U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

37–142 PDF WASHINGTON : 2019

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THE AUTHORIZATIONS FOR 

THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE: 

ADMINISTRATION PERSPECTIVE 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

OCTOBER 30, 2017 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: 

http://www.govinfo.gov 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

BOB CORKER, Tennessee, Chairman

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

CORY GARDNER, Colorado 

TODD, YOUNG, Indiana 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

ROB PORTMAN, Ohio 

RAND PAUL, Kentucky 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut 

TIM KAINE, Virginia 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon 

CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey 

TODD WOMACK, Staff Director

JESSICA LEWIS, Democratic Staff Director

JOHN DUTTON, Chief Clerk

(II)

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Corker, Hon. Bob, U.S. Senator from Tennessee .................................................. 1 

Cardin, Hon. Benjamin L., U.S. Senator from Maryland ..................................... 3 

Tillerson, Hon. Rex, Secretary of State, U.S. Department of State, Washington DC .............................................................................................................. 6 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 8 

Mattis, Hon. James, Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, DC ............................................................................................................. 9 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Statement for the Record Submitted by HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST ........................... 55 

Responses to Questions for Secretary Tillerson 

Questions from Senator Corker ....................................................................... 58 

Questions from Senator Cardin ....................................................................... 60 

Questions from Senator Young ........................................................................ 61 

Questions from Senator Menendez ................................................................. 61 

Questions from Senator Portman .................................................................... 66 

Questions from Senator Shaheen .................................................................... 67 

Questions from Senator Kaine ........................................................................ 68 

Responses to Questions for Secretary Mattis 

Questions from Senator Corker ....................................................................... 69 

Questions from Senator Cardin ....................................................................... 71 

Questions from Senator Flake ......................................................................... 71 

Questions from Senator Menendez ................................................................. 72 

Questions from Senator Young ........................................................................ 75 

Questions from Senator Shaheen .................................................................... 76 

Questions from Senator Isakson ..................................................................... 76 

Questions from Senator Kaine ........................................................................ 77 

Questions from Senator Portman .................................................................... 78 

CIA Memorandum for the Director: Use of Nuclear Weapons in the Vietnam 

War—18 March 1966 ........................................................................................... 81 

Letter Expressing the Trump Administration’s Opposition to S.J. Res. 41 

and S.J. Res. 43 .................................................................................................... 93 

Navy Contract Solicitation for Personnel Support, Part 1 ................................... 95 

Navy Contract Solicitation for Personnel Support, Part 2 ................................... 97 

(III)

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

(1) 

THE AUTHORIZATIONS FOR 

THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE: 

ADMINISTRATION PERSPECTIVE 

MONDAY, OCTOBER 30, 2017 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 5:00 p.m., in Room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Bob Corker, chairman of the committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Corker [presiding], Risch, Rubio, Johnson, 

Flake, Gardner, Young, Barrasso, Isakson, Portman, Paul, Cardin, 

Shaheen, Coons, Udall, Murphy, Kaine, Markey, Merkley, and 

Booker. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BOB CORKER, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE 

The CHAIRMAN. The Foreign Relations committee will come to 

order, and I want to deal with two housekeeping issues, if I could. 

I know we have a number of people here in the audience, some of 

whom sometimes like to express themselves. We thank you for 

being here. 

In the past when there have been interruptions, on occasion I 

have been able to have people un-arrested, but we have stopped 

that. So, please, do not do anything that causes you to have to be 

escorted out of the room because then the process continues with— 

being arrested is fairly unpleasant, and I would hate to see you go 

through that process. 

Secondly, we have a vote. We actually have two votes today, and 

so, which is unfortunate. What we have talked before about doing 

is adjourning the hearing at about seven minutes to six, everybody 

rushing down and actually voting on the tail end of the first vote, 

the beginning of the second vote. There will be no speaking before 

the second vote, and then if we could hustle back and keep going. 

I know General Mattis—Secretary—excuse me—Mattis has a meeting he would like to attend. I know others want to complete our 

work in an appropriate way. 

So, with that, I would like to thank Secretary Tillerson and Secretary Mattis for being with us today to share the administration’s 

perspective on the Authorizations for the Use of Military Force. We 

are grateful to both of you for your service to our country and your 

willingness to come here again as we continue this critical discussion on behalf of the American people. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

2 

Oversight and debate of the 2001 AUMF is something in which 

this committee has been engaged for as long as I have helped lead 

it, beginning as ranking member in 2013. At that time, many of us 

from both parties sought to craft a revised authority to enable the 

President to address the threats we face from terrorism while ensuring an appropriate role for Congress. 

When President Obama submitted an ISIS AUMF to Congress in 

February of 2015, our committee again held a hearing and debated 

the issue, but there was really no effort on the part of the White 

House to actually enact a new authorization. This year, we have 

already held two full committee hearings on this important topic, 

a public hearing in June with private witnesses and a classified 

briefing with Secretaries Tillerson and Mattis in August, and we 

thank you for that. We have been working to schedule this public 

hearing since that time. 

Numbers of members both on and off this committee have raised 

questions about the executive’s authorities with respect to war 

making, the use of nuclear weapons—the use of nuclear weapons, 

and, from a diplomatic perspective, entering into and terminating 

agreements with other countries. As I have mentioned publicly, 

this is the beginning of a series of hearings where our committee 

will also examine those issues. But today it is my hope we will remain focused on the topic at hand, the 2001 AUMF and the 2002 

AUMF for Iraq. 

The President’s de facto ability to initiate conflict has grown in 

an age of advanced technology, including the use of unmanned 

drones and war from a distance where large numbers of boots on 

the ground are not necessary to conduct a very significant military 

engagement. Examples of significant military actions by recent 

presidents relying solely on Article II of the Constitution include 

air strikes in Kosovo, regime change in Libya, and the April missile 

strike against the Assad regime in Syria. 

In his last War Powers Resolution letter to Congress, the President identified the following 19 countries where U.S. military personnel were deployed and equipped for combat: Afghanistan, Iraq, 

Syria, Yemen, Somalia, Libya, Kenya, Niger, Cameroon, Uganda, 

South Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Central Africa—African Republic, Djibouti, Jordan, Turkey, Egypt, Cuba, and Kosovo. 

As this month’s deadly attack in Niger proved, those forces can find 

themselves in combat at any moment. 

As our men and women in uniform continue to meet threats 

around the world, I hope that our witnesses can help us examine 

what the appropriate oversight role for Congress is, and how we 

can work together to ensure that our Nation’s political leadership 

is meeting the responsibility to decide when and where our country 

uses military force. 

As I stated previously, in this hearing we will focus primarily on 

the two current Authorizations for the Use of Military Force. Unfortunately, the use of lethal force against ISIS, al-Qaeda, and 

other terrorist groups will remain necessary for the foreseeable future to prevent attacks against Americans and our allies. 

The President, just like President Obama, believes he has the 

legal authority he needs under the 2001 AUMF to fight ISIS, alQaeda, and other terrorist groups, and I agree. I agreed with the 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

3 

Obama administration, and I agree with this administration that 

they currently have that authority. 

It is clear that Congress is united in the strong support of the 

fight against al-Qaeda, the Taliban, ISIS, and other terrorist 

groups, and I believe Congress as a whole would agree that the 

President should continue to act against these threats. Congress 

has regularly notified—been notified of troop deployments around 

the world, including the build-up in Niger, and has responded consistently by funding the Department of Defense and its operations 

against ISIS and terrorists around the world. At the same time, I 

also believe we should update the AUMF to reflect the current conflict and reassert Congress’ constitutional role, but we cannot risk 

undermining the legal foundation for this critical fight. 

We must also be mindful that moving an AUMF without significant bipartisan support could send the wrong message to our allies 

and our adversaries that we are not united and committed to victory. So far, Congress has been unable to bridge the gap between 

those who see a new AUMF as primarily an opportunity to limit 

the President and those who believe constraining the Commanderin-Chief in wartime is unwise. And unfortunately, the inability to 

reconcile this divide without threatening the existing authorization 

has allowed the status quo to prevail. 

This committee has always recognized that we have a special responsibility to try to speak with one voice on foreign policy. We 

have a great tradition of working together in a bipartisan way to 

advance the national interests. It is my hope that we will be able 

to do the same on this issue. I thank both of our distinguished witnesses and the members of this committee for the seriousness with 

which they approach the topic before us today. And I hope that together we can have a productive discussion about a way forward. 

Our distinguished ranking member, Senator Cardin. 

STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM MARYLAND 

Senator CARDIN. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join you in 

welcoming our two witnesses, and join you in our strong desire for 

this committee to operate in a nonpartisan way for the betterment 

of our national security, and I thank you for conducting this hearing. This is one of the most important topics the United States Senate and this committee could ever consider: under what circumstances and legal authority should the United States send men 

and women into war. 

Mr. Chairman, I am pleased that you are reasserting this committee’s prerogatives on this issue. I hope that soon we will also 

be considering the repeal of the existing overextended Authorizations for the Use of Military Force from 9/11 and the Iraq War, and 

a new AUMF tailored to the current terrorist threats. 

America faces unprecedented crises around the world, from ISIS 

in multiple countries, and al-Qaeda affiliates continuing to plot attacks against the United States, to a worsening nuclear crisis with 

North Korea, and a newly-manufactured crisis with Iran. I am 

deeply concerned about President Trump’s inclination to go to war 

rather than find diplomatic solutions to these crises. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

4 

It seems we have U.S. troops deployed almost everywhere in the 

world. In addition to significant deployments in Iraq, Afghanistan, 

and Syria, and major deployments in South Korea, Japan, and Europe, U.S. forces are and have been engaged in counterterrorism 

operations in Yemen, Somalia, Ethiopia, Libya, and Chad, with extensive advice, train, and capacity-building efforts in many more. 

Two weeks ago, we learned that four service members were 

killed in Niger in circumstances that are still unclear, their mission 

and the mission of what many may be as many as 800 U.S. troops 

in Niger. What is also unclear, the loss of these four courageous 

soldiers—Sergeant La David Johnson, Staff Sergeant Dustin M. 

Wright, Staff Sergeant Bryan C. Black, and Staff Sergeant Jeremy 

W. Johnson—shows the danger faced by men and women who are 

deployed around the world, whether they are deployed with the expectation of combat or not. 

Our hearts are with the families of these soldiers. They served 

their country courageously, and their families deserve the respect 

and appreciation that all men and women should receive after losing a loved one. 

During this hearing, I am going to be asking the witnesses some 

specific questions about the Niger incident, the mission these soldiers were performing, and the legal authorities for their deployment. That is our responsibility, this committee’s responsibility. If 

our witnesses are unable to answer these in open hearings, then 

I am going to ask that you return to provide this committee a classified hearing. I think that we and the American people are now 

asking if the United States is fighting and dying in Niger, where 

else are U.S. forces put in harm’s way. 

Some information has been provided to the Congress on this 

issue, including the June 27 notice to Congress that the chairman 

referred to. But there has been inadequate explanation of what activities are actually being done and under what legal authority. 

That is this committee’s responsibility to deal with the authorization. Protecting the American people from terrorism extending from 

threats around the world is certainly important. But I think there 

needs to be more public discussion and light on these activities because I do not think the American people want the United States 

conducting a global endless shadow war under the radar, covert, 

and beyond scrutiny. 

There have been developments since this committee’s last conversation on this topic with the Secretaries in August. First, ISIS 

control of contiguous territories in Iraq and Syria have been broken 

with hundreds of ISIS fighters killed and hundreds more surrendering. Second, the crisis with North Korea has gotten worse with 

North Korea testing both the ICBM with the ability to reach the 

United States and a thermonuclear device amid a bitter war of 

words and threats between President Trump and Kim Jong-un. 

Third, President Trump has even threatened the use of military options in response to the crisis in Venezuela. 

And finally, I am aware that we cannot discuss all the aspects 

of the use of the Authorization for Military Force in this meeting. 

The Foreign Relations Committee has jurisdiction over the AUMF 

and security assistance in the Senate, and an obligation to provide 

oversight as to how they can be used. Secretary Mattis and SecFOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

5 

retary Tillerson, I will be asking you to commit to come up shortly 

to this committee and brief us in a classified setting on the use of 

the 2001 AUMF, including for counterterrorism purposes. 

As I said at our hearing in June, the 9/11 and Iraq AUMF have 

now become mere authorities of convenience for presidents to conduct military activities anywhere in the world. They should not be 

used as the legal justification for the administration’s military activities around the world. I am not convinced that the evolving 

threat of ISIL to the United States and to our friends and allies 

necessitates committing more of our brave men and women to 

ground combat operations, and certainly not under the rubric of the 

9/11 AUMF against al-Qaeda for their attacks in Washington and 

New York. 

I am going to repeat one more time for the record what that says. 

The 2001 AUMF said the President is ‘‘authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, 

or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided 

the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11th, 2011, or 

harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by 

such nations, organizations, and purposes.’’ As one who voted for 

that AUMF when I was in Congress in 2001, I never intended, and 

I think all of us never intended, it would still be used today to justify the use of military force against ISIS. 

Just one last point, if I might, Mr. Chairman, and that is I think 

it is very clear that under this authorization, there is no authorization for the use of military force against North Korea, unless there 

is an—absent an imminent attack upon the United States or upon 

forces or allies in this region. And I would be interested in hearing 

the Secretaries’ belief as to what authorizations exist today for 

military operations against North Korea. 

Finally, it is important for Congress to better exercise its oversight over the use of force now. The United States has relied for 

too long on military force as the first response to the problems of 

terrorism, insurgency, and instability abroad. In this administration, one wonders—one wonders whether it has become the first 

and only response. It has proposed a dramatic increase in the defense budget, while the foreign affairs’ budget has been slashed by 

30 percent. Very soon, practically the only tools left in the U.S. foreign toolbox will be the massive hammer applied everywhere for 

lack of better options. We need to both authorize and to set limits 

on the use of that hammer. In so doing, perhaps the administration 

will rediscover the necessity and the value of diplomacy, development, and support for human rights as the means to build a safer 

world for everyone, especially the United States. 

I know that our two witnesses share the commitment to our national security and the importance of diplomacy and the use of 

military, and I look forward to their testimony. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Cardin. We thank both of 

you for being here today. You have tremendous respect by almost 

every member of this committee. We support your efforts around 

the world. And if you could limit your comments to about 5 minutes or so, you are going to have a lot of questions I know. Any 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

6 

written materials that you would like to have entered into the 

record will be done without objection. 

And I guess we will start with you, Secretary Tillerson. Again, 

we thank you for your extraordinary efforts on behalf of our country. 

STATEMENT OF HON. REX TILLERSON, SECRETARY OF STATE, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Secretary TILLERSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman 

Corker, Ranking Member Cardin, and distinguished members, I appreciate the opportunity to speak to you today. I know the Senate’s 

desire to understand the United States’ legal basis for military action is grounded in your constitutional role related to foreign policy 

and national security matters. I understand your sense of obligation to the American people well in this regard. 

In the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Force, or AUMF, Congress authorized the President to ‘‘to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11th, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons.’’ Congress granted the President this statutory authority ‘‘in order to prevent any future acts of international 

terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations, 

or persons.’’ 

The 2001 AUMF provides statutory authority for ongoing U.S. 

military operations against al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated 

forces, including against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, or 

ISIS. The administration relies on the 2001 AUMF as a domestic 

legal authority for our own military actions against these entities, 

as well as the military actions we take in conjunction with our 

partners in the coalition to defeat ISIS. The 2001 AUMF provides 

a domestic legal basis for our detention operations at Guantanamo 

Bay where the United States currently detains members of alQaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces. 

The 2001 AUMF also authorizes the use of necessary and appropriate force to defend U.S., coalition, and partner forces engaged in 

the campaign to defeat ISIS in Iraq and Syria. In Syria, the efforts 

of the U.S.-led coalition are aimed at the defeat of ISIS. The United 

States does not seek to fight the Syrian government or pro-Syrian 

government forces. However, the United States will not hesitate to 

use necessary and proportionate force to defend U.S., coalition, or 

partner forces engaged in the campaign against ISIS. The President’s authority to use force against ISIS is further reinforced by 

the Authorization for Use of Force against Iraq, or, in more plain 

terms, the 2002 AUMF. 

In addition to authorities granted to the President by statute, the 

President has the power under Article II of the Constitution to use 

military force in certain circumstances to advance important U.S. 

national interests, including to defend the United States against 

terrorist attacks. As an example, President Reagan relied on his 

authority as Commander-in-Chief in 1986 when he ordered airstrikes against terrorist facilities and military installations in 

Libya following a terrorist attack by Libya in West Berlin, which 

killed and wounded both civilians and U.S. military personnel. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

7 

The United States has the legal authority to prosecute campaigns against the Taliban, al-Qaeda, and associated forces, including ISIS, and is not currently seeking any new or additional congressional authorization for the use of force. The 2001 AUMF remains a cornerstone for ongoing U.S. military operations and continues to provide legal authority relied upon to defeat this threat. 

However, should Congress decide to write a new AUMF legislation, 

I submit to you several recommendations that the administration 

would consider necessary to a new AUMF. 

First, a new AUMF authorities must be in place prior to or simultaneous with the repeal of old ones. Failure to do so could 

cause operational paralysis and confusion in our military operations. Diplomatically speaking, it could cause our allies in the 

global coalition to question our commitment to defeating ISIS. And 

a potential repeal of the 2001 AUMF without an immediate and 

appropriate replacement could raise questions about the domestic 

legal basis for the United States’ full range of military activities 

against the Taliban, al-Qaeda, and associated forces, including 

against ISIS, as well as our detention operations at Guantanamo 

Bay. 

Second, any new authorization should not be time constrained. 

Legislation which would arbitrarily terminate the authorization to 

use force would be inconsistent with a conditions-based approach 

and could unintentionally embolden our enemies with the goal of 

outlasting us. Any oversight mechanism in a new AUMF also 

would have to allow the United States the freedom to quickly move 

against our enemies without being constrained by a feedback loop. 

Third, a new AUMF must not be geographically restricted. As is 

the case under the AUMF, the administration would need to retain 

the statutory authority to use military force against an enemy that 

does not respect or limit itself based on geographic boundaries. As 

ISIS’ fraudulent caliphate in Iraq and Syria has crumbled, it has 

tried to gain footholds in new locations. As was discussed with the 

Senate during a closed defeat ISIS briefing in July, the United 

States has a limited military presence in the Lake Chad Basin to 

support partners, including France, in their counterterrorism operations in the region. This information is also being conveyed to you 

in multiple periodic reports submitted to Congress consistent with 

the War Power Resolution. 

The collapse of ISIS’ so-called caliphate in Iraq and Syria means 

it will attempt to burrow into new countries and find new safe havens. Our legal authorities for heading off a transnational threat 

like ISIS cannot be constrained by geographic boundaries. Otherwise, ISIS may reestablish itself and gain strength in vulnerable 

spaces. 

The United States must retain the proper legal authorities to ensure that nothing restricts or delays our ability to respond effectively and rapidly to terrorist threats to the United States. Secretary Mattis and I, along with the rest of the administration, are 

completely aligned on this issue. We fully recognize the need for 

transparency with you as we respond to what will be a dynamic regional and global issue. We will continue to regularly update Congress and to make sure you and the American people understand 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

8 

our foreign policy goals, military operations, and national security 

objectives. 

I thank the committee for supporting our efforts and look forward to your questions. 

[Secretary Tillerson’s prepared statement follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SECRETARY OF STATE REX TILLERSON

Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Cardin, and distinguished members, I appreciate the opportunity to speak to you today. I know the Senate’s desire to understand the United States’ legal basis for military action is grounded in your constitutional role related to foreign policy and national security matters. I understand your 

sense of obligation to the American people well in this regard. 

In the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force, or AUMF, Congress authorized the President ‘‘to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, 

organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided 

the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons.’’ Congress granted the President this statutory authority ‘‘in 

order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States 

by such nations, organizations or persons.’’ 

The 2001 AUMF provides statutory authority for ongoing U.S. military operations 

against al- Qaeda; the Taliban; and associated forces, including against the Islamic 

State in Iraq and Syria, or ISIS. 

This administration relies on the 2001 AUMF as a domestic legal authority for 

our own military actions against these entities, as well as the military actions we 

take in conjunction with our partners in the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS. 

The 2001 AUMF provides a domestic legal basis for our detention operations at 

Guantanamo Bay, where the United States currently detains members of al-Qaeda, 

the Taliban, and associated forces. 

The 2001 AUMF also authorizes the use of necessary and appropriate force to defend U.S., Coalition, and partner forces engaged in the campaign to defeat ISIS in 

Iraq and Syria. In Syria, the efforts of the U.S.-led Coalition are aimed at the defeat 

of ISIS; the United States does not seek to fight the Syrian Government or pro-Syrian-Government forces. However, the United States will not hesitate to use necessary and proportionate force to defend U.S., Coalition, or partner forces engaged 

in the campaign against ISIS. 

The President’s authority to use force against ISIS is further reinforced by the 

Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq, or, in more plain terms, the 

‘‘2002 AUMF.’’ 

In addition to authorities granted to the President by statute, the President has 

the power under Article II of the Constitution to use military force in certain circumstances to advance important U.S. national interests, including to defend the 

United States against terrorist attacks. As an example, President Reagan relied on 

his authority as Commander in Chief in 1986 when he ordered airstrikes against 

terrorist facilities and military installations in Libya following a terrorist attack by 

Libya in West Berlin which killed and wounded both civilians and U.S. military personnel. 

The United States has the legal authority to prosecute campaigns against the 

Taliban, al-Qaeda, and associated forces, including ISIS, and is not currently seeking any new or additional congressional authorization for the use of force. The 2001 

AUMF remains a cornerstone for ongoing U.S. military operations and continues to 

provide legal authority relied upon to defeat this threat. 

However, should Congress decide to write new AUMF legislation, I submit to you 

today several recommendations that the administration would consider necessary to 

a new AUMF: 

First, new AUMF authorities must be in place prior to or simultaneous with the 

repeal of old ones. Failure to do so could cause operational paralysis and confusion 

in our military operations. Diplomatically speaking, it could cause our allies in the 

Global Coalition to question our commitment to defeating ISIS. And potential repeal 

of the 2001 AUMF without an immediate and appropriate replacement could raise 

questions about the domestic legal basis for the United States’ full range of military 

activities against the Taliban, al-Qaeda, and associated forces, including against 

ISIS, as well as our detention operations at Guantanamo Bay. 

Second, any new authorization should not be time-constrained. Legislation which 

would arbitrarily terminate the authorization to use force would be inconsistent 

with a conditions-based approach, and could unintentionally embolden our enemies 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

9 

with the goal of outlasting us. Any oversight mechanism in a new AUMF also would 

have to allow the United States the freedom to quickly move against our enemies 

without being constrained by a feedback loop. 

Third, a new AUMF must not be geographically restricted. As is the case under 

the current AUMF, the administration would need to retain the statutory authority 

to use military force against an enemy that does not respect or limit itself based 

on geographic boundaries. As ISIS’s fraudulent caliphate in Iraq and Syria has 

crumbled, it has tried to gain footholds in new locations. As was discussed with the 

Senate during a closed defeat-ISIS briefing in July, the United States has a limited 

military presence in the Lake Chad Basin to support partners, including France, in 

their counterterrorism operations in the region. This information has also been conveyed to you in multiple periodic reports submitted to Congress consistent with the 

War Powers Resolution. The collapse of ISIS’s so-called caliphate in Iraq and Syria 

means it will attempt to burrow into new countries and find safe havens. Our legal 

authorities for heading off a transnational threat like ISIS cannot be constrained 

by geographic boundaries. Otherwise, ISIS may re-establish itself and gain strength 

in vulnerable spaces. 

The United States must retain the proper legal authorities to ensure that nothing 

restricts or delays our ability to respond effectively and rapidly to terrorist threats 

to the United States. Secretary Mattis and I, along with the rest of the administration, are completely aligned on this issue. We fully recognize the need for transparency with you as we respond to what will be a dynamic regional and potentially 

global issue. We will continue to regularly update Congress to make sure you and 

the American people understand our foreign policy goals, military operations, and 

national security objectives. 

I thank the committee for supporting our efforts, and look forward to your questions. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Secretary Mattis, we thank you also 

for being here and your extraordinary service not only as Secretary, 

but through many, many years in our military. We especially appreciate the fact that the two of you work together constantly to 

deal with issues in a unified voice, and we very much appreciate 

that. 

With that, if you would begin. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES MATTIS, SECRETARY OF 

DEFENSE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Secretary MATTIS. Thank you. Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Cardin, members of the committee, it is appropriate we appear 

before you today to explain what we are doing from DOD’s perspective in our counterterrorism campaign and why. 

This has been a long 16-year global conflict characterized by a 

very different form of warfare, specifically terrorism, fueled by extremism, aimed at innocents around the globe. Traditional campaigns to protect our people must adapt to the reality of today’s 

nontraditional transnational character of this fight. The 2001 and 

2002 Authorizations to Use of Military Force, or AUMF, remain a 

sound basis for ongoing U.S. military operations against a mutating threat. 

In the aftermath of the deadly 9/11 attack and to prevent future 

acts of international terrorism against the United States, Congress 

passed the 2001 AUMF, finding the President has, and I quote, 

‘‘authority under the Constitution to take action to deter and prevent acts of international terrorism against the United States.’’ The 

2002 AUMF provides the President with authority to, and I quote 

again, ‘‘defend the national security of the United States against 

the continuing threat posed by Iraq.’’ Previous administrations 

have cited these statutory authorities to address the threat posed 

by terrorist groups in Iraq and Syria. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

10 

As demonstrated by presidents from Washington to Lincoln, Wilson, FDR, and their successors, it lies firmly within any president’s 

constitutional authority and responsibility as the elected Commander-in-Chief to designate who presents a threat to our country. 

To date, this Article II authority, reinforced by the 2001 and 2002 

AUMFs, has been used to take action against al-Qaeda, the 

Taliban, ISIS, and associated forces. 

Following the December 2011 pullout of our forces and—from 

Iraq and the outbreak of civil war in Syria, al-Qaeda in Iraq regained strength and rebranded itself as ISIS. In 2014 under its 

new name, ISIS unleashed mayhem in the heart of the Middle 

East, building its self-described caliphate and attracting the allegiance of terror groups from the Sahel to Southeast Asia. Groups 

would plan, inspire, and conduct external attacks around the globe, 

attacks that include San Bernardino, Paris, Orlando, London, and 

the Philippines to name only a few. 

Though a statement of continued congressional support would be 

welcome, a new AUMF is not legally required to address the continuing threat posed by al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and ISIS. Article II 

of our Constitution, the 2001 and 2002 AUMFs provide sufficient 

legal authority for us to engage and defeat the current threat, 

which we are doing by working by, with, and through our allies 

and partners. That said, any new congressional expression of unity, 

whether or not an AUMF, would present a strong statement to the 

world of America’s determination, demonstrating, as Senator Kaine 

has stated, ‘‘an important message of resolve to the American public and our troops that we stand behind them in their mission.’’ 

With that for background, I would like to note that to successfully prosecute the counterterrorism campaign, any debate on a 

new or revised AUMF needs to incorporate the following factors. 

First, the 2001 and 2001 AUMFs should not be repealed. After 

numerous court cases and debates, there appears to now be a general consensus by all three branches of government that these two 

AUMFs provide sufficient authority to prosecute operations against 

al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and, we believe, ISIS. 

Repealing the 2001 and 2002 AUMFs would only cause unnecessary policy and legal uncertainty, which could lead to additional 

litigation and public doubt. The uncertainty accompanying that situation could only signal to our enemies and our friends that we are 

backing away from this fight. It would stall our operations, immediately reduce allied commitments and support, and create significant opportunities for our enemies to seize the initiative. Additionally, repealing the AUMFs without new authority would deprive us 

of the ability to detain dangerous enemy combatants who could 

then be released to fight again. 

Second, any new AUMF must not be time restricted. For example, President Trump’s South Asia strategy is conditions-based, not 

time-based, because war is fundamentally unpredictable. We cannot put a firm timeline on conflict against an adaptive enemy who 

would hope that we have not the will to fight as long as necessary. 

Instead, we must recognize that we are in an era of frequent skirmishing, and we are more likely to end this fight sooner if we do 

not tell our adversary the day we intend to stop fighting. A conditions-based AUMF would not lessen Congress’ authority. The 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

11 

power of the purse remains firmly vested in your hand should the 

executive branch not present a persuasive case for continuing the 

campaign. 

Lastly, any new AUMF must not be geographically constrained. 

As has been stated, these are not traditional threats. This is a fight 

against a transnational enemy, one that does not respect international borders, and does not place geographic limits on their 

areas of operations. So necessarily, to defend our country, we must 

be prepared to swiftly engage this global enemy in conjunction with 

our allies and partners. 

Regardless of the adaptations we must make for the common defense, I recognize that it is incumbent on the Department of Defense to keep Congress fully informed to fulfill its constitutional 

role, and I will continue to do so. Accordingly, as our troops on the 

battlefield carry out the last 300 meters of American foreign policy 

to protect our way of life, I ask Congress for your continued support and commitment to ensure we retain the necessary authorities 

to take our own side in this fight. 

Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. I am going to reserve my 

time for interjections and defer to our ranking member, and then 

move down the line. For those of you who may have stepped—may 

have stepped in late, I know giving guidance to senators is a useless effort—[Laughter.] 

Senator RISCH. Very true. 

The CHAIRMAN—[continuing]. But we are going to have a whole 

series of hearings. This one hopefully is mostly focused on the 

2001/2002 AUMFs, but we will have a series of hearings looking at 

other war-making powers, whether it is North Korea, nuclear 

issues. We have had members on the committee and off ask about 

these issues. So, just know that, but I know you are going to ask 

whatever you wish. 

With that, Senator Cardin. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, I want to welcome Senator King to our committee. It is not the first time he has 

attended our hearings, and it is nice to have you here. 

I would ask consent that the statement from Human Rights First 

be made part of our record. 

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you. 

[The information referred to is located at the end of this hearing 

transcript on pages 55–58.] 

Senator CARDIN. Secretary Mattis and Secretary Tillerson, I 

think we all agree that we are not anxious to repeal the 2001 authorization without a new authorization being in force. That has 

certainly been the game plan. But I will point out that there are 

significant differences here about whether the 2001 authorization 

covers the military operation—counterterrorism operations against 

ISIS. Many of us believe that is not included in the 2001, but we 

do agree that Congress needs to make sure that there is authorization to pursue our counterterrorism efforts. 

As I indicated in my opening statement, operational decisions on 

the use of AUMF for counterterrorism, I understand would not apFOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

12 

propriate in an open setting. So, my request, and I would ask that 

you respond to it, that you would be willing to return in a closed 

session in order that the committee of jurisdiction on the AUMF 

has a better understanding of how the operational decisions are 

being made? 

Secretary TILLERSON. Certainly, Senator. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you. 

Secretary MATTIS. Absolutely, sir. 

Senator CARDIN. I appreciate that. I understand the chairman’s 

admonition about North Korea, but I just really want to put on the 

record, would you agree that there is no congressional authorization for the use of military force against North Korea? I understand 

the President’s authorities under Article II. If there is an imminent 

threat against the United States, he has certain powers. But as far 

as congressional authorization, there is no authorization. Is that 

correct? 

Secretary TILLERSON. That is my understanding, yes. 

Secretary MATTIS. I believe the President has Article II, you 

know, authority only. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you. I want to get to what happened in 

Niger and sort of understand where we are because there is also 

limitations on the introduction of troops under the War Powers Act 

limiting it to 60 days, and as I understand it, our troops in Northern Africa have been there much longer than 60 days. Can you just 

explain very briefly what our mission was in Niger when the tragedy occurred, and under what legal authority those troops were 

there? 

Secretary MATTIS. I can, Senator. The troops are there are under 

Title 10 in a train and advise role. The letter from the President, 

from President Obama in 2013 to the president pro tem of the Senate and speaker of the House talks to the total number of U.S. 

military deployed there in 2013 was a hundred in furtherance of 

U.S. national security interests is President Obama’s report to you. 

That continues to be the case at this time. 

Senator CARDIN. But the specific mission that they were participating in, as I understand it, went beyond that. Am I wrong on 

that? 

Secretary MATTIS. The mission of those troops on that patrol was 

a—was a combined patrol, which means they were with Niger 

troops, and they were on a patrol where they were teaching them 

how you do what is called key leader engagement. I would have to 

wait until I get the full investigation in to give you a more complete answer. But they are there with the Niger troops to train and 

advise them, consistent with the original intent they were sent 

there under the previous administration, continues to be the intent 

today. 

Senator CARDIN. So, this is not 2001 authorization. 

Secretary MATTIS. No, sir, this is under—this is under the Title 

10, and requires us to report to you under that authority. 

Senator CARDIN. I understand. Thank you for that answer. I 

want to know how far we would go in pursuing military options in 

that region of the world. Boko Haram is a horrible group doing terrible things. Do you have the authority under the 2001 to pursue 

Boko Haram’s atrocities? 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

13 

Secretary MATTIS. These troops were there under Title 10. 

Senator CARDIN. I know. 

Secretary MATTIS. But as far as Boko Haram goes, they have 

pledged allegiance to ISIS or al-Qaeda, and so either way, they 

have associated themselves with the very group that that authorization is targeted on. 

Senator CARDIN. So, without any further authorization from Congress, you believe you have authorization if the determination is 

made to deploy whatever force is necessary to go after Boko 

Haram, including ground troops? 

Secretary MATTIS. If the President detects that there is a threat 

from them against us, our interests, I believe he would have the 

authority to designate that group, yes, sir. 

Senator CARDIN. Yes, I understand the threat, but the threat is 

related to the 2001 threat is what you are saying. That this is a 

group that is—whose terrorist activities are endangering—— 

Secretary MATTIS. If it is an associated group, he would, under 

that—— 

Senator CARDIN. Well, he could—he could declare that to be an 

associated group? 

Secretary MATTIS. No, he didn’t. 

Senator CARDIN. He could—— 

Secretary MATTIS. Boko Haram declared that they were an associated group. 

Senator CARDIN. They did, but the President could authorize 

them as an affiliate group, and then use the full force of our military, including ground troops, without further restrictions? 

Secretary MATTIS. Right now, Senator, they are—our troops are 

there under Title 10. I do not want to speculate about that because 

that is not what they are doing right now. I would have to go back 

and study it, but I believe a group that declares its allegiance to 

either al-Qaeda or ISIS would then be part of al-Qaeda or ISIS, 

yes, sir. 

Senator CARDIN. Yeah, but my question really is related to how 

far he could commit our military to these types of campaigns. 

When we were attacked on September the 11th, we recognized the 

need for a military response, and we certainly understood that 

American troops are going to be called upon to protect our country. 

I am not sure that Congress envisioned that we would have the potential of ground troops in Northern Africa in combat missions. 

However, if I understand what you are saying, unless we modify 

this AUMF, you would feel that you have adequate authorization 

to commit American ground troops in Northern Africa. 

Secretary MATTIS. Senator, if the President determines they are 

a threat to the United States, and—under the AUMF, say, they are 

allied with al-Qaeda or ISIS, yes, sir, I believe so. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Senator Johnson. 

Senator JOHNSON. Mr. Chairman, let me first start out by thanking both the Secretaries for their service to the country. Let me 

pick up on the point of ground troops. 

Secretary Mattis, in your testimony, you talked about a 16-year 

global conflict, totally different than anything we have really witnessed in the past. I remember when we had this discussion a couFOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

14 

ple years ago with the advent of ISIS, trying to rewrite a new authorization for use of military force, there was an awful lot of discussion about limiting ground troops. No ground troops. Secretary 

Tillerson, I think you said in your testimony, you talked about the 

caliphate is basically ended, is it not, or really darn close? 

Secretary TILLERSON. Well, we have liberated a large amount of 

area in Iraq and Syria, but that fight is not over yet. 

Senator JOHNSON. Secretary Mattis, is there any way we could 

have done what we have done so far with the caliphate without 

ground troops? 

Secretary MATTIS. I do not believe so, Senator. 

Senator JOHNSON. And yet, 2 years ago we were debating in this 

committee replacing the Authorization for Use of Force with one 

that would have restricted President Obama’s and his replacement, 

his successor, his ability to—his or her ability to use ground troops. 

That would have been a big mistake, would it not have? 

Secretary MATTIS. Senator, generally speaking, when you—you 

do not tell the enemy in advance what you are not going to do. 

That is not a wise—even if you do not choose to do it, there is no 

need to announce that to the enemy and relieve them of that concern. 

Senator JOHNSON. Yeah, in the 2001 authorization, I personally 

do not think the 2001 applies to this situation, I really do not, 

when you read it, but by precedent, it does. But it does not restrict 

the President’s use of force. It says, ‘‘to use all necessary and appropriate force,’’ and then it goes on to describe what those—what 

those nations, what those organizations really are. 

In a real declaration of war against Japan and Germany, Congress declared that ‘‘The President is authorized and directed to 

employ the entire naval and military force of the United States and 

the resources of the government to carry on the war against,’’ in 

this case, the government of Germany, ‘‘and to bring the conflict to 

a successful termination, all the—all the resources of the country 

are hereby pledged by the Congress of the United States.’’ 

So, both in the 2001 authorization and the declarations of war 

against both Germany and Japan, there were no restrictions. We 

pledged all necessary resources of this country to the defeat of our 

enemy. 

In both your testimony, you laid out three conditions, but one 

thing I want to clear up. Secretary Mattis, you said we should not 

be—we should not repeal the 2001/2002 later on you talked about, 

without a new authorization. You are not—there is no difference in 

your testimony, correct? 

Secretary MATTIS. No, sir. 

Senator JOHNSON. You can repeal them as long as you have 

something else in its place. 

Secretary MATTIS. There are some lawyers who will say it is good 

to hold on to what you have even if you pass a new one that perhaps changes it in some way. 

Senator JOHNSON. So, is there a slight difference between your 

two testimonies then? You would prefer keeping the 2001/2002 

AUMF in place. 

Secretary MATTIS. I would have to see what came out next, Senator, but right now I would say yes. We have been through a lot 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

15 

of difficulty trying to get the three branches of government aligned 

on this. 

Senator JOHNSON. Okay. I am not disagreeing with you in any 

way, shape, or form. You both said that neither—if there is a new 

AUMF, it should not be time restricted. You both said it should not 

be geographically restricted. I was waiting for the fourth, but neither one of you said this: there should be no operational restrictions. Do you believe there should be operational restrictions as we 

contemplated a couple years ago? No ground troops or something 

of that type of restriction? Secretary Tillerson. 

Secretary TILLERSON. No, I do not think we can restrict operations given the way this particular enemy morphs, changes its 

tactics. As we saw with the emergence of ISIS, we start with what 

might be a fairly limited group of terrorists who then are able to 

overrun large territories and amass armies, essentially their own 

armies of tens of thousands. That requires a very different use of 

force than trying to chase and defeat terrorists that are making 

their way through the jungles in smaller numbers. 

This is an enemy that changes it names. It moves across borders. 

It is a non-state actor. And it has morphed and changed over this 

16 years, which I know is part of why this is such a vexing issue 

because it does not fit a declaration of war. Certainly, it does not 

fit the criteria that Congress has used in the past for declarations 

of war. 

Senator JOHNSON. It is a totally different enemy than we faced 

in the past, but this has been a 16-year struggle. 

I do not think it is going to be over any time soon. Secretary 

Mattis, can you describe what has changed in the change of the administration that has allowed us to defeat the caliphate in relatively short order compared to what had been happening the previous 2 years? 

Secretary MATTIS. Senator, what we did was we changed the tactics. We accelerated the number of partnered units that had American forces with them, not to do the fighting, but to call in air support. The change in tactics was one that where we could, we would 

surround the enemy first so they could not fall back and reinforce 

the next site, thus making it harder. And you saw the surround 

tactics used in Mosul, in Tal Afar, in Tatkal, in Raqqa. 

And those are the big changes, sir, as we accelerated the campaign, but also lessened the chance that foreign fighters could escape to return home or to reinforce the next position. 

Senator JOHNSON. Would you say it is true that we have allowed 

the commanders on the ground to make the decisions to defeat the 

enemy rather than direct them here from Washington, D.C.? 

Secretary MATTIS. I have delegated authority to the appropriate 

levels, yes, sir. 

Senator JOHNSON. Both of you seemed to indicate that continued 

congressional support would be welcome if it is a statement of 

unity. But it has to be an authorization that does not restrict the 

military’s ability to defeat our enemies. Is that correct? 

Secretary TILLERSON. That is correct. 

Secretary MATTIS. I agree, Senator. Assuming strong and very 

robust feedback loops to the Congress to keep you fully informed. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

16 

Senator JOHNSON. I have no further questions. Again, thank you 

for your service. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Senator Udall. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you both 

for your service, and thank you for being here today. 

Secretary Mattis, the existence of multiple local militia forces in 

Iraq remains a major problem as ISIL is driven out. Kurdish aspirations of nationhood may be just the tip of the iceberg, and I am 

concerned we are ending up on multiple sides of a complicated conflict in a post-ISIL, Iraq, and Syria. How many different groups are 

the Department of Defense advising and assisting in Iraq? 

Secretary MATTIS. Sir, we advise and assist the Iraqi Security 

Forces only in Iraq. And I would just mention that Secretary 

Tillerson just returned from there, and this issue was brought up 

with the prime minister. Do you wish to say anything, Mr. Secretary? 

Secretary TILLERSON. Yes, the prime minister is asserting authority himself over other various militias, including Popular Mobilization Forces, the PMF, which are by and large Iraqi forces. They 

are Iraqi citizens who are fighting under militia arrangements, including the Peshmerga forces of Kurdistan during the war to defeat 

ISIS, to liberate Mosul, to liberate large parts of Ninawa and other 

provinces. These forces put themselves under the command of 

Prime Minister Abadi. 

So, there are multiple forces, but I think as the Secretary indicated, our support is through the Iraqi forces working with Prime 

Minister Abadi and under—and his authorities. 

Senator UDALL. I am glad you brought that up because, Secretary Tillerson, it was reported that the Iraqi prime minister was 

pretty blunt in his response about Shia Iranian-backed militias in 

Iraq, stating that they are already home and they are not going 

anywhere, and that—and that maybe U.S. forces should leave. If 

U.S. forces are told to leave, will we depart Iraq, or will we stay 

uninvited as our forces are doing in Syria, and under what legal 

authority will they remain? 

Secretary TILLERSON. Senator, the prime minister—I never heard 

the prime minister say U.S. forces should leave. What he did clarify is that, as I said, many of the PMF forces are Iraqi Shia forces, 

so they are Iraqi citizens. My comment was regarding foreign fighters, foreign fighters that may have come to Iraq. We know there 

are foreign fighters in Syria. And my comments were that any foreign fighters, particularly those from Iran, needed to leave Iraq 

and go home. Certainly, PMF Iraqi citizens, this is their home. 

They will remain. But I think the prime minister has also made 

it clear as to his expectations of how these forces will organize 

themselves, or put their arms down and just rejoin their villages 

as citizens. 

Senator UDALL. But we have reached—we have reached this new 

phase, and I—and I think this is a real possibility that I am asking 

you about. If U.S. forces are told to leave, will we depart Iraq, or 

will we stay uninvited as our forces are doing in Syria, and under 

what legal authority? 

Secretary TILLERSON. We will remain in Iraq until ISIS is defeated, and we are confident that ISIS has been defeated. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

17 

Senator UDALL. Under what legal authority? 

Secretary TILLERSON. Under the 2001 and 2002 AUMFs. Now 

having said that, we are there also at the invitation of the Iraqi 

government, and Prime Minister Abadi has given to me no indication that he is in any particular hurry to have us depart. 

Senator UDALL. Secretary Mattis and Secretary Tillerson, do you 

agree with the assertion that this fragmentation of security forces 

will pose difficulties to the Iraqi Government maintaining order in 

areas that the U.S. Government recently regained control of? What 

is your advice to ensure that these areas do not see resumed sectarian violence now that the fight with ISIL is nearly over, and 

does this necessitate U.S. troops on the ground? 

Secretary TILLERSON. Senator, as areas have been liberated, we 

are working with the coalition partners and with the United Nations and other non-governmental organizations to create stability 

around liberated cities, in particular, as well as villages. And that 

means having the military forces, the armies, pull back out of the 

villages, allow the—our coalition to enter those villages, undertake 

de-mining of the villages so that it is safe for people to return, and 

then begin the process of training local basically police forces. And 

we have a number of coalition partners that have undertaken that 

activity. So, as we are liberating areas, we are preparing security 

forces, local security forces, to transplant the military forces. 

Prime Minister Abadi made this direct observation to me. He 

said, I have to get my armies out of the cities. They are not—they 

are not policemen. They are not trained to be policemen, and they 

are not equipped to be policemen, and I have to replace them with 

trained security forces to carry out police activities and provide security for the civilians as they return. There is a lot of work to do 

to stabilize these areas, but that is how we will lock in the military 

gains that have been achieved with the liberation. 

Senator UDALL. Secretary Mattis, do you have a comment on 

that issue? 

Secretary MATTIS. It is the Iraqi forces, you know, operating 

under Prime Minister Abadi that have—that have liberated these 

areas. It is not any other armed groups. Now, there are PMF forces 

that are engaged with them, but he has insisted that they fall 

under the authority of his field commanders. That is being imperfectly done. I would not say it is happening in all cases, but you 

have seen the successes enjoyed so far. And we are moving now 

against al-Qaeda with Iraqi forces to restore the border against 

Syria. So, you see it unfolding in that direction. The next step is 

exactly what the Secretary of State has laid out. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you both. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. I think, Senator Flake, you are next. 

If it is okay, maybe we will go with about 3 minutes of your questions, and then come back and you can resume if that is okay. 

Senator FLAKE. It is fine. 

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. 

Senator FLAKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for being 

here. 

I think that here, you know, in the Senate we aspire to be more 

than just one cog on a feedback loop. This is the body with Article 

I authority to declare war and to authorize the use of military 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

18 

force. I understand the importance in looking at your three items 

that should not put a new AUMF—or should not repeal the old one 

until a new one is in its place: no time constraints—I will get to 

that in a second—not geographically limited. And the AUMF that 

Senator Kaine and I have introduced, the bipartisan AUMF, I 

think meets the conditions of the—of one and three. 

But number two with regard to time constraints, anybody want 

to hazard a guess of how many in this body right here on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee were in the Senate when the 

2011 AUMF was passed? Not one. Not one member of this panel 

was in the Senate when the 2001 AUMF was passed, or the 2002 

for that matter. Seven of us were in the House during that time 

and voted on it, but not one has had the opportunity to weigh in 

on it 16 years later. 

I would argue that the concern about giving our adversaries notice that we have to vote on something may be an issue, but it is 

overwhelmed in a big way by not having Congress buy in and not 

having us have skin in the game. It simply allows us to criticize 

the administration—Republican or Democrat—if we do not like 

what they are doing because we have not weighed in. We have not 

said our peace. We have not voted on this. So, I would simply say 

that any concern about having to come back—we have a 5-year 

sunset on ours. Five-years. That is pretty long. 

But Congress needs to weigh in. We have to make sure that our 

adversaries, and our allies, and, most importantly, our troops know 

that we speak with one voice. And so, I hope that as we go along, 

we can—we can—we can talk about the relative importance of signaling that we might leave or might not finish, and not having 

Congress weigh in at all, to go for 16 years before we actually 

weigh in or have any skin in the game. 

We, as I said, ought to aspire to be more than just part of a feedback loop. Article I authority is more than that. So, with that I will 

pull back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Bertie, if you will keep 4 minutes and 15 seconds on Senator 

Flake’s time. If we could all sprint over and sprint back, you will 

start again as soon as we will get back. And we will recess for 

about 14 minutes I hope. Thank you. 

You are welcome to come into the back or do whatever. [Break.] 

The CHAIRMAN. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee is now 

coming back out of recess. As with the Senate, we had one member 

kind of lollygagging around, and it took a little longer than we 

thought. It is the story of the United States Senate, but we are 

glad to be back in session. 

Senator Flake, if you will, continue your work. 

Senator FLAKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We talked before the 

break about reasons we need an AUMF, and I mentioned how few 

people were actually here. Nobody on this panel voted in the Senate on the AUMF. In the House, fewer than a hundred members 

of the House were there when the 2001 AUMF was passed. I think 

total in the Senate, nobody on this panel, but only 23 members of 

the Senate were here to vote on the AUMF. And so, it simply helps. 

We have got to have a situation where the Congress is more involved here. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

19 

I understand what you say that a new AUMF would be welcomed, but not required. Just for the benefit of everybody here, no 

administration would ever concede that you need an AUMF because the absence of it would suggest that what we have been 

doing for 16 years would be illegal, or certain activities we have 

undertaken. So, I think we all understand that the administration 

will say that no new AUMF or no new authorities are needed. 

But whether or not they are needed to provide a legal basis, it 

is certainly needed politically, and we cannot continue to go on in 

a situation where, you know, 70 percent of the House and the Senate has never voted on an AUMF, and has no reservation at all to 

criticize whatever administration is in power and their use of military force because they did not vote on it. And we cannot continue 

to go year after year after year without doing that. 

But specifically on a question here, with regard to Niger, I understand that you say that is Title 10 authority. You expressed concern about not having authorities that expire so as not to tip off 

the enemy that we might leave. Explain Title 10 authority with regard to—now that is part of the NDAA that we gratefully—it is the 

one authorization bill that we pass every year. But what if we were 

not going to pass that next year, if we failed in our duty to do it? 

What would that do? 

Secretary MATTIS. Well, we would—I believe, Senator, we would 

still have Title 10 authority under the U.S. Code, so we would 

not—I mean, we would have trouble probably getting appropriations if we did not have the NDA—the authorization. But I think 

that under the U.S. Code, we still exist as a military, so—I would 

have to turn to my general counsel, sir, to give you a better answer. 

Senator FLAKE. You mentioned, Secretary Mattis, in your remarks that we still in Congress here have the power of the purse, 

and that maybe should be sufficient. There was one member of our 

body who said when he was briefed on what was going on in Niger, 

he said that Congress—we would—‘‘We need to decide whether or 

not we want to authorize this operation through the appropriations 

process.’’ 

Now, for us authorizers, that ought to be a hit right here that 

only the Appropriations Committee in this body has authority to 

look at what we are doing and decide whether or not appropriate 

authority exists and, through the appropriations process, give that 

authority. I would suggest that this committee ought to stand up 

and say that is not enough. That is not enough. Let us pass a new 

AUMF. 

So, I know that—I hope Senator Kaine will go into the AUMF 

that we have proffered. It is gaining momentum certainly and support. And I hope, above all else, that we can come to a point where 

we speak with one voice overseas, whether it is use of diplomacy 

or use of military force. And under the current situation with a 16- 

year-old AUMF, I would suggest that we do not, and our adversaries, our allies, and our troops need to know that we do. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. If I could just for clarification, when 

you say ‘‘Title 10,’’ you are talking about the Train and Equip Program? 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

20 

Secretary MATTIS. That is correct, Chairman. Basically, we have 

the authority under Title 10 to carry out these kind of partnering 

activities, yes, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Throughout the world. 

Secretary MATTIS. If the President directs it, yes, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Murphy. 

Senator MURPHY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank 

you both for being here. You are both patriots, and thank you for 

your service to the country. I want to maybe get back to this question of exploring the limits of that Title 10 authority, but I wanted 

to build upon a question preview that Senator Cardin referenced, 

and that is on the existing authorities in North Korea. 

The President has talked about our military options should we 

choose to use them in North Korea, and I just wanted to make sure 

that we understand the range of authority that the President has 

today with respect to potential military operations in the Korean 

peninsula. Would you both agree that absent a strike against the 

United States or the imminent threat of a strike against the 

United States, the administration would need congressional authorization to engage in military activity against North Korea? 

Secretary TILLERSON. Well, Senator, I think it would depend, 

again, on all circumstances, and it is a fact-based decision. I think 

clearly today we are there under Article II authorities, and Article 

II is really—you know, if you look at it historically, it has been 

grounded in kind of two criteria. One is to protect United States’ 

persons, property, and national security interests, and secondly, it 

has been used for circumstances that do not rise to the level of a 

declaration of war. And I think that is the circumstance we have 

in the peninsula today in Korea. 

So, it is a question of the—of the threat, the imminent threat, 

the nature of the threat as to whether the President then would 

exercise his authorities without the need of further congressional 

authorization. So, it is—it will be fact-based, and all those will 

have to be considered. 

Senator MURPHY. Secretary Mattis? 

Secretary MATTIS. Yes, I believe under Article II, he has the responsibility obviously to protect the country. And if there was not 

time, I could imagine him not consulting or consulting as he is 

doing something, along the line, for example, of what we did at 

Shayrat Airfield here in Syria when we struck that and the Congress was notified immediately. This was after the chemical weapons use by the Assad regime. But in this case of North Korea, it 

would be a direct, imminent, or actual attack on the United States 

that I think Article II would apply. 

Senator MURPHY. I think I would agree that if it is an attack or 

an imminent attack, and we can all split hairs as to what the definition of ‘‘imminent’’ would be. But let me try to get to the bottom 

of that. Would the possession of a weapon, a nuclear weapon, capable of reaching the United States fill—fulfill the definition of an 

‘‘imminent threat’’ to the United States? Would a possession—the 

simple possession of a weapon that is capable of doing great damage to the United States be sufficient to qualify as an imminent 

threat? 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

21 

Secretary TILLERSON. Well, again, I am always reluctant to get 

into too many hypotheticals because the possession can be sitting 

in an underground, not ready to be used condition, or possession 

could be sitting upright on a Tel about to be launched. So, again, 

I think it would be have to be fact-based and given consideration 

as to the circumstances around an imminent threat. 

Senator MURPHY. Secretary Mattis? 

Secretary MATTIS. I fully agree with Secretary Tillerson. I think 

this is an area that a number of facts would have to bear on the 

problem in order to give you a complete answer, Senator. 

Senator MURPHY. I thank you both for your answers. I think the 

primary fact is whether there is an attack or an imminent attack. 

I think other than those two facts, you need to come to Congress 

for authorization, but I appreciate your answers. 

Secretary Mattis, I wanted to drill down a little bit more on the 

Title 10 authority. You certainly have Title 10 authority to conduct 

training missions abroad. You are using that authority in Niger 

today. You have properly notified Congress. You referenced President Obama’s notification. But how do you answer concerns that 

our constituents may have when it looks as if a training mission 

is something more than training, that we are actually putting 

American troops out in harm’s way, partnered with local forces engaged in activity that imperils U.S. men and women? 

To many folks, this did not look like a training mission. It did 

look like we were side-by-side with domestic forces, but we were actually helping them carry out pretty critical mission components. 

How do you address concerns that some of our constituents have 

that a training mission can very easily morph into something that 

looks much more like operational and offensive capabilities that are 

unauthorized by Congress? 

Secretary MATTIS. It is a great question, Senator. When you look 

at why did President Obama send troops there, why did President 

Trump send troops there, it is because we sensed that as the physical caliphate is collapsing, the enemy is trying to move somewhere, 

and so, those troops are there. Most of them are providing, frankly, 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support, intelligence 

support, refueling support. There are some doing this train and advise mission. 

In this case, we are trying to build up the internal defenses of 

another country so they can do this job on their own. The French 

have carried the burden for this, have taken severe casualties at 

times in this mission. We are supporting them. But in this case, 

since April, I believe, and we will get the specific numbers once the 

investigation comes in, over 2 dozen patrols in this area with no 

enemy contact. I think it was reasonable to think they could go out 

and continue training these troops without the idea they were 

going into direct combat, but that is not a complete answer. I need 

to wait until I get the results of the investigation. — 

Senator MURPHY. But you referenced the falling apart of the caliphate at the beginning of that answer, and so that suggests that 

this might not be a Title 10 authority mission. This might be a 

2001 AUMF mission. And if that is the case, then—okay, you are 

not saying—— 

Secretary MATTIS. I misled you there. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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Senator MURPHY. Okay. 

Secretary MATTIS. This is a Title 10 train and advise, and we are 

trying to prepare them if, as the caliphate falls apart, their country 

comes under attack so they can defend their own population. You 

will remember Boko Haram nearby and the 276 girls they kidnapped. It is a real problem up in that region, and we are trying 

to get them in a position where they can defend themselves, and 

do it in accordance with the law of armed conflict in a very complex 

environment. This is tough training, sir. 

Senator MURPHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Senator Young. 

Senator YOUNG. Thank you, Chairman. Secretary Mattis, you 

said in the past, you said again here today, that a new AUMF by 

this Congress would send a message of resolve to our troops and 

to our enemies. I absolutely agree with that. I would like to get 

into the law, though, the legal components of this. 

Legally, there are at least—one, it seems we would have to 

make—concede that there is a principle, there is a logical argument 

that the 2001/2002 AUMFs do not apply, or now have a highly attenuated application to current circumstances. 2001 AUMF was in 

response to 9/11. It was directly in response to 9/11, albeit written 

broadly. 2002 AUMF was directed against the Saddam Hussain regime. In fact, it was invoked here today, but the language of that 

AUMF says ‘‘a threat posed by Iraq.’’ And then in 2014, ISIS leadership—al Baghdadi—actually disavowed very publicly any association with al-Qaeda. 

Secretary Mattis, you indicated that a terrorist group—I think it 

was Boko Haram—but a terrorist group was covered by the 2001 

AUMF because they swore allegiance to al-Qaeda. Now, by that 

same logic, if ISIS broke with al-Qaeda, why would the 2001 

AUMF apply to the fight against ISIS? 

Secretary MATTIS. Senator, what we have seen is these groups 

come apart, go back together. They change their name as often as 

a rock and roll band. They are keenly aware that they have got— 

they have got certain legal strictures on our side that they can take 

advantage of. We call lawfare where they actually use our laws 

against us. We have seen it. We read their mail. We know what 

they are thinking in many cases. 

It is an associated group because if you look at the photographs 

we have from intelligence that shows who is leading in Baghdadi’s 

outfit, there is a remarkable resemblance to other photographs we 

have under al-Qaeda in Iraq. So, when the same group in the same 

area seems to be spawning from the same people, a disavowal is 

something that is of interest, but it is not necessarily compelling, 

especially since they seem to have many of the same tenets to their 

ideology as the group they disavow. And I am not sure I would call 

them ‘‘highly attenuated’’ in that circumstance. 

Senator YOUNG. Well, that is my characterization. No, I respect 

yours, Mr. Secretary. 

Secretary MATTIS. Yes, sir. 

Senator YOUNG. So, it seems like these arguments could be made 

both ways. They swore an allegiance; therefore, they are covered by 

the AUMF. And then secondarily, well, you know, that factor is not 

all that important in our consideration based on a range of other 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

23 

factors. It might be helpful to lay out what multi-factor analysis legally your attorneys are looking at to help make these decisions. 

Secretary Mattis, on January 27, 2015, you testified before the 

Senate Armed Services Committee. You said the following: ‘‘We 

have observed the perplexing lack of detainee policy that has resulted in the return of released prisoners to the battlefield. We 

should not engage in another fight without resolving this issue up 

front. Treating hostile forces, in fact, is hostile.’’ When asked about 

that in the hearing, you continued: ‘‘I think that when we have— 

what we have to do is have a repeatable detainee policy so that 

when we take them, we hold them, and there is no confusion about 

their future, not among the enemy’s mind, certainly not among our 

own.’’ Do you stand by those statements, sir? 

Secretary MATTIS. I do, Senator. 

Senator YOUNG. Why do you believe it is important up front to 

ensure that there is no confusion regarding our Nation’s ability to 

detain enemy combatants under the law of war until the end of 

hostilities? 

Secretary MATTIS. Senator, when we release people and eventually we find them back on the battlefield fighting us—when Rommel’s Africa corps was taken prisoner in World War II in North Africa, we did not let them go because they said, ‘‘well, I was only 

a tank driver, I was not a gunner,’’ and let them take another shot 

at us at Normandy. We held them in the prison camp until the war 

was over. I think that that is a rather straightforward proposition 

that we take our own side in this. 

Senator YOUNG. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. So, if this body were 

to pass another AUMF, would you support an effort that seeks to 

eliminate any uncertainty whatsoever regarding our Nation’s ability to detain enemy combatants under the law of war until the end 

of hostilities? 

Secretary MATTIS. For those taken overseas, yes, sir. I just want 

to make sure you understand I am not talking about people here 

in the United States who are taken. 

Senator YOUNG. Nor am I, so thank you. Another legal point 

going back to the law here, I would argue—you invoked litigation 

risks. I would argue that the further away we get as a country 

from 2001 or 2002, the more attenuated the relationship exists between our ongoing fight against associated forces and that period 

of time in which our previous Congress, working with our previous 

Commander-in-Chief, passed an AUMF, but the litigation risk is 

only going to grow. So, kindly consult with your attorneys and give 

me their analysis about why I have it wrong or right, but I think 

I have it right. 

Secretary Tillerson and Secretary Mattis, both of you over the 

course of this hearing have indicated that there are three essential 

elements for a new AUMF. And I think you worded them differently, but I think they are distilled down to no lapse in authorities, no time constraint, and no geographic restriction. Is that a 

correct and fair summary of the elements that need to be in there? 

Secretary MATTIS. Yes, sir. 

Secretary TILLERSON. Yes. 

Senator YOUNG. Thank you. Well, I would just note for the record 

that the AUMF I introduced on March 2nd—Senate Joint ResoluFOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

24 

tion 31—meets all of those criteria. So, I think it certainly satisfies 

that. 

I am going to pivot to a different topic. Secretary Mattis, you 

mentioned ISR assets. And in testimony before the Senate Armed 

Services Committee on March 9, 2017, General Waldhauser, who 

is commander of AFRICOM, stated in his written testimony that 

only approximately 20 to 30 percent of Africa Commands’ ISR requirements are met. The general wrote that ‘‘this shortfall in ISR 

limits situational understanding, support to operations, and fails to 

offer threat indications and warnings.’’ Secretary Mattis, could you 

please discuss AFRICOM and DOD’s ISR shortfalls and the operational impacts of those shortfalls, and what we can do to help? 

Secretary MATTIS. Yes, sir. The ISR assets are insufficient basically worldwide. I can go to a number of other combatant commanders from the Pacific, even in the Middle East, CENTCOM, 

certainly EUCOM, and they would all say they have shortfalls. As 

you know, we’ve been under continuing resolutions for many of the 

last 10 years. We have been under budget reductions, and eventually real capability is insufficient. 

At the same time, I think in this case, General Waldhauser is a 

hundred percent correct, but that force, again, was in an area 

where a reasonable person looking the last several months would 

say contact was not imminent, was not likely to be imminent. And 

so, you look at how you prioritize it. There is a finite amount of 

ISR assets, and we deal them out—we deal them out, frankly, like 

gold coins through the various combatant commanders. 

Senator YOUNG. Thank you both for your service. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Thank you very much. Senator 

Coons. 

Senator COONS. Thank you, Chairman Corker, Ranking Member 

Cardin, for this important hearing. And thank you, Secretary 

Mattis and Secretary Tillerson, for the service you have rendered 

to our country, and for the men and women you lead and command. I think it is important that we as a committee come together 

in a bipartisan way and provide you with an updated authorization 

for the very demanding and difficult work that your men and 

women are doing around the world. 

I think the tragedy in Niger—the loss of four American soldiers—helped focus on the fact that we have got citizens and we 

have got senators who are unclear on exactly where in the world 

we are engaged against this morphing, changing enemy in a new 

era of skirmishes, as you put it, sir. And in the opening list, you 

gave of roughly, I think, 19 countries, I will tell you it is a striking. 

A majority of them are on the continent of Africa in a region that 

is not that familiar to many senators and many Americans. 

So, I will just assert that I believe it to be in our national interest to have a renewed, clearer, strengthened authorization of the 

very difficult work that you and the folks you lead are doing 

around the world. And I take seriously the risk presented of potentially emboldening our adversaries and undermining the confidence 

of our coalition partners if we do it in a way that is rough-hewn. 

But at the same time, it just defies my sense of our role to accept 

that a 2001 AUMF, where, as Senator Flake put it, fewer than a 

third of the currently-serving Congress voted for it, has become so 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

25 

attenuated, I think was your phrase, so convoluted that it is hard 

to trace a path from 2001 and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan to young 

American men and women serving in the Philippines, or in Yemen, 

or in Niger. 

So, we have to do this, I think, together. And I find it beyond 

my ability to get my head around that we must authorize an unlimited war that has no limits of geography, of time, or of an oversight mechanism. So, I commend my colleagues who have put together what I think are strong drafts and that attempt to tackle 

this. And I, frankly, think on both sides we are going to make concessions in order to provide our warfighters and our diplomats with 

the authorization that makes it clear what we intend to do and for 

how long we intend to do it. I think that strengthens our country. 

I think that shows democracy at work, but it also means we are 

going to have to take some risks. 

Talk to me, if you would, for a moment about how we make sure 

that our citizens, that our senators, know where we are fighting beyond the current system of notification because I think it is not 

fully effective. And what do you think is the appropriate level of 

public transparency for military deployments outside of areas of active hostility? Is it helpful, is it important, and how do we strengthen accountability to the Senate and the public of where we are deployed, and what are the limits on that? 

Secretary MATTIS. Senator, I would just say that in my Department’s case, in Fiscal Year 2016, we submitted 901 reports to the 

Senate, which, for the number of days you are in session, is about 

six a day. It has been added in Fiscal Year 2017 another 175, so 

we will be submitting seven reports a day. Under the War Powers 

Resolution notification that comes in, Niger has been reported 

every 6 months under the previous administration as well as under 

our current administration. 

The most recent in June reported about 645, thanks to the appropriation by the Congress, to work on airfield. We have actually 

got probably 150 more there right now, engineers working on airfield with the money you provided to make the airfield that will 

provide more ISR opportunity for our troops in that region. So, I 

think the most important thing is we look at the reports we are 

giving you to see if we are just bearing on the important information inside a mass of reports that pour into you every day literally, 

and make sure that maybe tier one issues that—and this would 

be—you would decide tier one, that we are highlighting that information to you to include in any closed hearing briefings that filled 

in any gaps you sensed. 

Senator COONS. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Secretary Tillerson. 

Secretary TILLERSON. Well, Senator, I think your—what you 

have really put your finger on is what is, I think, concerning—I am 

hearing concerning this committee and others, and that is the level 

of transparency and understanding of where our forces are deployed, and in what role they are deployed, and to what levels they 

are deployed, and what is the expectation for the likelihood of combat engagement. 

But I also think that when I consider the current AUMF, and I 

do not want to pretend to know what the intent of Congress was 

in 2001. But quite frankly, maybe the intent recognized that this 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

26 

was a completely different situation than we have ever faced before. This was not a sovereign state actor that we can do a war declaration against. War declarations, I think as Senator Johnson 

pointed out, do not have timelines. We did not tell the Japanese 

we are going to come out and fight for 3 and a half years, and then 

we are going home, and we have done that. We have done that 

under this AUMF. We announced withdrawal from Iraq, and we 

see what happened. ISIL emerged and created an enormous caliphate. 

So, anything that signals our intentions, this enemy takes advantage of that. We have now learned that lesson multiple times. So, 

I do appreciate that—the issue over what congressional control or 

oversight there is for this authorization. On the other hand, you 

know, Article I gave the Congress the right to declare war. Article 

II gave the Commander-in-Chief the right to conduct the military 

affairs. And I think the Founders recognized in writing Article I 

and Article II that you cannot fight war by consensus. You cannot 

fight war with a collective approach. There has to be one Commander-in-Chief to fight the war because someone has to take the 

hard decisions to win. 

And so, the separation is there, I think, in Article I and Article 

II. And the reason there is not a declaration of war here is because, 

as I indicated earlier, the situation, the circumstances do not give 

rise to a declaration of war, which then puts into motion a number 

of other authorizations. So, I think the authority has been properly 

used by the Congress in the 2001 AUMF. 

Secretary Mattis, I think, would welcome a strong statement 

from the Congress. But in many respects, the Congress can express 

its will now 16 years later and say this authorization is still valid, 

and it is serving the purposes of this war against this very unique 

and unusual enemy that we will fight for we do not know how long, 

or for where, or for—with what forces. That is the nature of this 

fight that we are in. 

Senator COONS. Well, Mr. Secretary, I would like to thank both 

of you. I will just comment in closing. Having spent time in West 

Africa, I am particularly concerned about the ways in which associated forces morph and change, affiliate and disassociate, and the 

way in which who we are fighting metastasizes, more at their 

choice, and direction, and timing than ours, and how it is possible 

for something like Boko Haram to split into two, and to become 

now two enemies, one al-Qaeda-affiliated, one ISIS-affiliated, but 

without a significant amount of direction, or funding, or control 

from a core enemy. 

This is a different kind of fight than we have been in as a Nation 

before, and I do think our constituents expect some sense of strategy, trajectory, timeline, and cost. Yet I am not blind to what you 

raise as the very real risks if we undermine the confidence of our 

coalition partners and our troops by failing to deliver a strong consensus AUMF. 

I look forward to working on that with you both, and I thank 

you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Ranking. 

The CHAIRMAN. I will say before turning to Senator Isakson, with 

few exceptions—I have been here 11 years—I really have not heard 

a member specifically raise questions or criticize efforts that are 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

27 

underway against ISIS, al-Qaeda, Boko Haram. So, I know everybody is concerned. I mean, I know that when this began, no one 

expected in 2001 that we would be continuing as we are today. I 

understand that, and I would like for us to strive for a balance. 

But in fairness, and we may hear it—I know there is one member here that may express that in just a moment. But I really have 

not heard a member go down to the Senate floor and criticize the 

Bush administration—as it relates to al-Qaeda now—the Bush administration, the Obama administration, or this administration yet 

relative to the activities they have underway. It does seem to me 

that the Senate and the House, generally speaking, do support the 

efforts that underway. 

So, with that, Senator Isakson. 

Senator ISAKSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Mattis, I 

want to thank you very much for mentioning the names of those 

four soldiers in Niger who lost their life last week. In particular, 

I want to be sure and mention Dustin Wright from Lyons, Georgia, 

who was one of the four troops who lost his life. 

I want to thank you and repeat what was told to me in a Kroger 

grocery store in Marietta, Georgia, this past weekend when I was 

home by a lady who came up, whose son is in the United States 

Army, volunteer for the United States Army, is overseas now. She 

talked about how proud she was for him to be serving under people 

like you and the leadership we have in our country. So, I want to 

thank you from the bottom of my heart for that, but also tell you 

that is what the people in the streets are telling me. 

Now, Senator Coons and I go way back, and, in fact, the chairman and I traveled to Africa and went to Darfur. We were the second and third senators to ever go to Darfur, if I remember correctly, and saw some of the horrible things that were happening in 

Africa. And I appreciate on the one hand what Senator Coons said 

about how complex the continent of Africa is, and how many players are, and how hard it is to keep up. But I think that underscores 

the reason you just cannot write an AUMF with restrictions, or try 

and be so prescriptive in the way you prescribe the geography— 

where they can fight or the tools that they can use, or anything 

like that—and do so without risking the life of your own troops. 

I was in the military. It has been a long time ago. We had muskets back then, but—[Laughter.] 

Senator ISAKSON. I remember the limitations on your ability to 

serve and what you could do, the rules of engagement, were affected, I am sure by the AUMF at the time. I am sure the AUMF— 

the rules of engagement flow down from the AUMF. Am I right? 

Secretary MATTIS. Yes, sir. 

Senator ISAKSON. So, when we are writing an AUMF here to restrict our soldiers geographically, methodology wise, or any other 

way, in the end we are affecting—potentially affecting the rules of 

engagement we have on the ground in countries where there are 

no rules, like Niger and the other countries we talk about in Africa. 

So, I think we have to be very much aware the people that who 

are working for us—the people who we are working for are our constituents, and the people who are working for us are our soldiers 

in the field, our airmen and our soldiers and our naval personnel. 

And they operate under rules of engagement where they are limFOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

28 

ited to what they can do to carry out their mission, and those limitations are then somewhat affected by the AUMFs that exist at the 

time. 

So, I just wanted to bring that point out. We have to be very 

careful about what we are really—we are not just dealing with limitations we as senators want to have—our country to have. We are 

limiting the people who are out there as volunteers fighting to save 

our country day in and day out in some very dangerous places. Am 

I right? 

Secretary MATTIS. Well, you are, Senator, in terms of geography 

or time, this sort of thing. And I think that people run on hope, 

and if the enemy hopes we are going to quit on a certain day, or 

if they know we will not deal with them if they step over a certain 

border, then the enemy is going to do exactly that. As our sergeants say in the military, ‘‘the enemy gets a vote.’’ 

Senator ISAKSON. Absolutely. By the way, your comment about a 

rock and roll band, that was—it piped something in my mind. My 

staff is going to get mad at me for doing this. I am ad libbing now. 

But I come from Athens, Georgia, and went to the University of 

Georgia, and it founded a lot of bands. One of the best ones is Wide 

Spread Panic, and that is what happens in continents like Africa, 

the type of countries they are. You have—you are not talking about 

an enemy that is just a country. You are talking about groups 

within those countries who are waging war in their own country 

that we end up getting engaged with one way or another. 

My next question, Secretary of State Tillis, from the standpoint 

of any limitation whatsoever, from your testimony, I take it that 

you do not think there should be—if we were to write a new 

AUMF, it ought to simultaneously go into force and replace the one 

that exists today. There should no gap. Is that correct? 

Secretary TILLERSON. Yes, Senator. We cannot afford to have any 

gap in terms of our authorities. 

Senator ISAKSON. And like Secretary Mattis, you do not think 

there should be any limitation, geographic or otherwise, in that 

AUMF. 

Secretary TILLERSON. No, Senator. Again, this is the nature of 

the enemy we are confronted with today. 

Senator ISAKSON. And we have to be ready to make the decisions 

that those—that those lack of limitations allow us to make at the 

drop of a hat in today’s type of warfare and today’s type of conflict 

around the world. 

Secretary TILLERSON. I think we have seen how quickly this 

enemy can collect itself, raise forces, and overrun territory. We saw 

that happen at an outstanding level of speed in Iraq. 

Senator ISAKSON. My last comment, I have been giving a lot of 

thought to this issue for a lot of reasons. One of them is North 

Korea, which is a serious problem that all of us recognize is serious. I do not know if we all recognize it as serious as it really is. 

But I was in college in the early 60s. John Kennedy was President of the United States. And it was a period of time where the 

Russians put missiles in Cuba and had the potential of launching 

missiles 90 miles north into the United States and into Miami. And 

that was a—you are talking about a huge issue that got 

everybody’s attention. For those few—Ms. Shaheen was not here. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

29 

She was not even born then I know, but most everybody in this 

room was not here, but they were tough times and perilous times. 

President Kennedy did a great thing in that conflict because— 

there was a book, Seven Days in May, that described—he took it— 

we got to the point where we had done the air photography. We 

had the evidence. It was clear that the missiles had been installed 

in Cuba. Khrushchev had beat his shoe on a table and talked about 

he was not going to take them out. And Kennedy had done everything but tell him, yes, he was, and lock themselves away in a 

room. And finally, President Kennedy and his brother, Bobby, sat 

down one night and decided it was time to draw a line that he 

would have to cross. And they used an embargo on an island as a 

line—a red line in the sand, so to speak. 

Now, I know North Korea is not an island. I do not want anybody to think I am comparing that. But what I am saying if there 

was a non-lethal, but provocative, way to force them to have to 

come into the game that they have started with, the North Koreans, we are getting close in my mind to that point. I know you all 

are thinking about it today, and the last thing I would want you 

to do is talk about it because he is over there in North Korea 

watching our television right now anyway getting his intelligence. 

But we are getting close to that particular time in the history of 

or country where it is an example of how you go to the next step 

without necessarily risking a life, by drawing the line in the sand 

that somebody has got to cross, or else you do end up engaged with 

them. So, I just wanted to throw that thought out. I did not want 

you to have to respond to it. But I thought it was a great example 

of leadership by a great President at that time in a time that certainly was similar to what we face today with North Korea. 

Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Senator Markey. 

Senator MARKEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank you 

both for your service. 

During the last Congress and again this past January, I introduced the Restricting First Use of Nuclear Weapons Act with Representative Ted Lieu. This bill would ensure that no President can 

launch a first-use nuclear attack against any target anywhere 

without a declaration of war from Congress. Under existing laws, 

the President possesses unilateral authority to use a first-use nuclear strike on anyone anywhere around the world, even in the absence of a nuclear attack against us or our allies. 

There is no question that since the dawn of the nuclear age, it 

has been essential for the President to have clear authority to respond to nuclear attacks on the United States, our forces, or our 

allies. But in my view, no one person should have the power to 

launch a first-use nuclear strike without congressional approval. 

Under Article II of the Constitution, the President has authority 

to repel sudden attacks as soon as our military and intelligence 

agencies inform him of such an attack. Nothing in our bill changes 

the President’s authority to use nuclear weapons against anyone 

who is carrying out a nuclear attack on the United States, our territories, or our allies. What we do propose is a commonsense step 

to check any President’s authority to launch a first-use nuclear 

strike by prohibiting such a strike unless explicitly authorized by 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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a congressional declaration of war. Since the dawn of the nuclear 

age 7 decades ago, we have been relying upon cooler heads and 

strategic doctrine to forestall the unthinkable, but too often those 

kind of ad hoc measures seem less reassuring than ever. 

Do you think, Secretary Mattis, that the President has the authority to launch a first-use nuclear strike without congressional 

approval? 

Secretary MATTIS. Senator, first, I would not say it is ad hoc. It 

is extremely rigorous the discussions and the step-through process 

for decision making. And I would just prefer not to talk about a hypothetical that we have never confronted since we—basically in the 

post-World War II time to today, we have never—we have never 

had something like that come up. 

Senator MARKEY. Do you contemplate a circumstance within 

which the President of the United States could launch nuclear 

weapons against another country where that country has not 

launched nuclear weapons against us? 

Secretary MATTIS. If we—if we saw they were preparing to do so 

and it was imminent, I could imagine it. It is not the only tool in 

the toolkit to try to address something like that, but I believe that 

congressional oversight does not equate to operational control. I 

think that we have to keep trust, keep faith in the system that we 

have that has proven effective now for decades. 

Senator MARKEY. Well, again, we are in the circumstance now 

where the President talks at least elliptically to preventative war, 

which would mean the United States launching nuclear weapons 

potentially against North Korea as we did in Iraq. That is not nuclear weapons, but starting a war in order to disarm Saddam of nuclear weapons. That was at least the ostensible justification that 

Dick Cheney gave 2 days before the war began. 

So, in your opinion, is there a circumstance under which we 

would be able to use nuclear weapons if we have not been attacked 

with them? 

Secretary MATTIS. The question, again, please, Senator? 

Senator MARKEY. Again, I am coming back to this question of 

whether or not there is a scenario under which a first strike using 

nuclear weapons could, in fact, be used by the President of the 

United States without consulting any member of the United States 

Congress, much less the entire Congress in its entirety. 

Secretary MATTIS. Senator, again, it’s a hypothetical. I think that 

if there was an imminent strike and it was the only way to stop 

it, and I am not saying that would happen. There may be different 

tools, conventional tools, to stop it, but he has a responsibility to 

protect the country. 

Senator MARKEY. Well, I think—I think it is too important a subject for the United States Congress not to be informed as to what 

the circumstances are under which we would use nuclear weapons 

first. I think that it is imperative for you, and Secretary of State, 

and others, if necessary, to give us the classified briefing as to 

what those circumstances might be as to when you think they 

would have to be used, they could be used without ever consulting 

the Congress at all. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

31 

Would you be willing to come up and to give us a classified briefing on when you think first use of nuclear weapons is appropriate 

when we have not been attacked? 

Secretary MATTIS. Senator, I have a record of never being reluctant to come up and speak. Some hearings are best in closed session, but I am often reluctant to speak to hypotheticals. But I can 

certainly go part way down that road in terms of what might occasion something like that, like an imminent attack, yes. 

Senator MARKEY. Well, in my opinion, no human being should 

have the authority to use nuclear weapons if there has not been 

an attack. We have the most powerful military in the world—Air 

Force, Navy, Army. If there is—if there is a threat that is conventional, then we have a conventional response, but if nuclear weapons are used, I think that there has to be a process by which the 

United States Congress is consulted. 

This is not something, in my opinion, which is any longer hypothetical. I think it is something that President Trump contemplates, although I will add that we introduced the legislation 

when Hillary Clinton was ahead by seven points last September. 

So, it has to do more with whether or not any President should 

have this authority unfettered. 

What would be the process right now to use nuclear weapons? 

What would the President have to go through? Could you walk us 

through what that consultation would have to be? 

The CHAIRMAN. We will walk that through in another hearing if 

it is okay. And just for what it is worth, we have had—I know that 

you have asked about this, and I appreciate that. Other members 

have asked the same. We have met with CRS and understand that 

there has not been a hearing on this topic, through them—they 

could be incorrect—since the 1970s. And so, we do plan to have a 

hearing to walk through how the process works. You know, there 

are multiple scenarios that come into play, and I think a full hearing would be much better than a 1-minute response. 

Senator MARKEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Risch. 

Senator RISCH. Gentlemen, thank you, and thank you for your 

service. 

You know I have been 9 years on this committee and the Intelligence Committee, and I have sat through literally dozens and dozens and dozens of debates, arguments, hearings, witnesses on 

AUMF and trying to redo the 2001/2002, or replace them and do 

a new one. And I am struck with a number of things after all that 

time. 

Number one, everybody wants to do something. Everybody wants 

a new AUMF, and the parties on both sides are working, I really 

believe, in good faith. It certainly is not a partisan exercise. There 

are people on both sides working on a bipartisan basis to do this. 

The second thing that has struck me is I have seen dozens of 

iterations of what a new—what a bill would look—a resolution 

would look like. And the problem is we get high centered on the 

details, and after listening to all this, I am a little pessimistic 

about whether we can actually do something new. The old system 

is in place, and with all due respect to my good—my really good 

friend, Senator Flake, you know, none of us voted on the original 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

32 

2001/2001, but we vote every year on this when it comes to the appropriations. In fact, at times, we vote multiple times a year, depending upon how many CRs that we do. 

So, Congress could stop fighting ISIS if we wanted to. You know, 

we all the time put restrictions on funding as to what the money 

cannot be used for, and we are pretty successful in that regard 

when we do it. The problem is, of course, we both know that the— 

that the will is different than what we would like to see in a perfect world. So, I agree with you, we did not vote on it directly, but 

all of us here have had a say every single year. 

In any event, you know, the Founding Fathers had a really good 

idea. They said, look, the first branch of government, the legislative 

branch should decide when we are going to war. Really good idea 

because the—we are not made up of the military branch. The military branch is the one more likely to pull the trigger quicker than 

the—than the civilian branch is. So, they put that in our hands. 

The other idea they had, which was also an excellent idea, is that 

Congress would not run the war. As has been pointed out here, you 

cannot have the politicians running the war. You need a commander-in-chief, and that was a really good idea. The difficulty, of 

course, today is things have changed so dramatically since the time 

that that was done. War fighting has changed. On top of that, 

those guys could not possibly have thought that a war we are fighting is against non-state actors, against people dispersed all over 

the world with a common idea of what they—what they want to accomplish. And it is so different today than what it was then. 

So, where does that leave us? I think we have got the constitutional provisions, which are pretty clear. We have got the War 

Powers Act, which you can argue is constitutional in all or in part. 

And we are moving forward, but we do not seem to be headed towards a resolution on this AUMF. 

I would like to get your thoughts on an issue that has already 

been touched on. We have talked a lot about terrorism because that 

is where the—that is where the fight is. But I think North Korea 

has been raised a couple of times, and to me, that is the biggest 

issue that we have if you are going to describe ‘‘big.’’ What happens 

when somebody knocks on the door of the Oval Office and says, Mr. 

President, North Korea has just launched, what do you want us to 

do? And, look, there is no time for an AUMF. There is no time to 

get the lawyers involved to determine what can or cannot be done. 

And somebody has got to make—somebody has got to make that 

decision. 

So, I appreciate the chairman’s thoughts that we should have a— 

should have a separate hearing on this particular issue. But I 

would like to get your thoughts on what—and I know the lawyers 

are on both sides of this. I have heard cadres of lawyers argue 

whether the President has this power, whether it is limited, whether Congress has that power. I would like to get your thoughts 

under the scenario I just talked about. 

As far as the terrorism thing, we deal with that regularly in the 

Intelligence Committee and on this committee. Tell me—tell me 

about North Korea. What happens? What happens if somebody 

knocks on the door and says, Mr. President, they have launched? 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

33 

A summary. In summary. I am not going to ask you to give us anything classified obviously. 

Secretary MATTIS. Senator, the first step, of course, would be 

that our ballistic missile defense forces at sea and in Alaska, California, the various radars would be feeding in, and they would do— 

they would do what they are designed to do as we make every effort to take them out. The response, if that is what you are referring to, after the immediate defense, would, of course, depend on 

the President and laying out options, a wide array of options, I will 

tell you, and in alliance with our allies as well, I might add, because many of them have roles to play here and have indicated 

they will be with us. And we would take the action the President 

directed, and I am sure that Congress would be intimately involved. 

Senator RISCH. Well, and, of course, under the scenario I have 

outlined, this is a matter of minutes, not a matter of days or even 

hours. 

Secretary MATTIS. Defenses will go, sir, if we do not do any—— 

Senator RISCH. I get that. 

Secretary MATTIS. I mean, the President will be woken up or 

whatever, but our commands are—we rehearse this, I will just tell 

you, routinely. 

Senator RISCH. I get that. 

Secretary MATTIS. I will just leave it at that in this open session, 

sir. 

Senator RISCH. Secretary Tillerson, do you have anything to add 

to that? 

Secretary TILLERSON. Well, I think as Secretary Mattis indicated, 

we do have defensive mechanisms which are in place. There would 

be some judgment made as to the effectiveness of those, and then 

there would be some judgment made of whether a necessary and 

proportionate response is required. 

You know, one of the strengths over the last 70 years has been 

the deterrence, and the fact that no President—Republican or Democrat—has ever foresworn the first-strike capability. That has 

served us for 70 years. So, I think any consideration of foregoing 

that does change in a very material way the strength of that deterrence. 

Senator RISCH. I agree, Mr. Secretary. And also, it seems to me 

that the enemy we are dealing with here with North Korea, that 

deterrence issue does not seem to be fazing them because either a 

man would have to be absolutely crazy or incredibly stupid to not 

know what was going to happen after that. 

My time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. So, I think in that scenario, it is about a 15- to 

20-minute process before response takes place. And, again, I think 

it would be very edifying for us to walk through that. 

Let me, before I turn to Senator Kaine, Secretary Mattis, you 

have—you have, I know, said on several occasions that you think 

it would be great if Congress spoke with one voice on this issue and 

showed support. And, look, I hope we are going to have an outcome 

here that does that. But does anybody get any sense anywhere in 

the world that the United States and the people that are within 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

34 

the United States are somehow divided over fighting ISIS, alQaeda, and groups that spin off? 

Secretary MATTIS. Chairman, there have been times when allies 

and even, I think, our adversaries have been convinced we were 

willing to give up and pull out of certain theaters, yes, sir, I think 

so, but those are operational aspects. I think as far as our antipathy of people—— 

The CHAIRMAN. And you are really speaking more to what happened in Iraq and what happened—what are you speaking to when 

you say ‘‘them being concerned about.’’ 

Secretary MATTIS. Pulling out—yeah, announcing the pullout 

from Iraq, sir. Obviously, that was one of the reasons ISIS had a 

chance to grow. When we were talking about pulling out of Afghanistan, we had a total of 50 nations in the field fighting the enemy. 

As we were pulling out, we have now dropped to 39. That is turning around, and those allies are coming back on board, adding 

troops based on the rollout of our South Asia strategy. 

So, you can see what happens as both—you know, when we 

started pulling out of Afghanistan, people thought, well, maybe the 

Taliban will want to make peace then. Some of us doubted that, 

but, in fact, they accelerated their campaign. So, you see the enemy’s response. You see allies, 11 of them, leaving the field when 

they saw us saying we were going to leave. So, yes, it does have 

an effect. But I do not think it is that the enemy believes the 

American people are suddenly willing to vote for the kind of things 

our enemy exists for, believes in. But they at times question whether or not we have the will to stand the strain. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Senator Kaine. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Mr. Chair. The question of this hearing is whether we can be in an endless war with no congressional 

vote against newly-formed terrorist groups all over the world forever. We are in year 17, and I have heard testimony before that 

this could go on for generations with no vote of Congress. 

The recent deaths of four American troops in Niger and the news 

about a June death of a Green Beret in Mali while deployed there 

on a special forces mission raise many questions about the geographic scope of the American military campaign against terrorism. 

And I repeat what I have often said in the last 4 years: it is time 

for Congress to have a public debate and vote about an authorization for U.S. military action against non-state terrorist groups. 

Many of us believe we are legally required to do. Others believe if 

not required, we would be wise to do so. 

Secretary Mattis has testified in support of this on earlier occasions, as has the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General 

Dunford. Our troops and the American public deserve an open debate and vote on the extent of military operations. If not in year 

17, in year 30? In year 40? In year 50? 

Mr. Chairman, I want to introduce for the record a contract solicitation issued by the Navy in 2014 seeking to contract with an entity able to provide casualty evacuation, search and rescue, and personnel recovery in connection with ‘‘high-risk activities’’ in Africa. 

It designates 14 nations, five of which have been identified to Congress in War Powers notice letters. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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I find no fault with the contract solicitation. You have to plan. 

But I believe that this level of planning, and this is from the 

Obama administration era, demonstrates a contemplated scope for 

American counterterrorism activity in Africa far greater than what 

has been briefed to Congress, and significantly greater than what 

the American public understands. 

[The information referred to is located at the end of this hearing 

transcript on pages 97.] 

Senator KAINE. To our witnesses, Senator Flake and I have introduced an authorization for military action against ISIS, alQaeda, and the Taliban to replace 2001 and 2002, and to finally engage us in our Article I responsibility. You signed a letter to Congress on September 5th opposing the proposal. I will introduce that 

for the record as well. 

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection. 

[The information referred to is located at the end of this hearing 

transcript on page 93.] 

Senator KAINE. I think we can stipulate that this administration, 

like the two preceding administrations, believes that the 2001 authorization and 2002 gives it broad power in this area, and would 

rather than not have any congressional revision. But we have a job 

to do, the Article I branch, so let me ask you about your reasoning. 

Your first objection in the letter to the proposal is that ‘‘The legislation would arbitrarily terminate the authorization 5 years after 

date of enactment. This is inconsistent with a conditions-based approach in the President’s South Asia strategy. Such a provision 

could also unintentionally embolden our enemies with a recognizable goal of outlasting us.’’ 

The annual NDAA we pass every year expires every year, but 

Congress still manages to pass the next NDAA. And appropriations 

bills and continuing resolutions expire every year, and then they 

are followed by subsequent appropriations. And other critical national security legislation must have legislation, like FISA, for example, commonly have an expiration date and a need for congressional reauthorization. 

Do either of you view the annual expiration of the NDAA or defense appropriations as Congress ‘‘arbitrarily terminating our support for the military?’’ 

Secretary MATTIS. No, sir, we have several hundred years that 

this works. It may be imperfectly with continuing resolutions, but 

I suggest the AUMF is substantially different. 

Senator KAINE. Do you have any evidence that the annual expiration of the NDA or defense appropriations unintentionally 

emboldens our enemies? 

Secretary MATTIS. The continuing resolution has certainly inhibited our ability to adjust the military to the modern threats. 

Senator KAINE. Do you think the enemies are emboldened by 

thinking that we will not pass a CR or will not pass an appropriation? 

Secretary MATTIS. I do not think they understand those kind of 

intricacies, whereas an AUMF is a statement of purpose. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

36 

Senator KAINE. You count on being able to get the next NDAA 

passed and the next appropriations bill passed because you have 

confidence in your request, and you have confidence in Congress to 

take seriously the need to defend the United States. Is that not correct? 

Secretary MATTIS. That is correct, Senator. My reservation is 

that, for example, I have several dozen people who have been waiting some time for hearings in order to give me the civilian oversight of the Department of Defense we need and respond appropriately in keeping Congress informed, and I cannot seem to get 

floor votes on some and certainly hearings for others. So, I think 

it is the speed at the—at the speed of relevance for something like 

this. We would want to make certain that where you get into could 

be construed as the—not just the oversight, but the management 

or direction of this fight has a degree of continuity that destroys 

the enemy’s confidence that they can outlast their enemies. 

Senator KAINE. If you deemed it advisable at the end of 5 years 

that we should continue the battle against these authorizations, do 

you doubt your ability to make the case to Congress, or you 

doubt—do you doubt the ability of Congress to take seriously the 

need to defend the Nation against terrorist organizations? 

Secretary MATTIS. Sir, I am not in the political realm. I realize 

I play a political role up here, but I am probably—— 

Senator KAINE. You do not—you do not doubt the will of Congress to battle non-state terrorist groups, do you, Secretary? 

Secretary MATTIS. Sir, this war is so non-traditional that I think 

we—— 

Senator KAINE. I understand that, but you do not doubt the will 

of Congress to defend the Nation against non-state terrorist groups, 

do you? 

Secretary MATTIS. No, I do not. 

Senator KAINE. A second objection, if I could—I am sorry I am 

having to move—is that the resolution includes a definition of ‘‘associated persons or forces’’ that is inconsistent and could result in 

unnecessary uncertainty. The definition says, ‘‘associated persons 

or forces or individual entities other than a sovereign state that are 

part of or substantially support al-Qaeda, the Taliban, or ISIS, and 

are engaged in hostilities against U.S. armed forces and other personnel.’’ I am just going to leave that for the record. I think it is 

crystal clear, and there is no uncertainty about it. 

The third and final objection in your letter is that the joint resolution would create a cumbersome congressional review process for 

use of force against new associated forces or new countries. Let me 

ask you this. Does the administration object to having to identify 

to Congress the associated forces we are targeting with military 

force, to notify us? 

Secretary MATTIS. I believe that under Article II of the Constitution, the President has the authority to declare a threat to the 

United States as the elected Commander-in-Chief. 

Senator KAINE. Do you object—does the administration object to 

notifying Congress of the associated forces against which you are 

taking military action? 

Secretary MATTIS. I do not think so, sir. We have been forthcoming with that very information. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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Senator KAINE. You have, and do you object to the need to notify 

Congress of the countries where military action is undertaken? You 

do that in the War Powers letters correct, right? 

Secretary MATTIS. We do it routinely, sir. 

Senator KAINE. That is all that Senator Flake and I have in our 

resolution. We require you to notify us about countries and notify 

us about associated forces, and you can immediately take action 

against them, subject only to a resolution of disapproval by Congress, which is the current law. 

If I could just conclude, Mr. Chairman. Based on the answers in 

this quick thing, and it is tough to do it so quickly, I have a hard 

time understanding the opposition to the resolution as anything 

other than we do not want congressional oversight. There is a 5- 

year sunset reauthorization with an opportunity to extend just like 

we do in FISA, just like we do in the Patriot Act, just like we do 

in NDAA, just like we do in appropriations. The ‘‘associated forces’’ 

definition is extremely clear. The process for countries is not a geographic limitation. It is just a notice requirement that Congress 

can then affirmatively take steps under the normal rules of the 

Constitution to rebut. 

I recognize that the administration feels like it does not want 

any more authority, but to quote my colleague, we are more than 

a feedback loop. This is a constitutional power, and we should not 

be putting troops into harm’s way, and as Congress standing back 

and trying not to have our fingerprints on this when it is mutating 

all over the globe. 

The CHAIRMAN. I think we are good. 

Senator KAINE. I think it is a forever war, and I worry about 

deeply about handing the power over to presidents to do this without the feel—the need to come to Congress at all. Thanks, Mr. 

Chair. 

The CHAIRMAN. You did a good job. [Laughter.] 

The CHAIRMAN. I do have remaining time. I do want to say that 

what the senator said is true. I mean, you just have to notify the 

countries. You just have to notify the additional groups, so that 

part is not cumbersome. 

I would ask, and this was going to be a cue from us anyway, but 

I would like to know what the problem is with the associated 

forces. It does appear to be very broad, and I would like, if it takes 

a classified response, we will be glad to take it. But it is—I do not 

understand what the problem is with associated forces, and I think 

it would be—I actually ask, and I know you will send me a response to that. I appreciate it. Senator Paul. 

Senator PAUL. You know, I think it should not surprise any of 

us that administrations, Republican and Democrat, come to us and 

say they believe in unlimited Article II power to execute war. What 

should surprise and worry us, though, is that it seems like they 

also argue that they have virtually unlimited power to initiate and 

to execute war, and that is where the real problem comes here. 

I am pretty much like everybody else, execute the war. I do not 

want to have you restrained by rules of engagement, I want to engage and kill the enemy, but initiation of the war was given to us. 

Madison wrote that the executive branch is the branch most 

prone to war, and, therefore, was studied—we gave that power to 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

38 

the legislature. And so, while some would argue, well, we can just 

not appropriate money, that becomes very difficult. Even in Vietnam, nobody wanted to cut off the money because no one wants to 

be accused of not giving money to soldiers in the field. So, our real 

only chance of preventing war is not to initiate the war. 

The problem we have with you coming forward to us and saying—my goodness, you will not even tell us we are not going to 

have preventative or preemptive war with North Korea. This sends 

a signal not just that we are willing to do first strike, but what signal does it send to enemies of other nuclear powers—enemies of 

Russia, enemies of China, enemies of Pakistan, of India—that we 

are reserving the right, if we do not like what weapon you have 

and you think it might reach us, we might as well just take you 

out. 

I mean, look, Pakistan and India are pointed at each other. You 

have got Israel pointed at Saudi Arabia, pointed at Iran. You have 

all of these enemies, and if we are going to assert that, yes, we 

have the right and the will, and we will take preemptive war 

against a nuclear power, I think that is very troublesome. But if 

we want to fix it, we should fix it. 

You know, we complain if administrations want to take II power, 

we reassert our power. It is not just us. It has been generation 

after generation of Congress just acquiescing in this. And while I 

applaud the AUMF that is being put forward as asserting our authority, if it does not limit the authority of the executive, I am not 

sure we are a lot better. My problem, if the executive branch thinks 

it is too restrictive, I think will still authorize war in 34 countries. 

At least seven for certain, but probably 30-some odd. 

So, when we look at this and we want to ask whether or not 

there should be limitations, whether or not we are prepared to be 

involved in perpetual war, or whether we are prepared to let any 

president involve us in perpetual war, we have to think about this. 

I mean, the war started in the first generation after Muhammad. 

I mean, you have got Ali Hussein, and Yazid the First fighting in 

66 A.D. They still remember the Battle of Karbala. The Shia still 

mourn that battle 13-some-odd years later. Are we willing just to 

not have any more votes and say the vote in 2011? No intellectually honest person thinks 2011 has anything—2001 has anything 

to do with this, I promise you that. 

It says specifically we are going after the enemies who attacked 

us. ISIS has nothing to do with that. Nobody in Niger has anything 

to do with 9/11 other than they have sort of this ideology of radical 

Islam. But I do not think we gave the executive branch a blanket 

authority just to go to war anywhere they want against people who 

they say are, you know, a part of radical Islam. Ultimately there 

is going to have to be diplomacy involved in this as well. 

You know, how are we ever going to end the war? Is there ever 

an end to this war? But really, the crux of the argument is over 

who has the power. You say you have got it. Dick Cheney once said 

that it should be unconstitutional to challenge Article II authority, 

which he also meant to be unlimited basically. The Constitution 

was very clear. We were supposed to initiate war. It does not matter whether it is a state or a non-state actor, initiation of war 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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comes from Congress, and I believe that very strongly. And I think 

if we all did, we should assert our power. 

We have the ability to assert our power, and we should resist 

when the administration—anyone, Republican or Democrat—comes 

before us and tells us they have—they believe they have the ability 

to have preemptive war anywhere, any time, and they have the 

ability to continue to fight a war against an ideology wherever they 

perceive it to be. So, I think it is very, very dangerous, and this 

should be a wake-up call to all of us, and if we can come together. 

What I would say, though, just passing an AUMF is not enough 

for me because it should be an AUMF that does give us some hope 

of someday coming to an end, and someday there will be an end 

to the war. I see no end to this war historically. I think the war 

and the answers are going to come from within Islam. I think 

Islam is going to ultimately have to stamp out. I think we are a 

target everywhere we go. And, yes, we can defeat anyone, but I do 

not think in the end it ends the war. 

I mean, we went to Yemen. You guys just did it on your own. 

So, you are in a new war theater now. You are involved with Saudi 

Arabia there. You got 17 million people on the point of starvation 

in Yemen, and we are assisting and aiding the Saudis in blockading. We give them weapons. They kill civilians. They killed 150 

people in a funeral procession. 

So, when we go to a village and you guys come and say, oh, we 

got great information, which no one will tell me specifically what 

the information came from that village in Yemen. But when we 

went in there unavoidably, and I do not blame our soldiers, I blame 

us, the people in charge, but women and children were killed in 

that village. What do you think—and you say, well, we were—we 

did not try to do that. Sure, but what do you think they tell about 

us in the surrounding communities? What do you think they say 

about the time the Americans came in the night, and women, children, and a whole village was wiped out? What do you think they 

say about that? They will repeat that by oral tradition. The same 

way they remember Karbala from 680 A.D., they are going to remember this. 

So, I do not think we can kill more than we create in the process, 

so ultimately there is going to have to be another way that involves 

some diplomacy, some discussion. It does not mean we cannot resist the enemy and we should not, but it should not be your power. 

I am here to say very forcefully it is not your power. But the only 

way we will ever change that is if we as a body stand up and say 

enough is enough, we are going to reassert the power of the Senate 

and the power of Congress to determine these things. And we 

could, and my admonition is to do that. 

I am alarmed today to find out that Article 10 basically has us 

involved in civil wars in Africa. So, we can call any kind of euphemism we want—‘‘train and equip’’—but it sounds like you have got 

a conflict going on there. You have got conflict there. You have got 

conflict going on in Niger. We have 6,000 troops in 54 countries in 

Africa, and we should just politely say, oh, we were given this authority under Article 10 to be anywhere any time? 

I was alarmed that you were going to justify it with 9/11. Now 

I am even more alarmed that Section 10 or Article 10 sounds like 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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you believe you can be anywhere any time whether there is a war 

going on or not. And we can say it is train and equip, but I suspect 

there is more going on in Niger than train and equip. 

But I do not think there is ultimately a question there other than 

I hope that we as a body would pull together, and stand up, and 

resist, not because you are bad people. You are good people. You 

served your country. You want what is best for your country. All 

soldiers are. But the balance of power—Madison said we would pit 

ambition against ambition, so we would check and balance each 

other. We have not been checking and balancing the executive 

branch for 60-some odd years, maybe longer. So, we need to stand 

up, and that is my admonition to our body, and I do not think I 

will change your minds. But it is an admonition that we should 

have a real full-throated debate, and I thank the chairman for the 

beginning of this. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. No, thank you very much. And my guess is 

under Title 50 authorities, there is a great deal underway that the 

American people nor us are aware of, but that is part of what we 

are dealing with here. Senator Merkley. 

Senator MERKLEY. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank 

you to both of you, Secretaries, for your management of perilous 

circumstances around the world. 

Secretary Tillerson, I believe I understood you to say that the retention of the potential for first use with nuclear weapons has been 

a foundational doctrine that has helped keep the peace over the 

last, I think you referred to 70 years. Did I catch that right? 

Secretary TILLERSON. Yes, Senator. 

Senator MERKLEY. I would say that maybe not. It has not generally been the retention of the potential for first use as it has been 

assured destruction, assured retaliation that has kept that peace, 

and there is a significant difference between the two. And I believe 

I heard one of you refer to that we had not really considered the 

use of nuclear weapons after World War II. I am not sure if I heard 

that right. Did I hear that right? 

Secretary MATTIS. Senator, I said that we have not initiated the 

use of nuclear weapons since World War II. 

Senator MERKLEY. Okay, great. And that would certainly be very 

accurate, but we have had serious conversations about the potential of using a nuclear weapon in—as a first-use weapon both in 

Vietnam and in Korea. And, Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit 

for the record a CIA document that goes through—it is March 18th, 

1966. 

Senator RISCH. [Presiding] There is no objection. 

[The information referred to is located at the end of this hearing 

transcript on page 81.] 

Senator MERKLEY. Thank you. It noted they were analyzing in 

the context of a debate about using nuclear weapons the issues 

that might flow should we choose to do so, and they noted some 

of the following things. They said NATO would be badly shaken. 

They said once a taboo had been broken, there would remain no 

effective barrier to the expansion of such weapons. They said there 

would be great agitation in Japan, probably including the loss of 

facilities available to the United States. They said there would be 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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accelerated momentum for nuclear proliferation, that there would 

be fundamental revulsion of the United States, including condemnation of the United States and the United Nations, that no 

British government that failed to condemn the U.S. would probably 

be able to stand, and that there would be pressure for immediate 

nuclear disarmament. This was the list of the things that they 

talked about that would be consequences. 

Are these all kind of concerns that you all would share if the 

U.S. was to utilize a nuclear weapon against North Korea, or another circumstance where it is essentially a conventional setting? 

Secretary TILLERSON. Senator, are you asking with respect to a 

first strike or use of a weapon under any circumstance? 

Senator MERKLEY. Use of a first strike with a U.S. nuclear weapon against conventional forces. 

Secretary TILLERSON. I am sure some of those conditions in that 

report are enduring. I am not sure all of them are. I would need 

to study it and give it greater thought. 

Senator MERKLEY. Secretary Mattis? 

Secretary MATTIS. I would have to study it, sir. I would just tell 

you that we have not been discussing this sort of thing in any kind 

of an actionable way. 

Senator MERKLEY. Thank you. I am very, very pleased to hear 

that. I was very struck when I read this list. It is that they would 

all be things that probably stand up today if we were discussing 

them, the impact on NATO, our allies, the world attitude toward 

us, the effect on the British Government, and so forth. It just—I 

was almost like, wow, it could be a list for today’s conversation. 

Turning to the 2001 AUMF, my colleague from Kentucky, and 

please correct me if I get this wrong, but noted that most rational 

people looking at the 2001 AUMF would not see a connection to the 

uses in which it is being employed today. Did I get that right? And 

I have it—I have it here in my hand. 

And earlier, Secretary Tillerson, you noted that you were not 

sure of the motivations behind that AUMF, but it is so clearly laid 

out in the ‘‘whereases’’ of that—of that AUMF. And it is very specifically targeted to use all necessary and appropriate force against 

nations, organizations, or persons planning, or authorized, or committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred or harbored 

such organizations or persons. Completely the—completely about 

those 2001 attacks. 

The thing that I think all we are struggling with as a committee 

in our role in this constitutional balance is between a situation— 

a vision of the past in which our Constitution was framed around 

a declaration of war and then an executive who commanded forces 

in such wars, and the modern battlefield of the world in which 

there are terrorist groups scattered about, and whether what you 

are asking for, which sounds like permanent worldwide ability for 

the executive on its own to take on radical Islam. And that is quite 

a different vision than the one laid out in our Constitution. 

Am I—am I describing it fairly in terms of—because I did hear 

no timeline, no geographic constraints, no restriction on type of operations. That sounds a whole lot like a permanent transition of 

power to the executive that really takes Congress out of the picture. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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Secretary MATTIS. Senator, that statement from the authorization goes on to say, ‘‘In order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations, or persons.’’ And I think you bring up a very valid point 

because the Westphalian world that the Constitution was written 

in obviously has been thrown aside by these very powerful 

transnational groups that we see right now. 

And so, however we deal with this to keep Congress’ legitimate, 

strong, constitutional power in play has got to recognize that traditional forms of warfare are no longer used. There are ways to do 

this. There are many variations that have been offered for AUMFs 

that could address this or, in some ways will not address it. But 

I think we do have to recognize that Congress was very blunt that 

it was to prevent future acts of terrorism. 

Senator MERKLEY. Yes, and it sure was: ‘‘by such nations and organizations that had been involved in planning, authorizing, and 

assisting the terrorist attacks on September 11th.’’ But often I 

hear, and I think we have heard a number of times today, that this 

has been reinterpreted to involve any associated forces. Now, there 

is no wording in this of associated forces, and it is often, I find in 

just academic discussions, it is people think that those words exist 

in here. 

And I do understand the point that organizations change names, 

and fracture, and move on. But we are quite distant in purpose and 

time from these groups which attacked us on 2001. And the challenge here is what—if one takes this ‘‘associated forces’’ as an addon to this, an implication of this, then the question becomes is not 

almost anything associated in the world, and where is that line? 

And that is a challenge for this committee and in dialogue with the 

executive to figure out what is that line. And that is what we are 

struggling with. And I for one am not ready to concede that the 

line should be wiped out with no geographic limits, no time limits, 

no style of force limits. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. [Presiding] Thank you very much. Senator Gardner. 

Senator GARDNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, 

Secretaries Tillerson and Mattis, for your leadership and your commitment to our country. 

A couple of questions. I believe, Secretary Mattis, you had stated 

that one of the advantages of Congress passing a new AUMF would 

be to show the resolve of Congress and the unity of Congress. What 

does—what does that look like, though, a ‘‘united Congress?’’ Is 

that a filibuster-proof passage of an AUMF? Is that a 100 to nothing passage? What does a ‘‘united passage’’ passed AUMF look like? 

Secretary MATTIS. Well, I am not sure it would have to a hundred percent, sir, but it would have to show, I think, a bipartisan 

embrace of the definition of the threat, and then at least sufficient 

congressional support for what to do about that threat, that we 

would see America standing up saying that is where we stand, if 

that helps, Senator. 

Senator GARDNER. Under the AUMF that is currently in effect, 

has there been any material change to the authorities that you 

view, the President views, the AUMF through that President 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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Obama had not already defined that way, utilizing the same authority, the same reasoning? 

Secretary MATTIS. There have been some changes in the application. 

Senator GARDNER. Rules of engagement issues. 

Secretary MATTIS. That sort of thing. But I do not—I cannot 

think of any change in the authorities that we think we are operating under. 

Senator GARDNER. Has there been any additional AUMF grant of 

authority since President Obama left office over the last 10 

months? 

Secretary MATTIS. I do not believe so, sir. 

Senator GARDNER. If you move from a Title 10 type of action to 

an AUMF type of authorization, what would that require? What 

would that look like? 

Secretary MATTIS. I think it would have to be an authorization 

that defines this enemy sufficiently, that it does not restrict our operations in the field, and sets a condition under which we are to 

fight for an objective. 

Senator GARDNER. So, we are in the Philippines right now under 

Title 10. Is that correct? In the Philippines right now under Title 

10. Is that correct? Do we have special operators in the Philippines? 

Secretary MATTIS. Yes, sir, we do. 

Senator GARDNER. And are they under Title 10? 

Secretary MATTIS. I know we have had them there under Title 

10. The difference is that now with the fight going on in Marawi, 

I believe we reported them under ‘‘other authorities’’ as well, 

AUMF, but I am not positive. I need to check on that. 

Senator GARDNER. So, is that a presidential declaration? Is that 

a determination by you? I mean, when is there a cold break between a Title 10 action and a 2001 AUMF action? 

Secretary MATTIS. Well if troops were to be sent into direct combat, which they are not in the Philippines—we are supporting, 

again, with intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance—that would 

cause us, under the War Powers Resolution, to notify you of that. 

But I think we notify you of the troops there under our normal 

maintaining your knowledge of where we have troops deployed, not 

in a combat role. 

Senator GARDNER. Quickly here because I want to move on to 

North Korea. Quickly here, what is the most significant rule of engagement change that we have seen right now in our fight against 

ISIS from the previous administration to this administration? 

Secretary MATTIS. I believe it would be in Afghanistan where we 

have authorized the troops there not to have a requirement for 

proximity to the enemy. In other words, wherever we see them, we 

can attack them. They are declared hostile—Taliban, al-Qaeda, 

ISIS—and there is no need for them to have to be in self-defense 

mode to call our air support, for example. 

Senator GARDNER. And that goes to your question—your point 

you made on lawfare earlier. They knew that, correct? Our enemy 

knew that. 

Secretary MATTIS. Absolutely. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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Senator GARDNER. They could utilize that rule of engagement 

against us, and that is your point on lawfare that they were protecting themselves based on rule of engagement, correct? 

Secretary MATTIS. Absolutely, sir. 

Senator GARDNER. And we have made significant progress in the 

fight against terrorism because of a change in the rule of engagement, correct? 

Secretary MATTIS. And the tactics we have employed, yes, sir. 

Senator GARDNER. Thank you. North Korea. Secretary Mattis, 

you said that North Korea was the most urgent national security 

threat facing our country. Do you still agree with that today? 

Secretary MATTIS. I do. 

Senator GARDNER. Secretary Tillerson, do you agree with that? 

Secretary TILLERSON. I do. 

Senator GARDNER. Has there been—I hear comments about first 

strike and nuclear capabilities. Kim Jong-un, to our knowledge, has 

not given up his first-strike capabilities. Is that correct? 

Secretary TILLERSON. Well, it is unclear what his striking capabilities are at this point from a nuclear perspective. 

Senator GARDNER. But should he have a nuclear weapon, has he 

given up a first-strike possibility? 

Secretary TILLERSON. Not to my knowledge. 

Senator GARDNER. Secretary Mattis? 

Secretary MATTIS. No, sir. 

Senator GARDNER. Has anything in our nuclear chain of command doctrine changed between the previous administration and 

this administration? 

Secretary MATTIS. No, it has not. 

Senator GARDNER. So, the chain of command, the response, the 

first-strike capability, that is all the same, correct? 

Secretary MATTIS. Yes, sir. 

Senator GARDNER. Secretary Tillerson, you may or may not wish 

to answer that? 

Secretary TILLERSON. No, as far as I am aware, nothing has 

changed. 

Senator GARDNER. Thank you. An additional question on North 

Korea. You have said, Secretary Mattis, I believe, that if there was 

an action going into North Korea, under Article II, the President 

would obviously act if need be, but an AUMF would be required for 

further operations. Is that correct? 

Secretary MATTIS. I would think an AUMF, a declaration of war, 

you know, it would depend on the circumstance, so I would have 

to see the circumstances surrounding the requirement for—to engage in conflict, sir. 

Senator GARDNER. Thank you. And I know that you have made, 

at least in the last week, Secretary Tillerson, that the Department 

of Treasury announced several new sanctions against Chinese entities. Are there more Chinese entities forthcoming in sanctions as 

it relates to North Korea? 

Secretary TILLERSON. There are additional sanctioning targets 

that Treasury has developed. 

Senator GARDNER. Thank you. And I am running out of time 

here, so a couple brief questions for you. Secretary Mattis, do you 

believe the Iraqi Security Forces’ use of U.S. armor is legal under 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

45 

the Iraqi constitution as it relates to what is taking place right now 

with the Kurds—Kurdistan? 

Secretary MATTIS. Sir, right now we have got a pause in the activity on both sides as a result of the referendum, and I think we 

are talking our way through it right now. 

Senator GARDNER. Well, I would like to have an answer, though, 

on the Iraqi Security Forces’ use of U.S. armor and whether that 

is legal under the Iraqi constitution, and whether Iranian involvement in the current situation could create further implications 

under U.S. law as it relates to the use of that equipment. That is 

one question I would like to have an answer to. 

The second question relates to Section 702 reauthorization. I 

know Senator Kaine mentioned FISA reauthorization earlier. Secretary, is the Department of Defense asking for Section 702 to be 

reauthorized as part of the Defense Authorization Act Conference 

Committee? 

Secretary MATTIS. I need to talk with the President about that, 

sir. 

Senator GARDNER. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Before turning to Senator Booker, I do think as 

we move through this, the lawfare issue that you brought up relative to Afghanistan, that was a significant problem. Our enemies 

were aware it existed, and they took advantage of it. And I just— 

I think that was a very good line of questioning also. Senator Booker. 

Senator BOOKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen, for being here, and I appreciate your service to our country. 

Secretary Mattis, right now in Niger, it is becoming a pretty significant beneficiary of a lot of DOD activity, a lot of DOD funding 

under the train and equip—global train and equip program. To my 

understanding, there is a new Air Force facility in Agadez amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars. Is that correct? 

Secretary MATTIS. That is correct. 

Senator BOOKER. And we are seeing a lot of talk now about continued military operations in the region, continued investment of 

U.S. troops as well resources. Is that correct? 

Secretary MATTIS. Senator, we have been operating in Niger and 

the surrounding area for about a little over 20 years now, yes, sir. 

Senator BOOKER. But there is—but my point is that there has 

been a significant increase of recent. 

Secretary MATTIS. There has been recently as we watch—as we 

try to build them up to take care of their own security. 

Senator BOOKER. And at the same time, we are seeing that, at 

least a proposed budget from the administration for food peace programs. It used to total about $33.8 million. The proposed budget 

is now being cut to $1.6 million for all bilateral aid to Niger. Is that 

correct, sir, to your knowledge? 

Secretary MATTIS. I am going to have go back and look at the figure. 

Senator BOOKER. Those figures are correct, in the proposed budget. So, in other words, a massive ratcheting up of our military operations, a proposed decrease. Now, I bring that up to you really because, and I—and I think I have heard you talk to this, but I would 

like for you to speak to it now. You know, we are seeing in a lot 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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of these states we are involved in Africa very different conditions 

often than we have seen in other places we have been involved in 

train and equip programs or fighting in the sense of what is happening with a lot—in a lot of these countries. 

Let us turn to Nigeria for a second. Nigerian military forces have 

conducted significant crimes, I would say, massacres of Shia Muslims in the northeast town of Zaria in which over 350 people were 

killed. The Nigerian air force bombed and displaced persons—a displaced persons camp killing 236 refugees and injuring thousands 

more. In 2014, the military was accused of over 600 unarmed detainees—of killings of over 600 armed detainers, interring them in 

mass graves. There has been very little progress or accountability 

for these incidents. 

And I guess I say this because we seem to be involved in places 

like Nigeria, and you know that as we decrease efforts in stabilizing democracies, helping with food aid, creating an environment 

where there is stability, and we are involved in partnering with 

militaries that are responsible for atrocities, that that creates an 

environment for more terrorism, or do you disagree with that statement, Secretary Mattis? 

Secretary MATTIS. Senator, what we try to do is maintain our 

diplomatic engagement, our development support, at the same time 

provide sufficient security, which is by training them how to do 

their own security behind which the development can occur to remove the root causes. Anywhere you see U.S. troops, Senator, you 

will find them schooling local troops. Part of our training, the law 

of armed conflict is military ethics. We are the good guys in trying 

to get this across. 

Senator BOOKER. I do not take issue with that at all. What I take 

issue with is that you are saying we try to maintain our efforts at 

the diplomacy and food support because that is not reflected in 

budget numbers. 

Let me just continue to the point I was trying to make, that 

there is a lot of extensive research, which I am sure you aware, 

that in addition to socioeconomic status, excessive force by police 

and military forces engenders deep grievances that lead to 

radicalization, and the heavy-handed responses from military drive 

recruitment and violent extremism in organizations that often then 

lead to terrorist activity. You are aware of that research. 

Secretary MATTIS. I am not aware of what we have done. In May 

of 2014, when 276 Nigerian girls were kidnapped. I do not find the 

connection between our activities and Boko Haram’s kidnapping of 

hundreds of girls. 

Senator BOOKER. I was not making—I was not making that connection, sir. I am simply making the point Senator Paul made 

within Yemen, for example, that we are engaged in counterterrorism activities, partnering with military operations like we are 

seeing with Saudi Arabia, like we are seeing with the Nigerian 

forces. And they are conducting operations in a way in which civilians are killed, in which atrocities are accomplished. In your opinion, does that in any way often drive the creation or the—or the 

condition for radicalization? 

Secretary MATTIS. I understand, Senator. It certainly could. I assure you that what we are trying to do is to keep that from hapFOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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pening, those very things. And in this case, the United Nations-recognized government in Yemen is fighting inside a civil war there 

to try to restore that government. And if we do not get it restored, 

then that will set the conditions for the very kind of growth of terrorist groups that you have mentioned. 

Senator BOOKER. In Somalia, the language of your current notification of June 27th says, ‘‘United States forces also advise, assist, 

and now accompany regional forces.’’ Is that a change that means 

that we could be accompanying regional forces, means a potential 

combat role for troops in Somalia? 

Secretary MATTIS. Yes, sir. However, our mission there is still to 

train, and advise, and assist them by accompanying them how to 

carry out their own security. We are not taking over the fighting 

from the Somalia or the Africa Union Forces, AU Forces. 

Senator BOOKER. So, I have run out of time. I just want to say 

there is a whole bunch more questions on a lot of the activities in 

Africa that I would love to get answers to, Mr. Chairman. I will 

also say that it strains my understanding of what an authorization 

for the use of military force—I do not want to tell you what I was 

doing 16 years ago. [Laughter.] 

Senator BOOKER. But it really strains me—— 

The CHAIRMAN. I am sure we do not want to hear it. 

Senator BOOKER. Okay. [Laughter.] 

Senator BOOKER [continuing]. It strains me that this idea that 

somehow that authorization is being used, I do not care if it is Indonesia, where there is a terrorist activity in the Philippines, 

Niger, Somalia—I can go through—that we are still relying for all 

of these activities. There has been no objective, in my opinion, of 

a conversation had enough to see if we are really achieving U.S. 

aims or engaging in a way that is making this world a much more 

complex place. And I really do agree with a lot of my colleagues, 

that we should be having this debate openly and more in Congress. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you so much. Senator Barrasso. 

Senator BARRASSO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Mattis, 

as we were discussing, you have just gotten back from Korea, the— 

just right before this time today. You were at the DMZ, and you 

said, ‘‘North Korea has accelerated the threat that it poses to its 

neighbors in the world through its illegal and unnecessary missile 

and nuclear weapons program.’’ 

Well, today North Korea announced that it is going to be launching more ‘‘satellites’’ into space, and I am just wondering if these 

satellite launches are simply just another way for North Korea to 

test ballistic missiles under the guise now of a space program. 

Secretary MATTIS. The application of technology is by and large 

the same, sir. 

Senator BARRASSO. Secretary Tillerson, I want to switch a little 

bit to what I see happening in terms of recent confrontations between the government of Iraq and the Kurdistan regional government. I am very concerned about the Christians and the minority 

communities in the disputed territories that are being impacted by 

this. There have been recent media reports of 700 to a thousand 

Christian families forced to flee their homes in Telasofa, a Christian town about 19 miles north of Mosul. Many of these Iraqi 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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Christians recently just were able to return to their home, to their 

villages after ISIS had forced them out of the area. 

So, could you just spend a little time explaining what are you 

hearing from Christian leaders in their—in these communities and 

what the U.S. is doing to ensure that Christian and other vulnerable minorities are being protected? 

Secretary TILLERSON. Senator, the good news is they are trying 

to get back to their homes, their villages, their traditional homes 

that they fled when ISIS entered the area. And many of their villages have been spared because the fighting did not occur there. 

We have been in direct contact with Christian leaders in those 

communities who are concerned that this conflict between Kurdish 

Peshmerga forces and Iraqi Central Government forces not be 

fought out in their villages, and as a result, they have pulled their 

forces out. 

Prime Minister Abadi has ensured that his forces stay out of 

those villages, and I think, to my knowledge, the Kurdish have 

pulled out of those villages as well. So, we have direct engagement 

with local leaders of those communities and Christian leaders that 

are trying to bring those populations back. 

Senator BARRASSO. Thank you. Secretary Mattis, earlier this 

month there were violent clashes between the Iraqi Security Forces 

and the Kurdish Peshmerga in Northern Iraq. The media reports 

indicated that the Iraqi government had moved forces into the disputed areas and the region of Kurdistan. So, I am wondering what 

impact does the fighting have on our efforts of the U.S.-led international coalition against ISIS in terms of the ability to move military equipment and supplies to allied forces in Iraq and in Syria? 

Secretary MATTIS. Senator, the fighting has disrupted and delayed some of those movements of our equipment, logistics support, 

ammunition, for example. But I would point out that the Iraqi 

forces moved into areas short of the 2004 green line. And as a result, although there were some firefights along there, Secretary 

Tillerson has been engaged diplomatically. We always lead diplomatically on all of our efforts, and those have been successful. 

And Prime Minister Abadi has, in effect, been able to hold things 

under control, make certain none of these militias are creating 

more problems as the Kurds sort out their political situation in 

Erbil. 

Senator BARRASSO. Thank you. And in terms of moving first diplomatically, if I could Secretary Tillerson, turn to Pakistan. August 

21st, President Trump gave a primetime address to announce his 

strategy for Afghanistan. He said a pillar of that strategy was, as 

he said, ‘‘to change the approach in how to deal with Pakistan.’’ 

You briefly discussed this issue while you were traveling in the region last week. You said that you have given the Pakistanis, I 

think, ‘‘certain expectations we have of their government.’’ And you 

went on to say that you were ‘‘attempting to put in place a mechanism of cooperation through information sharing and action to be 

taken to begin to deny these organizations the ability to launch attacks.’’ 

So, could you talk a little bit about what is the change to approach to Pakistan and maybe some of the expectations that you 

have articulated for the Pakistani government that you could share 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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with the committee in terms of what this cooperation is going to 

look like? 

Secretary TILLERSON. Well, I can share some broad contours, and 

if there is an interest in more detail, we might need to do that in 

a closed hearing. But the conversation with the Pakistani government is for them to recognize that they will be one of the greatest 

beneficiaries of a successful peace process in Afghanistan. Pakistan 

lives with two very unstable borders, one with Afghanistan and one 

with India. And our message to them is you have to begin to create 

greater stability inside your country, and that means denying safe 

haven to any of these organizations that launch attacks from your 

territory. 

So, we are going to enter into an effort to have greater sharing 

of certain intelligence information. The Pakistanis have indicated 

they—if we provide the information, they will act. We are going to 

have to test that. We will give them an opportunity to do so. 

And so, what will change is that Pakistan will find it in their interest to begin to disassociate these longstanding relationships that 

have developed over time with certain terrorist organizations—the 

Haqqani Network, the Taliban—inside of Pakistan, which may 

have served their purpose for stability once upon a time, but they 

no longer serve that purpose. And it is up to Pakistan, I think, to 

think about their longer-term stability and their future by changing that relationship with these organizations. 

Senator BARRASSO. Okay. Thank you. Thank you very much. I 

am very grateful for your leadership and your service. Thank you, 

Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Senator Shaheen. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, 

Secretary Tillerson and Secretary Mattis, for being here, and for 

your service and your stamina, frankly, that we are still here. 

Over the past several years, as has been pointed out in this discussion, the range of threats that we face from terrorist groups and 

state actors has become increasingly diverse, fragmented, and geographically expansive. And militants that we defeat in one country 

have spread their ideology and violence to other areas. Similarly, 

state actors, like Iran and Russia, are increasingly expanding their 

reach beyond their borders, particularly in the Middle East and Africa, where our troops are present. 

So, I am concerned, as many on this committee are, that without 

an adequate understanding of the parameters that the administration is using to justify the use of force, that our strategies will remain ambiguous, and that our troops will have few limits to where 

they will be asked to go and what they will be asked to do. 

And I have to say that I believe in the importance of U.S. engagement in the world, so I am not an isolationist. I do not think 

we should withdraw from everywhere. But I want to make sure, as 

Senator Booker said, that we are actually achieving the aims that 

we set out to achieve when we put troops in a particular area. And, 

Secretary Tillerson, as you point out, the American people and our 

soldiers have a right to know where they are being asked to go, 

what they are being asked to do, and what the expectations are, 

and what the end game is. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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And I think one of the places where it is not at all clear to me 

what the end game is and that we have a strategy for that end 

game, is in Syria, which is—you know, the conflict there is one of 

the things that has allowed terrorist groups and ISIS to metastasize in the way that they have. So, as we look at the liberation of 

Raqqa, what is our end game for fighting ISIS along the Middle 

Euphrates River? Do we intend to continue down the Euphrates to 

Mayadin? Will the Assad regime or the Russians do that? It is not 

at all clear, and we have not just the terrorists that we are fighting 

there, but we also have those state actors—Russia, Syria, Iran— 

who are playing a role that is complicating the situation. 

So, I guess this is for you, Secretary Mattis. 

Secretary MATTIS. Senator, it is the most complex battlefield I 

think I have ever experienced. I would tell you right now that, 

again, our operational aspects are by, with, and through partnered 

or allied forces. That is why you see us helping others learn how 

to fight or putting our people, in this case in Syria, in a position 

to resupply them. Basically we, I believe, lost one soldier killed taking Raqqa, and the Kurds lost over 600 killed. You see it written 

in the grimmest possible statistic. 

What we will do is knowing they have moved their external operations elements down toward Mayadin, as we gather strength from 

the Arab tribes, we certainly will continue to move against ISIS— 

move against ISIS because we—this thing is not over until it is 

over. At the same time, the regime, the pro-regime forces—I am 

talking about Iranian-supported elements—Lebanese Hezbollah— 

and the Russians forces are moving from Darzar in the same direction. Again, we do de-confliction, as you know with them, at several 

levels. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Right, understand. 

Secretary MATTIS. So, we will continue to move against them. 

The Iraqis will move against them from their side of the border. 

Even as this Kurdish referendum issue has been a distraction further north, they are continuing to move. So, we are still on the 

move. We are still de-conflicting, and Secretary Tillerson is coordinating the larger issue of the end state diplomatically. 

Senator SHAHEEN. And so, is the expectation as we drive ISIS 

out, that we will leave that remaining sections of Syria to Assad, 

to the Russians, to Iran? Because it is not at all clear that once 

we are gone, what will happen in those territories? 

Secretary TILLERSON. Well, Senator, that is where our diplomatic 

efforts are underway to create these de-escalation zones. That is, 

areas are liberated. We then de-escalate the conflict so that the 

civil war does not re-erupt. And in order for that to happen, that 

means that the regime hold its positions and not try to overrun or 

retake areas that were liberated by others. 

We have successfully put one de-escalation zone in the southwest 

of Syria in conjunction with Jordan and Russia. That de-escalation 

zone went into effect January the 9th. There have been no aerial 

bombings in that area since, and we have had success moving Iranian presence as well as Lebanese Hezbollah presence out of those 

areas. 

We are working to create additional de-escalation zones, and 

these are not demarcation zones. These are not intended to divide 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

51 

the country. They are merely intended to de-escalate, de-conflict, 

and, in effect, get ceasefires in place so that we then can get representatives to the Geneva process pursuant to U.N. Security 

Council Resolution 2254, which has a very prescribed process for 

how Syria will work its way towards new elections over the next 

few years. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Well, sorry to interrupt. I would like to pursue 

this discussion in a classified setting. But I did want to follow up 

on a statement that you made, Secretary Mattis, where you said 

that we always lead with diplomacy. I would to like to think that 

we always lead with diplomacy, but given the current reorganization at the State Department, the current cuts to the budget at the 

State Department that were requested by this administration, the 

number of personnel, the number—the amount of years of expertise 

of people who have left the State Department, I guess I question 

whether, in fact, we are leading with diplomacy and putting our 

best foot forward. 

So, I do not know, Mr. Secretary. Can you explain to me why this 

is a good time to let go of those personnel, to cut back on the budget of the State Department? 

Secretary TILLERSON. We have let no one go, Senator. Some people have retired. Some people have chosen to leave and pursue 

other interests on their own. There have been no layoffs. There 

have been no terminations. And, quite frankly, Senator, I have to 

speak on behalf of the professional men and women at the State 

Department—Foreign Service officers and others—who have many, 

many years of experience that have stepped up to the open positions that are still open because we are waiting for confirmations, 

and are doing a superb job representing the American people’s interests. 

And our diplomacy has not stopped. It is not hampered. It is not 

slowed. These people are engaged directly with our counterparts 

and leading this diplomatic effort. I am proud of them. They are 

doing a great job, and we need some more help. We need some 

leadership help. But we have not depleted our ranks of expertise 

by any stretch of the imagination, and, quite frankly, on their behalf I want to defend their expertise, to you. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Well, I certainly was not attacking the men 

and women of the State Department. I think they do an excellent 

job. And my concern is that we have seen many people with a lot 

of expertise who have left the Department because they are concerned about the direction there, and that is what I wanted to 

speak to. But I share your support for the work that they are 

doing. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Senator Portman. 

Senator PORTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. So, Secretary 

Mattis, Secretary Tillerson, in an increasingly dangerous and volatile world, I am glad you are where you are. And we have got a 

lot of challenges, and I think the current AUMF covers the fight 

against ISIS, even though as was stated earlier, 15 years ago there 

was no ISIS as such. 

However, I also believe having a new AUMF has benefits. I think 

it can be worthwhile in providing greater clarity and guidance, inFOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

52 

cluding to our military commanders and to your diplomats, Mr. 

Secretary. I think it can help you establish a firmer base of political support for overseas operations. I think it can send a clear signal of resolve from the United States Congress as well as the administration to friend and foe alike. And so, I am interested, but 

I am only interested in the right AUMF. It has got to be helpful 

in empowering those who are undertaking this incredibly important task during a time with such danger. 

I guess my question to you would be, I understand looking at 

your testimony and having been here earlier, that you have laid 

out what you think the guiding principles ought to be. But are 

there any authorities or guidance that you now lack that a new 

AUMF could provide? 

Secretary MATTIS. On the military side, Senator, I would just— 

I would say no as it stands right now. And, again, when I spoke, 

I just thought that we need to incorporate those factors that I 

brought up. I am not telling the Senate how to do its business. I 

just owe you my best military advice. How you deal with that, I 

salute, and we will—we will carry out our orders to the Commander-in-Chief. 

But I think those factors of conditions-based and the timelines— 

anything that we do, we have to recognize has an impact on both 

our operations and on the enemy’s view, and we just have to take 

that into account. That is a reality. And I am not saying that there 

is some prescriptive one way to solve these. 

Senator PORTMAN. Secretary, any guidance or any authorities 

you lack? 

Secretary TILLERSON. I do not think there are any authorities we 

lack. As we indicated, we think the current authorizations we have 

are sufficient to allow us to pursue this enemy wherever they 

choose to want to fight us. And, again, I think, you know, this is 

all about fighting them over there so they do not come here to attack us on the homeland again. 

Senator PORTMAN. And the threat has evolved, and it will continue to evolve. And geographic limitations, as an example, would 

make no sense, I assume, given the fact that we have seen a metastasizing of the threat through countries we might never have 

imagined would be part of now ISIS or former al-Qaeda. 

Let me ask you a broader question, and this is a tough one. But 

I have, as is true with many of my colleagues, been frustrated as 

you have with regard to Syria. You called it a very complex battlefield, and I know the President and our administration has focused 

on defeating ISIS as is appropriate. But there is a broader issue 

here, which is, you know, how did ISIS evolve in the first place, 

and how do we deal with the underlying problems and the chaos 

in that region, the instability that fueled the rise of ISIS in the 

first place. 

And I guess my question to you is, let us say we continue to be 

successful with ISIS. You talked about Raqqa earlier, and you 

talked about some of the military success we have on the ground. 

As we do that, I would think our coalition partners and us are 

going to see the limitations of a military approach because you will 

continue to have sectarian divisions, competing interests, a worsening humanitarian crisis. And I just want to be sure if we are 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

53 

doing a new AUMF we cover that. In other words, this is not just 

to give you the authority to use military force, but it is really to 

get at the underlying causes so that we do not have to go back 

again. 

I guess, Secretary Tillerson, to ask you first, as an example, do 

you think there can be a lasting peace there as long as Assad is 

in power, and does the current AUMF give you the ability, Secretary Mattis, to be able to deal with that issue. If you—if you 

think that has to be resolved, that might be one example. 

Secretary TILLERSON. Well, the current AUMF only authorizes 

our fight against ISIS in Syria, as I indicated in my remarks. We 

are not there to fight the regime. There is no authority beyond the 

fight against ISIS. Therefore, we have to pursue a future Syria 

that is kept whole and intact, and a process which the—which the 

U.N. Security Council process does provide a process by which, in 

our view, the Assad regime will step down from power. 

How that occurs will be part of that process, and that is what 

we have continued to indicate. That is a view that is widely held 

by others in the region as well. It is a view that is widely held by 

our allies in Europe, and broadly by the coalition. So, what we 

want to do is create conditions so Geneva has an opportunity to 

succeed. 

Senator PORTMAN. And, again, how does this play into the potential new AUMF, and, Secretary Mattis, you might focus, if you 

would, on the military operation side of this thing, in order to secure the peace after ISIS is defeated if we are successful. What 

would you like to see in an AUMF that would be broader and give 

you the ability to do what has to be done? 

Secretary MATTIS. Sir, I think the AUMF has to address the two 

basic brands of terrorism that we have seen strike at civilized people everywhere, and to determine what it takes to define that problem in sufficient detail, and to a point that here in the Congress 

we are in agreement, if you go forward along those lines, so that 

we speak with one voice on the threat. If we spend time basically 

defining the threat in sufficient rigor, then I think much of the response to that threat will be understandable and supportable 

across the political spectrum. 

Senator PORTMAN. Okay. And, again, I know this is a sensitive 

topic, but do you think a broader AUMF is needed to deal with the 

underlying issues, not just the immediate elimination of the ISIS 

threat in Syria, but some of the factors that have led to the rise 

of ISIS? 

Secretary MATTIS. It could do that, Senator. Properly constructed, it could do that. 

Secretary TILLERSON. I think it is a question of after we are successful as we are having success now, how do you stabilize these 

areas. And do we as—is there any military role for that stabilization? I am not—I would have to think about it further as to whether it is a military role or whether it is really we equip, which is 

what we are doing today, we equip local capacity to maintain the 

security of their communities. 

And as I said, and even as Prime Minister Abadi noted, armies 

are not good at police—serving in a police role. They are not 

trained for that. So, we have to train security forces that are able 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

54 

to provide a policing function to maintain stability and security for 

these communities, which helps tamp down the conditions that give 

rise then to this violent extremism again. 

Senator PORTMAN. No question. I guess I am just—I am just 

again—I am out of time, and I appreciate your indulgence allowing 

me to go a little over, Mr. Chairman. But I do think this is a discussion that we can have as part of this potential new AUMF is, 

you know, what is the broader strategy here that we ought to be 

pursuing to avoiding getting back in the fight again. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. And before I turn to Senator Cardin 

for his closing comment, on that note, I mean, you guys, I just want 

to be clear—people are tuned into this. You are not asking for an 

authority to go against Assad. 

Secretary TILLERSON. No, Senator. 

The CHAIRMAN. And if you attempt—— 

Secretary MATTIS. No, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. If you felt you needed to go against 

Assad as part of the broader picture that Senator Portman was 

bringing up, you would come to Congress because we would then 

be going against a country. Is that correct? 

Secretary TILLERSON. That is correct. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Cardin. 

Senator CARDIN. Mr. Chairman, I first want to thank both of our 

witnesses for their service to our country and their participation in 

this hearing. There may be some disagreements about what the 

AUMF covers currently and what Congress should include in a 

more up-to-date AUMF. That is a healthy debate that we are having. There is no debate, as the chairman has pointed out, about our 

resolve to go after terrorists who are attacking our interests and 

our allies, and we want you to have the ability to root them out 

and destroy them. So, there is no disagreement about that. 

I just would sort of conclude on this, and that is I think there 

is a real willingness of all of us to try to work together to modernize the AUMF. So, we are going to try—we are going to try to 

be able to do that. But I particularly want to thank you for the direct answers to our questions. I think you were very clear in responding to the questions that have been asked by the members of 

this committee, and that is very encouraging because this hearing, 

I think, has been extremely helpful to us to try to sort out how we 

can best represent the national security interests of this country. 

The CHAIRMAN. I really want to thank you both for coming, for 

your service to our country, for the concrete answers that you gave. 

Obviously, the next logical step is for us to mark up an AUMF, and 

I would just ask while you are here that you agree to work with 

us promptly, and the work period is short. We have got other 

issues to deal with, and that you would both use your resources to 

respond quickly to questions we might have legally and otherwise 

relative to an AUMF. 

Secretary TILLERSON. Will do. 

Secretary MATTIS. Absolutely. 

The CHAIRMAN. Yeah. Again, thank you so much. There will be 

additional questions that will be—we will take those through the 

close of business Wednesday. To the extent you can answer those 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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1 Connor O’Brien, Niger Attack Fuels New Push for War Vote, Politico, Oct. 20, 2017. 21T3AAuthorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224, 224 (2001) 

(codified at 50U.S.C. § 1541 note), 3See David Abramowitz, The President, the Congress, and the Use of Force: Legal and Political 

Considerations in Authorizing the Use of Force Against International Terrorism, 43 Harv. Int’l 

L.J. 71 (2002); Gregory D. Johnsen, 60 Words And A War Without End: The Untold Story Of 

The Most Dangerous Sentence In U.S. History, January 16, 2014, Buzzfeed. 4The executive branch has also relied on the 2002 Iraq AUMF to justify its counter-ISIL campaign. See e.g., Stephen Preston, The Legal Framework for the United States’ Use of Military 

Force Since 9/11, Remarks at the American Society for International Law, Washington, DC, 

April 10, 2015 5 Report on the Legal and Policy Frameworks Guiding the United States’ Use of Military Force 

and Related Operations, December 2016. 6 It is worth recalling that in 2014 when the claim that the 2001 AUMF applied to ISIS was 

first made, national security law experts from both sides of the aisle were astounded. See e.g. 

Robert Chesney, The 2001 AUMF: From Associated Forces to (Disassociated) Successor Forces, 

Lawfare Blog, September 10, 2014. Before the announcement, law professor Ryan Goodman had 

noted the ‘‘remarkable consensus of opinion’’ among experts ‘‘that ISIS is not covered by the 

2001 AUMF.’’ See Ryan Goodman, The President Has No Congressional Authorization to Use 

Force against ISIS in Iraq, June 19, 2014. National security expert Ben Wittes commented that 

extending the 2001 AUMF to ISIS ‘‘is not a stable or sustainable reading of the law.’’ See Ben 

Wittes, Not Asking the Girl to Dance, September 10, 2014. And former State Department legal 

advisor Harold Hongju Koh considered a new AUMF to be the only ‘‘lawful way to fight the 

Islamic State’’ and prevent a ‘‘constitutional battle over the president’s prerogative to conduct 

unilateral war.’’ See Harold Hongju Koh, The Lawful Way to Fight the Islamic State, August 

29, 2014. 

promptly considering the other duties you have, we would appreciate it. 

Again, I cannot thank you enough for your service and for the 

time you spent with us today. 

And with that, the meeting is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 8:15 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

Additional Material Submitted for the Record 

STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED BY HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST

INTRODUCTION

The recent deaths of 4 U.S. service members in Niger have prompted members 

of Congress to give renewed attention to the scope of war authorities that govern 

U.S. counterterrorism military operations abroad.1 Within days of the 9/11 attacks, 

Congress passed an authorization for use of military force (‘‘AUMF’’) against those 

who ‘‘planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred 

on September 11, 2001 or harbored such organizations or persons.’’ 2 This language 

is widely understood as authorizing force against al-Qaeda, who planned and committed the attacks on the United States on 9/11, and the Afghan Taliban, who had 

harbored al-Qaeda before and after the attacks. 

The 2001 AUMF is also expressly limited to using force to prevent future acts of 

terrorism against the United States by the entities responsible for 9/11, not their 

associated forces, successor entities, or unaffiliated terrorist organizations. Indeed, 

Congress expressly rejected the executive branch’s request for broad and open-ended 

authority to use military force against other terrorist groups without specific authorization from Congress.3

Yet for nearly 16 years, longer than any war in the nation’s history, the executive 

branch has been using the 2001 AUMF as the primary legal basis4 for military operations against an array of terrorist organizations in at least seven different countries around the world.5 Some of these groups, like ISIS and al Shabaab, not only 

played no role in the 9/11 attacks, but did not even exist at the time Congress authorized the use of force in 2001.6

The executive branch’s continued reliance on the 2001 AUMF for military operations far beyond what Congress originally authorized undermines Congress’ important constitutional role as the branch responsible for the decision to go to war. As 

Senator Todd Young noted during a keynote speech at the Heritage Foundation in 

May of this year, the founders entrusted Congress with the decision to go to war 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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7 Is it Time for Congress to Pass an ISIS-Specific AUMF?, The Heritage Foundation, May 1, 

2017. 8 Recent entanglements with Iranian and Russia-backed pro-Assad forces in Syria, where the 

U.S. is fighting ISIS, demonstrate just how far the 2001 AUMF has been stretched. See Kate 

Brannen et al., White House Officials Push for Widening War in Syria Over Pentagon Objections, 

Foreign Policy, June 16, 2017. 

to ‘‘avoid foolish, hasty, unnecessary, and perpetual wars that tend to accrue debt 

and erode liberty.’’ 7 The lack of any sunset provision or reporting requirements in 

the 2001 AUMF also restricts the ability of Congress to conduct meaningful oversight over military operations and the foreign affairs of the United States.8

This untenable state of affairs has other dangerous consequences as well. Continued reliance on outdated and ill-defined war authorizations that blur the line between war and peace undermine national security, U.S. leadership in the world, and 

human rights both at home and abroad. 

ILL-DEFINED WAR AUTHORITIES UNDERMINE NATIONAL SECURITY, U.S. GLOBAL

LEADERSHIP, AND HUMAN RIGHTS AT HOME AND ABROAD. 

War authorizations confer extraordinary powers on the president, powers that 

outside of war would amount to egregious violations of human rights. Wartime rules 

were designed for the unique circumstances of armed conflict between opposing 

armed forces. As a result, the laws of war sometimes permit killing as a first resort, 

detention without charge or trial, and the use of military tribunals-actions that are 

otherwise contrary to basic American values and human rights. 

The United States has long been a global leader on human rights, leveraging its 

example to influence other nations to improve their own human rights records. The 

United States has rightly criticized other nations for improperly invoking wartime 

authorities in the name of national security. But the ability of the United States 

to level this criticism effectively demands that it demonstrate that its own use of 

wartime authorities is lawful and appropriate. Continued reliance on ill-defined authorities or questionable legal theories that enable the use of wartime authorities 

outside the lawful boundaries of war not only harms U.S. leadership on human 

rights, but U.S. national security as well. 

The current status quo puts the United States at odds with allied nations, 

counterterrorism partners on the ground, and local populations whose help is critical to effective counterterrorism. As a result of doubts about the lawfulness or legitimacy ofU.S. actions or policies, allies and partners withhold critical cooperation, 

consent, and intelligence information. Local populations turn against the United 

States, fueling terrorist recruitment and propaganda and increasing attacks against 

U.S. and allied forces. Assuring U.S. allies, counterterrorism partners, and local 

populations that the United States respects human rights and the rule of law-including important limits on where, when, and against whom wartime authorities 

may be employed-will improve cooperation, undermine terrorist recruitment and 

propaganda, and reduce attacks against U.S. forces. 

Setting the country on a new course is also needed to ensure that the United 

States does not set dangerous precedents that are detrimental to its long-term interests. The policies, practices, and legal justifications used by the United States today 

will be used by other states tomorrow. Expansive interpretations of a state’s authority to use wartime powers-such as lethal force as a first resort, military tribunals, 

and detention without charge or trial-embolden other states to use such practices. 

Constraining the use of these exceptional authorities to circumstances meeting the 

legal threshold for armed conflict and to where their use is militarily necessary, will 

provide a model for other states on how to use wartime authorities lawfully, strategically, and responsibly. 

Not only is it unlawful to apply wartime authorities to address terrorist threats 

off the battlefield, it is not necessary. The United States has a robust array of diplomatic, law enforcement, and intelligence resources to mitigate the threat of terrorism. And ultimately, partner nations in which terrorist threats reside must take 

the lead to address those threats head on, and effectively, with the support of the 

United States. The United States also retains the authority to act in self-defense, 

including through the use of military force, when there is an imminent threat that 

cannot be addressed through other means. Wartime authorities such as an AUMF 

are not necessary to take such action. 

By tailoring congressional war authorizations to the conflicts to which they are 

intended to apply and conducting regular oversight of war, Congress provides a crucial check on the executive branch, ensuring that presidents do not stretch wartime 

killing, detention, and trial authorities beyond the bounds of armed conflicts authorized by Congress. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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9These elements have been recommended and endorsed by numerous national security experts from across the political spectrum. See e.g., Goldsmith et al., Five Principles That Should 

Govern Any U.S. Authorization of Force, Washington Post. These elements have also gained the 

support of a coalition of human rights, civil liberties, and faith groups. See ‘‘Re: Authorizing the 

Use of Military Force.’’ Letter to Senator Bob Corker and Senator Ben Cardin. June 19, 2017. 10Should Congress to choose to authorize force against the associated forces of a group named 

in the authorization, it should carefully define the term associated forces in a manner that complies with the laws of war. Congress should not authorize force against so-called ‘‘successor entities.’’ See Human Rights First, Authorizing the Use of Force Against ISIS: How to Define ‘‘Associated Forces’’. 11Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804). 

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DRAFTING AUTHORIZATIONS FOR USE OF MILITARY FORCE

Any new war authorization passed by Congress should be clear, specific, carefully 

tailored to the situation at hand, and aligned with the international legal obligations of the United States to respect state sovereignty, human rights, and the 

boundaries of wartime rules. Careful drafting is critical to prevent any new AUMF 

from being stretched to justify wars not authorized by Congress, to ensure ongoing 

congressional engagement and an informed public as the conflict proceeds, and to 

prevent the authorization from being used in ways that undermine human rights 

or U.S. national security. 

To meet this standard, Human Rights First recommends that any new authorization for use of military force include the following elements: 9

Specify the enemy and the mission objectives: 

Any new AUMF should clearly specify the entity against which force is being authorized, the mission objectives or purpose for authorizing force, and where force 

may be used. These elements prevent the executive branch from overstepping 

Congress’s intent, discourage mission creep, and ensure that the authorization will 

not be used to justify unlawful or perpetual armed conflict. Authorizing the president to use force against unknown future enemies,10 for undefined purposes, or in 

unknown locations is an unconstitutional delegation of Congress’s power to declare 

war. It is also unnecessary for national security. The president has authority to defend the nation from sudden attacks under Article II of the Constitution and Article 

51 of the U.N. Charter. Moreover, Congress can authorize force against new threats 

when and if such threats arise. 

Reporting requirements: 

Regular and detailed reporting helps promote democratic accountability, maintain 

legitimacy both at home and abroad, ensure compliance with domestic and international law and enables Congress to fulfill its critical oversight functions. To properly keep Congress and the public informed of the scope and progress of the mission, 

the president should provide regular reports detailing at minimum: the entities the 

administration believes are covered under the new AUMF, the factual and legal 

basis for including these entities in the AUMF, the number of civilian and military 

personnel killed, and the legal analysis the administration is relying on for undertaking new actions. This information is critical for proper public transparency and 

engagement and enabling Congress to exercise its constitutional oversight responsibilities over a continuing armed conflict. 

Compliance with U.S. obligations under international law: 

For over 200 years the Supreme Court has held that domestic statutes must not 

be interpreted to conflict with U.S. obligations under international law if there is 

any other plausible interpretation.11 An explicit statement in an AUMF that operations must only be carried out in compliance with U.S. international legal obligations would bolster global confidence in the United States as a national that complies with the rule of law and is committed to its obligations to respect state sovereignty under the U.N. Charter and customary international law, treaty and customary law-based human rights law, and the requirements of the law of armed conflict, where applicable. Such a statement would enhance the legitimacy of the mission, aid the effort to win hearts and minds, and encourage cooperation from allies, 

and partners. 

Supersession/sole source of authority provision: 

Any new AUMF should include language that makes it clear that it is the sole 

source of statutory authority to use force against the named enemy in the authorization. This is important to avoid overlap, confusion, or loopholes that could be used 

to evade the requirements of either an existing or new AUMF. For example, as the 

executive branch has claimed that the 2001 AUMF and 2002 Iraq AUMF already 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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12The Obama administration claimed that the 2001 and 2002 AUMFs already authorize force 

against ISIS. Failing to clarify that a new ISIS AUMF supersedes these authorizations confuses 

rather than clarifies the administration’s powers. See Jen Daskal, Why Sunset and Supersession 

Provisions Are Both Needed in an Anti-ISIL AUMF, Just Security, March 18, 2015. 13 Ending the Endless War, National Security Network, February 2015. 14 Is it Time for Congress to Pass an ISIS-Specific AUMF?, The Heritage Foundation, May 1, 

2017. 

provide authority to use force against ISIS, a new ISIS AUMF should either repeal 

the 2001 AUMF and 2002 Iraq AUMF, or include language that makes it clear that 

the new ISIS AUMF is the sole source of statutory authority for using force against 

ISIS.12 Failing to include such clarifying language or to repeal old AUMFs opens 

the door for the executive branch to rely on the 2001 AUMF to avoid the requirements of the new ISIS AUMF. 

Sunset clause: 

Sunset provisions have been included in nearly a third of prior AUMFs.13 They 

act as a forcing mechanism that guarantees continued congressional oversight and 

approval as the conflict evolves, providing a safeguard against perpetual armed conflict or executive branch overreach. Sunsets require Congress and the administration to come together to reexamine the AUMF at a future date in light of current 

conditions, and if necessary, reauthorize and/or refine the legislation to suit those 

new conditions. As former general counsel for the CIA and Department of Defense 

Stephen Preston has explained, requiring Congress to reauthorize an ongoing conflict does not signal to the enemy that the United States plans to walk away from 

the fight at a set date.14 Rather, heexplained, a properly structured reauthorization 

provision with a mechanism for renewing the authority in advance of the sunset 

would signal to our partners and adversaries that the United States is committed 

to its democratic institutions and will fight the fight for as long as it takes. 

CONCLUSION

The founders of this nation recognized the profound significance of going to war 

and wisely assigned this power to Congress. If and when Congress passes a new 

war authorization, that authorization should reflect the hard lessons of the last decade and a half by including the above elements. If Congress cannot reach agreement 

on an authorization that meets these requirements, it should not pass one. 

RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED TO

HON. REX TILLERSON, SECRETARY OF STATE, BY SENATOR BOB CORKER

Question 1. If Congress decided to repeal the 2001 and 2002 Authorizations for 

Use of Military Force (AUMFs), and simultaneously provide a replacement AUMF 

that authorizes the President to use all necessary and appropriate force against the 

Taliban, al-Qaeda, ISIS, and associated forces (appropriately defined): 

• What would be the legal consequences, and what other provisions of law would 

be impacted? Please be as specific as possible. 

Answer. The repeal of the 2001 and 2002 Authorizations for Use of Military Force 

(AUMF), even if accompanied by a simultaneous replacement statute, could cause 

unnecessary uncertainty to the President’s authority to use military force in the 

midst of ongoing military operations. 

With respect to the 2001 AUMF, all three branches of the U.S. Government have 

affirmed the ongoing authority conferred by the 2001 AUMF and its application to 

al-Qaeda, to the Taliban, and to forces associated with those two organizations within and outside Afghanistan. Specifically, the Federal courts have issued rulings in 

the detention context that affirmed the President’s authority to detain individuals 

who were part of, or substantially supported, Taliban or al-Qaeda forces or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its Coalition 

partners. Congress has also affirmed the President’s detention authority under the 

2001 AUMF in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012. 

Repeal of the 2001 AUMF could be seen as reopening settled legal questions regarding the President’s detention authority. Such repeal would likely lead to renewed litigation by detainees at Guantanamo Bay seeking to challenge the legal 

basis for their continued detention beyond the date of the repeal of the statute 

under which they are currently being held notwithstanding the continuation of hostilities between the United States and the Taliban, al-Qaeda, and associated forces, 

including against ISIS. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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The 2002 AUMF provides authority ‘‘to defend the national security of the United 

States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq.’’ The repeal of the 2002 AUMF 

could call into question the President’s authority to use military force to assist the 

Government of Iraq both in the fight against ISIS and in stabilizing Iraq following 

the destruction of ISIS’s so-called caliphate. 

Question 2. How could Congress mitigate any negative legal consequences in a replacement AUMF and ensure a smooth transition to the new authority, including 

with respect to legacy detainees? If possible, please provide specific language. 

Answer. Ensuring that there are no negative consequences is the reason why this 

administration urged Congress not to repeal the 2001 and 2002 AUMFs. Therefore, 

at a minimum, any subsequent AUMF must not call into question the legal basis 

for the continued detention of individuals currently held at Guantanamo Bay. For 

example, the administration would seek language that avoids reopening settled 

legal questions relating to the President’s authority to continue to detain individuals 

at Guantanamo Bay, ‘‘who were part of, or substantially supported, Taliban or alQaeda forces or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United 

States or its Coalition partners, including any person who has committed a belligerent act, or has directly supported hostilities, in aid of such enemy armed forces.’’ 

The administration is prepared to review any proposed language that the committee might develop. 

Question 3. In the alternative, if Congress decided to repeal the 2002 AUMF and 

amend the 2001 AUMF to provide fresh authorization for the use of military force 

against the Taliban, al-Qaeda, ISIS, and associated forces (appropriately defined): 

• What would be the legal consequences, and what other provisions of law would 

be impacted? Please be as specific as possible. 

Answer. The 2002 AUMF provides authority ‘‘to defend the national security of 

the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq.’’ Any repeal of the 

2002 AUMF could call into question the President’s authority to use military force 

to assist the Government of Iraq in military operations against ISIS and in stabilizing Iraq following the destruction of ISIS’s so-called caliphate.The administration 

would need to review the specific language of any proposed legislation. 

Question 4. How could Congress mitigate any negative legal consequences with an 

amended 2001 AUMF and ensure a smooth transition, including with respect to legacy detainees? If possible, please provide specific language. 

Answer. Ensuring that there are no negative consequences is the reason why this 

administration urged Congress not to repeal the 2001 and 2002 AUMFs. Therefore, 

at a minimum, any subsequent AUMF must not call into question the legal basis 

for the continued detention of individuals currently held at Guantanamo Bay. For 

example, the administration would seek language that avoids reopening settled 

legal questions relating to the President’s authority to continue to detain individuals 

‘‘who were part of, or substantially supported, Taliban or al-Qaeda forces or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its Coalition 

partners, including any person who has committed a belligerent act, or has directly 

supported hostilities, in aid of such enemy armed forces.’’ 

The administration is prepared to review any proposed language that the committee might develop. 

Question 5. In a letter to Senate leaders earlier this year, you and Secretary 

Mattis expressed concern about the definition of ‘‘associated persons or forces’’ in 

S.J. Res. 43, which you stated is ‘‘inconsistent with the standard applied by the Executive Branch and which could result in unnecessary uncertainty regarding its 

scope.’’ 

• What is the ‘‘standard applied by the Executive Branch’’ to which you referred 

in your letter? 

Answer. To be considered an ‘‘associated force’’ of al-Qaeda or the Taliban for purposes of the authority conferred by the 2001 AUMF, an entity must satisfy two conditions. First, the entity must be an organized, armed group that has entered the 

fight alongside al-Qaeda or the Taliban. Second, the group must be a co-belligerent 

with al-Qaeda or the Taliban in hostilities against the United States or its Coalition 

partners. 

Question 6. If the administration does not support the definition of ‘‘associated 

persons or forces’’ in S.J. Res. 43, what definition does the administration recommend for a new AUMF? 

Answer. The administration would want to ensure that any statutory definition 

of ‘‘associated force’’ is consistent with the standard currently applied by the Executive Branch as described in the answer to the previous question. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

60 

Question 7. Does your Department have any legal or policy concerns with repealing the 2002 AUMF? If yes, please explain. 

Answer. The 2002 AUMF provides authority ‘‘to defend the national security of 

the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq.’’ The repeal of the 

2002 AUMF could call into question the President’s authority to use military force 

to assist the Government of Iraq both in the fight against ISIS and in stabilizing 

Iraq following the destruction of ISIS’s so-called caliphate. 

Question 8. Does your Department construe any of the following provisions of existing law as an Authorization for Use of Military Force? If yes to any, please specify 

and explain the interpretation: 

a. Authorization of the Secretary of Defense to provide support for friendly foreign 

countries (10 U.S.C. § 331). 

b. Authorization of the Secretary of Defense to support for foreign forces, irregular 

forces, groups, or individuals engaged in supporting or facilitating ongoing military operations by United States special operations forces to combat terrorism 

(10 U.S.C. § 127e). 

c. Authorization of the Secretary of Defense to conduct or support a program or 

programs to provide training and equipment to the national security forces of 

one or more foreign countries for the purpose of building the capacity of such 

forces to conduct one or more of the following (10 U.S.C. § 333): 

1. Counterterrorism operations. 

2. Counter-weapons of mass destruction operations. 

3. Counter-illicit drug trafficking operations. 

4. Counter-transnational organized crime operations. 

5. Maritime and border security operations. 

6. Military intelligence operations. 

7. Operations or activities that contribute to an international coalition operation that is determined by the Secretary to be in the national interest of the 

United States. 

Answer. No, the administration does not interpret 10 U.S.C. § 331, § 127e, or § 333 

to provide statutory authorization for the use of military force. 

RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED TO

HON. REX TILLERSON, SECRETARY OF STATE, BY SENATOR BENJAMIN L. CARDIN

Question. Section 4(a) of the War Powers resolution requires that in the absence 

of a declaration of war, in any case in which ‘‘United States Armed Forces are introduced (1) into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances,’’ the President must withdraw such 

forces within 60 days unless Congress has declared war or otherwise authorized 

their deployment. U.S. Forces in Niger are now, obviously, in an area in which imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances of the attack on U.S. soldiers, and the resulting death of four of them, in early October. Does 

the administration now consider that the 60-day clock has begun, and if not, what 

is the legal reasoning behind this conclusion? 

Answer. Consistent with the War Powers Resolution, the President previously reported the deployment of U.S. Armed Forces to Niger, including in a report submitted to Congress on June 6, 2017. The report of June 6, 2017, stated that there 

were approximately 645 U.S. military personnel deployed to Niger in support of our 

African partners’ counterterrorism operations in the Lake Chad Basin Region. Since 

submitting that report, the number of U.S. military personnel deployed to Niger has 

fluctuated consistent with operational requirements. 

The October 4 ambush of U.S. and Nigerien forces was a tragic but isolated incident. It does not indicate imminent involvement of U.S. forces in further hostilities. 

Additionally, our assessment is that an ISIS group was responsible for that ambush. 

Operations against ISIS are authorized by the 2001 AUMF so would not be subject 

to the termination provision of the War Powers Resolution. 

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RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED TO

HON. REX TILLERSON, SECRETARY OF STATE, BY SENATOR TODD YOUNG

Question. I note that you spoke with the Burmese Armed Forces Commander-inChief on October 26 to discuss the Rohingya crisis. Can you please provide an update on the administration’s efforts related to the situation in Burma? 

Answer. This administration is undertaking significant efforts to ensure the violence and suffering end immediately, in addition to pursuing accountability for those 

responsible for human rights abuses. Our most pressing objectives are achieving 

protection for all local populations and meaningful, durable solutions for those who 

have been displaced, including the creation of conditions that will allow those displaced the chance to go home again voluntarily, in safety, and with dignity. 

As part of those efforts, I traveled to Burma on November 15, where I met with 

high-level government officials, including State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi and 

Commander-in-Chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, and discussed ways forward 

on this crisis. While in Manila for the ASEAN-related summits, I met with numerous counterparts from across the region to coordinate efforts related to humanitarian assistance, repatriation of refugees, and accountability for abuses committed 

against members of communities in Rakhine State. 

RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED TO

HON. REX TILLERSON, SECRETARY OF STATE, BY SENATOR ROBERT MENENDEZ

Question 1. You were recently quoted as saying ‘‘it’s our view that we do not believe there is a future for the Assad regime, the Assad family.’’ What implications 

does that have for U.S. policy in Syria? Are we actively engaged in a political dialogue that would remove Assad from power? With whom? How do you plan to promote this view with Russia and Iran? Will the United States actively seek to remove 

Assad from power? [If so] Under what authorities? 

Answer. The United States believes a lasting peace in Syria ultimately means a 

Syria without Bashar al-Assad. That said, we do not seek the dissolution of the Syrian state, which would likely result in further chaos, violence, and instability. Nor 

is it ultimately a U.S. decision whether Assad stays or goes—that decision rests 

with the Syrian people. We will work to ensure that the Syrian people get that 

choice in a free and fair U.N.-supervised election. 

Our priorities in Syria are defeating ISIS, countering malign Iranian influence, 

and de-escalating the Syrian conflict to create the necessary space for a political solution to the crisis. As part of our efforts to de-escalate violence, we reached the July 

9, 2017 southwest ceasefire arrangement with Russia and Jordan, which is still 

largely holding. The United States, Russia, and Jordan signed a Memorandum of 

Principals in Amman on November 8, endorsed by Presidents Trump and Putin in 

Vietnam on November 10. We hope this arrangement, and other genuine efforts to 

de-escalate violence, will contribute to creating a better environment to negotiate a 

permanent political solution to the crisis. 

As part of our diplomatic efforts, we are committed to the Geneva process and 

support a credible, U.N.-led political process to resolve the question of Syria’s future. 

According to the U.N., it will host the next round of Geneva talks at the end of November or beginning of December, and we hope they will be another step towards 

implementing U.N. Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2254 and ending this crisis. 

Russia voted for UNSCR 2254, which explicitly requested that the U.N. convene 

formal negotiations on a process for political transition between the regime and the 

opposition. And per UNSCR 2254, the Syrian parties were supposed to reach agreement on the shape of a transition within six months. President Putin reiterated 

Russia’s commitment to a political transition and UNSCR 2254 in the joint statement our countries released November 10. Though the Russians continue to declare 

support for the efforts enshrined in UNSCR 2254, to date they have not used their 

influence to bring Assad to the negotiating table. Russia is concerned about terrorist 

threats emanating from Syria, which will continue as long as Assad remains in 

power. He has caused too much destruction in his country for Syria to return to or 

remain at peace under his leadership. 

Question 2. Sanctions are one of the most powerful diplomatic tools we have, yet 

you have apparently eliminated the position of sanctions coordinator at the State 

Department. By systematically undermining crucial offices, are you pushing us into 

more inevitable conflicts? 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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Answer. Sanctions are a critical tool in supporting and advancing U.S. foreign policy and national security interests, and are fully integrated into all areas and levels 

of the Department diplomatic and policy activities. The State Department was at 

the forefront of coordinating and directing the use of sanctions as a tool of foreign 

policy before the Office of Sanctions Coordinator was established and remains a 

leader in the interagency. Dozens of officers within our Bureaus of Economic and 

Business Affairs (EB), Counter Terrorism (CT), International Security and Non-Proliferation (ISN), International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), International Organizations (IO), Democracy Human Rights and Labor (DRL), and in 

every regional bureau and at countless posts overseas historically have, and continue to apply and implement the United States’ sanctions commitments and obligations. These Bureaus work with the Policy Planning Staff (S/P) to continue to coordinate State Department sanctions activities with those of other departments and 

agencies, as well as foreign allies and partners. As long as sanctions remain a critical tool to advance foreign policy, the Department will continue to devote significant attention, personnel, and resources to sanctions policy, coordination, and implementation. 

Question 3. As the fight to recapture territory held by ISIS seems to wind down, 

what are the standards and metrics you will use to determine the defeat of ISIS 

in Iraq and Syria? 

Answer. Coalition-backed military operations have liberated over 90 percent of the 

territory ISIS once controlled in Syria and Iraq and freed an estimated 7.5 million 

people from ISIS’s oppressive rule. Realizing that military operations while necessary are insufficient to achieve ISIS’s enduring defeat, the U.S.-led Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS is committed to helping stabilize liberated communities and preventing ISIS’s reemergence. 

The United States and our Coalition partners are using several metrics to gauge 

the success of our efforts to militarily defeat ISIS and subsequently provide explosive remnant of war removal and stabilization assistance to enable the safe return 

of displaced persons and the restoration of essential services in liberated areas, in 

addition to humanitarian support for those affected by the conflict. First, ISIS has 

been unable to recapture a single inch of the over 103,000 square kilometers of territory liberated in Coalition-backed military operations, and which includes important cities such as Mosul, Fallujah, Ramadi, Tikrit, Tal Afar, Hawija, al-Qaim, 

Sinjar, Manbij, Tabqa, Shaddadi, and Raqqa. Second, the Coalition has trained-andequipped over 122,000 members of the Iraqi Security Forces, to include the Iraqi 

Army, local and federal police, border guards, Kurdish Peshmerga, the Counter Terrorism Service, and local hold forces. The Coalition has also trained over 9,500 

members of the Syrian Arab Coalition, the Arab element of the Syrian Democratic 

Forces, and over 2,000 members of the Raqqa Internal Security Force. These forces 

will be a vital component of our partnered forces’ efforts to combat a likely ISIS insurgency in the weeks, months, and even years ahead. Third, Coalition-funded, Government of Iraq-led, United Nations Development Programme-implemented stabilization assistance has helped facilitate the safe and voluntary return of more 

than 2.6 million internally displaced Iraqis. Similarly, in Syria we are working with 

an array of local actors including the Raqqa Civilian Council to coordinate and implement stabilization programming. The longer it takes to establish the conditions 

that allow for the return or local integration of internally displaced persons (IDPs), 

the higher the risk for a potential re-emergence of ISIS or another violent extremist 

organization. We will continue to work with the Government of Iraq and Prime Minister Abadi in particular to ensure local authorities and beneficiary populations are 

included in the provision of humanitarian assistance and the implementation of stabilization projects to bolster trust between Iraqi citizens and the central government. 

Question 4. What is your assessment of the ISIS threat[s] after the[y] lose their 

territory? Where will ISIS fighters go and what tactics will they employ? Is there 

a threat of ISIS fighter rebranding? 

Answer. Despite losing over 90 percent of the territory it once controlled in Syria 

and Iraq, ISIS remains a capable adversary with the ability to conduct offensive operations in a number of areas of Iraq and Syria. The group also maintains its ability 

to direct, enable, and inspire external operations outside of Iraq and Syria. 

ISIS maintains control over the city of Albu Kamal, pockets of territory in other 

areas of Syria, and a sizeable presence north of the Euphrates River in Syria’s Deir 

Ez-Zour province. ISIS similarly maintains control over a small segment of territory 

in Iraq’s Anbar province along the Euphrates River Valley, including the town of 

Rawa on the northern bank of the Euphrates River. The overall force strength of 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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ISIS in Iraq and Syria is approximately 1,500-3,000 fighters, though this number 

has likely been reduced further by recent military operations. 

As ISIS loses territory in Iraq and Syria, ISIS is likely to evolve into a more traditional insurgency group, shifting tactics from larger, conventional operations to 

asymmetric guerrilla and terrorist attacks to sow instability. ISIS fighters in Syria 

and Iraq are still able to conduct improvised explosive device (IED), vehicle-born improvised explosive device (VBIED), suicide, mortar, sniper, and small-arm attacks. 

They have also used unsophisticated, commercially-available unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) technology to drop munitions from the air in harassing attacks, and rudimentary chemical weapons largely for psychological effect. And they maintain the 

capability to radicalize and recruit foreign sympathizers using the internet and 

other media. Furthermore, ISIS has deliberately hidden large numbers of IEDs and 

other unexploded munitions in territory it has fled, which will complicate stabilization efforts and likely continue to cause significant civilian casualties, damage cities, 

and incite apprehension. 

ISIS is also a global phenomenon, unconstrained by international boundaries. In 

the Lake Chad Region, Yemen, North Africa and the Sahel, East Africa, and the 

Philippines, ISIS branches, affiliates, and sympathizers will continue to carry out 

terrorist attacks and look to recruit and radicalize potential followers. The U.S. Government will continue to work with local, regional, and international partners to degrade these individuals and cells, regardless of their location, and work to ensure 

they are unable to direct or enable attacks against the U.S. homeland, U.S. persons, 

or U.S. interests. Our security partnerships will persist beyond near-term battlefield 

victories to ensure our partners are able to effectively counter any new insurgency 

and to ensure ISIS is unable to re-emerge. Our Intelligence Community will continue to track the movement of ISIS fighters both inside Iraq and Syria and around 

the world. 

The Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS is committed to ISIS’s enduring defeat. Realizing that military operations are necessary, but alone insufficient to achieve that 

objective, the Coalition will remain engaged with our partners on the ground in Iraq 

and Syria to help stabilize liberated communities and prevent ISIS’s reemergence. 

The United States Government, alongside our Coalition partners, will continue to 

engage in bilateral, regional, and international efforts to eliminate ISIS and ISIS 

facilitation networks. 

Question 5. Is there a point at which you will run out of authorities to legally remain in Iraq—or Syria— if ISIS, al-Queda, Jabhat Fateh Al-Sham, or any other affiliate groups have been driven from their previously held territory? 

Answer. As a matter of domestic law, the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military 

Force (AUMF) and the 2002 AUMF authorize the U.S. use of military force against 

ISIS in Iraq. As a matter of international law, the United States is using force 

against ISIS in Iraq at the request of and with the consent of the Government of 

Iraq. 

In Syria, the 2001 AUMF and, in certain circumstances, the 2002 AUMF authorize the use of force in Syria against al-Qaeda in Syria and ISIS. As a matter of 

international law, the United States is using force in Syria against ISIS and is providing support to Syrian partners fighting ISIS in the collective self-defense of Iraq 

(and other states) and in U.S. national self-defense. The United States is also using 

force in Syria against al-Qaeda in self-defense of the United States. 

These domestic and international legal bases for U.S. military operations in Iraq 

and Syria do not depend on ISIS’s, or any other group’s, physical control of territory. 

Whether and to what extent the United States would have legal authority to undertake specific military actions in Iraq and Syria in the future would necessarily depend upon the facts and circumstances of a specific situation. 

Question 6. In Iraq, how do you determine which groups within the Popular Mobilization Forces are taking orders from Iran? 

Answer 6. We are under no illusions about the destabilizing nature of Iran’s activities in the region. To the extent that Iran pursues policies in Iraq that heighten 

sectarian tensions and undermine Iraqi sovereignty, we remain committed to helping the Government of Iraq (GoI) counter these activities. 

The Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) are part of the Iraqi Security Forces 

(ISF), reporting to the Prime Minister’s Office. Over 40 groups are part of the PMF, 

many of them Shia, but also Sunni, Christian, and Yazidi. 

Some PMF groups are openly close to Iran, and we monitor this closely. The 

United States carries out extensive vetting of all ISF units and their leaders before 

delivering any training or equipment. We do NOT provide support to groups or 

forces that are designated terrorist organizations, responsible for gross violations of 

human rights, or that are not under the full control of the GoI. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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Question 7. What is the U.S. policy on demobilizing the PMF after ISIS is defeated in Iraq? 

Answer. We agree with Prime Minister Abadi on the importance of ensuring that 

all participants in the shared fight against ISIS are under the control of the GoI 

and held to the same standards of accountability. We will support the GoI as it continues to reform its security sector, and begins to demobilize some PMF elements 

and make others a part of the Iraqi Army, Federal Police, or other security structures and institutions under the full control of the Iraqi state. 

Question 8. Does PMF involvement in Kurdish majority areas threaten stability 

and civilian protection in these areas? 

Answer. We remain concerned about the potential for violence between ISF and 

Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) forces following the KRG’s unconstitutional 

and ill-advised independence referendum. We continue to urge all parties in Iraq to 

halt any uncoordinated movement in disputed areas, and we are encouraged that 

parties have begun dialogue on establishing Federal authority at international border crossings. We expect enhanced military coordination will lead to constructive 

dialogue on a host of issues, from establishing joint security and administrative 

mechanisms in disputed territories to oil revenue sharing. 

We have and will continue to express our concerns with undisciplined elements 

of the PMF having security responsibility in sensitive disputed areas or around minority communities. We continue to urge Iraqi leaders to withdraw PMF from these 

areas and replace them with Iraqi Army and local police units.Question 7: 

As Iran’s influence continues to grow in Syria, what measures would we take if 

Iran attacked U.S.-backed forces there? [If so] Under what authorities? 

Answer. The efforts of the U.S.-led Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS in Syria are 

aimed at the defeat of ISIS. The United States does not seek to fight the Syrian 

Government or pro-Syrian-Government forces, including Iran. 

The 2001 Authorization to Use Military Force (AUMF) authorizes the use of force 

against al-Qaeda and associated forces, including against ISIS, including in Iraq and 

Syria. The 2001 AUMF also provides authority to use force to defend U.S., Coalition, 

and partner forces engaged in the campaign to defeat ISIS to the extent such use 

of force is a necessary and appropriate measure in support of these counter-ISIS operations. 

As a matter of international law, the United States is using force in Syria against 

al-Qaeda and associated forces, including against ISIS, and is providing support to 

Syrian partners fighting ISIS, such as the Syrian Democratic Forces, in the collective self-defense of Iraq (and other States) and in U.S. national self-defense. Necessary and proportionate measures in self-defense include the use of force as needed 

to defend U.S., Coalition, and U.S.-supported partner forces engaged in the campaign to defeat ISIS from interference by Syrian Government and pro-Syrian Government forces. 

Question 9. In August, Secretary Tillerson said that it appeared Russia was 

ramping up support of the Taliban in Afghanistan. Is the friend of our enemy our 

enemy as well? Does this make Russia our enemy in Afghanistan or more broadly? 

What authorities do you believe you have to respond to state-sponsored support of 

the Taliban and how would you use those authorities? What authorities would you 

seek? 

Answer. Russia maintains relationships with the Afghan government and the 

Taliban in part to hedge against instability in Afghanistan and in part to undermine 

U.S. influence in the region. Russia seeks to justify its relations with the Taliban 

by claiming it is to counter ISIS, promote a peace process, and protect Russian diplomatic personnel. 

Our conditions-based South Asia Strategy is a strong rebuke to Russia’s Taliban 

hedging strategy. We have made it clear the United States will stay in Afghanistan 

as long as it takes to ensure a peace agreement that ends the conflict and prevents 

Afghanistan from ever again becoming a safe haven for transnational terrorist 

groups. We will continue to engage all regional actors, including Russia, to reinforce 

the fact that the only way to promote security, including countering transnational 

terrorist groups, is to fully support the Afghanistan government and its security 

forces. 

I am not aware of any additional authorities the State Department needs to respond to foreign support to the Taliban. We have made it clear to all parties in the 

region—Iran and Russia, in particular—that hedging behavior through support to 

the Taliban only undermines security in the region. Support to the Taliban’s military capacities is especially dangerous and destabilizing. We will counter any and 

all support to the Taliban. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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Question 10. Our military leaders generally agree that the best investments we 

can make into preventing war start with a robust diplomacy and development budget. 

You submitted a budget with deep cuts to critical diplomatic initiatives and development efforts. The President has not provided a nomination for an Ambassador to 

South Korea—our most crucial ally as we seek to confront an aggressive North 

Korea. You shuttered the office of the Special representative for Afghanistan and 

Pakistan: 

• What are the implications for cuts to the State Department? What are the implications for less than a fully staffed diplomatic presence in places like Iraq 

and Afghanistan? 

Answer. The President’s FY 2018 budget request prioritizes the well-being of 

Americans, bolsters U.S. national security, secures our borders, and advances U.S. 

economic interests. Within those priorities, the State Department’s mission is focused on protecting our citizens at home and abroad, as well as advancing the economic interests of the American people. 

Ensuring the security and prosperity of the American people and advancing our 

values has necessitated difficult tradeoffs in our budget. The State Department and 

USAID’s FY 2018 budget request acknowledges that our operations must become 

more efficient, that our assistance must be more effective, and that our primary 

mission must always be advocating for the national interests of our country. Global 

challenges cannot be met by governments alone, and no longer rely so heavily on 

the United States. The FY 2018 request expects greater leveraging of U.S. dollars, 

along with increased efficiency and effectiveness of each dollar. In addition, the request expects that the private sector and countries themselves make better use of 

their own investments for development. 

The FY 2018 budget request reorients our foreign assistance to the most critical 

priorities, which means revisiting where and at what level we provide assistance. 

If no bilateral funding is requested for a particular country, in some cases we are 

leveraging prior-year funds to continue some support. In other cases we may utilize 

funds from a regional line to support activities in a particular country. 

Charge ́ d’Affaires Marc Knapper is leading our diplomatic mission in the Republic 

of Korea and the Secretary has full confidence in him. Mr. Knapper is a Korea expert with extensive experience working on Korea issues. 

On November 18, 2016, the Department notified to Congress our intent to merge 

the U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan (SRAP) into the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs (SCA). Subsequent to the November 18, 

2016 notification, SCA has assumed the functions and staff of SRAP and coordinates 

across the government to meet U.S. strategic goals in the region. 

Consistent with past practice, U.S. staffing abroad is driven by foreign policy priorities and weighed against risks to personnel, as well as the availability of resources to support the U.S. mission. Regarding staffing in Afghanistan and Iraq, 

staffing levels remain largely consistent with prior years. 

Question 11. If the United States suffered a state-sponsored massive cyber-attack, 

how would we respond? Do the Departments of Defense and State have in place response plans to cyber-attacks? How should Congress authorize those responses? 

Should we measure cyber-attacks on a scale? Would an attack on the energy grid 

of a major city merit the same response as an attack on a nuclear facility? On a 

voter database? 

Answer. The United States responds to cyber threats through a whole-of-government approach that leverages the full range of U.S. Government capabilities—diplomatic, economic, law enforcement, technical, and military. 

The Department of Defense (DoD) maintains a deliberate planning process to prepare for the defense of the Nation across all domains, including cyberspace. DoD’s 

plans and actions are always in support of the larger foreign policy and diplomatic 

efforts of the U.S. Government. 

The Department of State supports interagency efforts to address cyber incidents 

that rise to the level of a national security concern by providing foreign policy guidance on appropriate responses, building support among foreign governments for 

such responses and, where appropriate, delivering messages of warning to potential 

adversaries. 

The U.S. Government evaluates malicious cyber activities on a case-by-case basis 

precisely because, as your questions highlight, the appropriateness of a response is 

dependent on the specific facts and context of the particular malicious cyber activity 

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text from the international security environment. The loss of life and threats to public health and safety obviously raise the greatest concern. 

When evaluating a cyber attack to determine the appropriate response, it is the 

effects of the attack, and not the instrument used to carry it out, that matters. If 

cyber operations cause effects that, if caused by traditional physical means, would 

be regarded as a use of force, then such cyber operations would likely also be regarded as a use of force. 

Moreover, there need not be loss of life for a response to be merited. As we have 

seen during the past 18 months, our adversaries are seeking to act below the 

threshold of the use of force. To the extent that adversary cyber activity seeks to 

undermine U.S. national security interests the United States reserves the right to 

respond appropriately and proportionately at a time and place of its choosing by 

using any instrument of national power on land, in the air, at sea, in space or cyberspace. 

RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED TO

HON. REX TILLERSON, SECRETARY OF STATE, BY SENATOR ROB PORTMAN

Question 1. Secretary Tillerson, do you still support providing defensive lethal 

military assistance to the Ukrainian armed forces? What is the status of this decision? 

Answer. In response to Russian aggression, the United States has committed 

more than $750 million in security assistance since 2014 to provide training and 

equipment to help Ukraine defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity, better 

monitor and secure its borders, and deploy its forces more safely and effectively. 

The United States and partners also established a Multinational Joint Commission to coordinate international security assistance efforts and identify capability 

gaps. We will continue to use grant military assistance to build Ukraine’s capabilities by investing in our ongoing Joint Multinational Training Group—Ukraine, defense reform and institutional advisors, secure communications, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, maritime domain awareness, counter-mortar/counter-artillery radars, night vision devices, HMWWVs, medical, and related sustainment 

and training. 

Question 2. Is the State Department taking a lead role in implementing the administration’s new Afghanistan strategy? Where are the State Department and 

USAID focusing their efforts in Afghanistan? 

Answer. The State Department is taking the diplomatic lead to encourage a 

peaceful political settlement in Afghanistan. We have made significant progress in 

Afghanistan since 2001—on security, governance, socio-economic development, and 

regional integration—but the country remains fragile. To cement this progress, we 

have focused on building and strengthening the Afghan government led by President Ashraf Ghani and Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah. In conjunction with our 

new strategy, and at the initiative of President Ghani, the Afghan government developed the Kabul Compact to monitor priority reforms in four key sectors: governance, economic development, the peace process, and security. We meet regularly 

with the Afghan government to assess progress on these reforms. We are particularly focused on supporting the Afghan government’s effort to hold parliamentary 

elections scheduled for 2018 and a Presidential election in spring 2019. 

In my recent visit to South Asia, I explained the President’s South Asia strategy 

to leaders in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India and reviewed what these countries 

could do to support it. We are working closely with our allies and partners to continue strong international support for the Afghan government and its security forces 

to help create the environment necessary to sustain peace. On October 16, we held 

the sixth meeting of the Quadrilateral Coordination Group (QCG) with Afghanistan, 

China, and Pakistan, to promote Afghanistan-Pakistan cooperation and align efforts 

in support of a peace process. The State Department leads the U.S. delegations to 

several international fora intended to renew and align international support for Afghanistan, including the Heart of Asia/Istanbul Process, the Regional Economic Cooperation Conference on Afghanistan, and the Kabul Process Conference. 

USAID is developing strategies in Afghanistan and Pakistan to support the broad 

vision outlined in the South Asia strategy. The new USAID development strategy 

for Afghanistan will advance U.S. national security interests, and complement the 

efforts of the Departments of Defense and State to strengthen the government’s 

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hance the accountability of our assistance. It focuses on increasing the government’s 

revenue base by enabling private sector-led economic growth, strengthening service 

delivery in government-controlled areas, and helping Afghanistan sustain its gains 

in health, education, and women’s empowerment. 

RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED TO

HON. REX TILLERSON, SECRETARY OF STATE, BY SENATOR JEANNE SHAHEEN

Question 1. Earlier this summer, the Department of State briefed committee staff 

on your goals for the proposed reorganization of the State Department. At that time, 

Department officials stated that it was the intention of the Department to reduce 

the number of positions at the Department by at least 2,000 over the coming years. 

Can you confirm that this is still your intention? How does the Department intend 

to achieve those personnel reductions? 

Answer. Yes, that is still our intention. The Department developed a workforce 

reduction plan consistent with OMB guidance. The plan consists of voluntary attrition, some strategic hiring, and incentivized attrition (e.g. buyouts) of approximately 

641 voluntary early retirement authority and/or voluntary separation incentive payments (VERA/VSIP). VERA/VSIP plans must be approved by OPM and OMB. Foreign and Civil Service hiring (intake planning) is based on replacing less than 100 

percent of projected attrition. In both cases, we believe this measured approach to 

hiring reflects a careful balance of workforce continuity and stability within the 

overarching context of the Department’s ongoing workforce reductions. 

For the Foreign Service, intake planning figures were developed to ensure that 

sufficient numbers of new entry level Foreign Service personnel are available to fill 

critical overseas postings and, over the course of their careers, fill higher level positions in our most critical Generalist and Specialist skill categories. Civil Service intake focuses hiring on those mission critical occupations that provide important policy development and program support here in Washington and in concert with our 

colleagues serving overseas. 

Question 2. What is the current and anticipated intake of new entry-level Foreign 

Service generalists and specialists? What is the status of the State Department’s 

hiring freeze and the rationale for its continuation? 

Answer. The Department is continuing with strategically managed hiring while 

we undertake a comprehensive redesign of the Department in order to ensure strategic alignment. This is a temporary measure while a thorough review of the entire 

State Department is conducted. This initiative will direct sound decisions on how 

to best strengthen the institution and enhance our diversity. At the same time, we 

are committed to preserving future leadership pipelines and and will continue to assess and hire Foreign Service candidates. 

On September 18 we swore in the 192nd A-100 class for Foreign Service Officers 

and the 147th Foreign Service specialist class, comprised primarily of diplomatic security special agents and medical professionals. In Fiscal Year (FY) 2017, the State 

Department brought on board the following new Foreign Service personnel: 

• 220 Foreign Service Officers 

• 254 Foreign Service Specialists 

• 126 Consular Fellows (limited non career appointments) 

• 7 Medical and PEPFAR-related limited non career appointments Recruitment 

and assessment of candidates continues in order to preserve a future mid-level 

and leadership pipeline of talented and diverse Foreign Service Officers and 

Specialists, as well as to meet current entry-level needs overseas. Strategically 

managing hiring remains a priority for FY 2018, with a goal of onboarding the 

following number of new Foreign Service personnel: 

• 101 Foreign Service Officers of whom 55 are Pickering and Rangel Fellows 

• 91 Foreign Service Specialists 

Additionally in accordance with EO 13870, the Department plans to onboard in 

FY 2018: 

• 281 Consular Fellows (limited non-career appointments) 

Question 3. Please provide the numbers of employees that have departed the State 

Department in 2016 and to date, for 2017. Please break those numbers down by 

month and by civil service versus Foreign Service. Do not include political appointments or Schedule B positions in the count. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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1Losses include retirements, non-retirement separations, and conversion between the Foreign 

Service and Civil Service. 

Answer. Department of State loss1 counts for career full-time permanent employees in FY 16 and FY 17 as of September 30, 2017 are provided in the table below. 

These counts exclude non-career losses including limited and political appointments. 

DEPARTMENT OF STATE LOSS COUNTS FOR CAREER 

FULL-TIME PERMANENT EMPLOYEES 

Month 

FY 2016 FY 2017 

Foreign 

Service 

Civil 

Service Total 

Foreign 

Service 

Civil 

Service Total 

Oct 36 84 120 30 63 93 

Nov 61 42 103 56 53 109 

Dec 37 74 111 43 75 118 

Jan 24 93 117 36 113 149 

Feb 25 43 68 18 47 65 

Mar 21 54 75 24 73 97 

Apr 55 88 143 50 47 97 

May 21 38 59 24 50 74 

Jun 36 59 95 42 56 98 

Jul 39 60 99 *38 *45 *83 

Aug 53 54 107 *35 *71 *106 

Sep 124 74 198 *118 *49 *167 

Total 532 763 1295 *514 *742 *1256 

* Preliminary counts as transactions may still be in process. 

RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED TO

HON. REX TILLERSON, SECRETARY OF STATE, BY SENATOR TIM KAINE

Associated Forces 

Question 1. Can you please detail and list all the groups that have been deemed 

associated forces under the 2001 AUMF and all the locations where the U.S. military is involved under the 2001 AUMF? How many of these associated forces are 

engaged in hostilities against the United States, its Armed forces, or personnel? 

Which of these associated forces present a direct threat to the Unites States? Is 

there a single source that Congress can access to find up to date information on this 

question? 

Answer. The U.S. military is currently taking direct action against the following 

individuals and groups under the authority of the 2001 Authorization for Use of 

Military Force (AUMF): al-Qaeda; the Taliban; certain other terrorist or insurgent 

groups affiliated with al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan; al-Qaeda in the 

Arabian Peninsula; al-Shabaab; al-Qaeda in Syria; and ISIS. 

During the Trump administration, the United States has used military force pursuant to the 2001 AUMF in Afghanistan, Cuba (detention operations), Iraq, Libya, 

Somalia, Syria, Niger, and Yemen. 

As a matter of international law, the United States is in an ongoing non-international armed conflict with these groups and individuals and is engaged in hostilities against them. Counterterrorism operations against these individuals and 

groups are undertaken in furtherance of U.S. national self-defense and, in some 

cases, also in collective self-defense of partner States such as Iraq. The administration is committed to keeping Congress timely and fully informed of uses of military 

force pursuant to the 2001 AUMF, including in periodic reports submitted consistent 

with the War Powers Resolution. 

Question 2. Please detail the process for which a new group is identified and approved as an associated force under the 2001 AUMF. Does such determination trigger a requirement to notify or brief Congress? 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

69 

Answer. A determination of whether a group is covered by the 2001 AUMF is 

made at the most senior levels of the U.S. Government only after a careful evaluation of the intelligence concerning each group’s organization, links with al-Qaeda or 

the Taliban, and participation in al-Qaeda’s or the Taliban’s ongoing hostilities 

against the United States or its coalition partners. 

The administration periodically briefs members of Congress about U.S. operations 

against these groups and the legal basis for these operations. 

Question 3. The administration considers ISIS an associated force of al-Qaeda and 

thus covered under the 2001 AUMF (in addition to being covered under the 2002 

AUMF). Though we disagree on this, I am further troubled by suggestions that the 

administration may be expanding its definition of associated forces to include ISIS 

affiliated militants or ISIS associated forces. Previously, an associated force need to 

be both: 1) an organized, armed group that has entered the fight alongside al-Qaeda, 

and 2) a co-belligerent with al-Qaeda in hostilities against the United States or its 

coalition partners. As such, not every group that commits terrorist acts is an associated force and not every group aligned with al-Qaeda is an associated force. Can 

you confirm that the administration does not consider forces that are affiliated or 

associated with ISIS as covered under the 2001 AUMF? Please provide the administration’s current definition of associated forces. 

Answer. The administration has not determined that the 2001 AUMF applies to 

any group solely on the basis that the group is an ‘‘associated force’’ of ISIS. Although branches of ISIS have emerged in locations outside Iraq and Syria, we regard those branches in a number of locations as being part of ISIS. 

The Government’s definition of associated forces remains unchanged from the 

prior administration. 

Coalition Partner 

Question 4. Can you confirm that the current number of countries in the counterISIS coalition is currently 69? Do you believe the U.S. currently has the authority 

to undertake military action, outside of treaty obligation, to protect all of these 

countries in hostilities with al-Qaeda through U.S. military operations? 

Answer. There are currently 70 countries in the Defeat-ISIS Coalition. Whether 

and to what extent the United States would have legal authority to undertake military action in defense of another country would necessarily depend upon the facts 

and circumstances of a specific situation. Of course, as the administration has previously reported, the 2001 AUMF provides the authority to use force to defend U.S. 

and Coalition forces engaged in the campaign to defeat ISIS to the extent such use 

of force is a necessary and appropriate measure in support of counter-ISIS operations. 

Syria Strikes 

Question 5. In April, Representative Schiff and I sent a letter to the President 

asking for the administration’s legal justification for the April 6th strike against the 

Shayrat military airbase in Syria. I asked General Dunford the same question and 

he stated he would get back to me. To date, I still have not received a response. 

Can you please provide me with the legal justification under domestic and international law for these airstrikes? 

Answer. The April 6 U.S. missile strike on Shayrat airfield in Syria was not based 

on the authority of the statutory authorizations for use of military force that we 

have been discussing at this hearing. The President authorized that strike pursuant 

to his power under Article II of the Constitution as Commander in Chief and Chief 

Executive to use this sort of military force overseas to defend important U.S. national interests. The U.S. military action was directed against Syrian military targets directly connected to the April 4 chemical weapons attack in Idlib and was justified and legitimate as a measure to deter and prevent Syria’s illegal and unacceptable use of chemical weapons. 

RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED TO

HON. JAMES MATTIS, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, BY SENATOR BOB CORKER

2001 and 2002 AUMF Repeal 

Question 1. If Congress decided to repeal the 2001 and 2002 Authorizations for 

Use of Military Force (AUMFs), and simultaneously provide a replacement AUMF 

that authorizes the President to use all necessary and appropriate force against the 

Taliban, al-Qaeda, ISIS, and associated forces (appropriately defined): 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

70 

• What would be the legal consequences, and what other provisions of law would 

be impacted? Please be as specific as possible. 

• How could Congress mitigate any negative legal consequences in a replacement 

AUMF and ensure a smooth transition to the new authority, including with respect to legacy detainees? If possible, please provide specific language. 

Answer. The U.S. Government’s response in litigation of habeas corpus petitions 

brought on behalf of certain detainees has expressly relied on the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF). One of the principal concerns with repealing 

the 2001 and 2002 authorizations would be uncertainty regarding the effect of such 

a repeal on the ongoing detention of those individuals. To the extent that the Government would seek to continue detaining the individuals on the basis of any new 

AUMF, the applicability of any subsequent law could be subject to further litigation. 

The administration would need to review any proposed language that the committee 

might develop. 

2002 AUMF Repeal and 2001 AUMF Amendment 

Question 2. In the alternative, if Congress decided to repeal the 2002 AUMF and 

amend the 2001 AUMF to provide fresh authorization for the use of military force 

against the Taliban, al-Qaeda, ISIS, and associated forces (appropriately defined): 

• What would be the legal consequences, and what other provisions of law would 

be impacted? Please be as specific as possible. 

• How could Congress mitigate any negative legal consequences with an amended 

2001 AUMF and ensure a smooth transition, including with respect to legacy 

detainees? If possible, please provide specific language. 

Answer. Amendment of the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) 

could present similar concerns as a repeal and replacement of that law, including 

that it could result in a need to re-litigate the lawfulness of the detention of certain 

individuals who are currently detained under the 2001 AUMF. The administration 

would need to review the specific language of any proposed legislation. 

Associated Persons or Forces 

Question 3. In a letter to Senate leaders earlier this year, you and Secretary 

Tillerson expressed concern about the definition of ‘‘associated persons or forces’’ in 

S.J. Res. 43, which you stated is ‘‘inconsistent with the standard applied by the Executive Branch and which could result in unnecessary uncertainty regarding its 

scope.’’ 

• What is the ‘‘standard applied by the Executive Branch’’ to which you referred 

in your letter? 

• If the administration does not support the definition of ‘‘associated persons or 

forces’’ in S.J. Res. 43, what definition does the administration recommend for 

a new AUMF? 

Answer. The Executive Branch has described a concept of ‘‘associated forces’’ in 

interpreting and applying the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF). 

It requires, first, that the entity be an organized, armed group that has entered the 

fight alongside al-Qaeda or the Taliban and, second, that the group be a co-belligerent with al-Qaeda or the Taliban in hostilities against the United States or its 

coalition partners. In the context of detention, the Executive Branch has described 

the 2001 AUMF as applying to people who are part of or substantially support such 

groups. 

2002 AUMF Repeal 

Question 4. Does your Department have any legal or policy concerns with repealing the 2002 AUMF? If yes, please explain. 

Answer. Although the threat posed by Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq was the 

primary focus of the 2002 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), the statute, in accordance with its express goals, has always been understood to authorize 

the use of force for the related dual purposes of helping to establish a stable Iraq 

and of addressing terrorist threats emanating from Iraq. After Saddam Hussein’s 

regime fell in 2003, the United States continued to take military action in Iraq 

under the 2002 AUMF to further these purposes, including action against al-Qaeda 

in Iraq (now known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)). Then, as now, 

that organization posed a terrorist threat to the United States and its partners and 

undermined stability and democracy in Iraq. The 2002 AUMF thus continues to provide authority for military operations against ISIS in Iraq and, to the extent necessary to achieve these purposes, elsewhere, including in Syria. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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Additional Authorizations for Use of Military Force 

Question 5. Does your Department construe any of the following provisions of existing law as an Authorization for Use of Military Force? If yes to any, please specify 

and explain the interpretation. 

• Authorization of the Secretary of Defense to provide support for friendly foreign 

countries (10 U.S.C. § 331). 

• Authorization of the Secretary of Defense to support for foreign forces, irregular 

forces, groups, or individuals engaged in supporting or facilitating ongoing military operations by United States special operations forces to combat terrorism 

(10 U.S.C. § 127e). 

• Authorization of the Secretary of Defense to conduct or support a program or 

programs to provide training and equipment to the national security forces of 

one or more foreign countries for the purpose of building the capacity of such 

forces to conduct one or more of the following (10 U.S.C. § 333): 

1. Counterterrorism operations. 

2. Counter-weapons of mass destruction operations. 

3. Counter-illicit drug trafficking operations. 

4. Counter-transnational organized crime operations. 

5. Maritime and border security operations. 

6. Military intelligence operations. 

7. Operations or activities that contribute to an international coalition operation that is determined by the Secretary to be in the national interest of the 

United States. 

Answer. The provisions of Title 10 cited in your question provide important authority for certain military activities that support counterterrorism operations and 

other aspects of U.S. national security, but they are not authorizations to use military force. 

RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED TO

HON. JAMES MATTIS, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, BY SENATOR BENJAMIN L. CARDIN

Section 4(a) of the War Powers Resolution 

Question. Section 4(a) of the War Powers resolution requires that in the absence 

of a declaration of war, in any case in which ‘‘United States Armed Forces are introduced (1) into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances,’’ the President must withdraw such 

forces within 60 days unless Congress has declared war or otherwise authorized 

their deployment. U.S. Forces in Niger are now, obviously, in an area in which imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances of the attack on U.S. soldiers, and the resulting death of four of them, in early October. Does 

the administration now consider that the 60-day clock has begun, and if not, what 

is the legal reasoning behind this conclusion? 

Answer. The October 4th ambush of U.S. and Nigerien forces was a tragic but isolated incident. It does not indicate imminent involvement of U.S. forces in further 

hostilities. Additionally, our assessment is that an ISIS group was responsible for 

that ambush. Operations against ISIS are authorized by the 2001 Authorization for 

Use of Military Force so would not be subject to the termination provision of the 

War Powers Resolution. 

RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED TO

HON. JAMES MATTIS, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, BY SENATOR JEFF FLAKE

Operations Authorized by 2002 AUMF 

Question. In your prepared remarks and during the question and answer period 

of the hearing, you repeatedly referenced the need to maintain the authorities provided in both the 2001 and 2002 authorizations for the use of military force (PL 

107–40, and PL 107 243, respectively). The 2002 law provides that, ‘‘The President 

is authorized to use the Armed Forces of the United States as he determines to be 

necessary and appropriate in order to 1) defend the national security of the United 

States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq, and 2) enforce all relevant 

United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq.’’ 

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• Given the regime change that has taken place in Iraq following the U.S. invasion in 2003, what utility does PL 107–243 continue to serve? 

• What U.S. military operations are currently taking place inside Iraq that rely 

on the authority provided in PL 107–243? 

Answer. The United States continues to rely on the 2002 Authorization for Use 

of Military Force (AUMF) Against Iraq Resolution, along with the 2001 AUMF, as 

part of the domestic legal basis for conducting military operations against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in Iraq and Syria. Although the threat posed 

by Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq was the primary focus of the 2002 AUMF, the 

statute, in accordance with its express goals, has always been understood to authorize the use of force for the related dual purposes of helping to establish a stable 

Iraq and of addressing terrorist threats emanating from Iraq. After Saddam Hussein’s regime fell in 2003, the United States continued to take military action in 

Iraq under the 2002 AUMF to further these purposes, including action against alQaeda in Iraq (now known as ISIS). Then, as now, that organization posed a terrorist threat to the United States and its partners and undermined stability and democracy in Iraq. The 2002 AUMF continues to provide authority for military operations against ISIS in Iraq and, to the extent necessary to achieve these purposes, 

elsewhere, including in Syria. The 2002 AUMF also provides authority to respond 

to threats to U.S. national security from Iraq that may re-emerge in the future and 

that may not be covered by the 2001 AUMF. The repeal of the 2002 AUMF could 

call into question the President’s authority to use military force to assist the Government of Iraq both in the fight against ISIS and in stabilizing Iraq following the 

destruction of ISIS’s so-called caliphate. 

RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED TO

HON. JAMES MATTIS, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, BY SENATOR ROBERT MENENDEZ

Defeating ISIS 

Question 1. As the fight to recapture territory held by ISIS seems to wind down, 

what are the standards and metrics you will use to determine the defeat of ISIS 

in Iraq and Syria? 

Answer. The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) will be militarily defeated 

when it is unable to plot and carry out attacks against the United States, and when 

local security forces are capable of pursuing the group’s underground networks. The 

coalition has liberated more than 90 percent of ISIS-held territory, its plotters are 

on the run, and fewer fighters are flocking to its banner. However, the job is not 

done. ISIS will continue to pose a terrorist threat to the U.S. and our interests in 

the region, as it continues efforts to destabilize the region and direct or inspire external attacks. The coalition has played, and will continue to play, a vital role in 

supporting partners in Iraq and Syria as they secure their hard fought gains. 

ISIS Threat After Fall of Rocca 

Question 2. What is your assessment of the ISIS threat after the lose their territory? Where will ISIS fighters go and what tactics will they employ? Is there a 

threat of ISIS fighter rebranding? 

Answer. The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) still poses a security threat 

in Iraq and Syria despite losing large amounts of territory to Iraqi, pro-Syrian regime, and Coalition forces. ISIS probably is giving priority to clandestine operations 

to plot attacks to degrade local governance and security and maintain the group’s 

legitimacy. ISIS members who remain loyal to the group may provide administrative or logistic support to these networks. Members who have become disillusioned 

by ISIS’s apparent defeat probably will attempt to reintegrate into their communities. In areas such as Baghdad, Kirkuk, and Diyala where it has robust networks, 

ISIS is conducting sophisticated operations, including IEDs, ambushes, or suicide 

attacks. ISIS could engage in some localized rebranding or alliances to preserve the 

group’s security. The group has not changed its extremist ideology to allow alliances 

with more moderate groups and is tailoring its narrative to highlight that considerable setbacks are part of its preordained, multi-generational struggle. 

Authorities to Remain in Iraq or Syria 

Question 3. Is there a point at which you will run out of authorities to legally remain in Iraq—or Syria— if ISIS, al-Queda, Jabhat Fateh Al-Sham, or any other affiliate groups have been driven from their previously held territory? 

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Answer. The domestic and international legal bases for U.S. military operations 

in Iraq and Syria do not depend on the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria‘s, or any 

other group’s, physical control of territory. Whether and to what extent the United 

States would have legal authority to undertake specific military actions in Iraq and 

Syria in the future would necessarily depend upon the facts and circumstances of 

a specific situation. 

Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces 

Question 4. In Iraq, how do you determine which groups within the Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq are taking orders from Iran? What is the U.S. policy on demobilizing the PMF after ISIS is defeated in Iraq? Does PMF involvement in Kurdish majority areas threaten stability and civilian protection in these areas? 

Answer. I am under no illusions about the destabilizing nature of Iran’s activities 

in the region. The Department remains committed to helping the Government of 

Iraq (GoI) counter Iranian policies that heighten sectarian tensions and undermine 

Iraqi sovereignty. The Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) are part of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), reporting to the Prime Minister’s Office. The PMF is composed of 

more than 40 groups, many of them Shia, but also Sunni, Christian, and Yazidi. 

The Department will support the GoI as it continues to reform its security sector, 

including the GoI’s efforts to ensure all armed groups are under their full control. 

The presence of any sectarian forces in sensitive, disputed areas is unhelpful and 

destabilizing. The Department has convened military leaders from the Iraq Security 

Forces and the Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga to promote calm, ensure situational awareness, and encourage the establishment of joint security mechanisms to ease tensions 

and facilitate a broader political dialogue. I expect enhanced military coordination 

will facilitate constructive dialogue on a host of political issues, from disputed internal boundaries to oil revenue sharing. 

Iranian Actions in Syria 

Question 5. As Iran’s influence continues to grow in Syria, what measures would 

we take if Iran attacked U.S.-backed forces there? Under what authorities? 

Answer. The efforts of the U.S.-led Global Coalition to Defeat the Islamic State 

of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in Syria are aimed at the defeat of ISIS. The United States 

does not seek to fight the Syrian Government or pro-Syrian-Government forces, including Iran. The 2001 Authorization for use of Military Force (AUMF) authorizes 

the use of force against al-Qaeda and associated forces, including against ISIS, including in Iraq and Syria. The 2001 AUMF also provides authority to use force to 

defend U.S., Coalition, and partner forces engaged in the campaign to defeat ISIS 

to the extent such use of force is a necessary and appropriate measure in support 

of these counter-ISIS operations. As a matter of international law, the United States 

is using force in Syria against al-Qaeda and associated forces, including against 

ISIS, and is providing support to Syrian partners fighting ISIS, such as the Syrian 

Democratic Forces, in the collective self-defense of Iraq (and other States) and in 

U.S. national self-defense. Necessary and proportionate measures in self-defense include the use of force as needed to defend U.S., Coalition, and U.S.-supported partner forces engaged in the campaign to defeat ISIS from interference by Syrian Government and pro-Syrian-Government forces. 

Russian Support to the Taliban 

Question 6. In August, Secretary Tillerson said that it appeared Russia was 

ramping up support of the Taliban in Afghanistan. Is the friend of our enemy our 

enemy as well? Does this make Russia our enemy in Afghanistan or more broadly? 

What authorities do you believe you have to respond to state-sponsored support of 

the Taliban and how would you use those authorities? What authorities would you 

seek? 

Answer. Reports of Russian support to the Taliban are puzzling because a de-stabilized Afghanistan is clearly not in Russia’s interest. I understand the Department 

is looking at this issue carefully to determine where it is necessary to moderate any 

unhelpful Russian behavior. Russia and the United States have a shared interest 

in Afghanistan’s stability. Russia’s participation in the Afghan-led and owned peace 

process and contributions to regional stability would be welcome. However, I do believe state sponsors of terror need to be held fully accountable, and I would work 

closely with the State Department and other agencies to ensure we are exercising 

all necessary tools and authorities to increase the costs on states that sponsor support of the Taliban. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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State Department Cuts 

Question 7. Our military leaders generally agree that the best investments we can 

make into preventing war start with a robust diplomacy and development budget. 

You submitted a budget with deep cuts to critical diplomatic initiatives and development efforts. The President has not provided a nomination for an Ambassador to 

South Korea—our most crucial ally as we seek to confront an aggressive North 

Korea. You shuttered the office of the Special representative for Afghanistan and 

Pakistan. What are the implications for cuts to the State Department? What are the 

implications for less than a fully staffed diplomatic presence in places like Iraq and 

Afghanistan? 

Answer. The Department of Defense strongly supports, and relies on, the Department of State’s leading role in establishing and implementing U.S. foreign policy. 

The Department of State needs to be appropriately staffed and resourced in order 

to protect our country’s national security. The Department of Defense relies on our 

diplomatic corps to help resolve disputes before they become military crises. State 

Department personnel likewise play an invaluable role in theaters of conflict, leading the important work of diplomacy, humanitarian relief, and development. The 

role of the Department of State is particularly critical in areas where we are seeking 

to negotiate a peace, build an enduring relationship, or manage a potential contingency, as is the case in places like the Korean Peninsula, Afghanistan, and Iraq. 

The Department of Defense and the Department of State must work together closely 

and be able to call upon their respective authorities and expertise to navigate today’s challenging global security environment and protect U.S., allied, and partner 

interests around the world. 

Cyberattack Response 

Question 8. If the United States suffered a state-sponsored massive cyberattack, 

how would we respond? Do the Departments of Defense and State have in place response plans to cyberattacks? How should Congress authorize those responses? 

Should we measure cyberattacks on a scale? Would an attack on the energy grid 

of a major city merit the same response as an attack on a nuclear facility? On a 

voter database? 

Answer. The United States responds to cyber threats through a whole-of-government approach that leverages the full range of U.S. Government capabilities—diplomatic, economic, law enforcement, technical, and military. The Department of Defense (DoD) maintains a deliberate planning process to prepare for the defense of 

the Nation across all domains, including cyberspace. DoD’s plans and actions are 

always in support of the larger foreign policy and diplomatic efforts of the U.S. Government. The Department of State supports interagency efforts to address cyber incidents that rise to the level of a national security concern by providing foreign policy guidance on appropriate responses, building support among foreign governments 

for such responses and, where appropriate, delivering messages of warning to potential adversaries. 

The U.S. Government evaluates malicious cyber activities on a case-by-case basis 

precisely because, as your questions highlight, the appropriateness of a response is 

dependent on the specific facts and context of the particular malicious cyber activity 

in question. Factors to be assessed include the scope, scale, and impact of the activity; the entities targeted; the actor that executed the activity; and any broader context from the international security environment. The loss of life and threats to public health and safety obviously raise the greatest concern. 

When evaluating a cyber attack to determine the appropriate response, it is the 

effects of the attack, and not the instrument used to carry it out, that matters. If 

cyber operations cause effects that, if caused by traditional physical means, would 

be regarded as a use of force, then such cyber operations would likely also be regarded as a use of force. Moreover, there need not be the loss of life for a response 

to be merited. As we have seen during the past 18 months, our adversaries are seeking to act below the threshold of the use of force. To the extent that adversary cyber 

activity seeks to undermine U.S. national security and prosperity, the United States 

reserves the right to respond appropriately and proportionately at a time and place 

of its choosing with any of the instruments of national power, including the military 

and including cyberspace. 

Al-Qaeda–Iran Connection 

Question 9. CIA Director Pompeo was recently quoted as saying the al-Qaeda– 

Iran connection is an ‘‘open secret.’’ Do you agree that the al-Qaeda–Iran connection 

is an open secret? Was he laying groundwork to expand operations against al-Qaeda 

into Iran? 

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Answer. It would be inappropriate for me to speculate on the intent of Director 

Pompeo’s remarks. 

POTUS in the Chain of Command 

Question 10. Civilian control of the military is one of the most critical 

underpinnings of a free and democratic society. Regarding the recent attack in 

Niger, the President recently told reporters on Wednesday of last week that he had 

not specifically authorized that mission. He said, ‘‘I have generals—they are great 

generals. I gave them authority to do what’s right so that we win. I want to win 

and we’re going to win and we’re beating ISIS very badly . . . as far as the incident 

we’re talking about I’ve been seeing it just like you’ve been seeing it.. They have 

to meet the enemy and they meet them tough and that’s what happens.’’ In your 

view, where does the chain of command begin and end? In other words—where does 

the buck stop with authorizing military operations? 

Answer. The President of the United States is the Commander-in-Chief of the 

U.S. Armed Forces. The President delegates authority, through the military chain 

of command, to conduct a wide range of military operations. 

Rules of Engagement 

Question 11. In general, it seems that thus far, the President has largely continued policies of the Obama administration and claimed new ideas for fighting ISIS. 

On October 17, and other times as well, the President stated: ‘‘I totally changed 

rules of engagement. I totally changed our military, I totally changed the attitudes 

of the military and they have done a fantastic job.’’ I understand the President sent 

a memo on January 28 directing the DOD to develop a plan to defeat ISIS and 

asked for recommended changes to ROE. What are those changes? Could they put 

our troops more in harm’s way? Do they change our approach to civilian casualties? 

Do the American people have a right to know under what terms our military is engaging in conflict, widely and ambiguously defined training missions, and other deployments? 

Answer. The President’s delegation of certain authorities to appropriate levels has 

allowed the Department to be more flexible and react more quickly to battlefield opportunities against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and threats to our 

forces. These adjustments have accelerated the territorial defeat of ISIS and allowed 

us to degrade the group’s leadership and capabilities while keeping our forces safe 

and minimizing the risks to civilians. The military continues to take all feasible 

measures to minimize civilian harm in military operations. The use of force continues to be governed by the law of armed conflict, including the principles of proportionality, distinction, necessity, and humanity. The Department is committed to 

transparency and provides regular updates to Congress on the military mission and 

force levels in Iraq and Syria. 

RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED TO

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HON JAMES MATTIS BY SENATOR TODD YOUNG

Excess Infrastructure 

Question. In its FY 2018 Budget Request, the Department of Defense requested 

authority to conduct a Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round in fiscal year 

2021. The proposal noted that ‘‘the Department has about 20 percent more infrastructure capacity than required for its operations.’’ What are the implications for 

readiness and modernization if the services are required to maintain infrastructure 

they don’t need? 

Answer. Like any business, maintaining excess infrastructure denies the Department the opportunity to spend funds on higher priorities. The Department requested a Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round for 2021 to provide a means 

to align infrastructure with force structure and to station our forces to enhance their 

capabilities and lethality. The Department is developing a new National Defense 

Strategy, and it must be supported by an updated basing strategy. Without BRAC, 

the Department cannot station forces as effectively as possible because we are 

locked into a status quo configuration, thereby negatively affecting readiness. I must 

be able to eliminate excess infrastructure in order to shift resources to readiness 

and modernization. The billions in annual recurring savings—otherwise wasted on 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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unnecessary infrastructure—could be applied directly to readiness (e.g. more training) and modernization (e.g. investing in next generation weapons systems). 

RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED TO

HON. JAMES MATTIS, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, BY SENATOR JEANNE SHAHEEN

Euphrates River Valley 

Question. Secretary Mattis, I agree with you when you said that Syria is ‘‘the 

most complex battlefield.’’ Also in your response to my question, you said that the 

United States will continue to clear the Euphrates River Valley. You specifically 

said that our military will move toward Mayadin. Reports, however, indicate that 

Asad’s regime forces and the Russians are in that area. What are the differences 

between regime’s goals in Mayadin and for the greater Eurphrates River Valley, and 

U.S. goals? If we have similar goals, why is deconfliction necessary? If we have differing goals, how do we trust that the diplomatic process that you laid out will 

work? 

Answer. The Syrian Government’s motivation for operations in the Euphrates 

River Valley is no different than its motivation for operations in western Syria: to 

regain control over the fractured Syrian state and reassert President Assad’s will 

over the Syrian people. Although the Syrian Government is finally confronting the 

Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), make no mistake—we are not working together with Syria or its partners, and they are not approaching this fight in a way 

that will prevent ISIS’ return. In contrast, we are working ‘‘by, with, and through’’ 

local partners to defeat ISIS militarily and secure, stabilize, and restore local governance in liberated areas to prevent ISIS’ return. De-confliction measures are necessary to reduce the risk of escalatory incidents and ensure the safety of coalition 

forces operating nearby. Through the established deconfliction channels with Russia, 

we are able to mitigate risk from pro-regime forces and preserve the operational 

safety of coalition and coalition-supported forces. De-confliction discussions between 

the United States and Russia thus far have been professional and constructive. 

RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED TO

HON. JAMES MATTIS, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, BY SENATOR JOHNNY ISAKSON

E-8 Joint Surveillance Attack Radar System (JSTARS) 

Question 1. During the hearing, you mentioned that not only are the intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) requirements not being met within U.S. Africa Command’s (AFRICOM) area of responsibility, but also that ISR requirements 

are not being met worldwide. This is understandable as the number of priority intelligence requirements far outnumber the number of platforms available. This is only 

further complicated by the continued decentralization of operations by violent extremist organizations. Despite this, however, the Air Force has indicated its desire 

to divest the E-8 Joint Surveillance Attack Radar System (JSTARS) in favor of synchronizing a host of other platforms to provide the same capabilities. JSTARS’ 

unique ability to provide battle management, command and control, and ISR capabilities through a single platform are unparalleled and divestment should strongly 

be reconsidered bearing in mind the collection gaps and ISR shortages that you stated. Do you recommend that the Air Force continue forward with the recapitalization 

of JSTARS rather than planned retirement in order to meet the ISR demands of 

AFRICOM and the other combatant commands? 

Answer. The Department of Defense will continue to evaluate any changes to programs that support our warfighters with the full and open participation of the Combatant Commands. I believe we must modernize the required capabilities for battlefield management; command and control; and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. As in all low-density, high-demand capabilities, careful analysis and allocation of these limited actions are required. This is done through an extensive process that includes the participation of the Joint Staff, Combatant Commanders, and 

the Services. 

DPRK Artillery 

Question 2. Even without a nuclear weapon, North Korea (DPRK) has hundreds 

of conventional artillery pieces capable of attacking Seoul. The devastation there 

would be catastrophic and millions of lives would be lost. What capabilities do we 

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have in place to counter such an attack? Do we need additional resources and capabilities there to protect our Korean allies and the U.S. citizens that live within the 

range of DPRK artillery? 

Answer. The United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK) continue to modernize the Alliance posture in order to deter and respond to any conventional or nuclear attack by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). This includes the 

U.S. steady-state presence of 28,500 U.S. forces, a layered ballistic missile defense 

architecture, and rotational deployment of top U.S. capabilities in and around the 

Korean Peninsula. Our extended deterrence commitment to the ROK remains steadfast, and we are committed to defending our allies using the full range of our capabilities—including the U.S. nuclear umbrella and conventional capabilities—against 

the DPRK. We have substantially bolstered our ballistic missile defense capabilities 

in the Asia-Pacific region in recent years with the deployment of an additional ANTPY-2 (ballistic missile warning) radar to Japan, an increased number of deployed 

U.S. Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense capable ships, Patriot PAC-3 ballistic missile defense upgrades in the ROK, and deployments of a Terminal High-Altitude 

Area Defense (THAAD) battery to Guam and the ROK. The U.S.-ROK Alliance decision to operationalize the THAAD battery is part of a continued effort to acquire 

critical military capabilities to ensure the defense of both U.S. and ROK forces and 

citizens living in the ROK from the increasing North Korean nuclear and ballistic 

missile threats. 

RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED TO

HON. JAMES MATTIS, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, BY SENATOR TIM KAINE

Associated Forces 

Question 1. Can you please detail and list all the groups that have been deemed 

associated forces under the 2001 AUMF and all the locations where the U.S. military is involved under the 2001 AUMF? How many of these associated forces are 

engaged in hostilities against the United States, its Armed forces, or personnel? 

Which of these associated forces present a direct threat to the Unites States? Is 

there a single source that Congress can access to find up to date information on this 

question? 

Answer. The U.S. military is currently taking direct action against the following 

individuals and groups under the authority of the 2001 Authorization for Use of 

Military Force (AUMF): al-Qaeda; the Taliban; certain other terrorist or insurgent 

groups affiliated with al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan; al-Qaeda in the 

Arabian Peninsula; al-Shabaab; al-Qaeda in Syria; and ISIS. 

During the Trump administration, the United States has used military force pursuant to the 2001 AUMF in Afghanistan, Cuba (detention operations), Iraq, Libya, 

Somalia, Syria, Niger, and Yemen. 

As a matter of international law, the United States is in an ongoing non-international armed conflict with these groups and individuals and is engaged in hostilities against them. Counterterrorism operations against these individuals and 

groups are undertaken in furtherance of U.S. national self-defense and, in some 

cases, also in collective self-defense of partner States such as Iraq. The administration is committed to keeping Congress timely and fully informed of uses of military 

force pursuant to the 2001 AUMF, including in periodic reports submitted consistent 

with the War Powers Resolution. 

Question 2. Please detail the process for which a new group is identified and approved as an associated force under the 2001 AUMF. Does such determination trigger a requirement to notify or brief Congress? 

Answer. A determination of whether a group is covered by the 2001 AUMF is 

made at the most senior levels of the U.S. Government only after a careful evaluation of the intelligence concerning each group’s organization, links with al-Qaeda or 

the Taliban, and participation in al-Qaeda’s or the Taliban’s ongoing hostilities 

against the United States or its coalition partners. 

The administration periodically briefs members of Congress about U.S. operations 

against these groups and the legal basis for these operations. 

Question 3. The administration considers ISIS an associated force of al-Qaeda and 

thus covered under the 2001 AUMF (in addition to being covered under the 2002 

AUMF). Though we disagree on this, I am further troubled by suggestions that the 

administration may be expanding its definition of associated forces to include ISIS 

affiliated militants or ISIS associated forces. Previously, an associated force need to 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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be both: 1) an organized, armed group that has entered the fight alongside al-Qaeda, 

and 2) a co-belligerent with al-Qaeda in hostilities against the United States or its 

coalition partners. As such, not every group that commits terrorist acts is an associated force and not every group aligned with al-Qaeda is an associated force. Can 

you confirm that the administration does not consider forces that are affiliated or 

associated with ISIS as covered under the 2001 AUMF? Please provide the administration’s current definition of associated forces. 

Answer. The administration has not determined that the 2001 AUMF applies to 

any group solely on the basis that the group is an ‘‘associated force’’ of ISIS. Although branches of ISIS have emerged in locations outside Iraq and Syria, we regard those branches in a number of locations as being part of ISIS. 

The Government’s definition of associated forces remains unchanged from the 

prior administration. 

Coalition Partner 

Question 4. Can you confirm that the current number of countries in the counterISIS coalition is currently 69? Do you believe the U.S. currently has the authority 

to undertake military action, outside of treaty obligation, to protect all of these 

countries in hostilities with al-Qaeda through U.S. military operations? 

Answer. There are currently 70 countries in the Defeat-ISIS Coalition. Whether 

and to what extent the United States would have legal authority to undertake military action in defense of another country would necessarily depend upon the facts 

and circumstances of a specific situation. Of course, as the administration has previously reported, the 2001 AUMF provides the authority to use force to defend U.S. 

and Coalition forces engaged in the campaign to defeat ISIS to the extent such use 

of force is a necessary and appropriate measure in support of counter-ISIS operations. 

Syria Strikes 

Question 5. In April, Representative Schiff and I sent a letter to the President 

asking for the administration’s legal justification for the April 6th strike against the 

Shayrat military airbase in Syria (attached). I asked General Dunford the same 

question and he stated he would get back to me. To date, I still have not received 

a response. Can you please provide me with the legal justification under domestic 

and international law for these airstrikes? 

Answer. The April 6 U.S. missile strike on Shayrat airfield in Syria was not based 

on the authority of the statutory authorizations for use of military force that we 

have been discussing at this hearing. The President authorized that strike pursuant 

to his power under Article II of the Constitution as Commander in Chief and Chief 

Executive to use this sort of military force overseas to defend important U.S. national interests. The U.S. military action was directed against Syrian military targets directly connected to the April 4 chemical weapons attack in Idlib and was justified and legitimate as a measure to deter and prevent Syria’s illegal and unacceptable use of chemical weapons. 

Congressional Reports 

Question 6. In response to a question from Senator Coons regarding public transparency on military deployments, you referred to 901 reports to the Senate for FY 

2016 and an additional 175, implying 1,076 reports, for FY 2017 in the your reply. 

In an effort to improve upon the communications between your Department and the 

Senate, could you provide responses to the following questions: 

• Of the 901 reports cited for FY 2016, how many involved troop deployments, 

status updates on military operations or intended missions? 

• For the reports involving troop deployments, status updates on military operations or intended missions, did these reports also note the legal authorization 

for such actions? What are the source documents requiring those reports? 

• Do you have any recommendations to better consolidate or improve the process 

for generating and/or submitting reports on troop deployment status updates on 

military operations or intended missions and their legal authority to Congress? 

Answer. I believe the process by which the Department provides reports to Congress needs appropriate transparency and reform to enable the Congress to conduct 

oversight. In that spirit, I look forward to working with the Congress on solutions 

to consolidate and improve the process for generating and submitting the needed reports on all topics of interest to the Congress. The Deputy Secretary of Defense is 

leading our efforts to improve this process. 

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RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED TO

HON. JAMES MATTIS, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, BY SENATOR ROB PORTMAN

Global Engagement Center 

Question 1. Secretary Mattis, as you know, the 2017 NDAA, which was signed into law in December 2016, authorized up to $60 million to support interagency efforts led by the State Department’s Global Engagement Center to counter propaganda and disinformation by countries like Russia, China, and Iran—as well as terrorist groups like ISIS. I was pleased to see Secretary Tillerson’s decision to approve 

the GEC’s strategic plan and release funds to execute it. The State Department also 

submitted a request to DoD for $40 million to support the GEC’s efforts to counter 

foreign disinformation and help ensure unity of effort between DoD and the State 

Department. Despite the urgency of the threat, I do not believe DoD has released 

these funds. 

• Secretary Mattis, would you agree that the dangers posed by extremist messaging and state-sponsored information operations represent a critical national 

security threat to the United States? 

Answer: I agree that extremist messaging and state-sponsored information operations represent a national security threat. The Global Engagement Center has the 

potential to play a key role in exposing and countering extremist and state-sponsored disinformation and propaganda aimed at countering U.S. national interests. 

The Department of Defense will continue to collaborate with the Department of 

State and other relevant U.S. departments and agencies to counter these threats. 

Question 2. Secretary Mattis, as you know, the 2017 NDAA, which was signed into law in December 2016, authorized up to $60 million to support interagency efforts led by the State Department’s Global Engagement Center to counter propaganda and disinformation by countries like Russia, China, and Iran—as well as terrorist groups like ISIS. I was pleased to see Secretary Tillerson’s decision to approve 

the GEC’s strategic plan and release funds to execute it. The State Department also 

submitted a request to DoD for $40 million to support the GEC’s efforts to counter 

foreign disinformation and help ensure unity of effort between DoD and the State 

Department. Despite the urgency of the threat, I do not believe DoD has released 

these funds. Where does the Department of Defense stand on executing the transfer 

of the $40 million for carrying out the GEC’s important mandate? 

Answer. The Department of Defense plans to support the Global Engagement 

Center in fulfilling its statutory roles and responsibilities by partnering with the 

Department of State on a mutually agreed upon collaborative pilot program in Fiscal Year 2018 to counter state actor disinformation and propaganda. The Department of Defense will propose the establishment of a joint Department of Defense 

and Department of State senior-level coordination group that would determine the 

scope of Department of Defense-supported programs. This proposed coordination 

group would be composed of relevant Department of Defense and Department of 

State regional and functional offices with equities in countering state and non-state 

actor disinformation and propaganda campaigns. 

Defensive Lethal Assistance to Ukraine 

Question 3. Since 2014, Ukraine has struggled to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity against Russian aggression. I have long supported providing Ukraine 

with the support it needs, including defensive lethal military assistance, to defend 

itself and believe Russia must be held accountable for its unacceptable and destabilizing violations of Ukraine’s sovereignty. Therefore, I was very encouraged by reports that a decision by the Trump administration to approve this vital capability 

was apparently imminent. Despite this optimism, however, a a decision to provide 

lethal aid has not been forthcoming. I believe you are both on the record in favor 

of providing defensive lethal assistance to the Ukrainians (Tillerson said so in response to RP question at his confirmation hearing), so I’d be curious to hear your 

thoughts on where things stand. Secretary Mattis and Secretary Tillerson, do you 

both still support providing defensive lethal military assistance to the Ukrainian 

armed forces? 

Answer. Since 2014, the United States has committed more than $750 million in 

security assistance including training programs to improve Ukraine’s internal defense capabilities, equipment to meet some of Ukraine’s most critical operational 

needs, and advisory efforts to advance the implementation of critical defense reforms. In addition to this extensive support, the United States has not ruled out the 

option of providing weapons to Ukraine. I recently visited Kyiv and consulted with 

Ukrainian leaders in order to be able to inform the President and Secretary 

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80 

amine how best to use U.S. security assistance to bolster Ukraine’s ability to defend 

its sovereignty and territorial integrity, and to deter Russian aggression. 

Budapest Memorandum and Non-Proliferation 

Question 4. Far more than just the territorial integrity of Ukraine and the principle of respecting sovereign borders are at stake here. When Ukraine regained its 

independence following the collapse of the Soviet Union, it possessed the world’s 

third-largest nuclear arsenal. In 1994, the United States, Britain, Russia, and 

Ukraine signed the Budapest Memorandum, which assured Ukraine’s sovereignty 

and territorial integrity in return for Ukraine giving up its nuclear weapons. If the 

United States does not unequivocally support Ukraine’s defense of its sovereignty 

and undermines the value of U.S. security assurances, what will be the impact on 

U.S. non-proliferation efforts around the world? Why should a country like North 

Korea give up its nuclear weapons? 

Answer: The United States strongly supports Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial 

integrity, including Ukraine’s right to choose its own foreign policy course. In contrast, Russia’s actions continue to threaten Ukraine’s security, stability, sovereignty, 

and territorial integrity. Russia must live up to its international commitments and 

remove its forces from Ukraine. The impact of Russia’s actions on nuclear nonproliferation, the United States and the vast majority of nations worldwide remain 

committed to the global nuclear nonproliferation regime, with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as its foundation. Ukraine made the right strategic choice 

to give up its nuclear weapons in 1994, and it is imperative that the world community continue to condemn Russia for its flagrant violation of the understandings 

reached in the Budapest Memorandum. 

With respect to North Korea, Kim Jung Un must recognize that the world is 

united against his regime’s continued possession of nuclear weapons. There are multiple United Nations Security Council resolutions that call on the regime to relinquish its weapons of mass destruction capabilities and their means of delivery. 

North Korea must understand that these efforts will only make it more isolated and 

less secure than if it agreed to denuclearize comprehensibly, verifiably, and irreversibly in order to rejoin the world community. 

Afghanistan Strategy 

Question 5. Secretary Mattis, can you please explain the relationship between the 

counter-terrorism mission in Afghanistan and our efforts to build the capacity of Afghan security forces and help them ensure stability throughout the country. 

Answer. The U.S. counterterrorism mission complements the Resolute Support 

mission of train, advise, assist (TAA) to build the capacity of the Afghan National 

Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF). Limited U.S. unilateral direct action, coupled 

with a stronger and increasingly capable ANDSF, helps preserve the security gains 

to date and contributes to a robust, enduring partnership aimed at securing the people and territory of Afghanistan. The Special Operations Joint Task Force-Afghanistan (SOJTF-A) supports U.S. counterterrorism efforts through TAA with the Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF) and by accompanying them on certain operations. The ASSF will continue to conduct operations in Afghanistan using its increasing capabilities to address both insurgent and transnational threats. The focus 

of SOJTF-A’s TAA mission is to build the ASSF’s capacity logistics, command and 

control, intelligence analysis and sharing, aviation, and interoperability between the 

ASSF and conventional forces. 

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CIA MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR: USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

IN THE VIETNAM WAR—18 MARCH 1966 

OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

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C. It 1s p:>ssibl.c tb3.t ooee the US had used lnlc:Lear woaj)OI>o 

the Chinese C"""""'tsts miabt move t:> 41acng<J6", but we think it 

=re like~ tM.t tl>oy voul.d not do s:>, but v.:>uld h:>pc that 

accUJ!Iulattng US losses and 111:>unttng .r.>rld prcscurco ~-ould force 

tho US ~., bo.ck d:>Vn . 'll>c OOV vOuld have been reduced t:> Cl 

seconclary ro:Le. 1be ussn ~'Ould act vtaor.>uo~ aaainat the US :>n 

the politiea.l. ond propaganda hont; ve do rn>t believe t hat it 

V'>Uld enter t he wr or ou,ppert tho Chtncse vttb nuc:Leu veapons . 

DISCUSSION 

I. SCEIIARIO 

l. It vil1 be araued in tbio paper tMt roreJ.an reactions 

to US UIC :>! nuclear veapons in the Vietnam wr vould be detenatned. 

far more by the fact tbo.t the veap:>no verc nucl.enr than by tho 

circUCIIItancec in which they vere uocd or the pr:>V<>cationa Vhich 

cfabt M.vc :Led tbe US t:> wse tbclll. llovcrtbcl.e&s, the eircumeto.necs 

voul.d lllake S:li:IC diiTercnee , at :Leut in certain quartcra. 'Dlo 

tolloving ohort list of eonecivab:Le ae<>narioc begins vtth one 

in Vhich US uae or nuclear vea.po~>o vould appe<>r l ea.at Juot triable 

in tho cyca or the vorld gene~ and least tn o.ccord with 

C¢cmlunlat el(l)Ccto.ttono, and pr:>c<:cds t:> the one which to at the 

ot her extreme in t hese respects. 

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(a) 'lhe military situnti:>n 1n south Vietnam rcll1ains 

essentially as at present; the US employs nucleo.r 

weaponG out of sheer frustration at its inability 

to obtain a.-zy decision by conventional means. 

(b) 'lhe US invades Norttl Vietnam, either ovel•lnnd or 

by amp!>ibious assault, or both; the Chinese 

Communists intervene 1n large combat force, either 

overtly or wit h "volwrteers, '' and the US :f'oreeG 

in North Vietnam find themsel ves threatened vi tb 

destruction . 

(c) 'lhe US does not invade North Victna.-.. But the 

PAVN, plus Chinese C<>muuniat ground forces, launch 

the largest ccale overt invasi:>n of S!)Uth Vietnam 

of which they arc capabl e, across and around the 

demilitarized z:>nc , 'lhcy may also come into 

northern Laos in strong force . US and South 

Vietn=ese forces may or may not be seriously 

endangered; i n any event a new phase of t he 

var is o:pened by Chinese and llRV initiative. 

(d) 'lhe aren of connict is expanded by Chinese 

Communist initiative, involving 1nvasiona of 

LaoG, 'lhailand, and pcrhapG Buma. 

(e) The Chinese Collnunists then:;elves first use a 

nuele(U" weapon. 

2 . Neither the first nor tbe last of t hese scenarios appears 

vortb serious consideration; they are bot h so highly unlikely as 

to be virtually out of the question, and they are included only 

to illustrate the possibility of situations different from those 

which ve shall discuss. Within each of the three middle scenarios 

there are, no doubt, a large nlllllber of posstble at tendant circumstances 

which would have some benrtns on t he situation and misllt modify to 

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FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER


""'''=V- F £ P C-B-E- T 

L..--.._ _ _____.1 -

some omaJ.J. degree the judgments which the world made of the US 

nuclear reoponse, and alter the reactions to tt. Because the 

e:ffect of such variations would al=st corteill!y be minor it 

docs not ueem use:ful to attempt to exPlore any of them in detail. 

The discw:sion vbicb follows applies principally to situation (c) 

a J.arse- ccalc Conmuntst 1::1Vasion c:f S:>ctth Vietnam -- but we h:>.ve 

included some references to the differences in reaction which 

miC)lt be eX{)OCted in situations (b) or (d) , 

II. REACTIOlB IN THE NON-CO!·lMU!llST WORLD 

3. In the non-Co1!111untst world there are a g:>:.d many people 

who ne ither knov nor care m..ch about nucl ear weapons and would not 

reaet one W3::f or the other 1f the US used them in VietneJn, particular~ 

so lcng o.s the danger seemed relllOte from the .. .selves. n.ere are 

governments which, vho.tever their public pronounc~nts on the 

subJect, would in th<> liGht of their particular national interests 

be glad to sec the Chinese Colll!lunist regime destroyed by this 

means. There arc also individuals and governments who would 

consider the United States weol< if it allowed substantial numbers 

of its armed forces t o be dest royed without attempting to save 

them by the use or nuclear eQp~ns . And there are some vho would 

con~ider the united States foolish to accept defeat or even 

c ompromise i n the VtetnWtt struggle vtthout having recourse to its 

moot f~rmidable element of mUttary power. 

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FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER


~. Grant1f13 these and perhaps S:)ll]C other exceptions, there 

is in the field ::.f international affaire prob:lbly no 1110re universal 

opi.nion than that which holds the u.se of nuclear weapons to be 

abhorrent. Any use of nuclear weapons by the US 1n the Vietnam 

war would be viewed as cmong the lli:)St fearful and fateful events 

of modem history. Wor.:.'t reactions would be affected to some 

extent by the conditions under which the US resorted to their uae 

and the kinds of weapons and targets involved. But all:l.:>st 

independent of these i'nct::.rs V::>uld be n fundamental revulsion 

that the US had broken the 20-year t:lb~ on the use of nuclear 

weapons. 

5. 'lhc use or atomic bOillbs against Japan in 1945 is still 

condellUied by tll40'f, n::.t :>nly abroad but with'-" the US. Most 

informed opinion, h::.wevcr, recoBOizcs that i t vas intended t::> 

hasten t he end of n loJl8 and bloody V::>rld war. Most important, i t 

is seen as a bad m:>rncnt of history t hat occurred nearly a 

gcnerati:>n ago nod must never be repeated. 

6. Over t he years, world opinion has been generally surprised 

and relieved to discover that the US-Soviet nuclear race, rather 

than precipit:>tir.g " var between the two powers, has tended to make 

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~-rL ___ s __ r__ R~ T L I -

cuch a war "unthinkable . " Nuclear bombs and warheads thus tend to 

be looked upon as w<>ap:>ns which will never be used except in a 

world bent on sel f-destruction . It bas come to be felt that t he 

chances of a nucle ar holocaust have •ignificantl.y receded in recent 

years because the two s upcr-p:>WCrs are led by responsible governments 

which are prepared t<> (lO t :> great len(!tbs to see that nucle ar 

weapons will never again be employed. 

7 . TMir use in Vie~r.am, r egardle ss of the circumstances, 

would send a wave of fear and an(ler through most of the inf:n1!led 

v~rld. The general f eeling would be that, once the taboo had been 

broken, there would remain no effective barrie r to c l'.panded use of 

such weapons. People would fear tbat the Communists woul d respond 

1n kind if they had, or could acquire, a nuclear capability. 

Behind all thi s would lie a fear tbat the use of nuclear weap~ns 

mi(lht lead to a (lCne rol nuclear var endangerin(l the world at large. 

6 . Moot friends ~f the US would condei!IXl i t for having 

draooed the vorld into a new and terrible phase of history in 

\lbich nucle ar weapons had become t he worlting weapons of the times. 

Resolutions of condei!IXlation would be introduced in the UN wtth the 

likelihood of winning a maj ority vote . NATO w~uld be badly shaken. 

Such public support as t.5 policy in iet~UUU now receives from a 

n\lllbe r of ~vernmcnts, especially in Europe 1 would be ended. 

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T!tJ .. f G U C .. R .. E- T 

c__ _ ___.JI9. A British (p'lemment which felled to caho a public 

c:mde~:~Mt1on or the 1ntrocluct1on or nucle:u- wecpona into t he 

Vietnam fiahUne would probably ta.J.l. In Japan, memories ot 

H1rcah1oo and Nolla&lll<i would 111/lkc the people espcciol.l.r roacnttul 

or a tocond usc of' \JS r.aclcar woapono QC&1nst Ani-.n. . At " cinimuo, 

Pr1mc MUl1st<rSato v:)Ul-:1 reel compelled to end hio o~port or 

us policy' B!)d, in particulAr' to restrict t he 1.5 uae or Jopanese 

racU1t1oo. M:>rc likely, the Llbera.l.- Demoeratic l'llrty would 

re~c Sato with sOID:lono lcoo idontifi.?.bly pro-US in his views. 

It is poooiblc 'that, under lctt1at prodding, the popul4r 

reaction would force a a>::>vo to close us bases or even to denounce 

the US-Japan defense treaty. ~bat opinion in India Md the Indian 

llOVOmaent would st~ c:mc!CI'll'l the US acUoo, tllouah a::ae 

IndiQJI lcodcra would be relieved to see t~..: Chinese C~un1ato 

aet b:1el:, Ol1d some would be aoerotly plenoed if Chinese nuclear 

facilities were destroyed. '1\,e scnera.l. IndiQJI eondetnnQt1on would 

be l:llle:Whot reduced if the nuclear weapons were used to stop a 

Chinooe invuion of southeo.at Asia. 

10. A very l imited uae ot t4et1eal weapons in only the 

1Jmlcdinte battle area woUl<l e..uae a less violent reaction in 

ooph1otieatcd e ircles than wUld t he nuclear bombing or Chinese 

- 7 -

I 
88 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER


a1rficld.s, rall centers, &!ld nuclear pr.>duction sites. But to 

10\lCh or tho world t.hc distinction vould not be signiticsnt; the 

important th1ng would be th.clt these weo.pons had been used o.t e.ll. 

'Uto circumstances under vh1ch tho veaponc ""re usee:. •ouJ.•' also 

have soc.e orrect on reactions. 1llc m:>ot severe reacti on \IOUJ.d 

occur 1t the US ball invadM tbrtb V1e~:wn ( e.ase 'b ' ) ; on t~ 

other h<lr.d, the n~ativt> rc>aet1oll4 would be reduced it nuclear 

llt!apono wor-e employed as a last resort to stop the Cocamist 

Chineae b:tu overw!tcllnine tho Vbolo of Southeast Asia. Indeed, 

1n thia C41le some positive auPPQrt would be ma:'litcatcd, 

ll.. Boyor.d these dil:eet r-caetions, there vou:!il be other 

be a vnvc or 1ntcrnationaJ. pressure tor ilmled1ate d1S41'1113l0Cllt in 

the nuclear field . lo'.ont or this would be aiJ:\ed at tho US o.a the 

only nation to have used such weapons, and t here would be littl e 

pati onc:o v ith continued L'S 1na1atcncc on tbe need for 1nepcct1on. 

It 1s possible, b"""'ver, that nome of this precsure could be diverted 

to the B<>vl.cts in the f:>rm of demands tor "re<ll. • and "verified • 

d l.sar=:ocnt. 

12. Yet, paradoxically, there would probably alao be an 

accel erated 1110ment i.Cn t ovard nuclear proliferat ion. A US uac which 

- 6-

._1 __ _,1 -
89 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER


""l'=o:i .£ E-C--R-I.-T 

"le(litimatized" nuclear weapons and de~nonstratcd their critical 

impor'~aru:e and J)rn~ticabUi.ty in today-'s vars vould lead so:ne 

gove::·umcnts t<> feel they must have such weapons in their arsenals. 

At the S (l)lle t ime, the lk1 ar(lurncnt D(lainst prolifera tion ll:luld l ose 

moral. credit and encount r cynical reactions . 

III. REACTIONS CF 'l'I!E KEI COlli-ttrnlST COurmuES 

13. ££_~t Chin"· The Chinese Colmnunist leaders are 

qUite consc iow; of the potent nuclear arseD:\1 of the US. In 

adoptin(l a policy invol viD(l the probnbility of war vith the US, 

they would have consider ed the possibility that nuclear we:1pons 

mi(lht be used. They oniS)>t have concluded that international and 

domcstl.c precsures vould prevent the US f'r"" usina nuclear weapons 

under any conditions short or a direct thre ~ to its national 

survival. They could not be certein of this, bovever, and their 

plans would have included courtes to !ollov 1f nuclear weapons 

were used. 

11<. It is possibl e that once the US used nuclear weapons, 

the Chincoc mi(lht move to diseD(ID(le 1 particularlY if they had not 

c:(J>Cctcd th<l US t<> do so. We think it more lil<cl:f, however 1 that 

once coumittcd, the Chinese would attempt to continue in spite of 

nuclear weapons. In the belief that they could event uallY prevaU, 

- 9-
90 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER


they 'oQuld probably preso o:>, acceptin.'J the mllitary consequences 

whUe try1113 to minimize them by dispersal, close-embrace battlefield 

tactics, and an intensification of guerrillA warfare behind the t1S 

11."\Cs. They would hope thus to prolonG the str<l(l(lle t o the point 

where ncct'lU\llatin(: t1S losseo :>nd mountina world pressures would 

force the t1S to ba.cl< doW>l. 

15. ~· ~loscov would be a1armed at the pros)?ect of 

contirru.ed escalation vnich miebt force it into a nuclear 

confrontation with the US . It would talte steps on a1l fronts to 

reduce the likelihood of such a development. It wouJ.d act vigorously 

on the propaganda and polt tical front, strivtn:: t o ?,"lnerate sufficient 

international pressure in and out of the UN to fore" the US to pull 

back from its escalation. The S<>viets would probably feel co:o:;:>elled 

to warn the US that the USSR would suPPOrt China with mllitary 

aid. At the same time, however, they 'oQuld ma:'e it cl ear to 

:!\>kin« not to count on Soviet nuclear weapons. They would almost 

certainly not provide SilY nuclear weapons to the Chinese. 

1.6. 'Ibe D!!Y• liith the war havln3 expanded to the point 

where the Chinese were directly invol ved and nuclear weapons 

had been introduced, the ORV would have been reduced to a secondnry 

role. 'Ibe PAVN/VC would retain a significant capo.bUity in the 

- 10-

~ 
91 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER


South, but in the l>~ picture tlle;y woulll ba•e bec:ll:le on adJunct or 

the Chinese forces. In tlvl event th:>t the u.se of nuclear we"l>O"" 

so o.l.Qmcd tho OR'/ as to lend it to wish to quit the vnr, the 

Chincco involvement o.'>d prcaoncc voul.d probabl.y bnve foreclosed 

this option. They cr.-..J.<! end the vu onl.y if Ftlt1"11& concurred. 

IV. LO!«JER 'IE!lM nm.ICI.TIOI5 

1·r. If the tactical. u.so of nuclcu veapono succeeded in 

turnin.!l l>acl< tho Chinese Gild helped lend to " qutcl< Olld oovantQ(!cous 

so~tloment in Vietnam, tbcrc vould be lllllliY sains for the US to 

set aellinDt tl>c losses ocnt~d above . "liothinG auceellda like 

aucecoa," one! t:lllllJf v:>uld roratw the lS once the dan(:cr receded. 

Asf.an ol.l1cs of the US v:>uld feel much C>Ore cecurc aeailUlt 

Chinese encroachments. Pel;tn.:;, l>adl.y act be.eJ(, woul.d lose prcatt.,"C, 

Olld th1o miGht lead to a reappraiool of the leadership by tho masoeo 

Olld tho you:l(lcr part;y leaderB. 1be Soviets would cain ncv fear 

and respect for the US bnrd liners; tl>cir conviction of the 

<~anaer or "vo.ro or national liberation" woulll be eO!lfin:ICd. At 

the SQillC tilllc 1 those in the USSR vbo advocate sreatcr ctreu on 

mUito.r;y devclopnent Olld nre unenthusiastic about detente vould 

have their hands strencthcncd. 

- 11-
92 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER


T.:v:[ __ s_ s_ r_-_R...J-E-T - 1-

18. If the US used nuclear weapons with some persist'lnce 

and still failed to turn back the Chinese or bring a quick end 

to the l<clr, the results would be serious i .ndced. The cccparat1ve 

impotence of the US end of its most vaunted weapons in coping 

with n ''revolutionn.ry struggle'' vould have been dC'Llonstrs.ted to 

Peking's natisfact1on and advantage . At the avme time, the US 

would pay the v hole political cost of having used thesa weapons 

1n the first p~ce . 

19. There remains, of course, the question of the consequences 

of~ uning nuclear weapons, and of accepting a miliUlry disaster, 

perbnps extending to lees of the war, which these weapons might 

have averted. Such a development vould bnve profound implications 

tor the standing of the US in the world and for the balance of 

power in Asia. Examinat~on of these implie.:."~ t.ions, however, "Would 

involve consideration of the whole subJect of US obJectives and 

policies in Southeast Asia, ond does not come vi thin the scope of 

this paper. 

FOR THE llOARD OF NATIONAL ESTD'.ATFS: 

- 12 -

ABBOI SIUIB 

Acting Cllairman 
93 

LETTER EXPRESSING THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION’S OPPOSITION TO

S.J. RES. 41 AND S.J. RES. 43 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

94 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER


-2-

Among other key concerns, the legislation would arbitrarily terminate the authorization five 

years after the date of enactment. This is inconsistent with the conditions-based approach in the 

President's South Asia Strategy. Such a provision could also unintentionally embolden our 

enemies with the recognizable goal of outlasting us. In addition, S.J. Res. 43 includes a 

definition ofuassociated persons or forces .. which is inconsistent with the standard applied by the 

Executive Branch and which could result in unnecessary uncertainty regarding its scope. 

Further, the joint resolution wou1d create a cumbersome Congressional review and disapproval 

process for the use of force against new associated forces or in new countries. 

In sum, the Administration affirms that the United States has sufficient legal authority to 

prosecute the campaign against the Taliban, al-Qa'ida, and associated forces, including against 

ISIS, and S.J. Res. 43 would, in our view, undermine this campaign. We look forward to 

working with Congress on reviewing and analyzing any further proposals. 

~V'I"'-.J....~ 

u -Ji;,Mattis 

Secretary of Defense 

Cc: Speaker Paul Ryan 

Sincerely, 

Rex W. Tillerson 

Secretary of State 
95 

NAVY CONTRACT SOLICITATION FOR PERSONNEL SUPPORT, PART 1 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER


R..Pers.onnel Recovery(PR)I Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC)/ Search and Recover 

(SAR) support to Department of Defense (DoD) for United States African Command 

(USAFRICOM)utilizing Short Take Off and Landin Sollc:l tion Number! N001H 14PRSAR 

~-<IOleH""' 0.0.: Na'fllll $uppfy Systems CotNnend 

Loution: NAVSUP Attt lOSJlsb Cenltf Norfolli: 

____ _JI NoU..O..:.W In'........,......,.List I 

Oflfln.I Synoptla 

Apt2<1. 2014 

4. 15pm 

SOIICUIUOI'I Num.ber. 

N()(U89 t 4 PftSAA 

Synopslt: 

Addt<S.Apf24. 201C 4 .1Spm 

Sou•'" ~ 1ot r.foftNtlon lnd ~ putpc>HS toicltolilyqualif~ 

al"l<l t'IPtrit~ $0Utoet fol•n anticipated a Firm Fix., Prit-t ((lntrta unclet 

NAICS code 431211. TNs propoMd contract vttlic:fe will pro~ Pei'ION'Iel 

~ty(PA)IC...S~Ity Ev.-cuation (CASEVACY SearCh and R~r 

(SAR) wppon eo Ofpattmtnt ol O.!ens.e (000) tot l/t!Med $\tittt Africtn 

OOtnt'l\lnd (USAFRICOM). personnoet and indl~l$ ~~ icletltHied b)' 

USAFAJCOM In West Abit1. 

s~ to FAR Clause 52.215-.3, M lillled •ftequntiOt lnJotmatlOn or 

SoliQtllrion I« PlarrinO Purposes; ltlis announeeme:nt constitutes a sources 

SCM.Ighl synopsl$ fOI wri:len infOI'lfl.ation only. Thbls not a $01~ 

announ~ment f« proposalS and no contract W. be awatded from thiS 

nnoun~nt. 

This souron JOOOhl notiCe It not to be OMJINed In •ny WrJ as a 

oomnwntnt b)' U\e Gov«M''(!tll.. nof Wllltr'le Go'o'(!,mment ~y fOI the 

lnioti'Ntlon 1410mlll00 In ,..,pon ... 

The f leet LogillJQ Ctnl., NorfOlk (fLCN), NOffolk., V~~g~nQ tl SHII.Ing 

1nrorrna110n on qc.talltitcl an4 t.xPtrif cte~ IQ\It(.U for p}IN!inSI pui'POMJin an 

effort to dertve a conlrad whlde lhat w•l ptoY~ PRICASEVACISAR ~ 

lor U$AFRICOM personnel and aooNiclu~ls as ktenti6ed by 1M command In 

we.- AkiU. Tht c<MWac~ WI pro'licM a-11 Ptrsonntt. ~•""*"· foQI.III:Imtnl 

Moe~ ....,.,.tvisicM\ ~ IOOI)I'Idud PRfCASEVACISARopett.tlons 

U!l!lzinrg Soon Take 01 and LIMing (STOL) flxed winS! and rotaty vMg air tift 

lOr lr.nsport. ln.e~. and cldrildlons. 

AdditiOnally, lhe contrac:tot s~h potOYicle EM T·B meciCal ewe as a PR 

re-source &paMing h'om a filled ~bon In Niamey, Nigoef out 10 ~ naubcaol 

mi:n. This 500 mk rac11us m..u be 11oe c.ot~lrattors /.lea or Responstllllly 

(A.OR) unclet 1he pursuant contro1tt, AI PRICASEVA.CISAR CICWWactors n'IU$1 

poss-e.ss a sec:r~t Ctearanet. The periOd 01 ptMtmanoe rot thiS antieipated 

contract ts a $be (G) month Ns.e ~~ WJih two (2) tvtt-IVe- (12) month op110n 

paOoc:ls. See Vlt ~ti.Khtd dral'l Perbman4;e1 WOI'tl; Sti •me t (PWS) for 

llCI&tiOnal lniOmlatiOn. 

R~es to tNt Sowan Sought ftOtice 5hould reference the SeMen 

~tit number and 51'\al lnCNCJe lhoe ~ lnf«mabon IR ~.is format 

' ·Company n.amt, a611rtM, Point ot Contact name. phoM nt.mOet. fax 

nutnbet and etnal ec:tclress. 

"""' AU.f!Uit 

Ill 

/t>l/lt2:<1, 201<1 

HOOIU!-4efi:SAA SOURCf 

GtHtAAL tHF'oAMAnOH 

Not ; 

--Potltd o..ce: 

24.20 4 

""pons.. O.t.: 

8. 201 4 

AlcbMng P'oJicy: 

AIAOMIOic. on ~dt-10 

Atcblvt O..tt: 

J.Wy 2).20 \4 

Orlg~t~.ti S.CAt-kSt: 

WA 

...... _ WA 

C&nsmctUOft Code: 

-PfO~~ .. 

Md ~k~PPCWtMMcn 

NAN:SCOcH: 

-AitT~IIonf4& 12tt

senoer 

NI rtt~si)OI'lallon 
96 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER


2. Contractor and Government Entity (CAGE) Code. 

3. An estimated Rough Order of Magnitude (ROM). 

4. Size of business - Large Business, Small Business, Small Disadvantage, 

S(a). Hubzonc. Woman-owned and/or Vctcran.owncd. 

5. Capability statement displaying the contractorat:"'s ability to provide the 

minimum requirements to inctuele past performance information. If past 

performance information is provided. please include only relevant past 

performance on the same/similar wort< within the last 5 years. Please also 

indude in past performance information the contract numbers, dollar valve, 

and period of performance for each contract referenced In the response to 

this sources sought. 

6. Please indude any questions or concerns you have in regards to this 

requirement. 

Responses should be ema1led to AnthOny.Karanikas@navy.mil and 

John.W.North@navy.mll by 12:00 pm on Thursday, May 08, 2014. Again, this 

is not a request for a proposal. Respondents will not be notified of the results 

and the Government is not required to answer any questions submitteel in 

regards to this sources sought notice. Please note the Information within this 

sources sought notice will be updated and/or may change prior to an official 

synopslslsollcitatlon, If any. 

Please consult the list of document yjcwers if you cannot open a file. 

Attachment 

l'{pc: Other (Draft RFPsiRFis. Responses to Questions. etc .. ) 

Posted Date: April 24, 2014 

https·l/www ncco naw m!Vsynopsjs fllc/N0018914PRSA 

Description: N0016914PRSAR_SOURCES_SOUGHT _PWS_ 4·24· 

14.docx 

Contracting Office Address: 

N00189 NAVSUP Fleet Logistics Center Norfolk 1968 Gilbert Street,Suite 600 

NORFOLK, VA 

Point of Con ... ct(s): 

Anthony Karanikas 

anthony.karanikas@Mvy.mit 

John North 

john.w.norlh@navy.mit 

Return To Opportunities List 
97 

NAVY CONTRACT SOLICITATION FOR PERSONNEL SUPPORT, PART 2 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER


PERFORMANCE WORK STATEMENT (PWS) 

AFRICOM O~NEL RECOVERY (PR) I 

CASUALTY E\'ACllATI0:-.1 (CASE\ 'AC)/ 

SEARCH AND RESCUE (SAR) SUPPORT 

1.0 DESCRIPTION OF SERVlCES. 

1.1 PR I CASEVAC/SAR S UPPORT: 

1) AT F X :\'XX 

1.1.1. The contractor shall provide PRICASEV A CISAR support to Department of Defense 

(DoD), United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM), personnel and individuals as 

identified by Commander USAFRICOM in West Africa. 

1.1.2. The contractor shall provide all personnel, equipment and supervision necessary to 

conduct PRICASEVAC/SAR operations utilizing Short Take Off and lauding (STOL) 

fixed wing and rotary wing airlift for transport, insertions, and extraction. Additionally1 

the contractor shall provide medical care as aPR resource s anning from a fixed location 

in Niame , Niger out to 500 nautical miles. 'lltis 500 mile radius shall be the contractors 

Area of Responsibility (AOR) under this contract. 

1.1.3. The colllractor shall be capable of operating from alternate locations within the area of 

responsibility for eriods of up to I 0 continuous days with limited facilities in order to 

pro\"idc on-site PR·C ASEVAC SAR for at risk activities. 

1.1.4. Contractor performance shall include day, night and low visibility mission requirements 

involving short field landings / takeoffs. Contractor shall be able to successfully operate 

on improved and unimproved airfield landing zones and non-surveyed helicopter landing 

areas in the performance of their duties. 

1.2 GENERAL PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS 

1.2.1. Services shall be based at Niamey, Niger and be capable of conducting operations from 

various tcmpon•ry Forward Operating Locations (FOLs), to include primitive field 

accommodations (such as tents). 

1.2.2. Tite Jl!incipal place of perfonnance for this contract shall be the Primar 0 crating Area 

(POA), as dictated by operational requirements. The contractor may be required to 

provide labor hours in excess of 40 hours per work week to include holiday and 

weekends, and/or during irregular tin1es and shifls based upon USAFRICOM operations 

and exercises. 

1 .2 .. 3. rlte POA includes, but is not limited to. the recognized political bounda1'ies of Algeria, 

Burkina Faso, Chad, Libya, Mali, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Cameroon. Cot D'lvoire 

Ghana, Benin, Togo, Tunisia and as dictated b:i o~at onal rc~ ts . h is anticipated 
98 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER


the most likely lcx:ations for missions li-om the above list would be to: Burkina Faso, 

Togo. Cameroon, h<~d. Libya. Mali, Morocco. Nigeria. and Tunisia. 

1.2.4. All contractor personnel supporting overseas missions shall obtain and maintain visas as 

required to perfonn the services required in this contract. 

1.2.5. Crew duty shall be limited to 14 hours for two-pilot crews and 18 hours for three or more 

pilot crews or as restricted by Oighttime limitations and rest requirements under FAA 

Part 135, whichever is more restrictive. Crew duty will be considered as beginning when 

the crewmcmber reports for duty and ending at block-in of the final DoD segment for that 

crew. 

1.2.5.1. Crew duty execution limits shall be the same as scheduled, except that the limits 

may be extended by two hours for two and three-pilot crews. This extension is at the 

contractor's discretion. 

1.2.5.2. The contractor shall maintain and provide to !he Contracting Officer or his 

written designee upon request, statistical tracking of the number of times this extension is 

utilized. 

1.2.5.3. Minimum crew rest, prior to first DoD segment or between DoD segments, shall 

be I 0 hours. At the contractor's discretion that rest can be reduced to ni11e hours if the 

crew is still able to receive eight hours of uninterrupted rest. 

1.1.5.4. The reduced rest shall not be combined with the two-hour crew duty extension 

during a preceding or s ubsequent duty period. 

1.2.6. The contractor shall support operations 24 hours a day/7 days a week. Mission tasking for 

in-theater operations is typically initiated with 48 hours' notice. Although it is the 

Government's intent to have at least one aircraft operational 24 hours a day/7 days a 

week, there are times where the Government may require simultaneous 

PRICASEVAC/SAR, cargo, passenger, and/or missions requiring use of both aircraft. 

1.2.7 The contractor shall be able to land and take off at night from unlit airfields using 

contractor-provided night vision devices. The contractor shall have and maintain current 

night vision certification, by the FAA throughout the life of the contract, to be able to 

land and take Qff at night from un lit airfields using contractor-provided night vision 

devices. 

1.2.8. The colllractor shall assess the current situation (weather, Intel, NOTAMS, terrain, crew 

experience, and tactical situation) prior to launch to make an accur.tte risk assessment 

before perfomung a mission. 

1.2.9. The contractor shall be responsible to provide, at a minimum, the following requirements 

at all locations as required: 
99 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER


1.2.9.1 All maintenanece and supplies required to operate aircrall 

1.2.9.2 All medical equipment and supplies required to execute a CASEVAC 

1.2.9.3 All airport handling, landing, and Aerial Navigation in Africa (ASECNA) fees 

1.2.9.4 All contractor personnel support (lodging, meals, laundry, etc.) to include 

appropriate gear for personnel support in primitive environments at FOLs (such as tents) 

1.2.9.5 All force protection training prior to •nission execution. 

1.2.9.6 Appropriate theater/country authorities for aircraft entry and personnel clearances 

as required by specific nations in the Foreign Clearance Guide. 

1.2.10. The contractor shall be responsible to coordinate, at a minimum, the following 

requirements at all locations as required: 

1.2.10.1 Fuel 

1.2.10.2 Parking 

1.2.10.3 Hangar space (if available and necessary) 

1.2.10.4 Office. space at the base location (if necessary per the contractor's management 

approach) 

1.3 ME DICAL SUPPORT 

1.3.1. The contractor shall provide National Registry Emergency Medical Technician - Basic 

(NREMT-B) certified personnel in performance of the required PRICASEVAC/SAR 

seJVices. 

1.3.2. Contractor NREMT-B personnel shall provide en route care capabilities for 

PRICASEVAC/SAR events. These personnel shall be available 24 hours a day seven (7) 

days a week on a standby status and be flight ready within three (3) hours of notification 

(N+3) from the AFRlCOM CDR or his designee and may be put on a heightened 

response posture to be airborne within one (1) hour of notification (N+l). 

1.3.3. The contractor shall provide NREMT-B level c-ertified trained medical personnel on each 

aircraft perfonning evacuation and will have no other responsibilities when patients are 

onboard. The contractor shall plan for up to two (2) aircrall performing evacuation 

operations at any time with up to four (4) patients per aircraft. Contractor personnel shall 

provide critical care NREMT-B level scJVice deten.nined necessary for life support as 

required during the performance of PRICASEVAC/SAR operations. Routine medical 

care that is not associated with patient transport shall not be provided. 

1.3.4. Contractor must document all patient care provided during each mission and provide a 

legible copy of medicali documentation in English to the receiving medical faci lity or 

receiving medical crew (if being transferred to another medical aircraft) upon transfer of 

care. Copies of all medical documentation shall be retained by the contractor for (1) one 

year from date of mission and provided to the Contracting Officer Representative (COR) 

upon request. 

1.3.5. Contractor will ensure allmcdical persotmel wear the appropriate clothing/uniforms to 

safely operate and communicate during running aircraft operations (day or night). 
100 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER


Additionally, the contractor shall supply and wear the appropriate medical protection 

against disease, contamination and any other biological hazards during patient care. 

1.3.6. Contractor shall ensure all medical personnel possess the appropriate medical supplies 

and equipment in working order to safely operate during PR/CASEVAC/SAR 

operations (day or night). Additionally, contractor shall ensure medical personnel 

possess the appropriate communications equipment needed to communicate during 

PR/CASEVAC/SAR operations. 

1.4 PR!CASEVAC/SAR AIRLIFT SERVICE: 

1.4.1 The contractor shall provide, operate, maintain, and fuel, at a minimum, one (I) 

STOL- Fixed Wing and one (I) Rotary Wing aircraft based in Niamey, Niger. 

1.4.2 The aircran shall be operated and maintained entirely by contract personnel. 

1.4.3 The contractor shall obtain and/or maintain blanket over Hight clearances for all countries 

within the area of operations for the duration of the contract. Copies of these Hight 

clearances shall be provided to the COR. 

1.4.4 PR/CASEVAC/SAR airlift service shall be available 24 hours a day seven (7) days a 

week on a standby status and Hight ready within three (3) hours of notification (N+ 3) and 

may be put on a heightened response posture to be airborne within one (I) hour of 

notifi cation (N+ I). 

1.4.5 The contractor STOL aircraft shall have the capacity to safely transport a minimum of 

two (2) EMT-B and four (4) patients (ambulatory and/or on liners), person of interest or 

any combination thereof) (up to six (6) individuals in total) from unimproved landing 

strips or non-surveyed helicopter landing zones to an area designated by the 

USAFRICOM Conm1ander or his/her designee Patients and/ or passengers will possibly 

travel with personal weapons (small anus) and small amounts of anmlllnition. Planning 

weight for passengers plus baggage is 350 lbs per person. The aircran must be capable of 

transporting 2,500 pounds of intemal cargo. The internal cargo may be the six (6) 

pers01mel or a combination of persom1el and cargo not to exceed 2,500 pounds. 

1.4.6. The contractor STOL aircraft shall have the capability to load a patient on a litter with 

critical care equipment attached while maintaining the patient in a neutral horizontal 

position throughout the loading procedure. For this requirement, a loading door is an 

acceptable alternate to a ramp. 

1.4. 7. Additional STOL- fixed wing capability is the availability for routine airlift movement of 

personnel, materials, and equipment approved by USAFRICOM Commander or his/her 

designee to various locations within the area of responsibility. 

1.4.8. The Government will provide the contractor a manifest prior to boarding. The contractor 
101 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER


shall not pennit any unauthorized personnel to board the aircraft without consent from 

USAFRICOM. The contractor shall verify passenger and cargo weights prior to takeoff 

to ensure they do not exceed the maximum limitations of the aircratt. Contractor shall 

leave an accurate passenger manifest at depatture airfields with the user. Contractor shall 

present a safety briefing to all passengers prior to takeoff. 

1.4.9. The contractor shall routinely be required to successfully land on unimproved dirt 

airfields ofless than 2,500 feet in length and non-surveyed helicopter landing areas 

during PRICASEVAC/SAR operations to resupply and perfonn persom1eltransport 

services for requirements in the AFRICOM AOR. 

1.5 CARGO AIRLIFf SERVICE: 

1.5.1. Cargo airlift service shall be available within a minimum of 48 hours notification by the 

AFRICOM CDR or his designee. 

1.5.2 .The contractor shall provide service for cargo loads up to 2,500 pounds. 

1.5.3. The contractor shall ensure all Govenunent Provided Materials (especially hazardous 

materials) being transported are properly loaded and secured in the aircraft. Prior to 

departure, the contractor pilot shall obtain the following information from the 

Government: 

Proper shipping na me 

United Nations (UN) number (if applicable) 

Hazard class and division 

Quantity in tenus of weight or volume 

Location of the hazardous item in the aircraft 

Net Explosive Weight (NEW) for any Class I explosives 

Passenger uthori~t n 

Any special handling instructions 

1.6. AIR DROP SERVICE: 

1.6.3. The contractor shall execute door bundle drops within 48-hours' notice by the 

AFRICOM CDR or h is designee. Maximum door bundle dimensions are length: 36 

inches, width: 30 inches, height 47 inches, and weight 75 pounds. 

1.6.4. Aircraft shall be capable of static-line, perso•mel air drop operations. 

1.6.5. Aircrew shall be air drop qualified in accordance with the contractor's training program 

as approved by the FAA. 
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1.6.6. Air drop services are anticipated to be used sparingly throughout contract perfonuance. 

1.7. O J>ERATIONS SUPPORT: 

1.7.3. The Contracting Officer Representative (COR) will provide the contractor with the name 

of a Government Point of Contact (POC) who will act as the primary mission scheduler 

and will be responsible for providing all mission requirements and coordinating actions. 

1.7.4. The contractor shall provide mission coordination persOilllelto coordinate with the 

Govemment POC. The contractor's person(s) perfonuing mission coordination duties 

shall be available to interface with the Govemment POC(s) on short notice to support 

mission platming requirements. 

1.7.5. The contractor shall provide mission coordination services to USAFRICOM's 

Government POC to include, but not limited to: 

· Support for mission tasking, weather support, and publishing of all supporting 

documentation for the aircraft 

· Coordinate and support ad-hoc mission planning 

· Coordination of diplomatic and other required approvals for aircrall international 

transit, as well as lodging and transportation at intem1ediate and mission-approved 

stopover locations 

· Operational support, mission scheduling, airspace coordination, and review of threat 

data for the operational area. All Crew is required to have a secret clearance. 

· Support required for coordination for protocols to support aircraft communications, 

ad-hoc and in-flight mission tasking, and force protection mission procedures 

1.7.6. The contractor shall report any change of mission availability status within 30 minutes of 

change to the Govemment POC and COR. 

1.8. FLIGHT HOURS: 

1.8.1. The contractor shall provide allnece.ssary support required to include, but not limited to, 

personnel, equipment, and material supplies to provide up to an estimated I 000 flight 

hours per year (Combined), to be carried throughout the entire perfonuance period. 

1.8.2. Only flying hours in direct support of this contract shall be invoiced. Hours for 

orientation flights are not billable. Flight hours are calculated from the moment wheels 

are off the ground until the wheels touch the ground at completion of a mission time to 

the nearest 1/4 hour expressed in local time. 

1.8.3. All regulal'ly schedule maintenance downtime will be coordinated with the Govenunent 

POC no later than three (3) days prior to start time of maintenance. 

1.8.4. The contractor shall not exceed the flight hour limit without COR approval, regardless of 
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DoD pcrs01mcl directions. 

1.9. MOBILIZATION AND PHASE-OUT : 

1.9.1 Mobilization : The mobilization period (phase-in) shall be sixty (60) consecutive days 

from the beginning of the contract period of performance to allow the contractor a 

preparation period for the purpose of relocating and training personnel (including site 

surveys and familiarization), travel, ordering materials, and inventory of Government 

Furnished Equipment (GFE). These supplies shall serve as the baseline for supply 

inventory used to support flights that shall be maintained by the contractor. A report of this 

inventory, replenishment and utilization history for the reporting period sha ll be delivered 

per section XX of this PWS. llte contractor shall coordinate all mobilization efforts 

required to full y perfornt all aspects of the PWS after the mobilization period ends. 

Failure to become fully mission capable by the 60th day of the mobili zation period will be 

grounds to pursue a Termination tor Default. 

1.9.2.Phasc-Out: Should the incumbent contractor not be selected as the follow-on service 

provider, as applicable, the contractor shall participate in a transition phase to orderly and 

efficiently transition to a successor. Tite transition phase shall be considered the last sixty 

(60) days prior to the end of the contract period of pcrformaucc. The transition phase shall 

consist of phase-in training for the successor and transition of all matctials and documents 

needed so there is no break in service. 

1.1 0. RAPID BASE RELOCATION: 

1.1 0.1. lfforsome reason the Niamey, Niger base is no longer a feasible area to do emerging 

events or other impacts, the contractor must be able to set up a new base of operations 

within 40 days. Regardless of the new base locations, the contractor must be able to 

function within all time and location constraints per the PWS. 

1.12. REQUIRED AIRCRAFT EQUIPMENT: 

1.12.1. The aircraft shall contain the following insta lled equipment: 

lnstn unent Flight Rules (WR) capable with Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) 

Very High Frequency (VHF), and Ultra High Frequency (UHF) Radios 

UHF Radio shall have capability to monitor guard 

Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) navigation equipment 

Oxygen readily available for crew and passengers above 10,000 feet lA W FAA requirements 

Ability to start aircraft engines without use of extemal ground power units 

Weather detection capable radar 

Global flight tracking equipment; 
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· Ability for U.S. Govemment members to access the system through an online Web portal 

(such as MS lntemet Explorer), using only a standard web browser with no additional user 

software required to be loaded on the user's computer 

Minimum (5) user accounts for accessing flight tracking 

Near realtime worldwide tracking (GPS\lridium) 

Tracks location, velocity, heading, and altitude of asset 

Distress (Mayday, 911) capability 

2-way text messaging 

Remote management of all GPS device settings 

Rotary Wing Hoist (From land/water, two (2) personnel a t the same time or I stokes litter at 

a time. 

1.13. FLRE CONTAINM£NT COVERS 

1.13.1 ln accordance with FAA airworthiness directive 93-07-15, Fire Containment Covers 

(FCCs) shall be placed on all cargo transported in the class B cargo compartment of 

combination aircraft. TI1is airworthiness directive also stipulates altemate compliance for 

certain exempt items. 

1.13.2. The contractor shall furnish, transport, repair and replace sufficient FCCs o n each 

operational aircraft. An FCC shall be deemed unserviceable if it has damage in excess of 

any of the following: 4" x 4" L-shaped tear, 8" long tear, 2" diameter tear. 

t .13.3. The contractor shall be responsible for covering and uncovering cargo with the FCCs. If 

the Govemment removes FCCs from the aircraft, the Govenunent will ensure the same 

numbers of FCCs are re tumed to the aircraft. 

1.13 .. 4. All passenger and cargo doors used for on-loading and off-loading of passengers, 

baggage, and cargo aboard the aircraft shall be equipped with a safety barrier at chest or 

waist level. This safety barrier is not to supersede or replace any Original Eq uipment 

Manufacturer (OEM) mandatory safety procedures or safety procedures under the Title 

14 of the Code offederal Regulations (CFR) Part 135 (hereinafter also referred to as 

FAA Regulation Part 135) and Title 32 CFR Part 861. 

1.14. AffiCRAFf PERFORMANCE REQUIREM£NTS: 

1.14.1. All aircraft used for this contract shall be multi-engine. 

t .14.2 Depot-level maintenanc.e, or any other non-tasking-related aircraft absences from the 

base location, shall not absolve the contractor from the requirements of this contract. 

1.14.3. At least two aircraft shall be utilized to meet PWS requirements. 
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1.14.4. The aircraft shall meet the following minimum perfonnance requirements at sea level on 

a standard day. • 

• The "standard day" model of the atmosphere is defined at sea level: 

Density (p): 1.229 kglm' 

Pressure (p): 101.3 kPa 

Temperature (7): 15 •c 

Viscosity (u): 17.3 J.tPa·s 

1.14.5. Aircraft shall be capable of taking off and landing with 2,500 lbs of cargo on an 

unimproved runway of a minimum of 2,500 feet in length. 

1.14.6. Aircraft shall be capable of taking off and landing on unprepared and un-surveyed 

surfaces (for personnel recovery under emergency conditions during daylight hours), 

provided that sufficient infonnation is made available to determine safe operations are 

possible in accordance with FAA guidelines. Pilot discretion may be employed for 

landing location. 

1.14.7. Aircraft shall be capable operating in extreme heat and dusty conditions typical on the 

African continent. 

1.14.8. The contractor shall obtain all necessary export licenses from the Department of State to 

address any International Traffic in Anns Regulations (IT AR) restrictions to facilitate 

performance in all required countries. 

2.0. APPLICABLE REGULATIONS AND INFORMATION: 

2.1. All aircraft operations shall be conducted under FAA Regulation Part 135. 

2.2. Aircrew training, proficiency and aircraft maintenance shall be performed in accordance 

with FAA Regulation Part 135. 

2.3. The contractor must be an approved DoD air carrier as determined by HQ AMC/A3B and 

the Commercial Airlift Review Board (CARB). Tite contractor must maintain this 

approval throughout the performance of this contract. The contractor shall comply with 

all FAA requirements and with all DoD additional standards as published on the 

following web site: 

http://www.amc.af.miVlibrary/businesscustomers.asp 

3.0. PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS: 

3.1. The contractor shall provide an adequate number of supervisors, PRICASEVAC/SAR 

Subject Matter Experts, pilots, medics, air cargo handling specialists, and mechanics to 

support operational requirements as detailed in this contract. 

3.2. All personnel shall be able to read, speak and write English fluently. French language 

skills are highly desired, but not required. 
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3.3. Each mission shall be staffed with the appropriate number of pilots to safely and 

effectively operate the aircraft. 

3.4. TI1e contractor shall coordinate all missions with the appropriate fixed base of operation 

(FBO), military range control and air traffic control (A TC) facilities (military and 

civilian). 

3.5. Aircrew members shall be trained, qualified, and maintain proficiency in accordance with 

FAA Category I International Aviation Safety Assessment Program or in accordance with 

FAA Regulation Part 135.3. 

3.6. Aircraft maintenance personnel shall be trained, qualified, and will maintain proficiency 

in accordance with FAA regulation part 135. 

4.0. PERIOD OF PERFORMANCE: The period of performance associated with this PWS 

will consist of one (1) six month base period and two (2} twelve month option periods to be 

exercised at the option of the Government. The period of performance for the service shall be 

as follows: 

Period of Performance Months 

Base Period 6Months 

Option I 12 Months 

Option ?. 12 Months 

5.0. INSURANCE REQUIREMENTS 

Prior to perfonnance of any services herctmder, the contractor shall, at its own expense, procure 

and maintain during the entire performance period of this contract, with fmancially and legally 

responsible insurance company or companies, minimum insurance coverage as set forth below: 

5.1. Liability for Bodily Injury to or Death of Aircraft Passengers: A limit for each person of 

at least three hundred thousand dollars ($300,000.00), and a limit for each occurrence in 

any one aircraft of at least an amount equal to the sum produced by multiplying three 

hundred thousand dollars ($300,000.00) by the next highest whole number resulting from 

taking seventy-five percent (75%) of the total number of passenger seats. 

5.2. Liability for Bodily Injury to or Death of Persons (Excluding Passengers) A limit of at 

least three hundred thousand dollars ($300,000.00) for each person in any one accident, 

and limit of at least twenty million dollars ($20,000,000.00) for each accident. 

5.3. Liability for Loss of or Damage to Property: A limit of at least twenty million dollars 

($20,000,000.00) for each accident. 

5.4. If Combined Single Limit Liability is used, the amount thereof shall be at least equal to 

the combined minimum prescribed above for the various categories of split limits 

coverage. 
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5.5. Liability payment insurance purchased pursuant to the requirements of this paragraph 

shall cover payment to the U.S. Govemment pursuant to the subrogation provisions of the 

Medical Care recovery Act (42 U.S.C. 2651-3) and, within the liability limitations of this 

contract, the cost of U.S. Government provided medical care to the extent that said 

insurance would cover payment of the cost of medical care in the absence of any U.S. 

Govemment obligation to provide medical care. 

5.6. The contractor will provide evidence of insurance to the Contracting Officer no later 

than ten (I 0) days following the contract award. 

S. 7. The contractor will verify that all policies submiued (i) contain endorsements providing 

for the waiver of any right of subrogation the insurer may have against the United States 

by reason of any payment under the policy on account of any damage or injury in 

connection with the insured's use of any Government aviation facility, or the insured's 

purchase of services or supplies from the United States Govemment; and (ii) contain such 

provisions as the Government shall from time to time require in order to allord the 

Govermnent adequate protections there under. 

5.8. In the event of cancellation or material change in policy coverage, thirty (30) days prior 

wrirten notice shall be given to the Contracting Officer. 

6.0. CONTRACTOR TRAVEL: 

6.1. Aircraft and crew shall meet all requirements specified in the Foreign Clearance Guide 

(FCG) for each country in the POA. The contractor shall be solely responsible for 

submitting all theater/country clearance requests for contractor aircran and persotmel in 

accordance with the Foreign Clearance Guide. 

7.0. SECURITY: 

7.1. The majority of daily work associated with this PWS is at the unclassified level, but 

contractor personnel may be required to access SECRET infonnation during perfonnance 

of this contract. As such, all contract personnel shall have a secret clearance prior to 

perfonnance. Specific security requirements are identified in the DO Forn1 254, DoD 

Contract Security Classification Specification. 

7.2. Contractor personnel performing services under this contract shall be citizens of the 

United States of America. Dual citizens will not be authorized interim or final security 

clea rance determinations. US Citizens who currently have (either expired or active) 

foreign passports will not be able to obtain or hold interim or final security clearances 

within DOD. These contractors who maintain or have in their possession a valid or 

expired foreign passport are considered dual-citizens and will not be authorized classified 

material or access. The contractor and subcontractor shall possess the capability to 

articulate well, speak and write fluently in the English Language, and comprehend the 

English Language. 
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7.3. The contractor must have a valid Facilities Clearance Level (FCL) at the SECRET level. 

Interim FCLs are acceptable provided they are not expired. FCL procedures and security 

guidelines for adjudicative requirements are outlined in DOD 5220.22-M and DOD 

5200.2-R. FCLs and Interim FCLs must be awarded by the Defense Security Service 

(DSS) field office. Contractor personnel must possess required security clearances 

granted by the Defense Industrial Security Clearance office (DISCO) prior to 

performance under the contract 

7.4. Upon contract award, the COR shall submit the names of contractor personnel to the 

NAVAF Security Management Office for vetting through JPAS to ensure investigative 

and clearance requirements have been satisfied. This shall be completed before the 

COR!fnasted Agent (TA) accesses the DOD Contract Verification System (CVS) and 

submits a request for issuance of the CAC to the contractor's personnel. If a contractor's 

employee does not have the required investigative or security clearance level based on 

the Govenunent's determination, the contractor's employee will be denied the ability to 

work in support of this contract and the employee's infom1ation will not be loaded into 

CVS. 

7.5. Any visit(s) by contractor personnel require an electronic visit request be submitted using 

JPAS. JPAS visits can be forwarded to the Security Management Office (SMO) to 

location to be visited. The visit request shall annotate the contract number in the POC 

block of the visit request and the name/phone number of either the COR or CO in the 

phone number block. 

7.6. If the Government notifies the contractor that the employment, or the continued 

employment, of any contractor personnel is prejudicial to the interests or endangers the 

security of the United States of America, that employee shall be removed from 

performance on this contract. This includes security deviations/incidents and credible 

derogatory information on contractor personnel during the course of the contract's period 

of performance as noted in JPAS. Personnel who have incident reports posted in JPAS 

will be denied the ability to support the task order tmtil the issues have been resolved and 

the incident has been removed in JPAS. The contractor shall make any changes necessary 

in the appointment(s), at no additional cost to the Government. 

7.7 The contractor shall establish a program to prevent unlawful seizure of the aircraft. At 

airports, bases, and air tenninals where US forces are present and responsible for 

deployment or redeployment of forces, the military will be responsible for security 

processing of passengers at on- or off-load. 

7.8 At en-route or operational stops and at locations where there is no military presence, 

security processing of passengers shall be the responsibility of the contractor. At these 

locations, the contractor shall satisfy the requirements of the Transportation Security 

Administration (fSA) security program for charter operations in conunercial service. 

7.9. Security Regulation Guidance: 
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Deparrmelll of Defense (DOD): 

2000.16 (DOD Antiterrorism (AT) Standards) 

5200.0 I (DOD lnfolTI1ation Secu,.ity Program) 

5200.2-R (DOD Personnel Security Program) 

5200.08-R (DOD Physical Security Program) 

5220.22-M (National Industrial Security Program) 

8500. 1 (lnfonnation Assurance (lA)) 

2000. 12 (DOD Antiterrorism (AT) Program) 

8500.2 (lnfonnation Assurance (lA) Implementation) 

DOD regulations found at: http://www.dtic.millwhs/directives/corresfpub l.html 

7.10. USAFRICOM Force Protection (Industrial Security) Points of Contact: 

Provided upon award. 

8.0. INFORMAT ION ASSURANCE: 

8.1 The Contractor shall provide an Inforu1ation Assurance Report to describe their 

enviromnent that safeguards DOD non-public information resident on or transiting the 

contractor's unclassified information systems !rom unauthorized access and disclosure. 

Protection measures applied should consider the risks (i.e. consequences aod their 

probability) of loss, misuse, unauthorized access, or modification of infonnation. The 

report shall address the SANS (SysAdmin, Audit, Network, Security) Institute's 

Twenty Critical Security Controls for Effective Cyber Defense: Consensus Audit 

Guidelines (http://www.sans.org/critical-security-controls) and be provided io accordance 

with the template at Appendix XX. The contractor is encouraged to provide additiooal 

infom1ation above and beyond what is om lined in the SANS guidelines to enhance the 

govemment's understanding of their infolTI1ation security posture. The report will be 

updated 30 days prior to exercise of an option period, if applicable. 

8.2 CYBER SECURITY INCIDENTS. 

8.2.1 The contractor sb:•ll report to Commander Naval Forces Europe/Africa Cotmnander 

SIXTH Fleet (CNEIA C6F) N6 Cybcr Security (+39 08 1-568·6101) and/or the COR as 

soon as possible upon discovery of any suspected cybcr intrusion events that affect DOD 

information resident on or transiting the comractor's unclassified infonnation systems. 

mitial report shall be provided even if some details are not yet available, with follow-on 

detailed reporting within 72 hours. Reportable cybcr intmsion events include the 

following: 

I. A cyber intmsion event appearing to be an advanced persistent tl1reat 
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2. A cyber intrusion event involving data ex.filtration or manipulation or other loss of any 

DOD information resident on or transiting the contractor's, or its subcontractors', 

unclassified infom1ation systems 

3. Intrusion activities that allow unauthorized access to an unclassified infonnation system 

on which DOD information is resident or transiting Defmition of advanced persistent 

threat: An extremely proficient, patient, detennined, and capable adversary, including 

two or more of such adversaries working together. 

8.2.2 Incident Report Content. The incident report shall include, at a minimum, the following 

infonnation: 

I. Applicable dates (date of suspected compromise and date of discovery) 

2. Threat methodology (all known resources used such as Internet Protocol (IP) addresses, 

domain names, copies mal ware, etc.) 

3. An account of what actions the thrcat(s) may have taken on U1e victim system/network and 

what information may have been accessed 

4. A description of the roles and functions of the threat-accessed system 

5. An initial list of potentially impacted government programs and each program's classification 

6. What information may have been exfiltrated that may in1pact government programs. 

7. A list of all employees and subcontracted employees who work or have worked with the 

victim system/network 

8. A point of contact to coordinate damage assessment activities 

8.2.3 Incident Report Submission. l11e contractor will submit unclassified network cyber 

incident reports to the AFRJCOM POC. Tcclmical lnformation Analysis Center (TlAC) 

and USAFRJCOM designated government personnel via encrypted email or another 

mutually agreed upon secure communications method. Copies of mal ware require special 

handling and pre-coordination must be accomplished prior to submission. 

9.0. NOTICES AND REPORTS: 

9.1 Notice of Accidents - DOD Missions. When the contractor's aircraft is involved in an 

accident or incident in support of a DOD mission, as defmed in 49 CFR, Part 830, the 

contractor will transmit the following infonnation by the most expeditions means 

available, to the CNE/A C6F Battle Watch. On the next business day, notification mnst 

also be made to the Contracting Officer identified in the contract. ( 1) Carrier and trip 

number, (2) aircraft type and number, (3) date and time of accident, (4) last point of 

departure and point of intended landing of the aircraft, (5) nature of the accident and the 

extent of damage to the aircraft so far as is known, (6) total number of crew members and 
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passengers on board, {7) number of injured and fatalities aboard the aircraft, and (8) 

condition of baggage or government owned material, iJ any, on board. 

9.2 Notice of accidents- Non DOD Missions. When the contractor's aircraft is involved in 

any accident or inc idem in support of a non-DOD mission, as defined in 49 CFR, Part 

830, the contrdctor will transmit the inJonnation in pardgraph 4. 1 above by the most 

expeditious means available on the next business day to CNE/A C6F Battle Watch. 

9.3 Aircrall Medical Incidents. Report all aircraft medical incidents in Oight, or while DOD 

passengers arc under control of the aircraft captain, to the llrst available COR or CO, at 

the next en route station for in Oight incidents, or the station where the incident occurs. 

For all me.dical incidents, aDD Fom1 2852 shall be completed in English. On the DD 

Fonu 2852, all sections are mandatory except Section IV. TPMRC-E shall be notified 

within 24 hours if a death occurred. For all other medical incidents, TPMRC-E shall be 

notiiied within 72 hours. 

9.4 DOD Casuahies.ln cases where death occurs on a contractor's aircraft, the following 

infonnation shall be ftmushed by telephone to the addrcss.:s below, with an infonnation 

copy to CNE/A C6F Battle Watch: 

Name, service number and component of service identified as: 

Anny-USA, Air Force-USAF, Navy-USN,Marine Corps-USMC, Coast Guard-USCG. 

9.5 Safety and Financial lnfom1ation. The contractor shall satisfy the requirements of 32 

CFR, Part 861, Section 86 1.3. The DOD will conduct periodic evaluations to assess the 

contractor's ability to perfom1 safely. To complete the evaluation, the government may 

contact the contractor in order to obtain infonnation bearing upon the contractor's 

practices, resources, and capabilities. Upon request, the contractor shall provide data 

pertinent to such evaluations, includin.g current audited financial statements, to NA VSUP 

Fleet Logistics Center Norfolk or the COR listed on this contract. NOTE: Data furnished 

pursuant to this paragraph may be utilized by the U.S. Govenunent or its representatives 

for any matter related to this contract. 

10.0. GOVERNMENT FURNISHED PROPERTY. 

To Be Provided in Solicitation. 

11.0. CONTRACT DELfVERABLES. 

Deliverable Name* Due 

Number 

AOOI Master Schedule Not La tea· Than 

(NLT) 10 calendar 

days after awaa·d; 

Updates due with 
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monthly progress 

r epot·t 

A002 Contractor's Monthly; NLT 10 

Pmgress, Status, and business days from 

Management Repot·t end of previous 

month 

A003 Operations Security NLT 30 calenda.. 

(OPSEC) Plan days after award 

A004 Status As t•equired 

Meetings/Program 

Reviews 

AOOS Quality Control Plan NL T 30 calendu 

davs after award 

A006 Mission Capable Daily 

Status Report 

A007 Government Weekly; NL T close 

Furnished Property of business each 

Report Monday 

A008 Phase-Out Plan NLT 100 calendar 

days after award; 

Updates due with 

monthly progress 

report 

11.1 Master Schedule (A001): 

11.1.1 The contractor shall provide a Master Schedule to the Contracting Officer and COR for 

approval. The contractor shall create, maintain, and report the schedule in conjunction 

with the monthly progress report after initial delivery. The schedule shall cover all phases 

of the project from kick off to contract close out. The contractor's Master Schedule shall 

include, but not be limited to, the following information: 

Timeline for providing proposed staffing 

Timeline for procurement of equipment 

Timeline for development of an Implementation Plan 

Timeline for training 

Scheduled maintenance plan and schedule 

Repair c.oncept and tum around schedule 

Milestones for contract deliverables 

1 I. 1.2 For the scheduled maintenance plan and schedule, any proposed changes shall be 

provided in the daily Mission Capable Status Report (reference paragraph 5.6) at least a 

month prior to the change for COR approval after POC review and concurrence. The 
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POC may possibly request variances based on upcoming mission requirements: the 

contractor sh11ll coordinate scheduling to accommodate known upcoming mission 

tasking. 

11.2 Contractor's Progress, Status, and Management Report (A002): 

11.2.1 The contractor shall provide a comprehensive monthly progress report that covers each 

operational area deli vered to the Contracting Officer and COR. The report shall, at a 

minimum, contain the fol lowing: 

Updates to Master Schedule and Phase-Out plan 

Training status of medica l personnel 

List of missions tasked 

Number of missions aborted 

Number of PR!CASEVAC/SAR missions aborted and the justification 

Number of mission flight hours 

Operational readiness of medical equipment/supplies 

Monthly pcrfonnancc metrics (from section XX. of this PWS) of availability rate, mission 

capable hours, pre-approved scheduled maintenance hours, and number of hours for each type of 

status (FMC and each PMC category) 

· Latest approved scheduled maintenance schedule and any updates awaiting approval by the 

COR 

Accomplishments completed 

Lessons learned 

Issues to be addressed by the Contracting Officer 

11.2.2 Other items deemed necessary in this report may be added during the contract by the 

Contracting O fficer or COR. 

11 .2.3 Monthly Progress Site Inspections: The contractor shall allow for scheduled monthly 

progress site inspections made by the COR or authorized agent. 

11.3 Operations Secur·ity (OPSEC) Plan (A003): 

I 1.3.1 The contractor shall be responsible for OPSEC procedures when operating missions for 

the DoD to include safeguarding cril"ical information. OPSEC procedures shall include, 

but not be limited to: 

Assurance that employees receive OPSEC training upon initial assignment in support of this 

contract. 
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Information such as flight schedules, hotels where crews are staying, retum trips, and other 

facts about missions shall be kept close hold and only communicated to persons who have the 

proper security clearance and a need to know this information. 

· Flight crews shall be aware of persons who are seeking information about the contractor, 

missions, flights, and schedules. 

· Maintenance of a low prolile while operating DoD missions. Any OPSEC questions can be 

addressed by the USAFRICOM Security Officer. 

11.3.2 The contractor shall provide a plan to the Contracting Officer and COR that demonstrates 

compliance with OPSEC procedures. 

11.4 Status Meetings/Pr ogram Reviews (A004): 

11.4.1 The contractor shall participate in status meetings and Program Reviews (conunonly 

called Program Management Reviews (PMR), as required, to be scheduled upon request 

of the Contracting Officer or COR, to discuss and to informally evaluate the contractor's 

efforts and accomplishments. All after-action reports shall be due I 0 days after 

Govemment request. Status meetings and PMRs, when required, will be held at a 

CONUS/OCONUS location detennined by the Govemment. Any required formats for 

PMRs will be provided by the Contracting Officer or COR ahead of PMRs. ln some 

cases, time will be allo\led lor the contractor to meet individually with representatives 

from USAFRICOM to discuss contractual issues. 

11.4.2 During the meetings, the contractor shall present necessary data to enable a joint review 

of its various assigned tasks, attendant schedules, and reimbursable expenditures. The 

contractor shall present and participate in status discussions and shall inform, in a timely 

fashion, the Contracting Ollicer and COR of any problems with contract execution and 

any proposed solutions. 

11.5 Quality Control Plan (AOOS): 

11.5.1 The contractor shall develop and implement a commercial quality control plan to ensure 

safe. and reliable air transportation in accordance with FAA Regulation Part 135 and Title 

32 CFR Part 861. The plan shall also address the contractor's approach to: (I) ensuring 

the control of GFE and consumable supplies, including controlled narcotics, (2) ensuring 

personnel provided to support this contract comply with and execute solely those 

functions required of this task, and (3) controlling reimbursable costs required to support 

this contract. 

11.6 Mission Capable Status Report - Daily (A006): 

11.6.1 The contractor shall report Mission Capable status of each aircraft daily to the 

Contracting Officer, COR, and POC. The anticipation is that this report shall be sent via 

email every morning; however, operational tempo may require an altemate time of day 
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for reporting. The Contracting Officer will direct the reporting time of day at tbe kick-off, 

and direct any changes to that time during the period of performance. 

11.6.2 For any status other than Fully Mission Capable (FMC), the daily report shall include a 

brief description of what missions can be supported by each aircraft, the reason FMC is 

not available, the steps being taken to upgrade status to FMC, the anticipated time for 

retum to FMC status, and the number of hours the aircraft has been at each of the 

following types of statuses for the daily reporting period: 

Pre-approved scheduled maintenance actual hours. 

PMC(PR!CASEVAC/SAR) = Partially Mission Capable. able to perfom> PRICASEVAC/SAR 

PMC(Air Drop) • Partially Mission Capable. able to perfom1 Air Drop 

PMC(Airlift. Personnel) • Partially Mission Capable. able to perform Personnel Airlift 

PMC(Airlift. Cargo) = Partially Mission Capable, able to perform Cargo Airlift 

11.6.3 The contractor shall send an additional email to the same distribution list as the daily 

report at the time (within an hour) that any aircraft bas changed status. 

11.7 Phase-Out Plan (A008): 

11. 7.1 Tbe contractor shall provide the Government with a phase-out plan. 

11.7.2 The initial phase-out plan shall be delivered within I 00 calendar days of contract award. 

Any changes to the plan shall be delivered with the monthly progress report (reference 

paragraph XX), with a separate notification (email-body) that the plan has been altered, 

what was altered, why it was altered, and any impacts to proposed schedule and cost 

caused by the alteration. The Contracting Officer must approve the initial plan and any 

altered plan before the plan is accepted into the c.ontract. 

12.0. APPENDICES 

Appendix 6.1 - Vendor Assessment Guidelines for Twenty Critical Security Controls for 

Effective Cyber Defense: Consensus Audit Guidelines (CAG) 

Appendix 12.1 

VE IDOR ASSESSMENT GUIDELINES FOR TWENTY CRITICAL SEC URITY 

CONTROLS FOR EFFECTIVE CYBER DEFENSE: CONSENSUS AUDIT 

G UIDEL.INES (CAG) 

G-eneral: Organizations should compare all 20 control areas against their current status. 

The 20 Critical Controls are: 

I. Inventory of Authorized and Unauthorized Devices 

2. Inventory of Authorized and Unauthorized Software 

3. Secure Configurations for Hardware and Software on Mobile Devices, Laptops, Workstations, 

and Servers 

4. Continuous Vulnerability Assessment and Remediation 

5. Malware Defenses 

6. Application Software Security 
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