alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.  No. 01-4345

CHRISTOPHER MICHAEL WATKINS,

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Newport News.

Henry C. Morgan, Jr., District Judge.

(CR-00-43)

Submitted: November 14, 2001

Decided: December 4, 2001

Before WIDENER, TRAXLER, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

COUNSEL

John G. Lafratta, COWAN, NORTH & LAFRATTA, L.L.P., Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. Kenneth E. Melson, United States

Attorney, Matthew W. Hoffman, Special Assistant United States

Attorney, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c). 
OPINION

PER CURIAM: 

A jury convicted Christopher Michael Watkins of possession of a

firearm by a convicted felon. On appeal, he alleges that the evidence

was insufficient to support the finding of guilt and that his counsel

rendered ineffective assistance. Finding no error, we affirm. 

On direct appeal of a criminal conviction, a "verdict must be sustained if there is substantial evidence, taking the view most favorable

to the Government, to support it." Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S.

60, 80 (1942). In the present case, we find that the evidence, viewed

in the light most favorable to the Government, was sufficient for a

rational trier of fact to determine that Watkins possessed a firearm

and threw it while being pursued by the police. 

We review claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct

appeal only when the ineffectiveness "conclusively appears" on the

record. United States v. Smith, 62 F.3d 641, 651 (4th Cir. 1995). Otherwise, such claims should be raised in the district court in a postconviction proceeding rather than in this court by direct appeal. Id. In

the present case, there is nothing in the record that clearly shows that

counsel was deficient for failing to move for a downward departure,

given Watkins’ extensive criminal history. In addition, because the

record does not show that a juror was sleeping during Watkins’ trial,

counsel was not clearly deficient for not raising an objection. 

Accordingly, we affirm Watkins’ conviction and sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are

adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument

would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED

2 UNITED STATES v. WATKINS
#### William Randell and David Barinholz, copartners, trading as United Auto Wreckers, appellees, v. Community State Bank, appellant.

Gen. No. 28,677.

Complaint for accounting and for injunction restraining the dispositions of two promissory notes. lTemPorary injunction issued and motion to dissolve denied. Interlocutory appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Ira Byner, Judge, presiding. Heard in the third division of this court for the first district at the March term, 1923.

Affirmed.

Opinion filed July 3, 1923.

Shulman, Shulman & Abrams, for appellant. Philip A. Weinstein, for appellees.

Mr. Presiding Justice Taylor

delivered the opinion of the court.
### §5714–22. Transferred

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Codification

Section 5714–22 was editorially reclassified as section 11242 of Title 34, Crime Control and Law Enforcement.
#### In the Matter of Quentin-2nd Street Corp., Appellant, v. Robert E. Herman, as State Rent Administrator, Respondent.

In a proceeding under article 78 of the Civil Practice Act to review and annul the determination of the State Rent Administrator which denied petitioner’s protest and affirmed the Local Administrator’s order refusing to issue a certificate of eviction to enable petitioner, as landlord, to prosecute summary proceedings for the removal of a tenant from a certain apartment, the petitioner appeals from a final order of the Supreme Court, Kings County, dated June 12, 1961, which denied the petition and dismissed the proceeding. Order affirmed, without costs. Upon the instant record, the petitioner failed to adduce satisfactory proof that the subject apartment was the only one available for a resident superintendent. Ughetta, Acting P. J., Christ, Brennan, Hill and Rabin, JJ., concur.
#### In the Matter of the Arbitration between Jake Glatstian, Appellant, and Fredia E. Peller, Respondent. Jake Glatstian, Appellant, v. Harold Peller, Defendant, and Fredia E. Peller, Respondent.

Order entered on February 15, 1962 denying the motion to stay arbitration and granting the motion to stay the action, unanimously affirmed, with $20 costs and disbursements to respondent. The record reveals that the petitioner participated in the arbitration process to a degree sufficient to bar his present attempt to stay the proceeding. (See Civ. Prac. Act, § 1458; *Matter of Iino Shipbuilding Eng.*
      *632
      *Co. [Hellenic Lines],*6 A D 2d 159.) We conclude that Item No. 1 of the demand for arbitration contemplates a determination of the status of Freída Peller as a stockholder. Inasmuch as that is essentially the issue to be tried in the Supreme court action, such action should be stayed. Concur — Breitel, J. P., Rabin, Valente, McNally and Eager, JJ. [33 Misc 2d —.]
[Proposed] Order Granting Motion to Seal 

CASE NO. C 08-5048 MMC

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

ALPHONSO OLIPHANT, ET AL.,

 Plaintiffs, 

 vs. 

CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN 

FRANCISCO,

 Defendant. 

Case No. C 08-5048 MMC 

[PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING 

DEFENDANTS' REQUEST TO FILES 

DOCUMENTS UNDER SEAL 

(CIVIL L.R. 6-3; 7-11)

Pre-Trial Conference June 8, 2010 

Trial: June 21, 2010 

The Court has reviewed Defendants' Motion to Seal Documents in support of its Opposition to 

Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine #1. 

Good cause appearing therefore, the Court GRANTS Defendants request and ORDERS that 

Exhibits C and D to the Lucas Declaration in Support of Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion 

in Limine #1 may be filed under seal. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: ______________________________ 

 MAXINE M. CHESNEY 

 United States District Judge 

; DIRECTIONS TO

DEFENDANTS

Defendants are hereby DIRECTED to electronically file under seal, no later than June 7, 2010,

Exhibits C and D to the Lucas Declaration. See General Order No. 62 (“If a motion to file under seal is

granted in part or full, the requesting party will e-file the document under seal according to the procedures

outlined in the FAQs on the ECF website.”).

June 4, 2010

Case 3:08-cv-05048-MMC Document 120 Filed 06/04/10 Page 1 of 1
#### Irene H. Farrell, Appellant, v Thomas F. Farrell, Respondent.

In a matrimonial action in which plaintiff had previously been awarded a judgment of divorce, she appeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of (1) an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County, dated October 12, 1976, as denied the branch of her motion which sought a prehearing examination of defendant-respondent, her former husband, and certain other named individuals, concerning his financial circumstances and (2) a further order of the same court, dated November 24, 1976 (amending an order of the same court dated November 15, 1976) as, upon reargument, adhered to the original determination. Appeal from the order dated October 12, 1976 dismissed as academic, without costs or disbursements. That order was superseded by the order made upon reargument. Order dated November 24, 1976 modified by striking therefrom the word "denied” and by substituting therefor provisions that, upon reargument, the said branch of the motion is granted only to the extent of permitting a prehearing examination of the defendant as to his income and financial circumstances, and requiring him to produce all books, records and documents relevant thereto, and that the motion is otherwise denied. As so modified, order affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements. The prehearing examination of the defendant shall proceed at a time and place to be fixed in a written notice of not less than 10 days to be given by the plaintiff, or at such other time and place as the parties may agree. The time within which plaintiff may serve such notice is extended until 30 days after entry of the order to be made hereon. The plaintiff is entitled to a prehearing examination of the defendant concerning his present income and financial circumstances (see Domestic Relations Law, § 250; *Grant v Grant,*84 Misc 2d 577). However, she is not entitled to examine the other individuals named in her order to show cause dated September 2, 1976. Cohalan, J. P., Damiani, Rabin and Titone, JJ., concur.
Court of Appeals

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA,____________________

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:

A24D0122. IN THE INTEREST OF E. M. F. et al., CHILDREN

(GRANDMOTHER).

This appeal arises from the dependency action regarding minor child E. M. F.

and her younger siblings. On July 25, 2023, the juvenile court entered an order that

terminated the parental rights of E. M. F’s step-father to the younger children.

1

In the

same order, the juvenile court found that the maternal grandmother of all of the

children, Dawn Cooley, who sought to intervene in the dependency action, was not

an appropriate placement and denied her request for custody and visitation. Instead,

the juvenile court continued placement of the children with the Department of Family

and Children Services (“DFCS”) to facilitate their adoptions. Cooley filed an

application for discretionary appeal in the Supreme Court of Georgia, which

transferred the case to this Court. See Cases No. S24D0113 (Oct. 5, 2023); S24T0052

(Aug. 22, 2023) (granting Cooley an extension of time to file her application).

Appeals from orders terminating parental rights must normally proceed by

discretionary application. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (12). But Cooley does not

challenge the termination of the father’s rights. Rather, she challenges the denial of

her request for custody and visitation and the award of custody to DFCS. “An order

within a [dependency] proceeding deciding temporary custody of the child is a ‘final

order,’ within the meaning of OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (1), from which a direct appeal

lies.” In the Interest of A. T., 309 Ga. App. 822, 824 (711 SE2d 382) (2011) (citation

1 The mother’s parental rights to all of the children were terminated in May

2023, and she is not a party to this appeal. 

November 07, 2023
and punctuation omitted); Vines v. Vines, 292 Ga. 550, 551 (2) (739 SE2d 374)

(2013) (visitation rights are a part of custody). See also Voyles v. Voyles, 301 Ga. 44,

47 (799 SE2d 160) (2017) (“the proper appellate procedure to employ depends upon

the issue involved in the appeal”). Accordingly, the order Cooley seeks to appeal is

directly appealable.

ThisCourt will grant an otherwise timely discretionary application if the lower

court’s order is subject to direct appeal. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (j). Accordingly, this

application is hereby GRANTED. Cooley shall have ten days from the date of this

order to file a notice of appeal with the trial court. The clerk of the trial court is

DIRECTED to include a copy of this order in the record transmitted to the Court of

Appeals.

Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk’s Office, Atlanta,____________________

I certify that the above is a true extract from

the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court

hereto affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

11/07/2023
### §5512. Small business concerns' opportunities to participate in programs

In carrying out their functions under this subchapter, all Federal officers and agencies shall take steps to assure that small business concerns will have realistic and adequate opportunities to participate in the programs under this subchapter to the maximum extent possible.

(Pub. L. 93–409, §14, Sept. 3, 1974, 88 Stat. 1077.)
### §5653. Transferred

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Codification

Section 5653 was editorially reclassified as section 11143 of Title 34, Crime Control and Law Enforcement.

#### Prior Provisions

A prior section 5653, Pub. L. 93–415, title II, §243, Sept. 7, 1974, 88 Stat. 1126; Pub. L. 95–115, §§3(a)(3)(B), 5(b), Oct. 3, 1977, 91 Stat. 1048, 1057; Pub. L. 98–473, title II, §632, Oct. 12, 1984, 98 Stat. 2118; Pub. L. 100–690, title VII, §7261, Nov. 18, 1988, 102 Stat. 4442; Pub. L. 102–586, §2(g)(3), Nov. 4, 1992, 106 Stat. 4995, related to research, demonstration, and evaluation, prior to repeal by Pub. L. 107–273, div. C, title II, §12210(1), Nov. 2, 2002, 116 Stat. 1880.
-81 -80 -79 -78 -77 -76 -75

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NOAA HYSPLIT MODEL

 Backward trajectory ending at 2300 UTC 09 Jul 07

 EDAS Meteorological Data

Source

★ at 38.92 N 77.01 W Meters AGL
### §4101d. Flood insurance rate map certification

The Administrator shall implement a flood mapping program for the National Flood Insurance Program, only after review by the Technical Mapping Advisory Council, that, when applied, results in technically credible flood hazard data in all areas where Flood Insurance Rate Maps are prepared or updated, shall certify in writing to the Congress when such a program has been implemented, and shall provide to the Congress the Technical Mapping Advisory Council review report.

(Pub. L. 113–89, §17, Mar. 21, 2014, 128 Stat. 1027.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Codification

Section was enacted as part of the Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014, and not as part of the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 which comprises this chapter.

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Definitions

For definitions of terms used in this section, see section 4005 of this title.
### §3192. Economic development information clearinghouse

In carrying out this chapter, the Secretary shall—

(1) maintain a central information clearinghouse on the Internet with—

(A) information on economic development, economic adjustment, disaster recovery, defense conversion, and trade adjustment programs and activities of the Federal Government;

(B) links to State economic development organizations; and

(C) links to other appropriate economic development resources;

(2) assist potential and actual applicants for economic development, economic adjustment, disaster recovery, defense conversion, and trade adjustment assistance under Federal and State laws in locating and applying for the assistance;

(3) assist areas described in section 3161(a) of this title and other areas by providing to interested persons, communities, industries, and businesses in the areas any technical information, market research, or other forms of assistance, information, or advice that would be useful in alleviating or preventing conditions of excessive unemployment or underemployment in the areas; and

(4) obtain appropriate information from other Federal agencies needed to carry out the duties under this chapter.

(Pub. L. 89–136, title V, §502, as added Pub. L. 105–393, title I, §102(a), Nov. 13, 1998, 112 Stat. 3610; amended Pub. L. 108–373, title V, §501, Oct. 27, 2004, 118 Stat. 1768.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Prior Provisions

A prior section 3192, Pub. L. 89–136, title V, §513, as added Pub. L. 91–123, title II, §206, Nov. 25, 1969, 83 Stat. 219; amended Pub. L. 94–188, title II, §203, Dec. 31, 1975, 89 Stat. 1087, related to regional transportation systems, prior to repeal by Pub. L. 97–35, title XVIII, §1821(a)(8), Aug. 13, 1981, 95 Stat. 766, effective Sept. 30, 1981.

A prior section 502 of Pub. L. 89–136 was classified to section 3182 of this title prior to repeal by Pub. L. 97–35, §1821(a)(8).

#### Amendments

2004—Par. (1). Pub. L. 108–373, §501(1), added par. (1) and struck out former par. (1) which read as follows: "maintain a central information clearinghouse on matters relating to economic development, economic adjustment, disaster recovery, defense conversion, and trade adjustment programs and activities of the Federal and State governments, including political subdivisions of States;".

Par. (2). Pub. L. 108–373, §501(2), added par. (2) and struck out former par. (2) which read as follows: "assist potential and actual applicants for economic development, economic adjustment, disaster recovery, defense conversion, and trade adjustment assistance under Federal, State, and local laws in locating and applying for the assistance; and".

Par. (4). Pub. L. 108–373, §501(3), (4), added par. (4).

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Effective Date

Section effective Feb. 11, 1999, see section 105 of Pub. L. 105–393, set out as a note under section 3121 of this title.
### §4994. Repealed. Pub. L. 103–82, title III, §333(1), Sept. 21, 1993, 107 Stat. 903

Section, Pub. L. 93–113, title I, §124, as added Pub. L. 99–570, title IV, §4301(1), Oct. 27, 1986, 100 Stat. 3207–152; amended Pub. L. 100–690, title III, §3401(a)(1), Nov. 18, 1988, 102 Stat. 4252; Pub. L. 101–204, title III, §302, title VI, §603, Dec. 7, 1989, 103 Stat. 1813, 1820, related to drug abuse education and prevention services and activities.

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Effective Date of Repeal

Repeal effective Oct. 1, 1993, see section 392 of Pub. L. 103–82, set out as an Effective Date of 1993 Amendment note under section 4951 of this title.
#### Amjet Industries, Inc., Appellant, v Jeff Shor, Respondent, et al., Defendant.

Order, Supreme Court, New York County, entered on October 26, 1976, unanimously affirmed for the reasons stated by Ascione, J. Respondent shall recover of appellant $40 costs and disbursements of this appeal. Concur—Murphy, P. J., Lupiano, Silverman, Lane and Lynch, JJ.
#### In the Matter of the Claim of Adrilla Eddings, Appellant, v Big Jim Service Center, Inc., et al., Respondents. Workmen’s Compensation Board, Respondent.

Appeal from a decision of the Workmen’s Compensation Board, filed April 28, 1976, which denied her application to reopen her claim. While working as a service station attendent on August 4, 1973, the deceased employee herein, who was the son of the claimant, was shot to death in an apparent robbery on his employer’s premises. Subsequently, accident, notice and causal relation were established, but, in a decision filed January 22, 1976, the board denied the claimant an award of death benefits upon finding that she was not a legal dependent of the deceased at the time of his death. Shortly thereafter, the claimant made application to reopen her case on the basis of newly discovered evidence, and the board also denied this application in the decision which is challenged on this appeal. We hold that the board’s decision should be affirmed. Absent its being arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion, a determination by the board not to reopen a case will not be disturbed *(Matter of Bello v Ladman,*43 AD2d 869, affd 36 NY2d 741; *Matter of Dudley v Brown, Harris & Stevens,*35 AD2d 1040). Here, claimant seeks to have her case reopened on the basis of newly discovered evidence, and yet it is undisputed that the alleged new evidence was discovered by her attorney almost two months before the board’s decision denying her death benefits. Nonetheless, no attempt was made to apprise the board of this evidence prior to the issuance of its decision on January 22, 1976, and the failure of the claimant or her attorney to so act in this regard justified the board’s later refusal to reopen the case. Decision affirmed, without costs. Sweeney, J.P, Staley, Jr, Main and Larkin, JJ, concur; Mikoll, J, dissents and votes to reverse in the following memorandum. Mikoll, J. (dissenting). I respectfully dissent. The new evidence was discovered in this case by claimant’s attorney after the case had been heard by the board. In view of the fact that the request to reopen was promptly made and involved a witness who is impartial and *1120whose identity and existence were unknown at the time of the hearing, a denial to reopen is arbitrary and capricious. The matter should be remitted for further hearings and findings.
#### § 530.102 Application.

This part applies to all programs or activities conducted by the Board.
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#### William E. Reardon, Appellant, v. W. Linwood Heaver, Respondent.

— Order so far as appealed from unanimously affirmed, with $20 costs and disbursements to the respondent. No opinion. Concur — Breitel, J. P., Rabin, Yalente and Bergan, JJ.