Yll Bajraktari and Emily Hsu

Developing Media 

in Stabilization and 

Reconstruction Operations

Summary and Recommendations

•	 In war-torn societies, the development of independent, pluralistic, and sustainable

media is critical to fostering long-term peace and stability. Post-conflict civilian populations are particularly vulnerable to manipulation by mass media as tensions run high and

the possibility of violent relapse remains strong. Many civilians harbor deep skepticism

and mistrust of the media, being accustomed to platforms that are controlled either by

the state or by political groups looking to further their political agendas.

•	 An effective media strategy can mitigate postwar tensions by elevating moderate voices

and dampening extremist ones. It can create peaceful channels through which differences can be resolved without resort to violence. The creation of a robust media culture

will also allow citizens to begin holding their government accountable for its actions

and ensuring its commitment to democracy.

•	 Efforts to develop local media institutions should be undertaken separately from attempts

to develop strategic communications. In an increasing number of non-permissive environments (i.e., environments where security is not fully established), the distinction

between these two endeavors is blurred because of a mistaken assumption among some

players that both activities share the same purpose and goal.

•	 A poorly developed media strategy can be detrimental in a war-ravaged country still rife

with violence. A hastily conceived plan may reinforce divisions between warring parties

or create a weak media sector that is vulnerable to exploitation by warlords, political

patrons, and spoilers. Media development efforts also fail when the public does not trust

them to establish a credible source of information.

Stabilization and Reconstruction Series No. 7 

October 2007

About the Report

This report is part of a series produced by the United

States Institute of Peace’s Filling the Gaps program,

which aims to systematically address the causes

of failure in specific areas in reconstruction and

stabilization operations and to generate policy options

for those in the U.S. government and elsewhere who

lead and staff these missions. Filling the Gaps is

directed by Daniel Serwer and managed by Beth Cole

of the Institute.

	 Yll Bajraktari is a former program specialist

at the United States Institute of Peace’s Center of

Innovation on Media and Conflict; he is now at the

Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University.

Emily Hsu is a program specialist at the Institute’s

Center on Post-Conflict Peace and Stability Operations.

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect 

those of the United States Institute of Peace, which does not 

advocate specific policy positions.

Contents

Introduction2

Predeployment Phase: Mapping and Strategizing 3

Deployment Phase: Building and Developing 8

Exit Phase: Transitioning and Sustaining 14

Conclusion 15

Matrix of Recommendations 17

Stabilization and

U n i t e d S t a t e s I n s t i t u t e o f P e a c e

Reconstruction series

 1200 17th Street NW • Washington, DC 20036 • 202.457.1700 • fax 202.429.6063 • www.usip.org


•	 Ideally, given the media’s capacity to shape war-torn countries, interveners should

apply a coherent strategy in the pursuit of media development. Unfortunately, no

such strategy yet exists and thus interveners have little guidance as to what tools

and methods work best in the development of media institutions. In fact, media

development is still conducted on an ad hoc basis from conflict to conflict.

•	 This report seeks to fill this strategic gap. More particularly, it recommends that

interveners take the following series of steps as they generate a strategy for media

development in post-conflict zones.

Predeployment Phase: Mapping and Strategizing

•	 Map out the existing media landscape

o	 Identify the postwar condition of the media infrastructure, media personnel, and

other resources that have survived the conflict

o	 Assess the history of state-media relations

o	 Analyze the potential market for sustainable media

•	 Create a strategy for developing media

o	 Coordinate all relevant players in media development

o	 Identify spoilers and create a plan to isolate extremist voices while elevating

moderate ones

o	 Plan to establish a responsible media sector before the first postwar elections are

held

Deployment Phase: Building and Developing

•	 Build a foundation for the media sector

o	 Establish a mission-owned outlet to monitor and counter hate speech while promoting peace operations

o	 Create a representative media commission to establish media standards

o	 Create legal underpinnings for media during the transition or help the government

to do so

•	 Create media outlets and develop personnel

o	 Encourage creation of a diverse array of media outlets and ensure media accessibility by different segments of the population

o	 Establish effective on-the-job training programs and mechanisms for evaluating

trainees and university-based training programs

o	 Create local associations of journalists, publishers, and editors to strengthen

leadership and connect local media actors to international media networks

Exit Phase: Transitioning and Sustaining

•	 Transition to local control and ensure long-term sustainability

o	 Gradually give full control to local media leaders

o	 Ensure a robust media market in which private outlets are self-sustaining

o	 Create an indigenous mechanism to continue monitoring hate speech

Introduction

As history has demonstrated repeatedly, mass media can be a powerful tool in fanning the

flames of conflict and inciting bloodshed. In Nazi Germany, to cite a particularly notoriAbout the Institute

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, non-partisan institution established and funded

by Congress. Its goals are to help prevent and resolve

violent conflicts, promote post-conflict peacebuilding,

and increase conflict-management tools, capacity,

and intellectual capital worldwide. The Institute does

this by empowering others with knowledge, skills,

and resources, as well as by its direct involvement in

conflict zones around the globe.

Board of Directors

J. Robinson West (Chair), Chairman, PFC Energy,

Washington, D.C. • María Otero (Vice Chairman),

President, ACCION International, Boston, Mass.

• Holly J. Burkhalter, Vice President, Government

Affairs, International Justice Mission, Washington, D.C.

• Anne H. Cahn, Former Scholar in Residence, American University, Washington, D.C. • Chester A. Crocker,

James R. Schlesinger Professor of Strategic Studies,

School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University,

Washington, D.C. • Laurie S. Fulton, Partner, Williams

and Connolly, Washington, D.C. • Charles Horner,

Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute, Washington, D.C.

• Kathleen Martinez, Executive Director, World

Institute on Disability • George E. Moose, Adjunct

Professor of Practice, The George Washington University, Washington, D.C. • Jeremy A. Rabkin, Professor

of Law, George Mason University, Fairfax, Va. • Ron 

Silver, Actor, Producer, Director, Primparous Productions, Inc. • Judy Van Rest, Executive Vice President,

International Republican Institute, Washington, D.C.

Members ex officio

Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of State • Robert M. 

Gates, Secretary of Defense • Richard H. Solomon,

President, United States Institute of Peace (nonvoting)

• Frances C. Wilson, Lieutenant General, U.S. Marine

Corps; President, National Defense University.


ous example, mass media was used to stoke the anti-Semitism that led eventually to the

Holocaust. In 1994, to take a more recent example, Rwandan Hutus used hate radio to

mobilize a genocidal campaign that took the lives of eight hundred thousand Tutsis in

just four weeks.1

But while the media’s power to provoke violence is well known, less appreciated is its

ability to foster peace and stability—something it can do in various ways:

•	 A pluralistic media sector puts an end to the dominance of a narrow range of extremist views by giving citizens the opportunity to access a diverse array of voices with

competing perspectives.

•	 A transparent media can become a credible source of information and a peaceful

channel for public dialogue.

•	 An independent media culture that serves the public interest helps keep the government accountable to the people and enables citizens to monitor the state’s commitment to reform and democratization.

The positive contribution that the media can make has given media development a

central role in stabilizing societies emerging from conflict. Even so, there is still no triedand-tested strategy to which interveners can turn when seeking to develop media in

postwar zones. This strategic gap is reflected in the challenges that plague practitioners in

almost every mission. Some of the same issues that confronted post–World War II reconstruction efforts in Germany and Japan, for example, surfaced again in the Balkans in the

1990s and more recently in Iraq and Afghanistan. Recurring challenges include reconciling

the tension between, on the one hand, winning “hearts and minds” and, on the other,

promoting independent journalism; determining the breadth of media regulation; dealing

with hate speech and inflammatory journalism; coordinating the activities of external and

internal players; and ensuring the viability of media after interveners depart.

To address this critical gap, this report identifies important tasks that interveners

should consider in fashioning a strategy for independent, pluralistic, and sustainable

media. Drawing on best practices from past and present postwar media development

efforts, the report presents a strategy that encompasses the three phases of an intervention: predeployment, deployment, and exit.

Predeployment Phase: Mapping and Strategizing

Mapping the Media Landscape

Lesson: Identify media outlets and personnel that have survived the conflict and 

could potentially support media reforms and the development of society as a 

whole.

The nature and extent of postwar media resources can vary widely. Practitioners should

begin by creating a thorough map of the country’s existing media landscape, including

an assessment of the postwar status of the media infrastructure, media personnel, and

the intended media market. Identifying available resources will help shape the course of

the media strategy.

In some cases, practitioners find that many media resources have survived the war:

broadcasting capacity (antennas, for instance), printing presses, and transmission systems

may still be intact and a significant number of journalists may still be at work. After the

fighting ended in Bosnia, for example, many radio stations and broadcast centers continued to function, albeit under the control of the leaders of political factions. Iraq’s former

Ministry of Information retained a reservoir of journalistic talent after the Ba’thist regime

fell and many of these journalists were eager to create an independent, grassroots media

network after their experience under authoritarian rule.

Practitioners should begin by 

creating a thorough map of 

the country’s existing media 

landscape.


Many war-torn countries, however, are left with few or no viable resources with which

to launch a media sector. Such was the case in Afghanistan, where the Taliban abolished

virtually all forms of media in the late 1990s. In Kosovo, all terrestrial broadcast cables

were destroyed during the war and had to be replaced. Indonesians ransacked media

outlets during their withdrawal from East Timor, leaving little behind with which to build

a new media sector.

In Liberia, the Partnership for Media and Conflict Prevention in West Africa, formed at

a conference held at the Media Foundation for West Africa (MFWA) in July 2003, sought

to provide support to media affected by conflict. An assessment mission to Liberia in late

2003, undertaken in cooperation with United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and the

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), included experts from

the UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the Panos Institute

West Africa, Media Rights Agenda, MFWA, International Media Support, the International

Federation of Journalists, International Freedom of Expression eXchange, and Article 19.

This mission produced a detailed plan for media intervention that addressed the reform

of media policy, the capacity of the media for the elections, public service broadcasting,

assistance to regional broadcast media, and support for print media. It also proposed an

institutional framework for media and the establishment of the Liberia Media Center.2 (At

the request of UNESCO, the mission also contributed to the needs assessment that was

prepared jointly by the UN Development Program and the World Bank and that became

part of “Results-Focused Transition Framework	“ the baseline document for international

donor assistance in Liberia.)

Each situation and society poses its own challenges. For instance, building a media

sector from scratch calls for significant financial investment in facilities and training, but

it also enables implementers to avoid the difficulties of managing existing outlets and

of dealing with journalists who have grown accustomed to a status quo and who resist

reforms.

Lesson: Assess the history of the media’s relationship with the government and with 

society prior to and during the conflict.

Understanding the media’s traditional role in a society is imperative for determining how

best to cultivate a sustainable new media culture, one that facilitates a sense of independence and ownership by the people. A centrally controlled public broadcasting model,

for example, may not be the best option for a society emerging from totalitarian rule and

seeking pluralism and independence.

Like the postwar condition of media resources, the relationship that exists between

media and the government or society will vary from conflict to conflict. In many war-torn

countries, the media will have been heavily state controlled and allowed little, if any,

independence. In Liberia, Charles Taylor monopolized the country’s media institutions

during the civil war (1989–96), shutting down a slew of independent radio stations that

sought to offer an alternative voice to that of the government. These stations included

Radio Monrovia, which broadcast news on the International Red Cross; Star Radio, a

humanitarian radio station funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development; and

Radio Veritas, which was run by the Catholic Church.3

In Bosnia and Rwanda, the dominant media resources resided not only with the state

but also with nationalist or ethnic parties seeking to incite violence against opposing

parties and to further their political agendas. In response to the April 1994 assassination

of President Habyarimana of Rwanda, Hutu extremists launched a radio station whose

broadcasts would incite the Hutu population to wage a genocidal campaign against the

Tutsis and enable genocidaires to coordinate their operations. Radio-Television Libre des

Mille Collines (RTLM, or Free Radio-Television of the Thousand Hills) was initially ignored

by the international community, which considered the propaganda to be so outrageous

that it would not be taken seriously.4

Like the postwar condition of 

media resources, the relationship 

that exists between media and the 

government or society will vary 

from conflict to conflict.


Lesson: Assess the viability of a self-sustaining media market and identify available 

resources for creating a steady stream of revenue for a private market.

As past media development endeavors have revealed, media must be understood not only

as a producer of news but also as a complex interaction of economic, social, and political

forces. The economic aspect is often overlooked in media development, even though it is

central to creating a self-sustaining, market-driven media sector.

To factor in economic forces, interveners should conduct an economic business analysis

to identify available funding, advertising potential, and other sources of revenue that can

sustain a private media market. Measuring the size of the market will help planners determine how many radio or television stations can be supported. Although media institutions

often enjoy a flood of capital at the outset of reconstruction and stabilization missions,

their longevity depends on the cultivation of a robust market able to generate a steady

stream of advertising revenue. Without such revenue, any advances made in an immature

media sector will likely falter when grants expire and international support wanes.

The situation in Bosnia reflects the importance of factoring economic forces into the

media strategy. The radio and television sectors today are oversized for the market, forcing

channels to compete fiercely with one another for advertisement revenue while weakening

the impact of international investments. In 2000, the Independent Media Commission

reported that there were more than two hundred registered radio stations and seventy-one

television stations—forty-two in the Federation and twenty-nine in Republika Srpska. An

IREX ProMedia study of the advertising market in the country suggests that it generates

only enough revenue to support a handful of stations. Oversaturation of the market also

makes it difficult for listeners to focus on a single station and forces financial investments

to be spread thinly across many outlets.5

Creating the Media Strategy

Lesson: Create a plan for coordinating all the relevant players in media development.

The coordination of international donors, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and

other common players in media development is critical to the long-term success of the

media sector. In some cases, media development sponsorships come from a range of

diverse organizations, which makes a focused effort more challenging. Bosnian media

development, for example, enjoyed support from several international organizations such

as the Council of Europe, the Southeast European Stability Pact, as well as NGOs such

as IREX ProMedia, Internews, Media Plan Institute, Media Center Sarajevo, and the Open

Society Foundation.

Better communication and planning among all the actors involved helps to avoid

duplicative efforts and cement alliances. Creating joint working groups or task forces that

meet regularly to discuss media development activities can be very effective. The Serbian

experience is a model to learn from; it enabled the international community to collectively challenge Slobodan Milosevic’s clampdown on media freedoms. In Serbia, periodic

meetings were held among international media practitioners to share best practices, form

coalitions, and address other challenges. The meetings were held regularly, even though

the political situation was in constant flux.

By contrast, in Iraq the task of media development was given to the U.S. Department

of Defense (DOD), whose major contractors had little or no relevant experience. Science

Applications International Corp. (SAIC), a longtime DOD contractor, was awarded an initial

contract of $15 million to undertake something it had never done before—transform an

entire state-run media system into an independent, BBC-style national news service. The

research and engineering firm received the grant just eight days before the initial U.S.

offensive took place in Iraq. Moreover, supervising SAIC was a DOD office specializing

in psychological warfare operations, which many believe contributed to the perception

among Iraqis that the Iraq Media Network (IMN) was merely a mouthpiece for the Coalition Provisional Authority. Before another company won the contract through a competi-

(continued)

To factor in economic forces, 

interveners should conduct an 

economic business analysis 

to identify available funding, 

advertising potential, and 

other sources of revenue that 

can sustain a private media 

market.

Better communication and 

planning among all the actors 

involved helps to avoid duplicative efforts and cement alliances.


tive bidding process in January 2004, SAIC’s performance in Iraq was considered costly,

unprofessional, and a failure in terms of establishing the objectivity and independence

of the IMN.

Coordination of strategies and the management of competing interests among international players are also critical to successful media development. A difference in approach

between European and U.S. media developers created friction and delayed the progress

of developing the media sectors in Kosovo and Bosnia. The Europeans favored a public

service broadcast approach, looking to pool media efforts with the Organization for

Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Their focus was on monitoring media outlets

and tracking their outputs in order to maintain a fragile peace. The Americans, however,

insisted on supporting private broadcasters to pave the way for a market-driven media.

The U.S. approach emphasized minimal state regulation, allowing for the development of

a strong media foundation for private, independent media outlets.6

Similarly, in Cambodia, a lack of consensus among international funding agencies

and NGOs was problematic. The UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) was

established in 1991, when NGO activity was exploding across the international arena.

A lack of coordination and vetting of strategies resulted in a series of ad hoc journalist

training programs that did little to jumpstart a vibrant media culture in the country. The

fragmented effort left behind a media system that was fragile, vulnerable to exploitation,

and economically unsustainable.

Lesson: Identify potential spoilers, and their associated infrastructure, who may 

seek to dominate media channels or continue to broadcast or print hate speech. 

Identify and elevate repatriates or local leaders with the potential to lead independent media development.

The media strategy should include a plan for marginalizing extremist voices that seek to

discredit the international mission and/or promote their violent political goals. During

its mission in Cambodia, UNTAC was continually accused by opposition groups of being a

puppet of the Vietnamese government. Opponents of the peace attacked the transitional

authority, warning the Cambodian people that UNTAC was a threat to the country.

This lesson is also clear in the case of Bosnia, where nationalist factions retained control over media resources after the war and used them to pursue divisive objectives. Each

of the three main territories—Republika Srpska, the Bosniak-controlled part of the Federation, and the Croat-controlled part of the Federation—held fast to their party-controlled

media, scrambling to repair damaged transmitters and extend their frequencies as widely

as possible. To diversify each region’s access to information and minimize the impact

of each party’s nationalistic messages, the OSCE (tasked by the 1995 Dayton Accords

to organize elections) tried to establish a set of media regulations. These regulations

required media outlets to meet an airtime quota for opposition political parties, report

information accurately and truthfully, and avoid airing provocative programs. Although

they complied to a limited degree, the media outlets in all three territories continued to

resist pressures.

In a more specific case, irresponsible use of the media has prolonged ethnic divisions and hindered prospects for reconciliation. In Kosovo, the Albanian newspaper Dita

accused a local UN worker of having been a Serb paramilitary and published his home

address. Within two weeks, the named individual was kidnapped and stabbed to death

by vigilantes. Under orders from the Kosovo UN administrator, the police and NATO forces

shut down the newspaper for eight days on charges that it was encouraging vigilante

violence.

One approach that has been effective in mitigating extremist voices involves media

policies that level the playing field and boost moderate voices during electoral campaigns.

A successful program in Afghanistan sought to provide equal airtime opportunities for

emergent leaders during the 2005 Wolesi Jirga and Provincial Council elections. The

Coordination of strategies and 

the management of competing 

interests among international 

players are also critical to successful media development.


Afghan Media Commission implemented the Sponsored Advertisement Program (SAP),

which allotted equal advertising spaces for parliamentary candidates. Reflecting the

program’s success, no political advertisements other than those provided for under SAP

were broadcast on televisions or radios once SAP was in place. In a post-election assessment, candidates said they found the system to be very useful, particularly women, who

were otherwise excluded from campaigning in mosques and schools. Seventy-six percent

of female candidates used the system, as opposed to fifty-six percent of their male counterparts. SAP was the largest program of its kind in any international mission.

In addition to marginalizing extremism, interveners should also identify repatriates or

local leaders with the experience and credibility to lead independent media development.

Selecting capable individuals for this role can be a sensitive and difficult process. Practitioners should look for leaders who are able to fight corruption and can resist manipulation, uphold professional standards, and prioritize the public interest. These individuals

should be well respected within their communities.

Lesson: Plan for an accountable media sector to begin operating before the first 

postwar elections are held.

Setting an appropriate timeline for media development is crucial in the context of other

stabilization and reconstruction activities that may be running in tandem. In particular,

having a responsible and accountable media sector in place is instrumental in conducting

free and fair elections. Media should provide balanced coverage of candidates and their

platforms, publicizing information on election processes that may be unfamiliar to certain

populations and exposing society to the fundamental concepts of free media.

A positive example of the media’s influence in elections involves the work of the U.S.

Agency International Development’s Office of Transitions Initiative (OTI) in Bosnia. In the

first postwar Bosnian election, in 1996, U.S.-backed candidate Biljana Plavsic ran against

Radovan Karadic, a nationalist candidate who has since been accused of genocide. At the

time, Karadic’s stronghold, Republika Srpska, allowed very few independent media outlets

to operate within its territory. Between February 1996 and November 1998, however,

OTI awarded $6.3 million in grants to various independent media outlets throughout

the country, including Republika Srpska, which increased the amount of available public

information about the contest between Plavsic and Karadic. Through the expanded work

of these new independent journalists, Plavsic was able to consolidate her power and win

a stronger constituency.7

In Cambodia, UNTAC, recognizing that building a free press would take years and

that free elections would be impossible without a free press, established Radio UNTAC,

the first broadcast station run by a UN peacekeeping mission. Radio UNTAC was credited

with bringing credible news and information to the public and with helping to produce a

turnout of 95 percent of voters in the 1993 elections in spite of an aggressive campaign

by the Khmer Rouge to dissuade the public from going to the polls.8 This achievement

underscores the need for a widely accessible and credible news outlet as a critical component in a transitional environment. Although Radio UNTAC stands out as the best practice

of facilitating an open and trusted information environment conducive to elections, a free

and independent press with legal protections has still not been established in Cambodia

due to government crackdowns on the media.

In the 2005 Afghan parliamentary elections, media coverage of the campaign was beneficial to the Afghan people, the electoral candidates, and the media entities themselves.

For the public, media coverage of the elections provided critical information about candidates’ platforms, voting locations, and the electoral process, which was new to the Afghan

people. For the candidates, the experience of using the media to campaign exposed them

to liberal concepts of free media and objective reporting. For the media sector, election

coverage became a capacity-building experience. Through SAP, Afghan television and

radio stations learned how to run a large advertising program efficiently and to create

 (continued)

In particular, having a responsible and accountable media 

sector in place is instrumental 

in conducting free and fair 

elections.


political advertisements in concise, two- to five-minute packages. Outlets also learned to

adhere to professional standards and to apply media laws designed to encourage evenhanded coverage of candidates regardless of their gender and party affiliations.

By contrast, in Kosovo, the U.S.-supported media initiative was not launched long

enough before the first postwar Kosovar election, held in October 2000, to have much

impact on those elections. U.S.-supported private media entities did not go on the air

until September 2000, seventeen months after the Serbian withdrawal, a delay that media

observers consider one of the biggest mistakes made during the pre-election period. As a

result, there was insufficient time to train journalists before they had to cover the politically sensitive elections.

In addition to ensuring the presence of a media sector during elections, practitioners

should seek to maximize diversity and pluralism. In Bosnia, before the first postwar

elections were held, many media outlets existed but they were deeply veined by ethnic

fault lines, which resulted in stations promoting sectarian candidates. The UN Office of

the High Representative (OHR) realized that without an effort to diversify the media and

create a stronger multiethnic voice, the elections would merely empower the nationalist

leaders who had begun the war in the first place. The OHR established the Independent

Media Commission (IMC) in Bosnia, which aimed to monitor hate speech and promote a

tolerant and democratic society through independent media. The IMC also adopted political campaign coverage guidelines intended to ensure fair coverage of and equitable access

to all political parties.

Deployment Phase: Building and Developing

Building a Foundation for the Media Sector

Lesson: Create a mission-owned outlet to deliver critical information about peace 

operations while monitoring and countering hate speech. Also consider ways to 

provide alternative programming.

Developing a mature media sector can take years, if not decades. One of the most immediate media tasks in a post-conflict environment is to create an outlet or outlets with the

capacity to monitor and counter hate speech while promoting a durable peace.

Virtually every UN mission since UNTAC has created its own radio outlet to serve a

range of functions critical to maintaining peace. Cambodia’s Radio UNTAC was a positive

model for mission-owned radio stations. Radio UNTAC was the most popular radio station

in the country during the UN mission, delivering information on humanitarian assistance

initiatives, disarmament sites, electoral processes, and other mission activities.9 Radio

UNTAC also countered hate messages that sought to undermine the mission objectives,

including rumors that UN personnel posed a threat to civilians and that voting devices

had been tampered with.

The station denounced electoral violence and reassured voters that steps were being

taken to ensure their safety and that their votes would be cast secretly. It also provided

free and equal opportunities for political parties to air their messages and made a strong

effort to inform all voters, many of whom were illiterate and had limited access to television, about all the candidates and their platforms.

Aside from their informational activities, mission-owned radios have also set positive

examples for local media outlets. Within three weeks of its deployment, the UN Transitional Authority in Eastern Slovakia (UNTAES) had set up Radio UNTAES in partnership

with local broadcaster Radio Vukovar. Over time, Radio UNTAES, which was committed

to unbiased reporting of UN efforts, became widely credited with “mellowing” Radio

Vukovar’s programming. Like Radio UNTAC, Radio UNTAES provided election coverage,

One of the most immediate 

media tasks in a post-conflict 

environment is to create an outlet or outlets with the capacity 

to monitor and counter hate 

speech while promoting a 

durable peace.


including news of election developments and practical advice on voting procedures. It also

offered nonsensational coverage of the exhumations of mass graves.

But, like any regulatory entity, mission-owned radios can present challenges. Creating

a media entity that is controlled by an intergovernmental organization (IGO) and that

dominates the local airwaves can conflict with efforts to create the perception of the

establishment of an independent, transparent media, even if the IGO’s control is meant

to be temporary. It can also weaken the indigenous capacity for media development and

alienate the local population from a process that will be vital for the country’s democratic progress. Furthermore, once the mission is complete, many international journalists

return to their home countries, leaving few local practitioners with the skills to continue

operations.

Lesson: Create a representative media commission to regulate media entities and 

establish norms that are consistent with international standards.

A healthy media sector requires a credible state media commission to establish standards,

monitor media abuses, and address complaints. The inability to reign in irresponsible

media can be detrimental in war-torn societies where ethnic tensions are still strong

and violent relapse remains a possibility. To be effective, however, these regulatory entities must be fair and transparent, with clearly defined powers to avoid opportunities for

abuse of authority. The task of creating a media commission is a delicate one, because

indigenous populations may be wary of giving the state such authority, especially if the

pre-conflict regime was a dictatorship.

The precise role of a media commission will vary according to the maturity of a

country’s media sector. Afghanistan’s first media commission, established in 2005,

focused on educational initiatives to introduce liberal media concepts to Afghans and

educate people on the role of media in politics and society. Although the commission

was limited in scope—its mandate was to monitor media coverage of the 2005 elections

and handle any violations of media laws—it was able to achieve noteworthy success by

establishing media standards throughout the Afghan provinces. Based in Kabul, the commission—which was composed of three national commissioners and two international

commissioners—worked closely with the Joint Electoral Management Body to deliver critical information to the public while establishing a monitoring unit to track media coverage

and ensure compliance with a code of conduct for the mass media.10

To implement the monitoring mandate, the commission contracted with Inkeshaf Consulting, an Afghani consulting firm that specializes in media monitoring. The firm trained

sixty-eight monitors to track the output from nearly sixty media outlets nationwide. Working from offices located across seventeen provinces, the monitors included representatives

from the Pashtun, Tajik, and Hazara ethnic groups, as well as twelve women. Monitors

were trained in methodology, data entry, and other relevant tasks.11

By contrast, the media commissions in Bosnia and Kosovo assumed a broader role over

their media sectors, with greater authority to clamp down on nationalistic propaganda

broadcast by party-controlled outlets. Bosnia’s Independent Media Commission (IMC) has

a jurisdictional reach that extends across all of the country’s outlets, with full authority

to grant and rescind operational licenses, order sanctions, and seize equipment.12 Prior

to 1997, the IMC was known as the Media Experts Commission (MEC), whose mandate

included setting forth rules and regulations on the content of media outlets. Some

of these policies included “providing true and accurate information,” “refraining from

broadcasting incendiary programming,” and enabling parties to advertise on stations run

by their political opponents. Although the regulatory body was resisted by local stations

and was, by many accounts, largely ineffective, the MEC produced substantive successes

for the media sector. Journalists praised it for raising the professional bar for journalism

during electoral campaign periods and for seeking to enhance the personal safety and

professional freedom of journalists by documenting complaints and violations of their

(continued)

To be effective, however, these 

regulatory entities must be fair 

and transparent, with clearly 

defined powers to avoid opportunities for abuse of authority.
10

rights. During the 1998 elections, the IMC addressed many complaints about extremist

language being used in certain outlets.

In 2000, the UN established the office of the Temporary Media Commissioner (TMC) in

Kosovo, whose job it was to monitor press reports. The TMC has since become an advocate

for responsible media and has imposed fines on press outlets that have violated the UN

media legal framework and the Code of Conduct for the Print Media. The commissioner

fined Bota Sot, a daily newspaper, for making unsubstantiated accusations that two Albanian editors were working with the Serbian secret service, a claim that put the journalists’

lives in danger. The TMC eventually used accumulated revenue from the fine to establish

an award for journalism.13

Lesson: Create the legal underpinnings for media on a transitional basis and assist 

the indigenous government in passing sound media laws that protect journalists’ 

freedom of speech while also protecting individuals from libel or slander.

The creation of a fully functioning media sector requires intensive work on various levels.

One of the most fundamental levels involves implementing a strong legal framework that

safeguards the greatest possible freedoms for the press and lays down a robust foundation

on which to build radio, television, and print outlets.

Establishing or reforming a legal media framework can entail a range of tasks, including

lobbying for media safeguards in the country’s constitution, establishing a code of ethics

for journalists, transforming state-controlled broadcasters into public service broadcasters, amending the penal and civil code to protect journalists against defamation charges,

and adopting laws on information access to ensure transparency of public administration.

Many different organizations have been involved in reforming media regulations and laws.

In East Timor, Internews was the key actor in drafting press laws and lobbying the Timor

constituent assembly for six months to include media freedoms in the state constitution.

Other NGOs—Article 19, the World Press Freedom Association, and the Journalists’ Association of East Timor (TJLA)—contributed to the process by providing legal advice and

assistance in lobbying. The TJLA also created a self-regulating code of ethics with help

from Internews and the UNTAES Office of Communication and Public Information.14

Media laws should be stated as unambiguously as possible to avoid misunderstanding

in implementation. In 2004, the Afghan government passed a media law establishing

the National Commission of Electronic Media Broadcast. Although the commission was

designed to regulate and make policy for Afghan mass media, it was misunderstood to be

an executive authority with control over Afghanistan’s main public radio and television

station, Radio and Television Afghanistan. For Afghans, who are unlikely to be well versed

in liberal media vocabulary, the law does not sufficiently explain the different roles of

policymaking bodies, regulatory authorities, and media operators.15

Another indispensable aspect of media law is the protection of journalists. Protecting

journalists’ rights has become imperative. Each year, according to the Committee to Protect Journalists, dozens of journalists are murdered for their work as reporters, while hundreds more are persecuted by governments or opposition groups and face death threats to

their families and themselves. In a well-known Bosnian case, Zeljko Kopanja, the editor of

Banja Luka’s (Republika Srpska) Nezavisne novine, was targeted because of his coverage

of Serbian war criminals and lost both of his legs in a car bombing.16

Once media laws are in place, interveners must seek to ensure that state judiciary bodies have the capacity and the will to fully enforce these laws and to do so as consistently

as possible. The weakness of the Afghanistan judicial system, for example, has enabled

warlords to enforce their own media policies while ignoring national standards on free

speech. The absence of a viable institutional framework for media has undermined the

enforcement of media laws. Cambodia today still lacks an effective means by which to

file complaints of libel, leaving the media unfettered by professional standards and more

likely to breed a culture of journalistic impunity. At the same time, the government has

One of the most fundamental 

levels involves implementing 

a strong legal framework that 

safeguards the greatest possible 

freedoms for the press and lays 

down a robust foundation on 

which to build radio, television, 

and print outlets.
11

arbitrarily sanctioned outlets, creating a climate of uncertainty in which there are no uniform codes of conduct for journalists. Effective justice must also be administered against

perpetrators of threats or violence against journalists.

Developing Media Outlets and Personnel

Lesson: Establish a diverse array of media outlets, including private and public entities and radio, television, and print outlets. Assess country demographics to maximize media accessibility by different segments of the population (e.g., minorities, 

women, youth, the illiterate).

One of the most visible steps in a media development strategy involves establishing media

outlets that provide the public with truthful, objective information. The kinds of outlets

that are created will shape the overall success of the strategy. Ultimately, practitioners

should seek to create a diverse array of media outlets that includes a wide range of

voices, including women and minorities, not just the leaders of dominant factions. Greater

diversity typically produces a more open debate and a more competitive media market,

which is critical to the long-term sustainability of media outlets. A pluralistic market also

helps to dilute radical views and elevate moderate voices. Competing views also improve

opportunities for peaceful public dialogue that will strengthen democratic values of nonviolence and compromise.

The Radio Television of Kosovo (RTK), created by the OSCE, is considered one of the

most successful examples of an inclusive, multiethnic outlet established in a post-conflict

country. As Kosovo’s sole public broadcaster, RTK sought to expand its accessibility to

the country’s diverse ethnic communities by implementing projects to provide captions

for foreign films in the many different languages spoken by the various communities. In

2004, RTK also began to offer daily news broadcasts in the Serbian language and initiated

programs directed specifically at various ethnic communities. Although RTK was initially

run by a board of directors comprising both internationals and locals, governing authority

was later transferred to locals.17

Similarly, in Bosnia, the OSCE established Radio FERN in July 1996, which became the

first station in the country to be operated by a multiethnic staff of journalists. The news

it produced was also multiethnic in nature; eventually, the station became independent of

the OSCE and served as the foundation for the country’s public radio structure.18

To determine the most suitable forms of media for a particular country, interveners

should collect demographic information on language, literacy rates, and access to electricity, television, and radio. Widespread illiteracy and poverty in Afghanistan, Timor,

Cambodia, and Rwanda, for example, warranted greater investment in radio rather than

newspapers. Limited access to electronics and electricity could preclude the use of television stations as major media outlets. By comparison, Iraq has a high rate of literacy as

well as substantial access to satellite technologies, which has resulted in the spread of

newspapers and satellite television. According to Internews, television stations tend to

be the media of choice in European and Eurasian regions, with radio, the Internet, and

newspapers getting secondary attention. In Asia and Africa, where literacy rates are low,

radio is the most popular medium. As a general trend, the role of the Internet in the

spread of information has become increasingly important.19

Another consideration involves determining the suitable mix of public and private

outlets. Both types have their benefits and drawbacks. Public outlets sometimes have

more credibility with the public because they exist ostensibly to serve public interests,

but they also tend to suffer from low levels of international assistance, which constricts

their ability to produce high-quality programming. Private outlets tend to lack a clear

mechanism for public service, but they offer diversity, a decentralized media culture, and

Ultimately, practitioners 

should seek to create a diverse 

array of media outlets that 

includes a wide range of 

voices, including women and 

minorities, not just the leaders 

of dominant factions. 
12

prospects for developing a self-sustaining, market-driven media corps. Some interveners

believe that a sustainable democracy requires both public and private media. The U.S.

and European approaches to media outlet development that are fundamentally distinct,

as mentioned earlier. Whereas Europeans favor transforming and strengthening publicly

owned entities, U.S. media developers tend to focus on fostering new, independent, privately owned outlets.

The economic situation of the country may drive the outcome of the public-private

debate. In many less developed countries, especially in Africa, the lack of a robust market

for media explains why privately owned media outlets are few in number and overshadowed by the state media structure. Small, independent media entities are more likely to

be found in more developed countries, such as in Asia and the Middle East.

One successful example of supporting private media features what eventually became

Afghanistan’s first private radio station, Radio Arman. The U.S. Agency for International

Development gave $2.2 million to three Afghan-Australian brothers. Within months, the

brothers had successfully established the country’s first radio station; they later started

the country’s first private television station, Tolo TV. This example is unusual insofar

as international funding was given to a local entity that also used its own investment

money.20

Lesson: Establish effective journalism-training programs and institutions. Create a 

follow-up mechanism to ensure proper training of journalists.

Practitioners should develop rigorous media training programs to educate personnel on

journalistic standards of professional integrity and independence. Many reporters in postconflict societies have worked only under authoritarian regimes and lack experience in

running independent media. Training programs must be designed with long-term interests

in mind; they should offer a comprehensive education, include follow-up initiatives, and

run for a long time.

A successful training program should educate people in the concepts of truth, impartiality, public service, and journalistic ethics. Business concepts, such as competition in

the media market and management and administrative capacities, must also be taught.

Station managers should understand how to run a business, including how to create and

manage a sales department, run classified advertisements, arrange distribution, and manage revenue.

One positive model for media education is the Soros Media Center in Sarajevo, established in 1995 by financier and philanthropist George Soros. Many native journalists in

Bosnia point to the center as a highly successful training initiative. After several years of

operation, the center was turned over to Bosnians as an independent journalism school.

Care should be taken to continue to monitor trainees after the completion of their

training programs. Too often, NGOs are preoccupied with being able to report that a high

volume of trainees have completed a program and overlook the importance of testing

trainees after the course is completed and helping them secure local jobs. Interveners

should assess not only the trainees but also the training programs themselves to determine their long-term effectiveness in creating a competent cadre of local journalists. In

Cambodia, international journalism training programs had limited impact because they

were too narrowly focused on short-term gains and failed to follow up with trainees after

the programs had been completed. Many Khmer journalists left the country after training

or went to work for wire services.

Another task essential for long-term success is to establish vocational and postgraduate courses at the university level to encourage students to pursue journalism as a

profession. Training programs must also get “buy in,” or acceptance, from managers and

media owners to maximize the benefits of training lower-level journalists. Additionally,

interveners must groom local individuals to become trainers themselves and thus be able

Training programs must be 

designed with long-term interests in mind; they should offer 

a comprehensive education, 

include follow-up initiatives, 

and run for a long time.
13

to continue the education process once international programs have concluded. The first

wave of trainers is typically made up of foreign journalists, but subsequent waves should

feature an increasing number of locals. Interveners should also consider using journalists

from the surrounding region as trainers; such people will likely better understand the

history and culture of the host country than will trainers recruited from distant parts of

the world.

In addition to training journalists, interveners must make a determined effort to

educate the broader public about liberal conceptions of the role of media in politics and

society. Many post-conflict societies are unaccustomed to having more than one dominant

media outlet, which is typically controlled by the state. Moreover, some citizens are deeply

suspicious about the media, having been accustomed to the distortions and half-truths

that state-owned media outlets often disseminate. Others, especially in deeply divided

societies, are easily manipulated by hate radio. Given these conditions and deep-seated

preconceptions, substantial investment must be made to inform and educate the public

on the role of free and independent media in democracies and the importance it has in

protecting their rights and spotlighting abuses of government power.

Many NGOs specializing in media development have implemented educational programs, holding workshops and publishing informational materials to educate journalists

and government officials on the proper relationship between the state and media.

Lesson: Create professional associations of journalists, publishers, and editors to 

strengthen leadership, promote the principles that undergird an independent media, 

and encourage accountability and compliance with community standards. Connect 

local journalists with international networks to enhance accountability.

Interveners should facilitate interaction among broad communities of independent journalists to bolster a culture of professionalism and encourage high standards. By engaging

in a wider support network, journalists avoid being isolated from their domestic and

international colleagues and are better positioned to resist manipulation by the state or

other entities.

An association of media outlets can broadly represent the media community when its

interests are at stake. Positive tasks for such an association might include developing

widely accepted standards of journalism and negotiating with the government when it

is designing media policies. Moreover, for interveners, supporting a community of media

outlets may be more beneficial in terms of stimulating diversity than singling out individual outlets to support.

A number of existing entities help connect journalism communities across the world.

One notable example is the International Journalists’ Network, which is sponsored by the

International Center for Journalists. Its Web site (www.ijnet.org) contains collections of

media laws and codes of ethics adopted worldwide, as well as contact information for

media assistance organizations around the world. The organization also tracks media

assistance programs and seeks to coordinate donor activities to prevent duplication and

to maximize impact.

A useful media standards entity in Bosnia is www.mediaonline.ba, a Web site dedicated

to monitoring media in that country. Created with help from the French government in

2000, the site provides a forum for media experts and journalists to communicate and

share experiences with colleagues from other countries that are also in transition. The

organization comprises a network of correspondents throughout southeast Europe who

track media development in their own countries

Internews created the Global Forum for Media Development in 2005 to help connect

media assistance organizations and improve strategies and policies for developing media

around the world. The forum’s first conference brought together more than five hundred

participants from ninety-seven countries.21

By engaging in a wider support 

network, journalists avoid being 

isolated from their domestic and 

international colleagues and 

are better positioned to resist 

manipulation by the state or 

other entities. 
14

Exit Phase: Transitioning and Sustaining

Transition to Local Control and Ensure Long-Term Sustainability 

Lesson: Transition control to local media leaders to avoid an erosion of capacity when 

the international mission concludes.

When developing media, implementers should assist new media outlets with an eye

toward developing local capacity while mitigating dependency on the international

community and other external entities. The strategy should involve weaning outlets off

external support as soon as possible, forcing them to become self-sustaining. Private

media outlets will become sustainable based on advertising revenue, the availability of

which will ultimately depend on the ability of an outlet’s programming to draw viewers

or listeners.

A successful model for empowering local media is the mission-owned radio station in

Bosnia, which assisted a student group (the Students’ Union of Bosnia-Herzegovina) in

establishing a station with the slogan “106.5—Keepin’ You Alive, eFM Radio.” The station

started broadcasting from a wrecked militia barracks in Sarajevo’s “snipers’ alley” with

$20,000 worth of equipment from United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina

(UNMBIH). With additional funding and assistance from the European Union, Norway,

Canada, and IFOR, eFM became a twenty-four-hour media outlet, broadcasting music and

entertainment as well as news. (One exclusive interview that garnered the station respect

and popularity was with the chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for

the former Yugoslavia.) The station is still popular and today broadcasts not only to the

Sarajevo area but also beyond. It is now partners with other local broadcasters under an

umbrella corporation, Cross Radio, which incorporates Croatian, Kosovar Albanian, and

Serbian broadcasters. eFM has also become a training center for the students, teaching

them not only the arts of journalism but also how to manage a radio station.

Lesson: Develop a robust media market in which private outlets can be self-sustaining over the long run, after international funding wanes. Establish funding 

mechanisms for local outlets to ensure continued funding to cover operating costs, 

training, and so forth.

A recurring challenge for media developers involves creating a sector that is sustainable

beyond the mandate of the UN mission and is not dependent on international aid. In

East Timor, the UN Transitional Administration (UNTAET) ran popular radio and television

stations that reached all parts of the country. Programming on the stations focused on

providing information on the Timorese elections and included UN news and entertainment. But despite their success among the Timorese population, the stations were unable

to continue beyond the UNTAET mandate because no local broadcasting company was

capable of assuming operations. The stations were shifted to the National Public Broadcasting Authority, a public service managed by the state.

Likewise, in Cambodia, Radio UNTAC was popular among the population but faltered

after UNTAC’s mandate ended. Local journalists lacked the technical know-how to sustain

the station and did not have adequate funding to cover transmitter costs, spare parts for

recording equipment, and other important assets.

Without the ability to fund operations over the long term, media entities become

vulnerable to manipulation by political patrons who do have the funding to support

media operations. Such dependency on external funding threatens outlets’ credibility and

independence. Many Cambodian outlets today, for example, remain hostage to political

patrons, who shape media content to favor their own agendas.

To expedite the development of a sustainable media market, interveners should nurture a private media market that can begin to sustain itself based on market demand.

A recurring challenge for media 

developers involves creating a sector 

that is sustainable beyond the mandate of the UN mission and is not 

dependent on international aid.
15

According to industry experts, it takes more than five years to get a media market up

and running. The market requires four key components—content creation, distribution,

viewership, and outside revenues—that together create a positive feedback loop that can

become self-propagating when properly nurtured.

Although a previously closed society will initially consume a great deal of news, the

economic sustainability of a media outlet will depend on the entertainment it provides.

In general, media environments consist overwhelmingly of entertainment, which drives

ratings and the overall economics of a media market. Hence, interveners should introduce

entertainment content to media outlets to foster the sustainability of the market over

time.

Lesson: Create an indigenous mechanism to continue monitoring hate speech.

Once the international presence diminishes, having a permanent entity dedicated to

monitoring media development is critical to fostering a healthy, independent media

sector. It is particularly important to monitor hate speech; if the ability to monitor and

respond to hate media declines, any progress made to that point in media development

can be easily reversed.

Although Radio UNTAC was applauded for stimulating the growth of independent

broadcast media in Cambodia, the trend reversed when the radio shut down. Within two

years of the station’s demise, the new Cambodian government passed a media law permitting the state to censor media that it considers a threat to national security. Opposition

parties are no longer allowed to broadcast in the country and dissenting journalists are

subjected to intimidation.

Elections in particular require robust media monitoring mechanisms. Three entities

most commonly take up monitoring responsibilities: electoral management bodies;

international electoral observation missions; and NGOs and other civic bodies. During

parliamentary elections, the Afghan Media Commission successfully implemented a monitoring program that reached across all seventeen provinces. The Media Monitoring Unit

trained Afghan media monitors to monitor Afghan media during the electoral campaign.

Following the elections, the monitors were hired by an Afghan company that continues

to monitor local media.22

Conclusion

While each post-conflict situation will inevitably pose unique challenges for media practitioners, experience has shown that some issues present themselves—in one form or

another—in almost all operations. If practitioners not only recognize these challenges

but also learn how they have been handled in other interventions, then practitioners

can shape their media development strategies accordingly and avoid repeating past

mistakes.

In tailoring an appropriate model for media development in a given society, interveners should consider the following:

• 	 The relationship that existed between the government and media outlets before and

during the conflict. In some instances, this relationship may in some instance have

led to or fed violence.

•	 The economic landscape of a country and its market potential to sustain media outlets

once international donors and foundations have departed. After carefully considering

all the components of the media sector, international players should calculate how

best to distribute resources to enhance the prospects of that sector becoming selfsustaining. Interveners should also focus on the creation of local capacity to maintain

the media outlets even after the interveners are gone; local buy-in and ownership are

important in ensuring longevity and success.

Once the international presence 

diminishes, having a permanent 

entity dedicated to monitoring 

media development is critical to 

fostering a healthy, independent 

media sector.
16

• 	 The presence or absence of institutional mechanisms to regulate the conduct of the

media. Where no effective institutions exist, interveners should create a mechanism

such as a media commission to help ensure that media outlets play by the rules.

Interveners should also consider establishing independent associations of journalists,

editors, and publishers to help protect journalists’ rights and promote high professional standards.

• 	 The timing of elections. Organizing free and fair elections is usually an important

milestone in the development of societies emerging from conflict. However, such

elections should be organized only after free and nonpartisan media outlets have

been established in a country to ensure proper representation of all the actors

involved.

Free media can serve as a powerful tool in societies emerging from conflict. If interveners can create a media sector that is not only independent, self-sustaining, and selfregulating but also inclusive and diverse, they can help to give a voice to those people

who were silenced during the conflict, initiating open and honest dialogue about both

the violent past and a peaceful future.
17

Developing Media in Stabilization and Reconstruction Missions

Predeployment Phase

1. Map the Landscape

a. Map the existing media landscape in the country by identifying

media outlets and personnel that have survived the conflict and

could potentially support media reforms and the development of

society at large.

b. Assess the history of the media’s relationship with the government and with society prior to and during the conflict.

c. Assess the viability of a self-sustaining media market and identify available resources for creating a steady stream of revenue

for a private market.

2. Create a Strategy

a. Create a plan for coordinating all the relevant players in media

development by creating joint working groups or task forces

(donors, trainers, NGOs, IOs, etc).

b. Identify potential spoilers, and their associated infrastructure, who may seek to dominate media channels or continue to

broadcast or print hate speech. Identify and elevate repatriates

or local leaders with the potential to lead independent media

development.

c. Plan for an accountable media sector to begin operating before

the first postwar elections are held.

Deployment Phase

1. Build a Foundation for the

Media Sector

a. Create a mission-owned outlet to deliver critical information

about peace operations while monitoring and countering hate

speech. Also consider other ways to provide alternative programming for the public.

b. Create a representative media commission to regulate media

entities and establish norms that are consistent with international standards.

c. Create the legal underpinnings for media on a transitional basis

and assist the indigenous government, if applicable, in passing

sound media laws that protect journalists’ freedom of speech

while also protecting individuals from libel or slander.
18

2. Develop Media

Outlets and Personnel

a. Establish a diverse array of media outlets, including private

and public entities and radio, television, and print outlets. Assess

country demographics to maximize media accessibility by different segments of population (e.g., minorities, women, youth, the

illiterate).

b. Establish effective journalism-training programs. Create a

follow-up mechanism to ensure proper training of journalists.

c. Create professional associations of journalists, publishers, and

editors to strengthen leadership, promote the principles that

underpin an independent media, and encourage accountability

and compliance with community standards. Connect local journalists with international networks to enhance accountability.

Exit Phase

1. Ensure Sustainability

a. Transition control to local media leaders to avoid an erosion of

capacity when the international mission concludes.

b. Develop a robust media market in which private outlets can

be self-sustaining over the long run, after international funding

wanes. Establish funding mechanisms for local outlets to ensure

continued funding for local initiatives to cover operating costs,

training, and so forth.

c. Create an indigenous mechanism to continue monitoring hate

speech.
19

Notes

1.	 Russell Smith, “The Impact of Hate Media in Rwanda.” BBC World Service, December 3, 2003.

2.	 International Media Support, Annual Report, 2004–05 (Copenhagen: International Media Support, 2005),

www.i-m-s.dk/Media/PDF/IMS%20Annual%20Report%202003-2004.pdf.

3.	 Peter Feuilherade, “Liberia Condemned for Radio Shut Down.” BBC World Service, February 2, 2000.

4.	 “Hate Radio Journalist Confesses,” BBC World Service, May 15, 2000.

5.	 Matthew Burton, “The International Community and Media Development in the New Bosnia” (April 2001),

www.impublished.org/bosnia.htm.

6.	 U.S. Mission to Kosovo, “USAID Director Calls for Level Playing Field for Kosovar TV Stations,” (press

release, April 26, 2002).

7.	 Monroe E. Price, ed., “Restructuring the Media in Post-Conflict Societies: Four Perspectives: The Experience

of Non-Governmental and Intergovernmental Organizations” (background paper for UNESCO World Press Day

Conference, 2000).

8.	 Gordon Adam, Radio’s Peacekeeping Potential: Crosslines (Ireland: Crosslines, 1995).

9.	 Susan Manuel, “UN Media and Post Conflict Peace-Keeping” (article prepared for UNESCO seminar, “Support to Media in Violent Conflict and Countries in Transition,” May 3, 2004), http://portal.unesco.org/ci/en/

ev.php-URL_ID=15499&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html.

10. Afghan Media Commission, Media Commission Final Report (Kabul: Afghan Media Commission, 2005).

11.	 Ibid.

12.	 Tarik Jusic, “Media Landscape: Bosnia-Herzegovina” (published on the European Journalism Center Web

site, 1999), http://www.ejc.net/media_landscape/article/bosnia_herzegovina/.

13.	 Anna Di Lellio, Curbing Kosovo Media Excess (London: Institute for War and Peace Reporting, 2002).

14.	 Article 19 and Internews, Freedom of Expression and the Media in Timor-Leste (December 2005), http://

www.article19.org/pdfs/publications/timor-leste-baseline-study.pdf.

15. Afghan Media Commission, Media Commission Final Report.

16.	 Amnesty International, Bosnia and Herzegovina: Country Report (New York: Amnesty International,

2000).

17.	 Radio Television of Kosovo, Annual Report, 2004, http://www.rtklive.com/eng/2004_en.pdf.

18.	 Price, “Restructuring the Media in Post-Conflict Societies.”

19.	 “Internews: How We Work,” http://www.internews.org/why/default.shtm.

20.	 David Rohde, All Successful Democracies Need Freedom of Speech: American Efforts to Create a Vibrant Free 

Press in Iraq and Afghanistan (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2005).

21.	 “Internews: How We Work.”

22.	 Afghan Media Commission, Media Commission Final Report.
United States 

Institute of Peace

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Washington, DC 20036

www.usip.org

An online edition of this report can be

found at our website (www.usip.org),

together with additional information

on the subject.

Of Related Interest

This report is part of a series of special reports issued by the United States Institute of

Peace’s Filling the Gaps series of working groups. The special reports address the causes

of failures in specific areas in reconstruction and stabilization as well as generate policy

options. Preceding reports in the series include the following:

• Measuring Progress in Stabilization and Reconstruction, Craig Cohen

• Transitional Governance: From Bullets to Ballots, Beth Cole DeGrasse and Christina

Caan

• Filling the Gaps: Managing Natural Resource Wealth, Jill Shankelman

• The Role of Women in Stabilization and Reconstruction, Camille Pampell Conaway

• The Urge to Remember: The Role of Memorials in Social Reconstruction and Transitional 

Justice, Judy Barsalou and Victoria Baxter

• Employment Generation and Economic Development in Stabilization and Reconstruction 

Operations, Johanna Mendelson-Forman and Merriam Mashatt

Please visit www.usip.org to download this and related reports.