alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Juan Manuel Mendoza MARTINEZ; et al., Petitioners, v. Alberto R. GONZALES, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 05-74742.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted March 12, 2007 *.

Filed March 16, 2007.

Juan Manuel Mendoza Martinez, San Jacinto, CA, pro se.

Lourdes Diaz De Mendoza, San Jacinto, CA, pro se.

CAC-District Counsel, Esq., Office of the District Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, Los Angeles, CA, Ronald E. Lefevre, Chief Counsel, Office of the District Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, Lisa M. Arnold, Esq., DOJ — U.S. Depart*568ment of Justice, Civil Div./Office of Immigration Lit., Washington, DC, for Respondent.

Before: KOZINSKI, LEAVY, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Husband and wife Juan Manuel Mendoza Martinez and Lourdes Diaz de Mendoza petition pro se for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) orders upholding an immigration judge’s order denying their applications for cancellation of removal. We dismiss in part and deny in part the petition for review.

We lack jurisdiction to review the discretionary determination that petitioners failed to show exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to a qualifying relative. *See Romero-Torres v. Ashcroft,*327 F.3d 887, 890 (9th Cir.2003).

Petitioners’ constitutional challenges regarding the Nicaraguan and Central American Relief Act are unavailing. *See Jimenez-Angeles v. Ashcroft,*291 F.3d 594, 602-03 (9th Cir.2002); *Hernandez-Mezquita v. Ashcroft,*293 F.3d 1161, 1165 (9th Cir.2002). We also are not persuaded by petitioners’ constitutional challenges regarding the rights of their children. *See Cabrerar-Alvarez v. Gonzales,*423 F.3d 1006, 1012-13 (9th Cir.2005).

We do not consider Lourdes Diaz de Mendoza’s contention regarding the moral character finding, because her failure to establish hardship is dispositive.

Finally, we are not persuaded by petitioners’ contention that the BIA’s orders were inadequate. *See Alaelua v. INS,*45 F.3d 1379, 1382 (9th Cir.1995) (“The adoption of a lower tribunal’s reasons is a valid practice on review.”).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DISMISSED in part and DENIED in part.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
#### TYLER v. YOUNG et al.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Term.

March 21, 1905.)

1. Replevin—Possession—Evidence.

In replevin, where defendant admitted on the trial that the property was then stored in his name, it may be inferred that he controlled its possession.

[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see vol. 42, Cent. Dig. Replevin, §§ 69-81.]

2. Same—Wrongful Sale.

Defendants are liable in replevin, though they had no possession of the property, where they were concerned in its wrongful sale.

[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see vol. 42, Cent. Dig. Replevin, §§ 281, 293-294.]

Appeal from City Court of New York, Trial Term.

Action by Benjamin P. Tyler against John Young and another. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal. Affirmed.

Argued before SCOTT, O’GORMAN, and BLANCHARD, JJ.

Joseph Martin, for appellants.

David C. Myers, for respondent.

BLANCHARD, J.

This is an action in replevin." The only point that merits consideration is the contention of the appellant that the plaintiff must prove possession in the defendants at the time of the commencement of the action. . One of the defendants admitted on the trial that at that time the property in question was stored in his name, and it may be inferred that he controlled its possession. At the close of the trial the defendants’ counsel excepted to so much of the learned court’s charge “as holds that, even if the defendants had no possession of the property, if they were in any way concerned in the wrongful sale of it they are liable in an action for replevin.” We think the law as stated by the court is sustained by the case of Nichols v. Michael, *819
      *23*N. Y. 264, 80 Am. Dec. 259, and by the more recent case of Sinnott v. Feiock, 165 N. Y. 444, 59 N. E. 265, 80 Am. St. Rep. 736, 53 L. R. A. 565.

Judgment should be affirmed, with costs. All concur.
#### In the Matter of Carlos Ruiz, Petitioner, v Joseph P. Sullivan et al., Respondents.

— Petition in article 78 proceeding is unanimously dismissed and application denied, without costs and without disbursements. The question whether the Trial Justice shall inspect the Grand Jury minutes is one for the sound discretion of the Trial Justice (CPL 210.30, subd 4) and is not reviewable by an appellate court either on direct appeal (CPL 210.30, subd 6) or in the guise of an article 78 proceeding. (See *Matter of Miranda v Isseks,*41 AD2d 176.) So much of the application as seeks a stay of trial pending decision by the United States Supreme Court in *Patterson v New York*is denied as moot in view of the decision of that case by that court on June 17, 1977. Concur — Lupiano, J. P., Silverman, Evans, Capozzoli and Lane, JJ.
**
**Exhibit 31.1**

**CERTIFICATION**

I, CoreyHenry, certify that: 

1. I have reviewed this report on Form 10-K and all reports on Form 10-D required to be filed in respect of the period covered by this report on Form 10-K of Santander Drive Auto Receivables Trust 2019-3(the “Exchange Act periodic reports”); 

2. Based on my knowledge, the Exchange Act periodic reports, taken as a whole, do notcontain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by thisreport; 

3. Based on my knowledge, all of the distribution, servicing and other information required to be provided under Form 10-D for the period covered by this report is included in the Exchange Act periodic reports; 

4. Basedon my knowledge and the servicer compliance statement required in this report under Item 1123 of Regulation AB, and except as disclosed in the Exchange Act periodic reports, the servicer has fulfilled its obligations under the servicing agreement inall material respects; and 

5. All of the reports on assessment of compliance with servicing criteria forasset-backed securities and their related attestation reports on assessment of compliance with servicing criteria for asset-backed securities required to be included inthis report in accordance with Item 1122 of Regulation AB and Exchange Act Rules 13a-18 and 15d-18 have been included as an exhibit to this report, except as otherwisedisclosed in this report. Any material instances of noncompliance described in such reports have been disclosed in this report on Form 10-K.

In giving the certifications above, I have reasonably relied on information provided to me by the following unaffiliated parties: Wells FargoBank, N.A. and Computershare Trust Company, N.A. 

 
By: 
/s/ Corey Henry
Name: Corey HenryTitle: 
President and Chief Executive Officer

SantanderDrive Auto Receivables LLC, as Depositor
 (senior officer in charge of securitization of the depositor)Date: March 31, 2023**
§ 1002.4 Written requests. In order to facilitate the processing of written requests, every petitioner should: ( a ) Address his request to: General Counsel, Inter-American Foundation, 901 N. Stuart St., 10th Floor, Arlington, VA 22203.
( b ) Identify the desired record by name or brief description, or number, and date, as applicable. The identification should be specific enough so that a record can be readily identified and found;
( c ) Include a check or money order to the order of the “Inter-American Foundation” covering the appropriate search and copying fees, or request a determination of fee;
( d ) Allow a reasonable amount of time for reply. Furnishing the requested information will involve search and retrieval of records, copying and mailing;
( e ) Blanket requests or requests for “the entire file of” or “all matters relating to” a specified subject will not be accepted.
[37 FR 8375, Apr. 26, 1972, as amended at 71 FR 63236, Oct. 30, 2006]
Editorial Note on Part 62
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to part 62 appear at 64 FR 54539, Oct. 7, 1999, and 67 FR 17612, 17613, Apr. 11, 2002.

§ 62.43 Extension of Program. ( a ) Responsible officers may extend an exchange visitor's participation in the Exchange Visitor Program up to the limit of the permissible period of participation authorized for his or her specific program category.
( b ) A responsible officer extending the program of an exchange visitor shall issue to the exchange visitor a duly executed Form DS-2019 reflecting such extension and provide a notification copy of such form to the Department of State.
( c ) The responsible officer seeking a program extension on behalf of an exchange visitor in excess of that authorized for his or her specific category of participation shall: ( 1 ) Adequately document the reasons which justify such extension; and
( 2 ) Secure the prior written approval of the Department of State for such extension.
( d ) In addition to individual requests, the Department of State shall entertain requests for groups of similarly situated exchange visitors.
#### § 223.4 Examiner.

When a former Government employee after receiving adequate notice requests a hearing, a presiding official (hereinafter referred to as “examiner”) shall be appointed by the Administrator to make an initial decision. The examiner shall be a responsible person who is impartial and who has not participated in any manner in the decision to initiate the proceeding. The hearing officer shall be an individual with suitable experience and training to conduct the hearing, reach a determination and render an initial decision in an equitable manner.
#### In the Matter of Thomas P. Birmingham, Appellant, v. William S. Hults, as Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, Respondent.

Motion granted to prosecute appeal on original and five typewritten copies of record and five typewritten appellant’s briefs.
#### In the Matter of Union Carbide Corporation, Respondent, v Assessor of the Town of Greenburgh et al., Appellants. Pocantico Hills Central School District, Intervenor-Appellant.

[715 NYS2d 650]

—In a proceeding pursuant to Real Property Tax Law article 7 to review certain real property tax assessments for the tax years 1992-1993 through 1995-1996, the Assessor of the Town of Greenburgh, the Board of Review of the Town of Greenburgh, and the Town of Greenburgh appeal and the intervenor Pocantico Hills Central School District separately appeals from (1) a decision of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Orlando, J.H.O.), entered May 6, 1999, and (2) a judgment of the same court, dated August 25, 1999, entered upon the decision, which, *inter alia,*reduced the petitioner’s real property tax assessment.

Ordered that the appeal from the decision is dismissed, as no appeal lies from a decision *(see, Schicchi v Green Constr. Corp.,*100 AD2d 509); and it is further,

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed; and it is further,

Ordered that the respondent is awarded one bill of costs.

Contrary to the appellants’ contentions, the challenged findings of the Supreme Court are within the range of the experts’ testimony and are supported by the record *(see, Matter of 495 Cent. Ave. Corp. v Town of Greenburgh,*237 AD2d 606; *Matter of Krebs v Board of Assessors,*225 AD2d 625; *Matter of Alexander’s Dept. Store v Board of Assessors,*227 AD2d 549).

The appellants’ remaining contentions are without merit. Mangano, P. J., Ritter, S. Miller and H. Miller, JJ., concur.
§ 224.18 Authority of the ALJ. ( a ) The ALJ shall conduct a fair and impartial hearing, avoid delay, maintain order, and assure that a record of the proceeding is made.
( b ) The ALJ may: ( 1 ) Set and change the date, time, and place of the hearing upon reasonable notice to the parties;
( 2 ) Continue or recess the hearing in whole or in part for a reasonable period of time;
( 3 ) Hold conferences to identify or simplify the issues, or to consider other matters that may aid in the expeditious disposition of the proceeding;
( 4 ) Adminster oaths and affirmations;
( 5 ) Issue subpoenas requiring the attendance of witnesses and the production of documents at depositions or at hearings;
( 6 ) Rule on motions and other procedural matters;
( 7 ) Regulate the scope and timing of discovery;
( 8 ) Regulate the course of the hearing and the conduct of representatives and parties;
( 9 ) Examine witnesses;
( 10 ) Receive, rule on, exclude, or limit evidence;
( 11 ) Upon motion of a party, take official notice of facts;
( 12 ) Upon motion of a party, decide cases, in whole or in part, by summary judgment where there is no disputed issue of material fact;
( 13 ) Conduct any conference, argument, or hearing on motions in person or by telephone; and
( 14 ) Exercise such other authority as is necessary to carry out the responsibilities of the ALJ under this part.
( c ) The ALJ does not have the authority to find Federal statutes or regulations invalid.
### §294g. Repealed. Pub. L. 111–148, title V, §5306(a)(1), Mar. 23, 2010, 124 Stat. 626

Section, act July 1, 1944, ch. 373, title VII, §757, as added Pub. L. 105–392, title I, §103, Nov. 13, 1998, 112 Stat. 3551, authorized appropriations to carry out this part.

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Codification

Pub. L. 111–148, title V, §5306(a)(1), Mar. 23, 2010, 124 Stat. 626, which directed the amendment of part D of title VII by striking section 757, without specifying the act to be amended, was executed by repealing this section, which was section 757 of act July 1, 1944, to reflect the probable intent of Congress.

#### Prior Provisions

A prior section 294g, act July 1, 1944, ch. 373, title VII, §734, as added Oct. 12, 1976, Pub. L. 94–484, title IV, §401(b)(3), 90 Stat. 2263; amended Oct. 22, 1985, Pub. L. 99–129, title II, §208(f), 99 Stat. 531, related to establishment of a student loan insurance fund, prior to the general amendment of this subchapter by Pub. L. 102–408. See section 292i of this title.

Another prior section 294g, act July 1, 1944, ch. 373, title VII, §747, as added Nov. 18, 1971, Pub. L. 92–157, title I, §105(f)(4), 85 Stat. 451; amended Oct. 12, 1976, Pub. L. 94–484, title I, §101(f), 90 Stat. 2244, provided for student loans to citizens of United States who were full-time students in schools of medicine located outside United States, prior to repeal by Pub. L. 94–484, title IV, §401(a), Oct. 12, 1976, 90 Stat. 2257, effective Oct. 1, 1976.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
SIX MONTHS ENDED JUNE 30, 1998 HAVE BEEN RESTATED TO REFLECT THE MERGER
WITH M-R GROUP PLC, ACCOUNTED FOR AS A POOLING-OF-INTERESTS.  SEE PART I,
ITEM 1, NOTES TO CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS - NOTE 2.
</LEGEND>
<RESTATED>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1998
<CASH>                                           8,171
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   87,660
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                      7,900
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               123,079
<PP&E>                                          58,259
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 353,094
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           54,781
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           147
<OTHER-SE>                                     187,161
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   353,094
<SALES>                                        151,622
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               151,622
<CGS>                                           92,314
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   92,314
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                39,991
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               2,125
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 17,192
<INCOME-TAX>                                     6,372
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             10,820
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    10,820
<EPS-BASIC>                                        .74
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .71


</TABLE>
I 

112TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 4410 

To extend the temporary reduction of duty on acrylic or modacrylic staple 

fibers. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

APRIL 19, 2012 

Mr. BISHOP of Georgia introduced the following bill; which was referred to 

the Committee on Ways and Means 

A BILL 

To extend the temporary reduction of duty on acrylic or 

modacrylic staple fibers. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. ACRYLIC OR MODACRYLIC STAPLE FIBERS. 

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—Heading 9902.10.22 of the Har5 monized Tariff Schedule of the United States (relating to 

6 acrylic or modacrylic staple fibers) is amended by striking 

7 ‘‘12/31/2012’’ and inserting ‘‘12/31/2015’’. 

8 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by 

9 subsection (a) apply with respect to goods entered, or 


PWALKER on DSK7TPTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 4410 IH

1 withdrawn from warehouse for consumption, on or after 

2 the 15th day after the date of enactment of this Act. 

Æ 


PWALKER on DSK7TPTVN1PROD with BILLS
#### Israel Trachtenberg, Appellant, v. John P. Rowan, as Executor of Ben Lupoff, Deceased, Respondent.

Motion to stay enforcement of the order appealed from, dated June 7, 1960, pending the appeal, granted on condition that appellant be ready to argue or submit the appeal at the September 1960 Term, beginning September 7, 1960, for which term the appeal is ordered to be placed on the calendar. The record and appellant’s brief must be served and filed on or before August 1, 1960. Nolan, P. J., Beldock, Ughetta, Christ and Pette, JJ., concur.
#### In the Matter of the Claim of George Teague, Respondent, v Rockville Reconditioning Center et al., Appellants. Workmen’s Compensation Board, Respondent.

Appeal from a decision of the Workmen’s Compensation Board, filed October 29, 1976. Claimant was injured in an automobile accident while on route from his inside employment to the nearby bank with which the employer had arranged a system to facilitate cashing paychecks. It was the employer’s policy to allow its employees to leave for lunch early on payday to go to the particular bank. In *Matter of Flamholtz v Byrde, Richards & Pound*(37 AD2d 645) the claimant fell during a lunchtime trip to a local bank at which her employer had a paycheck cashing arrangement. The claimant had left work 15 minutes early to cash her check. This court ruled that the injuries suffered were in the course of employment. The case at bar cannot be distinguished. Although claimant failed to give the written notice required by section 18 of the Workmen’s Compensation Law, the employer had actual notice of the accident on the very day it occurred. It was therefore within the discretion of the board to excuse the absence of written notice (Workmen’s Compensation Law, § 18; *Matter of Kenny v County of Nassau,*58 AD2d 696). The failure of either the referee or the board to explain the reason for excusing *875the notice requirement does not warrant reversal. Unlike the case relied on by the appellants, *Matter of Zraunig v New York Tel. Co.*(32 AD2d 686), the employer herein had actual notice, thus making the basis of the board’s finding of no prejudice obvious. Decision affirmed, with costs to the Workmen’s Compensation Board against the employer and its insurance carrier. Mahoney, P. J., Greenblott, Sweeney, Staley, Jr., and Mikoll, JJ., concur.
§ 308.11 Accounting for disclosure of records. Each office maintaining a system of records shall keep a written account of routine disclosures (see paragraphs (a) through (e) of this section) for all records within such system in the form prescribed by the Director, Office of Administrative Services. Disclosure made to employees of the agency in the normal course of their official duties or pursuant to the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act need not be accounted for. Such written account shall contain the following: ( a ) The date, nature, and purpose of each disclosure of a record to any person or to another agency.
( b ) The name and address of the person or agency to whom the disclosure was made.
( c ) Sufficient information to permit the construction of a listing of all disclosures at appropriate periodic intervals.
( d ) The justification or basis upon which any release was made including any written documentation required when records are released for statistical or law enforcement purposes under the provisions of subsection (b) of the Act.
( e ) For the purpose of this part, the system of accounting for disclosure is not a system of records under the definitions hereof and no accounting need be maintained for the disclosure of accounting of disclosures.
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

FIRST DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT HOUSTON

ORDER

Appellate case name: Samuel Gallegos v. The State of Texas

Appellate case number: 01-16-00885-CR; 01-16-00886-CR

Trial court case number: 1452140; 1452142

Trial court: 184th District Court of Harris County

The clerk’s records in these causes were marked “Confidential Clerk’s Record,” although 

there is no trial court order requiring the sealing of the record. Nevertheless, the clerk’s records 

were filed in this court by the trial court clerk as “sealed” records. Appellant has filed a motion 

to “order the trial court to make available all sealed records for inspection” by appellant’s 

counsel. 

There is no apparent reason why appellant’s counsel should be denied access to the 

clerk’s record. If the State contends that appellant’s counsel should not have access to the record, 

or if the State contends that some other procedure should be followed, it is ordered to file a 

response in opposition to appellant’s motion no later than March 3, 2017. If no response in 

opposition is filed by March 3, the clerk of this court is ordered to make the clerk’s records in 

these appeals available to all counsel of record effective March 6, 2017, and the deadlines for the 

filing of appellant’s brief shall run from that date. TEX. R. APP. P. 2; cf. TEX. R. APP.

P. 38.6(a)(1).

All counsel are admonished to follow Appellate Rule 9.10 with regard to privacy 

protection for documents they may file.

It is so ORDERED.

Judge’s signature: /s/ Michael Massengale

 Acting individually  Acting for the Court

Date: February 24, 2017
###### Editorial Note on Part 64

#### Editorial Note:

Nomenclature changes to part 64 appear at 64 FR 54540, Oct. 7, 1999.

#### § 64.1 Purpose.

This part sets forth the procedures for the application for approval of a cultural exchange program of a foreign government, so that Federal employees may participate in such program; the grant and termination of such approval; and related procedures.