Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before 

any court except for the purpose of 

establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

CLARK W. HOLESINGER GREGORY F. ZOELLER

Valparaiso, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana

MICHAEL GENE WORDEN

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

ERIC WILLIAM STAHL, )

)

Appellant-Defendant, )

)

vs. ) No. 45A04-1303-PC-137

)

STATE OF INDIANA, )

)

Appellee-Plaintiff. )

APPEAL FROM THE LAKE SUPERIOR COURT CRIMINAL DIVISION 2

The Honorable Clarence D. Murray, Judge

Cause No. 45G02-1109-PC-005

August 12, 2014

MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

FRIEDLANDER, Judge
2

Eric William Stahl appeals from the denial of post-conviction relief from his 1992 

conviction for murder and felony robbery, presenting the following restated issues for 

review:

1. Did Stahl receive ineffective assistance of trial counsel regarding 

counsel’s advice as to the maximum possible sentence faced by Stahl?

2. Did Stahl receive ineffective assistance of appellate counsel?

We affirm.

The underlying facts were set out by our Supreme Court in Stahl’s 1993 direct 

appeal, as follows:

Louise and James McIntire operated a retail motorcycle business in Hobart, 

Indiana. In mid-July 1988, Stahl discussed the purchase of a motorcycle from 

the shop. Stahl returned to the shop on July 29, left a $100 check as a deposit, 

and indicated that he would return the following day to take delivery. After 

a telephone call to the bank about the check, Stahl was advised that he would 

be required to pay with cash or a certified check.

Stahl returned to the store on Saturday morning, July 30, a day the store 

would normally close at 3:30. He confirmed his desire to purchase the 

motorcycle and offered the one he already owned in trade. He telephoned 

three times during the day to discuss taking delivery of the new motorcycle. 

At approximately 4:30 that afternoon, Stahl returned to the store and stayed 

until after 6:00. At around 5:00, Mr. McIntire spoke with his wife by 

telephone, telling her that Stahl was in the shop and that they were waiting 

for the purchase money to be delivered by a cashier. When later telephone 

calls to the shop went unanswered, Mrs. McIntire went to the shop and found 

her husband dead on the bathroom floor. Both the motorcycle that Stahl had 

been negotiating to purchase and all copies of the documents pertaining to 

that purchase were missing from the shop.

The next day, Stahl was questioned by the police. He admitted being in the 

store between 4:30 and 6:00. He stated that he had paid for the motorcycle 

with cash and that just before he left the building, a white male entered with 

a weapon hidden under his belt. Additionally, Stahl turned over his copies of 
3

the sales documents on the motorcycle. After reviewing the documents, the 

victim’s son testified that this paperwork was not signed by his father and 

was not completed in the same manner that his father would have completed 

it. A handwriting expert later identified some of the victim’s purported 

handwriting on these documents as belonging to Stahl and not the victim. 

Finally, two witnesses testified at trial that Stahl had admitted shooting the 

victim.

Stahl v. State, 616 N.E.2d 9, 10-11 (Ind. 1993) (footnote omitted). In his direct appeal, 

Stahl challenged the refusal of a tendered instruction, as well as the admission of alleged 

hearsay statements of the victim. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court in all respects. 

On September 7, 2011, Stahl filed his PCR petition, which the trial court denied following 

a hearing.

In his PCR petition, Stahl alleged that he received ineffective assistance of trial and 

appellate counsel. In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a 

petitioner must demonstrate both that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the 

petitioner was prejudiced thereby. Bethea v. State, 983 N.E.2d 1134 (Ind. 2013) (citing 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)); see also Taylor v. State, 840 N.E.2d 324, 

331 (Ind. 2006) (the failure to satisfy either component will cause an ineffective assistance 

of counsel claim to fail). This is the so-called Strickland test. Counsel’s performance is 

deficient if it falls below an objective standard of reasonableness, “committing errors so 

serious that the defendant did not have the ‘counsel’ guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.” 

Id. at 1138. To establish the requisite prejudice, a petitioner must show there is “a 

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would 

have been different.” Id. “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine 
4

confidence in the outcome.” Passwater v. State, 989 N.E.2d 766, 770 (Ind. 2013). The 

two elements of Strickland are separate and independent inquiries. Thus, if it is easier to 

dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, that course 

should be followed. Helton v. State, 907 N.E.2d 1020 (Ind. 2010).

1.

We begin with Stahl’s claim that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. 

Under Issue II in his brief, Stahl frames this issue as: “Was Petitioner denied the effective 

assistance of Counsel at either the trial level or the appellate level?” Brief of Appellant at 

15. He then claims that he was advised by his trial counsel that he faced a maximum 

possible sentence of sixty years, which was less than the eighty years the trial court actually 

imposed. Even if this is true, Stahl does not identify the prejudice he suffered as a result 

of this error, much less support his case with legal argument. Therefore, he has not satisfied 

the showing of prejudice required in order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of 

trial counsel. Helton v. State, 907 N.E.2d 1020.

2.

We turn now to Stahl’s claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. We 

review claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel utilizing the same standard that 

is used for claims pertaining to trial counsel, i.e., the petitioner must show appellate 

counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficiency resulted in prejudice. Garrett 

v. State, 992 N.E.2d 710 (Ind. 2013). Claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel 

“generally fall into three basic categories: (1) denial of access to an appeal, (2) waiver of 
5

issues, and (3) failure to present issues well.” Id. at 724 (quoting Reed v. State, 856 N.E.2d 

1189, 1195 (Ind. 2006)). Stahl’s claim falls into the second category.

1

 He contends that, 

in sentencing him, the trial court “did take things into account which were improper, 

including factors which are elements of the crimes for which Petitioner was convicted [.]” 

Brief of Appellant at 17. Specifically, he claims (1) the trial court cited elements of the 

offenses of which he was convicted as aggravating circumstances, (2) considered evidence 

that was presented at the sentencing hearing but had not been introduced at trial and not 

disclosed to Stahl until the day of the sentencing hearing, (3) considered unrelated 

misconduct in a different state, and (4) noted that Stahl took advantage of an elderly victim. 

According to Stahl, had appellate counsel raised these issue on direct appeal, “there is a 

reasonable probability that the appellate court would have granted relief to petitioner and 

that the facts shown are sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome that the Court 

did breach in its sentencing order.” Id. at 18-19.

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to raise an issue 

on appeal, “the defendant must overcome the strongest presumption of adequate assistance,

and judicial scrutiny is highly deferential.” Garrett v. State, 992 N.E.2d at 724 (quoting 

 

1 Stahl also includes in this discussion the allegation “that at no time did [Stahl] have any contact with his 

appointed appellate Counsel.” Brief of Appellant and 17. If this was intended as an argument that he 

received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel because counsel did not have contact with him, it falls 

considerably short of the requirements of Rule 46 (A)(8) of the Indiana Rules of Appellate Procedure, which 

provides that contentions must be supported by cogent argument and reasoning, complete with citation to 

authority. Therefore, the argument is waived. See Harman v. State, 4 N.E.3d 209 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014),

trans. denied.
6

Ben–Yisrayl v. State, 738 N.E.2d 253, 260–61 (Ind. 2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1164 

(2002)). We apply the following test when evaluating the performance element of the 

Strickland test: (1) Are the unraised issues “significant and obvious from the face of the 

record”, and (2) are the unraised issues “clearly stronger” than the raised issues? Id. If this

analysis demonstrates deficient performance, then we evaluate the prejudice element by 

examining whether “the issues which ... appellate counsel failed to raise would have been 

clearly more likely to result in reversal or an order for a new trial.” Id. (Bieghler v. State,

690 N.E.2d 188, 194 (Ind. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1021) (quotation omitted).

Stahl first complains that appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing 

to appeal the trial court’s citing elements of the offenses of which he was convicted as 

aggravating factors. In the present posture, he is required to do more than allege trial court 

error; he must explain why the unraised issue was “significant and obvious” and how the

issue is “clearly stronger” than the issues raised on direct appeal. See, e.g., Reed v. State,

856 N.E.2d at 1196 and 1198, respectively. In fact, his argument on all of the claims raised 

in this category suffer from the same fatal deficiencies. The issues are raised in the context 

of the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel and require argument and analysis 

concerning the legal viability and relative strength of those arguments vis-à-vis the issues 

raised on direct appeal. Yet, Stahl’s argument, such as it is, is devoid of any discussion of 

these matters and indeed seems more appropriate for a direct-appeal challenge to the 

reasonableness of the sentence. In short, Stahl identifies the issues and states the 

conclusions, but provides no legal argument germane to the issue of ineffective assistance 
7

of appellate counsel which guides us from one to the other. The issue of the ineffective 

assistance of appellate counsel is therefore waived. See Lyles v. State, 834 N.E.2d 1035 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied; App. R. 46(a)(8).

Judgment affirmed.

MATHIAS, J., and PYLE, J., concur.