SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 

BRITTANI LAMPKIN, 

Appellant, 

vs. 

THE STATE OF NEVADA, 

Respondent. 

No: 66274 

FILED 

JAW 1 5 2016 

RA. 

i 

C K 

U E CO 

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE 

This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction, pursuant to a 

jury verdict, of multiple transactions involving fraud or deceit in the 

course of enterprise or occupation, theft, and racketeering. Eighth 

Judicial District Court, Clark County; David B. Barker, Judge. 

Appellant Brittani Lampkin first argues that insufficient 

evidence supported the jury's findings of guilt for multiple transactions 

involving fraud or deceit in the course of enterprise or occupation and for 

racketeering and that the district court erred in denying her motions for a 

new trial and for an advisory verdict. The district court has discretion to 

advise the jury to acquit a defendant when it deems the evidence 

insufficient for a conviction, NRS 175.381(1), and we review its decision for 

an abuse of discretion. Milton v. State, 111 Nev. 1487, 1494, 908 P.2d 684, 

688 (1995). We will not overturn its decision on a motion for a new trial 

absent a palpable abuse of discretion. Johnson v. State, 118 Nev. 787, 796, 

59 P.3d 450, 456 (2002), overruled on other grounds by Nunnery v. State, 

127 Nev. 749, 263 P.3d 235 (2011). Our review of the record on appeal, 

however, reveals sufficient evidence to establish guilt beyond a reasonable 

doubt as determined by a rational trier of fact. See Jackson v. Virginia, 

-0 106 (0) 1947A 40101. 
443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Origel-Candido v. State, 114 Nev. 378, 381, 956 

P.2d 1378, 1380 (1998). 

The record shows the following. Lampkin misrepresented the 

sale of sexual services to Officer Peck when he first paid to enter Club 

Exclusive II at the front desk and again when she lightly stroked Peck as 

her colleague elicited a second payment from Peck. Peck paid $480 as a 

result of these misrepresentations. Lampkin agreed to and did participate 

in the affairs of Club Exclusive II, an enterprise that existed to 

fraudulently acquire money from victims by misrepresenting the sale of 

sexual services. Lampkin attended staff meetings, where management 

discussed business practices, which included the practice of fraud, as that 

was the Club's purpose. Lampkin's manager told employees that the Club 

was a "hustle" and provided a script designed to perpetrate their scheme 

in the most effective fashion. Lampkin overtly acted to effect the scheme 

of the Club by defrauding Peck. 

The jury could reasonably infer from the evidence presented 

that Lampkin participated in at least two transactions involving acts in 

the course of an enterprise with the knowing intent to defraud by means of 

a false representation known to be false and the intent to induce reliance, 

causing a loss greater than $250. See NRS 205.377(1) (2010). The jury 

could also reasonably infer that Lampkin agreed to participate in Club 

Exclusive II's fraudulent scheme and overtly acted to effect this 

agreement. See NRS 207.400(j). Lampkin's mere-presence argument is 

belied by the record. The jury's verdict will not be disturbed on appeal 

where, as here, substantial evidence supports the verdict. See Bolden v. 

State, 97 Nev. 71, 73, 624 P.2d 20, 20 (1981); see also McNair v. State, 108 

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Nev. 53, 56, 825 P.2d 571, 573 (1992). Accordingly, the district court did 

not abuse its discretion in denying Lampkin's respective motions to set 

aside the jury verdict and for a new trial and for an advisory verdict. 

Second, Lampkin argues that the district court abused its 

discretion in settling jury instructions by (1) denying the proposed defense 

instruction on. racketeering, (2) denying an instruction permitting 

Lampkin to argue that unpreserved evidence should be considered adverse 

to the State's case, and (3) shifting the burden of proof to the defense with 

the provided ignorance-of-the-law instruction. We review the district 

court's decisions in settling jury instructions for an abuse of discretion or 

judicial error, Crawford v. State, 121 Nev. 744, 748, 121 P.3d 582, 585 

(2005), and review de novo whether a jury instruction is an accurate 

statement of law, Nay v. State, 123 Nev. 326, 330, 167 P.3d 430, 433 

(2007). The proposed defense instruction on racketeering was misleading 

and incomplete for suggesting that racketeering liability could inhere only 

through finding racketeering activity when the statute clearly envisions 

numerous modes of commission. See NRS 207.390; NRS 207.400(1)(a)-(j). 

The record suggests that the police's failure to seize the digital-video 

recorder was negligence, not gross negligence, such that an instruction 

pursuant to Sanborn v. State, 107 Nev. 399, 812 P.2d 1279 (1991), was not 

warranted. See also Randolph v. State, 117 Nev. 970, 987, 36 P.3d 424, 

435 (2001). Lampkin's argument that she was precluded from arguing 

adverse inferences from unpreserved evidence is contradicted by a 

codefendant's argument about inferences from that evidence. Lastly, 

Lampkin has failed to explain how the ignorance-of-the-law instruction—

which reflects a well-established rule of law, Whiterock v. State, 112 Nev. 

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775, 782, 918 P.2d 1309, 1314 (1996)—shifted the burden to the defense. 

Maresca v. State, 103 Nev. 669, 673, 748 P.2d 3, 6 (1987) (declining to 

address issues not supported by relevant authority and cogent argument). 

Third, Lampkin argues that the district court erred in denying 

her motion to dismiss because she was merely present at Club Exclusive II 

as an employee.' Presence coupled with other circumstances may support 

an inference that one is a party to an offense and not merely present. 

Winston v. Sheriff, Clark Cnty., 92 Nev. 616, 618, 555 P.2d 1234, 1235 

(1976). We review the district court's denial of a motion to dismiss for an 

abuse of discretion. Hill v. State, 124 Nev. 546, 550, 188 P.3d 51, 54 

(2008). As substantial evidence supports Lampkin's convictions and 

shows her active efforts to defraud Peck, we conclude that Lampkin 

participated in the Club's fraudulent scheme and was not merely present 

and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying her 

motion to dismiss. 

Lastly, Lampkin argues that cumulative error warrants 

reversal. Having found no error, there is no error to cumulate. 

'Lampkin asserts that this was error because of deficiencies in the 

pleading instrument, but Lampkin did not make that argument in her 

motion to dismiss below, and we decline to consider it on appeal. See Ford 

v. Warden, 111 Nev. 872, 884, 901 P.2d 123, 130 (1995). 

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Pickering i 

Oidebt. ,J. 

Having considered Lampkin's contentions and concluded that 

they are without merit, we 

ORDER the judgment of conviction AFFIRMED. 2 

J. 

Hardesty 

J. 

Saitta 

cc: Hon. David B. Barker, District Judge 

The Law Office of Dan M. Winder, P.C. 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Clark County District Attorney 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

2We note that Lampkin's brief was seriously deficient for failing to 

properly cite to the record. See Thomas v. State, 120 Nev. 37, 43, 83 P.3d 

818, 822 (2004). 

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