I 

109TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 2620 

To increase the evidentiary standard required to convict a person for a 

drug offense, to require screening of law enforcement officers or others 

acting under color of law participating in drug task forces, and for 

other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MAY 25, 2005 

Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas (for herself, Mr. CONYERS, Mr. RANGEL, Mr. 

TOWNS, Mr. PAYNE, Mr. WYNN, Mr. CLEAVER, Mr. RUSH, Mr. LEWIS

of Georgia, Mr. DAVIS of Illinois, Ms. WOOLSEY, Mr. FATTAH, Mr. JEFFERSON, Ms. WATSON, Mr. JACKSON of Illinois, and Mr. OWENS) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary 

A BILL 

To increase the evidentiary standard required to convict a 

person for a drug offense, to require screening of law 

enforcement officers or others acting under color of law 

participating in drug task forces, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘No More Tulias: Drug 

5 Law Enforcement Evidentiary Standards Improvement 

6 Act of 2005’’. 
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1 SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 

2 Congress finds the following: 

3 (1) In recent years it has become clear that 

4 programs funded by the Edward Byrne Memorial 

5 Justice Assistance Grant program (Byrne Grants) 

6 have perpetuated racial disparities, corruption in law 

7 enforcement, and the commission of civil rights 

8 abuses across the country. This is especially the case 

9 when it comes to the program’s funding of hundreds 

10 of regional antidrug task forces. The grants for 

11 these antidrug task forces have been dispensed to 

12 State governments with very little Federal oversight 

13 and have been prone to misuse and corruption. 

14 (2) Numerous Government Accountability Of15 fice reports have found that the United States Jus16 tice Department has inadequately monitored Byrne 

17 discretionary grants. A 2001 General Accounting 

18 Office report found that a third of the grants did 

19 not contain required monitoring plans. 70 percent of 

20 grant files did not contain required progress reports. 

21 41 percent did not contain financial reports covering 

22 the full grant period. A 2002 report by the Heritage 

23 Foundation reported that ‘‘there is virtually no evi24 dence’’ that Byrne grants have been successful in re25 ducing crime and that the program lacks ‘‘adequate 

26 measures of performance’’. 
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1 (3) A 2002 report by the American Civil Lib2 erties Union of Texas identified 17 recent scandals 

3 involving Byrne-funded antidrug task forces in 

4 Texas, including cases of the falsification of Govern5 ment records, witness tampering, fabricating evi6 dence, false imprisonment, stealing drugs from evi7 dence lockers, selling drugs to children, large-scale 

8 racial profiling, sexual harassment, and other abuses 

9 of official capacity. Recent scandals in other States 

10 include the misuse of millions of dollars in Byrne 

11 grant money in Kentucky and Massachusetts, 

12 wrongful convictions based on police perjury in Mis13 souri, and negotiations with drug offenders to drop 

14 or lower their charges in exchange for money or ve15 hicles in Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Massachu16 setts, New York, Ohio, and Wisconsin. 

17 (4) The most well-known Byrne-funded task 

18 force scandal occurred in Tulia, Texas, where dozens 

19 of African American residents (totaling over 16 per20 cent of the town’s African American population) 

21 were arrested, prosecuted, and sentenced to decades 

22 in prison, based solely on the uncorroborated testi23 mony of one undercover officer whose background 

24 included past allegations of misconduct, sexual har25 assment, unpaid debts, and habitual use of a racial 
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1 epithet. The undercover officer was allowed to work 

2 alone, and not required to provide audiotapes, video 

3 surveillance, or eyewitnesses to corroborate his alle4 gations. Despite the lack of physical evidence or cor5 roboration, the charges were vigorously prosecuted. 

6 After the first few trials resulted in convictions and 

7 lengthy sentences, many defendants accepted plea 

8 bargains. Suspicions regarding the legitimacy of the 

9 charges eventually arose after two of the accused de10 fendants were able to produce convincing alibi evi11 dence to prove that they were out of State or at 

12 work at the time of the alleged drug purchases. 

13 Texas Governor Rick Perry eventually pardoned the 

14 Tulia defendants (after four years of imprisonment), 

15 but these kinds of scandals continue to plague Byrne 

16 grant program spending. 

17 (5) A case arose in a Federal court in Waco, 

18 Texas concerning the wrongful arrest of 28 African 

19 Americans out of 4,500 other residents of Hearne, 

20 Texas. In November 2000, these individuals were ar21 rested on charges of possession or distribution of 

22 crack cocaine, and they subsequently filed a case 

23 against the county government. On May 11, 2005, 

24 a magistrate judge found sufficient evidence that a 

25 Byrne-funded anti-drug task force had routinely tar-
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1 geted African Americans to hold the county liable 

2 for the harm suffered by the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs in 

3 that lawsuit alleged that for the past 15 years, based 

4 on the uncorroborated tales of informants, task force 

5 members annually raided the African American com6 munity in eastern Hearne to arrest the residents 

7 identified by the confidential informants, resulting in 

8 the arrest and prosecution of innocent citizens with9 out cause. On the eve of trial the counties involved 

10 in the Hearne task force scandal settled the case, 

11 agreeing to pay financial damages to the plaintiffs. 

12 (6) Byrne grant-related scandals have grown so 

13 prolific that the Texas legislature has passed several 

14 reforms in response to them, including outlawing ra15 cial profiling and changing Texas law to prohibit 

16 drug offense convictions based solely on the word of 

17 an undercover informant. The Criminal Jurispru18 dence Committee of the Texas House of Representa19 tives issued a report in 2004 recommending that all 

20 of the State’s federally funded antidrug task forces 

21 be abolished because they are inherently prone to 

22 corruption. The Committee reported, ‘‘Continuing to 

23 sanction task force operations as stand-alone law en24 forcement entities—with widespread authority to op25 erate at will across multiple jurisdictional lines— 
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1 should not continue. The current approach violates 

2 practically every sound principle of police oversight 

3 and accountability applicable to narcotics interdic4 tion.’’ Most recently the Texas legislature passed a 

5 law that ends the ability of a narcotics task force to 

6 operate as an entity with no clear accountability. 

7 The legislation transfers authority for multicounty 

8 drug task forces to the Department of Public Safety 

9 and channels one-quarter of asset forfeiture proceeds 

10 received by the task forces to a special fund to sup11 port drug abuse prevention programs, drug treat12 ment and other programs designed to reduce drug 

13 use in the county where the assets are seized. 

14 (7) Texas’s ‘‘corroboration’’ law was passed 

15 thanks to a coalition of Christian conservatives and 

16 civil rights activists. As one Texas preacher related, 

17 requiring corroboration ‘‘puts a protective hedge 

18 around the ninth commandment, ‘You shall not bear 

19 false witness against your neighbor.’ As long as peo20 ple bear false witness against their neighbors, this 

21 Biblical law will not be outdated.’’ 

22 (8) During floor debate, conservative Texas leg23 islators pointed out that Mosaic law requires cor24 roboration: ‘‘One witness shall not rise up against a 

25 man for any iniquity, or for any sin, in any sin that 
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1 he sinneth: at the mouth of two witnesses, or at the 

2 mouth of three witnesses, shall the matter be estab3 lished.’’ Deuteronomy 19:15. Jesus concurred with 

4 the corroboration rule: ‘‘If thy brother shall trespass 

5 against thee, go and tell him his fault between thee 

6 and him alone. . . . But if he will not hear thee, then 

7 take with thee one or two more, that in the mouth 

8 of two or three witnesses every word may be estab9 lished.’’ Matthew 18:15–16. 

10 (9) Texas’s ‘‘corroboration’’ law had an imme11 diate positive impact. Once prosecutors needed more 

12 than just the word of one person to convict someone 

13 of a drug offense they began scrutinizing law en14 forcement tactics. This new scrutiny led to the un15 covering of massive corruption and civil rights abuse 

16 by the Dallas police force. In what became known 

17 nationally as the ‘‘Sheetrock’’ scandal, Dallas police 

18 officers and undercover informants were found to 

19 have set up dozens of innocent people, mostly Mexi20 can immigrants, by planting fake drugs on them 

21 consisting of chalk-like material used in Sheetrock 

22 and other brands of wallboard. The revelations led 

23 to the dismissal of over 40 cases (although some of 

24 those arrested were already deported). In April 

25 2005, a former Dallas narcotics detective was sen-
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1 tenced to 5 years in prison for his role in the 

2 scheme. Charges against others are pending. 

3 (10) Many regional antidrug task forces receive 

4 up to 75 percent of their funding from the Byrne 

5 grant program. As such, the United States Govern6 ment is accountable for corruption and civil rights 

7 abuses inherent in their operation. It is the sense of 

8 Congress that Byrne grants should be prohibited for 

9 States that do not exercise effective control over 

10 these task forces. At a bare minimum, no State that 

11 fails to prohibit criminal convictions based solely on 

12 the testimony of a law enforcement officer or in13 formants should receive a Byrne grant. Corrobora14 tive evidence (video or audio tape, drugs, and money, 

15 etc.) should always be required for such convictions 

16 to be sustained. 

17 SEC. 3. LIMITATION ON RECEIPT OF BYRNE GRANT FUNDS 

18 AND OTHER DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE LAW 

19 ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE. 

20 (a) LIMITATION.—For any fiscal year, a State shall 

21 not receive any amount that would otherwise be allocated 

22 to that State under section 506 of the Omnibus Crime 

23 Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (42 U.S.C. 3756), 

24 or any amount from any other law enforcement assistance 

25 program of the Department of Justice, unless the State— 
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1 (1) does not fund any drug task forces for that 

2 fiscal year; or 

3 (2) has in effect throughout the State laws that 

4 ensure— 

5 (A) a person is not convicted of a drug of6 fense unless the fact that a drug offense was 

7 committed, and the fact that the person com8 mitted that offense, are each supported by evi9 dence other than the eyewitness testimony of a 

10 law enforcement officer or individuals acting on 

11 behalf of law enforcement officers; and 

12 (B) a law enforcement officer does not par13 ticipate in a drug task force unless the honesty 

14 and integrity of that officer is evaluated and 

15 found to be at an appropriately high level. 

16 (b) REGULATIONS.—The Attorney General shall pre17 scribe regulations to carry out subsection (a). 

18 (c) REALLOCATION.—Amounts not allocated by rea19 son of subsection (a) shall be reallocated to States not dis20 qualified by failure to comply with subsection (a). 

21 SEC. 4. COLLECTION OF DATA. 

22 (a) IN GENERAL.—A State recipient of funds under 

23 section 3(a)(2) shall collect data, for the last year funds 

24 were allocated, as to the— 
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1 (1) racial distribution of charges made during 

2 that year; 

3 (2) nature of the criminal law specified in the 

4 charges made; and 

5 (3) city or law enforcement jurisdiction in 

6 which the charge was made. 

7 (b) REPORT.—The data collected under subsection 

8 (a) shall be reported to Congress within 180 days prior 

9 to the award of funds for each fiscal year of eligibility to 

10 receive grants. 

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