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NONIMMIGRANT STUDENT TRACKING: IMPLEMENTATION AND PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON IMMIGRATION, 

BORDER SECURITY, AND CLAIMS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

APRIL 2, 2003

Serial No. 8

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/judiciary 

(II)

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., Wisconsin, Chairman 

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

WILLIAM L. JENKINS, Tennessee 

CHRIS CANNON, Utah 

SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama 

JOHN N. HOSTETTLER, Indiana 

MARK GREEN, Wisconsin 

RIC KELLER, Florida 

MELISSA A. HART, Pennsylvania 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

STEVE KING, Iowa 

JOHN R. CARTER, Texas 

TOM FEENEY, Florida 

MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee 

JOHN CONYERS, JR., Michigan 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

RICK BOUCHER, Virginia 

JERROLD NADLER, New York 

ROBERT C. SCOTT, Virginia 

MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

MAXINE WATERS, California 

MARTIN T. MEEHAN, Massachusetts 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin 

ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

LINDA T. SA ́ NCHEZ, California

PHILIP G. KIKO, Chief of Staff-General Counsel 

PERRY H. APELBAUM, Minority Chief Counsel 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON IMMIGRATION, BORDER SECURITY, AND CLAIMS

JOHN N. HOSTETTLER, Indiana, Chairman

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

CHRIS CANNON, Utah 

STEVE KING, Iowa 

MELISSA A. HART, Pennsylvania 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

LINDA T. SA ́ NCHEZ, California 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

JOHN CONYERS, JR., Michigan

GEORGE FISHMAN, Chief Counsel 

LORA RIES, Counsel 

ART ARTHUR, Full Committee Counsel 

CINDY BLACKSTON, Professional Staff 

NOLAN RAPPAPORT, Minority Counsel 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

APRIL 2, 2003

OPENING STATEMENT 

Page 

The Honorable John N. Hostettler, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Indiana, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Immigration, Border 

Security, and Claims ............................................................................................ 1

The Honorable Lamar Smith, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Texas ................................................................................................................. 3

The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Texas, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims ..................................................................................... 4

WITNESSES 

Mr. Johnny N. Williams, Interim Director, Immigration Interior Enforcement, 

Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, United States Department of Homeland Security 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 9

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 11

Mr. Glenn A. Fine, Inspector General, United States Department of Justice 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 13

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 16

Mr. Thomas P. Fischer, former District Director, Atlanta District, Immigration and Naturalization Service 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 26

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 28

Mr. David Ward, President, American Council on Education 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 33

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 36

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Letter from the Honorable John Conyers, Jr., a Representative in Congress 

From the State of Michigan, and Ranking Member, Committee on the 

Judiciary ............................................................................................................... 5

APPENDIX 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

Prepared Statement of the Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative 

in Congress From the State of Texas, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee 

on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims ................................................... 53

Letter From Stanford University Submitted by Rep. Lofgren ............................. 54

(1)

NONIMMIGRANT STUDENT TRACKING: 

IMPLEMENTATION AND 

PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS 

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 2, 2003

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON IMMIGRATION,

BORDER SECURITY, AND CLAIMS, 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 

Washington, DC.

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:04 p.m., in Room 

2141, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. John N. Hostettler 

[Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding. 

Mr. HOSTETTLER. The Committee will come to order. 

Our educational system is one of the strongest attractions that 

our country has to offer foreign citizens. In the last academic year 

alone, 582,996 aliens were attending colleges and universities in 

the United States. The education of foreign nationals in the United 

States has provided many benefits, both tangible and intangible, to 

our country. Many foreign leaders have obtained at least part of 

their education here and presumably have taken some of our democratic values back home with them. In addition, foreign students 

have contributed to the American economy. 

Unfortunately, not all aliens who come to study in the United 

States come with benevolent intentions. In June 2000, the National 

Commission on Terrorism found that, ‘‘a small minority of foreign 

students may exploit their student status to support terrorist activity. The United States lacks the nationwide ability to monitor the 

immigration status of these students.’’ The student visa conveys a particularly valuable status to an 

alien terrorist because in the absence of an effective tracking system, an alien student can remain in the United States almost indefinitely. The truth of the Commission’s findings was underscored 

in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks. Of the 19 identified hijackers, three were present in the United States on student 

visas. At least two of those terrorists gained skills to carry out 

those attacks at an American flight school. 

Those attacks demonstrate how easily alien students who may 

pose a terrorist threat can enter the country. The September 11 attacks also demonstrate how critical it is to our national security for 

the Government to implement an effective system for tracking and 

monitoring foreign students in the United States. 

The Government’s efforts to establish a student tracking system 

date to the mid-1990’s. In 1996, Congress directed the INS to set 

2

up an automated system to track foreign students in the United 

States as a result of action by a Member on this panel, Mr. Smith. 

Following the September 11 attacks and the USA PATRIOT Act, 

Congress authorized more than $36 million to fully implement and 

expand the foreign student tracking system by January 1, 2003. In 

response to that mandate, the INS completed its development of 

the Student and Exchange Visitors System, or SEVIS. The agency 

required all schools that sought to admit foreign students to enroll 

in that system no later than January 30, 2003. As part of SEVIS 

enrollment, schools had to be recertified to accept non-immigrant 

students. 

Because of technical problems with SEVIS, the INS extended the 

deadline for enrollment in SEVIS to February 15, 2003. SEVIS is 

now operational and schools are now required to use the system in 

admitting new foreign students. By August 1, 2003, the INS has 

decreed information on all non-immigrant students currently attending school in the United States will be entered into the system. 

Some observers remain critical, however, both of the performance 

of the system and of the sufficiency of the INS’s recertification of 

schools approved to accept foreign students. Some schools and academic organizations complain that the SEVIS system is slow and 

riddled with glitches and technical problems. Because of these 

problems, they question whether they will be able to meet the August 1, 2003, deadline for full SEVIS compliance. Critics have also 

complained that the Government has failed to provide sufficient 

training to school personnel and to its own employees to make the 

system work properly. 

The Justice Department’s Inspector General has voiced his own 

concerns about the INS’s implementation of SEVIS. Specifically, in 

a March 2003 report, the Inspector General questioned the way in 

which the INS used contract employees to review schools during 

the recertification process, as well as other aspects of the INS’s implementation of SEVIS. In fact, the Inspector General concluded 

that notwithstanding the Congressional mandate and the USA PATRIOT Act for full implementation of SEVIS by January 2003, that 

system is still not fully implemented. 

Finally, some outside observers have asked whether SEVIS goes 

far enough in protecting the United States from foreign criminals 

and terrorists. They question whether SEVIS is doing everything 

possible to keep the American people safe from individuals who 

have come to this country to do us harm and to ensure that the 

student visa program promotes, rather than endangers, our national security. 

We hope to explore all these issues at today’s hearing. On a historical note, after it was revealed that a participant in the first 

World Trade Center bombing was an alien student who was out of 

status, a 1995 INS report concluded, ‘‘Americans have a fundamental basic expectation that their Government is effectively monitoring and controlling foreign students.’’ That conclusion is as true 

today as it was 7 years ago, if not more so. 

This Subcommittee will continue to monitor the Bureau of Immigration and Custom Enforcement’s implementation of the student 

tracking system to ensure that it meets this expectation. 

3

I am heartened by the priority that Assistant Secretary-designee 

Michael Garcia has given to this important project. Having prosecuted some of the plotters of the first World Trade Center bombing, he knows how high the stakes can be. I cannot imagine an individual better equipped to handle this task. 

One final point, however. I note that this is the first hearing at 

which the Department of Homeland Security has sent a witness to 

testify before our Subcommittee. Unfortunately, the Department 

failed to submit its written testimony to this Subcommittee 48 

hours in advance of this hearing, as requested by the Chairman of 

the Judiciary Committee, or even 24 hours in advance of the hearing. This appears to be a continuation of an unfortunate trend by 

the former INS. 

Mr. Williams, I do not blame you for this and realize that this 

testimony was not presented in a timely manner because of the 

byzantine clearance process within the executive branch itself. The 

Department, however, is on notice that such a delay will not be tolerated in the future. 

At this point, I would like to recognize the gentleman from 

Texas, if he has an opening statement. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do have an opening 

statement. The first thing I would like to do is to thank you again 

for taking the initiative to address such an important subject. This 

has been a subject that has been of previous interest to you, given 

another hearing on the general concept, but I appreciate your having the hearing today. 

I also want to say that, unfortunately, the Science Committee on 

which I also sit is having a markup at the exact same time that 

we meet as Members of the Immigration Subcommittee, so I am 

going to have to shuttle between two Committees. 

But the last thing to mention, Mr. Chairman, is that in 1996, 

Congress overwhelmingly approved an Immigration Reform Act 

that I happened to introduce, and it was signed into law by President Clinton, and among the provisions of that particular piece of 

legislation is one that said we needed a foreign student tracking 

system and it needed to be implemented immediately by five or 

more countries—in five or more countries, particularly those who 

sponsor terrorism and we would track the students coming from 

those countries, and then the program was supposed to have been 

expanded to other countries, as well. 

I don’t want to speculate whether the course of history would 

have been changed had the Clinton administration enforced that 

law instead of ignoring it, but it’s certainly possible, and I have not 

made that statement in public before simply because I don’t want 

to speculate. But at the same time, I think the entire country 

would have been better served had the previous Administration implemented the Immigration Reform Act as Congress has intended. 

I think there is a good chance that had the law been enforced, who 

knows. We might have apprehended one or more of the three terrorists who came in on student visas. We might have been unravel 

the conspiracy. You never know. 

But no matter what, we would have been better served had we 

had a foreign student tracking system in existence several years 

ago rather than waiting until after a crisis occurred before we did 

4

the right thing, and I’m glad we’re getting to that point. I know 

some of the testimony we are going to hear today is going to indicate that we still have a system that doesn’t work as well as it 

should, and I’m hoping that that can be corrected. 

I guess what I’m saying is, better late than never, but it certainly 

would have been better had we implemented a foreign student 

tracking system when Congress intended to do so, and that was 

back in 1996. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. HOSTETTLER. Thank you for your insightful and timely comments. 

Gentlemen, panel, I apologize. We are 10 minutes away from closure of a vote. I will recess the Subcommittee but bring it back to 

order very shortly after this vote. I believe it’s just one vote that 

we will have, and so it should be over very shortly. I apologize for 

the delay and thank you for your indulgence. The Subcommittee is 

recessed. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. HOSTETTLER. The Subcommittee will reconvene. 

At this point, I would recognize the Ranking Member of the Subcommittee, Ms. Jackson Lee, for any opening remarks she may 

make. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am 

delighted that this is a microphone that is somewhat camouflaging 

my very weak voice. I ask the Committee for its indulgence. I 

thank the Chairman very much for his kindness. When the meeting was gaveled, I was on the floor in debate, and as you well 

know, we began the voting very shortly thereafter. 

Let me say to the witnesses that I also offer my apologies. We 

are supposed to be multi-dexterous, multi-faceted, but I think they 

want us to be triplets and quadruplets. I have a markup upstairs 

dealing with the Science Committee, and so I look to be in and out, 

but I look to be able to—hopefully will be able to engage these very 

fine witnesses, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me briefly—first of all, I’d like to ask unanimous consent 

that my opening statement in its entirety be included in the record. 

Mr. HOSTETTLER. Without objection. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I would ask that the record remain open for 

the submission of my colleagues, for their statements, as well. 

Mr. HOSTETTLER. Without objection. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. In addition, I have a letter from Mr. Conyers 

to Mr. Johnny Williams, who is the Interim Director of the Bureau 

of Immigration and Customs Enforcement and we would like to put 

this in the record and also submit this to Mr. Williams. 

Mr. HOSTETTLER. Without objection. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you very much. 

[The letter from Mr. Conyers follows:]

5


Conyers1.eps
6


Conyers2.eps
7

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman, we need to keep track of foreign students while they are in this country, there is no doubt. But 

I want to emphasize that the primary reason for doing this is to 

enforce immigration laws and not necessarily to search for terrorists. 

As I say that, let me also be very clear, having lived through 9/

11 along with this nation and the world, I am quite well aware of 

the heightened emphasis on students and student visas. Certainly, 

I would be remiss not to acknowledge my own outrage that we 

were not able to track them effectively at that time or that visas 

were given to facilities that I thought may have been less than 

scholarly. I particularly was outraged that some of the students 

seem to have crafted their own curriculum, one that no one could 

understand. Let’s take off, but let’s not learn how to land. And 

none of that, of course, was triggered, or triggered anyone to call 

any of the authorities. 

I guess my other concern was is that they were able to take these 

classes, Mr. Chairman, by giving a cash payment of $25,000. Hopefully, that is an issue that I may want to have us discuss in terms 

of foreign students and the way that the students’ tuitions are 

paid. 

I would simply say, Mr. Chairman, that we do have a problem. 

Despite news reports to the contrary, only one of the 9/11—this is 

referring to the issue that I discussed, however—into the country 

on a student visa, 18 entered on what we call B-visas, either as 

tourists or as business persons. So I think we should clarify some 

of the concerns that we may have with respect to student visas. It 

is still important to track them. 

I’d like to emphasize that the SEVIS program, that is a program 

that needs to be implemented successfully. Enforcement’s ability to 

track and monitor foreign students and exchange visitors in order 

to ensure that they arrive in the United States, show up, and register at the school or exchange, visit a program they are scheduled 

to attend, and properly maintain their status during a stay in our 

country is all dependent upon the successful utilization of SEVIS. 

SEVIS can be made easier for us to identify those who may come 

to America for the wrong reason, while extending our welcome to 

those seeking the knowledge that the schools of this country have 

to offer. 

As I indicated, I would like the entire statement to be put into 

the record, but I would like to suggest, Mr. Chairman, that we recently had a hearing in the Science Committee noting that there 

is some difficulty in providing opportunity for—this is a parallel 

issue—for some of our finest researchers to come to this country. 

Certainly, we want to ensure that our nation is safe. But I have 

always said that this is a nation of immigrants and laws and it is 

a nation that does not equate immigration to terrorism. 

As an aside, Mr. Chairman, as I conclude, let me note that many 

of our world leaders, such as Kofi Anan, Jordan’s King Abdullah 

II, and Mexican President Vincente Fox were students on student 

visas. So let us be both effective and efficient, but let us be sensitive to how we can best utilize this process and help our universities. 

8

Might I also say, Mr. Chairman, that we have made a commitment to sit down and establish a very full agenda for this particular Committee, and I’d like to publicly say, as you well know, 

we met just a week or so ago on my request in the plight of the 

Kesbeh family. I believe they should be a center point for some 

weak points in our immigration laws. Unfortunately, a God-fearing, 

if you will, or a country-loving family that happened to be without 

documentation was tragically deported last week and they had a 9-

year-old citizen. 

What fails in our immigration policies is that we fail in efficiency 

and effectiveness to be able to secure ourselves against the terrorists, and then we give this nation a very bad name by not being 

able to show its compassion and humanitarianism for those who 

truly simply want to be here because they love this country and 

they want to be part of the democracy which we represent. Yes, 

maybe without documentation, but because our laws are so antiquated, complex, it makes it very difficult. 

I believe it is important that we put a face that is generous, that 

is efficient, effective, and provides security for this nation, and Mr. 

Chairman, I believe it is extremely important that we craft a response that has a humanitarian response, because I can assure you 

that we are a much better nation that those who happen to be immigrants can say to the countries around the world that this is, in 

fact, a place that really believes in its ideals of democracy, equality, 

and fairness and due process, and I think that is a better approach 

that we should take. 

I thank the Chairman for his indulgence. I ask that my entire 

statement be submitted into the record. 

Mr. HOSTETTLER. Once again, without objection. I thank the 

gentlelady for her comments. 

Mr. HOSTETTLER. And now, I turn to our panel, introducing 

Johnny Williams, who has been the Interim Director of Immigration Interior Enforcement at the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement since March 1, 2003. In this position, he is responsible for managing and directing the immigration investigations, detention removals, and intelligence programs of ICE. 

In the former INS, Mr. Williams was the Executive Associate 

Commissioner for Field Operations of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, a position that he held until that agency was 

transferred to the Department of Homeland Security. Prior to becoming the Executive Associate Commissioner at the INS, Mr. Williams was the INS’s Western Regional Director, a position that he 

held since November 1997. 

Before that, Mr. Williams served as Chief Patrol Agent for the 

San Diego Border Patrol, the largest Border Patrol sector in the 

nation. Mr. Williams began his career with the U.S. Border Patrol 

in 1971 as a trainee in Laredo, Texas. He attended Southwest Junior College, Laredo Junior College, and Texas A&I in Laredo, and 

Western New Mexico State University in Silver City, New Mexico. 

The Honorable Glenn A. Fine is the Inspector General for the 

United States Department of Justice. He was confirmed as Inspector General for the Justice Department in December 2000. General 

Fine served as Acting Inspector General from August 2000 to DeVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:21 May 06, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 G:\WORK\IMMIG\040203\86265.000 HJUD1 PsN: 86265
9

cember 2000. He has worked for the Inspector General’s Office 

since January 1995. 

General Fine was in private practice from 1989 to 1995. Prior to 

that, he served as an Assistant U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia from 1986 to 1989. He is a graduate of Harvard College and 

Law School and he was a Rhodes Scholar. 

Thomas Fischer is an immigration consultant in Atlanta, Georgia. From 1988 to 1999, Mr. Fischer was the District Director of 

the INS’s Atlanta District Office. Most importantly for this hearing, 

Mr. Fischer was District Director in Atlanta at the time it was the 

pilot district for CIPRIS student tracking system. CIPRIS was the 

predecessor to the current SEVIS system that we are talking about 

today. 

From 1979 to 1988, Mr. Fischer served as Director of Training 

for the INS as well as Director of the Officer Development and 

Training Facility at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center. 

Prior to that, he was an Assistant Regional Commissioner in the 

INS’s Southern Region in Dallas, Texas. He is a graduate of the 

State University College of New York-Fedonia and the University 

of Hawaii, from which he received a master’s in educational psychology. 

Mr. David Ward is the President of the American Council on 

Education. Dr. Ward is Chancellor Emeritus of the University of 

Wisconsin-Madison, where he received his doctorate in 1963. Prior 

to becoming Chancellor at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, 

Dr. Ward served as the Associate Dean of the graduate school at 

the university from 1980 to 1987, and as Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs and Provost from 1989 to 1993. Dr. Ward also held 

the Andrew Hill Clark Professorship of Geography at the university and served as chair of the Geography Department there from 

1970 to 1977. 

Gentlemen, with unanimous consent and without objection, your 

statements may be entered into the record, and feel free to give 

your testimony. We are going to try to stay as close to the 5-minute 

rule as possible. I appreciate your sticking to that as much as you 

can. Mr. Williams, if you will begin. 

STATEMENT OF JOHNNY N. WILLIAMS, INTERIM DIRECTOR, 

IMMIGRATION INTERIOR ENFORCEMENT, BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, UNITED STATES 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. WILLIAMS. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, Members of the 

Committee. Thank you for the opportunity to bring you up to date 

on our Student Exchange Visitor Information System, SEVIS. This 

new computer system greatly enhances our capability to fulfill our 

obligations to register, to track, and to monitor foreign students applying to come to the United States to study. 

SEVIS is designed to facilitate the structured entry of valid students into the United States. The system better positions us to 

combat fraud by making critical information available to Consular 

Officers when they are making visa issuance decisions. The same 

SEVIS information is available to our Officers at the Ports-of-Entry 

and to the adjudicators who review benefit applications at our 

Service Center. SEVIS serves as the collection point of entry inforVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:21 May 06, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 G:\WORK\IMMIG\040203\86265.000 HJUD1 PsN: 86265
10

mation that will be used to monitor the students’ compliance with 

terms of their student visa. 

On March 1 of this year, the Immigration and Naturalization 

Service transitioned to the Department of Homeland Security. The 

responsibility of SEVIS under the Homeland Security Act was 

given to the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 

where it is now managed. Let me assure you, though, that although we have transitioned, we are working hand-in-hand with 

our sister bureau, Citizenship and Immigration Services, to assure 

a smooth transition and a partnership in meeting our joint obligation. 

The Student Exchange and Visitor Program encompasses both 

SEVIS software and other critical functions, to include a certification process for schools, internal and external training, and the 

enforcement piece, as well. The software program is an Internetbased system that collects accurate and current information on foreign students. This information includes data about the individual’s school admission, their visa issuance, and their entry into the 

United States. 

Following the prospective student’s entry into the U.S., the system then awaits and receives more required information on the actual registration for classes, program of study, program extensions, 

any change of address, and employment authorization, if permitted. 

We have worked hard to make SEVIS a program that embraces the 

needs of the student, the needs of the school, and the needs of the 

Government. 

All approved schools are required to utilize SEVIS for new students as of February 15, 2003. Additional schools continue to apply 

for certification and they are adjudicated on a continuing basis. As 

of March 19, approximately 4,300 schools and 1,400 exchange programs have been certified and have been enrolled to utilize SEVIS. 

We have established a help desk call center with a toll-free number dedicated to SEVIS numbers. This call center assists schools 

with their questions, provides a venue to report problems, as well 

as to obtain their suggestions for future enhancements to the system. We constantly monitor the call center to evaluate ways to increase its efficiency and to ensure the highest level of customer 

service. 

SEVIS is supported by a team of talented, dedicated professionals, both from the public and private sector. We will continually seek the educational community’s input and feedback to 

make this important system a continuing and sustained success. 

We will continue to examine and reexamine our methods to ensure 

and verify compliance with recordkeeping, reporting, and other requirements. We will continue to provide and embrace internal 

training for our officers as well as the training provided to those 

at the schools. 

We believe that our interactions with the educational community 

and the educational associations are vitally important and they 

have provided us with key information and insight as we have 

rolled out this program. We host a conference call weekly with 

major educational organizations to convey information and to receive their feedback. 

11

While appropriated funding of $36.8 million in FY 2002 was instrumental in our ability to develop SEVIS, the ongoing costs are 

envisioned by the statute to be supported by the collection of fees. 

Schools are charged a fee for the certification process, and once the 

regulations are promulgated, students will be charged a SEVIS 

processing fee, as well. These regulations are now under review, 

and until the regulation is promulgated, we will continue to allocate existing resources to this very important program. 

In summary, SEVIS is an important component of the homeland 

security mosaic and one that we take very seriously. It’s designed 

to be customer friendly and as transparent as possible for those 

seeking the exceptional education, training, and cultural opportunities our great country has to offer. But let me be clear. SEVIS better enables us to identify and track those who come to America for 

illicit reasons. While continuing to extend a hand in friendship, we 

are prepared to take swift enforcement action on those that come 

to violate our laws or do our country harm. 

Thank you for the opportunity to provide the update and I look 

forward to your questions. 

Mr. HOSTETTLER. Thank you, Mr. Williams. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Williams follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHNNY N. WILLIAMS

MR. CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE, thank you for the opportunity to update the Committee on the deployment of the Bureau of Immigration 

and Customs Enforcement’s (ICE) Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS)—a new Internet-based system that greatly enhances the government’s ability to manage and monitor foreign students and exchange program visitors and 

their dependents during their stay in the United States. SEVIS maintains critical, 

up-to-date information that can be accessed electronically, making it a powerful tool 

for combating fraud and for ensuring that individuals comply with the terms of their 

visa, activities that are vital to enhancing homeland security. 

State Department consular officers overseas now have instant access to this information, improving their ability to decide whether to issue a student visa. This information is also available to the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (BCBP) 

officers at ports-of-entry (POEs), allowing them to better track the entry of students 

and exchange visitors and to guarantee that the visa holder is the same person to 

whom it was issued. Additionally, personnel at Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services (BCIS) Service Centers are using this information to better adjudicate 

applications for benefits. 

SEVIS was initially a project of the Immigration and Naturalization Service 

(INS), where it was developed and deployed by the Immigration Services Division 

(now BCIS). When INS transitioned into the Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS) on March 1, responsibility for SEVIS shifted to ICE, as mandated by the 

Homeland Security Act. The two bureaus are working hand-in-hand to assure a 

smooth transition of the system. 

The system is part of the overall Student and Exchange Visitor Program (SEVP), 

the other functions of which include certifying schools for accepting foreign students, 

internal and external training, fee collection, and enforcement. SEVIS tracks information about an individual’s school admission, visa issuance, entry into the United 

States, registration for classes, changes of address, program of study, program extensions, and employment authorization. It enables schools and exchange program 

sponsors to quickly update information they are required to send to the DHS and 

the Department of State (DOS) throughout the duration of a student or exchange 

visitor’s stay in the United States. 

INS worked hard to meet the aggressive deadlines set forth in the statute. SEVIS 

was fully deployed and operational by January 1, 2003, as required by the USA PATRIOT Act. And, as of February 15, all DHS-approved schools and DOS-approved 

exchange programs were required to use SEVIS for all new foreign students and 

visitors. 

The required use of SEVIS by schools and the implementation of its parent program are both being phased in. This phased approach, which is designed to ensure 

12

program integrity, was outlined in proposed regulations published in May 2002, 

highlighted in congressional testimony in the fall of 2002, and codified in final regulations in December 2002. This approach also provides necessary and adequate time 

for the schools to review the considerable existing data on their continuing students 

and enter it into SEVIS. All new and continuing foreign students and exchange visitors must be entered into the system no later than August 1, 2003. After August 

1, the database will contain complete information on all foreign students and exchange visitors currently within the United States, and it will be the sole system 

used to monitor these non-immigrants. 

As mentioned earlier, the other elements of SEVP include the collection of fees 

from schools, which will pay for the operation of SEVIS, and school certification. 

Our fee collection proposal is now under review. ICE will continually process requests for school certification under SEVIS. There will always be new schools seeking certification to use SEVIS, and those already certified must recertify every two 

years. As of March 19, approximately 4,300 schools (and numerous campuses for 

many of those schools) and 1,400 exchange programs had been certified and were 

enrolled to utilize SEVIS. 

Since implementation, SEVIS has performed very effectively, but it has not been 

without issues. Most problems are quickly addressed and resolved. For example, the 

intermittent inability of some schools to access the system and users timing out before they could complete their desired task had occurred. In early March, the system 

was taken off line for 15 minutes and the necessary fixes were made to remedy 

these performance problems. Currently, the only outstanding issue has to do with 

an issue known as ‘‘bleeding,’’ the unintended merging of data from one school to 

another which results in the printing of legitimate student information at the wrong 

institution. ICE has hired an additional contractor specifically to address this issue, 

which is an issue of privacy, not accuracy. The information in SEVIS is the important component of the system and how that information enhances our ability to 

track foreign students. Bleeding does not affect the accuracy of the foreign student 

information. 

SEVIS is a new system, developed and deployed under an aggressive schedule. 

Any new system will have bugs and anomalies that must be addressed. SEVIS is 

supported by a team of talented and dedicated professionals, from both the public 

and private sectors. Although we cannot guarantee that this new Internet application will not have additional problems over the next year, we can assure you that 

any such problems shall be addressed immediately, aggressively and professionally. 

The SEVP and its SEVIS application are works in progress and will continue to 

evolve. We continually examine our requirements and the educational community’s 

feedback to make the system and the foreign student program sustained successes. 

We believe that our interactions with the educational community are vitally important. We have worked closely with many education associations including the American Council on Education, NAFSA: Association of International Educators, the National Association of State Universities and Land-Grant Colleges, and the California 

Community Colleges Chancellor’s Office. In fact, we host a conference call at least 

once a month with the major educational organizations to convey information and 

to receive their feedback. 

SEVIS is a learning process for ICE and the schools, who are being encouraged 

to contact the SEVIS Help Desk should they encounter any problems accessing or 

using the system. The Help Desk has been receiving more than 500 calls a day, a 

third of which have to do with changing a user password. We are looking to decrease demand on the Help Desk through greater automation which will allow our 

Help Desk officers to focus on more substantive issues. We take all problems seriously, and seek to address them aggressively. 

As we move forward, we will continue to enhance internal training of DHS officers, as well as improve the SEVIS training provided to schools. Looking ahead to 

a constant two-year cycle of school certification reviews, we will be examining the 

best ways to verify the bona fides of currently certified schools and new schools 

seeking to use the system. Now that SEVIS is fully implemented and all schools enrolling non-immigrant foreign students are required to utilize the system, we will 

also continue to examine and re-examine methods used to verify compliance with 

record-keeping, reporting, and other SEVIS requirements. 

The DHS and the DOS Office of Consular Affairs have established Datashare, 

under which SEVIS data are made available for verification purposes during the 

visa issuance process. The program also allows State to make all non-immigrant 

visa issuance data available to DHS systems. SEVIS extracts data on all the F (academic), M (vocational), and J (exchange visitor) records from the Datashare system, 

as required by statute, and also provides this information to the schools. 

13

SEVIS is updated at the time of an individual student’s entry to the United 

States. The Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act (Border Security 

Act) of 2002 requires schools to report foreign students who fail to enroll within 30 

days of the schools’ registration deadline. Schools appoint foreign student advisors 

who are required to maintain foreign student information and assist the students 

and the school in adhering to the laws and regulations of the Immigration and Nationality Act. These advisors, known as designated school officials, are responsible 

for reporting student ‘‘no shows’’ to the ICE Immigration Investigation Program 

Headquarters either by calling a dedicated toll-free number or by electronically 

‘‘flagging’’ the student’s record in SEVIS as a ‘‘no show’’. More than 1,800 ‘‘no shows’’

students have been reported to ICE through the toll-free number. 

After a ‘‘no-show’’ has been reported, ICE has the Law Enforcement Support Center run database checks. All referrals confirmed to have entered the United States, 

and for which no record of departure exists, are subject to further indices searches. 

Student status violators who may present a heightened security risk are immediately referred to the ICE National Security Unit for appropriate action. All others 

are being prioritized based upon other factors such as criminal history and prior adverse immigration history, and then referred to the appropriate field office. All student violators are entered into the National Automated Immigration Lookout System to ensure replacement visas are not inadvertently issued, and to ensure any 

subsequent attempts to enter the United States are scrutinized. ICE is committed 

to enforcing our immigration laws against violators identified through SEVIS. This 

is founded in our belief that effective compliance enforcement against student violators is a critical component of the SEVIS system. 

There has been some concern in the school community that SEVIS errors have 

been responsible for unwarranted enforcement actions being taken against students. 

ICE can assure the public that it does not rely solely on information in SEVIS. Prior 

to taking an enforcement action, ICE agents review each individual case, including 

interviewing potential violators, to confirm that action is warranted. ICE will only 

take action against immigration law violators when action is warranted. 

SEVIS is part of the Homeland Security mosaic. It is deployed now and in the 

next year it will develop and grow as a program, increasing its ability to manage 

and monitor foreign students and exchange visitors in order to ensure that they arrive in the United States, register at the school or exchange visitor program, and 

maintain their status during their stay as valued guests in this country. SEVIS enhances our ability to detect and deter those who may come to America for nefarious 

purposes, while extending a hand in friendship to those seeking the exceptional education and training opportunities this great country has to offer. SEVIS allows our 

nation to strike the proper balance between openness to international students and 

exchange visitors and the necessary security obtained by enforcing our nation’s 

laws. 

I appreciate the opportunity to testify before the subcommittee today. I look forward to your questions.

Mr. HOSTETTLER. General Fine? 

STATEMENT OF GLENN A. FINE, INSPECTOR GENERAL, 

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 

Mr. FINE. Mr. Chairman, Congresswoman Jackson Lee, Members 

of the Subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to testify about the 

implementation of SEVIS, the foreign student tracking system. 

The Office of the Inspector General has conducted several reviews of this system. In a May 2002 report, we described our investigation of how the INS had mailed forms notifying a Florida flight 

school that two September 11 terrorists, Mohamed Atta and 

Marwan Alshehhi, had received approval to change their immigration status from visitors to students 6 months after they committed 

the terrorist attacks. In that report, we also examined the INS’s 

monitoring of foreign students and raised serious concerns about 

the implementation of SEVIS. 

In January of 2003, we began a follow-up review to assess the 

INS’s progress in implementing SEVIS. Three weeks ago, we released our follow-up report, at which time the responsibilities of 

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the INS had been transferred into the Department of Homeland 

Security. 

Our follow-up review concluded that the INS had made significant progress in implementing SEVIS. SEVIS was operating and 

available at Department of State consular posts, INS service centers, INS district offices, and ports-of-entry. The INS had required 

all schools to reapply for approval to use SEVIS, and it had required non-accredited vocational schools, language schools, and 

flight schools to undergo an on-site review prior to approval. The 

INS also planned to conduct on-site reviews at all schools every 2 

years. 

Yet, despite the progress, we concluded that SEVIS is still not 

fully implemented. The INS asserted that SEVIS was fully implemented by January 1, 2003, the Congressionally mandated deadline, because it was operational as of that date. However, we believe full implementation requires more than technical availability 

of the system. 

Also, while the SEVIS database contains information on newlyenrolled foreign students, it will not contain information on all continuing foreign students until August 1, 2003. Until then, the INS 

will continue to operate its inadequate paper-based system to monitor continuing foreign students. 

In my testimony today, I will briefly summarize some of the continued gaps in the system, which are discussed in more detail in 

my written statement. 

First, the INS hired contract investigators to conduct site visits 

of schools applying to accept foreign students. The INS provided 

the contractors with checklists to use in conducting the reviews. 

Our follow-up review found that the contractors’ completed checklists were of limited use to INS adjudicators in determining whether a school was bona fide. We also found that the INS failed to 

properly train the contract investigators, test the checklists for usefulness and completeness, or monitor the quality of the contractors’ on-site reviews. 

Second, our follow-up review concluded that INS employees had 

not received sufficient training for performing school adjudications. 

Third, at the time of our follow-up review, the INS had not fully 

trained its inspectors at ports-of-entry on how to use SEVIS. 

Fourth, we recommended in our May 2002 report that the INS 

establish a separate unit at headquarters responsible for analyzing 

SEVIS data to identify fraudulent activity, such as sham schools 

and alien smuggling operations. The INS said that it hired a consulting firm to prepare a quarterly report analyzing SEVIS data, 

but the INS has not provided us with details on what actions will 

be taken in response to anomalies identified in the quarterly reports. While identifying noncompliance and potential fraud is a 

good first step, the process will be effectively only if these issues 

are referred for further investigation and enforcement action. 

Fifth, although we did not do a technical review of the SEVIS 

system, we have heard that technical problems have impeded the 

ability of schools and immigration employees to efficiently use 

SEVIS. For example, we have heard complaints that the system is 

sluggish, takes a significant amount of time to access and input 

data, freezes frequently, and sometimes provides access to one 

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school of another school’s records. It is critical that these technical 

problems be overcome for the system to be usable and able to fulfill 

its mission. 

Sixth, the transfer of the INS to the Department of Homeland 

Security creates a significant management challenge. Responsibility for the foreign student program and SEVIS has been shifted 

from one bureau in the INS, which had focused on providing immigration benefits, to another bureau, the DHS, which focuses on enforcement. We are concerned about the continuity of supervision of 

the program. 

To help improve the implementation of SEVIS, we made several 

recommendations in our follow-up review, including that the INS, 

now the DHS, appoint a Foreign Student Program Manager to coordinate and be accountable for immigration issues affecting foreign students; monitor more closely the contract investigators to 

ensure that they conduct timely and thorough on-site reviews; coordinate with the Department of Education to conduct audits of 

schools to ensure that they are complying with SEVIS reporting 

and recordkeeping requirements; provide better training on SEVIS; 

ensure that sufficient investigative resources are available to investigate potential fraud identified by SEVIS. 

In sum, we believe that SEVIS has the potential to significantly 

improve the monitoring of foreign students studying in the United 

States. We also found the INS had made significant progress in implementing the new system. However, additional steps still must be 

taken to fully implement SEVIS and to ensure that it is reliable, 

usable, and effective. 

This concludes my statement. I would be happy to answer any 

questions. 

Mr. HOSTETTLER. Thank you, General Fine. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Fine follows:]

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PREPARED STATEMENT OF GLENN A. FINE


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Mr. HOSTETTLER. Mr. Fischer? 

STATEMENT OF THOMAS P. FISCHER, FORMER DISTRICT DIRECTOR, ATLANTA DISTRICT, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 

Mr. FISCHER. Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, thank 

you for inviting me to your hearing and allowing me to provide you 

my insight regarding the current Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services development and implementation of the Student 

and Exchange Visitor Information System, SEVIS. 

As you are aware, this program was developed to track and monitor foreign student educational participation in academic and vocational schools within the United States. Before I address my comments regarding the SEVIS program, I feel it is important to look 

at the genesis of the student enrollment and tracking process before SEVIS was implemented. The purpose of this is not to walk 

down memory lane, but to provide all the Committee Members an 

insight that may be helpful, since the purpose of this hearing is to 

evaluate the implementation of SEVIS and promote possible modifications to the system that might improve its performance and 

functionality in the war against terrorism. 

To do this, I believe it is important to review certain actions the 

former Immigration and Naturalization Service implemented in the 

mid-1990’s. Although to some degree the March 2003 Department 

of Justice report partially addresses this issue, it nevertheless 

misses the mark on more relevant and critical shortcomings of 

SEVIS. 

My written comments provide all of the specific information and 

data that will allow you to evaluate the current SEVIS program 

and its forerunner, CIPRIS, Coordinated Interagency Partnership 

Regulating International Students, which began in 1997 as a pilot 

test and part of an interagency task force partnership group with 

national program development initiatives. However, full development of a national CIPRIS system was halted by the INS in October 1999. This action dramatically scaled down the program and 

reduced the development of a national system to a state that can 

best be described as one of minimal life support. 

As you are aware, the INS has been charged with conducting a 

program to approve schools and universities that lead to the granting of degrees with course work in many areas, such as accounting, 

chemistry, engineering, fine arts, and nuclear science, to name a 

few. This was a paper-based process for establishing visa eligibility 

for participation of those foreign students who were eligible and received from the Department of State non-immigrant visas in the F, 

M, and J classifications, including their dependents. 

During the mid-1990’s, many INS field and headquarters officials 

were concerned about the abuses in the program and its effect on 

U.S. security. They were also aware that the current system lacked 

any way to accurately identify the names and locations of foreign 

students within the U.S. and their program participation. Also, 

they were very concerned with the apparent inability of State Department and INS field offices to have a database at their disposal 

that could prevent issuance of visas to those ineligible to receive 

them and also monitoring databases with peripheral related inforVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:21 May 06, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00030 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 G:\WORK\IMMIG\040203\86265.000 HJUD1 PsN: 86265
27

mation such as financial databases, NCIC, Interpol, and others. 

This concern was shared by the FBI, which alerted the Deputy Attorney General to the problem in 1995, who, in turn, directed INS 

to address the issue. 

Based on this concern, INS established a task force in 1995 that 

was to address the concerns of those offices that year. A task force 

was established and their findings were reported in December 1995 

and they basically said they exposed the extent of weaknesses and 

vulnerabilities inherent in the program and the ease with which 

terrorists, criminals, and others could take advantage of the program to gain entry and freedom of movement through the U.S. 

without being effectively screened, monitored, or tracked. 

In 1997, a workshop was convened in Atlanta, Georgia, with the 

CIPRIS task force program leader from headquarters convening 

this meeting. A summary paper was established in April 1999 and 

that summary paper outlined an all-electronic interactive process 

that would effectively eliminate all F, M, and J non-immigrant visa 

fraud as observed earlier, for example, forged documents, counterfeit supporting documents, and the like, and created a process that 

expanded the screening to include on-site real-time registration information as well as course major participation and location of the 

student. 

In addition, CIPRIS would have had a complete relational database on every school, training program, and exchange program, 

electronic images of signatures, and a complete electronic file on 

every school or program to provide matches on lookouts based on 

schools and programs suspected of fraud and mollified activities 

that could quickly be checked or flagged prior to visa processing or 

in connection with any admission to the U.S. or benefit being applied for to the INS. 

A review of the current SEVIS program and its fact gathering as 

well as its foreign student and institutional monitoring capabilities 

indicates to me a dumbed-down version of CIPRIS. For example, a 

review indicates many in SEVIS—of the critical capabilities of 

CIPRIS, excuse me, have not been included in SEVIS, which I believe undermines the program objectives. 

For example, there is no coordination with FINCEN for financial 

checking of the student’s source of funds. Also, if the non-immigrant visa is issued and the student is admitted and does not register within a 30-day period, there is no procedure to interview the 

prospective student or take them into custody. A referral to investigations in many cases will go unanswered since there is no written policy and minimal resources within investigations to investigate this action. Also, the current student adjudicating officers 

have had minimal training and realize the program will be transferred to BICE within a year. In my opinion, there is no resident 

expertise within BICE at this time knowledgeable of the rules and 

regulations governing the student and exchange visitor program. 

In closing, it should be noted that the CIPRIS program was established to be a proactive search engine that would assist all others, but more important, flag violators, identify trends that could 

violate the program objectives. SEVIS, on the other hand, appears 

to me to be configured to be user friendly, a database with no seriVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:21 May 06, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00031 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 G:\WORK\IMMIG\040203\86265.000 HJUD1 PsN: 86265
28

ous or thorough means of ferreting out violators or trends or crosscheck with other pertinent Government databases. 

Thank you for the opportunity to comment. 

Mr. HOSTETTLER. Thank you, Mr. Fischer. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Fischer follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THOMAS P. FISCHER

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me to your 

hearing, and allowing me to provide you my insight regarding the current Bureau 

of Citizenship and Immigration Services (BCIS) development and implementation of 

the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS). As you are aware, 

this program was developed to track and monitor foreign student educational participation in academic and vocational schools within the United States. 

Before I address my comments regarding the SEVIS program, I feel it is important to look at the genesis of the student enrollment and tracking process before 

SEVIS was implemented. The purpose of this is not to ‘‘walk down memory lane’’, but to provide all of the Committee members an insight that may be helpful since 

the purpose of this hearing is to evaluate the implementation of SEVIS, and promote ‘‘. . . possible modifications to the system that might improve its performance 

and functionality in the war against terrorism.’’ To do this, I believe it is important to review certain actions the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) implemented in the mid 1990’s. Although to 

some degree the March 2003 Department of Justice report titled Follow-up Review 

on the INS’ Efforts to Track Foreign Students in the US through the Student and 

Exchange Visitor Information System, (Report Number I–2003–003, March 2003) 

partially addresses this issue, it nevertheless misses the mark on more relevant and 

critical shortcomings of SEVIS. I will try to provide more specific information and 

data that hopefully will allow you to evaluate the current SEVIS program, and its 

forerunner, CIPRIS (Coordinated Interagency Partnership Regulating International 

Students), which began in 1997 as a ‘‘pilot test’’ and part of an interagency taskforce 

partnership group, with national program development initiatives. However, full development of a national CIPRIS system was halted by former INS Deputy Commissioner Mary Ann Wyrsch in October 1999. This action dramatically scaled down the 

program and reduced the development of a national system to a state that can best 

be described as one of ‘‘minimal life support.’’

As you are aware, since the end of the Second World War, the INS has been 

charged with conducting a program to approve schools (vocational and academic) 

and universities to participate in a program that allowed foreign nationals to come 

to the United States (US) and take courses of study in any academic area that may 

enhance their skill level (English language training, pilot training, vocational training), or lead to receiving a degree of academic achievement in a specific area (BS, 

BA, MA, MBA, PhD), with course work in many areas such as accounting, chemistry, engineering, fine arts, and nuclear science to name a few. 

This was a paper-based process for establishing visa eligibility for participation 

of those foreign students who were eligible, and who received from the U.S. Department of State non-immigrant visas (NIV) in the F, M or J classifications, for themselves and their dependents. The program has allowed over two million foreign students to come to the US for study, and generally the INS admitted them as F/M/

J non-immigrants, and on their I–94 (Arrival/Departure Card) showed the authorized length of stay as D/S, Duration of Status. This meant that there was not any 

specific date to leave the US, or to coincide with the ending date on the F–1 NIV 

issued by the DOS, or the ending date of their course of study or proposed graduation. This allowed much flexibility for the schools as well as the students for both 

transition to other programs or degrees, full-time employment as an H–1B, as well 

as the possibility for abusing the guidelines. It also resulted in abuses both by 

schools and students failing to abide by the legitimate terms of the programs. 

The program going back to the early 1980’s that provided this ‘‘flexibility’’ was the 

Student and Schools System (STSC) program. Unfortunately, there was no immediate database or system against which the Department of State consular officer 

could check, and to verify the authenticity of supporting documents and information 

on key eligibility forms, such as the I–20 and IAP–66. The review was done on an 

ad hoc basis by the DOS with varying operating policies depending on the embassy 

and its staff. Once issued the NIV, and admitted by the INS, the student was ‘‘supposed to be monitored by at the mercy’’ of the designated school official who was 

delegated by the INS awesome responsibility, and acted as a surrogate INS adjudicator/information officer/school officer. However, as you can imagine, this arrangeVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:21 May 06, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00032 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 G:\WORK\IMMIG\040203\86265.000 HJUD1 PsN: 86265
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ment made for wide spread abuses, committed by both students and Designated 

School Officials. 

The schools in many cases had just as porous of a tracking system and record 

keeping process, and experienced document fraud as well. Academic drop outs, ‘‘no 

shows’’ and the like, could not be tracked and, even if they were reported and identified, there was no means for them being found or apprehended. 

During the mid-1990’s, many INS field and headquarters officials were concerned 

about abuses in the program and its affect on US security. They also were aware 

that the current system lacked any way to accurately identify the names and locations of foreign students within the US and their program participation. Also, they 

were very concerned with the apparent inability of State Department and INS field 

officials to have a database at their disposal that could prevent issuance of visas 

to those ineligible to receive them, or monitoring databases with peripheral related 

information, such as financial databases, NCIC, Interpol and others. This concern 

was shared by the FBI, which alerted the Deputy Attorney General to the problem 

in 1995, who in turn directed INS to address the issue. Based on this concern, INS 

established a Task Force in 1995 that was to address the concerns of these officers, 

and that task force convened on a fairly regular basis that year. The Task Force 

issued its findings and recommendations in a December 1995 report on the extensive weaknesses and vulnerabilities inherent in the program, and the ease with 

which terrorists, criminals, etc., could take advantage of the program to gain entry 

and freedom of movement throughout the U.S. without being effectively screened, 

monitored or tracked. It should be mentioned that historically there are over 

500,000 foreign students in the US on any given day, with generous travel and work 

provisions delegated to the DSO. 

The following year, partially in response to the Task Force’s report and recommendations, Public Law 104–208 (IIRIRA) was passed by the Congress. One of 

the features of that legislation required INS to develop a system to collect foreign 

student information electronically from colleges and universities in order to screen, 

monitor, and track them. The INS moved ahead with a program to meet these Congressional mandates, planning a new electronic tracking process. This program was 

named CIPRIS, and the Atlanta District of the INS, of which I was the District Director at the time, was identified in 1997 as the pilot District for development and 

implementation of a ‘‘test concept’’ pilot program. 

It was determined by the INS officials at all levels that in order to succeed and 

develop a sound, relevant workable program would require the assistance and commitment of all participating parties and organizations. This included Federal officials, school and university officials, and parent organizations of those groups (National Association of Foreign Student Advisors-—AFSA), and where appropriate 

other individuals with a stake in the project. 

In April 1997, a workshop was convened in Atlanta, Georgia by the CIPRIS Task 

Force Project Leader, Mr. Morrie Berez, from INS Headquarters. Mr. Berez was involved with CIPRIS from the beginning as the leader of the original Task Force and 

author of the Task Force’s report. I believe that it can be accurately stated for the 

record that Mr. Berez was the principal architect of the program. Over 20 schools 

and exchange programs participated in this partnership session, with representatives from institutions of higher education such as the University of Alabama, Duke 

University, Auburn, Shaw University, and Mercer University, as well as vocational 

schools institutions that provided flight training and English as a second language 

training. Through evaluation and ‘‘lessons learned’’ from the pilot, and extensive involvement of key stakeholders from both government and schools, the elements and 

features of a sophisticated, computer-based proactive national CIPRIS system were 

outlined in a summary paper in April 1999. 

The summary paper outlined an all electronic interactive process that would effectively eliminate all F/M/J NIV visa fraud as observed earlier (forged documents, 

counterfeit supporting documents, etc.) and created a process that expanded the 

screening to include on-site real time registration information as well as course/

major participation and location of student. The national program envisioned in the 

paper was aimed at guarding against criminals and known and suspected terrorists 

being able to slip into the U.S. under the guise of students or exchange visitors. 

The highlights of the envisioned national CIPRIS program included the following 

features that were not part of the current STSC program, and for the most part are 

not included in the design or plans for SEVIS. 

These features can be condensed into 20 basic areas as follows:

1) The identifying information in the CIPRIS transmission actions would include the alien’s full name, COB, DOB, gender, and passport number (if the 

30

alien possessed a passport at time of application to the school), major area 

of study or training, school, address and other routine data.

2) In addition to the basic identifying information in item 1 above, the school 

would also capture and transmit to a national CIPRIS system the full name 

of the applicant’s father and mother, all siblings, and their dates and places 

of birth. ‘‘A fully realized national CIPRIS would also require that the 

school capture and enter into CIPRIS the student’s last two addresses 

abroad for the past 3 years, last job, job title and place of employment, last 

school attended and areas of study, as well as the source of funding for the 

student’s program of study including the account type and account number. 

Also included would be the name and address of the bank or entity containing the funds, and the full identity of the person or organization who 

‘‘owns’’ the account.

3) Upon receipt of the transmitted data from the school, a national CIPRIS 

program would then instantly verify the legitimacy of the school/sponsor 

and the DSO, as well as the study program information.

4) A national CIPRIS would do a ‘‘lookout’’ pre-screen, running the identifying 

data against all pertinent lookout systems (NAILS, IBIS, INTERPOL, 

TECS, etc.), as well as running the applicant’s information against risk assessment models for fraud and national security.

5) A national CIPRIS would also instantly transmit the ‘‘source of funding’’

money account to FinCEN at the Department of Treasury to prescreen 

against laundered funds as well as to possibly ‘‘flag’’ an account or institution as being associated with illicit or terrorist-related funds transactions.

6) A national CIPRIS also would cross-check all existing records within its 

data base (being a relational data base) to identify and flag any previous 

or duplicate records within the CIPRIS system relating to the ‘‘new’’ record 

entry that has been transmitted by the school to CIPRIS, and if a duplicate 

match is found, flagging the record as a possible duplicate for review and 

verification by a CIPRIS action aide who would either determine that the 

case is or is not a duplicate and clear the transaction to proceed, or, if a 

duplicate, initiate automated file consolidation within CIPRIS, thus eliminating duplicate or multi records.

7) The cross-check lookouts and file duplication search would be all automated 

and would run within seconds.

8) Where a record is flagged either because of a ‘‘lookout hit’’ or a FinCEN 

‘‘possible’’, then it would automatically be routed to both an INS investigative desk officer as well as a Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) analyst for 

possible investigation for fraud, criminal alien, terrorist affiliation, etc. The 

system would send a notice to the school that the record has been referred 

for review and that it may take up to 30 days for the system to respond 

with an outcome, either a ‘‘go’’ to issue eligibility document, or a ‘‘hold’’

wherein no authorization can be forthcoming and the school must contact 

INS directly regarding the particular record.

9) The system would process and issue a ‘‘go’’ or ‘‘hold’’ on a record within 24 

hours of receipt and processing.

10) In the case of a ‘‘go’’ (expected to be the case 95% of the time) the school 

would proceed to the next steps in the business process, receiving back from 

the CIPRIS system electronically the ability to generate a bar-coded notice 

that then goes to the alien overseas as required in order to apply for the 

appropriate F, J or M nonimmigrant visa (or change of status if already in 

the U.S. as a visitor). This notice would eliminate the form I–20 (still issued 

in SEVIS) to further lessen the opportunity for counterfeiting or duplicating 

such documents fraudulently.

11) If overseas, the alien would bring the notice with them to the American 

consulate along with their supporting evidence for applying for the visa. At 

the Consulate, the Consular Officer verifies the legitimacy of the alien’s 

record instantly through direct access to the CIPRIS data. If the school/

sponsor record (validated by INS) is not in CIPRIS at the point of visa application or if it’s in CIPRIS with ‘‘flag’’ holding it for investigation, the 

alien is refused a visa. Simply put, if there is no INS-validated record in 

CIPRIS that is immediately accessible at the visa post, or if the case is on 

‘‘hold’’ as a possible criminal or terrorist, etc., then there is no visa 

issuance. Any applicant presenting a CIPRIS notice must have a validated 

and ‘‘cleared’’ electronic record in CIPRIS, or no notice could ever be issued, 

31

and the likelihood is that the alien is presenting a counterfeit notice in 

their attempt to obtain the visa.

12) If there’s a ‘‘go’’ in CIPRIS thus proving prima facie eligibility for an F/M/

J visa, the consular officer can then more thoroughly screen and interview 

the applicant and verify the authenticity of supporting evidence. If the visa 

is approved or denied, then the action is entered immediately into the DOS 

CLASS system by the consular officer, which in turn automatically updates 

the CIPRIS record. If approved, the visa information, passport information, 

and photo/fingerprint of the alien are downloaded immediately into the 

CIPRIS system from the visa post, updating the alien’s CIPRIS record, and 

CIPRIS electronically notifies the school/sponsor of the alien’s visa issuance 

based on their record.

13) The visa produced and issued to the alien would be a credit card size combination Visa/Identity card, containing identifying information together 

with the alien’s photograph and fingerprint both on the face of the card, 

and encoded in a machine readable code on the back of the card (corresponding to the photo and print that were captured by the consulate and 

downloaded to CIPRIS). This combination Visa/Identity card would have a 

master ID number that serves as both the visa and alien identification 

number.

14) When the alien travels to and seeks admission to the U.S. at a POE, based 

on the data-share interfaces (that include the CIPRIS transactions at the 

Consulate), the Inspector is able to verify the Visa/ID card, passport, and 

appearance of the alien against the data from CIPRIS (including having 

scanned the machine readable code on the back of the Visa/ID card that includes the photo and fingerprint appearing on the front face of the card, 

and matching them to the visa issuance update in CIPRIS). This all electronic process/system affords continual validation and verification, from initial transmission of the eligibility record to CIPRIS from the school/sponsor 

through to visa application, photo/fingerprint capture and visa/id card 

issuance at the consulate, and entry at the POE. If the alien is admitted, 

deferred or denied admission, this action immediately updates the alien’s 

record in CIPRIS, automatically assigning a record transaction number 

within the system for each action against the master alien ID number 

(which corresponds to the number on the Visa/ID card) and, at the same 

time electronically notifying the school/sponsor each action through CIPRIS 

via the Internet.

15) Upon enrollment/registration at the school/exchange program, the school/exchange program verifies the identity and bona fides of the alien student by 

looking at their Visa/ID card against the record of ‘‘their’’ student in 

CIPRIS, which action automatically electronically notifies CIPRIS via the 

Internet of the alien’s arrival and enrollment in school.

16) Upon admission by the POE of the student/exchange visitor, or granting of 

change of status by the Service Center, the CIPRIS system commences a 

60-day clock, which monitors the record awaiting electronic file update confirmation from the school or exchange program that the alien has in fact 

enrolled in school or commenced participation in the exchange program. If 

CIPRIS receives no such online Visa/ID confirmation check from the school 

per step 15 above, then CIPRIS automatically flags the record to generate 

an automatic electronic notice to the school/program directing the school/

program to confirm by a date-certain (within 10 business days) that the student/exchange visitor has either enrolled, is a ‘‘no show’’ (or per step 17 

below has completed or extended his/her program.)

17) If the school program confirms that the student did in fact enroll, then 

CIPRIS would update the record, but would also send a warning notice to 

the school or program that its failure to confirm the alien’s identification 

against the CIPRIS system within the 60-day required timeframe is a violation of procedure and that repeated violations by the school or program 

could subject it to having its authorization withdrawn to enroll foreign students and/or exchange visitors.

18) The CIPRIS system would then monitor each ‘‘enrolled’’ student/exchange 

visitor record for regular report updates each semester to verify continued 

enrollment and academic or other standing with each semester/term. It 

would be designed to receive regular updates from each school’s registrar 

system, so that each change in any foreign student’s data as entered into 

the registrar’s data base would automatically be copied to a special CIPRIS 

32

update file for regular update transmission to the national CIPRIS system. 

This would eliminate the unreliable and fragmented data that comes to the 

attention of the designated school official often weeks or months after being 

reported to the registrar. The system would also look to receiving notification of the student/ev having completed or terminated their program within 

30 days of program completion date in their record (or within 30 days of 

the next semester start date if they prematurely terminated and failed to 

re-register). Failure to receive the completion notification (or extension of 

program notification) or notification of premature termination from the 

school/program would result in notices to the school similar to that in steps 

16 and 17 above.

19) If the school program confirms that the student/exchange visitor is a ‘‘no show’’ per item 17 above, or has completed or terminated his/her program 

per item 18 above, then CIPRIS would automatically flag the case as a 

‘‘lookout’’ and would update the appropriate lookout systems to flag the 

record and update the appropriate lookout systems. Also, CIPRIS would 

transmit the record to the duty officer’s electronic ‘‘action queue.’’ In addition, if the record meets criteria for a terrorist threat assessment, the 

flagged record would also be immediately transmitted to the FBI and DIA 

duty officer’s electronic ‘‘action queue’’ as well.

20) For any record flagged in CIPRIS as a ‘‘no show’’, ‘‘early termination’’, ‘‘failure to depart’’, etc. the Visa/ID card would immediately be tagged/coded by 

the system as invalid, so that any attempt by the alien to use the card for 

purposes of verifying employment authorization, re-entry to the U.S., or status to a local or federal law enforcement officer who has encountered the 

alien, would be stopped. The CIPRIS system would enable authorized officers to verify the Visa/ID card number by means of dial up computer, check 

through local law enforcement checks, or via an automated phone/fax back 

verification process available twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week.

In addition to all of the above, CIPRIS would have a complete relational data base 

on every school, training program and exchange program, electronic images of DSOs 

and RO’s signatures, and a complete electronic file on each school or program to provide matches on lookouts based on schools and programs suspected of fraud and 

mala fide activities, that could be quickly checked or flagged prior to visa processing 

or in connection with any admission to the U.S. or benefit being applied for to the 

Service. 

This program as formulated in 1999 was envisioned to be a joint partnership effort combining the resources and expertise of the INS, Department of State, USIA, 

Department of Education and Department of Treasury, working in close relationship 

with eligible schools, universities and exchange programs. As envisioned, a national 

CIPRIS was a very promising interactive system, and the concepts associated with 

electronic reporting via the internet was piloted in the Atlanta District with excellent feedback from all participants, public and private. This included the INS Atlanta International Airport POE, the INS Atlanta District headquarters examinations division, the INS Texas Service Center, the Departments of State and the 

former USIA. Also, 21 pilot institutions located in the states of Georgia, Alabama, 

North Carolina and South Carolina agreed upon and were active partners. 

In October 1999, the month that I retired from over 32 years of government service, the INS suspended active development and development of the national CIPRIS 

program. No explanation was provided to me since I was no longer a federal employee, and the Headquarters’ program leader, Mr. Morrie Berez was removed from 

his leadership role. The program was placed in a ‘‘suspended animation’’ format, and 

remained that way until the tragic events of September 11th. In October 2001 the 

program objectives were revised by the President and Congress and the INS commenced developing a program named the Student/Exchange Visitor Program 

(SEVP), and then changed it to SEVIS which it presently called. 

A review of the current SEVIS program and its fact gathering, as well as its foreign student and institutional monitoring capabilities indicates to me a ‘‘dumbed 

down’’ version of CIPRIS. For example, a review indicates that of the 20 previously 

identified critical capabilities of CIPRIS, many of those important features have not 

been included, which I believe undermines the program’s objectives. For example, 

there is no coordination with FinCEN for financial checking of the student’s source 

of funds. Also, if the NIV is issued, and the student is admitted, and does not register within a 30 day period there is no procedure to interview the prospective student or take them into custody. A referral to Investigations in many cases would 

go unanswered since there is no written policy and minimal resources within Investigations to investigate this action. Also, the current student adjudicating officers 

33

have had minimal training, and realize the program will be transferred to BICE 

within a year. In my opinion, there is no resident expertise within BICE at this time 

knowledgeable of the rules and regulations governing the student and exchange visitor programs. 

Additionally, for a school or university to participate in the SEVIS program after 

the application is filed it must be investigated by a contract investigator who is not 

a federal employee and lacks knowledge, understanding or mastery of the complex 

rules governing both foreign students, exchange visitors, and the schools/programs 

enrolling them. These contracts are now being awarded to contract firms, which 

send their poorly trained staff members to the schools based upon an I–17 application being filed, to assess their eligibility for participation. Instead of having this 

done within the 30 day designated time period, it runs now up to 3 months. Also, 

none of these contract investigators have federal investigator security clearance, nor 

in many cases any federal investigative experience, and as I said above, they also 

lack an even rudimentary knowledge and understanding of the rules governing students, schools, exchange visitors and exchange program sponsors. 

Also, nothing still precludes non-student non-immigrants from attending courses 

at school and universities. Non-immigrants in classifications such as B–1, H–4, L– 2, E–2 and others can take courses incidental to their authorized stay in the US, 

and in many if not all of the cases, BCIS would not be informed, aware or knowledgeable of their attendance, as there is no requirement for schools and exchange 

sponsors to report or track foreign students through SEVIS other than those in the 

F, J and M nonimmigrant classes. 

Additionally, Congress may want to consider amending the Immigration & Nationality Act (INA) to add penalties for non-compliance with the provisions of 

SEVIS. For example, the INA could include language and provisions to explicitly bar 

any school, university or training program not authorized by BCIS from admitting, 

accepting or enrolling foreign students or trainees, under penalty of law and subject 

to fine. This could be similar to the I–9 employer sanctions process for employers 

where any employer failing to verify the prospective employee’s work authorization 

would be subject to civil/criminal penalties with possible fine. Among the sanctions 

the schools or training programs could be at risk for would be debarment from Title 

V Funds in the Higher Education Act, disbarment from being eligible for VA GI Bill 

Funds, and training schools such as flight schools could have their FAA Certification withdrawn. 

There are no requirements for any post-secondary school to report illegal alien 

students to a system such as SEVIS. The fact that adult aliens over the age of 18 

who have somehow gotten into the U.S. can attend any college or vocational school 

as long as they have the financial means to pay means that an entire population 

(which may contain individuals wishing to harm the U.S.) is not subject to any reporting by the school to the government. 

Finally, I should like to point out, that over 11 million United States Citizen college post secondary students, who receive Federal student financial aid, are electronically reported each semester by the school to the U.S. Department of Education 

as a condition for continued financial aid. The school reports their academic status, 

whether they are full time or part time, whether they’re making ‘‘normal progress’’ towards their degree or certificate, whether they are maintaining good academic 

standing, etc. I would urge the Congress to re-evaluate and reconsider the relatively 

inequitable reporting situation, wherein vast numbers of foreign students (legal and 

illegal) are not subject to monitoring or reporting by schools to the government, 

while well over 11 million U.S. students receiving Federal financial aid or student 

loans are reported on by close to 8,000 schools each and every semester. 

In closing, it should be noted that the CIPRIS Program was established to be a 

proactive search engine that would assist all users, but more important, that would 

‘‘flag’’ violations, abnormalities and identify trends that could violate the program 

objectives. SEVIS, on the other hand, given the way it is configured, appears to be 

a ‘‘user friendly’’ database, with no serious or thorough means of ferreting out violators or trends, or cross checking with other pertinent governmental databases. 

Thank you for the opportunity to comment

Mr. HOSTETTLER. Mr. Ward? 

STATEMENT OF DAVID WARD, PRESIDENT,

AMERICAN COUNCIL ON EDUCATION 

Mr. WARD. Thank you. Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I guess I am here to represent the foreign student position 

and that of the member institutions of ACE, which are essentially 

34

degree-granting institutions, approximately 1,800 in the United 

States. 

The events of September 11 changed a great deal in this country 

and many of the policies and practices by which the U.S. welcomes 

international visitors and especially students have rightly been 

subjected to reexamination and sustained discussion. We strongly 

support that review. 

We can make decisions about academic suitability of potential 

students and scholars, but we lack the information to determine 

whether a specific individual is likely to constitute a security risk. 

We will never be good at that. If the Federal Government, therefore, determines that a particular individual is a security risk, we 

do not want them to be in the country. We do not want them on 

our campuses. We strongly support the security program. 

However, if an individual receives a student or exchange visitor 

visa, we have an obligation to help the Federal Government monitor them while they’re in this country and we have a responsibility 

to advise them of the terms and conditions of their visas. We also 

have a responsibility to help them, in a sense, take advantage of 

their stay in the United States. 

While we certainly cannot control everything they do, we can 

help ensure that they remain in status. SEVIS is a vitally important, if currently flawed, tool in this regard. In fact, we believe that 

the implementation of an effective, workable SEVIS is the single 

best step that the Federal Government can take to improve our 

ability to monitor international students and scholars who come to 

the United States. 

But I fear that we are, for a variety of reasons, making it more 

difficult for international students and scholars to come to our 

country and complete their studies, scholarship, and research. This 

is mostly because enormous and complicated efforts have been 

made in a very short period of time. The result is a complicated set 

of new regulations, rules, and procedures that do not work very 

well at the present time. 

We have repeatedly indicated a concern that this system was 

being implemented before it was fully operational. Last fall at 

hearings held by the House Education and the Workforce Committee and the House Judiciary Committee, the higher education 

community indicated that we did not believe that the SEVIS system would be operational in time for smooth implementation. The 

Department of Justice Inspector General also expressed doubts 

about the implementability of SEVIS at both hearings. 

Sadly, our concerns have been justified. SEVIS was not ready 

and our campuses are confronting growing difficulties. Let me be 

quite specific, because we are supporting SEVIS. We simply wish 

to improve it. 

SEVIS is technologically flawed. Many of our members have reported frequent data losses. Many have reported that their immigration forms have printed out on computers at other schools, often 

hundreds of miles away. Batch processing, which is crucial to institutions that need to enter large numbers of records, has worked 

intermittently, as best. And, of course, some schools still have not 

been able to use the batch feature at all. 

35

Secondly, SEVIS does not provide real-time access, as promised. 

The system was designed to link schools, the State Department, 

and INS in real time. Delays can cause confusion at consular offices and embassies when students arrive to apply for their visa, 

only to discover that their SEVIS information is not available on 

the system. 

Immigration and Naturalization Service, or its successor, has not 

really provided adequate training, and this point has been made by 

others, so I won’t repeat it. 

The INS service help desk can answer technical questions about 

SEVIS system, but is unable to answer regulatory questions. As a 

result, many officials are left to interpret the regulations on their 

own. The help staff, in my judgment, or our judgment, is understaffed and badly overworked, and it can often take up to a month 

to resolve a problem involving a single student. 

There are two other issues that make the situation worrisome. 

Firstly, a dramatic increase in the number of new entries that will 

be made in the next 6 months, and secondly, the lack of regulations 

at the present time concerning the collection of fees. 

The first issue is between today and October 1, an estimated one 

million additional records will be entered as colleges begin processing admissions for fall 2003 and we make up the backlog of students who are already here on a student visa. That is an enormous 

scale increase which will stress the system that is already greatly 

stressed. 

On the subject of the SEVIS fee, the Federal Government still 

has not published regulations concerning how the fee will be collected. We understand the fee collection process will be totally separate from the process by which students are listed in SEVIS. Additionally, it may rely on traditional mail and paper receipts, undermining the original goal of creating an entirely electronic system. 

Obviously, in a new world in which we live, the Government 

must put new security procedures and policies in place. We support 

these efforts and we have and will continue to work with Government agencies to meet these needs. We understand it will take 

some time before new policies and procedures begin to operate 

smoothly and we do have patience. At the same time, unfortunately, some of the steps we have taken are counterproductive, unworkable, and uncoordinated, and, in fact, the systems of communication between State Department, higher education, and the Immigration Service certainly are not smooth. 

Let me just end by certain proposals here that might be helpful 

to the Committee. The SEVIS fee collection system needs to be rethought to simplify collection and to avoid yet another complex system plagued by delay and lost information. 

Secondly, the Social Security Administration should be able to 

have access to SEVIS to verify work authorization before issuing 

Social Security numbers. 

The State Department should use SEVIS system to ensure retail 

access of data. Currently, the State Department runs SEVIS data 

through their own system instead of using the secured Internetbased interface. 

36

And finally, campuses’ specifically designated school officials 

should be given broader access to SEVIS in order to correct clerical 

errors in initial form. 

Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you and Members of the 

Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims for 

holding this hearing. We hope that our comments are viewed as 

helpful in having SEVIS become the effective system we hope it 

will be, but it’s certainly not at the present time. Thank you very 

much. 

Mr. HOSTETTLER. Thank you, Mr. Ward, and all of your comments have been very helpful. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Ward follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DAVID WARD

Mr. Chairman, my name is David Ward and I am president of the American 

Council on Education (ACE). ACE represents 1,800 public and private colleges and 

universities. I am testifying today on behalf of those institutions as well as the 32 

education and exchange visitor organizations listed at the conclusion of my testimony. 

I have a deep professional interest in the issue that we are discussing today. As 

the former Chancellor of the University of Wisconsin-Madison, a major research university with 4,500 international students and scholars, I had the privilege of working with international students and scholars every day and saw firsthand the talents and skills they brought to my university and our country. I am also personally 

interested in this issue—I originally came to the United States as an international 

student in 1960, earned a Ph.D. and then left, as my visa required me to do. I returned to the U.S. later and became a U.S. citizen in the Bicentennial year of 1976. 

The events of September 11th changed much in this country. Many of the policies 

and practices by which the U.S. welcomes international visitors have been the subject of examination and sustained discussion. We strongly support this review. We 

believe that the federal government has the responsibility to decide who may receive 

a visa to enter this country. Colleges and universities can make decisions about the 

academic suitability of potential students and scholars, but we lack the information 

to determine whether a specific individual is likely to constitute a security risk. If 

the federal government determines that a particular individual is a security risk, 

we do not want them to be allowed into this country and we do not want them on 

our campuses. 

If an individual receives a student or exchange visitor visa, colleges have an obligation to help the federal government monitor them while they are in this country 

and we have a responsibility to advise them of the terms and conditions of their 

visas. While we certainly cannot control everything they do, we can help ensure that 

they remain in status. SEVIS is a vitally important tool in this regard. Indeed, we 

believe that the implementation of an effective, workable SEVIS is the single best 

step that the federal government can take to improve our ability to monitor international students and scholars who come to the United States. 

I believe that international students and exchange visitor programs are extremely 

beneficial to this country and that the strongest justification for having such visitors 

is the benefits the United States derive from having them study in this country. For 

example, our economy is increasingly based on science and technology. As a result, 

it is in our economic self-interest to remain the destination of choice for the world’s 

best minds—students and scholars alike. 

This has been the case for the past 30 years and it has benefited this nation dramatically. For example, the rapid developments in information technology that 

helped fuel the economic growth of the 1990s benefited immeasurably from the 

international students and scholars from Southeast Asia who studied at American 

universities in the late 1980s. In the same vein, a central feature of the last decade’s 

advances in biomedical research that will pave the way for future gains in the quality and length of life are the collaborative efforts between native and foreign-born 

researchers now taking place in thousands of American laboratories. 

Second, in the current global climate, we need more and better efforts to enhance 

international understanding. One of the best ways to do this is through the everyday classroom discussions that one finds on college and university campuses. Candid 

discussion enhances familiarity—and familiarity leads to understanding. When 

international students and exchange visitors return home, they take with them a 

37

first-hand understanding of our country and our values. Indeed, some of America’s 

strongest supporters abroad are those who have spent time in this country as a student or exchange visitor. 

Third, international students add diversity to college classrooms. For many native-born students, international students offer the first chance for a sustained 

friendship with someone born in another country. As the world grows ever smaller, 

meaningful exposure to international students will better prepare American students to live, communicate, and compete in the global economy. 

And finally, the economic benefits of international students and scholars are enormous. According to the Institute for International Education and NASFAA: The Association of International Educators, the nearly 600,000 international students who 

visit this country every year purchase some $12 billion a year in goods and services. 

They do this when they pay tuition, rent an apartment, buy a pair of jeans, order 

a pizza, or go to a movie. Of course, like everyone else, international students and 

exchange visitors pay taxes on the goods and services they purchase. If they are allowed to work while they are here, they also pay federal and state income tax. 

According to the U.S. Commerce Department, higher education is the nation’s 

fifth largest service-sector export. In an era when many policy makers and economists worry about our huge trade deficit, the presence of international students 

helps reduce it. 

In short, the benefits of international students are unambiguous and overwhelming. So it is no surprise that President Bush has said: ‘‘The United States 

benefits greatly from international students who study in our country,’’ or that he 

has committed his Administration to ‘‘continue to foster and support international 

students.’’

Secretary of State Colin Powell—no stranger to what is in America’s international 

interests—says that international education ‘‘encourages and sustains democratic 

practices, creates a cohort of future leaders who understand each other’s countries 

from the inside, and promotes long-term linkages between institutions here and 

abroad.’’ The list of foreign heads of state that have studied at an American college 

is long and distinguished. The State Department has concluded that fully one-half 

of the world leaders who agreed to support our war on terrorism first came to this 

country as an international student or exchange visitor. 

Colleges and universities are among the most open institutions in our very open 

society. The openness and the freedom that campuses provide individual students 

and scholars is a central feature in our widely admired system of higher education. 

To maintain this openness, we need to make certain that all potential students and 

researchers come here with the best of intentions, that they remain in compliance 

with all appropriate laws and regulations, and that we help the appropriate authorities monitor their academic activities and visa status. 

But I fear that we are, for a variety of reasons, making it more difficult for international students and scholars to come to our country and to complete their studies, 

scholarship and research. This is mostly because enormous and complicated efforts 

have been made in a very short period of time. The result is a complicated set of 

new regulations, rules and procedures that do not work very well at the present 

time. Eventually, they will work well, but the damage to our reputation as the destination of choice may be seriously undermined before that happens. 

Of particular interest to this Committee is the implementation of the Student and 

Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS). This is a large and complex information technology system that is designed to link all US embassies and consulates, all 

INS ports of entry, every institution of higher education that sponsors international 

students, and every exchange visitor program. Under the Patriot Act, INS was required to have implemented SEVIS. INS required colleges and universities to be in 

‘‘full compliance’’ by January 30, 2003, a date they later extended to February 15th. 

I believe that SEVIS is the single most important step that the federal government can take to improve its ability to monitor international students and exchange 

visitors and we strongly support its implementation. However, we have repeatedly 

indicated a concern that this system was being implemented before it was fully 

operational. Last fall, at separate hearings held by the House Education and the 

Workforce Committee and the House Judiciary Committee, the higher education 

community indicated that we did not believe that the SEVIS system would be operational in time for smooth implementation. The Department of Justice Inspector 

General also expressed doubts about the implementability of SEVIS at both hearings. 

Sadly, as we feared, SEVIS was not ready and campuses are confronting enormous difficulties. The simplest way to characterize these problems is to say that the 

Immigration and Naturalization Service implemented this system before it was fully 

38

tested. Campus officials are now dealing with the failure to adequately prepare this 

system before it was launched. 

SEVIS suffers from three serious problems: 

First, SEVIS is technologically flawed. Schools report that SEVIS frequently ‘loses’ data that has been properly entered into the system. Many schools report that 

their immigration forms have printed out on the computers of other schools. For example, official government immigration forms that Stanford University in Palo Alto, 

California, attempted to print were later discovered at Duke University in Durham, 

North Carolina; forms for Michigan State University appeared on the printer at Arizona State University. Most worrisome, perhaps, confidential SEVIS forms printed 

by the Jet Propulsion Laboratory—a secure government installation—were printed 

at a school in San Francisco. Although INS claims to have fixed this problem— known as ‘‘bleeding’’—we learned from at least one campus official that it continues. 

Batch processing, which schools need to submit large amounts of data, works intermittently at best. Some schools have not been able to make batch processing work 

at all and at other schools it works intermittently. Finally, unlike any other information technology I have worked with, SEVIS does not allow errors that may occur 

to be corrected, even typographical mistakes. 

These technological flaws can have serious consequences for students. Consider 

this very recent example: an international student advisor submitted an I–20 form 

to enable a student to apply for Optional Practical Training. Although the form was 

filled out correctly, SEVIS lost (or did not ‘‘capture’’) two pieces of required information—the dates the training would start and finish. This error could not be corrected 

by the school. Thirty days ago, the school contacted the SEVIS help desk (Level 1) 

and was issued a ticket (or a receipt) acknowledging the problem. On March 4, the 

SEVIS help desk (Level 2) called and asked for more information, which was provided that same day. 

Despite daily phone calls to the SEVIS help desk, this student’s case remains unresolved. The campus director of International Education recently wrote to me: 

‘‘Both the student and the department have a difficult time understanding that 

there is nothing that can be done to correct the issue. I have a difficult time explaining that I am doing everything I possibly can. The student has an amazing job lined 

up at a leading worldwide financial services firm and will lose his job if this problem 

cannot be corrected in time. Will SEVIS be corrected? Will he lose his job? I do not 

know what else I can tell the student or his program directors.’’ Second, contrary to promises, SEVIS does not provide real-time access to data.

SEVIS was designed to link schools, the State Department and the INS in real time. 

This is a reasonable goal for an electronic information system. Unfortunately, 

SEVIS does not yet provide these linkages in a timely fashion. For an extended period in February, no data was transmitted because the INS did not configure the 

system to transmit data automatically and failed to do a manual transmission of 

the data. Some embassies and consulates find that it takes a week or longer for 

them to access data entered into SEVIS. This means that students arrive at an embassy—sometimes after traveling a great distance—only to be told (incorrectly) that 

their data has not been entered into SEVIS and that they may not apply for a visa. 

In fact, their data is in SEVIS—that’s the only way they could receive an I–20 

form—but the SEVIS data has not been forwarded to the consulate. The bottom line 

is the same—without timely consular access to the SEVIS data, a student or scholar 

may not apply for a visa. These delays cause confusion and frustration for embassies, students and schools. 

Third, the INS has not provided adequate training to anyone. Training is critical 

for the successful implementation of any new information technology system, yet the 

INS has provided almost no training to campus officials or even to its own staff. 

One campus official recently visited an INS regional service center and learned that 

the center did not know how to identify SEVIS documents and had not been provided with any training. The campus official was asked to help INS officials understand what they were supposed to do. Regional INS officials have not been adequately trained and therefore often provide different answers to the same questions. 

INS’s SEVIS Help desk can answer technical questions about the SEVIS system 

but is unable to answer regulatory questions. As a result, school officials are left 

to interpret the regulations on their own. Moreover, the help desk is understaffed 

and badly overworked. It typically takes more than four weeks to resolve a problem 

involving a single student. 

Two factors make this situation even more worrisome. First, the volume of information in SEVIS is about to increase dramatically. Between now and August 1, we 

conservatively estimate that an additional one million records—approximately 

250,000 per month—will need to be entered in SEVIS. We do not believe there is 

any chance that SEVIS will be able to accommodate this huge surge of information 

39

and are deeply concerned that it will play havoc with students, colleges, universities, and consular and immigration offices, alike. 

Second, the federal government still has not published the regulations specifying 

how the SEVIS fee will be collected. Under the law, potential international students 

must be registered in SEVIS and they must pay a SEVIS fee. The government has 

not yet begun to collect the fee but there are indications that it plans to do so in 

the very near future. While no regulations have been published, we understand that 

the fee collection process will be totally separate from the process by which students 

are listed in SEVIS. Moreover, fee collection will reportedly rely on traditional mail 

and paper receipts and thus dramatically undermines the promise that SEVIS 

would be an entirely electronic system. 

We have proposed ways to simplify the collection of this fee but federal agencies 

have been unwilling to consider them. We believe that adding a poorly designed 

paper based fee collection process to a poorly functioning SEVIS system at the same 

time that the volume increases sharply is a prescription for disaster. 

I emphasize that the federal government must decide who receives a visa to study 

in the United States. International students and scholars who are of concern to the 

government should not receive a visa. Speaking as a former university president 

and a devout supporter of international education and scientific research, I do not 

want any individuals on a college campus if the government has any reasonable concerns about them. I do not want them in our nation’s classrooms, dormitories, laboratories, or libraries. I do not want them to have access to scientific equipment or 

even to extracurricular activities. 

But the U.S. economy is fueled by innovations in science, engineering and technology. Given the innovation-driven nature of our economy, it is important that the 

U.S. continue to remain the destination of choice for the world’s best students and 

scholars. 

Obviously in the new world in which we live, the government must put new security procedures and policies in place. We support these efforts and we have and will 

continue to work with the government to meet security needs. We understand that 

it will take some time before new policies and procedures begin to operate smoothly. 

At the same time, unfortunately, some of the steps we have taken are counterproductive, unworkable and uncoordinated. The costs associated with these new 

policies are higher than desirable and necessary. We fear that some of the new policies and procedures may well make the nation a less desirable and welcoming place 

for international students and scholars and this will force some students to choose 

to go elsewhere. The loss to our economy and our scientific enterprise will be incalculable and profound. 

We believe that there are several measures that could be taken right now to address a number of the current and future problems with SEVIS:

• The SEVIS fee collection system needs to be rethought to simplify collection 

and to avoid yet another complex system plagued by delay and lost information. The issue is not whether there is a fee or how much the fee will be. The 

issue is whether INS will launch an unworkable system. We believe that 

there are ways to streamline fee collection but these steps would require collaboration between INS and the State Department, collaboration that the 

State Department has been unwilling to provide. Most importantly, this needs 

to be fixed now, before INS launches it.

• The Social Security Administration (SSA) would like to have access to SEVIS 

to verify work authorization before issuing social security numbers. Giving 

them such access would reduce the administrative burden on colleges and 

would improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the SSA. However, INS has 

been unwilling to give SSA access to the system. We strongly recommend that 

the INS give SSA access to SEVIS as soon as possible.

• The State Department should use the SEVIS system to ensure real time access of data. Currently, the State Department runs the SEVIS data through 

their own system instead of using the secured Internet-based interface. This 

often results in the loss of data and undermines the promise of a single computer system used by all parties.

• Campuses—specifically Designated School Officials (DSOs)—should be given 

broader access to SEVIS in order to correct clerical errors in the initial form. 

(For example, a field of study change, correction of gender, name spelling.) 

Minor changes should not require direct involvement by the INS to correct, 

especially since it commonly takes four weeks or more to make the correction.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you and the members of the Subcommittee 

on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims for holding this hearing on the develVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:21 May 06, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00043 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 G:\WORK\IMMIG\040203\86265.000 HJUD1 PsN: 86265
40

opment and implementation of SEVIS and the impact on U.S. campuses. I wish to 

assure you and the members of this Committee our strong commitment to the implementation of SEVIS. But, to do this, we ask that our campuses be given the tools 

and the regulatory guidance to achieve this goal while ensuring that international 

student and scholars are not discouraged from study and research in the U.S. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify this morning. 

On behalf of: 

Alliance for International Educational and Cultural Exchange 

American Association of Community Colleges 

American Association of Higher Education 

American Association of University Professors 

American Council on Education 

American Dental Education Association 

APPA: The Association of Higher Education Facilities Officers 

Association of American Medical Colleges 

Association of American Universities 

Association of Catholic Colleges and Universities 

Association of Community College Trustees 

Association of Governing Boards of Universities and Colleges 

Association of International Education Administrators 

Association of Jesuit Colleges and Universities 

Council for Advancement and Support of Education 

Council for Opportunity in Education 

Council of Graduate Schools 

Council of Independent Colleges 

Educational Testing Service 

Hispanic Association of Colleges and Universities 

NAFSA: Association of International Educators 

National Association for Equal Opportunity in Higher Education 

National Association of College and University Business Officers 

National Association of Independent Colleges and Universities 

National Association of State Universities and Land-Grant Colleges 

National Association of Student Financial Aid Administrators 

National Collegiate Athletic Association 

National Council for Community and Education Partnerships 

National Council of University Research Administrators 

The College Board 

United States Student Association 

University Continuing Education Association

Mr. HOSTETTLER. We will now enter a round of questions, and 

I will tell the Subcommittee that we will probably be able to do a 

second round of questions and we are going to try to hold as close 

to the 5-minute mark as possible. 

Mr. Williams, first of all, as I understand it, all aliens who apply 

for student visas abroad are interviewed in person by a consular 

official, but aliens who change from another non-immigrant status 

to that of an alien student in the United States do not. Why don’t 

aliens who change status to non-immigrant student in the United 

States receive in-person interviews? 

Mr. WILLIAMS. Well, first, let me say that the interview for the 

visa process is handled by the Consular Office abroad. As far as 

changing status from one non-immigrant status to another, it may 

involve a personal interview. It may not be required, but it also can 

be required. Depending on the information at hand, we could require and very often do require that interview. 

Mr. HOSTETTLER. How is that determined? Excuse me. How do 

you determine whether an interview is to be taken? 

Mr. WILLIAMS. That would be determined, of course, on the particular non-immigrant status that was being changed, the information at hand, if the person had been maintaining status, a number 

of key elements that our adjudicators would use to make that decision. 

41

Mr. HOSTETTLER. Is that discretionary on the part of the adjudicators or is that a regulation? Is that a guideline within the Department? 

Mr. WILLIAMS. That is discretionary. 

Mr. HOSTETTLER. Okay. Thank you. 

Mr. Fine, you state in your testimony, ‘‘In the past, alien smuggling rings were operated from within legitimate schools by individuals who were involved with the school’s foreign student programs.’’ Who are these ‘‘individuals involved with the students’ foreign student programs’’ that you are talking about? 

Mr. FINE. We have seen instances where designated schools’ officers, the ones who are involved with the I–20’s and the students, 

have used them to sell visas and have been prosecuted for that. In 

fact, there was one in Atlanta University. Mr. Fischer was probably——

Mr. FISCHER. Morris Brown. 

Mr. FINE [continuing]. Morris Brown University—knows about 

this—was a legitimate school but an illegitimate person there using 

the program to sell I–20’s and visas, and so we have seen instances 

of that, where legitimate schools use it for illegitimate purposes. 

Mr. HOSTETTLER. Thank you. Mr. Fischer, you spoke eloquently 

about the CIPRIS system and you also stated that it was your experience that in October 1999, it was scaled back significantly to, 

I think you said, what, life support? 

Mr. FISCHER. Minimal life support. 

Mr. HOSTETTLER. Minimal life support. Let me ask you a question. Had the system been up and running a little bit better than 

minimal life support in 2000–2001, when the September 11 hijackers entered the U.S., would that system have possibly taken a part 

in preventing those attacks? Could it have? 

Mr. FISCHER. I’ve asked myself that many times. Speculation, obviously. But the way the system was moving and the databases 

that we were ratcheting up and incorporating on a regular basis, 

it would have been much more difficult for any individual who had 

a desire to undermine our country’s national security to perhaps receive an F–1 student visa, or a B–1, in many cases, but an F–1 specifically, because of the database that we were going to establish. 

I’m pretty confident that there would have been some flags, and 

that was the whole key. Flags would have been basically raised, 

and I think then the consular officer or the inspector at the port 

of entry or a defense intelligence analyst or a CIA operative, depending on how we had this established, and FINCEN, because 

you’re talking about a source of funds. You’re talking about where 

is the money coming from? Who is supporting this student? He or 

she has to show a source of funds. They can’t come over here on 

scholarship. So who really owns the bank account? And that’s what 

we were leading to and that was going to be part of our program. 

Mr. HOSTETTLER. And SEVIS today doesn’t have any type of 

FINCEN type of——

Mr. FISCHER. Not to my knowledge, sir. 

Mr. HOSTETTLER. Exactly. Very good. 

And then, finally, Mr. Ward, in your statement, you indicate that 

your organization has proposed ways to simplify the fee that is supposed to be imposed on students to pay for the student tracking 

42

system, but that Federal agencies have been, in your words, unwilling to consider them. What payment methods has your organization proposed to simplify that fee? 

Mr. WARD. Well, all visas now require payment time and we just 

propose that it be added at the time and be collected at the consular office so that—and then they transmit that fee to the new 

INS. Right now, it’ll be a separate paper trail, and for many folks 

who don’t have the appropriate credit, it will be complicated. It will 

be, it seems to me, quite easy for the State Department to collect 

this fee and transmit it to INS. 

Mr. HOSTETTLER. Thank you very much. Why, in your opinion, 

has the Government been unwilling to consider those proposals? 

Mr. WARD. Well, I think part of this is the problem of two agencies. I think you have to ask the Department of State and INS 

about that. I think there’s just some reluctance on the part of Department of State, maybe legitimate reluctance, if I might say so, 

about collecting money on behalf of another agency about which it 

may have had some insecurity. 

Mr. HOSTETTLER. Very good. Thank you. 

The gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman, as I indicated, we are between 

a markup and voting and your Committee. Ms. Lofgren has an 

amendment in that Committee. May I ask her to—if you will allow 

her just to say a word with respect to her opening statement? She 

is about to offer her amendment in the Science Committee. 

Mr. HOSTETTLER. Sure. Yes. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I would ask the Chairman, without objection. 

Mr. HOSTETTLER. There is no objection. 

Ms. LOFGREN. I thank the gentlelady, and Chairman, just very 

quickly, I asked Stanford University, not a university we are in 

doubt of as to their legitimacy, to do a compilation yesterday of the 

problems that they are facing with SEVIS and they gave me an 

about seven-page missive that I would like to make a part of the 

record and give to Mr. Williams so that he might answer all of the 

questions they have. 

But I will just say this. I actually was a fan of CIPRIS, but I 

don’t think that SEVIS is a better system. Whether CIPRIS was 

scalable is a question I had. But this system doesn’t work, and although I am for creating a database that works, that’s accessible 

by consular officers, by—at the border and also by schools and this, 

this is not there yet, and I guess the question I have is how are 

we going to make this system work? 

We have got, right now, the technology is actually defeating the 

law. People who have a right to take certain actions under the law 

can’t do it because the fields will not allow the law to be implemented. The schools—I mean, if a school like Stanford University, 

that’s full of computer scientists and has resources, can’t make this 

work, I wonder about some of the smaller State colleges who have 

less resources and how they are possibly going to make this work. 

So I am eager—both Ms. Jackson Lee and I are on the Homeland 

Security Committee, so we will see you there, as well. The Science 

Committee is looking at it. Everybody is looking at it. But by the 

time I see you next, I am hopeful that I can get answers to these 

questions, and I thank the gentlelady for yielding. 

43

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I want to thank the gentlelady from California. She has a great interest in this area, and I thank the witnesses for their indulgence and recognizing the many talents that 

we think we have. Mr. Chairman, thank you for your indulgence, 

as well. 

Let me direct my questions to the Inspector General, and thank 

you for your presence, along with the other witnesses. You have 

done a thorough analysis of where we are with respect to SEVIS, 

and I think the key bottom line is if we are to make a jump start, 

obviously, we need resources, and you are in the midst, and do you 

think the Bureau, and now the Homeland Security combination, 

meaning that, as you well know, the INS and most of its responsibilities, if not all, are in the Homeland Security Department, concern out of what you have analyzed is whether there are any resources to do this. 

As you answer that question, let me prepare David Ward for if 

he can balance his position on the issue of moving as fast as we’re 

moving, what would be your counter-suggestion? You’ve heard the 

testimony. You know that our intent is to secure the nation, to secure universities, but also to give that wonderful educational opportunity of exchange. 

So, Inspector Fine, you have mentioned that we have inadequate 

training for the implementators. We have inadequate training for 

the universities, and I can account for that. I have the University 

of Houston in my district, Texas Southern University, and any 

number of others. How can we pointedly get right to the problem? 

Mr. FINE. I think we do need more resources, as you’ve pointed 

out. The INS and now the Department of Homeland Security 

agrees with that. I think they need more resources and more training. They need more resources for oversight of the contractors. 

They need more resources to solve these technical problems that 

are emerging that we are all hearing about more and more. And 

they need more resources to use the information. It is one thing to 

have a system, but it is another thing to use that information appropriately, so when they find problems, when they find anomalies, 

when they find potential fraud, they need to refer it to the appropriate investigators to follow through with that. We haven’t seen 

that, and I think a significant issue is the resources devoted to it. 

I also think a significant issue is the continuity of supervision. 

It has been an adjustment. It’s moving from one part of the INS 

to another part, the Department of Homeland Security, and I believe there needs to be accountability. There needs to be one person, one program manager to ensure that all these issues are dealt 

with in a timely and effective way, and I am concerned about what 

is happening as we’re transitioning into the Department of Homeland Security. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. So if there was something that this Committee—this is an authorizing Committee, but if there was something that this Committee would do, it would be to assess your report and listen to the other witnesses, but to provide the additional 

resources because we have some cracks in the armor, if you will, 

in terms of implementation. I’m very concerned about the oversight 

on contractors. I think you recall the glaring embarrassment after 

9/11, egregious embarrassment of sending some documentation to 

44

deceased terrorists, and obviously was a contractor which did an 

enormous mea culpa, it wasn’t me, but it was certainly something 

that would not give us comfort. So the oversight over contractors 

is important to you? 

Mr. FINE. Absolutely. We did that report on it and described the 

failure of the INS to adequately oversee the contractor, who then 

mailed off the change of status notifications to the schools 6 

months after the September 11 attacks, and we did see a problem 

with the supervision of the contractors. We clearly see a problem 

in the supervision of the contractors here. We’re doing the on-site 

reviews. We’ve found contractors whose checklists are incomplete, 

contractors who didn’t go to the school or didn’t complete their onsite review because the school was closed or because the classes 

weren’t in session, and we found when we talked to some of the 

INS adjudicators that the contractors’ reports were not very usable. 

So we do believe there needs to be more adequate oversight over 

the contractors’ work. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Well, just to, if I may—thank you very much, 

Inspector Fine—go to David Ward. Just in that one embarrassing 

situation, it means that the students were actually in school with 

no documentation because it came a long time after they had—obviously, talking about 9/11, there were these individuals being 

trained in the United States with no documentation because it had 

not come officially to the school. 

Mr. FINE. Well, the adjudication had occurred. It was the notification of the school that occurred in a belated fashion. They—— Ms. JACKSON LEE. Correct, and the school is to be notified in a 

more timely fashion. 

Mr. FINE. We said that the adjudication and the notification was 

untimely and significantly flawed. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Very important. Thank you very much. Mr. 

Ward? 

Mr. WARD. I think some of the answers I would give you would 

be related to the organizational culture of the entity, which is, in 

a sense, a security entity on the one hand and yet a service agency 

on the other hand, and the mixing of those two cultures is a real 

problem. And I do think the feedback or communication mechanism 

from the universities who are trying to enter data into SEVIS is 

just very weak. There is no systematic way to deal with that. I 

think there needs to be a much more systematic feedback mechanism. 

Secondly, there has not been, I think, a scan which allows us to 

determine what is an exceptional mistake and what is a systemic 

problem. Some mistake could just be the odd thing that will not be 

repeated and can be fixed. If they’re systemic and cause a backlog, 

they need to be fixed. 

But right now, even though I think toward the end of the old INS 

era, higher education developed—good communication was beginning, I think, to feel it was being heard and, therefore, responsive 

to semantic problems. I think we have not fully reestablished with 

the new organization the kind of feedback mechanism that would 

help us solve these problems. 

Mr. HOSTETTLER. The gentlelady’s time has expired. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I thank the Chairman. 

45

Mr. HOSTETTLER. The chair now recognizes Mrs. Blackburn. 

Mrs. BLACKBURN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I am going to pick up where the gentlelady from Texas left off 

and, Mr. Fine, come right back to you. If the oversight for the INS 

contractors is inadequate and you all seem to sit here and say 

there is a problem, what is the next step for rectifying that and 

what type oversight plan do you have, what type training plan do 

you have? 

Mr. FINE. Well, I think to one extent, that should be a question 

directed to Mr. Williams. I do believe that there is a problem with 

oversight. I believe that when we suggested this, when we recommended to the INS that they spot-check the contractors, they indicated that they didn’t think that was necessary because it was 

a reputable contractor. Even so, I believe that you may trust them, 

but you need to verify it. You need to spot-check what they are 

doing and the INS did not do that. 

With regard to training, I think it’s very important. The training 

is critical, and they have taken some steps to train both their own 

officials and the schools, but I don’t think it’s sufficient. I think it 

needs to happen more. I think there might need to be an online 

training program for schools’ officers. I think there might need to 

be a representation, a certification that the INS employees have received the training and understand what needs to be done. I think 

more effort needs to be done rather than what has been done up 

until now, but I think Mr. Williams perhaps could address that 

issue, as well. 

Mr. WILLIAMS. Thank you. Let me first say we welcome all the 

input. My staff is down here writing copiously, so—we also work 

with everyone at this table on any issues they have that we haven’t 

written down. So we seek your input. 

Let me say we have taken the Inspector’s report very seriously. 

We’ve also reviewed our processes laboriously and we’ve compared 

notes with the schools and the associations. We intend—we intend 

to make all corrections to customer service issues that we can. 

As far as oversight to the contractors, we take that seriously, as 

well. Along with the approved fee, we will be implementing a quality assurance plan. We will be looking at all aspects of the software 

system, the people that are inputting the system, and oversight for 

those compliance officers. 

We do say, and state again publicly, that the SEVIS system is 

important to us. It is important to America. We intend to make the 

system work. We do need a viable software system that tracks and 

collects the information. We also need a strong compliance and investigative enforcement piece to make the system work. 

Mrs. BLACKBURN. Let me ask you something else there. On the 

SEVIS system, now, how much money have you spent in developing that software and developing that system? 

Mr. WILLIAMS. Well, let me answer this way. I’ll get you a much 

more accurate figure, but we are allocated the $38 million and that 

is the budget we are spending on developing that software. 

Mrs. BLACKBURN. Just on software development, not on the implementation and not on training? 

Mr. WILLIAMS. On the entire process. 

Mrs. BLACKBURN. The entire process? 

46

Mr. WILLIAMS. Plus some resources also that aren’t included in 

that $38 million. 

Mrs. BLACKBURN. Thirty-eight million. Now, Mr. Ward said that 

the fee collection system would be adequate for collecting the fees 

if that were followed up on. Are you using the fees you collect as 

any type of offset on the cost of the system? 

Mr. WILLIAMS. I think the question about the fees, yes, we do 

need those fees in order to have the system whole. We need the 

revenue. Congress intended for this to be a fee-based system. Depending upon the fees, we planned it that way. So depending on 

the fee regulation as it comes out, we hope to make the system robust in customer service and just as robust in enforcement. 

Mrs. BLACKBURN. Okay. One more thing for you, and I think this 

would be directed to you, maybe to you, Mr. Ward, but the students 

that were in the country before SEVIS came in, how are you going 

to ensure that they are included and are placed into this system? 

Mr. WILLIAMS. All of our planning includes a phased-in system. 

All new students must begin to be enrolled as of February. All students, those recurring students and those currently enrolled, will 

be in the system by August 3 of this year. 

Mrs. BLACKBURN. Okay, all of them. Okay, and thank you. 

Mr. Fischer, you said that CIPRIS was a promising system, that 

you had excellent feedback from the participants, from the public 

schools, private schools. But yet you said that the former INS Deputy Commissioner halted that pilot system, and I want to know 

why you think it was halted. 

Mr. FISCHER. The program never developed. It basically went on 

suspended animation, as we call it, and to my knowledge, SEVIS 

replaced CIPRIS. CIPRIS is—I retired in the first week in November 1999. I heard after I retired that CIPRIS was basically put on 

hold, or the progress of development was halted. It was allowed to 

continue without any development, enhancements, in the Atlanta 

District, and I believe at perhaps the Texas Service Center, which 

is in Dallas, Texas, but it was not allowed to mature as we hoped 

it would be and integrate the other databases and the relationships 

that we had established with the Department of Education, Department of State, USIA, Department of Treasury, and the like, let 

alone the schools that were partnered with us, and we had over 

400 schools in the Atlanta District at that time. We had identified 

21 schools—Clemson, Duke, Mercer, Shaw, vocational schools that 

had flight training, English as a second language. We went the 

whole gamut. 

I’ve been out of the INS since November 1999, and why it was 

is speculation on my part, I think, Congressman. You’d have to 

probably ask the former Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner 

why they suspended it. But we thought it was an excellent program, excellent. 

Mrs. BLACKBURN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. HOSTETTLER. I thank the gentlelady. 

The chair now recognizes Ms. Sa ́nchez. 

Ms. SA ́ NCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I was not here for the 

majority of the testimony, so I hope you’ll all indulge me with just 

a couple questions that I may have, even though it may be information that you’ve already discussed. 

47

Mr. Williams, I understand that right now, there is a problem 

with the SEVIS system and ‘‘bleeding,’’ which is where information 

about a student, instead of going to School A, winds up at School 

B, and while that certainly is not—that is an issue that particularly concerns me because it raises privacy concern issues that I 

have. And I understand that a contractor has been hired to try to 

address that specific problem. Has any progress been made in that 

problem of bleeding? 

Mr. WILLIAMS. Thank you. Let me say that we’re concerned 

about that issue, as well, data migration. ‘‘Bleeding,’’ of course, 

doesn’t quite capture it. It’s not profusely bleeding, but we have 

problems in that system and any problems there is not acceptable. 

We have hired a very respected contractor. They are on-site now. 

They are going through that system now. They are very confident 

we are going to find the solution to that piece of—glitch in the system, and yes, we intend to have that issue fixed in pretty fast 

order. 

Ms. SA ́ NCHEZ. Do you have a target date for when the majority 

of these problems—— Mr. WILLIAMS. I would, but I will say as soon as possible, you’ll 

have me back up here answering why it didn’t happen. I’m going 

to tell you this. We’re going to work on this project. We’re going 

to keep focusing on it until it’s fixed. It is an issue. It’s a very important issue. We intend to tackle it with whatever means necessary to get it fixed. 

Ms. SA ́ NCHEZ. Okay. And one of sort of the recurring things that 

I’m hearing here is somewhat of a lack of resources and a lack of 

oversight and enforcement. Is there an oversight or an enforcement 

mechanism for the work that this contractor is doing on this specific problem? 

Mr. WILLIAMS. We’re working alongside of them with our technicians. We have our very own agency technicians, as well, that are 

partnering with them to make sure that we’re aggressively working 

that problem, and I feel confident that we will overcome that issue. 

Ms. SA ́ NCHEZ. Okay. Thank you very much. 

Inspector Fine, I understand that INS adjudicators have not been 

properly trained for performing school adjudications, and I’m wondering if there are any plans to incorporate some suggestions in 

terms of how we can train these adjudicators to make adjudications. 

Mr. FINE. We have made suggestions to the INS that adjudicators need more training. They need not only technical training on 

what the checklists are, but what to do with them and what to look 

for, how to look for fraud, what kind of indicators they should be 

seeking to determine whether a school is not bona fide or whether 

there are problems with the school. So I do believe there needs to 

be more training. There has been some training by the INS, but 

when we went back and talked to the adjudicators, some of them 

found it difficult to understand and not particularly useful, so I 

think there needs to be more emphasis placed on that. 

Ms. SA ́ NCHEZ. Thank you. Mr. Fischer, I understand that you 

made a recommendation to Congress that we consider adding penalties for noncompliance with SEVIS. Given the problems that INS 

has had in overseeing the current system, do you think that it’s 

48

particularly realistic that INS would be able to impose those penalties evenly and appropriately and in a timely manner? 

Mr. FISCHER. I think so. I think they should be on the books, at 

least, because there really is no penalty in many cases for violators 

of the program. 

I’d like to even go back if I may, please, to the contractor issue. 

I find it, with my 32 years of former Government experience, when 

I’ve dealt with contractors, whether they be on computer systems, 

whether they be with engineering issues, with establishment of offices or whatever, that it’s difficult to pin them down, the accountability and responsibility. You can cancel a contract, but you can’t 

really direct that person. Our service centers probably have 90 percent of their workforce as contractors. They open the mail. They 

handle the checks, sensitive documents, things like that. 

Here, we have a very, very sensitive program that’s going to be 

with us in a better fashion, hopefully, down the road. I don’t know 

if I would want to trust investigating schools or establishing compliance guidelines and doing important things like that to somebody who’s not even a Federal employee and perhaps never even 

had a records check done on them. I have difficulty with that—or 

could quit at a moment’s notice and be replaced by somebody else. 

And the adjudicator is the one who is gathering that information, 

supposed to be getting it in 30 days. Now, it is over 3 months. I 

have trouble with that. And the money issue, I mean, what price 

do you pay for quality? 

But if I may go back to your original question, I still think, yes, 

Congress should consider having some sort of penalty assigned to 

the individuals who are overseeing programs, training, whatever 

the case may be, if there are violations. Now, the Inspector General 

mentioned the case at Morris Brown, where you had a DSO, a Designated School Official, who was selling I–20’s and sold numerous 

I–20’s for tens of thousands of dollars to individuals who were 

never enrolled in school. Now, I’m not saying that the school should 

be penalized. I think the individual should be. I think that person 

should be accountable. I suspect the U.S. Attorney, I know, is taking the case because the INS investigations did an excellent job in 

the Atlanta District of ferreting this out. 

But this is the same type of thing that needs to be done with a 

system, and I—what Dr. Ward said, I agree 100 percent. It needs 

to be systematic, but it needs to be user friendly but still help that 

DSO, help that inspector, help that consular officer. And there’s no 

reason in 2003 that we can’t develop something, and $37 million, 

Congresswoman, that is a lot of money. 

Ms. SA ́ NCHEZ. I appreciate your comments. I share many of your 

comments, and I thank you for your thoughtful answer and I’d 

yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. HOSTETTLER. I thank the gentlelady. 

I would like to now enter into a second round of questioning and 

kind of from the gentlelady’s first question with regard to the issue 

of ‘‘bleeding,’’ Mr. Williams, in your comments, you refer to the 

issue of ‘‘bleeding,’’ and that is where the unintentional merging of 

data from one school to another which results in the printing of legitimate student information at the wrong institution. You refer to 

it as an issue of privacy and not accuracy. 

49

Dr. Ward describes in his statement a bleeding incident in which 

confidential SEVIS forms printed by the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, 

a secure Government installation, were printed at a school in San 

Francisco. Would you not also say that, from time to time, this may 

be an issue of national security as well as privacy? 

Mr. WILLIAMS. I think any system flaw in SEVIS is of concern 

and it should be repaired. We are concentrating on that. We are 

going to fix it. Any deviation from a planned process is a concern. 

Mr. HOSTETTLER. Thank you. Mr. Fischer, if I can return to you, 

in your statement, you say that the visa that was issued under the 

CIPRIS system was a ‘‘credit card-sized combination visa/identity 

card.’’ It included biometric features like a fingerprint and a photograph. What were the advantages of such a card from a law enforcement viewpoint? 

Mr. FISCHER. Right now, Mr. Chairman, I–20’s—when a student 

comes over—when a school—when a student is accepted academically, that school will generate an I–20. That I–20 is sent to the 

student. The student takes that I–20 into the embassy or to the 

post. The post will review it, hopefully run through the system. If 

everything’s okay, post will issue in the passport a non-immigrant 

visa F–1. When that student comes here to the States, he or she 

will fill out a white I–94, arrival/departure card, and when they’re 

admitted, on that card will normally be D/S, which is duration of 

status, no date to leave the country. They’re here as long as they’re 

fully matriculated in a school that’s approved. They have a paper 

I–20 with them with a bar code. 

Right now, some of the ports can’t even read the bar code. It’s 

a difficult program. It’s a paper program. When you have paper, 

you run the risk of manipulation, you run the risk of problems, 

whatever the case may be. 

We envisioned and we factored into the CIPRIS program a biometric—sort of like a credit card. It would have on the front your 

fingerprint, your photo. On the back would be data, sort of like the 

I–551, the ‘‘green card,’’ where there is material in there, whether 

it be your mother’s first name, your father’s first name, your place 

of birth, your date of birth, that somebody can basically query that 

person to see if it’s legitimate. 

And through that card, basically all the information, whether it 

be the issuance of employment authorization documents, whether 

it be the ability to travel back home—we look at it as a feature for 

the student to use and for the schools to get out of this paper trail 

business that leads to a lot of problems. 

For some reason that—and the card would be secure, obvious, 

which is the name of the game. It would be secure, with good data 

built into it that the school and the student and the DCIS and 

BICE and Homeland Security and the FBI and State could read, 

and that’s the advantages that we saw. It never went beyond, I 

guess, October 1999, unfortunately. 

Mr. HOSTETTLER. Mr. Williams, is there anything in law that 

precludes SEVIS from including biometric information? 

Mr. WILLIAMS. Mr. Chairman, we are considering biometrics, all 

kinds of different things in the future. We know to put a system 

like that in place in a quick time frame would have been next to 

impossible. 

50

I do add, though, that the SEVIS system is not taken as a single 

component of the law enforcement function. We have access to the 

State Department, the POE data, the non-immigrant information, 

the visa application, people that are enrolled in our new NSEERS 

program have a biometric and a digital photograph. 

I also comment at the Service Center, that one component that 

was asked earlier, we have very professional intel research specialists backed up by now a dedicated crew of investigators to look over 

those applications. 

So, as you mentioned, our new appointed Assistant Secretary, 

Michael Garcia, is focused on this as a law enforcement component, 

as well. We are continuing to focus on making those kind of improvements in the future, as well. 

But as I mentioned in my opening testimony, this mosaic of 

homeland security does have connectivity. I know you’re familiar 

with the data share capabilities, as well. 

Mr. HOSTETTLER. And just in closing, I understand the point 

about the timeliness for the system to be put in place, but there 

are a lot of us that are very interested in the usage of biometrics 

with regard to immigrants and non-immigrants, the folks that are 

visiting this country, and so we would like to continue work with 

you on improving SEVIS to the point where some of the things that 

worked with CIPRIS can be moved over into SEVIS. 

Mr. WILLIAMS. We look forward to that, as well. 

Mr. HOSTETTLER. At this point, Ms. Sa ́nchez, do you have any 

other questions? 

Ms. SA ́ NCHEZ. No further questions, thank you. 

Mr. HOSTETTLER. Ms. Blackburn, any—— Mrs. BLACKBURN. Yes, I do. I have just a couple. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Mr. Fischer, back to you and to the discussion that we were having about the former INS Deputy Commissioner halting the 

CIPRIS system, I guess it’s a little perplexing to me that a system 

that seemed to carry information that would be deemed to be superior to the system that replaced it, why that decision was made. 

So what I want to ask is, what did you do with—or what was 

done with that data and that information from the CIPRIS system? 

Was that used as a building block from the SEVIS system, or 

SEVIS or however this is properly pronounced? Is this integrated 

into the other systems that track those that have visas and are in 

our country? And the final question would be, how much money 

was spent on that CIPRIS system before it was pitched, thrown 

out? 

Mr. FISCHER. I don’t know the amount of money. It was——

Mrs. BLACKBURN. Could you find that for us, or could someone? 

Mr. FISCHER. I don’t know the amount, and I don’t think it was 

substantial. It was more labor intensive because of the partnership 

that we generated with the schools and universities and the different departments. 

When the program was suspended, I retired. I don’t know specifically what was carried over. The program up to that time, Congresswoman, that was developed was allowed to continue in the Atlanta District until SEVIS went online. So certain aspects, obviously, I would think—and that’s speculation on my part—were carVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:21 May 06, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00054 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 G:\WORK\IMMIG\040203\86265.000 HJUD1 PsN: 86265
51

ried over. But I really don’t have the answer to that because I’ve 

been out of that Federal loop for three-and-a-half years. I apologize. 

Mrs. BLACKBURN. A problem. Mr. Williams, did you have something to add? 

Mr. WILLIAMS. Yes. I would just add that the data that was in 

CIPRIS is, in fact, in SEVIS. 

Mrs. BLACKBURN. It is? Okay. 

Mr. WILLIAMS. I will say, too, that, just for clarification purposes, 

I wasn’t around then. I was working on the other coast. But it’s my 

information that it was, indeed a pilot program. It was a wideparametered piloted program to test the ability and scalability of 

a large amount of data and how could you take this large amount 

of data which was—and then apply it to 1.5 million students. 

It did form the basis of our thinking when we began the SEVIS 

project now, and with consultation with the educational associations and the schools, decisions had to be made on what you could 

put out, what was available. So the CIPRIS system did, in fact, 

provide the basis for our thinking and what we are doing now with 

SEVIS. 

Mrs. BLACKBURN. Excellent. And do you have an idea of what the 

cost was on that pilot program? 

Mr. WILLIAMS. I believe the cost was minimal. I would venture 

a guess, but I think it better that I provide you with that, so if you 

wouldn’t mind, after the—— Mrs. BLACKBURN. That would be wonderful. Thank you. 

And then finishing that, the system, the SEVIS system that is 

in place, is that integrated with other systems or do you maintain 

it separate and secure or what is your data tracking and transfer? 

Mr. WILLIAMS. It is available to different—it’s one of the data 

share processes. The State Department has that, has accessibility 

to that system. Our Port-of-Entry Inspectors have accessibility to 

that system. And it’s not necessarily a stand-alone system when it 

comes to law enforcement. It provides us with the best, the freshest 

locating information if it’s necessary for us to go after a person that 

did violate their status. That’s why it’s so important that it remain 

current. 

Mrs. BLACKBURN. Excellent. Thank you very much. I appreciate 

that. 

Mr. HOSTETTLER. If the gentlelady will yield, I’d like to ask one 

additional question. 

Mrs. BLACKBURN. I’ll yield. 

Mr. HOSTETTLER. Mr. Williams, when will the fee regulation 

come out with regard to this system? 

Mr. WILLIAMS. I hope very soon. 

Mr. HOSTETTLER. Very good. And are there plans to hire more investigators with that fee? 

Mr. WILLIAMS. Depending on the outcome of the fee, we will 

make resource decisions. Again, I would just reemphasize that to 

make this system whole, there has to be a law enforcement component. The system has to have compliance and has to have consequences. 

Mr. HOSTETTLER. I want to thank the panel for being here today. 

I will just say in closing, Mr. Williams, you’ve heard a lot about the 

issues with the SEVIS system. I want you to know that this ComVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:21 May 06, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00055 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 G:\WORK\IMMIG\040203\86265.000 HJUD1 PsN: 86265
52

mittee is dedicated, as Ms. Jackson Lee pointed out, to hearing 

about and understanding the resources necessary to make SEVIS 

work for everyone, from the foreign students to the user schools as 

well as our law enforcement personnel. We will hold, or this Committee will hold ICE responsible for the proper administration of 

this program and its effectiveness and efficiency, and so knowing 

that, we want you to understand that we want to know about the 

resources you need to make it effective and efficient. This is a significant issue. This country has been touched significantly on September 11 by issues related to tracking students, non-immigrant 

aliens who come in to study in this country, and this Committee 

will be following up on this. 

I want to likewise thank all of you gentlemen for appearing 

today, for testifying before the Subcommittee. 

I just want to tell the Subcommittee that the record will remain 

open for 7 days for any additional materials that you’d like to have 

added. 

This Subcommittee’s business is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:22 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(53)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE SHEILA JACKSON LEE, A REPRESENTATIVE

IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS

We need to keep track of foreign students while they are in this country, but I 

want to emphasize that the primary reason for doing this is to enforce our immigration laws, not to search for terrorists. Despite news reports to the contrary, only one 

of the 9/11 terrorists entered the country on a student visa. Eighteen entered on 

B visas, either as tourists or as businessmen. After arrival in the United States, two 

of the terrorists, Mohammed Atta and Marwan Al Shehhi, applied for a change to 

student status. They were planning to attend flight school and, despite not technically needing to be in M–1 vocational student status to do so, they ostensibly 

wanted to comply with any regulations that were arguably applicable to avoid attention. 

Nevertheless, a successfully implemented SEVIS program is needed to increase 

the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s ability to track and monitor 

foreign students and exchange visitors in order to ensure that they arrive in the 

United States, show up and register at the school or exchange visitor program they 

are scheduled to attend, and properly maintain their status during their stay in our 

country. SEVIS can make it easier for us to identify those who may come to America 

for the wrong reason, while extending our welcome to those seeking the knowledge 

that the schools of this country have to offer. But, it must be done in such a way 

as to maximize the effectiveness of our increasingly limited national resources. 

International students and exchange visitor programs are enormously beneficial 

to the United States. They dramatically increases the knowledge and skills of our 

workforce. They boost worldwide appreciation for democracy and market-based economics and give future world leaders first-hand exposure to America and Americans. They bring greater international understanding to the world at a time of great 

turmoil. 

Many world leaders have attended American universities, including United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan, Jordan’s King Abdullah II, and Mexican President Vicente Fox. Each year, thousands of international students return to their 

homelands as proponents of American values, democracy, and the free market. 

Without these unofficial ambassadors for the American way, our country’s image is 

more susceptible to the spread of misinformation and propaganda by those who 

would do us harm. Curtailing international exchanges would only serve to deprive 

our nation of one of its best tools for extending American influence in the world. 

The task of entering the data for the SEVIS system must be performed by the 

schools. The schools will feel the effect of any push to implement the SEVIS system 

at a more rapid pace. It is a gigantic task. Moreover, the delays and technical problems with the system have exacerbated this problem. I have heard of significant 

computer problems such as that SEVIS sometimes will inexplicably, and apparently 

randomly, reset or change data. For example, the status of full-time enrolled students have been changed from ‘‘active’’ to ‘‘terminated.’’ The computer software must 

be bug free and reliable for the SEVIS system to work properly. 

Mr. Chairman, I hope that we can continue to work cooperatively and in the true 

spirit of bipartisanship to ensure the successfully implementation of the SEVIS system. I believe that we can create an effective system that will eliminate many of 

the risks our nation is concerned about, without discouraging the talented men and 

women from different countries from coming to the United States to study and to 

exchange creative thought and ideas. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

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