Operation Ceasefire in 

Reducing Gun Violence 

Research Report 

Los Angeles 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of Justice Programs 

FEB. 05 

National Institute of Justice 
This and other publications and products 

found at: 

of the National Institute of Justice can be 

National Institute of Justice 

www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij 

Office of Justice Programs 

Partnerships for Safer Communities 

www.ojp.usdoj.gov 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of Justice Programs 

810 Seventh Street N.W. 

Washington, DC 20531 

Alberto R. Gonzales 

Attorney General 

Tracy A. Henke 

Acting Assistant Attorney General 

Sarah V. Hart 

Director, National Institute of Justice 
FEB. 05 

Reducing Gun Violence: Operation 

Ceasefire in Los Angeles 

Findings and conclusions of the research reported here are those of the 

authors and do not reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. 

Department of Justice. 

The research was sponsored by the National Institute of Justice, U.S. 

Department of Justice, under grant 98–IJ–CX–0043, awarded to RAND 

Corporation. 

NCJ 192378 
OPERA TION CEASEFIRE IN LOS ANGELES 

Foreword 

This Research Report is part 

of the National Institute of 

Justice’s (NIJ’s) Reducing 

Gun Violence publication 

series. Each report in the 

series describes the implementation and effects of an 

individual, NIJ-funded, locallevel program designed to 

reduce firearm-related violence in a particular U.S. city. 

Some studies received cofunding from the U.S. Department of Justice’s Office of 

Community Oriented Policing 

Services; one also received 

funding from the Centers for 

Disease Control and Prevention and the Justice Department’s Office of Juvenile 

Justice and Delinquency 

Prevention. 

Each report in the series 

describes in detail the problem targeted; the program 

designed to address it; the 

problems confronted in designing, implementing, and 

evaluating the effort; and the 

strategies adopted in responding to any obstacles 

encountered. Both successes and failures are discussed, 

and recommendations are 

made for future programs. 

While the series includes 

impact evaluation components, it primarily highlights 

implementation problems 

and issues that arose in 

designing, conducting, and 

assessing the respective 

programs. 

The Research Reports should 

be of particular value to anyone interested in adopting 

a strategic, data-driven, 

problem-solving approach to 

reducing gun violence and 

other crime and disorder 

problems in communities. 

The series reports on firearm 

violence reduction programs 

in Boston, Indianapolis, St. 

Louis, Los Angeles, Atlanta, 

and Detroit. 

iii 
OPERA TION CEASEFIRE IN LOS ANGELES 

Contents 

Foreword................................................................................. iii


The Need for an Intervention...................................................1

Borrowing From Boston.......................................................... 3


What Lay Behind Hollenbeck’s Violence? ................................7

Launching Operation Ceasefire in Los Angeles .....................11


Did Violence Decline? ............................................................15


The Balance Sheet .................................................................19


A Message to Other Jurisdictions ........................................ 21


Notes .................................................................................... 23


v 
OPERA TION CEASEFIRE IN LOS ANGELES 

George E. Tita, K. Jack Riley, Greg Ridgeway, and Peter W. Greenwood 

The Need for an Intervention 

This report is based on 

“Reducing Gun Violence: 

Results from an Intervention in East Los Angeles,” 

final report by the authors 

with Clifford Grammich 

and Allan F. Abrahamse to 

the National Institute of 

Justice, 2003, available at 

www.rand.org/publications/ 

MR/MR1764/MR1764.pdf. 

About the Authors 

George E. Tita, Ph.D., is 

with the Department of 

Criminology, Law and 

Society at the University 

of California, Irvine. 

K. Jack Riley, Ph.D., is 

Director of RAND’s 

Infrastructure Safety and 

Environment research unit. 

Greg Ridgeway is a statistician with RAND. Peter 

W. Greenwood, Ph.D., is 

President and CEO of 

Greenwood & Associates 

and was the founder of 

RAND’s criminal justice 

program. 

On October 8, 2000, a particularly brazen “walk by” 

shooting took place in the 

Hollenbeck area of the city of 

Los Angeles. According to 

police, several members of 

the Cuatro Flats gang, armed 

with handguns and at least 

one high-powered semiautomatic assault weapon, 

climbed out of a van and 

opened fire on a group of 

rival TMC (The Mob Crew) 

gang members. They left one 

TMC member dead, along 

with a 10-year-old girl who 

was riding her scooter nearby. The double homicide, in 

an area notorious for its gun 

crime and predatory gang 

killings, set in motion an 

intervention that came to be 

known as Operation Ceasefire in Los Angeles. The initiative was intended to send 

gang members the message 

that there would be consequences for all members of 

a gang if any one member 

committed a crime involving 

guns. 

Almost immediately after the 

crime, and for the next several weeks, police beefed up 

patrols in the area, attempting to locate gang members 

who had outstanding arrest 

warrants or had violated probation or parole regulations. 

Gang members who had violated public housing rules, 

failed to pay child support, 

or were similarly vulnerable 

were also subjected to stringent enforcement. Gang 

members knew it was coming. The message that something would happen if gun 

violence continued had been 

conveyed—or “retailed”—to 

them in advance. Information 

about available support to help 

them turn their lives around 

was also included. The strategy and tactics resulted from 

months of meticulous planning and coordination by 19 

public and private agencies 

throughout the city and county of Los Angeles, all of whom 

came together to work with 

researchers in defining the 

problem and designing a 

response. 

The results from the law 

enforcement components 

were surprisingly good even 

though the intervention did 

not proceed exactly as 

planned. In the area of Hollenbeck where the two 

gangs were most active 

and enforcement was most 

intensive, both gang crime 

1 
REDUCING GUN VIOLENCE / FEB. 05 

and violent crime fell. The 

retailing component, however, turned out to be less 

effective. The planned coupling of enforcement with 

provision of social services 

did not fully materialize, and 

other deviations from the 

original plan also emerged. 

Nevertheless, Operation 

Ceasefire in Los Angeles 

demonstrated the potential 

for using data-driven research 

to identify problems and 

design interventions, obtain 

the commitment of disparate 

criminal justice agencies to 

work together on a discrete 

problem, and secure the support of an array of partners in 

the community. 

2 
OPERA TION CEASEFIRE IN LOS ANGELES 

Borrowing From Boston


Myriad approaches to gang 

violence in Los Angeles in 

recent decades had failed, so 

Boston’s Operation Ceasefire 

became a possible model. 

Begun in 1996, the Boston 

project used a combination of 

sanctions and incentives in a 

highly successful attempt to 

reduce youth homicide.1 

Could it work in Los Angeles? 

Los Angeles is not 

Boston 

The Boston experience could 

not simply be pulled off the 

shelf. The type of problem 

Los Angeles faced was different; the nature of the intervention had to be different. 

The gangs responsible for 

much of the violence in Los 

Angeles are bigger and more 

entrenched than those in 

Boston. In Boston, most 

gang members are AfricanAmerican; in Los Angeles, 

the majority are Latino. 

The two cities are vastly different geographically and 

politically. Los Angeles County sprawls over a huge area 

covering dozens of municipalities. This means it has 

no single point of political 

leverage; rather, it has a network of overlapping power 

centers. The implication was 

that bringing all stakeholders 

to the table would be more 

difficult in Los Angeles. 

The process is 

paramount 

What Los Angeles transferred from Boston was the 

process governing the design 

and implementation of the 

intervention. Like Boston, 

Los Angeles set a manageable and measurable objective, focusing on the specific 

problem of gun violence.2 

Working on a small scale and 

selecting a defined locale 

offered two benefits: it gave 

project participants the 

opportunity to pinpoint the 

more immediate causes of 

youth violence, identify the 

actors, and cultivate close 

collaboration with the community; and it held out the 

possibility of immediate 

payoff. 

Key to the process was the 

working group, also adopted 

from Boston. Researchers 

served as convenors/ 

facilitators, analyzing crime 

3 
REDUCING GUN VIOLENCE / FEB. 05 

data and other information. 

Criminal justice agencies and 

community- and faith-based 

organizations identified the 

locale where an intervention 

would have a likely impact, 

and they decided what to do 

with the results of the researchers’ analyses. (See 

“Working Group Members” 

for a list of participating 

agencies.) 

From Boston, Los Angeles 

also adopted a menu of 

“sticks” and “carrots.” Sticks 

were a range of sanctions or 

“levers” used to make gang 

members desist from violence by holding all of them 

accountable for violence 

committed by any one of 

them.3 Saturation patrol by 

the police is an example of 

a lever. The levers would 

be pulled or activated in 

response to a serious crime 

(the triggering event). In 

advance of lever-pulling, the 

message would be retailed; 

that is, gang members would 

be told not only of the consequences that would result 

from gun violence but also of 

social services and alternatives to violence available to 

them. Carrots were the prevention component of alternative services, a measure of 

the community’s determination to intervene early in the 

lives of at-risk youths. 

DEFINITIONS 

Researchers defined the terms in this study as follows: 

Gang crime: 

ism, and graffiti. 

Gun crime: Any violent or gang crime that involves the use of a firearm. 

Levers/lever pulling: A crime deterrence strategy that attempts to prevent violent behavior by 

compliance. 

Retailing: Forewarning gang members that violent crime would have consequences and offering 

services as an incentive to turn away from crime. 

Violent crime: Homicide and attempted homicide, robbery, assault, and kidnaping. 

Gang member-committed violent crime and terror threats, firearm discharge, vandalusing a targeted individual or group’s vulnerability to law enforcement as a means of gaining their 

4 
OPERA TION CEASEFIRE IN LOS ANGELES 

WORKING GROUP MEMBERS 

■ Los Angeles Police Department 

■ Los Angeles County Department of Probation 

■ California Division of Corrections, Parole and Community Services 

Division 

■ 

■ 

■ 

■ 

■ City of Los Angeles Housing Authority 

■ Los Angeles Unified School District Police 

■ Soledad Enrichment Action 

■ Homeboy Industries/Jobs for a Future 

■ East Los Angeles Community Development Corporation 

■ Boyle Heights Chamber of Commerce 

■ Mothers of East L.A. 

■ Local parent-teacher associations 

■ 

■ Catholic Archdiocese of Los Angeles—East Los Angeles Deanery 

■ Dolores Mission 

■ White Memorial Medical Center 

■ RAND Corporation 

■ University of California, Irvine 

Criminal Justice Agencies 

California Youth Authority (Juvenile Parole) 

U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Central District of California 

Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office 

Los Angeles City Attorney’s Office 

Community-Based Organizations 

Association of Community Based Gang Intervention Workers 

Faith-Based/Other Institutions 

Researchers 

5 
OPERA TION CEASEFIRE IN LOS ANGELES 

What Lay Behind Hollenbeck’s


Violence? 

The working group, which 

began meeting in early 1999, 

examined trouble spots to 

find a locale where an intervention would have an 

impact. It selected the Hollenbeck section of Los Angeles, chiefly because of its 

high crime rate (see exhibit 

1).4 Among the 18 policing 

areas in the city, Hollenbeck 

has consistently ranked near 

the top in violent crime. In 

recent years, the homicide 

Exhibit 1. Hollenbeck, Los Angeles: The intervention site 

rate has been higher in Hollenbeck than in Los Angeles 

overall and the country as a 

whole. 

A gang crime hot spot 

In the community’s view, 

gangs were at the core of 

homicides and gun violence 

in Hollenbeck. The researchers’ 

analysis confirmed that this 

belief was well founded. 

Pasadena 

Hollywood 

Downtown 

Los Angeles 

Santa Monica 

Long Beach 

Hollenbeck 

Los Angeles County 

7 
REDUCING GUN VIOLENCE / FEB. 05 

Most of the nearly 200 homicides committed in Hollenbeck between 1995 and 1998 

involved gangs. In half of the 

killings, the motive was an 

issue of “respect” among 

gang members or a dispute 

over turf. Another one-fourth were not gang motivated, but 

either the victim or offender was a gang member. Drugs 

played a minor role; they were the cause of only about 

20 percent of the homicides. 

When drugs were the motive, 

homicides were more likely 

to be the result of a dispute 

over issues such as drug 

quality or quantity than over 

control of markets.5 Aside from being a hot spot for gang crime, Hollenbeck 

also offered the prospect of 

committed partners from the 

community. In addition to having a long tradition of “street 

gang workers,” it had a solid 

infrastructure of community 

organizations, including faithbased institutions whose missions included youth violence 

and gangs. The commitment 

of the churches was evident 

from the start: At the first 

meeting of the working 

group, 14 of 17 participants were Catholic priests from 

area parishes. A number of 

the community-based organizations offer a variety of services to young people who want to break with their 

gangs. Homeboy Industries/ Jobs for a Future, a local job 

referral/training center established by a priest, is one of 

the most active of these 

organizations. 

Why Boyle Heights? 

When the researchers analyzed gang activity to define 

an intervention point, they 

uncovered a dense network 

of rivalries among Hollenbeck’s 29 gangs (see exhibit 

2).6 They also found, however, 

that each gang kept to itself. Because gang violence was 

concentrated, the researchers felt it would be best to focus 

resources, particularly law 

enforcement, on a small 

area, perhaps consisting of 

only a few blocks. Further analysis revealed that 

the most intense gang rivalries played out in the southern part of Hollenbeck—the 

Boyle Heights neighborhood. 

Gun crime was even more 

concentrated there than in 

the rest of Hollenbeck. Another reason for choosing 

Boyle Heights was geography. The San Bernardino Freeway (I–10) forms a distinct 

boundary separating Boyle 

Heights from the rest of Hollenbeck to the north. With 

one minor exception, no gang 

rivalries crossed the freeway. 

8 
OPERA TION CEASEFIRE IN LOS ANGELES 

Exhibit 2. Network of gang rivalries in Hollenbeck 

Rose Hills 

18th St 

Glassel Happy 

Valley 

Locke 

Lincoln Clover Metro 13 

Lowell East Lake 

Hazard 

San Bernardino Freeway 

Tiny Boys 

State St 

Li’l Eastside Clarence


Breed


KAM 

CF 

Primera Vickeys Flats MCF Town 

Evergreen 

TMC 

White Fence 

East L.A. Dukes 

Varrio Nuevo 8th St 

Estrada 

Opal Indiana Dukes 

CF = Cuatro Flats 

KAM = Krazy Ass Mexicans 

MCF = Michigan Crime Force 

TMC = The Mob Crew 

Note: Exhibit is based on violent relationships and is not meant to reflect the geographic distribution of gangs. 

Adapted from G. Tita et al., Reducing Gun Violence: Results from an Intervention in East Los Angeles (MR–1764–NIJ), Santa 

Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2003. Used with permission. 

9 
OPERA TION CEASEFIRE IN LOS ANGELES 

Launching Operation Ceasefire in


Los Angeles 

The working group decided 

which violent crimes would 

set the intervention in motion. These triggering events 

were defined as any serious 

crimes by a gang member or 

any gang crimes in which a 

gun was used. The double 

homicide involving two Boyle 

Heights gangs, Cuatro Flats 

and TMC, qualified. In response, the police and other 

agencies pulled the levers; 

that is, they activated the 

sticks part of the intervention. 

However, because the 

carrots, or prevention component, ran into some difficulty, 

implementation did not proceed exactly as planned. 

(“Sticks and Carrots in Hollenbeck” lists the levers and 

positive inducements used or 

planned.) 

Enforcement levers 

The array of agencies that 

pulled enforcement levers 

S C HOLLENBECK 

Secondary 

Responsible Services 

Parole Enforce parole regulations Job training and development 

Probation Enforce probation regulations 

abuse treatment 

Los Angeles Police Serve warrants; conduct 

Department saturation patrols for drug 

market abatement 

Housing Authority Enforce public housing Enforce property code 

Police residency 

Hospital 

abuse treatment 

Homeboy Industries/ 

Jobs for a Future training and development 

Enforce child support Job training and development 

payments or property 

code violations 

TICKS AND ARROTS IN 

Sticks Carrots 

Organization Primary Prevention 

Levers Levers 

Tattoo removal, substance 

Tattoo removal, substance 

Tattoo removal, job 

Various city agencies 

11 
REDUCING GUN VIOLENCE / FEB. 05 

was a testament to the level 

of coordination achieved 

among diverse enforcement 

agencies. The Los Angeles 

Police Department (LAPD) 

quickly allocated additional 

resources, stepping up patrol 

in the five police reporting 

districts of Boyle Heights in 

and around the homicide site 

(see exhibit 3), which was in 

TMC territory (although the 

reporting district itself was 

claimed by both TMC and 

Cuatro Flats). Officers from 

several special units were 

deployed, and each weekend 

for 2 months after the shooting, mounted police patrolled 

the parks and adjacent public 

housing developments in the 

targeted area. The County 

Housing Authority police 

stepped up patrol in a housing complex that was a 

hotbed of Cuatro Flats 

activity. 

Police and probation officers 

visited the homes of several 

well-known Cuatro Flats 

members, arresting three 

who had outstanding warrants or probation violations. 

At each visit, the officers 

made clear that their actions 

were a direct result of the 

violence committed by the 

gang. Over the next 3 

months, they arrested or 

revoked the parole of five 

more gang members, seized 

illegal guns, and referred several gun cases to the U.S. 

Attorney for prosecution. 

Other levers included inspections by health and child welfare agencies at properties 

where gang members congregated. Public housing 

occupancy rules, for example, were strictly enforced. 

With the aid of a city council 

member, speed bumps were 

installed at the site of the 

double homicide, and the 

alleyway behind it was 

fenced off, making future 

attacks and escape more 

difficult. 

Retailing: The ideal 

versus the reality 

The intention was to tightly 

couple the levers with prevention services. Before the 

intervention, a great deal of 

retailing was done throughout Boyle Heights by Homeboy Industries, the police, 

and the churches. It began 

in the second half of 1999, 

when gang members were 

12 
OPERA TION CEASEFIRE IN LOS ANGELES 

Exhibit 3. Five police reporting districts targeted for intensive law enforcement 

Location of 

Heights 

San Bernardino 

Freeway (I–10)* 

Cuatro Flats Territory 

Cuatro Flats 

and TMC Territory 

double homicide 

(triggering event) 

Hollenbeck 

Boyle 

Note: The grey boundaries are those of Hollenbeck’s police reporting districts. The red boundaries show the five targeted 

districts. 

*Separates Boyle Heights from the rest of Hollenbeck. 

Adapted from G. Tita et al., Reducing Gun Violence: Results from an Intervention in East Los Angeles (MR–1764–NIJ), Santa 

Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2003. Used with permission. 

13 
REDUCING GUN VIOLENCE / FEB. 05 

put on notice that a project 

with the goal of reducing gun 

violence was being planned. 

They were not apprised of 

the specifics of what would 

happen, but they were told 

that accountability for a single violent crime would be 

collective. 

The other component of 

retailing was the message 

that services would be available to help gang members 

cultivate alternatives to violent behavior. The services 

included job training and 

development opportunities, 

substance abuse treatment, 

and tattoo removal. They 

would be offered through or 

by police and probation officers, area hospitals, various 

other city agencies, and the 

employment referral center. 

The plan did not fully materialize, however, because a 

few days before the double 

homicide, community representatives urged that the law 

enforcement component of 

the intervention be put into 

effect immediately, even 

before any triggering event 

and before services were 

ready. Their reasoning was 

that people perceived violent 

crime to be escalating rapidly 

in the area and that TMC and 

Cuatro Flats activities were 

especially troubling. The situation was so urgent, they 

believed, that there was not 

enough time to coordinate 

services with law enforcement. Retailing continued 

throughout Boyle Heights 

during the first 3 months of 

the intervention, but programs and services were not 

consistently or widely available. Events had overtaken 

the carefully laid plans. 

14 
OPERA TION CEASEFIRE IN LOS ANGELES 

Did Violence Decline?


The law enforcement levers 

were pulled largely in the 

parts of Boyle Heights where 

Cuatro Flats and TMC were 

most active. This meant that, 

although the intervention 

was directed at the gangs 

the community was most 

concerned about, the researchers were limited to 

measuring the effect on 

crime only in a relatively 

small area of Boyle Heights. 

Retailing, on the other hand, 

was carried out throughout 

Boyle Heights, so its effect 

could be measured more 

broadly, even though it was 

not implemented as comprehensively as intended. 

The researchers wanted to 

find out whether the intervention reduced three categories of offenses—violent 

crime, gang crime, and gun 

crime—and whether it did so 

both during the time the intervention was taking place— 

the suppression phase—and 

during the months following 

—the deterrence phase. (The 

method used to measure 

crime levels is described in 

“Conducting the Evaluation.”) 

Retailing—a weak 

component 

In Boyle Heights, where retailing was carried out and 

some increased social services were offered, all three 

types of crime—violent, 

gang, and gun—declined.7 

However, the differences 

between Boyle Heights and 

the rest of Hollenbeck, where 

there was no intervention, 

were not statistically significant. Thus, the researchers 

concluded that retailing 

would have to be conducted 

aggressively to affect crime. 

Enforcement levers do 

a better job 

Intensive law enforcement 

took place in the five police 

reporting districts of Boyle 

Heights where Cuatro Flats 

and TMC were most active. 

In these districts, violent 

crime fell during the suppression phase, and the decline 

was even stronger in the 

deterrence phase (37 percent 

overall, compared with 24 

percent in the rest of Boyle 

15 
REDUCING GUN VIOLENCE / FEB. 05 

C E

ured crime rates before and after these interventions, examining the effects on violent, gang, and 

gun crime. They compared crime rates in the intervention areas with crime rates outside those 

areas. 

Crime rates in the 6 months leading up to the intervention (the preintervention phase) were compared with crime rates in the following 6 months—the period after the triggering event, when the 

intervention was carried out. The first 4 months of the intervention were considered the suppression phase because, during that time, all elements of the intervention were applied. During the next 

2 months, only selected parts of the intervention were consistently applied. This period was termed 

the “deterrence phase” because if crime continued to fall after intensive suppression ended, the 

intervention could be considered to have a longer term effect. 

ment (saturation patrol, enforcement of probation and parole rules, arrests for outstanding warrants, and similar enforcement actions) took place in the five police reporting districts of Boyle 

October 8, 2000 

6 months 4 months 2 months 

Preintervention Phase Suppression Phase Deterrence Phase 

(full intervention) (partial intervention) 

ONDUCTING THE VALUATION 

To find out whether retailing and intensive law enforcement reduced crime, the researchers measComparing before and after crime rates 

Measuring law enforcement and retailing 

The effects of law enforcement and retailing were measured separately. Intensive law enforceTriggering Event 

Heights). Gang crime also 

fell during the suppression 

phase, although it began to 

rise during the deterrence 

phase. 

Gun crime, however, did not 

decline more steeply in the 

five districts than in the rest 

of Boyle Heights. It fell at 

almost the same rate (by 

about one-third) as where 

there was no law enforcement intervention. One 

possible reason was the 

small number of gun crimes 

in the area (about 10 incidents per month), which 

made statistically meaningful 

measurement difficult.8 

It is possible that the five targeted reporting districts were 

in some way different from 

the rest of Boyle Heights. 

If so, any decline in crime 

16 
OPERA TION CEASEFIRE IN LOS ANGELES 

Heights where the Cuatro Flats and TMC gangs were active.a Crime rates in these reporting districts were compared with crime rates in the rest of Boyle Heights, where only retailing had been 

conducted and some services had been made available. 

Boyle Heights and not an aberration, the researchers compared crime levels there with crime levblocksb in the five reporting districts and six census blocks that lay outside the area but were similar in median household income, percentage of households below the poverty line, percentage of 

was intended to ensure that any difference in crime levels between the two areas could not be 

attributed to social and economic factors specific to the targeted census block groups. 

Retailing the message—forewarning gang members that violent crime would have consequences 

and offering services as an incentive to turn away from crime—took place throughout Boyle 

fell as a result of retailing, crime rates in Boyle Heights were compared with rates in the rest of Holof law enforcement on crime, data from the five targeted reporting districts were first eliminated. 

tract has between 2,500 and 8,000 people.) 

b. Several census blocks make up a census tract. 

According to criminological theory, places that are similar economically and socially will generally 

have similar crime levels. To make sure that the five reporting districts were representative of 

els in an area closely matched economically and socially. The comparison was between six census 

households that rented their homes, population density, and population mobility. The comparison 

Heights. Most of it happened in the first 3 months of the suppression phase. To see whether crime 

lenbeck, where there had been no intervention. To avoid possible “contamination” from the effect 

Notes 

a. Boyle Heights has 18 police reporting districts, each of which is nearly the size of a census tract. (In Los Angeles, a census 

might result from these differences, not from the 

intervention. To make the 

comparison more precise, 

the researchers identified 

areas in Hollenbeck that lay 

outside the reporting districts 

but were similar economically and socially to selected 

areas within the districts. 

Then they compared the 

effects of the intervention 

in both areas. They found a 

3-percent decline in violent 

crime in the comparison area 

(outside the five districts) and 

a 34-percent decline in violent crime in the selected 

areas within the districts. This 

34-percent decline was consistent with the 37-percent 

overall decline in the five 

reporting districts, but far 

greater than the 3-percent 

decline in the comparison 

area. 

The intervention seemed to 

be most effective during the 

suppression phase, with the 

effect declining slightly in the 

deterrence phase. However, 

17 
REDUCING GUN VIOLENCE / FEB. 05 

because the decline continued into the deterrence 

phase, the possibility of a 

longer term effect cannot be 

ruled out. 

Gun and gang crime also 

declined, although not as 

much as violent crime; the 

decline was not statistically 

significant for either type of 

crime, however. One reason 

may be that the area is small, 

making it difficult to accurately measure the relatively few 

gang and gun crimes that 

took place there. 

18 
OPERA TION CEASEFIRE IN LOS ANGELES 

The Balance Sheet


The law enforcement (i.e., 

lever pulling) components 

of the intervention showed 

more promising effects than 

the retailing components, 

most notably in the measurable reductions in crime. Criminal justice system partners, 

especially LAPD and probation officers, were able to 

design a powerful law enforcement element, in part 

because of the resources 

available to them and the 

flexibility they had in using 

them. 

It is difficult to say whether 

the successes of Operation 

Ceasefire in Los Angeles outweighed the failures or vice 

versa. Certainly, the methodical and inclusive process of 

planning and design can 

serve as a template for other 

communities grappling with 

gang violence. 

The plus side 

Perhaps the most important 

success of the program was 

the working group. Using 

data analysis led by the researchers and relying on collaboration from many public 

and private agencies, the 

group came up with a welldesigned intervention. The 

group also served as a forum 

that enabled agency representatives to exchange ideas 

and, perhaps most important, 

to focus on a discrete and 

manageable problem. 

The working group process 

proved that diverse criminal 

justice organizations can 

work together effectively. The 

experience confirmed what 

group members had supposed: Each agency has 

unique resources that, when 

pooled with those of other 

agencies, make it more effective than it would have been 

working alone. 

The working group also 

helped build community support for the intervention that 

exceeded its expectations. 

One possible reason was 

that the project focused on 

criminal activity rather than 

on gang members. In other 

words, the community 

backed the intervention to 

the extent it was not directed 

against young people’s affiliation with a gang but rather 

toward reduction of gun violence. Community support 

motivated the city attorney to 

assign a dedicated prosecutor and community organizer 

to the project. 

19 
REDUCING GUN VIOLENCE / FEB. 05 

The minus side 

Aside from the inconsistent 

and limited provision of services, a more general problem 

was that the working group 

did not follow the plan of 

responding to each triggering 

event as it occurred. Instead, 

because of immediate concern about Cuatro Flats and 

TMC, the group focused 

almost exclusively on these 

two gangs. As a result, 

shootings that involved other 

gangs did not receive as 

much attention. Because of 

this, Operation Ceasefire in 

Los Angeles failed to create 

the perception among gun 

users that all violence would 

provoke an immediate response, and it did not have 

the desired deterrent effect. 

A sense of sustained ownership of the project never 

materialized. The working 

group’s view that the intervention was a research project that would last only for 

the duration of the study 

persisted. The group did 

not have a sense that this 

was the beginning of a 

transformation to ongoing, 

self-sustaining interagency 

collaboration and new operating procedures. One reason 

was frequent staff rotations, 

particularly in the LAPD. 

Another reason was that no 

single agency had resources 

sufficient to manage and 

maintain the collaboration. In 

fact, interagency collaboration was not a criterion used 

to judge staff performance, 

and agency budgets were 

not structured to encourage 

such collaboration. 

Changes in the city’s political 

leadership affected support 

for the project. In at least one 

key agency, project contacts 

changed frequently. The inability to marshal dedicated 

staff from participating agencies was an obstacle, although it was not unexpected 

because the agencies received no financial support. 

Where dedicated staff were 

assigned, they had to perform 

all their regular duties in addition to those of Operation 

Ceasefire. 

20 
OPERA TION CEASEFIRE IN LOS ANGELES 

A Message to Other Jurisdictions


Perhaps the biggest lesson 

learned from this project is 

the need to create concrete 

mechanisms that promote 

interagency collaboration. 

Typically, criminal justice 

agencies do not work together on common problems. 

Judging the performance of 

agency heads on how well 

they collaborate with their 

partner agencies would be a 

step in the right direction. 

Interagency collaboration is 

often viewed as cumbersome 

and costly. These assumptions could be tested by collecting information about 

how much it costs to develop 

and sustain an intervention 

like Operation Ceasefire in 

Los Angeles. Evaluations 

generally focus on crimereduction benefits, but if 

jurisdictions also were armed 

with cost information, they 

would be better positioned to 

decide whether the intervention is worth the effort. 

21 
OPERA TION CEASEFIRE IN LOS ANGELES 

Notes 

1. See Reducing Gun Violence: The 

Boston Gun Project’s Operation 

Ceasefire, by David M. Kennedy, 

Anthony A. Braga, Anne M. Piehl, 

and Elin J. Waring, Washington, DC: 

U.S. Department of Justice, National 

Institute of Justice, September 2001, 

NCJ 188741. 

2. The process used to design and 

carry out Operation Ceasefire in Los 

Angeles is documented in “From 

Boston to Boyle Heights: The 

Process and Prospects of a ‘Pulling 

Levers’ Strategy in a Los Angeles 

Barrio,” by George Tita, K. Jack Riley, 

and Peter Greenwood, in Policing 

Gangs and Youth Violence, ed. Scott 

H. Decker, Belmont, CA: WadsworthThomson Learning, 2003: 102–130. 

The outcome of the evaluation is presented in Reducing Gun Violence: 

Results from an Intervention in East 

Los Angeles, by George Tita, K. 

Jack Riley, Greg Ridgeway, Clifford 

Grammich, Allan Abrahamse, and 

Peter W. Greenwood, Santa Monica, 

CA: RAND Corporation, 2003. 

3. For a detailed discussion of the 

pulling levers strategy in the Boston 

Ceasefire Program, see Kennedy, D., 

“Pulling Levers: Getting Deterrence 

Right,” NIJ Journal 236 (July 1998): 

2–8. 

4. A 15-square-mile area east of 

downtown Los Angeles, Hollenbeck 

has a population of 200,000, is largely Latino, and includes the communities of El Sereno, Lincoln Heights, 

and Boyle Heights. 

5. This finding—that the motive for 

homicide was not likely to be fights 

among gangs for market control— 

confirmed other research that contended the links among youth gangs, 

drugs, and violence are overdrawn. 

6. These 29 were Hollenbeck’s “criminally active street gangs,” a term 

used by the LAPD to describe problematic, violent groups. 

7. Crime rates in Boyle Heights, 

where retailing took place, were 

compared with rates in the rest of 

Hollenbeck, where there was no 

retailing. Before the analysis, data on 

the five targeted police reporting districts of Boyle Heights were eliminated to exclude any results that might 

have been due to law enforcement 

rather than retailing. 

8. Greater citizen involvement and 

police deployment may increase the 

reporting of crime. This may explain 

in part why the rates of gun crime 

did not decline. 

23 
The National Institute of Justice is the 

research, development, and evaluation 

agency of the U.S. Department of Justice. 

NIJ provides objective, independent, 

evidence-based knowledge and tools 

to enhance the administration 

of justice and public safety. 

NIJ is a component of the Office of Justice 

Programs, which also includes the Bureau 

of Justice Assistance, the Bureau of Justice 

Statistics, the Office of Juvenile Justice 

and Delinquency Prevention, and the 

Office for Victims of Crime. 
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