U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402–0001

76–191PDF 2001

AFRICA AND THE WAR ON GLOBAL TERRORISM

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

NOVEMBER 15, 2001

Serial No. 107–46

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international—relations

(II)

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa

DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey

DAN BURTON, Indiana

ELTON GALLEGLY, California

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina

DANA ROHRABACHER, California

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California

PETER T. KING, New York

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio

AMO HOUGHTON, New York

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina

JOHN COOKSEY, Louisiana

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado

RON PAUL, Texas

NICK SMITH, Michigan

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania

DARRELL E. ISSA, California

ERIC CANTOR, Virginia

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona

BRIAN D. KERNS, Indiana

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia

TOM LANTOS, California

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American

Samoa

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio

CYNTHIA A. MCKINNEY, Georgia

EARL F. HILLIARD, Alabama

BRAD SHERMAN, California

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida

JIM DAVIS, Florida

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York

BARBARA LEE, California

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York

JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada

GRACE NAPOLITANO, California

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California

DIANE E. WATSON, California

THOMAS E. MOONEY, SR., Staff Director/General Counsel

ROBERT R. KING, Democratic Staff Director

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman

AMO HOUGHTON, New York

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona

BRIAN D. KERNS, Indiana

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York

BARBARA LEE, California

EARL F. HILLIARD, Alabama

THOMAS P. SHEEHY, Subcommittee Staff Director

CHARISSE GLASSMAN, Democratic Professional Staff Member

MALIK M. CHAKA, Professional Staff Member

ALYSSA JORGENSON, Staff Associate

(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page

WITNESSES

Susan E. Rice, Consultant on African Affairs (former Assistant Secretary

of State) ................................................................................................................. 6

J. Stephen Morrison, Ph.D., Director, Africa Program, Center for Strategic

and International Studies ................................................................................... 14

Sulayman S. Nyang, Ph.D., Professor, African Studies, Howard University ..... 22

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING

The Honorable Edward R. Royce, a Representative in Congress from the

State of California, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Africa: Prepared statement ...................................................................................................................... 2

The Honorable Donald M. Payne, a Representative in Congress from the

State of New Jersey: Prepared statement .......................................................... 4

Susan E. Rice: Prepared statement ........................................................................ 10

J. Stephen Morrison: Prepared statement ............................................................. 17

Sulayman S. Nyang: Prepared statement ............................................................. 27

(1)

AFRICA AND THE WAR ON GLOBAL

TERRORISM

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 15, 2001

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA,

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,

Washington, DC.

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:12 p.m., in Room

2200 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Edward R. Royce

[Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.

Mr. ROYCE. This hearing on the Subcommittee on Africa will

come to order. This hearing will be titled Africa and the War on

Global Terrorism. U.S. policies toward all regions of the world have

been forced to adjust to the post-September 11th world. It is clear

that in the fight against terrorism no region can be ignored, and

that is especially true of Africa.

The general weakness of African governments, as well as the

civil strife which exists in several countries, makes parts of the

continent hospitable grounds for terrorist operations. International

terrorist cells are believed to be operating in several African countries.

The abundant natural resources of the continent provide a ripe

target for unscrupulous exploitation, including terrorist organizations seeking financial gains. The Subcommittee is particularly

concerned by recent reports that al-Qaeda has been dealing in diamonds with Sierra Leone’s Revolutionary United Front, and also

with Liberia’s President, Charles Taylor. I notice Ambassador Lee

in the audience, thank you, Ambassador, for being with us. It is far

overdue that we got serious about Liberia and serious about

Charles Taylor.

African governments have been largely supportive of the U.S.-led

coalition against global terrorism. The comments of former President Nelson Mandela of South Africa deserve to be highlighted. On

Tuesday, in his words, Nelson Mandela said,

‘‘There is no other alternative for the United States but to go

into Afghanistan in order to apprehend Osama bin Laden and

his terrorist group. In that regard, I support the United States

without any reservation.’’

The American people appreciate this powerful support.

But nevertheless a small number of Africans, predominantly

Muslims, have expressed anger and opposition to the U.S. anti-terrorism campaign against the Taliban. Anti-American protests have

taken place in Nigeria, in South Africa, Kenya, Tanzania, and elseVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:54 Jan 03, 2002 Jkt 076191 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\AFRICA\111501\76191 HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
2

where. Some believe that segments of Africa’s large Muslim population will make it difficult for certain African governments to provide continued support to the United States and may even prove

to be a recruiting base for international terrorist organizations.

There is evidence that traditional and tolerant Islamic practices

in African countries are being increasingly influenced negatively by

economic support and anti-Western pressure coming from foreign

countries, including, most importantly, Saudi Arabia. This is of

great concern to me.

Osama bin Laden is no stranger to Africa. He took shelter in

Sudan between 1991 and 1996. U.S. authorities have charged him

and al-Qaeda operatives with the 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies

in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. On Tuesday, Secretary of Defense

Donald Rumsfeld warned Sudan and Somalia, among other countries, not to harbor terrorists who may be fleeing Afghanistan. The

current global economic slowdown, which was intensified by the

terrorist attacks, will hit Africa hard, I fear, further agitating political waters and perhaps contributing to opposition to the U.S.-led

anti-terrorist effort. With all these developments, Africa must be

placed in the U.S.’s strategic spotlight.

The Bush Administration has recognized Africa’s centrality to

the war on terrorism. National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice,

while speaking on October 30 to over 100 African ministers gathered in Washington for the African Growth and Opportunity Act

Forum, said this,

‘‘Africa’s history and geography give it a pivotal role in the war

on terrorism. Nevertheless, some Africans have expressed concerns that U.S. attention and resources devoted to Africa will

be shorted in favor of the Middle East and South Asia. This

should not be the case under any circumstances. Africa is critical to our war on terrorism.’’

Let me now turn to Mr. Payne, who is the Ranking Member, and,

if I could ask him if he has any comments to make.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Royce follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE EDWARD R. ROYCE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON

AFRICA

WASHINGTON, D.C.—The following is the statement made by Africa Subcommittee Chairman Ed Royce (R–CA) at today’s hearing on the role of Africa in

the war on global terrorism.

‘‘U.S. policies toward all regions of the world have been forced to adjust to the

post-September 11 world. It is clear that in the fight against terrorism, no region

can be ignored, especially not Africa. The general weakness of African governments

as well as the civil strife, which exists in several countries, makes parts of the continent hospitable grounds for terrorist operations. International terrorist cells are

believed to be operating in several African countries. The abundant natural resources of the continent provide a ripe target for unscrupulous exploitation, including by terrorist organizations seeking funds. The subcommittee is particularly concerned by recent reports that al Qaeda has been dealing in diamonds with Sierra

Leone’s Revolutionary United Front and Liberia’s President Charles Taylor. It is far

overdue that we got serious about Liberia and Charles Taylor.

‘‘African governments have been largely supportive of the U.S.-led coalition

against global terrorism. The comments of former President Nelson Mandela of

South Africa deserve to be highlighted. On Tuesday, this statesman said, ’There was

no other alternative for the United States but to go into Afghanistan in order to

apprehend Bin Laden and his terrorist group. In that regard I support the United

3

States without any reservation.’ The American people appreciate this powerful support.

‘‘Nevertheless a small number of Africans, predominately Muslims, have expressed anger and opposition to the U.S. anti-terrorism campaign against the

Taliban. Anti-American protests have taken place in Nigeria, South Africa, Kenya,

Tanzania and elsewhere. Some believe that segments of Africa’s large Muslim population will make it difficult for certain African governments to provide continued

support to the U.S., and may even prove to be a recruiting base for international

terrorist organizations. There is evidence that traditional and tolerant Islamic practices in African countries are being increasingly influenced negatively by economic

support and anti-Western pressures coming from foreign countries, including Saudi

Arabia. This is of great concern to me.

‘‘Osama bin Laden is no stranger to Africa. He took shelter in Sudan between

1991 and 1996. U.S. authorities have charged him and al Qaeda operatives with the

1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Nairoba and Dar es Salaam. On Tuesday, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld warned Sudan and Somalia, among other countries, not to harbor terrorists who may be fleeing Afghanistan. The current global

economic slowdown, intensified by the terrorist attacks, will hit Africa hard, further

roiling political waters and perhaps contributing to opposition to the U.S.-led antiterrorist effort. With all these developments, Africa must be placed in the U.S.’ strategic spotlight

‘‘The Bush administration has recognized Africa’s centrality to the war on terrorism. National Security Advisor Rice, while speaking on October 30 to over 100

African ministers gathered in Washington for the African Growth and Opportunity

Act Forum, said ’Africa’s history and geography give it a pivotal role in the war [on

terrorism].’ Nevertheless some Africans have expressed concerns that U.S. attention

and resources devoted to Africa will be shorted in favor of the Middle East and

South Asia. This should not be the case under any circumstances. Africa is critical

to our war on terrorism.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will condense my comments and leave my statement for the record since we don’t know

when the bells are going to ring to vote. So let me just, first of all,

thank Mr. Royce for calling this important hearing.

We all know that September 11 changed everything as we know

it, and that is a day that will certainly live in infamy. I must say

that this tragedy has changed the scope and focus of foreign policy

around the world. In the wake of America’s singular focus on the

fight against international terrorism, it is unfortunate that issues

such as AIDS and the HIV pandemic, economic development, democracy-building, and other programs which beset Africa, has

seemed to be put on the back burner.

As a matter of fact, I am very distressed to know that $88 million from development assistance have been diverted from those

funds, therefore, making less money available for the problems on

the continent. We cannot fight terrorism by putting funds into one

region and diverting them from another.

And so I just want to say that, to me, this is an opportunity to

improve and enhance our presence in Africa. I think that Africa is

right in the middle and it can go either way. We have, for too long,

neglected Africa. We have not put in the resources that we should

have been putting into Africa.

Anytime there are large numbers of unemployed people, large

numbers of young people who have no future, then there are breeding grounds for terrorists. We see that in Afghanistan and the

number of young persons from the Arab world, from Pakistan and

from Saudi Arabia, and other countries, who are in Afghanistan as

fighters. They have been there for a decade because they have

nothing else to do, nowhere else to go—no one to look up to.

4

So we don’t want the same conditions to happen in Africa. They

are not there now. We are at the crossroads, and it will be our public policy which will determine whether we will be able to prevent

the pendulum from swinging in the wrong direction. This is the

time to look at our policies and see how we can strengthen, not

weaken, the policies that we have.

We have to also be concerned about situations which are happening, for example, in Sudan where the Islamic—National Islamic

Front there, as we saw in Algeria, are trying to say that you

must—the state must be Islamic and we will take other people and

convert them and make them see it our way. We have an opportunity to defeat that in Africa and not to let it go any further than

what it has gone.

And so I am here saying that I look forward to hearing our witnesses. And, once again, as I indicated, I appreciate you calling this

hearing. I think we are at the crossroads in Africa.

Let me also state that the African Diplomatic Corps presented to

me a letter that it sent immediately to President Bush, immediately following September the 11th.

We did see President Obasanjo at the White House about a week

ago where President Bush invited him. And I think there could

probably be no better spokesperson on the problems between Islam

and Christianity because he is living it every day. And, as I indicated, if I were the President, I would have had him at the White

House 4 or 5 days after the tragedy occurred to try to get advice

on how he is dealing with it and what mistakes he might be making and what things he is doing right and how we can better understand how we deal with this problem.

It is important that we not confuse the Muslim religion in general with fundamentalism and extremism. The Islamic faith is a

beautiful faith. And I think that we want people to understand and

know this. And one of our weaknesses that we spent so little time

understanding Islam that we now are trying to catch up. So, Mr.

Chairman, let me yield back the balance of my time.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Payne follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DONALD M. PAYNE, A REPRESENTATIVE

IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY

Thank you Mr. Chairman for calling this hearing on ‘‘Africa and the War on Global Terrorism.’’ September 11th is a day that will live in infamy. That day will forever change the scope and focus of foreign policy all over the world.

In the wake of America’s singular focus on the fight against international terrorism, issues such as AIDS and economic development, unfortunately, will take the

back seat. Indeed, U.S.-Africa relations are likely to change in a fundamental way

because of the renewed focus on terrorism. While it is understandable to put all our

energies in the fight against terrorism, we must remain engaged in Africa. I am

deeply concerned about the $88 million dollars in the Development Assistance Account designated for Africa. I hope we aren’t thinking of diverting this pot of money

to accounts in Afghanistan.

Some may argue that Africa is not relevant in the fight against international terror. I say think again. Africa may not be strategically relevant in this phase of the

military campaign, but Africa’s participation in winning this war against terror is,

without a doubt, pivotal. Let us not forget the birth place of Al-Qaeda—Sudan—

where its founder, Osama bin Laden, spent five years establishing his network of

terror.

The same government that is in power today in Khartoum was the same government that gave sanctuary to Osama bin Laden and other terrorist groups. It is imVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:54 Jan 03, 2002 Jkt 076191 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\AFRICA\111501\76191 HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
5

portant for Washington to continue its cooperation on terrorism with Khartoum, but

we broaden the focus Khartoum’s bombing campaign in the south.

Meanwhile, another African country has emerged as a focus of attention in Washington—Somalia. In late September, the Bush Administration added al-Ittihad, a

Somali group active in Somalia and Somali-populated areas of Ethiopia, to the list

of terror suspect organizations whose assets were ordered frozen by a presidential

Executive Order.

According to a Washington Post article (November 4, 2001), ‘‘an interagency working group involving analysts from the State Department, Pentagon, CIA, and the

National Security Council has been meeting for the past three weeks to discuss

where and how al-Qaeda operates in the East Africa country.’’

In conclusion, if our campaign against international terrorism is to be successful,

we must not confuse Muslim fundamentalism and extremism with the beautiful Islamic religion.

Thank you.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Payne. Any other opening statements? Ms. Lee.

Ms. LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you and our

Ranking Member, Mr. Payne, for calling today’s hearings on terrorism as it relates to the African Continent. I also want to welcome and thank our panelists for being here. It is very good to see

all of you.

The role of Africa in the war on global terrorism is extremely relevant and must not be underestimated. In the wake of September

11, and in our efforts to bring the terrorists responsible to justice,

it is important that the United States look once again at our policy

toward Africa.

As the United States develops partnerships with African nations,

we must continue to develop and promote policies in regions of Africa with high poverty rates, large refugee populations, and porous

borders. These policies can help to mitigate factors that lead to terrorism recruitment.

I look forward to hearing from our panelists about how you believe that the United States can increase its efforts to assist countries where terrorists could seek refuge. I would also like to know

the status of the United States, as well as other western nations,

efforts to urge and assist African nations, to develop extradition

treaties, which focus on capturing terrorists. It would also be helpful to know your views on a strategy for helping to build anti-terrorist capabilities in Africa and what resources you envision to accomplish this task.

The impact of the terrorist attacks in the United States has devastated our economy, killed thousands of people, and its repercussions have spread far beyond our borders. Many African nations

rely heavily upon revenue generated by tourism. And we have

heard in our meetings, subsequent to today, from African leaders,

that since September 11, tourism revenues have dropped dramatically. The outcome of this will surely affect the national economies

in Africa and have the potential to further exacerbate poverty.

So, again, I want to thank our panelists. And, Mr. Chairman, I

want to thank you very much for calling this very important hearing today.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you very much. Mr. Hilliard, go ahead, sir.

Mr. HILLIARD. Thank you very much. I just wish to thank you

for what you have done in calling this hearing and thank the panel

for what I hope will be a meaningful discussion.

6

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you. I wish to associate my remarks with our

Ranking Member, Ms. Lee, and Mr. Hilliard. I agree, we need to

do all we can for Africa. And on that note, the Africa Growth and

Opportunity Act has been a great asset. I am glad to see that we

will be enhancing these benefits tomorrow when we have the vote

on the AGOA II provisions.

So with that said, I wanted to introduce Susan Rice, who actually needs no introduction. She has testified before this Committee

on numerous occasions while she was Assistant Secretary of State

for African Affairs, from 1997 until last year. Before that, Dr. Rice

served as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for

African Affairs at the National Security Council. Dr. Rice received

a Bachelor’s in History from Stanford University and she earned

her doctorate in International Relations at Oxford.

Dr. Stephen Morrison is the Director of the African Program at

the Center for Strategic and International Studies, where he had

led reviews of U.S./Africa policy in key areas, most recently, the

impact of the September 11 terrorist attacks. Dr. Morrison previously worked with the State Department in Policy and Planning.

He also worked with the Agency for International Development,

and from ’87 to ’91, he was a Senior Staff Member with this Subcommittee. Dr. Morrison is a graduate of Yale University and

earned a doctorate in Political Science at the University of Wisconsin.

Dr. Sulayman Nyang is a Full Professor in the African Studies

Department at Howard University. He is an internationally recognized scholar on Islam in Africa, who has written and edited several books, including Islam, Christianity, and African Identity. Dr.

Nyang has served as a Consultant for the World Bank and the

United Nations Development Program. And the professor completed his undergraduate education at Hampton University and received a master’s and doctorate at the University of Virginia.

I think this is probably the first time this Subcommittee has had

a panel of all Ph.D’s., and I guess we are set for a good hearing.

Dr. Rice, please summarize your statement for the record.

STATEMENT OF SUSAN E. RICE, CONSULTANT ON AFRICAN

AFFAIRS (FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE)

Ms. RICE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and, distinguished Members. Thank you for the opportunity to testify before your Subcommittee today. It is nice to be back as a private citizen.

I am sure you have heard, as I have, many times since September 11, the familiar refrain, that it is quite a shame that Africa

will now get fewer resources and zero attention in the context of

the new focus on terrorism. And while I think we all would acknowledge the conventional wisdom underlying that sentiment, I

can think of no outcome that would be more shortsighted and, indeed, more dangerous if we are not just to fight, but ultimately to

win the global war on terror.

That is because, in my judgment, Africa is unfortunately the

world’s soft underbelly for global terrorism. Al-Qaeda and other terrorist cells are active throughout East, Southern, and West Africa,

not to mention North Africa. These organizations hide throughout

7

Africa. They plan, finance, train for, and execute terrorist operations in many parts of Africa, not just from Sudan and Somalia.

Terrorist organizations take advantage of Africa’s porous borders,

weak law enforcement and security services, and nascent judicial

institutions to move men, weapons, and money around the globe.

They also take advantage of poor, disillusioned populations, often

with religious or ethnic grievances, to recruit for their jihad against

the civilized world. In short, terrorist networks are exploiting Africa thoroughly. And in the process, they are directly threatening our

national security.

What are we doing about it? Mr. Chairman, I would say, not

nearly enough. President Bush has, in my opinion, defined well the

global nature of the threat we face and the necessity of a comprehensive, long-term response. He has got all of the right component parts of that comprehensive strategy, but I think two critical

pieces are missing.

First and foremost, we must help those countries in Africa and

elsewhere that have the will to cooperate with us on the war on

terrorism, but lack the means. There are plenty of countries that

can’t act to defend their own citizens from terror, much less our

own. And we only need recall that Kenya and Tanzania lost over

200 of their own and 5,000 wounded.

We also ought to recall the difficulty the United States is having

defending our homeland from these sorts of threats. And then,

imagine how hard it must be for African countries that are impoverished, have fragile institutions, deficient infrastructure, widespread corruption, for them to be effective partners with the U.S.

on the war on terrorism.

I was very pleased to hear President Bush say in his speech to

the U.N. General Assembly that we would help such countries. But

we don’t yet seem to have in place a strategy to do so and we certainly haven’t set aside the necessary resources to implement such

a strategy.

It is imperative, in my judgment, that we invest tens of millions

of dollars annually in helping build counter-crime and counter-terrorism capacity in a number of African countries. We started programs and we had in place strategies to that effect under the previous Administration. We had early and modest sums of money,

but not nearly enough to do what we must do now on the scale we

must do it.

We have to help African counties take the necessary steps to control their borders, improve intelligence collection, strengthen law

enforcement and security services, and build effective, transparent

judicial institutions. And it is not enough to do this simply in Nigeria and South Africa and other big countries, but over time we

have to do it throughout the continent because the problem is continental in scope.

Second, over the longer term, we have to drain the swamps

where the terrorists breed. Many of these are obviously in the Middle East and South and Central Asia, but many are also in Africa

today and, I fear, potentially in the Caribbean and Latin America

tomorrow. Islam is a fast-growing and large religion in Africa. And

that, in itself, I want to be extremely clear, is not a concern. Islam

is a religion of peace. But the fact that some of Islam’s most radical

8

and anti-American adherents are increasingly active from South

Africa to Sudan, from Nigeria to Algeria, ought to be of great concern to us.

Much of Africa has become a veritable incubator for the foot soldiers of terrorism. Its poor, young, disaffected, unhealthy, undereducated populations often have no stake in government, no faith

in the future, and harbor an easily exploitable discontent with the

status quo. And, perhaps, that is part of the reason why we have

seen an increase in recent years in the number of African nationals

engaged in international terrorism.

These are the swamps we must drain. And we must do so for the

cold, hard reason that to do otherwise, we are going to place our

national security at further and more permanent risk.

To drain these swamps, we must reduce this burgeoning hostility

and address its sources. We must view it as our fight, not just the

developing world’s, to close the gaps between rich and poor. Without progress on this front, throughout the developing world, we

should expect bin Laden and future such enemies to find a growing

constituency for their radical form of Islam, whose chief tenet is

hatred of the United States and the civilized world.

Fighting this battle will not be swift or cheap. America, leading

our partners in the developed world, both in the public and private

sectors, will have to invest on a scale previously inconceivable, if

we are to defend ourselves against this pervasive threat. We will

have to open our markets completely to goods and services from the

developing world, provide much more trade and investment financing, bridge the digital divide, increase assistance for education, especially for girls, build necessary health infrastructure and treat

the infected, invest greater resources in debt relief and in finding

a vaccine for HIV/AIDS. And we must do more to help professionalize Africa’s militaries.

In short, we will have to pay the price, billions and billions, to

lift the peoples of Africa and other underdeveloped regions out of

poverty and hopelessness. If we do not, we will reap the harvest

of a disaffected generation’s hostility and growing anti-Americanism, from the Middle East to Central and South Asia and, indeed, to Africa.

It goes without saying that the United States cannot do this

alone. Nor could all the developed countries on earth do it together.

African peoples and African governments will have to provide the

leadership, the transparency, the will and the commitment to forge

a better future. Without this, all well-intentioned efforts will fail.

But with mutual commitment and serious sustained investment,

we can achieve mutual security, and even, over the long term, mutual prosperity.

Unfortunately, these are, by necessity, budget-busting times. And

I am afraid it is not enough simply to ramp up spending, as we are

and, I believe, we must, for defense and intelligence. We also have

to dramatically increase resources in the Foreign Operations accounts to help would-be partners in Africa and elsewhere to fight

with us side by side in the war on terrorism.

The Foreign Operations budget is all but final, and, regrettably,

it is business as usual—almost a straight-line appropriation. And

9

Africa, after several years of progressively increasing resources,

will predictably and shortsightedly get less than last year.

Now is the time to reverse that trend. We cannot realistically

hope to win a truly comprehensive global war on terrorism without

substantial additional Foreign Operations resources. I believe if we

are going to fight this war big, we also have to fight it smart.

Mr. Chairman, Congressman Payne, in my testimony I go on to

talk about the particular concerns and challenges we face with respect to Sudan and Somalia. With your permission, I would like to

spend a couple of minutes on Sudan.

Mr. ROYCE. By all means. Dr. Rice, by all means.

Ms. RICE. I don’t have to tell anybody on this Subcommittee that

Sudan has been an aggressive and active state sponsor of terrorism. It has been, for many years, the only country in Sub-Saharan Africa that poses a direct threat to U.S. national security.

But suddenly and rapidly in the wake of September 11, according

to Administration officials, Sudan has begun meaningful cooperation with the United States on terrorism. If this is true, it is a good

thing. Fear, in this case of more American military strikes, can be

a good motivator. But will it be a converter? Time will tell.

If Sudan, indeed, provides meaningful, comprehensive, and sustained cooperation to the United States on terrorism, we ought to

acknowledge it. But we cannot forget Sudan’s past role in plots to

destroy American people and interests, but we can seize all valuable assistance in our current battle.

But given Sudan’s past, it has a very long way to go if it is to

be a credible member in good standing in this global coalition

against terrorism. I outline a number of specific steps that I believe

Sudan has to take to meet that qualification and I want——

Mr. ROYCE. Let us go over those steps.

Ms. RICE. Go over them?

Mr. ROYCE. Yes.

Ms. RICE. Yes, sir. To achieve such standing, Sudan must detain,

offer for interrogation, and, if requested, render to the United

States or responsible partners all suspected terrorists within their

borders. Sudan must share all intelligence on terrorist networks

and activities, past and present. It must freeze the assets and shut

down the businesses, NGOs, and charities that provide financial

lifelines to all U.S.-designated terrorist organizations active in

Sudan, not just al-Qaeda. And, by this, I mean, they can’t claim

that Hamas and Hizballah and other organizations are not, in fact,

terrorist organizations. Sudan also has to close down all terrorist

training camps and allow them to be inspected on a random basis.

It must crack down on the issuance of visas, which is loose, and

the abuse of its passports. And Sudan must halt the mobilization

for the war in the South on the basis of jihad.

I believe if Sudan falls short on any of these criteria, it ought to

be reminded swiftly of President Bush’s promise to go after

unreconstructed state sponsors of terrorism, the way we have gone

after the Taliban.

And, moreover, and, I think, very importantly, we need to separate the issues of potential Sudanese cooperation on terrorism from

our long-standing objections to Sudan’s human rights abuses, its

prosecution of the civil war, which is brutal, its use of humaniVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:54 Jan 03, 2002 Jkt 076191 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\AFRICA\111501\76191 HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
10

tarian assistance as a weapon, its religious persecution in its efforts to destabilize neighboring states.

The Administration has to make plain to Sudan that cooperation

on terrorism will not afford it a get out of jail free card on any

other aspects of the agenda. We ought to maintain, in my view, and

if possible, increase pressure on Sudan to change fundamentally its

behavior. And by that, I mean, we ought not to lift bilateral sanctions or alter the fundamentals of our bilateral relationship with

Sudan until Sudan demonstrates a conversion in deeds, not just

words.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, if I might say one brief final thing on embassy security. Despite the shock and the robust U.S. response to

the embassy bombings in Africa in 1998, we have yet to take all

the necessary steps to secure our personnel in our embassies in Africa. Secretaries Albright and Powell both sought and have received more resources for embassy security. But 3 years later, we

have completed construction of only one new facility in Africa. That

is not because former colleagues in the State Department are slow

or slacking. It is because these resources have been staggered in

small—relatively small increments over many past and future

years.

So that 3 years later after the bombings, at least three-quarters

of our embassies in Africa remain vulnerable in high-risk environments. And that is not to say security hasn’t improved at our embassies. It has. Streets have been closed, additional guards have

been positioned, barriers erected, and other defensive measures

taken. But the age and location and set-back and quality of construction of many of these facilities makes them vulnerable until

replaced and relocated in many cases.

I think the status quo is inexcusable. I think Congress ought to

act, hopefully with the Administration, but, if necessary, without,

to end this reality before more American blood is spilled.

Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Payne, and, colleagues, and, distinguished Members, I am grateful for the chance to be before you and

to testify. And thank you very much for your interest and attention.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Rice follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SUSAN E. RICE, CONSULTANT ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS

(FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE)

Mr. Chairman, Congressman Payne, distinguished Members, thank you for the

opportunity to testify today before your Subcommittee. It is a pleasure to return before you as a private citizen. I commend you for holding this timely hearing on a

subject of critical importance.

Since September 11, I cannot count the number of people who have said to me,

as I am sure they have said to you: ‘‘What a shame that Africa will now get fewer

resources and zero attention in Washington.’’ I certainly acknowledge the conventional wisdom underlying this sentiment. Moreover, I concede that, if past is prologue, this will likely be the case.

Yet, no outcome would be more shortsighted and indeed more dangerous—if we

are not merely to fight but, ultimately, to win the global war on terror. We should

not and we cannot condemn Africa to the far reaches of our global campaign. We

should not and we cannot see Africa as separate from our comprehensive and longterm war against terror.

11

AFRICA: THE SOFT UNDER-BELLY

What has Africa got to do with al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, terrorist finance networks, even weapons of mass destruction? Unfortunately, everything. Africa is the

world’s soft under-belly for global terrorism.

As became painfully obvious even to casual observers after the bombings of our

embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, terrorism directed against the United

States is alive and well in Africa. Al-Qaeda and other terrorist cells are active

throughout East, Southern and West Africa, not to mention in North Africa. These

organizations hide throughout Africa. They plan, finance, train for and execute terrorist operations in many parts of Africa, not just Sudan and Somalia. They seek

uranium, chemical weapons components and the knowledge of renegade nuclear,

chemical and biological weapons experts from Libya to South Africa.

Terrorist organizations take advantage of Africa’s porous borders, weak law enforcement and security services and nascent judicial institutions to move men,

weapons and money around the globe. They take advantage of poor, disillusioned

populations, often with religious or ethnic grievances, to recruit for their jihad

against the civilized world.

Terrorist networks are exploiting Africa thoroughly and rapidly. In the process,

they directly threaten our national security.

THE APPROPRIATE AMERICAN RESPONSE: TWO MISSING LINKS

What are we doing about it? Not nearly enough.

President Bush has, in my opinion, defined well the global nature of the threat

we face and the necessity of a comprehensive, long-term response. He has rightly

coupled the imperative of robust military action with energetic efforts to build an

effective global coalition, to improve our intelligence collection, to seize the terrorists’ assets, to defend the homeland, and to use the full weight of law enforcement

in the U.S. and around the world to disrupt, apprehend and prosecute terrorists and

their organizations.

But two critical pieces are missing from our comprehensive strategy. Both are defensive. One is shorter term. The other is long term.

First and most immediately, we must help those countries in Africa and elsewhere

that have the will to cooperate with us in the war on terror but lack the means.

It’s not sufficient to say simply to the world: ‘‘you are either with us or against us.’’ Or ‘‘we want action’’. There are plenty of countries that cannot act to defend their own citizens from terror, much less America’s citizens. Recall that Kenya and Tanzania lost over two hundred of their own dead and suffered more than 5,000 casualties.

Recall too the difficulty the United States is having in defending our homeland

from external and, perhaps, internal threats. And then, imagine how hard it must

be for impoverished countries, with fragile or non-existent democratic institutions,

deficient infrastructure, widespread corruption and great social distress to take the

steps they must to protect their citizens and be effective partners for the U.S. in

the war on terror.

I was pleased to hear President Bush say in his speech to the UN General Assembly that we would help such countries. But we do not seem yet to have in place

a strategy to do so. And we certainly have not set aside the resources to implement

such a strategy.

In the wake of the East Africa Embassy bombings, the Clinton Administration finalized the first ever continent-wide strategy to combat crime, terrorism and narcotics flows in Africa. We made available for the first time funds to establish the

International Law Enforcement Academy for Southern Africa (ILEA). Africa received for the first time an annual share of the State Department’s global anticrime, counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism budgets. It was a start, but a modest

start. And in the global battle we now face against terrorism, these resources are

woefully inadequate.

It is imperative that we invest tens of millions of dollars annually in helping build

counter-crime and counter-terrorism capacity in a large number of African countries.

We must help them take the necessary steps to control their borders, improve intelligence collection, strengthen law enforcement and security services and build effective, transparent judicial institutions. We need to invest not only in big countries,

like Nigeria, Ethiopia and South Africa, but over time throughout the continent,

since the threat is continental in scope. From Cote D’Ivoire and Mauritania to Mozambique, from Zambia to Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and Ethiopia, we must put our

money where our mouths are. And we must begin to do so now.

Second, over the longer term, we have to drain the swamps where the terrorists

breed. Many of these are in the Middle East and South and Central Asia. But many

12

are also in Africa today and, potentially, in the Caribbean and Latin America tomorrow. Islam is a large and fast growing religion in Africa. That in itself is not a concern. But the fact that some of Islam’s most radical and anti-American adherents

are increasingly active from South Africa to Sudan, from Nigeria to Algeria should

be of great concern to us.

Much of Africa is a veritable incubator for the foot soldiers of terrorism. Its poor,

overwhelmingly young, disaffected, unhealthy and under-educated populations often

have no stake in government, no faith in the future and harbor an easily exploitable

discontent with the status quo. For such people, in such places, nihilism is as natural a response to their circumstances as self-help. Violence and crime may be at

least as attractive as hard work. Perhaps that is part of the reason why we have

seen an increase in recent years in the number of African nationals engaged in

international terrorism.

These are the swamps we must drain. We must do so for the cold, hard reason

that to do otherwise, we place our national security at further and more permanent

risk. We must do so not for liberal, humanitarian or moral reasons, but out of realpolitik recognition that our long-term security depends on it.

To drain these swamps, we must reduce this burgeoning hostility and address its

sources. We must view it as our fight, not just the developing world’s, to close the

gaps between rich and poor. It must be our fight, not just Africa’s, to educate the

uneducated, prevent and treat infectious diseases especially HIV/AIDS, to increase

trade, investment and growth, to fight corruption, as well as to bolster and strengthen democratic institutions. Without progress on these fronts throughout the developing world, we should expect bin Laden and future such enemies to find a growing

constituency for their radical form of Islam, whose chief tenet is hatred of America

and the civilized world.

Moreover, we must recognize that regimes lacking legitimacy and failed states are

convenient safe havens as well as breeding grounds for terrorists. If we are serious

about our anti-terrorism commitment, whether we like it or not, the U.S. must become more rather than less engaged in the difficult tasks of peacemaking, peacekeeping and national reconstruction—from the Great Lakes to Sierra Leone, from

Liberia to Sudan and Somalia. We must also find effective ways to secure Africa’s vast natural resources—its diamonds, cobalt, uranium, oil, timber, coltan, its gold— so they do not provide currency for the world’s terrorists.

Fighting these battles will not be swift or cheap. America, leading our partners

in the developed world, both in the public and private sectors, will have to invest

on a scale previously inconceivable, if we are to defend ourselves against this pervasive threat. We will have to open our markets completely to goods and services from

the developing world, provide much more trade and investment financing, bridge the

digital divide, increase assistance for education (especially for girls), build necessary

health infrastructure and treat the infected, invest greater resources in debt relief

and in finding a vaccine for HIV/AIDs. And we must do more to help professionalize

Africa’s militaries.

In short, we will have to pay the price, billions and billions, to help lift the peoples of Africa and other under-developed regions out of poverty and hopelessness.

If we do not, we will reap the harvest of a disaffected generation’s hostility and

growing anti-Americanism—from the Middle East to Central and South Asia and,

indeed, to Africa.

It goes without saying that the United States cannot do this alone. Nor could together all the developed countries on earth. African peoples and African governments will have to provide the leadership, the transparency, the will, and the commitment to forge a better future. Without this, all well-intentioned efforts will fail.

But with mutual commitment and serious, sustained investment, we can achieve

mutual security and, eventually, even mutual prosperity.

Unfortunately, these are by necessity budget-busting times. It’s not enough to

ramp up spending, as we are and we must, for defense and intelligence. We must

also dramatically increase resources in the Foreign Operations accounts to help

would-be partners in Africa and elsewhere in the world fight with us side-by-side

in the war on terror.

The Foreign Operations budget is all but final and, regrettably, it is business as

usual—almost a straight-line appropriation. At the end of the day, Pakistan will get

supplemental resources and therefore fare better than last year, but much of the

rest of the world will not. And Africa, after several years of progressively increasing

resources under President Clinton, will predictably and shortsightedly, get less than

last year.

Now is the time to reverse that trend. We cannot realistically hope to win a truly

comprehensive, global war on terrorism without substantial additional Foreign Operations resources. If we are going to fight this war big, we must also fight it smart.

13

ADDITIONAL CHALLENGES

We must also deal with the unique challenges posed by two of Africa’s most troublesome countries: Sudan and Somalia.

Sudan has been an active and aggressive state sponsor of terrorism. It has been

for many years the only country in Sub-Saharan Africa that poses a direct threat

to U.S. national security. As evidenced by this week’s bombing by GOS forces of a

WFP food distribution center in the Nuba Mountains, Sudan continues to be one of

the worst abusers of human rights on the planet. They support the enslavement of

their own citizens, bomb regularly innocent civilians, persecute people for their religious beliefs and prosecute one of the deadliest and long-standing wars on earth.

Sudan is also notorious for saying one thing and doing quite another.

But suddenly and rapidly in the wake of September 11, according to Administration officials, Sudan has begun meaningful cooperation with the U.S. on terrorism.

Good. Fear, in this case of more American military strikes, can be a great motivator.

But can it be a converter? Time will tell.

If Sudan indeed provides meaningful, comprehensive and sustained cooperation to

the United States in the war on terrorism, we ought to acknowledge it. We cannot

forget Sudan’s past role in plots to destroy American people and interests, but we

can seize all valuable assistance in our current battle.

Yet given its recent past, Sudan still has a long way to go if it is to become a

credible member in good standing of the global coalition against terrorism. To

achieve such standing, Sudan must detain, offer for interrogation and, if requested,

render to the U.S. or responsible partners all suspected terrorists within its borders.

Sudan must share all intelligence on terrorist networks and activities, past and

present. It must freeze the assets and shut down the businesses, NGOs and charities that provide financial life-lines to all U.S.-designated terrorist organizations active in Sudan, not just Al-Qaeda. Sudan must close down all terrorist training

camps and allow them to be inspected on a random basis. It must crack down on

the loose issuance of entry visas and abuse of its passports. And Sudan must halt

the mobilization for war in the South on the basis of ‘‘jihad.’’

If Sudan falls short on any of these key criteria, it should be reminded of President Bush’s promise to go after unreconstructed state sponsors of terrorism the way

we have gone after the Taliban. Let us not forget that, in the current context, Sudan

needs to cooperate with us more than we need its cooperation.

Moreover, and very importantly, we need to separate the issues of potential Sudanese cooperation on terrorism from our longstanding objections to Sudan’s human

rights abuses, its brutal prosecution of the civil war, its use of humanitarian assistance as a weapon of war, and its efforts to destabilize neighboring states. The Administration must continue to make plain to Sudan that cooperation on terrorism

will not afford it a ‘‘get out of jail free’’ card on any other issue. We ought to maintain, and if possible, increase the pressure on Sudan to change fundamentally its

behavior. We ought not to lift our bilateral sanctions or alter the fundamentals of

our bilateral relationship until Sudan demonstrates a conversion in deeds, not just

words.

Somalia has been America’s Achilles heel in Africa for almost a decade and remains so. It is hardly any closer to coherent and unified national government than

it was when the UN withdrew in 1995. Somalia has become the continent’s proverbial black hole: an ungoverned, lawless, radicalized, heavily armed country with one

of the longest undefended coastlines in the region. It is terrorist heaven.

Worse still, no one I am aware of, either in the U.S., the UN, the region or elsewhere, has a good idea of what to do about it. Certainly, there is no consensus on

what the policy objective ought to be, much less how to fulfill it. Somalia may again

now be the greatest policy challenge we face in Africa. It is one that successive

American administrations, the previous one included, have preferred to ignore. We

no longer have that luxury, if we ever did, as we fight the global war on terror.

UNFINISHED BUSINESS

Public Diplomacy. We must employ all our wits and substantial resources to fight

and win the public diplomacy battle in Africa, as we must elsewhere in the world.

Too many men and women on the streets of Africa believe the lie that we are antiIslam and anti-Arab. Too many view our war of self-defense in Afghanistan as an

effort to starve and kill innocent civilians. We have to combat these dangerous perceptions aggressively, not just in the Middle East and South Asia, but around the

world. The Administration, with our British allies, has taken some important recent

steps to engage this battle of public perceptions. As they do so, it is critical that

African public opinion be viewed both as a target and a resource.

14

Embassy Security. Finally, despite the shock and the robust U.S. response to the

Embassy bombings in 1998, we have yet to take all the necessary steps to secure

our personnel and our embassies in Africa. Secretaries Albright and Powell both

sought and have received more resources for embassy security. But three years

later, we have completed construction of only one new embassy facility in Africa.

Three years later, at least three quarters of our African embassies remain vulnerable in high-risk environments. That is not to say that security around our facilities

has not been enhanced. It has. Streets have been closed, additional guards positioned, barriers erected, other defensive measures taken. But the age, location, setback and quality of construction of many of these facilities makes them vulnerable

until replaced and, often relocated. The status quo is inexcusable, and Congress

ought to act, with or without the Administration, to end this travesty before more

American blood is spilled.

CONCLUSION

Mr. Chairman, thank you for your interest and attention. I am grateful to you

and Congressman Payne for the opportunity to appear before you. I trust that with

your continued strong leadership, and the sustained energy and attention of this

Administration, we will chart the right course in Africa during these uncertain

times.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Dr. Rice. I will forward to Special Envoy

Danforth your notes specifically on Sudan. Thank you——

Ms. RICE. Thank you.

Mr. ROYCE [continuing]. For your testimony today. Dr. Morrison.

STATEMENT OF J. STEPHEN MORRISON, PH.D., DIRECTOR, AFRICA PROGRAM, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

Mr. MORRISON. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and, Mr. Payne, for the opportunity to come and be here

today with you on this very important subject. I will simply summarize some of the main points within my paper. I realize time is

short.

Africa presents five principle challenges or flashpoints with respect to terrorist networks, if we are looking at the linkage between global terrorist networks and threats to U.S. interests within

Africa.

First, I would say, al-Qaeda elements and sympathizers have

linkages into central and southern Somalia. They have operated in

a league with the Somalia Islamist movement, Al-Itihaad. They

could enhance those linkages. We could see more movement there.

That could invite a strong United States military response, already

is inviting, and has, in the past, triggered military responses from

Ethiopia.

Second, there is a risk of a violent anti-U.S. reaction in northern

Sudan. This is a comment that, I think, simply complements some

of what Susan has described. There is an ongoing U.S.-Sudan dialogue on terrorism. There is an active effort by former Senator

Danforth to test prospects for renewed peace process within Sudan.

Many of the same measures that Susan has outlined are part of

that ongoing testing process. I think we need to understand that

there is residual linkages to, and sympathies to, al-Qaeda, and

those could be aggravated or deliberately manipulated to act

against U.S. interests there.

Third, al-Qaeda’s influence could expand in northern Nigeria and

contribute possibly to a violent anti-U.S. reaction there. There is

plenty of evidence already on the table that could create a crisis

15

of governance for President Obasanjo. It could strain U.S.-Nigerian

relations.

A fourth threat is in South Africa. There are al-Qaeda cells in

Cape Town and Durban. There have been violent actions emanating from those. You could see an acceleration. It could test the

mettle of President Mbeki. It could test the shape of U.S.-South African relations.

The fifth point pertains to West Africa to illicit diamond trafficking. There we see a confluence of Libya’s Quaddafi, the Sierra

Leone outlawed insurgency, the RUF, the Revolutionary United

Front, Burkina Faso President Campaore, and Liberian President

Charles Taylor. We could—this is a set of relations which is being

used for money laundering purposes for al-Qaeda. It has been

treated in the press.

So those are the fifth major—the five principal challenges. I

will—and my paper goes into some detail on each of those areas.

What I would like to do is skip ahead and speak to the—to two

points. One is, the ambivalence that exists within Africa toward

the United States and its anti-terrorist global campaign. And then

what I see as six actions that the Administration—which are affordable, which the Administration could take in putting together

a more comprehensive and assertive counter-terrorist strategy.

The reaction within Africa was quite muted and quite ambivalent

to the events of September 11. It is a response to fear, fear that

a U.S. military campaign might harm Muslim civilians and outrage

domestic constituencies. A fear that it might invite further attacks

on U.S. facilities in Africa, which have taken high causalities

among the Africans, that would kill and wound many Africans, and

a fear that reminiscent of the Gulf War a decade earlier, that it

will set back the continent economically and that it will lead to significant cuts in international development assistance. Memories of

that period are still very live.

There is a also a skepticism of U.S. commitments to Africa, and

that skepticism has resurfaced in significant new ways that links

back to actions taken with respect to Somalia in ’93, ’94, Rwanda,

’94, and the like. And we have seen some hot spots within Africa

where there has been violent anti-U.S. reaction in Kano, in Khartoum, in coastal Kenya.

Now, set against that was the reaction by strong friends of the

United States to very vocally and assertively demonstrate resolve

in support of the United States—Senegalese President Wade, Nigerian President Obasanjo, expressions that came from South Africa,

Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Angola, among others. This culminated

in the mid-October Dakar Summit.

One point I want to make here is that I believe that these friends

of the United States, who have projected themselves in this fashion, are sincere in their expressions. They are also very concerned

that the effort that they lead through the New Africa Initiative

that was adopted by the Organization of African Unity and praised

by the G8 Summit in Italy in the summer, is at risk that this new

African partnership, in which these reformist states are seeking a

new compact with the west in support of political and economic reforms. That it will be eclipsed, that it will be overlooked, that the

promise of increased external development and financial flows from

16

the west, along with expanded debt relief and trade and investment opportunities to support real political and economic reform,

will be damaged. The reason I highlight this is I think that that

compact, that reciprocity, that implicit quid pro quo, that exists

within Africa, is central to any effective counter-terrorist strategy,

vis-a-vis Africa.

Where do we go from here? I think we need to keep in mind that

oil matters very significantly to Africa—to the United States, oil

from Africa. It will matter even more now as we look for new nonGulf sources. There is $40 billion in new American investment on

the table in the energy sector in Africa for the next few years. We

derive 17 percent of our oil from Africa, 80 percent of American

trade and investment. This is a zone which will get much greater

attention, particularly with respect to Nigeria and Angola. We don’t

have an energy policy. We don’t have a policy that looks toward

supporting—curb corruption, developmental benefits, respect of

human rights, and resolution of long-standing internal armed conflicts in this zone.

The second point I want to make reinforces something that

Susan, quite eloquently, expressed, which is our diplomatic and intelligence capacities in Africa have been sorely depleted over the

past decade. In the aftermath of September 11, resources—human

and financial resources have been diverted on a very significant

scale.

Today we have very, very weak insight into northern Sudan,

northern Nigeria, and central and southern Somalia, three of the

critical areas that I outlined where threats are emanating into our

interests. This creates real vulnerabilities for Americans. The

bombings of Dar es Salaam and Nairobi in August 1998 were, in

some respects, a significant human and intelligence failure. We

need more secure embassies. We need stronger human and diplomatic intelligence assets and capacities.

We should take six steps. One is, we should bring our existing

policy priorities to scale. In some respects, we are doing the right

thing along a number of different fronts. If you look at what we are

doing with respect to the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act,

which the Chairman referenced, if we look at debt-relief facilities,

if we look at our enlarging commitment on HIV/AIDS, if we look

at efforts to restore the development assistance account, which

Susan led in the late Clinton Administration, if we look at the

heightened focus upon the energy sector—all of these are very valid

bases for strengthening Africa. They are now part of the focus of

the New Africa Initiative. What is missing, however, is defending

and protecting these efforts against raiding, in the context of the

crisis in Afghanistan, and enhancing them as our contribution to

support of the New Africa Initiative.

The second point is we should reach beyond official contacts to

Africa’s citizens. We have a strong need for a public diplomacy

strategy to reach Africa’s Muslim communities. We have instruments like the Horn of Africa Service at VOA that could be greatly

enhanced to bring across straight journalism, straight accounts, of

what is happening on the ground and what U.S. policy represents.

At a popular non-governmental level we should expect that we will

encounter heightened skepticism to U.S. actions on counter-terVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:54 Jan 03, 2002 Jkt 076191 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\AFRICA\111501\76191 HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
17

rorism, and we need to bring forward, particularly in Sudan, in the

Horn, other parts of the Horn, in Nigeria, and South Africa, what

U.S. policies are.

Second, we need a feasible and integrated Horn of Africa strategy. The sorts of concerns on Sudan that Susan outlined, the initiatives by Senator Danforth—those are key elements. We also need

a strategy that defines how we are going to relate to Kenya and

Ethiopia in coping with the threat within central and southern Somalia. The Horn of Africa is at a much more fragile point today

than it was earlier.

We need to bring our anti-terrorism concerns into our bilateral

dialogue with South Africa and with Nigeria. That will be a sensitive and complex challenge. We need to upgrade our U.S. human

and institutional capacities. And we need a feasible U.S. security

assistance strategy for counter-terrorism.

Mr. Chairman, I realize time is short. I think these measures

that we have proposed are affordable, the ones that Susan has outlined and the ones that are contained within my paper. They are

complimentary. They are consistent with one another, and they are

affordable if there is sufficient will at a high level. And if they are

brought forward through early systematic consultations in Africa.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Morrison follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF J. STEPHEN MORRISON, PH.D., DIRECTOR, AFRICA

PROGRAM, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

I wish to commend Chairman Royce, Congressman Payne, and other Members for

focusing today on a critical challenge now before Washington: how to reorient U.S.

policies to address global terrorist threats that link to Africa—at the same time that

the United States strengthens its other key interests in Africa in promoting democracy, the rule of law, resolution of chronic and multiple wars, and integration into

the global economy.

Africa today matters, for good and bad, far more to U.S. interests than it did preSeptember 11. The outstanding policy question is what the Bush administration is

prepared to do to meet this historic challenge—with what level of sustained political

will and essential resources. Several affordable measures can be undertaken right

away that can attract bipartisan support from Congress and support from serious

African reformers. Under funded half-measures, on the other hand, will have little

positive effect and only weaken U.S. credibility.

THE TERRORIST THREAT IN AFRICA

Fully one third of Africa’s 700 million citizens are Muslim, and for the vast majority radical Islam has had minimal resonance. Africa is replete with enduring traditions of tolerance among Muslim and non-Muslim communities, while the U.S. has

successfully developed close friendly relations with a range of African states with

substantial Muslim populations. Nonetheless, most of Africa’s Muslims, like their

non-Muslim African brethren, are impoverished global have-nots who live in acute—

and worsening—marginality that invites local sectarian and interethnic strife, despair and anti-Western resentment.

During the past decade, frustrated Muslims living under corrupt, malfunctioning

governments across the Horn, West Africa’s Sahel zone and areas of southern Africa

have looked increasingly to Islamic agencies funded by Saudi and other Persian Gulf

donors to provide education, health, social welfare, and security. This weakly understood phenomenon has often stabilized communities and enhanced the local legitimacy of Muslim social activism. At the same time, it has provided the means to

mobilize anti-U.S. and anti-Western sentiment and has created havens for militant

actors who endeavor to act in solidarity with Al Qaeda. From the outside, differentiating among legitimate social welfare action, rhetorical posturing, and support for

international terrorism is a formidable challenge.

As the campaign against global terrorism unfolds, several flashpoints in Africa

will merit special attention. First, Al Qaeda elements and sympathizers may seek

18

refuge in central or northern Somalia, in league with Al-Itihaad, and with possible

linkages to ethnic Somali communities in Kenya. That could invite a strong U.S.

military response into Somalia and possibly new cross-border interventions by Ethiopia. Second, there is a risk of a violent anti-U.S. reaction in northern Sudan that

could derail the ongoing U.S.-Sudan dialogue on terrorism and prospects for renewed negotiations to achieve a just, comprehensive peace settlement to Sudan’s internal war. Third, Al Qaeda’s influence could expand in northern Nigeria, possibly

contribute to a violent anti-U.S. reaction there, and potentially create a crisis of governance for President Obasanjo. A fourth threat, perhaps more modest than the others, is a terrorist assault upon U.S. interests and others in Cape Town and Durban

that would test the mettle of President Mbeki and reshape the contour of U.S.-South

African relations. Finally, Al Qaeda could seek to strengthen its underground linkages to West African illicit diamond trafficking, based on direct and indirect partnerships with Quaddafi, the RUF, Campaore and Taylor.

The most serious and complex challenges lie in the Horn of Africa

SUDAN

Sudan is one of seven countries on the State Department’s list of state sponsors

of terrorism and since 1989 has been a self-proclaimed Islamic republic. Twelve

years hence, its Islamic revolution is exhausted and widely discredited, internally

and externally. From 1991 until early 1996, Khartoum provided a home to Osama

bin Laden; it may still provide a haven to members of the Al Qaeda network. Reportedly, Al Qaeda business linkages persist in the banking sector and export-import and agricultural commodity enterprises. Al Qaeda enjoys an unknown level of

popular support within northern Sudanese society. The radical Islamist leader, Hassan Turabi, who sought for himself and the National Islamic Front government a

leading international role on behalf of political Islam, has been detained for most

of 2001, and demonstrations of support in northern Sudan on his behalf have been

modest but persistent.

Since first moving against Turabi at the end of 2000, President Umar Al-Bashir

has attempted to moderate his external image and rehabilitate his external linkages. Internally, he has persistently pursued a hard-line Islamist rhetoric against

his opponents, shown no proof of willingness to pursue a negotiated peace settlement to Sudan’s eighteen-year internal war, and persisted in aerial bombardments

of civilian humanitarian sites in southern opposition areas and egregious human

rights abuses.

Sudan swiftly became a priority focus of U.S. investigators immediately after September 11. Sudanese President Umar Al-Bashir announced that Sudan had broken

all its links to bin Laden, and would cooperate fully in identifying those responsible

for the attacks. According to U.S. officials, Sudan responded cooperatively ‘‘across

the board’’ to U.S. requests for specific information and actions, making an ‘‘implicit’’ offer of access to military bases and overflight rights, and providing names

and locations of individuals in the Al Qaeda network, as well as access to Sudan’s

banking system.

Khartoum’s newfound willingness to cooperate has drawn an overt acknowledgment from Secretary of State Colin Powell and other U.S. officials. Senior House Republicans, under pressure from the White House, have postponed indefinitely debate

on the Sudan Peace Act, a bill that would have bolstered support to the southern

rebels in Sudan and punished foreign companies doing business in the country. And,

on September 28, the United States acquiesced to a UN Security Council decision

to lift sanctions on Sudan, imposed in April 1996 after an assassination attempt on

Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak.

Nonetheless, these developments represent only the opening phase of a new and

urgent U.S.-Sudan dialogue on terrorism. The United States will almost certainly

push for further measures, including expanded efforts to identify and renounce all

remaining terrorist ties, a willingness to ship known terrorists abroad to face justice, and enduring cooperation in international intelligence and law enforcement efforts. Beyond terrorism, it will be critically important that Washington not ease

pressure on Khartoum to improve its deplorable human rights record, enhance humanitarian access, cease aerial bombardment of civilian sites, and return in earnest

to the negotiating table to seek a just peace settlement to Sudan’s war. There is

a clear risk that Khartoum may conclude that cooperation on international terrorist

issues has won it space on internal war issues, and that Washington will be distracted by other, more pressing matters in South Asia.

19

SOMALIA

Al-Itihaad, the radical Islamist movement assembled out of mujahhedin veterans,

operates in the stateless space of central Somalia, in the midst of other Muslim

charities that enjoy considerable popular legitimacy for the social welfare they have

created. Supported by wealthy Saudi elements, Al-Itihaad has strong ties to ethnic

Somalis inside Kenya (especially Eastleigh, near Nairobi, and within Kenya’s coastal Muslim community) and is alleged to have been closely associated with violent

Al Qaeda operations against U.S. personnel. In 1993, Bin Laden provided training

support to the Somali warlord Mohamed Farah Aideed, whose forces on October 3,

1993 killed 18 American commandos. The Washington Post reported on November

4 that following the U.S. withdrawal from Somalia in 1994, ‘‘al Qaeda members continued to use Somalia as a regional base of operations, including preparations for

the 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.’’ Those attacks killed 12 Americans and 245 Africans and seriously injured

over 4,000 persons (the vast majority Kenyan.)

In the early to mid-1990s, Al-Itihaad dominated the port of Merca and the inland

center of Luuq. At its peak, it has been able to muster upwards of 3,000 armed

fighters, has staged terrorist operations in Ethiopia and Kenya, and coordinated activities with terrorist entities operating out of Khartoum. Its power and personnel

have declined significantly at each of the three points during the past five years

when Ethiopian forces have intervened massively inside Somalia. At present, AlItihaad reportedly has a base of operations on Ras Kamboni Island in southern Somalia, which is used by Al Qaeda for transit of materials and personnel. According

to official Ethiopian and other sources, Al-Itihaad has also made inroads into northeastern Somalia, in the semi-autonomous region Puntland, and through its port,

Bosaso, has sent volunteers to support Al Qaeda operations in Afghanistan.

Al-Itihaad was named in September 2001 by the Bush administration as one of

the 27 entities supporting Al Qaeda. On November 7, the Bush administration took

action to shut down the Al Barakaat hawala financial network, whose operations

are centered in Somalia and which is accused of funding Al Qaeda’s activities.

NIGERIA

Nigeria, where fifty percent of the 120 million citizens are Muslim, could see a

deepening rift along ethno-religious lines. In the twelve self-proclaimed Islamic

states of northern Nigeria, authority rests with governors linked to the northern

military power base that plundered Nigeria under Sani Abacha and saw its influence collapse, much to its surprise, with Obasanjo’s electoral triumph in 1999. These

governors have successfully consolidated their position through an aggressive critique of Obasanjo’s failure to curb corruption and decentralize authority, combined

with his close alliance with the West. There is a great deal of favorable sentiment

toward Al Qaeda in the north, and easy, unregulated flows of finance, people and

commodities linked to external Islamic networks.

SOUTH AFRICA

Al Qaeda cells exist in Cape Town and Durban. Al Qaeda has been affiliated with

two Cape Town movements, People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (Pagad) and its

associate, Qibla. Pagad launched a bombing campaign in Cape Town in 1998 that

included American targets. Both Pagad and Qibla are on the official U.S. list of terrorist organizations. Though only an estimated two percent of South Africa’s population is Muslim, that figure is growing, as proselytizing efforts reach beyond the

Asian population to the mixed race and black African communities. The South African government has been too ill-informed, and ill equipped, to bring effective controls upon radical Islam within its borders.

LIBYA AND ILLICIT DIAMONDS

Libya’s Quaddafi has a history of terrorist activities in Africa that has been in

remission in recent years, at the same time that he has launched an expansive campaign to win political allegiances across Africa. More recently, however, credible reports have surfaced that Quaddafi is linked to illicit diamond trafficking out of Sierra Leone that directly benefits Al Qaeda, along with Liberian President Charles

Taylor, the outlawed Sierra Leone insurgency, the Revolutionary United Front

(RUF), and the President of Burkina Faso, Blaise Campaore.

AFRICA’S APPREHENSIVE FRIENDS AND SKEPTICS

Though in the immediate aftermath of September 11, many African leaders expressed heartfelt sympathies and condolences, the reaction in many African states

20

was strikingly muted and ambivalent. Some feared that the inexorable American

military campaign might harm Muslim civilians (and outrage domestic constituencies), invite further attacks on U.S. facilities in Africa that would wound and kill

many Africans, and, reminiscent of the Gulf War a decade earlier, set back the continent economically, and trigger cuts in international development assistance.

The toned-down reaction also reflected a skepticism of America, if not outright

anti-Americanism in some corners, that follows from America’s swift disengagement

in 1993–1994 from Somalia and passivity in early 1994 in the face of the Rwanda

genocide; a perception of U.S. detachment from Africa’s profound needs (many in Africa continue to argue that the Bush administration is woefully indifferent to Africa,

contrary indications notwithstanding); and the United States’ perceived bias in favor

of Israel in the Middle East crisis. As U.S. military action commenced in early October, virulent anti-U.S. sentiment surfaced in select hotspots—including Muslim cleric leaders in coastal Kenya, religious leaders and official media in Khartoum, and

rioters in Kano in northern Nigeria who played upon pre-existing, acute sectarian

tensions, and whose violence quickly left more than 120 dead and threatened to

spread to several major urban centers.

A notable exception to Africa’s muted response was the reaction of a small set of

powerful African leaders with comparatively strong, established ties to the United

States. Nigerian President Olesegun Obasanjo swiftly backed U.S. and British operations against Al Qaeda and the Taliban regime. South Africa, Ethiopia, Kenya,

Uganda and Angola, among others, soon followed, with frequent emphasis on the

need for hard evidence and targeted retaliation. Interestingly, though, when Wade

hosted a summit in Dakar in mid-October, the results fell far short of his original

ambitions and reaffirmed Africa’s fundamental hesitation to identify too overtly

with the United States’ anti-terrorism campaign. Only ten African heads of state appeared (of whom the majority did not represent regional powers). Instead of endorsing a major new pact on terrorism, participants temporized—issuing a declaration

calling for a meeting of the Organization of Africa Unity (soon to be transformed

into the African Union) to monitor developments and evaluate implementation of

the existing African Convention against Terrorism. That desultory initiative was

adopted in 1999 following the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Dar es Salaam and

Nairobi, signed by 36 of Africa’s 53 states, and subsequently ratified by only three.

Wade and others’ hope for a fresh African pact that expressly aided the U.S. campaign was prompted in part by fear that the emerging war in Afghanistan would

lay waste to their New African Initiative (NAI), adopted by the Organization of African Unity and praised by the G8 summit in Italy in July 2001. The NAI seeks a

‘‘new global partnership’’ to end Africa’s marginal position in the world economy,

spur trade and reduce poverty. African political and economic reforms would be reciprocated by increased external developmental and financial flows from the West,

along with expanded debt relief and trade and investment opportunities.

THE ROAD AHEAD

Post-September 11, Africa matters to U.S. interests in significant new ways, both

good and bad. There is now greater recognition in the United States that Africa’s

institutional weaknesses, autocratic governance and economic marginality pose a serious threat to U.S. security interests. In the near to medium term, these vexin g

factors are only expected to worsen; in the midst of a global economic downturn aggravated by the aftermath of September 11, the World Bank predicts the worst impact will be felt in Africa. Africa’s exceptional circumstances give rise to porous borders, places to hide, opportunity for bribery, and a ready, aggrieved audience, all

of which could significantly benefit the next emergent, terrorist network seeking advantage in Africa. Openings already exist in Sudan, Somalia, northern Nigeria and

South Africa—which must be addressed systematically. Other openings could appear in several other African settings and quickly merit priority attention.

At the same time, an important subset of Africa’s leaders appears genuinely ready

to work with the United States in the battle against international terrorism. Their

commitment is linked—in a direct and timely way—to their quest to reverse Africa’s

decline through new reciprocal partnerships with Western powers. If managed carefully and aggressively, so that credible new U.S. commitments are put in place, and

if African partners show tangible progress in economic and political reform, including respect for human rights, the United States may realize real gains in the next

five years, and consolidate ties with an enduring, core African coalition. Where this

opportunity is mishandled, the United States could easily find itself in intimate alliances—reminiscent of the Cold War—with unsavory, and ultimately unreliable partners.

Two additional factors enter the equation, post-September 11.

21

There is greater recognition that Africa matters to the United States as an important and growing source of non-Gulf oil: currently the central/west African basin accounts for 17% of U.S. oil imports and over 80% of American trade and investment

in Africa. Plans exist for an estimated $40 billion in new U.S. private investment

in the energy sector in Africa in the next few years, when production and imports

in and from this region are expected to rise steadily. This factor has its most powerful impact on U.S. bilateral ties with Nigeria and Angola; in these two instances,

future debate over U.S. policy will continue to center on the best means to curb corruption, promote tolerance, broaden developmental benefits from oil, respect human

rights, and resolve longstanding internal armed conflicts. The challenge will be balancing U.S. policy on the difficult internal reforms required of Nigeria and Angola

with short term goals of securing new oil flows and expressions of political allegiance.

Second, U.S. diplomatic and intelligence capacities in Africa have been steadily

depleted over the past decade, and indeed have been further degraded since September 11, as substantial personnel and resources have been diverted. Diplomatic

personnel dedicated to Africa were slashed by 15 percent in the mid-1990s, at the

same time that intelligence personnel were cut back over a third, and fully a dozen

aid missions were shuttered. These developments predictably translate into a weakened grasp of quickly evolving trends on the ground (the U.S. currently has at best

weak insight into northern Sudan, northern Nigeria, and central and southern Somalia), and create acute vulnerabilities that can be brutally exploited—as was seen in the August 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi.

As the U.S.-led war against terrorism unfolds, U.S. citizens and embassies, along

with innocent Africans, could easily be the targets of new violence.

Looking ahead, six actions will be critical to an effective U.S. counter terrorism

policy in and with Africa.

1) Bring existing priority initiatives to scale.

A top priority should be to demonstrate U.S. resolve in bringing multiple enhanced benefits to those states that are both reliable anti-terrorist partners and

credible economic and political reformers. That will mean protecting existing programs from abrupt depletions to support non-African programs—‘raiding’ that has

already begun within the Bush administration. That will mean overt, strong U.S.

diplomatic leadership to support the New Africa Initiative. It will also mean deepening and broadening the trade and investment opportunities of the Africa Growth

and Opportunity Act (AGOA); increasing debt relief and facilities through the IMF

and World Bank; steadily enlarging U.S. commitments to battle HIV/AIDS, so that

they surpass $1 billion within a year, and otherwise doubling bilateral assistance

in support of economic growth, conflict reconciliation and rule of law. It means

elaborating a serious energy strategy for Africa that focuses upon building management capacity, transparency and accountability, power generation and regional integration of energy grids. It is less important, post-September 11, that the United

States embarks on wholly new initiatives than that it protect and bring to scale existing policy priorities that require substantially higher commitments to be effective,

and to earn credibility and leverage in Africa.

2) Reach beyond official contacts to Africa’s citizens.

The U.S. needs a smart public diplomacy that systematically builds ties with Muslim communities, and more generally, with civic organizations, opposition leaders,

religious authorities and human rights advocates. At a popular and non-governmental level, Washington should expect that its heightened counter-terrorist actions

U.S. will frequently be met in Africa with intense skepticism, if not outright hostility: that it is anti-Islam in its motivations; that it relies on close ties with autocratic regimes; and that it will not be sustained. Special efforts should be made in

northern Sudan, Kenya, Ethiopia, Tanzania, northern Nigeria, and South Africa.

3) Define a feasible, integrated Horn of Africa strategy.

A related, second priority will be to elaborate a Horn of Africa strategy that consolidates recent gains in bilateral terrorism cooperation with Khartoum; effectively

contains and reduces Al-Itihaad’s influence in central and southern Somalia; clarifies strategy vis-a-vis the Somaliland government in northern Somalia and the

fledgling Transitional National Government in Mogadishu; and spells out how the

United States will pursue—versus compromise—its enduring interests in democracy, respect for human rights, economic reform and just peace settlements to the

region’s internal wars.

The latter considerations will be especially important in the U.S. strategy to end

Sudan’s eighteen-year war and U.S. relations with regional partners such as Kenya

and Ethiopia. As Ethiopia and Kenya inevitably turn to the United States for new

22

forms of security cooperation to address threats in Somalia (and perhaps also assist

with ending Sudan’s war), the United States should have a medium-term strategy

ready at hand. Washington should not desist, for example, from pressing aggressively for curbs on Kenyan governmental corruption and for an orderly and transparent national electoral transition into the post-Moi future. Nor should it shy away

from engaging Addis Ababa on full implementation of the Algiers peace accord (ending Ethiopia’s interstate war with Eritrea), and genuine democratic and economic

liberalization. At all points, Washington will need discipline and caution, in dealing

with the threat of instability in Asmara and Addis Ababa, breakdown of the Algiers

Accord, and realism in judging what Kenya and Ethiopia are capable of delivering

in their dangerous neighborhoods.

A key element to the U.S. Horn strategy will be accelerating administration efforts, led by former Senator John Danforth, to bring the Saudis, Egypt, Kenya and

key Europeans behind a concerted multilateral effort to achieve a just, negotiated

peace settlement to Sudan’s internal war. The United States should also expedite

the restaffing of the U.S. Embassy in Khartoum (suspended since early 1996).

4) Bring antiterrorism into the bilateral dialogue with South Africa and Nigeria.

Corruption and sectarian violence in Nigeria, along with uncontrolled movement

of people, goods and finances into the north, remain complex, volatile issues. The

same can be said for Pagad and Qibla—two anti-government, anti-Western organizations in South Africa. These are subjects which U.S. diplomacy will have to approach gingerly and flexibly, and where new forms of outreach and leverage will be

essential. As in the case of the Horn of Africa, a challenge will be to integrate this

new dimension of U.S. foreign policy with pre-existing priorities.

5) Upgrade U.S. human and institutional capacities.

A fourth priority is bolstering U.S. human capital and resources—strengthening

significantly U.S. intelligence, diplomatic and foreign assistance personnel in the

Horn and West Africa, the latter with special reference to northern Nigeria. Much

more effort will be needed also to understand Quaddafi’s expansive policies in Africa. Overall, this effort will require a multi-year strategy to recruit and train additional career personnel.

6) Define a feasible U.S. security assistance strategy for counter-terrorism.

Fifth, the Bush administration should accelerate its review of U.S. security assistance to Africa—for example, the Africa Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), and Operation Focused Relief—to reconfigure these programs to strengthen military counterterrorist capacities in Kenya, Ethiopia, Nigeria and South Africa. It should step up

support to regional arms control initiatives and the international campaign to tighten illicit diamond flows (the ‘‘Kimberley process’’) and secure new, substantial nonmilitary assistance to strengthen border controls, law enforcement and financial

controls. Substantial increases in flexible Economic Support Funds (ESF) will be essential: $300 million per year.

CONCLUSION

These proposed measures can all be undertaken at an affordable cost, if there is

sufficient political will at a high level. All can muster bipartisan support from Congress, if the administration extends itself in a concerted fashion. All can win support

in Africa where support matters, if U.S. policies meaningfully and powerfully answer the needs of serious African reformers, and if they are accompanied by systematic, early consultations. If attempted on the cheap, these measures will be a formula for policy failure and erosion of U.S. credibility.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Dr. Morrison. And we are going to now

go to Dr. Nyang. In the meantime, as you can tell, there is a series

of votes, and so myself and Ranking Member Congressman Payne

will be trading off here. Thank you. Dr. Nyang.

STATEMENT OF SULAYMAN S. NYANG, PH.D., PROFESSOR,

AFRICAN STUDIES, HOWARD UNIVERSITY

Mr. NYANG. Yes. Thank you very much, Chairman Royce, and

Congressman Payne, and, staff. It is a pleasure to be here. And

what I am going to do really is to give some historical background,

because, I think, in order for us to understand the present state of

23

affairs in Africa, we have to really understand the conditions and

circumstances which created the problem we are now dealing with.

The link—and I am going to read a portion of my testimony for

the record. The linkage between terrorism and African societies can

be traced back to the anti-colonial struggle. The Mau Mau

uprisings in Kenya and the atrocities associated with it were generally characterized by the British authorities as acts of terrorism

carried out by what was then perceived to be a predominately

Kikuyu movement. The other instance of political violence that received the name terrorism was the Algerian uprising against

French rule. This bloody uprising led to the death of thousands of

Algerians and Frenchmen.

Yet, until the Tricontinental Conference of 1966 in Havana,

Cuba, sub-Sahara Africa did not witness any major forms of political violence one can now, retrospectively, call terrorism. Up until

the Havana conference, which declared the justifiability of violence

in waging wars of national liberation, the African liberation movements took the path of nonviolence to fight for political independence. This change of rhetoric and tactics in the prosecution of the

national liberation in the former Portuguese territories and in the

former settler states of South Africa and Rhodesia, would create

the precedent for the employment of low-level terrorism in these

parts of the African continent. Although many system challengers

of that period would now claim their acts to be those of freedom

fighters against oppressive regimes, their acts were perceived in

most Western circles as acts—violent acts of terrorism. These sentiments would affect the policies and decisions of the United States

Government until the collapse of apartheid and the rise to power

of the ANC National Congress.

And I think this is very important to understand because of the

ambiguity that Stephen was mentioning with regard to some of

these African governments. Because many of them came out of that

kind of background.

It is against this background that we now examine the rise of

militant Islam in Africa. Before we go into any serious analysis of

the potential threat of Islamic militants to the United States of

America, we must first identify the factors and forces responsible

for the development of Islamic militancy in Africa.

Before the collapse of the colonial orders in Africa, African Muslims were becoming increasingly secularized. This process of secularization was a global phenomenon and scholars like American social scientist Daniel Lerner saw it as the passing of traditional society. This transition from a traditional society dominated by Islam

to another on the verge of modernization, was widely celebrated by

the champions of African and Arab nationalism. This was the heyday of African and Arab nationalism on the one hand and African

and Arab socialism on the other. Taking place within the framework of the Cold War, this secularization process put Islam and religion generally on the defensive.

In the special case of Africa, the only defenders of Islam were the

traditional conservative members of the Ulema—these are the

learned scholars—and the sufi orders committed to Islamic mysticism, tassawuf. Because the young people were sold on the ideas

of development and modernization, Islam continued to be observed

24

ritually but its political potency remained either underestimated or

ignored completely by the political class and scholars. Three global

and regional African developments would change the course of African and world history. The present state of Islamic militancy and

terrorism in Africa and the world could be traced back to these

changes in the international system.

The first development was the export into Africa of the political

troubles of the Middle East. But before we go into the analysis of

this development, let me remind my readers and audience here

that the Middle East of the Cold War era was different from all

other regions of the world because of the trinity of conflicts raging

within its borders. The trinity of conflicts raging in the Middle East

consists of the following: One, the bipolar Cold War between the

United States of America and her allies and the Soviet Union and

her Eastern Bloc allies; two, the Arab-Israeli conflict; three, the

Arab Cold War.

To understand the present state of affairs regarding Islamic militancy and terrorism in Africa and the potential for terrorism in

Muslim lands and among Muslim minorities in African societies,

one must first examine how the African Muslims became involved

in the theater of conflicts in the Middle East in the first place. The

trinity of conflicts from the Middle East came to Africa because of

the Arab-Israeli conflict on the one hand and the Arab Cold War

on the other. Because of Gamal Abdul Nasser’s campaign against

Israel and Zionism in Africa, African states became the target of

both Arab and Israeli propaganda. The Arabs capitalized on both

Islam and Pan-Africanism to ingratiate themselves with the Africans.

On the other hand, the Israelis played on the fact that both

blacks and Jews have historically suffered at the hands of other

human groups. This idea of a community of suffering was an important card in the Israeli hand. Although in retrospect, one can

now argue that this ideological game of the Middle Eastern states

resulted in a mixed bag of Arab and Israeli victories, the fact remains that these two struggles imported into Africa set the stage

for the revitalization of Islam in Africa.

To put it another way, I could say that political Islam in contemporary sub-Saharan Africa owed a great debt to the activities of

secular Egypt under Nasser, and the Arab-Israeli conflict. These

are unintended consequences because although Nasser gave thousands of scholarships to young Muslims to study and receive training at Egyptian centers of higher learning, he could not predict the

fact that many of these young men and women would later return

to Africa to replicate politically what he himself tried hard to prevent the Islamic Brotherhood from doing in Egypt. This post-colonial phenomenon of revitalized militant Islam was a revival of the

colonial process of secularization that came with the advancing armies of the newly installed colonial powers.

The second factor responsible for the revivification of militant

Islam was the Arab Cold War. Saudi Arabia played a crucial role

and, ironically, the Western Powers who were totally preoccupied

with the Cold War, wittingly or unwittingly supported this venture.

Because Nasser and the Baathist forces in the Arab World were

suspected to be collaborators with the Soviet Union, this Saudi atVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:54 Jan 03, 2002 Jkt 076191 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\AFRICA\111501\76191 HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
25

tempt to use Islam for political and strategic ends in Africa received some encouragement. Because of these political uses of

Islam in Africa, the Saudi brand of Wahabism soon gained some attention in sub-Saharan Africa. This was most evident after the

1973 war between Israel and Arab states and the oil embargo and

its aftermath.

For this discussion it should be noted here that the sharp rise

in oil prices in the mid-1970’s catapulted Saudi Arabia to the plateau of economic success, and this new state of affairs in Africa and

world politics enhances Saudi prestige in Muslim circles.

Because of this development, thousands of young Muslims from

various African lands went to study in Arabia. Saudi literature and

Saudi-financed missionaries spread across the African continent.

This process of Islamization became more intense after the Iranian

Revolution, when it became evident to Saudi leaders that their

brand of Islam could be threatened by the Shiite revolutionary

state next door. The Iran-Iraq War was just one consequence of

this war between the two major sects in the Islamic world.

In order for us to prosecute the war against terrorism in Africa

successfully, we must recognized the fact that those who subscribe

to militant Islam would like to conflate a fight for change in their

parts of the world with the use of political violence to accomplish

their goals. Manipulating Islamic texts on social justice and banking heavily on the need to resort to jihadic means to settle scores

with the ruling elites of their societies, these system challengers of

the Muslim African states could be influenced by forces in the Middle East.

Yet, because the African Muslim states are not homogeneous and

their conditions are not identical, it would be dangerous and unwise to come up with one prescription. However, one should point

out the fact that the cannon fodder for any terrorist acts are most

likely going to be young Africans who are terribly indoctrinated

about the poor state of Islam and Muslims in the world and the

need to correct such inequities in the world system.

Although most African states, including predominantly Muslim

countries, have majorities of young people, the chances for successful recruitment of sizable African armies for these purveyors of terrorism are limited. This is largely due to the degree of Western cultural penetration in most of the sub-Saharan African states and

the growing fascination with creature comforts even when they do

not have any means to realize their dream of owning things from

the West.

Yet, this source of strength on the part—on our part could turn

against us if the potential sources of dissatisfaction are not addressed through effective and meaningful aid program. Indeed, one

irony of this war against global terrorism is the fact that when we

failed to do for African—what we failed to do for African development during the Cold War must now be done with deliberate speed

if we are going to curb the forces of terrorism and lay the foundations for a strong African link in the chains against global terrorism.

This idea of strengthening the African link in the chain against

global terrorism, deserves our attention for important reasons.

First, Africa is the weakest political territory to penetrate by interVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:54 Jan 03, 2002 Jkt 076191 PO 00000 Frm 00029 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\AFRICA\111501\76191 HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
26

national terrorists. The weakness of Africa lies in two factors. One

is the weak nature of the African state, and the other is the corruptibility of the African political class. A combination of these two

factors makes this vast continent an explosive Pandora’s box.

The United States of America has worldwide interests and Africa

consists a major part of that global strategic chain. For this and

other related reasons it certainly makes political sense for U.S. policy makers to pay greater attention to Africa. The U.S. may often

times play political Gulliver to the African Lilliputs; but in a world

that is increasingly becoming dangerous and deadly, it would be

politically prudent to strengthen materially and strategically the

weakest links to your chain of self protection. Greater USAID involvement in the development process in Africa could make a big

difference.

Secondly, the U.S. government must come to the realization that

the war on global terrorism can only be won first in the minds and

hearts of the African Muslims and then in the global battlefields.

Here is where the democratic hand of the United States of America

becomes a potential source of strength in the war against the terrorism. By supporting and strengthening the second wave of democratization in the African continent, U.S. leaders at all levels of

government could make African governments, not only materially

effective in dealing with the knotty problems of economic and social

development, but they could also help in the planting of the seeds

of democratic governance in many parts of Africa.

As in the Middle East, where the Cold War policies of the United

States of America helped maintain many an autocratic regime, in

many African states where Muslims live either as minorities or

majorities, systems of government have not always been democratic. For this and other related reasons it makes good political

sense for the U.S. Government to invest heavily in the democratic

enterprise. Indeed, in the war against terrorism, the democratic

card pays bigger dividends.

The third factor in this war against terrorism is for the U.S. Government to initiate a dialogue between African Muslims and the

American people. By drawing upon its cultural and moral resources

in the formulation and development of programs linking Americans

and Africans, especially Muslim Africans, the United States of

America could help set the state for the detalibanization of many

African madrassas. These are Quranic schools, which could be

breeding ground for any kind of Taliban, African side.

This is particularly so since in places like northern Nigeria the

spirit of militant Islam has occasionally, over the last 30 years,

taken the lives of thousands of people in inter-religious strife and

violence. This state of affairs has developed in that part of Africa,

largely because the lower classes, what they call in house, the

talakwawa, have found in militant Islam avenues of self-expression. This is to say, these lower classes in northern Nigeria have

vented their rage and anger through destructive actions against

state and private property. Their emotional fragility and their vulnerability to the sloganeering of pie-in-the-sky rhetoric of Islamic

militants, could ignite the fires of sectarianism and inter-religious

warfare. This is the greatest danger to the democratic experiment

now led by President Obasanjo.

27

By supporting scholars of Islam who show evidence of reform and

modernization, the U.S. could help the advancement of such points

of view through exchanges between American Muslim centers of

learning and African Muslim centers of learning. This is one way

of nipping in the bud any attempts at subversion and recruitment

of African Muslim youth. The U.S. Government can only inoculate

these young people from the promises and offers of the likes of

Osama bin Laden when the bread and butter issues are addressed

in their home countries. This is as true in Northern Nigeria, as in

other parts of Western and Eastern Africa, places like Somalia,

which is now a failed state.

The fourth and last factor in this war against global terrorism

in Africa lies in the curriculum development of the African states.

Even though African school textbooks have not generally fostered

any sense of religious bigotry, there is still the greater need to encourage the cultivation of tolerance in the school system. Here the

interfaith experiences of many urban areas of the United States

could begin to be shared abroad. American missionaries abroad

who have not taken pain to indulge in the art of inter-religious dialogue at home before their posting abroad may have to explore this

unfamiliar territory in their own interest and in the long-term interest of their church and state.

Similarly, the U.S. Government must begin to study carefully

how the American Muslim communities and their non-governmental organizations could contribute positively to the prosecution

of this war against global terrorism through the dissemination of

correct and reliable information about the American experience and

the Muslims stake in it.

By encouraging such acts of patriotism among American Muslims, the U.S. authorities can make their Muslim minorities equal

partners in the promotion of the American experiment abroad. This

is a powerful, psychological, moral, and political weapon in the

campaign against international terrorism.

I urge all Members of Congress to pay serious attention to this

challenge for greater American involvement in Africa. There is so

little to lose and so much to gain through such strategies. Thank

you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I hope I added to what my colleagues have presented here.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Nyang follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SULAYMAN S. NYANG, PH.D., PROFESSOR, AFRICAN

STUDIES, HOWARD UNIVERSITY

The September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the United States of America and the

global reverberations it triggered made it categorically clear that even America is

not safe anymore. The World Trade Center bombing of the early 1990’s and the

Oklahoma bombing that followed some years later, had already brought the United

States of America within the circle of vulnerable states. The Middle East, Europe,

Asia, and Latin America were already at the center of the waves of terrorist attacks

from the late 1960s onwards. Africa, potentially the most vulnerable part of the

globe, did not however see the international character and the destructive power of

terrorism until the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Although political violence as terrorism was prevalent in the northern part of the continent, sub-Saharan Africans have not generally associated with terrorism the type

of political violence perpetrated by African liberation movements in the Portuguese

colonies and settler states of South Africa and Rhodesia. This earlier attitude toward political violence has historically colored the African opinions on and attitudes

toward political violence and terrorism. The state of mind that accompanied this atVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:54 Jan 03, 2002 Jkt 076191 PO 00000 Frm 00031 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\AFRICA\111501\76191 HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
28

titude was most evident during the final years of the struggle against apartheid in

South Africa.

The linkage between terrorism and African societies can be traced back to the

anti-colonial struggle. The Mau Mau uprisings in Kenya and the atrocities associated with it were generally characterized by the British authorities as acts of terrorism carried out by what was then perceived to be a predominately Kikyuy movement. The other instance of political violence that received the name terrorism was

the Algerian uprising against French rule. This bloody uprising led to the death of

thousands of Algerians and Frenchmen. Yet, until the Tricontinental Conference of

1966 in Havana, Cuba, sub-Sahara Africa did not witness any major forms of political violence one can retrospectively call terrorism. Up until the Havana conference,

which declared the violence in waging wars of national liberation justifiable, the African liberation movements took the path of nonviolence to fight for political independence. This change of rhetoric and tactics in the prosecution of the national wars

in former Portuguese territories and in the former settler states of South Africa and

Rhodesia, would create the precedents for the employment of low level terrorism in

these parts of the African continent. Although many system challengers of that period would now claim their acts to be those of the freedom fighters against oppressive regimes, their acts were perceived in most Western circles as violent acts of terrorism. These sentiments would affect the policies and decision of the U.S. government until the collapse of apartheid and the rise to power of the African National

Congress.

It is indeed against this background that we now examine the rise of militant

Islam in Africa. Before we go into any serious analysis of the potentials threat of

Islamic militants to the United States of America, we must first identify the factors

and forces responsible for the development of Islamic militancy in Africa. Before the

collapse of the colonial orders in Africa, African Muslims were becoming increasingly secularized. This process of secularization was a global phenomenon and scholars like American social scientist Daniel Lerner saw it as ‘‘the passing of traditional

society.’’ This transition from a traditional society dominated by Islam to another

on the verge of modernization, was widely celebrated by the champions of African

and Arab nationalism. This was the heyday of African and Arab nationalism on the

one hand and African and Arab socialism on the other. Taking place within the

framework of the Cold War, this secularization process put Islam and religion generally on the defensive. In the special case of Africa, the only defenders of Islam

were the traditional conservative members of the Ulema (learned scholars) and the

sufi orders committed to Islamic mysticism (tassawuf). Because the young people

were sold on the ideas of development and modernization Islam continued to be observed ritually but its political potency remained either underestimated or ignored

completely by the political class. Three global and regional African developments

would change the course of African and world history. The present state of Islamic

militancy and terrorism in Africa and the world could be traced back to these

changes in the international system.

The first development was the export into Africa of the political troubles of the

Middle East. But before we go to the analysis of this development, let me remind

my readers that the Middle East of the Cold War era was different from all other

regions of the world because of the trinity of conflicts raging within its borders. The

trinity of conflicts raging in the Middle East consists of the following: (i)bipolar Cold

War between the United States of America and her Allies and the Soviet Union and

her Eastern Bloc allies; (ii) the Arab-Israeli conflict; (iii) the Arab Cold War. To understand the present state of affairs regarding Islamic militancy in Africa and the

potential for terrorism in Muslim lands and among Muslim minorities in African societies, one must first examine how the African Muslims became involved in the theater of conflicts in the Middle East. The trinity of conflicts from the Middle East

came into Africa because of the Arab-Israeli conflict on the one hand and the Arab

Cold War on the other. Because of Gamal Abdul Nasser’s campaign against Israel

and Zionism, African states became the target of both Arab and Israeli propaganda.

The Arabs capitalized on both Islam and Pan-Africanism to ingratiate themselves

with the Africans. On the other hand, the Israelis played on the fact that both

blacks and Jews have historically suffered at the hands of other human groups. This

idea of a community of suffering was an important card in the Israeli hand. Although in retrospect, one can now argue that this ideological game of the Middle

Eastern states resulted in a mixed bag of Arab and Israeli victories, the fact remains that these two struggles imported into Africa set the stage for the revitalization of Islam in Africa. To put it another way, I could say that political Islam in

contemporary sub-Saharan Africa owed a great debt to the activities of secular

Egypt under Nasser, and the Arab-Israeli conflict. These are unintended consequences because although Nasser gave thousands of scholarships to young MusVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:54 Jan 03, 2002 Jkt 076191 PO 00000 Frm 00032 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\AFRICA\111501\76191 HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
29

lims to study and receive training at Egyptian centers of higher learning, he could

not predict the fact that many of these young men and women would later return

home to replicate politically what he himself tried hard to prevent the Islamic

Brotherhood from doing in Egypt. This post colonial phenomenon of revitalized militant Islam, was a reversal of the colonial process of secularization that came with

the advancing armies of the newly installed colonial powers.

The second factor responsible for the revivification of militant Islam was the Arab

Cold War. Saudi Arabia played a crucial role and ironically the Western Powers who

were totally preoccupied with the Cold War willingly or unwillingly supported this

venture. Because Nasser and the Baathist forces in the Arab World were suspected

to be collaborators with the Soviet Bloc, this Saudi attempt to use Islam for political

and strategic ends in Africa received some encouragement. Because of these political

uses of Islam in Africa, the Saudi brand of Wahabism soon gained some attention

in sub-Saharan Africa. This was most evident after the 1973 War between Israel

and Arab states and the oil embargo and its aftermath. For this discussion it should

be noted here that the sharp rise in oil prices in the mid-1970’s catapulted Saudi

Arabis to the plateau of economic success, and this new state of affairs in Arab and

world politics enhances Saudi prestige in Muslim circles. Because of this development, thousands of young Muslims from various African lands went to study in Arabia. Saudi literature and Saudi financed missionaries spread across the African continent. This process of Islamization became more intense after the Iranian Revolution, when it became evident to Saudi leaders that their brand of Islam could be

threatened by the Shiite revolutionary state next door. The Iran-Iraq War was just

one consequence of this war between the two major sects of the Islamic world.

In order for us to prosecute the war against terrorism in Africa successfully we

must recognized the fact that those who subscribe to militant Islam would like to

conflate the fight for change in their parts of the world with the use of political violence to accomplish their goals. Manipulating Islamic texts on social justice and

banking heavily on the need to resort to jihadic means to settle scores with the ruling elites of their societies, these system challengers of the Muslim African states

could be influenced by forces in the Middle East. Yet, because the African Muslim

states are not homogeneous and their conditions are not identical, it would be dangerous and unwise to come up with one prescription. However, one should point out

the fact that the cannon fodder for any terrorist acts are most likely going to be

young Africans who are terribly indoctrinated about the poor state of Islam and

Muslims in the world and the need to correct such inequities in the world system.

Although most African states, including predominantly Muslim countries, have majorities of young people, the chances for successful recruitment of sizable African armies for these purveyors of terrorism are limited. This is largely due to the degree

of Western cultural penetration in most of the sub-Saharan African states and the

growing fascination with creature comforts even when they do not have any means

to realize their dreams of owning things for the West. Yet, this source of strength

on our part could turn against us if the potential sources of dis-satisfaction are not

addressed through an effective and meaningful aid program. Indeed, one irony of

this war against global terrorism is the fact that what we failed to do for African

development during the Cold War must now be done with deliberate speed if we

are to curb the forces of terrorism and lay the foundations for a strong African link

in the chain against global terrorism.

This idea of strengthening the African link in the chain against global terrorism,

deserves our attention for four important reasons. First, Africa is the weakest political territory to penetrate international terrorists. The weakness of Africa lies in two

factors. One is the weak nature of the African state, and the other is the corrupt

manner of the African political class. A combination of these two factors makes this

vast continent an explosive Pandora’s box. The United States of America has worldwide interests and Africa is a major part of that global strategic chain. For this and

other related reasons it certainly makes political sense for U.S. policy makers to pay

greater attention to Africa. The U.S. may often times play political Gulliver to the

African Lilliputs; but in a world that is increasingly becoming dangerous and deadly, it would be politically prudent to strengthen materially and strategically the

weakest links to your chain of self protection. Greater USAID involvement in the

development process in Africa could make a big difference. Secondly, the U.S. government must come to the realization that the war on global terrorism can only be

won first in the minds and hearts of the African Muslims and then in the global

battlefields. Here is where the democratic hand of the United States of America becomes a potential source of strength in the war against the terrorists. By supporting

and strengthening the second wave of democratization in the African continent, U.S.

leaders at all levels of government could make African governments, not only materially effective in dealing with the knotty problems of economic and social developVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:54 Jan 03, 2002 Jkt 076191 PO 00000 Frm 00033 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\AFRICA\111501\76191 HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
30

ment, but they could also help in the planting of the seeds of democratic governance

in many parts of Africa. As in the Middle East, where the Cold War policies of the

United States of America helped maintain many an autocratic regime, in many African states where Muslims live either as minorities or majorities, systems of government have not always been democratic. For this and other related reasons it makes

good political sense for the U.S. Government to invest heavily in the democratic enterprise. Indeed, in the war against terrorism, the democratic card pays bigger dividends.

The third factor in this war against terrorism is for the U.S. Government to initiate a dialogue between African Muslims and the American people. By drawing

upon its own cultural and moral resources in the formulation and development of

programs linking Americans and Africans, especially Muslim Africans, the United

States of America could help set the state for ‘‘detalibization’’ of many African

madrassas (Quranic schools). This is particularly so since in places like northern Nigeria the spirit of militant Islam has occasionally over the last thirty years taken

the lives of thousands of people in interreligious strife and violence. This state of

affairs has developed in that part of the African continent, largely because the lower

classes (the talakwawa) have found in militant Islam avenues of self-expression.

This is to say, these lower classes have vented their rage and anger through destructive actions against state and private property. Their emotional fragility and

their vulnerability to the sloganeering of ‘‘pie in the sky’’ rhetoric of Islamic militants, could ignite the firs of sectarianism and inter-religious warfare.

By supporting scholars of Islam who show evidence of reform and modernization,

the U.S. could help the advancement of such points of view through exchanges between American Muslim centers of learning and the African Muslim centers of

learning. This is one way of nipping in the bud any attempts at subversion and recruitment of African Muslim youth. The U.S. Government can only inoculate these

young people from the promises and offers of the likes of Osama Bin Laden when

the bread and butter issues are addressed in their home countries. This is as true

in Northern Nigeria, as in other parts of Western and Eastern Africa.

The fourth and last factor in this war on global terrorism in Africa lies in the curriculum development of the African states. Even though African school textbooks

have not generally fostered any sense of religious bigotry, there is still the greater

need to encourage the cultivation of tolerance in the school system. Here the interfaith experiences of many urban areas of the United States must begin to be shared

abroad. American missionaries abroad who have not taken pain to indulge in the

art of inter-religious dialogue at home before their pointing abroad may have to explore this unfamiliar territory in their own interest and in the long-term interest

of their church and state. Similarly, the U.S. Government must begin to study carefully how the American Muslim communities and their non-governmental organizations could contribute positively to the prosecution of this war against global terrorism through the dissemination of correct and reliable information about the

American experience and the Muslims stake in ti. By encouraging such acts of patriotism among American Muslims, the U.S. authorities can make their Muslim minorities equal partners in the promotion of the American experiment abroad. This

is a powerful, psychological, moral and political weapon in the campaign against terrorism. I urge all members of Congress to pay serious attention to this challenge

for greater American involvement in Africa. There is so little to lose and so much

to gain.

Mr. PAYNE [presiding]. Well, thank you very much. Let me say

that I appreciate the testimony from all of you, although I only

heard two of the three. But let me certainly say, Dr. Nyang, that

was very—a thorough historical document, and I think that it was

certainly important, not only for me, and we have it here in the

text, but for the people in the audience. And thank you very much

for that.

Mr. NYANG. Thank you.

Mr. PAYNE. And we will have to kind of speed up. We have been

trying to prevent adjourning as these votes go on. So we—I will

just be brief so that we can share the remaining time because we

will have to both leave.

And I just wonder—let me just ask a general question to the

three of you. Is U.S. policy attune to the growth of Islam in SubSaharan Africa? And if you think it is, then what changes in U.S.

31

policy would you make? And how can the U.S. counter the blatant

falsehoods prevalent that the fight against terrorism is a fight

against Islam? As you know, it is being terrorized that this is a

jihad, that the U.S. is against Islam. That is not what it is. It is

against the terrorists. So if you had the opportunity, what would

be your suggestions? We will start with you, Dr. Rice, and move

right on through.

Ms. RICE. Thank you. I think, first of all, to answer your question directly, I don’t think we are sufficiently attuned to the growth

of Islam in Africa. And before we are even well-positioned to answer what implications being attuned would have to our policy, I

think we need to address some of the reasons why we are not sufficiently well-attuned.

And I think that gets to some of the points that Steve outlined,

particularly in his written testimony and in some depth. We don’t

have, to this day, on the ground in Africa, sufficient personnel and

expertise to understand as well as we need to what is going on in

a number of these societies. We have got very small, understaffed

embassies, which don’t have the people and the wherewithal to

cover goings on at the grass roots level in many of these countries.

One point that Steve made, I think, very effectively in his written text, and I want to underscore, is I cannot begin to tell you how

ill-equipped we are from an intelligence collection point of view in

Africa. And I realize this is not a classified hearing and I am not

going to go into a great deal of depth, but suffice it to say, this was

something that I found extremely troubling as a policy maker. And

it is not getting any better. That is a battle we tried to fight. But

this is something—an area where I believe Congress could really

play a leadership role.

Back in the early ’90s there was a retrenchment of our human

and other collection assets in Africa, and we have been paying the

price for that ever since. And unless we ramp up on that level,

along with on the diplomatic and public diplomacy side, we are

going to be fighting with one hand tied behind our back.

The other thing I would say goes to the point of public diplomacy,

which, I think, all three of us touched on, at least in our written

testimony, I am glad to see the Administration begin to look for

creative ways to fight the public diplomacy battle on many fronts,

but it can’t leave Africa out of that mix. And I think Africa is not

viewed either as a target or as an opportunity for the United States

when it comes to winning hearts and minds. And I would like to

take my hat off to Dr. Nyang for some very creative suggestions

about how to use the American Muslim community more effectively

in that effort.

Mr. MORRISON. Thank you. Just a few points to remind us of

some of the steps that have been taken. This Administration

opened its doors pretty early on to President Obasanjo, President

Mbeki, President Wade of Senegal, Konare of Mali, and Moi of

Kenya. It is a dialogue in the aftermath of September 11, particularly in the Horn of Africa. It has been aggressive at trying to

stand up to Special Envoy to Sudan, Senator Danforth, and has appointed Andrew Natsios, the Administrator of USAID, as a humanitarian emissary and has empowered Roger Winter, the head of

OFDA, at USAID, to carry forward a number of creative initiatives.

32

I see that as certainly a sensitivity. They have outlined that they

are not anti-Islam. They are, with respect to Sudan, that they are

against egregious human rights violations, forced abductions, and

slavery, the perpetuation of this awful war. They have made clear

that, on a humanitarian basis, we are prepared to bring substantial

humanitarian aid into northern Sudan to benefit those persons at

risk because of the drought in Darfur and Fasher.

These are important steps. We have not advertised them particularly well, I suppose. And I think that we have facilities like the

Horn of Africa Service. It could be pretty much more an assertive

use in that respect. So I think that there are some important

things that have been done that give us a basis diplomatically and

politically to move forward in carrying out some of the actions that

Susan and others have outlined. Perhaps, Dr. Nyang would like to

add a few words. Thank you.

Mr. ROYCE [presiding]. Thank you, Dr. Morrison.

Mr. NYANG. Chairman Royce, I think I would just briefly identify

three areas, policies, problems, and personnel, in that order—the

three ‘‘P’s’’ for U.S. policy in Africa.

I think in order to deal with international terrorism in Africa,

the root causes of international terrorism in the African context

must be addressed. And that is poverty. Many of the young people

whom might very well be recruited by terrorist groups are young

people who are completely desperadoes. And many of them, if you

look at what has happened, you find that many of these young people used to go to Libya to find jobs and then were recruited.

And people like Charles Taylor and others were beneficiaries of

that kind of generation of young people who found themselves unemployed. They found themselves in what psychologists will call

status inconsistency. You have education, however you are doing a

job way below your education. And, of course, this is a problem. So

in terms of policy, I think greater material development in Africa

becomes very imperative.

Secondly, another policy imperative would be to push the democratic process. That is one reason why I am very pleased to see

that President Wade of Senegal, President Obasanjo and Konare

from Mali, and Mbeki, who are all democratically elected leaders

of their societies, have been taken into account in this regard.

Now, with regard to problems, I think the State Department is

beginning to move in that direction. There are things going on

which will become evident, I am sure, in the coming months with

regard to so many things that are being undertaken.

And I think with respect to personnel, I promised one of the INS

people in Ghana that I will meet publicly with you, Chairman,

when you agree to meet, they didn’t even have computers that help

them do their job. And then so this goes with what Susan is saying

that, you know, the very—I mean, most of us have this idea that

the American Embassies in Africa, they have everything that is

high tech. That is not true. And, you know, like—and I promised

that I will visit with you. And I take this opportunity here to—so

that the journalists will make this point, so that their point of view

is being reported today.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you. You had another point, Dr. Morrison.

33

Mr. MORRISON. Can I just add very quickly—Somalia—we

walked away from Somalia in ’93, ’94, much as we walked away

from Afghanistan at the end of the Cold War. And that creates

vulnerabilities and enormous challenges in grasping what is going

on internally and grasping what is going on among the neighboring

states. And I think that is our key vulnerability. We have walked

toward Sudan because of the enormous mobilization of constituencies here in the United States.

I think we have got a reasonably clear policy. We are aware of

the risks and we need to keep pushing hard on that. I think the

constituencies will remain very active. I think Danforth and his effort and Natsios and others has a unity of purpose. There is support emerging both within the diplomatic establishment and the

constituent—the activist constituencies.

On Nigeria and South Africa, we have had very, very limited dialogue with the government on what it means to have 12 of 36

states in a breakaway Sharia status in which you have opportunities, flows of people commodities and finances, through a very porous system into those 12 states, which there are significant linkages in with militant Islamic external entities.

Similarly, with South Africa, we have had very limited bilateral

dialogue with them about those entities that are linked to alQaeda.

Mr. ROYCE. I wonder how much bilateral dialogue we have had

with Saudi Arabia about the fact that these Madras schools are

funded by the Saudis. I also wonder how much dialogue with the

Saudis there is about the fact that we didn’t have the intelligence

on the ground to pick all of this up. But it seems to me that not

only has this gone on unnoticed, but it continually seems to expand

without comment by the West as Wahabism is introduced, not only

throughout northern Nigeria, but throughout Africa, Central Asia,

East Asia, and wherever there is the opportunity for the Saudis to

build a new mosque and another new Madras school. They may

take that opportunity.

Mr. MORRISON. Right. Right.

Mr. ROYCE. Dr. Nyang, you talked about the detalibanization of

this situation. How do you detalibanize what is happening in the

Madras schools where the offer is an offer nobody can refuse? We

give the money. We build you the school. We have only one condition. We bring in the instructor. And by the time the graduating

class is out of there, we suddenly find we have got a problem in

that town. The town finds, Nigeria finds, we all find, that we have

a problem. Because that is not Islam the way that most of us understand Islam. It is a new interpretation of a very, very

confrontational and jihadi form of Islam. I wondered about your

thoughts on this.

Ms. RICE. I don’t want to beat a dead horse, but I think this

comes back to what was my central thesis, and I think it was a

thesis shared by the other two panelists. We cannot leave a

vacuum——

Mr. ROYCE. Right.

Ms. RICE [continuing]. In Africa——

Mr. ROYCE. Yes.

34

Ms. RICE [continuing]. For those with hostile agendas to fill. And

that means we are going to have to put our monies where our

mouth is. Over the last many years, it has been, as you pointed

out, Mr. Chairman——

Mr. ROYCE. Yes.

Ms. RICE [continuing]. Investors from Saudi Arabia, also from

Libya, and other parts of North Africa and the Middle East who

come in with agendas that, in many respects, are antithetical to

our own and they are very generous philanthropists. The problem

is, as you say, it comes with some serious strings attached.

Mr. ROYCE. Yes.

Ms. RICE. And we can’t fight something with nothing. Which is

not to say we are doing nothing, but I—to use Steve’s term, we

have to bring our efforts to scale.

Mr. ROYCE. I concur.

Ms. RICE. And scale, in this instance, is a level much higher than

we might have anticipated a year or two or more ago.

Mr. ROYCE. Yes. Dr. Morrison.

Mr. MORRISON. I think we also need to be careful in many instances, for instance, in Muslim communities within Ethiopia—

there was a surge of resources that came in, largely from Saudi

Arabia, in support of Muslim social activism. And it provided a—

it was in the context of a very depleted state, great poverty, postwar situation. These forms of activism didn’t translate into a militant, violent Wahabism that threatened others within Ethiopia or

the others within the surrounding region.

Mr. ROYCE. I see.

Mr. MORRISON. It brought stability. It brought education, health,

social welfare, and security. It is a terribly difficult challenge before

us in looking at Al-Itihaad in central Somalia to distinguish between the valid and legitimate activities of some of these agencies

versus those that are providing permissive environments and havens.

Mr. ROYCE. I understand.

Mr. MORRISON. And——

Mr. ROYCE. Dr. Nyang, what are your observations?

Mr. NYANG. And let me just respond to this. I think this is where

the historical narrative becomes very useful.

Mr. ROYCE. Yes.

Mr. NYANG. What counts really more is that during the Cold War

when the Egyptians under Nasser were waging wars against the

royal families in the Gulf, interesting enough, the United States

and the western countries supported and encouraged these activities. This is one of the tragedies of what we are reaping now. Because many of these militants——

Mr. ROYCE. Yes.

Mr. NYANG [continuing]. Islamic militants were condoned and accepted during the Cold War. Now, after the Cold War, they become

freelance——

Mr. ROYCE. To wage war on the Saudi oil family you said?

Mr. NYANG. No. What I am saying is that during the Cold

War——

Mr. ROYCE. Right.

35

Mr. NYANG [continuing]. The militant groups in Egypt, in Syria,

and other places, who were being pursued by their own secular

government, the Baathists or the Nasserites, fled to the Gulf. Now,

Saudi Arabians don’t have qualified people to go to Africa. They

don’t have many educated people. At that time—— Mr. ROYCE. I see your point.

Mr. NYANG. So they have to recruit Egyptians to go and

teach—— Mr. ROYCE. Yes.

Mr. NYANG [continuing]. In Africa. So that is what you have.

Mr. ROYCE. Right.

Mr. NYANG. This international brigade we are talking about——

Mr. ROYCE. Right.

Mr. NYANG [continuing]. Capable—likely recall the Saudis were

able to recruit Muslim militants for these governments in Syria, in

Iraq, and in Egypt, and then they send them to Africa to teach Arabic or Islam. So what has happened as a result is that these groups

were really strained bedfellows——

Mr. ROYCE. Yes.

Mr. NYANG [continuing]. Would-be sponsors, you know. And I

think John Cooley made this very clearly in his book——

Mr. ROYCE. Yes.

Mr. NYANG [continuing]. With regard to Afghanistan when he

talks about this phenomenon.

Mr. ROYCE. Sure. Well, I have got a series of votes here and so

I just want to thank all of you for coming down today to testify before the Committee and for your thoughts. And I certainly think

you made some very good points. And you are right, Dr. Rice, nature abhors a vacuum, and it has been quite a vacuum, and this

Committee is dedicated to try and reverse that. Thank you very

much for being here today.

Mr. NYANG. Thank you very much, Congressman.

[Whereupon, at 3:26 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

Æ