(806) 798-8723 
Inspector George Albin Mr. Kent C. Bond 

Police Inspector Senior Law Enforcement Advisor 

Port Authority of New York National Reconnaissance Office 

 and New Jersey Police 14675 Lee Road 

241 Erie Street Chantilly, VA 20151-1715 

Jersey City, NJ 07310 (703) 808-6004 

(201) 239-3720 (703) 808-1184 

(201) 239-3862 bondk@nro.mil 

g.albin@panynj.gov 

Lieutenant Chuck Boschert 

Mr. Rafael Anton Lieutenant 

Electronics Engineer St. Louis County Police Department 

U.S. Army Counterdrug Office 7900 Forsyth Blvd. 

Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-7110 Clayton, MO 63105 

(520) 538-4916 (314) 615-4692 

(520) 538-4926 (314) 615-4243 

antonr@epg.army.mil chuck_boschert@stlouisco.com

Attorney General Hon. John Ashcroft Major James P. Bourque 

Attorney General of the United States Commander of Investigations Bureau 

U.S. Department of Justice Chesterfield County Police Department 

Washington, DC 20530 10031 Iron Bridge Road 

P.O. Box 148 

Ms. Karen Aumond Chesterfield, VA 23803 

Assistant Director (804) 748-1266 

RISS/WSIN (804) 748-6265 

1825 Bell Street, #205 bourquej@chesterfield.gov 

Sacramento, CA 95825 

(916) 263-1190 Chief Timothy A. Braaten 

(916) 263-1180 Chief of Police 

kaumond@wsin.riss.net City of Victoria Police Department 

306 S. Bridge 

Ms. Judith E. Bertini Victoria, TX 77901 

Deputy Assistant Administrator for (361) 572-2747 

Intelligence (361) 572-6874 

Office of Intelligence Policy and tbraaten@victoriatx.org

Management 

Drug Enforcement Administration 

700 Army-Navy Drive 

Arlington, VA 22202 

(202) 307-8748 

(202) 307-4649 

IACP CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE SHARING SUMMIT: 

Overcoming Barriers ot Enhance Domestic Securtiy 

Doubletree Hotel Crystal City 

March 7-8, 2002 

PARTICIPANTS
Dr. Albert E. Brandenstein 

Director, Counterdrug Technology 

 Assessment Center 

Office of National Drug Control Policy 

Executive Office of the President 

750 17th Street, NW 

Washington, DC 20503 

(202) 395-6781 

(202) 395-6775 

albert_e._brandenstein@ondcp.eop.gov 

Ms. Mary Breen 

Special Assistant 

Executive Office for Weed and Seed 

810 7th Street, 6th Floor, Rm. 6113 

Washington, DC 20351 

(202) 514-4075 

Assistant Chief Dan Bryant 

Assistant Chief 

Seattle Police Department 

610 Third Avenue 

Seattle, WA 98104 

(206) 684-5485 

(206) 684-5489 

dan.bryant@ci.seattle.wa.us 

Ms. Pamela Cammarata 

Assistant Director 

Program/Policy Support & Evaluation 

Division 

COPS Office 

U.S. Department of Justice 

1100 Vermont Avenue, NW 

Washington, DC 20530 

(202) 514-9193 

(202) 616-8658 

pam.cammarata@usdoj.gov 

Chief R. Doyle Campbell 

Assistant Chief, Special Operations Division 

Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department 

4700 Ramona Blvd. 

Monterey Park, CA 91754 

(323) 526-5755 

(323) 415-1285 

rdcampbe@lasd.org 

Mr. Duncan Campbell 

Director of Intergovernmental Affairs 

Office of Homeland Security 

The White House 

Washington, DC 

(202) 456-1700 

(202) 456-1908 

Ms. Traci Campbell 

Associate Director 

Office of Intergovernmental Affairs 

The White House 

Washington, DC 

(202) 456-2896 

(202) 456-7015 

Mr. Don Clements 

Attorney/Advisor 

Drug Enforcement Administration 

Office of Chief Counsel 

Washington, DC 20537 

(202) 307-8075 

(202) 307-7948 

Deputy Commissioner David Cohen 

Deputy Commissioner, Intelligence 

New York City Police Department 

1 Police Plaza 

New York, NY 10038 

(718) 765-4305 

(718) 765-4456 

megan22442@aol.com

Chief Gregory M. Cooper 

Chief of Police 

Provo Police Department 

48 S. 300 W. 

Provo, UT 84601 

(801) 852-6200 

(801) 852-6208 

provo.gcooper@state.ut.us 

Chief Carlo Cudio 

Chief of Police 

Monterey Police Department 

351 Madison Street 

Monterey, CA 93940 

(831) 646-3800 

(831) 646-3802 
Mr. Timothy Danahey 

Special Agent 

Naval Criminal Investigative Service 

Washington Navy Yard, Building 111 

716 Sicard Street, SE 

Washington, DC 20388-5383 

(202) 433-7113 

(202) 433-0904 

Ms. Lori Sharpe Day 

Director of Intergovernmental Affairs and 

 Advisor to the Attorney General 

950 Pennsylvania Avenue, Rm. 1629 

Washington, DC 20530 

(202) 514-3465 

(202) 514-2504 

Colonel William J. DeBlock 

Field Commander 

New York State Police 

1220 Washington Avenue, Bldg. 22 

Albany, NY 12226 

(518) 457-5936 

(518) 457-4779 

wdeblock@troopers.state.ny.us 

Mr. William M. Deyermond 

Executive Director 

NESPIN–RISS 

124 Grove Street 

Franklin, MA 02038-3159 

(800) 343-5682, ext. 202 

(508) 528-5184 

wdeyermond@nespin.riss.net 

Mr. E.J. Doyle 

Assistant to the Deputy Attorney General 

Virginia Attorney General’s Office 

900 E. Main Street, 6th Floor 

Richmond, VA 23219 

(804) 786-7584 

(804) 786-4239 

Ms. Patricia Durgin 

Deputy Director, CAS Intelligence 

Federal Aviation Administration 

800 Independence Avenue, SW 

Washington, DC 20591 

(202) 267-8023 

(202) 488-7119 

patricia.durgin@faa.gov 

Mr. Bruce Edwards 

Program Manager 

Bureau of Justice Assistance 

810 7th Street, NW 

Washington, DC 20531 

(202) 514-9155 

edwardsb@ojp.usdoj.gov 

Chief Joseph Estey 

Chief of Police 

Hartford Police Department 

812 V.A. Cutoff Road 

White River Junction, VT 05001 

(802) 295-9425 

(802) 295-5146 

jestey@dps.state.vt.us 

Mr. John Firman 

Director, Research Center Division 

International Association of Chiefs of Police 

515 N. Washington Street 

Alexandria, VA 22314 

(703) 836-6767 

(703) 836-4544 

firmanj@theiacp.org 

Director Roger Gaspar 

Deputy Director General 

National Criminal Intelligence Service 

P.O. Box 8000 

London, England SE11 5EN 

44 207 238 8205 

44 207 238 8327 

directorate@spring34.demon.co.uk 
Colonel Richard M. Gibaldi 

Chief, Intelligence Division 

AC2ISRC/A-2 

130 Andrews Street, Suite 205 

Langley AFB, VA 23665-1993 

(757) 225-0229 

(757) 225-0326 

richard.gibaldi@langley.af.mil 

Ms. Karen Gilbert 

Attorney–Advisor 

Office of Justice Programs 

810 7th Street, NW 

Washington, DC 20531 

(202) 514-9370 

(202) 307-1419 

gilbertk@ojp.usdoj.gov 

Inspector Thomas J. Goldrick 

Inspector 

Bergen County Prosecutor’s Office 

Bergen County Justice Center 

10 Main Street 

Hackensack, NJ 07601 

(201) 646-2300 

(201) 646-3673 

tgoldrick@bcpo.net 

Mr. Robert Greeves 

Policy Advisor 

Bureau of Justice Assistance 

810 7th Street, NW 

Washington, DC 20531 

(202) 305-9317 

(202) 305-1367 

greevesr@ojp.usdoj.gov 

Mr. Brian Guay 

Intergovernmental Public Liaison Specialist 

Intergovernmental Public Liaison Division 

1100 Vermont Avenue, NW 

Washington, DC 20530 

(202) 514-8953 

(202) 616-5899 

Mr. Douglas Gurin 

Social Science Research Analyst 

National Highway Traffic 

 Safety Administration 

400 7th Street, SW, NTS-31 

Washington, DC 20590 

(202) 366-5594 

(202) 366-7096 

dgurin@nhtsa.dot.gov 

Ms. Beth Haley 

Assistant General Counsel 

FBI 

935 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Rm. 7338 

Washington, DC 20535 

(202) 324-1742 

(202) 324-1039 

lhaley@leo.gov 

Professor Robert J. Heibel 

Professor 

Mercyhurst College 

501 E. 38th Street 

Erie, PA 16546 

(814) 824-2117 

(814) 824-3335 

rheibel@mercyhurst.edu 

Director Norena Henry 

Director, American Indian and 

 Alaska Native Affairs Desk 

Office of Justice Programs 

U.S. Department of Justice 

810 7th Street, NW 

Washington, DC 20912 

(202) 616-3205 

(202) 514-8812 

henry@ojp.usdoj.gov 

Director Michael T. Horn 

Director 

National Drug Intelligence Center 

319 Washington Street, 5th Floor 

Johnstown, PA 15901-1622 

(814) 532-4607 

(814) 532-4517 

michael.t.horn@usdoj.gov 
Mr. Richard Hunt 

Chief Executive Officer 

The Hunt Group LLC 

12 Wyndam Court 

Lutherville, MD 21093 

(410) 308-4845 

(410) 308-4847 

azran50@all-systems.com 

Mr. John Imhoff 

Section Chief 

FBI 

935 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW 

Washington, DC 20535 

(202) 324-0458 

Mr. George Jaramillo 

Assistant Sheriff 

Orange County Sheriff’s Department 

550 N. Flower Street 

Santa Ana, CA 92703 

(714) 647-1801 

(714) 953-3092 

jdruiz@ocsd.org 

Dr. John Jarvis 

Behavioral Science Instructor 

FBI Academy 

Behavioral Science Unit 

Quantico, VA 22135 

(703) 632-1139 

(703) 632-1148 

jjarvis@fbiacademy.edu 

Mr. Carl J. Jensen, III 

Supervisory Special Agent 

Behavioral Science Unit, FBI 

FBI Academy 

Quantico, VA 22135 

(703) 632-1143 

(703) 632-1148 

cjensen@fbiacademy.edu 

Chief Bob Jordan 

Chief, Civil Rights Section 

FBI 

935 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW 

Washington, DC 20535 

(202) 324-2801 

Mr. Vernon M. Keenan 

Assistant Director 

Georgia Bureau of Investigation 

3121 Panthersville Road 

Decatur, GA 30034 

(404) 244-2502 

(404) 244-2757 

vernon.keenan@gbi.state.ga.us 

Chief Kevin Kilduff 

Chief of Police 

Clarkstown Police Department 

20 Maple Avenue 

New City, NY 10956 

(845) 639-5814 

(845) 639-5919 

g_king@town.clarkstown.ny.us 

Mr. Michael Kortan 

Chief, Public Affairs Section 

FBI 

935 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW 

Washington, DC 20535 

(202) 324-5035 

Sheriff James F. Kralik 

Sheriff 

Rockland County Sheriff’s Department 

55 New Hempstead Road 

New City, NY 10956 

(845) 638-5464 

(845) 638-5035 

kralikj@co.rockland.ny.us 

Ms. Elaine N. Lammert 

Unit Chief, Investigative Law Unit, OGC 

FBI 

935 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW 

Washington, DC 20535 

(202) 324-5640 

(202) 324-1039 
Ms. Nancy Leach 

Social Science Analyst 

Program/Policy Support & 

 Evaluation Division 

COPS Office 

U.S. Department of Justice 

1100 Vermont Avenue, NW 

Washington, DC 20530 

(202) 514-8252 

(202) 616-8658 

nancy.leach@usdoj.gov 

Sergeant Forrest H. LeMoine 

Sergeant 

Vermont State Police 

103 S. Main Street 

Waterbury, VT 05671 

(802) 241-5352 

(802) 241-5349 

flemoine@dps.state.vt.us 

Commander Bud Levin 

Commander, Policy and Planning 

Waynesboro Police Department 

250 S. Wayne Avenue 

Waynesboro, VA 22990 

(540) 453-2228 

(540) 234-9066 

budlevin@yahoo.com

Deputy Chief Mike Leyman 

Deputy Chief 

Richardson Police Department 

140 N. Greenville Avenue 

Richardson, TX 75081-6006 

(972) 744-4874 

(972) 744-5996 

mike.leyman@cor.gov 

Director Charles H. Lutz 

Director 

Counterdrug Intelligence Executive 

Secretariat 

1331 F Street, NW, Suite 700 

Washington, DC 20530 

(202) 353-1919 

(202) 353-1901 

Chief Ed Manavian 

Chief 

California Department of Justice 

4949 Broadway 

Sacramento, CA 95820 

(916) 227-4169 

(916) 227-4761 

ed.manavian@doj.ca.gov 

Mr. George P. March 

Director, Office of Information Technology 

RISS 

315 E. Lancaster Avenue 

Downingtown, PA 19335 

(610) 873-9940 

(610) 873-9950 

gmarch@risstech.riss.net 

Mr. Ritchie A. Martinez 

Criminal Intelligence Analyst Supervisor 

Arizona Department of Public 

Safety/HIDTA 

6868 S. Plumer Avenue 

Tucson, AZ 85706 

(520) 547-8760 

(520) 547-8776 

intelram@aol.com 

Chief Michael McCann 

Chief, Security and Safety Service 

United Nations 

Room C110, United Nations 

New York, NY 10017 

(212) 963-7525 

(212) 963-6850 

mccann@un.org 

Mr. John P. McCann 

First Vice President 

National Law Enforcement Association 

c/o Argus 

10 W. 66th Street 

New York, NY 10023 

(212) 875-0010 

(212) 875-0054 

jmccann@argusprotective.com 
Ms. Kathleen L. McChesney 

Executive Assistant Director 

FBI 

935 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW 

Washington, DC 20535 

(202) 324-4880 

Mr. Steven C. McCraw 

Director 

Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force 

Crystal Square 5, Suite 1200 

1755 Jefferson Davis Highway 

Arlington, VA 22202 

(703) 414-9565 

(703) 416-8310 

ftttf1@mktsurvey.net

Mr. J. Patrick McCreary 

Special Assistant 

Bureau of Justice Assistance 

810 7th Street, NW 

Washington, DC 20531 

(202) 616-0532 

(202) 305-1367 

mccrearj@ojp.usdoj.gov 

Mr. William A. Miller 

Assistant General Counsel/ 

Chief, Administrative Law Unit 

FBI 

935 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Rm. 7338 

Washington, DC 20535 

(202) 324-4523 

(202) 324-1039 

wmiller@leo.gov 

Chief Charles Miller 

Acting Chief, Congressional and 

 Interagency Liaison 

National Drug Intelligence Center 

8201 Greensboro Drive, Suite 1001 

McLean, VA 22102 

(703) 556-8986 

(703) 556-7807 

charles.miller4@usdoj.gov 

Chief Peter A. Modafferi 

Chief of Detectives 

Rockland County District Attorney’s Office 

County Court House 

1 S. Main Street 

New City, NY 10956 

(845) 638-5009 

(845) 638-5298 

modaffep@co.rockland.ny.us 

Mr. Bob Morehouse 

Manager 

California Department of Justice 

4949 Broadway 

Sacramento, CA 95820 

(916) 227-7880 

(916) 227-0335 

bob.morehouse@doj.ca.gov 

Mr. Dennis A. Morton 

Deputy Assistant Administrator for 

Intelligence 

Drug Enforcement Administration 

700 Army-Navy Drive 

Arlington, VA 22202 

(202) 307-3650 

(202) 307-3636 

Director Hon. Robert S. Mueller 

Director 

FBI 

J. Edgar Hoover Building 

935 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW 

Washington, DC 20535 

Mr. Thomas E. Nagy 

Agent/Analyst 

Region I Drug Task Force 

1600 Sichler Road 

Los Lunas, NM 87031 

(505) 344-7169 

(505) 344-7397 

gl5166@aol.com 
Mr. Richard Nedelkoff 

Director 

Bureau of Justice Assistance 

810 7th Street, NW 

Washington, DC 20531 

(202) 616-6500 

Director Milton E. Nix, Jr. 

Director 

Georgia Bureau of Investigation 

3121 Panthersville Road 

Decatur, GA 30034 

(404) 244-2501 

(404) 244-2757 

milton.nix@gbi.state.ga.us 

Commissioner Edward T. Norris 

Police Commissioner 

Baltimore Police Department 

601 E. Fayette Street, Suite 500 

Baltimore, MD 21202 

(410) 396-2020 

(410) 396-2023 

edward.norris@baltimorepolice.org 

Chief Michael J. O’Connell 

Chief of Police 

Tinley Park Police Department 

7850 W. 183rd Street 

Tinley Park, IL 60477 

(708) 444-5300 

(708) 444-5399 

mocsr@aol.com 

Deputy Chief Tom O’Connor 

Chief of Police 

Maryland Heights Police Department 

212 Millwell 

St. Louis, MO 63043 

(314) 298-6820 

(314) 298-9217 

toconnor@marylandheights.com 

Chief Daniel J. Oates 

Chief of Police 

Ann Arbor Police Department 

100 N. Fifth Avenue 

Ann Arbor, MI 48104 

(734) 994-2848 

(734) 997-1506 

doates@ci.ann-arbor.mi.us 

Warden David S. Owens, Jr. 

Warden 

Camden County Department of Corrections 

330 Federal Street 

Camden, NJ 08103 

(856) 225-7632 

(856) 614-8097 

dowens@camdencounty.com 

Major Joseph A. Papili 

Major 

Delaware State Police 

1441 N. Dupont Highway 

P.O. Box 430 

Dover, DE 19901 

(302) 739-5911 

(302) 739-5966 

jpapili@state.de.us 

Director Carl R. Peed 

Director 

COPS Office 

U.S. Department of Justice 

1100 Vermont Avenue, NW, 10th Floor 

Washington, DC 20530 

(202) 616-2888 

(202) 616-2914 

carl.peed@usdoj.gov 

Lt. David W. Peltomaa 

Commander, Criminal Intelligence Unit 

Michigan State Police 

2911 Eyde Parkway 

East Lansing, MI 48823 

(517) 336-6681 

(517) 333-5399 

peltomaad@michigan.gov 
Ms. Marilyn B. Peterson 

Financial Analysis Coordinator 

New Jersey Division of Criminal Justice 

25 Market Street 

P.O. Box 085 

Trenton, NJ 08625 

(609) 984-1035 

(609) 292-5976 

petersonm@njdcj.org 

Chief Joe Polisar 

Chief of Police 

Garden Grove Police Department 

11301 Acacia Parkway 

Garden Grove, CA 92842 

(714) 741-5900 

(714) 741-5902 

joep@garden-grove.org 

Mr. Stephen Pomerantz 

Executive Director, Center for 

 Criminal Justice Technology 

Mitre-Tek Systems 

3150 Fairview Park Drive S. 

Falls Church, VA 22042 

(703) 610-2300 

Mr. Russell M. Porter 

Special Agent in Charge 

Iowa Department of Public Safety 

Intelligence Bureau 

Wallace State Office Building 

Des Moines, IA 50319-0049 

(515) 281-8627 

(515) 281-6108 

porter@dps.state.ia.us 

Mr. Phillip Ramer 

Special Agent in Charge 

Florida Department of Law Enforcement 

2331 Phillips Road 

Tallahassee, FL 32308 

(850) 410-7068 

(850) 410-7069 

philramer@fdle.state.fl.us 

Colonel Dennis M. Robinson 

Colonel 

Baltimore County Police Department 

700 E. Joppa Road 

Baltimore, MD 21286 

(410) 887-2220 

(410) 296-4204 

dmrobinson@co.ba.md.us 

Mr. Charles H. Rogovin 

Professor of Law 

Temple University School of Law 

1719 N. Broad Street 

Philadelphia, PA 19122 

(610) 527-0121 

crogovin@temple.edu 

Mr. Richard M. Romley 

Maricopa County Attorney 

Maricopa County Attorney’s Office 

301 W. Jefferson 

Phoenix, AZ 85003 

(602) 506-7650 

(602) 506-8102 

romley@mcao.maricopa.gov 

Mr. Daniel Rosenblatt 

Executive Director 

International Association of Chiefs of Police 

515 N. Washington Street 

Alexandria, VA 22314 

(703) 836-6767, ext. 201 

(703) 836-4718 

rosenblatt@theiacp.org 

Dr. Kim Rossmo 

Director, Research Division 

Police Foundation 

1201 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 200 

Washington, DC 20036 

(202) 721-9790 

(202) 296-2012 

krossmo@policefoundation.org 
Chief James Rybicki 

Chief of County Detectives 

Cape May County Prosecutor’s Office 

4 Moore Road, DN-110 

Cape May Court House, NJ 08210 

(609) 465-1164 

(609) 465-4434 

jrybicki@cmcpros.net 

Director Kurt F. Schmid 

Director, HIDTA Program 

Office of National Drug Control Policy 

750 17th Street, NW 

Washington, DC 20503 

(202) 395-6692 

(202) 395-6841 

kurt_f._schmid@ondcp.eop.gov 

Chief Paul R. Scranton 

Chief of Police 

Ankeny Police Department 

211 S.W. Walnut Street 

Ankeny, IA 50021 

(515) 965-6440 

(515) 965-6438 

pscranton@ci.ankeny.ia.us 

Dr. Ellen Scrivner 

Deputy Director 

Community Policing Development 

COPS Office 

U.S. Department of Justice 

1100 Vermont Avenue, NW, 10th Floor 

Washington, DC 20530 

(202) 514-5793 

(202) 616-2914 

ellen.scrivner2@usdoj.gov 

Ms. Karla L. Snellings 

Deputy Director 

National White Collar Crime Center 

7401 Beaufont Springs Drive, Suite 300 

Richmond, VA 23225 

(804) 323-3563 

(804) 323-3566 

ksnellings@nw3c.org 

Lt. Col. Michael R. Snyders 

Lieutenant Colonel 

Illinois State Police 

500 Iles Park, Suite 102 

Springfield, IL 62718 

(217) 782-8005 

(217) 524-8140 

snyderm@isp.state.il.us 

Mr. Michael Stenger 

Deputy Assistant Director 

U.S. Secret Service 

950 H Street, NW 

Washington, DC 20001 

(202) 406-9122 

(202) 406-5052 

mstenger@usss.treas.gov 

Chief Robert Stewart 

Chief 

South Carolina Law Enforcement Division 

4400 Broad River Road 

Columbia, SC 29210 

(803) 896-7136 

(803) 896-7588 

rstewart@mail.sled.state.sc.us 

Deputy Chief James Sullivan 

Deputy Chief 

INTERPOL 

U.S. Department of Justice 

1301 New York Avenue, NW 

Washington, DC 20005 

(202) 616-9700 

(202) 616-1048 

james.m.sullivan@usdoj.gov 

Mr. Danny Taylor 

Special Assistant to the Director 

National White Collar Crime Center 

7401 Beaufont Springs Drive, Suite 300 

Richmond, VA 23225 

(804) 323-3563 

(804) 323-3566 

dtaylor@nw3c.org 
Lieutenant Bill Tegeler 

Lieutenant 

Santa Ana Police Department 

60 Civic Center Plaza 

Santa Ana, CA 92702 

(714) 245-8350 

(714) 245-8384 

btegeler@ci.santa-ana.ca.us 

Chief Mary Ann Viverette 

Chief of Police 

Gaithersburg Police Department 

7 E. Cedar Avenue 

Gaithersburg, MD 20877 

(301) 258-6400 

(301) 258-6410 

mviverette@aol.com 

Mr. David Walchak 

Deputy Assistant Director 

FBI 

935 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW 

Washington, DC 20535 

(202) 324-8910 

Chief David Lon Walker 

Chief of Police 

Marshalltown Police Department 

22 N. Center Street 

Marshalltown, IA 50158 

(641) 754-5771 

(641) 752-1211 

lonwalker@yahoo.com 

Mr. Ken Walker 

Texas Police Chiefs Association 

9405 Nashville Street 

Lubbock, TX 79423 

(806) 798-8723 

kwalker950@aol.com 

Chief Barbara S. Wallace 

Chief, Community Outreach Unit 

FBI 

935 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Rm. 4944 

Washington, DC 20535 

(202) 324-6660 

(202) 324-2020 

Deputy Director Richard H. Ward III 

Deputy Director 

Bureau of Justice Assistance 

810 7th Street, NW 

Washington, DC 20531 

(202) 514-6278 

(202) 305-1367 

ward@ojp.usdoj.gov 

Mr. Roy G. Weise 

Senior Advisor 

FBI 

935 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW 

Washington, DC 20535 

(202) 324-8910 

Mr. Emory B. Williams 

Chairman and CEO 

Institute for Intergovernmental Research 

2050 Centrepointe Blvd., Suite 200 

P.O. Box 12729 

Tallahassee, FL 32317 

(850) 385-0600 

(850) 422-3529 

Chief John D. Wintersteen 

Chief of Police 

Paradise Valley Police Department 

6433 E. Lincoln Drive 

Paradise Valley, AZ 85253-4399 

(480) 948-7418 

(480) 998-0877 

Capt. Richard W. Wright 

Captain 

Simi Valley Police Department 

3901 Alamo Street 

Simi Valley, CA 93063 

(805) 583-6905 

(805) 583-6201 

rwright@simivalley.org