About the Report

The need for an assessment of the National Internal Security 

Policy and subsequent National Action Plan of the government 

of Pakistan became evident as the heightened military action 

under Operation Zarb-e-Azb entered its second year. This report 

is based on conversations with civil and military officials and 

politicians inside Pakistan and on focus group sessions with 

leading civil and military thinkers, including retired officials, 

members of the media, and members of the police force. Much 

remains unclear due to the lack of transparency in operations 

of both civil and military institutions and the absence of 

active parliamentary oversight or questioning of operations. 

A key element of the review was the ability of the military 

and the civil government to work together effectively at both 

the federal and provincial levels. As a corollary to this, it was 

important to see the opportunity for the central government 

to assert its supremacy. This report focuses on the civil-military 

nexus, especially in the context of the Apex Committees at 

the provincial level, and identifies areas that demand 

attention if the National Action Plan is to succeed.

About the Author

Shuja Nawaz is a Pakistani-born strategic analyst based 

in Washington, DC. He was the founding director of the 

South Asia Center of the Atlantic Council, where he is now 

a distinguished fellow. He writes for leading newspapers, 

journals, and websites and speaks on current issues before 

civic groups, at think tanks, and on radio and television 

worldwide. He has also advised and briefed senior 

government and military officials and parliamentarians 

in the United States, Europe, and Pakistan. 

2301 Constitution Ave., NW • Washington, DC 20037 • 202.457.1700 • fax 202.429.6063

Special Report 393 October 2016

© 2016 by the United States Institute of Peace. 

All rights reserved.

Contents

Introduction 2

Searching for a New Security Strategy 3

Drafting a New National Security Policy 4

A Forced Change 6

Who Calls the Shots? 8

Provincial Apex Committees 9

Recommendations and the Way Ahead 14

Shuja Nawaz

Countering Militancy and 

Terrorism in Pakistan

The Civil-Military Nexus

Summary

• Pakistan resides in an unsettled and hostile neighborhood and faces an existential challenge 

from domestic forces of sectarian and ethnic militancy and terrorism.

• Many of Pakistan’s domestic problems are related to poor governance and the imbalance of 

power and operational ability between civil institutions and the military.

• Shortsighted policies of successive civil and military governments and a dynastic political 

system have hobbled efforts to develop a strong, stable polity and economy. 

• Civil and political institutions remain weak and dysfunctional; a well-organized and disciplined 

military continues to dominate key strategic sectors related to foreign policy and security and 

currently retains control over the Afghan border region. 

• Recent military operations to clear the northern border regions abutting Afghanistan of terrorist bases have had some success, but the effort inside Pakistan remains unfinished.

• A well-defined objective and longer-term timetable are needed for the use of the paramilitary 

Rangers in Punjab and Sindh. Karachi may be the test for these efforts.

• Governance would be strengthened with better coordination and collaboration between civil 

institutions and the military.

• Greater willingness by the military to bring civilians into their military campaign planning 

processes and to train and assist civil institutions (particularly the police force) in growing 

into their roles and responsibilities would bolster security. 

• The central government should establish a clearer vision and a process for decision making 

related to antiterrorism and antimilitancy efforts; devote more resources to its security institutions; and better organize its relationships with individual provinces. 

• Parliament should play a more active role in defining and measuring the success of efforts to 

counter terrorism and militancy. 

• Civil society must play a more active and informed role in this process. 

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE www.usip.org

SPECIAL REPORT
2 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 393

Introduction

Pakistan’s battle against militancy and violent extremism will decide the future of this critically 

placed country of two hundred million people, armed with nuclear weapons and situated in one 

of the toughest neighborhoods in the world. Instability inside Pakistan not only has repercussions for the country itself, but also affects major countries such as China, India, and Iran, as 

well as its western neighbor Afghanistan. The internal battle also has implications for Pakistan’s 

important and long-standing relationship with Saudi Arabia and the United States. Over the 

past two years, Pakistan carried out a widely publicized battle against the forces of militancy 

and terrorism, led primarily by the military in the border areas adjoining Afghanistan. Other 

operations in Karachi (see Box 1, Karachi) and limited efforts in Punjab have been launched as 

well. Both civil and military leaders have periodically proclaimed a civil-military nexus in this 

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily 

reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace, 

which does not advocate specific policy positions.

To request permission to photocopy or reprint materials, 

email: permissions@usip.org.

About the Institute

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, 

nonpartisan institution established and funded by Congress. 

Its goals are to help prevent and resolve violent conflicts, 

promote postconflict peacebuilding, and increase conflict 

management tools, capacity, and intellectual capital 

worldwide. The Institute does this by empowering others 

with knowledge, skills, and resources, as well as by its direct 

involvement in conflict zones around the globe.

Board of Directors

Stephen J. Hadley (Chair), Principal, RiceHadleyGates, LLC, 

Washington, DC • George E. Moose (Vice Chair), Adjunct 

Professor of Practice, The George Washington University, Washington, DC • Judy Ansley, Former Assistant to the President and 

Deputy National Security Adviser under George W. Bush, Washington, DC • Eric Edelman, Hertog Distinguished Practitioner 

in Residence, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International 

Studies, Washington, DC • Joseph Eldridge, University Chaplain 

and Senior Adjunct Professorial Lecturer, School of International 

Service, American University, Washington, DC • Kerry Kennedy, 

President, Robert F. Kennedy Center for Justice and Human 

Rights, Washington, DC • Ikram U. Khan, President, Quality Care 

Consultants, LLC., Las Vegas, NV • Stephen D. Krasner, Graham 

H. Stuart Professor of International Relations at Stanford 

University, Palo Alto, CA • John A. Lancaster, Former Executive 

Director, International Council on Independent Living, Potsdam, 

NY • Jeremy A. Rabkin, Professor of Law, George Mason 

University, Fairfax, VA • J. Robinson West, Chairman, PFC 

Energy, Washington, DC • Nancy Zirkin, Executive Vice 

President, Leadership Conference on Civil and 

Human Rights, Washington, DC 

Members Ex Officio

John Kerry, Secretary of State • Ashton Carter, Secretary of 

Defense • Gregg F. Martin, Major General, U.S. Army; President, 

National Defense University • Nancy Lindborg, President, 

United States Institute of Peace (nonvoting)

Karachi: The Litmus Test

The balance and collaboration between the civil institutions and the military in fighting militancy and terrorism is being 

tested most publicly in Karachi, the largest city of Pakistan with a population approaching twenty-five milliona and a 

microcosm of Pakistan at large. Karachi is the gateway for Pakistan’s economy and the location of the headquarters of its 

major enterprises. It is also a battleground for different political parties seeking funding through legal and illegal means, 

often through their militant wings. The military believes that there is a nexus between this corruption and terrorism and 

has tried to assert control over this megacity while working with a recalcitrant provincial leadership. 

Soon after taking office, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif visited Karachi to put his own imprimatur on the shape of the 

campaign that he entrusted to the military.b The provincial government, led by the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), holds 

constitutional authority to request the federally controlled Sindh Rangers to help restore order in the city.c On the 

surface, a delicate balance is being maintained.d But, as on the national level, this is empty rhetoric. The Rangers see 

their task as not only providing temporary safety for the citizens of Karachi, but also to remove the sources of militancy 

and terror, including the removal of political sponsors of militant groups. 

In interviews, Karachi Corps Commander Lt. Gen. Naveed Mukhtar denied that the military is seeking to remove the 

individual leaders of political parties.e But the military has brought corruption charges linked to terrorism against 

government officials and political leaders in the provincial government—most prominently, former PPP minister Dr. Asim 

Hussain—who are accused of funding the activities of militant wings of their parties. The military also put a stop to 

Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM) chief Altaf Hussain’s regular telephonic broadcasts from London to mass gatherings 

of his followers. This has restricted the MQM’s ability to operate in the public space. The central government of Prime 

Minister Sharif might welcome the removal of its rivals but also secretly fears the enhanced power of the military if it 

succeeds in this aim. 

The director general of the Rangers, Major General Bilal Akbar, believes that Karachi needs a “permanent, formal system” 

of policing that is both “modern and professional.” In the meantime, he sees the Rangers filling the gap for the civil 

authorities.f Senior police officials interviewed indicate the same but also bemoan the police’s relative lack of resources, 

training, and equipment. The total for all twenty-five million persons in Karachi is only some thirty thousand policemen, 

some eight thousand of whom are deployed for VIP protection duties. 

For the time being, the Rangers-led approach appears to have worked, reportedly cutting crime rates despite some 

high-profile killings.g The Rangers spoke about how locals now routinely inform the Rangers of illegal activities either 

directly or through hotlines that have been established for that purpose. Senior police officers concur in some of the 

positive assessments. But the military will need to show results in building the police force and actively involve them in 

the planning and execution of their joint operations so they can eventually take over. As elections draw near in 2018, 

the PPP and MQM will begin to assert their positions forcefully and may well prompt an open clash with the army as a 

result. If that happens, Karachi will suffer, as will Pakistan as a whole.

a. Khawaja Amer, “Population Explosion: Put an Embargo on Industrialisation in Karachi,” The Express Tribune, October 6, 

2013, http://tribune.com.pk/story/614409/population-explosion-put-an-embargo-on-industrialisation-in-karachi/.

b. Interview, Aftab Sultan, director general of the Intelligence Bureau (IB), October 2015. Sultan’s term as director general 

of the IB was extended for the third time by the prime minister in February 2016. 

c. “Sindh Assembly Adopts Resolution Seeking to Curtail Rangers’ Powers,” Dawn, December 30, 2015, www.dawn.com/

news/1226757. 

d. Interviews, director general of Pakistan Rangers and other officials. 

e. Interviews, Karachi Corps Commander Lt. Gen. Naveed Mukhtar, Karachi, 2015–2016.

f. Interview, Major General Bilal Akbar, Karachi, 2015. 

g. Zahid Gishkori, “Crime Rate in Karachi Has Halved Since Start of Operation, Claim Rangers,” The Express Tribune, April 

27, 2015, http://tribune.com.pk/story/876803/crime-rate-in-karachi-has-halved-since-start-of-operation-claim-rangers/. 
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 393 3

struggle to regain control of its territory and polity. But although civil and military leaders 

often state that they are “on the same page,” the results indicate a gap. It is possible that 

they are looking at different books. 

If Pakistan fails to follow through on its promised war against violent extremism, it will 

invite pressure and interference from powerful forces in the region. This could create conditions of external conflict with a growing and extremely powerful, and also nuclear-armed, 

India to the east, and an Afghanistan emerging from its decades-long internal wars but now 

with a large army of some 350,000 that may be tempted to assert its influence in the porous 

border region. Iran, too, would not countenance unrest on its border with the Pakistani 

province of Balochistan, a traditional hotspot in Pakistan-Iran relations.

Internally, the failure of the state to assert control over its own territory will continue to 

spawn the growth of numerous religion-based militant organizations, supported by internal 

and external actors. A Lebanon-like situation could emerge in Karachi and elsewhere, with 

open interference in sectarian conflict from external forces, especially Saudi Arabia and Iran. 

The end result could well be sectarian, ethnic, and rural-urban fights that could challenge the 

ability of Pakistan’s five hundred thousand–strong military to effectively control these internal 

wars in the absence of adequate and effective civilian structures and policing capacity. 

Pakistan’s immediate enemy appears to be within the country. Its survival depends on 

a clear victory, changing the landscape that nurtures organized militancy, and changing its 

ideological narrative by removing the overwhelming influence of Islamic extremists from 

its education and political system. Pakistan must also build a strong and viable economy 

to bolster its security. The campaign will be long and arduous, and cannot rely on military 

might alone; it will rest importantly on the ability of Pakistani political leaders and civil 

society to muster support from the general population to reshape the country’s priorities 

and recast the socio-political compacts that have defined the country since independence 

in 1947. It is in Pakistan’s interest and that of its allies to ensure that the centripetal forces 

of geography and codependence, that have held the country together until now, triumph in 

this struggle. A stable and growing Pakistan will be key to stability and development in the 

region as a whole. There is some evidence to support a cautious optimism about Pakistan’s 

recent efforts to regain its balance, but the battle for Pakistan has only just begun.

Searching for a New Security Strategy

From its birth, Pakistan has been in a state of conflict and hostility with a much larger 

and increasingly more powerful India to the east. A series of wars resulted, often short and 

with unclear outcomes, except the comprehensive defeat and dismemberment of what was 

then united Pakistan in 1971. Yet, India was unable to dominate or subdue a much smaller 

Pakistan after the birth of Bangladesh. This ability to thwart an enemy with a military that 

was on average two to three times the size of Pakistan’s forces was seen as a victory inside 

Pakistan and fueled its effort to maintain an impregnable defense against India’s growing 

military power in the region. 

The U.S. National Intelligence Council scenarios posit the growth of the Indian economy 

from seven times the size of Pakistan in 2012 to sixteen times its size in 2030.1 A growing 

economic pie allows India to increase defense spending while using a smaller proportion 

of its gross domestic product. Economics does not favor Pakistan in the long run, unless it 

changes its domestic strategy to one of economic growth and development and can create 

a more powerful polity, based on a clear and widely supported national ideology. 

The attacks by Saudi terrorists on mainland United States on September 11, 2001, guided 

and supported by the Afghanistan-based al-Qaeda group of Osama bin Laden, produced a 
4 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 393

rapid reaction and invasion of Afghanistan in late 2001. A fresh influx of Afghan refugees into 

Pakistan ensued. Pakistan’s military dictator du jour General Pervez Musharraf aligned with 

the invading forces and created a backlash from extremists on both sides of the border. Over 

time, he moved Pakistani forces into the border region known as the Federally Administered 

Tribal Areas (FATA) and granted the United States access to Pakistani airbases and land and air 

routes into Afghanistan in return for U.S. funding through the Coalition Support Fund, which 

provided reimbursement for Pakistani military expenditures in moving troops into the region. 

This injection of the Pakistani army into FATA upset the balance of power inside that 

tribal society, which had been treated by Pakistan as a buffer against Afghanistan along the 

disputed Durand Line. The assumption that the fight against militancy in the borderlands 

could be contained to that territory and would not affect the rest of the country proved 

incorrect. Musharraf may well be seen as the unwitting creator of the Tehreek-e-Taliban 

Pakistan (TTP), which formed in 2007. The sudden and heavy military presence disrupted the 

delicate societal balance inside FATA’s tribal culture and produced ill-thought peace agreements between the military and militant tribal leaders. The Pakistani Taliban turned their 

guns on the tribal leaders, or maliks, killing hundreds of them, and also used the growing 

Pakhtun population of Karachi, a magnet for internal migrants, to consolidate their position 

in that key city. 

A confused soldiery was asked to fight its own people while ostensibly supporting foreign 

efforts against the Afghan Taliban. Yet, Pakistan maintained surreptitious links to some 

elements of the Afghan Taliban, who did not overtly fight the Pakistani state and in return 

benefitted from sanctuary inside FATA and Balochistan—even while they attacked Pakistan’s 

coalition partners in Afghanistan.

It was not until Musharraf was succeeded as chief of army staff by General Ashfaq Parvez 

Kayani, the former head of the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate, that an effort was 

made to clarify to the rank and file of the army the nature of the conflict against fellow 

Pakistanis. Kayani portrayed the fight as one not against fellow Muslims but against those 

who committed shirq—those who deviated from the true path of Islam toward extremism.2 

This led to the battle against militancy and extremism within Pakistan today.

Drafting a New National Security Policy

In October 2008, Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani took pride in pulling together a joint 

resolution of Parliament to declare war on terrorism after an on-camera session.3 But no 

follow-up actions were taken to implement the resolution’s objectives. Indeed, some members of the Islamic parties sounded a different note in their commentary after the resolution 

was passed.

General Kayani persuaded the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) government in 2009 to agree 

on a major move against entrenched TTP and foreign fighter positions inside South Waziristan4

but failed to follow up with similar action in North Waziristan, where, among others, the bases 

of the Afghan Taliban’s Haqqani network were located. He had assembled a force of some fortythousand in North Waziristan after a successful operation against the local Taliban and other 

militants in Swat and Malakand. But despite promises to his U.S. partners, he failed to launch 

an operation there, largely because he wished to get a national consensus and public support 

for such a new campaign. He also feared opening a new front that might extend deep into the 

Pakistani heartland. 

During its five years in power, the coalition led by the PPP was reluctant to take the 

lead in the battle against terrorism, deferring to the military. The successor Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) government took the first steps toward establishing a national 
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 393 5

security plan. In the waning months of his tenure, General Kayani pushed Prime Minister 

Nawaz Sharif to expedite creation of a national security policy.5 This task was entrusted to 

the prime minister’s close confidant, Interior Minister Chaudhary Nisar Ali Khan. The minister 

commissioned the drafting of a policy and sought to bring the provincial chief ministers 

into the process, but it is unclear if he got any substantive input from them. On February 

26, 2014, he presented an eleven-page summary document, the National Internal Security 

Policy 2014–2018 (NISP), before the National Assembly for debate. According to this report, 

Pakistan’s “internal security environment is dominated by non-traditional threats of extremism, sectarianism, terrorism and militancy....no single state agency is capable of dealing 

with such threats on its own.”

The NISP laid out the scope of the internal threats and the policy objectives of the government plan to counter them. Significantly, it listed the need for a broad-based approach to 

fighting terrorism and militancy and presented ideas for strengthening civilian institutions. 

However, it failed to create the symbiotic relationship between the military’s counterinsurgency operations and the counterterrorism approach that the civilians were emphasizing.6

The NISP named the Ministry of Interior as the lead ministry for implementing the policy 

and outlined an ambitious plan of action but did not identify the resources available, nor 

the distribution of duties and responsibilities for the NISP among governmental bodies 

and between the federal and provincial authorities. It also avoided the issue of educational 

reform and the need to control and integrate Islamic seminaries that were seen as a potential 

breeding ground for sectarian divisions and extremist violence. In interviews for this study, a 

senior general said that a paper prepared by the army on a counterterrorism strategy was not 

reflected in the final NISP. A senior member of the drafting team of the NISP was not aware 

of the military’s input.7

By November 2013, the army had a new chief, General Raheel Sharif (no relation to the 

prime minister), who pressed the prime minister for action in North Waziristan following 

attacks on troops stationed there. The prime minister chose instead to engage the TTP in a 

dialogue; but these so-called peace talks failed to get off the ground. The delay in giving the 

army approval to launch military action produced some unhappiness among military leadership, and this unhappiness was magnified nationwide after a brazen attack on Karachi airport 

on June 8 by militants associated with the TTP. Some twenty-eight persons were killed, and 

the paramilitary Sindh Rangers were called to clear the airport.8

The military had been preparing for action in North Waziristan for some years. The 

air force had been updating its target lists over time.9 A week after the attack at Karachi 

airport, they sprung into action. On June 15, 2014, the military announced a “comprehensive operation against foreign and local terrorists” in North Waziristan, Operation 

Zarb-e-Azb. Although military statements suggested this was carried out “on the directions of 

the government,” inside accounts from the military high command indicate that the operation 

was launched unilaterally. 

Zarb-e-Azb dominated the local airwaves and newspaper headlines, supported by a highpitch military information campaign and restricted access to information and to the scene of 

the operations for local and foreign media. But there were few opportunities for the public 

to understand the details of what was being done and the relationship between the actions 

of the military inside FATA and the actions being taken by the civilian authorities in the 

rest of the country. Periodic meetings between the civil and military leaders were reported 

briefly, largely through the shorthand tweets from the military PR outfit. Parliament did not 

appear to seek, nor was it granted, regular briefings or reports on the ongoing operations. 

Against this backdrop, it was not surprising that the general public was not fully engaged in 

the effort against militancy and terrorism. 
6 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 393

A Forced Change

When institutional systems are not in place, policy becomes reactive and event-driven. None 

of the suggestions made in the NISP for coordination of intelligence and joint planning by 

civil and military organizations have been visibly implemented. 

A seminal and tragic event occurred on December 16, 2014, when a group of gunmen 

penetrated the walls of the Army Public School in Peshawar Cantonment, the heavily fortified 

military area in the capital of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, and killed 140 persons, including 

a large number of young students. The massacre shook Pakistani society at its core, raising 

questions about the ability of the TTP and its affiliates to strike soft targets seemingly at will 

and also about the failure of the military to protect even those areas under its direct control. 

The political system responded with a sense of alarm. Prime Minister Sharif announced that 

leading political parties had reached a consensus on a new National Action Plan (NAP). The 

NAP was an ambitious list of objectives, but like the preceding NISP, it lacked the clarity of 

focus needed for such an important task and failed to set management responsibility on any 

person or entity in government, or to establish benchmarks for success.10

Parliament passed three laws, introducing a civil-military hybridization in the legal system: 

• Amendment to the Anti-Terrorism Act allowing the Rangers to be called in aid of civil 

power;

• Protection of Pakistan Act, giving special powers to the authorities to hold any person, 

often for rolling periods; and

• Amendment of the Army Act, allowing the military to set up courts for proceedings 

against terrorists via speedy trials.11

The government ceded some of its antiterror activities to the paramilitary Rangers in 

both Sindh and Punjab and gave cover to the military authorities to detain all suspects for 

virtually indefinite periods under the sweeping powers of the Protection of Pakistan Act. 

Military courts were also authorized to conduct highly secretive and speedy trials, including 

for civilians whom the military considered to be terrorists. This expansion of military law to 

cover civilians, the parallel courts run by the military, and the widening of their power of 

detention created a virtual though undeclared martial law throughout the country. Rather 

than enhancing the central government’s stature and reputation as an activist against 

terrorism and militancy, the outsourcing of policing and legal measures to the military 

reflected a weakness of purpose and ability. 

Unlike the previously invoked Article 245 under which fundamental rights were suspended, 

the new laws and the invocation of Section 147 of the constitution allows access to the 

Supreme Court for habeas corpus petitions (petitioning of the Supreme Court in the cases of 

persons who have been picked up by the authorities to produce the petitioner in court and 

establish the reasons for their detention). During the review of the draft amendments to the 

Army Act in January 2015,12 former law minister and PPP leader Aitzaz Ahsan raised the issue 

of provisions giving the military courts jurisdiction over those who “wage war against Pakistan 

and its armed forces” and whether this might apply to Baloch nationalists. The language was 

amended by adding “using the name of a religion or a sect,” thus confining it to groups like 

the Taliban and the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi. A sunset clause was also added, with the courts’ tenure 

set to expire in January 2017. The role of the Interior Ministry as the “competent authority” 

and the Law Ministry as the “advisory authority” was also defined with regard to the structure 

of military courts.

According to Mr. Ahsan, “We have to ask ourselves one question: are we in a state of war? 

If yes, then military courts are justifiable.” He believes this is true today, citing the Latin 

dictum Jus ad Bellem (right to war) and the evidence that there were 1.9 million courts martial 

None of the suggestions made 

in the NISP for coordination 

of intelligence and joint 

planning by civil and military 

organizations have been 

visibly implemented. 
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 393 7

instituted by the allies in World War II. Others see gray areas, including the use of the term 

“enemy alien” for insurgents in FATA.13 Aside from military-manned “special tribunals” to deal 

with terrorism-related cases, responsibility for other elements of the NAP and the order of 

priority within this broad agenda was not clarified. Given the devolution of political power 

to the provinces following the 18th Amendment, the real action ultimately takes place in the 

provincial capitals and by their officials and local police in conjunction with their military 

counterparts. But it was not clear who would provide the funding for these operations, especially at the provincial level, following the devolution of power from the center, and the nexus 

with the military was not clearly spelled out. 

Two broad areas require consideration by the military as it proceeds to exercise its newly 

enhanced powers: First, the need for transparency in the cases tried by its Judge Advocate 

General Branch. Little information is currently shared, and this could lead to legal problems, 

especially if the Supreme Court decides to offer a judgment on all the military trials in a single 

verdict.14 Second, the issue of penetration of Pakistani society (civil and military) by extremist 

religious ideology poses a potent threat. Unless the education system can be purged and the 

activities of militant religious groups curbed in the public sphere, the polity and system of 

laws risk being undermined from within. The military has reportedly taken some steps to curb 

the activities of some religious organizations in its ranks.

Despite its shortcomings, the NISP was a major step forward to outline the challenges facing Pakistan and identify the tasks ahead. If properly debated in civil society fora, and if the 

results of those exchanges had been synthesized, the NISP could well have laid the basis for a 

major shift in public understanding of and sustained support for this important initiative. But 

the key agency tasked with coordinating much of the work of the NISP, the National Counter 

Terrorism Authority (NACTA), was not yet fully operational as of early 2016 (more than a year 

after the launch of the NAP), and there was no clear coordinator within the central government 

for the media and public policy debates necessary to garner public support. NACTA’s role in the 

NAP remained passive and minimal (see Box 2, NACTA).

The Emerging Role of NACTA

The National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) is one institution that might be able 

to take on an important role and help coordinate civil and military actions against 

terrorism and militancy. After a delayed formation, NACTA gained a new coordinator 

in August 2015 and initial funding to begin to shape its mandate. Some funds have 

been released for it to hire staff and set up a bare-bones secretariat, but the 2016 

federal budget allocates only a small proportion of the funds requested and required.a

Moreover, the relatively lower pay scales and ranks of its members may place it at a 

disadvantage to other government agencies, especially the much bigger, better staffed 

and equipped agencies of the military. NACTA also continues to reside in the Ministry 

of Interior, constraining its ability to coordinate across government.

The current head of NACTA, Ihsan Ghani, a former Navy officer who transferred to 

the police service and has had a wide range of experience (including as inspector 

general of police and head of the Intelligence Bureau three times in Khyber 

Pakhtunkhwa), has outlined a broad and ambitious agenda for action since taking 

office in August 2015. He has been allocated a thirty-five-person staff and a board 

that is supposed to meet quarterly, though the board had not met until late 2015 

when Mr. Ghani was interviewed for this study. 

NACTA has a Joint Intelligence Directorate (JID) component that is envisioned to 

be eight hundred–men strong once it is fully staffed. But the JID will be primarily 

in military hands, and NACTA itself will have only three hundred staff at maximum. 

The military is averse to working under the Interior Ministry and would prefer to 

work with the prime minister’s office. Yet most donors, including the United States 

and the United Kingdom, seem to favor a civilian face of NACTA and are trying to 

direct resources toward it. 

Ghani sees NACTA’s role as not just to provide security alerts, but also to conduct 

research and craft policies, and to garner support for police work among the public 

by effective use of the media. NACTA plans to establish deeper links with local 

and international think tanks working on counterterrorism, countering violent 

extremism, deradicalization, conflict resolution, and stabilization. A key element 

in his deradicalization efforts is the creation of a strong base of police officers 

with sound academic and field experience.b At the top of his list of twelve items is 

seminary reform, given the deep roots of sectarianism, militancy, and terrorism in the 

educational system of Pakistan and the increasing role of religious schools. 

The success of NACTA will depend not only on the quality of its leadership and staff, 

but, perhaps more importantly, on the provision of financial and political support. This 

support is required if NACTA is to become an active participant in the implementation 

of the NAP, as well as a direct resource for the Cabinet Committee on National Security 

(CCNS)—which in theory is the central body to review Pakistan’s security issues, 

domestic and foreign. But the CCNS has not been meeting regularly, nor does it, or 

the National Security Advisor, routinely connect with NACTA.

a. In 2015–16 NACTA had been allocated Rs 1.06 billion. It had requested Rs 1.8 billion 

for 2016–17 but the current budget only indicated an allocation of Rs 109.42 million. 

Some administrative expenses may be hidden in the Ministry of Interior funds. See 

Qadeer Tanoli, “NACTA Assigned Only Rs 109.42m in Budget,” The Express Tribune, 

June 5, 2016, http://tribune.com.pk/story/1116544/just-fraction-nacta-assignedrs109-42m-budget/.

b. Interviews, Ihsan Ghani, Coordinator for NACTA, October 2015 and February 2016. 

Unless the education system 

can be purged and the activities 

of militant religious groups 

curbed in the public sphere, the 

polity and system of laws risk 

being undermined from within. 
8 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 393

Broadcast media relied on military reports to portray one aspect of the struggle: the 

clearance of militant hideouts in FATA and numbers of militant casualties. The new army 

chief was lionized by the media, not only for the attack on militants in FATA, but also for 

pushing for peace in Karachi, reportedly with help from the Inter-Services Public Relations 

Directorate and elements of civil society. There were some who felt that the entire army’s 

battle was being portrayed as one man’s battle. But the peripatetic army chief went out 

of his way in visiting his troops in the field to encourage their efforts; his face was seen 

everywhere as the man leading the battle. The civilian leadership, meanwhile, was missing 

in action. Another critical element missing in the implementation of the NAP was the role 

of the provincial governments, many of whom were working with Islamist groups in their 

electoral campaigns and who had allowed the gradual ingress of sectarian and other Islamist 

militants into their administrative machinery. 

Who Calls the Shots?

From all accounts, in the initial phase of the NAP, as in other aspects of national policymaking 

and governance, the military has the advantage of organization, preparation, access to resources, 

discipline, and unity of command, while the civilian side is fractured and often unprepared and 

slower to respond. The military traditionally takes the largest chunk of foreign counterinsurgency 

assistance, and it has spread its influence into key areas of foreign and even economic policy (for 

example, in the newly emerging projects related to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor). It 

thus can crowd out civilian efforts. When the military has a different view on any issue, it uses 

its large and powerful public relation machinery to issue tweets or press releases to promote its 

views, bypassing the Ministry of Defence that is its titular superior. When decisions are taken at 

the center, the military is ready to move faster than the civil side.

The inherent advantage of the military in being able to tackle the tasks assigned to it creates a potential challenge for the civilian side. As a senior U.S. official who deals with Pakistan 

put it, “The military is like a great big tree that does not allow much else to grow beneath its 

shade.” In the interest of efficiency, the military may take on more tasks against militancy and 

terrorism, but it will need to create partnerships at early stages of planning and implementation with civilian agencies so it can transfer tasks to them to be completed and translated into 

political actions. The military does not have the skill set for forensics and preparation of legal 

cases, especially those involving complicated financial dealings; it will need to work with civilian experts and local police on such matters. Otherwise civilian courts will throw out its cases.

For its part, the central government has not set up a clearly visible central coordinating 

secretariat to handle implementation of the NAP. It is unclear if the central role of the Ministry 

of Interior that was envisaged in the NISP is understood or even supported by the rest of the 

government. Currently, the Ministry of Defence does not appear to have an active role in this 

process. The Ministry of Interior does, and it is primarily the minister who is seen as the public 

face; yet he does not participate in provincial meetings as a central coordinator should. Except 

for Punjab, where the ruling party at the center has political control, opposition parties or 

coalition governments at the provincial level make coordination by the central government 

very difficult. Provincial governments have different and more localized political objectives 

largely aimed at preserving their political and economic hold. The result is a cacophony of 

voices within government and confused messages to the general public. 

In contrast, the military has a clear and very steep pyramid of power, with devolved 

authority at the corps commander level. But the national dialogue on militancy and terror 

must allow room for debate and disagreement so all aspects of the public’s views are shared 

and understood. This is largely missing today.
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 393 9

Parliament can and should play a role in this regard. There does not appear to be much 

effort by provincial or national parliamentarians to seek answers to questions about the 

nature and progress of the NAP. Parliament convenes only when major attacks take place, 

rather than serving as a proactive forum for investigating issues and crafting guidelines for 

the government to follow up via public hearings and seeking answers from both military and 

civilian leaders. Constitutional responsibility properly rests with the elected representatives 

of the people, but despite lip service from both senior civil and military officials that the 

government and the military are working in tandem and that the civilians are driving the 

process, it seems much of the action has been outsourced to the military.

Good governance rests on transparency and accountability. An ambitious target has been 

set for the military via the establishment of military courts with a sunset clause of two years. 

It is too soon to cite the effects of speedy trials as a deterrent to violent extremism. The 

TTP continues to attack soft targets in urban Pakistan; it may have lost its bases in FATA, 

but clearly has allies in the hinterland that assist these attacks. The relative drop in crime 

in Karachi is an exception, but whether it is a sustainable situation depends on many factors. On the military side, increased access of civil groups and journalists and analysts to 

firsthand information on operations in FATA and elsewhere in the country could help build 

understanding and greater public support for combined civil-military efforts.

Provincial Apex Committees

A key initial element of the NAP implementation plan was the formation of ad hoc bodies at 

the provincial level, bringing together military and civilian leaders. The “Apex Committee” 

format was used during the Musharraf government to bring together the corps commander 

and the provincial political leadership in Peshawar to discuss issues related to security in 

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (earlier known as the North West Frontier Province) and FATA. Its revival 

offered an opportunity to bring together the chief ministers and their senior officials in each 

provincial capital with the army corps commander and his senior officials, as well as the Directors General Rangers of Sindh and Punjab and the Inspectors General of the Frontier Corps in 

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, where applicable. On rare occasions, the governor or 

other leading politicians were invited to meetings. The army chief and the director general of 

the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (DG ISI) participated in some meetings when the 

chief ministers were also present. 

But the minister of interior and heads of NACTA and the Intelligence Bureau were not 

regulars in those provincial deliberations; nor was the minister of defense, nor even the new 

national security advisor. In August 2016, the national security advisor was tasked by the 

prime minister with a review of the NAP; however, he does not have the staff or resources 

nor the line authority to monitor or shape actions in the provinces. The interior minister 

immediately clarified in the national assembly that the national security advisor’s work was 

merely “administrative,” referring to the fifteen committees that the prime minister had set 

up to monitor the NAP. No details of the remits of those committees were provided.15 There 

was no system for consistent and regular reporting to the public on the agenda and outcomes of the Apex meetings. At the national level, a few topics are raised again and again, 

but without much continuum in analysis. Among these is the request from the military to 

activate the special courts under the Protection of Pakistan Act and for politicians to take 

the lead in moving against seminaries, hate speech, and religious scholars known for inciting 

sectarianism. The federal ministers for interior and finance were asked to review existing 

laws related to ending terrorism financing and suggest ways of improving them. 
10 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 393

At the provincial level, the nature, tone, and content of the discussions varies widely, 

depending on the issues at the forefront in each province. The site of the meetings also varies. 

Some are held at military headquarters, others at the chief minister’s offices. There is little 

direct coordination of these meetings’ agendas with the announced purposes of the NAP.

Punjab

The first meeting of the Punjab Apex Committee took place at the corps headquarters in Lahore 

Cantonment and included the army chief, DG ISI, corps commanders from across Punjab, and 

the Chief Minister Shahbaz Sharif. This high-level discussion focused on the internal security 

situation. The chief minister emphasized the need for a comprehensive security plan that could 

be jointly executed by the civil sect and the military. It was not clear who would take the 

lead, though the army chief assured the chief minister of the army’s support. Over time, the 

focus shifted to changing curricula and on seminaries. Specific actions to restrict the financial 

activities and fundraising of banned organizations and a crackdown on terrorists and their 

facilitators and financiers came to the fore in subsequent meetings. Again, no details were 

shared with the public. Between January 2015 and November 2015, some seven meetings of 

the Apex Committee were reportedly held in Punjab.

No visible actions have yet emerged against the Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammed, or 

other extremist organizations that were once seen as proxies of the state against India in 

Kashmir. The army chief is reported to have stated privately that actions will proceed against 

all groups and that “we will go where the evidence takes us.” But other than a limited action 

against a single group of gangsters led by a man named Chottu in Punjab under an operation 

spearheaded by the Lahore corps commander and named Zarb-e-Ahan, there has been no 

concerted military push to pursue its stated goals.16 The previous corps commander also supported the likelihood of military action in Punjab “as and when the time comes.”17 According to him, a list of some eleven hundred potential suspects was gathered in consultations 

between Inter-Services Intelligence, Military Intelligence, and the police’s counterterrorism 

department. Many of the key suspects were already in jails; the corps commander indicated 

that within two months, seven hundred had been captured. The military was also concerned 

about the mushrooming of madrassahs in the province and proceeded to identify through 

“geotagging” some fourteen thousand. “Finally we went in for five hundred madaris,” the 

corps commander said. The army chief sat in on a meeting of the prime minister with religious leaders in Islamabad to emphasize the importance of keeping the madaris in check. 

“We’d tell them to start at the top,” said the corps commander, while admitting that the 

“capacity of the Punjab authorities was limited.”18

As a result, the provincial government was seen to act against the violent sectarian Sunni 

group Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, and reports of the killing of their leadership in police encounters 

appear to indicate that certain groups that incite sectarian hatred and are based in central 

Punjab have come under pressure. According to Lt. Gen. Naweed Zaman, “This helped turn the 

tide.”19 Southern Punjabi groups with whom the ruling PML-N is reported to have had electoral 

alliances are not yet feeling the heat, nor are groups that were affiliated with the Kashmir jihad 

under the aegis of the military. Reports of intelligence-based operations (IBOs) nationwide 

and specifically in Punjab indicate that evidence may be collected by both civil and military 

authorities, but the nexus of these IBOs and counterterrorism operations is hard to establish 

in the absence of detailed information from the authorities.

Chief Minister Shahbaz Sharif favored the concept of “safe cities,” starting with Lahore. 

He supported the raising of a new counterterrorism department entirely on merit with both 

male and female cadres. The chief minister spoke of improving forensic capabilities of the 
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 393 11

Punjab police, enhancements in Sahiwal jail for holding terrorists and militants, and a focus 

on deradicalization efforts. He spoke of the battle of the “bullet of the gun versus the bullet 

of economics,” and emphasized the importance of infrastructure to bring private sector investments into Punjab. Further, he hoped that the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor would allow 

the government to fight terrorism with economic tools.20 This appears to be a good potential 

strategy, but his ability to implement it may be constrained by both resources and the deadweight of historical alliances with militant groups, especially in southern Punjab.

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the FATA

The inaugural meeting of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) Apex Committee took place on 

January 4, 2015, and included the army chief, the DG ISI, the corps commander of Peshawar, 

the governor of KP, and the Chief Minister Pervez Khattak. The discussion focused on KP 

and FATA, progress of Zarb-e-Azb, operations in Khyber Agency of FATA, and the situation of 

the displaced persons as a result of military operations. Brief reports on all nine meetings 

of the Apex Committee between January 2015 and February 2016 appeared in local media.

Late in January 2016, the focus shifted to security of educational institutions following 

the attack on Bacha Khan University in Charsadda. IBOs also figured in these more recent 

meetings. Resettlement remained an important agenda item in February 2016. The military 

was keen to set up an improved administration to handle the needs of the people; there 

appeared to be consensus that the FATA reform process was very slow. This took place against 

the backdrop of a report from the FATA Reforms Commission with recommendations regarding 

the future status of FATA. The prime minister set up a new committee, headed by his Advisor of 

Foreign Affairs Sartaj Aziz, to review the recommendations and suggest actions. There was no 

public discussion or reporting on progress on this front until July 2016. No clear representation 

from FATA, in either the reforms commission or the subsequent committee, indicated that the 

final decision would be taken in Islamabad without ratification by the people of FATA. This is 

what finally transpired as a new report was produced and released in June 2016 that recommended a merger of some parts of FATA into KP in a gradual process—thus expanding the size 

of KP instead of creating a new province that might have benefitted from focused attention 

to its special needs and given the people of FATA greater say in their future.21

The army’s point of view will likely continue to play a key role in whatever developments 

occur, since it has taken effective control of FATA and has a vested interest in preserving 

the relative calm in the region—albeit without a huge proportion of the population of the 

two Waziristans back in their homeland. 

The current corps commander, who served with 7 Division in North Waziristan in 2008, 

explained that there were “no instructions about good and bad Taliban. But we did not have 

the capacity to deal with everyone. Today, I am all out against everyone!”22 Public doubts 

remain over the relationship with the Haqqani group, whose leadership and families many 

believe continue to receive protection in the hinterland. He acknowledged that, at that time 

(2007–08), “we also held back because we were fighting Muslims. But then we lost good men.” 

This helped clarify the resolve of the military. “The army was clear” from that point onward; 

yet, according to the corps commander, elements in society had sympathy for the insurgents, 

“not due to understanding, but lack of understanding.” The delay in launching the North 

Waziristan Agency (NWA) operation was also because the “government did not have enough 

money to support it.” This runs counter to the military’s own data after the Swat operation 

that indicated that some forty thousand troops had been shifted into NWA. Some Pakistani Rs 

88 billion (roughly $840 million) are needed for resettlement of displaced persons from NWA, 

according to the corps commander. No details of these expenditures are available. 
12 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 393

The military operations are largely at the “clear and hold” stages. “Build and transfer” 

are not yet done in any substantive manner, though some rebuilding activity under the military’s aegis had started in South Waziristan Agency with U.S. and Arab funds and in Miran 

Shah in NWA. A road network has been created in NWA that serves a strategic purpose for 

military operations but also promises to assist in the economic revival of the agency. The 

primary objective of the military now is a four-phased operation to bring back the temporarily displaced persons (TDPs); to immediately rehabilitate mosques, roads, schools, electricity, 

water, and livestock; and to bring back teachers.

According to the corps commander, phase one for the return of TDPs has been completed. 

Roads have been built and electricity restored, including installation of solar equipment to 

assist with tube wells and piped water. The military took the lead, since, according to the 

commander, the FATA Secretariat did not have the capacity. On the military side of the operations in FATA, Lt. Gen. Hidayat ur Rehman reported that the border had been closed to ingress 

from Afghanistan in the area adjoining NWA. In the Tirah area, too, and the broader Khyber 

Agency, successive operations have cleared the militants of the Lashkar-e-Islam, facilitating 

travel to and from Peshwar in one hour instead of six. According to him, over two thousand 

IBOs had been conducted in conjunction with the police in KP by the latter half of 2015. 

The head of the Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf (PTI), Imran Khan, confirmed that there was good 

cooperation in the Apex Committee.23 Yet, Chief Minister Pervez Khattak of the PTI sent a 

long list of demands to the central government in a letter under the heading, “Meeting of [sic] 

chalking out of strategy to curb the infiltration of militants and their subversive activities.” 

Acknowledging that “the Zarb-e-Azab [sic] operation and the implementation of the National 

Action Plan have considerably improved the situation,” he stated that the “incidents of terrorism have decreased considerably” but “extortion has again cropped up” with “98 percent 

of extortion calls...originating from Afghanistan.” He sought better border management and 

greater control over operation of Afghan subscriber identity modules and the spillover of cell 

phone signals into Pakistan from Afghanistan. Further, he asked for an increase of KP police 

manpower and funding for it.24 The army corps commander spoke highly of the KP police force, 

labeling it “strong and brave and ready to act.” But he also stressed that it needed “to be 

trained and equipped.” Clearly, the full implementation of the NAP in KP has some way to go, 

and removal of resource constraints will be key to its eventual success.

A critical element in determining the future of FATA and of the fight against militancy in KP 

and FATA is the ability to engage with the local populations and to bring them into managing 

their own affairs. The corps commander cited a local saying about the Pakhtuns: “If you force 

them to go to heaven, they will refuse. If you take their views, they’ll [even] go to hell [for 

you]!”25 The speed of the resettlement effort will testify to his own ability to abide by that dictum. What is clear is the desire of the military to retain its control over FATA for the time being.

Balochistan

The first meeting of the Balochistan Apex Committee took place in Quetta on January 9, 2015, 

and was chaired by the Chief Minister Dr. Abdul Malik Baloch, assisted by the home minister, 

the chief secretary, the inspector general of police, and the home secretary. Commander of 

Southern Command, Lt. Gen. Nasser Khan Janjua and the inspector general of the Frontier Corps 

(Balochistan) also participated. (General Janjua later retired and was inducted into the central 

government as national security advisor but ceased to participate in meetings on the NAP.) 

According to published reports, the meeting focused on cases to be sent to military courts, 

and an agreement was established to work with clerics to eradicate hate speech and literature. 

It was also decided that the committee would meet every fifteen days; however, according to 

the public record, only six meetings took place until February 2016.

The primary objective of the 

military now is a four-phased 

operation to bring back the 

temporarily displaced persons; 

to immediately rehabilitate 

mosques, roads, schools, 

electricity, water, and livestock; 

and to bring back teachers.
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 393 13

The second meeting was bigger and at a higher level, with the prime minister, governor, 

army chief, Senior Minister Sardar Sanaullah Zehri, DG ISI, federal ministers of defence and 

railways, minister of state for petroleum, former prime minister Mir Zafarullah Khan Jamali, 

commander of Southern Command, inspector general of the Frontier Corps (Balochistan), 

inspector general of police, and director general of Inter-Services Public Relations Directorate attending. The prime minister called for executions for those convicted in death penalty 

cases. It was also decided to move against organizations and seminaries involved in terrorism and to restrict cross-border infiltration. Later meetings added to these issues by focusing on the collection of data on seminaries and Afghan clerics, creation of jobs for Baloch 

youth, and hurdles in the creation of the western corridor of the China-Pakistan Economic 

Corridor that would pass through Balochistan and could potentially benefit its people.

Under the previous military commander of Southern Command, Lt. General Janjua, a concerted effort was launched to change the nature of the dialogue with the Baloch people and 

especially to persuade the return from exile of some tribal leaders. An effort was launched 

to buy back weapons from militants and to pay militants to surrender to the authorities. 

Reportedly, Rs 150,000 (roughly $1,500) per foot soldier and Rs 1,000,000 (roughly $10,000) 

per leader was being offered.26

Sindh

The Sindh Apex Committee was headed by the chief minister and was comprised of thirteen 

members including, among others, the provincial ministers for information and parliamentary affairs, the corps commander, chief secretary, Director General Rangers, the inspector 

general of police, divisional commissioner, sector commander of the Inter-Services Intelligence, and joint director general of the Intelligence Bureau of Sindh. It held its first 

meeting on January 8, 2015, and was briefed, among other things, on the cases of religious 

and sectarian terrorism. The Sindh government agreed to strengthen legislation on hate 

speech and extremist material, use of loudspeakers, and monitoring of printers and publishers and SMS (short message service, or text messages on mobile telephones), websites, and 

social media. The chief minister also asked all departments to suggest cases to be sent to 

the military courts for expeditious handling, and to crack down on illegal immigrants and 

Afghan refugees who had sought shelter in Sindh. Some sixty-four terrorism cases were 

subsequently sent to military courts.27

Later meetings focused on establishing an antiterrorism force inside the police and a 

counterterrorism department. But the military continued to have concerns about the nature 

of the police appointees, and at one meeting, the army chief asked for the depoliticizing of 

these appointments by having the Apex Committee approve postings. The committee also 

decided to launch a comprehensive operation to end terrorism financing networks, and the 

army chief approved the setting up of a counterterrorism office at V Corps headquarters with 

an intelligence-sharing cell. The corps commander also suggested the need for computerization of records of seminaries and land records.28 Later meetings bemoaned the slow progress 

in implementing many of the earlier decisions of the Apex Committee and especially on the 

low conviction rates of criminals. The committee was told that slow progress in Sindh was 

hampering the national effort. An issue frequently arising was the rolling mandate of the 

Rangers in aid of civil power. They had to be requisitioned for ninety days at a time, and the 

Sindh government had concerns about their actions, which enveloped political operatives 

of the ruling PPP.

The activist Director General Rangers’ Major General Bilal Akbar pressed hard for his 

autonomy and stressed repeatedly, even in public statements, about the importance of 

proceeding with their efforts “to their logical conclusion.” The corps commander also went 
14 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 393

public with his statement of intent that the antiterrorism operations would continue until 

peace was established in Karachi. He spelled out his vision in a forthright statement that 

went viral in Pakistan.29 There was no supporting statement from the PPP leadership. Some 

thirteen meetings were held from January 2015 to January 2016, and additional measures 

were agreed upon, including increasing the police force by some eight thousand recruits.

There is a visible gap between the provincial political leadership and the military on the 

one hand and the central government on the other. Reports abound that many provincial 

leaders of the PPP have decamped to Dubai for fear of being enveloped in the military’s legal 

dragnet. The ability of the provincial government to delay processes and to disrupt operations 

by transferring police officers and others in key slots should be curbed to facilitate continuity.

Recommendations and the Way Ahead

The military has declared Zarb-e-Azb largely over. According to the Peshawar Corps commander, “Security forces have presence in 99.2 percent of areas within FATA,”30 with only a 

small area bordering Afghanistan unoccupied. The army is now launching so-called “combing” operations (intelligence-based sweeps) in rural and urban KP to eliminate sleeper cells 

and networks. Zarb-e-Azb has displaced the terrorist networks in FATA and destroyed their 

training and supply centers, but the leadership escaped to Afghanistan. The terrorist and 

militant sectarian networks inside Pakistan proper have yet to be dismantled and disarmed, 

especially in Punjab. Pakistan has taken the first steps in fighting its war within; how well 

this battle of Pakistan proceeds will determine if this will be a swift victory or a long, drawnout campaign with an uncertain ending.

The biggest challenge facing the country other than terrorism is the sluggish economy. 

Pakistan cannot afford to muddle through the next critical decade when its youth cohort 

will expand at an alarming rate and the job outlook appears bleak. It is said that a budget 

reflects the values of a country and its society. The 2016–17 budget indicates the lopsided 

nature of Pakistan’s budgetary allocations: defense spending rose from Rs 781 billon in the 

previous year to Rs 860.2 billion (11 percent), while education rose from Rs 74 billion to Rs 

82 billion and health from Rs 11 billion to Rs 12.1 billion.31

The government should be commended for coming up with both the NISP and the NAP, 

which serve as important steps toward a national debate on domestic security threats, and 

to counter the narrative of the militant groups. However, the strategy needs to cover other 

key elements, for example education reform, that could pose challenges in achieving its 

intended objectives. 

Establishing sharper terms of reference for the NAP, even at this stage, could help spell 

out more clearly the relationship of the civilian and military actors in the process of formulating and implementing this strategy. The prime minister should also ask for periodic 

progress reports and designate the minister of interior to liaise with the provinces and other 

key entities, including the military, to that end. These reports should be shared with parliament for discussion on a regular basis and later with the public. 

The NAP could set up an empowered office, perhaps under the NSA, in the Prime Minister’s Secretariat to help coordinate and execute the strategy at the central and provincial 

levels. NACTA’s role needs to be clarified and linked to the NAP in general, perhaps by bringing it under or closer to the NSA in the Prime Minister’s Secretariat. A clearer link between 

the Cabinet Committee on National Security and the work of the national security advisor 

would facilitate wider buy-in across the national landscape, including from the military. 

The strategy should clarify the government’s position on not only the continued 

operation of armed militias inside Pakistan but also the unfettered and often extra-legal 

The biggest challenge facing the 

country other than terrorism is 

the sluggish economy. Pakistan 

cannot afford to muddle 

through the next critical decade 

when its youth cohort will 

expand at an alarming rate and 

the job outlook appears bleak. 
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 393 15

operations of its own agencies. This would produce greater accountability and help establish 

public confidence in this effort and in the government’s intentions.32

The deployment of paramilitary forces for a prolonged period in urban settings could 

become counterproductive. Recent videos posted by the MQM’s social media teams show 

Rangers’ soldiers and noncommissioned officers beating civilians in public in Karachi, 

actions that hitherto were associated with the ill-trained local police forces. Such counterpropaganda by political forces will make the military’s job difficult. 

Better training of prosecutors could assist the military in taking cases to their proper 

conclusion. This is the weakest link in the civil-military nexus. Cases fall apart when poor 

police work and prosecution leads to dismissal of cases in civil courts.

The military should assist in redirecting counterinsurgency and counterterrorism funding 

toward civilian efforts so they could be better equipped to take over operations after initial 

clearing activities by the military. The military also needs to work closely with civilian financial 

experts and bankers to guide the military in the forensics of antiterrorism cases. 

Public support for the military’s actions to clean up corruption in the messy political 

system can become a double-edged sword. In the absence of speedy positive results and 

transparency, the emergence of broadcast media and cell phone–based technologies can 

easily muster a counternarrative to the military’s messaging.

There must be clear assignment of responsibility and participation of key elements of 

the state in the NAP’s deliberations, including specific roles for the Ministry of Interior and 

NACTA, the Intelligence Bureau, the Ministry of Defence, and provincial police departments. 

Commensurate resources should be allocated to these tasks; for example, adequate police 

forces in Karachi and other key provinces. Further clarity is required on the nature and flow 

of resources that will be provided from the center to the provinces, which bear the heaviest 

weight of implementation of the NAP’s objectives. 

Finally, the role of military intelligence services needs to be examined carefully, especially 

relative to the civilian Intelligence Bureau, which should be the first line of defense against 

domestic militancy and terrorism. There does not appear to be any collaborative mechanism 

set up between the military and civil intelligence agencies. The NACTA’s Joint Intelligence 

Directorate is not going anywhere if the paltry 2016–17 budget allocation for NACTA and its 

existing staffing are any guide. It is disturbing to hear of instances of lack of coordination even 

among the military’s separate agencies.

Pakistan could well achieve success in its counterterrorism and countermilitancy goals 

with better focus and better organization of its current disparate efforts to that end. Given 

the complex urban battlefield, this should be seen as an extended project rather than one 

that will yield results against the symptoms of militancy and terrorism in the short term. The 

current actions of both civil and military planners do not indicate a long-term plan to fight 

the sources of terrorism and militancy; hence, the outlook for the battle against militancy and 

terrorism remains uncertain.

Notes

1. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds, Washington, DC: National 

Intelligence Council, 2012, www.dni.gov/files/documents/Interactive%20Le%20Menu.pdf. 

2. Interview, General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, Rawalpindi, March 2016. Indeed, the military dusted off an old word to 

describe the insurgents as “miscreants,” an antique English word once used to describe the independence-loving 

Bengalis who wished to break away from Pakistan in 1971. 

3. National Assembly of Pakistan, Resolutions, “Consensus Resolution at the Conclusion of the In-Camera Joint 

Sitting of Parliament (8th Oct–22th Oct 2008), www.na.gov.pk/en/resolution_detail.php?id=39. 

4. “Pakistan Invades Taliban Stronghold,” The Washington Times, October 18, 2009, www.washingtontimes.com/

news/2009/oct/18/pakistan-invades-taliban-stronghold/?page=all. 

5. “General Kayani Called on Nawaz Sharif on Security Matters,” The News Tribe, August 19, 2013, www.thenewstribe.

com/2013/08/19/general-kayani-called-on-pm-nawaz-sharif-on-security-matters/. 

Given the complex urban 

battlefield, this should be 

seen as an extended project 

rather than one that will yield 

results against the symptoms of 

militancy and terrorism in the 

short term. 
6. Ministry of Interior, National Internal Security Policy: 2014–2018, Pakistan: Ministry of Interior, 2014, http://

nacta.gov.pk/policies/NISP.pdf. 

7. Interview, Senior General, 2013; and Interview, Member of National Security Council Staff, 2016. 

8. Zahir Shah Sherazi, “TTP Claims Attack on Karachi Airport,” Dawn, June 9, 2014, www.dawn.com/news/1111397. 

9. Interview, Rao Qamar Suleman, Chief of Air Staff, 2014.

10. Anup Kaphle, “Pakistan Announces a National Plan to Fight Terrorism, Says Terrorists’ Days Are Numbered,” The 

Washington Post, December 24, 2014, www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2014/12/24/pakistanannounces-a-national-plan-to-fight-terrorism-says-terrorists-days-are-numbered/. 

11. For more details on these changes and their nuances, please see Tariq Parvez and Mahvish Rani, An Appraisal of 

Pakistan’s Anti-Terrorism Act (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2015; and Zulfiqar Hameed, “Changes in 

Pakistan’s Counter-Terrorism Legal Regime,” New America, June 11, 2015, www.newamerica.org/internationalsecurity/policy-papers/changes-in-pakistans-counter-terrorism-legal-regime/.

12. “Two Bills Tabled in NA for Changes to Constitution, Army Act,” The News International, January 4, 2015, www.

thenews.com.pk/print/10118-two-bills-tabled-in-na-for-changes-to-constitution-army-act. 

13. Interview, Babar Sattar, February 2016.

14. This was the view of a number of persons interviewed individually and in focus groups in October 2015 and in 

February and March 2016. 

15. Hassan Belal Zaidi, “NAP Body Led by NSA Merely Administrative,” Dawn, August 17, 2016, www.dawn.com/

news/1278092. 

16. Kashif Zafar, “Operation Zarb-e-Ahan: Every Terrorist Will Be Eliminated, Says Sukhera,” The Express Tribune, April 

11, 2016, http://tribune.com.pk/story/1082336/operation-zarb-e-ahan-every-terrorist-will-be-eliminated-sayssukhera/.

17. Interview, Lt. Gen. Naweed Zaman, Lahore, October 2015. 

18. Op. Cit. 

19. Op. Cit. 

20. Interview, Chief Minister Shahbaz Sharif, Lahore, October 2015. 

21. Ismail Khan, “Reforms Proposed for Fata’s Merger into KP,” Dawn, June 13, 2016, www.dawn.com/news/1264492. 

22. Interview, Lt. Gen. Hidayat ur Rehman, Peshawar, 2015.

23. Interview, Imran Khan, Bani Gala, Islamabad, February 2016.

24. Facsimile of chief minister’s letter to the prime minister, February 23, 2016.

25. Op. Cit. 

26. Interview, news analyst with close ties to military, Islamabad, October 2015.

27. “Sindh, Balochistan to Combat Terrorism Together,” The News International, February 13, 2015, www.thenews.

com.pk/print/23743-sindh-balochistan-to-combat-terrorism-together.

28. Sindh Apex Body Bans Display of Weapons,” The Nation, April 18, 2015, http://nation.com.pk/karachi/18-

Apr-2015/sindh-apex-body-bans-display-of-weapons.

29. “Karachi Operation Will Continue Until Peace is Established: Corps Commander Karachi,” Filmed May 2015, Daily 

Mail, www.dailymotion.com/video/x2qe338_karachi-operation-will-continue-until-peace-is-established-corpscommander-karachi_news.

30. Zulfiqar Ali, “Sleeper Cells Being Eliminated in KP: Army,” Dawn, May 31, 2016, www.dawn.com/news/1261720/

sleeper-cells-being-eliminated-in-kp-army.

31. “Dar Unveils Agri-Focused Budget to Meet Growth Target,” Dawn, June 4, 2016, www.dawn.com/news/1262508/

dar-unveils-agri-focused-budget-to-meet-growth-target.

32. These suggestions also benefit from the recommendations of experts convened by the South Asia Center, Atlantic 

Council, Washington, DC, May 2014. 

Of Related Interest

• The Islamic State in Pakistan by Tariq Parvez (Special Report, September 2016)

• Nationalistic Narratives in Pakistani Textbooks by Ahsan Butt (Peace Brief, July 2016)

• Informality in Karachi’s Land, Manufacturing, and Transport Sectors by Asad Sayeed, Khurram 

Husain, and Syed Salim Raza (Peaceworks, May 2016)

• Terrorism Prosecution in Pakistan by Syed Manzar Abbas Zaidi (Peaceworks, April 2016)

• Pakistan After the Lahore Bombing: Shaping the Security Response by Colin Cookman (Peace 

Brief, April 2016)

ISBN: 978-1-60127-628-5

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reports can be found on our website 

(www.usip.org), together with additional 

information on the subject.

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